II. THE MALTA CONFERENCE

January 30–February 2, 1945
5. THE PRESIDENT'S LOG AT MALTA

Editorial Note

The document referred to in this volume as the President's Log constitutes the major portion of the 83-page booklet entitled "The President's Trip to the Crimea Conference and Great Bitter Lake, Egypt, January 22 to February 28, 1945". This booklet, which was prepared by Lieutenant J. G. Rigdon and approved by the President's Naval Aide, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, has the following contents: List of the President's Party, Itinerary, Chart Showing Travel Across Atlantic Ocean, Chart Showing Travel in Mediterranean and Black Sea Areas, Foreword, Log of the Trip, Report of the Crimea Conference, List of Saudi Arabian Guests, Memorandum of Conversations between King Ibn Saud and President Roosevelt (2-14-45), List of the Seaman Guard at Yalta.

The Malta Conference began on January 30, 1945, but President Roosevelt did not arrive until February 2, the last day of the conference. There is reproduced below the Log for February 2. The portions of the Log covering the Malta Conference (February 4–11) are printed post, pp. 549–561.

Log of the Trip

Friday, February 2nd:

0000: In Mediterranean Sea, enroute Malta from Gibraltar, steaming on various courses and at various speeds while conforming to our prescribed routing.

0610: We sighted the island of Sicily, bearing 055, distant 50 miles.

0616: We sighted the islands of Gozo, and Malta, bearing 115, distant 32 miles.

0935: We passed through the submarine net gate and entered Grand Harbor, Valetta, Malta. The President was on deck as we entered port. From the very large crowd evident, it appeared that all Malta was out to greet him. Both sides of the channel were lined with people of Malta.

1001: The Quincy moored, starboard side to, at Berth 9 in Grand Harbor, Valetta. The U. S. S. Memphis (light cruiser and flagship of Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U. S. N., Commander Eighth Fleet) was present in Malta. Prime Minister Churchill and his party were at

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1 Gozo, an island of the Malta group.
2 Valetta, capital of Malta.
Grand Harbor and witnessed our arrival from the deck of the H. M. S. 
Sirius \(^3\) (light cruiser), moored across the channel from where the 
Quincy tied up.

Total distance steamed, Newport News to Malta, 4883 miles.

Colonel Park and the following listed members of our advance party 
were awaiting us on the dock at Grand Harbor and joined us as soon 
as the Quincy had been moored: Mr. Reilly, Major Greer, Mr. Holmes, 
Mr. Wood and Mr. O’Driscoll.

A few days before our arrival at Malta we began to receive dis-
concerting messages from the Prime Minister about the difficulties of 
reaching Yalta and the unhealthy living conditions there. The first 
gun came from Mr. Hopkins who stated, “He (the Prime Minister) 
says that if we had spent ten years on research we could not have 
found a worse place in the world than Yalta . . .” He claims it is 
good for typhus and deadly lice which thrive in those parts.” This 
was followed by other messages from the Prime Minister, who re-
ported the drive from the airfield at Saki to Yalta as being six hours, 
instead of two hours as originally reported by Mr. Harriman; and that 
one of his people had reported the mountain part of the drive as fright-
ening and at times impassable, and the health conditions as wholly 
unsanitary, as the Germans had left all buildings infested with vermin. 
It was, therefore, a great relief upon arriving at Malta to find from Mr. 
Harriman and members of our advance party (headed by Colonel 
Park) that although we would face a difficult drive after landing at the 
airport at Saki, it would not be too tiring if completed during daylight 
and if we had clear weather. We were also informed that the medical 
oficers of the U. S. S. Catoctin had accomplished a very effective job 
of de-bugging at Yalta.

1020: Secretary of State Stettinius, Ambassador Harriman, and 
Mr. Hopkins came on board the Quincy to confer with the President. 
Sergeant Robert Hopkins came on board with his father, Mr. Harry L. 
Hopkins. Sergeant Hopkins had joined his father at Paris.

1042: His Excellency, the Governor-General of Malta (Lieutenant 
General Sir Edmond Schreiber) came on board the Quincy and called 
on the President. The President was on deck (port side, first super-
structure deck) at the time, enjoying the warm sun. He received all 
his distinguished guests there during the forenoon.

1052: Admiral Sir John Cunningham, Allied Naval Commander in 
Chief, Mediterranean, came on board and called on the President.

1107: General of the Army George C. Marshall came on board and 
called on the President. A short time later Fleet Admiral Ernest J. 
King called and he and Fleet Admiral Leahy joined the President and 
General Marshall in a conference.

1143: Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N. (Commander, U. S.

\footnote{According to Churchill, p. 343, the Prime Minister watched this scene from 
the deck of H. M. S. Orion, in which he had his quarters.}

\footnote{Points appear in the original.}
Naval Forces, Europe) and Vice Admiral Hewitt came on board and called on the President.

1148: Prime Minister Churchill and his daughter, Section Officer Sarah Oliver (WAAF), came on board the Quincy and called on the President.

1155: The Right Honorable Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, came on board and called on the President.

1800: The President entertained at lunch in his quarters aboard the Quincy. His guests included: The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, Mrs. Oliver and Mrs. Boettiger.

1415: The Governor-General, Mrs. Schreiber and Miss Schreiber came on board and called on the President and Mrs. Boettiger.

1430: Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, U. S. N. (Ret.), Director of War Shipping Administration, came on board and called on the President.

1443: The President, the Governor-General, Mrs. Schreiber, Miss Schreiber, Mrs. Oliver and Mrs. Boettiger left the ship for a 30-mile auto drive about the Island of Malta. They visited the countryside and the towns of Medina, Chajn Tuffieha, and Valetta. The Prime Minister left the ship at the same time but did not accompany the President on the drive. The President rode in the car with the Governor-General, while the ladies followed in a second car. During the course of the drive Palace Square in Valetta was visited and the President was shown the stone replica of the scroll that he presented to the people of Malta on his previous visit, December 8, 1943. The replica is mounted in the side of the Palace building, near the main entrance.

To those of us who had been with the President on his previous visit, the many signs of rebuilding were most evident all about the island.

The weather was delightful. The average temperature was 58.

1605: The President and Mrs. Boettiger returned to the ship from their drive.

1630: The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff came on board and the President met with them in his quarters. Present were: Fleet Admiral Leahy, General of the Army Marshall, Fleet Admiral King and Major General L. S. Kuter (representing General of the Army H. H. Arnold who was ill and did not attend this conference), and the President.  

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* The old capital of Malta, near the center of the island, variously called Notabile, Città Vecchia, and Medina.
* Not identified.
* For an account of this presentation, see New York Times, December 11, 1943, pp. 1, 2.
* No minutes of such a meeting have been found. Leahy, pp. 294–295, however, refers to a meeting of the President with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the afternoon of February 2; and King, p. 586, mentions that Marshall and King called on the President that afternoon. See also post, plate 3 following p. 546.
1800: The Prime Minister, accompanied by the members of the British Staff, came on board. The President then met with the Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (American and British) in his cabin. Present were: The President, the Prime Minister, Fleet Admiral Leahy, General of the Army Marshall, Fleet Admiral King, Major General Kuter, Field Marshal H. Maitland Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. B. Cunningham, General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, and Major General Jacob. Major Randolph Churchill came on board with his father but did not attend the meeting. The meeting adjourned at 1850. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had been in conference at Malta for several days prior to our arrival and this was the first plenary meeting with the President and the Prime Minister.

2000: The President was host at dinner in his quarters. His guests included: The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mrs. Oliver and Mrs. Boettiger.

2215: The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden and Mrs. Oliver left the ship. 2230: Lieutenant (jg) A. L. Conrad, USNR, special courier, left the ship with White House mail to proceed to Washington via air transportation.

2300: The President and members of his party left the Quincy by automobile for the Luqa Airfield, Malta. On arrival at the airfield they embarked in assigned aircraft to await scheduled departure times. The entire British and American delegations to the Conference at Yalta were on the move and departed from Malta during the night. This involved approximately 700 people, so that the Luqa airport was a very busy place throughout the night. Commencing at about 2330, huge planes took off at about 10-minute intervals all night long. The Air Transport Command aircraft specially fitted for the President’s use was used by the President for all flights on this cruise. It has private quarters for the President and an elevator which lowers to ground level to facilitate his embarking and disembarking.

The President turned in at once as his plane was not scheduled to take off until 0330 tomorrow.

2330: Colonel Park, Commander Clark, Commander Tyree, Major Putnam and Chief Warrant Officer Cornelius, departed Malta for Saki, U. S. S. R. They were embarked in the State Department plane.

2345: The special cargo aircraft transporting our heavy baggage and freight departed Malta for Saki. Embarked were Agents Dorsey and Williams and Messmen Estrada, Calinoa, Floresca and Sarate. Air Transport Command planes were used exclusively by the American delegation.
6. MINUTES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1945

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 30, 1945, 10 A.M.,
MONTGOMERY HOUSE¹

PRESENT

General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter²
Lieutenant General Somervell
Lieutenant General Smith
Rear Admiral Duncan
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Bull
Major General Hull

Major General Wood
Major General Anderson
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Lindsay
Captain McDill
Colonel Peck
Colonel Dean
Colonel Lincoln

Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes³

TOP SECRET

1. AGENDA FOR NEXT U. S.-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE
(C. C. S. 765/8)⁴

General Marshall said that this paper set forth the British Chiefs of Staff suggestion for the agenda for the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussions at Cricket. He drew attention to the following changes which it embodied: paragraph 1 (E), the Combined Bomber Offensive; paragraph 1 (F), Planning Date for the End of the German War; paragraph 2 (D), Planning Date for the End of the Japanese War; and paragraph 4. He recommended approval of the paper as presented.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve
C. C. S. 765/8.

¹ Montgomery House is located in Floriana, a suburb of Valletta, Malta.
² At the Malta and Yalta Conferences Major General Kuter represented General of the Army Arnold, who was ill.
³ J. C. S. 183d Meeting. The meetings of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were numbered consecutively from the first formal meeting of that body, which took place in Washington on February 8, 1942.
⁴ Ante, p. 426.

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2. OVERALL REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING
(J. C. S. 1205/3)\(^5\)

General Marshall said that this subject was on the agenda in order to determine the status of the study. J. C. S. 1205/3 contains the recommendation of the Joint Staff Planners.

Admiral King recommended approval of the paper as presented.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C. S. 1205/3. (Memorandum subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 746/7)\(^6\)

3. STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE
(J. C. S. 1237 (ARGONAUT))\(^7\)

General Marshall said this subject had been placed on the agenda for examination and discussion of Allied strategy in Northwest Europe with a view to formulating the United States stand thereon. He called upon General Smith to discuss the present intentions of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, in connection with future plans submitted in SCAF 180.\(^8\)

General Smith said that timing is the important consideration at present. As much as possible to occupy German forces should be accomplished while the Russian offensive is under way. Our present operations were making good progress, and with the withdrawal of the 15th Panzer Division, apprehension had been relieved. The plan outlined in General Eisenhower's message had envisaged the disposal of certain operations such as the elimination of the Colmar pocket while proceeding with the necessary build-up for the main effort. It was estimated that a period of one week would be required to remove U. S. divisions engaged in operations in the south after which mopping up operations could be turned over to the French.

There were three distinct phases in General Eisenhower's plan: (a) operations to the west of the Rhine, (b) operations involving the establishment of bridgeheads, and (c) operations to the east of the Rhine.

In the first place, the logistics implications of operations north of the Ruhr had been given serious study, and it had been estimated by the 21st Army Group that 20 to 21 divisions could be maintained in

\(^5\) Not printed as such, but see C. C. S. 746/7, post, pp. 536-538.
\(^6\) Post, pp. 536-538.
\(^7\) Not printed.

SCAF 180 was Eisenhower's appreciation and plan of operations for the winter and spring of 1945; SCAF 194 contained General Smith's wording of certain paragraphs of the plan. In Message No. S-77211 Eisenhower agreed to the changed text. SCAF 180 and SCAF 194 are summarized in the report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta, post, pp. 828-829.
the area of main effort in the north. This size force was insufficient for the main drive, and the Supreme Allied Commander had taken an arbitrary stand that a force of at least 30 divisions, ultimately increased to 36, would be used in the main effort.

In the Ruhr area of the Rhine where the main effort would take place, there were three good and two possible points for establishing bridgeheads. General Smith desired to emphasize, however, that no matter how many divisions were employed in the effort, the crossing would be accomplished with but five, due to the restricted front. There is no foundation in the British analogy between the cross-Channel attack and the crossing of the Rhine. Our effort will obviously be met in strength behind the Ruhr, and General Eisenhower feels that if we employ everything in one effort at this point, the enemy may be able to prevent a successful operation by concentrating his forces. In order to draw off some of the strength that he will undoubtedly mass in this area, a secondary effort is necessary.

In the plan proposed by Field Marshal Montgomery, the Cologne- Bonn area had been selected for the secondary effort. The disadvantages seen in this plan were:

a. It is too close to the main crossing of the Rhine to draw off German forces.

b. The crossing points are not good, and
c. Crossings having been made, operations become difficult due to the nature of the terrain.

All of SCAEF’s examinations lead to the selection of the Frankfurt area for the secondary effort. This area is sufficiently separated from the main drive to attract enemy forces. From Frankfurt the drive would be directed toward Kassel, over which route the nature of the terrain would permit the relative ease of movement of armored forces. Also, the lines of communication in this southern area are better than those in the north.

The decision has not yet been made as to the area in which the secondary operation will be mounted. General Eisenhower prefers the Frankfurt-Kassel operation as the secondary effort. His great concern is to maintain flexibility, and in order to provide against the possibility of a slowing up of the main effort he is strongly in favor of this secondary drive.

In answer to a question by Admiral King, General Smith explained that it had been planned to provide a strategic reserve of ten divisions. Our infantry divisions are completely mobile and can be moved into position rapidly. If the secondary effort is accepted, it must of course go forward rapidly and not be allowed to stop at any point short of the objective. It is felt that forward movement can be adequately maintained by the rotation of the planned reserve.
In referring again to the planned effort in the Cologne-Bonn area, General Smith stated that SCAEF felt that a threat in this section would hold as many German forces as an actual crossing.

If it becomes impossible to accomplish the major effort before the 15th of March, the Germans could transfer divisions from the Eastern Front to the Western Front. We would then be extended west of the Rhine in a long line requiring 10 to 15 more divisions than if we were along the Rhine proper. If it becomes impossible to establish a firm bridgehead, it may be necessary to coordinate our operations with the Russians in June.

General Bull explained the effect of the spring thaw, about 1 March, on the Rhine crossings. In the lower Rhine area, crossings would not be greatly affected, but upper Rhine crossings would not be possible after the first of March until the high water and ice had receded.

In response to an inquiry by General Marshall, General Smith explained that the operations in the Eifel area were all part of the build-up for the main effort in the north. He anticipated that General Bradley would encounter strong opposition when he approached the Rhine and would substitute operation GRENADE. He felt that if operation VERITABLE could be mounted by the 8th of February the main effort would be successful as far as timing is concerned.

General Marshall referred to the last sentence of the third paragraph of Appendix "A" to J. C. S. 1237 and suggested certain amendments in the light of the British position concerning the operations referred to therein.

General Smith emphasized the necessity for maintaining flexibility in the Supreme Commander's plans. It would be dangerous to try to define in detail how the battle should be fought. Too much depends upon the seizing of opportunities as they are presented. General Montgomery is now in agreement with General Eisenhower's plan and is quite satisfied with the arrangements. General Eisenhower has committed himself to the main effort to the north and he, General Smith, as well as the rest of the Staff, felt that the main effort would not be successful unless a secondary effort were mounted.

General Marshall referred to the fourth paragraph of Appendix "A" to J. C. S. 1237 and suggested certain amendments affecting command arrangements for SCAEF's armies.

General Smith said he felt that the British would not raise the question of command at the present time. They had proposed that General Alexander be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander, but due to General Montgomery's attitude on this matter, the British position was not yet firm.
After further discussion, 

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

Approved the memorandum in Appendix "A" of J. C. S. 1237 as amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 761/4 (Argonaut).)  

*Not printed.*

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**Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, January 30, 1945, Noon, Montgomery House**

**Present**

**United States**
- General of the Army Marshall
- Fleet Admiral King
- Major General Kuter
- Lieutenant General Somervell
- Lieutenant General Smith
- Vice Admiral Cooke
- Major General Bull
- Major General Anderson
- Major General Hull
- Rear Admiral McCormick
- Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
- Colonel Twitchell

**United Kingdom**
- Field Marshal Brooke
- Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
- Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
- Field Marshal Wilson
- General Ismay
- Admiral Somerville
- General Riddell-Webster 1
- Air Marshal Robb
- Major General Laycock

**Secretariat**
- Brigadier General McFarland
- Captain Graves
- J. C. S. Files
- Major General Jacob
- Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
- Commander Coleridge

**Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes** 2

**Top Secret**

1. **Procedure for the Conference**

Sir Alan Brooke said that it had been suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff that he should take the chair at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings in Malta and he was glad to do so. He hoped, however, that a member of the United States Chiefs of Staff would take the chair at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Magneto.

General Marshall agreed to this proposal.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should normally take place at 1430 daily.

Admiral King, in agreeing to this proposal, stated that alterations in the timing might have to be made in the light of circumstances.

**The Combined Chiefs of Staff:**

Agreed to meet daily at 1430, circumstances permitting.

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1 Present for items 4–8 only.
2 C. C. S. 182d Meeting. The meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were numbered consecutively from the first formal meeting of that body, which took place in Washington on January 23, 1942.

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II. THE MALTA CONFERENCE

2. AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE
(C. C. S. 765/8)

Sir Alan Brooke tabled a note setting out proposals for the business to be transacted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on each day.4

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed to these proposals. He felt, however, that one or two items should be earmarked as susceptible of earlier consideration if time allowed.

It was agreed that the U-boat threat and the planning date for the end of the Japanese war should be so earmarked.

3. GERMAN FLYING BOMB AND ROCKET ATTACKS

General Marshall referred to the data made available by the British Chiefs of Staff to enable him to show the Congress the scale of rocket and flying bomb attacks on London. He explained that in the course of his talk to the Congress 5 he had stressed the importance of a common understanding in order to assist the formation of combined decisions and policies. He had stressed the necessity for teamwork and the importance of understanding the other man’s point of view and difficulties. The data with regard to flying bomb and rocket attacks on London had been of great value in this connection and had made a very strong impression on his audience.

Sir Alan Brooke said that on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff he would like to thank General Marshall for the action he had taken in this connection. Sir Alan Brooke outlined the suggestions which had been made to mitigate the German rocket attacks and the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on this matter.

Sir Charles Portal then explained the proposals for air action against the rocket attacks and the course of action which it had been decided to follow.

Sir Charles Portal then explained the difficulties which had arisen with regard to the United States proposal to use war-weary bombers against industrial targets. The possibility of retaliation against the unique target of London had been felt to outweigh the advantages of the employment of this weapon.

General Marshall then outlined certain discussions he had had at Allied Force Headquarters with regard to the possibility of employing small formations of fighter-bombers to attack com-

4 Ante, p. 426.
5 The proposal on order of business was annexed to the C. C. S. minutes. For the text, see infra.
6 On January 24, 1945, at 9 a. m., at a meeting to which each Member of Congress received a formal invitation, Marshall and King gave “a confidential report on the present status of the war and related subjects” (Congressional Record, January 22, 1945, vol. 91, p. 865).
munications and particularly for attacks against the entrances to tunnels, possibly by skip bombing. He felt that skip bombing might also be used against the entrances to the underground production plant where the rockets were assembled.

