III. THE YALTA CONFERENCE

February 4–11, 1945
7. THE PRESIDENT'S LOG AT YALTA

Log of the Trip

Saturday, February 3rd:

1210: The President's plane (#1), escorted by five fighters, arrived at Saki [in the Crimea]. The fighters had joined the flight at Athens. A sixth P-38 had to turn back to Athens because of engine trouble.

At the airport to meet the President were the Honorable V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State Stettinius and Ambassador Harriman. It was explained that Marshal Stalin had not yet arrived in the Crimea.

The President did not leave his plane at once but remained embarked until the Prime Minister arrived from Malta some twenty minutes later.

Distance traveled, Malta to Saki, 1375 miles.

We were met at Saki by Agents Rowley, Peterson, Deckard, Campion, Savage and Griffith, members of our advance party.

1230: The Prime Minister and his party arrived at Saki in his special aircraft escorted by six fighters. The Prime Minister disembarked and came over to the President's plane. The President then left his plane and entered a jeep. As the President and the Prime Minister approached the guard of honor, honors were rendered for them. The honors consisted of the guard presenting arms and the band playing the Star Spangled Banner, God Save the King, and the Third Internationale. Then, while in the jeep, the President drove down the ranks of the guard and made an inspection of them. Afterwards the guard of honor passed in review before the President and the Prime Minister. The President took the review while seated in the jeep.

1306: The ceremonies at the airport over, the President and members of his party left Saki by automobile for Livadia Palace, near Yalta, some 80 miles distant. Mrs. Boettiger rode with the President. All automobiles used in our caravan were furnished by the Soviet Government and were operated by Russian drivers.

The first stretch of our drive, from Saki to Simferopol, was over rolling, snow-covered country somewhat like that of our Middle-West.

1 For a bibliographic note on the Log, see ante, p. 459.
We saw few, if any, trees and many reminders of the recent fighting there—gutted-out buildings, burned out tanks and destroyed German railroad rolling stock that had been abandoned and burned by them in their flight.

From Simferopol, the capital city of the Crimea, we went on to Alushta, a small town on the east coast of the Crimean Peninsula. From Alushta we followed the “Route Romanoff” to Yalta. This is a high and very winding road that passes around the west side of the Roman Kosh (the highest mountain in the Crimea—5,055 feet) and ascends to the Red Crag (4,760 feet). The entire distance from Saki to Yalta was guarded by Soviet troops. It was noted that a considerable number of them were young girls.

1750: We passed through the city of Yalta.

1800: We arrived at Livadia Palace, two miles south of Yalta. This was our headquarters during the Crimea Conference. Miss Kathleen Harriman (daughter of Ambassador Harriman) was at Livadia to greet the President and Mrs. Boettiger.

We were all very tired, so it was a case of bathing, dining and to bed for us this evening.

The Prime Minister’s party proceeded separately from the President’s and went from Saki to Vorontsov Villa (located about 12.5 miles south of Livadia), where they made their headquarters during the conference.

Commander Tyree, Major Putnam and Mr. Cornelius had arrived at Livadia several hours before us and had our map room and communications center set up and in operation when the President arrived. Commander Smith had been at Livadia for several days. He had come to the Crimea in the Catoctin.

2100: Lieutenant Bogue, who had remained behind at Malta to handle any last minute communications for our party and had left Malta on one of the last planes of our flight, arrived at Livadia, completing the arrival of our party.

The U. S. minesweepers Pinnacle and Implicit were moored in the harbor at Yalta. The naval auxiliary Catoctin, the liberty ship William Blount and the minesweepers Incessant and Incredible were moored in the harbor at Sevastopol, 50 miles to the southwest. The Soviet authorities had declined to permit the Catoctin or the William Blount to continue on to Yalta because of the presence of mines in that area of the Black Sea. This task group had been sailed from the Mediterranean Area some ten days previously in order to be on hand to furnish miscellaneous services to the American Delegation at Yalta. These ships were the first Allied vessels to pass through the Dardanelles since the beginning of the present war and they opened communications with Sevastopol and Yalta.
Because the Catoctin could not come to Yalta, or closer than Sevastopol, it was necessary for us to communicate by landline (teletype) with the Catoctin which vessel served as communications relay ship for our party during the conference. For the first few days we experienced "wire trouble" between Livadia and Sevastopol. Our communication engineers eventually laid an entirely new line from Livadia to Sevastopol and thereafter no further wire trouble was experienced.

YALTA

Yalta before the war was the center of the health resorts on the south coast of the Crimea. In 1928 it had a normal population of 29,000. It is picturesquely situated in the valley of the river Utchansu and is surrounded on three sides by mountains. The mountain range to the north thwarts the cold blasts headed that way and permits the warm sun to exert its full effect in and around Yalta. The mean annual temperature there is 56.65. The thermometer hovered around 40 during our visit but it was not at all uncomfortable.

Livadia Palace

The buildings used by the American Delegation during the Crimea Conference are the former summer palace of the Czars. The main building is called the Livadia and the two auxiliary buildings the Svitski Korpus.

After the Revolution Livadia was used by the Soviet Government as a rest home for tubercular patients. During the German occupation of the Crimea it was used by their high command, who did a very thorough job of looting when they were forced to leave. The buildings were left in complete disrepair and the grounds in equally bad condition. The only original furnishings in the building (Livadia) at the time we resided there were the two pictures in the President's bedroom.

The Soviet Government had performed an amazing job, however, in completely renovating the place during the three weeks period immediately preceding the conference; amazing because of the critical shortage of materials and the very limited time available. This was because it was not until about 15 January that it was definitely decided to hold the conference at Yalta. Hotel staffs were brought in from Moscow and furniture and furnishings were obtained from Moscow and other Soviet cities or from local sanatoria and rest homes. It should be added here that in addition to everything that the Soviets did, Lieutenant Commander L. H. Backus, MC-V(S), U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant T. W. Sullivan, MC-V(S), U. S. N. R., (both from the U. S. S. Catoctin) did an outstanding job in transforming Livadia, an infested building since the German occupation and pillage, to a place that was completely habitable and comfortable, and prevented what might have been a most serious threat to the health of the entire party.
The New Palace (Livadia) was built from white Inkerman granite in 1911, in the style of the Italian renaissance, from plans by the architect Krasnov. It stands on the site of the former palace which, except for the church, had been entirely demolished. Situated more than 150 feet above the sea, it commands a striking panorama of the mountains and the sea to the east and north. Wings extend from the rear of the main building to form two courts, one modeled after the Convent Court of St. Mark (Florence, Italy), and the other is of Moorish design.

The first floor of the 50-room palace was used by Nicholas and his son, Alexi, for living quarters. The left wing, facing the sea, contained the Czar's study and bedroom. The room used as the President's private dining room was formerly a billiard room. The large room used as the main conference room was the ballroom-banquet hall.

The second floor was used principally by the Czarina and her four daughters. The room occupied by General Marshall was formerly the Imperial bedroom and that used by Admiral King was the Czarina's boudoir. The second floor conference hall was formerly a private reception room of the Czarina. The second floor dining room was a private sitting room used only by the Czar's family.

The parks and gardens, which stretch down to the seaside, contain fifteen miles of paths and lanes lined with cypress, cedar, yew and bay trees. There are many rare and beautiful plants and trees in the parks, brought there from all over the world by Count Potocki and the Romanov family during the Nineteenth and early part of the Twentieth Centuries.

**Sunday, February 4th:**

Marshal Stalin and his party arrived early this morning. They came down from Moscow by rail to a point in the Crimea and from there motored to Koreiz Villa, about 6 miles south of Livadia, where they made their headquarters during the Crimea Conference.

1100: The President conferred with Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Harriman, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Kuter, General McFarland, Mr. Matthews (H. Freeman Matthews, Director of Office of European Affairs, State Department), Mr. Hiss (Alger Hiss, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State) and Mr. Bohlen (Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State). The conference was held in the grand ballroom of Livadia.

1615: Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov called at Livadia and conferred with the President in his study. Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov were also present.

1630: The President conferred with Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Matthews and Mr. Bohlen in his study.
1710: The First Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present:

**FOR THE U. S.**
- The President.
- Mr. Stettinius.
- Admiral Leahy.
- General Marshall.
- Admiral King.
- Mr. Harriman.
- General Deane.
- General Kuter.
- General McFarland.

**FOR GREAT BRITAIN**
- The Prime Minister.
- Mr. Eden.
- Field Marshal Brooke.
- Air Marshal Portal.
- Field Marshal Alexander.
- Admiral Cunningham.
- General Ismay.
- Major Birse.

**FOR THE U. S. S. R.**
- Marshal Stalin.
- Commissar Molotov.
- Admiral Kuznetsov.
- Col. General Antonov.
- Air Marshal Khudyakov.
- Mr. Vyshinski.
- Mr. Maisky.
- Mr. Gousev.
- Mr. Gromyko.
- Mr. Pavlov.

This meeting adjourned at 1950.

2030: The President was host at dinner at Livadia to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Clark Kerr, Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Vyshinski, Justice Byrnes, Major Birse, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov. The menu included: Vodka, five different kinds of wine, fresh caviar, bread, butter, consommé, sturgeon with tomatoes, beef and macaroni, sweet cake, tea, coffee and fruit.

Monday, February 5th:

0730: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier arrived at Livadia with White House mail. This mail had been dispatched from Washington on January 31st.

0800: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier departed Livadia with mail for the White House.

1300: The President had lunch at Livadia with the members of his Mess.

1430: The President conferred with Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Matthews, and Mr. Bohlen in his study. This conference lasted until 1600.

1600: The second Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:

**FOR THE U. S.**
- The President.
- Mr. Stettinius.
- Admiral Leahy.
- Mr. Hopkins.
- Mr. Harriman.
- Mr. Matthews.
- Mr. Bohlen.

**FOR GREAT BRITAIN**
- The Prime Minister.
- Mr. Eden.
- Mr. Cadogan.
- Mr. Clark Kerr.
- Mr. Bridges.
- Mr. Wilson.
- Mr. Dixon.
- Major Birse.

**FOR THE U. S. S. R.**
- Marshal Stalin.
- Mr. Molotov.
- Mr. Vyshinski.
- Mr. Maisky.
- Mr. Gousev.
- Mr. Gromyko.
- Mr. Pavlov.

The meeting adjourned at 1945.

2030: Dinner at Livadia.—The President, General Marshall, Admiral King, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Mr. Stettinius, Admiral Leahy, Admiral McIntire, Justice Byrnes, Mrs. Boettiger, Admiral Brown and Mr. Early.
Tuesday, February 6th:

0800: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier departed Livadia for Washington with White House mail.

1300: Luncheon at Livadia.—The President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Cadogan, Justice Byrnes, Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harriman. Discussions continued after lunch until 3 p.m. The Prime Minister did not return to Vorontsov, as he was due back at Livadia at 4 p.m. (1600) for another conference. Instead, he accepted the loan of the room occupied by Admiral Brown and General Watson and took a short nap at Livadia.

1615: The Third Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:

**FOR THE U.S.**
- The President
- Mr. Stettinius
- Admiral Leahy
- Mr. Hopkins
- Justice Byrnes
- Mr. Harriman
- Mr. Matthews
- Mr. Hiss
- Mr. Bohlen

**FOR GREAT BRITAIN**
- The Prime Minister
- Mr. Eden
- Mr. Cadogan
- Mr. Clark Kerr
- Mr. Jebb
- Mr. Bridges
- Mr. Wilson
- Mr. Dixon
- Major Birse

**FOR THE U.S.S.R.**
- Marshal Stalin
- Mr. Molotov
- Mr. Vyshinski
- Mr. Maisky
- Mr. Gousev
- Mr. Gromyko
- Mr. Pavlov

The following preliminary statement concerning the conference was agreed on at today's meeting for release at 1630 tomorrow (Washington time).²

Mrs. Boettiger, Mrs. Oliver, Miss Harriman and Mr. Spaman made a motor trip to Sevastopol today.

1900: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier arrived from Washington with White House mail.

2030: Dinner at Livadia.—The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Justice Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Mr. Early and Mr. Flynn.

This afternoon Commander Tyree, Mr. Reilly, Major Greer, Mr. Long, Mr. Holmes and Mr. O'Driscoll left Livadia by automobile for Saki. At Saki they enplaned for Cairo to complete the advance arrangements incident to the President's forthcoming visit to Egypt.

Wednesday, February 7th:

1300: Lunch at Livadia.—The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Mr. Flynn and General Watson.

² At this point in the Log there appears the text of the preliminary communiqué which is printed post, p. 659.
1610: The Fourth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>For the U.S.</th>
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<td>Major Birse.</td>
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This meeting adjourned at 2000.

2030: Dinner at Livadia.—The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Justice Byrnes, Admiral Leahy and Mr. Stettinius.

Thursday, February 8th:

1200: The President conferred with Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Harriman, Justice Byrnes, and Mr. Bohlen. The conference was held in the President’s study.

The British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff met in the grand ballroom at Livadia. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister attended this meeting.

1330: The President and Mrs. Boettiger had lunch in his study from a tray.

1500: The President signed an Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of War to take over and operate the plants and facilities of the Detroit Edison Company of Detroit, Michigan.

1545: Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov conferred with the President in the President’s study.

1615: The Fifth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present were:

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<td>Mr. Hiss</td>
<td>Major Birse.</td>
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The meeting adjourned at 1940.
2030: The President and certain members of his party left Livadia by motor for Koreiz Villa to dine as guests of Marshal Stalin. The complete guest list was:

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<tr>
<th>The President.</th>
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<td>Mr. Pavlov.</td>
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<td>Mrs. Oliver.</td>
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<td>Major Birse.</td>
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Friday, February 9th:

1230: The President attended a plenary meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Livadia. Present were:

**For the U.S.**

- The President.
- Admiral Leahy.
- General Marshall.
- Admiral King.
- General Kuter.
- General McFarland.

**For Great Britain**

- The Prime Minister.
- Field Marshal Brooke.
- Air Marshal Portal.
- Admiral Cunningham.
- Brigadier Cornwall-Jones.

1330: Lunch at Livadia.—The President, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Boettiger, Mrs. Oliver, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Admiral Leahy and Justice Byrnes.

1600: The President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin and members of the American, British and Soviet Delegations met in the courtyard of Livadia where they sat for still and motion pictures.

1615: The Sixth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present:

**For the U.S.**

- The President.
- Mr. Stettinius.
- Admiral Leahy.
- Mr. Hopkins.
- Justice Byrnes.
- Mr. Harriman.
- Mr. Matthews.
- Mr. His.
- Mr. Bohlen.

**For Great Britain**

- The Prime Minister.
- Mr. Eden.
- Mr. Cadogan.
- Mr. Clark Kerr.
- Mr. Jebb.
- Mr. Bridges.
- Mr. Wilson.
- Mr. Dixon.
- Mr. Bohlen.

**For the U.S.S.R.**

- Marshal Stalin.
- Mr. Molotov.
- Mr. Vyshinski.
- Mr. Maisky.
- Mr. Gousev.
- Mr. Gromyko.
- Mr. Pavlov.
- Major Birse.

The meeting adjourned at 1950.

1930: Lieutenant (j.g.) W. K. Kloock, U.S.N.R., White House courier, arrived at Livadia with mail from Washington. He made the journey from Washington in three days.
2030: Dinner at Livadia.—The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Major General John E. Hull, Major General Kuter, Fleet Admiral Leahy and Vice Admiral C. M. Cooke.

Saturday, February 10th:

0800: White House mail was dispatched to Washington via a Joint Chiefs of Staff courier who left Livadia this morning.

1200: Lunch at Livadia.—The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Miss Harriman, Admiral Leahy, Justice Byrnes and Admiral Brown.

1500: Justice Byrnes left Livadia to return to Washington. He traveled by air in company with the Joint Chiefs of Staff party.

1600: The President presented specially engraved Fourth-Term Inaugural Medallions to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov, and a book entitled “Target Germany” to Marshal Stalin. This book had been prepared by General Arnold and contained photographs showing damage wrought in Germany as the result of bombings by our strategical air forces.

1630: Marshal Stalin and Mr. Harriman conferred with the President. The conference was held in the President’s study. Mr. Bohlen was also present.

1650: The Seventh Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present:

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<td>Mr. Foots.</td>
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The meeting adjourned at 2000.

2030: The President, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Bohlen left Livadia for the British Headquarters (Vorontsov Villa) where they dined with the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Major Birse, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Pavlov as the guests of the Prime Minister.

Sunday, February 11th:

1130: The President, accompanied by Mrs. Boettiger, took a jeep ride through the grounds and gardens of Livadia. Before he returned to his quarters he also inspected the U. S. Naval seaman guard which was drawn up outside the palace at the time.
1200: The Eighth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present:

FOR THE U.S.  FOR GREAT BRITAIN  FOR THE U.S.S.R.
The President.          The Prime Minister.          Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius.       Mr. Eden.                  Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy.        Mr. Cadogan.               Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins.          Mr. Clark Kerr.            Mr. Maisky.
Mr. Harriman.         Mr. Jebb.                 Mr. Gousov.
Mr. Matthews.         Mr. Bridges.              Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Bohlen.           Mr. Wilson.               Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Hiss.             Major Birse.              Mr. Dixon.
Mr. Foote.            Mr. D. Wilson.            Mr. D. Wilson.

The conference recessed at 1250.

1300: The President was host at luncheon at Livadia to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Clark Kerr, Mr. Cadogan, Major Birse, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov.

Conference discussions continued at the lunch table under 1545, at which time the Crimea Conference formally adjourned.

1555: Marshal Stalin, after having bade the President and members of his party goodbye, left Livadia by motor for Koreiz Villa. Before the Marshal left Livadia the President presented to him for further delivery the following decorations that had been awarded by the United States to officers of the Soviet Forces:

Legion of Merit (Degree of Chief Commander) for Marshal Vasilevsky, Chief of Staff of the Red Army;
Legion of Merit (Degree of Chief Commander) for Marshal Novikov, Commanding General of the Red Air Force;
Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Colonel General Repin;
Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Lieutenant General Greendall;
Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Lieutenant General Krolenko;
Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Major General Levin dovich;
Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Major General Slavin; and
Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Colonel Byaz.

As we were leaving Livadia the President was presented numerous gift packages by the Soviet Authorities at the palace, as also were various other members of the party. These packages contained vodka, several kinds of wine, champagne, caviar, butter, oranges and tangerines.

GENERAL COMMENT

The weather at Livadia was most pleasant during our visit. The average temperature was 40. The Russians accredited the good weather to the President and called it "Roosevelt weather."
several days preceding our arrival the weather had been anything but favorable. At exactly the "right time", however, it cleared and remained so generally throughout our stay at Yalta.

During the period 4–11 February, daily meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries were held in addition to their attendance at the major conferences. Livadia, Vorontsov and Koreiz shared these Foreign Secretary meetings.

Our mail was brought to Yalta by Joint Chief of Staff couriers who used the regular Air Transport Command facilities from Washington to Cairo and the shuttle service from Cairo to Saki. The average time employed for the journey from Washington to Conference Headquarters was four days.

The British party had daily mail service. Their mail was flown directly from London to Saki in "Mosquito" type aircraft, the flights following a direct course between the two points involved.

Our radio communications were handled by a two-way high speed circuit set up between Radio Washington and the Catoctin (at Sevastopol), using Navy Radio Oran as an intermediate relay station. The messages were broadcast over the Washington "FOX" schedules and when necessary rebroadcast by Radio Oran. Communication between the Catoctin and Livadia was by a land line or by telephone.

A number of U. S. Naval personnel who speak Russian were assembled by Admiral Hewitt and sent to Yalta in the Catoctin. This team proved most helpful in working with the Soviets to complete the preparations for our visit and they were also very helpful to us as interpreters during our eight days at Livadia. They were:

Lieut. George Sheberatoff, U. S. N. R.
Lieut. Dimitri P. Kesseff, U. S. N. R.
Lieut. C. Norris Houghton, U. S. N. R.
Lieut. Michael Kimaek, U. S. N. R.
Lt (jg) John Cheplick, U. S. N. R.
Lt (jg) John P. Romanov, U. S. N.
Andrew M. Bacha, Chief Yeoman, U. S. N. R.
Andrew Sawchuck, Yeoman 2/c, U. S. N. R.
Harry Sklenar, Yeoman 2/c, U. S. N. R.
Alexis Nestoruk, Yeoman 2/c, U. S. N. R.
Nicholas Korniloff, Yeoman 3/c, U. S. N. R.
Russel Koval, Yeoman 3/c, U. S. N. R.

1600: The President and members of his party left Livadia by motor for Sevastopol. Mr. Harriman and Miss Harriman accompanied the President. Mr. Early remained behind at Livadia to iron out several details concerning the joint communiqué that had been agreed to by the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin at the final meeting of the Crimea Conference. Mr. Hopkins, Sergeant Hopkins, Mr. Bohlen, Colonel Park, Major Putnam, Lieutenant Kloock, Chief Warrant Officer Stoner, Agents Deckard, Hastings and Wood left Livadia by motor for Simferopol where they
spent the night on a special sleeper-train that had been parked there by the Soviets for our convenience.

The drive to Sevastopol was over high and winding mountain roads along the Black Sea coast. It took us over the battlefield, nearly a century old, where the historic Light Brigade made its famous charge in the Crimean War of 1854–1856, and for many miles led through territory bitterly contested by the Russians and Germans in the recent Crimean campaign.

1840: The President and his party arrived in Sevastopol and proceeded to the U. S. S. Catoctin, a naval auxiliary moored at the Soviet naval base.

It was dusk when we arrived in Sevastopol but the President saw scenes of stark destruction there wrought by the Germans. The city was virtually leveled to the ground except for the walls of homes and other buildings which the mines, bombs and shells in recent battles left standing like billboards—mute testimony of the horrific wanton Nazi vengeance. Of thousands of buildings in the city, the President was told that only six were left in useful condition when the Germans fled.

Distance traveled, Livadia to Sevastopol, 80 miles.

1855: The President and his party went on board the Catoctin where they spent the night. The Catoctin manned the rail and accorded the President full honors as he went on board.

The Catoctin served a delicious steak dinner to us, which was a real treat for us after eight days of Russian fare.

After dinner Admiral McIntire, Admiral Brown, Mrs. Boettiger and Miss Harriman attended a concert given in Sevastopol by the members of the band of the Black Sea Naval Base.

2130: Mr. Early arrived on board the Catoctin from Livadia and the encoding and radio transmission of the Conference communiqué was started. The communiqué was to be released simultaneously in Washington, London, and Moscow at 1630 tomorrow, February 12th. Lieutenant Bogue and Mr. Cornelius and the communication force of the Catoctin are to be commended for the expeditious manner in which this communiqué was encoded and transmitted to Washington. See Annex A for complete text of the communiqué.³

Captain C. O. Comp, U. S. N., commanded the Catoctin. Her Executive Officer was Lieutenant Commander W. S. Dufton, U. S. N., and her Supply Officer Lieutenant Commander E. C. Laflen, (SC), U. S. N.

³ For the text of the communiqué, see post, pp. 968–975.
Monday, February 12th:

0655: After a very comfortable night, the President and members of his party left the Catoctin and proceeded by automobile to the airfield at Saki. Vice Admiral Batistii [Basisty], U. S. S. R. Navy, was on the dock to see the President off. He was second in command at the Soviet Naval Base, Sevastopol. The Admiral commanding was on the sick list at the time and unable to appear. The night aboard the Catoctin had enabled our party to avoid tiring mountain driving on the same day as the long plane flight to Egypt, as most of the road from Sevastopol to Simferopol was over rolling country.
8. MINUTES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS
SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1945
MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 4, 1945, 10 A. M., LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Cooke
Major General Deane
Major General Bull
Major General Hull
Major General Wood
Rear Admiral Duncan
Rear Admiral McCormick
Rear Admiral Olsen
Brigadier General Roberts
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Lindsay
Brigadier General Bessell
Brigadier General Everest
Commodore Burrough
Colonel Peck
Colonel Ritchie
Colonel Lincoln
Colonel Cary
Captain Stroop
Captain McDill
Lieutenant Colonel McRae
Commander Clark

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. AGENDA FOR TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS AT ARGONAUT (J.C.S. 1176/9, J.C.S. 1227/3 and J.C.S. Info. Memo 359)

Admiral Leahy said that there had not been time to study the papers before the meeting and asked for a summary.

Admiral Cooke explained that the Joint Staff Planners and the members of the U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, had met to bring up date all matters dealing with negotiations with the Russians. These discussions had resulted in the circulation of J.C.S. 1176/9 and J.C.S. 1227/3. He said that the two major items to be considered were:

(1) coordination with the Russians in the matter of operations in the field;
(2) negotiations with the Russians concerning Far Eastern matters.

1 J. C. S. 187th Meeting.
2 Not printed.
The first item involved British, U. S. and Russian negotiations. This matter has been under discussion for a considerable length of time and little progress has been made. The second item involved only discussions between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. This matter has been the subject of examination by the special U. S. mission now in Russia. There are certain phases of the problem which are not progressing very well.

The papers before the Chiefs were presented by the Planners with the view to formulating for the President a form of approach in the forthcoming discussions. It was felt that the President should be thoroughly familiar with matters which will be the basis of the tripartite discussions.

The agenda items listed in Appendix “A” in J.C.S. 1227/3 have been presented to the Soviets and the British. To date no answer has been received from the Soviets.\(^3\)

In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, General Deane expressed the opinion that the Soviets would withhold their views on the agenda until they met in formal tripartite session. The Russian military staff would be adequately represented at such a meeting and having already received the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the agenda items, they would be prepared to discuss them.

General Marshall said it was important to keep the consideration of military matters alive during the conference while political talks were taking place on higher levels.

Admiral King felt that the President should be advised to ask Premier Stalin to discuss the matters set out in the agenda.

Admiral Cooke said that the views of the Russian military staff would probably not be discussed freely unless Premier Stalin had previously given his approval. The President should tell Premier Stalin to give his staff a rather free hand in the preliminary discussions with the British and U.S. staffs. Further, it was felt by the Planners that the President should get the consent of the Prime Minister to set up direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U.S. and British Military Missions to Moscow. This, it was felt, was the proper approach to the desired arrangement.

General Marshall felt that the first and important step should be to inform the President of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite sessions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should put before the President the agenda as outlined in Appendix “A” and “B” of J. C. S. 1227/3.\(^4\)

Admiral Leahy said that he would undertake to do this.

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\(^3\) The agenda under reference was the agenda proposed for the tripartite military discussions at Yalta. It may be found in C. C. S. 765/1, ante, pp. 424-425.

\(^4\) The agenda outlined in Appendix “B” of J. C. S. 1227/3 was the agenda proposed for the American-Soviet military discussions at Yalta. It may be found ante, pp. 393-394.
ADMIRAL KING emphasized the necessity for clearing up the matter of direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U.S. and British Missions in Moscow and endorsed the suggestion of having the President speak to the Prime Minister on this subject.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he would attempt to have military matters presented first at the meeting with the President this morning. This would enable the President to be briefed on the subjects which are now under discussion prior to his talks on political matters.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:
Took note that Admiral Leahy would inform the President of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite sessions.

__________________________
J. C. S. Files
The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army (Antonov)

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] 3 February 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ANTONOV

It is the desire of the American Staff to discuss with the Soviet Staff details of possible participation in the war against Japan. Can you obtain approval of this suggestion?

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J. C. S. Files

MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH HIS ADVISERS, FEBRUARY 4, 1945, 10:30 A. M., LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT
The President
Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Hiss

Secretary
Brigadier General McFarland

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

ADMIRAL LEAHY said there were two matters which the Chiefs of Staff considered it desirable to have settled at the tripartite meeting
scheduled for 1700 today. The first was to get Marshal Stalin to instruct the Red General Staff to participate in full, free and frank discussions with the U. S. and British Staffs. It was also desirable to get agreement to effect the needed coordination and exchange of information between General Eisenhower, Field Marshal Alexander and the Soviet General Staff by having them deal with each other directly through the Heads of the U. S. and British Military Missions in Moscow.

General Marshall said that the establishment of direct liaison for day to day communication between the Allied commanders and the Russians was highly desirable. In his opinion the important thing was to obtain agreement to the general idea as early as possible and leave the detailed procedure to be worked out later. The difficulty had been, not with the Russians but with the British who wish to effect the liaison through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall pointed out that with the Russians within 40 miles of Berlin there was not time enough to go through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He thought the British reluctance to agree to direct liaison was probably due to the objection which the Russians had raised to the presence of General Burrows on the proposed tripartite liaison committee and to the fear that General Eisenhower would become involved in the settlement of matters which would be more appropriate for consideration on a higher level.

Mr. Harriman said with reference to discussions between the Russian and Allied staffs that Marshal Stalin's formal approval of the discussions would be necessary before it would be possible to get any information of value from the Russian General Staff.

At this point, a memorandum from the President to the Prime Minister enclosing a memorandum requesting Marshal Stalin to agree to the proposed method of liaison through the Military Mission in Moscow was presented to the President, signed by him and dispatched at once to the Prime Minister.¹

The President considered the agendas contained in Appendices “A” and “B” of J. C. S. 1227/3.²

In answer to the President's question with reference to item e, General Marshall explained that Milepost requirements and progress was not a matter for discussion with the British but with the Russians only.

In reply to the President's question as to whether the British troops released from Burma would go into China, General Marshall said that the British had not raised this point. He thought it more likely that the British troops would be used in Thailand.

¹ Not found.
² See ante, p. 563, footnotes 3 and 4.
The President asked if any material and supplies would be stockpiled in Petropavlovsk.

General Marshall replied that the Russians wanted some of it there but the bulk of it was desired at Vladivostok.

General Marshall then read to the President a telegraphic report summarizing the situation on all war fronts and explained it on the map.

The President stated any action in Indochina which resulted in damage to the Japanese was satisfactory to him. He had no objection to any U. S. action which it was considered desirable to take in Indochina as long as it did not involve any alignments with the French.

Mr. Stettinius informed the President that there were seven major topics which he thought the President should be prepared to discuss with the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. The first was the question of the post-war international organization. The matter of immediate interest was the question of who was to be invited to attend the next conference on this subject and where the conference was to be held. He indicated a number of locations which would be suitable and stated that he had options on all of the desirable places in the United States if this country should be selected as the site.

The second topic was the matter of the creation of an emergency European high commission to function during the interim period between the end of the war and the setting up of the permanent organization.

The President indicated that he preferred periodic meetings between Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov to the creation of a formal commission.

The third topic was the treatment of Germany, political and economic.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the Russians were interested in taking this up as the first subject to be discussed by the tripartite conference.

The fourth topic was the subject of Poland.

The fifth topic was the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The attitude manifested by the Russians toward the U. S. and British delegations on these commissions made necessary an early clarification of the situation.

The sixth subject was the question of Iranian relations.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the British were willing to withdraw troops in Iran in June.

The seventh topic was China. It was desirable to seek Soviet and British assistance in composing the relations between the Chinese Government and the Communists.
Mr. Stettinius stated that papers have been prepared by the Department of State on all of the subjects listed and would be available for the President's information.

Mr. Harriman stated that Marshal Stalin would very likely wish to raise the question of what the Russians would get out of the Pacific war. He stated they would want the southern half of Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. They would wish to maintain the status quo in Outer Mongolia and to obtain control over the railroad running to Dairen.

The President said he wished to have the views of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek before discussing the status quo in Mongolia but was ready to go ahead on the other questions.

At this point Mr. Matthews and Mr. Hiss entered the meeting to discuss the papers prepared by the Department of State for the President.  

\[5\] Cf. Stettinius, pp. 84 ff.

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The Secretary of State to the President  

MEMORANDUM OF SUGGESTED ACTION ITEMS FOR THE PRESIDENT  

1. International Organization.

We should seek adoption of United States proposal for voting formula and agreement to announce immediately calling of general United Nations Conference.

(Copies of text of United States proposal and analysis thereof are available if you wish to hand them to Churchill and Stalin.)

Argumentation: Our proposal safeguards unity of the great powers so far as is possible by any formula—enforcement action will require unanimous vote—only with respect to discussion will a party to a dispute not be able to vote. Latin American and other small powers will be disillusioned if discussion can be vetoed.

Note: If the voting issue is settled, additional points would have to be agreed to before a United Nations Conference could be called: International Trusteeships, France as fifth sponsoring power, list of nations to be invited, date of conference and its being held in United States, invitations to be by United States on behalf of other four sponsoring powers, United States to consult China and France on behalf of Britain and Russia, form of announcement of agreement on International Organization matters (we have available the necessary papers on these points).

\[1\] This paper is a copy of the memorandum which Stettinius said he presented to the President at the President's meeting with his advisers on February 4. Cf. Stettinius, pp. 85–87. The paper was prepared at Malta and reflects certain agreements reached there by Stettinius and Eden. See ante, p. 504.
2. Adoption of Emergency European High Commission.

(Copies of draft text of declaration and of accompanying protocol are available if you wish to hand them to Stalin and Churchill.)

Argumentation: Unity of great power policy with respect to liberated and Axis satellite countries is highly desirable, and France should be included as one of the great powers for this purpose.

3. Treatment of Germany.

(a) Final agreement should be reached with respect to control machinery and zones of occupation. Announcement should be made of such agreement and of the earlier agreement on surrender terms.

(b) Boundaries: It is not expected that definitive, detailed commitments will have to be made at this time. However, if it proves necessary, our detailed position has been prepared and is available.

(c) Minorities: We should oppose, so far as possible, indiscriminate mass transfer of minorities with neighboring states. Transfers should be carried out gradually under international supervision.

(d) Long range economic policies: We should favor abolition of German self-sufficiency and its position of economic domination of Europe, elimination of certain key industries, prohibition of manufacture of arms and of all types of aircraft, and continuing control to achieve these aims.

4. Poland.

(a) Boundaries: We favor the Curzon line in the north and center and, in the south, the eastern line of Lwow Province, which would correspond generally with one of the frontiers proposed in 1919 to the Supreme Allied Council. Transfer of German territory to be limited to East Prussia (except Koenigsberg to Russia), a small coastal salient of Pomerania, and Upper Silesia.

(b) We should be prepared to assist in the formation of a new representative interim government pledged to free elections when conditions permit. We should urge inclusion in a provisional government of Mikolajczyk (Peasant Party is most important in Poland) and other moderate Poles abroad. We should not agree to recognize the Lublin “government” in its present form.

5. Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

Our representatives must be assured of: (a) freedom of movement, and (b) consultation before decisions are made by the Control Commissions.

6. Iran.

We should seek Soviet agreement not to press for oil concessions in Iran until termination of hostilities and withdrawal of Allied troops.
7. China.

We should seek Soviet and British support for our efforts to bring about Kuomintang-Communist agreement.

Argumentation: Cooperation between the two groups will expedite conclusion of the war in the Far East and prevent possible internal conflict and foreign intervention in China.


INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES DElegation,
FEBRUARY 4, 1945

Hiss Collection

Hiss Notes 1

Jebb joined us 2
Jebb said: Have paper on Dep. 3 areas—which has been cleared thru Dominions & is now being considered by War Cabinet
He then read rapidly a paper containing following points
1. Goal is Int. collabor. to promote well being of colonial peoples by:
   (a) develop self govt
   (b) social & econ devel.
   (c) ?
2. Majority of problems are not in dep. areas themselves
3. Need something broader & more flexible than mandates
4. Proposal—regional bodies
5. Full publicity re colonial admn—desire uniformity of admn.

Proposal: Regional bodies could make recommends. to individual govts or gen. decl.

Eur H Com. 4

(a) Jebb said might continue as regional body
(b) Wants it also to make provisional demarcations
(c) Mix with quarterly meetings to be held at its seat.

Put temporary nature into Protocol

To assist, where conditions require, in the maintenance of internal order, such assistance to include where other means fail the joint use of force.

1 Transcribed for this volume from longhand notes in pencil.
2 An account of Byrnes’ talk with the “State Department delegation” is given by Stettinius, pp. 88–89. Only Byrnes and Jebb of the British delegation are identified as participants by Hiss, and the Stettinius account adds nothing on this point.
3 Dependent. (Throughout the Hiss notes the editors have supplied footnote explanations for a few of the more important and unusual abbreviations at the points where they first appear.)
4 European High Commission.
to take, upon the unanimous decision of the Commission, action
designed to accomplish the following aims:

When the emergency which has given rise to action by the Com-
mission in any country has terminated the Commission will terminate
Justice Byrnes 2:15
(Leahy earlier meeting: get US troops out of Eur)
Pres. fears taking internal rep.
Pres. doesn't like “big” organ.
Mr. B doesn't like indep. auth. of U. S. Commissioner Would
prefer decl. with auth. to Ambassadors to act as specified in protocol.
Amb. are appointed with consent of Pres. & are under control of Sec.
Mr. B fears any agency would perpetuate itself
Redraft as mere decl.—ad hoc commission for any country

ROOSEVELT-STALIN MEETING, FEBRUARY 4, 1945, 4 P. M.,
LIVADIA PALACE ¹

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Bohlen

SOVIET UNION
Marshall Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Minutes

TOP SECRET

Subject: General Discussion.

After an exchange of amenities, in which the President thanked
Marshal Stalin for all the successful efforts that had been made for
his comfort and convenience, the President said that the military
situation was considerably improved since they had last met.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that this was certainly true, and that the
Soviet armies were moving very successfully onto the line of the Oder.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he had made a number of bets on board
the cruiser coming over as to whether the Russians would get to Berlin
before the Americans would get to Manila.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he was certain the Americans
would get to Manila before the Russians got to Berlin, since there was
at present very hard fighting going on for the Oder line.

There followed a discussion about the climate and characteristics
of the Crimea.

¹ According to Stettinius (pp. 83–84), Harriman called on Molotov at Koreiz
after dinner on February 3 and arranged for this meeting of Roosevelt and Stalin.
The President said that he had been very much struck by the extent of German destruction in the Crimea and therefore he was more bloodthirsty in regard to the Germans than he had been a year ago, and he hoped that Marshal Stalin would again propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German Army.

Marshal Stalin replied that because of the honest blood shed in fighting the Germans, everyone was more bloodthirsty than they had been a year ago, adding that the destruction in the Crimea is nothing compared to that which occurred in the Ukraine. He said in the Crimea the Germans had been out-flanked and had had little time to carry out planned destruction, whereas in the Ukraine they had done it with method and calculation. He said the Germans were savages and seemed to hate with a sadistic hatred the creative work of human beings.

The President agreed with this.

Marshal Stalin then inquired about the military situation on the Western Front.

The President replied that General Marshall, at the five o'clock meeting, would give a detailed outline of the situation and plans, but he could say now that there was an offensive planned for the 8th of February and another on the 12th, but that the main blow of the Anglo-American armies on the Western Front would take place in March.

Marshal Stalin expressed gratification at this news, and said that General Antonov of the Soviet General Staff would give a detailed review of the situation on the Eastern Front at the five o'clock meeting. He added that if it were possible to capture the Ruhr and Saar regions the Germans would be deprived of all sources of coal, since the Russians had already captured the Silesia basin.

The President said he felt that the armies were getting close enough to have contact between and he hoped General Eisenhower could communicate directly with the Soviet Staff rather than through the Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington as in the past.

Marshal Stalin agreed and thought it was very important and promised that the staffs while here would work out the details of this suggestion. He added that if the Germans were deprived of all their coal, since they were already short of bread, there was a possibility that the German collapse would come before absolute military defeat.

The President inquired whether the Soviet bridgeheads across the Oder were sufficient for further offensive action.

Marshal Stalin replied that in regard to these bridgeheads, of which there were five or six, fierce battles were in progress on the Eastern front.

The President said that one of the difficulties on the Western Front was that we had no secure bridgeheads and that on the upper
Rhine the current was so strong with floating ice that it made it very difficult for pontoon operations, but that General Eisenhower felt once he reached the Rhine he would be able to cross it, but he did not expect this before March. He added that the British had wanted to make a major crossing of the Rhine on the north sector in Holland, but since we had four times the number of men in France that the British had we felt we were entitled to have an alternative, which would be either through Holland or in the region of Mainz.

The President then inquired how Marshal Stalin had gotten along with General de Gaulle.

Marshal Stalin replied that he had not found de Gaulle a very complicated person, but he felt he was unrealistic in the sense that France had not done very much fighting in this war and de Gaulle demanded full rights with the Americans, British and Russians who had done the burden of the fighting.

The President then described his conversation with de Gaulle in Casablanca two years ago when de Gaulle compared himself with Joan of Arc as the spiritual leader of France and with Clemenceau as the political leader.

Marshal Stalin replied that de Gaulle does not seem to understand the situation in France and that in actual fact the French contribution at the present time to military operations on the Western Front was very small and that in 1940 they had not fought at all.

The President replied that he recently decided to arm eight new French divisions composed of Frenchmen who had had previous military training.

Marshal Stalin said that was good insofar as it would help the American armies but at present he felt the de Gaulle army was very weak.

The President said he had recently heard that the French Government did not plan to annex outright any German territory but they are willing to have it placed under international control.

Marshal Stalin replied that was not the story de Gaulle had told in Moscow—there he said the Rhine was the natural boundary of France and he wished to have French troops placed there in permanency.

The President said he would now tell the Marshal something indiscreet, since he would not wish to say it in front of Prime Minister Churchill, namely that the British for two years have had the idea of artificially building up France into a strong power which would have 200,000 troops on the eastern border of France to hold the line for the period required to assemble a strong British army. He said the British were a peculiar people and wished to have their cake and eat it too.
The President then said that he understood the tripartite zones in regard to occupation of Germany were already agreed upon, to which Marshal Stalin appeared to agree, but he went on to say that one outstanding question was that of a French zone of occupation. The President said he had had a good deal of trouble with the British in regard to zones of occupation. He said that he would of [have] preferred to have the northwest zone which would be independent of communications through France, but the British seemed to think that the Americans should restore order in France and then return political control to the British.

Marshal Stalin inquired whether the President thought France should have a zone of occupation, and for what reason.

The President said he thought it was not a bad idea, but he added that it was only out of kindness.

Both Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov spoke up vigorously and said that would be the only reason to give France a zone. Marshal Stalin said that question would have to be considered further here at Yalta.

As it was then three minutes to five, the President suggested that they proceed to the conference room where the military staffs were gathered.²

² The Log (ante, p. 552) indicates that the President met with Hopkins, Matthews, and Bohlen at 4:30 p.m. on February 4. No record of such a meeting has been found, and there is no other evidence to indicate that such a meeting actually took place.

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FIRST PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 4, 1945, 5 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

**UNITED STATES**

President Roosevelt
Secretary Stettinius
Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Major General Deane
Brigadier General Morehead
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Alexander
General Ismay
Major Birse

**soviet union**

Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molotov
General of the Army Antonov
Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Pavlov
TOP SECRET

Subject: The Military Situation.

MARSHAL STALIN said he hoped the President would again consent to opening the meeting.

The President replied that his opening of this meeting, as had been the case in Tehran, was not based on any law or historic tradition but merely by chance. He said that he was honored to open this great Conference and he wished first of all to express on behalf of the American guests here their deep appreciation for the hospitality and splendid arrangements made by Marshal Stalin and his assistants for their comfort and convenience. He said that he knew that all the people he represented wished peace above all and the war to be over as soon as possible. He said that he felt that we understood each other much better now than we had in the past and that month by month our understanding was growing. For this reason, he felt safe in proposing that the talks be conducted in an informal manner in which each would speak his mind frankly and freely, since he had discovered through experience that the best way to conduct business expeditiously was through frank and free speaking. He said he knew that while they were here in Yalta they would cover the map of the world, but today he thought that military questions, particularly those on the most important front of all, the Eastern Front, should be the subject of discussion. He said he wished to add that when the Red Armies advanced into Germany 25 kilometers, it was doubtful whether the Soviet people were more thrilled than those of the United States and those of Great Britain. Here, he thought, it would be most appropriate if the Marshal would ask one of his staff officers to give a detailed report on the Eastern Front.

GENERAL ANTONOV then read a prepared paper, giving in great detail the background development of the Soviet offensive of early January, the estimate of enemy probabilities and the results of the offensive. He concluded with the statement of Soviet desires with regard to the actions of their Allies. (A copy in translation of General Antonov’s report is attached hereto.)

In regard to the part of the Soviet report where General Antonov referred to the number of divisions which were being moved to the East, the Prime Minister asked if he could go into more detail as to where they were coming from.

GENERAL ANTONOV stated that they anticipated that there would be five German divisions from Norway, twelve from the Western

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1 For the text of General Antonov’s statement, see the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes of this meeting, post, pp. 581–583.
Front, eight from Italy, and eight from the interior of Germany which would be moved to the Eastern Front to reinforce the Germans.

The President then inquired whether in the advance into Germany the Russians had altered the gauge of the railroads from the customary European gauge to the wide Russian gauge.

General Antonov replied that the majority of the locomotives and wagons which they had captured from the Germans had been so badly damaged that they had been useless and it was, therefore, necessary to widen the gauge on a few important lines of the railroads in order to accommodate Russian rolling stock to supply the troops.

The President said that as our armies are now approaching each other in Germany it was important that the staffs should discuss this problem so that there would be a definite place in Germany where the different gauges would meet.

Marshal Stalin answered at this point that the greater part of the German railroad lines would remain of their customary gauge and that it was not for pleasure but for absolute necessity that any at all had been changed, since the Soviet Union did not have adequate resources to adopt this expedient to a greater extent than was absolutely necessary.

The Prime Minister then said that he had a number of questions in regard to General Antonov’s report, that he felt that the Anglo-American and Russian staffs which were here gathered for the first time should discuss these technical military matters between themselves. He added, for example, that it was important to find out how long it would take the enemy to move these divisions from Italy and the Western Front to the Eastern Front and whether the Allies could be of more help by reinforcing the Western Front or by leaving the divisions in Italy, or by moving across the Adriatic into the Balkans. He suggested that General Marshall, with the President’s approval, present a picture of the operations on the Western Front.

General Marshall then gave the following general summary of the situation on the Western Front:

The Ardennes bulge had now been eliminated and in certain places the Allied armies were further to the East than they had been when the German offensive began.

In the last week General Eisenhower has been regrouping his divisions for future offensive action and was engaged in eliminating enemy pockets on the southern sector of the line north of Switzerland. He was exerting pressure on the base of the Ardennes bulge for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Germans were in sufficient force to successfully oppose a movement Northeast in the direction of Bonn or whether such an operation would require special preparation. He had ascertained that the German resistance was too strong and four days ago has ceased operations in this area and begun to transfer divisions
to the North. North of Switzerland operations were being directed toward the elimination of German positions around Mulhausen and Colmar. Colmar had been taken but the First French Army was advancing very slowly north of Mulhausen.

Small German bridgeheads to the north of Strasbourg were being eliminated. When our forces have reached the Rhine a number of divisions will be released through the shortening of the line.

Field Marshal Montgomery in command of the 21st British Army Group and the United States Ninth Army is preparing offensive action in a Southeast direction north of Düsseldorf. A supporting operation is planned by the Ninth Army in a northeast direction toward the same objective. The first of these operations is expected to commence on February 8 and the second approximately a week later. These two operations are designed to drive the Germans East of the Rhine and to cross the river North of the Ruhr. This operation will be the main blow of the Anglo-American armies. Airborne divisions will be used in large numbers to land East of the Rhine.

The passage of the Rhine is considered possible after the first of March. Although a crossing would be attempted if the Rhine were reached before that date it would be a hazardous operation because of ice conditions and the strength of the current. There are three good crossings in this sector and a fourth may be attempted. Only five divisions could be accommodated on the actual front of the assault.

In the South the left wing of the United States First Army was endeavoring to carry out the capture of two dams on the Roer River. Despite air action these dams remained intact and there was a danger of imperilling our positions in that area if the Germans were to open the dams.

Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the area of Frankfort as an alternative if the main operation in the North suffers a check.

Operations on the Western Front had been limited by the shortage of supplies due to inadequacy of shipping. The opening of the port of Antwerp has remedied this situation and the armies are now receiving adequate supplies. The utilization of the town of Rouen has facilitated the movement of supplies. It is now possible to bring in 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo and 12,000 to 15,000 tons of wet cargo a day. The Germans were endeavoring to disrupt the use of the port of Antwerp by robot bombs and rockets and sporadic air attack. The day before yesterday sixty robot bombs and six rockets fell on the city of Antwerp. One ship had been destroyed and one oil dump blown up. The chief danger was that a lucky hit might destroy the Antwerp lock gates. When weather permitted the American Air Forces had been extremely active in destroying German transport, railroad lines and troop convoys, particularly in the direction of Cologne.
MARSHAL STALIN then inquired if there was any definite estimate of the actual destruction done by the tactical air force.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he did not have the exact estimates but the destruction had been very heavy. According to present data the German oil production had been reduced to about 20% of its former capacity as a result of Allied heavy bombing. They had also struck at tank factories, motor transport factories, rail communications and assembly yards. In these operations were included the heavy bombers from Italy which, when the weather did not permit a strike on Germany, operated in the valley of the Po and against railroad lines leading from Italy into Germany.

In reply to a question General Marshall stated that there were approximately 32 enemy divisions on the Italian front, 27 German and 5 Italian, facing an approximately equal number of Allied divisions. The Allied forces have superiority in fighter aircraft in this theater.

GENERAL MARSHALL mentioned briefly the submarine danger which was more threatening at the moment than it had been in the past, due largely to improvements in German technical methods. At the time of the African landings there had been 100 enemy submarines operating in the Atlantic. At the present time there were between 30 and 35 in the Atlantic and their threat was potential rather than actual. He said difficulty had been encountered in attacking submarines in the shallow waters around the British Isles because the tide made it difficult for ASDIC to locate them. The Allied heavy bomber force has been striking heavily at submarine pens and construction yards but first priority was still being given to enemy oil production and refining centers.

GENERAL MARSHALL concluded by saying that Field Marshal Brooke might have something to add to his report on the military situation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he hoped that Field Marshal Brooke would have some news, but he certainly hoped that Admiral Cunningham would be able to speak on the help the Soviet Armies could give in the U-boat war, since Danzig was the principal point of construction of U-boats.

MARSHAL STALIN asked what were the other points.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM replied: Kiel and Hamburg.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we had had great experience with the United States forces in working out the crossing of oceans for landing operations but that we hoped to benefit by the Russian experience in crossing rivers. There was an officer here especially charged with that duty and he hoped to be able to get into contact with the Russian staff on this subject.

MARSHAL STALIN then asked a number of questions particularly relating to the potentials which the Anglo-Americans would have in
the Northern area and those designated for the attacks on February 8 and February 15. He said that on the central front in Poland the Soviet Army had enjoyed a superiority of 100 divisions over the Germans as well as overwhelming artillery supremacy. He added that they had had 9,000 planes on a relatively narrow front in Eastern Poland. He said that the Red Army had had 9,000 tanks on the break-through sector on the central front.

General Marshall said that approximately one in three Allied divisions was armored comprising 200-300 units. There was some discussion as to the relative strength of the German and Allied divisions in which General Marshall said that a German panzer division which they had encountered on the Western Front had had a complement of 23,000 men, at which Marshal Stalin expressed surprise.

The Prime Minister said that he understood that the British division was composed of 18,000 men and the American 14,000 with tank divisions of approximately 10,000 men.

Sir Charles Portal, in reply to a question from Marshal Stalin, said that we would have 8,000 to 9,000 aircraft on the section of the Western Front designated for the attack, of which 4,000 would be Anglo-American heavy bombers capable of carrying 3 to 4 tons of bombs each.

The Prime Minister said, in reply to Marshal Stalin’s observations that they had 180 Soviet divisions against 80 German divisions on the central front in Poland, that the Anglo-American armies had never had a superiority in manpower but that their superiority had rested in air power and armor.

General Marshall stated that ten days ago there had been 79 German divisions on the Western Front opposing 78 Anglo-American divisions.

Marshal Stalin then said that in the present offensive the Soviet armies had enjoyed artillery supremacy of four to one and gave a brief description in the manner in which the special Soviet artillery “break-through” divisions had been organized. He said that these artillery divisions had from 300 to 400 guns and in addition to offensive operations the corps artillery was added during the attack. For example, on a front from 35 to 45 kilometers, Marshal Konev had had six artillery “break-through” divisions and the corps artillery, which meant that for every kilometer there were some 230 guns of heavy calibre. The result was after a two hour bombardment a gate was opened in the front through which the Soviet forces advanced fifteen kilometers the first day. The German losses in killed and wounded were very heavy and the survivors were severely stunned and shell shocked. Marshal Stalin then said that they had explained their desires from their Allies, but that they had learned from the
discussions already undertaken that their desires had already been met, and inquired what were the wishes of the Allies in regard to the Red Army.

The Prime Minister said first of all that he wished to express the gratitude of England and he was sure of America for the massive power and successes of the Soviet offensive.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was not a desire. Marshal Stalin then said that the Soviet Union was not bound by any agreement at Tehran to conduct a winter offensive and despite what some people had thought no demand or request had been received from the President or the Prime Minister in regard to such an offensive. The President had asked him to receive a representative, Air Marshal Tedder, from General Eisenhower's staff to discuss the situation and he had, of course, immediately agreed. He said that he mentioned this only to emphasize the spirit of the Soviet leaders who not only fulfilled formal obligations but went farther and acted on what they conceived to be their moral duty to their Allies. He said Air Marshal Tedder had explained the desire, which he presumed was that of the President and the Prime Minister, that the Soviet army continue their offensive operations until the end of March. Marshal Stalin said that they would do it if the weather and road conditions permitted.

The President said that he thoroughly agreed with Marshal Stalin's statement since at the Tehran Conference it had been merely agreed that each partner would move as quickly and as far as possible against the common enemy. He said at that time he personally was facing an election, and that it had been impossible to make detailed plans far into the future. Also at that time our armies were separated by many miles. Now, however, the President said, with our armies approaching each other it should be possible to coordinate more closely our operational plans.

The Prime Minister remarked that the reason no request had been made on Marshal Stalin was because of the complete confidence which the President and he felt in the Marshal, the Russian people and the efficiency of the Russian military, and therefore, there had been no attempt to strike any bargain. He had always been thoroughly confident that when an offensive was possible the Red Army would attack. The Prime Minister added that no matter what discussions Air Marshal Tedder had had in Moscow, he felt that it was of the highest importance that the three staffs which were assembled here for the first time should really work out together detailed plans for the coordination of the joint blows against Germany; so that if the Soviet offensive came to a halt because of the weather or road conditions the Allied armies could move. The best of all would be for both armies to attack simultaneously from the East and the West.
MARSHAL STALIN agreed with the Prime Minister but stated that they had to take into account what had occurred; that when the Anglo-American armies were on the offensive in the West the Soviet armies were not ready and conversely. He felt that it would be most useful for the staffs to discuss the question of a summer offensive against Germany because he was not so sure that the war would be over before summer.

Mr. CHURCHILL replied that he thoroughly shared the view of the Marshal and that we should take full advantage of this gathering.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM then gave a short review of the situation in regard to German submarines. He said that the threat was more potential than actual at the present time. The Germans had kept technically ahead of the Allies although the present sinkings around the British Isles were not serious. We knew, however, that based on a prefabricated method of construction the Germans were building large submarines of a new type fitted out with the latest devices and with high underwater speed. He said that these submarines were being built primarily at Kiel, Hamburg and Danzig and that since the Marshal had asked for our desires he would give a naval desire, namely, that the Red Army should as soon as possible take Danzig where 30% of the German submarine construction was being carried out.

The President asked if Danzig was within range of Soviet artillery fire.

MARSHAL STALIN replied in the negative but expressed the hope that it soon would be.

It was then agreed that the Military Staffs would meet tomorrow at 12:00 noon at the Soviet villa at Kores and that tomorrow, February 5, there would be a meeting at the Livadia Palace at 4:00 p.m. between the President, Marshal Stalin, and the Prime Minister and the three Foreign Ministers on the political treatment of Germany.

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

MARSHAL STALIN asked the President to open the meeting.

The President said that he was very happy to open such a historic meeting in such a lovely spot. In view of the conveniences and comforts that had been provided the visiting delegations, he wished to thank Marshal Stalin for all that he had found time to do in this regard in the midst of the prosecution of the war. He said that the United States, British and Russian delegations would understand each other better and better as we go along. We could therefore proceed informally to discuss frankly and freely among ourselves the matters necessary to the successful prosecution of the common cause in which
we all are engaged. There was much that required discussion, the whole map in Europe in fact. Today, however, the conversations by common agreement would be concerned with Germany. In this connection he felt sure that the British and American people were viewing with a satisfaction as deep as must be that of the Soviet people themselves the successful advances of the Soviet armies against the common enemy.

MARSHAL STALIN said that Colonel General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, would outline the situation existing on the Eastern Front.

GENERAL ANTONOV made the following statement:

Soviet forces from the 12th to the 15th of January went into attack on the front from the Niemen River to the Carpathians, a distance of 700 kilometers. Forces of General Cherniakhovsky advanced towards Koenigsberg; forces of Marshal Rokossovsky, along the north bank of the Vistula cutting off East Prussia from central Germany; forces of Marshal Zhukov, south of the Vistula against Poznan; forces of Marshal Konev, against Chenstokhov-Breslau; forces of General Petrov, in the area of the Carpathians against Novo Targ. The greatest blow was delivered by the army groups of Rokossovsky, Zhukov, and Konev on the Ostrolenka-Crakow front, 300 kilometers.

Because of the unfavorable weather conditions, this operation was to commence at the end of January when weather conditions were expected to improve. Since the operation was planned and prepared as an operation in full strength, it was hoped to carry it out under the most favorable conditions possible. Nevertheless, in view of the difficult circumstances on the Western Front in connection with the German attack in the Ardennes, the High Command of the Soviet Army gave an order to commence the attack not later than the middle of January, not waiting for improvement in weather.

The enemy grouping, after the Soviet forces reached the Narev and Vistula Rivers, was the most concentrated on the central sector of the front, since striking from this sector led our troops out along the shortest route to the vital centers of Germany. In order to create for ourselves more advantageous conditions for attack, the Supreme Soviet Command decided to extend it to the central group of the enemy. For this purpose this operation was conducted as a subsidiary against East Prussia, and the advance in Hungary toward Budapest was continued. Both of these attacks were for the Germans very painful, and they quickly reacted to our attack by a swift transfer of power onto the flank at the expense of the central sector of our front; thus, out of 24 tank divisions on our front, representing the principal German striking power, 11 tank divisions were drawn in to the Budapest sector, 6 tank divisions on the East Prussian (3 tank divisions were located in Courland), and thus on the central part of the front there
remained only 4 tank divisions. The aim of the High Command was accomplished.

On the front from Ostrolenka to Crakow, that is, in the area of our greatest attack, the enemy had up to 80 divisions. We set up a grouping calculated on having a superiority over the enemy: in infantry, more than double; in artillery, tanks and aviation, a decided superiority.

The massing of artillery on the sectors of the break-through amounted to 220–230 guns (from 75 mm. and above) on one kilometer of the front.

The advance was begun under extremely unfavorable weather conditions—low visibility and fog, which completely ruled out the possibility of air operations and limited artillery observation to several hundred meters.

Due to good preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy positions and a powerful artillery advance, the fire power of the enemy was overwhelmed and his fortifications destroyed. This situation permitted our troops during the first day of the advance to move forward 10 to 15 kilometers, that is, to completely break through the entire tactical depth of the enemy defense.

The following results were achieved:

a. During the 18 days of the advance, the Soviet troops moved forward up to 500 kilometers in the direction of the main offensive.

Thus the average speed of forward movement was 25–30 kilometers per day.

b. The Soviet troops came out onto the Oder River on the sector from Kyustrin (north of Frankfurt) and south and seized the Silesian industrial area.

c. They cut across the main roads and cut off enemy groups in East Prussia from central Germany; thus, in addition to the Courland group (26 divisions) isolated 27 divisions of the enemy group; a series of divisional groupings were surrounded and annihilated in the region of Lodz, Torne, Poznan, Shneidmul and others, an approximate total of up to 15 divisions.

d. Break-throughs in force of long duration of German defensive positions in East Prussia in the Koenigsberg and Latvian directions.

e. Destroyed 45 German divisions against which we sustained the following losses:

Prisoners — about 100,000 men
Casualties—about 300,000 men
Total — approximately 400,000 men.

Probable enemy action:

a. The Germans will defend Berlin for which they will try to hold up the movement of the Soviet troops in the area of the Oder River, set-
ting up the defense here at the expense of withdrawn troops and at the expense of reserves being moved over from Germany, Western Europe and Italy.

For the defense of Pomerania they will try to use their Courland grouping, moving it over by sea beyond the Vistula.

b. The Germans will probably cover the direction leading to Vienna more strongly, strengthening this sector at the expense of troops now in action in Italy.

The shifting of enemy troops:

a. On our front there have already appeared:

- From the central regions of Germany — 9 divisions
- From the Western European Front — 6 divisions
- From Italy — 1 division

Total 16 divisions

b. In the process of being shifted:

- 4 tank divisions
- 1 motorized division

Total 5 divisions

c. It is probable that there will yet be shifted up to 30-35 divisions (at the expense of the Western European Front, Norway, Italy, and reserves located in Germany).

In this manner there can appear on our front an additional 35 to 40 divisions.

Our wishes are:

a. To speed up the advance of the Allied troops on the Western Front, for which the present situation is very favorable:

(1) To defeat the Germans on the Eastern Front.
(2) To defeat the German groupings which have advanced into the Ardennes.
(3) The weakening of the German forces in the West in connection with the shifting of their reserves to the East.

It is desirable to begin the advance during the first half of February.
b. By air action on communications hinder the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the East from the Western Front, from Norway, and from Italy.

In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig.
c. Not permit the enemy to remove his forces from Italy.

The President asked whether the Russians proposed to change the gauge of the railroad rolling stock captured from the Germans or to widen the gauge of the lines.

General Antonov replied that much of the equipment was unfit for use. At present the Russians are widening the gauge of those lines
that are most vital to supply. These lines were being widened only
as a matter of necessity as, manifestly, the available resources are not
sufficient to widen all the railroads in Germany. The greater part of
the German lines will remain intact.

The Prime Minister stated that the British Delegation would have
a number of questions to address to the Russians. As these were of a
technical and military nature, he thought it would be more advan-
tageous if they could be brought up between the military staffs.

The Prime Minister then suggested that General Marshall ex-
plain to Marshal Stalin the impending operations on the Western Front.

The President pointed out the increasing necessity for coordinating
the operations of the three Allies now that the British and American
armies are getting so close to the Russians. By reason of the short
distance separating the Western and Eastern Fronts the Germans are
now able to transfer their reserves quickly from one front to the other.

General Marshall then gave a résumé of the operations planned
for the Western Front. He said that the German bulge in the Ar-
dennes had now been eliminated and the Allied forces have advanced
in some areas beyond the line originally held. During the past week
General Eisenhower has been regrouping his forces and conducting
operations designed to eliminate enemy pockets in the southern part
of the line north of Switzerland. At the same time he has been main-
taining pressure in the Ardennes area in order to determine whether
the Germans were present in sufficient forces to resist a movement
northeast towards Bonn. Because of the resistance encountered, it
was decided four days ago to cease operations and to transfer divisions
further north. In the southern end of the line, operations were being
directed towards the elimination of the German positions in the vi-
cinity of Mulhausen and Colmar. Colmar has now been occupied
but the advance of the First French Army north of Mulhausen has
been very slow.

North of Strasbourg the small German bridgeheads across the
Rhine are being eliminated. As soon as the Rhine is reached it will
be possible to reduce the number of divisions in the front line and
release them for other employments. Some released divisions are
even now moving north in preparation for the larger operations.

Field Marshal Montgomery, in command of the 21st Army Group
and Ninth U. S. Army, is preparing an operation designed to strike
towards the southeast in order to reach the line of the Rhine from
Düsseldorf north. A complementary operation has been planned in
a northeast direction towards the same objective, which it is hoped
can be launched about a week later than the first operation. By
means of these two operations it is hoped to drive the Germans east of
the Rhine north of Düsseldorf and then to cross the river north of the
Ruhr. This crossing will constitute the main effort of the British and
American armies and into it will be put all of the divisions which it is logistically possible to support. In addition, airborne troops in large numbers will land east of the Rhine.

From the standpoint of weather, the passage of the Rhine is considered possible after 1 March. A crossing will be attempted as soon as the river is reached, but it is recognized that ice will make hazardous any crossing prior to 1 March. Three good crossing sites are available for the operation and a fourth may be attempted. However, the front of the assault will accommodate initially only five divisions.

Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the vicinity of Frankfurt which can be exploited if the main effort in the North should fail to go through. The troops composing the left of the American First Army are now conducting an operation designed to capture the two dams controlling the water in the Roer River. As long as these dams are in the hands of the Germans, there is a danger that the bridges established for the river crossing may be swept away by the release of the impounded water.

The opening of the port of Antwerp has relieved the limitation on operations on the Western Front imposed by a lack of supplies. It is now possible to bring in from 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo a day. The Germans have realized the importance of Antwerp in the Allied supply scheme and have made a continuous effort to interfere with the operations of that port through the use of robot bombs and rockets. This constitutes a danger as there is, of course, always a chance of a lucky hit being made against the Antwerp lock gates. Only scattered attacks have been made by air.

United States and British fighters and light bombers supporting the ground troops have destroyed a great deal of German transport. Considerable effort has been directed against trains operating in the vicinity of Cologne and on the east bank of the Rhine. Although definite final reports have not yet been received, there is every indication of severe damage having been done to panzer divisions withdrawing from the Ardennes.

The heavy bombers have been employed primarily against German oil supplies in order to reduce the German supply of fuel for airplanes and motor transport. Present data indicate that these operations have resulted in a reduction of German oil production to 20 percent of the former capacity. The heavy bombers have also been used against German rail communications and assembly yards and a continuous effort has been maintained to destroy German fighter forces. These planes have also struck heavily at tank factories. The air forces in these operations include United States heavy bombers operating from the Italian Front. When weather prevents profitable operations in the Po Valley, they are directed against communications leading into Germany.
There are now about 32 enemy divisions on the Italian Front, 27 German and 5 Italian. The number of Allied divisions is approximately equal. The Allied forces have great superiority in fighter airplanes and these, in good weather, are able to ravage the Po Valley. The destruction of rail lines and rolling stock has been heavy.

Indications point to a serious resumption of the German submarine war as the result of technical developments which are making the detection of the submarines increasingly difficult. The submarines have developed considerable skill in operating in shallow waters where the tide makes it difficult for ASDIC to locate them. In order to counter this submarine resurgence, heavy bombers are being employed to strike at submarine assembly points whenever these operations do not interfere with the bombing of the German oil supplies.

In concluding, General Marshall said he would be glad to have Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke amplify his remarks in any way he thought desirable.

The Prime Minister stated he would be very glad for Field Marshal Brooke to do this and stated that he would like for Admiral Cunningham also to say a word about the submarine operations.

The Prime Minister pointed out that Danzig is the place where much of the assembling of the submarines is done and expressed satisfaction in the thought that the city is now not far from the Russian front lines, which are daily drawing closer.

In answer to a question from Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister said that other submarine assembling points were Kiel and Hamburg.

Field Marshal Brooke said that General Marshall had fully covered the situation now existing on the Western Front and the operations which are contemplated for the future. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in full accord with the plan for the future operations which General Marshall had outlined.

The Prime Minister stated that both the British and Americans have amphibious branches in their services. The officer commanding the British amphibious branch is at present in Argonaut and he, the Prime Minister, would like very much to have him meet with the Russian amphibious experts and obtain from them any information which the Russians would be kind enough to provide.

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin, General Marshall explained that the front of the main effort in the impending operations covered three crossings over a distance of 25 or 30 miles and afforded room for not more than five divisions. The front eventually would extend all along the Rhine down as far as Düsseldorf, a total of some 50 or 60 miles. He pointed out that, as was the case in Normandy, it will be necessary to assault initially on a narrow front but this front would be expanded as rapidly as possible. He said that the Ruhr was very heavily fortified and for that reason would
be by-passed. However, troops attacking on this front would soon get into good tank country.

In answer to a question from Marshal Stalin, General Marshall said the reserves available for the proposed attack were believed to be ample.

Marshal Stalin said that he asked the question because in the Russian central campaign 9,000 tanks were used up. He would like to know how many tanks the Allies expected to employ.

General Marshall said that roughly one in every three divisions employed would be a tank division. He said that on March 1st General Eisenhower will have 89 divisions at his disposal to cover the front from the Mediterranean to Holland, not including Italy; nine of these were French and all the remainder were either British or American.

Through answers to his questions it was made clear to Marshal Stalin that there are nearly 10,000 Allied tanks in the European Theater. The British divisions number 18,000 men, the American divisions 14,000, and armored divisions contain 10,000. There will be available 4,000 heavy bombers, each carrying up to 3,000 pounds of bombs.

Marshal Stalin explained that in their attack on the central German position, the Russians employed 100 divisions, which was 20 more than the Germans had. He was interested in the preponderance that the British and Americans would have over the Germans.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the British and American forces had overwhelming preponderance in airplanes and armored troops but not great preponderance in infantry. He stressed the necessity of exploiting to the full such superiority in strength as existed.

Marshal Stalin said that the British and Americans had asked the Russians to express their wishes. He would like to know now what the wishes of the British and Americans were.

The Prime Minister said that his greatest wish was to express profound gratitude and admiration as he witnessed the marvelous advance of the Russian troops. He said the British and Americans recognized the hard and difficult task lying before them in their impending operations but had full confidence in their power to execute it. All they could ask from the Russians was that the Russians continue to do as they are doing now.

 Marshal Stalin said there had been no demand from the British and Americans for the Russian winter offensive and no pressure was exerted by them to bring it about.

The President had asked that information of the offensive be given to General Eisenhower in order to assist him in his planning and Air Marshal Tedder, who came to Moscow as General Eisen-
hower’s representative, had requested that the Russian offensive continue to the end of March but this was understood to be a request from the military leaders.

**Marshal Stalin** said they had staged their winter offensive because they felt it to be their duty as Allies to do it. They greatly appreciated the attitude manifested by both the President and the Prime Minister in this matter.

**The Prime Minister** said the reason that neither the British nor Americans had made any attempt to bargain with Marshal Stalin was because of their faith in him and in the Russian people and the realization that they could be depended on to do the right thing. It was his opinion that regardless of the discussions which had been held with Air Marshal Tedder, matters should be fully discussed now by the three Staffs in order to determine what is the best course to pursue with respect to the coordinating of the action on the Western and Eastern Fronts. It was imperative that the two offensives should be integrated so as to get the best results.

**Marshal Stalin** agreed that the offensives had not been fully synchronized at first and that action should be taken to do this now. He thought it would be well also to consider a summer offensive as he was not at all certain that the war would be over by that time.

**Admiral Cunningham** said that he would like to add something to General Marshall’s statement on the submarine warfare. He said while the submarine threat was potentially great it was not very serious at the moment. The point is, however, that the Germans are building large numbers of new types of U-boats. As these will have high underwater speed and embody all the latest technical devices, it will be very difficult for the Allied air and surface craft to deal with them. In Bremen, Hamburg and Danzig the new submarines were being built by prefabrication methods. His greatest wish as a naval man was for the Russians to take Danzig as quickly as possible for in that city about 30 percent of the U-boats were being constructed.

In answer to a question by the President, **Marshal Stalin** stated that Danzig was not yet within artillery range of the Russian guns but it was hoped that it soon would be.

Discussion then turned upon the time and place of the next meeting. After discussion, it was agreed that the Staffs of the three nations would meet at 1200 on Monday, 5 February, at the headquarters of the Russian Delegation.
TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, FEBRUARY 4, 1945, 8:30 P. M.,
LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Major Birse

SOVIET UNION
Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Minutes

TOP SECRET

Subject: Voice of Smaller Powers in Postwar Peace Organization.

Before dinner and during the greater part of the dinner the conversation was general and personal in character. Marshal Stalin, the President and the Prime Minister appeared to be in very good humor throughout the dinner. No political or military subjects of any importance were discussed until the last half hour of the dinner when indirectly the subject of the responsibility and rights of the big powers as against those of the small powers came up.

MARSHAL STALIN made it quite plain on a number of occasions that he felt that the three Great Powers which had borne the brunt of the war and had liberated from German domination the small powers should have the unanimous right to preserve the peace of the world. He said that he could serve no other interest than that of the Soviet state and people but that in the international arena the Soviet Union was prepared to pay its share in the preservation of peace. He said that it was ridiculous to believe that Albania would have an equal voice with the three Great Powers who had won the war and were present at this dinner. He said some of the liberated countries seemed to believe that the Great Powers had been forced to shed their blood in order to liberate them and that they were now scolding these Great Powers for failure to take into consideration the rights of these small powers.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he was prepared in concert with the United States and Great Britain to protect the rights of the small powers but that he would never agree to having any action of any of the Great Powers submitted to the judgment of the small powers.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed that the Great Powers bore the greater responsibility and that the peace should be written by the Three Powers represented at this table.

1 The President acted as host.
2 Listed in the Log, ante, p. 553, and by Stettinius, p. 111, as being among those present, but not so listed by Bohlen.
The Prime Minister said that there was no question of the small powers dictating to the big powers but that the great nations of the world should discharge their moral responsibility and leadership and should exercise their power with moderation and great respect for the rights of the smaller nations. (Mr. Vyshinski said to Mr. Bohlen that they would never agree to the right of the small powers to judge the acts of the Great Powers, and in reply to an observation by Mr. Bohlen concerning the opinion of American people he replied that the American people should learn to obey their leaders. Mr. Bohlen said that if Mr. Vyshinski would visit the United States he would like to see him undertake to tell that to the American people. Mr. Vyshinski replied that he would be glad to do so.)

Following a toast by the Prime Minister to the proletariat masses of the world, there was considerable discussion about the rights of people to govern themselves in relation to their leaders.

The Prime Minister said that although he was constantly being "beaten up" as a reactionary, he was the only representative present who could be thrown out at any time by the universal suffrage of his own people and that personally he gloried in that danger.

Marshal Stalin ironically remarked that the Prime Minister seemed to fear these elections, to which the Prime Minister replied that he not only did not fear them but that he was proud of the right of the British people to change their government at any time they saw fit. He added that he felt that the three nations represented here were moving toward the same goal by different methods.

The Prime Minister, referring to the rights of the small nations, gave a quotation which said: "The eagle should permit the small birds to sing and care not wherefor they sang."

After Marshal Stalin and the President had departed the Prime Minister discussed with Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius further the voting question in the Security Council. The Prime Minister said that he was inclined to the Russian view on voting procedure because he felt that everything depended on the unity of the three Great Powers and that without that the world would be subjected to inestimable catastrophe; anything that deserved [preserved?] that unity would have his vote. Mr. Eden took vigorous exception to the Prime Minister and pointed out that there would be no attraction or reason for the small nations to join an organization based on that principle and that he personally believed it would find no support among the English public. The Prime Minister said that he did not agree in the slightest with Mr. Eden because he was thinking of the realities of the international situation.

In reply to an inquiry of the Prime Minister in regard to the American proposal to the solution of the voting question, Mr. Bohlen remarked that the American proposal reminded him of the story of
the Southern planter who had given a bottle of whiskey to a Negro as a present. The next day he asked the Negro how he had liked the whiskey, to which the Negro replied that it was perfect. The planter asked what he meant, and the Negro said if it had been any better it would not have been given to him, and if it had been any worse he could not have drunk it.

Soon thereafter the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden took their departure, obviously in disagreement on the voting procedure on the Security Council of the Dumbarton Oaks organization.

**MONDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1945**

**MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 5, 1945, 10 A.M., LIVADIA PALACE**

**Present**

Fleet Admiral Leahy  
General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Major General Bull  
Major General Deane  
Major General Anderson  
Major General Hull  
Major General Wood  
Major General Hill  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Rear Admiral Duncan  
Brigadier General Roberts  
Brigadier General Bessell  
Brigadier General Everett  
Brigadier General Lindsay  
Commodore Burrough  
Colonel Peck  
Colonel Lincoln  
Captain Stroop  
Captain McDill  
Commander Clark  

**Secretariat**

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves  

**J.C.S. Files**

**Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes**

**TOP SECRET**

1. **APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES, 185TH MEETING OF C. C. S.**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to recommend approval of the conclusions of the Minutes of the 185th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

2. **BRITISH PROPOSAL TO ABANDON THE PLAN TO RETURN TO “CRICKET” (SM-411)**

Admiral Leahy said that this was a memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff which proposed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff com-

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1. J. C. S. 188th Meeting.  
2. _Ante_, pp. 530–534.  
3. Not printed.
plete all of their unfinished business at Magneto and abandon the plan to return to Malta. The suggestion was open to discussion.

General Marshall said that the proposal was agreeable to him as the next best thing to do. He preferred to have the United States Shipping Representatives sent to Magneto to complete their studies and, if necessary, to detach the necessary number from this place to provide space.

General Somervell explained that the point at issue was the agreement on a planning date for the end of the war with Germany. The dates of 1 April, 1 July, and 1 November had already been considered, but it was necessary to settle on one date. He suggested that an agreement be reached with the British on the date of 1 July for planning purposes. The only possible complication in such an arrangement would be the introduction of some other operation which would change planning.

Admiral King said that Russian concurrence should be obtained on the planning date.

General Marshall suggested that the course of action should be as follows:

a. Obtain Russian concurrence to a planning date of 1 July 1945 for the end of the war with Germany, and

b. Detach a suitable number of personnel from Magneto to make room for the shipping personnel ordered from Cricket to complete the shipping studies at this place.

After further discussion,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Agreed to seek Russian concurrence on the date of 1 July 1945 as the date of the collapse of Germany.

b. Agreed to accept the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff contained in their memorandum of 4 February 1945 and directed the Secretaries to take necessary action.

3. Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany

(J. C. S. 577/26)  
Reference: SCAF 198

Admiral Leahy said that this subject had been under consideration by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. J. C. S. 577/26 was the report of the Joint Logistics Committee on its own initiative, recommending the acceptance of the British proposal subject to certain amendments set forth in Appendix "A" of this paper.

General Marshall explained that J. C. S. 577/26 is the last of a long series of papers pertaining to the controversy with the British

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4 See C. C. S. 772, January 30, 1945, under Malta Conference, ante, pp. 478-480.
5 Not printed.
concerning the Bremen-Bremerhaven area. General Macready wrote a letter to Mr. McCloy on 20 January offering an agreement which is on page 223. Mr. McCloy wrote a letter back saying that this agreement was acceptable providing its meaning was in accordance with specifications which he named.

The Joint Logistics Committee in this paper has proposed a 4⅞ page memorandum to the British in which the argument is somewhat unbending and proposes an agreement which amounts to amending General Macready’s proposal to include Mr. McCloy’s interpretations. Mr. McCloy’s letter is not attached to the paper.

Failure to reach agreement on this paper is holding up the protocol on the zones of occupation in Germany. In an effort to make more certain that this controversy will be halted, it is recommended that the action adopted be substituted for the proposal by the Joint Logistics Committee. This action consists of a presentation to the British of a short memorandum, with the draft agreement proposed by the JLC, and General Macready’s letter to Mr. McCloy.

General Marshall then distributed copies of the memorandum to be presented to the British in lieu of the memorandum proposed by the Joint Logistics Committee.

After further discussion,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to present to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the memorandum proposed by General Marshall, with the draft agreement proposed by the Joint Logistics Committee and General Macready’s letter to Mr. McCloy attached thereto. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 320/35)

4. Russian Participation in the War Against Japan
(J. C. S. 1176/10, J. C. S. 1176/11)

Admiral Leahy said that in the papers under consideration the Joint Staff Planners recommend memoranda bearing on the war against Japan to be presented to the Soviet General Staff. He questioned whether the Russians would understand the memoranda when they received them.

Admiral Duncan explained that the memorandum embodied in J. C. S. 1176/11 had to do with a special U.S. planning staff in Moscow and would be understood by the Russians.

General Deane explained further that this planning group had already had one meeting with the Russian Staff in Moscow previous to this conference and this memorandum was intended to facilitate

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* Ante, pp. 199–201.
* For the text of this protocol, see ante, pp. 118–123.
* Post, pp. 637–639.
* Not printed.
* The two memoranda are printed post, pp. 765–766.
the work of the planning group. There has been delay in the work of the reconnaissance party mentioned therein due to the fact that some Japanese had been allowed to remain in Kamchatka. As soon as they have been removed the American planning staff would be permitted to travel in that territory. He suggested that the memorandum be approved and handed to the Russians at a bilateral meeting which he felt was necessary. He recommended further that the President should be asked to request from Marshal Stalin the Soviet answers to two questions of paramount importance. The basic question is whether the Russians will require a Pacific supply line. The next question concerns Soviet agreement to establishment of U. S. air forces in Eastern Siberia. These questions should be put to the Soviets and definite answers requested.

General Marshall agreed and recommended approval of the memorandum for transmission to the Russians, preliminary to a meeting with them. He recommended further that a memorandum be prepared for the President to present to Marshal Stalin as follows:

"The following are two basic military questions to which the United States Chiefs of Staff would appreciate an early answer at this conference:

a. Once war breaks out between Russia and Japan, is it essential to you that a supply line be kept open across the Pacific to Eastern Siberia?

b. Will you assure us that United States air forces will be permitted to base in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk or some more suitable area providing developments show that these air forces can be operated and supplied without jeopardizing Russian operations?"

In reply to a question by General Marshall, General Deane said that the memorandum he had proposed was entirely satisfactory. He thought that after discussion of the two basic questions with the Russian Staff we should outline the main points and request the President to ask Marshal Stalin for a flat approval or disapproval of them. The Russian Staff have already disapproved a U. S. move into Eastern Siberia and he felt that they would not change this decision without a direct approval from the highest level.

After further discussion,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C. S. 1176/10 and 1176/11.

b. Agreed to send to the President the memorandum proposed by General Marshall, with a request that it be presented to Marshal Stalin.

11 The two memoranda embodied in these papers were sent by Leahy to the representatives of the Soviet General Staff on February 5, 1945.

12 The memorandum was sent by the President to Marshal Stalin on February 5, 1945 (Roosevelt Papers).
MINUTES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 595

FIRST TRIPARTITE MILITARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 5, 1945, NOON, YUSUPOV PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Vice Admiral Cooke
Major General Deane
Major General Bull
Major General Anderson
Major General Hull

UNITED KINGDOM
Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Alexander
General Ismay
Rear Admiral Archer

sov

SOVIET UNION
General of the Army Antonov
Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
Lieutenant General Gryzlov
Vice Admiral Kucherov
Commander Kostrinsky

SECRETARIAT
Brigadier General McFarland
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Captain Graves
Commander Coleridge

INTERPRETERS
Captain Lunghi
Captain Ware
Lieutenant Chase
Mr. Potrubach

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

At the suggestion of General Antonov, Field Marshal Brooke agreed to take the chair.

COORDINATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the meeting should begin by considering the coordination of the Russian and U.S.-British offensives. At the Plenary Meeting on the previous day, General Antonov had put forward certain Russian requirements. He had asked, first, that during the month of February the Allied armies in the West should carry out offensives. As General Marshall had explained, the Allied offensive in the West would start in the North on the eighth of February and some eight days later the Ninth U. S. Army would also start an offensive. These operations would be carried out during most of February. In addition to these operations in the North, operations were now being carried out by United States and French armies to push the Germans back to the Rhine in the Colmar area. It was therefore clear that the immediate coordination of Allied and Russian offensives was already being carried out. It was necessary, however, to look into the matter of coordination of offensives in the spring and summer months. As far as operations in the West were concerned these would be more or less continuous throughout the spring. There were, of course, bound to be intervals between operations, though such intervals would not be of long duration. For instance, after clearing the western bank of the Rhine on the northern part of the front, prep-
arations would have to be made for the final crossing of the Rhine. From a study of conditions of the river it was hoped to effect a crossing during the month of March. After establishing the crossing it would have to be widened and improved before the final advance into the heart of Germany could be undertaken.

Should operations in the North aimed at the Ruhr be held up, it was the intention to carry out further operations in the South. It was safe to say, therefore, that during the months of February, March and April, active operations would be in progress during almost the entire time.

The actual crossing of the Rhine presented the greatest difficulties and it was during the period of this crossing that the Allies were anxious to prevent a concentration of German forces against the armies in the West. It was therefore hoped that during March operations on the Eastern Front would be able to continue. Sir Alan Brooke said he appreciated the difficulties in March and early April due to the thaw and mud which would interfere with communications. He also realized that after their present great advances the Russian armies would want to improve their communications. He would much like to hear General Antonov’s views on what operations could be undertaken by the Soviet armies during March and April.

General Marshall said that during the Tripartite Plenary Meeting on the previous day the number of divisions, the amount of artillery, and the number of tanks on the Eastern Front had been enumerated. In considering the Western Front it was important to bear in mind that operations must be conducted to meet the special conditions existing. In the West there was no superiority in ground forces. There were delicate lines of sea communications, particularly in the Scheldt Estuary. The Allies, however, did enjoy a preponderance of air power, but in this connection the weather was an important consideration. If the Allies were unable to take full advantage of their air superiority they did not have sufficient superiority on the ground to overcome enemy opposition. Operations must therefore be conducted on this basis. Another restriction arose from the fact that there were only a small number of favorable locations for crossing the Rhine. It was therefore most important to insure that the enemy could not concentrate strongly at the point of attack.

The enemy were now operating behind the Rhine and the Siegfried line and therefore had great freedom of maneuver. We must therefore arrange to occupy the Germans as much as possible to prevent them from concentrating against us on the very narrow bridgehead area available to us.

With regard to air forces, on the Western Front some 3,000 to 4,000 fighter-bomber sorties could be undertaken each day. There was
about one-third of this strength on the Italian Front. This did not include the power of the great four-engine bombers with their escorting fighters.

General Antonov said that, as Marshal Stalin had pointed out, the Russians would continue the offensive in the East as long as the weather permitted. There might be interruptions during the offensive and, as Sir Alan Brooke had said, there was the need to reestablish Russian communications. The Soviet Army would, however, take measures to make such interruptions as short as possible and would continue the offensive to the limit of their capacity.

