EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND CHINA REGARDING THE ADMINISTRATION OF
LIBERATED AREAS

800.0146/7-2544: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

CHONGKING, July 25, 1944—3 p.m.
[Received July 25—12:18 p.m.]

1989. Foreign Minister² told me last evening that as Chinese advance in Burma, the British have sought to send in British officials; that British requests have so far been met as a matter of course; but that British have now asked for a general agreement on the subject; and President Chiang³ in considering this request and with background of the Cairo Conference⁴ has instructed Foreign Minister to suggest to American and British Governments a three-power conference to settle question of administration to follow military liberation in following categories which will arise in Pacific areas:

1. Former territories such as Manchuria, Formosa and Pescadores for China, Burma and Malaya for Britain, and Philippines for U.S.A.
2. Colonies or possessions of other powers such as French Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies. Three-power conference might need to expand to four-power conference with particular reference for instance to Netherlands East Indies.
3. Thailand.
4. Territories heretofore under Jap mandates.
5. Japan proper.

In general discussion Soong intimated China will expect to send Chinese officials into Manchuria and Formosa, for example (he repeatedly referred to Manchuria), while we would send Americans into Philippines and British would re-enter Burma and Malaya whatever the nationality of the liberating forces. As to Japan proper, he remarked that China would want to be represented in any administrative authority whatever the nationality of the occupation forces and no matter whether Chinese were part of such forces.

¹Continued from Foreign Relations, 1943, China, pp. 836-840.
²T. V. Soong.
³Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.
⁴For documentation on the Cairo Conference, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.
Soong said China would expect to “follow the President” in attitudes on subject. He indicated some exposition would be needed of our attitude on French Indo-China, Netherlands Indies and Thailand. Soong said that before proceeding formally to make the proposal to Washington and London as directed by President Chiang, he wished first to submit the matter informally through me to American Government alone to ascertain our views on proposal, which views he will await before making any approach to the British.

He gave it as his personal opinion that Washington might be desirable as venue for proposed conference.

Refer to our despatch 1588, September 17, 1943 on administration of liberated areas.

GAUSS

800.0146/7–2544 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1944—8 p.m.

1036. 1. With reference to Chinese desire that a three-power conference be convened to settle question of military government in territories recaptured from the Japanese, these problems are being given careful study and consideration. (ReEmbs 1289, July 25, 3 p.m.)

2. Department hopes to be able to clear at an early date with the highest officers of the Government the conclusions we have reached and will then communicate with you further.

3. In your discretion you may inform Dr. Soong of the foregoing.

STETTINIUS

800.0146/8–2844 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, August 28, 1944—2 p.m.
[Received August 28—2 p.m.]

1464. Soong asked me on August 24 for information as to progress in regard to suggested three-power conference on the question of administration of liberated areas in Far East (ReEmbs 1289, July 25 and ReDepts 1036, August 3).

Soong asked me to inquire on progress and said he attached importance to early development of this matter. It is probable that Generalissimo is pressing [pressing] him in regard to it.

GAUSS

*Not printed, but see telegram No. 1819, September 28, 1943, noon, from the Ambassador in China, Foreign Relations, 1943, China, p. 839.
WASHINGTON, September 2, 1944—5 p. m.

1166. The Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have given careful consideration to the matter forming the subject of your 1464, August 26 [28], 2 p. m., and previous telegrams.

1. It is our opinion that a three-power conference on the question of administration of liberated areas in the Far East would not be practicable at this time. You may so inform President Chiang Kai-shek, and explain that, while we fully sympathize with his objective in suggesting a conference, there are considerations of a military character, including the all-important consideration of military security, which render it inadvisable to hold a three-power conference on the subject.

2. There follow certain statements of broad over-all policy for civil affairs administration which should be communicated orally and in confidence to Chiang: Our planning for civil affairs is based solely on military considerations. The military administration of civil affairs in any area recovered from the Japanese is temporary and entirely without prejudice to the future status of the area. Because of the necessity of fitting military administration with the local military situation in any area, the scope and structure of military administration is to be left largely to the discretion of the commanding officer in the area. The personnel of military administration will depend primarily upon the composition of the armed forces actually engaged in conducting the military operations. In the event strategic developments result in the recovery by U. S. armed forces of Chinese territory occupied by the Japanese, the occupying U. S. forces expect to turn the administration of civil affairs over to Chinese Government authority as soon as the military situation permits. If it is found necessary to carry out a long-term military administration in Japan, it is hoped that participation in such administration will include personnel of powers which have actively engaged in war against Japan, including China of course, and that the administration will be on a broad, practical basis.