Sir Charles Portal said that he was not accurately informed as to the topography of the terrain above the underground factory concerned and thought it likely that baffles had been erected before the entrances. It was probably also extremely well defended by guns; however, the possibility of skip bombing the entrances to this factory was very well worth investigating. With regard to attacks on communications, he had recently discussed the possibility of further attacks on communications with General Spaatz, who was arranging that the long-range fighters of the Eighth Air Force should, as a matter of course, attack communications on their return from escorting daylight bombers.

General Marshall then referred to the possibility of the Germans instigating suicide attacks on vital targets, particularly in the Antwerp area in which the lock gates were a vital and vulnerable target.

Some doubt was expressed as to the suitability of the German temperament to such a form of attack.

In reply to a question, Admiral King said that the Japanese suicide attacks were, on the whole, slightly less numerous than they had been, but they were still difficult to meet and there was apparently no panacea for it. The Commander of the Pacific Fleet had recently issued explicit instructions as to the method of employing anti-aircraft gunnery against these attacks.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Took note with interest of the above statements.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff adjourned until 1430.

4. Strategy in Northwest Europe
(C. C. S. 761/3 and 761/4)*

At General Bedell Smith's suggestion General Bull outlined the projected operations in Northwest Europe. The first phase entailed a closing up to the Rhine and the destruction of the enemy forces to the west of that river; the second phase consisted of obtaining bridgeheads across the Rhine; the third phase, of advancing into the heart of Germany and defeating her armed forces. The first phase was now going on. General Bradley was endeavoring to advance on the Prüm-Bonn axis. Divisions were now being released from the southern front, and were already being moved up to the North to be available for the offensive operations Veritable and Grenade, the latter of which was an alternative in the event that General Bradley's present attack did not proceed with sufficient rapidity.

* Not printed.
General Bull then outlined these two operations. Field Marshal Montgomery's forces would strike down in a southeasterly direction parallel to the Rhine while the Ninth United States Army would strike from its present position north of Aachen in the direction of Düsseldorf. A decision would shortly have to be taken as to whether it was worthwhile to continue General Bradley's operations in the Ardennes. Operations were also in progress to clear the Colmar pocket and were being undertaken by French forces to be assisted by three United States divisions. It was obviously desirable, if it proved possible, to clear the entire west bank of the Rhine since by so doing security would be improved and additional divisions released for the offensive.

Turning to the second phase—the seizure of bridgeheads across the Rhine—General Bull explained that in the North between Emmerich and Wesel there were three good and two possible positions for bridging points. In the South, in the Mainz area, there were four good bridging points and in addition two possible ones. In the center, in the Cologne-Bonn area, there were three possible bridging sites.

Field Marshal Montgomery's operation Veritable would be launched between the eighth and tenth of February and operation Grenade approximately a week later if the decision was taken to mount the latter. There was therefore a reasonable chance that the area west of the Rhine from Düsseldorf northwards would be clear of the enemy by the end of February. Field Marshal Montgomery would be instructed to grasp any possibility which presented itself of seizing bridgeheads on the lower Rhine during the southerly drive.

General Bull explained that the Supreme Commander had strongly of the opinion that a second line of advance into Germany must be available. It was for this reason that the bridgeheads in the Mainz-Mannheim area were to be seized. The line of advance of this army would be on Frankfurt and Kassel and would assist in isolating the Ruhr. In the North, Field Marshal Montgomery's drive would be directed on Munster and would swing down toward Hamm. It had been estimated that logistically it would not be possible to maintain more than 35 divisions in the northern thrust until rail bridgeheads had been established across the Rhine. In the South there were no serious logistic limitations and up to 50 divisions could be maintained before rail bridgeheads had been established.

The Supreme Commander had emphasized throughout the importance of flexibility in his planning. All forces which could be maintained would be employed in the northern thrust but the short length of the river available for the crossings, together with other limiting

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7 General of the Army Eisenhower.
factors, made it essential to have an alternative thrust available should the northern thrust be held up. The forces not employed in the two thrusts would be used to secure the remainder of the line and to stage diversions and threats.

General Bedell Smith explained that the only factor which had altered since General Eisenhower’s appreciations and intentions had been communicated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in SCAF 179 and SCAF 180 8 (C. C. S. 761/3), was the factor of time which had now become of great importance in view of the Russian advance. It was felt that on the Western Front freedom of movement could be counted on until the 15th of March. The Sixth Panzer Army was thought to be in process of withdrawal. There was no longer believed to be any serious threat to Strasbourg and there was a good chance of clearing up the Colmar pocket quickly, thus releasing four divisions. In view of the present diminution of German offensive capabilities in the West, it was essential to get to the Rhine in the North as soon as possible and it was hoped that Field Marshal Montgomery’s attack would start on 8 February.

Turning to the question of the distribution of forces, General Smith explained that initially the Staff of 21st Army Group had said that only about 21 divisions could be maintained in the northern thrust; this strength was obviously too small a proportion to use in the main thrust out of a total of some 85 divisions available. The Supreme Commander, however, had directed that logistic arrangements be made to support initially 30 divisions in the main effort and later a total of 36 divisions. These arrangements were under way. Grave thought had been given to the area in which the secondary effort should be staged. The neighborhood of Cologne presented certain advantages in that there could be no question of an Allied dispersal of forces. On the other hand this area was so close to the area of the main effort that the Germans could quickly reinforce between these two threatened areas and little diversion of enemy strength would be achieved. To sum up, in General Eisenhower’s view the thrust in the North was absolutely essential, that in the South necessary and desirable and to be undertaken if at all possible.

In reply to a question, General Smith explained that it was obviously desirable to close the Rhine throughout its whole length but that the Supreme Commander did not intend to do this if resistance was such that the operation would delay the main attack until mid-summer or would militate against an opportunity to seize a bridgehead and effect a crossing in strength on the northern front. A discussion then ensued as to the effect of the spring thaws on the possibilities of crossing the Rhine. General Smith and General Bull explained

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8 See ante, p. 464, footnote 8.
that the lower Rhine could, it was believed, be crossed at any date after the first of March, though certain risks were entailed. The spring thaws affected the upper Rhine but had no effect on the lower Rhine.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that there was not sufficient strength available for two major operations, and that therefore it would be necessary to decide on one of those proposed. Of the two, the northern appeared the most promising. The base port of Antwerp was nearer, the armies were already closer to the Rhine in that area, and the advance into Germany immediately threatened the vital Ruhr area whose importance had been even further increased by the fall of Silesia to the advancing Russian Army. In the South, though the actual crossings might prove easier, our armies had further to go before being in a position to cross the Rhine and, after crossing, the country was less favorable for operations and our forces would be further from the Ruhr or the lines of communications thereto. It was therefore felt that the plan should be based on the whole effort being made in the North if this was to be certain of succeeding and that every other operation must be regarded as subsidiary to this main thrust. There was, it was felt, a danger of putting too much into the southern effort and thereby weakening the main northern attack.

Another doubt which had been felt by the British Chiefs of Staff was in regard to the closing up to the Rhine on its whole length, which it was felt would slow up the advance into Germany. This point had already been cleared up by the explanations given by General Smith and General Bull. The general impression gained from SCAF 180 was that the southern thrust was regarded to be almost as important as the northern and that it diverted too much strength from the latter, both in forces and in the available facilities such as bridging material. The present situation on the Eastern Front obviously necessitated the speeding up of operations in the West in order to engage as many Germans as soon as possible, both to prevent the withdrawal of forces to the East and to take advantage of such reduction in strength as was taking place.

General Smith emphasized that the Supreme Commander intended to put into the northern effort every single division which could be maintained logistically. The plan called for an ultimate strength of 36 divisions in the northern thrust. There would also be about ten additional divisions in strategic reserve available to exploit success. A very strong airborne force would be used for the northern crossing. It was, however, impossible to overlook the fact that the northern attack would, of necessity, take place on a narrow four-divisional front and might bog down. The southern advance
was not intended to compete with the northern attack but must be of sufficient strength to draw off German forces to protect the important Frankfurt area and to provide an alternate line of attack if the main effort failed. He wished to make clear the Supreme Commander’s view of the differentiation between the main and secondary thrusts. Everything that could be put into the main effort would be put there.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he welcomed this explanation. He had felt that the southern advance might cause the northern attack to bog down.

General Marshall, in referring to a point previously made by Field Marshal Brooke as to the necessity of resting and relieving divisions in the line, agreed that this was vitally important. In his view the considerations involved in the plan were as follows: the most favorable spot logistically, that is, in the North; the fact that it was not safe to rely on one line of advance only; the number of divisions required to maintain security in the non-active parts of the line; the assessment of the number of divisions which could be logistically supported in the northern thrust. He considered it essential that there should be more than one possible line of advance. The strategic reserve should be fed into either advance in the light of how well that advance was succeeding. If extremely heavy casualties were sustained in the northern attack there were the alternatives of either battling through or switching the weight of attack elsewhere. It was his view that it was essential to have some other line of advance to turn to if we bogged down in the North. It was likely that the Germans would put up a heavy resistance in the North and, with the aid of jet-propelled reconnaissance aircraft, would assess the likelihood of our attacking in that area.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that after crossing the Rhine the strength of the main thrust would be reduced by the necessity for relief and rehabilitation of tired units.

General Smith gave the proposed general deployment of divisions. He said that while 36 would be available for the northern thrust they would not all be in the line at the same time. There would also be a strategic reserve of about ten divisions which would permit rotation. About 12 divisions would be used in the secondary attack and the remainder would be holding relatively quiet sectors of the line, where tired divisions could be rotated for rest and refit.

Turning to the employment of French divisions, General Smith said that every effort was being made to arm the new divisions as quickly as possible. Equipment for the first three of the new divisions was already moving, and they would be ready for action together with their corps troops by the latter part of April. The French had certain
odd brigades and other units available at present and these, with the new French divisions, might be used to contain or reduce St. Nazaire and Bordeaux.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not entirely agreed with the Supreme Commander’s plan as set out in SCAF 180. This however had taken on a different complexion in the light of General Smith’s explanations. The British Chiefs of Staff were loath therefore to approve SCAF 180, as at present drafted, as had been suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 761/4.

Sir Charles Portal drew attention to paragraph 20 of SCAF 180 which appeared out of keeping with General Smith’s explanation.

General Smith said that as he understood it, it had never been General Eisenhower’s intention to sweep the whole area west of the Rhine clear of Germans before effecting crossings.

General Bull confirmed this view and said that such action had not been intended if heavy fighting and consequent delay was thereby entailed. However, closing up to the Rhine on its whole length was obviously desirable if it could be achieved without delay.

General Smith said that if the Germans resisted our attack in the North with their full strength it was likely that they would only have Volksgrenadier divisions available to hold the ground west of the Rhine to the south.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the final sentence of paragraph 9 of SCAF 180 also implied equally important lines of advance.

Admiral King drew attention to paragraph 22 which he felt clarified the position.

In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke, General Smith said that the southern thrust was likely to start from some position between the Siegfried Line and the Rhine. He felt that about 12 divisions could successfully achieve this thrust if the Germans concentrated to oppose the main effort and the Siegfried Line would not impose an insuperable obstacle. In general he felt that the Siegfried Line could be “nibbled through” by two or three good divisions in 15 days in almost any position.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that rather than approve SCAF 180 at the present time, he would prefer that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note of it and should examine the record of General Smith’s explanation at their meeting on the following day.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Deferred action on the above subject pending further consideration by the British Chiefs of Staff.

5. Coordination Of Operations With The Russians

Sir Alan Brooke said that as he saw it, the only point was to insure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were still in full agreement with the
instructions which they had issued to General Deane and Admiral Archer in FAN 477.

General Marshall confirmed that the United States Chiefs of Staff were still in complete agreement with the contents of this message, no answer to which had yet been received from the Russians. He felt it would be necessary to raise the issue with them during the forthcoming conference.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to press the Russians to agree at Argonaut to the proposals in the Appendix to C. C. S. 741/6 (FAN 477).

6. THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE
   (C. C. S. 166 Series) 10

Sir Charles Portal explained that his object in raising this question was to find out if the United States Chiefs of Staff had any views on the possible move of the Fifteenth Air Force from the Mediterranean to Western Europe. Such a move, involving some 1,000 heavy bombers, would, of course, have considerable effect on the potentialities in other theaters.

General Kuter explained that C. C. S. 400/2 10 did in effect give the commander of the United States strategic air forces the right to move such forces within the two theaters. He understood in fact that General Spaatz had been considering the possibility of moving the Fifteenth Air Force to the United Kingdom but had decided against such a course.

General Marshall said that he had directed an examination of the possibility of using the Fifteenth Air Force, or part of it, from southern France, thus avoiding the bad weather over the Po Valley. This proposal, however, had not commended itself to his staffs.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that any large move as between theaters should, he felt, be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff since it had a great effect on the strategy in the theaters concerned. The number of bombers available in Italy, for instance, very materially affected the possibility of withdrawing ground forces from that theater.

General Marshall said that as he remembered it, the agreement with regard to the movement of the Fifteenth Air Force was designed to permit the commander of the strategic air forces the freedom of movement and flexibility to employ his forces temporarily in whichever theater provided the best weather at that time. There was in his mind no question of a permanent move of forces.

Sir Charles Portal said that it had been felt that temporary moves of air units to the United Kingdom was undesirable in view

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9 Not printed. FAN 477, dated January 15, 1945, dealt with the bombline in Eastern Europe and the Balkan area between the Allied and Soviet Armies.
10 Not printed.
of the difficult weather and the fact that operating out of the United Kingdom was a highly specialized business.

Admiral King said that he considered the permanent allocations of forces to be the function of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If necessary, the paper under discussion (C. C. S. 400/2) should be modified to bring it into line with this view.

Sir Charles Portal said that he was entirely reassured by General Marshall's statement with regard to the future of the Fifteenth Air Force.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not at present contemplating the transfer of any formations of the Fifteenth Air Force from the Mediterranean.

7. Planning Date for the End of the War with Germany (C. C. S. 772) 11

Sir Alan Brooke presented a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff dealing with the planning date for the end of the war with Germany (C. C. S. 772). He explained that it had been necessary to estimate such a date or dates in order to provide a basis for production and manpower planning.

General Marshall explained that United States production planning was based on a bracket of the first of July and the 31st of December, 1945.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Deferred action on C. C. S. 772 pending consideration by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

8. Planning Date for the End of the War with Japan

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Reaffirmed the planning date for the end of the war against Japan as recommended in paragraph 32 of C. C. S. 680/2. 12

9. The U-Boat Threat

Sir Andrew Cunningham explained that at present we were in a somewhat similar position to that of 1918. The ASDIC was proving less effective against present U-boat operations in shallow water where the tide affected the efficiency of the ASDIC. The Germans had discovered this and were working their submarines close inshore around the United Kingdom. At present they were operating principally in the Channel, the Irish Sea, and one had even penetrated

11 Post, pp. 478-480.
12 The document under reference came from the Quebec Conference of 1944. Paragraph 32 recommended that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany. This planning date was reaffirmed at Yalta. See post, pp. 830-831.
the entrance to the Clyde. Our aircraft were also hampered by the extremely small target presented by the schnorkel. This relatively small object was normally used only some three feet above the water and ASV aircraft could therefore only detect it in calm weather.

Further, the Germans were fitting a radar device on their schnorkel which enabled them to detect the ASV emissions before the aircraft contacted the schnorkel.

In the last month there had been six sinkings in the Irish Sea, an escort carrier had been torpedoed in the Clyde, and at least four ships sunk in the Channel. He hoped, however, that the position would improve, and, in fact, two submarines had been sunk in the Irish Sea in the last week and a further one south of Land's End. The object was to force the submarines back into deep water where the ASDIC would be effective, and to achieve this deep mine fields were being laid in order to shut the enemy out of the Irish Sea.

The Chief of the Air Staff explained that from the air point of view new devices were being brought into action. . . . It must be remembered, however, that with a submerged submarine using her schnorkel, the aircraft, even after it had contacted the submarine, found difficulty in sinking it since it could dive in some three seconds and left no swirl at which to aim.

Sir Andrew Cunningham explained that the Germans were building new types of submarines which were a vast improvement over those which had been used previously. There were two new types: one of 1600 tons with a speed of up to 18 knots submerged, and carrying twenty torpedoes; the other, a small coastal type, was capable of 13 knots submerged and carried two torpedoes. The larger boat had an extremely long range. It was thought that these new boats would be coming into operation about the middle or end of February.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

. Took note with interest of the foregoing statements.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

PROPOSED PROGRAMME OF WORK

Tuesday, 30th January

1. A. War Against Germany

1. C. Co-ordination of Operations

Bomblines, etc.

1 Annexed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes of the 182d Meeting.
1. E. Combined Bomber Offensive
1. F. Planning Date for End of German War

**Wednesday, 31st January**
1. B. Strategy in Mediterranean
2. War Against Japan
   A. South-East Asia
   B. Allocation of Resources Between S. E. A. C. and China

**Thursday, 1st February**
2. C. Pacific Operations
2. D. Planning Date for End of Japanese War
1. D. U-Boat Threat

**Friday, 2nd February**
3. Review of Cargo Shipping
   Additional Item. Oil Stocks
4. Basic undertakings

*Castille*, 2 30.1.45.

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*The Auberge de Castile, in Valletta, built in 1574 and altered in 1744, one of the national palaces of the Order of Malta.*

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**J. C. S. Files**

**Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff**

**TOP SECRET**

**[MALTA,] 30 January 1945.**

**C. C. S. 772**

**Planning Date for the End of the War with Germany**

We have reviewed the planning date for the end of the war against Germany as follows:—

1. In considering German capacity to resist we have been guided by the latest study by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee on this subject. Their conclusions are:—

   a. If, as seems just possible, the Russians succeed in overrunning the eastern defences of Germany before the Germans can consolidate there, the effect might be to force the Germans so to denude the West as to make an Allied advance comparatively easy. As the result of such advances in the East and in the West, a German collapse might occur before mid-April, 1945.

   b. On balance, however, we conclude that distance combined with stiffening German resistance is likely to bring the Russians to a halt on approximately the line Landsberg-Giant Mountains. This will involve the loss of industrial Silesia.
c. As the result of the loss of industrial Silesia, production of finished armaments, mainly land armaments, would fall over a period of about six months by a quarter or more.

d. If, as now appears improbable, the Germans succeed in stopping the Russian advance forward of Upper Silesia, thus retaining their two main industrial areas, in Silesia and in the Ruhr, we nevertheless consider that the over-all decline in Germany’s capacity to resist will be such that an Allied offensive in the West followed by a further Russian offensive in the summer should lead to the collapse of German resistance before November.

e. The need for forces to stem the Russian advance may cause a German withdrawal in Italy, at least to the line of the River Adige.

f. Germany, at any rate until the summer of 1945 when the U-boat campaign is expected to be at its height, is likely to retain sufficient forces to hold at least southern Norway.

2. Based on the above, we have considered three cases:

a. The best case.

b. A reasonably favourable case.

c. An unfavourable case.