In connection with the western offensive in February, it was not believed that the Germans could transfer forces from the Eastern Front to the West in large numbers. The Soviet Staff, however, was also interested in the Italian Front, from where the Germans had the opportunity of transferring troops to the Eastern Front. In view of this, the Soviet General Staff would like to know the potentialities of the Allied armies now fighting the Germans in Italy.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the situation on the Italian Front was being carefully examined as it developed. Kesselring’s forces had now been driven into northern Italy where the country was very well suited for defense or for systematic retirement. There was a series of rivers which could be used for rear-guard actions while withdrawing his forces gradually. The enemy would have to retreat through the Ljubljana Gap or the passes of the Alps. The coast in the Bay of Venice was not suitable for amphibious operations, and therefore outflanking operations in the Adriatic did not appear fruitful. So far there had been continuous offensive operations which had driven the enemy out of the Apennine line and into the Valley of the Po. Winter weather and floods had, however, brought these offensive operations almost to a standstill.

At present our troops were preparing for further offensive action when the weather improved. It had, however, been decided that it would be better to transfer some of the forces now in Italy to the Western Front, where at present we did not have sufficient superiority in ground forces. Five divisions were therefore now to be transferred from Italy to France and certain air forces would accompany them. The forces remaining in Italy had been instructed to carry out offensive operations and to seize every opportunity to inflict heavy blows on the enemy. Their object was to retain as many of Kesselring’s forces as possible by offensive action. However, owing to the topography of the country, it was believed that Kesselring could carry out a partial withdrawal without the Allies being able to stop it. The rate of withdrawal was estimated at some one and one-half divisions per week. Thus, any withdrawal which he did undertake could only be gradual.
To sum up, it was proposed to take what action was possible to stop the German withdrawal in Italy, though it was not thought that this could be entirely prevented. For this reason, it had been decided to withdraw certain forces from Italy to the vital front in Northwest Europe.

General Marshall said that he agreed with Sir Alan Brooke’s summary of the position but felt that a reference should be made to the value of our air power in Italy.

General Antonov asked the number of German troops believed to be in Italy.

Field Marshal Alexander said that at present the German forces in Italy consisted of 27 German divisions and 5 Italian divisions.

Sir Alan Brooke said that all these forces could not be held down in Italy by offensive action. If the Germans decided to retire to the line of the Adige, it was estimated that they would be able to withdraw some ten divisions from Italy.

Sir Charles Portal said that on the Western and Italian Fronts together the United States and British air forces consisted of some fourteen thousand aircraft. This figure did not include the reserve behind the front line. Should the land campaign have to halt, the war in the air would continue, so far as weather permitted, even more strongly than before. Everything possible would be done, as General Marshall had stated, to bring the greatest possible air assistance to the vital points of attack in the land offensive. Such air assistance included the operations of a number of airborne divisions, for which the necessary transport was available.

So far as the requirements of the land battle permitted, it was the intention to concentrate the strategic bomber forces on the enemy’s oil supply. Evidence was available almost daily that the destruction of his oil production capacity was imposing limitations on the enemy’s operations. It was believed that the destruction of enemy oil was the best contribution which the air forces could make, both to the offensive on land and in the air. Much had been done and would continue to be done to disorganize the enemy’s rail communications, but it was our experience that an attempt to cut all railways in the middle of Germany to stop troop movements would produce disappointing results in view of the relative ease with which the enemy could repair such destruction.

It was known that the Germans intended to assemble a strong force of jet-propelled fighters during the course of the present year. It had therefore been decided that, in order to maintain our air superiority into the summer, a proportion of our air effort must be devoted to attacks on the German jet-propelled fighter manufacturing plants. Nevertheless, it was an agreed principle that when the land offensive
began, everything in the air that could contribute to its success should be so used.

Before the advance of the Soviet armies, Allied air power had been brought to bear as far afield as Koenigsberg, Danzig, Posen and Warsaw. The great range of our strategic air forces made it most necessary that Allied air operations should be coordinated with the advance of the Soviet armies both to prevent accidents and to obtain the best value from our bomber effort.

**General Marshall** invited Field Marshal Alexander to comment on the capability of air forces in Italy to prevent a German withdrawal.

**Field Marshal Alexander** said that it had been his experience in Italy that our greatly superior air forces were a most powerful weapon while the enemy was withdrawing, if it was possible to force the pace of his withdrawal. If, however, he was in a position to withdraw at his own pace the air forces were less effective since the withdrawal could be undertaken mostly under cover of darkness.

In the Valley of the Po there was a series of extremely strong holding positions and it would therefore be difficult to force the enemy to withdraw faster than he planned. Nevertheless, when the weather improved from May onwards, considerable damage could be done to the withdrawing German forces and to their lines of communication. However, in February, March and April the weather was bad, with low clouds, which hindered the air effort to a great extent. Further, the Germans had destroyed nearly all the bridges over the River Po and had replaced them with some 30 to 40 pontoon bridges which were not kept in position during the day but were hidden along the banks. The destruction of these bridges was therefore extremely difficult.

To sum up, the better the weather the more damage could be done to the enemy by air action but however successful the air action, he did not believe that it would be possible entirely to prevent a German withdrawal by this means.

**General Marshall** said that at the Tripartite Plenary Meeting on the previous day the desire had been expressed that every effort should be made to stop the movement of German forces from west to east by air action and, in particular, to paralyze the vital rail junctions of Berlin and Leipzig. In this connection a report he had received that day summarizing Allied air operations in the last few days was of interest. On Friday, the second of February, the Royal Air Force had flown 2,400 sorties, concentrating on rail and road targets in Euskirchen and Coblenz. The latter, in particular, was of vital importance in the transfer of German forces to the East. Similar destruction of rail targets had taken place east of Alsace. On the same night a thousand of our bombers had attacked Wiesbaden, Karlsruhe
and synthetic oil plants elsewhere. On the following day, Saturday, the third of February, four-engined United States bombers had attacked Marienberg railway yards and 550 RAF bombers had attacked targets in the same area.

In relation to the destruction of communications and the interference with enemy movements the following data had been received relating to the effect of air attacks carried out on the 22d and 23d of January: On these two days alone 2,500 motor cars and trucks had been destroyed and 1,500 damaged; a thousand railway cars had been destroyed and 700 damaged; 93 tanks and self-propelled guns had been destroyed and a further 93 damaged; 25 locomotives had been destroyed and 4 damaged; 50 horse-drawn vehicles had been destroyed and 88 damaged. In addition, 62 known gun positions had been wiped out and 21 marshalling yards damaged. These very large results had been obtained on the two days he had referred to, but similar attacks were carried out on almost every fine day by the Allied air forces. He had referred on the previous day to the thousand-bomber attack on Berlin carried out on the third of February. There was also ready a plan to carry out a similar attack on Leipzig.

M. H. Khudyakov said that, as Marshal Stalin had pointed out, more than 8,000 Soviet planes were being used in the main thrust. In spite of weather conditions, between the 12th of January and the first of February 80,000 sorties had been flown in support of the Russian advance. More than a thousand enemy planes had been captured on airfields which had been overrun by the Russian troops. These aircraft had been prevented from flying away by bad weather. In addition, 560 planes had been shot down in air combat. If better weather prevailed air operations could be carried out on objectives further in the enemy rear but fog at this time of year rendered such deep operations to the west of Berlin almost impossible. He agreed with Sir Charles Portal that there were too many railroads in Germany to destroy all of them. He hoped that Field Marshal Alexander’s operations could be aimed at hampering the movement of German divisions from Italy to the Eastern Front.

Field Marshal Alexander said that this object was contained in his directive.

M. H. Khudyakov said that he was glad to hear of this. In Italy there were fewer railways to assist the enemy withdrawal.

Field Marshal Alexander explained that the Germans in Italy largely used roads for their withdrawals.

General Antonov said that in addition to the Soviet offensives in the North, offensives would also continue in the direction of Vienna and west of Lake Balaton. It was for this reason that Allied action in Italy was of importance to the Soviets. It seemed to him expedient
that Allied land offensives should be directed toward the Ljubljana Gap and Graz. He now understood that this was not possible.

Sir Alan Brooke said that it must be remembered that the Allies had no great superiority in land forces. They had come to the conclusion that in conjunction with the vital death blows being dealt by the Soviet armies in the East, the correct place for the western death blow was in Northwestern Europe. For this reason it had been decided to transfer divisions from Italy to the Western Front and to limit operations in Italy to holding as many German forces in that theater as possible. In the event of a German withdrawal from northern Italy, we had forces strong enough to take advantage of such a withdrawal, and possibly at a later date to be able to operate through the Ljubljana Gap. Such action, however, must remain dependent on the withdrawal of a proportion of the German forces at present in the north of Italy.

2. Movement of German Forces from Norway

General Antonov said that the Germans were transferring forces from Norway to Denmark. He asked if there was any way in which such a movement could be stopped.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said as far as was known, these movements were being carried out by rail and road to Oslo and not by sea. The troops were then being moved across the short sea passage to Denmark. It was not possible in view of heavy mining to operate surface forces in the Skagerrak and thus prevent the enemy making this short sea passage.

Sir Charles Portal said that the action of the air forces in this connection could be divided into two parts: firstly, by such attacks as could be made on shipping in the Kattegat, and with four-engined bombers operated on almost every fine night in an endeavor to bomb enemy ships. Several ships had recently been set on fire in this area. The second form of air action was by mine-laying aircraft. Approximately 1,000 mines were being laid by this method each month. Each aircraft carried some six mines. Sir Andrew Cunningham had just told him that recently these mines had sunk or damaged four enemy transports. German minesweepers did endeavor of course to sweep up our mines but it was now planned to increase the number of air attacks made on these minesweepers. However, there were so many varying tasks for the air forces to carry out that all could not be undertaken equally well.

Sir Alan Brooke said an examination had also been made of the possibility of stopping the movement of German forces from Norway by land action in Norway itself. There were, however, insufficient forces to undertake this without weakening our main effort on the Western Front.
3. USE OF ARTILLERY AND AIR IN FUTURE OPERATIONS

**General Antonov** said he felt it would be interesting to exchange information with regard to the method of carrying out operations in the autumn, winter and spring when, by reason of weather, it was not always possible to make use of air power. On these occasions the role of artillery became one of particular importance. As Marshal Stalin had said on the previous day, the Russians were establishing special artillery divisions of some 300 to 400 guns each, which were used for breaking through the enemy line. This method enabled a mass of artillery of some 230 guns of 76 millimeters and upwards to be concentrated on a front of one kilometer. He would be very glad to know what degree of artillery density would be used on the Western Front when the February offensive commenced.

**General Bull** said that the northern army group, which would take part in the next offensive, possessed some 1,500 guns of 105 millimeters and upwards, and the United States Army group which would also take part in the offensive, had some 3,000 guns of similar calibers. The army commanders concerned, by concentrating their artillery power on a narrow front, would be able to use some 200 guns to the mile in the area of the break-through. To this offensive power should be added the power of the air forces. In the three days preceding the attack on the eighth of February, it could be expected that some 1,600 heavy bombers would be used, capable of delivering 4,500 tons of bombs on the first day. For the remaining two days before the offensive, a slightly less weight of bombs could be dropped, but closer to the point of attack. Not only would communications behind the front be bombed, but also positions known to be strongly held.

On the day of the attack itself, "carpet bombing" would be used, and some 4,000 tons could be dropped on an area two miles square. He felt the effect of the air attack and the artillery concentration should produce a break-through, thus allowing our armor to operate in the enemy’s rear. A similar pattern of attack had been used on previous occasions with great success.

**Marshal Khudyakov** asked what action would be taken if it was found that weather prohibited the air forces from operating on the day of attack.

**General Bull** explained that the attack was normally timed for a day on which it was predicted that the weather would enable “carpet bombing” to be carried out. During the actual attack the bombing was carried out some 2,000 yards ahead of our own front line, but earlier bombing on targets further behind the line could be undertaken through overcast.

**Marshal Khudyakov** explained that all Russian operations in winter were planned on the supposition that bad weather would exist,
and no air operations would be possible. He felt that the Allies should bear this point in mind in planning their own operations.

General Marshall said that he had endeavored to explain that the Allies did not possess the same superiority in ground forces as did the Russians. The Allies did not have 300 divisions, nor was it possible to produce them. It was therefore essential to make full use of our air superiority. He would like to point out the advance across France had, in fact, been accomplished with the same number of divisions as the enemy himself had. This was made possible by a combination of ground and air power.

General Antonov said that he now had a very clear picture of Allied offensive intentions. Were there any questions which the British or United States Chiefs of Staff would like to ask?

4. Liaison Arrangements

Admiral Leahy said that in view of the very frank discussion of plans which was taking place, he would like to bring up the question of liaison between the Eastern and Western Fronts. The distance between the two armies was now so short that direct liaison was a matter of great importance. He had been directed by the President to bring up this question of liaison before the British, Russian and United States Chiefs of Staff. It was the opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff, who had not yet discussed it with their British colleagues, that arrangements should be made for the Allied armies in the West to deal rapidly with the Soviet commanders on the Eastern Front through the Military Missions now in Moscow. He would be glad to take back to the President the views of the Soviet and British Chiefs of Staffs on this matter.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were equally anxious to have the necessary liaison in order that plans could be concerted. They felt that such liaison required organizing on a sound basis. Military Missions were already established in Moscow, and these should, he felt, act as a link on a high level between the United States, British, and Soviet Chiefs of Staffs. In addition to this, closer liaison was required between the commanders of Allied theaters with the commanders of the nearest Russian armies. For example, on the Italian Front, Field Marshal Alexander required direct liaison with the Russian commander concerned.

In the case of the Supreme Commander on the Western Front, he would require direct liaison with the commanders of the Russian armies in the East. Thus there would be coordination between the high commands dealing with future action and in addition, direct coordination between the Allied and Soviet armies, who were closely in contact, on such matters as the employment of air forces and the coordination of day-to-day action.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that the question of liaison between the general staffs was very important and, as had already been mentioned, could be undertaken through the Missions in Moscow. In the present state of the offensives, this should be perfectly satisfactory until the forces came closer into contact with each other. Later, as operations advanced, the question of liaison between Army commanders could be reviewed and adjusted. These proposals would be reported to Marshal Stalin.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had not entirely understood the necessity for limiting liaison.

GENERAL ANTONOV explained that his proposal was to limit liaison to that through the General Staff in Moscow and the U. S. and British Missions. Such arrangements, however, could be revised and adjusted later to meet changing conditions.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that difficulties and serious results had already occurred in air operations from Italy over the Balkans. Such operations were directed from day to day and even from hour to hour, depending on weather and other conditions. If contact had to be maintained between the armies concerned through Moscow, difficulties would be certain to arise.

If this round-about method of communications through many busy people had to be adopted, there was a risk that our powerful air weapon could not be properly used.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the accident to which General Marshall referred had occurred not because of lack of liaison but due to the pilots concerned losing their way. They had, in fact, made a navigational mistake with regard to the correct point for bombing.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he recognized this. However, the bombline at that time excluded roads crowded with retreating Germans who could not be bombed by the Allied forces without an approach being made through Moscow. A powerful air force was available and good weather existed but the Allied air force was unable to act and the Germans profited thereby.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he entirely agreed with General Marshall that, through lack of liaison, we are losing the full force of the air power at our disposal.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that at the present time no tactical coordination was required between Allied and Russian ground forces. We should, he believed, aim at planning the strategic requirements of our air forces. The use of all Soviet air forces was dictated by the Soviet General Staff in Moscow. It was for this reason that the coordination of the air effort should, in his view, be carried out through the Soviet General Staff in Moscow, who alone could solve the problems. It was possible to agree on the objectives for strategic bombing irrespective of a bombline.
Sir Charles Portal said that in the British view there were two distinct problems with regard to liaison. The first was the necessity for the form of liaison referred to by General Antonov, i.e., the coordination of the Allied long-range bomber effort over eastern Germany and its relation to the advance of the Red Army. The Allied long-range strategic bomber force was not controlled by the Supreme Commander in the West except when it was undertaking work in close cooperation with the ground forces but was controlled by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff. It was right, therefore, that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff or their representatives should deal direct with Moscow on this matter.

The second problem was in respect to the constant air operations out from Italy in relation to Russian operations in the Balkans and Hungary. In that theater liaison was required, not so much on policy as on an interchange of information. The British Chiefs of Staff entirely agreed with the United States view that it was inefficient for liaison between Field Marshal Alexander and the Russian commanders to be effected through Moscow. It was, therefore, essential that some machinery should be set up to deal with day-to-day liaison between General Alexander and the Russian headquarters which controlled the southern front. Without such direct liaison it was impossible to take advantage of the many opportunities presented to hit the Germans from the air.

Marshal Khudyakov said that concerning air action into Germany itself, this could be done through the General Staff in Moscow as suggested by Sir Charles Portal, using the U. S. and British Military Missions. This liaison on policy was one which took time to arrange and was not a matter for great speed. With regard to direct liaison between Field Marshal Alexander and the Russian left wing he felt this was a matter which should be reported to Marshal Stalin.

General Antonov asked if it could not be agreed that a bombline should be established running from Berlin to Dresden, Vienna and Zagreb, all these places being allotted to the Allied air forces. Such a line could, of course, be changed as the front changed.

Admiral Leahy and Sir Alan Brooke asked that this matter be deferred one day for consideration.

5. Naval Operations in Support of the Land Offensive

Admiral Kuznetsov asked if plans had been made for any naval operations in direct assistance to the land attack which was shortly to be carried out. He referred not so much to the normal naval operations in the defense of communications and day-to-day operations of the fleet to control the seas but rather to direct operations in support of a land offensive.
SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM explained that projected operations were too far inland to be directly affected by any operations which could be carried out by the fleet except the routine operations of keeping open communications. He asked if Admiral Kuznetsov had any particular operations in mind.

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV said he had no particular operation in mind but rather the possibility of some operation in the neighborhood of Denmark that would not have any direct tactical connection with the army operations but would have a strategic connection.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that possible operations to outflank the Rhine had been studied. However, landing on the coast of Holland would prove extremely difficult and the necessary land forces were not available to enable an operation against Denmark to be undertaken.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that owing to the difficulty of forcing a crossing of the Rhine when that river was in flood, a very detailed examination had been carried out of the coastline from the Scheldt to the Danish coast, but operations in this area had not been found practicable since: firstly, large areas of Holland could be flooded and, secondly, operations further to the north would be too far detached from the main thrust to be of value.

ADMIRAL KING asked if Admiral Kuznetsov would outline the successes which the Soviet Fleet had been able to obtain in amphibious operations or operations to interfere with the transport of troops from the Baltic states to Germany.

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV said that operations of the Soviet Fleet to cut German communications in the Baltic had been undertaken by submarines and naval aircraft. When the area of Memel was reached, it became possible to transfer torpedo boats to augment Russian naval activity in that area. However, all operations were at present hampered by ice conditions and, further, the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga were heavily mined by the enemy, and mine clearance was hampered by weather conditions and ice.

ADMIRAL KING said that he appreciated that ice conditions were now limiting operations but had asked this question in view of earlier Soviet communiqués mentioning the damage or destruction of German shipping.

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV said that the earlier destruction of German shipping had been carried out by naval air forces and submarines.

6. DATE OF THE END OF THE WAR WITH GERMANY

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were engaged in making logistic plans for that phase of the war following the collapse of Germany. It had been suggested that such plans should now be based on a probable date of the first of July for the
earliest possible collapse of Germany. Before deciding on such a date he was anxious to have the views of the Soviet Staff on this matter.

General Antenov said that until the eastern and western offensives developed it was difficult if not impossible to predict the date of the collapse of Germany.

Admiral Leahy said he entirely appreciated the uncertainty but for planning purposes he would be glad to know if the Soviet Staff regarded the first of July as the earliest date as a reasonable assumption.

General Antenov said he regarded such assumptions as being difficult to make. He could assure Admiral Leahy that the Soviet General Staff would concentrate every effort on the earliest possible defeat of Germany.

General Marshall explained that a year ago it had been necessary to assume a date for the defeat of Germany on which to base calculations on such matters as production and the construction of shipping. It was necessary to revise this date from time to time, particularly in connection with the handling of shipping throughout the world. It had been proposed to take two target dates, one the earliest and one the latest likely date for the defeat of Germany. Such dates were now under consideration between the United States and British Chiefs of Staff who were in agreement that the first of July was the earliest likely date but differed by two months with regard to the latest likely date. The United States assumption in this connection was the 31st of December. Did General Antenov regard the first of July as improbable as the earliest likely date?

General Antenov said that he regarded the summer as the earliest date and the winter as the latest. The first of July should be a reasonably certain date for the defeat of Germany if all our efforts were applied to this end.

7. Future Business

A brief discussion took place on future business.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that a meeting should be held on the following day at 12 noon in the Soviet Headquarters, and that the following subjects should be discussed: (1) Coordination of Air Operations; (2) Shuttle Bombing; and (3) A Short Discussion on the War in the Far East.

Admiral King said he would be prepared to make a statement on operations taking place in the Pacific and his conception of the future development of the war in that theater. He would welcome any questions which the Soviet Staff might wish to ask on this subject.

General Antenov said he would be glad to listen to a description of the situation in the Far East and operations in that area, but as far
as discussion of the matter was concerned the Soviet General Staff would prefer that this should take place after the war in the Far East had been considered by the Heads of Government.

LUNCHEON MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 5, 1945, 1:30 P. M., YUSUPOV PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Page

UNITED KINGDOM
Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Major Theakstone

SOVIET UNION
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Pavlov

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Page Minutes

TOP SECRET

Subjects: 1. Toasts.
2. Name of the Conference.
3. Treatment of Germany.
4. Economic Matters relative to Germany.

1. Toasts.

Mr. Molotov opened the luncheon by proposing a toast to the leaders of the three countries. Upon being informed by Mr. Harriman that Manila had been captured, Mr. Molotov immediately proposed a toast to this victory of the Allied armies.

After a brief toast by Mr. Eden to Mr. Molotov as Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the 1943 Moscow Conference, Mr. Stettinius also proposed a toast to Mr. Molotov. He said that he hoped that he would be able to carry on the fine work of his predecessor, Secretary Hull. He stated that Mr. Hull, who was now in a hospital but was recovering, had asked him to present his compliments to Mr. Molotov. He concluded by stating that he looked forward to the day when he, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden would have frequent meetings.

Mr. Molotov immediately rose and proposed a toast to the recovery of Secretary Hull. He requested Mr. Stettinius to convey to Mr. Hull the sympathy and best wishes of all those present at the luncheon. He then proposed a toast to the British Ambassador, who reciprocated by toasting the “Moscow Commission” and its

1 Molotov acted as host.
2 Stettinius did send such a telegram to Hull; it appears to have been drafted on February 5 but not received until February 7 (Defense Files, Argonaut 53).
continued cooperation. This was followed by toasts on the part of Mr. Stettinius to his Dumbarton Oaks colleagues (Messrs. Gromyko and Cadogan); to the health and success of his ally, Mr. Harriman, by Mr. Molotov, and a toast to the important head of the Drafting Committee who asserted such control over the “Moscow Commission,” Mr. Vyshinski, by Mr. Harriman.

Mr. Justice Byrnes then proposed that the guests drink to the Great Armies of the Soviet Union and Ambassador Gromyko toasted Mr. Byrnes as a great American who had served in the three most important branches of the American Government.

Mr. Vyshinski suggested that Messrs. Strang and Winant, the co-workers on the European Advisory Commission be the subject of a toast.

Mr. Stettinius then raised his glass to Ambassador Gromyko, whom he described as an able and effective representative of the Soviet Union in Washington who had won the respect and admiration of the American people.

Mr. Molotov remarked that there had been enough toasts to the diplomats. He wished to raise his glass to Mr. Byrnes who held one of the most important positions in the United States Government. He said that it was hard for the average person to imagine just how important Mr. Byrnes was.

Mr. Eden then toasted the men who were fighting the war.

After a toast to the success of the present conference, Mr. Maisky was requested to make a few remarks. He raised his glass to the closest possible unity between the peoples, governments and chiefs of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union and remarked that the future of mankind depended upon this unity.

2. Name of the Conference.

During the course of the luncheon Mr. Molotov proposed a toast to the “Crimean Conference.” After a brief discussion it was suggested that the Conference should be so-called.

3. Treatment of Germany.

Mr. Eden inquired of Mr. Molotov as to what the Russians had in mind to discuss this afternoon.

Mr. Molotov replied that the Russian Delegation was prepared to discuss any question the United States or the United Kingdom Delegations so desired. This included those relating to the breaking up of Germany as well as political and economic matters relative to that country.

Mr. Eden stated that the general subject needed further study before any final decisions could be made.

Mr. Molotov remarked that in his view the Americans and British were considerably ahead of the Russians in their studies on this question.
Mr. Eden replied that although the British had studied the matter on a technical level, there had yet been no Cabinet discussions on the question. He stated that the President, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin would in all probability be unable to come to any final decisions today on the subject of the treatment of Germany and suggested that the matter be the subject of a joint study on the part of the three countries.

Mr. Molotov favored this idea.

Mr. Eden continued with the suggestion that the Prime Minister, the President and Marshal Stalin discuss the treatment of Germany in general terms at today's meeting, that they refer the question to the three Foreign Ministers for further study and that they instruct them to report back to the Big Three in two or three days with definite proposals.

Mr. Molotov indicated his approval of this proposal.

4. Economic Matters Relating to Germany.

Mr. Stettinius stated in an aside remark to Mr. Molotov that the United States Government believed it very important that agreement be reached on certain economic considerations with respect to Germany.

Mr. Molotov indicated that the Soviet Government expected to receive reparations from Germany in kind and hoped that the United States would furnish the Soviet Union with long term credits.

Mr. Stettinius stated that his Government had studied this question and that he personally was ready to discuss it at any time with Mr. Molotov. This could be done here as well as later either in Moscow or in Washington.

Mr. Molotov indicated that now that the end of the war was in sight it was most important that agreement be reached on these economic questions.

MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH CERTAIN OF HIS ADVISERS,
FEBRUARY 5, 1945, 2:30 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE

Present
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Bohlen

Editorial Note

No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, ante, p. 553, which states that the discussions continued
until 4 p.m. On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote of this meeting as follows: “I do not recall the subject but most such meetings were to inform the President of the results of our morning Foreign Ministers meeting and to prepare him for the afternoon agenda” (640.0029/8-1354).

SECOND PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 5, 1945, 4 P.M., LIVADIA PALACE

**Present**

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<tr>
<th>United States</th>
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<td>President Roosevelt</td>
<td>Prime Minister Churchill</td>
<td>Marshal Stalin</td>
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<td>Secretary Stettinus</td>
<td>Foreign Secretary Eden</td>
<td>Foreign Commissar</td>
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<td>Fleet Admiral Leahy</td>
<td>Sir Archibald Clark Kerr</td>
<td>Molotov</td>
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<td>Mr. Hopkins</td>
<td>Sir Alexander Cadogan</td>
<td>Mr. Vyshinsky</td>
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<td>Mr. Byrnes</td>
<td>Sir Edward Bridges</td>
<td>Mr. Maisky</td>
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<td>Mr. Harriman</td>
<td>Mr. Dixon</td>
<td>Mr. Gusev</td>
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<td>Mr. Matthews</td>
<td>Mr. Wilson</td>
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<td>Mr. Bohlen</td>
<td>Major Birse</td>
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**Bohlen Minutes**

Subject: Treatment of Germany.

The President opened the meeting by stating that it was his understanding that political matters affecting Germany would be discussed today. He said that they would not cover the map of the world and discuss Dakar or Indochina, but confine themselves to the political aspects of the future treatment of Germany. He said that the first question was that of the zones of occupation, which he understood had been agreed upon in the European Advisory Commission. He said there was one question still open and that was the desire of France to have a zone of occupation and French participation in the control machinery for Germany. He emphasized that the question of zones did not relate to the permanent treatment of Germany.

The President then handed a map ¹ of the agreed tripartite zones to Marshal Stalin, pointing out that although these zones had been agreed upon in the European Advisory Commission they had not yet been signed by the three governments.

Marshal Stalin said that in the discussion of Germany he would like to include the following points:

1. The question of dismemberment of Germany. He said that at Tehran they had exchanged views on this subject and later at Moscow he had talked this subject over with the Prime Minister. From these informal exchanges of views he had gathered that all were in favor of dismemberment, but nothing had been decided as to the manner of

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¹ A reproduction of this map faces p. 612.
dismemberment. He said he wished to know first as to whether the President or Prime Minister still adhered to the principle of dismemberment.

(2) Marshal Stalin inquired whether the three governments proposed to set up a German government or not and if there was a definite decision on dismemberment whether or not the three governments would set up separate governments for the various parts of Germany.

(3) Marshal Stalin inquired as to how the principle of unconditional surrender would operate in regard to Germany; for example, if Hitler should agree to surrender unconditionally, would we deal with his government?

(4) Marshal Stalin said his last point dealt with the question of reparations.

The President replied that, as he understood it, the permanent treatment of Germany might grow out of the question of the zones of occupation, although the two were not directly connected.

Marshal Stalin replied that what he wished to find out here was whether or not it was the joint intention to dismember Germany or not. He said that at Tehran, when the question had been discussed, the President had proposed the division of Germany into five parts. The Prime Minister, after some hesitation, had suggested the division of Germany into two parts with a separation of Prussia from the southern part of Germany. He said that he had associated himself with the views of the President, but the discussion at Tehran had only been an exchange of views. He added that at Moscow with the Prime Minister they had discussed the possibility of dividing Germany into two parts with Prussia on the one hand and Bavaria and Austria on the other, with the Ruhr and Westphalia under international control. He said that he thought that this plan was feasible but that no decision had been taken since the President was not there. He inquired whether the time had not come to make a decision on the dismemberment of Germany.

The Prime Minister stated that the British Government agreed in principle to dismemberment but he felt that the actual method and a final decision as to the manner of dismemberment was too complicated to be done here in four or five days. He said it would require elaborate searchings by experienced statesmen on the historical, political, economic and sociological aspects of the problem and prolonged study by a subcommittee. He added that the informal talks at Tehran and Moscow had been very general in character and had not been intended to lay down any precise plan. In fact, he added, if he were asked to state here how Germany should be divided he would not be in a position to answer, and for this reason he couldn’t commit himself to any definite plan for the dismemberment of Germany. The Prime Minister said, however, that personally he felt that the isolation of Prussia and the elimination of her might from Germany would remove the arch evil—the German war potential would be
Map attached to Bohlen minutes of Second Plenary Meeting
greatly diminished. He added that a south German state with perhaps a government in Vienna might indicate the line of great division of Germany. He said that we are agreed that Germany should lose certain territories conquered by the Red Army which would form part of the Polish settlement, but he added that the question of the Rhine valley and the industrial areas of the Ruhr and Saar capable of producing armaments had not yet been decided; should they go to one country, or should they be independent, or part of Germany, or should they come under the trusteeship of the world organization which would delegate certain large powers to see to it that these areas were not used to threaten the peace of the world. All this, the Prime Minister said, required careful study, and the British Government had not yet any fixed ideas on the subject. Furthermore, he said, no decision had been reached on the question as to whether Prussia after being isolated from the rest of Germany should be further divided internally. He said that we might set up machinery which would examine the best method of studying the question. Such a body could report to the three governments before any final decision is reached. He said we are well prepared for the immediate future, both as to thought and plans concerning the surrender of Germany. All that was required was a final agreement on zones of occupation and the question of a zone for France.

MARTIAL STALIN replied that it wasn’t clear to him as to the surrender. Suppose, for example, a German group had declared that they had overthrown Hitler and accepted unconditional surrender. Would the three governments then deal with such a group as with Badoglio in Italy?

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that in that case we would present the terms of surrender, but if Hitler or Himmler should offer to surrender unconditionally the answer was clear—we would not negotiate under any circumstances with any war criminals and then the war would go on. He added it was more probable they would be killed or in hiding, but another group of Germans might indicate their willingness to accept unconditional surrender. In such a case the three Allies would immediately consult together as to whether they could deal with this group, and if so terms of unconditional surrender would immediately be submitted; if not, war would continue and we would occupy the entire country under a military government.

MARTIAL STALIN inquired whether the three Allies should bring up dismemberment at the time of the presentation of the terms of unconditional surrender. In fact, he added, would it not be wise to add a clause to these terms saying that Germany would be dismembered, without going into any details?

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not feel there was any need to discuss with any German any question about their future—that uncon-
ditional surrender gave us the right to determine the future of Germany which could perhaps best be done at the second stage after unconditional surrender. He said that we reserve under these terms all rights over the lives, property and activities of the Germans.

**Marshal Stalin** said that he did not think that the question of dismemberment was an additional question, but one of the most important.

**The Prime Minister** replied that it was extremely important, but that it was not necessary to discuss it with the Germans but only among ourselves.

**Marshal Stalin** replied that he agreed with this view but felt a decision should be made now.

**The Prime Minister** replied that there was not sufficient time, as it was a problem that required careful study.

**The President** then said that it seemed to him that they were both talking about the same thing, and what Marshal Stalin meant was should we not agree in principle here and now on the principle of dismemberment of Germany. He said personally, as stated by him at Tehran, that he was in favor of dismemberment of Germany. He recalled that forty years ago, when he had been in Germany, the concept of the Reich had not really been known then, and any community dealt with the provincial government. For example, if in Bavaria you dealt with the Bavarian government and if in Hesse-Darmstadt you dealt with that government. In the last twenty years, however, everything has become centralized in Berlin. He added that he still thought the division of Germany into five states or seven states was a good idea.

**The Prime Minister** interrupted to say "or less", to which the President agreed.

**The Prime Minister** remarked that there was no need, in his opinion, to inform the Germans of our future policy—that they must surrender unconditionally and then await our decision. He said we are dealing with the fate of eighty million people and that required more than eighty minutes to consider. He said it might not be fully determined until a month or so after our troops occupy Germany.²

**The President** said he thought the Prime Minister was talking about the question of dismemberment. In his view he said he thought it would be a great mistake to have any public discussion of the dismemberment of Germany as he would certainly receive as many plans as there had been German states in the past. He suggested that the Conference ask the three Foreign Ministers to submit a recommendation as to the best method for the study of plans to dismember Germany and to report within twenty-four hours.³

² It appears that the first note of Hopkins, post, p. 633, was passed to the President at about this point. See this portion of the Matthews minutes, post, p. 626.

³ For a facsimile of a note on this point which Stettinius passed to Roosevelt, see Stettinius, p. 125.
The Prime Minister said the British Government was prepared to accept now the principle of dismemberment of Germany and to set up suitable machinery to determine the best method to carry this out, but he couldn’t agree to any specific method here.

Marshal Stalin said he wished to put a question in order to ascertain exactly what the intentions of the three governments are. He said events in Germany were moving toward catastrophe for the German people and that German defeats would increase in magnitude since the Allies of the Soviet Union intend to launch an important offensive very soon on the Western Front. In addition, he said that Germany was threatened with internal collapse because of the lack of bread and coal with the loss of Silesia and the potential destruction of the Ruhr. He said that such rapid developments made it imperative that the three governments not fall behind events but be ready to deal with the question when the German collapse occurred. He said he fully understood the Prime Minister’s difficulties in setting out a detailed plan, and he felt therefore that the President’s suggestion might be acceptable: namely, (1) agreement in principle that Germany should be dismembered; (2) to charge a commission of the Foreign Ministers to work out the details; and, (3) to add to the surrender terms a clause stating that Germany would be dismembered without giving any details. He said he thought this latter point was important as it would definitely inform the group in power who would accept surrender unconditionally, whether generals or others, that the intention of the Allies is to dismember Germany. This group by their signature would then bind the German people to this clause. He said he thought it was very risky to follow the plan of the Prime Minister and say nothing to the German people about dismemberment by the Allies. The advantage of saying it in advance would facilitate acceptance by the whole German people of what was in store for them.

The Prime Minister then read the text of Article 12 of the surrender terms agreed on by the European Advisory Commission, in which he pointed out that the Allied governments have full power and authority over the future of Germany.\(^4\)

The President said that he shared Marshal Stalin’s idea of the advisability of informing the German people at the time of surrender of what was in store for them.

The Prime Minister said that the psychological effect on the Germans might stiffen their resistance.

Both the President and Marshal Stalin said there was no question of making the decision public, and Marshal Stalin added that as far as he knew the surrender terms which Italy had accepted had not yet been made public.

\(^4\) For the text of the draft surrender terms, see ante, pp. 113-118.
The Prime Minister said he would find it difficult to go further than to give the assent of the British to the principle of dismemberment and the setting up of machinery to study the best method of putting it into effect.

It was agreed that the three Foreign Ministers should consider Article 12 of the surrender terms instrument in order to ascertain the best method of bringing in a reference to the intention to dismember Germany.

The President then said that the question of the French zone remained to be decided. He said that he had understood from Marshal Stalin that the French definitely did not wish to annex outright the German territory up to the Rhine.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was not the case, since during the visit of General DeGaulle the French had made it quite plain that they intended to annex permanently the territory up to the Rhine.

The Prime Minister said that he did not feel it possible to discuss possible frontiers as they were considering only the zones of temporary military occupation. He added that he was for giving the French a definite zone which could come out of the British and possibly the American zones and that all he sought here was that the Soviet Government would agree that the British and American Governments should have the right to work out with the French a zone of occupation. He added that this zone would not in any way affect the proposed Soviet zone.

Marshal Stalin inquired whether or not the granting of a zone to France would not serve as a precedent to other states.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the occupation of Germany might be a long one and that the British Government was not sure that it could bear the burden alone for an extended period and that the French might be able to be of real assistance in this matter.

Marshal Stalin said that if the French were given a zone, would not that change the Tripartite control of Germany to a four-nation control.

The Prime Minister replied that the British Government expected that if France were given a zone they would, of course, participate in the control machinery, but that in regard to other nations that might assist in the occupation, such as Belgium or Holland, there would be no question of a specific zone and thus no part in the participation of the control machinery [sic].

Marshal Stalin stated that he thought it would bring up many complications if we should have four nations instead of three participating in the determination of German matters. He thought that some method might be evolved whereby England might let the French, Belgians and Dutch assist in the occupation but without the right to
participate in the Three Power decisions for Germany. He said that if this was accepted the Soviet Government might desire to ask other states to help in the occupation of the Soviet zone without any right to participate in the decisions of the control commission.

The Prime Minister replied that he felt that this brought up the whole question of the future role of France in Europe and that he personally felt that France should play a very important role. He pointed out that France had had a long experience in dealing with the Germans, that they were the largest naval power, and could be of great help in the administration of Germany. He went on to say that Great Britain did not wish to bear the whole weight of an attack by Germany in the future and for this reason they would like to see France strong and in possession of a large army. He said it was problematical how long the United States forces would be able to stay in Europe, and therefore, it was essential that France be relied upon to assist in the long term control of Germany.

The President replied that he did not believe that American troops would stay in Europe much more than two years. He went on to say that he felt that he could obtain support in Congress and throughout the country for any reasonable measures designed to safeguard the future peace, but he did not believe that this would extend to the maintenance of an appreciable American force in Europe.

The Prime Minister said that he felt that France should have a large army since it was the only ally that Great Britain had in the West, whereas the Soviet Union in addition to their own powerful military establishment could count on the support of the Poles.

Marshal Stalin said he fully appreciated the necessity of a strong France, which had recently signed a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union. He added that he had discussed this matter with Daladier before the war and recently in Moscow with General De Gaulle.

The President then remarked that he felt that France should be given a zone, but that he personally felt that it would be a mistake to bring other nations into the general question of the control of Germany.

Marshal Stalin observed that if France was given the right to participate in the control machinery for Germany, it would be difficult to refuse other nations. He repeated that he wished to see France a strong power but that he could not destroy the truth, which was that France had contributed little to this war and had opened the gate to the enemy. In his opinion, he said, the control commission for Germany should be run by those who have stood firmly against Germany and have made the greatest sacrifices in bringing victory.

5 For the text in translation of this Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, signed at Moscow December 10, 1944, see Department of State Bulletin, January 7, 1945, vol. xii, pp. 39-40.
He did not believe that France should belong on the list of such powers, but that it should be limited to the three nations represented here.

The Prime Minister replied that every nation had had their difficulties in the beginning of the war and had made mistakes. He said that France had gone down before the attacks of the new German tank and air units and while it was true that France had not been much help in the war, she still remained the nearest neighbor of Germany and of great importance to Great Britain. He agreed that it would be inconvenient to add France to the present group of major allies, but he felt that British public opinion would not understand why France was being excluded from a problem which was of such direct concern to her. He observed that the destiny of great nations was not decided by the temporary state of their technical apparatus. He said that sooner or later we would have to take France in. He mentioned, however, that he had been against the participation of France in the present conference, which he understood was the opinion of the President and had gathered here was also that of Marshal Stalin. He concluded by saying that we must provide for France in the future to stand guard on the left hand of Germany otherwise Great Britain might again be confronted with the specter of Germany on the Channel at the Channel ports.

Marshal Stalin repeated that he would not like to see France as a participant in the control machinery for Germany, although he had no objection to their being given a zone within the British and American zones.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the control commission will be an extraordinary body under the orders of the governments concerned and that there was no reason to fear that basic policy in regard to Germany would be made by this commission.6

The President pointed out at this point that France was in fact a full member of the European Advisory Commission which was the only Allied body, apart from this Conference, which was considering the German problem.

The President said that he favored the acceptance of the French request for a zone, but that he agreed with Marshal Stalin that France should not take part in the control machinery, otherwise other nations would demand participation. He went on to say, for example, that as a result of the deliberate German destruction of the dikes that large sections of Dutch farm land had been inundated by salt water and that it would be necessary to give the Dutch farmers compensation for a temporary period from German territory. He said that he

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6 It appears that the second note of Hopkins, post, p. 634, was passed to the President at about this point. See this portion of the Matthews minutes, post, p. 629.
understood that it would be at least five years before the flooded lands would be suitable for cultivation. If this was done, and he personally felt that it should be done, the Dutch might well claim a voice in the control machinery for Germany.⁷

Mr. Eden then pointed out that there was no question of any zones for any other power except France, but that France would not accept a zone of occupation within the British and American zones without participation in the control commission.

Marshal Stalin remarked that Great Britain could speak for France in the control commission.

The Prime Minister supported Mr. Eden’s theories and said that if France got a zone they must be given representation in the control commission, otherwise, the question of the administration of the French zone and its relation to the other zones would be impossible of solution. He again pointed out that the control commission would be a subordinate body similar to the European Advisory Council.

Marshal Stalin said that the control machinery for Germany would not be an advisory body but would be actively engaged every day in the administration of Germany. He added that he felt French participation would serve as a precedent for others.

The Prime Minister then suggested that the three Foreign Ministers be asked to study the question in relation to [of the relationship of] the French zone to the control commission.

Mr. Molotov said that the European Advisory Commission had already worked out a definite agreement on a tripartite administration of Germany.⁸

Mr. Eden replied that there was no intention of reversing that decision but that he felt as a practical matter the question of the relationship of the French zone to that of the control commission should be considered.

In reply to a question from Mr. Molotov, the Prime Minister repeated that there was no intention of giving the Belgians or Dutch a zone.

Mr. Eden repeated that the case of France was different and that they would not accept a zone subordinate to British control.

Marshal Stalin then said that he felt that there was agreement on the fact that France should be given a zone but should not be given participation in the control commission. The three Foreign Ministers should study the question of the relationship of the French zone to that of the commission.

Marshal Stalin then said that he would like to discuss the question of German reparations.

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⁷ Perhaps the third note of Hopkins, post, p. 634, was passed to the President at about this point.
⁸ See ante, pp. 124–127.
The President said that in regard to reparations there was first of all the question of the desires and needs of principal allies and then subsequently that of the smaller countries, such as Belgium, Holland, Norway, etc. He said he would like to bring up the question of the Russian desires in regard to the utilization of German manpower.  

Marshal Stalin replied that they had a plan for reparations in kind but were not ready yet to present any plan in regard to German manpower. He then said that Mr. Maisky would present the Soviet plan.

Mr. Maisky then outlined the Soviet plan for reparations for Germany. He said that the Soviet plan for reparations in kind envisaged two categories: (1) the removal from the national wealth of Germany of plants, machine tools, rolling stock, etc. to be completed within a period of two years after the end of hostilities, (2) yearly payments in kind to last for ten years. He said that in order to restore Soviet economy which had suffered so much from German aggression, and to safeguard the future security of Europe, it would be necessary to reduce German heavy industry by 80%. By heavy industry he meant iron and steel, electrical power and chemical industries. Specialized industry useful only for military purposes should be 100% removed. In this category would fall all aviation factories, synthetic oil refineries, etc. He said that the Soviet Government felt that with 20% of her heavy industry Germany would be in position to cover the economic needs of the country. He said the list of goods to be delivered during the 10 year period could be definitely fixed later on. He further proposed that in the interests of the orderly execution of the reparations plan and for the security of Europe there should be an Anglo-Soviet-American control over German economy which would last beyond the period of the reparations payment. All German enterprises which could be utilized for war purposes should be placed under international control with representatives of the Three Powers sitting on the boards of such enterprises. Mr. Maisky went on to say that in the calculation of losses as a result of German aggression the figures had been so astronomical that a selection and the establishment of a system of priorities for compensation had been necessary. He said that even direct material losses, such as public and private property, factories, plants, railroads, houses, institutions, confiscation of materials, etc. had been so large that no reparations could cover their loss. For this reason, priorities had been established according to indices, (1) the proportional contribution of any one nation to the winning of the war, (2) the material losses suffered by each nation. He said that those countries which had made the highest contribution to the war and had suffered the

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* Perhaps the fourth note of Hopkins, *post*, p. 634, was passed to the President at about this point.
highest material losses would come into the first category and all others would fall into the second. Mr. Maisky proposed that there should be set up a special reparations committee of the three governments to sit in Moscow. He concluded that the total reparations shown in withdrawals and yearly payments in kind which the Soviets required would reach a total of ten billion dollars.

The Prime Minister stated that he recalled very well the end of the last war and that although he did not participate in the peace settlement he had been very fully informed of the discussions. He remembered well that there had been only two billion pounds extracted from Germany in the form of reparations by the Allies after the last war and that even this would not have been possible had not the United States given Germany credits. He said, for example, that they had taken some old Atlantic liners from the Germans, who had immediately proceeded on credit to build new and better ships. He recognized that the suffering which the Soviet Union had undergone in this war had been greater than any other power, but he felt that the Soviet Union would get nowhere near the sum which Mr. Maisky had mentioned from Germany. He said that at the end of the last war the Allies had also indulged themselves with fantastic figures of reparations but that these had turned out to be a myth. He said that the British Isles had also suffered in this war and that the British Government had disposed of the bulk of its assets abroad despite the generous help of Lend-Lease. He said that the British Isles had to export goods in order to import food, since they were dependent on imports for one-half of their food supply. He said that there would be no victorious country so burdened in an economic sense as Great Britain and that, therefore, if he could see any benefit to Great Britain in large reparations from Germany he would favor such a course but he very much doubted whether this was feasible. He added that other countries, such as Belgium, Holland and Norway also had claims against Germany. He said he was haunted by the specter of a starving Germany which would present a serious problem for the Allies since we could either say "It serves them right" or endeavor to help them. In the latter case, who would pay for the help. The Prime Minister concluded that if you wished a horse to pull a wagon that you would at least have to give it fodder.

Marshal Stalin observed that that was right, but care should be taken to see that the horse did not turn around and kick you.

The President remarked that he had also been through the last war and that he remembered very vividly that the United States had lost a great deal of money. He said that we had lent over ten billion dollars to Germany and that this time we would not repeat our past mistakes. He said that in the United States after the last war the German property that had been sequestered during the war had been
turned back to the German owners, but that this time he would seek the necessary legislation to retain for the United States all German property in America. He said that the Germans had no capital, factories, or other equipment that the United States needed but that he did not wish to have to contemplate the necessity of helping the Germans to keep from starving. He said, however, that he would willingly support any claims for Soviet reparations since he felt that the German standard of living should not be higher than that of the Soviet Union. He added that just as we expected to help Great Britain expand her export trade, we would also help the Soviet Union retain the reparations in kind which she required, as well as German manpower to reconstruct the devastated regions, but he felt that the Germans should be allowed to live in order that they might not become a burden on the world. The President concluded, however, that despite his desire to see the devastated areas in all countries, in the Soviet Union, in Great Britain, in France, and elsewhere, restored, he felt that reparations could not possibly cover the needs. He concluded that he was in favor of extracting the maximum in reparations from Germany but not to the extent that the people would starve.

Mr. Maisky then stated that while he appreciated the Prime Minister's points concerning the experiences after the last war in the matter of reparations, he felt that the failure in this respect had been due not to the fact that the reparations had been too heavy but to the transfer problem which was the rock on which the reparations policy was founded. He said that he must add that the financial policies of the United States and Great Britain contributed to the German refusal to pay. He said that the Germans had never paid more than one-quarter of the total reparations figure and had received a great deal more in credits and loans. Mr. Maisky stated that the purpose of reparations in kind was to avoid the problem of transfer. He pointed out that the amount desired by the Soviet Union was equal only to 10% of the present United States budget and equal to about six months' of the British expenditures in the war. The Soviet demands for German reparations equaled about 1½ times the United States budget in peace and about 2½ times the British budget. He said, of course, there was no intention to force Germany into starvation but he pointed out that he did not feel that the Germans had a right to a higher standard of living than that of Central Europe. He said Germany can develop her light industry and agriculture and that since the Germans would have no military expenditures there was no reason why Germany could not give a modest but decent standard of living to her people.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that the question of reparations should be examined by a sub-commission and that this commission should consider the claims of other countries who bore the facts of Nazi aggression as well.

THE PRESIDENT said that in his opinion the commission should be confined to the representatives of the Three Powers, to which Stalin agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was in agreement, that in the first instance the representatives of the three major powers should consider the question.

Marshal Stalin said he felt that the commission could accomplish nothing unless it was given general directives from this Conference. He said he felt that the commission composed of the representatives of the three principal Allies must work on the basis that these Powers had contributed most to the common victory and should be given priority in the matter of reparations. He said that although the United States did not need machine tools she might well need raw materials which she could receive from Germany. He mentioned that the United States would take over German property in the United States as a part of her share.

THE PRESIDENT expressed agreement with this view.

Marshal Stalin continued that in calculating German capabilities, Germany's post-war resources should be also taken into consideration. Then all factories and farms would work not for war but for peace. He repeated that the Three Powers who had made the most sacrifices and had been the organizers of victory should have first claim on reparations. He stated that he did not include France among these powers since she had suffered less than Belgium, Yugoslavia, or Poland.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the Allies had done a great deal of the damage in France.

Marshal Stalin replied that France could not expect to get reparations from the Allies. He said that he respected France but that he could not ignore the truth and that at the present moment France only had eight divisions in the war, Yugoslavia twelve and the Lublin Government of the Poles thirteen.

It was then agreed that the question of the main directives to a commission on reparations which would sit in Moscow would be referred to the Foreign Ministers who would report back to the Conference. It was agreed that the next meeting would be 4:00 p.m. tomorrow, February 6, and that the questions of Dumbarton Oaks and Poland would be considered.
TOP SECRET

The President opened the meeting and said that he thought they should talk about the general aims of peace rather than about Dakar and China. There were many things to discuss. He said that one of the first questions to discuss of immediate importance was that of zones of occupation of Germany now that the situation seemed to be coming to a head. He meant not the permanent solution of Germany but just that of occupation. It was a question of the French who want a zone. Occupation also involves control machinery. He showed a map to those at the table and said that is what he and Prime Minister Churchill discussed about at Quebec. He amended this statement when it was explained to him privately that the map had its origin in the protocol on the zones of occupation and the European Advisory Commission.

Stalin: I should also like to discuss the following questions: (1) the dismemberment of Germany. There was an exchange of views at Tehran and when Churchill came to Moscow it was further discussed that [but?] there were no decisions. I understand that we are all in favor of dismemberment but I would like to know definitely do we agree, and if so, what form of dismemberment. (2) Do we admit the setting up of any government in Germany or not? Or should we confine ourselves merely to establishing their administration? If we divide Germany will each part have its own government or will each part have its own administration? (3) Unconditional surrender. We are agreed on that, but if Hitler surrenders unconditionally are we to preserve his government? One thing excludes the other. Do we still adhere to unconditional surrender? We have already had experience with that in Italy. Do we not need to work out the definite terms of unconditional surrender? (4) Reparations and the amount. All these questions are in addition to those raised by the President. (It appeared that Stalin was not familiar with the EAC approved protocol on unconditional surrender.)

President: All these other questions are permanent and grow out of the zones of occupation.

Eden: (nodding) That's right.

Stalin: That we shall find out. If Germany is to be partitioned, then in what parts? It is well known that we twice exchanged views. First at Tehran when the President then suggested partition into five parts. The Prime Minister hesitated but said he also favored partition. I associated myself with the President but that was only an

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1 For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.
exchange of views. The second time I exchanged views with the Prime Minister in Moscow. He talked of partition in two parts; one of Prussia and one of Bavaria. He suggested that the Ruhr and Westphalia be put under international control. I replied that might be appropriate but would make no decision because the President was not there. Hasn't the time come for decision? If you think so, let us make one.

Prime Minister: In principle I think we are all agreed on dismemberment, but the actual method, the tracing of lines, is much too complicated a matter to settle here in five or six days. It requires very searching examination of geography, history and economic facts and is deserving of prolonged consideration by sub-committees or committees to be set up to go into the question. The two conversations mentioned by Marshal Stalin have approached the topic in a very general way only. If asked today, "How would you divide Germany?" I would not be prepared to answer. I might make some personal suggestion but would feel free to change my views. One has in mind, first, the might of Prussia, then the [omission] of Austria. One can see that Prussia separated from other German states [would have] her power greatly reduced, and I personally myself thought establishment of another German state to the south—possibly with its capital at Vienna—would be a line of ground division between Prussia and the rest. The population would be half and half. There are other questions, in principle decided, which here present themselves for consideration: (1) We are agreed Germany should lose certain territories largely conquered by Russian arms or needed in connection with Polish settlement. (2) Also there is the question of the Rhine Valley—the Ruhr and the Saar—potent munitions areas. Should they be handed to a country like France? or made independent under Germany? or placed under some world organization for a long period of time? This obviously requires very searching study and consideration. I have no fixed ideas. (3) Finally, there is the question whether Prussia herself, having been isolated, should be subjected to internal division. I have no fixed opinion. I would like the matter explored and possibly settled in agreement with our two great allies. The French must of course be consulted. At Tehran there was some talk of an examination being made of these complex matters. We should do this quickly, mainly set up machinery for examination.

We are not ill-prepared for the immediate effect of German surrender. All details have been worked out and are well known to the three governments. There remains only formal agreement on zones of occupation and control machinery. If Germany surrenders in a few weeks or a month unconditionally we have only to march in and occupy by processes already agreed upon.
STALIN: This is not clear. How can it be carried out in practice? Suppose a group declares it has thrown out Hitler? Shall we be prepared to deal with them?

EDEN: We would set the terms agreed upon before this regime.

(1 left the room at this point to get a copy of the surrender terms and missed the next few minutes.)

PRIME MINISTER: In that case we must make up our mind whether the group is worth dealing with. If so, we must make them sign the agreed terms. If they are not worth dealing with we should continue the war and occupy the whole country.

STALIN: When shall we bring up the question of dismemberment to these new people if there is no provision for dismemberment (in the surrender terms)? Shall we not add a provision to the terms of surrender for dismemberment?

PRIME MINISTER: If they sign we do not discuss with them any question about the future. There is no need to raise the question. We reserve all rights over their land, their liberty and their lives.

STALIN: This is not an additional question but it is most important.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree. But it is not necessary to discuss it with the Germans.

STALIN: No, simply to demand from them.

PRIME MINISTER: I do not think it possible to discuss the exact form of dismemberment. That would come at the peace conference.

PRESIDENT: We have not decided what the Marshal proposed. Are we going to dismember or not? He wants the matter settled in principle but not as to details. The Prime Minister says he is not yet ready to lay down the limit; that requires study. In effect, these are our terms and in addition we shall dismember. That is the only difference. Shall we all agree that Germany should be dismembered? As at Teheran, I am very much personally in favor of decentralization. Forty years ago when I was in Germany there was no word for the Reich and in Bavaria affairs were managed entirely locally. I do not know whether there should be more or less states than suggested before but shall we tell the Germans that we are going to dismember and do it our way?

PRIME MINISTER: I see no need to inform the Germans at the time of surrender whether we will dismember them or not. It is enough to tell them, "Await our decision as to your future." We might be able to tell while our troops are marching in what is needed.

PRESIDENT: If this question is discussed all over the world there will be a hundred plans for dismemberment. Therefore, I ask that we confine it to ourselves and that the three foreign secretaries bring in tomorrow a plan for dismemberment.

PRIME MINISTER: You mean a plan for the study of the question of dismemberment, not a plan for dismemberment itself?
PRESIDENT: Yes, for the study of dismemberment.

PRIME MINISTER: His Majesty's Government would be prepared now to assent [to the] principle of dismemberment and to set on foot the best body to study the method.

STALIN: I put the question so that we may be quite agreed on what we want. Events in Germany are developing rapidly toward a catastrophe for them. Their defeats shall increase because of the allied airforce attacks in the near future.

(I left the room to get a glass of water for the President and missed the following few minutes.)

STALIN: In view of such rapid events we should not be without preparation. Therefore, I put the questions and think they should be settled here. No details need be worked out now. I think the President's compromise proposal should be accepted. Is it agreed (1) to dismember Germany and empower a commission to elaborate concrete plans? (2) To add to the surrender terms that Germany is going to be dismembered though not to say into how many states? I think it important that we should say this so that the group in power should know Germany is to be dismembered. I think the Prime Minister's plan not to tell the Germans is a risky one; we should say this to them in advance. I think there are advantages to have this provision in the surrender terms so that any German group should know when they sign and bear the responsibilities.

PRIME MINISTER: The terms of unconditional surrender are terms on which the fighting stops. (He reads article 12 of surrender terms.) That is what they have got to sign.

PRESIDENT: The first paragraph on disarmament does not mention dismemberment and does not make it clear enough. The Marshal's idea, which is somewhat my own, is that it will make it easier if it be in the terms and tell them.

PRIME MINISTER: But you don't want to tell them. Eisenhower doesn't want that. That would make the Germans fight all the harder. We should not make this public.

PRESIDENT: My own feeling is that the people have suffered so much that they are now beyond questions of psychological warfare.

STALIN: No, these conditions for the moment are only for us. They should not be public until the time of surrender. We can do as we have done with Italy where the surrender terms are not yet public. I want it agreed (1) to dismember and (2) to put dismemberment into the surrender terms.

PRIME MINISTER: I find it difficult to go beyond assent to the principle of dismemberment and the setting on foot of machinery as to the best method of doing it. I agree to a most rapid examination of the question of the best means of studying a method of dismemberment.
PRESIDENT: Would you put in Article 12 in addition the word "dismemberment"?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes, I would agree.

EDEN: Or some other formula to make dismemberment possible.

STALIN: I have no objection to the proposal. It is agreed.

PRESIDENT: Now to take up the next question—a zone of occupation for France. (A portion missed here.)

STALIN: The French told me in Moscow that they would want a frontier on the Rhine.

PRIME MINISTER: I can't agree. There is a question of a condominium on the Rhine. The present question is different. It applies only to zones of occupation. We are all now agreed, are we not, on the three zones? The French want a zone and I am in favor of granting it to them. I would gladly give them part of the British zone. All we want is this: It does not affect the Soviet zone. Will our Russian allies agree that the British and Americans get together on a zone to allot to the French? The line of the Moselle seems a convenient place to let them in. They are not in a position to occupy a large zone.

STALIN: Would it not be a precedent for other states? Would it not mean that the French become a fourth power in the control machinery for Germany which, so far, is only for the three of us?

PRIME MINISTER: Our answer is that France should come in and as its army grows take a larger part in the occupation.

STALIN: I think there might be complications in our work if we have a fourth member. I suggest another method—for the British to get the help of France or Holland or Belgium in occupation but not give them rights in the control machinery. We might ask on our side to invite other states to help occupy our zone but not to sit in on control machinery.

PRIME MINISTER: The discussion is on the immediate question of France. They have had long experience in occupying Germany. They do it very well and they would not be lenient. We want to see their might grow to help keep Germany down. I do not know how long the United States will remain with us in occupation. (The President: "Two years.") Therefore the French army should grow in strength and help us share the burden. If Russia wants some other power in her zone we should not object.

STALIN: I should like to know the President's opinion.

PRESIDENT: I can get the people and Congress to cooperate fully for peace but not to keep an army in Europe a long time. Two years would be the limit.

PRIME MINISTER: I hope that would be according to circumstances. At all events we shall need the French to help us.
Stalin: France is our ally. We signed a pact with her. We want her to have a large army.

President: I should much rather have a small number on the control machinery. I should be just as satisfied if the French are not in on the control machinery.

Stalin: I should like to repeat that if we let the French in on control machinery it would be difficult to refuse other states. I agree that the French should be great and strong but we cannot forget that in this war France opened the gates to the enemy. This is a fact. We would not have had so many losses and destruction in this war if the French had not opened the gates to the enemy. The control and administration of Germany must be only for those powers standing firmly against her from the beginning and so far France does not belong to this group.

Prime Minister: We were all in difficulties early in this war and France went down before the new tanks and I admit they were not much help in this war. But the fact remains they are the neighbor of the Germans and the most important neighbor. British public opinion would not understand if decisions vital to France are being made with regard to Germany over France's head. I hope, therefore, that we shall not decide for an indefinite exclusion of France for all time. I was very much against General de Gaulle's coming here and the President's view was very much the same. Apparently Marshal Stalin feels the same. But the fact remains that France must take her place. We will need her defence against Germany. We have suffered badly from German robot guns and should Germany again get near to the channel coast we would suffer again. After the Americans have gone home I must think seriously of the future. I propose to offer the French a zone out of present British and American zones and that technical studies be made of the French position in the control machinery.

Stalin: I am still against France taking part in the control machinery.

Prime Minister: I agree. (Several sentences not understood) That France cannot be a member of this group but cannot we let her into control machinery.

President: (On the basis of a note from Mr. Hopkins) I think we have lost sight of the French position on the European Advisory Commission. I suggest that the French have a zone of occupation but that we postpone discussion on control machinery. Others might want to come in, such as Holland or Austria.

Stalin: I agree.

President: The Netherlands are in a very serious situation. Several millions of their farmers are thrown off their land by flooding and
we must set aside some land in Germany to take care of this. Their own land will not be suitable for cultivation for five years. The Netherlands might ask for a seat on the Control Commission.

Eden: If the French are to have a zone, how can they be excluded from the control machinery? If they are, how can their operation of their zone be controlled?

Stalin: They could be controlled by the power from which they obtained the zone.

Prime Minister and Eden: We cannot undertake to do that and the French would never submit to it.

Eden: The French pressed us hard on this question in Paris when we visited there. Did they question it at Moscow?

Stalin: We talked about it but we said it could only be discussed by all the three powers.

Prime Minister: Is it agreed that the Americans and British set aside a zone for France? I propose to leave the next step as to the future status of France when it may be approved as a whole. I propose that the three foreign secretaries sketch out the kind of commission for control to be set up. (After Eden has whispered to him) He (Eden) says it has all been worked out and I withdraw my question.

Maisky: I think it is superfluous to discuss the question with the three foreign ministers.

Molotov: The European Advisory Commission has already taken decisions and has set up for only the three powers. It is agreed that France is to have a zone and that the question of their relation to the control machinery shall be left for report by the three foreign ministers.

Reparations

President: The three of us are involved in this question and there is also the question of what the small powers want. First, there is the question of manpower. What does Russia want? The United States and British I believe do not want reparations in manpower.

Stalin: We have a plan for reparations in kind but we are not ready to talk about manpower.

Prime Minister: Could we hear about your plan for reparations in kind?

(Stalin instructs Maisky to explain the Russian plan.)

Maisky: Reparations in kind we think should be in two forms: (1) Withdrawals from the national wealth of Germany at the end of the war. By this is meant transfer of factories, plants, machinery, machine tools, rolling stock and investments abroad. (2) Yearly payments in kind for a period of ten years.

To restore Russian economy and for the security of Europe it is necessary to cut down German heavy industry by 80%. By heavy industry is meant iron and steel, metal working, engineering, chemi-
cals, electrical engineering, etc. All military production and aviation as well as synthetic petroleum should be prohibited 100%. About 20% of German heavy industry would be left and this would be enough for the real need of German economy. Reparations in kind should be for a period of ten years and the list could be settled later on. The reparations in kind should be terminated in ten years and withdrawals of plants, factories, etc., in two years. In order to make Germany pay there must be very strict tri-partite control over Germany. The details can be settled later on but it must be established that the most important industries should be internationalized and members of the three great allies should be on the boards of directors, such representation to continue for the ten-year period. In estimating reparations we have considered the kind of losses to be covered. The figures are so astronomical that we believe that only those losses under the category of direct material losses, that is, destruction of state and private property of all sorts should be included. Even this is so large that the whole amount of reparations cannot be covered. Therefore, priorities among countries should be fixed by indices. We make two suggestions: (1) The proportion of contribution by a country to the winning of the war to its losses of material in the war. The highest should be in the first category and the others in the second category. (2) For discussion of the principles and details on reparations we suggest that a commission with its seat in Moscow should be set up. The question now comes how much would Russia want for reparations. We would want not less than ten billion dollars.

Prime Minister: I remember well the last war and the sad experience in reparations that followed. It was with great difficulty that one billion pounds was finally extracted from Germany and that was due to the fact that Germany received much larger amounts in loans from the United States. I remember we took over some old Atlantic liners which permitted Germany to build better new ones. I do not want to repeat that experience. I admit that Russian losses are much greater than those of any other country. I feel that the removal of certain plants and materials from Germany is the proper step for restitution. I am sure that we will never get out of Germany anything like 250 million pounds a year. We too have suffered. Our houses have been destroyed. We are faced with an export problem. We must export in order to buy food, one half of which we must import. We have incurred very heavy debts outside lend-lease. No victorious country will come out so burdened financially as Great Britain. If I could see any benefit in reparations I would be glad to have them but I am very doubtful. Other countries also have suffered great devastation—France, Belgium, Norway. We
must also consider the phantom of a starving Germany and who is going to pay for that. If eighty millions are starving are we to say, "It serves you right." and if not, who is going to pay for feeding them?

STALIN: There will be food for them anyway.

PRIME MINISTER: I am in favor of setting up a commission to study the question.

PRESIDENT: We lent Germany far more than we got after the last war. That cannot happen again. We want no manpower. We do not want their machine tools or their factories. Therefore, what can we get? German stock and property in the United States? This has at present been taken over by the Alien Property Custodian. After the last war it was used as an off-set against our claims in Germany. I hope to get legislation this time to take it over as a trust fund.

We must think of the future of Germany. We have always been generous through our Red Cross but we can’t guarantee the future of Germany. We don’t want to kill the people. We want Germany to live but not to have a higher standard of living than that of the U.S.S.R. I envision a Germany that is self-sustaining but not starving. There will be no lending of money. Our objective is seeing that Germany will not starve in helping the Soviet get all it can in manpower and factories and helping the British get all they can in exports to former German markets. Therefore, the time has come to set up a reparations commission. In re-building we must get all we can but we can’t get it all. Leave Germany enough industry and work to keep her from starving.

MAISKY: The experience of reparations has been bad but the reason was not because reparations were too heavy but because they were asked in monetary form and therefore the transfer question arose. There was also the question of Germany’s refusal to pay. What is ten billion dollars? It is 10% of the United States budget this year. It is six months war expenditure of Great Britain. It is one and one quarter times the United States peacetime budget and two and one quarter times the British each year. Yes, we should prevent Germany from having a higher standard than the middle European standard. Germany will be able to live on this and she is free to develop her light industries and agriculture. The doubts of the Prime Minister are unfounded. Germany will be able to live a decent life and we must not forget that she will have no burden of military expenditures.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree on the setting up of a reparations commission but we must keep it secret.

STALIN: Yes, it should be kept secret.

PRIME MINISTER: The commission must also consider the claims of all the victims, the assets available, and the priorities to be assigned.
Differences arising in the commission must be referred to and settled by the three governments.

STALIN: We must take here common decisions as the guiding lines for the commission. The work must be done by the three parties to the commission. We three should have the first place on reparations claims as we bear the burden of the war. The United States should get German property in America. She doesn't want machine tools. We must take into consideration not only present German resources but her future resources when her manpower returns and goes to work. I do not include France in the first category and certainly France shall not have reparations from us. I must say, in all truth, France cannot be compared to us. She takes part in the war with eight divisions and some navy. The Yugoslavs, and I am not mentioning them, have twelve divisions; Lublin Poland has ten divisions, which is more than de Gaulle has. I propose that the three foreign ministers meet and report.

PRIME MINISTER: They should settle the heads of the directives—the guiding principles—and I hope that within one month the governments can receive their version. You must remember I have a cabinet and parliament. Also the point of the first index on damage sustained I think is enough. I do not think that the exertion in the war should be taken into consideration. Remember the saying of each according to his needs. The President agrees to the setting up of the reparations commission in Moscow; the Prime Minister agrees also.

The meeting adjourned at 8 p.m. after determining that the next meeting should be held at 4 tomorrow afternoon, and that the world organization should be taken up first and Poland second.

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Hopkins Papers

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President

[YALTA, February 5, 1945.]

Mr. President:—

I would suggest that you say this is a very important and urgent matter and that the three foreign ministers present a proposal tomorrow as to the procedure by which a determination as to to dismemberment can be arrived at an early date

Harry

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1 See ante, p. 614. This and subsequent Hopkins notes have been transcribed literally from facsimiles of the handwritten originals.
The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President

[YALTA, February 5, 1945.]

1. France is on the European Advisory committee now. That is only body considering German affairs now.
2. Promise a zone.
3. Postpone decision about Control Commission.

The relationship of this and the two following notes to the Second Plenary Meeting appears from internal evidence and from their association in the files with a paper bearing the following words in Hopkins’ handwriting: “Notes given to President by me during conference with Stalin and Churchill on Feb 5—45”. See ante, p. 618.

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President

[YALTA, February 5, 1945.]

Why not agree to a French zone and consider later the question of putting them on control commission for Germany? or not—Could you not add that French participation on Control Commission might be considered later?

See preceding footnote. See also ante, p. 619.

The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President

[YALTA, February 5, 1945.]

Could you ask him
1. Why not take all Gestapo-Storm Troopers and other Nazi criminals.

See ante, p. 620.

Tuesday, February 6, 1945

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, February 6, 1945, 10 A. M., Vorontsov Villa

Present

United States

General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Bull
Major General Anderson
Major General Hull
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser

United Kingdom

Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Wilson
Field Marshal Alexander
General Ismay
Admiral Somerville
Major General Laycock
TOP SECRET

1. Approval of Minutes of the 185th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C.C.S. 185th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

2. Levels of Supply of Petroleum Products in U.K. and Northwest Europe

3. Planning Date for the End of the War Against Germany (C. C. S. 772)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to accept for planning purposes the following dates for the end of the war with Germany:—

a. Earliest date, 1 July 1945.

b. Date beyond which war is unlikely to continue, 31 December 1945.

4. Provision of LVT’s for the Mediterranean

5. Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany (C. C. S. 320/35)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff proposing the acceptance of an agreement regarding the Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave and the use of the railway from Bremen to the southwest zone, on the understanding that this agreement did not involve the question of command of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area.

General Marshall referred to the fact that the letter at Enclosure "B" (page 5) visualized the necessity for making a more detailed form of agreement, covering a variety of circumstances. He felt strongly

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1 C. C. S. 186th Meeting.
2 *See ante, pp. 530–534.
3 See under Malta Conference, ante, pp. 478–480.
4 Infra.
that no such detailed agreement was necessary. The broad policy had been decided and the good will was there. Details could be left very largely to local commanders and any problems of overlapping authority which did arise could be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the time came.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then agreed to the following amendments to the Appendix to Enclosure “B” of C. C. S. 320/35:—
a. In paragraph 1 delete the words “but will be generally administered as a sub-district of a larger British controlled area.”
b. In the second sentence of paragraph 1, delete the words “larger district” and substitute “British zone.”
c. In the second sentence of paragraph 2, delete the word “responsible” and substitute the word “responsive.”

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
a. Endorsed the views expressed by General Marshall above and approved the Appendix to Enclosure “B” of C. C. S. 320/35 as amended in discussion. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 320/37.)
b. Agreed to take no further action on the detailed recommendations included in the letter at Enclosure “B” to C. C. S. 320/35.

6. Basic Undertakings
(C. C. S. 775)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff recommending a substitution for the existing paragraph 6h. in C. C. S. 680/2.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were now in a position to agree to this subparagraph h., as it had been amended informally in discussion at a previous C. C. S. meeting when this had been discussed.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to the following revised subparagraph h.:

“h. Provide assistance to such of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of the other basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations against Germany and/or Japan.”

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* Post, p. 639.
† Ante, p. 539.
7. Liaison with the Soviet High Command over Anglo-American Strategic Bombing in Eastern Germany
(C. C. S. 778)  

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff suggesting a line that might be taken with the Soviet General Staff at a meeting which was to be held later the same day to discuss the matter of the bombline. The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the desirability of putting forward this fresh memorandum in the place of the one recently submitted in FAN 477.  

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed that the United States Chiefs of Staff should put forward to the Russians the views expressed in C. C. S. 778, as amended in discussion.  

8. Next Meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to meet again, provisionally at 1000 on Thursday, 8 February 1945, to finish off any outstanding items on the Argonaut Agenda. 

This paper as amended (C. C. S. 778/1) was read by Kuter at the Second Tripartite Military Meeting. See post, pp. 640–641.  

Not printed.  

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[Yalta,] 5 February 1945.
C. C. S. 320/35

Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany

1. With regard to the draft agreement concerning the Bremen-Bremerhaven area proposed by General Macready in the attached letter to Mr. McCloy 1 (Enclosure "B"), the United States Chiefs of Staff prefer that the final agreement exist on one sheet of paper and recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve Enclosure "A."

2. As regards the numerous points proposed in General Macready’s letter it appears to the United States Chiefs of Staff that such matters which cannot be agreed to by the local commanders of the Zones of Occupation should be referred at that time to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision. There will be undoubtedly some problems of

1 Ante, pp. 199–201.
overlapping authority and conflicting interests which will have to be resolved under the policy of coordination and cooperation.

3. It has been our understanding that the draft agreement as proposed by Lord Halifax and Mr. McCloy and as modified by the British Chiefs of Staff does not involve the question of command of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area. Such command, with the full authority that is inherent in command, must rest with the American commander of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area, as subordinate of the American commander of the Southwestern Zone. It is intended, however, that in the normal administration of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area the American commander thereof will, in accordance with the draft agreement, conform to the general policy pursued in the administration of the British Zone as qualified in the phrasing of the draft agreement.

4. If the British Chiefs of Staff prefer to retain the wording of the agreement attached to General Macready’s letter it is acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff provided the British Chiefs of Staff indicate their concurrence to the above interpretation of the draft agreement.

5. The United States Chiefs of Staff urge that this matter be completed before the end of the present conference.

Enclosure “A”

(Paragraph numbers conform to the attachment to General Macready’s letter. Underlining and italicizing represent amendments to that attachment.)*

1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave Area as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization but will be generally administered as a subdistrict of a larger British controlled area. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the larger district [British Zone, subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave Bremen-Bremerhaven Area in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff agree to permit necessary access by the British to offices, and necessary use of available installations, situated in the Bremen-Bremerhaven Area, which provide services essential to British administration of the British Zone of Occupation.

*Words underlined are proposed additions. Words italicized are proposed deletions. [Footnote in the original.]
2.3. The U. S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen-Bremerhaven Area to the Southwestern Zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American Zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsible responsive service, each military zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for United States (or British) requirements of Movement and Transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.

3.4. The map referred to is attached is the same as that attached to C. C. S. 320/29.  

*C. C. S. 320/29 is not printed, but the map in question is reproduced facing p. 200.

J. C. S. Files

Agreement Regarding the Bremen-Bremerhaven Enclave Approved by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[YALTA], 6 February 1945.

C. C. S. 320/37

THE BREMEN ENCLAVE

1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the British zone subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.

2. The U. S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen area to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsive service, each military zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for (United States/British) requirements of Movement and Transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.

3. The map referred to is that attached to C. C. S. 320/29.
SECOND TRIPARTITE MILITARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 6, 1945, NOON, YUSUPOV PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Vice Admiral Cooke
Major General Deane
Major General Bull
Major General Anderson
Major General Hull

UNITED KINGDOM
Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Wilson
General Ismay
Admiral Somerville
Rear Admiral Archer

SOVIET UNION
General of the Army Antonov
Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
Lieutenant General Gryzlov
Vice Admiral Kucherov
Commander Kostrinsky

SECRETARIAT
Brigadier General McFarland
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Captain Graves
Commander Coleridge

INTERPRETERS
Captain Lunghi
Lieutenant Chase
Mr. Potrubach

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

Chairmanship

General Antonov requested Admiral Leahy to serve as Chairman of the 2nd Tripartite Meeting.

Admiral Leahy thanked General Antonov but suggested that in the interest of continuity, Field Marshal Brooke continue to preside.

1. Bombline and Liaison Arrangements

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the first item to be discussed should be General Antonov's proposal for a bombline running from Stettin through Berlin, Vienna and Zagreb. He asked the United States Chiefs of Staff to express their views on this proposal since they were most intimately concerned with it.

General Kuter said he would like to read a statement on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff, setting out their views on this matter. This statement read as follows: ¹

"1. Our wishes are:

(a) To continue to do the greatest possible damage to the German military and economic system.

(b) To avoid interference with or danger to the Soviet forces advancing from the East.

¹ This statement is the text of C. C. S. 778/1, dated February 21, 1945, and entitled "Liaison with the Soviet High Command over Anglo-American Strategic Bombing in Eastern Germany".
(c) To do what is possible to assist the advance of the Soviet Army.

"2. To achieve the first wish, that is, maximum damage to the Germans, it is essential to avoid as far as possible any restriction of strategic bomber action. It is not our wish to draw a line on the map which would exclude our bombers from attacking any targets which are important to the war-making power of the enemy, whether against the Soviet or the British and American forces.

"3. To achieve the second wish, that is, avoidance of interference with Soviet land operations, we must rely upon the Soviet High Command to inform the British and United States Missions in Moscow of the positions of the Red Army from day to day. We also invite the Soviet High Command to inform the British and United States Missions if there are any particular objectives, for example, railway centers or centers of road communication close in front of their armies which they wish us not to attack. We should require at least 24, and preferably 48 hours' notice for action upon such requests.

"4. A regular daily meeting between the British and United States Missions in Moscow and a responsible officer of the Soviet General Staff seems to us to be essential.

"5. To achieve the third wish, that is, assistance to the Russian advance, we should be glad to receive through the British and American Missions in Moscow any suggestions from the Soviet High Command. This suggestion would have to be considered in the light of other commitments and such factors as the distance and the weather.

"6. To summarize, we suggest:—

(a) That there should be no rigid division of eastern Germany into spheres of action of the Soviet and British and American strategic bombers respectively;

(b) That day-to-day liaison should be established between a responsible officer of the Russian High Command and representatives of the British and American Missions in Moscow, in order to exchange information upon which we can regulate the action of the Anglo-U. S. strategic bombers in accordance with the development of Soviet operations on land.

"7. When the Soviet Air Force is ready to undertake strategic bombing deep into Germany from the East, the coordination of policy should be discussed by Soviet, American and British Staff representatives in London or in Moscow. Some further machinery for the closer coordination of operations would appear to be necessary at that time."

General Kuter said that he would like to add that in addition to his objection to the principle of a fixed line on the map, there was the further objection that there were valuable strategic targets to the east of the proposed line. From among some 20 such strategic targets which would be denied to Allied air power he would mention a few. These included the oil targets at Politz, the main production center of high octane gasoline and main source of fuel supply for
German Air Force; Ruhrland, second only in importance to Politz, and one of the four major synthetic oil plants in Germany. In addition there were several other oil targets. Further the proposed line would appear to prohibit attacks on some industrial and communication targets in the neighborhood of Berlin and Dresden. The line would also prohibit attack on three tank and self-propelled gun factories; and, lastly, and of great importance, it would prevent attacks on three jet-propelled fighter engine factories where components of the Juno jet engines were made and the engines themselves were assembled. He would point out that the oil targets referred to required repeated attacks in view of the German's ability to repair them rapidly.

There was one further point he would like to make. Apart from the strategic implication of the line, it was unacceptable in view of topographical considerations. A bombline must be clearly visible to a pilot in the air, both from high and low altitudes.

General Marshall said he would like to add an additional illustration of the point made by General Kuter. He had that morning received a message from the Commanding General of the United States heavy bombers operating from the United Kingdom, reporting an attack on Berlin carried out three or four days previously by a thousand heavy bombers supported by some 600 fighters. These fighters were practically over the Russian lines and, in fact, destroyed a number of German aircraft taking off from an airfield east of Berlin. The Commanding General pointed out that, with good liaison parties and proper radio communication, not only could valuable information be given to the Russians before such an attack but also that the most recent information with regard to enemy and Russian movements could be communicated to him.

With the speed of modern fighters the aircraft taking part in this raid were involved in operations only five minutes flying time from the Russian ground forces. Yet it must be remembered that these aircraft were bombing a definite point which the Russian staff had requested should be attacked. Unless better methods of handling liaison were evolved, it would mean that the most powerful weapon of the war would be denied its proper use in assisting the Russians. He asked that an immediate and really practical solution should be found to this problem.

Sir Charles Portal then explained the point of view of the British Chiefs of Staff. Owing to the fact that United States bombers operated by day while the Royal Air Force bombers operated mainly by night, this problem affected the United States forces more than it did the British. Nevertheless, the problem for both air forces was almost identical. Already complete integration of control of the
United States and British bomber effort from the West and from the South had been achieved.

Speaking for the British Air Staff, he fully supported the proposals which had been put forth by General Kuter which would entirely cover British requirements.

General Antonov explained that in putting forward at the previous meeting his proposal with regard to the bombline, he had in mind the wishes expressed by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff which had been put forward by General Deane and Admiral Archer. These wishes expressed a desire that the bombline should be as near as possible to the Soviet front. The line that he now suggested was only some 60 to 75 kilometers in front of the Soviet lines. There was no possibility of moving the bombline further to the eastward as this would hinder the action, not only of the Soviet ground forces but also the Soviet air forces. He appreciated that there were a number of important targets to the east of the proposed line which should be bombed. In connection with the bombing of such individual targets, each one could be considered separately. He would ask also that consideration should be given to the fact that the Soviets had a large number of aircraft themselves. He had mentioned on the previous day the 8,000 aircraft now being employed on the central front. If all the targets to the east of the line were made available to the Allied air forces, then there would be nothing left for the Soviet forces to attack. The line now proposed was only a very general line drawn in the light of considerations put forward by General Deane and Admiral Archer and would have to be worked out in detail and, in particular, altered to enable Allied flyers easily to identify it. With regard to changes in the line necessitated by changes in the position of Soviet forces, full information with regard to this would be provided daily through the missions in Moscow. Through the same channel, the efforts of the Soviet air forces could also be coordinated.

Sir Charles Portal said that as he understood it, General Antonov’s view was that if the line which he had proposed was to be moved further to the east, there would be nothing left for the Soviet Air Force to attack. He felt there had been some misunderstanding on this point since the United States and British air staffs were entirely agreeable that any strategic target should be attacked by all three air forces. This was one of the reasons why he was opposed to drawing of any line which would divide Germany into two parts from the point of view of strategic bombing.

General Kuter said he would like to comment on two points. He was glad to learn that the Soviet wishes were similar to his own, as indicated by General Antonov’s reference to constant liaison to enable
coordination to be achieved. Secondly, he would like to refer to the results achieved during the advance across the western desert. In this operation, as the result of excellent air-ground liaison, it was possible to place the bombline not at some specific distance ahead of the front line but at a point which it was expected that our own ground forces might be able to reach in eight hours.

**General Marshall** asked confirmation that General Antonov's view was that the bombline he proposed should be altered so that it could be better defined topographically and that at the same time arrangements could be made for Allied forces to bomb critical points on the Soviet side of this line.

**General Antonov** said the line which he had indicated was a rough guide only. He felt that the Heads of the Air Staffs could work out the details of this line so as to ensure its recognition from the air. This redefinition of the line could, he believed, be undertaken at the present conference. He also supported the statement made by Sir Charles Portal that there could be no line established which would entirely divide the targets of the three strategic air forces. It was for this reason that he considered that the action of the Soviet strategic air force should be coordinated with the Allied air effort through the missions in Moscow. If it was desirable for the Allied air forces to bomb targets to the east of the line, such action could be discussed in Moscow and the necessary decision taken.

**Sir Alan Brooke** said he regarded the bombline as a line of demarcation between the action of air forces and land forces and not as a line of demarcation between the action of strategic air forces. In Allied operations on the Western Front there was no line of demarcation between the action of the United States and British strategical air forces but there were bomblines on the various fronts closely connected with the action of the land forces and designed to insure close cooperation between land and air forces. He asked if it were to be assumed from General Antonov's statement that the proposed bombline now being discussed was to be considered as the bombline which would ensure coordination of action between land and air forces but not designed to restrict the action of the strategic air forces, which action would be regulated through the missions in Moscow on a day-to-day basis.

**Sir Charles Portal** said he would like to put the question in a different way. Was it the intention of the Soviet Staff that the improved liaison which it had been suggested should take place through the missions in Moscow, would be in lieu of the line proposed and should be such as to safeguard the Soviet ground forces from the action of strategic bombers?
General Antonov said that the line he had proposed was designed to secure Soviet land forces from the possibility of accidental bombardment by the Allied air forces. Such a line could not be permanent and would be changed frequently to conform to changes in the land front. The actions of the strategic air forces, both Soviet and Allied, would not be bound by this line, however. It was drawn so close to the Soviet front that he presumed that the Allied strategic air forces would not find many targets to the east of this line though such targets might exist and in this case action against any of them could be decided upon individually. As to the Soviet strategic air force it would appear that in most cases their attacks would take place to the west of the line.