3. The following is for your personal and strictly confidential information: The foregoing paragraph represents the ideas of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which expressed the opinion that if for political reasons the Department feels that it is necessary to communicate with the Chinese Government regarding military administration of civil affairs, it is essential that only broad over-all policy be mentioned without reference to specific areas. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further expressed the opinion that, in as much as military administration of civil affairs is based solely upon military considerations,
commitments for civil affairs during military occupation of any area should be handled on a military level.

4. The Department feels that it would be preferable that General Stilwell,6 or his Chief of Staff in Chungking,7 accompany you and communicate to Chiang the general statement contained in paragraph 2. It is requested therefore that you invite General Stilwell to accompany you to call on Chiang. After you have spoken to Chiang in accordance with paragraph 1 above, it is suggested that you inform Chiang that, in as much as the planning for military administration of civil affairs is based solely upon military considerations and commitments therefor are handled on a military level, General Stilwell (or the general officer who accompanies you) will communicate to him certain statements of broad over-all policy for civil administration. If General Stilwell should decide not to accompany you or to designate a general officer to do so, the contents of paragraph 2 should be communicated to Chiang by you.

5. In as much as the original approach to you in this matter was made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs you will of course confer with him prior and in regard to your call on Chiang.

Hull.

800.0146/9-1644: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1944—9 p. m.

1219. On the subject of civil affairs administration in areas recovered by the military (telegram 1166, September 2, 5:00 p. m.) Joint Chiefs of Staff have informed the Department that it has authorized General Stilwell or his Chief of Staff, in company with you, to call on Chiang Kai-shek and inform him of our broad over-all policy for civil affairs administration along the lines communicated to you in paragraph 2 of the Department’s reference telegram.

In response to a request from the Department for a statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s attitude, should the Chinese Government request a civil affairs agreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed the following opinion: If for political reasons the Department of State deems it expedient to do so, we perceive no military objection to entering into a civil affairs agreement with the Chinese, should they express a desire for such an agreement, provided the agreement is limited to broad policies. It is our opinion that the agreement should make no reference to specific areas; should be limited strictly to military pur-

poses during the period of military occupation; and should be consummated on a military level. All similar agreements by the United States with occupied countries of Europe have been negotiated and consummated on a military level.

It is not contemplated or desired, of course, that you initiate or encourage discussion of a civil affairs agreement with the Chinese but the Department will appreciate being informed promptly and fully with regard to your call on Chiang and with regard to any developments therefrom.

HULL

800.0146/9-1944: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, September 19, 1944—1 p. m.
[Received September 19—11 a. m.]

1581. I showed General Stilwell your 1166, September 2, 5 p. m. and induced him to accompany or send general officer with me to see Chiang. Stilwell was of opinion this was unnecessary and suggested I handle matter alone with Chiang. I informed Foreign Minister of import of your message. He made no comment beyond saying he could not understand our reason for unwillingness to support proposal for three power conference. He arranged appointment for me to see Chiang on 14th. Atcheson 8 accompanied me. When I had informed Chiang of your message and statement of policy of Chief of Staff, Chiang commented that he had not instructed Foreign Minister to ask for three power conference but had told him to seek written understanding with United States as well as British on civil administration of liberated areas. Political Vice Minister [for] Foreign Affairs, 9 who was interpreting, states Foreign Office has a draft of proposed written understanding and suggested to Chiang that after consulting Foreign Minister this draft might be communicated to United States. Matter was left in that state. Atcheson and I are of opinion that Chiang's object in seeking written understanding may be to provide that when civil administration of liberated areas is turned over to civil authorities the Chinese likely wish to stipulate that it shall be handed over to nation's authorities and not to local authorities. Foreign Minister in acting on Chiang's instructions probably saw an opportunity to ask for three-power conference on wide scope and possibly a conference abroad to which he might go to attend. I shall do nothing further in matter unless approached by Foreign Office.

GAUSS

8George Atcheson, Jr., Counselor of Embassy.
9K. C. Wu.
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, September 20, 1944—2 a. m.
[Received 10:15 a. m.]

1587. Civil administration of liberated areas. Department's 1219, September 16 crossed our 1581, September 19. As indicated in latter, Embassy proposes to let matter rest until it receives further anticipated approach by Foreign Office.

GAUSS