THE BEST CASE

3. It is clear from paragraph 1 a. above that there is a possibility that the result of the present Russian offensive may lead to a German collapse by mid-April. We do not consider, however, that there is sufficient likelihood of this timing being realised to justify its acceptance, for planning purposes, as the earliest date for the defeat of Germany.

THE REASONABLY FAVOURABLE CASE

4. Eastern Front. Distance and stiffening German resistance may well bring the Russians to a halt on approximately the line Landsberg–Giant Mountains. Thereafter, the Russians will have to re-establish their communications and prepare for a further major offensive as soon as weather conditions and their logistics allow. This might be in mid-May or early June.

5. Western Front. Preliminary operations to reach the Rhine should be completed before the end of March. An all-out Allied offensive could then be launched in the latter part of April or early May, with the object of isolating the Ruhr and advancing deep into Germany.

6. The result of these two offensives, if successful, should bring the end of organised German resistance by the end of June.
THE UNFAVOURABLE CASE

7. Eastern Front. In this case, we assume that the Russian advance is stopped short of Upper Silesia. Thereafter, if all factors are unfavourable, the combination of German resistance and Russian logistic difficulties may prevent a further major Russian offensive from being launched until the late summer.

8. Western Front. The Allied offensive in the spring may fail to achieve any decisive result. This might be caused by too great a dispersion of effort along the whole front, together with the qualitative superiority of the German heavy tanks and jet-propelled aircraft. It would then be necessary to re-group with a view to launching another offensive. This offensive could be launched in the summer, but it might well suffer in weight and momentum as the result of a successful U-boat campaign of which the effects are likely to be felt in the third quarter of the year.

9. In these circumstances we consider that the results of these two offensives, particularly the Russian, should bring about the end of German organised resistance by the beginning of November.

CONCLUSION

10. There is a possibility that, as a result of the present Russian offensive, Germany may be defeated by the middle of April. This, however, should be regarded as a bonus and should not influence our production or manpower planning.

For planning purposes, we consider that:—

a. The earliest date on which the war is likely to end is the 30th June, 1945.

b. The date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue is the 1st November, 1945.

HARRIMAN-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, JANUARY 30, 1945, EVENING, ON BOARD H. M. S. “ORION” IN GRAND HARBOR

Present

United States
Mr. Harriman

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Churchill
Lieutenant General Schreiber

Editorial Note

No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. Churchill had his quarters in H. M. S. Orion in Grand Harbor, Malta. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from Churchill, p. 343.
MINUTES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1945

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 31, 1945, 10 A. M.,
MONTGOMERY HOUSE

PRESENT

General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell
Lieutenant General Smith
Rear Admiral Duncan
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Bull
Major General Hull
Major General Wood

Major General Anderson
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Lindsay
Captain McDill
Captain Stroop
Colonel Peck
Colonel Dean
Colonel Lincoln
Colonel Cary
Lieutenant Colonel Woodward

Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF THE C. C. S. 182d MEETING

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Agreed to recommend approval of the Conclusions of the C. C. S.
182d Meeting and approval of the detailed record of the meeting
subject to later minor amendments.

2. STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE
(C. C. S. 761/3 and 761/4)

General Marshall said that the memorandum by the United
States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 761/4 had been presented at the 182d
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (30 January 1945) and
discussed at that time. He called on General Bull for any additional
comments he might wish to make at this time.

General Bull said that immediately following the meeting of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, General Smith had dispatched a telegram
to General Eisenhower outlining certain changes that had been recom-
pended in his plan, and that General Eisenhower's reply was expected

1 Present for items 4–7 only.
2 J. C. S. 184th Meeting.
3 Ante, pp. 467–477.
4 Not printed.
to arrive shortly. There was nothing that he could add until General Eisenhower's views had been received.

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff:**—

Took note of the foregoing statement.

3. Planning Date for End of War with Germany
(C. C. S. 772 and J. C. S. 1239)

**General Marshall** said that C. C. S. 772, the British memorandum on this subject, had been presented at the Combined Chiefs of Staff 182d Meeting (30 January 1945). Action had been deferred pending consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Staff Planners had studied the British proposals and now recommend in J. C. S. 1239 that action on C. C. S. 772 relative to the planning date for the end of the war with Germany be deferred until the end of the tripartite conversations at Argonaut.

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff:**—

Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff defer action on C. C. S. 772 until the conclusion of Argonaut.

4. Strategy in the Mediterranean
(C. C. S. 762; J. C. S. 1236 and J. C. S. 1236/1; C. C. S. 773)

**General Marshall** said that J. C. S. 1236 contains an examination and discussion by the Joint Staff Planners of Allied strategy in Italy in the light of recent developments, and of the issues raised by the Supreme Allied Commander in C. C. S. 762, with a view to establishing the position of the United States Chiefs of Staff as to operations in Italy. The Joint Staff Planners recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the conclusions and the proposed directive in J. C. S. 1236 as the basis for discussion with the British Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff at this point considered an advance copy of a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff containing a draft directive to SACMED, later circulated as C. C. S. 773.

**General Marshall** drew attention to the proposal to withdraw 6 British, Canadian and American divisions from Italy for use in France. It was his opinion that only British and Canadian divisions should be withdrawn, and that the number should be reduced to five.

**Admiral King** concurred with General Marshall. He felt that, in the event of a flare-up in the Balkans, the British would undoubtedly desire to withdraw additional British divisions for use in that area and that this contingency should not be overlooked.

**General Kuter** pointed out that the draft directive proposed by the British stated specifically that no tactical air forces were to be

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*ante, pp. 478–480.*

*Not printed.*

*None printed. Regarding C. C. S. 773, see post, p. 485, footnote 5.*
withdrawn. He considered it essential that a suitable proportion of the 12th Air Force should accompany the ground divisions to France.

General Marshall felt that before a decision was taken on the proposed directive, General McNarney’s views should be sought. He proposed a telegram for this purpose.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then discussed and agreed upon certain amendments to the British directive.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Approved the message to General McNarney proposed by General Marshall.

b. Directed the Secretaries to draft a memorandum embodying the agreed amendments to the British directive with a view to its circulation after the receipt of General McNarney’s views.

5. a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command
   (C. C. S. 452/35) 8

b. Allocation of Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters
   (J. C. S. 1238) 8

General Marshall said that the British Chiefs of Staff had presented a memorandum on operations in Southeast Asia Command in C. C. S. 452/35, which contained a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia.

In J. C. S. 1238 the Joint Staff Planners had examined strategy in the Southeast Asia Command, India-Burma and China theaters in the light of recent developments and the recommendations of General Sultan and General Wedemeyer with a view to the formulation of a policy for guidance of this Conference.

After discussion,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C. S. 1238, subject to the amendment of the memorandum in Appendix “A” as agreed during the discussion. (Appendix “A” subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 452/36). 8

6. Estimate of the Enemy Situation—Europe
   (C. C. S. 660/3) 8

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note of C. C. S. 660/3.

8 Not printed.
7. BOMBING OF U-BOAT ASSEMBLY YARDS AND OPERATING BASES (J. C. S. 1219/1) 9

General Marshall said that J. C. S. 1219/1 contained a study by the Joint Staff Planners of the possible resurgence of U-boat activity against North Atlantic shipping.

Admiral King felt that the directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and General Spaatz was satisfactory but appeared to be drawn up on rather general lines.

Admiral Duncan explained that the directive had been purposely prepared in this manner after a discussion of the present air directive under which the bomber forces were operating.

General Anderson explained that the present bombing directive had been drawn up to indicate certain priorities which included petroleum reserves and the installations of the German air force. Bombing of these objectives had definite bearing on the over-all effort. The destruction of petroleum reserves had the effect of cutting down the activities of the German air force, and slowing down the submarine and training programs. Certain areas were selected for each operation and at daily meetings targets were selected to take advantage of current opportunities. The general directive includes the bombing of U-boat building and assembly yards and bases.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C. S. 1219/1. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 774). 9

9 Not printed.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 31, 1945, 2:30 P. M., MONTGOMERY HOUSE

Present

United States
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell
Lieutenant General Smith 1
Vice Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Pull 1
Major General Hull
Major General Anderson
Major General Wood
Brigadier General Cabell 2
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser

United Kingdom
Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Wilson
Field Marshal Alexander 2
General Ismay
Admiral Somervell
General Riddell-Webster
Air Marshal Robb 1
Major General Laycock

Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves
Colonel Peck

1 Present for items 1–4 only.
2 Present for items 1 and 2 only.
TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF C. C. S. 182d MEETING

Sir Alan Brooke referred to the record of General Bull's statement contained in the fourth paragraph of item 4 of the minutes. He had not understood that there was any question about operation GRENDAE not being launched. He had, on the other hand, understood that operation VERITABLE was dependent on operation GRENDAE. Was it visualized that VERITABLE would have to await the launching of GRENDAE?

General Smith explained that General Bradley was endeavoring to advance on the Prüm-Bonn axis. If this advance succeeded in reaching Euskirchen quickly, it would be equally effective in assisting operation VERITABLE as would operation GRENDAE. VERITABLE was not, however, dependent on either operation. General Eisenhower was at present at General Bradley's headquarters and was now deciding whether or not to cancel General Bradley's operations and shift forces north in order to undertake GRENDAE instead.

General Marshall said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley's operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENDAE.

General Smith said that it was his personal opinion that it would probably be necessary to stop General Bradley's operations and to launch operation GRENDAE.

General Marshall pointed out that if General Bradley's operations could achieve their objective in time there were certain advantages since the troops were already in position.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the conclusions of the 182d Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

2. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
   (C. C. S. 773)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 773).

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* C. C. S. 183d Meeting.
* * ante, pp. 467-477.
* Not printed. The final version was circulated as C. C. S. 773/3, dated February 17, 1945; and its text, with variation of a few words, is appendix A (post, pp. 822–833) to the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta.
* Field Marshal Alexander.
SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had come to the conclusion that the right course of action was to reinforce the decisive Western Front at the expense of the Mediterranean Theater which, of necessity, would then have to revert to the offensive-defensive in Italy. There was now no question of operations aimed at the Ljubljana Gap and in any event the advance of the left wing of the Russian Army made such an operation no longer necessary.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not yet in a position to give their final views on the draft directive, particularly with reference to possible moves of part of the Twelfth Air Force. However, there were certain United States proposals which he would like to put to the British Chiefs of Staff at once. The United States Chiefs of Staff suggested the following amendments: In paragraph 2 the substitution of the word “British” for “our” wherever it occurred; in paragraph 4 the substitution of “five” for “six” divisions; in paragraph 5, first sentence, the deletion of the words “United States” and “in equal proportions.”

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that it was felt wiser to leave the Fifth Army intact as a well balanced organic force, and that it would be preferable to reinforce France with British and Canadian divisions in order to increase the strength of Field Marshal Montgomery’s army.

The United States Chiefs of Staff agreed to the removal of three divisions, British or Canadian, at once, and the remainder as soon as they could be released from Greece, since this was the only way of finding the additional forces required. The question of the equipment of Greek forces had also been considered, since on this depended the release of the British divisions now in that country, but this was a complicated problem which he would like to consider further. The United States proposal was therefore that five divisions, two of which should be Canadian and the remainder British, should eventually be moved to France. With regard to the transfer of these forces, a preliminary study went to show that use of air transport could expedite the transfer of at least the first two divisions. He felt that if motor transport could be provided for these divisions from the United Kingdom, the date by which they would be available for operations in France would be greatly expedited.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff originally estimated that six divisions could be spared from the theater. With regard to their nationality, there were obviously great advantages in moving the Canadian divisions to enable them to join up with the remainder of the Canadian forces in France. He was prepared to agree that the remaining divisions should be British. He felt it right
to accept five divisions as a basis and this figure could be reconsidered later in the light of the situation.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that the Canadian divisions were the easiest to move quickly; one was already out of the line and could be moved at once and the other approximately a fortnight later. He pointed out, however, that it would be difficult to find suitable British divisions since all were now in the line and they had been involved in hard fighting for a long period. He had no reserve divisions. He outlined the composition of the forces available to him in the Mediterranean Theater.

SIR ALAN BROOKE felt it unwise to go into the details of the formations to be moved at this stage. He accepted the United States proposals in principle. Two Canadian and one British divisions could be moved first and the remaining two British divisions as soon as they could be released from Greece.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had in mind to propose the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of a part of the Twelfth Tactical Air Force to include five fighter groups, one light bomber group, one reconnaissance unit, and two squadrons of night fighters. These air forces would be used to assist the First French Army and the Seventh United States Army.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER pointed out that if land formations were removed from him it was all the more desirable to keep as much air power as possible in the theater. If it was absolutely necessary to withdraw air forces from him he was most anxious that the United States medium and light bombers should not be taken, since British air forces in Italy were weak in those particular types.

GENERAL SMITH said that he was not asking for light bombers to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean Theater to Northwest Europe.

GENERAL ANDERSON pointed out that the greatest need was for fighter-bombers. The Southern Group of Armies had been robbed of these in order to strengthen the northern forces. He felt that if the Mediterranean Theater was passing to the defensive and the troops were being transferred to Northwest Europe, then the appropriate air components should, if possible, accompany them. The main deficiencies in Northwest Europe were in P-47's which could be used as either fighters or fighter-bombers.

GENERAL KUTER explained that the proposal to move the 47th Light Bomber Group from Italy had been made in view of the fact that it was trained for night intruder work which it was felt would be of more value in Northwest Europe than in Italy.

GENERAL SMITH said that he would be delighted to accept this group but only if Field Marshal Alexander could spare it. He was
as concerned as Field Marshal Alexander himself as to the security of the Italian Front.

Field Marshal Alexander said that if General Smith would give him his minimum requirements, he would do his utmost to meet them.

General Smith said that the five fighter-bomber groups were his minimum requirement for France and the light bombers, though desirable, were not essential.

Field Marshal Alexander undertook to examine this proposal at once and to release these forces if this proved at all possible. He fully realized that if his theater was to go on the defensive it was his duty to give up all possible resources, provided only that his front remained reasonably secure.

General Smith said that he was entirely prepared to leave the final decision to Field Marshal Alexander.

Sir Alan Brooke referred to NAF 841 in which Field Marshal Alexander had requested approval to the equipment of certain additional Greek forces. He (Sir Alan Brooke) was most anxious that a decision on this proposal should be reached before the Combined Chiefs of Staff left Malta since such a decision would greatly accelerate the dates at which the British divisions could be released from Greece.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Deferred action on this subject.

3. Strategy in Northwest Europe
(C. C. S. 761/3 and 761/4)

Sir Alan Brooke said the British Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the Supreme Commander’s operations as explained by General Smith and recorded in the minutes of the 182d Meeting. This explanation, however, was not in complete accord with the proposals put forward in SCAF 180. The British Chiefs of Staff therefore were not prepared to approve SCAF 180 as at present drafted.

General Smith then presented a redraft of the Supreme Commander’s plan as contained in paragraph 21 of SCAF 180. This redraft was designed to bring the Supreme Commander’s proposals into line with his previous explanation of SCAF 180.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Deferred action on this subject.

4. Planning Date for the End of the War With Germany
(C. C. S. 772)

General Marshall said that he felt it wiser to defer consideration of this item until after discussion with the Russian General Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Deferred action on this subject until the conclusion of Argonaut

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7 Not printed.

8 *Aide*, pp. 478–480.
5. a. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND
(C. C. S. 452/35 and 452/36)*

b. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BETWEEN THE INDIA-BURMA AND CHINA THEATERS

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 452/35 had put forward a new draft directive to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia.10

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt that the question of a directive to the Supreme Commander should be linked with the problem of the allocation of resources between the India-Burma and China Theaters. He drew attention to a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 452/36) which, while concurring in the directive proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, linked this directive to an understanding as to the allocation of United States resources to the Southeast Asia Command. He felt that the situation was developing to a point where the resources of the China and Burma-India Theaters would be separated. U. S. resources required for China would not be available for operations in Malaysia. It was important that Admiral Mountbatten should be in no doubt as to the circumstances under which United States forces were available to him.

General Wedemeyer had recently estimated that some three squadrons of fighters would be required to protect the air route to China and had further implied that he was prepared to accept the responsibility of protecting with Chinese or United States troops the northern part of the Burma Road. This would, of course, relieve Admiral Mountbatten of these responsibilities. The situation was developing rapidly and the Japanese might well hold out in the Rangoon area in order to deny us that port but, in a matter of weeks, the Japanese sea communications to Burma, Malaysia and the Netherlands East Indies would be cut by air operations out of the Philippines. This would materially reduce Admiral Mountbatten's problems. Further, it would soon be possible to transfer more power to China, not so much additional tonnage but the all-important transport vehicles and light and medium artillery. The striking power then available to us on the far side of the Hump would be very different from that which we now had.

Summing up, GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposed directive to Admiral Mountbatten was acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff, provided it was communicated to Admiral Mountbatten together with the policy with regard to the employment of United States forces outlined in C. C. S. 452/36.

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* Not printed.
10 Admiral Mountbatten.
SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the phrase "with the forces at present at your disposal" contained in paragraph 3 of the draft directive was inserted in order to make it clear to Admiral Mountbatten that he should not undertake operations which could not be carried out without an increased allocation of resources.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked for clarification of the meaning of the United States Chiefs of Staff memorandum (C. C. S. 452/36). Did this memorandum imply that, although Admiral Mountbatten could use for approved operations in Burma United States forces not required in China, such forces would not be available to him for use in Malaya?

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the memorandum was meant to make it quite clear that the employment of United States forces outside Burma must be the subject of fresh agreement and that Admiral Mountbatten must not be led to assume that they would be available to him.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—
Deferred action on C. C. S. 452/36 pending further study by the British Chiefs of Staff.

6. ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION—EUROPE
(C. C. S. 660/3)\(^\text{11}\)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—
Took note of C. C. S. 660/3.

7. BOMBING OF U-BOAT ASSEMBLY YARDS AND OPERATING BASES
(C. C. S. 774)\(^\text{12}\)

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that he would prefer to consider this memorandum at the same time as the paper he was putting forward with regard to the U-boat threat.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—
Deferred action on C. C. S. 774 pending study by the British Chiefs of Staff.


\(^{12}\) Not printed, but see coverage of this subject in the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister, \textit{post}, p. 828.

INTERDELEGATION DINNER MEETING, JANUARY 31, 1945, EVENING, GOVERNMENT HOUSE

PRESENT

\textbf{UNITED STATES}

Secretary Stettinius

\textbf{UNITED KINGDOM}

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Lieutenant General Schreiber

and various other members of the two Delegations
Editorial Note

The only record of the substance of this meeting that has been found is a summary of conversation between Stettinius and Churchill in Stettinius, pp. 60–62. The meeting was “a large formal dinner at Government House” given by the Governor and Commander in Chief of Malta, Lieutenant General Schreiber, in honor of the American and British Delegations. The information given here with respect to the meeting and the participants is taken from Stettinius, pp. 56, 60, 62.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1945

STETTINIUS-EDEN CONVERSATION, FEBRUARY 1, 1945, MORNING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Secretary Stettinius

UNITED KINGDOM
Foreign Secretary Eden

Editorial Note

No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. Stettinius and Eden, who were both quartered on board H. M. S. Sirius in Grand Harbor, Malta, went ashore in the early part of the morning and took a walk, during the course of which, it seems, they “discussed some of the problems to be raised at Yalta”. This information is taken from Stettinius, pp. 60, 62, 63.