Admiral Leahy suggested that, since there appeared to be a large measure of agreement, time would be saved if the three air staffs met together and worked out the details of the proposed bombline.

Sir Charles Portal said he would like to suggest an amendment to Admiral Leahy’s proposal. He felt that instead of the air staffs trying to work out the details of the line they should work out the requirements for safeguarding the interests and security of the Soviet forces, having regard to the need for the destruction of as many important German installations as was possible. There seemed to be little difference between the various views expressed and what differences there were could, he felt sure, be settled quite easily.

Admiral Leahy said that he accepted Sir Charles Portal’s amendment to his suggestion.

General Antonov said that he agreed with Admiral Leahy’s view that the matter should be referred to the air staffs to work out a detailed line in accordance with the principles which had been discussed.

It was agreed that Marshal Khudyakov, General Kuter and Sir Charles Portal should meet together immediately to consider this matter.

Sir Alan Brooke said that there was one further related question which remained unsettled. This was the question of liaison on a lower level. General Antonov had undertaken, at the previous meeting, to seek the views of Marshal Stalin on this point.

General Antonov said he had reported on this matter to Marshal Stalin. Marshal Stalin had pointed out that there had so far been no close contact between Soviet and Allied land forces and therefore wished that liaison should take place through the Staff of the Red Army and the Military Missions in Moscow.

2. COORDINATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Sir Alan Brooke said that the forthcoming offensives had been fully discussed at the previous meeting and coordination had been broadly settled. There remained, however, the question of the of-
fensives during March and April. General Antonov had mentioned also a summer offensive. Could he give any further information as to the probable date of the commencement of this summer offensive and whether it would be in great strength? Further did he foresee any long periods between the end of the present offensive and the commencement of the summer offensive?

General Antonov said that Soviet offensive action had started and would continue. The Soviet forces would press forward until hampered by weather. With regard to the summer offensive, it would be difficult to give exact data with regard to the interval between the end of the winter and beginning of the summer attack. The most difficult season from the point of view of weather was the second part of March and the month of April. This was the period when roads became impassable.

General Marshall asked, with regard to General Antonov’s comment on the bad weather period between the winter and summer offensives, whether it was anticipated that it would be possible to carry out any important action until the summer offensive could be started.

General Antonov said that, if during this period operations in the West were carried out actively, the Soviets would take every possible action on the Eastern Front wherever this could be done.

General Marshall emphasized that the interval between the winter and summer offensives would probably be the period at which the Allies would be trying to cross the Rhine. He was therefore most anxious that the enemy should not be able to concentrate forces against the Allies on the Western Front at that particular time.

General Antonov said that he could assure General Marshall that the Soviets would do everything possible to prevent the transference of German forces from east to west during this period.

3. Exchange of Information With Regard to River-Crossing Technique and Equipment

Admiral Leahy said that at the first meeting between the Heads of State, the British Prime Minister had raised the question of exchanging information with regard to technique and equipment employed by the Soviet forces in river crossings. At the present time in view of the Allied proximity to the River Rhine this was a most immediate problem for the Allied forces. There were now two officers present from General Eisenhower’s headquarters and it appeared highly desirable that they should meet with the appropriate Soviet experts on the subject of the technique and equipment employed by the Red Army in major river crossings which they had undertaken.
Thus the Allies on the Western Front could obtain the benefit of the experience of the Red Army in this matter. He would therefore very much appreciate if General Antonov would indicate whether this could be done and if so would make such arrangements as were practicable for the officers from General Eisenhower's headquarters to meet with the appropriate Soviet officers.

General Antonov said that the Soviet Army was always ready to share its battle experience with its allies. However, at the moment there were no specialists in this technique available and he would like therefore time to look into this matter. He would furnish the required information later.

Admiral Leahy thanked General Antonov for this very satisfactory reply.

4. BASES FOR U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN THE VIENNA-BUDAPEST AREA

General Marshall said that as the Soviet advance proceeded it would be found logistically possible to move U. S. strategic bomber forces now in Italy, with their protecting fighters, to bases in the Vienna-Budapest area. It was very desirable for such aircraft to operate from that vicinity. It was therefore the hope of the United States Chiefs of Staff that this could be arranged by having a staging area or zone of passage in that area so that it could be arranged for some 670 individual heavy bomber sorties to be undertaken each month. This would require the support of about 1,800 fighter missions in the same period. To effect this it would be necessary to carry out certain construction work for which some 2,000 United States personnel could be provided from Italy and 200 from elsewhere. The greatest difficulty would be the transfer of the necessary supplies and equipment. 22,000 tons would be required initially and a further 8,300 tons a month thereafter. The President of the United States was likely to present this project to Marshal Stalin with a request for his approval. It would involve the use of two airfields in the Budapest area and also agreements that the Soviet authorities should undertake the movement of the necessary stores to the Budapest area by road, rail or barge.

General Antonov said that the matter would probably be decided between Marshal Stalin and the President. He personally felt that it could conveniently be undertaken and suggested that the Heads of the Air Forces should consider the problem.

General Marshall said he would be very happy for this to be arranged.
5. Provision of Soviet Airfields for Damaged British Night Bombers

Sir Charles Portal said he had one request to make. It would be extremely helpful if the Soviet General Staff could allocate air bases with night landing equipment at various points distributed along their front at which British night bombers, damaged in night combat over Germany, could land instead of having to fight their way back over the heavy defenses of Germany. If these aircraft were so badly damaged that they could not get back, and no such airfields were available, the crews had no alternative but to bail out and lose their aircraft. If the Soviet authorities could agree to this request he suggested that details could be arranged through the missions in Moscow.

Marshal Khudyakov said that he regarded this as a technical question. Up to the present the Soviet forces had never denied assistance to Allied fliers, who had always been met and taken care of. He suggested the details of Sir Charles Portal's proposal should be worked out after the conference.

6. Enemy Intelligence

General Antonov said that at the previous Conference he had referred to the fact that the Germans would endeavor to stop the Russian offensive on the line of the Oder. Quite possibly they would not only adopt a passive defense on this line but would try to gather together counterattack forces for a break-through. He would be glad to know if the Allied commander in the West had any intelligence with regard to the collection of such forces, their movements or the likely point for such an attack. He was particularly interested in the transferece of the Sixth S. S. Panzer Army.

General Bull said that when he left General Eisenhower's headquarters a short time ago evidence existed that the Sixth Panzer Army was leaving the Western Front and possibly an additional two divisions from north of the Vosges. General Eisenhower had taken immediate action to put the maximum possible air effort on these German movements. He was not up to date with regard to the direction of these moves but he was certain that such information as was available at the Supreme Commander's headquarters could be sent to the Soviet General Staff. He would be glad to take this matter up with General Eisenhower immediately on his return.

General Marshall said that he had received a message on the previous day which gave definite information of the moves of certain divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army from the Western Front. This message had also given the new total of enemy divisions on the Western Front as 69. This morning's operational report raised this total to
MINUTES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

70 since a newly formed parachute division had appeared on the Western Front on the right of Field Marshal Montgomery’s forces, in a position somewhere east of Venlo. He would get an exact statement on this matter and give it to General Antonov.

SIR ALAN BROOKESaid that his information was very similar to that given by General Marshall. It was known that the Fifth Panzer Army had also been pulled out of the line but there were no indications yet of its moving to the eastward. The British experts believed that this move was unlikely to take place. If General Antonov wished, a telegram could be sent asking for the latest information.

GENERAL ANTONOV said he was very grateful for the information given him and was particularly interested in the transfer of the Sixth Panzer Army to the eastward.

SIR ALAN BROOKESaid, with regard to the Italian Front, that as far as was known only one division was being withdrawn although there were indications of considerable movement.

GENERAL MARSHALL said it might be helpful, if the Soviet Staff was not already aware of them, to give details of the attack in the Ardennes. This attack had been made by the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. Prior to the attack the Sixth Panzer Army had been out of the line for several months and had been located northeast of the Ruhr with five divisions. The Fifth Panzer Army had been in the front line or close to it. The Sixth Panzer Army had crossed to the west of the Rhine a month or six weeks before the offensive had taken place but had not been located until the attack was launched. The Sixth Panzer Army had been the first to be withdrawn from the attack and the Fifth Panzer Army was finally also withdrawn though it was not known if it had left the front.

MARSHAL KHudyakov asked if the losses in the Fifth Panzer Army were known.

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was difficult to differentiate between losses incurred by the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. At the meeting on the previous day he had given information with regard to the destruction inflicted on one or the other of these armies in the course of two days operations. It was believed that very heavy casualties had been inflicted on the motor vehicles and tanks of almost all the divisions of both the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies.

GENERAL BULL said the Fifth Panzer Army had attacked in the center and, of the two, made the most progress. The Sixth Panzer Army had attacked in the north in the direction of Malmedy-Liege. Both the Fifth and the Sixth Armies had suffered considerable losses in armor and two divisions of the Fifth Army in particular were known to have suffered heavily.
7. Pacific Operations

Admiral King said that the general principles for the conduct of the war against Germany and Japan were: firstly, the defeat of both Germany and Japan at the earliest possible date; secondly, that Germany was the principal enemy; thirdly, that continuous and unremitting pressure would be maintained against the Japanese forces. Efforts would be made to attain positions from which the final attack on Japan could be staged when the necessary forces became available from Europe. There had been no fixed schedule but endeavor had been made to go as fast and as far as the available means permitted. At the present time our operations were hampered chiefly by lack of shipping and the shortage of service and auxiliary troops. It was worthy of note that all operations in the Pacific had, of necessity, been amphibious operations and some were carried out over great distances.

In general, the forward line now held included Attu, the Marianas, and Luzon. In addition, we had control of the sea and air not only up to this line, but beyond it to China, Formosa, the Ryukyus, and even to the coast of Japan itself. The present fighting was taking place on the island of Luzon, about 1,500 sea miles from Japan itself. The Japanese appeared to prefer to keep the fighting at that distance from their homeland. What was important was that it was still possible to inflict casualties on the Japanese navy, air forces, and shipping. The British Pacific Fleet was now available, and had been reported to him as being available for operations about the 15th of March.

Regarding future operations, it was proposed to continue the liberation of the Philippines and to establish air bases in Luzon from which to interdict enemy air and shipping in the north part of the China Sea, including the China coast and the area of Formosa. On the 19th of February the United States forces would seize the Bonin Islands, which would be used chiefly as a base for fighters accompanying the heavy bombers on raids on Japan. About the first of April it was proposed to go into Okinawa in the Ryukyus for the purpose of establishing air bases and an advance naval base, and to intensify the sea and air blockade of Japan.

Though no decision had been taken, planning was proceeding on an operation to go into the Chusan Archipelago to broaden the base for intensifying the air and sea blockade of Japan. This would also assist interdiction of communications in the Shanghai-Hankow area, including the great water highway of the Yangtze.

In the North Pacific, air operations were being conducted from the Aleutians and occasional ship bombardments of the Kuriles, chiefly against the islands of Paramushiru and Shushima in the extreme north of the chain. The weather for air operations in this area was par-
particularly bad, and consequently there had been a number of forced landings by United States aircraft in Kamchatka. He would like to express his deep appreciation for the care and assistance which had been rendered to these airmen by the Soviet authorities.

For a period of about a year examination and study had been continuing of the possibility of securing a safe sea passage through the Kuriles by seizing an island, preferably in the central part of the chain, whose topography was such as to permit the establishment of airfields. Lack of means made it unlikely that such operations would take place during 1945 unless they became so vitally important that ways and means would have to be found to do them, even though the over-all means available for the war against Japan were limited.

Admiral Kuznetsov asked if the capture of an island in the Kuriles was planned for 1945.

Admiral King said that means were not available to undertake it as well as the other operations which had been planned; however, as always, it was a question of the relative importance of the various operations under consideration.

General Marshall said he would like to add that from the point of view of the Army, plans were kept up to date in great detail, particularly with regard to shipping, in order to effect the most rapid possible movement of forces from Europe to the Pacific. These plans were so arranged that the movement would start one week after the termination of the war in Europe. The total transfer would, however, take a long time. Air would move first, accompanied by the service units needed to support the air forces and to prepare bases for the other troops. The necessity for these plans was one of the reasons why an estimated date for the end of the war against Germany had been required.

General Antonov said that, as he had mentioned on the previous day, it would be more convenient to discuss questions concerning the Far East after this matter had been considered by the Heads of State.

8. VLR Bomber Operations Against Japan

General Kuter said that the B-29's, the heavy long-range United States bombers, were organized into the Twentieth Air Force commanded by General Arnold. The operations of the Twentieth Air Force had been following a plan somewhat similar to that used by the strategic air forces in Europe. The Japanese aircraft industry had been selected as the first priority target. At the present time this air force had approximately 350 operational B-29's. About a third of that number had been operating from China bases since May 1944 and the remainder had begun operating from the Marianas in July 1944. It was expected to build up a force of approximately
1,800 operational B-29's. The latest operation carried out was on the previous Sunday, when 120 B-29's had attacked Kobe. Broadly speaking, the relatively small force of B-29's which had so far been employed had exceeded the anticipated results for the number of attacks that had been carried out.

9. Operations in Burma and China

Sir Alan Brooke said that during 1944 the Japanese had delivered a serious attack in north Burma. This attack was stopped and the Japanese were driven back by the British forces in north Burma, assisted by Chinese forces under United States direction which had been trained by United States officers in India. Land communications to China had now been opened through north Burma. The road was not good but motor vehicles and guns could now be delivered by that road to China. Operations in Burma were continuing southward with the object of ultimately clearing the Japanese out of Burma, which would then provide a suitable base for further operations against the Japanese in those parts. In addition, as Admiral King had mentioned, British naval forces had been dispatched to take part in operations in the Pacific. Carrier attacks had also been carried out against the oil targets in Palembang on the island of Sumatra.

Sir Charles Portal said that it was of interest to add that the British advanced forces operating in the Mandalay area and to the west of it, were almost entirely dependent on air supply provided by United States and British transport aircraft.

General Marshall said that the United States maintained a considerable air force in China, consisting, at the present time, of some 600 planes with more to come. The sole source of supply for these forces was over the 17,000-foot mountains between northeast Burma and Kunming. These operations presented an extremely difficult proposition from every point of view. As Sir Alan Brooke had said, the Japanese had in the previous spring attacked towards the line of communication to China. This was the line of communication not only for the British forces in Burma but also for the Chinese forces in Burma, and the United States air transport force flying supplies into China. In spite of all the difficulties, 44,000 tons of supplies had been flown over the Himalayas last month. A transport plane left airfields in Burma every two minutes of the day and night. It was necessary to provide not only gasoline for the air forces operating out of China but to provide also for the ground forces in China who had little food or equipment. United States transport aircraft had moved Chinese forces to India from where, after training, they had again been transferred by air to the seat of operations where they had joined up with their equipment. More recently the Chinese forces had been flown back
over the mountains, thus providing the only really dependable well-equipped fighting force in China. They were, however, without armored fighting vehicles or medium artillery. Now that the road was open, armored fighting vehicles, trucks and artillery could be sent to them. There had been almost a complete lack of motor transport in China and what there had been was now worn out. It was under these circumstances that the United States Chiefs of Staff had asked assistance from the Soviets in order to get 500 trucks to the Chinese. He very much appreciated the efforts the Soviets had made and fully understood their difficulties. Fortunately, these vehicles could now be sent to China direct by road.

A United States general (General Wedemeyer) was now acting as chief of staff to the Generalissimo in an effort to coordinate the various activities of the Chinese forces. This was of particular importance in relation to United States action in the Pacific. Operations in China were of increasing importance now that naval forces were so close to the coast of China. General Wedemeyer was endeavoring to restore a very serious situation and, with armored cars and trucks now available, his task should prove easier. As he (General Marshall) had previously mentioned, in the face of unparalleled difficulties 44,000 tons had been flown over the Himalayas last month. He mentioned this because to him it meant the accomplishment of the greatest feat in all history. In the face of such achievements cooperation by the staffs now seated around the table should be relatively easy.

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if the operations in Burma were regarded as decisive operations or secondary operations.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that they were decisive operations aimed at the clearing of Burma of all Japanese forces.

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if it was considered that there were enough troops for decisive action on the two fronts—the Far East and Europe. Would not concentration on the main front hasten the end of the war in Europe and thus hasten the end of the war against Japan by making additional forces available?

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that mainly local forces were being used in Burma, the majority of them being from the Indian Army. Indian divisions had been taken from India and had been engaging Germans since the beginning of the war. However, it had been essential to protect India’s eastern frontier and at the same time to open up a land route to China. Far greater forces were required in this theater to carry out all the desired operations. As General Marshall had mentioned, plans were ready to transfer forces as fast as possible upon the completion of the war with Germany in order to finish the war against Japan. Up to the present time Germany was regarded as the main enemy and Japan as the secondary enemy, to be taken on with full forces immediately Germany was defeated.
General Marshall explained that the policy of the United States Government played a great part in the decisions with regard to operations in Burma. The United States Government placed great importance on the maintenance of the present regime in China. From the military point of view it would be a very serious matter if all China passed into Japanese control. Only relatively small American forces had been used except for transport aircraft.

It was imperative, however, that operations should not stand still in the Pacific. This would enable the Japanese to build up a solid line in the occupied areas. In the first year of the war only small land and air forces had been available to assist the strong naval force in the Pacific. These forces had, however, pushed forward by by-passing Japanese positions. At present some 200,000 to 300,000 Japanese troops had been cut off in these by-passed positions and a comparable number could now be considered as cut off in Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and even Burma.

Admiral Kuznetsov asked for information with regard to the area of the United States submarine operations in the Pacific.

Admiral King said that the United States submarine force had always operated where the most Japanese shipping was to be found. The main submarine force used Hawaii as its main base and worked generally north of the latitude of 20° N. A further submarine force was based on Australia and was now supplemented by a considerable number of British submarines. This force worked in the area of the East Indies. Allied submarines in the Pacific had taken a heavy toll of Japanese shipping, which was now reduced from a maximum of some seven million tons to two million tons. These Japanese losses had been inflicted by submarines, by air forces and by naval surface vessels. United States submarine losses had remained relatively constant at about two per month. The number of United States submarines operating was still increasing. It was clear that the closer operations come to Japan the tougher would be the opposition not only for submarines but also for air and naval forces and for ground troops.

Admiral Kuznetsov asked if it was intended that United States submarines should operate in the Sea of Japan.

Admiral King said that so far they had not operated in the Sea of Japan though they operated in the Yellow Sea.

Admiral Kuznetsov suggested that the Japanese were likely to shift their sea lines of communication to the Sea of Japan.

Admiral King explained that such a line of communications already existed as did a Japanese sea line of communications to Manchuria and to the North China coast.
10. Future Business

After a brief discussion it was agreed that all the necessary subjects had already been covered and that no further meetings were called for until such time as the Heads of State might submit additional problems to the military staffs.

In reply to a question from Sir Alan Brooke, General Antonov said that he felt that for the present no written report to the Heads of State was necessary, but rather that each staff should report individually to its own Head of State. Should a written report be required, this could easily be prepared later.

In conclusion, Sir Alan Brooke said he would like to thank General Antonov for his hospitality in receiving the United States and British Chiefs of Staff in Yalta and for his cooperative attitude during the meetings.

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 6, 1945, NOON, LIVADIA PALACE

Present

United States
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Hiss
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Foote
Mr. Page

United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Jepp
Mr. Dixon
Mr. Harrison
Major Theakstone

Soviet Union
Foreign Commissar
Molotov
Mr. Vysheisky
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Novikov
Mr. Golunsky

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Page Minutes

TOP SECRET

2. Procedure for Studying Dismemberment of Germany.
3. Reference of the Question Concerning the Dismemberment of Germany to the EAC.

1. Press Release.

Mr. STETTINIUS stated that it had been deemed advisable to issue a preliminary communiqué on the Crimean Conference. He had requested Mr. Stephen Early, the Assistant to the President on press matters, to make a few remarks on this subject. A copy of this release is attached hereto.¹

During the course of the discussion Mr. Molotov suggested that the word “common” be inserted before the word “enemy” and Mr.

¹ Post, p. 658.
Stettinius suggested that the words "for meeting" and "immediately" be eliminated. Mr. Molotov agreed to these delineations. He stated that he would have to refer the release to Marshal Stalin and that he hoped to give an answer at the 4:00 o'clock meeting.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the release would be held in strict secrecy until its simultaneous issuance in London, Moscow and Washington on Thursday.

2. The Dismemberment of Germany.

Mr. Stettinius stated that this topic had been referred to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion. In his opinion much research and study would be necessary before agreement could be reached, but he hoped that they could come to agreement on the general principles involved. At the present session he would like to suggest that the word "dismemberment" be added after the word "demilitarization" in Article 12 of the surrender instrument for Germany. He also wished that consideration be given to the assignment of this topic to the EAC in London for study.

Mr. Molotov stated that Mr. Stettinius' suggestion regarding the addition of the word "dismemberment" was entirely acceptable.

Mr. Eden stated that he had worked out another formula which included the addition of the words "and measures for the dissolution of the German unitary state" which he wished included in the second paragraph of Article 12.

Mr. Molotov then suggested that the paragraph commence with the words "In order to secure peace and security of Europe, they will take measures for the dismemberment of Germany." He felt that this wording would reflect the agreement reached at yesterday's plenary session.

Mr. Eden maintained that this wording would commit the three powers to too great an extent before the question had been thoroughly studied. He stated that he would prefer merely to add the words "and the dismemberment." He felt that his proposed draft would not only cover the dismemberment of Germany but also its decentralization.

Mr. Molotov continued to press for the Soviet draft.

Mr. Eden maintained that the British Delegation could go no further than the addition of the words "and the dismemberment."

Mr. Stettinius suggested as a possible alternative a phrase reading to the effect that "including dismemberment to the degree necessary to safeguard the peace and security . . ." He added, however,
that his preference was his original suggestion of inserting the words “and the dismemberment.”

Mr. Molotov was inclined to prefer the second draft submitted by Mr. Stettinius.

Mr. Eden strongly objected.

Mr. Molotov then suggested rephrasing the paragraph by including the words “for the future peace and security” and eliminating the words “as deemed requisite.”

Mr. Eden maintained that he would be unable to accept this draft, since it was too broad. However, he would readily accept Mr. Stettinius’ original proposal. The British Government could go no further.

After some discussion as to the merits of Mr. Stettinius’ first and second proposals, during which Mr. Molotov mentioned that the second proposal was preferable since it was more definite and more closely reflected what Mr. Churchill had said at yesterday’s plenary session, it was decided to sum up the discussion by stating that all three Foreign Secretaries desired the word “dismemberment” included in Article 12 and that Mr. Eden would consult with Mr. Churchill as to whether this course was preferred by him to Mr. Stettinius’ second proposal.

3. Reference of the Question Concerning the Dismemberment of Germany to the EAC.

Mr. Stettinius inquired whether it might not be agreed that the question concerning the dismemberment of Germany might not be referred to the EAC for study.

Mr. Molotov suggested that this question be taken up at a later time. He said that since it was a specific matter it might be better to establish a special commission to study the question.

Matthews Notes 1

1. Communiqué 2—S. 3 thinks wise to issue one

Mol. Preliminary One suggestion: add “common” enemy. Likes
communicé. No objection to mention Black Sea area. Must be
approved by Stalin

2. S. announces 3 questions before the 3 F. M. On first point.

Adding “dismemberment” to Art 12 4 & refer to EAC.

1 Transcribed for this volume from longhand notes in pencil.
2 For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes of this
meeting.
3 Stettinius. (Throughout the Matthews notes the editors have added footnote
explanations of the more unusual contractions and abbreviations.)
4 Of the draft instrument entitled “Unconditional Surrender of Germany”.

Mol. Accepts addition of word.

EDEN. Another formula "and measures for the dissolution of the German unitary state" Would cover abolition of centralization of Germ. govt.

Mol: Will exercise sup.5 power ...6 take measures for dismemberment of G. For peace & security of Europe necessary to dismember G.

Agreed to add: "And the dismemberment" after demilitarization.

No agreement on Russian change.

5 supreme. 6 Points appear in the original.

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**United States Delegation Draft of Preliminary Yalta Press Release**

**PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ** ¹

The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their chiefs of staff, their foreign secretaries and other advisors, are now meeting in the Black Sea area.

Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the enemy and for building, with their allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace. While their discussions have not progressed as yet beyond the preliminary stages, they have been marked by most encouraging expressions of unity of purpose, frankness and friendship.² Meetings are continuing day and night.

The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged. There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.

Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, for meeting the immediate political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain the peace.

A complete communiqué will be issued at the conclusion of the Conference.

[YALTA,] February 6, 1945.

¹ This draft, which was attached to the Page minutes, appears to have been the one used as a basis for discussion in the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 6.

² The omission of this sentence, indicated in the source paper, was apparently made prior to the discussion of this draft by the Foreign Ministers on February 6.
Agreed Text of Preliminary Yalta Press Release

CRIMEAN CONFERENCE PRESS RELEASE

[YALTA,] February 7, 1945.

Statement for the press and radio released at 4:30 o'clock p. m., Eastern War Time Wednesday, February 7, 1945.

"The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their chiefs of staff, the three foreign secretaries and other advisors, are now meeting in the Black Sea area.

"Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the common enemy and for building, with their Allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace. Meetings are proceeding continuously.

"The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged. There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.

"Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, the political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain Peace.

"A communiqué will be issued at the conclusion of the Conference."

Approved by Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt. Released simultaneously in Washington, London and Moscow.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, FEBRUARY 6, 1945,
1 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Sir Alexander Cadogan

Editorial Note

No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, ante, p. 554, which states that the discussions continued after lunch until 3 p. m.
III. THE YALTA CONFERENCE

THIRD PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 6, 1945, 4 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE

Present

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<tr>
<th>United States</th>
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<td>President Roosevelt</td>
<td>Prime Minister Churchill</td>
<td>Marshal Stalin</td>
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<td>Secretary Stettinius</td>
<td>Foreign Secretary Eden</td>
<td>Foreign Commissar Molotov</td>
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<td>Fleet Admiral Leahy</td>
<td>Sir Archibald Clark Kerr</td>
<td>Mr. Vyshinsky</td>
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<td>Mr. Hopkins</td>
<td>Mr. Alexander Cadogan</td>
<td>Mr. Maisky</td>
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<td>Mr. Byrnes</td>
<td>Sir Edward Bridges</td>
<td>Mr. Gusev</td>
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<td>Mr. Harriman</td>
<td>Mr. Jebb</td>
<td>Mr. Gromyko</td>
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<td>Mr. Matthews</td>
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<td>Mr. Hiss</td>
<td>Mr. Dixon</td>
<td>Major Birse</td>
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<td>Mr. Bohlen</td>
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Bohlen Minutes

TOP SECRET

2. The Polish Question.

WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION

The President inquired whether the committee of Foreign Ministers had anything to report to the Conference.

Mr. Stettinius said it had been decided to insert the word “dismemberment” of Germany into Article 12 of the unconditional surrender terms, but that Mr. Molotov had had some additional phrases which he wished to see put in.

Mr. Molotov replied that he was withdrawing his proposed additional words.

Mr. Stettinius then said that they could report full agreement to insert the word “dismemberment” into Article 12 of the surrender terms but that they would like to have some more time before reporting on reparations and the relationship of the French zone to the control commission.

The Prime Minister said that he had not had an opportunity to obtain the consent of the War Cabinet to the proposed insertion but that he was glad to accept on the behalf of the British Government the decision on this point. He went on to say that in regard to the French zone he felt that the importance of France in the future had been enhanced by the limitation which the President yesterday had placed on the length of time United States forces might stay in Europe. He said that Great Britain would not be strong enough alone to guard the Western approaches to the Channel.

The President said that he had spoken on the basis of present conditions and he felt public opinion in the United States would be prepared to support an international organization along the lines of Dumbarton Oaks and that this might change their attitude in regard
to the question of troops. The President then added that he felt the Conference should now proceed to the consideration of the United States proposal in regard to Dumbarton Oaks. He felt strongly that all the nations of the world shared a common desire to see the elimination of war for at least fifty years. He said he was not so optimistic as to believe in eternal peace, but he did believe fifty years of peace were feasible and possible. He said that since neither he, Marshal Stalin, nor the Prime Minister had been present at Dumbarton Oaks he would ask the Secretary of State (Mr. Stettinius) who had been chairman of that conference to explain the United States position on the question of voting in the Security Council.1

Mr. Stettinius then read the following statement of the American position on voting in the Council: 2

"1. Review of Status of this Question.
"It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.

"At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.

"On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:

"C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."


(a) We believe that our proposal is entirely consistent with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.

(b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.

"We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization which we

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1 For two post-Yalta statements regarding this portion of the minutes, see post, pp. 994–996.
2 A copy of the document from which Stettinius read is printed post, pp. 682–683.
all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated.

"The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations 2 sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.

"3. Reasons for the American Position.

"From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure.

"First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world.

"Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for a fair hearing for all members of the organization, large and small.

"We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5 of last year 4 provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.

"It is our earnest hope that our two great Allies will find it possible to accept the President's proposal."

The President suggested that the Secretary of State (Mr. Stettinius) might usefully analyze the effect of the United States proposal on the decisions in the Council.

Mr. Stettinius reported as follows: 5

"II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.

"Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:

"I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on

"1. Admission of new members;
"2. Suspension of a member;
"3. Expulsion of a member;
"4. Election of the Secretary General.

"II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

"III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

"1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;

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3 Ante, pp. 53–59.
5 A copy of the document from which Stettinius read at this point is printed post, pp. 684–686.
"2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;

"3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;

"4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

"IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.

"V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.

"VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

"The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:

"I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council’s attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

"II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;

"III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;

"IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;

"V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy."

Marshal Stalin inquired what was new in Mr. Stettinius’ statement that had not been included in the President’s message of December 5, 1944.

The President replied that there had been no change of any significance.

Mr. Stettinius said that there had been a minor drafting change (this minor change was explained to Mr. Molotov by Mr. Bohlen on the document).

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government attached great importance to the question of voting in the Security Council and, therefore, he wished to study the United States proposal and in particular the effect of the drafting change and would be ready to discuss the question tomorrow.

The Prime Minister stated that the British Government had given the most careful consideration to the United States proposals.
He had not agreed with the original proposals made at Dumbarton Oaks since he was anxious that the realities of the situation of the Three Great Powers should be considered, but in studying the President's latest proposal his anxieties on that score had been removed. He could thus say that on behalf of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Empire and, he believed, the Self-Governing Dominions the President's new proposals were entirely satisfactory. He said that in the last resort world peace depended on the friendship and cooperation of the three Governments, but that the British Government would consider that they were committing an injustice if reservation were not made for free statement of their grievances by small countries. The matter looks as though the Three Great Powers were trying to rule the world, whereas, our desires are to save the world and save it from a repetition of the horrors of this war. He said he felt that the Three Major Powers should make a proud submission. He said that he had looked into the whole matter as it would affect British interests and would give an illustration of why the British Government does not think the President's proposal would bring any harm to British interests. He said, for example, if China should raise the question of the return of Hongkong under the President's proposal, both China and Great Britain would be precluded from voting in regard to the methods of settlement of this controversy, as listed in the five points of the analysis read by Mr. Stettinius. In the last analysis Great Britain would be protected against any decision adverse to her interests by the exercise of the veto power under paragraph 3 of Mr. Stettinius' analysis.

**MARSHAL STALIN** inquired whether or not Egypt, for example, would be on the assembly.

**MR. EDEN** replied "yes, but not on the Council unless elected."

**MARSHAL STALIN** then said suppose Egypt raised the question of the return of the Suez Canal.

**THE PRIME MINISTER** replied that he hoped that Marshal Stalin would let him finish his illustration in regard to Hongkong.

**THE PRIME MINISTER** said that under paragraph 3 of Mr. Stettinius' analysis Great Britain would in fact have the right by their veto to stop all action against Great Britain by the Council of the World Organization. He, therefore, felt that it would not be necessary for Great Britain to agree to any decision contrary to her own interests and, for example, Great Britain would not be required to return Hongkong unless they felt that this should be done. China should, however, have the right to speak and the same considerations would apply to Egypt if that country had a complaint in regard to the Suez Canal. He concluded that he felt that insofar as the United States was concerned the same considerations would also apply.
For example, in the event that Argentina raised a complaint against the United States.

The President then said that he recalled that in the Tehran Declaration the Three Powers had stated:

"We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world. . . ."

The President added that he thought this Declaration was pertinent to the discussion in progress.

The Prime Minister said that since he saw no reason to fear the United States proposals he was glad to associate the British Government with them. He added that because of our great power, which is still protected by the veto if we do not agree, we should allow others to be heard.

Marshal Stalin said that he would like to have this document to study, since only hearing it orally it was impossible to catch all of the implications. He said that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals already give the right of discussion in the assembly, but he did not believe that any nation would be satisfied with expressing its opinion. They would want some decision. He said that if Mr. Churchill thought that China after raising the question of Hongkong would be satisfied with merely expressing her opinion, he was mistaken since China would want a decision. The same was true of Egypt in the possible question of the Suez Canal. He added that it was not a question of one power or three powers desiring to be masters of the world since he felt that the Dumbarton Oaks organization put a brake on that. He said that he would like to ask for further clarification on what powers Mr. Churchill had in mind when he spoke of a desire to rule the world. He said that he was sure Great Britain had no such desire, nor did the United States and that that left only the U. S. S. R.

The Prime Minister replied that he had spoken of the three Great Powers who could collectively place themselves so high over the others that the whole world would say these three desired to rule.

Marshal Stalin then said ironically that it looks as though two Great Powers have already accepted a document which would avoid any such accusation but that the third has not yet signified its assent. He then went on to say that in his opinion there was a more serious question than the voting procedure or the question of the domination of the world. They all knew that as long as the three of them lived none of them would involve their countries in aggressive actions, but after all, ten years from now none of them might be present. A new generation would come into being not knowing the horrors of the

* Points appear in the original.
present war. He felt that there was, therefore, an obligation to create for the future generation such an organization as would secure peace for at least fifty years. He said the main thing was to prevent quarrels in the future between the three Great Powers and that the task, therefore, was to secure their unity for the future. The covenant of the new World Organization should have this as its primary task. He said the greatest danger was conflict between the three Great Powers represented here, but that if unity could be preserved there was little danger of the renewal of German aggression. He said, therefore, a covenant must be worked out which would prevent conflicts between the three Great Powers. Marshal Stalin apologized for not having had an opportunity for studying in detail the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. He said he had been busy on other matters. He said that as he understood it, there were two categories of disputes involved in Mr. Stettinius' explanation: (1) conflicts which would require the application of sanctions, economic, political or military, and (2) conflicts which could be settled by peaceful means. He said in regard to the first the permanent members had a right to vote even if they were parties to such disputes. Under the second category, however, in conflicts susceptible to settlement by peaceful means, the parties in dispute would not be allowed to vote. He added that we Russians were being accused of spending too much time on the technique of voting, which he admitted. But they attached great importance to this question since all decisions were made by votes and they were interested in the decisions, not in the discussions. He said, for example, if China or Egypt raised complaints against England they would not be without friends or protectors in the assembly.

Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Stettinius pointed out that under the United States proposal the power of the World Organization could not be directed against any of the permanent members.

Marshal Stalin said that he was afraid that any conflict might break the unity of our united front.

The Prime Minister replied that he saw the force of that argument, but he did not believe that the world organization would eliminate disputes between powers and that would remain the function of diplomacy.

Marshal Stalin said that his colleagues in Moscow could not forget the events of December 1939 during the Finnish war when at the instigation of England and France the League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union from the League and mobilized world opinion against the Soviet Union, even going so far as to speak of a crusade.

The Prime Minister answered that at that time the British and French Governments were very angry at the Soviet Union and in any
event any such action was impossible under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

Marshal Stalin said he was not thinking of expulsion but of the question of the mobilization of opinion against one country.

The Prime Minister answered that he thought this might happen to any nation, but he doubted very much if either the President or Marshal Stalin would lead a savage attack against Great Britain and he felt this applied also to the other two countries.

The President then said that he felt that the unity of the Great Powers was one of our first aims and that the United States policy promoted rather than impaired this aim. He said that should there unfortunately be any differences between the Great Powers, and there might well be, this fact would become fully known to the world no matter what voting procedure was adopted. In any event, there was no method of preventing discussions of differences in the assembly. He said that full and friendly discussions in the Council would in no sense promote disunity, but on the contrary, would serve to demonstrate the confidence which the Great Powers had in each other and in the justice of their own policies.

The Polish Question

The President inquired whether the Polish question should be taken up now or postponed until the next meeting.

The Prime Minister said that he hoped that at least a start could be made today.

The President said that the United States was farther away from Poland than anyone else here, and that there were times when a long distance point of view was useful. He said that at Tehran he had stated that he believed the American people were in general favorably inclined to the Curzon Line as the eastern frontier of Poland, but he felt that if the Soviet Government would consider a concession in regard to Lwow and the oil deposits in the Province of Lwow that would have a very salutary effect. He said that he was merely putting forth this suggestion for consideration and would not insist on it. He said that in regard to the government he wished to see the creation of a representative government which could have the support of all the great powers and which could be composed of representatives of the principal parties of Poland. He said one possibility which had been suggested was the creation of a Presidential Council composed of Polish leaders which could then create a government composed of the chiefs of the five political parties—Workers Party, Peasant Party, Socialist Party, etc. He said that one thing must be made certain and that was that Poland should maintain the most friendly and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union.
MARSHAL STALIN replied that Poland should maintain friendly relations not only with the Soviet Union but with the other Allies.

The President said he had merely put forth a suggestion but he thought if we could solve the Polish question it would be a great help to all of us. He added he didn't know personally any members of the London government or Lublin government, but he had met Mr. Mikolajczyk who had made a deep impression on him as a sincere and an honest man.

The Prime Minister said that he had consistently declared in Parliament and elsewhere that the British Government would support the Curzon Line, even leaving Lwow to the Soviet Union. He had been criticized for this and so had Mr. Eden, but he felt that after the burdens which Russia had borne in this war the Curzon Line was not a decision of force but one of right. He said he remained in that position. Of course, he added, if the mighty Soviet Union could make some gesture to the much weaker country, such as the relinquishment of Lwow, this act of magnanimity would be acclaimed and admired. He said he was much more interested in sovereignty and independence of Poland than in the frontier line—he wanted to see the Poles have a home where they could organize their lives as they wished. That was an objective that he had often heard Marshal Stalin proclaim most firmly, and he put his trust in those declarations. He said that he therefore had not considered the question of the frontier as a question of vital importance. It must not be forgotten, however, that Great Britain had gone to war to protect Poland against German aggression at a time when that decision was most risky, and it had almost cost them their life in the world. He said Great Britain had no material interest in Poland, but the question was one of honor and that his government would therefore never be content with a solution which did not leave Poland a free and independent state. The freedom of Poland, however, did not cover any hostile designs or intrigue against the U. S. S. R., and none of us should permit this. It is the earnest desire of the British Government that Poland be mistress in her own house and captain of her soul. He said that the British Government recognized the present Polish government in London but did not have intimate contact with it. He said he had known Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer and had found them good and honest men. He inquired whether there might be some possibility of forming a government here for Poland which would utilize these men. If this could be done all the great powers could then recognize it as an interim government until such time as the Poland government [Polish people?] by free vote could select and form their own government. He concluded by saying he was interested in the President's suggestion.
At the suggestion of Marshal Stalin, there was a ten-minute intermission.

MARSHAL STALIN then gave the following summary of his views on the Polish question: Mr. Churchill had said that for Great Britain the Polish question was one of honor and that he understood, but for the Russians it was a question both of honor and security. It was one of honor because Russia had many past grievances against Poland and desired to see them eliminated. It was a question of strategic security not only because Poland was a bordering country but because throughout history Poland had been the corridor for attack on Russia. We have to mention that during the last thirty years Germany twice has passed through this corridor. The reason for this was that Poland was weak. Russia wants a strong, independent and democratic Poland. Since it was impossible by the force of Russian armies alone to close from the outside this corridor, it could be done only by Poland’s own forces. It was very important, therefore, to have Poland independent, strong and democratic. It is not only a question of honor for Russia, but one of life and death. It was for this reason that there had been a great change from the policies of the Czars who had wished to suppress and assimilate Poland. In regard to the questions raised here on which we have different opinions, the following might be said:

In regard to the Curzon Line, concessions in regard to Lwow and the Lwow Province, and Mr. Churchill’s reference to a unanimous act on our part, it is necessary to remind you that not Russians but Curzon and Clemenceau fixed this line. The Russians had not been invited and the line was established against their will. Lenin had opposed giving Bialystok Province to the Poles but the Curzon Line gives it to Poland. We have already retreated from Lenin’s position in regard to this province. Should we then be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau? We could not then return to Moscow and face the people who would say Stalin and Molotov have been less sure defenders of Russian interest than Curzon and Clemenceau. It is, therefore, impossible to agree with the proposed modification of the line. I would prefer to have the war go on although it will cost us blood in order to compensate for Poland from Germany. When he was in Moscow Mr. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear that Poland’s frontier would extend to the West Neisse River and I favor the Polish frontier on the West Neisse and ask the conference to support this proposal.

As to the question of the Polish government, Mr. Churchill has said it would be good to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue, for without participation of the Poles it is impossible to create a Polish government. I am called a dictator and not a democrat, but I have enough democratic feeling to refuse
to create a Polish government without the Poles being consulted—the question can only be settled with the consent of the Poles. Last autumn in Moscow there was a good chance for a fusion of the various Polish elements and in the meeting between Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Lublin Poles various points of agreement were reached as Mr. Churchill will remember. Mikolajczyk left for London but did not return since he was expelled from office precisely because he wanted agreement. Artieszewski [Arciszewski] and Raskiewycz [Raczkiewicz] are not only against agreement but are hostile to any idea of an agreement. Artieszewski has characterized the Lublin Poles as bandits and criminals and they naturally pay him back in the same coin. It will be difficult to bring them together. The Warsaw Poles, Bierut and Osuskia Morawski, do not even want to talk about any fusion with the London government. I asked them what concessions they might make in this respect and they said they could tolerate Jelikowski [Żeligowski] or Grabski but they do not even want to hear about Mikolajczyk being prime minister. I am prepared to support any attempt to reach a solution that would offer some [chance] of success. Should we ask the Warsaw Poles to come here or perhaps come to Moscow? I must say that the Warsaw government has a democratic base equal at least to that of de Gaulle.

As a military man I demand from a country liberated by the Red Army that there be no civil war in the rear. The men in the Red Army are indifferent to the type of government as long as it will maintain order and they will not be shot in the back. The Warsaw, or Lublin, government has not badly fulfilled this task. There are, however, agents of the London government who claim to be agents of the underground forces of resistance. I must say that no good and much evil comes from these forces. Up to the present time they have killed 212 of our military men. They attack our supply bases to obtain arms. Although it has been proclaimed that all radio stations must be registered and obtain permission to operate, agents of the London government are violating these regulations. We have arrested some of them and if they continue to disturb our rear we will shoot them as military law requires. When I compare what the agents of the Lublin government have done and what the agents of the London government have done I see the first are good and the second bad. We want tranquility in our rear. We will support the government which gives us peace in the rear, and as a military man I could not do otherwise. Without a secure rear there can be no more victories for the Red Army. Any military man and even the non-military man will understand this situation.?

7 It appears that the note of Hopkins, post, p. 686, was passed to the President at some point during the foregoing statement by Stalin.
The Prime Minister said that he must put on record the fact that the British and Soviet Governments have different sources of information in Poland and therefore they obtain different views of the situation there. He said it is possible that their reports are mistaken as it is not always possible to believe everything that anyone tells you. He believed, he added, that with the best of all their information he could not feel that the Lublin government represents more than one third of the people and would be maintained in power if the people were free to express their opinion. One of the reasons why the British have so earnestly sought a solution had been the fear that the Polish underground army would come into collision with the Lublin government, which would lead to great bloodshed, arrests and deportations which could not fail to have a bad effect on the whole Polish question. The Prime Minister said he agreed that anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished, but he repeated that the British Government could not agree to recognizing the Lublin government of Poland.

The Conference then adjourned until four o'clock tomorrow.

Hiss Notes

Livadia

Note to Pres
for ERS² re VIII C
redraft of provision
Letter from
ERS to Vish.
for set of pictures

Tonight
Harriman
Page
AH
Gromyko
who else?

Voting
Plenary

1 From penciled notes in longhand. For this meeting the notes appear to have been taken by Hiss only during the discussion of the question of voting in the United Nations, prior to the intermission. There is a notation by Hiss that this part of the meeting ran from 4:15 to 6:20. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

A penciled diagram at the head of these notes shows the seating arrangement around the conference table clockwise as follows: Roosevelt, Bohlen, Byrnes, Harriman, Cadogan, Eden, Churchill, Birse, Bridges, Clark Kerr, Gromyko, Vyshinsky, Molotov, Stalin, Maisky, Gusev, Leahy, Stettinius.

² Stettinius.
1. Pres, ERS, Leahy, Bohlen, Byrnes, Harriman
2. P. M., Eden, Cadogan, Interpreter (military), Sir Ed. Bridges, Clark-Kerr
3. Stalin, Molotov, Maisky, Vishinsky, Gusev, Gromyko

1. Behind: Hopkins, Matthews, A. H.
2. " : Jebb, Dixon, Wilson
3. " : Pavlov

ERS reported that the words "and the dismemberment" be added to Art XII of Articles of Surrender. Mr. Mol. has a further proposal which will require more discussion. Ask to submit final report tomorrow

Molotov withdraws his suggestion
ERS made final report
Church. said instrument of dismemberment had not been approved by Cabinet but he is glad agt has been reached
Church: Position of Fr. becomes of great importance to us. Must have a strong French army
Pres: Pub. opinion in US will determine;—but in his opinion if we get D. O.³ much more likely to take part in world activity
ERS Read analysis
Pres: ERS explain US proposal as he was at D. O. & none of 3 heads of deleg. were.
Feel strongly people going to insist on getting something that will ensure peace, not for all time, but say for 50 years
ERS: read statement
3 ribbon copies to each of 3 heads of deleg.
Pres. suggested ERS read types of decisions requiring unan.⁴
Agreed
I shall first present 6 situations in which unan. of great powers must be maintained at all times

Read I to VI of Part II our paper (analysis)

I shall now read the situations which also require etc. . . . .⁵ in other words unanimity except when involved in a dispute

Read I to IV [V?]⁶

Pres that ends the reading & explanation of part of the procedure
Thing we have to remember—objective of the 5 great & of all nations is same & on a q. of procedure there ought not be any real difficulty

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³ Dumbarton Oaks.
⁴ Unanimity.
⁵ Points appear in the original.
⁶ Brackets appear in the original.
Stalin: Would like to know what is new in proposals read by ERS as compared with Dec. 5
    Asked about minor phraseological change
    Long discussion
    Asked for more time to study the proposal made by ERS as compared with Pres. proposal
    Could we put it off to tomorrow
    Church. Agrees to study of this particular & to adjourn q. to tomorrow

I cannot conceal from the company that HMG that has examined the U. S. proposal—the general proposal—with very close attention.
I did not feel myself wholly in agt. with the orig. proposal at DO I have been anxious to make sure that the realities of the positions of the 5 great powers have been fully faced

On studying the Pres. new proposal my anxieties have been removed so far as Brit Com of Ns & Brit Empire are concerned.

I & the self governing dominions have the feeling that of course whether world peace is achieved on a lasting found. can only depend in the last resort upon the collab of the 3 great powers

Not doing justice to our true heart felt intentions if didn’t provide for the free statement of grievances by the many smaller states of the world

It might look as if we were claiming to rule the world—we 3 Whereas our desire is to serve the world & to preserve it from renewal of the frightful horrors which have fallen upon the lap of its inhabs.

I feel that we great powers—3—should make what I would call a proud submission to the commun of the world. Within the limits stated. I’ve naturally been looking at this as to how it would affect the fortunes & ints of Brit Em & Com. I’m going to take a part. instance to illustrate why I do not feel this submission wh. we make to the whole world will be damaging to Brit. interests. The case I take is a difficult one which affects Gt. Brit. I take the case of HK

If we agree to the proposal of the US let us suppose Ch. asks us to return HK to them. We should have a right to state our case fully ag. any case made by the Ch. But we should not be allowed to vote on the qs set out—the 5 q’s set out at the end of this doc. (missed sentence—see Jebb)

St. Who is we
Church I’m speaking only of the Brit Govt
St. Will Eg. take part in the Assembly?
Church In Ass. but not in Coun. unless elected
St. Any member of Ass. could freely express his opin.

7 Hong Kong
8 China.
9 Egypt.
Church: Yes & so long as Brit G concerned these 5 q's the Brit Govt would not be allowed to vote. I say we agree to these procedural matters being decided without our vote—I’m only taking HK illus.—we means Brit Govt

I humbly beg to be allowed to keep to illus. I introduced & then others can follow

What his majesty’s Govt could not agree to is that the other matters in ¶ III the 4 matters set out there

I consider that we are suff. safeguarding ag. being overruled in a matter affecting sovereignty because of our rights under ¶ III

We have in fact the right by our veto power to stop all further action ag. us by the world organ.

...I can not feel that we should have to agree to any dec. contrary to our free choice in these matters as set out. We should be protected by our rt. of veto ag. all measures of the kind in ¶ III

No (missed more)

On other hand I feel it would be wrong that Ch. should not have oppor to state its case fully & Coun not have powers in last 5 ¶s US paper & we not vote on those

In the same way if Eg raises a q. ag the Brit affecting Suez canal——

Pres. read sentence from Tehran re good will

HMG see no danger from their own point of view in associating themselves with prop. in the US paper & we see great advantage in the 3 great powers not assuming the position of rulers of all the rest without even allowing them to state their case. In fact we feel it would not be right to take that position of denying them the rt. to state the case & we rely on ¶ III if we are not convinced by the arguments made ag. us.

(Absent see Doc 10)

St. If any nation raise any import. q. will raise not only q. but will want a dec. Already have rt to express opin in Ass. Mr. Church thinks that Ch after raising q of HK would be content to express her opin. Ch. might ask for a decision.

Will demand a dec.

...matters are much more serious than merely to secure for each nation rt. to express its opin

Also it is not a matter of 3 powers liking to be master of world, D. O. proposals should be a break upon such a group of powers. I don’t know any great power which would have intention to master world. Perhaps I am mistaken & see not everything.

I would like to ask my friend Mr Ch. to name which powers might intend domin world

10 Reference here is to Matthews.
I'm sure Mr Ch & Brit doesn't want domin. I'm sure US hasn't opin. of this kind. USSR hasn't. There remains only 1 power. China.

Church I was speaking of 3 great powers gathered here collectively lifting themselves so high that others would consider they were trying to domin world—not any 1 power but the 3. Not 1 but a trinity.

(St) If 2 great powers accept provs. which excuse them from that. 1 power has not yet agreed to that.

I will examine the doc. & perhaps I will understand what is the matter but at present everything is not clear to me.

Think much more serious q than rt of powers express opin or appear domin world.

I fear—we are not now & will not allow that any of our gt countries—act of agg. But in 10 yrs time we will disappear—new generations will come which did not experience horrors of war & forget what we been thru.

Seems we would like to secure peace at least for 50 yrs. I have such an idea. I think we have now to build up such a form which would put as many obstacles as possible to domination of world. I think that the task is to secure our unity of 3 powers in future & for this purpose must elaborate such a covenant which would in certain respects (?) The greatest danger for future is possibility of conflicts among ourselves. If unity Ger danger not very great & now we have to think how to create—that our great powers & poss. Ch. & Fr. will keep united fronts in future. There must be elaborated a statement which would prevent conflicts among great powers.

I must apologize. I was real busy other matters & not chance study this q in detail. As far as I understand what was said by Ams today all points divided in 2 categories—

In 1st cat. as I understood belong such things as sanctions econ, pol & mil & in other cat. all those conflicts which could be settled by peaceful means without sanctions.

Also understood that in consid. of conflicts of both types contemplated free discussion of the Council.

I understood in consid. of q's of 1st cat.

perm. members being party to dispute has rt. to vote & not be asked to withdraw.

But in conflicts of 2nd cat. party in dispute not be allowed to vote. We Rs being accused talking too much about how to vote. But Issues are being decided by vote & we are interested in the decisions & less in discussions. Can discuss for 100 yrs & nothing settled, but I'm interested in decs.
Suppose Ch. suggests HK be returned or Suez Can. to Eg. I can assure Mr Church Ch & Eg. will be not alone. They will have some friends in Ass. & possibly some protectors

Church: I would say no when it came to use of Leag. powers. Powers should not be used ag. us if we remained unconvincing

St: Is it so.

Church: It is as I understand it

Eden: They could talk & complain but no dec. could be taken without our consent

ERS: No econ. sanction or use of force without unan. of perm. members of Sec. Coun.

Maisky: No recommend. could be made

Maisky: These 5 points will not be decisions but only discussions?

ERS: Yes

St: I'm afraid these conflicts re HK might break our unity

Church: See force of that but whole force of diplomacy proceeds & is not prevented by World Org. Members will always be discussing matters among themselves

St: Another picture my colleagues in Mosc cannot forget the case which occurred in Dec 39 during Rus-Fin war when Brit & Fr. used Leag. ag us & eventually expelled us, & isolated us & later mobilised all the powers ag. us in matter of crusade

Church: we were very angry, were all alone

St: How guar. such thing not occur ag.

Church: We couldn't do it here

St: Couldn't we make more obstacles in way of it

Church: Expulsion must be unan. & gt. power could veto.

St: First time we have

Pres: Should emphasize action like Fin. one would be impossible as would require unan. of 5

St: Not only expulsion but mobilization of opinion

Church: I see the case which cause anxiety to any of us, agitation be worked up & lot of abuse be levelled at one of us. Might be Brit. I can only say dip. would be active

Everything would be done to prevent anything that would mar our unity

I'm quite sure Mar. St. wouldn't make a harsh att on Brit Em—verbally I mean—without talking to us first We would get to some arrangement, in any event we should be very careful not to let the unity be destroyed

St: I would prob. but what of Maisky

Pres: Let's put it another way. Whole doc. is drawn up to promote not impair unity. Will be differences—will be known—will be talked in Assembly. To permit discussion in Coun. will in no sense impair
unity but will promote it & will demonstrate confid. have in each other & in justice
St tomorrow continue, meanwhile study

Poland

In intermission Gromyko indicated he had not understood from L. P. the changes in 3rd of our proposal. I straightened him out on the score of texts but he was still not clear satisfied that the effect of the reference to VIII C was clear or desirable. He also said he would have great difficulty explaining its effect to his colleagues. He said it would be much easier for the Rs if we could drop the whole reference & asked if Pres would agree to that. I said I thought so

11 Leo Pasvolsky.

Matthews Files

Matthews Minutes

TOP SECRET

(The first part of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of the voting procedure for the world organization. This is covered in Mr. Hiss's notes.)

Poland

President: I should like to bring up Poland. I come from a great distance and therefore have the advantage of a more distant point of view of the problem. There are six or seven million Poles in the United States. As I said in Tehran, in general I am in favor of the Curzon line. Most Poles, like the Chinese, want to save face.

Stalin: (interrupting) Who will save face, the Poles in Poland or the émigré Poles?

President: The Poles would like East Prussia and part of Germany. It would make it easier for me at home if the Soviet Government could give something to Poland. I raised the question of giving them Lvov at Tehran. It has now been suggested that the oil lands in the southwest of Lvov might be given them. I am not making a definite statement but I hope that Marshal Stalin can make a gesture in this direction.

But the most important matter is that of a permanent government for Poland. Opinion in the United States is against recognition of the Lublin government on the ground that it represents a small

1 For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.
portion of the Polish people. What people want is the creation of a government of national unity to settle their internal differences. A government which would represent all five major parties (names them) is what is wanted. It may interest Marshal Stalin that I do not know any of the London or of the Lublin government. Mikolajczyk came to Washington and I was greatly impressed by him. I felt that he was an honest man.

The main suggestion I want to make is that there be created an ad interim government which will have the support of the majority of the Polish people. There are many ways of creating such a government. One of the many suggestions is the possibility of creating a presidency council made up of a small number of men who would be the controlling force ad interim to set up a more permanent government. I make this suggestion as from the distance of three thousand miles. Sometimes distance is an advantage. We want a Poland that will be thoroughly friendly to the Soviet for years to come. This is essential.

Stalin: (interrupting) Friendly not only to the Soviet but all three allies.

President: This is my only suggestion. If we can work out some solution of this problem it will make peace much easier.

Prime Minister: I have made repeated declarations in Parliament in support of the Soviet claims to the Curzon line, that is to say, leaving Lvov with Soviet Russia. I have been much criticized and so has Mr. Eden especially by the party which I represent. But I have always considered that after all Russia has suffered in fighting Germany and after all her efforts in liberating Poland her claim is one founded not on force but on right. In that position I abide. But of course if the mighty power, the Soviet Union, made a gesture of magnanimity to a much weaker power and made the gesture suggested by the President we would heartily acclaim such action.

However, I am more interested in the question of Poland’s sovereign independence and freedom than in particular frontier lines. I want the Poles to have a home in Europe and to be free to live their own life there. That is an objective which I have always heard Marshal Stalin proclaim with the utmost firmness. It is because I put my trust in his declaration about the sovereign independence and freedom of Poland that the frontier question I consider not of supreme importance. This is what is dear to the hearts of the nation of Britain. This is what we went to war against Germany for—that Poland should be free and sovereign. Everyone here knows the result it was to us unprepared as we were and that it nearly cost us our life as a nation. Great Britain had no material interest in Poland. Her interest is only one of honor because we drew the sword for Poland
against Hitler's brutal attack. Never could I be content with any solution that would not leave Poland as a free and independent state. However, I have one qualification: I do not think that the freedom of Poland could be made to cover hostile designs by any Polish government, perhaps by intrigue with Germany, against the Soviet. I cannot conceive that the world organization would ever tolerate such action or leave it only to Soviet Russia to take proper measures. Our most earnest desire which we care about as much as our lives is that Poland be mistress in her own house and in her own soul. I earnestly hope that we shall not separate without taking a practical step with this objective. At the present time there are two governments about which we differ. I have never seen any of the present London government. We recognize them but have not sought their company. But Mikołajczyk, Romer and Grabski are men of good-sense and we have confidence in them. We remain in informal but friendly contact with them. There will be great criticism against us all if we let them divide us when we have such great tasks and common hopes. Can we not make a government here in Poland. A provisional or interim government, as the President said, pending free elections so that all three of us can extend recognition as well as the other United Nations. Can we not pave the way for a free future on the future constitution and administration of Poland? If we could do that we should leave the table with one great step accomplished toward future peace and the prosperity of Central Europe. I am sure that effective guarantees can be laid down to secure the line of communications of the victorious Red Army in its battle to defeat Germany. His Majesty's Government cordially support the President's suggestion and present the question to our Russian allies.

(Stalin suggests a ten-minute intermission.)

Stalin: The Prime Minister has said that for Great Britain the question of Poland is a question of honor. For Russia it is not only a question of honor but also of security. It is a question of honor for Russia for we shall have to eliminate many things from the books. But it is also a question of security of the state not only because we are on Poland's frontier but also because throughout history Poland has always been a corridor for attack on Russia. It is sufficient that during the last thirty years our German enemy has passed through this corridor twice. This is because Poland was weak. It is in the Russian interest as well as that of Poland that Poland be strong and powerful and in a position in her own and in our interests to shut the corridor by her own forces. The corridor cannot be mechanically shut from outside by Russia. It could be shut from inside only by
Poland. It is necessary that Poland be free, independent and powerful. It is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet State. That is why Russia today is against the Czarist policy of abolition of Poland. We have completely changed this inhuman policy and started a policy of friendship and independence for Poland. This is the basis of our policy and we favor a strong independent Poland.

I refer now to our allies appeal with regard to the Curzon line. The President has suggested modification, giving Poland Lvov and Lvov Province. The Prime Minister thinks that we should make a gesture of magnanimity. But I must remind you that the Curzon line was invented not by Russians but by foreigners. The Curzon line of Curzon was made by Curzon, Clemenceau and the Americans in 1918–1919. Russia was not invited and did not participate. This line was accepted against the will of the Russians on the basis of ethnological data. Lenin opposed it. He did not want to give Bialystok and Bialystok Provinces to Poland but the Curzon line gives them to Poland. We have retreated from Lenin’s position. Some want us to be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau. What will the Russians say at Moscow and the Ukrainians? They will say that Stalin and Molotov are far less defenders of Russia than Curzon and Clemenceau. I cannot take such a position and return to Moscow. I prefer that the war continue a little longer and give Poland compensation in the west at the expense of Germany. I asked Mikolajczyk what frontier he wanted. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear of a western frontier to the river Neisse. I must say that I will maintain this line and ask this conference to support it. There are two Neisse rivers. The east and the west. I favor the west.

Now about the government. The Prime Minister has said that he wants to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue. Without the participation of Poles we can create no Polish government. They all say that I am a dictator but I have enough democratic feeling not to set up a Polish government without Poles. It must be with participation of Poles. We had the opportunity in Moscow to create a Polish government with Poles. Both London and Lublin groups met in Moscow and certain points of agreement were reached. Mikolajczyk returned to London and was kicked out of the government. The present London government of Archuchuski [Arciezewski], which is in reality under the President Brachewicz [Raczkiewicz]. All these people were against the agree-
ment and hostile to the idea. They called the Lublin government "bandits" and "traitors." Naturally the Lublin government paid the same coin to the London government. It is difficult to bring them together. The principal personalities, Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, won't hear of the London government. I ask what kind of concessions can be made. They can tolerate Grabski and General Jelikowski [Zeligowski] but they won't hear of Mikolajczyk. Under these circumstances I am prepared to support any attempt to create unity if there is some chance of success. I am prepared to call the Warsaw Poles here or better to see them in Moscow. But frankly, the Warsaw government has as great a democratic basis in Poland as de Gaulle has in France.

Now as a military man I must say what I demand of a country liberated by the Red Army. First there should be peace and quiet in the wake of the army. The men of the Red Army are indifferent as to what kind of government there is in Poland but they do want one that will maintain order behind the lines. The Lublin Warsaw government fulfills this role not badly. There are agents of the London government connected with the so-called underground. They are called resistance forces. We have had nothing good from them but much evil. So far their agents have killed 212 Russian military men. They have attacked supply bases for arms. It was announced that all wireless stations must be registered but these forces continued to break all the laws of war and complained of being arrested. If they attack the Red Army any more they will be shot. When I compare the agents of both governments I find that the Lublin ones are useful and the others the contrary. The military must have peace and quiet. The military will support such a government and I cannot do otherwise. Such is the situation.

(The President says that it is now quarter to eight and that the meeting should adjourn.)

Prime Minister: I must put on record that both the British and Soviet governments have different sources of information in Poland and get different facts. Perhaps we are mistaken but I do not feel that the Lublin government represents even one third of the Polish people. This is my honest opinion and I may be wrong. Still, I have felt that the underground might have collisions with the Lublin government. I have feared bloodshed, arrests, deportation, and I fear the effect on the whole Polish question. Anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished but I cannot feel that the Lublin government has any right to represent the Polish nation.
United States Delegation Memorandum

Statement on the American Position on Voting in the Council

1. Review of Status of this Question.

It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.

At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.

On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:

"C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

The text I have just read contains a minor drafting change in accordance with Soviet and British comments on the original text submitted by the President.


(a) It is entirely consonant with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.

(b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which the sovereign member states other than the permanent members have a right to state their case without arbitrary prohibition.

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1 Authorship not indicated. This is a carbon copy of one of the papers from which Stettinius spoke in the Plenary Meeting of February 6. (Cf. ante, pp. 661-662, and post, p. 994.) The copy contains pencilled notes by Hiss indicating the variations made by Stettinius when speaking from this paper.
We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization we all desire would be seriously jeopardized, if not made impossible. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from that we have contemplated.

The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.


From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure.

First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world to which I have referred.

Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for justice for all members of the organization.

It is our task to reconcile these two major elements. We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5, 1944, provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.

[Yalta], February 6, 1945.

United States Delegation Memorandum

Voting Procedure

Supplementary Arguments for Use of Secretary

1. Doubt as to acceptability of Organization unless our proposal is adopted. Our main concern is being able to establish the Organization.

American public opinion and the smaller nations, especially the Latin American nations, and—we believe—the British Dominions, may not accept an Organization which they believe fails to accord them a just and reasonable position.

1 Carbon copy; authorship not indicated. Certain of the arguments set forth in this paper are reflected in Stettinius' statement in the Plenary Meeting on February 6. (Cf. ante, pp. 661–662, and post, p. 994.)
2. Importance of the Organization starting off with good will of all members and of world public opinion.

In the Teheran Declaration, the three powers stated:

"We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world. . . ."

Without this good will on the part of all members of the Organization—even if it could be established—its future would be uncertain.

To insure this good will so necessary to the effective operation of the Organization, we must avoid the charge of great power domination.

3. Unity of the great powers is one of our major aims and is promoted rather than impaired by our proposal.

If there should unfortunately be any differences between the great powers, the fact would become fully known to the world, whatever voting procedure is adopted.

Discussion of differences cannot be prevented in the Assembly in any event.

To permit full and free discussion in the Council will in no sense promote disunity, but will, on the contrary, demonstrate the confidence the great powers have in each other and in the justice of their own policies.

[YALTA,] February 6, 1945.

1 The words "we feel" are inserted here in Hiss' pencilled handwriting.
2 The words "the charge" are stricken out and the words "even giving the impression" are inserted here in Hiss' pencilled handwriting.
3 The words "in any event" are transposed in pencil from the end to the beginning of this sentence.

UNA Files

United States Delegation Memorandum

PROPOSED FORMULA FOR VOTING PROCEDURE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THAT FORMULA

I. Proposed formula as communicated on December 5, 1944 to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill (with a minor clarification of the reference to Chapter VIII, Section C).

1 Undated copy; authorship not indicated. This is apparently the paper copies of which were distributed to the British and Soviet Delegations at the Plenary Meeting on February 6 and of which a considerable portion was read by Stettinius. (Cf. ante, pp. 662-663, and post, p. 994.) For the drafting history of this paper, see ante, p. 81, footnote 2.
The provisions of Section C. of Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would read as follows:

"C. Voting
1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.

Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:

I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on
   1. Admission of new members;
   2. Suspension of a member;
   3. Expulsion of a member;
   4. Election of the Secretary General.

II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

   1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;
   2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;
   3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;
   4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.

V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.

VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members,
except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:

I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council’s attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;

III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;

IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;

V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.

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Hopkins Papers

_The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President_¹

[**Yalta, February 6, 1945.**]

**MR. PRESIDENT**

Why not let this wind up today when Stalin is thru—and say we will talk it over again tomorrow. It is 7.15

**HARRY**

¹ This note is undated, but the content indicates that it was passed to the President during Stalin’s extended statement on the Polish question during the Third Plenary Meeting on February 6, 1945. See ante, p. 670.

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**WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1945**

**MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 7, 1945, 10 A. M., LIVADIA PALACE**

**TOP SECRET**

**PRESENT**

Fleet Admiral Leahy  
General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Major General Bull  
Major General Deane  
Major General Anderson  
Major General Hull  
Major General Wood  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Rear Admiral Duncan  
Rear Admiral Olsen  

Brigadier General Roberts  
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser  
Brigadier General Lindsay  
Brigadier General Bessell  
Brigadier General Everest  
Commodore Burrough  
Colonel Peck  
Colonel Lincoln  
Colonel Cary  
Captain Stroop  
Captain McDill  
Lieutenant Colonel McRae  
Commander Clark

**Secretariat**

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves
Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF C. C. S. 186TH MEETING

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Agreed to recommend approval of the conclusions of the Minutes of the 186th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

2. UTILIZATION OF THE FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE IN VIENNA-BUDAPEST AREA

(J. C. S. 1241)

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Staff Planners had in this paper reviewed the problem of basing or staging U.S. strategic air forces in the Vienna-Budapest area and recommended that a memorandum be sent to the President requesting Marshal Stalin's agreement to the staging of elements of the Fifteenth Air Force through airfields in the Budapest area. He found no objections to the paper and recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve it.

General Marshall drew attention to the fact that this subject had been discussed with the Russians at the tripartite meeting on 6 February 1945, and that the President need only to hand the memorandum to Marshal Stalin without discussion.

3. RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT ON PRISONERS OF WAR

(C. C. S. 777; J. C. S. 1266/1 (Argonaut); J. C. S. 1266/1 (Wash.))

Admiral Leahy said that J. C. S. 1266/1 (Argonaut) was the report of an ad hoc committee which expresses agreement with the

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1 J. C. S. 180th Meeting.
2 Ante, pp. 635-637.
3 Not printed.
4 See ante, p. 647.
5 In C. C. S. 777, dated February 4, 1945, the British Chiefs of Staff expressed their concurrence with a draft agreement that the Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary had submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff before pursuing further negotiations with the Russians. The draft agreement under reference appears to have been the British redraft of the Soviet draft of January 20. The Soviet draft is presented ante, pp. 416-418. The British redraft is post, pp. 694-696.
6 Not printed. This paper was prepared in Washington and was sent to Yalta by courier on February 2, 1945. It set forth certain objections formulated by the Washington agencies to the British redraft which was then under consideration at Yalta. These considerations are reflected in the telegram of February 7 (3), 1945, from Grew to Stettinius, post, p. 697.
British proposal in C. C. S. 777 and recommends a memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to this effect. He pointed out that the Acting Secretary of State in Washington had already agreed to a different method but that this problem appeared to be one for the State Department to solve and was not the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He found no objection to the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in J. C. S. 1266/1 (Argonaut) and recommended approval.

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

Approved the memorandum in the Appendix of J. C. S. 1266/1 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 777/1).  

4. **Supplies and Equipment Requested by the U.S.S.R.**
   (J. C. S. 1138/3, J. C. S. Info. Memo 360—Milepost Summary)  

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had reviewed J. C. S. 1138/2 and brought up to date the status of availability of equipment to meet the requirements for operation Milepost. In J. C. S. 1138/3 they recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the facts and conclusions of the report and that a copy of the paper be furnished to the Executive, President’s Soviet Protocol Committee. He recommended that J. C. S. 1138/3 be approved.

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

Took note of the facts and conclusions developed in the report of the Joint Logistics Committee in J. C. S. 1138/3 and directed that a copy of the report be furnished to the Executive, President’s Soviet Protocol Committee.

5. **Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany and Administration of “Greater Berlin”**
   (J. C. S. 577/28)  

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had recommended as the final action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany and administration of “Greater Berlin,” the dispatch of the message to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy contained in the Appendix to J.C.S. 577/28. He saw no objection to the paper and recommended approval.

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

Agreed to dispatch to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy the message contained in the Appendix to J.C.S. 577/28.

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7 As amended and approved, this document became C. C. S. 777/2, printed post, pp. 754–756.
8 Not printed.
9 The appendix to J. C. S. 577/28 is printed ante, p. 118, footnote 1.
10 Ante, pp. 118–123.
9. Zone of Limitation for British and U. S. Air Operations in Advance of the Soviet Armies

General Marshall requested General Kuter to report on the meeting of the tripartite air staffs in connection with the coordination of strategic air operations with the Soviets.

General Kuter said that the draft agreement reached had been circulated to the Chiefs of Staff informally. It had been decided not to use the term "bombline" because of the difference between the Russian, British and American definitions but to use instead, the expression "zone of limitation." There were two items in the agreement which were not entirely satisfactory. The first was the 24-hour notice of Allied air operations required by the Soviet General Staff and second, the depth of the zone, which would be deeper than the Allied command desired. However, it was the best arrangement that could be worked out. The agreement had been changed in one respect. He had substituted the words "British and U. S." wherever the word "Allied" occurred. He requested the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to a question by General Deane, General Kuter explained that the Mission in Moscow would be furnished daily information of the location of the Soviet front lines, which automatically fixed the location of the zone of limitation.

General Kuter said that the matter of Allied-Russian liaison on a lower level had also been brought up at the meeting. For the necessity of such liaison the strategic air operations to the east of Berlin which had involved bombing within an extremely short distance of the Soviet lines had been used as an example. It was suggested that the Russians consider the use of VHF communication links with the Allied planes in order that their own fighter pilots might be able quickly to receive information of German movements discovered by Allied pilots and conduct their operations accordingly. He felt that the meeting, although not entirely satisfactory on all points, would lead to further discussions in Moscow. As an additional point, no decision on the advance bomber bases in the Vienna-Budapest area had been reached.

Admiral Leahy recommended that the agreement be approved as General Kuter had requested.

After further discussion,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the agreement for a zone of limitation for British and U. S. air operations in advance of the Soviet armies prepared by the
British-U. S.-Soviet air staffs, as amended during the discussion. (Subsequently circulated as J. C. S. 1243.)

10. MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Approved the dispatch to General Antonov of a note requesting a meeting with the Soviet General Staff at Soviet Headquarters, Thursday, 8 February, at 1500.

11. REPORT BY COMBINED SHIPPING STAFFS

General Somervell said that combined oil and shipping studies had been progressing. Eight of the ten points involved in the oil studies had been resolved and a paper would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible. It had been decided to defer action on the remaining two points of difference in the oil studies.

The report of the Combined Shipping Staffs would be completed and circulated sometime during the night and would be ready for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the meeting scheduled for 8 February 1945.

Several disturbing points had arisen. The Russians had demanded additional ships, and what was of greater concern, there was the accompanying question of cargo requirements, chiefly the item of trucks. As yet it was not known how the Russian requirements could be filled. There was also the question of a cut in British requirements. The Prime Minister was intensely concerned in this matter and was reluctant to accept any reduction in imports but would do so if necessary. It was his, General Somervell's, view that the British import program should not be considered at this conference unless directed by the President.

In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, General Somervell explained that the necessary military shipping would be found but he felt that the Director of War Mobilization would require complete information and would wish to discuss the matter before making any final allocation.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Took note of General Somervell's report on the progress of cargo shipping and oil studies.

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11 Not printed.
12 The note and reply are printed post, pp. 698-699.
13 See post, pp. 750-751.
The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[YALTA], 5th February, 1945.

My Dear Secretary of State: As you know, one of the matters which we agreed should be discussed with the Russians during the present Conference is the question of concluding a Reciprocal Agreement with them about the treatment of Soviet citizens liberated by the Allied Armies in western and southern Europe and British and American nationals liberated by the Soviet forces in eastern Europe. The British Chiefs of Staff approved the draft text of such an agreement yesterday and I understand that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be taking it [up] today. If, as I hope, the text is approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we shall be in a position to take the matter up with the Russians as soon as possible.

In present circumstances where the Soviet forces are overrunning the sites of British and United States prisoners of war camps very fast, and we know that a number of British prisoners of war (though not exactly how many) are in Soviet hands, and no doubt some United States prisoners of war also, it is really urgent to reach agreement with the Soviet Government on this draft Agreement during ARCONAUT. I intend therefore to ask M. Molotov for discussions to be opened between the experts of the three parties concerned at once, in order to reach agreement upon a satisfactory text.

There is one further point, however, which I should like to mention. It is clear, as S.H.A.E.F. have already reported, that the only real solution to the problem of the Soviet citizens who are likely to fall into British and American hands shortly is to repatriate them as soon as possible. For this shipping is required and we have already sent 10,000 back from the United Kingdom and 7,500 from the Mediterranean.

It seems to me that it would materially help the proposed negotiations if we could inform the Russians at a suitable moment of our plans to repatriate their citizens. From the British point of view I can say that we have found shipping to send back from the United Kingdom a further 7,000 of these men during the latter part of this month and it is hoped that we can provide further ships to take some 4,000 a month from the Mediterranean during March, April and May, even though the Soviet citizens in the southern part of France and half of those liberated in Italy are primarily the responsibility of the United States. I am however without any information on the United States plans on this. General Eisenhower has recently pressed the Combined Chiefs of Staff once again to provide two ships to take 3,000 each from Marseilles until the present large numbers have been
cleared. No doubt your experts have been examining the position in the light of General Eisenhower's telegram, and I should be very glad if you could tell me whether you will be in a position to make any statement to the Russians about the United States plans.

Whilst it is clear that the discussions should not be delayed in order that a statement can be made on the shipping position, I would be very glad to know as soon as possible whether you can give the Russians any information on the lines I hope to give him from the British point of view, since the sooner this information can be provided the better are the chances of reaching an agreement during this Conference.

Yours sincerely, 

ANTHONY EDEN

740.00114 EW/2-545

The War Shipping Administrator (Land) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[YALTA,] February 5, 1945.

MEMORANDUM:

To: Mr. Stettinius
From: Admiral Land
Subject: Mr. Eden's letter to State Department on O. S.¹ proposals to meet Russian repatriation requirements.

1. After request by British Chiefs of Staff, U. S. Chiefs of Staff agreed to use of troopships for repatriation of Russians equivalent to British assistance of 10,000 personnel lift trans-Atlantic each month, contingent upon use of overland transportation after the defeat of Germany, when redeployment will require all available trooplift.

2. Following this authorization, Eisenhower requested use of two large troopships for repatriation of large numbers of Russians on hand, this movement to be from Marseille.

3. In Washington the C.M.T.C. in the belief the British Chiefs of Staff had failed to implement the approval described in paragraph 1 above, signalled London to determine whether Eisenhower's request had been made in ignorance of C. C. S. decision on availability of lift.

4. Informal discussion with British personnel movement officers at CRICKET indicates that implementation had been intentionally held up because of these two factors:

(a) Type of ship required.
(b) Policy on Russian repatriation to be established.

5. The type of ship referred to above involves the desire to use medium size troopships which means physical assistance by U. S. transports since British trans-Atlantic shipping is primarily of large

¹The reference is presumably to over-all shipping.
type. This changes U. S. conception at time of original British request referred to in Paragraph 1 above when it was understood all movement would be in British ships at cost to U. S. troop movement capabilities which it was estimated could be accepted.

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740.0014 EW/2-545

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) ¹

SECRET

[YALTA], 5th February, 1945.

You will remember that during the Moscow conversations of last October, I discussed with you and with Marshal Stalin the question of caring for and repatriating Soviet citizens and British subjects liberated respectively by Allied forces in the south and west and by the Soviet forces in the east of Europe.

Since then our two Governments have exchanged Drafts and on 20th January our Embassy received from your Government a redraft of a Reciprocal Agreement on this matter.² We have examined this redraft and, subject to what is stated below, I am glad to say that it is generally acceptable. I understand that a similar draft was put forward to the United States Government at the same time.³

In view of the integrated character of the Allied Commands in western and southern Europe, it seems to us essential that any agreement should be tripartite and cover British and United States Combined Commands. We have accordingly prepared a redraft of the text taking as basis your Government’s Draft and making some amendments to cover this point and also to cover certain other points where alterations appear to us necessary.

I have brought with me experts on this matter and I would like to suggest that it should be remitted to them and to experts of your Government and the United States Government with a view to reaching a text which is mutually satisfactory to all three Governments before this Conference breaks up.

On 20th January, your Government also presented to the British Embassy a redraft of the proposed Agreement covering the liberated Soviet citizens in the United Kingdom.⁴ This redraft is also generally satisfactory, but there are a few points on it which require clarification and amendment. I would suggest that this Agreement should

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¹ Carbon copy bearing the notation: “With the Compliments of Mr. Eden.”
² *Ante*, pp. 416-418.
³ Not printed.
⁴ Not found.
also be remitted to the same British and Soviet experts, so that agreement can be reached upon it during the present Conference.

I hope very much that you will agree with these suggestions and will instruct your experts to meet their British and American colleagues at once. I feel that the conclusion of this Agreement would be a very happy result of the present Conference and would give the greatest satisfaction in our two countries where so many families are affected by them.

I have given a copy of this letter to Mr. Stettinius.
I enclose a copy of the British redraft of the Reciprocal Agreement.\[^5\] His Excellency Monsieur V. M. Molotov.

\[Enclosure\]

**Redraft of Soviet Government's Draft Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet Armies and Allied Armies**

**Article 1.**

All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under Allied Command and British subjects and American citizens liberated by the Soviet forces will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

Allied and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

**Article 2.**

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens or subjects of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and Allied repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens or subjects are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are

\(^{5}\text{Infra.}\)
insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from
the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance
with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they
are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a com-
mmandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the overall
administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to
another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet
or Allied authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the
contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not
be permitted.

Article 3.

Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article may be
affected by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of
UNRRA (or other agreed relief agencies) the competent Allied and
Soviet authorities will do their utmost in the circumstances obtaining
in any area, and from time to time, to supply liberated citizens and
subjects of the contracting parties with adequate food, clothing,
housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concen-
tration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over
to the Soviet or Allied authorities at places agreed upon between
those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and
medical attention shall so far as possible be consistent with the
normal practice relating to military rank.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or
other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively
to liberated citizens or subjects of the other contracting party.

Article 4.

Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such
of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation
of its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party. Simi-
larly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own
facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens or subjects held by
the other contracting party.

Article 5.

Soviet and Allied military authorities shall make such advances on
behalf of their respective governments to liberated subjects and
citizens of the other contracting party citizens as the competent
Soviet and Allied authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency
of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.
In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and Allied governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens or subjects necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

**Article 6.**

Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed on work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure.6

**Article 7.**

The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens and subjects. They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens and subjects to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens and subjects shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.

**Article 8.**

The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.

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6 On a second carbon copy of this "Redraft" in the Department file, article 6 is replaced by the following text (underlining as in the source paper):

**(Redrafted) Article 6**

Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting Parties, may until their repatriation, be employed on a voluntary basis on work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with the military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their own officers. Any liberated member of the respective forces or civilian who is unwilling to perform such work will be exercised under similar supervision.
The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 7 [8], 1945. 1

War Department has just made available message dated February 7 from Marshall 2 which indicates that JCS on February 7 approved with certain changes British preliminary text of agreement with Soviet Union for exchange of prisoners of war and apparently also for liberated persons. (This is our message No. 27.) 3 While it is not definitely clear what preliminary British text is referred to, if it is the preliminary text included in JCS 1266, 4 the agreement would not appear to cover the following specific points which were incorporated in the United States counterproposals forwarded to JCS staff with you:

1. Protection of Geneva Convention 5 which we have informed Soviet Government we will accord to Soviet citizens captured in German uniform who demand such protection.
2. Soviet citizens in the United States not prisoners of war whose cases the Attorney General feels should be dealt with on basis of traditional American policy of asylum.
3. Persons liberated by United States forces no longer in their custody.
5. Persons claimed as citizens by the Soviet authorities who were not Soviet citizens prior to outbreak of war and do not now claim Soviet citizenship.

(ALLSTATE HORSESHOE) It is felt that these questions and others referred to in JCS 1266 and 1266/1 should be brought to your attention in order that consideration may be given to them before final agreement is reached. 6

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1 The text of this message in the Defense Files bears the date February 8, which is the date under which it was transmitted.
2 Not printed.
3 i.e., from the Acting Secretary to the Secretary since the departure of the latter from Washington, in this series of messages sent via Army channels.
4 Not printed. See text agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, post, pp. 754–756.
5 For the text of this Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which was signed at Geneva July 27, 1929, on the part of the United States and forty-six other countries, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 846, or 47 Stat. 2021.
6 For Stettinius' reply to this message, dated February 9, 1945, see post, pp. 756–757.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] 6 February 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff find that it is necessary to obtain Marshal Stalin's approval of holding a meeting with the Soviet Staff to discuss details of possible participation in the war against Japan and suggest that you speak to Marshal Stalin with the purpose of obtaining his agreement.

(From JCS) 1

An endorsement on this paper by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Executive Secretary reads: "Cdr Clark reported at 1615, 6 Feb 45 that this memo had been delivered to the President by Adm Leahy".

J. C. S. Files

The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army (Antonov)

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] 7 February 1945.

My Dear General Antonov: The U. S. Chiefs of Staff desire to meet with the Soviet Chiefs for a most secret discussion tomorrow, Thursday, February 8 at 3 P. M. at the Russian headquarters. No one to be present but the Chiefs of Staff and one interpreter, your Russian interpreter being satisfactory for our purpose.

For the U. S. Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy

J. C. S. Files

The First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army (Antonov) to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)

TOP SECRET

[Crimea,] 7 February 1945.

[Translation]

Dear Admiral Leahy: In reply to your letter of the seventh of February concerning your wish to meet with the Soviet Chiefs of Staff, I inform you that I shall be glad to meet with you on the eighth of February at three o'clock in the afternoon at the headquarters of the Russian Staff.
I hope you will be kind enough to inform me of the persons who will attend with you at this meeting.

Yours very respectfully,

ANTONOV
Deputy Chief of the General Staff
of the Red Army
General of the Army

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 7, 1945, NOON,
YUSUPOV PALACE

PRESENT

<table>
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<th>UNITED STATES</th>
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<td>Foreign Secretary Eden</td>
<td>Foreign Commissar</td>
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<td>Mr. Harriman</td>
<td>Sir Alexander Cadogan</td>
<td>Molotov</td>
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<td>Mr. Matthews</td>
<td>Sir Archibald Clark Kerr</td>
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Bohlen Collection

Page Minutes

TOP SECRET

Subject[s]: 1. Dumbarton Oaks.
2. The Dismemberment of Germany.
3. Creation of a Commission to Study the Procedure for the Dismemberment of Germany.
4. The Integration of France into the German Control Machinery on Condition that France were to Receive a Zone of Occupation.
5. Reparations.

1. Dumbarton Oaks.

Mr. Stettinius inquired at the outset whether there were any questions regarding Dumbarton Oaks which the American Delegation had failed to make clear at yesterday's plenary session. He said that if so he was prepared to answer with his colleagues any questions which remained open or which needed to be expanded.