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 1, 1945, 10 A. M., MONTGOMERY HOUSE

PRESENT

General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell
Lieutenant General Smith
Vice Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Duncan
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Bull
Major General Anderson

Major General Hull
Major General Wood
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Lindsay
Captain Stroop
Captain McDill
Colonel Peck
Colonel Lincoln
Lieutenant Colonel McRae

Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves
II. THE MALTA CONFERENCE

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. a. Approval of the Minutes of the J. C. S. 184th Meeting

General Kuter requested that the last sentence of the remarks of General Anderson in Item 7 be changed to read: "The general directive includes the bombing of U-boat building and assembly yards and bases."

b. Approval of the Minutes of the C. C. S. 183d Meeting

General Marshall requested the amendment of his remarks in the third paragraph of Item 1 to read as follows: "General Marshall said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley's operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Approved the minutes of the J. C. S. 184th Meeting, subject to the amendment agreed during the discussion.

b. Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the conclusions of the C. C. S. 183d Meeting and approve the detailed record of the meeting, subject to the amendment agreed during the above discussion and to later minor amendments.

2. Strategy in the Mediterranean

(C. C. S. 773)

General Marshall said that the Secretaries had prepared a draft of the directive to SACMED proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, which showed the amendments agreed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in their previous meeting. General McNarney's views, which had just been received, indicate that on balance he prefers to have British divisions rather than American divisions transferred to France. Concerning the tactical air force, General McNarney expresses satisfaction with the present air-ground ratio. He considers that a proportionate reduction in fighter-bomber strength should accompany a reduction in the number of divisions. He considers the medium bombers should stay in Italy.

In light of General McNarney's message and the discussions that have taken place, it seems that no American divisions should be taken from Italy and that the draft directive to General Alexander proposed by the British with the amendments already agreed to by

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1 J. C. S. 185th Meeting.
2 Ante, pp. 481–484.
4 See ante, p. 485, footnote 5.
the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and agreed in part by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and dispatched to General Alexander, with an information copy to General Eisenhower.

General Kuter proposed that a new paragraph 5 should be added to the directive as follows:

"The U. S. Twelfth Air Force, less such units as may be selected by agreement between you and SCAEF, shall be made available for transfer to SCAEF, together with necessary service units."

An appropriate sequence of paragraphs in the directive was then discussed and agreed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the draft memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prepared by the Secretaries, as amended during the discussion. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 773/1.)

3. Equipment of Allied and Liberated Forces

(J. C. S. 1240* and NAF 841*)

General Marshall read a brief of J. C. S. 1240 and proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee, subject to the following amendments:

Page 5, delete the last three lines of paragraph 11 and after the word "reviewing" add "NAF 841 again."

Page 8, line 2, insert the words "already approved in principle" between the words "provision" and "of."

Page 8, paragraph 9, line 3, after the word "review" delete the remainder of the sentence and substitute therefor "NAF 841 again."

General Somervell said he felt certain that when the British restudy their requirements for the supply of Greek forces, they would find that they could not meet them. It might then be suggested that the agreed figure of equipment for 460,000 liberated manpower in Europe could be reduced to 400,000 and the equipment for the 60,000 remaining be applied to the requirement for the Greek Army.

After further discussion,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in J. C. S. 1240, subject to the amendments proposed by General Marshall. (Memorandum subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 768/1.)
4. Operations in Southeast Asia Command
(C. C. S. 452/35, 452/36* and C. C. S. 747/7*)

General Marshall said that in C. C. S. 452/35 the British proposed a directive to Admiral Mountbatten. In C. C. S. 747/7 the British propose that transfer of forces from India-Burma to China be subject to C. C. S. agreements. The United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 452/36 set forth a policy with respect to U. S. resources in the India-Burma Theater.

The point at issue appears to be whether the United States Chiefs of Staff can order transfers of resources when they do not jeopardize British forces engaged in approved operations in Burma or whether every transfer requires agreement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as proposed by the British. The U. S. proposal as now written appears to safeguard sufficiently the British interests. Under the British proposal the Combined Chiefs of Staff would become involved in lengthy discussions of purely operational matters and the transfer of one air squadron or one Quartermaster company would be the subject for C. C. S. decision unless acceptable to SACSEA.

No compromise should be accepted which involves C. C. S. approval of transfer or requires discussion in the Combined Chiefs of Staff except where the British Chiefs think their forces are jeopardized. The U. S. paper provides clearly for this.

General Marshall recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff should recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the approval of the proposals made in the U. S. memorandum in C. C. S. 452/36. By this action both the policy for the transfer of U. S. resources and the directive for Admiral Mountbatten will be approved. The British in their paper state their willingness to discuss means of reducing the time occupied in the discussion of projected moves. He recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff should listen to whatever the British may propose in this respect since these discussions will be necessary when contemplated transfers might place British forces in jeopardy.

The Secretary stated that the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to withdraw their paper, C. C. S. 747/7, if the United States Chiefs of Staff will agree to delete the words "British forces engaged in" in the eighth line of the second paragraph of C. C. S. 452/36, which paper would then be acceptable to them.

Colonel Lincoln said that the proposed British amendment would nullify the intentions of the United States Chiefs of Staff because it would transfer the "jeopardy" from the "forces engaged" to "operations." While the jeopardy to the forces actually engaged in opera-

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* Not printed.
* Post, pp. 524-525.
tions was a factual matter, it would be difficult to determine from the existing circumstances the question of the jeopardy of approved operations, some of which might not yet have been initiated. This was a matter over which there could be considerable difference of opinion. Discussion of such a point was likely to be time-consuming. He recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff propose to the British, in lieu of their amendment, the substitution of the word "the" for the word "British" in the same line of the paragraph referred to above.

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff:**—
Agreed to adhere to the position outlined by them in C. C. S. 452/36.

5. **Pacific Operations**
(C. C. S. 417/11)\(^{10}\)

*Admiral King* said that this paper was on the agenda for the purpose of reaffirming the position of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the operations for the defeat of Japan. He doubted the possibility of maintaining and defending a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk from bases in Kamchatka alone, but suggested reaffirming the paper for planning purposes.

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff:**—
Reaffirmed their approval of C. C. S. 417/11.

6. **U-Boat Threat**
(C. C. S. 774 and 774/1)\(^{11}\)

*General Marshall* said that C. C. S. 774, upon which action had been deferred at the C. C. S. 183d Meeting, was the U. S. proposal for the directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and General Spaatz for the disruption of the German U-boat program. In C. C. S. 774/1 the British have presented a paper on the U-boat threat during 1945.

*Admiral King* was of the opinion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be obliged to accept the directive proposed in C. C. S. 774 in the light of the British paper which implied that immediate action was necessary. He suggested that the British paper should be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

*General Marshall* drew attention to the fact that the British paper would provoke serious complications in the allotment of tonnage being considered in current shipping studies and would provide the British with arguments for the increase of the figure of 8 percent which had been set for estimated shipping deficiencies. He was merely examining this aspect of the problem in order to formulate some reply to the British if the point were raised.

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\(^{10}\) *Ante*, pp. 395-396.

\(^{11}\) Not printed, but see coverage of this subject in the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta, *post*, p. 828.
Admiral King felt that the British paper might be accepted if the acceptance was without prejudice to the shipping deficiencies established in the current studies. He advised against any attempt to revise the percentage figure of assumed losses at this time.

Admiral Cooke suggested that it might be preferable to note the paper and review the deficiencies in sailings at some future date.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note of C. C. S. 774/1 and review the percentage of deficiencies in sailings on 1 April 1945.

7. Strategy in Northwest Europe

In closed session,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept SCAF 180 (Enclosure "B" to C. C. S. 761/3) as amended by SCAF 194, and take note of SCAEF's dispatch No. S-77211 of 31 January 1945.\(^\text{12}\)

Annex

Message by General Kuter to General Arnold Dated 1 February 1945

"The following letter received this date:

'My dear Kuter. Since the British Chiefs of Staff issued CCS 691\(^\text{13}\) about British participation in the very long range bombing of Japan and the United States Chiefs of Staff replied in CCS 691/1,\(^\text{13}\) we have made considerable progress in the development of our VLR bombing potential.

The bombing of the "Tirpitz" proved that it is possible to increase the all up weight of the Lancaster beyond our expectations and we now hope to achieve an effective radius of action of some 1,500 miles carrying a useful load of the order of 6,000 pounds with either the Lancaster or with its replacement the Lincoln. We are however carrying on with flight refueling experiments as an insurance.

The rate at which we will be able to bring our Bomber Force into action against Japan cannot finally be determined until we know more about the bases that will be available for our operations and the facilities we can count on at those bases. Assuming that bases are made available I estimate that our first squadrons could be fully operational in the Pacific 7 months after Germany is defeated, and the whole force some 5 months later.

This RAF force will be thoroughly experienced in the technique of night bombing and in sea-mining, and will be capable of dropping

\(^{12}\) See ante, p. 464, footnote 8.

\(^{13}\) Not printed.
the very effective 1,500 pound British mines. I feel that particularly in these respects the Force will be able to make a valuable contribution to our efforts against Japan.

'I am anxious to get our plans for the RAF very long range Force into more concrete form, particularly with regard to the rate of its deployment, the provision of bases, availability of common user items, local defence and the general administrative arrangements for the contingent.

'I would like to send the AOC designate of our Force together with a small number of staff officers, over to the United States at an early date in order to make contact with your Air Force authorities and the officers under whom he would be serving, to make as much progress as possible with these arrangements. It would also be helpful if he could visit the Pacific area and learn at first hand something about the operating conditions in that Theatre. Following this visit, I propose that the AOC would return to the United Kingdom to continue with the preparation of his Force. I realize the difficulties of deciding on the exact base facilities that will be available so far in advance, but I am anxious to make a definite start even on a small scale, and would be prepared to initiate planning on the assumption that you would make available to us, say, 4 bases for heavy bombers 6 months after Germany is defeated.

'I would very much like to discuss this VLR project with you during this conference, either here or at MAGNETO.

'Yours sincerely, Charles Portal.'

"Anticipating such proposal, I have cleared with JCS a reply which will infer favorable consideration after detailed presentation of desired visit to Theater at proposed conference here or at MAGNETO.

"Understand Air Marshal Hugh Pugh Lloyd is AOC designate. Expect to arrange that Lloyd and party of 8 to 10 of his elected staff will arrive Washington after March 1 to spend 2 or 3 days in Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff Plans studying probable course of air war on Japan and then 4 or 5 days in Headquarters XX Air Force for familiarization with means and methods of command and operations of XX Air Force and then visit to XX Air Force base in Mariannas and probably to Luzon.

"Expect that 36 squadrons of VLR Lancasters or Lincolns under Lloyd will operate as a unit of XX Air Force.

"All discussions will be based on condition that RAF unit will provide own aviation engineers and all services, will build, maintain and operate own bases, will provide all echelons of aviation maintenance and in general will be absolutely and completely self-supporting.

"Will tie resurrection of WEARY WILLIE project into same conversation and hope to establish full freedom for our development and operation from French bases and freedom to develop and operate accurately controlled types from UK bases."

CRICKET 55 (1 February 1945)
MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 1, 1945, 10:30 A.M., ON BOARD H. M. S. “SIRIUS” IN GRAND HARBOR

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Iohlen
Mr. Hiss

UNITED KINGDOM
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Butler
Mr. Dixon

Executive Secretariat Files

Agreed Minutes

TOP SECRET

Mr. Eden asked Mr. Stettinius if there were any points which he wished to raise.

Mr. Stettinius said that he hoped it would be possible for agreement to be reached between the British and American Delegations forthwith on the urgent question of—

1. ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

Mr. Stettinius thought that though there had been agreement between the Americans and British on the zones of occupation in Germany, there were still relatively minor points outstanding, notably in connexion with the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven. He thought it important to get agreement on these, particularly in view of the fact that the Russians might soon be in Berlin and have views of their own as regards the zones if our two Governments do not approve the carefully negotiated protocol.

Mr. Eden said that he understood that there were only certain small points unsettled; he agreed that it was desirable to get these

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1 The agreed record of this meeting lists as present for the United States only Stettinius, Matthews, and Hiss. According to Stettinius, p. 63, however, “Matthews, the rest of my staff, and I” attended. Besides Matthews and Hiss, Stettinius’ staff consisted of Bohen, Foote, and the secretariat, Blanchard, Conn, and Graham. On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote: “I think Bohen was . . . present” (640.0029/8–1354).

2 The source text for the minutes here printed is a mimeographed paper, slightly amended in pen and ink, and dated February 2, 1945, which states that it is the “Agreed Record” of the meeting. Authorship is not indicated, although the paper is evidently of British origin. It bears the caption “(This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government)” and the notation “Copy No. 38”. Attached to this copy is an identical copy numbered 39; and covering both copies is a memorandum from Dixon to Matthews dated at Yalta February 6, 1945, which reads: “I enclose three copies of the agreed record of the Foreign Secretaries’ meeting at Cricket on February 1st.” On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote of these minutes: “I think the authorship is probably British and that I personally went over them” (640.0029/8–1354).

* Ante, pp. 118–123.
tied up forthwith and thought that these points could be cleared up by agreement with the military authorities forthwith.*

It was agreed that it would be most important for us to get the Russians to approve the protocols on control machinery 4 and zones of occupation.

Mr. Stettinius next raised the question of zones for the French. The President was disposed to give the French a zone. This might include the southern part of the British zone and the northern part of the American, said Mr. Stettinius.

Sir A. Cadogan asked whether the Americans had had any indication from the French what zone they desired; he thought we should consult them before taking our decision. Neither the British nor the Americans had as yet had any such indication.

It was agreed that the approval of the Russians should be sought to the proposal that the Americans and British should agree on a zone with the French; it was also agreed that the French should be integrated into the control machinery.

2. Zones of Occupation in Austria

Mr. Eden raised the question of zones of occupation in Austria.

Mr. Matthews said that there had been general agreement as to the areas except as to exact extent of the Viennese zone.

Mr. Eden said that Sir William Strang had told the European Advisory Council 5 that we favoured the American view on Vienna rather than the Russian. He was not sure, however, that apart from this issue there was in fact agreement as to zones.

It was recalled that the French had also asked for a zone in Austria.

3. Poland

Mr. Stettinius said that from the point of view of American public opinion it was extremely important that some equitable solution should be reached. It was impossible for the United States Government simply to recognise the Lublin Provisional Government. What seemed to be required was some kind of Council including all the relevant sections including M. Mikolajczyk. Failure to reach a satisfactory solution of this question at the forthcoming meeting would greatly disturb public opinion in America especially among the

*The outstanding points were cleared up at lunch with General of the Army Marshall and Field Marshal Brooke, and telegrams were despatched to the Foreign Office and the U. S. Embassy in London with a view to the European Advisory Council being informed of the approval of their Governments of the proposed zones of occupation in Germany. [Footnote in the source paper. See the Foreign Ministers-Chiefs of Staff luncheon meeting, February 1, 1945, pp. 514–515.]

5 European Advisory Commission. See ante, p. 110, footnote 1.
Catholics and might prejudice the whole question of American participation in the post war world organisation. He asked whether the British had any formula.

Mr. Eden agreed that the British too could not simply recognise the Lublin Provisional Government. M. Mikolajczyk had put forward a suggestion for a presidential council which would be chosen partly from London elements, partly from the Lublin Provisional Government and partly from elements in Poland. Of the latter he instanced the Archbishop of Cracow, M. Witos and M. Zulawski, a leader of the Socialist party. He thought that M. Bierut would be a member of the presidential council from the Lublin Provisional Government.

Sir A. Cadogan thought the Russians might be suspicious of a proposal which might seem to them rather complicated. He suggested that we should ask them to agree to a new interim Government and that we might suggest a presidential council as one method of securing this. We should avoid suggesting a fusion between the Lublin Provisional Government and the London Government.

It was agreed, upon the proposal of Mr. Stetlinius, that the two Delegations should put up notes to the President and the Prime Minister in the above sense, bringing out in particular the point of the prejudicial effect on American opinion of failure to reach a satisfactory solution, and also that this would put in an impossible position all those in Great Britain most anxious to work in with Russia.\(^6\)

The possibility was discussed of the Russians refusing to play.

It was agreed that a deadlock would be bad but that a simple recognition of the Lublin Provisional Government would be even worse.

4. Persia

Mr. Eden raised the subject of Persia. He said that the essential point was to maintain the independence of Persia which was still threatened by the pressure which the Russian Government had been maintaining for some time on the Persian Government, mainly in connexion with the oil concession which the Persian Government had declined to give them. He suggested that an offer might be made to the Russians for the withdrawal of troops gradually and pari passu, after the Governments had agreed that the supply route through Persia was no longer required, which might be about June. He was obliged, however, to make a reservation that our military might feel it necessary to retain certain troops for the protection of the vital oilfields in southern Persia.

\(^6\) Post, pp. 508-511.
MR. MATTHEWS pointed out that in this case the Russians would insist on maintaining troops in the north.

It was recalled that both Americans and British had a grievance against the Russians in that British and American companies had proceeded quite far in their applications for oil concessions in South Persia and that their negotiations had been arrested by the ham-handed procedure of the Russians in demanding a concession in the north which raised political issues.

It was agreed that for the three Powers to appear to default on the specific undertakings in the Tehran Declaration \(^7\) would have repercussions elsewhere, for instance in connexion with Dumbarton Oaks,\(^8\) and that it was important to try to get the Russians to agree \((a)\) to the principle of gradual pari passu withdrawal and \((b)\) that the Persian Government were entitled to decline to negotiate oil concessions as long as foreign troops were in occupation of their territory.\(^9\)

5. WARM WATER PORT FOR RUSSIA (Straits and the Far East)

MR. STETTINIUS said that the President had in mind the question of Russian interests in a warm water port. He enquired whether the British had any indication as to what the Russians wanted.

MR. EDEN said that the Russians certainly wished to revise the Montreux Convention.\(^10\) We had told them that they should put their ideas on paper. We had no clear indication of what they had in mind but it might be that they would wish for a regime for the Straits similar to that of the Suez Canal which would enable their warships to pass from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean in time of war.

MR. EDEN continued that the Russians would be wanting a good many things, that we had not very much to offer them, but that we required a great deal from them. He felt, therefore, that we ought to arrange to put together all the things we wanted against what we had to give. This would apply to the Far East also. In his view if the Russians decided to enter the war against Japan they would take the decision because they considered it in their interests that the Japanese war should not be successfully finished by the U. S. and Great Britain alone. There was therefore no need for us to offer a high price for their participation, and if we were prepared to agree to their territorial demands in the Far East we should see to it that we obtained a good return in respect of the points on which we required concessions from them.

\(^7\) The text of the Declaration regarding Iran, which was signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Tehran under date of December 1, 1943, is printed post, pp. 748–749.

\(^8\) See ante, pp. 340–341.

\(^9\) See ante, pp. 330–331.

\(^10\) See the section entitled “The Turkish Straits,” ante, pp. 328–329;
In the course of discussion the views were put forward that the Russians would certainly want the lower part of Sakhalin and transit rights in southern Manchuria.