Mr. Molotov remarked that the World Security Organization had not been referred to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion. He continued that although he had a few questions to advance he was not prepared to go into this subject at the present time.

1 The photograph which is reproduced as plate 6 following p. 546 shows one other person present at this meeting, in addition to those here listed; and the Hiss notes (post, p. 705) likewise show one other person present, whose name Hiss did not know.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he was always ready now or at a later date to discuss the matter. He added that he wished merely to make the offer to discuss the question; he personally had no new points to bring up.

2. The Dismemberment of Germany.

Mr. Molotov recalled that it had been agreed to limit the changes in Article 12 of the German surrender instrument 2 to the addition of the words “and the dismemberment” after the word “demilitarization.” He suggested that a sub-committee consisting of British, American and Soviet representatives be appointed to work out the exact wording of Article 12.

It was decided to authorize Messrs. Vyshinski, Cadogan and Matthews to make a final redraft of Article 12 which would include the addition of the word “dismemberment” and to authorize a commission consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev to study the question of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany.

3. Creation of a Commission to Study the Procedure for the Dismemberment of Germany.

Mr. Molotov suggested that such a commission be set up in London consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he felt the creation of this commission was a most important matter. If this question were not referred to the EAC the prestige of that body would surely be diminished. He, therefore, thought that the question of taking away this work from the EAC should be carefully considered.

Mr. Eden pointed out that if the dismemberment of Germany were included in the EAC the French would participate in this work.

Mr. Stettinius stated that it was entirely agreeable to have these studies carried on in London and to appoint Mr. Winant as the American representative.

Mr. Molotov stated that the subject under discussion was the study of procedure for dismembering Germany and not the actual dismemberment or detail thereof. Therefore, it could be assigned to a special committee. Later, perhaps, it might be handed over to the EAC.

Mr. Eden remarked that he thought that the body handling this question should go further than merely studying questions of procedure. He stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the terms of reference of that body. On the assumption that Germany was to be broken up into individual states, that body, he believed, should examine when this separation should take place; should look into boundary questions and measures needed to insure the proper func-

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2 Ante, p. 117.
tioning and survival of the new states. What relations should be permitted between them and foreign powers should also be studied. He stated that it might be necessary to request that a report be drawn up on the practicability of the dismemberment of Germany. He also questioned whether the commission was to undertake the type of work referred to in the afore-mentioned terms of reference or merely to decide how this work was to be done.

Mr. Molotov stated that he did not believe that there was any need for a special commission at this stage and suggested that the question be studied through diplomatic channels in London. He expressed doubt that the foreign secretaries had received any directive to form an actual commission.

Mr. Eden stated that they had not; however they had the power to make recommendations.

Mr. Molotov continued that he was not insisting on a commission. Mr. Eden stated that he felt worried about the absence of the French. They were neighbors of Germany and had certain ideas on control of the Ruhr and Rhine. He felt that it would be a mistake to keep them out.

Mr. Molotov suggested that the question of French participation be subsequently decided by Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev in London.

Messrs. Stettinius and Eden stated that this would be agreeable. Mr. Eden stated that in view of his many activities it might be impossible for him personally to participate in the London discussions.

Mr. Molotov stated that he of course had the right to deputize someone to represent him.

4. The Integration of France into the German Control Machinery on Condition that France were to receive a Zone of Occupation.

Mr. Molotov submitted a statement on this matter (see attached)\(^3\) and inquired whether it could be used for a basis of discussion.

Mr. Eden stated that since it had been agreed upon that France would receive a zone of occupation he hoped that it might also be agreed that France would participate on the Control Commission itself. He said that he foresaw all kinds of difficulties if the French were not to participate and expressed the opinion that de Gaulle in all probability would refuse to accept a zone if he did not have the same treatment on the Control Commission as the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain. Even if France were to accept a zone they would always have trouble in administering it if they were not represented on the commission. He maintained that he could not see why it was any more of a departure to have France on the commission than on the EAC. He pointed out that the Prime Min-

\(^3\) *Post*, p. 707.
ister opposed enlarging the present three-power conferences; however, he could not see how the participation of France on the Control Commission would affect this view.

Mr. Molotov stated that he felt that at the present stage the question of France should be limited to the two proposals contained in the Soviet statement. If at a later date it were necessary to study French participation on the Control Commission it could be done. He felt that it was only proper that actual control should be in the hands of the three commanders-in-chief.

It was decided that the three secretaries should submit a report to the plenary session stating that: (a) it had been agreed upon to give to France a zone of occupation; and, (b) with respect to the question concerning the participation of France in the Control Commission, Messrs. Molotov and Stettinius considered it appropriate to submit this question to the consideration of the EAC, while Mr. Eden considered it appropriate to study the question at the present time and to assign to France a place on the Control Commission.

Mr. Eden stated that he believed that if France were admitted to the Control Commission the three foreign secretaries should agree that no other power should be given a zone of occupation.

Mr. Molotov suggested that there was not sufficient time to discuss that question at the present conference.

5. Reparations.

Mr. Molotov submitted a statement on this subject and summarized it in brief (copy attached). He requested Mr. Maisky to explain the considerations which formed the basis of the Soviet statement.

Mr. Maisky stated that the Soviet authorities had come to the figure of 20 billion dollars (ten billion dollars of property to be removed immediately after the war and ten billion dollars of reparations to be paid in kind over a period of ten years) the following way. The national wealth of Germany at the beginning of the war amounted to 125 billion dollars. It was figured that this national wealth would be reduced by 40 per cent or less during the course of the war. Thus, the national wealth of Germany at the termination of the war would amount to 75 billion dollars. An analysis of the national wealths of the more highly industrialized countries had shown that the mobile part of this wealth which could be transferred abroad amounted to approximately 30 per cent or in the case of Germany to 22–23 billion dollars. The Soviet Government proposed to remove ten billion dollars of this mobile wealth. The remainder would be left to Germany which would secure for that country living standards com-

*Post, p. 707.*
parable to those prevailing in Central Europe. These were lower than in Germany but quite decent. With respect to the second item it had been figured that the national income of Germany before the war amounted to 30 billion dollars annually. The war would lower this income by 30–35 per cent and would bring it to the neighborhood of approximately 18–20 billion. The Soviet Government proposed to take one billion dollars annually, or 5–6 per cent from the German national income. This was not a large sum and could be supported by Germany.

Mr. Eden stated that there was one point in the opening paragraph of the Soviet statement on which he wished to comment. The Prime Minister had stated that the test for reparations payments should be not only the exertion of a country in the war, but also the sufferings endured at the hands of the enemy. On either basis the Soviet Union stood well. He would like to see reference made also to the sacrifices undergone by the Allies in the first paragraph of the Soviet statement. He continued that he agreed in principle with the second paragraph of the Soviet statement. He wished, however, to give thorough study to the Soviet document before continuing discussion of it.

Mr. Molotov stated that there would be no objections to the addition in paragraph one of the words suggested by Mr. Eden.

Mr. Stettinus stated that he also wished to give a thorough study to the Soviet document. He recalled that the President at the plenary session had stated that the United States itself would not be interested in large reparations, except with respect to German foreign investments and perhaps raw materials. He expressed the hope that at this afternoon’s plenary session the foreign secretaries could report that the reparation matter had been discussed and that it had been agreed that a commission should be established in Moscow where it would immediately commence work on the question of reparations.

Mr. Molotov stated that whenever the British and American representatives were prepared he would be ready to continue the discussions. With respect to the amount of reparations for the United States and Great Britain that was entirely the concern of those countries. However, in view of their losses, especially at sea, the Soviet Government felt that it was only just to make mention in the reparations statement of compensation going to the United States and Great Britain. He favored Mr. Stettinus’ proposal that the foreign ministers report to the plenary session that the question of reparations had been discussed, would be discussed further, and that a reparations commission would be set up in Moscow which would immediately commence work on this question.
MR. STETTINIUS stated that it would be helpful for the American Delegation to know whether the subject of labor would be discussed at the Crimean Conference or at a later date.

Mr. Molotov stated that this question was very complicated, that the Soviet representatives needed time for further study on it and that they were not prepared to discuss it at the present conference. He agreed that it should be discussed by the reparations Commission in Moscow.

Mr. Molotov's interpreter then read a second paper on the creation of the reparations commission (see attached). Mr. Stettinius stated that his Government was prepared to accept the statement on the understanding that it had not yet agreed on the principles mentioned in it.

Mr. Eden inquired whether the Moscow Reparations Commission should not also be authorized to study German industry in connection with future security and control. If this were so, he suggested that this subject be dealt with in the draft terms of reference of the commission.

Mr. Molotov maintained that the commission would deal with German industry only in connection with reparations. The question of security, of course, would always be kept in mind although it was not the principal task of the commission.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that as a practical measure the German Control Commission should have the responsibility for the control of German industry for security purposes. The Reparations Commission should, of course, coordinate its work with the policy of the Control Machinery and should establish liaison with it.

Mr. Molotov was in agreement with this proposal.

* Post, p. 708.

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Matthews Files

Matthews Notes ¹

Dumbarton—No clarification needed

Agenda
   Mol: suggests Eden, Winant & Gousev.
   Eden: on terms of reference
   Mol. Perhaps no commission necessary.
   Eden: Worried about absence of Fr. They are neighbors. The three can decide on French participation. Eden has right to deputize

¹ For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes of this meeting.
M: Thinks we should limit to these 2 proposals
EDEN: Zone agreed on. S.² M.³ want control machinery postponed & studied in EAC Eden wants immediate admission

REPARATIONS

Mol. Explains paper
MAISKY: Explains how figure reached ½ immed ½ in annual 1 bil. Ge. natl wealth = 125 bil. before war. Reduction 40% after war 75 bil at end of war. Mobile part of natl wealth = 70% = 22 or 23 bil. of this 10 bil removal. This would give G. Middle European level standard of living. Before war 30 bil natl income. Lower by 30% after war = 18 or 19 bil Propose to take 1 bil annually - not big sum.

EDEN: Whether exertion in war should be a basis or whether sufferings at hands of enemy. On either basis would stand well.

In general agreement on principles of Par. 2.
S. Prep. to study. As Pres said U. S. not interested except for invest possible raw materials. Hopes we can agree Com. to start immed.

E: Should Com. examine econ. security provisions
Mol: To extent necessary for reparations.

² Stettinius.
³ Molotov.

Hiss Notes¹

2/7 12.00 meeting ERS, Molotov, Eden Amb H, Doc, Page, A. H.—Cadogan, Clark-Kerr, Jebb, Theakstone, Dixon, Harrison, ? — Vishinsky, Maisky, Gusev, Galunsky, Novikof
ERS at outset asked if there were any q's re D. O. which we failed to make clear yesterday If so I am prepared to answer with my colleagues any q's that may remain open & to expand in any way
Mol. Not quite prepared to ask any q's now
ERS merely made the offer but no desire to discuss it. No new points to bring up.
Mol. Thanks
ERS Ready at any time now or later
ERS report — 1 p. by 4 p. m.
2/7 For Mins Mol. Chm

¹ These handwritten notes cover three unnumbered pages in the Hiss Collection. Since the notes on the third page obviously pertain to the opening discussion at the meeting, they are printed here in that order, which corresponds to the sequence of topics in the Page minutes for this meeting.
For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes.
France

Report: We are agreed that Fr. should have a zone of occupation in Ger. for occup. by Fr. forces. Mr. Mol & ERS believe q. of particip
by Fr. in Control Com. should be studied by EAC. Ed. believes particip of Fr. in Con. Com should be agreed to now. [Ed would
also be willing say 3 For Mins agree that if Fr. is admitted to Con.
Com. no other power should be given zone] 3

Reparations

Mol: add 20,000,000,000 total

Principles—Eden wants add suffering to ¶ 1 Agreed by Mol.

Eden in prin agrees with ¶ 2

ERS wants study memo—will do so promptly & discuss it at your
pleasure. Pres. at plenary session that U S would be interested in
no reparations except for. investments & perhaps raw materials
Would be surprised if it would approach figure suggested. Perhaps
Brit would take some of what U S gives up. Mol. up to U S & Brit.

Hopes can report we agreed Commission should be est. immediately
to go to work.

Mol. ready to go on when Brit & Am. Delegs. have had time
study R draft.

Report we have discussed this q. today; Will discuss it further &
agreed Com. should be est in Mos. & begin work immediately

ERS asked Mol. if wants discuss work labor here or later. Mol—
may not be ready to discuss here but agreed will be discussed by

Machinery

Mol. amendment delete “on recommend. of the Allied Com. or
on their own initiative” OK Ed. change “may” to “shall” OK

ERS: Approves doc. on understanding we have not yet agreed on
principles

Ed. Should Rep. Com. study control of Ger. industry for security
purposes.

ERS—EAC, Rep Com, & D. O. Staff Com. all may do this

Ed. Amended suggestion: We should consider whether this Com. 4

ERS: Control machinery should have responsibility for control of
German industry for security purposes. The Reparation Commissi-
on should, of course, coordinate its work with the policies of the
Control machinery & establish liaison. Agreed.

Mol. It is bus. not only of Com but also of 3 govts

2 Eden.
3 Brackets appear in the original.
4 In the original notes there is a blank space of about half a page at this point.
Soviet Proposal on French Zone of Occupation in Germany

Regarding a Separate Zone of Occupation in Germany To Be Allotted to France

1. It has been found desirable to allot to France a separate zone of occupation in Germany for occupation by French forces.

2. It has been decided that the French occupational authorities shall exercise control in their zone of occupation under the general guidance of the Control Council.

1 Undated but submitted by Molotov on February 7, 1945. See ante, p. 701.

Hist Collection

Soviet Proposal on Reparations From Germany

Basic Principles of Exaction of Reparations From Germany

1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have organized victory over the enemy.

All other countries are to receive reparations in the second place.

2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labour by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

   a) removals in a single payment at the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises remaining in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

   These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

   b) Annual deliveries of commodities during 10 years after the end of the war.

3. The total sum of the German reparations in the form of removals from her national wealth as well as in the form of annual deliveries of commodities after the end of the war is fixed at 20 billion dollars.

   This amount shall be distributed as follows:

   a) USSR — 10 billion dollars,
   b) United Kingdom and U. S. A. — 8 billion dollars,
   c) All other countries — 2 billion dollars.

1 Original, undated, but endorsed to the effect that it was submitted by Molotov at the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 7. See ante, p. 702. A copy in the Bohlen Collection contains certain variances of spelling and wording.

305575—55—50
Soviet Proposal on the Establishment of an Allied Reparation Commission

REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF AN ALLIED REPARATION COMMITTEE

The Allied Reparation Committee shall be set up on the following basis:

1. The Committee shall consist of three representatives one from U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom and U. S. A. Each representative shall be entitled to call in to assist in the work of the Committee any number of experts.

2. The function of the Committee shall be to work out a detailed plan for exaction of reparations from Germany according to the principles adopted at the Crimea Conference of the Three Powers.

3. The Governments of USSR, USA and the United Kingdom shall determine the moment when the representatives of other Allied Powers will be invited to participate in the Allied Committee as well as define the forms of participation of these Powers in the Committee.

4. The activities of the Committee shall proceed in strict secrecy.

5. The Allied Reparation Committee shall be established in Moscow.

1 Original, undated, but endorsed to the effect that it was submitted by Molotov at the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 7. See ante, p. 704. A copy in the Bohlen Collection is of the same wording as here printed.

2 At this point the typewritten words "may on recommendation of the Allied Committee or on their own initiative" are stricken out in pencil and the word "shall" is inserted.

FOURTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 7, 1945, 4 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Secretary Stettinius
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Hiss
Mr. Bohlen

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Edward Bridges
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Dixon
Major Birse

SOVIET UNION
Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov
TOP SECRET

Subject[s]: 1. Dismemberment of Germany.
2. Poland.
3. World Security Organization;
4. Zone of Occupation in Germany for France and French Participation in the Control Commission.

The President said in regard to the Polish question he wished again to emphasize that he was less interested in the tracing of the frontier lines than he was in the problem of the Polish Government. He said that he did not attach any importance to the continuity or legality of any Polish Government since he thought in some years there had in reality been no Polish Government. He added that before proceeding with the Polish question he understood that Mr. Molotov had a report on the meeting of the Foreign Ministers today.

Mr. Molotov then read the results of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, as follows:

“Decisions Adopted at the Meeting of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden

February 7, 1945.

“1. Regarding the Dismemberment of Germany.
   (a) A. Y. Vyshinski, Mr. Cadogan and Mr. Matthews were entrusted with the preparation of the final draft of Article 12 of the instrument “unconditional surrender of Germany” having in view the insertion in the text of Article 12 of the word “dismemberment.”
   (b) The study of the question of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Eden, Mr. Winant and F. T. Gusev.

“2. Regarding the Zone of Occupation in Germany for France.
   (a) The allotment to France of a zone in Germany to be occupied by French occupational forces has been agreed upon.
   (b) As regards the question of the participation of France in the Control Commission, V. M. Molotov and Mr. Stettinius feel [it] desirable to refer the question to the EAC. Mr. Eden considers it necessary to discuss this question now and to give France a place on the Control Commission.

“3. Regarding the Reparations to be Exacted from Germany.
   (a) It was agreed that in the paragraph one of the Soviet proposals mention should be made of sacrifices borne.
   (b) It was decided that the residence of the Reparations Committee should be in the City of Moscow. It was agreed that the Committee should begin its work immediately upon the approval of the principles of the exacting of the reparations.
   (c) It was decided that the discussion of the two documents relating to the matter of the reparations which have been submitted by V. M. Molotov, first, regarding the basic principles of exacting the repara-
tions from Germany, and, second, regarding the organization of an
Allied Reparations Committee, should be continued at the Crimean
Conference.”

The President said that we are all grateful for the productive
work of the three Foreign Ministers.

The Prime Minister added that he joined the President in thank-
ing the Committee for their fruitful work but he said that since he
had only heard their report orally he would wish to study the English
translation, although, except for one point, he felt that he would be
in complete agreement.

The President inquired whether the document included Mr.
Eden’s reservation on France, to which Mr. Eden replied in the
affirmative.

The Prime Minister stated that the British Government was
unconvinced by the argument that it would be possible to accord a
zone to the French without participation in the Control Commission.
If the French were given a zone without participation they would
cause endless trouble. If we were strict in our zones, they might be
lenient in theirs and vice versa. He felt that it was of the utmost
importance that there should be uniformity in the treatment of Ger-
many by the three or four Allies. He repeated that he felt the Control
Commission for Germany would be a subordinate instrument as was
the case in Italy, although we recognized that the German Commission
would have more important tasks. He said he wished to make it
clear that he did not consider that French participation in the Control
Commission would give them any right to attend a conference such
as this one, at least for the time being. He said he must state frankly
that he found the arguments on the subject somewhat futile since it
was obvious that France would accept no zone unless they were given
participation in the Control Commission and he for one thought that
they were right. He felt it was no good to refer the question to the
European Advisory Commission which was a weaker body and par-
icularly as France was represented on the Commission and only a
deadlock could result with the French and British on one side and the
Russians and Americans on the other. He therefore was of the opinion
that the matter should be settled here, but it still required further
study.

Marshal Stalin inquired whether the Prime Minister meant that
it should be settled now or later.

The Prime Minister answered that it should be done now, but at
some later stage of this Conference.

The President then observed that would it not be better to post-
pone it for two or three weeks instead of two or three days.

1 Text of report also in the Hiss Collection.
The Prime Minister answered that he felt that once they had separated after this Conference it would be difficult to settle the question.

Marshal Stalin remarked that the three Governments had been able to settle a good many things by correspondence. Marshal Stalin then said that in the European Advisory Commission they could at least have the benefit of the French opinion which was not represented here.

The President said that he agreed that France should not join this body but he was doubtful whether this would keep them quiet. He then suggested that they go on with the Polish question.

Marshal Stalin stated that he had received the President’s letter containing the suggestion that they summon here from Lublin two representatives from the Lublin Government and two representatives from other elements of Polish public opinion and that in the presence of these four Poles they should endeavor to settle the question of a new interim government for Poland which would be pledged to hold free elections when conditions permitted. He said he noted that there were three personalities from London, namely, Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer, who had been mentioned by the President as possible members of this new government. He said he had received the President’s letter only an hour and a half ago and he had endeavored to reach the Lublin Poles by telephone but had been informed that they were away in Cracow and Lutz [Lódz?]. He had attempted to ascertain their opinion. As to the others, he was not sure that they could be located in time for them to come to the Crimea and he mentioned in this connection especially Vicenta Witos and Sapieha. The Marshal added that Mr. Molotov has worked out some proposals on the Polish question which appeared to approach the President’s suggestions, but that these proposals were not typed out. He suggested, therefore, that they proceed to the consideration of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal and he would ask Mr. Molotov to state the views of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Molotov said that yesterday we have heard Mr. Stettinius give a full report and explanations of the President’s proposals and that this report and explanation had been satisfactory and had made the issue clear to the Soviet Delegation. He said that they had always also followed closely Mr. Churchill’s remarks on the subject. He added that after hearing Mr. Stettinius’ report and Mr. Churchill’s remarks, which had clarified the subject, the Soviet Government felt that these proposals fully guaranteed the unity of the Great

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2 For the text of this letter, see post, pp. 727-728.
3 See post, p. 989.
Powers in the matter of preservation of peace. Since this had been the main Soviet purpose at Dumbarton Oaks and they felt that the new proposals fully safeguarded this principle, he could state that they were entirely acceptable and that they had no comments to offer. He felt that there was full agreement on this subject. Mr. Molotov said that there was one question raised at Dumbarton Oaks, mainly [namely?] that of participation of the Soviet Republics as initial members of the World Organization. He said the Soviet views were known as were those of the British and American Governments. He said the Soviet views were based on the constitutional changes which had occurred in February of last year and he did not think that this Conference should ignore this request.

It was not the Soviet intention to raise the question in the same form as had been done at Dumbarton Oaks, but they would be satisfied with the admission of three or at least two of the Soviet Republics as original members. These three Republics were the Ukrainian, White Russian and Lithuanian and he felt that three or at any rate two should have the right to participate as original members. He said that it was superfluous to explain the size, population and importance of the Ukraine, White Russia or Lithuania or their importance in foreign affairs. He said that as these three Republics had borne the greatest sacrifices in the war and were the first to be invaded by the enemy, it was only fair, therefore, that these three or at any rate two be original members. He said that the Soviet Government put these proposals before the President and the Prime Minister and hoped that they would be accepted.

The President then inquired whether Mr. Molotov meant members of the Assembly.

Mr. Molotov replied “yes,” that they should be included among other members of that body. The Dominions of the British Commonwealth have gradually and patiently achieved their place as entities in international affairs. He said he felt that it was only right that three, or at least two, of these Soviet Republics should find a worthy place among the members of the Assembly. Their sacrifices and contributions to the war earned them this place. He said in closing that he wished to repeat that he fully agreed with the President’s proposals and withdrew any objections or amendments but would request that three, or at least two, of the Soviet Republics mentioned above be given a chance to become equal members of the World Organization.

The President said he was very happy to hear from Mr. Molotov the agreement of the Soviet Government to his proposals on voting.

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4 For a facsimile of a note which Roosevelt passed to Stettinius at this point, see Stettinius, p. 174.
in the Council. He felt that this was a great step forward which would be welcomed by all the peoples of the world. He said that he thought the next step was to consider the question of summoning a conference to organize the setting up of the World Organization. He said he thought that this conference could take place at the end of March, although it might be physically possible to do it within the next four weeks. He added that he had been greatly interested in what Mr. Molotov had said in regard to the participation of the Soviet Republics. He added that the British Empire, the USSR and the United States were very different in structure and in tradition. The British Empire, for example, had many large units, such as Canada, Australia, etc. The USSR had a different national structure. The United States had one language and one Foreign Minister. He felt, therefore, that Mr. Molotov's suggestion should be studied, particularly in the light of the possibility that if the larger nations were given more than one vote it might prejudice the thesis of one vote for each member. He mentioned that certain countries are large in area, though small in population and referred in this connection to Brazil which he said was smaller than the USSR but larger than the United States. On the other hand, there were some countries that were small in area but large in population, such as Honduras and Haiti. He also mentioned the fact that there were a number of nations associated with the United Nations, such as Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Iceland, and others, which had broken relations with Germany but which were not at war. He concluded with the statement that he felt that the important thing was to proceed with the plans for a conference to set up the World Organization and that the question of the admission of countries not members of the United Nations could be considered either at that time or after the organization was in operation. He said he suggested, therefore, that the question raised by Mr. Molotov should be studied by the Foreign Ministers who might also make recommendations as to the time and place of the conference and as to what nations should be invited.

The Prime Minister said he would like to express his heartfelt thanks to Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov for this great step forward which he felt would bring joy and relief to the peoples of the world. On the question of membership of the Soviet Republics, he said this had been put before us for the first time. He said he must agree with the President that the United States and the British Empire were different, that during the last twenty-five years the Self-Governing Dominions have taken their place in world affairs and have worked for peace and, if he might say so, for the furtherance of Democratic

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5 It appears that the note of Hopkins, post, p. 729, was passed to the President at about this point.
processes. The Dominions had come into the war when Great Britain declared war against Germany, knowing full well the weakness of Great Britain at that time. Great Britain had had no means of forcing them into this decision and into which [sic] they knew they could not often be consulted on major matters. He said that Great Britain could not agree to any organization which would reduce the status of the Dominions or exclude them from participation. That is why, Mr. President, the Prime Minister said, he had great sympathy with the Soviet request. His heart went out to mighty Russia which though bleeding was beating down the tyrants in her path. He said he could understand their point of view, as they were represented by only one voice in comparison with the British organization which had a smaller population, if only white people were considered. He was glad, therefore, that the President had made an answer to the Soviet proposal which in no way constituted a final negation. He added, however, that he could not exceed his authority and as he had just heard this proposal he would like to discuss it with the Foreign Secretary and possibly communicate it to London and he asked Marshal Stalin to excuse him as he could not give a precise answer today.

The President remarked that his recommendations had been somewhat different. He had merely meant that the Foreign Ministers should study the question as well as that of the time and place of the conference and who should be invited.

The Prime Minister said that he did not disagree with the President's suggestions but he felt that the Foreign Ministers had already had a good deal of work thrust upon them. He said he must speak frankly and say that he foresaw difficulties in attempting to hold a meeting as soon as March. The battle would be at its height and more soldiers would be involved than at any time of the war. British domestic problems would be very pressing and their Ministers, including the Foreign Secretary, would be greatly occupied in Parliament. He also wondered whether the state of the world and in Europe in particular was not such as to make very difficult a meeting of all of the United Nations. He doubted whether any representatives at such conference would be able to have behind them the full thought of the vital forces of their countries.\(^6\)

The President observed that he had only in mind a meeting to organize the setting up of the world organization, and that the world organization itself would probably not come into being for from three to six months after the conference.

\(^6\) It appears that the notes of Hopkins and Roosevelt, \textit{post}, p. 729, were written at about this point. For a facsimile of a note regarding Stimson's views on this subject which Stettinius passed to Roosevelt at this time, see Stettinius, p. 177.
The Prime Minister said that he had in mind the fact that some nations in March would still be under the German yoke and would be represented by governments in exile whose authority in regard to their own people would be questionable. Other countries would be starving and in misery, such as Holland. France would be there with a loud voice. There would be other countries represented there who had not suffered at all in the war and who had not lost a man. He wondered how such a gathering could really undertake the immense task of the future organization of the world.

The President repeated his proposal, namely, that the Foreign Ministers could consider (1) the Soviet proposal regarding membership, (2) the date and place of the conference, and (3) what nations should be invited.

The Prime Minister said he had no objection to the Foreign Ministers discussing this point but he said he must emphasize that this was no technical question but one of great decision. With this qualification, he agreed to the President’s proposal.

Marshal Stalin remarked that the Foreign Ministers will not make decisions but merely report to the Conference.

There was a short intermission at this point.

The Prime Minister said that he proposed that the Foreign Ministers should consider the question of Iran and other matters of perhaps secondary importance but which should be considered.

The President and Marshal Stalin agreed.  

The President then said, jokingly, that he hoped that forestry would be one of the points considered since he had not seen a tree in his visit last year to Tehran. He went on to say that he thought Iran was a good example of the type of economic problem that might confront the world if we are to bring about expansion of world trade and greater exchange of goods. He said that Persia did not have the purchasing power to buy foreign goods, and if expansion of world trade was to occur measures must be considered for helping those countries like Persia that did not have any purchasing power. He mentioned that before the advent of the Turks, Persia had had plenty of timber and thus plenty of water and her people had been reasonably prosperous, but that he personally had never seen a poorer country than Persia was at the present time. He therefore very much hoped that the new world organization would conduct a world-wide survey with a view to extending help to countries and areas that did not have sufficient purchasing power, either in cash or in foreign exchange.

The President added that there was a parallel, he thought, in

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7 For a facsimile of a note regarding a TVA for Europe which Hopkins passed to Roosevelt at this point, see Stettinius, p. 179.
Europe in that certain countries had adequate supplies of power, such as coal and water power, and those countries had cheap and abundant electric power, whereas other countries within fifty miles had neither. He felt that this situation was wrong. He mentioned that in the Soviet Union and its various republics consideration had been given to the problem of a country as a whole, and in the United States the TVA had the same idea. He mentioned that in the region of the TVA electric current was sold at the same price throughout the area. He concluded that, having said his piece, he would now refer to Mr. Molotov for his proposals in regard to the Polish question.

Mr. Molotov then read his proposals in regard to the Polish question, as follows:

1. It was agreed that the line of Curzon should be the Eastern frontier of Poland with a digression from it in some regions of 5–8 kilometers in favor of Poland.

2. It was decided that the Western frontier of Poland should be traced from the town of Stettin (Polish) and farther to the South along the River Oder and still farther along the River Neisse (Western).

3. It was deemed desirable to add to the Provisional Polish Government some democratic leaders from Polish émigré circles.8

4. It was regarded desirable that the enlarged Provisional Polish Government should be recognized by the Allied Governments.

5. It was deemed desirable that the Provisional Polish Government, enlarged as was mentioned above in paragraph 3, should as soon as possible call the population of Poland to the polls for organization by general voting of permanent organs of the Polish Government.

6. V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted with the discussion of the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three Governments.

After reading the proposals, Mr. Molotov said he would like to add that they had attempted to reach the Poles in Poland by telephone but they had been unable to do so and it was apparent that time would not permit the carrying out of the President's suggestion to summon the Poles to the Crimea. He said he felt that the proposals he had just put forward went far toward meeting the President's wishes.9

The President replied that he must say he felt progress had been made in the light of Mr. Molotov's suggestions. He said there was just one word he did not like and that was "émigré". He said he did not see any necessity to go to émigrés since you could find enough Poles in Poland for the purpose. He repeated what he had said yesterday, namely that he did not know any of the Poles in the

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8 The words "and from inside Poland" were added at the end of this paragraph in the subsequent discussion.

9 For a facsimile of a note suggesting that the Soviet proposal on Poland be referred to the Foreign Ministers, which Hopkins passed to Roosevelt at this point, see Stettinius, p. 185.
Poland government in London and he knew only Mr. Mikołajczyk. He concluded by saying he would like to have an opportunity, with Mr. Stettinius, to study Mr. Molotov’s proposals, to which Marshal Stalin agreed.  

The Prime Minister said he shared the President’s dislike of the word “émigré”. The word had originated during the French revolution and meant in England a person who had been driven out of a country by his own people. He said in the case of the Poles this wasn’t true, since they had left their country as a result of the brutal German attack. He therefore preferred in place of the word “émigré” to refer to them as “Poles temporarily abroad”. He said in regard to the second point of Mr. Molotov’s proposals he would always support the movement of Polish frontiers to the west since he felt they should receive compensation, but not more than they can handle. He said it would be a pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it got indigestion. He said he felt that there was a considerable body of British public opinion that would be shocked if it were proposed to move large numbers of Germans, and although he personally would not be shocked he knew that that view existed in England. He said he felt if it were confined to East Prussia, six million Germans probably could be handled quite aside from moral grounds, but the addition of the line west of the Neisse would create quite a problem in this respect.

Marshal Stalin remarked that most Germans in those areas had already run away from the Red Army.

The Prime Minister said this, of course, simplified the problem, and in regard to the question of space in Germany for these deported persons he felt that the fact that Germany had had six to seven million casualties in this war and would probably have a million more would simplify that problem.

Marshal Stalin replied that the Germans might well have one or possibly two million more casualties.

The Prime Minister said that he wasn’t afraid of the problem of transfer of populations provided that it was proportioned to the capacity of the Poles to handle it and the capability of the Germans to receive them. He felt, however, that it needs study, not only in principle but as a practical matter. He said he had one other comment. In the Soviet proposal some reference should be made to other democratic leaders from within Poland itself.

Marshal Stalin agreed and the words “and from inside Poland” were added at the end of paragraph 3 of the Soviet statement.

10 For a facsimile of a note regarding boundaries, which Stettinius passed to Roosevelt during this discussion, see Stettinius, p. 183.
The Prime Minister then concluded that he agreed with the President that it would be well to sleep on this problem and take it up tomorrow, but he did feel that some progress had been made.

At the President’s suggestion the meeting was adjourned until four o’clock tomorrow afternoon.

Matthews Files

Matthews Minutes

TOP SECRET

President: I think we should take up the Polish question. When we concluded our meeting yesterday Marshal Stalin had explained his views. I have nothing special to add to what I said yesterday. I think it is particularly important to find a solution of the governmental question. I am not so concerned with frontiers. I am likewise not so concerned on the question of the continuity of the government. There hasn’t really been any Polish government since 1939. It is entirely in the province of the three of us to help set up a government—something to last until the Polish people can choose. I discard the idea of continuity. I think we want something new and drastic—like a breath of fresh air. But before we go on with Poland I think Mr. Molotov should report to us on the meeting of the three foreign ministers.

(Molotov reads his report. A copy of the text is attached.)

Prime Minister: I wish to thank the committee for their labor. I am in general agreement with the report with a single exception. However, I should like to see in writing what has been decided as I have only now been orally informed of what took place. On the question of giving the French a zone but not a place on the control commission His Majesty’s Government remains quite unconvinced. No solution has been found for controlling the French while they are controlling the Germans. If the French decide to accept the task of having a zone and wish to be tiresome they could produce conditions in their zone which would cause trouble in the other zones. If we decide to be strict they could be lenient. If we decide to be lenient they could be strict. I firmly believe that there must be uniformity in treatment of Germany between the four allies or there will be endless bitter disputes. I regard the Allied Control Commission as a subordinate instrument to the will of the governments. In principle, it is no more than the Allied Commission in Italy but they have a much more important task. I do not think that giving France a

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1 For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.
2 Not attached; but see the text in the Bohlen minutes, ante, pp. 709–710.
place on the control machinery gives any right to the French to sit in on these meetings of the three of us. But all this argument seems to me futile. I feel sure that the French will take no zone unless they are given participation on the control council. I must say I think they are right. Who would they get their directions from? For this reason I feel that the proposed plan will not work. Likewise, I feel that there is no use handing over what we cannot settle here to a weaker body such as the European Advisory Commission where the French are sitting. So why not settle it here. I suggest that we should give the question further study and settle it here.

President: Shall we go on with the discussion of Poland?

Stalin: I have received the President’s message. It contains a proposal to call from Poland two representatives of the Lublin government and two from the opposite camp, so that in our presence these four would settle the question of the new Polish government. If this is successful, the new provisional government should in the shortest possible time organize elections in Poland. This message of the President’s also proposes that some more Poles from London—Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski, should also take part in the new government. I received this letter an hour and a half ago. I immediately gave instructions to find Bierut and [Osóbka-]Morawski so that I could talk with them on the phone. The result was that at the moment they are outside Warsaw at Lodz or Cracow but they will be found and I must ask them how to find the representatives on the other side and what they think of the possibility of their coming. I can then tell how soon they will arrive. If Vicente Witos or Sapieha could come here it would facilitate a solution but I do not know their addresses. I am afraid we have not sufficient time. Meanwhile, Molotov has prepared a draft to meet in a certain extent the President’s proposal. Let us hear it when it arrives as the translation is not yet finished. Meanwhile, we might talk of Dumbarton Oaks.

(Molotov here gave his explanation of the Russian acceptance of our voting procedure and of their request for the inclusion of three representatives in the assembly. This is being covered by Mr. Hiss’s notes.)

The President made some remarks on the low purchasing power of Persians and other nations which he stated was another reason for organizing the world organization. He likewise threw out the idea of setting up a TVA for Europe. Mr. Molotov’s proposal then arrived.

Infra.
Molotov: I have here the proposals which I should like to make. (He reads them. Copy is attached.*) We are still trying to telephone the Polish leaders but without success and I am afraid there will not be time for them to come to this conference. That makes it impossible to try the President’s proposal. On the other hand I think these proposals meet the President’s wishes.

President: I think we are making definite progress. I should like to wait until tomorrow to study these proposals and to talk them over with the Secretary of State and officials of the State Department. There is one word in them I do not like. That is “émigré.” It is not necessary to take émigrés. There may be people who are now in Poland who are now satisfied. May we postpone discussion?

Stalin: Yes, certainly.

Prime Minister: I share the President’s dislike of the word “émigré.” It was applied during the French Revolution to people driven out by their own countrymen, but the Poles were driven out by a brutal enemy. With regard to the frontier on the River Neisse I should like to say a word. I have always qualified a movement west by the Poles, but say that the Poles should be free to take territory but not more than they wish or can manage. I do not wish to stuff the Polish goose until it dies of German indigestion. I also feel conscious of the large school of thought in England which is shocked at the idea of transferring millions of people by force. Personally I am not shocked but much of the opinion in England is. However, the exchange of Greeks and Turks was a great success but that only involved two million. If the Poles take East Prussia and Silesia that means moving six millions. That is manageable but there will be big arguments against it still.

Stalin: There will be no more Germans there for when our troops come in the Germans run away and no Germans are left.

Prime Minister: Then there is the problem of how to handle them in Germany. We have killed six or seven million and probably will kill another million before the end of the war.

Stalin: One or two?

Prime Minister: Oh I am not proposing any limitation on them. So there should be room in Germany for some who will need to fill the vacancy. I am not afraid of the problem of the transfer of populations as long as it is in proportion to what the Poles can manage and what can be put in the place of the dead in Germany.

I have only one other comment. It is a reference in Mr. Molotov’s plan to the utilization of some democratic leaders from émigré circles. Would Marshal Stalin be willing to add “and some within Poland itself.” This was also suggested in the President’s message.

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* Not attached but see the text in the Bohlen minutes, ante, p. 716.
STALIN: Yes, that is acceptable.
PRIME MINISTER: Well, I am in agreement with the President’s suggestion that we should sleep on this till tomorrow.
STALIN: I likewise find this acceptable.
The meeting is adjourned until four tomorrow.

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Hiss Collection

**Hiss Notes**

"Crimea Conf."

Plenary

2/7 4:10 p.m.

Ed Page—added to Mol. report—
given to Chip

D. O.

Mol.—Yesterday heard full report from ERS We are satisfied with this report & we have got some explanations (to ask). After this report & after these explanations certain q’s became much clearer We paid much atten to what Church told us After report of ES & remarks of Church the q is considerably clarified for us In the light of these explanations & remarks we believe it would secure the unan. of 3 powers in guar. p. & sec. after the war. Our position in the qs of D. O. essentially was to secure max. of unity among 3 gt. powers in q of p & sec after the war. We believe the decs. taken at D. O & modifications suggested by Pres will secure collab by all nations great & small after war. . . . we consider the proposals which were presented as acceptable to us We believe that now there is reach full agrt & clarity among ourselves I have to touch upon one q. which was raised in D. O. but not decided yet. This is the q about particip of Sov. Reps in the org. of sec. You know our point of view It is based on the modifs carried out in our Const. in Feb of last yr. We explained our point of view & know the point of view of US Govt & Brit Govt We consider its fair that should not pass these qs without notice but do not raise this q now in same form as in D. O.

We would consider it fair that at least 3 of our Reps or perhaps 2 be accepted as orig members. Have in mind Ukraine, Byelo Russia & Lith. Those 3 or at any rate 2 have full rts to be considered orig. members.

Ukraine’s Importance, pop., econ., importance all well known I don’t want to go into detail in describing also import. of B-R & Lith also from point of view of for. rels These reps made the

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1 From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.
2 Refers to Bohlen.
greatest sacrifices in this war. The peoples of U.-B.-R. & Lith have suffered very much in this war & were 1st to be invaded. Would be fair of these 3 or at any rate 2 be accepted as orig. members. The Sov Govt requests Pres & PM these 3 or at least 2 be accepted among other Un. Ns. I would like to mention in this connection that the doms of Brit crown approached int. rels gradually & showed great patience. This gives us the example & reason to withdraw our orig. proposal advanced at D. O. & propose now 3 or at least 2 be accepted as orig. members. Among members of Ass. these few reps certainly should find place due them. Their role & sacrifices in this war entitle

Pres. Much gratified at what Mol. has said in acceding to the gen. plan. That is making real progress. Next thing we have to consider is timing. What is next step. Invitations will go out to all nations that have had a place in this war.

Church—the Ger War. Pres. Yes.

Pres. No use talking much further about Un Ns. We are all agreed except it has not been set up. Next we should invite all nations to assemble. Gt. sentiment in US be held soon as possible—end of Mar., 1st of April.

Physically reps. of Un Ns could meet in 4 wks—1 month. Personally I think that quicker q of Un Ns meeting is determined, quicker we can take up what Mr Mol has said which is very interesting to me. But that in itself will mean the later meetings after the organ. is set up. As a practical matter when we have this organizing meeting whom shall we ask? Nations in the war or those associated but not in the war. For instance shall we invite—The assoc. nations have broken rels with Ger. but have not declared war. We: Read list. We've got to decide who we’re going to invite. What we have heard from Mr Mol. gives me a very great int. in matter of a vote for Uk, Wh. R., Lith. We 3 M. St., P. M & I have different views because our terrs. are so very different. The Brit Em has great pops like Austr., Can., S. Af. Sov Govt has great masses of pop. like 3 areas Mol mentioned. US is contiguous—no colonies, const. provides for 1 For Min. Those things require study, require study of q of more than 1 vote for the larger nations in the world. In same way certain nations have large terrs. Brazil smaller than S. U but larger than U. S. In same way many small countries like Haiti, Honduras & we should consider whether by giving any govt more than 1 vote we would break down prin of 1 vote for each. * * * if we can agree on gen plan for meeting to organ. Un Ns we can consider these q's for Byr Mins or at the meeting of the organizers.

Pres: For Mins have so successful suggested q. of voting in Ass. be referred to For Mins. Also to recommend time & place of a conf.
Church: I should like to express my heartfelt thanks to Mar. St. & Sov Govt for the enormous step they have taken to put forward D. O. I'm sure the agt of the 3 gt powers such as has already been expressed around this table will give joy & relief to thinking people around the world. On the q of voting membership of the Ass., it has been put before us in quite a new form by our R. friends & allies.

Everyone I'm sure will feel that here again a very remarkable advance to gen. agt. has been made. I must fully agree with the Pres that the position of the US & of the Brit Em. are different. We have our 4 selfgoverning dominions, that for nearly a quarter of a century have played a part in the organ. of p. which broke down before the present war. All these 4 doms have worked for p & for democratic purposes & all without hesitation sprang into the war when we declared it though they knew how weak we were. We had no means of compelling them & no rt. to give them any summons but they came freely in a matter in which they could only be partially consulted. We could never agree to any system which excluded them from the position they have held & justified for over ¼ of a century. It is for this very reason that I could not listen to the proposal of the Sov Govt without a feeling of profound sympathy. My heart goes out to mighty Russia, bleeding from her wounds & conquering & beating down the tyrant in her path. I should feel that a nation so great with 180,000,000 people would perhaps have cause to look at our Brit org with a questioning eye if they had but one vote when their nos. far exceed our own, speaking of whites. I was very glad that the Pres made an answer which could in no way be considered a final neg. to the consideration of this proposal. I must not however exceed my own personal auth. We have only just heard this new proposal & I should like to discuss it with the For Sec & possibly send a tel. to the Brit. War Cab. We only want to see done what is rt & fair. UNDLE. I will ask the Mar. to excuse me if I do not give precise final answer on behalf of HMG here today. I will not lose time.

Pres  My motion was a little different  It did not call for a dec. today. Refer the study to For Mins & second where it should be held & who should be invited.

Church  Very glad—we are putting great deal on them—very large & simple  Re meeting suggested by Pres  I shouldn't think it desirable hold it so early as March. In Mar. we shall be at the very height of the battle on both the fronts, more millions of soldiers will be engaged than ever before. Our dom. problems in Eng are very complicated with shortage of labor, housing & need of supplying fighting forces at the front. We also have a Par which is in active
life from day to day & claims large share of the atten. of the Mins. incl. For Sec.

We are now already a quarter thru Feb. I wonder also whether state of the world & Eur. particularly is such as not to make a meeting diff. of all the Un Ns. If they are charged with the most tremendous tasks of the future will they have behind them the full thought of their people. Will they have anything left over after vital needs of the war are met. I wonder what the aspect of the Ass. would wear. Could premiers be present?

Pres: This is not a meeting of the Ass.—only of the organizing conf.

Church But they would be same people. How many of the nations there will still be in the bondage of the Gers. We do not know how they will represent their people. Another group will be starving in their frightful misery amid the scenes of war. Holland will be there with her ghastly ruins. Fr. will be there with a loud voice. With all these agonized communities will also be joined a large no. of nations who have not suffered at all in the war. Ns that have not even declared war. I can not think that the meeting of such an ass. would be free from the danger of becoming chaotic. Some ns will be screaming in agony & others will be calmly weighing the problems of the future. I see particular diffs for an early meeting so far as Brit. is concerned.

Church Position in Eng though perfectly calm & steady is governed by our own const. We may have a gen. election impending. May have new parliament to carry with us, may have entirely new set of ministers.

Will always do our best to comply with the Pres. wishes but I feel it absolutely nec. to put on record the very great diff. which I see, practically. And I should be very disappointed if the settlement of the membership of Ass was postponed till new meeting of Un Ns can be held.

Pres again propose to refer to For Mins to study membership & date & place of meeting & who should be invited.

Stalin agreed.

Church I said earlier no objection to it being discussed by For Mins but is not a technical matter but one of large & broad dec. Not at all sure matters will be advanced by the discussion.

St. 3 Mins will meet, discuss & report.

Agreed.

(Intermission)
Church. proposed Iran be remitted to For Mins

\[
\begin{align*}
& (\text{Pres says to ERS he can cable Chiang & get consent re voting}) \\
& \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{immediately} \\
& \quad \text{He would not consult France, merely invite Fr. to the meeting}
\end{align*}
\]

While waiting for Molotov's paper on Pol.

Pres. raised q. of int. economics—another reason for early estab. of Un Ns Org—should be some way of getting ns that have no purchasing power to get some—historically Persia well wooded before Turks came—no erosion, water—today poorest place I have ever seen in the world. That is why I hope new Un Ns Org. will concern itself with those countries that have no money with which to get goods While on this subject—parallel one—in Eur. some areas have coal, cheap power & light from water. Why favoritism to those who have coal & water or cheap elec. light rates when others 50 miles away have no water, no light? Sov. govts. all the Soviets are all thinking in terms like that. We are thinking in terms like that—TVA

Poland

Mol. In E. Curzon line, 5–8 Kms digression in some regions in favor of Pol.

In W. from Stettin along Oder, then along Neisse
Add some emigres to Pol. Govt
Allies recog. Pol Govt now
Prov. Govt. hold elections soon as possible
Mol, Harr., Clark-Kerr to consider & report enlarging Pol. Govt
President's proposals
Can't reach Poles by phone in time to come here
Pres. We are making real progress
Wants ERS study this tonight.
Knows one word he doesn't like—"emigre"
Not nec. take emigres Like to have S. D.* study it until tomorrow
Church Agrees with Pres re "emigre"

Re Neisse—we have always qualified movement of Pol. frontier to W that they shouldn't take much more than they wish or can take care of. Great pity to stuff Pol. goose so full of Ger. food that he died of indigestion. Large school of opin. shocked by transferring many millions of people by force. I am not. Referred to success of Gk-Turk transfers after last war—but only 3/4 million
If take E. Pr. Silesia up to Oder means 6,000,000 Gers. That might be managed with modern facilities
St. Says there are no more Gers there. Where our troops come in they find no Gers.

* State Department.
Church We have killed 5 or 6 mil. prob. another million before the end. There ought to be room in Ger. for people transferred. They will be needed to fill vacancies. So not afraid of prob. of transferring pop. so long as proportioned.

Matthews Files

Draft of Letter From President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

My Dear Marshal Stalin, I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determinations that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest

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1 Undated carbon copy; authorship not indicated. Stettinius (p. 157) says that the letter as sent (infra) was prepared “by the Department and Hopkins.” On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote that he thought the draft was by Bohlen (640.0029/8-1354).
that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Bierut and Mr. Osobka Morawski from the Lublin government and also any two of the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapiela of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlowski [Zulawski], Professor Buyak [Bujak], and Professor Kutzeba [Kutrzeba]. If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland, the United States Government, and I am sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to disassociate themselves from the London government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

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Bohlen Collection

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

TOP SECRET [YALTA,] February 6, 1945.

MY DEAR MARSHAL STALIN: I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determination that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not,

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1 See ante, p. 711.
tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize the Lublin Government as now composed, and the world would regard it as a lamentable outcome of our work here if we parted with an open and obvious divergence between us on this issue.

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Bierut and Mr. Osobka-Morawski from the Lublin government and also two or three from the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapiela of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlowski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba. If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish leaders from abroad such as Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer, the United States Government, and I feel sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to examine with you conditions in which they would dissociate themselves from the London government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Hopkins Papers

The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President

[YALTA, February 7, 1945.]

MR. PRESIDENT I think you should try to get this referred to Foreign ministers before there is trouble.

HARRY

1 The relationship of this note to the Fourth Plenary Meeting appears from internal evidence and from Sherwood, pp. 855–856. See ante, p. 713.

Hopkins Papers

The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President, and Reply by the President

[YALTA, February 7, 1945.]

All of the below refers to Churchill’s opposition to early calling of conference of United Nations.

There is something behind this talk that we do not know of its basis. Perhaps we better to wait till later tonight what is on his mind.

All this is ret! local politics

I am quite sure now he is thinking about the next election in Britain.

1 The relationship of these notes to the Fourth Plenary Meeting appears from internal evidence and from Sherwood, pp. 852–864. See ante, p. 714.

2 This line is in Roosevelt’s handwriting.

Defense Files: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

(Winant)

TOP SECRET

ARGONAUT 51. Top secret and personal for Ambassador Winant from Secretary Stettinius.

In view of certain discussions here, please take no repeat no action with regard to our position on French participation in German affairs until further instructions.

War Department please furnish copy of above message to Acting Secretary of State Grew, Washington, for his information and notify him above relates to sentence fourth from end of his number 21 to Secretary Stettinius.1

ARGONAUT, February 7, 1945.

1 Not printed. The sentence in question, in Grew’s telegram No. 21, dated February 6, 1945, reads as follows: “Winant has called a meeting of the EAC for February 9 when he proposes to announce American acceptance of the French request for participation in German affairs regardless of whether the Soviet representative has instructions.” (740.0011 EW/1–2745.)
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1945

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 8, 1945, 10 A.M., LIVADIA PALACE

Present

Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Cooke
Major General Bull
Major General Deane
Major General Anderson
Major General Hull
Major General Wood
Major General Hill
Rear Admiral Smith
Rear Admiral McCormick
Rear Admiral Carter
Rear Admiral Duncan

Rear Admiral Olsen
Brigadier General Roberts
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Cabell
Brigadier General Lindsay
Brigadier General Bessell
Brigadier General Everest
Commodore Burrough
Colonel Peck
Colonel Lincoln
Colonel Dean
Colonel Bogart
Colonel Cary
Captain Stroop
Captain McDill
Commander Clark

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

1. Levels of Supply of All Petroleum Products in All Theaters

2. Overall Review of Cargo and Troop Shipping Position for the Remainder of 1945
   (C. C. S. 746/11)

Admiral Leahy said that although the paper was an agreed report
by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Com-
bined Shipping Adjustment Board it appeared to him that the essence
of the report was an agreement to reexamine the position when a need
for further study arose.

General Somervell said that the necessity for a revision had
already arisen, particularly with reference to redeployment plans.
On the other hand, he felt that the paper in its present form was
entirely satisfactory. Referring to paragraph 48 (1) (d) of the paper
he said that during the Committee negotiations the British had
insisted upon the submission of the report referred to therein on 1
June.

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1 J. C. S. 190th Meeting.
2 Not printed.
General Marshall said that if the war ended by 1 April 1945 the combined redeployment plan and the related combined report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and shipping authorities would be too late if submitted on 30 April 1945, as required in the paper.

General Somervell felt that the date for the submission of the report might well be moved up to 1 April.

Admiral King pointed out that the reports could be submitted at any time prior to 30 April. The requirement as stated in the paper was that they should be ready not later than 30 April.

Colonel Lincoln said that as far as the U. S. side was concerned the Planners already had a redeployment paper under way and that they could make this plan available by 1 April.

Admiral Leahy said that a change of the date to 1 April might not be acceptable to the British.

Admiral Smith said that the British members of the combined committees appeared to have no objection to a 1 April date. The date of 30 April had been selected to afford the U. S. Planners ample time to produce their redeployment plan.

General Somervell thought there might be some objection on the part of the British to moving the date up to 1 April. He understood that the British plans for redeployment had not progressed as far as the U. S. plans.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to recommend approval of C. C. S. 746/11 subject to the change of the date in the third line on page 4 from 30 April to 1 April.

3. Employment of War Weary U. S. Bombers Against Large Industrial Target Areas in Germany

(J. C. S. 1150/1)\(^3\)

Admiral Leahy said that in this paper the representative of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, proposed that the question of the employment of war weary bombers be reopened by recommending that the President address a memorandum on the subject to the Prime Minister. He understood the Prime Minister had instructed the British Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their previous concurrence in the employment of this type of weapon and felt that to request the President to ask the Prime Minister to reverse his stand would be undesirable.

General Anderson explained that there was no intention of launching uncontrolled aircraft indiscriminately against the German countryside. He believed that there had been a misunderstanding on the part of the British as to the employment of this weapon. Recent developments had proved that explosive-laden aircraft could be

\(^3\) Not printed.
directed against military targets with considerable accuracy and therefore had a definite military value when used against heavily protected underground installations.

General Marshall said that as he understood it, the British Chiefs of Staff have no military objection to the project but that certain Cabinet Members had opposed it. He doubted the propriety of having the President press the Prime Minister to urge these Cabinet Members to reverse their position, for heretofore these same Members had supported the British Chiefs of Staff in war measures advocated by the U. S.

In reply to a question by Admiral King as to why this project should not be restricted entirely to France, General Anderson said that while the launchings were to be made in France all of the developments so far had taken place in base installations set up in England and to move these base installations to France would be a waste of effort.

General Kuter pointed out that further development of this project was highly important in view of the prospects of a very profitable employment of this type of weapon against Japanese targets.

Admiral Leahy said the discussion had given him an entirely different conception of the weapon. When this matter first came up, he understood that the aircraft would be launched in the general direction of Germany and that the explosive-laden planes would fall aimlessly when the fuel was exhausted. This he considered an inhuman and barbarous type of warfare with which the United States should not be associated; but now, since it appeared that the missiles could be controlled with a considerable degree of accuracy, he agreed that they could be usefully employed. He inquired why, since the planes employed were American and would be operated under American command, it was necessary to collaborate with the British in their use.

General Kuter said that, in view of the instructions already received on this subject by the British Chiefs of Staff and since the matter had heretofore been dealt with on a combined basis, it would be undesirable for the United States now to employ this weapon unilaterally. Moreover, the bases where the project was being developed were located in England.

Admiral Duncan felt that it would be entirely proper for the United States Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their original proposal to use uncontrolled missiles and present the project as a development of a controlled missile.

General Kuter said that the development of the control of this type of aircraft had progressed very rapidly, and it was essential that this development continue.
In view of the foregoing, Admiral Leahy said that he felt an approach should be made to the British Chiefs of Staff for reconsideration at the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Agreed to bring up for discussion at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to follow, the question of the employment of radio-controlled explosive-laden bombers.\(^4\)

4. Subjects for First U. S.–U. S. S. R. Staff Meeting (J.C.S. 1227/4 and 1227/5)\(^5\)

Admiral Leahy said that in J.C.S. 1227/4 the Joint Staff Planners suggest certain subjects which the United States Chiefs of Staff should discuss with the Soviet General Staff. In J.C.S. 1227/5 General Deane recommends a series of questions as the basis of the discussions. The Planners’ paper appears to go into considerable detail and to contain items not covered in the questions suggested by General Deane.

Admiral Leahy said that he entertained little hope of engaging in extended conversations with the Soviet General Staff.

General Marshall observed that our success in arranging a meeting with the Soviet Army Staff was a good omen as to the Soviets’ willingness to discuss the matters in which we are interested.

Admiral King said that he favored the approach to the Soviets advanced by the Planners.

General Deane said that he found no fault with the Planners’ paper except that he would not recommend that the status of the Milepost project be discussed by the United States Chiefs of Staff unless the Soviets first brought up the matter. Moreover, he proposed that the United States Chiefs of Staff refrain from suggesting a Russian strategic air force, inasmuch as it appeared that the aircraft necessary to constitute such a force could not be provided.

General Deane felt that it would be a mistake to bring up the matter of the exchange of weather information in view of the satisfactory progress that had been made so far. The Soviets had met every United States request for the exchange of this information.

General Kuter said that the weather information received so far did not meet the full requirements of the Twentieth Air Force in dealing with Japanese targets and suggested that there should be an increase in the number of weather stations in Siberia.

Admiral Olsen said that the Soviets had encountered considerable difficulty in setting up weather stations in Siberia because of the lack of transportation and communication facilities. They prefer to use their own personnel and equipment and therefore, if it were suggested that more stations be installed, the request should indicate willingness

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\(^4\) The conference record contains no further mention of this subject.

\(^5\) Post, pp. 762–766.
to make U. S. equipment available. He confirmed General Deane's view that it would be a mistake to insist on a further exchange of weather information on a high level, since negotiations to meet United States requirements could be satisfactorily handled by the United States Mission in Moscow.

General Deane said he had arranged his list of questions with a view to permitting the Soviets to do the talking. The questions were designed to draw out Soviet views. Whether or not the questions were proper ones is a matter for decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to an inquiry by Admiral Leahy, General Deane said that the operations referred to in Question 7 in J. C. S. 1227/5 were those to be initially undertaken by the Soviets if they entered the war against Japan. General Deane felt that the Soviet answer to the first question in his paper would undoubtedly lead to several contributory questions which would cover the points made by the Planners in their paper.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to use both J. C. S. 1227/4 and 1227/5 in their conference with the Soviet General Staff.

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MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 8, 1945, NOON, VORONTSOV VILLA

Present

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<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary Stettinius</td>
<td>Foreign Secretary Eden</td>
<td>Foreign Commissar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Matthews</td>
<td>Sir Alexander Cadogan</td>
<td>Molotov</td>
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<td>Mr. Hiss</td>
<td>Sir Archibald Clark Kerr</td>
<td>Mr. Vyshinsky</td>
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<td>Mr. Page</td>
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<td>Mr. Golunsky</td>
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Beihlen Collection

Page Minutes

          2. Yugoslavian Frontiers.
          4. Reparations.
          5. Iran.

1. World Security Organization

Mr. Eden, who presided, stated that the Foreign Secretaries had been requested to consider two points vis-à-vis the World Security
Organization; first, the question of membership which included that concerning the admission of two or three of the Soviet Republics, and, second, the question of the time and place of the meeting.

Mr. Stettinius interjected that there was also the question of exactly which nations should be invited to the initial conference.¹

Mr. Eden inquired whether anyone desired to initiate the discussion on this general question.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he wished to start at the bottom. He said that he would be delighted to invite the great Allies to confer in the United States. He hoped that the President had not shocked the Foreign Secretaries yesterday by mentioning the month of March as the time for the opening of the conference, and he continued that he felt sure that the time could be arranged to fit in with the convenience of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden. However, he was anxious to open the conference at the earliest possible date. Personally, he hoped that it could be held no later than the latter part of April. With respect to the question concerning who would be invited, he recalled that at Dumbarton Oaks there had been considerable talk of inviting the Associated Nations as well as the United Nations. He stated that he had come to the conclusion that it would probably be most satisfactory to limit the invitations to those who had signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on the common enemy. With respect to Mr. Molotov’s references to multiple membership for the Soviet Union, it was his feeling, from the standpoint of geographical area and population, that this question should be given sympathetic consideration at the opening conference. He continued that he had thus far been unable in his own mind to decide just how inclusion of these entities could be arranged. In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals there was a provision to the effect that each sovereign state had one vote. He had not thus far been able to see clearly how the Dumbarton Oaks proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. He concluded that he wished again to refer the matter to the President who had said that the subject was most interesting and deserved sympathetic consideration.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had expressed his views on the inclusion of two or three Soviet Republics in the World Organization at the last plenary meeting. He requested Mr. Eden to state his ideas on the other subjects on the World Security agenda.

Mr. Eden stated that he would be glad to accept the invitation of the United States Government to hold the conference in the United States. He only wished to enter one caveat. He remarked that Mr. Winant, Mr. Gusev, and himself were getting a little jealous in never

¹ For a memorandum prepared for Stettinius on the items referred to the Foreign Ministers, see post, pp. 746–749.
having any large conferences in London. If Mr. Molotov and he
were to go to the United States for this conference, he hoped that
there would be an early meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov supported Mr. Eden's views
with respect to a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.

Mr. Eden continued that since some time would be needed to get
the Chinese and possibly the French in line, and since the lawyers
would need possibly two weeks before the conference opened, he
would prefer to postpone the opening of the conference until the
second half of April. He pointed out that he would be committed to
debates in Parliament before he would be able to go to the United
States. After some discussion it was agreed by Mr. Molotov and
Mr. Eden that the conference should open on April 25.

Mr. Molotov had previously accepted the invitation to hold the
conference in the United States.

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to make a few observations on
the inclusion of Soviet Republics in the Organization. He said that
he was sympathetically inclined to the Soviet position in this respect
and would be ready to say so at whatever was considered to be an
appropriate moment.

Mr. Molotov interjected "The sooner the better." Mr. Molotov
then pointed out, in relation to the remarks made by Mr. Stettinius,
that the President had indicated yesterday that according to the
Dumbarton Oaks proposals each Government had one vote. However,
Canada and Australia had individual votes and the fact that they
were component parts of the British Empire did not prevent them
from being individual members of the assembly. He said that amend-
ments had been made to the Soviet constitution which gave the
Soviet Republics the right to have contact with foreign states. The
Soviet Union was a union of states. The constitution had now been
revised to increase the rights of the Republics. The development of
relations between the Republics and foreign states, which had already
begun, was in this direction and was developing according to demo-
cratic principles. He continued that he believed that it would be
superfluous to mention the political, economic and military importance
of the Ukraine, White Russia and the Lithuanian Republic. He
urged that it would be most desirable if agreement could be reached
on this question today.

Mr. Molotov then referred to Mr. Stettinius' statement that only
those nations which had signed the United Nations Declaration and
declared war on Germany should be invited to the conference. This
immediately gave rise to some questions. Which Polish Government,
for example, should be invited.
Mr. Eden immediately interjected that this was a good reason for settling the Polish problem now.

Mr. Molotov continued that certain countries which did not maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would also be invited. He stated that he would like to check the exact list of states which would attend the conference.

Mr. Stettinius gave Mr. Molotov such a list and pointed out that although Ecuador had recently declared war on Germany it was not included on the list since it had not yet signed the United Nations Declaration.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that if agreement could not be reached on the membership of the organization it should be reported accordingly.

Mr. Eden stated that only the question of the membership of the two Soviet Republics remained open.

Mr. Cadogan pointed out that if a conference were called to complete the work of Dumbarton Oaks and to reach final agreement on a charter, he did not see how any of the original members of the organization could be excluded from the conference.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the United Nations should meet to complete the charter. New members could be elected at this meeting. He said that he was trying to find a way to arrange for consideration of the Soviet request before the first meeting of the assembly.

Mr. Eden suggested as a possible procedure that the United Nations might meet and might draw up an order of the day which would include the question of extending foundation membership to two Soviet Republics. He said that he was quite ready to agree to this proposal.

Mr. Molotov suggested an amendment to Mr. Eden’s proposal to the effect that the three Foreign Secretaries had agreed that it would be advisable to grant admission to the assembly to two or three Soviet Republics.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was favorably impressed with what Mr. Eden had said. He had not had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the President this morning and it was, therefore, impossible for him to make any firm commitment. However, he would be glad to discuss the question with the President promptly and hoped and expected that the United States would be able to give a favorable reply before the end of the day. He stated that he would not bring up the question of Poland since he hoped that agreement would be reached on this matter at the present conference.

\[2\] Post, pp. 747-748.
MR. STETTINIUS stated that there were a number of other details with respect to Dumbarton Oaks, such as the status of France, how China would be consulted, who would issue the invitations, etc.

MR. EDEN suggested that a sub-committee be set up to study these details and report back to the Foreign Secretaries. Messrs. Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to study these matters.3

2. Yugoslavian Frontiers.

MR. EDEN stated that although he did not wish to raise the question of Yugoslavian frontiers with Austria and Italy, he would like to point out that with the occupation of Austria by the Red Army there might well be administrative questions relative to the frontiers which should be handled. For this reason, the British Delegation was submitting a note to the Soviet Delegation on the question.4


MR. EDEN stated that he also wished to discuss the question of a Control Commission in Bulgaria in the light of the decisions reached vis-à-vis the Hungarian Control Commission. It was agreed to confine the present meeting to those matters which had been referred to the Foreign Secretaries by the Chiefs of State for consideration.

4. Reparations.

MR. MOLOROV inquired as to when the American and British Delegations would be prepared to discuss the question of reparations.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he would be ready tomorrow.

MR. EDEN added that he hoped that the British side would also be ready.

5. Iran.

MR. EDEN recalled the signing of the Declaration on Iran.5 He stated that the Allies had signed treaties with Iran6 in which certain privileges had been granted to them for the duration of the war. In all other respects, however, he felt that the Iranian Government should be the master in its own house and free to make its own decisions. The British Government felt that it was most important to observe this principle—otherwise the Allies might find themselves in competition in Iranian affairs. No one desired that. For this reason he urged that the Allies refrain from interfering in internal Iranian matters. With respect to oil, Mr. Eden stated that the British Government did not dispute the Soviet need for Iranian oil and that it

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3 For a notation by Hiss regarding this subcommittee, see post, p. 782. For a post-conference memorandum on these negotiations, see post, pp. 991-992.
4 See post, p. 887.
5 For the text of this declaration, see post, pp. 748-749.
was no part of British policy to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining oil from Northern Iran. Indeed, the Soviet Union was a natural market for this oil. The British Government did not wish to put any obstacles in the way of the Soviet Union’s obtaining oil concessions if and when the Iranians were prepared to negotiate. He continued that he felt that it should be made known publicly that the Allies would not press the matter concerning oil concessions any further until their troops had been withdrawn from Iran. The British Government was ready to consider at the Crimean Conference the advisability of making some statement which would indicate that the Allies were prepared to start to withdraw their troops earlier than was provided for in the Declaration on Iran. This withdrawal might commence as soon as the supply routes were closed. He believed that if agreement could be reached on this point it would have a good effect on world opinion and would show that the Allies were prepared to carry out the Tehran Declaration.

Mr. Molotov maintained that there were two different questions involved, i.e. those concerning the oil concessions and the withdrawal of Allied troops. With respect to the withdrawal of the troops, this question had never been placed before the Soviet Government until today. He maintained that this was a question of fulfilling the provisions of the treaty signed by Iran. If there were any need to amend this agreement the question should be studied. This would take some time.

With respect to the oil concessions, Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to make a few comments. The Soviet Government had asked Ambassador Ahl what the Iranian attitude would be to a request for concessions. Ahl’s reply had been most favorable. Kavtaradze had then proceeded to Iran to negotiate. In his first conversation with Foreign Minister Saeed, the Foreign Minister had taken a favorable position. This was only natural since the granting of concessions was not only to the interests of the Soviet Union, but also to Iran. It was also in compliance with the Declaration of Tehran, since the granting of concessions would assist Iranian economy. This was the first stage of the controversy.

During the second stage the situation changed. The Iranians then stated that it would not be appropriate to carry on the negotiations. Thereupon, the Medjilis had adopted a decision to the effect that there should be no concessions during the war. Subsequently, many Iranians had stated that this decision had been adopted in too great a hurry and that it was unwise.

Why could there not be a third stage? Since the Iranians had changed their minds in one direction the Soviets saw no reason why
they should not change it back to the first stage. The Soviet Government had endeavored to persuade them to do so. Kavtaradze had returned and the strong-armed methods he had used have subsided. He said that no negotiations were being carried on at the present time and that he did not believe it advisable to pay any special attention to this question now. He suggested that the matter be left alone—that it take its own course. The situation was not acute at the present time.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the United States had no wartime treaty with the Iranian Government. American firms had carried on negotiations for oil concessions but these had been dropped following the Medjlis decision. The firms were consequently in the same position as the Soviets. With respect to the withdrawal of troops from Iran he wished to point out that the American troops there were serving the interests of the Soviet Union in moving Lend-Lease supplies from the Persian Gulf. The United States Government was content to leave the question of oil negotiations until the end of the war. He wished fully to support Mr. Eden's proposals regarding the withdrawal of the Allied troops.

Mr. Eden remarked that the British Government had no opposition to the granting of oil concessions to the Soviet Government.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the United States Government took the same position.

Mr. Eden pointed out that the British had also carried on negotiations with the Iranians, even before the Soviet negotiations had started. As a result of the present attitude of the Iranian Government all of these negotiations were now held in abeyance. He said that if some statement were released, as suggested by him, it might reassure the Iranians and facilitate the recommencement of oil negotiations. With respect to the renewal [withdrawal] of Allied troops, there was no need to amend the Iranian treaty which stated that Allied troops would be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of hostilities. He felt that it would be wise to withdraw these troops as soon as the supply route was no longer necessary.

Mr. Molotov stated that he believed it might be advisable to limit the matter to an exchange of views on the subject. He offered to summon Kavtaradze to the conference to make a report on the Iranian situation.

Mr. Eden stated that he would like to think over what Mr. Molotov had said and added that he might have new suggestions to make at a forthcoming meeting.
Matthews Notes

2. Bulgarian & Hungary Control: Com:
3. Reparations tomorrow
4. Iran—

Oil—no dispute on Sov. to get oil from N. Persia. No obstacle on Rus. concession if & when Pers. are prepared to negotiate. We should all make it known we will not press matters further until Allied Troops withdrawn. We prepared to issue statement prepared to withdraw troops earlier pari passu—when supply route closes. Would show world prepared to carry out Teh 2 decl.

Mol: Eden has 2 pts—different 1. Oil 2. Troops. Troops question new. If necessary to change agreement must be studied & some time needed.

Oil—What was beginning? Negot began by asking Pers. govt attitude on concess N Persia. Answer was attitude would be most favorable Dep. Com Kav 3 went to Iran. Conversation with first position of Said & Shah both favorable. Seemed not only U.S.S.R. but Persia also inter. Would be econ. assistance to Pers.

Something has changed. No time for details but Govt. said would not continue discussions Persia during war. Mejlis would not discuss. Said decision was taken in a hurry. Why not now a third phase. Why can’t Pers. govt change position again. Trying to persuade them thats all. Kav. has returned home & method which might seem strong has changed. No negot. now but reserve right to take. Why special attention now? Why not let things go their way. Situation not acute.

S. We have no treaty with Our oil concessions also advanced stage & were in same position. Supports Eden on troop withdrawal. Willing to wait till war’s end on concess.

EDEN: Reiterates no oppos. to Soviet concession. Does believe some statement might reassure Pers who were frightened at one time and make negotiations easier.

On troop withdrawal no change in treaty necessary. Would help reassure Pers & therefore negot.

Mol: Thinks we should limit ourselves to an exchange of views Might bring in Kavtaradze—he is here in Crimea.

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1 For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes of this meeting.
2 Tehran.
3 Kavtaradze.
Hiss Notes

ERS see Ed. → Wire S. Am states act immediately

Eden: 1st World Org. q. 2 q’s referred to us

1) Q. of membership of 2 or 3 reps of SU
2) Time & place of conference

ERS & Ns to be invited

ERS To start at bottom of list 1st I should like take this opportunity invite our great allies to conf in US

Hope Pres didn’t shock you yester. by mentioning March I’m sure time can be arranged to fit in with convenience of Mr Mol & Mr Ed. However we are very anxious to have the conf. at earliest poss. time. Pers. hope could be held not later than latter part Apr.

As to matter of those to be invited you will recall at D. O. there was much talk as to the Assoc. Ns as well as the Un Ns. We have come to the conclusion that taking everything into consid. it would prob. be most satis. to limit those to be invited to those who had signed Un Ns Dec & declared war on our common enemy.

As to Mr. Molotov’s reference to multiple membership for S.U. From standpoint geog. area & pop. it is my feeling this entire q. should be given very sympathetic consid. As to how it could be done immediately at the very first meeting I have not been able to determine in my own mind

In D. O. proposals we wrote in the provision each state have 1 vote. I have not yet been able to see clearly how D. O. proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. I wish again to refer to the Pres’ reaction yesterday to this matter when he said it was most interesting & deserved sympathetic study

Mol. Has expressed his ideas re last q. As to 1st q. like Ed. to state his views

Ed. As regards time & place. Glad to accept the invitation of the U S Govt. I only want to enter 1 caveat. Mr Winant, Mr Gusev & I getting little jealous we never have anything in Lon. If Mr Mol & I go to Am for this I hope for an early meeting of For Secs in Lon

ERS Agreed
Mol Quite poss.
Ed. Invitation not ultimatum
ERS Promptly accept

1 From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes of this meeting.

2 See post, p. 962.
Mol  We also
Ed  As to time have to get Ch. into line & possibly Fr.  Lawyers want 10 days or so I rather think I am committed to debates in Par. before I go  I would like myself 2nd half April
ERS  around about Apr 15
Ed  I would give it a wk more  20 something
Mol  Agreed
ERS  latter part April?
Mol  Agreed
ERS  Wanted calendar  Suggested Wed Apr 25
Mol.  Agrees to both
Ed  We mildly prefer second (date) Easter 1st
Agreed April 25
Mol.  We accept your invitation to Wash & the date of 25th Re 3 reps  Ed. Definitely sympathetic to their inclusion in Ass. We would be ready to say that at whatever is considered the approp. moment
Mol—As soon as possible
Would like deal with this q. relation to remarks of Mr S.  Mr S has reminded us Pres spoke of decs of D. O. & 1 vote.  Like ask 1 q. Can & Austr part of U K.
Ed—Of Brit Em
Mol  & members of Ass.
The amends to Sov Const which have been accepted Feb last yr give reps rt of immed touch with for. states  S U union of states. Const Enlarges rts of reps. In this sense we must develop rels with for. states.  this already begun  As to their pol, econ, mil importance no use proving what impor. have such reps as U,—Would be very desirable if could arrive at agt & have reach dec. today
Re Proposal made by ERS that Un Cs Decl signers & decl. of war com.
Q. which Pol should be invited
Ed  Another reason settle prob.
Mol.  Some Cs have no dip. rels with S U
Would like to check up exact no. of states which would take place ERS read list
ECUADOR has recently declared war but has not yet declared war [sic]
Ed:  laughed
Mol  If we can not arrive at agt re membership must say so & move on to another subject
Ed:  all agreed except re 2 reps.
Cad:  If you call a conf. to complete D. O. work & to agree finally on the Charter I don't see how you can exclude any of members of that conf. from the Org.
ERS: The Un. Ns meet to complete a charter & all would be members They could elect new members before 1st meeting of Ass. Trying find way Sov request can be taken before 1st meeting
Ed Un Ns could meet as met last time & could agree amongst other bus. to extend foundation members to include the 2 Sov. Reps. We should be quite ready to agree to that
Mol. Suggests amend. to Ed proposal
We must formulate this q. as he proposed & add we 3 have agreed it would be advisable to give the 2 or 3 Sov. reps. a place in the Ass.
ERS asked Ed q.—Ed restated position
ERS I am favorably impressed with what Mr Ed. has said. I did not have an oppor. of discussing this with Pres this morn. ’.. at this time imp. make any firm commit. However delighted discuss with Pres promptly & would hope & expect US be able give favorable answer before end of day
Mol. Agreed
Ed.
Mol We leave now q of Pol.—in hope we reach agt.
Ed. Other items to consider
ERS There are a no. of details. If we could meet tomorrow Status of Fr., Ch. participant at DO. & must be consulted, form of invitation, how & by whom & when invitations be issued
Ed. We might set up subcom. to prepare this & report to us
ERS A. H., Gromyko, Jebb
Ed. Other items for agenda
1. Yugoslav frontier—Will put in a note on that
2. Control Coms., Bul & Hung.
Mol. Dec. re Hung. Con. Com just arrived at. Other q’s
3. Iran
Agreed not try to list q’s still to come up at plenary session
Mol. when can we go on with q. of reparations?
ERS we will be prepared tomorrow to discuss Rep. further
Ed. Hope we will
Iran
Ed At Teheran we signed Decl. re Persia & each made treaties with Iran.

About oil—no dispute about SU’s need for oil. No part of our pol. to prevent S. U. from obtaining oil from N. Persia. Indeed Sov. Un is a natural market for N. Per. oil. We do not wish to put any obstacle in way of R’s obtaining concession if & when Persians prepared to neg. it. We should all of us make it known that we will not press matters further re oil concessions until Allied troops have been withdrawn from Persia

* Marginal note in Hiss’ handwriting: “No”
Ready to consider making some statement indicating we would be prepared to start withdrawal Allied troops earlier than was agreed in treaty—which was conclusion of Eur war.

Mol. 2 diff. q’s oil & Allied troops in Persia

Q of withdrawal of troops was not taken up until today in such a way. Here is q of carrying out the agt already signed by Iran. If there is a nec. to change this agt, some time needed to study.

About oil—Negs. began by Rs asking Ir Amb what would be Ir. att. toward Sov concession Said sure answer would be most favorable. Then Dep. Com Kay—went to Iran & talked to Saed. 1st position of Saed quite favorable—same re Shah

Seemed quite natural not only SU but Persia interested in accord with Decl on Iran would be solid assistance to Iran

Second stage—something has changed in Iran. Not now dealing with details but Per. govt said not prepared go on with discussions & Majlis took dec. not give concessions during war. Since then have heard many times from Per. officials dec was unfortunate & taken in hurry

Why can’t there be 3rd stage—return of Per Govt to its 1st opin. If Per. Govt has changed mind in 1 direction what [sic] cant change in other dir. What objection? May reopen negs. Brit already have concessions—no inconvenience to Rs & R concession would not be to Brit

Let things go own way. Nothing acute now

ERS Just a word. For the record US has not signed a war-time treaty with Iran. Treaty was Sov-Brit-Iranian treaty. Also certain Am. oil co’s were negotiating & we too were cut short. I wish to support endorse entirely Mr. Eden’s proposal re withdrawal of troops. Only reason Am. troops are in Iran is to serve SU from standpoint supply & movement of Lend-lease.

As to oil we are perfectly contented not to resume negs. till after hostilities end.

Ed: No opposition to Sov. concession
ERS Same is true of U. S.

Ed. We were negotiating another concession even before R negs began & now all that has come to an end as result of Per. Govts present attitude. Thought statement he proposed might reassure Persians, who were undoubtedly frightened at one time, & make negs easier

As to troops, no need amend treaty which says be withdrawn not later than 6 mos after end hostilities No diff. in Brit withdrawing earlier. Thought might begin when supply line no longer going.

Mol Offered to have Kavtoradge come
Mol. Would like to have limit selves to exch of views
Ed. to think over what Mol. said & may make new suggestions
Mol All of should think
United States Delegation Memorandum

[Yalta,] February 8, 1945.

List of Items Referred to Foreign Ministers

1. Inclusion of Ukraine, White Russia and Lithuania among initial members of the Organization. (See attached paper)
2. Date and place of United Nations Conference.
   Emphasize membership should include all signatories of United Nations Declaration—not just the specific, listed countries which have already signed.
   (See attached list)
4. The policy toward Iran. (See attached paper)

[Attachment 1]

[Yalta,] February 8, 1945.

Arguments Against Inclusion of Any of the Soviet Republics Among the Initial Members

1. Soviet Republics not Signatories of the United Nations Declaration:
   On further thought we have become impressed with the Soviet view that the initial members of the United Nations Organization should be the signatories of the United Nations Declaration. As none of the Soviet Republics are signatories of that Declaration, Mr. Molotov’s proposal that two or three of these Republics be admitted to initial membership would be contrary to that principle.

2. The Question Should Be Postponed Until the Organization is Formed:
   The President indicated in his remarks yesterday at the plenary session that this question should not come up until after the Organization is formed.

   Mr. Molotov said yesterday at the plenary session that the Soviet Government had observed the gradual development of international relations of the British dominions. In accordance with the practice followed by the dominions, it would seem to be premature to take the action proposed by Mr. Molotov at this time. We should allow a longer time to elapse and have available more experience as to the international relations of the Soviet Republics before we consider this question.

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1 Author not indicated but presumably Hiss. This memorandum, with attachments, was presumably prepared for Stettinius prior to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 8, 1945.
2 Author not indicated but presumably Hiss.
The question is such a novel one in international relations that the other members of the Organization should have a chance to consider the question before a decision is reached.

3. The Soviet Republics are not Sovereign States under International Practice:

The Soviet constitution does not permit the Soviet Republics to control their own foreign policy or affairs. Other aspects of central control over the Republics are also inconsistent with the Republics being sovereign.

(Note: India is one of the United Nations. It, too, is not independent. The Soviet representatives will probably argue that if India can be a member so should their three Republics.

The answer:

India has for some period past been gradually developing international relations, and is generally regarded as having more of the attributes of separate nationhood than the Soviet Republics.)

[Attachment 2]

List of Nations Which Were Invited to the United Nations Conferences at Hot Springs, Atlantic City and Bretton Woods 8

United Nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Iran</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Panama</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Philippine Commonwealth</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Union of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Union of Soviet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>Haiti</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

8 This list was not attached to the covering memorandum in the Hiss Collection, but a copy was so attached in the UNA Files. The footnote on the original would indicate that the list had been prepared prior to January 1, 1945. (See ante, pp. 52-53.) The word "Turkey" was written in longhand beside the list of Associated States (see post, p. 774). Another copy of this list is an attachment to the Pasvolsky memorandum of January 23, 1945, ante, p. 82.
III. THE YALTA CONFERENCE

STATES ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE WAR

Chile
Ecuador
Egypt
*France—Provisional Government of
the French Republic
Iceland
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

Observers
Danish Minister at Washington,
attending in a personal capacity

[Attachment 3]

[YALTA,] February 8, 1945.

POLICY ON IRAN

At Malta we agreed with the British on two points:

1. We should urge the Soviet Government, in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943, to respect the decision of the Iranian Government to postpone negotiations for oil concessions until the termination of hostilities and withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran.

(The Declaration on Iran, which was signed by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at Teheran, expressed desire for the maintenance of Iran’s sovereignty and integrity.)

2. Both Governments should state that when the truck route to Russia across Iran is no longer needed, we would be prepared to begin removing our troops pari passu (i.e., at the same rate.)

[Attachment 4]

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS REGARDING IRAN

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U. S. S. R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

* On January 1, 1945 France became a signatory of the United Nations Declaration. [Footnote in the original.]
* Authorship not indicated.
* See ante, pp. 500–501.
* Although the covering memorandum refers to only three attachments, this paper was attached to the preceding document in both the Hiss Collection and the UNA Files.
The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

December 1, 1943.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 8, 1945, NOON, LIVADIA PALACE

Present

United States

Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Bull
Major General Anderson
Major General Hull
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser

United Kingdom

Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Wilson
General Ismay
Admiral Somerville
Major General Laycock
Major General Holmes
Lord Leathers

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

Major General Jacob
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

1 Present for items 1 and 2 only.
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 186TH MEETING OF THE
   COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

   The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
   Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 186th
   Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to
   later minor amendments.

2. LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF ALL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN ALL
   THEATERS

3. OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING
   (C. C. S. 746/11)  

Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had
examined this paper and it was acceptable to them with one amend-
ment. They would like to change the date referred to in the first
sentence of paragraph 4b. (1) (d) on page 4 of the enclosure from
30 April to 1 April.  

Lord Leathers said that this amendment would suit him personally
very well if the staffs concerned could prepare the study in time.

Admiral Leahy said that the United States staffs believed this
would be possible.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were quite
prepared to accept the first of April as a target date for the report
concerned.

Continuing, Sir Alan Brooke suggested that paragraph 4b. (1)
of the enclosure required clarification as to the order of priority in
which the tasks referred to were to be undertaken. For instance, the
fixing of priorities for the continuance of the war against Japan
referred to in paragraph 4b. (1) (b) might well have to take place
before the preparation of the combined redeployment plan or at least
concurrently with it.

General Somervell explained that the tasks referred to in para-
graph 4b. (1) were not set out in the sequence in which they would
necessarily be undertaken.

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* C. C. S. 187th Meeting.
* Not printed.
* For previous discussion of the paragraph under consideration, see ante, pp. 730-731.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide on the agencies to undertake the preparation of a combined redeployment plan, and the fixing of priority for continuance of the war against Japan. He felt that the Combined Staff Planners and the Combined Administrative Committee, in consultation, would be the best bodies to undertake this work. They would, of course, as set out in paragraph 4b. (1) (c) confer with the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the appropriate shipping authorities.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Approved C. C. S. 746/11, subject to the change of the date in the third line on page 4 from 30 April to 1 April 1945.

b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners, in collaboration with the Combined Administrative Committee, to take the action outlined in paragraph 4b. (1).

c. Invited the combined shipping authorities to take the action outlined in paragraph 4b (2).

4. Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War
(C. C. S. 777/1) 5

Sir Alan Brooke said there were two points the British Chiefs of Staff would like to make. With regard to Article 6, certain of the Dominion Governments had raised objections to the conclusion of an agreement whereby their prisoners of war should work for the Russians on any but a voluntary basis. He suggested therefore the insertion of the words “on a voluntary basis” after the words “They may also be employed” in the second sentence of Article 6.

As he saw it, the proposed agreement was susceptible to alteration by the State Department or Foreign Office, and all that was required was the assurance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they saw no objection to it in principle.

Admiral Leahy said that he had understood the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree on the wording of the document and recommend its acceptance to the State Department and Foreign Office as a basis for discussion with the Russians.

Replying to a question by General Marshall, Sir Charles Portal explained that the Dominion Governments concerned had pointed out that their forces were enrolled on a voluntary basis and were not conscripts. For political reasons, therefore, they felt it important that such troops who might be prisoners of war, should not be made to work by the Russians except on a voluntary basis.

Admiral Leahy said the proposed amendment was acceptable.

5 As amended and approved, this document became C. C. S. 777/2, printed infra.
Continuing, Sir Alan Brooke said that the second point which the British Chiefs of Staff wished to put forward was with regard to Article 8. They felt that this article introduced a new subject which had not previously been considered and might not be acceptable to the Russian authorities who might well object to agreeing that their prisoners of war falling into the hands of United States or British troops should, without their consent, be transferred by one of these powers to the other.

Admiral Leahy pointed out that such transfers might be operationally necessary.

Sir Charles Portal said that as he read it, there was nothing in the remainder of the agreement which prohibited such transfers but he regarded it as a matter more for mutual arrangement between the United States and British authorities concerned than for discussion with the Russians.

General Marshall said that he was prepared to agree that paragraph 8 should be deleted.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved C. C. S. 777/1 subject to the following amendments:

Article 6: In the fifth line, after "employed," insert "on a voluntary basis."

Article 8: Delete this article and renumber the succeeding article as Article 8.

(Amended paper subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 777/2.)

5. Equipment for Greek Forces
(C. C. S. 185th Mtg., Item 2; C. C. S. 768/1; *NAF 841 *)

Sir Alan Brooke reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that at their 185th Meeting, 2 February 1945, it had been agreed that the British would undertake the equipment of an additional 60,000 Greek forces upon receipt from London of certain assurances. The British Chiefs of Staff were now in a position to assure the United States Chiefs of Staff that the implementation of the proposals contained in NAF 841:

a. Would not interfere with the equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe; and
b. Would not result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.

The British would therefore go ahead with the equipping of the forces concerned. The British Chiefs of Staff would also formalize

* See under Malta Conference, ante, pp. 522-524.
* Not printed.
this matter by putting out a memorandum on the lines he had just mentioned.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that these assurances were satisfactory.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note of the assurance of the British Chiefs of Staff that the implementation of NAF 841 would not:

(1) Interfere with the equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe;
(2) Result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against U. S. resources.

b. Pursuant to the above, agreed to the implementation of the proposals in NAF 841.

6. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
(C. C. S. 776/1) *

ADMIRAL LEAHY raised the question of the preparation of the final report to the President and Prime Minister. He understood that such a report would be ready for consideration on the following morning. He understood also that the Prime Minister had suggested a plenary meeting at noon, on Friday, 9 February. He would seek the wishes of the President in this matter.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that it might be well for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to meet an hour before the plenary meeting in order to clear any final points with regard to the report itself or any other matters which might arise.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed to request a plenary meeting for 1200 hours on Friday, 9 February 1945.

b. Agreed to meet one hour prior to the plenary meeting, whatever the hour selected, to consider the final report.

7. OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT

GENERAL MARSHALL read out the latest information available on the course of ground and air operations on the Western Front. He felt it of particular interest to note that at the present time there were 49 Allied divisions in the line with 33 in reserve.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of the above statement.

* As amended and approved this document became C. C. S. 776/3, which is printed post, pp. 827–833.
Draft Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War as Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on February 8, 1945

TOP SECRET

AGREEMENT RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS LIBERATED BY THE SOVIET ARMIES AND U. S. (BRITISH) ARMIES

Preamble.

The Government of the U. S. S. R. and the Government of the United States of America (the Government of His Britannic Majesty) wishing to conclude an agreement on arranging for the care and repatriation of Soviet citizens freed by Allied troops, and for American citizens (British subjects) freed by the Red Army, through their appointed representatives, acting mutually in the authority duly and fully invested in them, have agreed as follows:—

Article 1.

All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under U. S. (British) command and American citizens (British subjects) liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or U. S. (British) authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

U. S. (British) and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

Article 2.

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and U. S. (British) repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens (or subjects) are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are

1 C. C. S. 777/2.
insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the over-all administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The relocation of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or U. S. (British) authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

Article 3.

Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of UNRRA (or other agreed relief agencies) the competent U. S. (British) and Soviet authorities will do their utmost in the circumstances obtaining in any area, and from time to time, to supply liberated citizens (or subjects) of the contracting parties with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or U. S. (British) authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall so far as possible be consistent with the normal practice relating to military rank.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party.

Article 4.

Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party.

Article 5.

Soviet and U. S. (British) military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens (and subjects) of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and U. S. (British) authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.
In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and U. S. (British) Governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens (or subjects) necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

Article 6.
Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and U. S. (British) authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labor shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure.

Article 7.
The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens (and subjects). They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens (and subjects) to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or U. S. (British) authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens (and subjects) shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements or their temporary employment.

Article 8.
The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.
American Governments on January 20. In origin, it is a SHAEF paper. The British have subsequently made a few changes in it which I feel we can accept without reservation. The British are most anxious to present this draft to the Russians today for their consideration. JCS are in full agreement. I can see no objections to the redraft and have authorized, insofar as we are concerned, tripartite discussions based on it. It does not cover the numbered points mentioned in your reference telegram which were embodied in the Department's note of February 1 to the Soviet Embassy. The consensus here is that it would be unwise to include questions relative to the protection of the Geneva Convention and to Soviet citizens in the U.S. in an agreement which deals primarily with the exchange of prisoners liberated by the Allied armies as they march into Germany. With respect to "claimants", notwithstanding the danger of German retaliation, we believe there will be serious delays in the release of our prisoners of war unless we reach prompt agreement on this question.

ARGONAUT, February 9, 1945.

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**MEETING OF THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 8, 1945, 3 P.M., YUSUPOV PALACE**

**Present**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Admiral Leahy</td>
<td>General of the Army Antonov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General of the Army Marshall</td>
<td>Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Admiral King</td>
<td>Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov (aided by a 2-star admiral)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Kuter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

J. C. S. Files

*Kuter Minutes*

**TOP SECRET**

Admiral Leahy opened the conference with the statement that we would discuss military problems in the Far East and that we required specific data on which to base the long range planning required by the great distances from the United States to the Pacific Theater.

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1 Note on the original: "No U. S. interpreters or secretaries were present. Three Russian secretaries or interpreters in military uniform attended meeting."
ADMIRAL LEAHY then stated that we have prepared a series of questions on which replies were desired.

GENERAL ANTONOV asked to have all of the questions presented prior to any replies or discussion.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then read the questions set forth in the memorandum by the Commanding General, U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, "Subjects for First U. S.–U. S. S. R. Staff Meeting," as stated in JCS 1227/5 (ARGONAUT), dated 7 Feb 1945. These questions were read as written with the words "or some more suitable area" interpolated in question (3).

After brief discussion on the side with Admiral King, ADMIRAL LEAHY posed two additional questions, the first consisting of paragraph 3 of the memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners, "Subjects for First U. S.–U. S. S. R. Staff Meetings" as set forth in JCS 1227/4 (ARGONAUT) 7 February 1945. ADMIRAL LEAHY's second additional question was based on paragraph 7 of the Planners' paper and asked if arrangements could be made whereby weather information could be made available to the U. S. from more stations than are now being used in Eastern Siberia.

GENERAL ANTONOV opened the period of reply and discussion with the very clear statement that he had no authority to give definite answers or promises or to make decisions on matters pertaining to the Far East. He stated that his comments represented his own personal opinion and views and further that he would refer the questions to Marshal Stalin the same day and would arrange to provide complete and authoritative answers as quickly as possible.

The following replies to questions and discussion ensued:

a. There have been no changes in the Soviet projected plan of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October.

b. With regard to the Soviet requirement for a Pacific supply route after Soviet-Japanese hostilities start, GENERAL ANTONOV opened with the statement that the operation of the Trans-Siberian Railroad "can be hampered" by the enemy. The Soviets therefore cannot rely on that rail line to support their forces. A maximum effort will be made to keep the Trans-Siberian Railroad in operation. However, the Soviets will require that air and sea routes across the Pacific (mainly sea routes) be kept open. They will particularly require fuel (petroleum products) and foodstuffs.

c. As to basing U. S. Air Forces in Siberia, no discussion could be had until Marshal Stalin's decision was obtained.

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Footnotes:

2 Post, pp. 762–763.
3 See post, p. 764.
4 Post, pp. 763–766.
d. U. S. Forces may be required to defend Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia. General Antonov’s words were that the Soviets “will find American help useful.”

e. As to pre-hostilities preparation including construction, reception, and storage of U. S. stock piles in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia, a rather lengthy reply was given including the following points:

The Soviets will move much larger forces to the Far East than are now there—these augmented forces will require greatly increased supplies—the Soviet problem will be great to supply their expanded forces and they cannot promise to construct and store materials for American forces. They may need American materials with which to build fuel storage for the Soviet forces. This question could be answered after detailed requirements were known and after a decision had been obtained that U. S. forces would be employed in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia.

f. Entry into Kamchatka by the American Survey Party will be determined by Marshal Stalin.

g. The Soviets will occupy southern Sakhalin as quickly after the beginning of hostilities as possible and will do this without American help. The Soviet Navy will deny Laparousa Strait to the Japanese but it will be difficult to permit friendly surface movements through the Laparousa Strait until a Soviet Navy base and shore artillery are established.

h. This question “Are we assured that combined planning in Moscow will be vigorously pursued” is somewhat garbled in reply. General Antonov stated that he had planned in October to start the movement of troops in early 1945. However, all Soviet troops, including those released from Finland and Latvia are now joined in the battle on the Eastern Front. He stated that the intended troop movements will, therefore, be delayed until the necessary units can be disengaged from the present battle. Later in the conversation, General Marshall expanded the American requirement for firm data on which to base future plans. He explained that necessity had lead the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to relieve their Senior Planners from their global responsibilities to permit them to move to Moscow to concentrate on the Russian-American phase of the war against Japan. He made it very clear that we must have planning basis and that we are security conscious. General Marshall concluded with a forceful statement that specific and constructive planning in Moscow must be pursued. General Antonov stated that he would do his best to improve the planning situation in Moscow.

i. Weather in Siberia was discussed at some length and its relation to the initiation of hostilities. From a ground force view point the most difficult conditions would be experienced during the thaw and floods in April and May and although June is a favorable month,
July and August is also undesirable. As far as the ground forces are concerned, weather would be most favorable in September, October and November. At sea weather is favorable in July, August and September.

j. Authority to obtain weather stations would be discussed with Marshal Stalin.

Admiral Kuznetsov presented his desire to take over ships from the U.S. at Dutch Harbor or Kodiak but accepted Admiral King’s statement that Cold Bay was more desirable and would be used. Some discussion followed and it was concluded that Russian crews could be moved from Murmansk to the east coast of the U.S. by returning convoys and then to be moved by rail to the west coast. However, the provision of American shipping to move these crews to Cold Bay was not viewed with favor by Admiral King.

Except for the immediately preceding conversation, the Russians had no questions to ask.

General Marshall presented a summary of recent operations—gave to General Antonov a written statement as to our views of the combat effectiveness of German divisions after the Ardennes battle and left with the Russians our estimate of Japan’s strength in the Pacific.

Air Marshal Khudyakov presented a Russian version of the agreement to create a restricted zone for air operations on the Russian front.

Upon adjourning General Antonov stated that he would see Marshal Stalin forthwith and would inform the U.S. Chiefs of Staff as to when we might expect the next meeting to receive official and definite replies to our questions.

Dictated to and transcribed by T/Sgt George J. Lang. General Kuter’s notes and Sgt Lang’s shorthand notes have been destroyed.

L. S. Kuter,
Major General, U.S. A.

Six (6) copies prepared with distribution to the individuals indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Marshall</th>
<th>3 copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Deane</td>
<td>1 copy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Hull</td>
<td>1 copy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Kuter</td>
<td>1 copy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations (King)  

TOP SECRET  

[YALTA,] 8 February 1945.  

MEMORANDUM  

Subject: Questions posed by Admiral Kuznetsov at the U. S.–Russian Chiefs of Staff Meeting Thursday Afternoon, February 8th.  

1. (a) Question. What has been determined about the transfer of ships to the Russians (presumably with reference to the Milepost program).  

Answer. It is difficult to be definite until we know more about the U-boat offensive in the Atlantic. However, it would seem practicable to work out a schedule of deliveries on a step-by-step basis in which the later deliveries may have to be delayed because of the U-boat situation in the Atlantic.  

2. (a) Question. If Dutch Harbor is not a suitable place for the transfer of ships to the Russians and for the training of Russian crews, the second preference would be Kodiak. What is your view?  

Answer. After thorough review of all considerations, it has been decided that Cold Bay is the best place to effect the delivery of ships to the Russians and the training of Russian crews.  

Note: Admiral Kuznetsov was unfamiliar with Cold Bay but when the location was pointed out to him he accepted it.  

3. (a) Question. We wish to transfer crews from Murmansk by utilizing convoys returning from Murmansk to the United States, thence by rail across the United States to the West Coast, and thence to Cold Bay. Can you manage this?  

Answer. It would seem practicable to move Russian crews as far as the West Coast of the United States in the manner you describe, but it will be extremely difficult to move them from the West Coast to Cold Bay because of the very bad shipping situation in the Pacific. The matter will require the closest examination and the answer must be understood to be very uncertain at this time.  

Note: Admiral Kuznetsov made no offer for the movement of the Russian crews from the West Coast to Cold Bay in Russian ships, which matter should be taken up further with the Russians.  

Note: After the Staff meeting adjourned, I asked the Russian Admiral how many men, total, they wish to move from Murmansk to Cold

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1 A copy of this memorandum was attached as Appendix A to the preceding Kuter minutes.
Bay. His reply was about 3,000. I suggested if they were moved in
detachments suitable to the accommodations in the ships of the con-
voys returning from Murmansk, it would make the problem more easy
of solution—and, as well, it would facilitate their transfer by rail across
the United States and, further, their transfer from the West Coast of
the United States to Cold Bay. I added that such an arrangement
would fit in well with the proposed schedule of delivery of ships on
a step-by-step basis.

4. Copies of this memorandum will be given to the distribution
list below. All agencies that are involved are urged to pursue this
matter to an acceptable solution.

E. J. King
Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy

Distribution List
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
General Somervell
General Kuter
General Deane
Admiral Olsen
Admiral Horne
Admiral Edwards
Admiral Cooke
Admiral Duncan
Admiral McCormick
Admiral Land

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Commanding General, United States Military
Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane)

TOP SECRET (SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION)
J. C. S. 1227/5 7 February 1945
(ARGONAUT)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECTS FOR FIRST U. S.—U. S. S. R. STAFF MEETING

References: a. J. C. S. 1176 Series

b. J. C. S. Memo for Info No. 360

MEMORANDUM BY THE COMMANDING GENERAL, U. S. MILITARY MISSION, MOSCOW

It is recommended that in your meeting with the Soviet Staff you
obtain their commitments or opinions, as appropriate, on the following subjects:

1 For J. C. S. 1176/1, 1176/2, and 1176/6, see ante, pp. 375–378, 388–394.
2 Not printed.
(1) Have there been any changes in Soviet projected plans of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October?
(2) Will the Soviets require a Pacific supply route after Soviet-Japanese hostilities start?
(3) Will agreement be given for operation of U. S. air forces in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area?
(4) Will U. S. forces be required for defense of Kamchatka?
(5) Will the Soviets make pre-hostility preparations including construction, and reception and storage of U. S. stockpiles in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia?
(6) Can the Kamchatka survey party depart from Fairbanks by 15 February 1945?
(7) Will the Soviets occupy southern Sakhalin and when? If so, will they cover passage of LaPerouse Strait?
(8) Are we assured that combined planning in Moscow will be vigorously pursued?

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners

TOP SECRET (SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION)
J. C. S. 1227/4
(ARGONAUT)

7 FEBRUARY 1945.

J O I N T C H I E F S O F S TAFF

SUBJECTS FOR FIRST U. S. - U. S. S. R. STAFF MEETING
References: a. J. C. S. 1176 Series
b. J. C. S. Memo for Information No. 360

MEMORANDUM BY THE JOINT STAFF PLANNERS

1. In the following paragraphs the Joint Staff Planners have set forth the various subjects and questions which it is considered should be brought up at the meeting and in so doing have used the phraseology which might be suitable for presenting each subject to the Red General Staff. Most of these have been presented previously in various papers and are repeated here for convenience of the Chiefs of Staff.

2. The President asked Marshal Stalin two questions, saying he would appreciate an early reply at this conference. The first was:

1 For J. C. S. 1176/1, 1176/2, and 1176/6, see ante, pp. 375-378, 388-394.
2 Not printed.
3 Ante, p. 594.
"Once war breaks out between Russia and Japan, is it essential to you that a supply line be kept open across the Pacific to Eastern Siberia?"

The second was:

"Will you assure us that United States air forces will be permitted to base in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk or some more suitable area providing developments show that these air forces can be operated and supplied without jeopardizing Russian operations?"

If the Red Army Staff gives an encouraging reply on basing the strategic air forces, suggest they be asked for agreement to entry of a U. S. survey party in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area at an early date, details to be worked out with the Mission.

3. On the assumption Russia can be ready to enter the war against Japan three months after the end of the German war as indicated by Marshal Stalin in October, how would the weather and season of the year affect the beginning operations in Eastern Siberia?

4. Do you estimate that you are liable to need any U. S. assistance in defending Kamchatka once war breaks out with Japan?

Do you consider you will be able to develop bases in Kamchatka, particularly air bases, before the outbreak of hostilities with Japan?

In connection with the foregoing, the United States Chiefs of Staff sent you a memorandum concerning the Kamchatka survey party. We consider it most important that this survey party get under way in the very near future. Will you give us your thoughts on our memorandum? (See Appendix "A" for copy of memorandum.)

5. In connection with your plan of operations in Eastern Siberia, do you intend to take the southern half of Sakhalin?

If so, do you think you will be able to open the Lé Perouse Strait to shipping?

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff have sent you a memorandum (see Appendix "B") in which we state our feeling as to the importance of combined planning in Moscow between your representatives and our planning group. We hope you will agree with our views and would like to hear any comments or suggestions you have.

7. In connection with our operations accurate information on weather is most important. This information will be equally necessary to your air forces as well as to ours operating over Japan. The United States Chiefs feel it important that they obtain weather information from more stations than are now being used in Eastern Siberia and request that you arrange this.

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4 The memorandum had been sent to the representatives of the Soviet General Staff on February 5, 1945. See ante, p. 594.
8. Providing the Red Staff elects to discuss Milepost requirements, it is suggested that the substance of J. C. S. Memo for Information No. 360 be given the Red General Staff verbally.

9. The Joint Staff Planners recommend that in the discussion of the above subjects, the United States Chiefs of Staff make clear to the Russians that:

   a. Amphibious operations in the North Pacific in 1945 are remote.
   b. If the Russians indicate a desire for a supply route across the North Pacific, the United States Chiefs indicate they expect facilities for basing U. S. strategic air forces in Eastern Siberia in connection with the opening of any such route.

Appendix "A"

MEMORANDUM FROM THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF

In order that there be complete understanding on the arrangements for the entrance into Kamchatka of the United States Reconnaissance Party, the composition of which by name has already been furnished the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it is requested that the Soviet General Staff indicate agreement to the following:

   a. The reconnaissance party will have access to any part of the area.
   b. Transportation to, from, and within the area will be furnished by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
   c. Full information and assistance will be furnished by local Soviet authorities.
   d. Free and rapid communication between the party and U. S. military authorities will be permitted and arranged for by the Soviets.

It is further urged that arrangements be completed in time to permit the departure of this party from Fairbanks, Alaska, not later than 15 February 1945.

Appendix "B"

MEMORANDUM FROM THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF

The United States Chiefs of Staff have noted with satisfaction the initiation of combined planning in Moscow. The work of this combined group is of the utmost importance to the planning and coordination of our operations for the defeat of Japan.

The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that special effort should be made on both sides to expedite this combined planning by a full, free and frank exchange of information, data and ideas between
members of the combined group. Preparation of combined studies and estimates for presentation to the respective Chiefs of Staff should be pushed forward without delay.

The United States Chiefs ask for your agreement to these views and for any comments or suggestions which you may care to make.

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**ROOSEVELT-STALIN MEETING, FEBRUARY 8, 1945, 3:30 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE**

**Present**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President Roosevelt</td>
<td>Marshal Stalin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Harriman</td>
<td>Foreign Commissar Molotov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bohlen</td>
<td>Mr. Pavlov</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**TOP SECRET**

*Air Bases in the Far East*

The President said that with the fall of Manila the war in the Pacific was entering into a new phase and that we hoped to establish bases on the Bonins and on the islands near Formosa. He said the time had come to make plans for additional bombing of Japan. He hoped that it would not be necessary actually to invade the Japanese islands and would do so only if absolutely necessary. The Japanese had 4,000,000 men in their army and he hoped by intensive bombing to be able to destroy Japan and its army and thus save American lives.

 Marshal Stalin said he did not object to the United States having bases at Komsomolsk or at Nikolaevsk. He said the first was on the lower reaches of the Amur River and the second at its mouth. He said that in regard to the bases on Kamchatka he thought we would have to leave that until a later stage since the presence of the Japanese Consul there made it difficult at this time to make the necessary arrangements. At any rate, he added, the other two bases in the Maritime Provinces were nearer.

 Marshal Stalin added that there had been one phrase in regard to "commercial routes" in the President's letter on the subject which had not been clear to him.

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1 The first two subjects here are separate memoranda, while the last four subjects are grouped in a third memorandum.

2 See ante, p. 594.
The President said he had had in mind the importance of the supply routes across the Pacific and Eastern Siberia to the Soviet Union and he felt that once war broke out between Japan and the Soviet Union it would become very important but also very difficult to get by the Japanese Islands.

Marshal Stalin indicated that he recognized the importance of these supply routes and again repeated that he had no objection to the establishment of American bases in the Maritime provinces.

The President handed the Marshal a paper in which it was requested that the Soviet staff be instructed to enter into planning talks with the United States staff.

Marshal Stalin indicated that he would give the necessary instructions.

Use of airfields and survey of bomb damage in Eastern and Southeastern Europe

The President said he had two questions of a military nature relating to Europe which he wished to take up with the Marshal. He then handed to Marshal Stalin two papers in English which were translated into Russian.

The first was a request that the United States Air Force be allowed to use certain airfields in the vicinity of Budapest in order to carry out bombing operations against the Germans. The President said that at the present time the American bombers based in Italy had to make a long and hazardous flight over the Alps in order to reach Germany.

The second paper contained a request that a group of United States experts be permitted to make surveys of the effects of bombing in the areas liberated or occupied by the Red Army in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, similar to the surveys that had been made at Ploesti. The paper asked that this group be permitted to proceed at once since it was important to examine the damage while the evidence was still fresh and the people who had been there during the bombing still were on the spot.

Marshal Stalin said he could grant both these requests and would immediately give the necessary orders.

Sale of Ships to the Soviet Union after the War

Marshal Stalin mentioned that Mr. Stettinius had told Mr. Molotov there was a possibility that the United States would have surplus shipping property after the war which might be sold to the Soviet Union.

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3 See supra, Appendix “B”.
4 Discussion of this subject began at 3:40 p. m.
5 Discussion of this subject began at 3:45 p. m.
The President said that this would require some changes in legislation which he hoped to work out so that surplus shipping after the war not needed by the United States and Great Britain could be transferred on credit without any interest. He said after the last war the mistake had been made of attempting to charge interest for the disposal of surplus property but it had not worked. His idea was to transfer the ships for a fixed sum on credit which would include the cost of the ship less the cost of depreciation, so that in twenty years the entire credit would be extinguished. He said that the British had never sold anything without commercial interest but that he had different ideas.

Marshal Stalin expressed gratification at the President’s statement and said this shipping would greatly ease the task of the Soviet Union in the future.

The President replied that he hoped the Soviet Union would interest itself in a large way in the shipping game.

Marshal Stalin said that he thought the President’s idea was a very good one and also that Lend-Lease was a remarkable invention, without which victory would have been delayed. He said that in former wars some allies had subsidized others but this had offended the allies receiving the subsidies and had led to difficulties. Lend-Lease, however, produced no such resentment, and he repeated his opinion of the extraordinary contribution of Lend-Lease to the winning of the war.

The President replied that four years ago, when having a rest on his small yacht, he had thought and thought of a way to help the Allies and at the same time avoid the difficulties inherent in loans, and had finally hit upon the scheme of Lend-Lease.

Far East: Russian Desires

Following the discussion of certain military questions involved in the Far East, Marshal Stalin said that he would like to discuss the political conditions under which the USSR would enter the war against Japan. He said he had already had a conversation on this subject with Ambassador Harriman.

The President said he had received a report of this conversation, and he felt that there would be no difficulty whatsoever in regard to the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands going to Russia at the end of the war. He said that in regard to a warm water port in the Far East for the Soviet Union, the Marshal recalled that they had discussed that point at Tehran. He added that he had then suggested that the Soviet Union be given the use of a warm water port at the end of the south Manchurian railroad, at possibly Dairen on

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the Kwantung peninsula. The President said he had not yet had an opportunity to discuss this matter with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, so therefore he could not speak for the Chinese. He went on to say that there are two methods for the Russians to obtain the use of this port; (1) outright leasing from the Chinese; (2) making Dairen a free port under some form of international commission. He said he preferred the latter method because of the relation to the question of Hong Kong. The President said he hoped that the British would give back the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China and that it would then become an internationalized free port. He said he knew Mr. Churchill would have strong objections to this suggestion.

Marshal Stalin said there was another question and that involved the use by the Russians of the Manchurian railways. He said the Czars had use of the line running from Manchouli to Harbin and from there to Dairen and Port Arthur, as well as the line from Harbin running east to Nikolsk-Ussurisk connecting there with the Khabarovsky to Vladivostok line.

The President said that again, although he had not talked with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek on the subject, there were again two methods of bringing this about: (1) to lease under direct Soviet operation; (2) under a commission composed of one Chinese and one Russian.

Marshal Stalin said that it is clear that if these conditions are not met it would be difficult for him and Molotov to explain to the Soviet people why Russia was entering the war against Japan. They understood clearly the war against Germany which had threatened the very existence of the Soviet Union, but they would not understand why Russia would enter a war against a country with which they had no great trouble. He said, however, if these political conditions were met, the people would understand the national interest involved and it would be very much easier to explain the decision to the Supreme Soviet.

The President replied that he had not had an opportunity to talk to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and he felt that one of the difficulties in speaking to the Chinese was that anything said to them was known to the whole world in twenty-four hours.

Marshal Stalin agreed and said he did not think it was necessary yet to speak to the Chinese and that he could guarantee the security of the Supreme Soviet. He added that it would be well to leave here with these conditions set forth in writing agreed to by the three powers.

The President indicated that he thought that this could be done.

Marshal Stalin went on to say that in regard to the Chinese, T. V. Soong was expected to come to Moscow at the end of April, and he said that when it was possible to free a number of Soviet troops in the west and move twenty-five divisions to the Far East he thought
it would be possible to speak to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek about these matters.

**Marshal Stalin** said that in regard to the question of a warm water port the Russians would not be difficult and he would not object to an internationalized free port.

**Trusteeships**

The President then said he wished to discuss the question of trusteeships with Marshal Stalin. He said he had in mind for Korea a trusteeship composed of a Soviet, an American and a Chinese representative. He said the only experience we had had in this matter was in the Philippines where it had taken about fifty years for the people to be prepared for self-government. He felt that in the case of Korea the period might be from twenty to thirty years.

**Marshal Stalin** said the shorter the period the better, and he inquired whether any foreign troops would be stationed in Korea.

The President replied in the negative, to which Marshal Stalin expressed approval.

The President then said there was one question in regard to Korea which was delicate. He personally did not feel it was necessary to invite the British to participate in the trusteeship of Korea, but he felt that they might resent this.

**Marshal Stalin** replied that they would most certainly be offended. In fact, he said, the Prime Minister might “kill us”. In his opinion he felt that the British should be invited.

The President then said he also had in mind a trusteeship for Indochina. He added that the British did not approve of this idea as they wished to give it back to the French since they feared the implications of a trusteeship as it might affect Burma.

**Marshal Stalin** remarked that the British had lost Burma once through reliance on Indochina, and it was not his opinion that Britain was a sure country to protect this area. He added that he thought Indochina was a very important area.

The President said that the Indochinese were people of small stature, like the Javanese and Burmese, and were not warlike. He added that France had done nothing to improve the natives since she had the colony. He said that General de Gaulle had asked for ships to transport French forces to Indochina.

**Marshal Stalin** inquired where de Gaulle was going to get the troops.

The President replied that de Gaulle said he was going to find the troops when the President could find the ships, but the President added that up to the present he had been unable to find the ships.
Internal Conditions in China

The President said that for some time we had been trying to keep China alive.

Marshal Stalin expressed the opinion that China would remain alive. He added that they needed some new leaders around Chiang Kai-shek and although there were some good people in the Kuomintang he did not understand why they were not brought forward.

The President said General Wedemeyer and the new Ambassador, General Hurley, were having much more success than their predecessors and had made more progress in bringing the communists in the north together with the Chungking government. He said the fault lay more with the Kuomintang and the Chungking Government than with the so-called communists.

Marshal Stalin said he did not understand why they did not get together since they should have a united front against the Japanese. He thought that for this purpose Chiang Kai-shek should assume leadership. He recalled in this connection that some years ago there had been a united front and he did not understand why it had not been maintained.

FIFTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 8, 1945, 4 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Secretary Stettinius
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Hiss
Mr. Bohlen

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Edward Bridges
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Dixon
Major Birse

SOVIEET UNION
Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

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TOP SECRET

Subjects: World Security Organization
Poland
Periodic Meetings of Foreign Ministers
Yugoslavia and Greece

The President opened the meeting by stating that he understood the Foreign Secretaries could report complete success and he wished
to congratulate them on their work and to ask Mr. Eden to report to the Conference.

Mr. Eden then read the report of that morning's meeting of the Foreign Secretaries:

"Report by Foreign Secretaries to Plenary Meeting of Conference on World Organization questions.

1. The Foreign Secretaries met on February 8th

(a) To consider the question of membership of [in] the World Organization of two (or three) of the Republics of the Soviet Union,
(b) To recommend what states should be invited to the proposed United Nations Conference, and
(c) To recommend the time and place at which that Conference should be held.

2. It was decided to make the following recommendations to the Plenary Meeting:

(a) The United Nations Conference on the proposed World Organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America,
(b) The United Nations, as they existed on February . . . ., * 1945, i.e. those who had at that date signed the United Nations Declaration, would be the only states invited to the Conference on World Organization. It will be for the Conference to determine the list of original members of the Organization. At that stage the Delegates of the U. K. and U. S. A. will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics.¹

3. The Foreign Ministers' meeting has established a sub-committee to examine further details in connection with the proposals for a World Organization and will report shortly to the Plenary Meeting."²

Mr. Eden concluded by saying that they were glad to accept the invitation of the United States Government to hold the meeting on April 25 in the United States. He added that he hoped that the next meeting of Foreign Ministers would, therefore, take place in London. Mr. Eden stated, in commenting on the report, that the British Delegation did not think it right for others to share the status of United Nations membership merely in order to participate in the Conference, but he understood that the United States Delegation had other views. He said a sub-committee was considering the details.

Marshal Stalin said that among the states which would be represented at the conference there were ten who had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He said that it was somewhat strange for the Soviet Government to attempt to build future world

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¹ N. B. The blank represents the date of the end of the Conference. [Footnote in the original.]
² For a subsequent memorandum on the negotiation of this decision, see post, pp. 991-992. See also post, pp. 791-792.
³ Copies of the text as read by Eden were found in the UNA Files and in the Hiss Collection.
security with states which did not desire to have diplomatic relations with it. He asked what could be done about this matter.

The President replied that he knew that most of these states would like to have relations with the Soviet Union but had just not gotten around to doing anything about it. There were a few, however, where the reasons were different and where the influence of the Catholic Church was very strong. He said that he would like to point out, however, that the Soviet Union had sat down with these states at Bretton Woods and UNRRA conferences.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was correct but that at this conference they were to consider the vital question of the establishment of world security.

The President then said that he would have to go back a bit into history. Three years ago the then Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, had told these few American Republics that it was not necessary to declare war on Germany but only to break diplomatic relations. Therefore, there were five or six South American countries who felt that they had taken the advice of the United States Government and were, therefore, in good standing. It was a fact, he added, that these states had helped us a great deal in the war effort. He said, speaking frankly, this advice had been a mistake and that a month ago the Secretary of State had brought up with him this embarrassing question. As a result he had sent letters to the presidents of these six countries urging them to declare war against the common enemy. Ecuador had already done so and Peru’s declaration could be expected at any time, and he hoped the others before long.

Marshal Stalin then inquired about Argentina.

The President said that we are considering a conference of United Nations and Associated Nations who had helped in the war effort.

Marshal Stalin said he had no love for Argentina but he felt that there was a contradiction in logic. He inquired what was the criteria [sic] for admission of states and mentioned in this connection Turkey. He said he felt there were nations who had really waged war and had suffered, and there were others who had wavered and speculated on being on the winning side.

The President replied that it was his idea that only those Associated Nations who had declared war should be invited and he suggested that the time limit should be the first of March.

Marshal Stalin agreed with this suggestion.

The Prime Minister said he recommended the President’s suggestion that only those countries who had declared war would be

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8 The Hopkins note, post, p. 791, was apparently passed to the President at about this point.
invited. He said he sympathized with the point of view of Marshal Stalin and pointed out that many countries had played a poor part. He felt, however, there would be some advantage of having a whole new group of nations declare war on Germany for the effect on German morale.

The President remarked that in addition to the South American countries there was, of course, Iceland, the newest of the United Nations Republics.

The Prime Minister said that in the case of Egypt, she had on two occasions wished to declare war but had been advised against it by the British Government, who had felt that it would be more useful and convenient to have Egypt a non-belligerent in order to protect Cairo from systematic bombings. He said that the Egyptian army had rendered good service to the cause. They had maintained good order, guarded bridges, etc. He felt that if Egypt now desired to declare war she should have the opportunity. He said Iceland had rendered valuable service at a time when the United States had not entered the war and had permitted the entry of British and United States troops, thus violating her neutrality in a marked manner, at the same time assuring a vital lane of communications to the British Isles.

Marshal Stalin remarked that this did not apply to former enemy states who had recently declared war on Germany.

The President and The Prime Minister heartily agreed.

The Prime Minister said that he certainly did not include Eire among the possible candidates, since they still maintained German and Japanese missions. He said he would refer to a new one that would not be greeted with universal approbation, namely Turkey. Turkey, however, had made an alliance with Great Britain at a very difficult time, but after the war had been in progress she had discovered she would not be up-to-date for modern war. Her attitude had been friendly and helpful, although she had not taken the chance provided them a year ago to enter the war.

Marshal Stalin replied that if Turkey declared war before the end of February he agreed to her being invited to the conference.

The Prime Minister expressed gratification with the Marshal’s attitude.

The President then said that there remained the question of Denmark, that they had been over-run by the enemy in one night and that the King had been virtually a prisoner and that only the Danish Minister in Washington, Mr. De Kauffman had voiced the sentiments which he knew all Danes felt and had repudiated the actions of his government.
Marshal Stalin observed that he thought Denmark should wait.
The President and the Prime Minister agreed and the latter added that once she was liberated she would certainly have the right to join the organization.

Marshal Stalin remarked, however, that Denmark had let the Germans in.

Marshal Stalin then said he hoped that in the recommendations of the Foreign Ministers it would be possible to name the Soviet Republics, that is, the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics. This was accepted.

Mr. Molotov then asked would it not facilitate the admission of these two Soviet Republics as members of the assembly if they signed the United Nations Declaration before the first of March.

The President reverting to the list of countries to be invited to the conference proposed that it be the United Nations, the Associated Nations and Turkey, provided the latter declared war before the first of March and signed the United Nations Declaration.

The Prime Minister remarked that it would not seem quite right to him to take in small countries who had done so little, simply by the expedient of their declaring war and to exclude the two Soviet Republics from the meeting. He said he had very much in mind the martyrdom and sufferings of the Ukraine and White Russia.

Marshal Stalin said he also thought it was illogical and stated that although the three Powers had agreed to recommend that the Ukraine and White Russia be members of the assembly, might not the fact that they had not signed the United Nations Declaration serve as an excuse for excluding them.

The President and Mr. Stettinius assured Marshal Stalin that this would not occur.

The Prime Minister remarked that he had preferred confining the conference to the United Nations but if others would be added he thought the Soviet Republics should also be added.

Marshal Stalin said "I don't want to embarrass the President, but if he will explain his difficulties we will see what can be done."

The President then said that it was a technical question but an important one. Up to the present they had been discussing the question of invitations to separate states, that is, new countries to be added to the list but that now it was not a question of a new country but of giving one of the Great Powers three votes instead of one in the assembly and that he felt that was a matter which would be put before the conference and that we had all three agreed to support the Soviet request.

Marshal Stalin inquired would it not be all right if the Ukraine and White Russia signed the United Nations Declaration.
THE PRESIDENT replied that he did not think this would overcome the difficulty.

MARSHAL STALIN then said he withdrew his proposal.⁴

THE PRESIDENT expressed gratification at the Marshal’s decision.

THE PRIME MINISTER then remarked that he had had time to study yesterday’s report of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and that he could give it his approval.

THE PRESIDENT then turned to the question of the proposals which he had sent to the British and the Soviet Delegations this morning in regard to Poland.⁵ He said he had noticed they were very close to those of Mr. Molotov but would like to have his comments.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether the last point of the President’s proposal in regard to the recognition of a Government of National Unity would mean that the London Government would then disappear.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that when we recognize the new government, we would of course withdraw our recognition of the London Government.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that when we recognized the new government, what would happen then to the property and resources of the London Government. Would they remain in the possession of Arciszewski?

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he thought that the withdrawal of recognition would take care of that and, [sic.]

THE PRESIDENT said that in his opinion the property would go to the new government.

There was then declared a short recess.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the British had put in a paper on Poland⁶ but that he did not know whether it had been studied by the other Delegations. He said that with some slight amendments, if a decision in principle was reached he was prepared to accept the President’s proposals which have been under discussion.

MR. MOLOTOV said he had some observations to make on the President’s proposals. He said that their proposals made yesterday ⁷ had been based on certain realities existing in Poland. It was impossible to ignore the existence of the present Polish government and he said that the Soviet Government had felt that it would be useful to have discussions on the basis of enlarging that government with the addition of other democratic elements from within Poland and abroad. He said that the Lublin, or Warsaw, government stands at the head of the Polish people and enjoys great prestige and popu-

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⁵ Post, pp. 792–793.
⁶ Post, pp. 869–870.
⁷ Ante, p. 716.
ularity in the country. The Poles would never agree to any solution which would greatly change the Provisional Government. We might have some success if we start from the basis that the present Provisional Government should be enlarged. The people who now compose the Polish Provisional Government have been closely connected with the great events of the liberation of Poland, but Messrs. Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Witos have not been directly connected with these events. Therefore, if we wish to achieve a practical result it should be done on the basis of the enlargement of the present government, but how many and who they should be is the subject we should talk about. He said his observations apply not only to the question of a new government but also to the proposed presidential committee. It was a difficult question, admittedly, but it stemmed from the Polish people, and he said he had grave doubts as to whether it would be feasible. He said we might be creating additional difficulty through a presidential committee since there already existed a national council, Kavaya Rada, which of course could be enlarged. He was sure, however, that it was better to discuss the whole question on the basis of the existing situation. It must be borne in mind that both the National Council and Provisional Government are temporary, and he had noted in all three proposals one common point of view, namely the holding of free elections in Poland, but during the temporary period pending such elections it was extremely important to insure stable rule in Poland.

Mr. Molotov said in regard to the question of frontiers he was glad to note the complete agreement on the eastern boundary, namely the Curzon Line with slight modifications, but he also noted that on the western boundary there was no unanimity. He said that they knew that the Provisional Government stood for the western frontier as outlined in the Soviet proposals. He added that they will have to ask the Poles about this, but he was in no doubt that they would categorically support this frontier.

Mr. Molotov said with reference to negotiations in Moscow between himself, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr we are all agreed it would be desirable to have these three talk with the Poles. He said that in so far as he knew, the Provisional Government always sent three persons to speak for the Government—Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, and General Rola-Zymierski. As for the Poles from the other side, it seems to him that the President’s proposals yesterday seemed more acceptable. He said he did not exclude the possibility that some Poles from abroad could be involved, but he is not a bit sure about Mikolajczyk, especially after the autumn talks in Moscow. Yesterday the President had proposed five names. He thought it

* * *
would be a good idea to invite the three members of the Provisional Government mentioned above and two from the President's list of other Poles submitted yesterday.

The President inquired whether Mr. Molotov meant that the presidential committee or an interim government should be avoided. Mr. Molotov replied that he thought it would be better to avoid the presidential committee and to enlarge the National Council and the Provisional Government. He and Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald could discuss the question of how to enlarge the Council and Government with three representatives from the Polish Provisional Government and two persons from the President's list of other Poles. The results of these discussions could then be submitted to the three Governments. He concluded that he had only discussed the American proposals and had not touched on the Prime Minister's ideas.

The Prime Minister said that we were now at the crucial point of this great conference. He said we would be found wanting by the world should we separate recognizing different Polish governments. This would be accepted by the world as evidence of a breach between Great Britain and the United States on one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand, with lamentable consequences in the future. It was stamping this conference with a seal of failure, and nothing else we did here would overcome it. He admitted, on the other hand, that we take different views of the same basic facts. According to the information of the British Government, the Lublin, or Warsaw, government does not commend itself to the overwhelming masses of the Polish people, and it is certainly not accepted abroad as representative of the people. If the British Government brushed aside the London government and went over to the Lublin government there would be an angry outcry in Great Britain. There was, in addition, the problem of the Poles outside Poland. He reminded the conference that on the Western and Italian fronts there was a Polish army of about 150,000 men who had fought steadily and very bravely for our cause. He did not believe that this army would be reconciled to the transfer of the British Government's support from the government with which it had dealt since the beginning of the war. It would be regarded as an act of betrayal of Poland. As Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov knew, he had no special feeling for the Polish government in London, which in his opinion had been foolish at every stage, but a formal act of transfer of recognition would cause the very greatest consequences. He pointed out that the group forming the new provisional government was only about one year old.

* For a facsimile of a note opposing merely enlarging the Lublin Government, which Stettinius passed to Roosevelt at this point, see Stettinius, p. 215.
The Prime Minister made it clear that, speaking only for Great Britain, it would be said that the British Government had given away completely on the frontiers, had accepted the Soviet view and had championed it. To break altogether with the lawful government of Poland which had been recognized during all these five years of war would be an act subject to the most severe criticism in England. It would be said that we did not know what was going on in Poland—that we could not even get anyone in there to find out what was going on and that we had accepted in toto the view of the Lublin government. Great Britain would be charged with forsaking the cause of Poland and he was bound to say that the debates in Parliament would be most painful and he might add most dangerous to Allied unity. He added that all the above was on the supposition that they might find it possible to agree to Mr. Molotov’s proposal. He said if they were to give up the London government it must be evident that a new start had been made on both sides from equal terms. Before such transfer of recognition His Majesty's Government would have to be convinced that a new government, representative of the Polish people, had been created, pledged to an election on the basis of universal suffrage by secret ballot with the participation of all democratic parties and the right to put up their candidates. When such elections were held in Poland, he said Great Britain would salute the government which emerges without regard for the Polish government in London. He concluded with the statement that it is the interval before such elections that is difficult and alarming.

Mr. Molotov suggested that perhaps the talks in Moscow might give some result, but it was very difficult to discuss the Polish question without participation with the Poles.

The Prime Minister remarked it was frightfully important that agreement should be reached on the question and that we should part over a signed agreement.

The President said we were all agreed on the necessity of free elections and that the only problem was how Poland was to be governed in the interval.

Marshall Stalin said that he had heard complaints from the Prime Minister that he had no information in regard to the situation in Poland. Mr. Churchill could get this information and he did not see why Great Britain and the United States could not send their own people into Poland. He said in regard to the popularity of the Provisional Government he could assure the conference that the people running the government were popular. The three leaders, Bierut, Osobka-Morawski and Rola-Zymierski had not fled from Poland but had stayed on in Warsaw and had come from the underground. It is necessary to bear in mind the psychology of people
under occupation—their sympathies are with those who stayed and not with those who left the country. Marshal Stalin said that he did not claim that the men in the Provisional Government were geniuses—indeed, it is possible that there are cleverer people in the Polish government in London—he did not know. Perhaps the feeling of the Polish people in this respect was somewhat primitive, but it exists. What puzzles the Polish people is that a great event—the liberation of their country by the Red Army has occurred. This changes the mentality of the people. For many years the Poles had hated the Russians and with reason, since three times the Czarist government had participated in the partitioning of Poland. With the advance of the Soviet troops the liberation of Poland had changed the attitude of the Polish people toward Russia and old resentments had disappeared and good will had taken their place. He said it was his impression that the driving out of the Germans by the Red Army had been received by the Poles in the light of a great national holiday. The people had been surprised that the Polish government in London had not had any part in this great holiday. They inquire, “We of the National Council and Provisional Government participated in this holiday, but where are the London Poles?” These two circumstances lay at the base of the great popularity of the members of the Provisional Government, although they may not be great men. He said he did not think we could ignore these facts nor fail to take into account the feelings of the people. Mr. Churchill worries that we will leave here without an agreement. What therefore can we do? We have different information—the best method, therefore, would be to summon the Poles from the different camps and to learn from them. It would, of course, be better if free elections could be held right off, but up to now the war has prevented this, but the day is drawing near, however, when such elections could take place and the people could express their view in regard to the Provisional Government. He said he saw little difference between the position of de Gaulle and that of the Polish Provisional Government. Neither had been elected, and he could not say which one enjoyed the greatest degree of popularity—yet we all had dealt with de Gaulle and the Soviet Government concluded a treaty with him. Why should we be so different with regard to the Polish government, and why could we not deal with an enlarged Polish government. He added that de Gaulle had done nothing to arouse popular enthusiasm, whereas the Polish government had carried out a number of land reforms that had been most popular. The situation is not so tragic as Mr. Churchill pictured it. He felt the situation could be settled if we concentrated on the essential points. He said it would be better to deal with the reconstruction of the Provisional Government rather than to attempt
to set up a new one. He said he felt Mr. Molotov was right, and rather than a presidential committee we might agree on increasing the Provisional Government.

The President asked how long it would be, in the Marshal’s opinion, before elections could be held in Poland.

Marshall Stalin replied it might be possible in a month provided no catastrophes occurred on the front and the Germans began to beat them.

The Prime Minister said of course they would welcome free elections but would not ask for anything that would hamper military operations.

The President proposed that the matter be referred to the Foreign Ministers for study, and this was agreed to.

The Prime Minister said there was one small matter he wished to bring up before adjournment, and that was the periodic meeting of Foreign Ministers every three months.

The President said he was in favor of this idea, but he knew that Mr. Stettinius was very busy with some of the Latin American countries and he felt it would be best to say they would meet when necessary and not fix any definite period for the meetings.

The Prime Minister said he hoped that the first of these meetings could be in London, to which the President and Marshal Stalin agreed.

Marshall Stalin then said he had one small matter which he would like to bring up. He would like to know what is holding back the formation of a unified government in Yugoslavia. He would also like to know what was going on in Greece. He said he had no intention of criticizing British policy there but he would merely like to know what was going on.

The Prime Minister said that Greece would take a great deal of time to explain and he would reserve it for the next meeting. He said in regard to Yugoslavia that the King had been persuaded, or even forced, to agree to a regency. Subasic was leaving soon, if he had not left already, for Yugoslavia to appoint the regents and form the government. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Eden tells him that there are two slight amendments, which he will take up with Mr. Molotov, to the agreement reached between Subasic and Tito. He added that he had always made it plain, both privately and publicly, that if the King would not agree to a regency he would be bypassed. He felt that in regard to the two amendments, if Marshal Stalin had said two words to Tito the matter would be settled.

Marshall Stalin replied that Tito is a proud man and he now was a popular head of a regime and might resent advice.
The Prime Minister replied that he felt that Marshal Stalin could risk this.

Marshal Stalin answered that he was not afraid.

The Prime Minister said that in regard to Greece he was hopeful peace would come on the basis of amnesties except for those who committed crimes against the laws of war. He doubted that a government of all the parties could be established since they hated each other so much.

Marshal Stalin said that the Greeks had not yet become used to discussion and therefore they were cutting each others' throats.

The Prime Minister concluded he would be glad to give information on Greece. He said that recently Sir Walter Citrine and five members of the trades unions had gone to Greece and they might have their report. He said that they had had rather a rough time in Greece and they were very much obliged to Marshal Stalin for not having taken too great an interest in Greek affairs.

Marshal Stalin repeated that he had no intention of criticizing British actions there or interfering in Greece, but merely would like to know what was going on.

The conference adjourned until four p.m. tomorrow.

Hiss Collection

Hiss Notes ¹

2/8 After the noon meeting of For Secs, Jebb, Gromyko & A H met as committee to discuss Un Ns Conference procedure. A. H. explained State Dept views but said Pres. had not approved. After lunch before plenary session ERS cleared all with Pres. & A H told Gromyko & sent word to Jebb

Pres called on Eden to report for For Mns

Ed: We met to consider etc. & read his report

re place Ed. repeated his statement of this morning that next meeting of For Mns be held in Lon & that seemed to meet with a measure of approval

Ed: Reason for saying those who are members now should be invited was to prevent nations from becoming Un Ns Just to be invited Understands Am. Del. has different view

St: I have the list of states which declared war on Ger I count this no. into official members of the Ass. Among these are 10 which

¹From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.
have no dip. rels with S. U.  We will together with them build up
world security——

Pres: I think many of them will be glad to recog & est. dip. rels
with S U.  Haven’t got round to it yet.  In few is very strong Cath.
Church influence  At same time we recognize most of these who have
not excl. dip. rels with Sov Un. have sat with Sov Un at Bretton
Woods & other dip. conferences held.

St.: That’s right but on other hand is very diff. build up world sec.
with countries which don’t recog. Sov Un

Pres: Easiest way to est. complete dip. rels. is to invite them.
That involves matter of history which should be explained.  3 yrs.
ago Actg Sec State Welles told number of these states not nec. to
declare on Ger. but should break all rels.  So there are 5 or 6 of
these which expect to be invited—& are in good standing  Sec. of
State has embarrassed me further by bringing this to my attention 1
month ago.  As a result I sent a letter to the 6 pres. of these 6 reps ex-
plaining that if they wanted to be invited they should declare war on
either Japan or Ger.  Ecuador has declared war but hasn’t had
chance sign Un Ns decl.  Paraguay will soon.  Peru, Venezuela etc
(not Chile, soon)  Will be embarrassing if not invited.  In meantime
in past 4 yrs. all of these nations have helped us in waging war because
large part of raw materials for munitions of war came from them.

Result is I’m in a somewhat diff. position

St.: Not discussed today

Pres: We have phrase Associated Ns meaning nations which have
broken rels but haven’t declared war.

The list of nations which Mr Stett gave to Mr Molотов at lunch
today

St. asked about Argentine

Pres: Not an assoc. nation

St: If “associates” come in that would include Argentina.  Would
include Turkey

Pres. My idea & it would save my life would be to invite those
who have are on the list who have helped us on condition that they
declare war.

St: Before or after they declare war

Pres: Before, put a time limit, say 1st of March

St: Agreed

Church: I am glad to say these nations would be required to declare
war before they would be invited to the Conf.  Of course I feel like
Marshall St’ that some of them have played a poor part, waiting to see
who would win.  Now it’s quite safe they would like to come in  Will
have depressing effect on Ger to realize another batch has come in.
Might also have effect on other hostile belligerents to see how whole world is turning ag. them

Pres: I should like to add one name to list for sake of clarity—newest rep. in world Iceland

Church: re Eg. HMG feel special resp. On 2 occasions were willing to declare war. It was more convenient to us to have them stay formally neutral

Pres: In other words you’re in same fix I’m in

Church: Also I must say on behalf of Eg that when enemy was only 30 miles from capital Egyptian Army rendered service, guarded bridges, communs & generally was more helpful than if she had declared war & made Cairo subject to air bombardment. Feel if Eg. now feels she wanted to declare war she should have the opportunity

Iceland also rendered very val. services. At a time when the U. S. had not herself entered the war she admitted Brit & US troops, violated her neutrality in a marked fashion & guarded a life line across the Atlantic. I think those two have certainly a case provided they declare war

Is it intended any nation which declares war.

Pres: no, only the Assoc Ns

(Italy, Ireland—no)

Church: I shall mention a name which I think will cause universal satisfaction—Turkey T.made an alliance with us before the war at a very dangerous time. But when the war broke out, after it had been going on little while, T’s found their army was not equipped with any of weapons that decide modern battles. But att. has been friendly although they would not take the opportunity which was offered to us yr. ago

St. says all right if by end of Feb. It will declare war

Ger. is not yet defeated war & war hardly will terminate by end of Feb.

Pres: One other case—curious case.

Den. was invaded. Has been under Ger. domination since

Only one man claimed to represent Den. was the the Dan. Min. in Wash. He could not declare war but he disowned acts of his own govt

Would be with us 100% if they could

Church: Have they agreed to the independence of Iceland?

I do not think it is of very great importance. I think Mar & Pres are quite right in letting any one come to the party who declares war by end of month

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2 Denmark.
St. & Denmark could wait
Pres. Yes
Church: She would have a perfect right to come if she is able to speak
Pres. Amend Un Ns & also those of assoc. powers & T. who declare war by Mar 1
Church. All who declare war
Ed. Un Ns as they exist on the 1st of Mar.
Church:
Pres. Ger. or Japan
Common enemy
Mol. Would it not facilitate position of Sov. Reps if they would sign Decl. of Un Ns before 1st of Mar.
Pres. I think its easier to take the list we've got. San Marino & Andorra might sign, nations like that
Church. What is the position
St. But T is not fighting
Pres: read list of Assoc. Ns & T only if they declare war
Mol: If Uk & Byelo-R sign decl before 1st of Mar.
Pres. That had been settled in this formula. We are prepared to support them.
St. I propose to name the Reps. which would be invited: Uk & Byelo-R. To call them by name in this protocol and secondly I propose that they should sign the Decl of Un Ns before 1st of Mar.
Change the protocol
Church. Delay invitations to two states of Sov. Un till we are all met. If so many new ones are to be brought in now be confusing
St.: I have point out that's not quite logical. 3 great powers agree to seat White R & Uk. But some might say they haven't signed
Church: Two R states should be treated same as other late arrivals
St. I wouldn't like to embarrass Pres. What is his difficulty. I might withdraw my proposal
Pres: Only technical. We have been discussing admitting other people. Uk & Wh R are not other people they are here already. We & UK will support it. We change SU from 1 vote to 3 right here. Why 3, why not 4, 5, 6?
St. Withdraw his request. But names of the two republics should be in the report
Poland
TOP SECRET

The President asked Mr. Eden to read the report of the meeting of the foreign ministers for today. This was followed by a lengthy discussion with respect to the world organization. Notes on this part of the session are being written by Mr. Hiss.

President: Has Mr. Molotov had time to read the proposal I have made with regard to Poland?

Stalin: I have received it.

President: Just to make it clear let me read it. (President reads the proposal. Copy attached.)

Stalin: Does this mean that you would withdraw recognition from the London government?

President: Yes.

Prime Minister: (Explains that with the recognition of a new interim government recognition would be transferred from the London government to that regime.)

Stalin: What about the property of the London government?

President: That automatically would go to the new government.

Prime Minister: I had prepared an alternate suggestion but since discussion has already begun on the President's proposal I would rather continue on that.

Molotov: I should like to make a few remarks on the proposal of the President and the Prime Minister. Our proposal of yesterday came from a concrete foundation. We think it would be useful to have discussions on the Polish question on the basis of the present government being extended. We cannot ignore that fact—that the present government exists at Warsaw. It is now at the head of the Polish people and has great authority. It has been enthusiastically [received] by the Polish people. If we put forward a proposal to ignore this fact we might be placed in a position where the Poles themselves could not agree. If we start on the basis that the present government could be enlarged, the basis of probable success is more secure. Those now in the provisional government are closely connected with great national events taking place in Poland. This is not true of Mikołajczyk, Grabski, Romer and Witos. Those names are not linked with decisive events in Poland. If we wish to reach a practical end we must take as the basis that the present government be enlarged. How many and who should be taken in is the question to be discussed by us. There may be differences but in any event it depends

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1 For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

2 Not attached, but see post, pp. 792–793.
upon the Poles now working in liberated Poland. The President proposes a new thought, namely agreement not only on the government but on a presidential commission. I have some doubts on that. I am afraid instead of one we will then have two difficult problems—that of the government and that of the presidential committee. This will increase our difficulties not decrease them. There is a national council, a representative body of Poland which could also be enlarged. We could discuss how this could be done. It would be better to talk on the basis of the existing situation and then how to improve it. Therefore, my conclusions are how to enlarge and by what basis the national council. The national council and government are temporary and provisional. All three proposals have one end in view, namely to secure as soon as possible free elections. That is the best way to build up stable rule in Poland which we all consider of fundamental importance. On the frontier question with regard to the east, we are in complete agreement. On the west there is no unanimous feeling. But I know that the Poles and the Polish government are definitely in favor of a frontier on the Neisse River. Of course we can ask them but I have not the slightest doubt of their desire. Also about holding negotiations in Moscow between myself, Harriman and Clark Kerr, I think there is full agreement.

The Poles usually select three people, Bierut, Osobka-Morawski and General Yelinski [Rola-Żymierski?]. Usually all three take part. Then there are those to be invited from the other side whom the President proposed yesterday. With some people the provisional government would not like to talk at all, for instance Mikołajczyk. Since his visit to Moscow relations have greatly deteriorated. The President proposed to invite two of the five mentioned. I agree that two of the five should be invited. If three of the provisional government, one I have mentioned and two of those mentioned in the President’s letter be invited, negotiations could be started. That is my proposal.

PRESIDENT: I should like to keep the presidential committee and then there is the question of election.

MOLOTOV: It would be better to avoid the presidential committee and to enlarge the national council. I think the two ambassadors and I could discuss how to enlarge the council. Any proposals to be finally adopted by the committee of three would of course be submitted to the three governments. My remarks have been addressed to the American proposal since the Prime Minister agreed to this.

PRIME MINISTER: Of course we are at the crucial point of this great conference. This is the question for which the world is waiting. If we accept that each recognize separate governments this will be interpreted all over the world as a sign of cleavage between the Soviet
government on the one hand and the U. S. and British governments on the other. The consequences would be most lamentable in the world and would stamp the conference as a failure. On the other hand, I take a different view about the basic facts on some of them. According to our information, the present Lublin, now Warsaw, government does not commend itself to the vast majority of the Polish people. We feel that it is not accepted abroad as representative. If we were to brush away the London government and lend all our weight to the Lublin government there would be a world outcry. As far as we can see, the Poles outside Poland would make a united protest. We have an army of 150 thousand Poles who are fighting bravely. That army would not be reconciled to Lublin. It would regard our action in transferring recognition as a betrayal. As Molotov and the Marshal know, I do not agree with the London government's action. They have been very foolish. But the formal act of transfer of recognition to a new government would cause the very gravest criticism. It would be said that the British government had given away completely on the eastern frontier and had accepted the Soviet view. It would be said that we have broken altogether with the lawful government of Poland which we have recognized during the five years of war. It would be said that we have no knowledge of conditions in Poland. We cannot enter the country and must accept the statements of the Lublin government. Therefore, it would be charged in London that we are forsaking the cause of Poland. Debates would follow in Parliament which would be most painful and embarrassing to unity of the allies if we were to agree. The proposals of Mr. Molotov do not go nearly far enough. If we give up the Poles in London it should be for a new start on both sides, more or less on equal terms. Before His Majesty's Government could leave its present position on continuing recognition of the London Government we would have to be satisfied that the new government was fairly representative of the Polish nation. I agree that this can be only a view because we do not know the facts. Our doubts would be removed by elections with full secret ballot and free candidacies to be held in Poland. But it is the transfer before then which is causing so much anxiety to us. That is all I have to say.

Molotov: Perhaps the discussions in Moscow will have a useful result. It is difficult to consider the Polish question without the presence of Poles.

Prime Minister: It is frightfully important that this conference separate on a note of agreement. We must struggle precisely for that.

President: From another hemisphere I should like to say that we are agreed on free elections. The only problem is how to govern in the meantime for a relatively few months.
STALIN: The Prime Minister complains that he has no real information and no means to receive it.

PRIME MINISTER: Certain information but—

STALIN: It does not coincide with ours. I think Great Britain and the United States can have their own sources of information there whenever they like. What is the basis of the popularity of the provisional government? I can assure you that these people are really very popular. Bierut and Osobka-Morawski and General Rola-Zymierski—They are the people who did not leave Poland. They have come from the underground. We should bear in mind the peculiar mentality of those who live under occupation. The Polish people consider these three as those who stayed. It may be that Arczieczoski has in his government clever people but they are not liked in Poland because during the time of stress they did not seek the underground. Perhaps this attitude is a little primitive but it must be taken into consideration. What troubles the Polish people? It is a great consolation that their country has been liberated by the Red Army. This has completely changed their psychology. The Poles for many years have not liked Russia because Russia took part in three partitions of Poland. But the advance of the Soviet Army and the liberation of Poland from Hitler has completely changed that. The old resentment has completely disappeared. Now there is good will toward Russia. It is natural that the Polish people are delighted to see the Germans flee their country and to feel themselves liberated. My impression is that the Polish people consider this a great historic holiday. The population is surprised, even astounded, that the people of the London government do not take any part in this liberation. Members of the provisional government they see there, but where are the London Poles? These two circumstances produce the fact that the members of the Warsaw government, though they may not be great men, enjoy great popularity. Cannot we take account of this fact? We cannot ignore it—the feelings of the Polish people. You are afraid also that we may separate before agreement. We have different information and have reached different conclusions. Perhaps to begin with we should call the Poles of the two different camps to hear them and learn from them. We are agreed to the fact that the Polish government must be democratically elected. It is much better to have a government based on free elections. But until now the war has prevented elections. The day for them is near but until then we must deal with the provisional government. It is like that of de Gaulle who is also not elected. Who is more popular, de Gaulle or Bierut? We have considered it possible to deal with de Gaulle and make treaties with him. Why not deal with an enlarged Polish provisional government? We cannot demand more of Poland
than of France. So far the French government has not carried out any reforms to create enthusiasm. The Polish government has carried out a great reform which gives it great popularity. If we approve this government without prejudice we can find a solution. We will not attach too much importance to secondary matters and concentrate on the primary ones. It is better to reconstruct than to create a new government. Molotov is right. We could not talk about a presidential committee without Poles. Perhaps they would agree. But as a result of their *amour propre* and feelings, the prestige of the provisional government is greatly increased. If we do not talk to them they would accuse us of being occupiers and not liberators.

**President:** How long before elections could be held?

**Stalin:** In about one month unless there is a catastrophe on the front and the Germans defeat us. (smiling) I do not think this will happen.

**Prime Minister:** Free elections would of course settle the worries of the British government at least. That would supersede at a stroke all questions of legality. Of course, we must not ask anything that would impair military operations. But if it is possible to learn the opinion of the population in Poland in one or even two months no one could object.

**President:** That is why it is worth pursuing the subject. I move that we adjourn our talks until tomorrow. I suggest that meanwhile the matter be referred to the three foreign secretaries. They are very effective.

**Molotov:** The other two will outvote me. (laughing)

**Prime Minister:** I have one bit of business before we separate. It would be a great advantage if we could set up permanent measures for consultation of the foreign secretaries. I think they should meet every three or four months to clear up difficulties between us.

**President:** I think the idea is O. K. but my foreign secretary has all South America to take care of too. I think we should make it as often as necessary rather than a specific period.

**Prime Minister:** I should also like to suggest that the first meeting be held in London. (This was agreed to)

**Stalin:** I have two small questions to raise. First the fact that the formation of the new united government in Yugoslavia has been delayed. I should like to know why. Also there are all sorts of rumors with regard to Greece. I have no criticism to make but I should like to know what is going on.

**Prime Minister:** It would take too long to talk about Greece now. I could talk about it for hours. As for Yugoslavia the King has been persuaded, indeed forced, to sign agreement with regard to the regency. Subasic and the other members of the government leave for
Belgrade any day now. They are merely held up by weather delays. My policy has never varied as I have stated in the House. If the King makes trouble we must take care of it. But he has signed I understand the regency act and Subasic is going out to Belgrade immediately. I am hopeful that peace will come on the basis of amnesty but they hate each other so much that they cannot keep their hands off each other in Yugoslavia.

STALIN: (Smiling) They are not yet accustomed to discussions. Instead they cut each others throats. I notice that Tito also seems to be very popular in the country.

PRIME MINISTER: I invited Sir Walter Citrine to go out with five trade unionists but I have not yet seen their report. I believe that he had a rather rough time. I thank the Marshal for his help.

STALIN: On Greece I only wanted to know for information. We have no intention of intervening there in any way.

The meeting adjourned.

Hopkins Papers

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President

[YALTA, February 8, 1945.] 1

MR. PRESIDENT:—The Joint Chiefs of Staff told Welles 2 that it would be difficult for us to defend their coasts against Japan. That is Welles excuse.

HARRY

1 This note is undated but is assumed to have been passed to the President at the plenary session on February 8 in connection with the President's reference to Welles and the reasons why certain South American states had not declared war. See ante, p. 773.

2 The Department of Defense states that there is no evidence in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to substantiate this statement.

His Collection

United States Delegation Memorandum on the Foreign Ministers' Report to the Fifth Plenary Meeting 1

The report by the Foreign Secretaries was accepted, subject to paragraph 2 (b) being amended to read as follows—“The United Nations as they exist on the 8th February, 1945, and such of the Associated Nations* as have declared war on the common enemy by

1 This is a ribbon copy, undated and uncaptioned. Authorship not indicated. On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote that he thought the memorandum had been drafted by Hiss (640.0029/8-1354).

* The term “Associated Nation” in this connection means the eight Associated Nations and Turkey which shall be regarded as an Associated Nation for the purpose. [Footnote in the original.]
1st March, 1945, would be the only States invited to the conference on World Organization. At that stage the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e. the Ukraine and White Russia.”

Hiss Collection

United States Proposal on Poland, February 8, 1945

TOP SECRET

The proposals submitted by Mr. Molotov in regard to the Polish question in reply to the President’s letter to Marshal Stalin dated February 6, 1945, have been given careful study.

In regard to the frontier question, no objection is perceived to point One of the Soviet proposals, namely, that the eastern boundary of Poland should be the Curzon line with modifications in favor of Poland in some areas of from five to eight kilometers.

In regard to point Two, while agreeing that compensation should be given to Poland at the expense of Germany, including that portion of East Prussia south of the Koenigsberg line, Upper Silesia, and up to the line of the Oder, there would appear to be little justification to the extension of the western boundary of Poland up to the Western Neisse River.

In regard to the proposals of the Soviet Government concerning the future Government of Poland, it is proposed that Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr be authorized on behalf of the three Governments to invite to Moscow Mr. Bierut, Mr. Osubka-Morawski, Bishop Sapieha, Mr. Vicente Witos, Mr. Mikolajczyk and Mr. Grabski to form a Polish Government of National Unity along the following lines:

1. There will be formed a Presidential Committee of three, possibly consisting of Mr. Bierut, Mr. Grabski and Bishop Sapieha, to represent the Presidential office of the Polish Republic.
2. This Presidential Committee will undertake the formation of a government consisting of representative leaders from the present Polish provisional government in Warsaw; from other democratic

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1 Carbon copy, endorsed “2/8 Presented by President.” See ante, p. 776. The copy of this paper in the Bohlen Collection has the entire text in quotation marks under the following heading: “Counter proposal circulated by the United States Delegation to the Soviet and British Delegations of February 8, 1945.” The copies in the Matthews Files and the UNA Files carry no heading or quotation marks.

The Hiss Collection contains at this point, along with the other documents herein cited to that Collection for February 8, the carbon copy of the undated paper entitled “Concrete Proposals on the Polish Question” which is printed under Malta Conference, ante, pp. 510–511.
elements inside Poland, and from Polish democratic leaders abroad.
3. This interim government, when formed, will pledge itself to the
holding of free elections in Poland as soon as conditions permit for a
constituent assembly to establish a new Polish constitution under
which a permanent Government would be elected.
4. When a Polish Government of National Unity is formed, the
three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition as the
Provisional Government of Poland.

Hiss Collection

United States Delegation Memorandum

[YALTA,] February 8, 1945.

Points To Take Up With the President

1. Location of Conference.
   (See attached papers)

2. Consultation of France before Invitations are Issued.
   (a) France is listed in the proposals as one of the five permanent
   members "in due course."
   At Dumbarton Oaks, "in due course" was understood to mean
   recognition—which has now occurred.
   (b) We need France's influence among the smaller powers in
   "selling" the Organization.
   (c) To save time, the United States can consult France on behalf
   of Britain and Russia.

3. Consultation of China before Invitations are Issued.
   (a) China is a full fledged Dumbarton Oaks participant and must be
   one of the sponsoring powers.
   (b) We can consult China on behalf of Britain and Russia.

4. Mr. Stimson is Opposed to Territorial Trusteeships.
   (a) Joint Chiefs have agreed to setting up the machinery of
   Territorial Trusteeships—without discussion of specific territories.
   (b) United States public opinion has criticized Dumbarton Oaks
   for leaving out Territorial Trusteeships.
   (c) New organization can't supersede League of Nations without
   disposing of Mandates System.
   (d) Chinese, Russians, Latin Americans all want Territorial
   Trusteeships.
   The British will agree.
   We can't be the one objecting power.

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1 Carbon copy; authorship not indicated. This was prepared presumably by
Hiss for Stettinius.
2 Not found.
United States Delegation Memorandum

[Yalta,] February 8, 1945.

Items Still Remaining Open Before Conference Can Be Called

At Malta the British and we agreed that France should be a fifth sponsoring power and should be included along with China as one of the powers on whose behalf invitations will be issued.


At Malta we and the British agreed that the United States should consult France and China on behalf of Britain and Russia.

Mr. Grew is all prepared to initiate this consultation promptly in Washington as soon as he gets a flash.

3. Form of Invitation.

The invitations could most conveniently be issued by the United States on behalf of itself and the other four sponsoring powers. (We have a draft invitation.)


We should get agreement that the subjects of international trustee- ships and dependent areas will be discussed at the United Nations Conference, and that provisions on these subject will be incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations.

(We should arrange for prompt interchange of papers on these subjects after the Crimean Conference in order to try to get agreed proposals drafted before the United Nations Conference.)


We have a drafted communiqué. (Wilder Foote is preparing an alternative draft for your consideration.)

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Defense Files: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)

TOP SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ARGONAUT 92. Crypto-War for Acting Secretary of State only from Secretary Stettinius. Topsec.

1. For your urgent information only the five Latin American associated nations which have not yet declared war should be urged
Note by the Secretary of State Regarding the Composition of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco

Delegation approved by FDR

Hull—Same at large as senior Adv.
S—Chairman—His desire

State—Conably—

Home—Bloom—Eaton—

Army—Rep. at large (to get out Navy temporarily)
Lask of Ohio—Alternate for Hull
Sibley—1/2 of check on foreign trade as satisfactory—
No doubt to farm—use them as advisors—

1 The original, which is in pencil, is apparently in the handwriting of Stettinius. With regard to the words “Lash of Ohio” in this paper, Byrnes wrote on July 27, 1955: “I recall that President Roosevelt discussed with me the list of delegates for the San Francisco Conference. We discussed Governor Lausche, of Ohio. Therefore, I assume the ‘Lash of Ohio’ mentioned in Stettinius’ memorandum has reference to Governor Lausche.” (310.1/7-2755.)
to do so and adhere to the United Nations declaration with the greatest promptness. It is absolutely essential that this be accomplished by the end of this month if their action is to be effective in their interests. Please limit knowledge of the existence of this message to yourself, Dunn, Rockefeller, Pasvolsky and Raynor.

2. I rely upon you to renew the Department’s recommendations to these countries without disclosing the cause for such renewal.

TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, FEBRUARY 8, 1945, 9 P.M., YUSUPOV PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Secretary Stettinius
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Flynn
Mrs. Boettiger
Miss Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal
Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
General Ismay
Field Marshal Alexander
Mrs. Oliver

SOVIET UNION
Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
General of the Army
Antonov
Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Beriya
Mr. Maisky
Marshal of Aviation
Khudyakov
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gronyko
Mr. Pavlov

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Bohlen Minutes

TOP SECRET

Subject: General Conversation.

The atmosphere of the dinner was most cordial, and forty-five toasts in all were drunk. Marshal Stalin was in an excellent humor and even in high spirits. Most of the toasts were routine—to the armed forces of the representative countries and the military leaders and the continuing friendship of the three great powers.

MARSHAL STALIN proposed a toast to the health of the Prime Minister, who he characterized as the bravest governmental figure in the world. He said that due in large measure to Mr. Churchill’s courage and staunchness, England, when she stood alone, had divided the might of Hitlerite Germany at a time when the rest of Europe was falling flat on its face before Hitler. He said that Great Britain, under Mr. Churchill’s leadership, had carried on the fight alone irrespective of existing or potential allies. The Marshal concluded

1 Marshal Stalin acted as host.
that he knew of few examples in history where the courage of one man had been so important to the future history of the world. He drank a toast to Mr. Churchill, his fighting friend and a brave man.

The Prime Minister, in his reply, toasted Marshal Stalin as the mighty leader of a mighty country, which had taken the full shock of the German war machine, had broken its back and had driven the tyrants from her soil. He said he knew that in peace no less than in war Marshal Stalin would continue to lead his people from success to success.

Marshal Stalin then proposed the health of the President of the United States. He said that he and Mr. Churchill in their respective countries had had relatively simple decisions. They had been fighting for their very existence against Hitlerite Germany but there was a third man whose country had not been seriously threatened with invasion, but who had had perhaps a broader conception of national interest and even though his country was not directly imperilled had been the chief forger of the instruments which had lead to the mobilization of the world against Hitler. He mentioned in this connection Lend-Lease as one of the President’s most remarkable and vital achievements in the formation of the Anti-Hitler combination and in keeping the Allies in the field against Hitler.

The President, in reply to this toast, said he felt the atmosphere at this dinner was as that of a family, and it was in those words that he liked to characterize the relations that existed between our three countries. He said that great changes had occurred in the world during the last three years, and even greater changes were to come. He said that each of the leaders represented here were working in their own way for the interests of their people. He said that fifty years ago there were vast areas of the world where people had little opportunity and no hope, but much had been accomplished, although there were still great areas where people had little opportunity and little hope, and their objectives here were to give to every man, woman and child on this earth the possibility of security and wellbeing.

In a subsequent toast to the alliance between the three great powers, Marshal Stalin remarked that it was not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there was a joint aim to defeat the common enemy which was clear to everyone. He said the difficult task came after the war when diverse interests tended to divide the allies. He said he was confident that the present alliance would meet this test also and that it was our duty to see that it would, and that our relations in peacetime should be as strong as they had been in war.

The Prime Minister then said he felt we were all standing on the crest of a hill with the glories of future possibilities stretching before us. He said that in the modern world the function of leadership was
to lead the people out from the forests into the broad sunlit plains of peace and happiness. He felt this prize was nearer our grasp than anytime before in history and it would be a tragedy for which history would never forgive us if we let this prize slip from our grasp through inertia or carelessness.

Justice Byrnes proposed a toast to the common man all over the world. He said there had been many toasts to leaders and officials and while we all shared these sentiments we should never forget the common man or woman who lives on this earth.

Miss Harriman, replying for the three ladies present, then proposed a toast to those who had worked so hard in the Crimea for our comfort, and having seen the destruction wrought by the Germans here she had fully realized what had been accomplished.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1945

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 9, 1945, 11 A.M., LIVADIA PALACE

Present

**United States**

Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kufer
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Hull
Major General Deane
Captain McDill
Commander Clark

**United Kingdom**

Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Wilson
General Ismay
Admiral Somerville

**Secretariat**

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

**TOP SECRET**

1. **APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 187TH MEETING OF C. C. S.**

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 187th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

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1 C. C. S. 188th Meeting.
2. Draft Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (C. C. S. 776/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered those paragraphs of the draft final report which had been added since they had approved C. C. S. 776/1.

Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in Appendix "A" of C. C. S. 776/2. He pointed out that in paragraph 4 c. of the directive it was stated that, "The nomination of ground formations to be withdrawn and the arrangements for their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction." In order to avoid any possible delay in the movement of these forces he suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should send an instruction to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean repeated to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force in the following sense:

"Reference paragraph 4 c. of the directive issued to you . . . The move of two Canadian and three British divisions should proceed under plans to be agreed between yourself and SCAEF, without awaiting any further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

General Marshall said that this proposal was acceptable.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

a. Approved the text of the report to the President and Prime Minister on the Argonaut Conference (C. C. S. 776/2).

b. Approved the dispatch of the . . . [instruction] proposed by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke. . . .

3. Liaison with the Soviet High Command with Regard to Strategic Bombing in Eastern Germany (C. C. S. 778, C. C. S. 186th Mtg., Item 7, Two Tripartite Military Meetings)

Sir Charles Portal referred to the discussions which had been taking place between himself and General Kuter and Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov. At the meeting a draft agreement had been drawn up and agreed and submitted to the three High Commands. It was acceptable to the British and, he understood, to the United States Chiefs of Staff. However, on the previous evening identical letters had been received by General Kuter and himself from Marshal Khudyakov setting out a considerably revised draft agreement. This was unacceptable to himself and to General Kuter.

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2 Following acceptance of this paper by the President and the Prime Minister at their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff later on February 9, 1945, the report was recirculated as C. C. S. 776/3, which is printed post, pp. 827–833.

3 The directive embodied in Appendix "A" of the final C. C. S. report (see post, pp. 832–833).

4 See ante, pp. 637, 640–641.

5 Not printed.
GENERAL KUTER said he had redrafted the Russian proposals in such a way as to make them acceptable to the U. S. and British; he proposed putting this new draft 6 to the Russians. If this were not acceptable to the Russians, it would probably be wisest to inform them that we planned to continue with the previous arrangements.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained the main difference between the Russian proposals and the draft which had been agreed at the meeting of the Heads of Air Staffs. In the original draft the Allied air forces could bomb a target to the east of the line, provided 24 hours' notice was given to the Soviet High Command and no objection was raised. In the Russian proposal, however, it was necessary to obtain agreement for any Allied bombing east of the line 24 hours before the attack was to take place. It had been his understanding in conversations with Marshal Khudyakov, that the Russian Staff was more interested in preventing incidents between Allied and Soviet aircraft than they were in protecting their ground forces.

GENERAL KUTER pointed out that there was one further important change in the Russian proposals. The Soviet Staff had now proposed that a rigid line should exist which would be moved from time to time by the Soviet Staff whereas in the original agreement the bomb-line was to move forward automatically at a given distance from the Russian front line. An example of the difficulties which would arise under Marshal Khudyakov's proposals had recently occurred. Marshal Tito had asked that the town of Brod be bombed on a certain day and a request for permission to do so had been made by General Deane in Moscow. General Deane had written letters to the Staff on this subject four consecutive days without receiving any reply and in fact no answer had yet been received. In his view the present Russian proposal was an entirely unworkable procedure.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the best method of handling further action with regard to the Russian proposals.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal and General Kuter should each reply separately to Marshal of the Soviet Air Force Khudyakov, making it clear that the revised agreement proposed by the Soviet High Command differed substantially from that which it was thought had been agreed between the Heads of the three Air Forces on 6 February; that these differences made acceptance of the revised agreement impracticable; and that the British/United States High Command therefore intended to continue with the arrangements in force prior to the Crimean Conference.

6 Not printed.
4. Concluding Remarks

Admiral Leahy said he would like to express on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the cooperation and assistance received from the British Chiefs of Staff during the present conference. He felt that progress had been made on the general plans of the war as a whole, and that much had been accomplished.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he would like to reciprocate on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff the feelings expressed by Admiral Leahy. He was convinced that great progress had been made during the present conference.

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MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 9, 1945, NOON, LIVADIA PALACE

Present

**United States**
- Secretary Stettinius
- Mr. Harriman
- Mr. Matthews
- Mr. Hiss
- Mr. Bohlen
- Mr. Page

**United Kingdom**
- Foreign Secretary Eden
- Sir Alexander Cadogan
- Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
- Mr. Jebb
- Mr. Dixon
- Major Theakstone

**Soviet Union**
- Foreign Commissar Molotov
- Mr. Vyshinsky
- Mr. Maisky
- Mr. Gusev
- Mr. Gromyko
- Mr. Pavlov

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Page Minutes

**Subject:** 1. Points Still Before the Foreign Ministers.
   (a) Dumbarton Oaks matters.
   (b) Report by Sub-Committee on Form of Invitations and other Details of Arrangements for United Nations Conference.
   (c) Reparations.
   (d) Poland.
   (e) Iran.
   (f) Questions Relating to the Yugoslav Frontiers.

2. The Polish Question.
3. Reparations.
5. Iran.
1. Points still before the Foreign Secretaries.

Mr. Stettinius, who presided, stated that he thought it might be helpful to have a general review of the unfinished items. He stated these were as follows: 1

(a) The Report of the February 8 Meeting on Dumbarton Oaks Matters. This report was modified in principle by general agreement at yesterday’s plenary session.

(b) Report by the Sub-Committee on the Form of Invitations and Other Details of Arrangements for the United Nations Conference.

(c) Reparations.

The American Delegation desired to submit a paper on this matter today. 2

(d) Poland.

The plenary session yesterday referred the Polish question to the Foreign Secretaries.

(e) Iran.

(f) Questions Relating to the Yugoslav Frontiers.

After a brief discussion it was decided to touch upon the Polish question first.

2. The Polish Question.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he would like briefly to comment upon one important point which had not been previously raised. There had been quite a struggle in the United States on American participation in the World Organization. From the standpoint of psychology and public opinion the Polish situation was of great importance at this time to the United States. He hoped with all his heart that the Polish question could be settled before the Crimea Conference broke up.

Mr. Stettinius then read the following statement: 3

"After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov’s statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.

I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative ‘Provisional Polish Government’ and we speak of the formation of a ‘Government of National Unity.’ All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.

1 The memorandum from which Stettinius spoke at this point is printed post, pp. 814–815.

2 See post, pp. 808, 816.

3 Post, pp. 815–816.
"The following formula might therefore be considered:

"That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed ‘The Provisional Government of National Unity’; Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This ‘Government of National Unity’ would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.

"When a ‘Provisional Government of National Unity’ is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to obtain a copy of the text of the statement in the Russian language, as he did not feel prepared to reply to the oral statement.

Mr. Eden said that he had some preliminary remarks on Mr. Stettinius’ proposal. He must tell his colleagues frankly of his difficulties in this matter. Many people thought that the Poles had been harshly treated by the British readiness to acquiesce in a frontier on the Curzon Line. He himself had been troubled for some time because, quite apart from the merits of the case, it might become a cause of difficulty between the Soviet Government and the British.

As regards the Lublin Provisional Government, it was possible that he might be quite wrong but he thought it was a fact that hardly anyone in Great Britain believed that the Lublin Government was representative of Poland. He should have thought that that view was widely held in the rest of Europe and in the United States of America. It was for that reason that the document 4 which he had put forward the previous day had avoided all mention of adding to the Lublin Government and had stressed that a new start was necessary.

If agreement were reached here, this would involve a transfer of recognition from the London Government to the new Government. The British Government should have to abandon recognition of the London Government and such abandonment would be much easier for it if it were not made in favor of the existing Lublin Government but in favor of a new Government.

The British Government had considerable Polish forces fighting with it—about 150,000 at present—and these forces would increase as

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4 Post, pp. 869–870.
more Poles were liberated or escaped from Switzerland. It naturally
desired very much to carry them along in any settlement. The task
would be easier if a fresh start were made.

He had one other comment which concerned a personality. It had
been said that there was considerable opposition to Mr. Mikolajczyk
in the Lublin Government. He was not convinced of that. But in
any case the presence of Mikolajczyk in a Polish Government would
do more than anything else to add to the authority of that Govern-
ment, and to convince the British people of its representative
character.

Mr. Molotov stated that while the American document was being
translated he wished to make some comments. Although he could
not, of course, go farther than what Marshal Stalin had said yesterday,
he recalled that the President had stated that the Polish situation was
temporary and could not last for a long time. In the Russian opinion
the most important question was the holding as soon as practical of
general elections in Poland. These elections would give a basis for
a permanent Government and do away with all the difficulties that
were facing the Allies at the present time. Marshal Stalin had
referred to the provisional period as lasting perhaps one month,
whereas the Prime Minister had mentioned two. In any event, it
would be a short interval. However, at the present time it was not
only a question of Poland but also the rear of the Red Army. Even
for a short period, it was essential to the Soviet Union, the United
States and the United Kingdom to take this military situation into
consideration. If there were any obstacles in the rear of the Red
Army an impossible situation would arise. That was why Mr.
Molotov had suggested yesterday that the reorganization of the
Polish Government should be on the basis of the present Lublin
Government with democratic elements from within and without the
country added to it.