6. China

The desirability of unity being achieved between the Kuomintang and the Communists was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity. Mr. Eden could not account for this idea having arisen; we were most anxious that unity should be secured.

Mr. Stettinius said that he had not heard the report.

It was agreed that the military situation had improved somewhat, partly through the diversion of two divisions from Burma to China, and partly through the reopening of the Burma Road.

Mr. Stettinius urged that the British, Soviet and American Governments make every effort to bring about agreement between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists.

7. Emergency High Commission for Europe

Mr. Stettinius referred to the two papers on this subject which Mr. Bohlen had communicated in London to Sir A. Cadogan. He asked Mr. Hiss to explain briefly their purpose.

Mr. Hiss said that the essential purpose was to secure unity of approach between the three Big powers to the manifold difficulties that must arise in liberated territories in Europe. The proposed High Commission would be a temporary body functioning until the World Organisation was set up. It would not include Germany, which was handled by the European Advisory Council; but in any case the scope including the psychological approach was different.

Mr. Stettinius stressed that the Commission would be composed of four members, i.e. by the inclusion of the French, or possibly more.

Mr. Eden made it clear that the British were much attracted by the proposal.

Mr. Matthews said that its presentation to the Russians would require considerable care, as the question of Poland was involved.

Mr. Eden foresaw that one difficulty would be to find members of the Council who would be able to take responsibility for decisions of importance—the Russians would find this particularly difficult. Apart from this there was the further difficulty that responsibility for such decisions vis-à-vis their own public opinion must rest with the Foreign Secretaries of each country, who could neither be permanently in session in a foreign country, nor delegate their duties beyond a certain measure.

11 See ante, pp. 98-100.
Mr. Stettinius shared this view, but explained that the intention had been that the members of the proposed Council would refer to their home Governments before the Council took decisions of importance.

Mr. Eden raised the further point of the relation between the Council and quarterly meetings of the Foreign Secretaries to which he attached importance. It was felt that it should not be impossible to work [out?] an arrangement combining both plans.

There was some discussion as to the title of the body. It was felt that some title must be found which would not wound the susceptibilities of the smaller Allies and at the same time would not seem to cut across the duties of the European Advisory Council and the Allied Control Commissions in certain enemy countries. It was thought that Mr. Matthews' suggestion of "Liberated Areas Emergency Council" deserved consideration.

Mr. Stettinius stressed that the proposal must still be regarded as informal and unofficial as the President had not yet approved it. The President had indeed some misgiving that its adoption might prejudice the prospects of the World Organisation which was the question of paramount importance.

Mr. Matthews pointed out that if the idea fructified some public announcement would be necessary as regards it and certain other kindred subjects.

Mr. Stettinius said that the ideal result of Argonaut would be two declarations, one bringing to birth the World Organisation and the other in regard to the Emergency High Commission. American public opinion keenly anticipated a satisfactory declaration as regards the World Organisation in the course of the next week, and if this were not forthcoming its prospects would be seriously jeopardised.

It was agreed that in view of the informality of the proposal the Prime Minister should be advised not to raise the question of the Emergency High Commission with the President.

8. Germany

Some discussion followed on the future of Germany. It was felt that both the political and economic aspects needed working out by some international body.

Mr. Stettinius enquired whether this was not in the province of the European Advisory Council and there was agreement that it was.

Mr. Eden summed up that with the Russians so close to Berlin it was urgently necessary to reach tripartite agreement.

(a) that a common political and economic policy in Germany was required,

(b) that no individual nation should take action without the agreement of the others, and
(c) that the European Advisory Council was the body in which detailed arrangements should be worked out.

Other questions requiring study would be the transfer of population and prisoners of war.

It was agreed that a note should be drafted embodying the views of the two Governments for the use of the President and the Prime Minister at Argonaut.\(^\text{12}\)

9. DUMBARTON OAKS

MR. EDEN said that he liked the President’s proposal for overcoming the difficulty as regards voting by the Big Powers.\(^\text{13}\)

MR. MATTHEWS stressed that its adoption was virtually essential to the creation of the World Organisation.

SIR A. CADOGAN agreed that it would hardly be possible to secure the latter with anything less.

At Mr. Stettinius’ request Mr. Hiss briefly described the American proposal. It distinguished between cases involving Enforcement and cases dealt with by Discussion. For the former unanimity in the part of the Great Powers would be necessary, whereas for the latter parties to the dispute, whether Big Powers or small, would not be entitled to vote. He stressed that this proposal, which had been described as a compromise, in effect was not so, but was actually the preferred solution of the United States Government.

SIR A. CADOGAN endorsed this and agreed that this point should be made plain to the public.

MR. EDEN agreed.

It was agreed (1) that two types of documents were required; first, a document setting out the American proposal which would be the document to be presented to the Russians; and secondly, brief and clear explanations of it for the information of the President and the Prime Minister; and (2) that if approved it would be for the President to present the plan formally at Argonaut both to Marshal Stalin and to Mr. Churchill.\(^\text{14}\)

Points arising in the event of agreement being reached on Dumbarton Oaks plan.

(a) Position of France and China

It was agreed that the French and Chinese Governments should be consulted as soon as agreement was reached, and if the Russians con-

\(^{12}\) It appears that separate American and British papers were drafted pursuant to this agreement. The British paper is printed post, pp. 511–512. The American views on the treatment of Germany were included in a memorandum drafted at Malta on February 2 but presented to the President at Yalta on February 4. See post, pp. 567–569.

\(^{13}\) Ante, pp. 58–60.

\(^{14}\) See post, pp. 660–661.
curred that the French should be invited to be the Fifth Power sponsoring the plan. The United States Government would be responsible for communicating the documents to and obtaining the concurrence of both the French and Chinese Governments.

(b) The invitations to other States to be present at the eventual United Nations Conference should be issued jointly in the name of all five Governments and by each of them individually. It was realised that the Russian Government might raise some objection to this in connection with China.

10. Polish-German Frontier

Mr. Eden said that the apparent desire of the Lublin Provisional Government to secure for Poland large additional sections of Germany involving eight million persons was causing him some anxiety. He thought that Poland was entitled to East Prussia and part of Upper Silesia, and certain other territories up to the Oder.

Mr. Matthews said that that was the American view and referred also to the inclusion of the eastern tip of Pomerania. He stressed also the American view that the transfer of populations should be gradual and not precipitate.

Sir A. Cadogan thought that agreement in principle between the Americans and British on this point might be registered now. This was agreed to.

11. Austro-Yugoslav Frontier

Mr. Eden referred to the fact that British troops under the proposed zone arrangement would be responsible for the Austrian frontier with Yugoslavia, and that one could not exclude the possibility that Marshal Tito would wish to occupy part of Austrian territory which was claimed for Yugoslavia. The position would be safeguarded if the three Big Powers were to tell Marshal Tito that the frontiers must remain as they are until the Peace Treaty, at which claims of parties concerned would be settled.

Mr. Stettinius expressed concurrence in this procedure.

12. Conduct of the Russians in Eastern Europe

It was pointed out that there were two main questions on which we had reason for complaint in regard to Russian conduct (a) in connexion with the Control Commissions and (b) in connexion with the British and American oil interest in Roumania.

It was generally felt that while the position on the Control Commission for Roumania was now more satisfactory it was important to insist with the Russians that before the Commissions took action there must be prior consultation with the Americans and British. Should the Russian Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on
military grounds, not covered in the Armistice, this should be taken on
their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government.

It was agreed that the British Delegation should draw up a paper 15
which would include Hungary specifying the points on which dis-
satisfaction was felt with the Russian conduct in Eastern Europe.
This paper, if the American Delegation concurred in it, would serve for
presentation by Mr. Eden to M. Molotov at some meeting between
the three Foreign Secretaries.

13. Civil Supplies

Mr. Eden raised this question and Mr. Stettinius said that he
understood that Admiral Land had submitted a paper on the subject.
It appeared that the British and American civil authorities were in
agreement but it remained to persuade the American military.

It was understood that the next stage would be for the matter to
be discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and if agreement were
not reached by them, between the President and the Prime Minister.

14. Prisoners of War

Sir A. Cadogan said that he understood that the Russian Dele-

gation at Argonaut would include an official who would be prepared to
discuss this subject. There were in effect two questions, (a) the treat-
ment of Allied civilian and military prisoners of war who were liberated
by the Russians and (b) our own treatment of Russian prisoners of
war who came into our hands.

It was agreed that the procedure for handling this with the Russian
expert should be discussed by the American and British experts who
were present at Cricket.

15. Anglo-American Warning to Germany about Allied
Prisoners of War

Mr. Matthews said that the State Department were disposed to
agree with the text proposed by the Foreign Office 16 but that the
United States War Department had some views on the subject.

It was agreed that the timing of any statement would be important
and that the proper time would be when the German collapse seemed
imminent or when some German outrage was threatened.17

16 Not printed.
17 For the warning to Germany by Truman, Churchill, and Stalin, released on
April 23, 1945, see Department of State Bulletin, April 29, 1945, vol. xii, p. 811.
16. Treatment of Major War Criminals

Mr. Eden said that when this was discussed at Moscow in October Marshal Stalin had disagreed with our view favouring some summary executions and had said that some form of judicial procedure was necessary. 18 The Prime Minister was still considering what the British attitude on this subject would be.


18 See ante, p. 400.

740.011 EW/1-2745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET  [WASHINGTON,] January 31, 1945.

1. General information. Winant has been instructed to act in concert with his Soviet colleague in the EAC in approving French proposals regarding equality in connection with the handling of German matters. . . . The British still insist on the desirability of a tripartite declaration on Denmark but the Department intends instead to send a secret message to the Danish Freedom Council and Danish political leaders praising their assistance to the common cause. . . . It is understood that Subasic will not leave London until the regency council appointed by the King has been recognized by Tito. The Greek situation is developing normally and it is reported that EAM has accepted the Government's proposal regarding the composition of the peace talk delegations. . . . As a result of extreme Soviet pressure the Czechoslovak Cabinet has decided to recognize the Lublin Committee. . . . Discussion in EAC of control machinery for Austria will be resumed as soon as instructions are received by the Soviet and French representatives. The British have approved in principle French participation in the occupation of Austria. . . . Bohlen has a copy of a long memorandum from Mikolajczyk 1 making proposals for the solution of Soviet-Polish difficulties.


3. . . . (This is our fifth message.) 2

1 For a summary of this memorandum, see post, pp. 953-954.
2 i.e., from the Acting Secretary to the Secretary since the departure of the latter from Washington, in this series of messages sent via Army channels.
The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill

P. M. (A) 2.
Prime Minister.

CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. STETTINIUS

POLAND

We found that we were in broad agreement on the necessity for finding a solution and that it was impossible for our Governments to recognise the Lublin Government. Mr. Stettinius stressed that failure to find a solution would greatly disturb American public opinion, and might prejudice the whole question of American participation in the World Organisation.

2. I agreed that a “Russian” solution of the question would be very likely to produce the latter result.

3. We found that we had very similar ideas on the lines of a possible solution. We should have to stress to Marshal Stalin the unsatisfactory nature of the present state of affairs, with the Soviet recognising one Government in Lublin and ourselves another Government in London. (We, of course, ourselves have the added problem of the Polish forces, acting with ours, who owe allegiance to the London Government). There would be apparent to the world a definite divergence of view on a point of first-rate importance. This would give rise to uneasiness amongst our peoples and would afford valuable material to enemy propaganda.

4. The time has probably gone by for a “fusion” of London and Lublin, and the only remedy that we can see is the creation of a new interim Government in Poland, pledged to hold free elections as soon as conditions permit. This would be representative of all Polish political parties and would no doubt include elements from the Lublin Government, from Poles in Poland, and from Poles abroad. There are no good candidates from the Government in London, but if M. Mikolajczyk and, perhaps, M. Romer and others such as M. Grabski could be included, that would make it much easier for us to recognize the new Government, which should be far more representative of Poland as a whole than is the Lublin Government.

5. If it would facilitate the realisation of this plan, we should be ready to see the adoption of M. Mikolajczyk’s idea of a “Presidential Council” consisting of such men as the former Prime Minister, M. Witos, Archbishop Sapieha, M. Zulawski and M. Bierut. Such a Council could appoint the new Government.

1 Page 1 of the source paper bears the notation “Copy for Bohlen”.
6. If the Russians persist in their present policy, that would only neutralise the efforts of all those in our two countries most anxious to work with Russia.

7. There remains the territorial problem. As regards Poland's eastern frontier, H. M. G. have already agreed with the Russians and announced publicly that this should be the Curzon Line, giving Lwow to the U. S. S. R. The Americans may however still wish to press the Russians to leave Lwow to Poland. As regards Poland's western frontier, we and the Americans agreed that Poland should certainly have East Prussia south and west of Königsberg, Danzig, the eastern tip of Pomerania and the whole of Upper Silesia. The Lublin Poles, no doubt with Soviet approval, are however also claiming not only the Oder line frontier, including Stettin and Breslau, but also the western Neisse frontier.

8. The cessions upon which we and the Americans are agreed would involve the transfer of some 2½ million Germans. The Oder frontier, without Breslau and Stettin would involve a further 2½ millions. The western Neisse frontier with Breslau and Stettin would involve an additional 3½ millions making 8 millions in all.

9. We were prepared last October in Moscow to let M. Mikołajczyk's Government have any territories they chose to claim up to the Oder, but this was conditional upon agreement then being reached between him and the Russians and there was no question of our agreeing to the western Neisse frontier. It was agreed before we left London that we should oppose the western Neisse frontier. I also think that we should keep the position fluid as regards the Oder line frontier, and take the line that H. M. G. cannot be considered as having accepted any definite line for the western frontier of Poland, since we need not make the same concessions to the Lublin Poles which we were prepared to make to M. Mikołajczyk in order to obtain a solution of the Polish problem. Even the Oder line frontier would severely tax the Polish capacity for absorption and would increase the formidable difficulties involved in the transfer of millions of Germans. We agreed with the Americans that in any event these transfers should be gradual and not precipitate.

10. If the Russians refuse to accept any solution such as that outlined above, the present deadlock must continue. That would be bad, but a simple recognition of the Lublin Government would be even worse.

II. THE MALTA CONFERENCE

Hiss Collection

United States Delegation Memorandum

Concrete Proposals on the Polish Question

Territorial Problems

We should make every effort to obtain agreement for a Polish frontier in the east which should run along the Curzon Line in the north and central section, and in the southern section should follow generally the eastern frontier line of the Lwow Province. This would give to Poland the Polish city of Lwow and the economically important oil fields. This frontier would correspond generally with one of the suggested frontiers proposed in 1919 to the Supreme Allied Council.

In regard to German territory to be turned over to Poland, we should make every effort to limit this compensation to East Prussia (except Koenigsberg), a small salient of Pomerania, which would include an area about one hundred miles west along the Baltic coast to the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia.

If we are unable to obtain Lwow Province for Poland, and if efforts are made to obtain greater compensation for Poland in the west, we should make every effort to keep this compensation to a minimum particularly because of the large population transfers which would have to be carried out if these purely German areas are included in Poland. We should resist vigorously efforts to extend the Polish frontier to the Oder Line or the Oder-Neisse Line.

Political Problems

The problem here involves the future independence of the Polish State. The Lublin Government in its present form cannot be regarded as representative of the Polish people. For this reason without violation of our commitments to the Polish people and without causing the most serious repercussions in American public opinion, we cannot transfer our recognition from the London Government to the Lublin Government. We must make every effort to resolve the question of the creation of a new interim Polish Government of national unity which should be composed of representative members of all important Polish political parties. This new interim government should not be in the form of an amalgamation of the Polish Government in London and of the Lublin Government. The first step in the direction of such a solution might be an agreement at this meeting to set up a Presidential Council which would be charged by the three powers (four if France would be included) with appointment

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1 The source paper is a carbon copy which bears no date and no indication of authorship. Its phraseology, however, reflects the outline of the proposed "note" to Roosevelt regarding Poland, to the preparation of which Stettinius agreed at the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries on February 1, 1945 (ante, p. 500).
of an interim Polish Government composed of the representatives of leading Polish political parties. This Presidential Council might be composed of Bierut, the present head of the Lublin Government, and a small number of Poles from inside Poland taken from the following list: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos—one of the leaders of the Polish Peasant Party and a former Prime Minister, Zulowski [Zulawski], a Socialist leader, Bishop Lukomski, Professor Buyak [Bujak], and Professor Kutzeba [Kutrzeba].

This Presidential Council would be commissioned by the three or four powers possibly acting through the medium of the proposed Emergency High Commission or by agreement among themselves to form an interim government which would be pledged to the holding of free elections when conditions inside Poland permit. The High Commission or other Allied instrument would assume responsibility for seeing that the Presidential Council selected an interim government based on a fair representation of Polish political parties and also that the interim government would carry out its pledge to hold free elections as soon as conditions permit.

Among the representatives of the Polish political parties making up this government would, of course, be certain present members of the Lublin Government as well as Poles from abroad, in particular Mikołajczyk.

Matthews Files

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill

P. M. (A) 4.

Prime Minister

The Future of Germany

As a result of developments in the war situation, it is becoming increasingly urgent to co-ordinate the policy of the major Allied Powers in regard to the future of Germany. It is clearly of paramount importance to future unity and security that there should be no divergence of policy between the Allies in dealing with Germany.

2. The E. A. C. was set up in 1943 to "study and make joint recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities". So far the Commission have agreed and referred to Governments three documents: (1) Terms of surrender for Germany;² (2) protocol on zones of occupation;³ (3) control machinery for Germany.⁴ Of these (1) has been

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¹ Carbon copy typed in the Department of State.
² Ante, pp. 113–118.
³ Ante, pp. 118–123.
approved by all three Governments, and (2) and (3) so far by the United States and British Governments only.

3. There are a considerable number of major questions of policy on which no decisions have been reached, though there have been exchanges of views at earlier conferences. In my view we should be wise to suspend final decisions until we see what conditions are in Germany. But there is a great deal of preparatory work which can and should be done. Governments have no doubt been studying all these questions individually; but the time has come when they could usefully be examined jointly by British, American, Soviet and French experts with a view to coordinating the individual studies. The obvious body to undertake this task is the E. A. C.

4. I would accordingly suggest that at the forthcoming conference we should try to get general agreement that the E. A. C. should be directed to examine and make joint recommendations at an early date to the member Governments regarding future political and economic policy towards Germany. In doing so, the Commission should pay particular attention to, *inter alia*, provisions for the disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the prevention of rearmament, dismemberment, decentralisation, measures of economic security, reparation, the future of the Rheno-Westphalian basin, the Kiel area, and transfers of population.

5. If this is agreed, it will be important that member Governments should ensure that their delegations are adequately staffed to cope with the increased work.

6. It might also be useful, in order to give the public some idea of the Commission's work, that the communiqué to be issued at the end of the Conference should announce the approval of the three Governments of the three documents so far negotiated by the E. A. C. This will, however, raise awkward problems as regards the French. While they are unlikely to propose any alterations of substance, they have not yet formally approved the documents, which will have to be recast in quadripartite form. We are telegraphing to the Foreign Office to ask (a) what effect it would be likely to have on the French if we announce the approval of the three Governments only of the three documents, and (b) whether they can devise a formula which we could use to cover the French.