With respect to Mikolajczyk, Mr. Molotov stated that it might
be a mistake to say that he was unacceptable. The Poles themselves
must decide this. Conversations must be held with the Poles in and
out of Poland. Perhaps the Mikolajczyk question was not as acute
as it appeared. However, it could not be cleared up in the Crimea
without consulting the Poles. Furthermore, reorganization of the
Polish Government could not be undertaken without speaking to the
Poles. The Moscow Commission made up of the British and American
Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov would have serious tasks to perform.
They should discuss the entire question with the Poles and make
clear to them the basis reached in the Crimea on the Polish question.

Mr. Eden said he entirely agreed with Mr. Molotov in respect to
his remarks on the importance of the Polish elections. However, he
felt sure that British opinion would agree that if the elections were controlled by the Lublin Government they would not be free elections or represent the will of the Polish people.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he supported Mr. Eden’s views in full in this respect.

After a brief interruption, Mr. Molotov, on reading a translation of the American proposal, stated that he would be unable to give a final answer to the new American considerations until he had consulted Marshal Stalin. He hoped to be able to do this by four o’clock. However, at the present time, he would like to make a few preliminary comments.

Firstly, it would be inadvisable to place too much emphasis on the formula of the question of the Polish Government before consulting the Poles themselves. He still believed that the new Polish Government should be created on the basis of the Lublin Government. If the three Foreign Ministers agreed to this in principle, it would not be difficult to find a formula.

Secondly, it might be better to leave out reference to the Allied Ambassadors in Warsaw since this reference would undoubtedly be offensive to the Poles as it would indicate that they, the Poles, were under the control of foreign diplomatic representatives. The Ambassadors would, of course, see and report as they desired. In the last analysis the question of a formula was not important—the question of an agreement on the fundamental issues was more so.

Mr. Eden stated that the three Allied Governments considered that a new situation would be created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This would call for the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government which could be more broadly representative than was possible before the liberation of Poland. This Government should be comprised of members of the Lublin Government and other democratic leaders in Poland and abroad.

Mr. Eden felt that this Government should be called the Provisional Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov continued to stress the advisability of forming the new Government on the basis of the Lublin Government. Otherwise an unstable situation would be established in the rear of the Red Army. This Government would include other representatives from Poland and from without the country.

Mr. Stettinius maintained that it would be preferable to start with an entirely new Government and stated that unless the Foreign Ministers could get away from the words “existing Polish Government”, no agreement could be reached on this question. He suggested that Mr. Molotov give consideration to a formula which would state
that the Polish Government should be based upon the old and also on the democratic leaders which will be brought in.

Mr. Molotov maintained that it was very difficult to deal with the Poles and that a serious situation would arise if a period should be created in which there were no Government in Poland. The authority of the present Lublin Government would be undermined. He maintained that if the American or British proposals were adopted everything would be standing in the air and a period of instability would be created in Poland.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the present Polish Government would continue until the new Government was formed.

Mr. Molotov maintained that the Poles would know that negotiations were proceeding on a change in government and that the present government would not endure. This would create a situation which might well cause difficulties for the Red Army.

Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Eden’s formula avoided this situation.

Mr. Molotov, however, adhered to his former position of insisting that the new Polish Government be formed on the basis of the Lublin Government. He maintained that the matter would have to be discussed with the Poles themselves before any decision could be reached.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to Mr. Molotov’s reactions with respect to the name of the new Polish Government.

Mr. Molotov replied that this could be taken up at a later date.

Mr. Stettinius stated that under present circumstances it would probably be best to report to the plenary session that the Foreign Ministers had discussed at length the Polish Government question on the basis of the memorandum submitted by the American Delegation and that although they had not yet reached an agreement on the matter they had decided to continue discussions at a later date.

Mr. Harriman asked Mr. Molotov to consider a redraft of the American formula which would contain the words “based on the old and also on other democratic elements from outside and inside Poland.”

Mr. Molotov’s reaction to this suggestion was negative. He appeared to prefer the wording “based on the old government and with the calling in of representatives ...”

3. Reparations.

Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Molotov had presented to him through Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Maisky a document on the principles of exacting reparations payments from Germany. He wished now

5 Points appear in the original.
to present some counter proposals which were fundamentally based on the Soviet principles. He then read the following statement:

“1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

“2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labor by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

“(a) Removal in a single payment in [after] the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investment abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

“These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

“(b) Annual deliveries of commodities during ten years after the end of the war.

“3. The total of German reparations in the form of removal from her national wealth as well as in the form of annual deliveries of commodities after the end of the war shall be the first subject of study by the Moscow Commission. In this study the Commission will take into consideration the effect of whatever common steps ought to be taken for the elimination or reduction of output of various important German industries, from the standpoint of the total decentralization of Germany. The Commission should take into consideration in its initial studies the Soviet Government’s suggested total of twenty billion dollars for all forms of reparation.”

Mr. Maisky pointed out that Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the American proposals were acceptable. However paragraph 3 should be more fully clarified. In order to do so he suggested that the Moscow Commission accept the total of $20,000,000,000 “as a basis” for its studies. The final figures arrived at by the Commission might be a little more or less than $20,000,000,000; however, the Soviet Delegation urged that this figure be accepted as the basis.

Mr. Eden stated that the Prime Minister was strongly against stating a figure in the basic principles, even as a basis.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation was thinking only of the Soviet Union. Mr. Maisky’s Commission had done good work—it had only one defect, that of minimalism.

Mr. Stettinius urged that the question of setting a figure be left to the Commission. He continued that he of course could not commit the United States but that he felt that Mr. Maisky’s figure was reasonable.

* See also post, p. 816.
Mr. Molotov inquired whether it would be agreeable to mention only the reparations, in the amount of ten billion dollars, which would go to the Soviet Union.

As a counter-proposal Mr. Stettinius suggested that it merely be stated that 50% of the total sum of reparations collected which would be not specified would go to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Molotov stated that he did not object to this suggestion; however, the exact percentage might be a little more or less than 50% of the amount collected. He again stressed the importance of including a figure in the statement.

Mr. Eden said that his Government well understood the suffering and need of the Soviet Government and would not be niggardly in the apportionment of reparations. However, he would like the Commission to do its work and ascertain the total amount of German reparations.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation was not endeavoring to supersede the work of the Commission but only to give it guidance.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to what price levels the Soviet Government had in mind.¹

Mr. Molotov replied that reparations should be based on 1938 prices since destruction had been in pre-war values.

Mr. Stettinius inquired whether the Soviet Government also had in mind additions of 15% to 20%.

Mr. Molotov said that this was likely.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to the effect of the dismemberment of Germany on payment of reparations.

Mr.Maisky replied that it would not have any effect on the removal from the national wealth of Germany of German equipment located inside and outside of the country at the termination of the war. It might affect annual payments in the post-war years. However, the Soviet Government had taken this into consideration in drawing up its report.

After some discussion the Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Eden stated that he would be obliged to await instructions from his Government.

¹ See post, p. 816.

Mr. Stettinius presented copies of the draft invitation (see attached)\(^8\) to the Dumbarton Oaks [United Nations] Conference and stated that it was his understanding that the United States would consult with China and France before the invitations were issued on the Dumbarton Oaks matters which had been discussed in the Crimea.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed to this.

It was pointed out that some differences existed in the invitation submitted at the meeting and a former draft.\(^9\) It was suggested that the invitation be referred back to the sub-committee which would report as soon as possible to the Foreign Ministers.\(^10\) He explained that he had placed the draft before the meeting in order to get the Foreign Ministers’ consideration of the general principles at this stage so that time could be saved. Without decisions of the Foreign Ministers the sub-committee could not complete its work.

It was also agreed that the paragraph relative to trusteeships should be omitted from the invitation and that the five governments which would have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the conference on the subject of territorial trusteeships and independent areas. This would be done on a diplomatic level.

Mr. Stettinius explained that he did not contemplate any detailed discussions on particular islands or territories but wished to establish the right of the organization to deal with the problem of trusteeships and to set up some machinery.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden indicated agreement.

5. Iran.

Mr. Stettinius inquired whether Mr. Eden wished to bring up the subject of Iran.

Mr. Eden stated that he had submitted a paper on this question.\(^11\) Mr. Stettinius remarked that the American Delegation was in entire agreement with the British position, as stated by Mr. Eden yesterday.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Soviet Delegation had not had time to give study to Mr. Eden’s paper. The subject was consequently no longer discussed.


Mr. Molotov referred to the unstable situation in Yugoslavia and to the Subasic-Tito agreement.\(^12\) He stated that he could not under-

\(^8\) Post, p. 817.
\(^9\) Post, p. 818.
\(^10\) Post, p. 819.
\(^11\) Post, pp. 819–820.
\(^12\) Ante, pp. 251–254.
stand the British desire to supplement this agreement when steps had not been taken to put the original agreement into force. He proposed that the original agreement be executed and that following this subsequent questions be discussed.

Mr. Eden maintained that the amendments to the agreement which had been suggested by the British Government were reasonable in nature and provided for a more democratic Yugoslavia. He could see no harm in the application.

Mr. Molotov continued to maintain that no useful purpose would be served by the submission of supplementary agreements until the original agreement had been effected.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that representatives of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation. The British and Russian Ministers agreed to this proposal. Mr. Molotov stated that it would be desirable to state that it had been agreed at the Crimean Conference that the Subasic-Tito agreement should be fully executed.

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32 For the text of the British proposal, see post, p. 821.

Hiss Notes 1

4th meeting 12.00 For Mins
ERS chmn
2/9

Poland

# ERS: We have a hard fight in U. S. on particip. in Un. Ns Org. Polish sit. is of great importance to us from psych. point of view at this time. So hopes with all heart we can settle this Pol. matter before we break up in a manner which will be acceptable to the world.

1. Dropped Pres. Commission idea
2. (a) Mol. spoke of reorg. of Pol. Govt
   (b) Brit. formula suggests formation of a fully representative provisional govt
   (c) We: govt of national unity
   All of us agree Pol. Govt should include 3 elements—Lublin, democrats in Pol. & abroad

Proposal Present Pol. Govt to be reorganized to include Pol. democrats in Pol. & abroad & be called Provisional Govt of Pol. Dem. Unity Pol. Commission in Mos. to consult in first instance Lublin Govt & Polish leaders in Pol. & outside

1 From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes of this meeting.
Be pledged hold free elections, universal suffrage & secret ballot as soon as practicable
When Pol. Govt of Nat Unity is formed 3 Govts recognize Ambs. of 3 powers in Warsaw be charged report on holding of free elections

Reparations
ERS presented proposal
Point 1 acceptable
Point 3 add should consider 20,000,000,000 as a basis—final figures to be arrived by Commission
ERS: We think that figure should be taken into consideration.
We can accept it as a basis for discussion.
Eden not prepared to mention any figure
Mol Maisky wants figure for Sov. share mentioned.
ERS Can't commit U.S. to any figure but as said before personally thinks it is a reasonable figure
Mol. Could it be mentioned as a basis for discussion also
ERS: suggests 50% as basis for discussion
Mol: No objection but should not insist on 50% may be more or less, but figure would have significance. Distribution of total sum may be different.
ERS Can't go further at this time
Maisky means 1938 prices
Eden: What of effect of dismemberment
Maisky Might affect annual payments—initially lower perhaps—but not total
ERS 10% or 15% variation that applied to Hung.
M: possibly
Agreed can mention 50% applies to 20,000,000,000

Report
ERS presented draft invitation
Understands we are agreed U.S permitted to consult China & Fr before
Agreed
ERS Agreed—to sub-committee but reserved re terr. trus.
ERS: We do not contemplate any detailed discussions re particular islands or territorials but do wish to establish right of org. to deal with this & to set up machinery
Mol. Agreed
Ed. Why mention it?
ERS Agreed to eliminate it in invitation.
Understood we will take it up at Conf. & meanwhile among us at dip. level

Report

Mol. — Brit. did not object at D. O
Ed. Agrees & should be in report to plenary session

Iran
Ed. mentioned his paper ERS said we agree

Poland
ERS Can we say US–S agree. Brit don’t

 Yug.
Committee to prepare statement

Poland
New draft by Brit.

Mol. Can only give prelim. answer. Try to give final answer by 4:00. Mustn’t say put too much in this formula, mustn’t put in what we can’t say without consulting Poles. 1st amend.: say based on Lublin Govt. 2. Leave out reference to Ambs in War. —offensive to Poles—indicate they are under control Q. of formula not important—q of agreement is

Ed: The 3 Govts consider that a new sit. has been created by the complete lib. of Pol by the Red Army. This calls for the est. of a fully repres. Provisional Govt which can now be more broadly repres. than was recently poss. This govt should comprise members of Lub Govt etc—— Should be called Prov. of Nat Unity

Mol. Can’t leave out statement Govt is based on present one proposes: The present Pol. Govt be reorg. into a fully repres. Govt based on the present govt & incl. etc

ERS Must be entirely new

Might say based on Lub & on etc

Mol. Will be very diff to deal with Poles Can’t do that when no auth. or stability in Pol.

ERS Present gov’t would go on during the negs. until new govt is formed.

Mol But Poles will know negs are going on & will know present govt won’t last long—make it weak & make negs last long That impossible sit. for Red Army

Mol.: Ed. proposal incompatible with his own Must discuss this proposal with Poles

ERS What about name of new govt?
Mol. We can consider this.

2 Warsaw.
III. THE YALTA CONFERENCE

Report we have discussed matter & will continue it later & were unable to agree on this feature.

Harriman Asked reconsider based on Lub & other
Mol Negative

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Hiss Collection

The Secretary of State to the Head of the Reconstruction Department of the British Foreign Office (Jebb) ¹

[YALTA, February 9, 1945.]

We must be sure—no respon.—rests on us relative to Iceland, Turkey, etc. Egypt ² on joining World Organ

¹ This message, in Stettinius’ handwriting, bears the following notation in the handwriting of Alger Hiss: “A. H. gave Jebb this message 2/9 12.30 p. m. during For. Mins. meetings”.
² The word “Egypt” is inserted in Hiss’ handwriting.

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Hiss Collection

United States Delegation Memorandum. ¹

[YALTA], February 9, 1945.

Points Still Before the Foreign Ministers

1. Report of February 8th Meeting on Dumbarton Oaks Matters:

The report was modified in principle by general agreement at yesterday's plenary session. Sir Edward Bridges and Sir Alexander Cadogan were preparing a re-draft which they may wish to submit to the Foreign Ministers this morning so that final text of the report can be agreed to and presented very briefly to the plenary session this afternoon.

2. Report by Sub-Committee on Form of Invitations and other Details of Arrangements for United Nations Conference:

Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to this Committee yesterday and are planning to meet this morning. Jebb was Chairman when we were appointed, and, as a courtesy, he might be asked to report—this report may have to be oral as we have not completed our drafting.

3. Reparations:

Two papers on this subject presented by Mr. Molotov at the meeting over which he presided are still under consideration.

¹ Apparently written by Hiss for Stettinius. Stettinius followed this outline in his review of unfinished items at the opening of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting at noon on February 9, 1945. See ante, p. 803.
4. Poland:

The plenary session yesterday referred the Polish question to the Foreign Ministers. The status of this is that Molotov presented a paper at the plenary session the day before yesterday, and yesterday the President presented a counter proposal.

5. Iran:

You might ask Molotov if, after thinking over the points made yesterday on Iran, he has any comments to make.

The points were:
(a) Respect for the Iranian decision not to grant oil concessions until after the war.
(b) Suggest for announcement now that the three powers would be prepared to begin to withdraw their troops from Iran pari passu, (i. e., by equal steps.)

6. Points mentioned by Mr. Eden Yesterday:

You may wish to ask whether Mr. Eden would like to say anything further with respect to the additional points he mentioned yesterday.

These points were:
(a) Questions relating to the Bulgarian Control Commission;
(b) Questions relating to the Yugoslav frontier.

Bohlen Collection

United States Proposal Regarding the Polish Government

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] February 9, 1945.

SUGGESTIONS IN REGARD TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENTAL QUESTION

After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov's statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.

I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative "Provisional Polish Government" and we speak of the formation of a "Government of National Unity". All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this

1 Authorship not indicated. This paper was attached to Bohlen's minutes of the Plenary Meeting on the afternoon of February 9, at which time the proposal was again discussed; see post, p. 842. A copy of this paper in the UNA Files bears the notation, "According to Mr. Hiss, this was proposed by 'Doc' Matthews." On August 13, 1954, however, Matthews wrote that he thought Bohlen was the author (640.0029/8-1354). Another copy of this paper is in the Hiss Collection.
government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.

The following formula might therefore be considered:

That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed "The Provisional Government of National Unity"; Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This "Government of National Unity" would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.

When a "Polish Government of National Unity" is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.

Hiss Collection

The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

[Yalta,] February 9, 1945.

I attach a suggested paper to hand to Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden on reparations. It is based on the Russian proposal of basic principles. The first two sections follow the Russian proposal literally with the additional words in the first paragraph suggested by Mr. Eden.

I think you should likewise ask Mr. Molotov on what price, i. e., what year it is intended that the total reparations shall be fixed.

1 Ribbon copy. The authorship is not indicated, but a handwritten notation on the original reads: "Note: According to Mr. Hiss, this was prepared by 'Doe' Matthews"; and on August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote that he thought he was the author (840.0029/3–1554). The "suggested paper" referred to as attached has not been found; presumably it was a draft of the proposal read by Stettinius at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers at noon on February 9, 1945, ante, p. 808. See also Stettinius' question to Molotov, ante, p. 809.
United States Proposal for the Invitation to the United Nations Conference

Invitation

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of _________ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at _________ in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

"C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

[The above named governments have agreed that it would, in their opinion, be desirable that consideration be given at the forthcoming Conference to the inclusion in the projected Charter of provisions relating to territorial trusteeships and dependent areas. They hope to be able to prepare and place before the Conference proposals relating to these subjects.] ²

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of _________ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

¹ Copy also in the Hiss Collection. This draft was presented by Stettinius at the noon meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 9, 1945. See ante, p. 810.
² Brackets appear in the source text. It was agreed at the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 9 that this paragraph should be omitted. See ante, p. 810.
United States Delegation Draft Invitation to the United Nations Conference

INVITATION

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of ________ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25 or soon thereafter, at _________ in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, a copy of which was transmitted to you for your information on October 9, 1944 which were made public last October and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

[Insert→]

The above named governments have agreed that it would, in their opinion, be desirable that consideration be given at the forthcoming Conference to the inclusion in the projected Charter of provisions relating to International territorial trusteeships & dependent areas. They hope to be able to prepare and place before the Conference proposals relating to these subjects.)

Further information as to the exact site of the Conference and as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of ________ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

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1 The source text is a carbon copy which, as typed, is of the same wording as the "Draft Invitation" attached to the memorandum of Pasvolsky of January 23, 1945 (see ante, p. 82, footnote 5). Marked "old" in the upper right-hand corner, this paper is presumably a copy of the "former draft" to which Stettinius referred ante, p. 810. The penciled modifications and insertions, which are in the handwriting of Alger Hiss and which are here printed in canceled type and in italics, presumably reflect the work of the subcommittee of which he was a member (see ante, p. 736, and infra). The modifications and insertions indicated by Hiss were incorporated in the text as presented by Stettinius, supra.

2 The brackets appear in pencil in the source text.
Draft Report to the Foreign Ministers by the Subcommittee on Arrangements for the United Nations Conference

REPORT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

We were instructed on February 8 to prepare a report to the Foreign Ministers on the following subjects:

(a) The method of consultation with France and China in regard to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

(b) The text of the invitation which should be issued to all the nations which will take part in the United Nations Conference.

With regard to (a) we consider that the United States on behalf of the three powers should consult the Government of China and the Provisional French Government.

With regard to (b) we attach for the approval of the Ministers a draft invitation to all the nations which will take part in the conference.

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1 Undated ribbon copy; authorship not indicated; but Matthews wrote on August 13, 1954, that it was written by Hiss (640.0029/8-1354). Carbon copy also in Matthews Fyles. The report was presumably drafted early on February 9, 1945, for possible presentation at the Foreign Ministers' meeting at noon on that day. It was not then presented as such, although Stettinius had evidently seen it prior to or during that meeting. See ante, p. 810. The report, unchanged from this draft, was formally presented at the noon meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 10. See post, pp. 875, 885–886.

2 The draft invitation was presumably the one presented by Stettinius to the Foreign Ministers at their noon meeting on February 9, 1945 (ante, p. 810). A copy of this draft is in the Hiss Collection but is not attached to this draft report of the subcommittee.

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British Proposal on Iran

DRAFT CONCLUSION ON PERSIA

The remarkable progress made in the war against Germany has enabled the American, British and Russian representatives to consider the application of Article 5 of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Persia regarding the withdrawal of Allied forces from Persian territory. It has been agreed that a commencement of the withdrawal of forces need not await the termination of hostilities, but should begin pari passu in stages as military considerations, including the use of the Persian supply route, may allow. The stages of this gradual with-

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1 This undated carbon copy is in the Hiss Collection with papers relating to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 11, 1945, at which time it was decided that the proposal would be eliminated in favor of the language agreed upon for the final protocol. See ante, p. 810, and post, p. 933.
withdrawal, beginning with the evacuation of Tehran, will be discussed and agreed on by the respective military authorities of the three countries in Moscow. The Persian Government will be kept fully informed.

Misunderstandings which have arisen in connection with applications for rights to develop oil resources in Persia were also discussed in the course of the conversations. It was agreed that in the light of the known views of the Persian Government within whose free decision the matter rests, none of the Governments involved would favour pressing any suggestions for further oil concessions upon the Persian Government pending the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia.

(Possible addition to be held in reserve until it is seen how the discussion proceeds). After the withdrawal the whole question of the future exploitation of Persian oil resources not already covered by existing concessions should be the subject of discussions to be held within the framework of the Tehran Declaration of December 1st 1943 and to which the Persian Government would be a party.

86021.01/2-1145

Memorandum From the British Delegation to the Soviet Delegation Regarding the Yugoslav Government ¹

When Dr. Subasic returns to Belgrade with his Government about February 7th, he intends to raise two outstanding points with Marshal Tito. His Majesty's Government consider it important that Marshal Tito should be in a position to give satisfactory assurances on both these points, and therefore hope that Marshal Stalin will agree to advise Marshal Tito in this sense.

2. The first of these points is that AVNOJ ² should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina ³ who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary parliament.

3. The second point is that legislative acts passed by AVNOJ should be subject to ratification by a Constituent Assembly. This could be arranged either (1) under Article 116 of the Constitution, which lays down that all measures taken in accordance therewith should be subject to ratification, or (2) by introducing a passage in the new Government's declaration agreed between Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic. The latter would be the more satisfactory course. It

¹ Notation on file copy reads: "Copy of paper handed by British to Soviet Delegation".
² Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Yugoslavia.
³ Skupstina, the national parliament of Yugoslavia before World War II.
would also be helpful if the new Government's declaration could include a statement to the effect that the Government was only temporary, pending free expression of the will of the people.

[Yalta,] 6th February, 1945.

Matthews Files

British Proposal Regarding the Yugoslav Government

Draft for Discussion With the Soviet and American Delegations

Message from the Soviet Government, His Majesty's Government and the United States Government to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic.

The Heads of the three Governments have met and discussed the Yugoslav question and have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic:

(a) That the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement;
(b) That the new Government as soon as formed should make a declaration that

(i) AVNOJ will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary Parliament;
(ii) Legislative acts passed by AVNOJ will be subject to ratification by a Constituent Assembly;
(iii) The Government is only temporary pending the free expression of the will of the people.

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1 Undated carbon copy. This is apparently the paper referred to by Eden in the Foreign Ministers' meeting at noon on February 9, 1945. See ante, p. 811.

Draft Report by the Foreign Ministers to the Sixth Plenary Meeting

TOP SECRET

[Yalta,] February 9, 1945.

Report to the Plenary Session of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting, February 9, 1945

1. The Polish Question:

The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish Governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the American

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1 This copy of the report was attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting at noon on February 9, 1945. A copy with slight variations is also in the Hiss Collection. The report was slightly modified before being delivered by Stettinius to the Plenary Meeting that afternoon. See post, pp. 858–860.
delegation. This memorandum, in accordance with Mr. Molotov's proposal, agreed to drop the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee.

With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the Polish Government, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to present to Marshal Stalin certain new considerations advanced in the American memorandum before making a final statement. It was decided to continue discussion of this question at a later date and to report that the three Foreign Ministers thus far had not reached an agreement on the matter.

2. Reparations:

The American Delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and to the type of reparations in kind Germany should pay.

The Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government, that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union. Mr. Eden stated that he would be obliged to await instructions from his Government.

The Soviet Delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15% on the prices of the items delivered.

3. Dumbarton Oaks:

It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the subjects of territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.

It was also agreed that these subjects should be discussed at the United Nations Conference itself.

The Sub-Committee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers today. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming Conference. This subject was discussed at today's meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.

4. Iran:

Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet Delegation to
How would you feel about sending around a list of our United Nations Cmty. (as in letter to Anr.-Aust.-New Zeal.-Chine.-Sudan.-or South—by way or otherwise.)

1 The original, which is in pencil, is apparently in Stettinius' handwriting, except for Hiss' notation at the top. See also Stettinius, pp. 203-207.
give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr. Eden on this question. The subject was consequently not discussed.

5. Yugoslavia:

On the proposal of the Chairman, it was agreed that representatives of Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov should be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation.

There was also agreement that before the termination of the Crimea Conference it would be desirable that agreement should be reached on the execution of the Subasic-Tito agreement.

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, FEBRUARY 9, 1945, NOON, LIVADIA PALACE

**Present**

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<th>United States</th>
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<td>President Roosevelt</td>
<td>Prime Minister Churchill</td>
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<td>Fleet Admiral Leahy</td>
<td>Field Marshal Brooke</td>
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<td>Fleet Admiral King</td>
<td>Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham</td>
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<td>Field Marshal Wilson</td>
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<td>Admiral Somerville</td>
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**Secretariat**

Brigadier General McFarland             Major General Jacob

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

Report to the President and the Prime Minister (C.C.S. 776/2)

The Meeting had before them the draft of the final report to the President and the Prime Minister, containing the results of the Combined Chiefs of Staff ARGONAUT discussions (C.C.S. 776/2).

The report was accepted and approved by the President and the Prime Minister without amendment.

In the course of the ensuing discussion, the following matters were touched on briefly:

- There was a discussion of possible developments after the defeat of Germany and the possible action of Russia at that time.

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1 The text of this report, renumbered C. C. S. 776/3 after its approval by Roosevelt and Churchill, follows these minutes.
The Prime Minister expressed the opinion that it would be of great value if Russia could be persuaded to join with the United States, the British Empire, and China in the issue of a four-power ultimatum calling upon Japan to surrender unconditionally, or else be subjected to the overwhelming weight of all the forces of the four powers. Japan might ask in these circumstances what mitigation of the full rigour of unconditional surrender would be extended to her if she accepted the ultimatum. In this event it would be for the United States to judge the matter; but there was no doubt that some mitigation would be worth while if it led to the saving of a year or a year and a half of a war in which so much blood and treasure would be poured out. Great Britain would not press for any mitigation but would be content to abide by the judgment of the United States. Whatever the decision, Great Britain would see the matter through to the end.

The President thought that this was a matter which might well be mentioned to Marshal Stalin. He doubted whether the ultimatum would have much effect on the Japanese, who did not seem to realize what was going on in the world outside, and still seemed to think that they might get a satisfactory compromise. They would be unlikely to wake up to the true state of affairs until all of their islands had felt the full weight of air attack.

b. The Prime Minister expressed his thanks to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the work which they had accomplished. He said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff was a wonderful institution which smoothed out so many difficulties, issued clear directions to the commanders in the field and would without doubt be held up in years to come as a model of cooperation between Allies. He hoped very much that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could be kept in being for three or four years more. There would be many problems affecting the security of the two nations in this period, the solution of which would be greatly facilitated if the Combined Chiefs of Staff could continue to operate.

The President agreed that there would be many matters affecting the two countries, such as the use of bases, which would have to be effectively handled.

In response to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, General Marshall expressed his personal opinion that the continuance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be advantageous. Its existence had certainly simplified the solution of the problems which had confronted the two nations during the war.

c. There was a short discussion upon the provision of intelligence to the Russian armies, and the President and the Prime Minister were informed of certain steps which had been agreed in discussion between General Marshall and Field Marshal Brooke.

The Meeting then adjourned.
MINUTES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS
827

J. C. S. Files

Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

TOP SECRET
C. C. S. 776/3

[YALTA], 9 February 1945.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AT THE "ARGONAUT" CONFERENCE

1. The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at ARGONAUT Conference is submitted herewith:—

I. Over-all Objective

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.

II. Over-all Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany.

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unceasing pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

5. Upon the defeat of Germany, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-all Strategic Concept

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation:—

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.

d. Continue the disruption of enemy sea communications.

e. Continue the offensive against Germany.

f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces.

7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.
h. Provide assistance to such of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of the other basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations against Germany and/or Japan.

i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows.

j. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of Japan.

IV. Execution of the Over-all Strategic Concept

DEFEAT OF GERMANY

The U-Boat War

7. We are concerned with the possibility that German U-boats may again constitute a serious threat to our North Atlantic shipping lanes. It is too early yet to assess the extent to which such an offensive could achieve success, and we propose to review the matter again on 1 April 1945.

8. Meanwhile, we have agreed on the following countermeasures:

a. To build up as much as is practicable the strength of surface hunting groups and anti-U-boat air squadrons.

b. To maintain and, if possible, increase “marginal” bomber effort on assembly yards, concentrating as far as is practicable against Hamburg and Bremen.

c. To maintain “marginal” effort against operating bases, being ready to increase this when bases become crowded beyond the capacity of concrete pens.

d. To increase, by 100% if possible, the air mining effort against U-boats, including the training areas.

e. To mine waters beyond range of d. above by using surface minelayers and carrier-borne aircraft.

f. To intensify operations against enemy minesweepers.

g. To maintain and intensify operations against the enemy shipping used to supply U-boat bases.

Operations in Northwest Europe

9. In two telegrams, SCAF 180 as amended by SCAF 194, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has presented his appreciation and his plan of operations for Northwest Europe. His plan is as follows:

a. To carry out immediately a series of operations north of the Moselle with a view to destroying the enemy and closing the Rhine north of Düsseldorf.
b. To direct our efforts to eliminating other enemy forces west of
the Rhine, which still constitute an obstacle or a potential threat to
our subsequent Rhine crossing operations.

c. To seize bridgeheads over the Rhine in the North and the South.

d. To deploy east of the Rhine and north of the Ruhr the maximum
number of divisions which can be maintained (estimated at some 35
divisions). The initial task of this force, assisted by air action, will
be to deny to the enemy the industries of the Ruhr.

e. To deploy east of the Rhine, on the axis Frankfurt-Kassel, such
forces, if adequate, as may be available after providing 35 divisions
for the North and essential security elsewhere. The task of this
force will be to draw enemy forces away from the North by capturing
Frankfurt and advancing on Kassel.

10. We have taken note of SCAF 180 as amended by SCAF 194
and of the Supreme Commander's assurance that he will seize the
Rhine crossings in the North just as soon as this is a feasible operation
and without waiting to close the Rhine throughout its length. Further,
that he will advance across the Rhine in the North with maximum
strength and complete determination, immediately the situation in
the South allows him to collect the necessary forces and do this
without incurring unreasonable risks.

Strategy in the Mediterranean

11. We have reviewed our strategy in the Mediterranean in the
light of the development of the situation in Europe and of the fact
that the enemy is at liberty at any time to make a voluntary with-
drawal in Italy. We have agreed that our primary object in the war
against Germany should be to build up the maximum possible strength
on the Western Front and to seek a decision in that theater.

12. In accordance with this concept we have agreed to withdraw
certain forces from the Mediterranean Theater and to place them at
the disposal of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary
Force, and to redefine the tasks of the Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean.

13. Our proposals are contained in the directive to the Supreme
Allied Commander, Mediterranean, attached as Appendix "A."

The War Against Japan

Over-All Objective in the War Against Japan

14. We have agreed that the over-all objective in the war against
Japan should be expressed as follows:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:—

a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea
and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and de-
stroying Japanese air and naval strength.

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.
Operations in the Pacific Area

15. We have taken note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 417/11 (Appendix “B”).

Operations in Southeast Asia Command

16. We have agreed to the following policy in respect of employment in Southeast Asia Command of United States resources deployed in the India-Burma Theater:—

a. The primary military object of the United States in the China and India-Burma Theaters is the continuance of aid to China on a scale that will permit the fullest utilization of the area and resources of China for operations against the Japanese. United States resources are deployed in India-Burma to provide direct or indirect support for China. These forces and resources participate not only in operating the base and the line of communications for United States and Chinese forces in China, but also constitute a reserve immediately available to China without permanently increasing the requirements for transport of supplies to China.

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff contemplate no change in their agreement to SACSEA’s use of resources of the U. S. India-Burma Theater in Burma when this use does not prevent the fulfillment of their primary object of rendering support to China including protection of the line of communications. Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would jeopardize those operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

17. We have reviewed the progress of the campaign in Burma and agreed upon the terms of a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. This directive is attached as Appendix “C.”

Planning Dates for the End of the War Against Germany and Japan

18. We feel that it is important to agree and promulgate planning dates for the end of the war against Germany and Japan. These dates are necessary for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower.

We recommend that the planning dates for the end of the war against Germany should be as follows:—

a. Earliest date—1 July 1945.
b. Date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue—31 December 1945.

We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany.

1 This paper, dated January 22, 1945, is printed ante, pp. 395-396.
All the above dates to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

Shipping

19. We have reviewed the over-all cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 1945 under the assumption that Germany is defeated on 1 July 1945.

For the first half of 1945 the principal difficulty will be with cargo shipping, which will be tight and in which deficits will approach unmanageable proportions until V-E Day. We have issued instructions to theater commanders to exercise strict control of shipping and have agreed that deficits should be adjusted in accordance with the following principles:—

In the event of a deficit in shipping resources, first priority should be given to the basic undertakings in support of the over-all strategic concepts as agreed in ARGONAUT.

So long as these first priority requirements are not adequately covered, shipping for other requirements will not be allocated without prior consultation with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff.

20. For the second half of 1945 the principal difficulty will be troop shipping, which will become particularly acute in the last quarter of the year. We have agreed that the matter should be reviewed and a report submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 1 April 1945. This report will take account, from the shipping point of view, of the possibility that the war against Germany may continue beyond 1 July 1945.

Oil

21. We have reviewed and agreed upon the levels of stocks of all petroleum products that should be maintained in all theaters. The text of our agreement is attached as Appendix "D." ²

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces

22. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, has submitted proposals (NAF 841)³ designed to assist the Greek Government in forming their own army and so releasing British forces for employment elsewhere.

We have agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should proceed to implement the Supreme Commander's proposals, on the understanding that this will not interfere with the provision of equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe, nor result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.

² Not printed.
Appendix "A"

Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, Repeated to SCAEF

1. It is our primary intention in the war against Germany to build up the maximum possible strength on the Western Front and to seek a decision in that theater. We have, therefore, reviewed your directive and decided as follows:—

Greece

2. The earliest possible discharge of British obligations in Greece must be your constant aim.

The object of British presence and operations in Greece is to secure that part of Greece which is necessary for the establishment of the authority of a free Greek Government.

3. This object must always be regarded in the light of the paramount need for releasing troops from Greece for use against the Germans. You should, therefore, concentrate on building up a Greek force on a national basis as soon as possible.

Italy

4. In pursuance of the policy given in paragraph 1, it has been decided to withdraw from your theater to the Western Front up to five divisions (of which not more than two should be armored) as follows:—

a. At the earliest possible date three Allied divisions drawn from the Allied Armies in Italy.

b. Further complete formations as the forces now in Greece are released from that country.

c. It is intended to withdraw Canadian and British divisions. The nomination of ground formations to be withdrawn and the arrangements for their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction. The program will be agreed between you and Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before any moves take place.

Air Forces

5. Two fighter groups of Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to the accomplishment of your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

On February 11, 1945, Roosevelt received an indication of the appreciation of the Canadian Government at the decision to transfer the Canadian Corps from Italy to northwestern Europe, thus uniting the whole Canadian Army in Europe (Roosevelt Papers).
6. There will be no significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces.

7. We recognize that these withdrawals will affect the scope of your operations in the Italian Theater. We, therefore, redefine your objects as follows:—

a. Your first object should be to ensure that, subject to any minor adjustments you may find necessary, the front already reached in Italy is solidly held.

b. Within the limits of the forces remaining available to you after the withdrawals in paragraph 4 above have been effected, you should do your utmost, by means of such limited offensive action as may be possible and by the skillful use of cover and deception plans, to contain the German forces now in Italy and prevent their withdrawal to other fronts.

c. You should, in any case, remain prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces.

Adriatic

8. Subject to the requirements of the Italian Theater, you should continue to give all possible support to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, until the territory of Yugoslavia has been completely cleared. You will carry out such minor operations on the eastern shores of the Adriatic as your resources allow.

Appendix "C" 4

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. Your first object is to liberate Burma at the earliest date. (To be known as operation LOYALIST.)

2. Subject to the accomplishment of this object, your next main task will be the liberation of Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca. (To be known as operation BROADSWORD.)

3. In view of your recent success in Burma, and of the uncertainty of the date of the final defeat of Germany, you must aim at the accomplishment of your first object with the forces at present at your disposal. This does not preclude the dispatch of further reinforcements from the European Theater should circumstances make this possible.

4. You will prepare a program of operations for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. In transmitting the foregoing directive the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct your attention to the agreed policy in respect of the use in your theater of United States resources deployed in the India-Burma Theater (see paragraph 16 of the Report).

4 Appendix "B" is printed ante, pp. 395–396.
ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, FEBRUARY 9, 1945, 1:30 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mrs. Boettiger
Miss Harriman
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Oliver

Editorial Note

For this luncheon meeting, Bohlen's record states simply, "No notes available". The information set forth above regarding the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, ante, p. 556. According to Leahy, p. 312, "The conversation centered around voting procedure in the proposed assembly of the world peace organization. Churchill agreed orally to an arrangement whereby the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Republics should have equal voting power in the Assembly." A notation on the Hiss notes for the Plenary Meeting of that afternoon indicates that this subject was discussed. (See post, p. 857.)

1 President Roosevelt acted as host.

MEETING OF THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 9, 1945, 3:30 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter

SOVIET UNION
General of the Army Antonov
Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
(aided by a 2-star admiral)

J. C. S. Files

Kuter Minutes

TOP SECRET

GENERAL ANTONOV opened the meeting with the statement that he had discussed all of the points raised at the previous meeting with Marshal Stalin. Whereas his comments at the first meeting represented only his personal views, he was prepared for the second meeting to give definite and official replies to each of the points. General

1 A note on the original reads: "Except for Fleet Admiral Leahy, who was absent, the attendance and security considerations were exactly as arranged for the first meeting." See ante, p. 757.
Antonov continued then to present brief statements on each of the questions that had been raised:

a. There is no change in intent and only minor change in the plans of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October. In October, it had been planned to begin the movement of units to the Far East in early 1945. The units which it had been proposed to move are now involved in the center of the line on the Russian front. The only change in the basic plan is therefore a delay in the movement of units eastward until they can be disengaged from the fighting now going on.

b. These Soviets will require specific supply routes after Soviet-Japanese hostilities start. Sea routes are needed to provide food and all types of gasoline and other petroleum products. Air routes also will be required.

c. Agreement is given for the operation of U. S. Air Forces in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area. Advance reconnaissance and survey parties may be sent to that area without delay.

d. Due to the great distance from the bulk of Soviet military strength “U. S. assistance will be very useful” for the defense of Kamchatka.

e. Pre-hostility preparations, including construction, reception, and storage of U. S. stock piles in Eastern Siberia (Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk) and in Kamchatka, will be prepared by the Soviets for the U. S. air units to be based in Soviet territory. Final decision must naturally await decision as to the air base requirements. Material assistance may be needed from the United States. Knocked-down fuel storage tanks (and probably pumps, pipes, etc) will be required. These requirements are in addition to all current requisitions. Supplies in the Milepost project have been computed as requirements for Soviet forces exclusively.

f. The departure of a survey party from Fairbanks to Kamchatka must be deferred “until the last moment.” In explanation for this decision considerable discussion ensued as to the fact that the presence of an American survey party in Kamchatka could not be kept a secret from the Japs.

g. After the beginning of hostilities the Soviets will take Southern Sakhalin unassisted by the United States. Although detailed plans are not yet firm, Soviet operations against Southern Sakhalin will be one of their first operations. Admiral King stated that his discussion with Admiral Kuznetsov was an adequate reply to our question concerning the La Perouse Strait. (See Appendix “A” of the notes on the meeting held 8 February 1945)
h. We had asked to be assured that combined planning in Moscow would be vigorously pursued. In his reply General Antonov replied: “We shall fulfill on our side the plan which was made”. General Marshall explained that we were not questioning Soviet good faith or ability to carry out plans. General Antonov then stated that combined planning in Moscow will proceed vigorously.

i. Our request for additional weather reporting stations in Siberia is approved. The details are to be handled by Military Mission in Moscow.

General Antonov then asked for a statement as to our airbase requirements in the Kamchatka-Nikolaevsk area. It was decided to have the Air Staffs (Marshal Khudyakov and General Kuter) continue with the discussion of air matters after the major meeting was completed.

General Marshall asked if the Soviets agreed that a high order of security was necessary in handling all Far Eastern matters because the Japs may attack if they learn of Soviet-American plans or of the movement of Soviet units. General Antonov agreed with this view.

General Marshall asked how many weeks it would be after the movement of Soviet units to the East began that the Soviets would be strong enough to meet a Jap attack. General Antonov replied that it would be “not less than three months.”

General Marshall asked when these movements Eastward would begin. General Antonov replied that the Soviets were initiating the movements of supplies at this time and stated that “units of troops, in any size, cannot be moved without attracting notice by the Japs.”

General Marshall asked if divisional equipment would precede the divisions. General Antonov stated that divisional armor and equipment would move with the divisions. However, supplies (ammunition, food, etc.) would precede the movement of divisions.

General Marshall asked how many divisions per week could be moved from the German to the Japanese front. General Antonov replied that a three month period would be required to move the necessary forces.

General Marshall stated that Field Marshal Brooke will expedite and will extend the flow of information from London to Moscow concerning German movements and intentions.

The principal meeting was adjourned with an exchange of statements of pleasure at the free, frank, clear, and definite interchange of information achieved in these conferences between the Russian and American military staffs.

Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov and Major General Kuter continued to discuss the air side of the Soviet-American business for
about two hours. The principal items covered in the discussion follow:

a. General Kuter gave to Marshal Khudyakov a prepared statement of our detailed requirements in expanding the weather reporting establishment in Siberia. He explained that Admiral Olsen was equipped with the same information and that further arrangements would be made in Moscow through the Military Mission.

b. General Kuter gave to Marshal Khudyakov a detailed statement of our requirements to permit the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey to operate on strategic air objectives which have already been captured by the Russians and those which might be captured in the future. It was agreed that further details would be arranged in Moscow with the Military Mission. Marshal Khudyakov requested that Soviet experts on bomb damage assessment would be permitted to accompany our survey parties. General Kuter stated that this was entirely acceptable, and furthermore, our reports of this survey would be made available to the Soviets on each of the targets within the Soviet area if those reports were desired.

c. General Kuter stated that our broad requirement in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area was for two large air bases, each to accommodate one group of very heavy bombers (B-29 Superfortresses). He stated the requirement for 8500 foot take-off strips with good approaches, and the heavy construction needed for landing, take-off, and dispersed parking by 150,000 pound aircraft. General discussion followed on the heavy bomb tonnages and very heavy 100-octane gasoline requirements of B-29 groups. Marshal Khudyakov appeared somewhat shaken by the magnitude of the air base requirement to handle our very heavy bombers. He repeated the probable necessity that we provide the materials to handle aviation gasoline storage and distribution, bomb trailers, and steel planking. Marshal Khudyakov stated that it might be difficult to find sufficient personnel to do the necessary construction and asked if American aviation engineers could be provided if needed for building. General Kuter replied that American aviation engineers would be available.

d. General Kuter stated that our request for air bases asked for the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area or some more suitable area. He explained the fact that two groups of B-29's in the far North in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area could pour far fewer bombs on Japan than would be possible if much larger numbers of heavy bombers (B-17 and B-24) were based in the Vladivostok area within range of Japanese targets. General Kuter made it clear that he would not prejudice the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk decision by raising the issue of the bases in the Vladivostok area, and further that it was appreciated that supply difficulties and the requirement to base extensive
tactical air forces in the Vladivostok area would probably postpone consideration of that area until after progress had been attained in the ground battle West from Vladivostok. Air Marshal Khudyakov clearly understood the desire not to prejudice other decisions and that Vladivostok probably could not be used as strategic air base area until the Russian ground war with the Japs in Manchuria had progressed, but stated that he was anxious to have heavy bombers attacking Japan and that he would initiate action toward making two bases on the scale of Poltava available to U. S. strategic air units in the Vladivostok area.

e. Marshal Khudyakov stated his requirement for C-54 type transport aircraft and acknowledged the reply that General Kuter could see no chance of providing that type transport. Discussion of C-47's followed and it was agreed that the Army Air Forces would cut down on proposed provision of C-47's to our troop carrier units in order to make additional C-47's available to the Red Air Force. (General Deane has been informed that we can provide an additional 100 C-47's to the Soviets during the first six months of 1945 and can provide 40 per month thereafter. This will more than double any scheduled flow of C-47's to the Red Air Force, and in my opinion, will tax their capacity to absorb transports.)

f. Marshal Khudyakov stated a requirement for four to five hundred single and twin engine trainers, plus 1500—200 to 400 horse-power trainer engines. The engines are for installation in Russian trainers. This was a surprise request. General Kuter replied that single engine primary trainers could be provided if shipping is available and that sympathetic consideration would be given to the request when received in Washington.

g. The current tour of the Army Air Forces Band in the European Theater, and General McNarney's suggestion that this band might be available to play in Moscow and the Balkan capitals was presented. General Kuter stated that if the Soviets wished to have the band, we would make it available and would request a visit to American bases by a Russian military choral group as a reciprocal gesture. Air Marshal Khudyakov voiced his personal hope that such arrangements could be made and requested that General Deane initiate the matter in writing in Moscow. General Deane will take this action.

h. General Kuter handed to Marshal Khudyakov a formal written statement of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff rejection of the Soviet's proposal to prohibit strategic air attack on targets near the Russian front without Soviet-American agreement. 4 Marshal Khudyakov

4 See ante, p. 801.
inferred that he had pressed the adoption of the agreement reached in
the Khudyakov-Portal-Kuter meeting but had been overridden by
the General Staff. This matter also will be handled by the Military
Mission in Moscow.

This meeting concluded in a friendly tone with the statement that
the airmen can get along all right, but whatever the nationality, the
airmen cannot guarantee agreement by General Staffs.

(Dictated to and transcribed by S/Sgt. Arthur Miller. General
Kuter’s notes and Sgt. Miller’s shorthand notes have been destroyed.)

L. S. KUTER,
Major General, U. S. A.

Three (3) copies originally prepared, with distribution made to the
individuals indicated below:

Admiral Leahy—No. 1
General Hill —No. 2
General Kuter —No. 3

Three (3) additional copies prepared, with distribution to the
individuals indicated below:

General Marshall—No. 4
Admiral King —No. 5
General Hull —No. 6

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum of Conversation

TOP SECRET

Yalta,] 9 February 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Conference with Russian Staff.

On the afternoon of Friday, February 9th, General Antonov orally
gave the following answers to the eleven questions propounded by
the United States Chiefs of Staff the previous afternoon.

To the First Question—(Changes in projected operations). No
change, except for delay in transfer of troops which it had been
planned to get under way the first of the year. These troops are
now engaged in the Central Sector on the Eastern Front, therefore
the delay.

To the Second Question—(Necessity for Pacific Supply route).
Marshall Stalin stated the Pacific Sea supply route will be required
particularly for the delivery of food stuffs and petroleum products.

1 Authorship not indicated.
Some air transport will probably be needed but due to its small carrying capacity the sea route is of first importance.

To the Third Question—(U.S. Airbases). Aviation bases in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk region will be given the United States Air Forces. Reconnaissances can now be made.

To the Fourth Question—(U.S. Defenses Kamchatka). Because Kamchatka is very far from the mainland United States assistance there will be very helpful.

To the Fifth Question—(Soviet construction for U.S.). When it is finally decided in exactly what places and what types of construction are required for the United States Air Forces in the district mentioned in the third question, the Russians will be able to carry out this construction for the United States forces. Assistance in the way of matériel is very desirable—gasoline tankage, knock-down buildings, etc.

To the Sixth Question—(Kamchatka Survey party). With regard to the reconnaissance of the Kamchatka region we ask you to arrange for the departure of the party only at the very last moment because under present conditions it is impossible to make the reconnaissance in secrecy. This does not apply to the reconnaissance of the Amur River district.

To the Seventh Question—(Occupation of Sakhalin). The Russians will take the southern half of Sakhalin Island considering this should be one of the first operations.

(Opening of the Straits of La Perouse). Answer is the same as yesterday. The Russians will do this.

To the Eighth Question—(Moscow Planning). Marshal Stalin stated that "From our side we shall fulfill your desires to carry on the planning vigorously."

To the Ninth Question—(Effect of weather on operations). From a ground force point of view the most difficult conditions will be experienced in the thaws and floods in April and May and although June is a favorable month, July and August are undesirable. As far as the ground forces are concerned weather will be most favorable in September, October and November. At sea weather is favorable in July, August and September.

To the Tenth Question—(Additional weather stations). Arrangements will be made to open additional stations if the details will be presented to the Russian authorities.

General Antonov expressed thanks for the information already given to him regarding the movements of Divisions to the Eastern Front and requested again that the Russian Staff be provided at the earliest moment with any information we might have regarding German concentrations and planned counter-attacks.
General Marshall informed General Antonov that arrangements were being made to give General Deane a daily routine report covering all such details of information in our possession, that if the character of the information or the details regarding it were not of a character satisfactory to General Antonov he would please notify General Deane accordingly and we would endeavor to meet his wishes.

General Marshall also informed General Antonov that he had discussed this matter with Field Marshal Brooke who is undertaking the moment he returns to London arrangements amplifying the information now being transmitted and expediting it; furthermore that instructions to this end had already been dispatched.

General Marshall then asked General Antonov if the United States Chiefs of Staff estimate was correct in the opinion of the Russians that if the Japanese obtained any intimation of the Russian concentration and intention in the Far East they themselves would launch an immediate offensive. General Antonov replied in the affirmative.

General Marshall then asked General Antonov how long a period was required for the concentration of additional troops and supplies on the Eastern Front and was told that three months was the desired period. General Antonov also stated that supplies, fuel and such were already being shipped but that the divisions could only go upon the completion of hostilities in Germany and then would be rushed. He stated that the equipment of the divisions would have to accompany them. It could not be sent in advance.

General Antonov requested that we keep the Russian Staff informed as to the deployment of the Japanese forces, particularly as regards Manchuria and as to the general progress of events in the Pacific.

SIXTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 9, 1945, 4 P. M.,
LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Secretary Stettinius
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Hiss
Mr. Bohlen

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Edward Bridges
Mr. Jubb
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Dixon
Major Birse

SOVIET UNION

Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molo
ov
Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov
TOP SECRET

The President said he understood the Foreign Ministers had another report to make, and he would ask Mr. Stettinius, who presided today, to give it.

Mr. Stettinius then reported on the results of the discussion concerning the Polish question as follows:  

The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish Governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the American Delegation. This memorandum, in accordance with Mr. Molotov's proposal, agreed to drop the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee.

With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the Polish Government, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to present to Marshal Stalin certain new considerations advanced in the American memorandum before making a final statement. It was decided to continue discussion of this question at a later date and to report that the three Foreign Ministers thus far had not reached an agreement on the matter.

It was decided, at Mr. Churchill's request, that the Polish question would be discussed before Mr. Stettinius proceeded with the balance of his report.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation accepted as a basis of discussion the proposal put forward this morning at the meeting by Mr. Stettinius. He said the Soviet Delegation was very anxious to come to an agreement and he believed that this could be done with certain amendments to Mr. Stettinius' proposal. First, he offered an amendment which dealt with the first sentence of the formula. He suggested that in place of the sentence in Mr. Stettinius' draft that the following be substituted:

The present Provisional Government of Poland should be reorganized on a wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad, and in this connection this government would be called the National Provisional Government of Poland.

He added that the next two sentences remained unchanged, but he had a slight amendment to the last sentence, namely that the words "non-Fascist and anti-Fascist" be added before the words "democratic parties." He then said that he felt the last sentence dealing with the responsibilities of the Ambassadors of the three Governments in Warsaw to observe and report on the carrying out of the free elections should be eliminated since he felt certain this would be offensive to the

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1 For the text of the report which Stettinius read, see post, pp. 558-560.
2 Ante, pp. 815-816.
Poles and would needlessly complicate the discussions. He said that it was the first duty of Ambassadors anyway to observe and report, and therefore no such statement is necessary. He concluded that with these slight amendments Mr. Stettinius' proposal made this morning was acceptable.

Mr. Molotov said he had one more request, and that was that the Subasic-Tito agreement in regard to Yugoslavia would be put into effect. He said that the Prime Minister, in messages to Marshal Stalin, had urged this, that there had been a series of delays, and he felt that agreement should be reached here. He felt that agreement should be reached here at this conference to put this agreement immediately into effect irrespective of the wishes of the King.

The Prime Minister replied he thought that the Yugoslavia question was virtually settled and would take no time, but he thought it better to proceed immediately to discuss the Polish question. He said he was glad to see that an advance had been made at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and to hear Mr. Molotov's proposal on the urgent, immediate and painful problem of Poland. He said he wished to make some general suggestions that he hoped would not affect the movements the President had in mind. He said that here, in a general atmosphere of agreement, we should not put our feet in the stirrups and ride off. He said that he felt it would be a great mistake to hurry this question—it is better to take a few days of latitude than to endanger bringing the ship into port. He said it was a great mistake to take hurried decisions on these grave matters. He felt he must study the Polish proposals before giving any opinion.

The President then proposed that Mr. Stettinius should finish his report on the meeting of Foreign Ministers this morning and then the conference would adjourn for half an hour in order to study Mr. Molotov's amendments to the Polish proposals.

Marshal Stalin and The Prime Minister agreed.

The Prime Minister repeated that he felt that this great prize should not be imperilled by too much haste, and he definitely did not want to leave this conference without an agreement on the subject, which he felt to be the most important we had before us.

Mr. Stettinius then read the following report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the results of their discussions on reparations:

The American Delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission. Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and to the types of reparations in kind Germany should pay.

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3 For the text of this agreement, see ante, pp. 251–254.
The Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government, that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Eden reserved his position to await instructions from his Government.

The Soviet Delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15% on the prices of the items delivered.

Mr. Stettinius then reported on the results of the discussion at the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the matter of providing machinery in the World Organization for dealing with territorial trusteeships and dependent areas, as follows:

It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference [on] providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.

The Prime Minister interrupted with great vigor to say that he did not agree with one single word of this report on trusteeships. He said that he had not been consulted nor had he heard of this subject up to now. He said that under no circumstances would he ever consent to forty or fifty nations thrusting interfering fingers into the life's existence of the British Empire. As long as he was Minister, he would never yield one scrap of their heritage. He continued in this vein for some minutes.¹

Mr. Stettinius explained that this reference to the creation of machinery was not intended to refer to the British Empire, but that it had in mind particularly dependent areas which would be taken out of enemy control, for example, the Japanese islands in the Pacific. He said that it was felt that provision had to be made for machinery to handle this question of trusteeship for dependent areas taken from the enemy and he repeated that this was not intended to refer to the British Empire.

The Prime Minister accepted Mr. Stettinius' explanation but remarked it would be better to say it did not refer to the British Empire. He added that Great Britain did not desire any territorial aggrandizement but had no objection if the question of trusteeship was to be considered in relation to enemy territory. He asked how Marshal Stalin would feel if the suggestion was made that the Crimea should be internationalized for use as a summer resort.

¹ For a facsimile of a page of Byrnes' shorthand notes covering this portion of the meeting, together with a transcription thereof, see Byrnes, pp. ix-x.
MARSHAL STALIN said he would be glad to give the Crimea as a place to be used for meetings of the three powers.⁵

Mr. STETTINIUS then completed reading the report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers, as follows:

**Trusteeships (continued)**

It was also agreed that this subject should be discussed at the United Nations Conference itself.

The Sub-Committee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers today. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming Conference. This subject was discussed at today’s meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.

**Iran**

Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet Delegation to give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr. Eden on this question.⁶ The subject was consequently not discussed.

**Yugoslavia**

On the proposal of the Chairman, it was agreed that representatives of Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov should be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation.

There was also agreement that before the termination of the Crimean Conference it would be desirable that agreement should be reached on the execution of the Subasic-Tito agreement.

The Prime Minister then asked if the Soviet Government had agreed to the two amendments proposed by Mr. Eden in regard to the Subasic-Tito agreement.

Mr. Molotov replied that it was a question of putting the agreement speedily into effect and that amendments meant more delays. He said that it would be better to ask Tito and Subasic concerning the amendments after the agreement had gone into effect.

The Prime Minister inquired whether it was too much to ask that legislative acts of the temporary authorities be subject to confirmation by democratic processes.

Marshall Stalin said that delays were very undesirable and that if the British proposed two more amendments the Soviet Government might propose some of their own. In the meantime, the government of Yugoslavia was held in the balance.

The Prime Minister said you couldn’t say this, as Tito was a dictator and could do what he wants.

Marshall Stalin replied that Tito is not a dictator but the head of a national committee without any clear government, and this is not a good situation.

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⁵ It appears that at about this point there was a brief intermission, during which, at Stettinius' request, Alger Hiss hastily prepared a summary of the Department's views on the trusteeship issue (see Stettinius, pp. 238–239). For the text of this summary, see post, p. 558.

Mr. Eden replied that it was not a question of amendments before the agreement went into force but merely that this conference request that they be adopted. He said that Subasic was going to ask for it anyway and as Tito would agree everything would be all right.

Marshal Stalin said the first of the British amendments provided that any former members of the Skupshina who had not collaborated with the Germans should be included in the anti-Fascist Vetch,\(^7\) and the second suggested that all legislative acts of the anti-Fascist Vetch should be confirmed by a regularly elected body. He said that he agreed with these amendments and found them good, but first he would like the government to be formed and then propose the amendments to it.

Mr. Eden remarked that he felt if we could agree here on the amendments then we could ask Tito after the agreement was in force to adopt them.

Marshal Stalin agreed to this proposal. He added that he thought it would be a good idea to send a telegram stating the desires of the three powers to have the agreement put into effect irrespective of the King’s wishes.

The Prime Minister and Mr. Eden explained that the question of the King had been settled and anyway wasn’t important, and Subasic was on his way to Yugoslavia, unless weather had prevented him, to put the agreement into effect. The Prime Minister added that he thought we should here agree to advise the adoption of the amendments.

Marshal Stalin said that he had already agreed, and as a man of his word he would not go back on it.

There was then a half-hour intermission for the study of the Polish proposals.

The President said that after studying Mr. Molotov’s amendment we were now very near agreement and it was only a matter of drafting. He said that for those governments which still recognized the London government the use of the words “Provisional Government” was somewhat difficult, and he felt that the first words of Mr. Molotov’s amendment might read “The Government now operating in Poland”. He said he felt it was very important for him in the United States that there be some gesture made for the six million Poles there indicating that the United States was in some way involved with the question of freedom of elections, and he therefore felt that the last sentence concerning the reports of the Ambassadors was important. He repeated that he felt, however, that it was only a matter of words and details and the three Foreign Ministers might meet tonight to discuss it.

\(^7\) Vetch, Communist committee of local government.
The Prime Minister said he agreed with the President that progress had been made, but he felt that the draft might be tied up by the Foreign Ministers this afternoon. He said that he had two points now that he wished to emphasize. He felt it was desirable to mention in the beginning the new situation that had been created as a result of the liberation of Poland by the Red Army which called for a government more broadly based. He said this might be an ornament but nevertheless an important ornament. He said the second question was more important and related to the last sentence of the United States draft. He said he would make an appeal to Marshal Stalin in that one of the great difficulties in the Polish situation was the lack of accurate information, and we were thus called on to make a decision of great responsibility on the basis of inadequate information. He said that we know that there are bitter feelings among the Poles and fierce language had been used by Osobka-Morawski in regard to the London government, and that he understood the Lublin government had declared its intention to try as traitors the members of the Polish Home Army and the underground forces. He said these reports caused great anxiety and perplexity in England, and he hoped these two points would be considered with Marshal Stalin's usual patience and kindness.

The Prime Minister continued that he personally would welcome observers of the three powers in any area where they appeared needed. He therefore felt that the last sentence of the United States draft in regard to responsibilities of the Ambassadors was very important. He said that he understood that Tito would have no objection to foreign observers when elections were to be held in Yugoslavia, and the British would welcome observers from the United States and the Soviet Union when elections were held in Greece, and the same would apply to Italy. He said these were not idle requests, since, for example, he knew in Egypt that whatever government held the elections won. He recalled that King Farouk for this reason refused to permit Nahas Pasha to hold an election while the latter was prime minister.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he understood the Egyptian elections where he had heard that the very greatest politicians spent their time buying each other, but this could not be compared with Poland since there was a high degree of literacy in Poland. He inquired as to the literacy in Egypt, and neither the Prime Minister or Mr. Eden had this information at hand.

The Prime Minister remarked that he did not mean to compare Poland with Egypt, but he had to give the House of Commons real assurance that free elections would be held. For instance, would Mikolajczyk be allowed to take part in these elections?
Marshal Stalin remarked that Mikołajczyk was a member of the Peasant Party which wasn’t a Fascist party and therefore he could take part in the elections.

The Prime Minister suggested this question be considered by the Foreign Ministers tonight.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought this was a matter which should be discussed in the presence of the Poles.

The Prime Minister said he thought this was a matter which was necessary to carry through and that it was important to assure the House of Commons that free elections would be held in Poland, . . .

Marshal Stalin, in reply to this observation, said they were good people and in olden times many of them were scientists. He mentioned Copernicus in this connection. He admitted that they were still quarrelsome and there were still some Fascist elements in Poland, and that was why “non-Fascist, etc.” had been added to the term “democratic parties”.

The President said he would like to add one word. He felt that the elections was the crux of the whole matter, and since it was true, as Marshal Stalin had said, that the Poles were quarrelsome people not only at home but also abroad, he would like to have some assurance for the six million Poles in the United States that these elections would be freely held, and he said he was sure if such assurance were present that elections would be held by the Poles there would be no doubt as to the sincerity of the agreement reached here.

Marshal Stalin then said he had before him the Declaration on Liberated Europe, and Mr. Molotov had one small change to propose.8 He said that in the fourth paragraph, after the part about consulting the other United Nations, he suggested adding the following:

In this connection, support will be given to the political leaders of those countries who have taken an active part in the struggle against the German invaders.9

Marshal Stalin remarked that with this slight amendment he found the Declaration acceptable.

The President pointed out that the Declaration would of course apply to any areas or countries where needed as well as to Poland.

The Prime Minister said he did not dissent from the President’s proposed Declaration as long as it was clearly understood that the reference to the Atlantic Charter did not apply to the British Empire. He said he had already made plain in the House of Commons that as far as the British Empire was concerned the principles already applied. He said he had given Mr. Willkie a copy of his statement on this subject.

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8 For the text of the declaration as proposed by Roosevelt, see post, pp. 862–863.
9 See post, p. 863.
The President inquired if that was what had killed Mr. Willkie. The President said that in earlier drafts France had been included but was now absent.

Marshal Stalin remarked that three powers were better than four. The Prime Minister said it might be possible to ask France to associate itself with the Declaration.

The President suggested that this matter be considered by the three Foreign Ministers tonight.

Marshal Stalin said that the Prime Minister need have no anxiety that Mr. Molotov's amendment was designed to apply to Greece.

The Prime Minister said he was not anxious about Greece—that he merely desired that everybody should have a fair chance and do his duty.

Marshal Stalin said he thought it would have been very dangerous if he had allowed other forces than his own to go into Greece.

The Prime Minister said he would welcome a Soviet observer in Greece.

Marshal Stalin said he had complete confidence in British policy in Greece.

The Prime Minister expressed gratification in this statement.

The Prime Minister then said that they should touch on, at this conference, the question of war criminals—that is, those whose crimes had no geographical limitation.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether his amendment to the Declaration was acceptable.

The President replied that he thought it should be considered by the Foreign Ministers.

Marshal Stalin said that we could then consider it agreed that the Tito-Subasic agreement should go into effect immediately.

The Prime Minister concurred.

Marshal Stalin made some reference to sending a telegram to Tito but the suggestion was not pursued.

The Prime Minister said that he personally had drafted the Declaration on German atrocities issued by the Moscow Conference which dealt with the subject of the main criminals whose crimes had no geographical location. He said it was an egg that he had laid himself and he thought a list of the major criminals of this category should be drawn up here. He said he thought they should be shot once their identity is established.

Marshal Stalin asked about Hess.

The Prime Minister said he thought that events would catch up with Hess. He said he believed these men should be given a judicial trial.
MARSHAL STALIN replied in the affirmative. He then asked if the war criminal question applied to prisoners of war.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that it did if they had violated the laws of war. He said that we should merely have an exchange of views here and no publicity should be given to the matter.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired if the offensive on the Western Front had begun.

THE PRIME MINISTER said yes—about 100,000 British launched an attack yesterday morning and made an advance of about 3,000 yards over a five-mile front. He said the defense had been weak except in two villages, and were now in contact with the defenses of the Siegfried Line. He said the second wave, of the United States 9th Army, was to start tomorrow. He added that this offensive was to continue and grow in intensity.

The meeting then adjourned until four o’clock tomorrow.

Matthews Files

Matthews Minutes

TOP SECRET

The President opened the meeting by calling on Mr. Stettinius to report on the 12 o’clock meeting of the foreign ministers. Mr. Stettinius read his report. Upon the conclusion of the section on Poland Mr. Molotov interrupted and said that he would like to make a few remarks. It was decided to hear his remarks on Poland prior to the reading of the rest of Mr. Stettinius’ report.

Molotov: We accept as a basis the proposal put forward this morning by Mr. Stettinius. We would like to come to an agreement, adding only some amendments. The first sentence we would modify to read that the provisional government should be “reorganized on a wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic statesmen in Poland and Poles living abroad.” I have a second amendment to suggest. In the sentence on the holding of elections I would revise to read: “In these elections all non-Fascist and anti-Fascist democratic parties would have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.” My third amendment is the omission of the last sentence of Mr. Stettinius’ draft which we feel would seriously offend the sensibilities of the Poles.

I have one more request to make. The carrying out of the Yugoslav settlement has been delayed. Since Mr. Churchill agreed on this settlement we feel that it should be carried out immediately.

1 For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.
Prime Minister: We can settle that in just a few minutes but let us wait until we finish discussing Poland. (This was agreed to.) I am glad to see that there has been a great advance towards a solution of the Polish question. I should like to have more time to study the problem.

(The President suggested a half hour intermission and this was agreed to but the Prime Minister continued.)

I mean more than that. I do not feel that we should hurry away from the Crimea leaving these vital problems unsolved or reach hasty decisions. These are among the most important days that any of us shall live. Of course you could all go away and leave me in this delightful spot but I do urge that we stay a little bit longer to conclude our discussions satisfactorily.

(There was no comment by either the President or Marshal Stalin on this statement.)

On Yugoslavia there were only two amendments to the agreement which Marshal Stalin has now had an opportunity to study.

Stalin: I agree with both of the suggested amendments but after the unified government is formed we will be in a position to carry them out. I propose that we first proceed with the formation of this unified government of Tito and Subasic and then we can proceed with the amendments.

(A copy of the British proposed amendments to the Tito-Subasic government is attached.)

Eden: We agree to this if it is likewise agreed that both of us will support the adoption of these amendments.

Stalin: This must be finished before we separate. We must have a promise that the Tito-Subasic agreement be carried out immediately creating a new government, irrespective of what fantasies there may be in the head of King Peter. Has Subasic actually left for Belgrade?

Eden: We telegraphed last night to find out but have not yet heard. Any delay must be due to weather.

(Here followed the intermission during which consideration was given by the Americans and British to Molotov's amendments to Mr. Stettinius' formula.)

President: I find that it is now largely a question of etymology—of finding the right words. We are nearer than we have ever been before. I believe there is a chance of real agreement to settle this question of the period before the Poles can hold their election. I have two examples of what I mean by the use of words. Mr. Molotov says that the present Polish government should be reorganized on a wider basis. This is difficult for those recognizing the Polish government

2 Not attached, but see ante, p. 821.
in London. I suggest that the words be changed to, "The Polish provisional government now functioning in Poland." I have another example. Mr. Molotov proposes the elimination of the last sentence. (He reads it.) I suggest that some gesture be made to show that there will be an honest election. Therefore, I think that a little more work by the three foreign ministers tonight—we are sufficiently close—might settle the question. They can report the results of tonight's meeting to us tomorrow.

Prime Minister: I agree with the President that there has been continuous progress towards a united declaration by the three principal powers. I agree with the President that the matter should be tidied up by the three foreign secretaries and reported to us tomorrow. But there are two points which I should like to emphasize now. The first is a small one. It arises out of what Marshal Stalin said yesterday. He said that Poland has been liberated and the enemy driven away—that is a great new fact. It is a good point to make before the world that the Red Army has liberated Poland. Therefore, a new situation has been created. This calls for the establishment of a new provisional Polish government, that this now be more broad based than before liberation. That gives a good chance for what we say to be received favorably by the world. It is ornamental but it is important to us.

The other point is much more important. That is the last sentence of the United States draft. I want to make an appeal to Marshal Stalin. We are at a great disadvantage in discussing Polish affairs for we know very little but must take great responsibilities. We know there are very bitter feelings among the Poles. Very fierce language has been used by Mr. Morawski. I am informed that the Lublin government has openly declared its intentions to try as traitors all members of the Polish Home Army. This causes us great anxiety and distress. We are perplexed in forming our view. Of course, I put first the non-hampering of the operations of the Red Army against Germany. But I would ask the Marshal with patience and kindness to consider our position. We really do not know what is going on except through a few people we parachuted in and a few we brought out through the underground. I don't like to obtain information that way. How can this be remedied without hampering the movements of the Red Army, which movements are, of course, before everything else important? Could any facilities be granted to the British—and the United States would no doubt like to participate—in order to see how the Polish quarrels are being settled? That is why the last sentence is so important for us. Might I say if elections take place in Yugoslavia, Tito will have no objection to Russian, British and American observers to assure the world that they are
impartial. So far as Greece is concerned, when elections are held, which we hope will be soon, we would greatly welcome U. S., Russian and British observers to show the world. The same thing is true of Italy. There are vast changes in the Italian political situation. There must be elections to form a constitutional assembly or parliament. Our formula is the same. The U. S., Britain and Russia should be observers to see that they are carried out impartially. These are no idle requests. In Egypt whatever government conducts the elections wins. Nahas wanted elections when he quarreled with the King. The King said, “No, not while you are in office.” When he turned Nahas out the King’s people won.

Stalin: I do not believe much in Egyptian elections. It is all rotten corruption there. They buy each other.

Prime Minister: Anyway, we seek this formula.

Stalin: What percentage of the people read and write in Egypt? In Poland 70% can read and write.

Prime Minister: I do not know the Egyptian percentage, but I meant no comparison with Poland. I only wanted fair elections. This should be considered with the Poles. I do not want to go on any longer. We have agreed to think this over. But I must be able to tell Parliament that elections will be free and fair.

Stalin: Mikołajczyk is a representative of the Peasant Party. The Peasant Party is not Fascist and will take part in the elections. Those candidates will be allowed to stand.

Prime Minister: Yes, specifically as a government is formed.

Stalin: Yes, the Peasant Party will be represented. This can be done in the presence of the Poles with various people present.

Prime Minister: In Parliament I must be able to say that the elections will be held in a fair way. I do not care much about Poles myself.

Stalin: There are some very good people among the Poles. They are good fighters. Of course, they fight among themselves too. I think on both sides there are non-Fascist and anti-Fascist elements.

Prime Minister: I do not like this division. Anybody can call anybody anything. We prefer the terminology democratic parties.

Stalin: I refer to the declaration on liberated areas. On the whole I approve it. I find in a certain paragraph the same expression, anti-Nazism and anti-Fascism.

President: This is the first example for the use of the declaration. It has the phrase to create democratic institutions of their own choice. The next paragraph contains the following: (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people.
STALIN: We accept that paragraph three.

PRESIDENT: I want this election in Poland to be the first one beyond question. It should be like Caesar's wife. I did not know her but they said she was pure.

STALIN: They said that about her but in fact she had her sins.

PRESIDENT: I don't want the Poles to be able to question the Polish elections. The matter is not only one of principle but of practical politics.

MOLOTOV: We are afraid to leave this phrase in without consulting with the Poles. They will feel that it shows a lack of confidence in them. It is better to leave it to the Poles.

PRESIDENT: Why not leave this for the foreign ministers and talk about it tomorrow?

STALIN: I think in the first place in the words "present provisional Polish government" we can delete the word "present." We can say, "the Polish government which acts in Poland."

PRESIDENT: The only thing left is this declaration on liberated areas.

PRIME MINISTER: I do not dissent from this declaration but I want to be on record that the Atlantic Charter I once interpreted as affecting the British empire. We are pursuing the Atlantic Charter. I sent a copy of this interpretation to Wendell Willkie.

PRESIDENT: Was that what killed him? (Laughter)

PRIME MINISTER: I will furnish the conference with a copy of this record. (This part was not clear.)

EDEN: I suppose it would be left open for France to associate herself with this declaration at a later date.

STALIN: Three would be better.

MOLOTOV: I should like to add at the end of the third from last paragraph the following phrase: "and there will be secured a wide measure of support to men in those countries who have taken active part in the struggle against German occupation."

PRIME MINISTER: (This seemed irrelevant) On Greece there was no question of setting up an allied commission but if Marshal Stalin wants to send in military observers they can go anywhere they like.

STALIN: I have full confidence in the way things are going.

PRIME MINISTER: I should like to discuss the treatment of war criminals. I sent a paper to the conference at Moscow. This is an egg I have laid myself. (He then discusses at some length the question of having lists prepared of principal war criminals and the question of holding trials.) There is nothing of course that would be said in public about this because I fear retaliation on our prisoners. (The President indicates that we are not ready to discuss this question at this meeting.)

PRESIDENT: I propose adjournment.
PRIME MINISTER: I should like to announce that the British troops began an attack at dawn yesterday in the Nijmegen area. They advanced about three thousand years [yards] and are now in contact with the Siegfried Line. They were not strongly resisted. Several hundred prisoners were taken. Tomorrow the second wave will follow and the American Ninth Army comes in. The offensive will continue without cessation.

The meeting adjourned.

Hiss Notes

Get copy of Eden's report of 2/8
Q of invitation to Poland

ERS read his report
Mol: After Polish part
New suggestions—postponed till conclusion of report
Amendments to Am. proposal re “reorg” etc & re Ambs.
Church: glad see advance
But going say something before goes on Refers to some private talks we have had about Lublin To Pres—if you will forgive me Can’t be hurried Feels this matter can’t be hurried. It may be complete meeting of minds can be achieved in the time we have in view. There are only 48 hrs left. I do not like to feel spoiling whole thing. Must say we should, if nec., take a day’s latitude. If we leave here without agt about Pol whatever else we say we shall have failed on the most dangerous & tiresome matter I haven’t taken it all in fully

(1) Get copy of Eden’s report of 2/8

(2) Q of Poland as invited nation to Conference

(3) Add T. T. formula to ERS report & eliminate “dependent areas”

(4) See H H re point 2 of formula

1 From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.
2 The foregoing is in Hiss’ handwriting on a loose sheet found in the Matthews Files.
3 Territorial trusteeship.
4 Harry Hopkins.

305375—55—59
ERS read report

Mol. After Pol. section, Mol. proposed amendments to U. S. paper of this morning

Re Terr trusteeship part of ERS report

I absolutely refuse to engage myself in that without consultation with the dominions. I will not have 1 scrap of the Brit Empire . . . (lost) . . . .

after all we have done in the war

I will not consent to a repres of Brit Em. going to any conference where we will be placed in the dock & asked to defend ourselves

Never, Never, Never

If you tell me we are not to go & be brought up before a vague tribunal & be told how to be good & proper I will not object.

Every scrap of terr. over which Brit flag flies is immune

ERS: Only plan is to provide machinery for trusteeship if org. wants set it up. We had in mind Jap. mandated islands to be taken from Jap.

We have nothing in mind in relation to Brit Empire.

Church: We desire no territory

Say it will in no way affect integrity of Brit. Em.

(In intermission a formula was agreed to)

Decl. on Lib. Eur.

Referred Pol q. back to For. Mins. for night session

Church: made speech in favor of Amb. watching over Pol election

When in discussion of this Church said we don't like word fascist,

St referred to Decl. on Lib. Eur. ¶ 2, 1st sentence & said he liked Decl.

Pres. then read ¶ 3 from (c) on.

St: We accept that

Pres: spoke of need of elections being above suspicion

Pres then brought up Decl. formally

Church: I do not assent from this but I would like it on record that Atl. Ch. was interpreted by me on my return from Newfoundland in short ¶ I read to H of C. that we were pursuing these aims in Brit Em. That is a part of our interpretation. I sent it to Wendel Willkie

Pres: Was that what killed him?

Church. I will furnish conf. with copy of this code (?)

Ed. Might be left open to 3 powers to associate the Fr. with them if they so desire

5 Points appear in the original.
St. Three will be better—looks better
Ed. I don’t want to change it now
Mol—amendment addition: at the end—of next to 3rd from last comma &:

When the 3 Govts will consult the other Un Ns
give           strong
& there will be executed wide measures of support to
the men of these countries who take took active part
struggle
in the fight ag. Ger. occuipation.

No other suggestion
Pres: I like the thought. Let For Mins look at the language
St to Church who was about to say something “Are you worried
about Gr.” ⑧ (laughing)
Church: I should like election in Gr.
St. I don’t want to control Mr Church.
Church: I don’t want to control the elections
If Mar. St. wants to send in some of his resp. officers they can go
where they like
St I have every conf. in the Brit. policy
Church: Let Unra come in & give food
Church: One q. we shall have to consider at—war criminals

Note: After Pres. made his commitment on 2/8 re Sov.
Reps Justice Byrnes was very agitated & discussed it with Flynn coming home from Stalin dinner. Flynn
said, with apparently some confusion of thought, that the Irish in N. Y. & other cities would never agree to
Britain having 6 votes & Russia 3 with U. S. only 1. He said D. O. is dead. Byrnes then began considering
giving Puerto Rico, Hawaii & Alaska votes & he & Churchill & the Pres. discussed it a [sic] lunch on
2/9. I talked to Byrnes after plenary meeting on 2/9 & argued against that. I said if Pres. could get St.
to release him from his commitment that would be best course. Byrnes still seemed to be worried about
Brit. citing 1920 League campaign ⑨

⑧Byrnes was particularly worried because Pres. had
made a special point with Sen. For. Rels. Com. &
others of the ridiculousness of Sov. proposal re repub-
lics.

⑧ Greece.
⑨ This item bears a check-mark on the original.
United States Delegation Memorandum

[Yalta, February 9, 1945.]

Ret to AH

P. M. & President, Eden & Cadogan
approved on 2/9 at Plenary session
during intermission

(Insert A)
Add to ERS report of 2/9

Territorial trusteeship would apply only to:

1. Existing mandates of the League of Nations.
2. Territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of this war.
3. Any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.

It would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which territories within the above categories would actually be placed under trusteeship. No discussions of specific territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations Conference. Only machinery & principles of trusteeship would be formulated at the Conference for inclusion in the Charter.

1 It appears that this paper, which is in the penciled handwriting of Alger Hiss, was written during a brief intermission in the plenary meeting on February 9 (see ante, p. 845). The paper consists of draft language which was subsequently incorporated in the report of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting of the same day (see infra).

Revised Report by the Foreign Ministers to the Sixth Plenary Meeting

[Yalta,] February 9, 1945.

Report to the Plenary Session of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, February 9, 1945

1. The Polish Question:

The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish Governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the American Delegation. This memorandum, in accordance with Mr. Molotov’s proposal, agreed to drop the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee.

1 Carbon copy which contains in the margin the following notation in Hiss’ handwriting: “Corrected as result of Plenary session 2/9 & copies given to Gromyko & Jodh 2/10 at For. Mins. meeting. Correction app’d by Pres. 2/10 just before Plenary session.”
With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the Polish Government, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to present to Marshal Stalin certain new considerations advanced in the American memorandum before making a final statement. It was decided to continue discussion of this question at a later date and to report that the three Foreign Ministers thus far had not reached an agreement on the matter.

2. Reparations:

The American Delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and to the types of reparations in kind, Germany should pay.

The Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion, the suggestion of the Soviet Government, that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union. Mr. Eden reserved his position.

The Soviet Delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15% on the prices of the items delivered.

3. Dumbarton Oaks:

It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeships.

Territorial trusteeship would apply only to:

(1) Existing mandates of the League of Nations.
(2) Territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of this war.
(3) Any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.

It would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which territories within the above categories would actually be placed under trusteeship. No discussions of specific territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations Conference. Only machinery and principles of trusteeship would be formulated at the Conference for inclusion in the Charter.

A Sub-Committee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming Conference.
This subject was discussed at today's meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.

4. Iran:
Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet Delegation to give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr. Eden on this question. The subject was consequently not discussed.

5. Yugoslavia:
On the proposal of Mr. Stettinius, it was agreed that representatives of Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov should be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation.

There was also agreement that before the termination of the Crimean Conference it would be desirable that agreement should be reached on the execution of the Subasic-Tito agreement.

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United States Delegation Draft of a Declaration on Liberated Europe

[Yalta, February 5, 1945.]

Declaration on Liberated Europe

The President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert the action of their four governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The retreat of the Nazi war machine and the collapse of its puppet regimes, under the relentless blows of the victorious armies and resistance forces of the United Nations, are leaving behind confusion and disorder, and incalculable distress and suffering. The agony of the liberated peoples must be relieved. Swift steps must be taken

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1 Carbon copy; carries this penciled notation in Hiss' handwriting: “1st redraft after talking to Justice Byrnes. Copy given 5:15 P. M. to Jebb 2/5 at Yalta. Copies to ERS, HFM, Byrnes and Hopkins 8:15 p. m.” This paper was included in the Hiss Collection with other drafts on this subject following the Plenary Meeting on February 10, 1945, when the subject was also discussed (see post, p. 899).
during the temporary period of confusion and disorder to help them in
the orderly reconstruction of their daily living.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national
economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the
liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism
and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a
promise of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the
form of government under which they will live—the restoration of
sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been
forcibly deprived of them.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise
these rights, the four governments will take joint action in any
European liberated state and any former Axis satellite state in Europe
where in the judgment of the four governments conditions may make
such action necessary, to assist the peoples concerned (a) to es-

tablish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency
measures for care of distressed peoples and for solution of pressing
economic problems; (c) to set up governmental authorities broadly
representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged
to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of govern-
ments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to arrange and
conduct free elections held to determine the type and composition of
governments.

The four governments will consult the other United Nations and
provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters
of direct interest to them are under consideration.

In carrying out this declaration the four governments will, usually,
act through their respective ambassadors nearest to the area con-
cerned, although on occasion the four governments may determine to
appoint special commissions charged with responsibility for carrying
out the policy of this declaration with respect to particular areas.
Such ambassadors of the four governments as have been authorized
jointly to take action pursuant to the declaration, and any special
commission which may be established for the same purpose, shall
meet quarterly with the foreign ministers of the four governments at
places to be selected hereafter.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the
Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by United Nations,
and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-
loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security,
freedom, and general well-being of all mankind.
Text Proposed by the United States for a Declaration on Liberated Europe, February 9, 1945

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

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1 This was the draft submitted by President Roosevelt to the Plenary Meeting on February 9, 1945. See ante, p. 848. Carbon copies are also in the Matthews Files and the Hiss Collection.
When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

Bohlen Collection

* Soviet Amendment to the Draft Declaration on Liberated Europe*¹

**TOP SECRET**

Amendment proposed by Mr. Molotov at Plenary Session of Feb. 9:

At the end of the fourth paragraph, omit the period, insert a comma, and add the following:

“and strong support will be given to those people in these countries who took an active part in the struggle against German occupation.”

¹ Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting on February 10, 1945. See ante, p. 848. Copies are also in the Matthews Files and the Hiss Collection.

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**TRIPARTITE MEETING ON THE DRAFT AGREEMENT REGARDING LIBERATED PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS, FEBRUARY 9, 1945, 4:30 P. M., VORONTSOV VILLA**

**Present**

**United States**

General Deane

Mr. Page

**United Kingdom**

Admiral Archer

**Soviet Union**

Mr. Novikov

Assistant
TOP SECRET

Memorandum of Conversation

Subject: Examination of the Draft Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet and Allied Armies.

EXAMINATION OF THE DRAFT RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS LIBERATED BY THE SOVIET AND ALLIED ARMIES

Preamble.

No comment.

Article I.

No comment.

Article II, paragraph 1.

Mr. Novikov requested that the words "undertake to follow all" be replaced by the words "at the same time take the necessary steps to implement."

Article II, paragraph 3.

Mr. Novikov requested that the words "notifying the competent Soviet or Allied authorities" be replaced by "effected as a rule by agreement or in any case only after notification to the competent Soviet or Allied authorities."

Article III.