[Malta,] 2nd February, 1945.
United Kingdom Delegation Memorandum

ALLIED (SOVIET) CONTROL COMMISSIONS IN BULGARIA AND HUNGARY

H. M. G. regard it as essential (a) that their representatives in Bulgaria and Hungary should enjoy reasonable freedom of movement and communication, and (b) that decisions about which they have not been consulted should not be taken in their name. In the case of Hungary, (a) has been satisfactorily dealt with in the “Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary”, and H. M. G. suggest that identical Statutes should be adopted for the Control Commission in Bulgaria in order to meet the points made in the message from Mr. Eden which was delivered to M. Molotov on or about December 11th, 1944.

H. M. G. also consider that during the first period there should be prior consultation with the British and American representatives and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the Armistice, it should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government only.

During the second period, i.e. after the conclusion of hostilities, H. M. G. wish to ensure that

(a) The British and American representatives should take their places in the Control Commissions as full members and should have the right to attend all their meetings and to participate fully in the consideration of all questions before the Commission. They should also have the right of direct access to the satellite authorities.

(b) Decisions of the Allied Control Commissions should be unanimous and its name and authority should be used only where the representatives of all three powers are in agreement. If the Soviet High Command, being in de facto control of the satellite countries through the presence of Soviet troops, insist upon issuing directives to the local Governments or taking action which are not approved by both the British and American representatives they should act unilaterally in their own name.

(c) The extent to which the British and the Americans will share in the actual executive and administrative work of the Control Commissions will be a matter to be settled on the spot. But they must certainly have the right to membership of any sub-committee or executive organ dealing with matters concerning British and American rights and property.

1 Undated British carbon copy which includes pen-written changes and which bears the pencilled endorsement “Mr. Matthews.”

2 Not printed, but see ante, p. 241.
(d) The detailed implications of these proposals should be worked out between the Soviet chairman and the British and American representatives on the Control Commissions on the spot.

**ROUMANIA**

H. M. G. have been glad to note that the Soviet authorities have now agreed to stop removing equipment from the oil fields in Roumania in which British interests are involved and have also agreed that the Ruat plant should remain *in situ*. But if the large quantities of equipment which have already been removed are not to be returned H. M. G. considers that they must be regarded as deliveries on account of reparations, and arrangements made for compensating the oil companies. Similarly the Ruat plant should be restored to its previous condition and brought into production as soon as possible. As the Soviet Government have made no attempt to refute the argument advanced by H. M. G. that any equipment which may be removed should be regarded as reparation and not as war booty, H. M. G. can only refer the Soviet Government to the statement of the case which has already been made. It should also be pointed out that these difficulties would never have arisen if the Soviet representatives in Roumania had discussed problems affecting the Roumanian oil industry with their British and American colleagues on the Control Commission instead of taking unilateral action.3

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3 This memorandum was subsequently revised and divided into two papers, both of which were circulated by Eden at the Yalta meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 10, 1945. See *post*, pp. 889–890, 893.

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**FOREIGN MINISTERS–CHIEFS OF STAFF LUNCHEON MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 1945, ON BOARD H. M. S. “SIRIUS” IN GRAND HARBOR**

**Present**

**UNITED STATES**

Secretary Stettinius
General of the Army Marshall
Mr. Matthews

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Foreign Secretary Eden
Field Marshal Brooke

**Editorial Note**

The only records of the substance of this meeting that have been found are in (a) Stettinius, p. 63, where the author states: "The two Chiefs of Staff, after a thorough discussion of the question [of zones of occupation in Germany] with us, authorized us to cable our representatives on the European Advisory Commission in London that the two governments now approved the zones"; and in (b) a telegram of Stettinius to Acting Secretary of State Grew dated February 1, 1945...
The telegram quotes the text of the message on this subject which Stettinius cabled on the same day to Ambassador Winant.

Matthews recalls that he was present at this meeting and that he wrote the message to Winant (640.0029/8-1354).

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**The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)**

**Nr: Cricket 45**

**SECRET**

For Acting Secretary of State Only from Secretary Stettinius.

Have dispatched the following to Winant after conference which Eden and I had with General Marshall and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke.

"You are Authorized immediately to inform the European Advisory Commission of this government's approval of the protocol on zones of occupation for Germany. Eden is likewise telegraphing the British Government's approval."

Please advise McCloy.

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**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 1, 1945, 2:30 P. M., MONTGOMERY HOUSE**

**Present**

**UNITED STATES**

General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell
Lieutenant General Smith
Vice Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Bull
Major General Anderson
Major General Hull
Major General Wood
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Cabell

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Wilson
Field Marshal Alexander
General Ismay
Admiral Somerville
General Riddell-Webster
Major General Laycock

**Secretariat**

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

Major General Jacob
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

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1 Present for items 1 and 2 only.
TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF C. C. S. 183rd MEETING

General Marshall said that he would like the first statement attributed to him in item 1 of the minutes amended to read as follows:

"General Marshall said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley's operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADA."

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 183rd Meeting, and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to the amendment proposed by General Marshall and to later minor amendments.

2. STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
   (C. C. S. 773/1 and 773/2)

Field Marshal Brooke referred to the amended draft directive contained in C. C. S. 773/1. He suggested that paragraph 4 b. of this directive should read as follows:

"Further complete formations as the forces now in Greece are released from that country."

It was explained that this amendment was consequent upon the reduction of the number of divisions to move to Northwest Europe from six to five. Three divisions would go from Italy and therefore it would only be necessary for two of the three divisions in Greece to follow them.

Sir Charles Portal referred to paragraph 5 of the draft directive. He felt that Field Marshal Alexander might well prefer to retain the Twelfth Air Force, since he was losing three divisions at once, in order to enable him to carry out that part of his directive contained in paragraph 7 c., which instructed him to be prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces. He might also require it to maintain the security of his front, though it might well be possible to release it after the Germans had withdrawn to the Adige. A further point was that since it was proposed to move the first three divisions quickly, it might not be possible to transfer air forces at the same time.

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2 C. C. S. 184th Meeting.
3 Ante, pp. 485-490.
4* Not printed.
In reply to a question, Sir Charles Portal confirmed that it was his view that the Twelfth Air Force should remain in the Mediterranean in the event that the German forces did not retire.

General Marshall said that in his view it was important to transfer such air forces as was possible to the decisive theater.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that the remainder of the directive should be approved and, in lieu of paragraph 5, the Supreme Commander should be informed that the question of the transference of parts of the Twelfth Air Force was still under consideration.

General Marshall said he was not in favor of this proposal.

General Kuter suggested that General Eisenhower might require parts of the Twelfth Air Force before the ground troops which were being transferred to him.

General Smith said that General Eisenhower's first requirement, before any of the land forces, was for two groups of fighter-bombers. These were urgently required in view of the lack of such types on the southern part of the front. The move of these two groups could, he believed, be very quickly accomplished.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Deferred action on this subject until their next meeting.

3. Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces
(C. C. S. 768/1)  
Deferred action on this subject until their next meeting.

4. a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command
(C. C. S. 452/35, C. C. S. 452/36)  
Deferred action on C. C. S. 768/1 until their next meeting.

b. Allocation of Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters
(C. C. S. 747/7 (Argonaut)  
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 452/36.

General Marshall said that he understood that the British Chiefs of Staff wished to delete the words "British forces engaged in." This he felt fundamentally altered the sense of the sentence. It implied that operations rather than forces should not be placed in jeopardy. It might result in lengthy discussions each time the question of the possibility of moving forces to China arose.

Post, pp. 522-524.
*Not printed.
Post, pp. 524-525.
Sir Charles Portal explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were asking only that discussion should take place before such a move was ordered. He felt that the crowning success of an approved operation might well be jeopardized by the withdrawal of United States forces without the British Chiefs of Staff or the Supreme Commander having an opportunity of laying before the Combined Chiefs of Staff the full consequences of such a withdrawal.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed on the following wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 452/36:

"Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would jeopardize those operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

Sir Alan Brooke said that in the light of this redrafting, the British Chiefs of Staff would withdraw C. C. S. 747/7 (Argonaut).

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted the draft directive put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 452/35, subject to the communication to the Supreme Commander of the policy recorded in C. C. S. 452/36 and amended in the course of discussion.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Approved the policy set out in the first and second paragraphs of C. C. S. 452/36, subject to the amendment of the last sentence of the second paragraph as agreed above. (The policy, as amended and approved, subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 452/37.)

b. Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia contained in C. C. S. 452/35, subject to the addition of a paragraph drawing his attention to the policy set out in C. C. S. 452/37.

c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff withdraw C. C. S. 747/7 (Argonaut).

5. Pacific Operations
(C. C. S. 417/11) 8

At the request of Sir Alan Brooke, General Marshall and Admiral King explained the future course of operations in the Pacific and various plans and projects which were under examination by the United States Chiefs of Staff. Plans had been prepared aiming at an attack on Kyushu in September of 1945 and the invasion of the

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7 Not printed. The text of this paper was incorporated in the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta, post, p. 830.

8 Ante, pp. 395–396.
Tokyo Plain in December of 1945. However, these operations involved the use of forces which would have to be redeployed from Europe after the defeat of Germany. The actual dates of these operations were therefore dependent on the date of the defeat of Germany. The length of time required for redeployment varied between four and six months, depending on whether the troops involved had actually been committed in Europe. At the present time all ground forces allocated to the Pacific were already in that theater and there would be no additional formations which could be moved there until the end of the German war. It was important, however, that during the necessary interval before the attack on the Empire itself could be carried out that the Japanese should be given no respite. It was intended to use this interval to obtain positions designed to assist in the final defeat of Japan. There were various possible courses of action after the capture of the Ryukyus and Bonins to achieve this object. The possible operations now under consideration were:

(1) An attack on the Island of Hainan. This had the advantage not only of securing an air base to assist in cutting Japanese sea and land communications but also afforded a new airway into the heart of China, thereby assisting the Chinese to take a more active part in operations.

(2) An attack on North Borneo. The advantages of such an operation were that it secured to the United Nations the valuable oil supplies in that area. In this connection it was interesting to note that certain of these oil wells afforded fuel which required but little refinement before it was ready for use.

(3) An operation against the Chusan-Ningpo area. This operation was extremely valuable in broadening the base for air attack against the Island Empire. In addition, it had the great merit of throttling Japanese communications up the Yangtze River. The area concerned contained a series of islands and a peninsula and was therefore one in which operations against the Japanese could be undertaken without permitting the enemy to deploy large land forces against us.

When Okinawa had been seized a decision could be taken as to which of the courses of action outlined above was likely to afford the most valuable results. At the same time it might be found desirable to capture additional islands in the Ryukyus either to the north or south of Okinawa.

In general, future operations in the Pacific were designed to avoid full-scale land battles against Japanese forces, involving heavy casualties and slowing up the conduct of the campaign.

With regard to operations in the Philippines it was not visualized that major United States forces would be used in mopping-up operations nor that the island of Mindanao and others to the south would be assaulted by United States forces. Rather, it was hoped that
with U. S. troops holding certain key positions, the rearmed Philippine Army and guerillas would be able to carry out the necessary mopping-up operations.

In view of the above considerations it was hoped to avoid an assault on Formosa and to isolate and bomb Japanese forces in the island from positions in the Ryukyus and Luzon.

The dates on which any of the possible alternative operations could be undertaken and the choice of such operations was dependent on the results of present operations in Luzon and on the date of the termination of the war in Europe. It was unlikely that both Hainan and North Borneo could be undertaken.

The importance of adequate bases and staging points was stressed. A fleet base was being developed on the southeast tip of Samar and it was estimated that three months' work could be achieved on this base before any work could be done to render Manila available to the fleet. It might, in fact, be decided not to recondition the Manila base at all. A base had also been developed in Ulithi 9 which was some 1100 miles to the westward of Eniwetok 10 which had previously been used as a base and staging point.

The difficulties of developing the northern sea route to Russia were emphasized. The two divisions which had been earmarked for an assault on the Kuriles had now been diverted to Europe and it was unlikely that further forces would be available for this operation. Further, the sea lane to Russian ports was rendered difficult and in certain instances impossible during the winter months due to ice conditions.

The Russians had asked for some 85 additional ships to enable them to stock up their eastern armies. The provision of such ships would of course affect the course of operations elsewhere. In order to make a sea route safe and effective it would be necessary to seize an island in the Kuriles from which air cover could provide safe passage either to the north or south of it. Unless such an operational base was seized by the first of July its value would be lost due to ice conditions preventing the passage of ships. At present ships flying the Russian flag were conveying "civilian-type" supplies to the Maritime Provinces.

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9 Ulithi or Mackenzie Islands, in approximately 10°6' north latitude and 139°50' east longitude, a large coral atoll with a cluster of low, sandy islands surrounding a central lagoon, toward the western extremity of the Caroline Islands in the western Pacific Ocean. Occupied by United States forces on September 20-21, 1944, Ulithi was subsequently developed into a base for the United States fleet operating against Japan.

10 A large, nearly circular, coral atoll consisting of about thirty islets of varying size surrounding a lagoon, at the northwest end of the Marshall Islands, in approximately 11°21' north latitude and 162°20' east longitude. Seized by United States forces in February 1944 and converted into an air and naval base, Eniwetok has been used by the United States since 1948 as a testing ground for atomic experiments.
To sum up, it was unlikely that the operation against Kyushu could be undertaken until four months after the defeat of Germany. In the period intervening before such an operation could be undertaken, further operations would be carried out with the forces available. These operations would be designed to secure positions best calculated to assist the final attack on the Empire.

In further discussion the shortage of service troops was stressed. These forces would be the first to be redeployed from Europe. They were in short supply throughout the world and additional commitments were caused by the inability of the French to provide service forces to maintain their own troops.

With regard to the employment of Australian troops, it was explained that these forces were relieving United States divisions wherever possible. They were carrying out mopping-up operations in New Guinea and were garrisoning such points as Bougainville and the Admiralty Islands. Two Australian divisions had also been included in a plan to assault Mindanao, which might not now be used.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Took note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 417/11.

6. a. U-Boat Threat
   (C. C. S. 774/1 and 774/2)¹¹

6. b. Bombing of Assembly Yards and Operating Bases
   (C. C. S. 774)¹¹

General Marshall said the United States Chiefs of Staff suggested that C. C. S. 774/1 should be noted and the situation with regard to estimated shipping losses should be reviewed on the first of April.

Sir Andrew Cunningham agreed with General Marshall.

Sir Charles Portal, referring to C. C. S. 774, said that he felt the proposals contained in the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not be implemented by the suggested directive to the air forces. He felt that if persistent bombing of U-boat assembly yards was now undertaken the effect of this action on the attacks on the vital oil targets would be unacceptable. Both the oil targets and the submarine targets necessitated visual bombing and there were very few days in the month available for such operations in Northwest Europe at the present time of year. His proposal was that the "marginal effort" should be used against submarine targets and explained that such a decision would mean that, when an attack against an oil target had been ordered and it was found that the weather over the oil target prevented visual bombing, the aircraft concerned would

¹¹ These three papers are not printed herein, but see coverage of these subjects in the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta, post, p. 828.
divert their efforts to a submarine target if one existed with clear weather over it.

He felt it right to point out that the issuance of the draft directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not materially increase the weight of bombs dropped on submarine targets.

**General Kuter** said that some directive on the subject of the submarine menace would be valuable in focusing attention upon it.

**Admiral King** said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should record their views with regard to the submarine menace and issue a directive on the action to be taken to counter it.

**Sir Andrew Cunningham** said that the Naval Staff would have liked to see some additional emphasis being placed on the bombing of submarine targets. He had, however, been convinced that the attacks on oil targets would in fact pay a more valuable dividend.

**The Combined Chiefs of Staff** then considered the summary of countermeasures set out in C. C. S. 774 and 774/2. It was agreed that the action proposed in paragraph 10 of this paper should be communicated to the appropriate authorities in the form of a directive.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Took note of C. C. S. 774/1 and agreed to review this paper on 1 April 1945.

b. Directed the Secretaries to draft and circulate for approval a directive based on C. C. S. 774 and C. C. S. 774/2.

7. **Strategy in Northwest Europe**
   (C. C. S. 761/5 and 761/6)

In closed session,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Took note of SCAF 180, as amended by SCAF 194 of 31 January, and as amplified by Message No. S–77211 of 31 January to General Smith.\(^{12}\)

\(^{12}\) See ante, p. 464, footnote 8.

J. C. S. Files

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Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

**TOP SECRET**

[MALTA,] 1 February 1945.

C. C. S. 768/1 (ARGONAUT)

**Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces**

1. In the 183d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 31 January 1945 the British Chiefs of Staff indicated the urgency for implementing action during the current conference covering the
forming of a Greek Army to take over responsibility for internal security within Greece as set forth in NAG 341, 25 January 1945.¹

2. It is noted that no difficulty is anticipated in meeting the phased requirements for the bulk of the items from British resources in or "due in" the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, but that all issues made for this purpose will require replacement.

3. The categories of supply required for either initial issue or replacement purposes involve many classes of equipment presently in or approaching a short supply position in the United States.

4. The Combined Administrative Committee is presently studying the problem of equipping Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe. This program involves the provision of necessary matériel for:—

a. The French Metropolitan Rearmament Program of eight divisions and supporting troops.

b. The Polish 2d Division.

c. Six Belgium infantry brigades.

d. Internal security, mobile military labor, and miscellaneous units (Liberated Manpower Program) aggregating 460,000 troops.

5. The United States have assumed responsibility for supplying those requirements requested from United States resources for the French Metropolitan Rearmament Program, and initial shipments thereon are now in progress. It has been tentatively agreed that the British will accept responsibility for supplying the 2d Polish Division and the six Belgium brigades. It has been proposed on the United States side that necessary equipment for liberated manpower program be also a British responsibility with the understanding that special equipment required for labor units to perform designated projects will be provided by the United Kingdom or the United States for those projects in the sphere of their respective armies. No finalized action on this latter program has been possible on the subcommittee level because of the inability of the British members to secure advice from London.

6. Until the program covering equipment for Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe is resolved, it is impracticable to make a determination of availability of United States equipment to meet any commitments necessary to implement the Greek Army proposal.

7. The subject of providing equipment for additional liberated manpower has been under study since early November. In view of the desirability of making maximum use of liberated manpower in northwestern Europe at the earliest practicable date, as emphasized

¹ Not printed.
by General Eisenhower in SCAF 193, dated 30 January 1945,\(^2\) the United States Chiefs of Staff request that the British Chiefs of Staff take such action as is necessary to insure an early solution to this problem.

8. Pending a satisfactory resolution of the program covering the equipping of Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff can make no commitments of United States resources towards implementing the proposed Greek Army. They have no objection, however, to the implementation of this program provided that the British Chiefs of Staff can give assurances that such implementation will not interfere with the provision already approved in principle of equipment for Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe and without subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.

9. Upon resolution of the problem of equipment for Allied and liberated forces of northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff will be glad to review NAF 841 again.

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\(^2\) Not printed.

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**Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff**

**TOP SECRET**

[MALTA,] 31 January 1945.

C. C. S. 747/7 (ARGONAUT)

**Allocation of Resources Between India-Burma and China Theaters**

1. The British Chiefs of Staff fully recognise the importance and magnitude of the United States commitments to China, both political and military.

2. They trust that the United States Chiefs of Staff will also recognise the political and military importance of the British stake in operations in Burma.