Mr. Novikov said that he would prefer the text of Article III of the Soviet draft. This reads as follows:

"3. The competent British and Soviet authorities will supply liberated Soviet citizens and British subjects with food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the authorities at the other side at places agreed upon between the sides on the following basis:

“(a) Ex-prisoners of war shall be provided with all forms of supply (stores and food) on a basis laid down respectively for privates, non-commissioned officers and officers.

“(b) Civilians will be supplied on a basis laid down for privates.

“The parties will not mutually demand compensation for these or other services which their authorities may respectively supply to liberated Soviet citizens or British subjects.”

It will be noticed that the Soviet draft makes no mention of UNRRA or other relief agencies and makes special provision of supplies to civilians.

1 Authorship not indicated, but Page has stated that this memorandum was drafted by him (telegram from Paris, September 13, 1954, 740.5/9-1554).
2 The draft under discussion was the draft approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on February 8, 1945 (ante, pp. 754-756).
3 Ante, pp. 416-418.
In endeavoring to find a compromise the British suggested a draft omitting the first three lines of Article III (up to the parenthetical statement) and revise the last sentence of the first paragraph to read as follows:

"The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall make distinction between military rank but shall apply to liberated civilians and liberated members of the respective forces."

The Soviets explained that the reference to UNRRA was superfluous since there was nothing in the agreement which would bar UNRRA or any other relief agency from operating. They said they would refer the British re-draft to their Government.

Article IV.

The Soviets requested the insertion of the words "in agreement with the other party" twice after the words "liberty to use."

Article V.

The British wish to add the words "except for the cases of payment of Lira in Italy which shall be subject to future discussions" at the end of the second paragraph.

The Russians stated that they thought this insertion should read "except for the cases of payment of Lira, __________, and __________, in Italy, Rumania, and Bulgaria which shall be the subject of future discussions."

Article VI.

The British pointed out that they had added a new sentence which had not as yet been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This sentence which comes at the end of the article, reads as follows:

"Any liberated member of the respective forces who is unwilling to perform such will be exercised under similar supervision."

Article VII.

No comment.

Article VIII.

No comment.

In addition to the above comments, it was considered advisable to include an additional article reading to the effect that "the agreement enters into force upon signature."

The British representative also stated that his Government desired to exchange notes with the Soviet Government concerning nationals of other countries, (Belgium, Holland, Poland), in British uniform who were liberated by the Russian armies.
The question also came up as to whether a tri-lateral or two bi-
lateral agreements should be signed. The Russians indicated that they were prepared to sign either document.

It was suggested that a further meeting be called tomorrow at 3:30 p. m. and that endeavors be made to have the documents signed by Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius no later than Sunday.

[Attachment]

Revised British Wording, Feb. 9.

Article 6.

X [Ex-] Prisoners of War (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreement to be reached between the competent Soviet and British authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between these authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their officers. Any liberated member of the respective forces who is unwilling to perform such work will be exercised under similar supervision.

* No minutes of such a meeting have been found.

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MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 9, 1945,
10:30 P. M., YUSUPOV PALACE

Present

**United States**
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Bohlen

**United Kingdom**
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Allen

**Soviet Union**
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Golunsky
TOP SECRET
Subjects: Poland

Declaration on Liberated Areas

The meeting was opened by Mr. Molotov announcing that we had come together to discuss formulas with regard to Poland. Mr. Eden interrupted to say that he had just had a strong cable from the War Cabinet indicating that the earlier basis of discussion had not been satisfactory. He must, therefore, frankly say if we cannot get something like his text of three days ago there seems no chance of the British Government approving a formula. (The text of Mr. Eden’s earlier formula is attached) ¹ He thereupon handed the attached draft of a “revised formula” to Mr. Molotov.² There was some lively discussion as to whether this was in fact a new formula to which Mr. Molotov objected, or whether it should be considered merely a modification of the American formula to which amendments could be added. This latter viewpoint was finally accepted, Mr. Eden explaining that the first two sentences were merely a reiteration of what the Prime Minister had said in the afternoon.

After a lengthy but amicable discussion, the following text was agreed to by all three:

“A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a provisional Polish government more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The provisional government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad. This new government will then be called the ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.’ Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.

“When a ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition.”

¹ Post, pp. 869–870.
² Post, pp. 870–871.
The one important point on which considerable discussion failed to produce agreement was with respect to the addition of a further sentence along the following lines:

“The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.”

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden emphasized the importance of the inclusion of some such sentence if recognition is to be transferred from the London Government because of its effect on public opinion in their respective countries. Mr. Molotov insisted that this was a point that could be discussed with the Poles by the commission of three in Moscow but could not be included without such discussion as it would offend their sensibilities. Mr. Stettinius then proposed a variation of that sentence, reading as following:

“The three governments recognizing their responsibility as a result of the present agreement for the future right of the Polish people freely to choose the government and institutions under which they are to live, will receive reports on this subject from their ambassadors in Warsaw.”

Mr. Molotov had the same objections to this sentence. It was left that the question would be put up to the Big Three Meeting this afternoon.

The second point discussed concerned Mr. Molotov’s proposed addition to the draft declaration on liberated areas. He proposed that the following clause be added at the conclusion of the third from last paragraph:

“And in this connection support should be given to the political leaders of these countries who took an active part in the struggle against the German invaders.”

Mr. Stettinius stated that he could not accept this addition and that it did not appear pertinent to the declaration. He said that it appeared like too much interference in the affairs of these countries and involved taking decisions on who had collaborated with the enemy, which should be left to the peoples of these countries themselves. Mr. Eden expressed full concurrence with those views. It was agreed likewise to refer this to the next session of the Big Three.
Matthews Notes

EDEN: Done work—put together a piece of work.
MOL: Objects new text—Wants old
EDEN: Cable War Cab tonight objecting his text 3 days ago. and extent of departure from other text. Says frankly, if can't get something like this text no chance of Brit Govt approving
MOL: Cant talk from a new text
EDEN: Has had text 2½ days
MOL: Until now hasnt had text & can't judge it.
EDEN: 1st par. exactly what P. M. read out this p. m.
MOL: Differs from text this a. m. & big conference. Objects "represent" pol govt. Whether de G. is rep. govt is a ? Mr. Churchill said his amend. not very import on first sen.
EDEN: Proposes amend. in 1st 2 sen. This in accord with P. M.s suggest.
MOL: Thinks "represent govt requires much explan. De G. Amend in Connection with prev. Govt now
EDEN: Must be frank. Wants transfer recog. to new govt—not reorgan. Lublin govt.
MOL: One further step
Last ¶ must be discussed

For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

Presumably De Gaulle.

Bohlen Collection

British Proposal on Polish Boundaries and Government

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] February 8, 1945.

Revised Formula for Poland

1. It was agreed that the Curzon Line should be the eastern frontier of Poland with adjustments in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers in favour of Poland.

2. It was decided that the territory of Poland in the west should include the free city of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia west and south of Königsberg, the administrative district of Oppeln in Silesia and the lands desired by Poland to the east of the line of the Oder. It was understood that the Germans in the said regions should be

See ante, p. 867.
repatriated to Germany and that all Poles in Germany should at their wish be repatriated to Poland.

3. Having regard to the recent liberation of western Poland by the Soviet armies it was deemed desirable to facilitate the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government based upon all the democratic and anti-Fascist forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poles abroad. That Government should be so constituted as to command recognition by the three Allied Governments.

4. It was agreed that the establishment of such a provisional Government was the primary responsibility of the Polish people, and that, pending the possibility of free elections, representative Polish leaders should consult together on the composition of this provisional Government. V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted with the task of approaching such leaders and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three Allied Governments.

5. It was deemed desirable that the provisional Polish Government, thus established, should as soon as possible hold free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, in which all democratic parties should have the right to participate and to promote candidatures, in order to ensure the establishment of a Government truly representative of the will of the Polish people.

Boken Collection

*British Revised Proposal on the Polish Government*¹

**TOP SECRET**

**British Revised Formula Submitted at the Meeting of Foreign Secretaries after the Plenary Session of February 9, 1945**

"A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. This Government should be based upon the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland and upon other democratic Polish leaders from within Poland and from abroad. This new Government should be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr should be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of

¹ See ante, p. 867.
the present Provisional Government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This "Provisional Government of National Unity" would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections, all democratic parties would have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been formed, which the three Governments can regard as fully representative of the Polish people, the three Governments will accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1945

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 10, 1945, NOON, VORONTSOV VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Hiss
Mr. Page

UNITED KINGDOM
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Dixon
Major Theakstone

SOVIET UNION
Foreign Commissar
Molotov
Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gronyko
Mr. Pavlov

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Page Minutes

TOP SECRET

Subjects: 1
1. The Polish Formula.
2. Declaration on Liberated Europe.
3. Yugoslavia.
4. Reparations.
5. Communiqué on the Crimean Conference.
6. World Organization.
8. Yugoslav-Italian Frontier.
9. Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations.
10. Iran.

1 For the United States Delegation memorandum on the items still before the Foreign Ministers, see post, p. 882.
Mr. Eden, who presided, opened the meeting.

1. The Polish Formula.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the American experts as well as the President had given serious study to the Polish formula and that the American Delegation was prepared to withdraw the last sentence, which Mr. Molotov had objected to, on the understanding that the President would be free to make any statement he felt necessary on Poland relative to his receiving information from his Ambassador on the question.

Later in the conversation Mr. Eden stated that he did not wish to indicate during the conversation on the Polish formula that he agreed with the American proposal to drop this last sentence.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he, of course, preferred the document as it existed. The President, however, was so anxious to reach agreement that he was willing to make this concession.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had several amendments to the formula. He proposed that "as soon as practicable" be changed to "as soon as possible." He also proposed that the last part of the last paragraph be drafted to read: "the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Government as has been done by the Soviet Union."

Mr. Stettinius stated that he could not agree with this second change.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that a special situation existed in Poland. The Soviet Government had accorded the Polish Government recognition, whereas, the United States and Great Britain had not.

Mr. Eden said that the Government referred to in the formula was a new government and that it was most necessary that the three Allies move together in recognizing it.

Mr. Stettinius supported Mr. Eden and added that it was vital for public opinion in the United States to adhere to the principle of a new Polish Government.

Mr. Molotov stated that the present situation was a different one and that the document would reflect this difference. He referred to the inadvisability of prejudicing the present situation or raising difficulties in the rear of the Red Army. He suggested that the matter be given consideration and be subsequently discussed. Mr. Molotov later suggested that Mr. Eden make a full report on last night's and

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2 Ante, p. 867.
3 See the United States Delegation memorandum, post, p. 884.
today's discussion on the Polish situation for submission to the plenary session.⁴

2. Declaration on Liberated Europe.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he had consulted with his experts and with the President on the Declaration on Liberated Areas and that he was obliged to say that the American Government found it impossible to accept the amendment proposed by Mr. Molotov at the Plenary Session of February 9. To do so would cause untold difficulties in United States domestic affairs. The text of this Declaration, with Mr. Molotov's amendment is attached hereto.⁵

Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to submit a second amendment. He suggested that in the fifth paragraph the words "they will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration," be replaced by the words "they will immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultation."

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden agreed to this formula.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to the status of Mr. Molotov's amendment of February 9.

Mr. Molotov agreed that it should be dropped, though he remarked that he thought it very useful in that it might prevent recurrences similar to those in Greece.

Mr. Eden inquired whether the British proposals⁶ regarding French association were acceptable.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had not had sufficient time to give full consideration to this proposal. He suggested that it be discussed at the four o'clock meeting.

Mr. Stettinius observed that he approved highly the British proposal and recommended that it be included in the Declaration.

3. Yugoslavia.

Mr. Eden stated that he had been informed that Subasic was due to leave today or tomorrow for Belgrade. The principal question under dispute, as he understood it, has been about the names of the Regents. However, in the British view, there was no reason why this should hold up the execution of the agreement. If Mr. Molotov so desired, Mr. Eden stated that Marshal Stalin's proposal might be accepted to the effect that a telegram be sent setting forth the views of the Foreign Ministers on the Yugoslav situation.

⁴ For the formula on Poland as amended by the Foreign Ministers, see the United States Delegation memorandum, post, pp. 883–884, and Eden's report to the Seventh Plenary Meeting, post, p. 898.
⁵ Post, p. 884.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether any mention should be made of Yugoslavia in the Crimea Conference Communiqué.

MR. EDEN suggested that both courses might be advisable.

MR. MOLOTOV recalled that Marshal Stalin had suggested that a telegram be sent to Tito and Subasic suggesting that they expedite the coming into force of the agreement.

MR. EDEN stated that he would submit such a draft telegram to the Foreign Ministers for consideration.\(^7\)

4. Reparations.

MR. EDEN stated that he wished to reserve the position of the British Government with respect to pre-war debts and claims. He was in favor of setting up the Reparations Commission as soon as possible.

MR. MAISKY interjected that unless the British agreed to the American draft submitted February 9,\(^8\) the Commission would have no basis, no directives for its work.

MR. EDEN stated that he agreed on the principles involved in the American proposals concerning the immediate withdrawal of property from Germany and the annual contributions. However, he wished to submit a redraft of the proposals.\(^9\)

MR. EDEN stated that reparations should be considered in connection with the dismemberment of Germany. There seemed to be two Russian objectives which were difficult to reconcile—the depletion of German manufacturing capacity and the insuring of German ability to make large payments at a later date. The British were most anxious to avoid conditions in which it would be necessary for them to finance and feed Germany at a later date as a result of reparations. Furthermore, the British would like France on the Moscow Commission from the start. The British Government also felt that the question of labor should be considered by the Moscow Commission and that it would be inadvisable to name any figure for deliveries until the Moscow Commission had started its work. In addition, reparations arrangements should be made without prejudices to the restitution of looted property.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed to this last statement.

MR. MAISKY stated that Mr. Eden’s reply was very disappointing. Its whole spirit was to take from Germany as little as possible.

MR. EDEN interjected that this was not the case; however, he could say that the Prime Minister did not believe that the Russians would receive anywhere near as much as they hoped for.

\(^7\) Post, pp. 919–920.

\(^8\) Ante, p. 908.

\(^9\) Post, p. 885.
Mr. Maisky stated that naturally when the dismemberment of Germany had been decided in a practical form the reparations plan must be adjusted. This problem was considered from its initiation. There was no contradiction. The amount of annual payments were quite possible after the contemplated removals. If Mr. Eden had any doubts the easiest way out was to accept the formula agreed upon by the Americans and Russians yesterday as the basis for discussion and to raise the British proposals in Moscow on this basis. He stated that the question of labor would certainly come up for discussion of the plan during the Commission studies of Germany. He pointed out that the formula did not commit the Allies to the exact figure. Taking into account all considerations advanced by Mr. Eden, Mr. Maisky maintained that the British could easily agree to the formula.

Mr. Eden maintained that the British wished a period shorter than ten years for the reparations payments. They preferred five years.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the ten-year period was merely mentioned as a basis for discussion. It might result that all the capital movements could be effected in seven years. He added that the Soviet Government was not committing itself to ten years or twenty billion dollars.

Mr. Eden inquired why this time limit should then be put in the formula.

Mr. Maisky replied that it was desired as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Eden stated that he would submit an alternative draft and that he hoped that the subject might be discussed at the 4:00 o’clock meeting.

5. Communiqué on the Crimean Conference.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether any thought had been given to the communiqué on the Conference.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the American Delegation was drafting something for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers. He suggested that the first item on the afternoon’s agenda be the question of a communiqué and that the drafting of a communiqué be assigned to the Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed to this suggestion.

6. World Organization.

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to submit a report of the subcommittee.10

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10 Post, pp. 885-886.
Mr. Molotov stated that he agreed to both points contained in the report, i.e., regarding the method of consulting France and China and the text of the invitation to the Conference.

Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius also agreed.


Mr. Eden stated that this problem would surely arise and that he did not wish a repetition of “Athens”. He wished to submit a small paper on the question.\(^1\)

Mr. Molotov stated that he would wish to study this paper before discussing it.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he felt that paragraph (b) on page two went beyond the period of occupation and that it might be improved by redrafting.

8. Yugoslav-Italian Frontier.

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to submit a paper on this question. He added that he did not expect to discuss it at the present meeting. A copy of this document is attached.\(^2\)

9. Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations.

In accordance with Mr. Eden’s suggestion, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty of alliance. The British Embassy in Moscow had transmitted to the Narkomindel a note on the Balkan Federation in which it was stressed that such a Federation might include Turkey. This was not an urgent matter at the present time; however there were conversations in progress between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on a treaty of friendship and alliance. The Soviet Government entertained favorable views on this treaty and had informed the British accordingly. The Bulgarians and Yugoslavs were collaborating militarily against the Germans in Yugoslavia. There should, consequently, be no objections to such a treaty.

Mr. Eden stated that this treaty raised the important question of principle. The British held the view that former enemy states should be debarred from entering into treaty relations with other states when they were under an occupational regime and certainly not without the permission of the Allies. Apart from this principle, the British were somewhat anxious concerning the effect of the treaty on reparations which Greece should obtain from Bulgaria. He wished to submit a separate memorandum on this matter.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) *Post*, p. 887.
\(^2\) *Post*, pp. 888–889.
\(^3\) *Post*, pp. 891–893.
Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Foreign Office had received a note from the British to the effect that former enemies under an armistice regime should not have treaty relations with other enemy states. But now it was a question of an ex-enemy and a friendly state. He maintained that the British had stated that they had no objections to treaties between ex-enemy and friendly states.

Mr. Eden questioned this.

Mr. Molotov continued that this principle was also implied in the British proposal concerning a Balkan Federation in which former enemy and friendly states would enter.

Mr. Eden maintained that he did not believe that states under an armistice regime should be permitted to make peace treaties without the permission of the Allies. Furthermore, the British never had in mind a Balkan Federation until the armistice period had terminated.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was completely in accord with Mr. Eden's views.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would not be preferable for the states in question to wait.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had no power to speak for them.

Mr. Eden reminded him that Bulgaria had signed an armistice and was not free to do what it wished.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that this question be discussed by the Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov in Moscow promptly.

Mr. Molotov stated that it might be preferable to postpone discussion of this matter until tomorrow and then to seek agreement.

10. Iran.

Mr. Eden inquired whether Mr. Molotov had considered the British document on Iran. Mr. Molotov stated that he had nothing to add to what he had said several days ago on the subject.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would not be advisable to issue a communiqué on Iran.

Mr. Molotov stated that this would be inadvisable.

Mr. Stettinius urged that some reference be made that Iranian problems had been discussed and clarified during the Crimean Conference.

Mr. Molotov stated that he opposed this idea.

Mr. Eden suggested that it be stated that the declaration on Iran had been reaffirmed and re-examined during the present meeting.

Mr. Molotov opposed this suggestion.

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14 For the text of the armistice with Bulgaria, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 437, pp. 1–4, 17, or 58 Stat. 1498.

ERS asked make statement

We are prepared to withdraw our insistence on the final sentence in the Polish memo. which Mr. Mol. objected to with the understanding that the Pres would be perfectly free to make any statement to the Am. people he might think he had to relative to receiving inform. from his Amb.

Mol. Would like to make a small amend. to yesterday’s text: one cond: as soon as possible

of U. S. & Gt Brit will est. dip. rels. with it as has been done by the Soviet Un

Ed. objected—It’s to be a new govt
Mol: we can leave out “as has been done by the Soviet Un”
Ed. But we would all have to recognize it.
Mol. our sit. is diff. from that of U. S. We have already given recog. to present govt
Ed: Yes but this will be a newgov’t
ERS: Advisable that we all move together
Mol: Present sit. being different the doc. must reflect this diff. We quite agree on the future. Let us think about it.
ERS Decl. on Lib. Areas Have discussed Mr. Mol’s proposal Impossible for us to consider amend. Would create untold diffs. for us with respect to our dom. situation
Mol: Then I will propose another amend:
2nd ¶ from the end “they would immed. take measures for carrying out mutual consultation”
Suggests one or other amend;
Ed: An improvement
ERS I’m very favorably impressed
Mol. As to the former amend. Thinks it would be very useless because we don’t wish shots which have occurred in Athens to take place elsewhere
ERS. Sorry, I’m not authorized to consider this amend. any further.

New amend. agreed to
→Mol Withdraws his former amend.

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1 From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes of this meeting.
Ed: One other point. About Fr. sit. Proposed addition of a last ¶
Mol: Hasn’t had time to study it, perhaps at 4.00
ERS: As stated yesterday, thinks it most desirable
Ed: Little further inform. Re Yug. Sub.² due leave today or tomorrow for Bel.³ Argument, as I as [sic] understand, has been about names of regents. But in our view no reason this should hold up coming into force of act. We can send tel. setting forth our views as Mar. St. suggested
Mol. and communiqué?
Ed: Can do that, too
Mol. Tel. telling them to hurry up. That the act. come into force imm.
Ed: Will show other 2 delegs. draft of tel.
Ed: Re Pol.—I didn’t mean to indicate act. with Am. proposal to drop last sentence
ERS: We would of course still prefer doc. as it exists but Pres so anxious reach act. he is willing to make this concession
Mol. Thanks him. Mr. Stett. very much

Reparations
Ed:
1. 4st reps should be considered in connection with dismemberment
2. Two R objects—depletion Ger. mfg. capacity & ensuring ability make large payments later—are difficult to reconcile. We are very anxious to avoid conditions making it nec. finance or feed Ger later as result reparations
3. Would like Fr. on Mos. Commission from start
4. Labor should be considered too
5. Can’t name any figure for deliveries until Commission has studied matter
Mol: Any points Mr Ed. agrees on?
Ed. Add: These arrangements are without prejudice to restitution of looted property
Mol: Of course
Ed: reserve position re pre-war claims. We are in favor of Com. being set up in Mos as soon as possible
Mol: No basis for work of Com. We don’t give it any directives or principles on which to work.
Ed. We agree on principles: immediate withdrawal of machinery, etc.—quicker the better—and annual payments. Has a redraft

² Šubašić.
³ Belgrade.
Maisky: Mr. Ed's reply is very disappointing—Whole spirit of reply
Spirit apparently is to take from Ger little as poss.
Ed: Never said anything of kind but can say my P. M. doesn't
think you'll get anything like as much as you think.
Re Ed's points
1. Naturally when dismemberment decided in practical form, plan
be adjusted
2. Problem was considered from beginning. No contradiction.
Am't of annual payments quite possible after contemplated removals.
If you have doubts, shortest cut to accept our formula of yesterday—
to take our proposals as basis for discussion & then bring up your
points Never expected support Ger.

Nothing on 3
4. Labor certainly will come in in elaboration of whole plan, but as
Com. studies q.
5. Our formula doesn't commit you to the figures. Taking into
account all your points, you can easily agree to formula agreed on by
Sov & Am. delegs
Ed. We consider $20 billion equals 500,000,000£ a yr.
Maisky No in ten yrs
Ed: We wanted a shorter period
Mol. Let us write down 10 yrs
Ed: We prefer 5 yrs
ERS Its all a basis of discussion Might end up all these capital
movements possible in 7 yrs Sov. Gov't isn't committing itself to
10 yrs or $20 billion
Maisky Certainly. In end might be 5 or 6
Ed Then why put in 10 yrs
Maisky: As basis for discussion
Ed. Let each put in its own plan Will give alternate draft & dis-
cuss at 4.00 p m
Agreed
Mol. re communiqué
ERS We are hard at work drafting something for your consid.
Mol: You take initiative?
ERS There will be a draft, we would be glad to take initiative I
would suggest 1st order bus. this afternoon that drafting of com-
umn. be assigned to For Mins
Mol. Good
Ed. all right

World Org. report of subcommittee

Mol. I agree to both points—consultation of Ch & Fr. & the invi-
tation
Ed We all agree then

Austria-Yug. frontiers

Ed: presented proposal
Mol. Translate & study
ERS: we feel (b) on p 2 should be pretty carefully considered. We feel that as phrased this goes beyond period of occupation
Ed: That is all that is meant Drafting may need to be made clearer

Yug-It frontier

Ed: proposal to be studied

Yug-Bul. relations

Mol. Mentioned treaty of alliance between Yug & Bul.
1. Recently For. Commissariat rec’d a note re federation, stressing federation might include Turkey. This is not an urgent q.
2. There are conversations between Yug & Bul about a treaty of friendship & alliance Sov. Govt holds a favorable view. They are collaborating militarily ag. Gers in Yug. There should be no objections to it.

Ed: Glad to hear treaty is not actual (?) Anxious about effect of this treaty on reparations we are anxious & all agreed Gr.⁴ should receive from Bul. Has separate memo on this.

Mol All obligations of Bul. have been enforced. No one can change them without consent of 3 powers Bul & Rum. cannot have a treaty between them Now is q. of treaty between 1 friendly country & an ex-enemy. There was a direct agt by Brit Govt to it. Q by Eden?

Mol. There were objections to treaty between 2 former enemies but not friendly & enemy

Ed. We do not think a country under armistice terms can make a treaty without consent of 3 powers. I never had it in mind a country under armistice would come into a federation until armistice over
ERS I’m completely in accord with Ed’s views
Ed: Can’t they wait?
Mol: Has no power to speak for them.
Ed. Bul. has signed armistice. Isn’t free to do as she wants. Although has threatened to shoot our planes coming here.
Mol. Our planes have been shot at in Yug but was mistake & our troops shot at by Am planes
Ed. I don’t know why Bul. can shoot at any planes Can we ask this wait awhile
Mol Can go on with discussions

⁴ Greece.
ERS Suggest our Ambs discuss with Mol. in Mos. promptly
Mol. Would wait until tomorrow

Iran
Mol. Has nothing to add
Ed: Would Mol like to put out communiqué
Mol: Undesirable. Can discuss this later
ERS I would urge some reference that Iranian problems have been
discussed & clarified. Very troublesome q.
Mol Against that
Ed: Say re-examined & reaffirmed Teheran Decl.
Mol Against that
ERS status of Pol. Agreed Ed. to report on yesterday's & today's
progress.

Reparations:
Mol.: mention in document just 2 figures as basis for discussion

His Collection

United States Delegation Memorandum

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

ITEMS STILL BEFORE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

1. Poland:
There is probably no reason to discuss this until the plenary meeting.

2. Declaration of Liberated Europe:
Same status as Number 1.

3. Iran:
The British may propose adoption of their paper—Mr. Matthews
has a copy of it.

4. Reparations:
The British have not yet agreed to Soviet-American paper. The
British or Russians may want to bring this up.

5. Mr. Eden Wants:
(a) To have the provisions relating to the Hungarian Control
Commission apply also in Bulgaria;
(b) To get an agreement for Bulgarian reparations to Greece;
(c) To express opposition to Russian proposal favoring an alliance
between Tito and Bulgaria.

1 Carbon copy; authorship not indicated. Presumably prepared by Hiss for
Stettinius just prior to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 10, 1945.
United States Delegation Memorandum on the Polish Government

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

TEXT OF FORMULA ON POLAND SO FAR AGREED BY THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS

“A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a provisional Polish government more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The provisional government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad. This new government will then be called the ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.’ Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.

“When a ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition.”

In lieu of the following sentence: “When a ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition.” Mr. Molotov suggests the following rewording:

“When a ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with it as has been done by the Soviet Union.”

This sentence was not accepted by Mr. Stettinius or Mr. Eden.

He said he would bring it up again at the four o’clock meeting this afternoon.

1 Undated carbon copy. On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote that he thought this memorandum had been drafted by him (640.0029/8-1354). It was presumably prepared after the Foreign Ministers’ meeting on February 10, 1945. The notations in Matthews’ handwriting, indicated in footnotes, reflect some of the changes incorporated in the text as reported by Eden to the Plenary Meeting that afternoon (post, p. 898).

2 “which can be”

3 “which is”

4 “Poles”

5 Sir “A,” Clark Kerr

6 “shall”

7 “shall”

8 The last seven words are crossed out and the words “Mol. formula” are written in the margin.
The British still advocate inclusion of the following sentence:

"The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

Matthews Files

United States Delegation Memorandum on the Soviet Proposal for the Final Paragraph of the Formula on Poland

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

Mr. Molotov's latest draft proposal for the end of the last sentence of the Polish formula:

"... the Government of the USSR, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity," and will exchange Ambas. by whose reports the respect. Goats. will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

This undated carbon copy reflects the proposal that Molotov made evidently after the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 10, 1945. It was apparently accepted by Stettinius and Eden, since it was incorporated into Eden's report to the Plenary Meeting that afternoon (post, p. 898).

The last clause (printed in italics) was added in Matthews' handwriting.

Bohlen Collection

British Amendment to the Draft Declaration on Liberated Europe

TOP SECRET

British Draft of Last Paragraph of Declaration on Liberated Europe

In issuing this Declaration the three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the action and the procedure suggested.

Copy attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 10, 1945. See ante, p. 873.
British Proposal on Reparations

[Yalta, February 10, 1945.]

TOP SECRET

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF EXACTION OF REPARATION FROM GERMANY

1. The proportions in reparation allotted to the claimant countries shall be determined according to their respective contributions to the winning of the war and the degree of the material loss which they have suffered. Account shall be taken of deliveries made to the claimant countries by other enemy countries.

2. Reparation is to be exacted from Germany in the three following forms:

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory. These removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany. Subject to the fulfilment of these aims Germany’s industrial capacity will not be reduced to a point which would endanger the economic existence of Germany and the execution of such obligations as may be imposed on her.

(b) Annual deliveries from current production for a period to be considered.

(c) Use of German labor and lorry service.

3. In fixing the amount of reparation to be exacted under paragraph two above account shall be taken of any arrangements made for the dismemberment of Germany, the requirements of the occupying forces, and Germany’s need to acquire from time to time sufficient foreign currency from her exports to pay for her current imports and the pre-war claims of the United Nations on Germany.

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1 Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting on February 10, 1945. See ante, p. 874.

Bohlen Collection

Report to the Foreign Ministers by the Subcommittee on Arrangements for the United Nations Conference

TOP SECRET

[Yalta, February 10, 1945.]

REPORT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

We were instructed on February 8 to prepare a report to the Foreign Ministers on the following subjects:

(a) The method of consultation with France and China in regard to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

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1 Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting of February 10, 1945. See ante, p. 875.
(b) The text of the invitation which should be issued to all the nations which will take part in the United Nations Conference.

With regard to (a) we consider that the United States on behalf of the three powers should consult the Government of China and the Provisional French Government.

With regard to (b) we attach for the approval of the Ministers a draft invitation to all the nations which will take part in the conference.

[Attachment] 2

INVITATION

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of ________ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at ________ in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

“C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.”

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of ________ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

2 A ribbon copy of this attachment in the Hiss Collection bears the notation in pencil “OK FDR”.

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886 III. THE YALTA CONFERENCE
British Proposal Regarding the Austrian-Yugoslav Frontier

TOP SECRET

[BALTA, February 10, 1945.]

BRITISH STATEMENT ON AUSTRO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER

If the British proposals for the allocation of zones of occupation in Austria are approved, the whole length of the Austro-Yugoslav frontier will be a British responsibility. This may involve us in difficulties with Yugoslavia because though the Yugoslav Government have not so far asked for any alteration of the Styrian portion of this frontier they have advanced claims to Klagenfurt and those parts of Carinthia which they failed to obtain under the plebiscite held in 1919. Action may be required to resist Yugoslav efforts to assert these claims and to secure the withdrawal of Yugoslav partisans who in the course of operations may well advance into Carinthia and establish control over it. It would be invidious for H. M. G. to be solely responsible for such action and after our experiences in Greece we must try to prevent British troops from becoming involved in fighting with Allied partisans. We hope, therefore that an agreement might be reached between the three powers for the maintenance of the 1937 Austro-Yugoslav frontier pending the final territorial settlement and for joint measures to ensure its maintenance and observance by Yugoslavia.

It is therefore suggested we should agree at the present conference:

(a) that pending the final peace settlement the 1937 frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia shall be restored.

(b) that the integrity of this frontier is the joint interest of the three powers, and that the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. will support any action which H. M. G. may see fit to take to preserve its integrity.

(c) that the three powers should jointly inform the Yugoslav Government of decisions (a) and (b) above and request the Yugoslav Government to give an undertaking to preserve this frontier.

1 Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting of February 10, 1945. See ante, p. 876. A carbon copy of this document is in the Department files, numbered 760H.6315/2-1145.
British Proposal Regarding Venezia Giulia

TOP SECRET

NOTES FOR THE SECRETARIES OF STATE IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA

I should like to draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that the province of Venezia Giulia in the northeast of Italy is a potential powder magazine. It is therefore likely that there will, as the war draws to a close, be clashes in this area between the Yugoslavs and the Italians, and we must prevent these outbursts to the best of our ability.

We had originally intended to set up Allied Military Government over the whole province up to the 1937 frontier but we now have doubts whether this would be a very satisfactory course for the following reasons. Tito has not yet put his views in writing but he has made it pretty clear that he will not agree to such a proposal. He certainly intends to administer himself the considerable areas which he claims for Yugoslavia and part of which are already controlled by his Partisans. Even if under extreme pressure he was forced to accept Allied (British) Military Government his Partisans would remain in arms throughout the district and it would be a miracle if sooner or later they did not obstruct our Military administration. We should then have to take forceful measures to assert our authority and fighting might begin. Alternatively there might be clashes between the Yugoslav Partisans and the Italian Partisans, both trying to hold as much territory as they could. In that case also we should have to intervene to keep the peace by force. I would therefore ask my colleagues to agree to establish some body for the purpose of working out a provisional line of demarcation in the Venezia Giulia between the area to be controlled by Tito and the area over which we should establish Allied Military Government. We have made an attempt ourselves to draw up such a line based for the most part of ethnic considerations. But obviously we cannot jointly agree on a line now, all we can do is agree to the principle that there should be such a line and that some body of technicians should be established for the purpose of determining it. After that it would no doubt be for His Majesty’s Government to obtain Tito’s acceptance of it. But if they do this His Majesty’s Government would like to be able to say that both their Allies agree with the proposal.

1 Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting of February 10, 1945. See ante, p. 876. A carbon copy of this document is in the Department files, numbered 740.00119 Control (Italy)/2–1145.
Finally I would point out that in any case, even if the area west of my suggested provisional line is allotted to Tito, it will be necessary, in the early stages at any rate, for our Supreme Commander to make use of the communications from Trieste northwards in which case he would have to take suitable measures to that end. It might later be possible for him to arrange for his communications to Austria to pass further to the west.

Bohlen Collection

British Proposal Regarding the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria

TOP SECRET

[Yalta, February 10, 1945.]

ALLIED (SOVIET) CONTROL COMMISSION IN BULGARIA

His Majesty’s Government regard it as essential (a) that their representatives in Bulgaria should enjoy reasonable freedom of movement and communication, and (b) that decisions about which they have not been consulted should not be taken in their name. In the case of Hungary, (a) has been satisfactorily dealt with in the “Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary”, and His Majesty’s Government suggest that identical Statutes should be adopted for the Control Commission in Bulgaria in order to meet the points made in the message from Mr. Eden which was delivered to M. Molotov on or about December 11th, 1944.2

His Majesty’s Government also consider that during the first period there should be prior consultation with the British and American representatives and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the Armistice, it should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government only.

During the second period, i.e. after the conclusion of hostilities with Germany, His Majesty’s Government wish to ensure that

(a) The British and American representatives should take their places in the Control Commissions as full members and should have the right to attend all their meetings and to participate fully in the consideration of all questions before the Commissions. They should also have the right of direct access to the Bulgarian authorities.

(b) Decisions of the Allied Control Commission should be unanimous and its name and authority should be used only where the

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1 Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting of February 10, 1945. Copy also in Matthews Files. Although the date of this memorandum is not indicated, copies were apparently circulated on February 10 in connection with the discussion, ante, pp. 876–877.

2 See ante, p. 241.
representatives of all three powers are in agreement. If the Soviet High Command, being in de facto control of Bulgaria through the presence of Soviet troops, insist upon issuing directives to the local Government or taking action which has not been approved by both the British and American representatives they should act unilaterally in their own name.

(c) The extent to which the British and Americans will share in the actual executive and administrative work of the Control Commission will be a matter to be settled on the spot. But they must certainly have the right to membership of any subcommittee or executive organ dealing with matters concerning British and American rights and property.

(d) The detailed implications of these proposals should be worked out between the Soviet chairman and the British and American representatives on the Control Commission on the spot.

Bohlen Collection

British Proposal on Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations 1

TOP SECRET [YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

His Majesty's Government recently communicated to the Soviet Government an expression of their views regarding a possible Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. In replying to this communication, the Soviet Government informed His Majesty's Government that they were aware that negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for the conclusion of a pact of alliance and mutual assistance were proceeding and added that their attitude towards this was favourable. The Soviet Government, however, considered that the question of a Balkan federation, and in particular of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation, was not at present actual and was of no practical importance.

While His Majesty's Government are glad to learn that the Soviet Government do not consider the question of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation to be actual at present and that they regard the matter as of no practical importance, they are disturbed to learn that a pact of alliance and mutual assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria is under negotiation and that the attitude of the Soviet Government towards these negotiations is favourable.

His Majesty's Government cannot but regard the pact now under negotiation as open to the same objections which they felt in regard to a possible federation. In their view an enemy state whose status is still regulated by an armistice regime must be debarred from entre-

1 Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 10, 1945. A copy of this document is in the Department files, numbered 760H.74/2-1145. Although this paper was not specifically referred to in the minutes, it was apparently circulated in connection with the discussion, ante, pp. 876–877.
ing into special treaty relations with another state, more particularly
with another state with which she is still technically in a state of war
except with the explicit permission of all the victorious Powers with
whom the armistice was concluded.

Quite apart from the important question of principle involved, His
Majesty’s Government are also anxious regarding the effect of the
pact now under negotiation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria upon
the interests of Greece which has hitherto not received from Bulgaria
the full reparation to which she is entitled under the terms of the
armistice. This aspect of the matter is treated in greater detail in a
separate aîde-mémoire.

His Majesty’s Government accordingly consider that a communi-
cation should be made to the Bulgarian Government by all the vic-
torious Powers with whom she recently concluded an armistice, stating
that they cannot agree to her entering into special treaty relations
with Yugoslavia at this stage and that full reparation must be made
to Greece before there can be any question of such negotiations being
resumed. His Majesty’s Government consider that Marshal Tito
should simultaneously be informed of the objections seen by the vic-
torious Powers to the conclusion of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact. His
Majesty’s Government would be glad to learn the views of the Soviet
Government upon this matter as soon as possible.

Bohlen Collection

British Proposal Regarding Greek Claims on Bulgaria

TOP SECRET

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

GREEK CLAIMS UPON BULGARIA, MORE PARTICULARLY IN REGARD
to Reparations

His Majesty’s Government are concerned regarding the position
in regard to Greek claims against Bulgaria. On the occasion of the
signature of the Armistice with Hungary, the Soviet Government
informed the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments that they
might send representatives to be accredited to the Hungarian
Control Commission for the purpose of dealing with all questions
affecting their particular government.

On January 23rd the Greek Government, with the support of His
Majesty’s Embassy in Moscow, approached the Soviet Government

1 Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting on February
10, 1945. See ante, p. 876. A copy of this document is in the Department files,
numbered 710.001196W2-1145.
2 For the text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 456,
or 59 Stat. 1321.
with a request for facilities in Bulgaria similar to those granted to the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments in Hungary. No reply has, however, yet been vouchsafed to this request by the Soviet Government.

The Greek people have suffered very seriously from Bulgarian depredations and are in the view of His Majesty’s Government entitled to early satisfaction and to immediate reparation deliveries of which Greece stands in urgent need. The Greek Government have already presented to the Bulgarian Control Commission a list of commodities necessary to the Greek economy and due to them in virtue of the Bulgarian Armistice Agreement, the delivery of which to Greece in the immediate future is essential to the maintenance of Greek economy. Deliveries which are more urgently required comprise, *inter alia*, food stuffs, locomotives, agricultural implements and live-stock. Furthermore, in view of the decision incorporated in the Hungarian armistice terms allotting to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia fixed sums payable in commodities as reparations over a period of six years, it is in the view of His Majesty’s Government equitable that similar arrangements should be made to fix a lump sum due to Greece by Bulgaria to be paid similarly in commodities over a period of six years. In the view of His Majesty’s Government a corresponding sum should be allocated to Yugoslavia which has also suffered from Bulgarian occupation. In this connection his Majesty’s Government desire to make it clear that, while they are in general opposed to the fixing of lump sums for reparations to be exacted from enemy countries, they consider it only equitable, in view of the fact that lump sums have been allocated to the Soviet, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments under the Rumanian, Finnish⁴ and Hungarian Armistices, that a similar lump sum should now be allocated to Greece and Yugoslavia under the Bulgarian Armistice.

His Majesty’s Government accordingly trust that the Soviet Government will accede to the proposals put to them on January 23rd with the support of His Majesty’s Government concerning Greek representation on the Control Commission in Bulgaria. They further trust that the Soviet Government will agree to give explicit instructions

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⁴ For the text of the Rumanian armistice, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490, or 50 Stat. 1712; for the text of the Finnish armistice, see Department of State Bulletin, February 18, 1945, vol. xii, pp. 261–268.
to the head of the Control Commission in Bulgaria that immediate deliveries must be made to Greece in accordance with the terms of the armistice and that the list already presented by the Greek Government to the Soviet Government is to be taken as the basis for determining the nature and amounts of commodities to be delivered. Finally His Majesty’s Government are of the opinion that immediate consideration should be given to the question of fixing the total Bulgarian reparation liability to Greece and Yugoslavia, if necessary in terms of money.

Matthews Files

_British Memorandum on Oil Equipment in Rumania_¹

_Yalta, February 10, 1945._

**OIL EQUIPMENT IN ROUMANIA**

His Majesty’s Government have been glad to note that the Soviet authorities have now agreed to stop removing equipment from the oil fields in Rumania in which British interests are involved and have also agreed that the Ruat plant should remain in situ. But if the large quantities of equipment which have already been removed are not to be returned, His Majesty’s Government considers that they must be regarded as deliveries on account of reparations, and arrangements made for compensating the oil companies. Similarly the Ruat plant should be restored to its previous condition and brought into production as soon as possible. As the Soviet Government have made no attempt to refute the argument advanced by His Majesty’s Government that any equipment which may be removed should be regarded as reparation and not as war booty, His Majesty’s Government can only refer the Soviet Government to the statement of the case which has already been made. It should also be pointed out that these difficulties would never have arisen if the Soviet representatives in Rumania had discussed problems affecting the Rumanian oil industry with their British and American colleagues on the Control Commission instead of taking unilateral action.

¹ This paper, an undated British carbon copy, was not attached to the Page minutes, nor do those minutes indicate that the subject was discussed at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting on February 10, 1945. A note from Eden to Molotov, however (post, p. 965), states that this paper was circulated at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting of February 10.
CONVERSATIONS REGARDING THE ENTRY OF THE SOVIET UNION INTO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN, FEBRUARY 10, 1945, AFTERNOON

Bohlen Collection

Harriman Memorandum of Conversations

TOP SECRET

1st Conversation

Present: Mr. Harriman                Date: February 10, 1945
         Mr. Molotov                   Time: 2:00 PM
         Mr. Pavlov                    Place: Koreis

2nd Conversation

Present: The President               Date: February 10, 1945
         Mr. Harriman                 Time: [blank]
         Place: Livadia Palace

3rd Conversation

Present: The President               Date: February 10, 1945
         Mr. Harriman                 Time: 4:30 PM
         Marshal Stalin               Place: Livadia Palace

Subject: The Far East—Political

At Mr. Molotov’s request I called on him at Koreis 2 at 2:00 p. m.
He handed me in English translation the draft of Marshal Stalin’s
political conditions for Russia’s entry in the war against Japan as
discussed with the President on February 8. 3

I explained to Molotov that there were three amendments I
believed the President would wish to make before accepting:

2. b) should indicate Stalin’s readiness to accept the President’s
 proposal that Port Arthur and Dairen should be free ports and 2. c)
 should cover the alternative of the railways being operated by a
Chinese-Soviet Commission, both of which Marshal Stalin had agreed
to. In addition I said I felt sure that the President would not wish to
dispose finally of these two matters in which China was interested
without the concurrence of the Generalissimo.

Mr. Molotov indicated that Marshal Stalin had agreed to the
first two points but it took me some time to explain to Molotov the
reasons for the last. I agreed to submit to Molotov the President’s
suggested revisions.

On my return to Livadia I showed the President the proposed draft
(copy attached) with the amendments covering the points mentioned

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1 The document is labeled “copy”, and a typewritten note at the bottom of the
first page says: “Dictated by Mr. Harriman”.
2 Yusupov Palace.
3 For this discussion, see ante, pp. 768–770.
(copy of amendments attached). The President approved and authorized me to resubmit them to Mr. Molotov, which I did.

After the formal Conference meeting in the afternoon between the President, the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin and their associates, Marshal Stalin came to me to explain the further changes he had in mind for the Agreement. He said that he was entirely willing to have Dairen a free port under international control, but that Port Arthur was different, it was to be a Russian naval base and therefore Russia required a lease.

I suggested to Marshal Stalin that he take the opportunity to discuss this matter at once with the President, which he thereupon did.

The President agreed to Marshal Stalin’s revised proposal regarding the ports as above.

Marshal Stalin then explained that he agreed it would be more appropriate for the Manchurian Railroads to be operated by a Chinese-Soviet Commission. He further agreed in the need for concurrence of the Generalissimo on these matters but stated that the Generalissimo should also give his concurrence to status quo in Outer Mongolia.

The President asked Marshal Stalin whether he (Stalin) wished to take these matters up with T. V. Soong when he came to Moscow or whether Stalin wished the President to take them up with the Generalissimo.4

Marshal Stalin replied that as he was an interested party he would prefer to have the President do it.

The President then asked when the subject should be discussed with the Generalissimo having in mind the question of secrecy.

Marshal Stalin said he would let the President know when he was prepared to have this done.

The President said that he would send an army officer from Washington through Moscow to Chungking with a letter of instructions to Ambassador Hurley in order to insure secrecy.

At that moment the Prime Minister interrupted the discussion. I had an opportunity later, however, to ask Marshal Stalin whether he would undertake to draft the further revisions, to which he replied in the affirmative.

W. A. Harriman

3 Attachments 5

4 See post, pp. 952–953.
5 The third attachment was a typewritten copy of the final agreement. For the text of the agreement as signed on February 11, 1945, see post, p. 954.
DRAFT OF MARSHAL STALIN'S POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR RUSSIA'S ENTRY IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has ended the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. Status quo in the Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian Peoples Republic) should be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 should be restored viz:

   a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to this part of Sakhalin should be returned to the Soviet Union,

   b) possession of Port Arthur and Dairen on lease should be restored.

   c) the rights possessed by Russia before the Russo-Japanese war to the operation of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian railroad providing an outlet to Dairen should be restored on the understanding that China should continue to possess full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union. The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unquestionably satisfied after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its willingness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

MR. HARRIMAN'S SUGGESTED CHANGES IN MARSHAL STALIN'S DRAFT OF RUSSIA'S POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR RUSSIA'S ENTRY IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Item 2. b):

Possession, lease of the port areas of Port Arthur and Dairen on lease should be restored, or these areas should become free ports under international control.
Item 2. c):

Add the following after the word "Manchuria;" at the end of the paragraph "or these railroads should be placed under the operational control of a Chinese-Soviet Commission."

Item 3.:

Add final paragraph:

"It is understood that the agreement concerning the ports and railways referred to above requires the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek."

Note: Portions crossed out are deletions and portions underlined are additions to original document.

SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 10, 1945, 4 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

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Bohlen Minutes

TOP SECRET

Subjects: Poland
French Participation in Control Commission for Germany
Yugoslavia
World Security Organization
Reparations from Germany
The Dardanelles

The President said that he thought that Mr. Eden had a report to make on the progress achieved at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning.

Mr. Eden said that he had to report agreement on the future Government of Poland, that there had been two questions involved
which he would refer to later but in the meantime he would read the new formula. He read the new formula with one correction which he admitted to have been made by Mr. Molotov. The new formula was as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The Prime Minister said that the document made no mention of frontiers. He said we are all agreed on the Eastern frontier of Poland and he agreed that Poland should receive compensation in the West, up to the line of the Oder if the Poles so desired. He said that the British Government was very doubtful about going any further or mentioning any such possibility at this stage, since he did not believe that the War Cabinet would accept the line of the Western Neisse. He said he felt, however, that some mention should be made of the territorial settlement otherwise the whole world would wonder what had been decided on this question. There would be some criticism, but nevertheless, it would be better than no mention at all.¹

The President said that the Polish Government should be consulted before any statement was made in regard to the Western frontier.

¹ For a facsimile of Hopkins’ note to Roosevelt at this point regarding boundary questions, see Stettinlus, p. 261.
Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought that there should be some statement on the Eastern frontier on which all present had agreed.

The Prime Minister concurred with this statement of Marshal Stalin and repeated the people would wish to know what we had decided on this question.

Mr. Molotov remarked that it would be a good thing if something definite could be said about the Eastern frontier, since it would clarify and quiet the whole situation insofar as the Poles were concerned. He said that it was certain that there would be criticisms, but he felt it would in general be beneficial. He suggested that the matter be referred to the three Foreign Ministers to draft some statement on this point. He added that it was perhaps not necessary to be as specific in regard to the Western frontier as in regard to the Eastern frontier.

The Prime Minister said that he had already gone on record to the effect that Poland would receive a good slice of territory in the North and in the West but that the opinion of the New Polish Government of National Unity would be sought.

The President said he had no objection in principle to such a statement but he thought the Prime Minister should draft it.

Mr. Molotov suggested that it should form a last sentence of the Polish statement.

Mr. Eden, continuing his report, said that in regard to his [the] declaration on liberated Europe the Soviet Delegation had proposed an amendment in regard to the last sentence of the fifth paragraph to the effect that the three Governments should immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultations. Mr. Eden said that he proposed a draft that the three Governments should immediately consult together upon the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

After some discussion as to what had been agreed upon at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning, Marshal Stalin said he accepted the British suggestion.²

Mr. Eden then said there was a note which he wished to attach to this declaration, namely, that the French should be invited to associate themselves with the declaration and that his note would merely state that in issuing this declaration the three heads of Governments expressed the hope that the Provisional Government of France would associate themselves in the actions and procedures envisaged therein.³

The President then said that he had changed his mind in regard to the question of the French participation in the Control Commission.

²See the Matthews minutes, post, p. 908, for the agreed wording of this proposal.
³Ante, p. 884.
He now agreed with the views of the Prime Minister that it would be impossible to give France an area to administer in Germany unless they were members of the Control Commission. He said he thought it would be easier to deal with the French if they were on the Commission than if they were not.

**Marshal Stalin** said he had no objections and that he agreed to this.\(^4\)

The **Prime Minister** suggested that there should be a joint telegram sent to De Gaulle informing him of these decisions to which there was general agreement.\(^5\)

Mr. **Eden** said the next subject was that of Yugoslavia and read the text of a telegram to be sent to Marshal Tito and Subasic suggesting that the agreement which they had reached be immediately put into effect as the basis for the formation of a unified Government of Yugoslavia.\(^6\)

The **President** said he was not sure whether he would be able to join in the statement on Yugoslavia but when it had been read to him he agreed that it was satisfactory and that he could associate himself with it.

After some discussion **Marshal Stalin** suggested that the telegram to Marshal Tito and Subasic should say that the heads of the three Governments have agreed that the agreement between Tito and Subasic should be put immediately into effect and that as soon as a new Government was formed the two amendments proposed by the British should be put into effect.\(^7\) He said he thought it was inconsistent to put more in the communiqué than there was in the telegram.\(^8\)

The **Prime Minister** said he hoped that both of the two amendments proposed by the British could be in the communiqué.

Mr. **Molotov** said he thought it would be better to confine the telegram and reference in the communiqué to the entry into force of the Tito-Subasic agreement.

The **Prime Minister** said he thought the British people would be more reconciled to the Government and it would have a better reception if the two amendments were included.

After some discussion with the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden, **Marshal Stalin** said he thought that three points could be included in the telegram: (1) that the Tito-Subasic agreement should go immediately into force, (2) that the members of the Skupskhina who had not collaborated with the Germans could be included into the Vetch,

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\(^4\) For the text as amended, see post, pp. 936–937.

\(^5\) For the texts of the two telegrams to De Gaulle, see post, p. 948.

\(^6\) For a copy of the British telegram as sent, see post, pp. 919–920.

\(^7\) For two amendments proposed by the British, see ante, pp. 820–821.

\(^8\) For the language of the communiqué on this subject, see post, p. 974.
and (3) that the actions of the anti-fascist Vetach would be subject to the confirmation by the Constituent Assembly. He added that he thought these three points could go into the communiqué.

Mr. Eden said that the sub-committee in regard to Dumbarton Oaks had reported on the matter of informing the French and Chinese Governments and on the form of the invitations, but he did not feel that it was necessary to bother the Conference with these small matters. He went on to say that in regard to reparations the British Government still had reservations in regard to the Soviet proposals.

The Prime Minister said he had received instructions from the War Cabinet not to mention figures and that that should be left to the reparations committee to determine.

The President said that he was afraid that if reparations and especially if any figures were mentioned that the American people would believe that it involved money.

Marshal Stalin explained that the sum mentioned was only the expression of the value of the reparations in kind.

The Prime Minister added that nothing would be published, as he understood it, in regard to reparations but that he could not agree to the inclusion of a definite sum.

Marshal Stalin said he wished to discuss the circumstances of the matter. He did not understand why there should be any confusion in regard to payment in money since the Soviet Union had concluded three treaties with Finland, Rumania and Hungary in which the value of reparations in kind were definitely stated and that there had been no confusion as far as he knew on this subject. He said that if the British felt that the Russians should receive no reparations at all, it would be better to say so frankly. He said he had heard a great deal of talk at the Conference that the Russians would receive reparations in kind in the form of factories and plants but that no decision had been reached. He said he thought that two decisions might be taken by the Conference: (1) that it was agreed in principle that Germany should pay reparations and (2) that the Reparations Commission to sit in Moscow should fix the amount and should take into consideration the American-Soviet proposal that there should be twenty billion dollars of reparations, with fifty per cent to the Soviet Union.

9 Ante, pp. 385-386.
10 For a facsimile of Hopkins' note to Roosevelt at this point on reparations, see Stettinius, p. 265.
11 Presumably the armistice agreements of September 19, 1944, with Finland; of September 12, 1944, with Rumania; and of January 20, 1945, with Hungary. For the respective texts, see Department of State Bulletin, February 18, 1945, vol. xii, pp. 261-268; Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490, or 59 Stat. 1712; and Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 456, or 59 Stat. 1321.
The President said he feared the word "reparations" somewhat since he thought the people in America would think it meant reparations in cash.

Someone replied that this could be easily avoided by using the term "compensation for damages caused by Germany during the war" instead of "reparations."

Mr. Molotov said that the Moscow commission would have the duty of finding out the total of reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion the American-Soviet formula.

The Prime Minister replied that the British Government could not commit itself to any figure.

Marshal Stalin replied that there was no commitment involved but it might be said that the Commission might take as material for discussion the American-Soviet formula.

The Prime Minister then read a telegram from the War Cabinet which said that they considered it inadmissible to state any figure until an investigation had been completed on the spot and that at any rate the figure of twenty billion dollars was too great. It was equal to Germany's export trade in times of peace and it was beyond the capacity of Germany to pay. It was true that some of these reparations would come from Germany's capital assets but that in turn would make it more difficult for Germany to pay her bills. The payments would more than cover German imports and if these imports were not given a priority ahead of reparations it would mean that the other countries would be paying for German reparations to those countries receiving them.

Marshal Stalin said he did not want to go into the circumstances of the telegram the Prime Minister had just read. The experts may be right, but that all they were preparing was a figure to be used as a basis for discussions—it could be reduced or increased by the Commission in Moscow.

The President then suggested that the whole matter be left to the Commission in Moscow.\footnote{It appears that the note of Hopkins, post, p. 920, was passed to the President at about this point.}

Marshal Stalin said that he felt in principle that Germany should pay reparations which would be stated by the three Governments here.

Mr. Molotov said that yesterday Mr. Stettinius had analyzed the results of the meeting and had reported full agreement on the first two points of the Soviet proposal. Now the question was what countries should receive reparations and the type of reparations and differences only appeared between the United States and the Soviet Delegation on the one hand and the British on the other in regard to the naming of a sum.
MR. EDEN said that rightly or wrongly, the British Government felt that even the naming of a sum as the basis of discussions would commit them. He said he proposed that the Moscow Commission be instructed to examine the report of Mr. Maisky, made at the Crimean Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV and MR. MAISKY both replied that to refer a question put by the Crimean Conference to a lesser body would be utterly illogical.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that no agreement had been reached as to the mention of a sum.

MR. EDEN added that the first two points referred to by Mr. Molotov were agreed upon but not the last which related to the sum.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated that he was willing to propose the following formula: (1) that the heads of the Governments had agreed that Germany must pay compensation for the damages caused to the Allied nations as a result of the war, and (2) that the Moscow Commission be instructed to consider the amount of reparations. This was agreed to by the Conference.

There was then a short intermission.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether they could discuss the British text of the paragraph on frontiers to be added to the Polish statement.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had not yet received the Russian translation.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that he would like to say a few words about the Montreux Convention regarding the Dardanelles. He said the treaty was now outmoded. As he recalled, the Japanese Emperor played a big part in the treaty, even greater than that of the Soviet Union. The treaty was linked with the League which does not exist just as the Japanese Emperor was not present at this Conference. Under the Montreux Convention the Turks have the right to close the Straits not only in time of war but if they feel that there is a threat of war. He said that the treaty was made at a time when the relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were not perfect, but he did not think now that Great Britain would wish to strangle Russia with the help of the Japanese. The treaty needed revision. He thought that there would be no objection to a consideration of the revision of that treaty. He said in what manner the treaty should be revised he did not know and he did not wish to prejudge any decisions, but he felt that the interests of Russia should be considered. He said that it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia's throat. He added, however, that it should be done in such a manner as not to harm the legitimate interests of Turkey. This was a question which an appropriate organization

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13 See ante, pp. 328-329.
could consider and he thought that the three Foreign Ministers who were to meet periodically—every two or three months—might well consider this matter at their first meeting and report to their respective cabinets.

The President said he had one general observation to make and that was that in the United States we had a frontier of over 3,000 miles with Canada and there was no fort and no armed forces. This situation had existed over a hundred years and it was his hope that other frontiers in the World would eventually be without forts or armed forces on any part of their national boundaries.

The Prime Minister said that Marshal Stalin had reminded them of the question of the Straits when they were in Moscow last autumn. They had said then that they were in sympathy with the revision of the treaty and had suggested to the Soviet Government that a note be sent on the subject but none has as yet been received. He said that he thought that the method proposed by Marshal Stalin was a wise one. The British certainly felt that the present position of Russia with their great interests in the Black Sea should not be dependent on the narrow exit. He said if the matter is brought up at the meeting with the Foreign Ministers he hoped the Russians would make their proposals known. In the meantime, it might be well to inform the Turks that the matter of revision of the Montreux Convention would be under consideration. This was particularly true if the Allies desired them to come into the war on their side. Mr. Eden reminded him that he had mentioned the matter several times to the Turkish Ambassador in London. He said it might be advisable to give the Turks at the same time some assurance that their independence and integrity will be guaranteed.

Marshall Stalin replied it was impossible to keep anything secret from the Turks and that such assurance should be expressed.

The President agreed to this.

Marshall Stalin said the Foreign Ministers could meet at the United Nations Conference and discuss the question of the Straits.

The Prime Minister said that he thought that this matter affected the position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean more than it did that of the United States and that he felt that if the Foreign Ministers had a meeting in London that would be the proper place to discuss this question. He went on to say that some years ago he had tried very hard to get through the Dardanelles and then the Russian Government had made available an armed force to help but it did not succeed.

Marshall Stalin said that the Prime Minister had been in too much of a hurry in withdrawing his troops since the Germans and Turks were on the verge of surrender.

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14 See ante, p. 328.
The Prime Minister replied that by that time he was out of the
government because of the Dardanelles campaign and had had
nothing to do with that decision.

Marshal Stalin then inquired who was taking down decisions
reached at this conference.

Mr. Eden replied there would be an agreed upon communiqué as
well as a list of the decisions taken.

The President then said he wished to propose some small amend-
ments in the paragraph regarding frontiers in the Polish statement.
He said these amendments were necessary for American Constitu-
tional reasons.\textsuperscript{16} He suggested that instead of the first words “The
three powers” he would like to substitute “The three heads of govern-
ment” and that in the second sentence the words “three powers” be
eliminated, and in the last sentence the word “feel” instead of “agree”
should be used.

These amendments were accepted by the conference, and the
following text approved:

“The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern
frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from
it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland.
It is recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of
territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the
new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be
sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the
final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter
await the Peace Conference.”\textsuperscript{17}

Mr. Molotov said he had one suggestion and that was to add to
the second sentence “with the return to Poland of her ancient
frontiers in East Prussia and on the Oder”.

The President inquired how long ago these lands had been
Polish.

Mr. Molotov said very long ago, but they had in fact been
Polish.

The President said this might lead the British to ask for the
return of the United States to Great Britain.

Marshal Stalin replied that the ocean prevented this. He
added that at the present the draft said nothing specific about
frontiers, which he thought was very important for the Poles.

The Prime Minister said he would prefer not to mention the
frontier in the west since he shared the same difficulties the President
had spoken of.

\textsuperscript{15} For facsimiles of notes from Stettinius and Hopkins to Roosevelt in this
connection, see Stettinius, pp. 183, 270.
\textsuperscript{16} For a facsimile of a note which Hopkins passed to Roosevelt at this point,
see Stettinius, p. 278.
Mr. Eden said that they had always said that they would accept any line up to the Oder that the Poles desired.

The Prime Minister said that there was no stopping place between what we proposed to do and the line of the Oder, and if the question is asked about ancient territories there would be no answer. He said that he was not against the line of the Oder in principle if the Poles so desired.

Mr. Molotov said he thought it might be worthwhile considering this wording.

Marshal Stalin said he would withdraw the Soviet amendment and leave the British draft as it had been.

The draft of the last paragraph regarding Polish frontiers was accepted.

The President then remarked he would have to leave Yalta tomorrow at three o’clock in the afternoon.

The Prime Minister remarked that he doubted if it would be possible to get all the work done by then, particularly the communiqué and the final text of the documents.

There followed a discussion between the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden concerning the possibility of preparing the communiqué before the time set for the President’s departure.

Marshal Stalin remarked that there was very little time and he felt it was impossible to complete the work in view of the dinner. He suggested that the dinner might be cancelled.

After some discussion it was decided that a drafting committee for the communiqué should come to the Villa and report at ten o’clock to the Foreign Ministers and heads of government.

The meeting then adjourned.

Matthews Files

Matthews Minutes

TOP SECRET

The President opened the meeting (which was delayed owing to an earlier discussion between Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin) by asking Mr. Eden to render a report on the foreign secretaries’ meetings of last night and this morning.

1 For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

2 According to Churchill’s account of this private meeting with Stalin, which was held at the Soviet headquarters, the subject of “Russian wishes in the Far East” was discussed, as was also the question of British representation in Poland (Churchill, pp. 385, 389–390).
EDEN: I should like to report that with the exception of two points outstanding we have reached a decision on the Polish question. I believe that we have since worked out an agreement with regard to these two points. (He reads the Polish formula, which after some discussion as to wording was finally agreed to.)

PRIME MINISTER: There is no reference in this formula to the frontier question. The world at large will ask about that. We are all agreed I believe about the eastern frontier. We are all agreed in principle about the western frontier. The only question is where the line is to be drawn and how much to say about it in our communiqué. We are doubtful about going further in mentioning frontiers at this stage. I have received a telegram from the War Cabinet deprecating any frontier going as far west as the Neisse. They feel that the population problem is too large to handle.

PRESIDENT: My position is that I would rather hear from the new government of national unity what they think about it. Therefore, I think we had better leave out all references to frontiers.

PRIME MINISTER: On the west?

STALIN: It is important to say something.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree. People will immediately ask what is the settlement on the question of the frontiers. We think that the eastern frontier is settled. On the west the wishes of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity must be consulted.

PRESIDENT: I do not believe we should say anything in the communiqué. I have no right to make an agreement on boundaries at this time. That must be done by the Senate later. Let the Prime Minister make some public statement when he returns if that is necessary.

MOLOTOV: I think it would be very good if something could be said about full agreement of the three heads of government on the eastern frontier. We could say that the Curzon line is generally representative of the opinion of all present. It is possible that there might be criticism of this for some time but that would be better in the long run. We should either agree or leave to the three foreign ministers to find a formula. I agree that we need say nothing about the western frontier.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree we must say something.

MOLOTOV: Yes, but less specific if you wish.

PRIME MINISTER: We must say that Poland is to get compensation in the west; also that there is to be left for discussion with the Polish government before the line is drawn.

MOLOTOV: Very good.

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3 The text of the formula is in the Bohlen minutes, ante, p. 898.
PRIME MINISTER: We must go out now with the rest of our communiqué on Poland. (Matter is referred to the three foreign ministers.)

STALIN: That could be done during our intermission.

EDEN: I shall next report on the declaration on liberated areas. Mr. Molotov kindly withdrew his amendment of last night with regard to the third from last paragraph but has proposed the following wording at the end of the penultimate paragraph. (There followed considerable discussion as to the exact wording that was agreed upon and finally Marshal Stalin accepted the following:"

"... we shall consult together on the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration." In this form it was approved.

I should like to add a sentence with regard to the French which we proposed last evening to clear up the ambiguous situation in regard to France. (The following was approved:

"In issuing this declaration the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of France will associate itself with them.")

PRESIDENT: I should like to say that I have changed my mind with regard to the position of the French on the Control Council for Germany. The more I think of it the more I think that the Prime Minister is right and that a nation with a zone of occupation must sit in on the control machinery. I think it would be easier if France is on the commission to get de Gaulle to agree to join the liberated areas declaration and many other things

STALIN: I have no objection. (It is agreed upon.)

PRIME MINISTER: Of course France may say that she will have no part in the declaration and reserve all rights for the future. (laughing) We must face that.

MOLOTOV: We must be ready to receive a rough answer.

EDEN: Next is the question of Yugoslavia. We prepared a draft on this which is still under discussion. (After some discussion between the British and Russians a draft telegram to Yugoslavia is agreed upon. Copy attached.) Molotov insisted that the telegram should be short and should be sent today. The Prime Minister wanted the joint telegram to contain not only the exhortation that the Tito-Subasic agreement be put into effect immediately and the new united government formed but also the additional points which the new government would be asked to accept (Subasic recommendations). First that the Avnoj be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary parliament, and, two, that legislative acts passed

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4 Points appear in the original.
5 The draft telegram was not attached to these minutes, but see post, pp. 919-920.
by the Avnoj would be subject to ratification by a constituent assembly. The British also wanted a third provision to the effect that the government is only temporary pending the free expression of the will of the people but dropped this at the Russian request as offensive to Yugoslav sensibilities. On that basis the telegram was agreed upon by all three after considerable discussion by the Prime Minister and Stalin, the latter wanting originally to confine the telegram to the question of the execution of the Tito-Subasic agreement and await till the government was formed before taking up the other point.

There followed a lengthy and at times somewhat heated discussion between Marshal Stalin and Churchill on the question of reparations. This was the only time during the conference that Stalin showed some annoyance. He obviously felt suspicious of the British opposing Russian reparations as part of a program to build up a strong Germany. At one stage in the discussion he asked point blank if the British did not want the Russians to receive reparations they should say so frankly. This of course Mr. Churchill emphatically denied. Stalin proposed that the three governments accept the principle of reparations in goods. (The President made it clear that what he feared was a system of reparations paid in money.) And second that the Moscow commission should be asked to find out the total or total possible reparations and report to the respective governments. He also asked that the three governments agree that Germany must pay in kind for losses suffered in the course of the war.

Molotov: We must give the Moscow commission on reparations the task of finding out the total of reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion the American-Soviet formula. The commission need only take that as the basis.

Prime Minister: We have had a very important communication from our government on this question. We cannot accept any specific figures in any formula.

Stalin: I propose first that the three heads of government agree that Germany must pay compensation in kind for losses caused during the war. Two, the heads of the three governments agree that Germany must pay for losses to the allied nations. Three, the Moscow reparations commission is given the task to consider the amount to be paid. We bring our figures before the commission and you bring yours. (to Churchill)

(This was followed by an intermission during which the formula to be used on Polish frontiers for inclusion in the communiqué was largely worked out.)

President: Marshal Stalin said that he wanted to talk a little on some question after our intermission and I now invite him to do so.

Stalin: I should like to say a few words on the Montreux Con-
vention. We believe that it is now out of date. The Japanese Emperor was one of the parties to it. In fact, he plays a greater role in it than the Soviet Union. The treaty was made at a time when relations between Britain and Russia were not very good. Now that is all changed. I do not think that Great Britain would with the help of the Japanese want to strangle Russia. Now the convention should be seriously modified. I do not wish to pre-judge future decisions. The interests of Russia should be taken into account and observed. The legitimate interests of Turkey must not be infringed. The question is how to do it. We can of course ask a certain organism to discuss this question. We have agreed that the three foreign ministers should meet from time to time. Perhaps they could discuss this question at their first meeting and report to the three governments. This would be a preparatory step to settling the question.

PREMIER: I only want to say that we have three thousand miles of natural boundary with Canada. There is no fort and no armed ship on this entire distance. If other parts of the world would do the same it would be a wonderful thing.

PRIME MINISTER: Marshal Stalin mentioned this question to me and to Eden in Moscow. We viewed it with sympathy. We agreed with the Soviets that the Montreux Convention should be revised or reconstructed. We asked the Soviet Government for a note with their ideas. This has not yet been received. The suggestion of Marshal Stalin is a wise one. I certainly feel that the present position of Russia—her Black Sea dependent on the narrow exit—is not satisfactory. I hope our Russian allies will make their proposal. Meanwhile, if Turkey wanted to declare war we should tell her beforehand that this matter is to be brought under consideration. They should know that fact before going into the war. I believe we are obligated to tell them. (After conferring with Mr. Eden) Eden tells me that he did mention that matter to the Turkish ambassador in London in general terms following our Moscow visit, so we have kept our engagement. It is worth considering whether when changes are made some assurances should be given Turkey that her independence will not be affected.

STalin: Certainly we should give such assurance. When the foreign ministers meet in April in the United States at the end of the conference could they not discuss the question of the straits?

PRIME MINISTER: Well, I think this question affects Britain with her Mediterranean interests more than the United States. Therefore, I believe that the meeting should be in London.

I tried some time ago to get through the Dardanelles (smiling) and the former Russian government had two army corps ready to help me
at the other end. However, we did not succeed in joining hands. I consequently have some feeling on this question.

Stalin: You were in too much of a hurry to take away your troops. Perhaps in another week you would have won as the Germans and Turks were getting ready to withdraw.

Prime Minister: I had nothing to do with that decision. I was already out of the government. (It was decided that the question would be discussed by the three foreign ministers in London.)

President: The only thing left now is the amended text on the frontiers of Poland. (The text is then read for consideration by the Russians who had received the Russian text.)

Stalin: I should like to suggest an amendment in the phraseology to indicate that Poland should receive the return of her ancient frontier of East Prussia and the Oder.

President: (Laughing to Prime Minister) Perhaps you would want us back?

Prime Minister: Well you might be as indigestible for us as it might be for the Poles if they took too much German territory.

Molotov: This change would give great encouragement to the Poles.

Prime Minister: I prefer to leave it as it is.

Molotov: But there is no mention of frontiers in the west. What about the Oder? No exchange was mentioned.

Prime Minister: Well, between what we propose and the question of specifying ancient territories up to the Oder there seems to be no stopping place.

Stalin: I withdraw my suggestion and agree to leave it as drawn. The President suggested changes (change “agreed” to “consider” in the first sentence and change “the three powers” to “the three heads of government” in the third sentence) are accepted. This I believe is our last point of decision.

President: There only remains the question of the communiqué; I must leave tomorrow at 3 p.m. I hope we can get the communiqué done and I suggest that if we meet at eleven tomorrow we can finish it by lunch. (This suggestion is vigorously opposed by Churchill and to a lesser degree by Stalin, both of whom insist that the communiqué is most important and should not be drawn too hastily. The matter was left indefinite with the representatives of the three governments assigned the task of concluding their drafts—an American and British draft had already been prepared—for submission to the Big Three.)

The meeting then adjourned.

* For the text, as approved, see the Bohlen minutes, ante, p. 905.
Ed. reported on meeting For Mins
We reached agt re Pol—there were two outstanding q’s. Perhaps I may come to that in a moment. Read draft as it now stands (included some changes app. agreed to by Church & St. in their private meeting before plenary session) included Mol. amend of noon. and new amend: “and will exchange Amb’s. by whose reports the respective govt’s will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.”

Church: We have made no reference to frontiers but of course people will ask at once about frontiers, what we have agreed. We are all agreed about the E. frontier, we are all agreed in prin. about W. frontier. The only q is where it is to be exactly drawn & how much we should say about it. We all agreed that the Poles are to have E. Pr. & be free to go to the line of the Oder if they so desire. We are very doubtful indeed about going further or mentioning at this stage—we have had a tel. from our War Cab. strongly deprecating frontier going as far as W. Neisse because they think the problem is larger than we could manage
Pres. We should rather hear from the Pol. Govt of Nat. Unity we had better leave out all references to boundaries
Church: on West?
Maisky on East we should say something
Church. agreed.
Church people will immediately say what is the position about the frontier. We think E. frontier is settled. We think on W. frontier wishes of Pol Govt Nat Un be first consulted & matter finally settled at peace settlements
Pres: I cannot agree on Pol boundaries at this time. It must be done by the Sen later
Mol It would be very good if something could be said about full agt of 3 heads about E. frontier. Would clarify that important q. It would be good to say gen. opin of all sides represented. Prob. would provoke criticism for a time but in end would be good. Proposes leave it to 3 Mins. to find nec. formula. Not nec. to say anything about W frontier
Church: Something
Mol Yes, much less def.

1 From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.
Church: Say recog. by 3 powers Pol should receive substantial accession of terr both to the N. & to the W. . . . 2 Thereafter final line be determined

St: That would be very good. That would correspond to wish of public opin. all around

Pres: 3 For Secs
Church: Along lines we have suggested
Maisk St.: As a last ¶
Ed Decl. on Lib Areas (continuing his report)
Read & Church amended the Mol. amend. to include “responsibilities” etc.
Mol: Wants his amend. to stand
Pres: read it as agreed this morning
Church: how can you carry out measure.
St. accepted Church. formula
Agreed To be put in language
Document approved
Ed: sug. amend. re Fr.

“In issuing this decl. the 3 powers express the hope that the French Prov. Govt. will be associated with them in the action & procedures contemplated”

Pres: I have rather changed my opin. I was opposed to Fr. sitting in on the Com. of 3, Control Machinery. The more I think of it the more I think the PM’s contention that a country which has an area to control can not do so without sitting in on the Con. Com. I think it would be easier if Fr. is on that Con Com to get DeG to agree to this Decl. & other things. Like St. think about it;
Pres agreed to add also Ed. addition
St agreed
Ed: Yug.
Agreed For Mins. prepare first draft final communiqué
Pres: Should communiqué contain Yug statement. Will leave to Ed in Conf. with For Mins whether we join in on that or not.
Church: These are very respectable issues
Pres: I’m not trying to protect my purity
Mol: What is agreed re Yug.
Ed: We’ve agreed to send a message & we’ve agreed to draft a communiqué
Read d

Message for 3 Govts to Tito & Sub 3 agreed to recommend Tito-Sub be immed. formed & put into effect plus Brit amends.

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2 Points appear in the original.
3 Marginal notation: “Get copy”.
Pres: All right
Mol: Tel was to be very short & without last 2 ifs
Ed: Yes then later then the amends second part.
Church. Hope commun. can mention both parts
Mol: We just had com. when agreed only 1st part be in tel.; 2nd part to be put off until United govt formed
Church: But world will give more attention to immed. enforcement of agt if other part were mentioned, too. Would have effect of getting better reception for what we say.
St. It would be inconvenient if tel. & communiqué different & we agreed a second tel. will be sent
Church: We have complex pub. opin. Want favorable reception of agt. Believes it would help (include in commun)
Ed: Might say: It was further agreed that when the agt is put into force, 3 govts would recommend to new govt to make a decl. of the 3 points
St.: Without 3rd point, which is very objectionable
Ed. & Church: all right leave it out.
Church: Besides it's understood in Tito-Sub agt.
St.: In any case change Tel—3 parts 1st Put agt in force imm. 2nd members Vojno be later included 3rd all acts be confirmed later
Church: Very good & very helpful
St.: & all 3 also be in communiqué
Ed: World Org. Report of subcom re consultation Fr & China & Invitation was accepted by For Mins & need not be discussed in plenary session.
  →Pres OK'd invitation

Reparations
Church: We were practically instructed by our gov't not to mention figures. Let Com. do that
Pres: goes along my idea not to mention money, not make reps an am't of money. Let Com. do Talk about the equiv.
St.: That's only a monetary expression of what the goods cost.
It is not money
Pres: so many people at home will think of it in terms of $ & cents
Church: I don't understand what is to be published
Pres: Nothing
Church: not even subject
St.: There is objection to mention dollars because someone will think will take reparations in money. But we have already 3 treaties on reps. where reps in kind are expressed in dollars. Why in this case should there be a misunderstanding?
Church. I was going to suggest Mos. Com. be auth. to issue an interim report & not have to issue whole report before authorization is given to taking reps. For ex. factories would be taken at once by Sov Govt.

St. I think we can be quite frank. How compare goods we should take from Ger. with our losses. If we accept them we should say we accept as reparation. R could take factories & lands but better have a dec. I propose simple prin.: 1. Ger must pay reps. for losses caused to Allies. 2. To ask Rep. Com to find out am’t of reps. which would be nec. to take & to report to govts Am. side agreed with us to take as basis $20 million [sic] dollars. Does it mean Am side withdraws its agt.

Pres: No. I am completely in agt. Only one word. Reparations mean to so many people money. Add parenthesis (in kind)

St. We won’t publish

Pres. U S entirely prepared discuss sum & principles. Only q

I raise is use of word reps

St. We can use another word. Compensation of losses

Church “Compensation in kind for losses”

St: 3 govts agree Ger. must pay in kind losses caused by her to Allies in course of war. To give to Mos Com the task to find out the figures of the reps. to be paid taking as basis To give Com to for discussion the Am-Sov formula.

Church We can not commit ourselves to fig. of $20 billion or any other figures until Com has studied

St. No commitment

Ed. What is value of the figure

St. Com. could change figures & modify them in any way.

Church You could propose that when the Com. meets Read excerpt from “communication from our govt” £500,000,000 a yr. = Ger’s pre-war exports. This could not be paid by Ger. True some of it capital but that make it harder for Ger. to supply rest. Attach importance to some statement re paying for Ger imports. Unless priority at least equal to reps. we shall pay by exports (?) for reps.

St: Suppose experts say figure is wrong. Then can fix new one. Our fig. not sacrosanct. We propose to discuss. It is nec. that things move forward.

Pres. suggest whole thing be left to Com at Mos.

Mol: Only yesterday ERS announced results of 3 For Mins consids.

Text of Read ERS report

Ed. We think putting fig. in report might commit us to the figures. If desired would be willing say:

Mos Rep Com will be instructed: 1st To take into exam the report presented by Mr M. to the Crimean Conf.
Mol. The 3 Mins considered this q. Eden’s proposal ignores fact this q has been discussed at Crimean Conf 
Ed. we didn’t want say how many yrs 
St. 1. The heads of 3 govts agree Ger must pay compensation in Kind for losses caused to Allied Govts 
2. & agree Ger must pay in Kind 
2. To the Mos. Rep Com has been given task to consider the am’t of reps. to be paid 
3. In the Com. we will bring in our fig & you will bring yours 
Church: I agree

Intermission

St. Montreux Agt.

I think this treaty is now out of date. In this treaty Jap. Emperor plays a very important role as one of the parties He plays perhaps more impor. role than S. U. The whole treaty is framed in such a way as to be linked up with Leag of Ns. But Leag doesn’t exist any more, just as Jap Emperor is not in our ranks. According to this Treaty T. has rt to close Straits not only in case of war but also if T considers sit. dangerous. This also is difficult from modern point of view

The treaty was made when our rels with Gt Brit were not very tight but now G Bt wouldn’t want strangle R. ... I think this treaty should be very seriously modified. Now nearly indecent to say we observe the treaty of Montreux. I think there could be no objection to consideration of a revision of the treaty. In what sense I won’t go on to prejudice future decs. But I should like int. of R to be taken account of. It is impossible to put up with a sit. where a small country will keep her hand at the throat of R. Ints of R must be taken into acct without infringing legit. int. of T. How to do it must be considered. I now propose the organ to study it. Is agreed 3 Mins will meet every few months Perhaps would be possible at 1st meeting to discuss so mins could report to their govts. That would be the preparatory stage for settlement of q. of the Straits

Pres. We have over 3,000 miles of natural boundary bet. US & Can No fort or armed ship on that boundary. Has existed for over 100 yrs. If we could get other govts do that would be wonderful thing

Church. Marshall mentioned this to Mr Ed & me when we were last in Mos. We viewed with sympathy the Sov. proposal that the treaty be revised We suggested that Sov Govt give us a note of what their ideas were on the Convention but this has not yet been done. We think proposal of Mar. is a wise one. We certainly feel present position of R with its great Black Sea being dependent upon this
narrow exit is not satisfactory If the matter is brought up at the
next For Secs meeting we hope the Rs will make their proposal Mean-
while I think it would be nec if T became minded to declare war on
Ger for any reason, it would bee to tell T the matter would be brought
under consid. Shouldn't like her to come in to war with out know-
ing of it. Indeed I think we have some promise to T that before
anything is decided affecting her she would be informed Mr Ed
reminds me that after we came back from Mos he mentioned the
matter to the T. Amb. in general terms, so we have Kept our engage-
ments It is worth considering whether at the time changes are made
to meet the wishes & needs of R in the Straits whether some under-
taking might be made to T that her indep. would in no way be affected
That would make it easy for her.

St. We can hide nothing from T & we should give her some assur-
ances

Church Then we are agreed
St. So For Mins will meet at the end of the Conf in US
Church I think it affects Brit position in the Med. more than U.S.
so conference might be in Lon. I tried hard some time ago to get
thru the Dardanelles. The R. Govt of that day sent 2 army corps
to help from the other end. However we did not succeed
St. They were in a hurry to take away the troops. If had waited
another wk. Gers & Ts all ready to capitulate Mr. Pres you would
not object to conf. in Eur.

Pres No
St. No secretary of the Conf. Who is taking notes of the decs.
Ed. Will put before you a commun & a note of decisions taken
Church In addition to commun.

Pres re Amended statement on Pol line For const. reasons I have
made a few changes Only 2 changes. Orig text was “The 3 Powers
are agreed” etc Const. q of whether I have a rt to say the 3 powers
can change a boundary :. the new lang: “The 3 heads of gov’t con-
sider” omit “3 powers” & change “agree” to “feel”

Mol Add Return her ancient terrs in E. Pr. & westerly
Pres Depends how long back you go
Mol Quite a long time ago It is of great importance to Poles
from a national point of view.

Church I feel it would be better not to draw the frontiers in the
W. at the present time & not to mention localities
Mol There is no mention of the frontiers & with regard to the
line of the Oder there was no objection
Church Never in pub.
Mol But at the Conf
Ed: On contrary, we have always said as far toward Oder as Poles want to go.

Church: If you talk of restoring the ancient terrs. I shall be asked what they are & there will be no sati. answer. We’re not ag: it
St Withdraw his suggestions & “your suggestion Mr Pres (to Pres) is accepted”
That will be the last point of paper on Pol Pres we have only commun
Church: D.O. (i.e. terr. trusteeships) [Then his advisers talked him out of it Prob. told him of revised copy of ERS report. He said “I haven’t seen it” but then matter was app. settled OK] 4
Pres suggested draft commun. be given to heads of govt tonight & then have 11.00 a.m. meeting tomorrow
Church Then said something about multiple membership in communiqué

4 Brackets appear in the original.

Amended Draft of the Declaration on Liberated Europe ¹

[Yalta, February 10, 1945.]

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

¹ Carbon copy in the Hiss Collection bears the notation: “As agreed to by For Mins 2/10 & at Plenary 2/10”. An identical carbon copy without notations is in the Matthews Files.
To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately (establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration) take measures for carrying out mutual consultation.²

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.³

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² The words after “immediately” are crossed out in pencil and the following substitution is indicated: “consult together on the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.”

³ This penciled notation follows: “add Fr. amend. of Eden’s”.

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880H.01/2-11465 : Telegram

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Foreign Office ¹

MOST IMMEDIATE

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

Following for Foreign Office from Foreign Secretary. Please repeat to Belgrade.

At plenary session of Crimea Conference on February 10th the Heads of the three Governments discussed the Yugoslav question and agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.

¹ This text is from an undated British copy evidently brought back to the Department from Yalta. A copy of the corresponding American telegram has not been found.
(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

(i) that Avnoj will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

(ii) that legislative acts passed by Avnoj will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.

2. Please arrange for a communication to be made at once on above lines to Dr. Subasic and to Marshal Tito.

3. Similar instructions are being sent by Soviet and United States Governments to their representatives with Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito and action should be concerted between the representatives of the three allied Governments.

Hopkins Papers

The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President ¹

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

Mr. President The Russians have given in so much at this conference that I don’t think we should let them down. Let the British disagree if they want to—and continue their disagreement at Moscow. Simply say it is all referred to the Reparations Commission with the minutes to show the British disagree about any mention of the 10 billion.

Harry

¹ The relationship of this note to the Seventh Plenary Meeting appears from internal evidence and from Sherwood, pp. 860, 861–862. See ante, p. 902.