3. The circumstances in which the British Chiefs of Staff accepted without discussion in conference the United States reservation stated in C. C. S. 308\(^1\) no longer apply. A year ago, British land forces were not committed to operations in which their security was dependent to the same extent upon air transportation as it is now. Moreover, the situation in China was not such as to demand such urgent increase of the Fourteenth Air Force as to preclude prior discussion. It was more a question of taking advantage of opportunities in China rather than of warding off dangers.

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\(^1\) Not printed.
4. In present circumstances, the British Chiefs of Staff feel bound to reopen the question and to ask that no transfer of forces to the China Theatre from the India-Burma Theatre which is not acceptable to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command should be made without the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The British Chiefs of Staff are very ready to discuss means of reducing to an absolute minimum the time occupied in discussion of projected moves.

STETTINIUS-CHURCHILL-EDEN DINNER MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 1945, EVENING, ON BOARD H. M. S. "ORION" IN GRAND HARBOR

Present

United States
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Hopkins

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan

Editorial Note

The only record of the substance of this meeting that has been found is in Stettinius, pp. 67–68. The meeting lasted until "almost midnight". The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from Stettinius, p. 67.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1945

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 2, 1945, 10 A. M., MONTGOMERY HOUSE

Present

General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Duncan
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Bull
Major General Anderson
Major General Hull

Major General Wood
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Cabell
Brigadier General Lindsay
Captain Stroop
Captain McDill
Colonel Peck
Colonel Dean
Colonel Lincoln
Colonel Cary

Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves
Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. a. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF THE J. C. S. 185TH MEETING

General Kuter stated that his remarks on British participation in the VLR bombing of Japan had been omitted from the minutes of the preceding Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting. Since then he had received a letter on this subject from Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the British Air Staff, which he had forwarded to General Arnold with certain comments of his own. He requested for the purpose of record, that his message to General Arnold (CRICKET 55, dated 1 February 1945), less the last sentence, be attached as an annex to the minutes of the J. C. S. 185th Meeting.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the minutes of the J. C. S. 185th Meeting, subject to the attachment requested by General Kuter.

b. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF THE C. C. S. 184TH MEETING

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the conclusions of the C. C. S. 184th Meeting and approve the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

2. STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
(C. C. S. 773/1 and 773/2)

General Marshall said that the principal issue in this item was the transfer of the Twelfth Air Force. Air Marshal Portal had stated that he was opposed to leaving the adjustments to the theater commanders. General Marshall felt that it was undesirable to allow this matter to lapse and thus delay action on the transfer of ground forces. He proposed the substitution for paragraph 5, page 3 of C. C. S. 773/1 of the following:

"5. Two fighter groups of Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to the accomplishment of your mission. Your recommendations are desired at once."

General Marshall said that he felt the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide the overall strength that should be withdrawn from the Twelfth Air Force for use in France and that the details of the withdrawal should be left to negotiations between SCAEF and

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1 J. C. S. 186th Meeting.
2 Ante, pp. 492-496.
3 Ante, pp. 496-497.
4 Ante, pp. 516-522.
5 Not printed.
SACMED. He felt that it might be necessary to debate the necessity for a larger part of the air force remaining in an inactive theater.

Admiral King felt that the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean was considering the use of air in as great strength as possible in the event of a German withdrawal.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to recommend the substitution in the directive to SACMED of the new paragraph 5 proposed by General Marshall.

3. Provision of LVT’s for Mediterranean

4. Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces

(C. C. S. 768/1)

General Marshall said that this subject had been discussed in the preceding J. C. S. meeting (185th Meeting, 1 February 1945). General Smith had exhibited charts which showed that very little progress had been made in the provision of equipment for the approved figure of 460,000 liberated manpower. He recalled that a possible reduction in this figure had been mentioned and invited any further remarks on the subject.

General Somervell said that General Smith had informed General Riddell-Webster that a figure of 400,000 liberated manpower instead of 460,000 would be acceptable. The British had found that certain items of equipment, particularly shoes, were in short supply. They would, however, be able to provide for the lower figure. The overall problem of supply was extremely difficult. The figure of 172,000 liberated manpower agreed at Octagon had gradually increased to an overall of 1,000,000. The British had increased their commitments which included the equipment of Yugoslavs, Greeks, and some of the liberated manpower. The supply can be accomplished but not in a reasonable length of time.

General Bull felt that the only satisfactory solution to the problem was to reduce the requirements to fit the supplies available. This was especially desirable in order to avoid the bad feeling which would result from the arousing of false hopes.

General Somervell added that it might be possible to meet the requirements in phases starting with the figure of 300,000 and completing the remainder subject to the availability of equipment.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Took note of the foregoing statements.

5. U-Boat Threat

General Marshall said that the directive before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on countermeasures to the U-boat threat had been

* Ante, pp. 522-524.
prepared by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in accordance with Item 6, C. C. S. 184th Meeting.⁷

**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:**

Agreed to recommend approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the directive drafted by the Secretaries.

6. **REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING**
(C. C. S. 746/7, ⁸ 746/8, ⁹ 746/9, and 746/10 ¹⁰)

**GENERAL MARSHALL** said that the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board ¹¹ had on their own initiative submitted in C. C. S. 746/10 a supplementary report to C. C. S. 746/6. He recommended approval subject to the deletion of the word “other” in the fourth line of paragraph 5 b.

**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:**

Agreed to recommend approval of C. C. S. 746/10 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff subject to the amendment proposed by General Marshall.

7. **LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN U. K. AND NORTHWESTERN EUROPE**

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8. **BASIC UNDERTAKINGS**
(C. C. S. 775)¹²

**GENERAL MARSHALL** said that in C. C. S. 775 the British Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic undertakings agreed upon at Octagon and set out in C. C. S. 680/2 ¹³ be reaffirmed subject to the amendment of paragraph h as indicated in this paper.

**ADMIRAL DUNCAN** said that the Joint Staff Planners recommended the amendment of the first and last sentences of the paragraph in order to prevent the supply of liberated areas from being placed in the same category as the supply of allies such as France, Russia or China.

**GENERAL SOMERVELL** explained that unless the last sentence of the proposed new paragraph is altered or deleted altogether, it will if

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⁸ Post, pp. 536–537.
⁹ Not printed as such. For the Hopkins-Law “Memorandum of Agreement” of January 14, 1945, and the supplementary letter of Law to Hopkins of the same date, copies of which were enclosures to C. C. S. 746/8, see *ante*, pp. 420–422. See also the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, January 30, 1945, *post*, pp. 534–538.
¹⁰ Not printed.
¹¹ In January 1942 the United States and the United Kingdom formed the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board for the purpose of utilizing as effectively as possible the vessels under the control of the Allied nations. The Board consisted of two panels, one in Washington, with officials of the War Shipping Administration, under Admiral Land, primarily responsible for vessels operating in the American pool, and the other in London, with the British Ministry of War Transport, under Lord Leathers, responsible for the British pool of vessels.
¹² *Post*, p. 539.
¹³ See *post*, p. 539, footnote 1.
accepted have the effect of giving first priority to shipping requirements for liberated areas. This would place shipments of civilian requirements ahead of British and American military requirements which, of course, could not be accepted. He recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept the substitute paragraph subject to deletion of the last sentence. If the British would not accept deletion of the last sentence, the amendments proposed by Admiral Duncan might then be put forward as a compromise.

General Marshall suggested that the first line of the last sentence be deleted and that the phrase “without prejudice to the fulfillment of other basic undertakings” precede the words “to provide” in the remainder of the sentence.

After further discussion,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Agreed to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that paragraph k be modified to read:

“Provide assistance to each of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other belligerents to the extent they are able to apply this assistance against the enemy powers in the present war. Without prejudice to the fulfillment of the other basic undertakings to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity against Germany and Japan.”

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 2, 1945, NOON, MONTGOMERY HOUSE

**Present**

**United States**

General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Lieutenant General Smith  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Major General Bull  
Major General Anderson  
Major General Hull  
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser  
Brigadier General Cabell

**United Kingdom**

Field Marshal Brooke  
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal  
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham  
Field Marshal Wilson  
Field Marshal Alexander  
General Ismay  
Admiral Somerville  
General Riddell-Webster  
Air Marshal Robb  
Major General Laycock

**Secretariat**

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves

1 Present for items 1–5 only.

2 Present for items 1–4 only.
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF C. C. S. 184TH MEETING

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 184th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

2. EQUIPMENT FOR ALLIED AND LIBERATED FORCES
(C. C. S. 768/1)

Sir Alan Brooke said that he understood that the question of equipment for Allied and liberated forces had been under discussion by General Somervell and General Riddell-Webster. It was understood that the requirement for internal security for mobile military labor and miscellaneous units could be cut from a total commitment of 460,000 to 400,000 and equipped on the scale of British forces rather than a United States scale—a commitment which he believed that the British could undertake. It would however be necessary to confirm this with the War Office, which would be done as quickly as possible.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Took note that SCAEF’s requirements in liberated manpower could be reduced from 460,000 to 400,000.

b. Agreed to the implementation of the proposals in NAF 841 upon assurance by the British Chiefs of Staff that, subject to confirmation from London, this implementation would not:

1. Interfere with the provision already affirmed in principle of equipment, on the scale for British forces, for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe, nor

2. Result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against U. S. resources.

3. REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING
(C. C. S. 746/8 and C. C. S. 746/10)

Sir Alan Brooke suggested the substitution of the word “some” for the word “present” in the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the enclosure to C. C. S. 746/10. With regard to paragraph 6 d., he felt that it should be made clear that the shipping and resources annex to the final report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Argonaut should

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1. C. C. S. 185th Meeting.
5. See ante p 528, footnote 9.
be completed before the conference ended. To enable this to be achieved it would be necessary for the shipping team to go to MAGNETO unless it could be definitely decided that the conference would be continued at CRICKET after the MAGNETO discussions had been concluded. It was generally agreed that the shipping staffs should remain at CRICKET.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested the deletion of the word “other” before the word “programs” in paragraph 5 b.

Turning to C. C. S. 746/8, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff, provided that a sentence could be added to paragraph 4 to make it clear that coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved C. C. S. 746/10 subject to the substitution of “some” for “present” in the first line of paragraph 4 and the deletion of “other” in the fourth line of paragraph 5 b.

b. Approved the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 of C. C. S. 746/8 subject to the addition to that paragraph of the following:

“Coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.”

c. Agreed that during the absence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in ARGONAUT, the shipping staffs would continue their studies at CRICKET with a view to the submission of a report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to the conclusion of ARGONAUT.

4. LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN U. K. AND NORTHWEST EUROPE

5. TRANSFER OF TACTICAL AIR FORCES FROM SACMED TO SCAEF (C. C. S. 773/1 and 773/2)

GENERAL MARSHALL said that as he saw it the British proposal left the matter of the transfer of aircraft open for consideration later. He felt that the two commanders concerned should be allowed to negotiate direct. He considered that the Twelfth Air Force should

8 Admiral Land and Lord Leathers were both present at the Malta Conference, where they discussed problems of shipping. Although no minutes or other first-hand record of their discussions has been found, Prime Minister Churchill referred to the importance and the difficulties of their negotiations in an address to the House of Commons on February 27, 1945 (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 408, cols. 1268–1269). The final decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on shipping were set forth in the report at Yalta to the President and the Prime Minister, post, p. 831.

9 Not printed.
move to Northwest Europe, which was the decisive theater in which additional air power would produce the most valuable results. A move of the tactical air force to the southern part of the line in France was complementary to the British Chiefs of Staff’s desire to strengthen the northern thrust.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that the offensive on the Western Front would be assisted by action on the Italian Front.

General Marshall pointed out that there was considerable air strength in Italy. He agreed that the final decision on moves should be taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff but felt that the commanders should consult and put up agreed proposals.

Sir Charles Portal said that he felt a valuable opportunity might be afforded us in Italy if the enemy started to withdraw. In such an event the United States’ P-47’s would be of the utmost help in cutting communications beyond the limits of the shorter ranged British fighters. He pointed out that the tactical air forces comprised 4,300 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 1,950 in the Mediterranean; including strategic air forces there were 9,000 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 3,580 in the Mediterranean.

There was another point involved: the move of the tactical air force to France might interfere with the agreed troop movement. The commander concerned must of course say which he required first, but there were also political factors involved. The public were more impressed with the number of divisions taking part in a battle than with the number of aircraft. It seemed to him that to withhold a movement of the tactical air force for the present fitted in well with this political consideration since the divisions could move to France first, thus leaving the tactical air force in Italy to exploit any opportunity which arose. However, to meet the views put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff he was prepared to accept a liberal interpretation of the words “substantial reduction” in paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 773/2. This he felt should not be allowed to rule out the immediate move of the two fighter-bomber groups particularly required by General Eisenhower. He understood that such a move was agreeable to Field Marshal Alexander and would leave three fighter-bomber groups in Italy. He understood, however, that it was important that the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force should remain in Italy since they administered and controlled the medium bombers and troop carriers of the Twelfth Air Force.

General Marshall said he understood that the 6th Army Group was inadequately supplied with air staffs and that the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force was important to them.

General Kuter said that he personally felt that the whole of the Twelfth Air Force should be transferred to France to assist in the
main effort. All this force should be made available to General Eisenhower to move when he required it.

General Marshall said that the French forces in the South were inadequately provided with air support and the air forces in question were urgently required for the reduction of the Colmar pocket.

Sir Alan Brooke felt that when this pocket had been eliminated the Allied line in this sector would be very strong.

Field Marshal Alexander said he was anxious to retain the Twelfth Air Force headquarters but he had many able officers in the theater from among whom he would be glad to provide General Eisenhower a new air headquarters in southern France.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in C. C. S. 773/1 subject to the substitution of the following for the existing paragraph 5:

“5. Two fighter groups of the Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. The Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.”

6. Provision of LVT’s for the Mediterranean

7. U-Boat Threat

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft directive prepared by the Secretariat in accordance with Conclusion 6 b. of the C. C. S. 184th Meeting.10

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the draft directive submitted by the Secretaries and invited the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to dispatch it to all appropriate commanders. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 774/3.11)

8. Basic Undertakings

(C. C. S. 775)12

In reply to a question from Sir Alan Brooke, General Marshall outlined the strategic reasons which rendered the maintenance of Russian goodwill of such vital importance. He appreciated, however, the importance of insuring also that a state of affairs did not arise in France which would hinder our operations based on that country.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the effect of various proposals to amend the basic undertakings contained in paragraph

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11 Not printed.
12 Post, p. 539.
6 h. of the interim report to the President and Prime Minister (C. C. S. 776 13).

General Marshall explained that the British proposal would introduce a new category of basic undertakings which would affect the availability of shipping for military operations. He recalled the difficult decision which had been necessitated when, in considering the timing of operations against the Bonins and Ryukyus, a deficiency of some forty sailings had arisen. Simultaneously, a demand for an additional forty ships to increase the bread ration in Italy had been put forward.

General Somervell pointed out that requirements to prevent disease and unrest and requirements to implement the U. S. military manufacturing programs in liberated areas were already included under the military shipping requirements.

After further discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Deferred action on this subject.

9. INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER (C. C. S. 776)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that paragraph 6 h. of C. C. S. 776 should be left blank with a notation to the effect that it was still under discussion.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the paragraph dealing with cargo shipping could not yet be inserted since British acceptance of C. C. S. 746/10 14 was conditional upon the rewording of paragraph 6 h. of the interim report along the lines indicated in C. C. S. 775.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the draft interim report as amended during the discussion.

13 Not printed as such. For the text as it appeared in the final report, see post, p. 828.

14 Not printed.

Roosevelt Papers

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

TOP SECRET

Nr: No #. MALTA, 30 January 1945.

Top Secret memorandum for the President.

Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Law in their memorandum of agreement concerning shipping for liberated areas 1 made the recommendation that the military and civilian authorities of the respective govern-

1 ante, pp. 420-422.
ments be ready to make recommendations to their heads of govern-
ment at the coming conference concerning the allocation of shipping. The British Chiefs of Staff have twice been asked to reaffirm the overall objective of bringing about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan and the overall strategic concept of beating Germany first while simultaneously extending unremitting pressure against Japan, followed by concent-
ration of full U. S.-U. K. resources on Japan. Twice the British Chiefs of Staff have conditioned their continued acceptance of these basic agreements with the statement that this acceptance is subject to any decisions concerning shipping at the coming conference.

The United States Chiefs of Staff are seriously concerned over the present determined effort to divert shipping to non-military uses, with the resulting effect on our military operations, and over the implied willingness of the British to consider qualifying our objective of ending the war at the earliest possible date. Extensive technical shipping studies show a considerable deficit in cargo shipping during the next 6 months. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that even the present estimated deficits are optimistic. Stated require-
mements of the United States Theater Commanders have been carefully reviewed in Washington and it is felt they have been cut to the bone; perhaps cut further than will prove, in fact, acceptable if we are to stick to the principle of finishing the war as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the availability of shipping has been computed on a loss rate which did not allow for the Germans attaining any degree of success in the campaign they may launch with their new fast submarines.

The Chiefs of Staff consider that the issue is now clear. The deci-
sion lies between continuing unqualified priority to beating Germany and Japan or compromising this policy by diverting to non-military programs shipping essential to military operations. Any compro-
mise almost certainly means prolongation of the war. Any unneces-
sary prolongation means ever-increasing pressure and demands for more diversions to non-military purposes. The overriding objection from the military standpoint to these proposals which amount to slowing down our military effort is that the price is paid directly in the unnecessary loss of the lives of many American fighting men and also in expenditure of American resources. The Chiefs of Staff know of no reason sufficiently pressing to justify the acceptance of such an extra and, what appears to them, unnecessary cost.

The military necessity for essential Civil Affairs supplies has always been recognized and these are included under the theater commander's military priorities. There is no doubt that more shipping and sup-
plies are desirable for rehabilitation to help out the liberated peoples.
At best this could be only a trickle. The sound and quickest step toward giving the aid wanted is to end the war quickly. The Chiefs of Staff recognize that considerations other than military may dictate some small allocations of shipping to non-military purposes in a priority above everything but urgent military necessity.

Before working out the details of shipping allocations it is essential to have certain basic principles agreed. The United States Chiefs of Staff have in the attached memorandum presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff proposed recommendations to the heads of State as to what these principles should be. It is considered that material change in the spirit of these principles may well result in prolonging the war with all the costs consequent thereto.

Attachment

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

C. C. S. 746/7

[MALTA.] 30 January 1945.

After considering C. C. S. 746/6 the United States Chiefs of Staff agree that additional relief supplies and home rehabilitation for liberated areas are most desirable. They consider, however, the basic truth is that the best help we can possibly give the populations of liberated territories in Europe or elsewhere is to win the war as quickly as possible following out the over-all objective which has been agreed up to this time. The principles for allocation of shipping proposed by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board Representatives in C. C. S. 746/6 can gravely lower our military effectiveness and may jeopardize complete victory. The vital military point involved to the United States Chiefs of Staff is the cost in American lives which would almost certainly result from placing non-military requirements in a priority where they could compete with military needs essential to ending the global war successfully at the earliest date.

A definite but secondary consideration is the cost in money and resources to the United States resulting from any prolongation of the war. The effect of any let-up in our maximum military pressure or any delay in operations is much more than the actual number of days' delay to a particular operation which would result from acceding to a demand for resources to rehabilitate liberated areas. It means we lose our momentum and give the enemy time to recoup his losses and build up his resistance with consequent unnecessary cost in American blood and resources. As to the Thesis of the British representatives of the combined military transportation committee that cuts in esti-

2 Not printed.
mates for operations can be made without adverse effects on those operations, the U.S. has already reviewed its military requirements and made a major cut below the theater commander's minimum estimates. If anything the minimum U.S. military requirements may prove to be higher than contained in the study to date.

The United States Chiefs of Staff recognize the military necessity for preventing disease and unrest among the liberated areas and continue to subscribe to a policy under which the theater commander includes essential civil affairs supplies in his military priorities.

They recognize that there may be consideration other than military so over-riding as to justify at times some small allocation of shipping for rehabilitation of liberated areas, regardless of routine military requirements, but however subject always to cancellation due to urgent military necessity.

Before the Combined Military Transportation Committee in collaboration with the Combined Shipping authorities can proceed with the allocation of shipping, made particularly difficult by the present apparent large deficit, it is essential for them to have basic principles agreed for their guidance. It is recommended that insofar as liberated areas are concerned the following principle be recommended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the heads of government:

Provision of resources for liberated areas will not be at the expense of current and projected operations to press the war to its earliest successful conclusion.

It is further recommended that the following be presented to the heads of government as guiding principles in working out the details of shipping allocation:

A. First priority to

(1) Military requirements (including civil relief) vital to the successful conduct of current and projected operations in accordance with agreed strategic concepts. This may include military lend-lease for existing forces engaged in operations.

(2) Increasing the fighting forces of the United Nations in order to apply greater pressure against the Axis powers.

(3) Civilian requirements that are vital to the maintenance of the war making capacity of the United Nations.

B. Second priority to civilian programs desirable but not essential to the war making capacity of the United Nations. This includes rehabilitation of liberated areas beyond that envisaged in civil relief under A above of direct value to the war making capacity of the United Nations.

C. Third priority to military requirements necessary for stockpiling not directly contributory to any approved or projected operation under the agreed strategic concepts.
D. Last priority to civil economy requirements which only indirectly affect the war effort.

3 [E]. Requirements in higher priorities will, in general, be filled before any in lower priorities.

F. So long as military requirements are not met in full shipping for civilian programs will not be allocated without prior consultation with the Chiefs of Staff.

G. Deficits will be absorbed on as broad a base as practicable within the above guidance in order that the incidence of limited shipping availability on programs essential to the military effort may be minimized.

H. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will decide priority classification of military requirements. Appropriate civilian agencies will decide the priority classification of civilian requirements.

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, February 1, 1945.]

U.S. URGENT

To the Secretary of State from Clayton.¹

Reference Russian attitude towards Agreement on shipping control. On August 5, 1944 Belgium, Canada, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, United Kindom and the United States of America signed an Agreement on Principles looking towards continued control of all merchant shipping until after the war with Japan.²

Because of its position as a maritime nation, special consideration was given to the accession of Sweden to this Agreement. In the negotiations with respect to Swedish accession, it has become apparent that Russia has intimated to Sweden that it would prefer Sweden not to adhere to the Agreement. This will probably not deter Sweden from signing, but Sweden is concerned about Russian attitude in light of general relations with the Soviet Union.

The Norwegian Government-in-Exile, a member of the shipping control, is worried also about the unfavorable Russian attitude towards the Shipping Agreement. Trygve Lie, Foreign Minister of Norway, has been to Stockholm to discuss the matter with Mr. Gunther,

¹ In the text of this message in the Defense Files, the words “from Grew” follow at this point, the words “This is Message 8” are at the end of the first paragraph, and the words “(ALLSTATE-HORSESHOE)” are at the end of the third paragraph.

² For the text of this agreement, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1722, or 61 Stat. (4) 3784.
Swedish Foreign Minister, and subsequent thereto went to Moscow to discuss the matter.

Those of our people who have been working on the Agreement tell us that Lord Leathers, head of Ministry of War Transport at London, has made several attempts to explain the Shipping Agreement to Russian officials in London. He believes that the full information has not been forwarded to Moscow. Ambassador Winant is reported also inclined to this view. The consensus is that the Russians are suspicious of any arrangements which look like a combine of other powers with post-war implications, and are uncertain of their ability to maintain position in negotiations relating to problems with which they have had relatively little experience. Another factor which may affect the Soviet attitude is the participation of the Polish Government-in-Exile in the Shipping Agreement.

It is believed that a joint approach by the United States and Great Britain should be made directly to Stalin to fully explain the Agreement, its intents and purposes, to clear up any misunderstandings. Through Mr. Harriman, Russia was kept informed of the preliminary negotiations and of the Agreement reached.

Admiral Land is familiar with this matter.

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J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

C. C. S. 775

MALTA, 1 February 1945.

BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic undertakings agreed upon at OCTAGON and set out in C. C. S. 680/2,1 paragraph 6, be reaffirmed, subject to the following amendment.

For existing h. substitute the following:

"h. Continue assistance to the forces of the liberated areas in Europe to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Within the limits of our available resources to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations.""}

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1 This paper came from the Quebec Conference of 1944. The text as amended and reaffirmed appears in the report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta, post, p. 828.
II. THE MALTA CONFERENCE

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, FEBRUARY 2, 1945, 1 P. M., ON BOARD THE U. S. S. "QUINCY" IN GRAND HARBOR

Present

United States

President Roosevelt
Mrs. Boettiger
Secretary Stettinius
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Byrnes

United Kingdom

Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Oliver
Foreign Secretary Eden

Editorial Note

The only record of the substance of this meeting that has been found is in Stettinius, pp. 70–72, plus a few words in Byrnes, p. 22, and in Leahy, p. 294. The information given here as to the time of the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, ante, p. 461, supplemented by Stettinius, p. 70. According to Byrnes, p. 22, there were "ten of us" at this luncheon; but Leahy, p. 294, and Stettinius, p. 70, both name only eight.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, FEBRUARY 2, 1945, 6 P. M., ON BOARD THE U. S. S. "QUINCY" IN GRAND HARBOR

Present

United States

President Roosevelt
Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter

United Kingdom

Prime Minister Churchill
Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Wilson
General Ismay

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland

Major General Jacob

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

The Meeting had under consideration an interim report to the President and the Prime Minister by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 776/1).¹

¹ According to King, p. 586, the meeting began at 5 p. m., and according to Leahy, p. 295, it began at 5:30 p. m.; but the C. C. S. minutes indicate that it began at 6 p. m., and the Log, ante, p. 462, states that it began at 6 p. m. and adjourned at 6:30 p. m.

² Not printed as such; but see the final report, C. C. S. 776/3, dated February 9, 1945, post, pp. 827–833.
THE PRESIDENT expressed his appreciation of the amount of progress which had been made in so short a time in the military discussions.

The report was then considered paragraph by paragraph.

a. Paragraph 6 h.

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER were informed that discussion was proceeding upon the wording of the basic undertaking to be included in this paragraph.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the wording proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff raised a new question which involved placing supplies for liberated areas, over and above those required for the prevention of disease and unrest, in the same category as operational requirements. This would entail a change in the general priority at the expense of essential military requirements, which the United States Chiefs of Staff were disinclined to accept.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether the British import program would be affected. He pointed out that Great Britain had less than half her pre-war imports for over five years, and he was afraid lest the requirements of liberated areas, and even certain of the military requirements, would necessitate a reduction in the tonnage which it was hoped to import into Great Britain in 1945.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the wording of the proposed basic undertaking was still under discussion, and the matter was not submitted for consideration at the present meeting.

THE PRIME MINISTER, referring to paragraph 6 f., thought that great efforts should now be made to pass supplies to Russia via the Dardanelles.

ADmiral King said that this was all in hand and the first convoy was expected to go through on 15 February. The delay had been caused by the fact that the port of Odessa had not previously been ready to receive the supplies.

b. The U-Boat War (paragraphs 7 and 8)

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his agreement with this paragraph. He thought the time had not yet come to take drastic measures at the expense of other operations, though it might be necessary to do so if the U-boat campaign developed in the way expected.

c. Operations in Northwest Europe (paragraphs 9 and 10)

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER were informed that complete agreement had been reached on this question.

THE PRIME MINISTER referred to the importance of having plenty of divisions available for the support of the main operation in the North, so that tired divisions could be replaced.

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8 C. C. S. 775, ante, p. 539.
SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this had been allowed for. Ten divisions would be in reserve and available to replace tired divisions in the battle. Other divisions could also be taken from the less active parts of the front.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired what action had been taken on SCAF 180.4

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had taken note of this telegram. General Bedell Smith had given further explanations of General Eisenhower’s proposed operations,5 and two further telegrams had been received from the latter.6 SCAF 180 should be read in the light of these additional explanations and telegrams.

THE PRIME MINISTER questioned the meaning of the words “to close the Rhine” which occurred in paragraph 10 of the report.

It was explained that these words were a quotation from General Eisenhower’s signal, and were understood to mean making contact with, or closing up to, the Rhine.

d. Strategy in the Mediterranean (paragraphs 11, 12, and 13)

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the Combined Chiefs of Staff were satisfied that if the forces proposed were withdrawn from the Italian Front, enough troops would be left behind for the task in hand.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that Field Marshal Alexander had been consulted and had agreed to the withdrawal of three divisions forthwith, and two further divisions as soon as they could be released from Greece.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there should be no obligation to take forces away from Greece until the situation there admitted of their withdrawal. It was necessary to build up a Greek National Army under a broad-based government.

SIR ALAN BROOKE drew attention to paragraph 4 of the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (Appendix “A”7 to the report), in which it was stated that further complete formations after the first three divisions would be sent as they could be released from Greece.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he expected that by the time the first three divisions had moved it would be possible to start withdrawing troops from Greece. He was in full agreement with the course proposed, and was particularly glad that General Marshall had taken the view that Canadian and British troops should be withdrawn.

4 See ante, p. 464, footnote 8.
5 Ante, pp. 471–474.
6 Not printed. One of these “two further telegrams” agreed to Smith’s rewording of Eisenhower’s plan of operations (see ante, p. 464, footnote 8); the other telegram has not been identified.
7 See appendix A to the final report, post, pp. 832–833.
There were special reasons for desiring the transfer to France of the Canadian Corps. He was also anxious that the British contribution to the heavy fighting which would be taking place in Northwest Europe should be as great as possible.

In reply to an inquiry by the President, Sir Henry Maitland Wilson said that he was in complete agreement with the course proposed.

With regard to the proposed withdrawal of air forces, Sir Charles Portal explained, in reply to an inquiry by the President, that the move of five groups was in question. Two were to go now, and proposals for further moves were to be made by the Supreme Commanders in consultation.

The Prime Minister agreed that it would be unwise to make any significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces from Italy, as to do so would be to relieve the Germans of an ever-present anxiety.

Referring to paragraph 7 of the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, the Prime Minister said that he attached great importance to a rapid follow-up of any withdrawal or of any surrender of the German forces in Italy. He felt it was essential that we should occupy as much of Austria as possible as it was undesirable that more of Western Europe than necessary should be occupied by the Russians.

Referring to paragraph 8 of the proposed directive, dealing with support to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, the Prime Minister said that he presumed that the phrase “the territory of Yugoslavia” should be interpreted to mean the existing or lawful territory of Yugoslavia. There were certain territories which were claimed by both Yugoslavia and Italy and he was unwilling to give any suggestion of support to the claims of either side. For example, Trieste ought to be a valuable outlet to Southern Europe and the question of sovereignty in that area should be entirely reserved.

The President agreed and said that he was unwilling to see either the Yugoslavs or the Italians in complete control.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the phrase as used in the report applied to the present territory of Yugoslavia.

The War Against Japan

e. Operations in Southeast Asia Command (paragraphs 18 and 19)

The Prime Minister said that the main object of the operations to clear the enemy from Burma was to liberate the important army engaged there for further operations against Japan. He inquired whether the Staffs had come to any conclusion on what these further operations should be.
Sir Alan Brooke referred to Appendix "C" of the report, which contained the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command. The directive gave as the next task the liberation of Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca.

The Prime Minister hoped there would be time to review this matter in accordance with developments. For example, if the Japanese forces in Java or Sumatra were greatly weakened, small detachments might be able to go in and liberate these countries. His object, however, was to go where a good opportunity would be presented of heavy fighting with the Japanese, particularly in the air, as this was the only way which the British had been able to discover of helping the main American operations in the Pacific.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the Supreme Allied Commander was directed to submit his plans, and it would then be possible to review the matter.

The Prime Minister inquired whether paragraph 13 meant that there would be no help from United States air forces in operations in the Kra Peninsula, Malaya, et cetera.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that any such help would be the subject of a separate agreement when the plan had been received.

The Prime Minister inquired whether the President had not been somewhat disappointed at the results achieved by the Chinese, having regard to the tremendous American efforts which had been made to give them support.

The President said that three generations of education and training would be required before China could become a serious factor.

General Marshall pointed out that the picture in China was now considerably changed. In the first place certain well-trained Chinese troops were now in China, having been transferred there from Burma. Secondly, the opening of the Burma Road had meant that the first artillery for the Chinese Army had been able to go through. Thirdly, if operations in Burma continued to go well, additional trained Chinese troops could move back to China, and it was hoped that an effective reinforced Chinese corps would soon be in existence.

The Prime Minister said that it now appeared that the American and British operations in this part of the world were diverging. The American effort was going on into China and the British effort was turning to the south. He inquired whether any consideration had been given to the move of British or Indian divisions from Burma into China to take part in the operations there.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the facilities for sending equipment and supplies into China allowed of the support of Chinese forces, who

See appendix C to the final report, post, p. 833.
required a considerably lower scale than British troops. These facilities certainly could not support British troops as well.

General Marshall agreed that the maintenance of British forces in China was not a practical proposition. There was only one reinforced United States brigade in China, which would act as a spearhead for critical operations. There was the reinforced Chinese corps, which had a stiffening of United States personnel in their tanks, armored cars, tank destroyers, et cetera, and there was an effective air force. These forces should now be able to insure that the Japanese could no longer go wherever they pleased in China. The aid which could be given by these forces to the American arrival on the Chinese Pacific Coast would be important. A pincer movement against the Japanese could in this way be initiated—one arm of the pincer being represented by the forces assaulting the selected spot on the Chinese Pacific Coast. This arm would be strong. The other arm of the pincer would be the Chinese and American forces in China. This arm would be weak, but nevertheless of value. The progress of the American main operations in the Pacific and the campaign in the Philippines had changed the picture in Southeast Asia, and would make further operations by Admiral Mountbatten’s forces much easier. He felt that it was important that Admiral Mountbatten should know what forces would be available to him in these operations, and that he should not plan on a false assumption. The American military authorities in Southeast Asia would know what United States forces could at any time not be supported logistically in China. These could be made available to Admiral Mountbatten in Burma. It might even be possible to bring air forces back from China for specific operations. Admiral Mountbatten should, however, be under no illusion as to what forces he could count on for his operations.

The Prime Minister repeated that if the Americans made any request for British troops to go into China he would certainly be prepared to consider it.

Admiral Leahy said that all the transportation available was fully required for the forces now in China, or earmarked for China.

General Marshall agreed, and said that he did not think it would be practicable to increase the forces in China until a port had been secured. Up to the present it had been possible to do only a very little in the way of equipping the Chinese ground army. Nearly all the transportation had had to be used for the needs of the American air forces. It would now be possible to handle the requirements of the Chinese ground forces.

Referring to paragraph 17, and Appendix “B,” which contained an outline of the plans and operations proposed by the United States

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*Appendix B is C. C. S. 417/11, printed ante, pp. 395–396.*
Chiefs of Staff for the Pacific, The Prime Minister inquired whether it had been decided to delay the assault on Japan until after the close of the German war.

General Marshall said that this delay had been necessitated by the fact that until the German war ended, shipping, air forces, and service troops, could not be made available in sufficient quantities to enable the main operations against Japan to be carried out. If the German war had ended in December of 1944, it would have been possible to operate against Kyushu in the autumn of 1945. There were also certain seasonal limitations on operations in this area.

Summing up, The Prime Minister said that he was glad to see that such a great measure of agreement had been reached. He understood that the present report was merely designed to keep the President and himself abreast of the progress of the discussions, and that a final report would be rendered later.

The President agreed, and again expressed his appreciation of the work which had been accomplished.

Discussion then turned upon the conduct of future discussions, and Sir Alan Brooke explained that arrangements were being made to keep all the accommodations available at Malta so that the conference could be resumed there if necessary after the discussions with the Russians.

The President and The Prime Minister expressed their agreement with this action, and said that although final plans need not be made until later, it appeared highly probable that a short meeting at Malta on the return journey would be desirable.

The Meeting then adjourned.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, FEBRUARY 2, 1945, 8 P. M., ON BOARD THE U. S. S. "QUINCY" IN GRAND HARBOR

Present

United States
President Roosevelt
Mrs. Boettiger
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Byrnes
Fleet Admiral Leahy

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Oliver
Foreign Secretary Eden

Editorial Note

The only record of the substance of this meeting that has been found is in Stettinius, pp. 74–75, plus a few words in Churchill, p. 344, and in Leahy, p. 295. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, ante, p. 462.

PLATE 1
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill aboard the U. S. S. *Quincy* at Malta, February 2, 1945.
President Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in conference aboard the U. S. S. Quincy at Malta, February 2, 1945. Left to right: Fleet Admiral King, Fleet Admiral Leahy, President Roosevelt, General of the Army Marshall, Major General Kuter.

Plate 3
Meeting of President Roosevelt with his advisers in Livadia Palace, Yalta, February 4, 1945. Left to right: Secretary Stettinius, Major General Kuter, Fleet Admiral King, General of the Army Marshall, Ambassador Harriman, Fleet Admiral Leahy, President Roosevelt.

Plate 4
Plenary Meeting in Livadia Palace, Yalta, February 1945. Left to right: Sir Edward Bridges, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, vacant space (Mr. Gusev), Mr. Vyshinsky, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Pavlov (behind), Mr. Maisky, Mr. Gromyko, Fleet Admiral Leahy, Mr. Matthews (behind), Secretary Stettinius, Mr. Hiss (behind), President Roosevelt, Mr. Hopkins (behind), Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Harriman (behind), Sir Alexander Cadogan, Foreign Secretary Eden, Foreign Commissar Molotov, Major Birse, Prime Minister Churchill.

Plate 5
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Yusupov Palace, Korcea, February 7, 1945. Left to right: Mr. Maisky, Mr. Golunsky, Mr. Gusev (behind), Foreign Commissar Molotov, Mr. Vyshinsky, Mr. Novikov, Mr. Jebb, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Mr. Dixon, Foreign Secretary Eden, Mr. Harrison, Major Theakstone, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, unidentified, Mr. Harriman, Secretary Stettinius, Mr. Hiss (behind), Mr. Page, Mr. Matthews.

Plate 6
Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin in the patio of Livadia Palace, Yalta, February 10, 1945.

Plate 7
Left to right: Secretary Stettinius, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Fleet Admiral Leahy, Mr. Bohlen, vacant space (Mr. Harriman), Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Mr. Hopkins, Foreign Secretary Eden, Mr. Pavlov, Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, Foreign Commissar Molotov, Major Birse.

Plate 8