Hiss Collection

The Secretary of State to the President ¹

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recommendation that the three powers encourage Kuomintang-Communist unity in the war effort against Japan.

As this is likely to be the final plenary session, I suggest that some time during today’s meeting you find occasion to urge the Marshal and the Prime Minister to see that full encouragement is given by

¹ Ribbon copy, bearing the initials of Stettinus as drafter and the following penciled notation in Hiss’ handwriting: “Bohlen says ‘the President has already taken this up with Stalin with satisfactory results’ (AH).” See ante, p. 771.
their Governments to Kuomintang-Communist unity in the war effort against Japan.

The importance of encouraging united Chinese efforts at this time must be apparent to all three Governments.

**TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, FEBRUARY 10, 1945, 9 P. M., VORONTSOV VILLA**

**Present**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President Roosevelt</td>
<td>Prime Minister Churchill</td>
<td>Marshal Stalin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary Stettinius</td>
<td>Foreign Secretary Eden</td>
<td>Foreign Commissar Molotov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bohlen</td>
<td>Major Birse</td>
<td>Mr. Pavlov</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bohlen Collection

**Bohlen Minutes**

**TOP SECRET**

Subjects: Reparations from Germany
Communiqué
British and American Politics
Jewish problems

At the beginning of dinner the conversation was general.

The **Prime Minister** then proposed a toast to the King of England, the President of the United States, and to Mr. Kalinin, President of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, and he asked the President as the only Head of State present to reply to this toast.

The **President** replied that the Prime Minister’s toast brought back many memories—that he recalled the first year as President of the United States in the summer of 1933. His wife had gone down in the country to open a school, and on the wall there had been a map on which there had been a great blank space. He said the teacher had told his wife that it was forbidden to speak about this place, and this place had been the Soviet Union. He said he had then decided to write a letter to Mr. Kalinin asking him to send someone to the United States to open negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations.

**Marshal Stalin,** in his conversation with Prime Minister Churchill, emphasized the unsatisfactory nature of the reparations question at the conference. He said he feared to have to go back to the Soviet Union and tell the Soviet people they were not going to get any reparations because the British were opposed to it.

---

1 Churchill acted as host.
The Prime Minister said that, on the contrary, he very much hoped that Russia would receive reparations in large quantities, but he remembered the last war when they had placed the figure at more than the capacity of Germany to pay.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought it would be a good idea to put some mention of the intention to make Germany pay for the damage it had caused the Allied Nations, and also some reference to the Reparations Commission, in the communiqué.

The Prime Minister and The President agreed to the inclusion of these statements in the communiqué.

The Prime Minister then proposed a toast to the health of Marshal Stalin. He said he hoped that the Marshal had a warmer feeling for the British than he had had, and that he felt that the great victories which his armies had achieved had made him more mellow and friendly than he had been during the hard times of the war. He said he hoped that the Marshal realized that he had good and strong friends in those British and American representatives assembled here. We all hoped, he continued, that the future of Russia would be bright, and he said he knew Great Britain, and he was sure the President, would do all they could to bring this about. He said he felt that the common danger of war had removed impediments to understanding and the fires of war had wiped out old animosities. He said he envisaged a Russia which had already been glorious in war as a happy and smiling nation in times of peace.

Mr. Stettinius then proposed a toast to his predecessor, Mr. Cordell Hull, who he said had been an inspiration to us all in his labors for the creation of a peaceful and orderly world. He concluded by saying that Mr. Hull was a great American and great statesman.

The President then said that he recalled that there had been an organization in the United States called the Ku Klux Klan that had hated the Catholics and the Jews, and once when he had been on a visit in a small town in the South he had been the guest of the president of the local Chamber of Commerce. He had sat next to an Italian on one side and a Jew on the other and had asked the president of the Chamber of Commerce whether they were members of the Ku Klux Klan, to which the president had replied that they were, but that they were considered all right since everyone in the community knew them. The President remarked that it was a good illustration

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2 The following morning Stettinius sent this message to Hull (Defense Files, Argonaut 143, February 11, 1945):

"'We have missed you at our Conference and send you our affectionate greetings and wish for you a speedy recovery in order that we may all have the benefit of association with you again. Signed: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, Molotov, Eden and Stettinius.'"

"'I was instructed to send the above message to you on behalf of the above who were guests of the Prime Minister at dinner this [last] evening.'"
of how difficult it was to have any prejudices—racial, religious or otherwise—if you really knew people.

Marshal Stalin said he felt that this was very true.

After considerable discussion between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin as to English politics, in which the latter said he did not believe the Labor Party would ever be successful in forming a government in England, The President said that in his opinion any leader of a people must take care of their primary needs. He said he remembered when he first became President the United States was close to revolution because the people lacked food, clothing and shelter, but he had said, "If you elect me President I will give you these things", and since then there was little problem in regard to social disorder in the United States.

The President then said he desired to propose a toast to the Prime Minister. He said that he personally had been twenty-eight years old when he entered political life, but even at that time Mr. Churchill had had long experience in the service of his country. Mr. Churchill had been in and out of the government for many, many years, and it was difficult to say whether he had been of more service to his country within the government or without. The President said that he personally felt that Mr. Churchill had been perhaps of even greater service when he was not in the government since he had forced the people to think.

The Prime Minister said that he would face difficult elections in the near future in England since he did not know what the Left would do.

Marshal Stalin said that he felt that Left and Right now were parliamentary terms. For example, under classical political concepts, Daladier, who was a radical socialist, had been more to the left than Mr. Churchill, yet Daladier had dissolved the trade unions in France, whereas Mr. Churchill had never molested them in England. He inquired who, then, could be considered more to the left?

The President said that in 1940 there had been eighteen political parties in France and that within one week he had had to deal with three different prime ministers in France. He said that when he had seen de Gaulle last summer he had asked him how this had happened in French political life, and de Gaulle replied that it was based on a series of combinations and compromises, but he intended to change all that.

The Prime Minister remarked that Marshal Stalin had a much easier political task since he only had one party to deal with.

Marshal Stalin replied that experience had shown one party was of great convenience to a leader of a state.
The Prime Minister said if he could get full agreement of all the British people it would greatly facilitate his task, but he must say that during the Greek crisis he had lost two votes in Parliament and the opposition had consisted of only eleven votes against him. He said he had accosted those Members of Parliament who had deserted him and had asked them to have the courage of their convictions. He added that they had been very unhappy because they had had this stand against the government. He concluded that he didn’t know what would be the result of the election in England but he knew he and Mr. Eden would continue to support the interests of Russia and the United States no matter who was in power.

The Prime Minister then remarked that although he had had great difficulty with Mr. Gallacher, the Communist member in the House of Commons, he nevertheless had written him a letter of sympathy when he lost his two foster children in the war. He added that he felt that British opposition to Communism was not based on any attachment to private property but to the old question of the individual versus the state. He said that in war the individual of necessity is subordinate to the state and that in England any man or woman between the ages of eighteen and sixty was subject to the government.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he did not believe the Labor Party could ever form a government in England. He asked the President whether there was any labor party in a political sense in the United States.

The President replied that labor was extremely powerful in the United States but there was no one specific party.

Marshal Stalin then said he thought more time was needed to consider and finish the business of the conference.

The President answered that he had three Kings waiting for him in the Near East, including Ibn Saud.

Marshal Stalin said the Jewish problem was a very difficult one—that they had tried to establish a national home for the Jews in Virovitzhan but that they had only stayed there two or three years and then scattered to the cities. He said the Jews were natural traders but much had been accomplished by putting small groups in some agricultural areas.

The President said he was a Zionist and asked if Marshal Stalin was one.

Marshal Stalin said he was one in principle but he recognized the difficulty.
During the course of the conversation, Marshal Stalin remarked that the Soviet Government would never have signed a treaty with the Germans in 1939 and had it not been for Munich and the Polish-German treaty of 1934.

Marshal Stalin came over and spoke to the President and said he did not think they could complete the work of the conference by three o’clock tomorrow.

The President replied that if necessary he would wait over until Monday, to which Marshal Stalin expressed gratification.

It was tentatively agreed that there would be a plenary session tomorrow at twelve noon, after which the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin would lunch with the President.

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SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1945

EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 11, 1945, NOON, LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

**UNITED STATES**

President Roosevelt
Secretary Stettinius
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Hiss
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Foote

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Edward Bridges
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Dixon
Major Birse

**SOVIET UNION**

Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar
Molotov
Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

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**Editorial Note**

There are no full minutes of this meeting in the Bohlen Collection. There is a list of those present and of subjects of discussion, indicated as (1) communiqué on close of conference, (2) reparations, and (3) Japan, but these are followed by the notation: “No report was written up on this Conference.” There is, however, a subsequent page in the Bohlen Collection, entitled “Report of Last Day’s Proceedings”, the
first paragraph of which bears the sub-heading "Last Plenary Session". This is the paragraph reproduced below. For references to documents, see the Hiss notes which follow the Bohlen note on this meeting.

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**Bohlen Note**

SECRET

At the last Plenary Session, the communiqué was discussed and most of the conversation dealt with the details of language, the results of which are apparent in the final communiqué agreed upon. The Soviet suggested that in the part on voting procedure no reference be made to the fact that the proposal accepted was put forward by the President. Marshal Stalin stated that there would be no objection to the President, or any other American Official, making it public that the United States’ proposal had been adopted, but he felt such a reference did not properly belong in a communiqué. The Soviet suggestion was adopted.

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**Hiss Notes**

2/11 12.15 p.m. Plenary

Communique

PM likes draft but too many "joints". Also make separate reparations

Mol. We have an amendment that does that

The 1st part: prefer more detail, naming personalities who took part

Church: At end

St: Better at beginning. Was at Teheran

Pres & PM: OK

St. no other remarks on opening

Church put in generals as well?

St. Yes

Church I agree with that

St name whomever you like

---

1 From penciled notes in longhand.

2 See Stettinius, p. 279.
I Defeat of Ger.

Mol amends
Church: Is point of substance in introducing word “Hitlerite”
It narrows it. We would prefer “Nazi” Germany
Mol. Withdraws amend. (re Hitlerite Ger)
Church. Leave out “joint”, goes without saying
various Church amendments

II OK with St.

Ed: Ought make it clear how zone is to be given
Shouldn’t indicate we have accepted the Fr. demand.
“Limits of the Fr. zone will be agreed by the 4 Govts thru their
reps. on the EAC”

Wire to Winant

Mol: After II a new chap. on reparations.
We consider the q. on the costs by Ger of Allied loss to Allied Govt
in this war it is fair to exact from Ger reparations in Kind in the
greatest poss. amt. to the greatest possible extent possible. A Com-
mision is created on Reps which will have as its task determining the
amt. of reps.
The Com. will sit in Mos.
Pres Only q is whether it is worthwhile to have sep. Chapter or
work it in. I can’t find a good place.

III

Mol After 1st 2 ¶s add:
It has been also resolved to recommend to the Conf. to invite Uk.
& Wh. R as orig. member
Pres very embarrassing to me
Church If brought out pub. now without any explanation of US
position will cause trouble.
3 members of the War Cab. are objecting to the prin. of more than
1 vote. This only shows controversies it will raise. We are all
pledged to it in the draft conclusions
I should have to ask for adjournment to consult dominions. It
might take several days. But we put it all down in the conclusions
St.: Withdrew it. But in
Mol ¶s 4 & 5
These ¶s should read as follows:

Concerning voting proc. in the Sec. Coun. of the projected org.
Confused with our early draft. Say they have no copy of last draft
omit “put forward by the Pres.”
Mol If the text which we rec’d last night is united draft of Brit
& Ams we didn’t know it. It is agreed
ERS asked Pres if it would affect him politically back home if “put forward by the Pres” is retained & Pres said it would not. Pres preferred to leave the phrase in

PM wants to eliminate 1st sentence of Chap. V on Pol.

Chap IV agreed to

Ed: insert after inherent: “we were impressed by the dangers of any divergence of policy between the major allies toward Poland”

St: Leave it out altogether

Church: Would prefer Ed’s amended form

St: This is only a statement about proceedings of various representatives. Some may have been impressed, others not.

Pres read our proposed new sentence

Agreed

Church wants to say dec. re Pol. will be very heavily attacked in Eng. It will be said we have yielded completely on the frontiers & the whole matter to R.

St: Is it in earnest? I doubt it

Church: I assure you it is. Lon³ Poles will raise a dreadful outcry

St: But the other Poles will predominate

Church: I hope you’re right. We’re not going back on it. It’s not a q. of nos. of Poles but of the cause for which Brit drew the sword. Will you have completely swept away the only const. govt of Pol. However I will defend it to the best of my ability

VI Yug

Church translate Avnoj

St: That’s right. Not every one will understand

VII Agreed

VIII Prisoners of war

St: suggests mention of prisoners of war should be deleted. This is a q. among ourselves. We can take dec. but not nec to pub

Mol: Says he & Ed agreed will come up in meeting For Mins

Church: But can be published?

Agreed be published separately when text completed this afternoon

IX Unity O K with St.

Summary was dropped O K

IX Church what does “want”? mean “It means privation & not desire”

Mol: Will this communiqué be signed by the heads of govts

Pres: Just as at Teheran

*London.
Should be signed first by St. because has been such a wonderful host
St. I object
Church. If take alphabet I’ll be first
St.—Am. bloc
"
If you take age I also come first
St. If St. 1st signature will say he leads. Insists he be in last
place
Who will take charge of final text
Church: Bridges
St. perhaps to the For Mins for final checking
Pres. Early
St. Mel & Vishinsky. He is not interested in lunch
Pres: For Mins then to read it over in place of P. M, Mar. & me.
St. Who will make list of decs. Assign this task to someone else
Pres: On summary of conclusions re reps. (i.e. Sov. protocol)
etirely satis to us with few changes
Church: Not for publication

4 For list of decisions prepared in the United States Delegation, see post, pp. 947–948. The final list of decisions became the Protocol of Proceedings, post, pp. 975–982.

Roosevelt Paper

List of Amendments to the Draft Communiqué 1

[YALTA, February 11, 1945.]

PRIME MINISTER’S AMENDMENTS TO DRAFT COMMUNIQUÉ

Defeat of Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>“co-ordination”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Read</td>
<td>“concert”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>After “launched”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insert</td>
<td>“continuously”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three lines lower down, instead of “our joint military plans”, read “our combined military plans”.
The word “joint” appears twice in the next three lines, and the Prime Minister would omit it in these two places.

Occupation and Control of Germany

In the second line for the word “jointly” substitute the word “together”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>the word “co-ordinated” should be struck out and “united” substituted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Line 7</td>
<td>the last sentence of the paragraph should read as follows:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Authorship not indicated.
"It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three Powers if she should so desire to take over a fourth zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission."

In the first line of the next paragraph for "it is our joint purpose" read "It is our inflexible purpose".

In the third line of this paragraph for "threaten" read "disturb".

Six lines from the bottom of the paragraph, instead of "to take jointly such other measures" read "to take in harmony such other measures".

The last sentence of the paragraph on this page should read as follows:

"It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and Militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for the Germans and a place for them in the comity of nations."

TRIPARTITE LUNCHEON MEETING, FEBRUARY 11, 1945, 1 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>Sir Archibald Clark Kerr</td>
<td>Mr. Pavlov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Hopkins</td>
<td>Sir Alexander Cadogan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Harriman</td>
<td>Major Birse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bohlen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Note

At the luncheon, which was attended by the President, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin; the three Foreign Secretaries, Ambassador Harriman, Clark Kerr, and Sir Alexander Cadogan, and three interpreters, the conversation was general and personal. At one point, however, Marshal Stalin made an obvious reference to Iran, and stated in his opinion, any nation which kept its oil in the ground and would not let it be exploited, was, in fact, "working against peace."

1 Roosevelt acted as host.
2 Leahy and Hopkins are not listed as present in the Bohlen note, but they are shown in the photograph which is reproduced as plate 8 following p. 546.
MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 11, 1945, 4:20 P. M.

Present

United States
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Hiss

United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Edward Bridges

Soviet Union
Foreign Commissar Molotov

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Note

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO APPROVE THE “SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE”

At this meeting, the discussion was almost entirely related to language and drafting problems. Mr. Eden, supported by Mr. Stettinius, proposed that Saudi Arabia be included among those countries which, if they declared war on the common enemy before March 1st, would be invited to attend the United Nations Conference at San Francisco. Mr. Molotov said that he could not accept that proposal without reference to Marshal Stalin, and suggested that, since time was so short, that it would be reserved for possible future consideration. Mr. Molotov’s suggestion was accepted.

1 Neither the Bohlen record nor Stettinius (p. 279) mentions any participants in this meeting other than the three Foreign Ministers. It appears, however, that Bohlen may have been present and that Hiss was certainly there. The Hiss notes indicate that Sir Edward Bridges also attended. The meeting presumably took place in Livadia Palace.

Hiss Collection

Hiss Notes

2/11 4.20 p m
ERS Chmn
Final meeting of For Mins

ERS: 1st subject is approval of communiqué
Sir Edward Bridges to report on read communiqué
Re D. O.
Mol. Marshal Stalin said should say what is said in conclusions that was agreed on voting & not that President’s proposal had been adopted
No objection if Mr. S. or anyone else should say this was the proposal of the Pres.
In no other place is it said on whose initiative it has been done

1 From penciled notes in longhand.
ERS This was discussed this morning in presence of Mar & Pres & I discussed it at length with Pres. Would be very diff. for me to agree

Mol. Was no agt on this special point
We said we had another q on this par.
Simultaneously with the pub. of com. you or someone say this was the proposal put forward by the Pres. We don’t want to hush-hush this fact.

ERS: agreed to eliminate the reference to Pres.
Re consultation
Ed on procedure—US is to approach Ch. & Fr. Desirable that consultation be done as soon as possible—48 hours if possible as will be great interest in the subject.²

2/11 ERS Chmn
For. Mins.

(After intermission)

Summary of Conclusions

p. 1 Mol. what would be the title: “Decisions”?
Agreed: Protocol of the proceedings of the Crimea Conference
Mol. First phrase
The Crimean Conf. of the 3 heads of the Govts of USSR, US & Gt Brit which took place in the Crimea from Feb 4 to Feb 11 took came to the following conclusions:

Ed. Would like to add Saudi Arabia before Turkey
Mol. Why
Ed. They did want to declare war & we discouraged them
Mol. This q. was not discussed. There would then come others (i e new suggestions)

Ed. Good to have Moslem or two Ibn Saud is having cup of coffee with Pres.
ERS I have no objection. They have assisted in the prosecution of the war to some extent
Mol I don’t know if Saudi Arabia will be much help. Think it over & consider at end of protocol

p. 2
San Francisco inserted
Mol. I want to be there

p. 3 ERS “or in the preliminary consultations”

² See the telegram from Stettinius to Grew, post, pp. 793–795.
Agreed
p 5 Insert protocol in place of reparations section
Agreed
p 9 ERS agreed re Yug.
p 10 ERS suggests insert “among the For. Secs”
Suggests eliminate last sentence
Mol: “Mr. Mol. agreed to this proposal”
Eden: should not say views will be conveyed “aint any views” instead say: could not be approved

Persia
Mol: Suggests instead:
“Mr Ed, Mr S & Mr Mol exchanged views on the sit. in Iran”
Otherwise eliminate altogether
Ed add “It was decided agreed that the matter would be pursued further through the dip. channel.”

Montreux
Mol. after “Convention”: which ceased to correspond to the contemporary sit.”
It's a hint in regard to change
ERS we should consider sit. before suggest give a hint
Ed. Alternative: the changes proposals which it was understood the Sov. Govt would put forward with reference in relation to the Montreux Con.
Agreed to Ed. alternative with last sentence omitted
Ed. We will inform the Turks
Mol About the fact that this q. will be raised
Ed insert informed “at the appropriate moment”
Mol. Insists on his amend
Ed. willing to stop there & leave out assurance point.
Transmit to Pres. copy of what ERS signs Protocol & of 2 tels to Ed. submitted the draft cable to de G. re zone of occup & Control
Com 3
ERS agreed
Mol. hadn’t had time to read
Mol. Gave his prelim. consent. Mar. St. has not seen them. Will give his answer tonight
Saudi Arabia—Mol. to let Ed. know

3 Post, p. 948.
III. THE YALTA CONFERENCE

Working Draft of the Protocol of Proceedings Revised by the Foreign Ministers on February 11, 1945

CRIMEA CONFERENCE
Summary of Conclusions:

Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference

The following conclusions were arrived at—

I. WORLD ORGANISATION

It was decided:

(1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organisation should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

(2) the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th February, 1945; and

(b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term "Associated Nation" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey"). When the Conference on World Organisation is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e. the Ukraine and White Russia.

(3) that the United States Government on behalf of the Three Powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed World Organisation.

(4) that the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

INVITATION

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of _________ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.

1 The source text is a mimeographed document which has the penciled initials "A. H." in the upper right-hand corner of the first page. The document contains various penciled alterations, most if not all of which appear to have been made by the hand of Alger Hiss. The insertions are here printed in italics. For the text as signed, see post, pp. 975-982.

2 Marginal notation: "& Saudi Arabia?"
The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

"C. VOTING
1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting".

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of _________ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments”.

TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP

It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference, or in the preliminary consultations and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

II. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the
liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested."

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COMMISSION FOR GERMANY

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed
out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Commission for Germany.

V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved: 3

It was agreed that a Reparations Commission should be set up in Moscow. This Commission will comprise one representative from the U. S. A., U. S. S. R., and U. K., each representative being assisted by such expert advisers as may be necessary. The Commission should begin its work as soon as possible.

It was agreed that the following should be the basic principles of exaction of reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy.

2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labour by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

(a) Removal in a single payment in the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investment abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

(b) Annual deliveries of commodities during 10 years after the end of the war.

3. Germany is to pay compensation in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied Nations during the war and the Moscow Reparations Commission shall have the task of considering the amount of reparations to be paid.

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3 In the source text the following paragraphs of this section are crossed out, in line with the decision (see ante, p. 933) to substitute therefor the reparations protocol (post, pp. 978-979).
VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.

VII. POLAND

The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity."

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorised as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. It is recognised that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference."

VIII. YUGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.
(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

(i) that the National Liberation Committee will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and
(ii) that legislative acts passed by the National Liberation Committee will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly;

and that this statement should be published in the communique of the Conference.

IX. ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER
ITALO-AUSTRIA FRONTIER

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views among the Foreign Ministers' Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed of the views of the Three Powers that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with M. Molotov in Moscow. M. Molotov promised to consider the matter and to give his views on the following day agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

(a) the Control Commission in Bulgaria
(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.
(c) Oil equipment in Roumania.

XII. PERSIA

Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius drew attention to the importance of observing the Tripartite Treaty and the Tehran Declaration of 1st December, 1943, particularly in so far as concerned requests for oil concessions in Persia.
XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

XIV. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider what changes should be made in the arrangements for the Straits laid down in proposals which Sov Govt will make in regard the Montreux Convention and report thereon to the three Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed that this matter is under consideration and should be given an assurance that their independence and integrity is in no way affected at the proper moment.

Hiss Collection

United States Delegation Draft of Announcement Regarding the United Nations Conference

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The proposals for a general international organization resulting from the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks have been considered, and agreed proposals have been worked out on the major points left open at those conversations. Our views are being transmitted to the Government of China and to the Provisional Government of the French Republic for their consideration. As soon as these consultations have been completed, the proposals agreed upon will be made public and invitations will be issued to a United Nations Conference to be held in the United States about April 15. This conference will prepare the charter of the general international organization.

1 Undated carbon copy; authorship not indicated. For an earlier draft of this paper, see ante, p. 85. That draft was revised to the wording here printed in the handwriting of Alger Hiss (UNA Files). See Section IV of the communiqué, post, p. 971, for the announcement as issued.
The President's Secretary (Early) to the President's Administrative Assistant (Daniels)¹

[YALTA, February 11, 1945.]

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO BE SENT TO THE WHITE HOUSE AT THE TIME OF THE RELEASE OF THE COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCING TIME AND PLACE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE.

Please release the following telegrams, as a White House statement 48 hours after the formal commencement of the Conference:

The President today announced that he will invite the following to be the members of the United States delegation to the United Nations Conference on April 25, 1945, at San Francisco:

Secretary of State Stettinius, Chairman;
Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who will also serve as Senior Advisor to the Chairman;
Senator Connally;
Senator Vandenberg;
Representative Bloom;
Representative Eaton;
Commander Harold Stassen, USN;
Dean Virginia Gildersleeve.

The names of advisors will be announced later.

Mr. Hull also will serve as Senior Advisor of the U.S. delegation.

¹Authorship not indicated. A copy of this document in the Hiss Collection, which embodies the alterations written on the copy reproduced above, bears the following handwritten notations:

"Mr. Early took original 2/11 10.30 a.m. & said he would send it."
"Map room informed us about 1:30 p.m. that it had been sent."

A copy of the same telegram obtained from the Roosevelt Papers indicates that the time of release was to be twenty-four, rather than forty-eight, hours after publication of the communiqué.
TOP SECRET

[YALTA], 11 February 1945.

ARGONAUT 147 Top Secret. For Acting Secretary of State from Secretary Stettinius. To be delivered immediately.

1. The conference has agreed upon our proposal on voting procedure and we are to consult China and France on behalf of the other two powers. The date of the United Nations Conference has been fixed for April 25, 1945, and the location at San Francisco. The substance of the foregoing will be announced in the communiqué to be issued Monday night for Tuesday morning’s papers although the communiqué will not itself state that the voting procedure agreed upon was proposed by the United States. It is however understood that we are at liberty, simultaneously with the release of the communiqué, to state that our proposal on voting procedure was the one that was adopted. ¹ Mr. Early is separately taking care of this latter statement but if there is any slip up in his communications you will wish to make that fact public at the time the communiqué is issued.

2. It is of the utmost urgency that our consultations with China and France be as brief as possible because of the intense interest which will be aroused throughout the world as to the substance of the voting provisions which are not to be made public until the consultation is completed. Mr. Eden said at this afternoon’s final meeting that he hoped the consultation could be completed within forty-eight hours. This will give you an indication of the urgency with which this matter must be treated.

3. The text of the invitation as agreed upon reads as follows:—

"The government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of blank to send representatives to a conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

¹ See ante, pp. 927–928.
"The above named governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:—

"1. C. Voting:—1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote. 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members. 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently. In the event that the government of blank desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating governments."

4. It was also agreed that the nations to be invited to the United Nations Conference should be the United Nations as they existed on February 8th, 1945, and such of the associated nations and Turkey as have declared war on the common enemy by March 1, 1945. This explains my recent urgent wire to you about the Latin American associated nations.2

5. It was also agreed that the five governments with permanent seats in the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeships which could apply only to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of this war; and (c) any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.

It was further agreed that no discussions of specific territories will take place during the preliminary consultations on trusteeships or at the United Nations Conference itself. Only machinery and principles of trusteeship will be formulated at the Conference for inclusion in

2 Ante, pp. 794, 797. A notation concerning the preparation of this telegram may be found ante, p. 782. As early as January 10, 1945, a memorandum (740.0011EW/1-1045) had been sent by the Executive Secretary of the Secretary’s Staff Committee (Rothwell) to Assistant Secretary Rockefeller, containing the following paragraph:

"The Secretary urged that immediate action be taken to have our Embassies informed of the six Latin American ‘Associated Nations’ of the possibility that they may be excluded from initial participation in the forthcoming United Nations Conference, unless they declare war on Germany or Japan, or both.”
the Charter and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to
which territories within the categories specified above will actually be
placed under trusteeship. I think that this subject should also be
covered in your consultations with China and France.

6. We are relying on you to conduct the consultation with France
and China in such manner as seems to you most effective and most
expeditious and thereafter to publish the text of the voting provi-
sions in concert with the other four powers.

7. I am leaving tonight for Moscow for a visit of only one or two
days and can be reached through the Embassy. Please cable me
summary of press and other public reaction to the communique as
soon as it is available.

8. Allstate Horseshoe.

His Collection

United States Delegation Draft Memorandum Regarding Invitation to
Saudi Arabia to Attend the United Nations Conference

(Copy)

[Yalta,] Feb. 11

R's refused to agree

Mr. Early: Please inform the President on behalf of Mr. Stettinius
that at today's final meeting of the Foreign Ministers held shortly after
the President left, Mr. Eden proposed and Mr. Molotov and Mr.
Stettinius agreed that Saudi Arabia be added to the eight associated
nations and Turkey as entitled to be invited to the United Nations
Conference on April 25 at San Francisco if they declare war by
March 1.

We consider this as a desirable move and suggest that the President
should inform Ibn Saud of this when the two meet in the next few days.

In any event Colonel Eddy, our Minister who will accompany Ibn
Saud to the Quincy, should be informed of this and should inform Ibn.

Will you please give the above information also to Admiral Leahy
& to Admiral Brown

1 Handwritten in pencil; authorship not indicated. Text is crossed out, appar-
ently in view of the notation at the top. Saudi Arabia, however, did adhere to
the Declaration by United Nations on March 1, 1945, and was represented at
the San Francisco Conference.

2 Russians.

3 The handwriting to this point is that of Hiss; the handwriting of the re-
mainder has not been identified.
TOP SECRET

[YALTA], 11 February 1945.

From Secretary Early to Jonathan Daniels, White House. Communiqué text will be dispatched tonight. Sent you two declarations today, one on Poland and the second on liberated Europe. Disregard previous instructions and insert these texts where indicated in communiqué. Kill title “Declaration on Poland” and insert without title in text of communiqué according to instructions to come. About one hundred words from beginning make read “are authorized as a commission to consult” instead “are authorized to consult.” About fifty four words from end make read “they recognized that Poland” instead “it is recognized.”

The following statement should be prepared for release simultaneous with communiqué but should be given out as a separate story, not even as an annex: A comprehensive agreement was reached at the Crimea Conference providing detailed arrangements for the protection, maintenance and repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians of the British Commonwealth, Soviet Union and United States liberated by the Allied forces now invading Germany.

Under these arrangements each ally will provide food, clothing, medical attention and other needs for the nationals of the others until transport is available for their repatriation. In caring for British subjects and American citizens the Soviet Government will be assisted by British and American officers. Soviet officers will assist British and American authorities in their task of caring for Soviet citizens liberated by the British and American forces during such time as they are on the continent of Europe or in the United Kingdom, awaiting transport to take them home.

We are pledged to give every assistance consistent with operational requirements to help to ensure that all these prisoners of war and civilians are speedily repatriated.

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1 The insertions and revisions indicated were incorporated in the final text as released. See post, pp. 968–975.
2 This statement was released by the White House, without change, on February 12, 1945.
United States Delegation List of Tripartite Decisions at Yalta

LIST OF DECISIONS ARRIVED AT BY THE THREE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

1. To include the word "dismemberment" in the German terms of surrender.
2. To appoint a committee composed of Mr. Eden, Ambassador Winant and Ambassador Gousev to study the question of dismemberment.
3. To adopt proposal of the United States with respect to the voting procedure in the Security Council of the proposed world organization.
4. To hold a United Nations Conference on April 25, 1945, in the United States, to prepare the charter of the proposed world organization.
5. To authorize the United States, on behalf of the three powers, to consult the Government of China and the Provisional Government of France, with respect to decisions 3 and 4.
6. That the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on providing machinery in the world charter for dealing with territorial trusteeships which would apply only to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of this war; (c) any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.

It was agreed it would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which territories within the preceding categories would actually be placed under trusteeship and that no discussions of specific territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations Conference.

7. The United States and the United Kingdom to support at the United Nations Conference, the Soviet request that the Ukraine and White Russia be admitted as initial members of the world organization.
8. To issue the statement on Poland agreed to at the Conference.
9. That there should be immediately established in Moscow a Commission on German reparations composed of Mr. Molotov, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and Mr. Harriman, which would be guided by the following agreed principles: (a) Germany must pay in kind for losses caused by it to the Allied Governments; (b) the amount of the reparations to be paid by Germany should be considered by the Moscow Reparations Commission and reported to it by the three Governments; (c) the three Governments will submit to the Commission their proposals and data relating to the question of German reparations.

1 Undated, but presumably February 11; authorship not indicated. Copies are also in the Matthews Files and the Hiss Collection. The list is obviously not complete (cf. texts of signed agreements, post, Chapter 10).
10. To issue the Declaration on Liberated Europe agreed to at the Conference.

11. To accord to the Provisional Government of France a German zone of occupation, and representation on the German Control Commission.

12. To send a joint telegram to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic, the text of which was agreed to at the Conference.

13. To hold periodic meetings of the three Foreign Ministers, the first meeting to be held in London in June, 1945.

14. That, at their first meeting, the three Foreign Ministers will consider revision of the Montreux Convention.

Defense File: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

TOP SECRET

ARGONAUT 149. Secret and personal for the Ambassador from Secretary of State Stettinius.

You should concert with your British and Soviet colleagues and arrange to deliver to General de Gaulle the following two telegrams from the three heads of Government as soon as possible after 8:30 p.m. Paris time, Monday, February 12.

1. Quote: You will observe that the communiqué which we are issuing the end of this Conference contains a Declaration on Liberated Europe. You will also see that, in the last paragraph of the Declaration, we express the hope that your Government may be associated with us in the action and procedure suggested. Had circumstances permitted we should have greatly welcomed discussion with you of the terms of this Declaration. The terms are, however, less important than the joint obligation to take action in certain eventualities; and we feel that it is of the highest importance, in the interests of Europe, that the Provisional Government of the French Republic should agree, jointly with her three allies, to accept such an obligation. Signed Winston S. Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and I. V. Stalin. Unquote and end of first telegram.

2. Quote: We have been considering the question of the control of Germany after her defeat and have come to the conclusion that it will be highly desirable for the Provisional Government of the French Republic, if they will, to accept responsibility for a zone of occupation and to be represented on the Central Machinery of Control. We should be glad to learn that the French Government are prepared to accept these responsibilities. Signed Winston S. Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and I. V. Stalin. Unquote and end of second telegram.¹

ARGONAUT, February 11, 1945.

¹ British drafts of these telegrams in the form of undated and unsigned carbon copies are in the Hiss Collection, among a group of working papers pertaining to the Foreign Ministers’ meeting on February 11, 1945. See ante, p. 933.

Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram No. 788 from Paris, dated February 21, 1945 (740.00119 Control (Germany)/2-2145) that the two messages were delivered to De Gaulle on February 12.
9. OTHER CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 2 [3], 1945.¹

1. General information. In view of our lukewarm attitude on the proposed tripartite statement recognizing the Danes as Allies, and probable Soviet refusal to participate in it, the British may refer the matter to the Big Three for decision. Meanwhile we are sending through our own channels, with copies to London and Moscow for the information of the British and Soviet Governments, a secret message to the Freedom Council and the Danish political party leaders, acknowledging their communication and lauding the contributions being made by the Danish resistance movement in the common cause. (This is eleventh message.)² . . . Kennan reports that the British Chargé under instructions has expressed the hope to Molotov that arrangements worked out for the Hungarian Control Commission would apply in Bulgaria as well. Molotov’s reaction was highly negative and he maintained that the matters had no connection. ALLSTATE. HORSESHOE. Subasic and his government do not intend leaving London until February 7. . . . It is understood that the Mikołajczyk memorandum shown to Bohlen did not reach Rome in time. Would you like a summary sent along to you?³

In reply to Ambassador Hurley’s telegrams to you ⁴ I said that his fuller report on the efforts he has made to bring about unification of Chinese military forces through agreement between Communists and the Kuomintang was welcomed; that for a long time we have recognized the importance of such unification in the prosecution of the war; that it was gratifying to know that both sides apparently desired to avail themselves of his good offices; and that in such cordial atmosphere we felt he could continue to be helpful in this matter. I

¹ The text of this message in the Defense Files bears the date February 3, which is the date under which it was transmitted.
² i.e., from the Acting Secretary to the Secretary since the departure of the latter from Washington, in this series of messages sent via Army channels.
³ For the summary in question, see post, pp. 953–954.
⁴ See ante, p. 346, footnote 1.

949
added that in the light of present circumstances I agreed with him that if any aid is to be given to the Communists by us this should be done only through the National Government.

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Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 3, 1945.

US URGENT [Received February 3—11:30 a.m.]

NIACT POLES 11. From Schoenfeld.

Polish Foreign Office has sent me by hand, with the request that it be urgently telegraphed, following letter dated February 3, 1945 for the President from Prime Minister Arciszewski:

"Mr. President.

At this time the fate of many nations rests in your hands and in the hands of Prime Minister Churchill. The whole world expects that these important discussions in which you and the Prime Minister of Great Britain are taking part will result in the creation of foundations for a future peace, a peace which should bring to nations the freedom of conscience and speech and secure for them freedom from fear and want. I trust that these essential freedoms will also be granted to our nation which has been fighting unflinchingly for their realization at the side of the great American and British democracies.

In particular I trust you will not permit any decisions to be taken which might jeopardize the legitimate rights of Poland or her independence and that you will not recognize any faits accomplis with regard to Poland. If peace in Europe is to be durable it must be based on principles of justice, on respect of law, on good neighbourly relations as well as honesty in international life.

While I am writing these words, the lives of many thousands of Poland's best sons are in danger. The so-called provisional govern-

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1 This telegram is endorsed "Text sent to President through Map Room Feb. 3". The telegram from Grew to the President, dated February 4, embodying the text of Arciszewski's letter, is among the Roosevelt Papers; and a chit with it reads as follows:

"6 February:

Shown to Mr. His who took it to show to Doc Matthews. Returned and said that no action was necessary that they were working on Polish problem then, and that perhaps later acknowledgment might be in order. "R[obert] W B[jogue]"

Roosevelt acknowledged Arciszewski's message by a telegram of February 15, 1945, in which he stated: "You may be assured that Poland's problems received most careful and sympathetic consideration at our recent Conference. I hope we may all work together harmoniously to find the correct solution in due time." (Roosevelt Papers.)
ment of Lublin has openly declared its intention to try as traitors all soldiers of the Polish home army and members of the Polish underground movement. Mass arrests and deportations have already taken place. You are well aware that they have fought the Germans gallantly and regardless of sacrifice throughout the five years of occupation. You assisted them yourself with your aid and in the memorable days of the Warsaw rising the American and British Governments recognized the home army as part of the regular Polish forces fighting alongside the United Nations. Today the lives of these soldiers are in danger because they recognize the independent, legal Polish Government and because they firmly insist on their rights as men and citizens. Therefore I beg of you to urge upon the Soviet Government whose armies are at present in occupation of the territory of Poland to give proof that they genuinely desire understanding with Poland and to prevent the execution of the criminal plans of the Lublin men.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed). Tomasz Arciszewski."

WINANT

740.0011 EW/1-2745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 3 [4], 1945.¹

Telegram to the Secretary of State from the Acting Secretary.

1. . . . (This is message no. 13.)

2. . . . Winant has informed the Soviet representative on EAC of our acceptance in principle of the five French proposals regarding French participation in the surrender, occupation and control of Germany.² The Soviet representative stated appreciation of our advance notice and is endeavoring to obtain early instructions from his government. Winant has also informed the Soviet and British representatives on the Commission of American approval of the protocol on German zones of occupation . . . .


Medina in Venezuela somewhat taken aback by President’s letter³ but appreciates the situation and will consult Cabinet and reply to us promptly . . . .

5. Poland. We are repeating to the President a message to him from Prime Minister Arciszewski⁴ which contains the following

¹ The text of this message in the Defense Files bears the date February 4, which is the date under which it was transmitted.
² For the five French proposals, see ante, p. 293.
³ Not printed, but see ante, pp. 794, 797.
⁴ Supra.
major points: It is hoped that no decisions will be taken in present conversations which might jeopardize legitimate Polish rights or Polish independence. The President is requested to urge on the Soviet Government that they should give some proof of their genuine desire for an understanding with Poland and should also take steps to prevent the destruction of the Polish home army and the Polish underground by the "so-called Provisional Government of Lublin."

Defense Files: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)

[Excerpt]

SECRET

ARGONAUT 12. Crypto-War for Acting Secretary of State only from Secretary Stettinius. Reference your message No. 11 of February 3.\(^1\) We would like summary of the Mikolajczyk memorandum shown to Bohlen.

Please continue to keep us promptly informed of developments with respect to the associated nations. What is your estimate of the present status and time at which future action may be taken by each of the five Latin American countries other than Ecuador?

Reference your message No. 9 of February 1.\(^2\) Please forward to us here at least a summary of Department's cable from [to] Moscow referred to in paragraph 4. ALLSTATE HORSESHOE.

ARGONAUT, February 4, 1945.

\(^1\) Ante, pp. 949-950.
\(^2\) Not printed. The paragraph in question reads as follows (Defense Files, CM-in-130):

"4. Hiss is familiar with our cable to Moscow commenting on the Malinin article in War and Working Classes referring to regional security arrangements. This missed Harriman and our Moscow Embassy suggests that Hiss explain the matter to him."

749.0011EW/1-2745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Excerpt]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1945.

1. Soviet-Chinese Conversations. Chiang Kai-Shek and Soong have informed Hurley that the Soviet Government has agreed to receive Soong as a personal representative of the Generalissimo either late in February or early in March. Discussions will cover establishment of closer relations, Soviet participation in the War against Japan, Soviet-Chinese relations in Korea and Manchuria, post-war economic
matters and the Sino-Soviet border. Hurley invites suggestions regarding this agenda for Chiang who desires full cooperation. Hurley points out that in September conversations, Molotov stated to him that Russians are not supporting Chinese communists who are not communists at all and desires closer relations with China. Molotov also stated that Russia does not want dissention in China. Chiang is anxious to learn whether this still represents Soviet attitude. (This is sixteenth message).

740.0011 EW/1-2745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET  [WASHINGTON,] February 5 [6], 1945.¹

Telegram to the Secretary of State from the Acting Secretary

In answer to first request in your cable of the 4th,² summary of Mikolajczyk Memorandum³ follows:

The Polish people in the homeland desire to regulate Polish-Soviet relations; they fear Poland will be forced into Communism; they pin their hopes of independence on Great Britain and the United States and advocate a guarantee by all the three great powers; frontier changes should embrace all frontiers simultaneously; delineation of the eastern frontiers should be effected by compromise, not unilateral dictation; the eastern frontier should be more favorable to Poland than the Curzon Line and should be arrived at only in conjunction with the guaranteeing of restitution to Poland of Danzig, East Prussia and western lands taken from Poland by Germany.

Mikolajczyk states that question of frontiers and independence closely intertwine. If Poland loses territory, it must not lose the Polish population living in it. Plan for the eviction of Germans as well as transfer of Poles in Russia must be prepared in advance and coupled with plan of credits. Mikolajczyk supports plans for modification of Curzon Line in Poland’s favor and states that in the west the new frontier should include East Prussia, Danzig, the region of Oppeln, the region of Gruenburg on the left bank of the Oder and, northward, the whole right bank of the Oder including Stettin. (This is message 17.)

¹ The text of this message in the Defense Files bears the date February 6, which is the date under which it was transmitted.
² Ante, p. 952.
³ Not printed as such. The text of this memorandum, without date, was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Polish Series No. 8 from Schoenfeld in London, signed by Winant and dated January 27, 1945. Mikolajczyk provided the British Government with a similar memorandum (860C.01/-1-2745.)
He presents following alternative solutions of problem of government and administration during transition period:

1. Return of Polish President to Poland where he would appoint new government.
2. President to resign in favor of a person in Poland who would appoint new government.
3. Representatives of Council of National Unity and the Lublin Committee to choose a new government in presence of representatives of three great powers.
4. Creation in Poland of Presidential Council composed of widely-known leaders which would summon conference of the political parties only or, alternatively, of the political parties and the Lublin National Council and Provisional Government, the Council of National Unity in Poland and Polish Ministers who lived in Poland throughout the war. (Allstate. Horseshoe.)

Memorandum concludes that the prompt establishment of government based on all democratic political movements is decisive for independence of Poland. Schoenfeld adds list of persons whom Mikolajczyk considers as possible candidates for the Presidential Council.

Grew

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740.001 EW/1-2745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 5 [6], 1945.¹

Telegram to the Secretary of State from the Acting Secretary

In response to the second request in yours of the fourth,² the Associated Nations question stands as follows:

1. Ecuador has declared the existence of a state of war with Japan since December 7, 1941.
2. Paraguay—We are expecting action momentarily. This is message No. eighteen. Allstate. Horseshoe.
3. Peru indicates that action may be taken soon by the Executive.
4. Venezuela—No change since our message No. thirteen.³ Ambassador Escalante is on his way to Venezuela to press this matter.
5. Uruguay—The Government is looking for a justification for acting.
6. Chile—No change since you left.
7. It looks as though favorable action may be expected by all except Chile within a reasonably short time.

¹ The text of this message in the Defense Files bears the date February 6, which is the date under which it was transmitted.
² Ante, p. 952.
³ Ante, pp. 951-952.
On February 14 we are planning a ceremony when Ecuador and any other nations which have qualified will affix their signatures to the United Nations Declaration. We are advising our Embassies in the other five countries of this ceremony with the thought that several may wish to hasten their action so that they may participate as signers on that day.

In answer to your third inquiry, following is summary Department’s reaction to Malinin article on Regional Arrangements. First, this section of Dumbarton proposals needs further elaboration and definition. Second, regional blocs or spheres of influence potentially or actually directed against other groupings of states are not favored. Third, security zones as proposed by Malinin would require close scrutiny to see if consistent with purposes of the organization. Fourth, such zones should in no case interfere with independence of states within the zones and should have primary purpose of maintaining security within region subject to provisions Chapter Eight Section C. Fifth, seriously question Malinin’s proposed method for establishing security zones by demarkation of frontiers and areas through agreement between chief powers of particular Continent. Believe all states concerned should agree not only leading ones and Security Council should be kept fully informed regarding security aspects. Sixth, no regional security arrangement or understanding should be permitted undertake enforcement action without authorization Security Council and latter should have power take cognizance of any situation within any region. Seventh, believe Malinin suggestion to divide General Assembly into four regional sections unwise and premature as need is for strong overall organization rather than for decentralized structure which would probably decrease general security.

GREW

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 6 February 1945.

French Embassy on February 3 presented formal note stating that French Government intends to address solemn warning to German Government cautioning latter against maltreatment or reprisal measures against French prisoners of war and deportees in violation of international law. French Government believes such warning would be more likely be effective and might save thousands of lives if issued by Governments of the United Nations as a whole. Embassy is seeking clarification to ascertain whether warning will be worded to
apply to all United Nations nationals instead of only to French nationals if suggestion is approved.

Above is for your information in event matter is raised at Conference. If matter is not dealt with at conference, I will take it up here with War and Navy Departments.

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Defense Files: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, 6 February 1945.

To Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant London serial number 2072.

Soviet acting representative on the European Advisory Commission has informed me that his government has approved the Protocol on zones of occupation and the control machinery agreement for Germany. All 3 governments have now approved without reservation the 3 basic documents for the control of Germany—the instrument of unconditional surrender, the Protocol on zones of occupation and the agreement on control machinery.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President's Secretary (Early) to the President's Administrative Assistant (Daniels)

[YALTA], 7 February 1945.

From Mr. Early for Mr. Jonathan Daniels

Pouch with letter, press conference transcript and so forth received. Exceedingly regret troubles you are facing but can honestly assure you our headaches are none the less severe. Situation here much too involved to explain. All we can do is carry on best we can. Regards.

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740.001 EW/1-2746: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON], February 7, 1945

Telegram to the Secretary of State from the Acting Secretary

2. French Developments. Following are French developments which Caffery asks be shown to Hopkins. Bidault has showed Caffery
the preliminary reports of the French Dumbarton Oaks Committee which are in general accord with our ideas. Bidault stressed that our ideas are so similar "that it would be wicked if we allowed anything to come between us." Although Stalin had informed DeGaulle in Moscow that he would not support any Free German movements Bidault is still disturbed over recent activities of Von Paulus, which he fears may have some bearing on the Big Three Conference. Bidault indicated clearly that the idea of a Soviet dominated government on their frontiers fill[s] the French with terror. Bidault has stated to Caffery that he is trying very hard to get along with the French Communists, particularly with Thorez, who "is the best of the lot." Alastair Forbes in the February 4 continental edition of the Daily Mail stated that it should be made perfectly clear that U.S. and not Britain or Russia is responsible for the failure to invite France to the Big Three conference. Kirk has learned that plans are now under consideration for moving the French Corps Leger d'Intervention to Ceylon. This group would be used originally in clandestine operations in Indochina. Chungking reports that the Japanese are concentrating forces in Indochina and are assuming a more exacting attitude. The French Military Attaché feels that French troops may be forced into guerilla activity and would then need supplies and assistance. Wedemeyer has consistently maintained attitude that this situation is probably well known to heads of American and French Governments and must be dealt with by them.¹

3. General Information. (This is message No. 23.) The departure of the Subasic Government has been postponed for several days. King Peter has been informed by Subasic that Simovich and Sutej are unacceptable to Tito as regents and must be replaced. The King will insist on having Sutej and will not permit his government to leave until the regents are appointed and approved. Otherwise, there will be no regency and the King will publish his White Paper. . . .

¹ This paragraph was quoted in a memorandum dated February 8, 1945, from Stettinius to Hopkins (Roosevelt Papers).

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President

[LONDON,] 7 February 1945.

2073. It has come to my attention that Mr. Eden, who directs Sir William Strang in representing Great Britain on the European Advisory Commission, and Ambassador Gousev, who represents
Russia on the Advisory Commission, are both attending the three-
power conference. Since you and Secretary Stettinius and Mr. Hopkins
decided to exclude me from the conference, I wish to make the follow-
ing brief report to you.

The United States Government, the United Kingdom and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have approved without reserva-
tion the Unconditional Surrender Instrument, the Protocol on Zones
of Occupation in Germany and the Agreement on Control Machinery.¹
If the control machinery is to be made an effective implement, it will
be necessary to obtain overall agreements between the three Govern-
ments on directives to the three Commanders-in-Chief, which are in
fact agreements between the three powers on basic policies. The
directives are on broad lines without detailing and provide a ground-
work for Allied cooperation in dealing with overall problems that
affect Germany. I hope these directives will have your support.


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740.00119 Control (Italy)/2–745 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)

TOP SECRET

YALTA, 7 February 1945.

Nr: ARGONAUT 45. Ref your No. 14.¹

As so clearly stated in the comments of the American members on
the CCAC, the recent directive which was finally agreed to on Italy
falls so far short of what we believe it should contain and has in it
so little of substance for the Italians, that I feel it would have a
disappointing and unfortunate effect both in the U. S. and in Italy.
Our original tentative acceptance of the idea of issuing such a state-
ment was made on the assumption that measures of real help both
moral and material to Italy would result from the discussions on the
Macmillan proposal.² This has not proved to be the case and there
seems therefore no reason to issue any public statement at this time.
Matthews and I discussed this matter with Ambassador Kirk and he
emphatically shares our view. ALLSTATE HORSESHOE.

¹ Not printed.
² For the aide-mémoire of February 24, 1945, from the Acting President of the
Allied Commission in Italy (Macmillan) to the Italian Government, see United
States and Italy 1939–1945: Documentary Record, Department of State Publication
Defense Files: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)

TOP SECRET

ARGONAUT 71A. Crypto-War for Acting Secretary of State only from Secretary Stettinius.

The British are disturbed over our having entered into an aviation agreement with Ireland\(^1\) without consulting or informing them. Please send us promptly an appropriate explanation for us to present to the British on this matter.

ARGONAUT, February 7, 1945.

\(^1\) For the text of this agreement relating to air-transport service, which was signed at Washington February 3, 1945, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 400, or 59 Stat. 1402.

Defense Files: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON], 8 February 1945.

No. 24. For Secretary of State Stettinius from the Acting Secretary of State.

ALLSTATE HORSESHOE. Your ARGONAUT 71-A. During the later part of the Chicago conference\(^1\) when it became increasingly doubtful that full agreement would be reached on a multi-lateral basis, we held preliminary discussions looking toward bilateral agreements with representatives of a number of countries. When the Spanish agreement\(^2\) was signed Berle stated publicly that we intended to conclude similar agreements with a number of other countries. Ireland was naturally one of these in view of its obvious geographic importance to American air routes. We saw no reason to consult the United Kingdom particularly since the agreement followed the standard form drawn up with British participation at Chicago. We nevertheless authorized our Minister in Dublin to advise his British colleagues of the matter before the agreement was signed. The agreement in no way prejudices the British right to effect similar arrangements.

Signature of agreement with Ireland does not indicate approval by the United States of that country’s war attitude any more than in

\(^1\) The International Civil Aviation Conference held at Chicago November 1–December 7, 1944.

\(^2\) For the text of this agreement relating to the operation of International air-transport services, which was signed at Madrid December 2, 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 432, or 58 Stat. 1473.
the case of the Spanish agreement. Our views in regard to Spain are well known and our attitude toward Ireland’s war policy is we think abundantly clear.

Upon receipt from Halifax of copy of Prime Minister’s message of January 27 to the President requesting postponement of signature until they could discuss it personally, we advised the President that we were postponing signature until February 3 but that British objections might possibly have ulterior motives and that further delay might expose us to Irish charges of bad faith and a domestic storm over British intervention in an Irish-American matter. He replied approving postponement until February 3 but sent no later instructions asking further delay.

You can obtain from the President’s Naval Aide the text of the messages exchanged with him but you will wish to consider carefully how much of the substance of this paragraph can be disclosed to Eden.

3 Not printed.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the President

TOP SECRET [CHUNGKING?] 8 February 1945.

(Top Secret. From Hurley for the eyes of the President alone. Information eyes alone Secretary of State)

NCR 4051. It has been suggested that if the President and his staff and Prime Minister Churchill and his staff could visit Delhi and invite the Generalissimo and his staff to meet them there it would be a great morale builder in this theater. It would also afford an opportunity to clarify policies and strategy. Delhi is suggested rather than any place in China for two reasons: (1) Security and (2) accommodations. A meeting at Delhi would probably make unnecessary Wedemeyer’s proposed conference at Washington. If there is possibility of such arrangement please advise me earliest convenience.

740.0011 EW/1-275: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 9, 1945.

Telegram to the Secretary of State, From the Acting Secretary.

1. General information. Observers in Athens consider that trial and sentencing of EAM members during peace talks was mistake,
particularly since no action has yet been taken against collaborationists. Perhaps to offset this reaction Athens press announces that nine leading collaborationists held by British are being returned for trial. . . . Chiang Kai-shek has been informed by the Soviet Government that Soong’s visit to Moscow should be postponed until the end of March or beginning of April because of the present status of the war in Europe. . . . Tito believes that the King is playing for time in belief that he will receive American support but that if he does not agree quickly he will lose the throne and his estates. Material is being collected to try Peter for his “crimes” even though American recognition might be lost thereby. . . . Summary of surrender terms to Germany has been communicated by EAC to representatives of Greek and Czechoslovak Governments. . . . (This is thirtieth message). It is assumed that you have received from Winant through military channels the substance of Massigli’s proposals regarding French zones of occupation.\footnote{See ante, p. 203.}

\[\text{Grew}\]

\[\begin{array}{ll}
\text{740.0011 EW/1-2745 : Telegram}
\end{array}\]

\[\begin{array}{ll}
The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State
\end{array}\]

\[\begin{array}{ll}
[Excerpts]
\end{array}\]

\[\begin{array}{ll}
\text{TOP SECRET}
\end{array}\]

\[\begin{array}{ll}
[WASHINGTON,] February 10, 1945.
\end{array}\]

Telegram to the Secretary of State, From the Acting Secretary.

1. . . . (This is thirty-third message). . . . British Foreign Office states that Subasic rather than Tito has opposed Simovic. Foreign Office believes that Subasic will leave shortly for Belgrade even though agreement has not been reached on the regents, but feels that the King’s approval is essential, particularly in connection with air and naval forces which will serve under the government only with the sanction of King Peter. . . . The Embassy in Moscow has been instructed to express gratification over the decision to cease removal of oil equipment from Rumania in order to rehabilitate the industry but is to reaffirm this Government’s unwillingness to accept the Soviet contention that this material can properly be described as war booty. . . .

\[\text{Grew}\]
Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President's Secretary (Early) to the President's Administrative Assistant (Daniels)

[YALTA,] 10 February 1945.

From Mr. Early to Mr. Daniels.
Justice Byrnes should arrive Washington early next week. The Press undoubtedly will want a conference with him. He and I have talked and he understands. Suggest you and Walter Brown arrange conference for him if Press wants one. Final communiqué should be published, however, before Justice Byrnes says anything.

Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of State to the President

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement.¹

Before I left Washington, Mr. Clayton told me that the British have said that you have never mentioned Article VII to Churchill. For this reason, Churchill has obtained the impression that you are not very much interested in this subject.

This mistaken impression on the part of the Prime Minister has tended to encourage the British to take an unyielding attitude on the matter of their Empire preferences and trade barriers.

I think it would be helpful, in this connection, if you could send to the Prime Minister the attached letter ² on this subject before you leave Yalta.

STETTINIUS

¹ For the text of this agreement, signed at Washington February 23, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. 1433.
² Infra.

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

DEAR WINSTON: I have been hoping to find an opportunity in the course of the present conferences to have a brief word with you on the
importance which I attach to a prompt resumption at a high level of conversation between our two Governments on the implementation of Article VII of the Lend-Lease agreement. As the opportunity for a quiet discussion between us on this matter may still not develop, I do not wish this meeting to close without sending you a brief word on this matter.

Discussion on commercial policies, pursuant to Article VII have been carried on from time to time between our two Governments ever since the Fall of 1943. I think it most important that these talks be re-invigorated and I should like to suggest the prompt naming of full delegations on both sides, to be headed by a Chairman with the rank of Minister. I hope you will find it possible to take the necessary steps to bring this about insofar as your Government is concerned.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

[YALTA,] February 11, 1945.

DEAR WINSTON: You have expressed some concern with regard to our different viewpoints concerning the policy to be pursued about Italy. I am happy to tell you that Mr. Matthews on behalf of the Department of State went over the ground on this matter with Alec Cadogan yesterday afternoon. As a result of their conversation, Matthews reports that although there are naturally some differences in emphasis in our respective viewpoints, there seems to be no basic reason for any quarrel between us. I find that we are both in accord with the important fact that whatever the Italian attitude and action have been in the past few years, we are faced with a real problem of the future. Italy is and will remain an important factor in Europe whatever we may think of the prospect. It is surely in our joint interest for us to do whatever we properly can to foster her gradual recuperation by developing a return to normal democratic processes, the development of a sense of her own responsibilities and the other steps so necessary in preparing the long hard road of Italy’s return to the community of peace-loving democratic states. To this end I believe we are both agreed that we must give her both spiritual and material food. I am impressed with the dangers for us both in Italy’s present condition of semi-servitude and of the fact that those who fish in troubled waters will be the only ones to gain from her present conditions approaching despair. I know that our soldiers share this view and feel that there is definite inherent danger in the situation to our joint military operations.
I believe that some constructive steps should be taken to move away from the present anomalous situation of onerous and obsolete surrender terms which are no longer pertinent to the situation today. I hope the Foreign Office and the State Department will be able to work out some mutually satisfactory procedure to remedy this situation. As you know, we accepted the Combined Chiefs of Staff's directive to General Alexander along the lines suggested by Mr. MacMillan [Macmillan].\(^1\) Although we felt that the directive was greatly watered down and much of its substance lost, we went along with you in the hope that we may reach some agreement on further steps in the near future.

At any rate, I want you to know that we are determined to pull together with you in Italy as we are in other areas, and that we believe that by full and continuous consultation and goodwill on both sides there is no danger of any serious split between us on this important question.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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\(^1\) Not printed.

760H.0312/3-1145

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov)\(^1\)

ALUPKA, 11th February, 1945.

Owing to lack of time there are a few questions on which we were not able to conclude our discussions during the Crimea Conference. These were

(a) the Austro-Yugoslav frontier,
(b) the Italo-Yugoslav frontier (Venezia Giulia)

You kindly undertook to study the suggestions on these questions contained in the papers\(^2\) which I circulated at the Foreign Secretaries meeting on February 10. With regard to (a) you will remember that the United States Delegation experienced certain doubts regarding the phraseology of our proposal. I therefore attach a redraft\(^3\) of my note which I would ask you to substitute for the one in your possession.

(c) At our meeting on February 10 I mentioned our attitude towards a pact between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and suggested that an indication of our views might be conveyed to the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments.\(^4\) You said that you would consider my suggestion.

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\(^1\) Copy bears notation: "Mr. Stettinius with Mr. Eden's compliments".
\(^2\) Ante, pp. 887–889.
\(^3\) Not found.
\(^4\) See ante, pp. 876–877.
I also circulated at our meeting on February 10 papers on the subject of

(d) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly in regard to reparations; 5
(e) the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission in Bulgaria; 6
(f) Oil equipment in Roumania. 7

I should be grateful if you would consider the points raised in the foregoing three papers.

May I also ask you to give favourable consideration to the proposals regarding

(g) Relief Supplies for Europe, contained in a paper which I enclosed in a separate letter today, 8 and
(h) the despatch of personnel to the Soviet component of the Control Commission for Germany in London, in regard to which I attach a memorandum. 9

On all these matters I suggest that, after the close of the Crimea Conference, discussion should proceed through the diplomatic channel. 9

Monsieur V. M. Molotov.

5 Ante, pp. 891–893.
6 Ante, pp. 889–890.
7 Ante, p. 893.
8 Not found.
9 See the protocol, post, p. 981.
10. SIGNED AGREEMENTS

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

My DEAR MARSHAL STALIN: I have been thinking, as I must, of possible political difficulties which I might encounter in the United States in connection with the number of votes which the Big Powers will enjoy in the Assembly of the World Organization. We have agreed, and I shall certainly carry out that agreement, to support at the forthcoming United Nations Conference the admission of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as members of the Assembly of the World Organization. I am somewhat concerned lest it be pointed out that the United States will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure wholehearted acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of our participation in the World Organization, to ask for additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.

I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you would perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forthcoming conference. I would greatly appreciate your letting me have your views in reply to this letter.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

1 A summary of the agreement embodied in this exchange of notes was released to the press by the White House on March 29, 1945 (Department of State Bulletin, April 1, 1945, vol. xii, p. 530). The texts of the notes here printed are from the copies in the Bohlen Collection. For information concerning the decision by the United States to request no more than one vote in the United Nations Assembly, see Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 422, and Department of State Bulletin, April 1, 1945, vol. xii, pp. 600–601.

Bohlen Collection

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

DEAR WINSTON: As I said the other day, I am somewhat concerned over the political difficulties I am apt to encounter in the United
States in connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement because of the fact that the United States alone among the three great powers will have only a single vote in the Assembly. I understand from our conversation that you would have no objection if I found it necessary to work out some way of giving the United States additional votes in order to insure parity. I am writing you this letter since I know you understand so well our political situation in the United States and I hope in reply to this letter you can give me your agreement to this suggestion if I find it necessary for our public opinion to make some proposal along those lines at the forthcoming United Nations Conference.

I am enclosing a copy of the letter which I have written to Marshal Stalin on the same subject.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Bohlen Collection

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

[YALTA,] February 11, 1945.

MY DEAR FRANKLIN, I have given consideration to your letter of February 10 about the political difficulties which might arise in the United States in connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement because of the fact that the United States alone among the three Great Powers will have only one vote in the Assembly.

Our position is that we maintained the long-established representation of the British Empire and Commonwealth; that the Soviet Government are represented by its chief member, and the two republics of the Ukraine and White Russia; and that the United States should propose the form in which their undisputed equality with every other Member State should be expressed.

I need hardly assure you that I should do everything possible to assist you in this matter.

Yours very sincerely,

WINSTON CHURCHILL

Bohlen Collection

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt

Translation ¹

KOREIS, February 11, 1945.

DEAR MR. ROOSEVELT: I have received your letter of February 10. I entirely agree with you that, since the number of votes for the

¹ Appears on the source text.
Soviet Union is increased to three in connection with the inclusion of the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet White Russia among the members of the assembly, the number of votes for the USA should also be increased.

I think that the number of votes for the USA might be increased to three as in the case of the Soviet Union and its two basic Republics. If it is necessary I am prepared officially to support this proposal.

With sincere respects

I. Stalin

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TRILATERAL DOCUMENTS

740.0011 EW/2-1145

Communiqué Issued at the End of the Conference

REPORT OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff and other advisors in the Crimea.

In addition to the three Heads of Government, the following took part in the Conference:

For the United States of America:

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the President;
Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President;
Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization;
General of the Army George C. Marshall, U. S. A., Chief of Staff, U. S. Army;
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet;
Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces;
Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator
Major General L. S. Kuter, U. S. A., Staff of Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces;
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U. S. S. R.
H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department;
Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State;
Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, together with political, military and technical advisors.

1 Released to the press Monday, February 12, 1945. The text here printed is from the original signed document in the files of the Department.
For the Soviet Union:
V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Admiral Kuznetsov, People's Commissar for the Navy
Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army
A. Ya. Vyshinski, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR
I. M. Maisky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Marshal of Aviation Khodjakov
F. T. Gousev, Ambassador in Great Britain
A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador in U. S. A.

For the United Kingdom:
Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport
Sir A. Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord
General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense, together with
Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
Field Marshal Wilson, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington
Admiral Somerville, Joint Staff Mission at Washington together with military and diplomatic advisors.

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America, and the Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimean Conference:

I

THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the Conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military efforts of the three Allies than ever before. The fullest
information has been inter-changed. The timing, scope and co-
ordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by
our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the East,
West, North and South have been fully agreed and planned in
detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute
them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among
the three staffs attained at this Conference will result in shortening the
war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future
whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the
cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue
a hopeless resistance.

II

THE OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the
unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on
Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed.
These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany
has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the Three
Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated
administration and control has been provided for under the
plan through a central Control Commission consisting of the
Supreme Commanders of the Three Powers with headquarters in
Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the
Three Powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupa-
tion, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission.
The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four governments
concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory
Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and
Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to dis-
turb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and
disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German
General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German
militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment;
eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for
military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punish-
ment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the
Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and
institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public
office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people;
and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and Militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

III

REPARATION BY GERMANY

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A Commission for the Compensation of Damage will be established. The Commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied Countries. The Commission will work in Moscow.

IV

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a Conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25th, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the Conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

V

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

We have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration on liberated Europe. This Declaration provides for concerting the policies of the
three Powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the Declaration is as follows:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.
In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

VI

POLAND

We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We reaffirm our common desire to see established a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussions we have agreed on the conditions in which a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major powers.

The agreement reached is as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.

VII

YUGOSLAVIA

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the Agreement ² between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that Agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed, it should declare that: ³

(i) The Anti-fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupschina) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and
(ii) legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly. ⁴

There was also a general review of other Balkan question[s].

VIII

MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES

Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the Heads of Governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their advisers have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore,

² For the text of this agreement, see ante, pp. 251-254.
³ The portion reading "it should declare that:" is handwritten on the original and initialed in the margin by Bohlen.
⁴ The words "Anti-Fascist Assembly of" are handwritten on the original, as is also "(AUNOJ)", the latter replacing the word "Committee" as typed. These changes are initialed in the margin, as in the case mentioned in the previous footnote.
meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three Capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations Conference on world organization.

IX

UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, “afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want”.

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT
И. СТАЛИН

FEVERALY 11, 1945

I. Stalin.

L/T Ffles

Protocol of Proceedings

PROTOCOL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

The Crimea Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which took place from February 4th to 11th came to the following conclusions.

I. WORLD ORGANISATION

It was decided:

(1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organisation should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

Released to the press by the Department of State March 24, 1947.
(2) the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th February, 1945 and

(b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term “Associated Nation” was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey). When the Conference on World Organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e. the Ukraine and White Russia.

(3) that the United States Government on behalf of the Three Powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed World Organisation.

(4) that the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

INVITATION

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of ________ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

"C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

"In the event that the Government of ________ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments".

TERITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP

It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations; and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

II. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

"The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

"To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

"The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

2 The final s of "consultations" was added with pen and Ink. The change is not initialed in the margin.
"When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

"By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

"In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested."

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL³ FOR GERMANY.

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council³ for Germany.

V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved: ⁴

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received

³ The word "Council" is a substitution with pen and ink for "Commission" as typed. In the margin opposite the change is a small penned question mark. The change is not initialed.

⁴ The original bears the notation in handwriting at this point: "Title to be added as in protocol." The title was not added, but the following was inserted in handwriting: "The Heads of the three Governments have agreed as follows:" The change is not initialed in the margin.
in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

   a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.
   b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.
   c) Use of German labour.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives—one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

   "The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.

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*The word "is" is handwritten, replacing "are" as typed. The change is not initialed in the margin.
VII. POLAND

The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the Western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorised as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference."

VIII. YUGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.

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6 The phrase "of the Western part of Poland" read "of Western Poland" as typed, but was revised by hand on the original, with no initials in the margin.
7 For the text of this agreement, see ante, pp. 251-254.
(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

(i) that the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

(ii) that legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly;

and that this statement should be published in the communique of the Conference.

IX. ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER
ITALO-AUSTRIA FRONTIER

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with M. Molotov in Moscow. M. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

(a) the Control Commission in Bulgaria

(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.

(c) Oil equipment in Roumania.

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8 As typed, this sub-paragraph began “that the National Liberation Committee”. The changes were made in handwriting, with the initials of Bohlen in the margin.

9 As typed, this sub-paragraph began “that legislative acts passed by the National Liberation Committee”. The changes were made in handwriting, with the initials of Bohlen in the margin.

10 No paper on the Italian-Austrian frontier has been found. Examination of the minutes of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 10 (ante, p. 876), of the British proposals attached thereto (ante, p. 887), and of the British note of February 11 (ante, p. 965) suggests that the heading “Italo-Austria Frontier” should read “Austro-Yugoslav Frontier”.
XII. IRAN.\textsuperscript{11}

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and M. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran.\textsuperscript{11} It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

XIV. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention and report to their Governments.\textsuperscript{12} The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

The foregoing Protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference, February 11, 1945.

E R STETTINIUS, Jr
B. MOLOTOV.\textsuperscript{13}

ANTHONY EDEN

\textsuperscript{11} Changed by hand from “Persia” as typed in the original. No initials in the margin.

\textsuperscript{12} In the original as typed the phrase at the end of this sentence read “to the three Governments.” The change was made by hand, with no initials in the margin.

\textsuperscript{13} V. Molotov.

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Protocol on German Reparation \textsuperscript{1}

Protocol on the Talks Between the Heads of the Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparation in Kind

The Heads of the three governments agreed as follows:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparation are\textsuperscript{2} to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy.

\textsuperscript{1} Released to the press by the Department of State March 24, 1947.

\textsuperscript{2} Cf. ante, pp. 978–979.
2. Reparation in kind are\textsuperscript{3} to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:
\begin{itemize}
  \item[a)] Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.
  \item[b)] Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.
  \item[c)] Use of German labour.
\end{itemize}

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exactation of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives—one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50\% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

\textbf{February 11, 1945.}

\textsuperscript{3} Cf. \textit{ante}, pp. 978–979.
\textsuperscript{4} I. Stalin.
Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan

TOP SECRET

AGREEMENT

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People’s Republic) shall be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:
   (a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;
   (b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored;
   (c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

February 11, 1945.

\[1\] Released to the press by the Department of State on February 11, 1946; printed as Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 498; also in 59 Stat. 1823.

\[2\] I. Stalin.
Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union Concerning Liberated Prisoners of War and Civilians

AGREEMENT RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS LIBERATED BY FORCES OPERATING UNDER SOVIET COMMAND AND FORCES OPERATING UNDER UNITED STATES OF AMERICA COMMAND

The Government of the United States of America on the one hand and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other hand, wishing to make arrangements for the care and repatriation of United States citizens freed by forces operating under Soviet command and for Soviet citizens freed by forces operating under United States command, have agreed as follows:

Article 1.

All Soviet citizens liberated by the forces operating under United States command and all United States citizens liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

United States and Soviet military authorities will respectively take the necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

Article 2.

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens of the other contracting party found by them, and will at the same time take the necessary steps to implement the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and United States repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from

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1 Released to the press by the Department of State March 8, 1945; printed as Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 505; also in 59 Stat. 1874.
the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the overall administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be effected by agreement with the competent Soviet or United States authorities. The removal of camps and transfer of liberated citizens may, in exceptional circumstances, also be effected without preliminary agreement provided the competent authorities are immediately notified of such removal or transfer with a statement of the reasons. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

Article 3.

The competent United States and Soviet authorities will supply liberated citizens with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall, subject to the provisions of Article 8, be fixed on a basis for privates, non-commissioned officers and officers. The basis fixed for civilians shall as far as possible be the same as that fixed for privates.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens of the other contracting party.

Article 4.

Each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens held by the other contracting party.

Article 5.

Soviet and United States military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and United States authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.
In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and United States Governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens necessary settlements with the Governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

Article 6.

Ex-prisoners of war and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and United States authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between these authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their own officers.

Article 7.

The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens. They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.

Article 8.

The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.

Article 9.

This Agreement shall come into force on signature.

Done at the Crimea in duplicate and in the English and Russian languages, both being equally authentic, this eleventh day of February, 1945.

For the Government of the United States of America

John R. Deane
Major General, U. S. A.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Генерал-лейтенант Грызов

2Lieutenant General Gryzlov.
11. POST-CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Editorial Note

In the course of compiling the present volume a few hitherto unpublished documents were found in which important participants at the Yalta Conference made authoritative statements on the proceedings, or portions of the proceedings, at the conference itself. Since these statements supplement the contemporary conference record, they have been reproduced at this point.

For previously published statements by participants regarding the proceedings at Yalta, the reader may wish to consult the following:

Message of President Roosevelt to the Congress, March 1, 1945, Department of State Bulletin, March 4, 1945, volume xii, pages 321-326, 361; Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st session, volume 91, pages 1618-1622.

Report by Prime Minister Churchill to the House of Commons, February 27, 1945, Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, volume 408, columns 1267-1295.


Statement by Secretary of State Stettinius, Department of State Bulletin, April 8, 1945, volume xii, pages 600-601.

Testimony of Alger Hiss, Communist Espionage in the United States Government, Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, 2d session, pages 656-657.

Testimony of George C. Marshall, Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 1, pages 559-565.

Statement of W. Averell Harriman, Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 5, pages 3328-3342.

Testimony of Charles E. Bohlen, Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen To Be United States Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 83d Congress, 1st session, passim.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

[Excerpts]

SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, March 6, 1945—2 a.m.

636. We had three more unproductive hours of discussion at the meeting of the commission on Poland this evening, going over much the same ground as last time.

Every argument Clark Kerr and I advanced was brushed aside. For example I told him that I knew the President would be shocked to learn of Molotov's obstruction to the progress of the work of the commission in objecting to our calling representative Polish democratic leaders to Moscow. I pointed out that Marshal Stalin had agreed to the inviting of Sapieha and Witos to Yalta and I failed to understand why Molotov now went back on this position. In reply he said that the communique was the "anchor" for the commission's work and that no other conversations at Yalta had a bearing.

1 See ante, p. 711.

Roosevelt Papers

The Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (Byrnes), to the President

[Excerpt]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
From: James F. Byrnes

At Yalta, the Prime Minister wished to discuss shipping and the British Import Program. Hopkins and I advised Lord Leathers that the problem was too complicated to be discussed so far away from basic data and that it would have to be resolved in Washington. Leathers accepted this viewpoint and said on several occasions that he would come to the United States at an early date to discuss the shipping situation.
The Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1945.

1. Attached is a draft message from the President to Marshal Stalin along the lines you indicated to Mr. Raynor over the telephone Saturday. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky strongly recommend that the President should not at this time send a message to Stalin on this subject for the reason that there are three or four other urgent matters of great importance which will require messages of this nature. (One of these has already been sent.) Mr. Dunn feels that it will rob this method of communication of its true importance when so many messages are sent at once. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky feel that you should take this matter up yourself with Ambassador Gromyko along the lines of the attached outline of points to be made.

2. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky also feel strongly that we should not attempt, at least at this time, to get out of the commitment on this subject which was made at the Crimea. They therefore think that any message from the President that might be sent despite their recommendation should not go into that subject and should be limited simply to the precise issue raised by Gromyko last Saturday.

SECRET

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN

Last Saturday Ambassador Gromyko informed the State Department that a party of thirty representatives of the Ukraine and White Russian Soviet Republics would arrive at San Francisco to attend the Conference. I feel certain that there must be some misunderstanding about this communication. During the Crimean Conference it was very clearly settled that these two republics would not be invited to send representatives to San Francisco and would not be separately represented there. It was agreed that the United States and the United Kingdom would support at San Francisco a Soviet proposal, to be presented at the Conference when the question of initial membership is under discussion there, that the two republics be included among the initial members of the United Nations Organization when

1 Carbon copy.
2 It appears that the proposed telegram from Roosevelt to Stalin was not sent but that a note was sent by Stettinus to Gromyko on March 20, 1945, indicating that at Yalta “no obligation whatsoever was assumed in regard to the question of the presence of representatives of these republics at San Francisco” (500. CC/3-2545). See also Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 396, footnote 11.
created. I want you to know that since my return to Washington I have been giving this matter very considerable thought. I have in particular been considering how the objectives you have in mind could be carried out most effectively. Quite frankly the difficulties, both in relation to the effect on American public support for the proposed organization and to the attitude of other governments, seem to be far greater than I had realized. I expect to communicate further with you on that aspect of the matter later but in the meantime I should appreciate it if you would take steps to clear up the misunderstanding which has led to Ambassador Gromyko’s communication of Saturday.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS TO BE MADE BY THE SECRETARY IN TALKING TO AMBASSADOR GROMYKO

1. I am very much disturbed about the statement made to Mr. Dunn last Saturday.
2. It was clearly settled at the Crimean Conference that the two republics would not be invited to San Francisco and would not be separately represented there.
3. In accordance with this decision no invitations have been issued to them.
4. It would be most embarrassing and contrary to the Crimean arrangements if their representatives should come to San Francisco.
5. Ambassador Gromyko should take this up with his Government immediately and have any misunderstanding eliminated.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF DECISIONS REACHED AT THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE IN THE MATTER OF THE TWO SOVIET REPUBLICS

The Soviet Representatives proposed that two or three of the Soviet Republics should be invited to the San Francisco Conference and should become initial members of the organization.

This matter was referred to the Foreign Ministers for consideration. At the Foreign Ministers’ meeting Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden jointly agreed that in the course of the San Francisco Conference the Soviet Representatives would propose that the Ukraine and White Russian Republics be named as initial members of the organization and that this proposal would be supported by the British Representatives.

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3 Although this memorandum is not referred to as an attachment in the covering memorandum, it appears to have been prepared as an accompaniment to the memorandum of March 19. The author was presumably Hiss.
4 Anti, p. 712.
Mr. Stettinius said that he would have to reserve his position. This meeting was held at the British Delegation's headquarters with Mr. Eden presiding. A drafting committee composed of Mr. Jebb, Ambassador Gromyko and Mr. Hiss was appointed to draft the report of this meeting, to be read at the next plenary session by Mr. Eden as Chairman of that day's meeting of the Foreign Ministers. The draft agreed upon by the drafting committee was in the foregoing sense. Subsequently, without clearing with or informing Mr. Hiss or, presumably, Ambassador Gromyko, the British Representatives changed the report so that it stated that representatives of both the United Kingdom and the United States will support the proposal to admit the Soviet Republics to original membership. The British Representatives said that they had cleared this change with Mr. Stettinius but this was not the case as he did not understand that any such issue was presented to him. At the afternoon plenary session Mr. Eden read the revised report and before the matter could be clarified the President expressed his agreement as a matter of policy.

The question of whether or not the two Soviet Republics should adhere to the United Nations Declaration prior to April 25 and the question of whether they should be invited to the Conference were both discussed fully at the plenary session and a negative decision was reached on each point.

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5 Ante, p. 737.
6 It appears from Stettinius, pp. 196–197, that between the adjournment of the drafting committee and the convening of the Fifth Plenary Meeting the President had had a private talk with members of the British Delegation and had agreed to this change.
7 Ante, pp. 772, 775.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

Moscow, April 2, 1945.

(Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman)

Aside from the major questions which are causing concern in our relations with the Soviet Union there has been an accumulation of minor incidents which started some six weeks ago. The following are only examples: . . . Little or no progress has been made in getting Soviet approval for our air teams to visit Soviet controlled territory for appraisal of bomb damage or for our naval team to [visit] Gdynia. Both proposals were agreed to at Yalta.

1 Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.
SECRET AND PERSONAL

[Moscow,] April 7, 1945.

In connection with your message of April 1 I consider it necessary to make the following remarks on the question of Poland.

Matters on the Polish question have really reached a dead end. Where are the reasons for it? The reasons for it are that the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow—members of the Moscow Commission—have departed from the principles of the Crimea Conference and have introduced into the matter new elements not provided by the Crimea Conference.

Namely: a) At the Crimea Conference all three of us considered the Provisional Government of Poland as the government functioning in Poland at the present time which is subject to reconstruction and which should serve as kernel of the new government of national unity. But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow depart from this principle.

b) At the Crimea Conference all three of us agreed that not more than five persons from Poland and three persons from London should be called for consultation. But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow have departed from this position and demand that each member of the Moscow Commission be given the right to invite an unlimited number of people from Poland and from London.

Naturally, the Soviet Government could not agree with this as the summons of people should be carried out according to decisions of the Crimea Conference, not by individual members of the Commission, but by the Commission as a whole, namely by the Commission as such. But the request of an unlimited number of persons summoned for consultation contradicts the plans of the Crimea Conference.

c) The Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that in accordance with the meaning of the decisions of the Crimea Conference such Polish leaders should be invited for consultations who, firstly, recognize the decisions of the Crimea Conference, including the decision on the Curzon Line, and, secondly, are really striving to establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

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1 Transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.
2 Appears on the original.
3 Not printed.
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) ¹

SECRET

EXCERPTS FROM HANDWRITTEN NOTES OF PLENARY SESSION OF FEBRUARY 6, 1945

Dictated at San Francisco, June 3, 1945 on the basis of longhand notes made during the meeting of February 6, held at Livadia Palace, Yalta.

President Roosevelt asked Mr. Stettinius to explain the United States' proposal on the voting formula as Mr. Stettinius was at Dumbarton Oaks and none of the three heads of delegation was. The President said that he felt strongly that people are going to insist on getting something that will insure peace, not for all time, but say for fifty years.

Mr. Stettinius then read "Statement on the American Position on Voting in the Council"² and concluded by making further remarks based upon the memorandum entitled "Supplementary Arguments for Use of Secretary".³ He concluded by expressing the hope that America's two great allies would be able to agree with the American proposal.

The President then suggested that Mr. Stettinius read the types of decisions which would require unanimity of the permanent members under the American proposal. The President's suggestion was agreed to and Mr. Stettinius then read the bottom half of page 1 and all of pages 2 and 3 of the memorandum entitled "Formula for Voting Procedure in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization and the Analysis of the Effects of that Formula."⁴ (He did not read again the actual proposed voting formula which is set forth in the first half of page 1 in the memorandum under reference. Before he read from this Mr. Stettinius distributed copies of it to the British and Soviet Delegations.)

In reading from this memorandum Mr. Stettinius specifically distinguished between the two categories of questions. In reading the first group of topics he said, "I shall first present six situations in which the unanimity of the great powers must be maintained at all times". Before reading the second list of items he said, "I shall now

¹ The copy is unsigned, but the author was presumably Hiss.
² ante, pp. 682-683.
³ ante, pp. 683-684.
⁴ ante, pp. 684-686.
read the situation[s] which also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party, in other words unanimity except when involved in a dispute".

The President then stated that that ended the reading and the explanation of the procedure involved in the American proposal. He said then that we have to remember that the objectives of the five great nations and of all nations is the same and that on the question of procedure there ought not to be any real difficulty.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion brought about by Stalin's question as to in what respect the voting formula as read by Mr. Stettinius differed from the texts submitted by the President in his telegrams of December 5. 5

5 Ante, pp. 58–60.

500.CC/6-345 : Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)

RESTRICTED

SAN FRANCISCO, June 3, 1945.

[Received June 3—7 p. m.]

5. Please transmit the following to the President as from me:

"Referring to our telephone conversation yesterday on the veto aspects of the voting procedure, the precise issue at present, as to which there has been a great deal of confusion especially in the press, is whether the veto power applies on the part of a great power not involved in a dispute so as to enable that great power to prevent having a situation discussed in the Council where such discussion is merely for the purpose of enabling the Council to decide what of [if] any action it should take or recommend. We are all in agreement that the unanimity of those great powers not involved in a dispute should apply to substantive decisions which the Council is called upon to make. The question of whether such a great power can prevent a situation from even being placed on the agenda and discussed in a preliminary way prior to the taking of substantive decisions was not covered either at Dumbarton Oaks or at Yalta. However, the British and we have always assumed and we have so stated publicly that any determination as to whether or not the Council itself undertake any such preliminary discussion should if a vote is required at all, be decided by not more than a procedural vote, i.e. without any of the great powers as such being able to exercise a veto. We are still hopeful that we will be able to reach agreement with the Soviet delegation on the interpretation of this question which is of course one on which we feel we cannot retreat.

You may be interested to know that in the course of the statement on voting procedure which I made to the February 6 Plenary Session at Yalta, I emphasized the importance which we ascribe to full and
free discussion. That conference addressed itself only to the issue of a great power abstaining from voting in a dispute. However, my statement was in such broad terms that, especially when taken in conjunction with later interpretative public statements issued by the Department on the precise issue now under consideration, there can be no possible basis for any contention that our present position could be considered to be in violation of the Yalta agreements. According to the best records available to us here the exact language of the two paragraphs in my Yalta statement which referred to freedom of discussion was as follows: ¹

"Our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.

We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the council is permitted, the establishment of the world organization which we all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated." ²

¹ See ante, pp. 661–662.
² Notation on file copy reads: "Message sent to the White House 6/4/45 8:30 a.m."