

## PHILIPPINES

### CONSIDERATION OF PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES<sup>1</sup>

811B.01/641

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Lockhart)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1944.

Mr. Hall<sup>2</sup> and Col. Boekel<sup>3</sup> came to see me today for the purpose of making inquiry regarding possible plans which the Department may have evolved, or which may have been evolved elsewhere, looking to the establishment of a civil government in the Philippines following the reoccupation of the Islands by American military forces.

I told Col. Boekel that so far as my knowledge goes the Department of State does not have in mind, at least at the present time, any plans for the establishment of a civil government or temporary civil administration in the Philippines when our forces return there; that in my judgment there already existed a government—that government being the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines—which could function, and would be expected to do so, as the civil administration in the Philippines as soon as the Japanese are driven from the Islands and the military authorities had given their consent for such an administration to function; that the Commonwealth Government is still recognized as the government of the Philippine Islands and that it is a government which was created as the result of legislative action on the part of the Congress of the United States<sup>4</sup> and as a result of the choice of the people of the Philippine Islands; that it is a constitutional government in every respect, well organized and functioning, and that I felt sure no one in the Department would be disposed to set aside this legal government for some newly-created civil administration which might be proposed on the reoccupation of the Islands; that in my judgment the Commonwealth Government now

<sup>1</sup> Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 1097-1117.

<sup>2</sup> Monroe B. Hall, Secretary of Commission at New Delhi, on consultation in the Department.

<sup>3</sup> Lt. Col. W. A. Boekel, Civil Affairs Officer attached to Headquarters of Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces in China, Burma and India.

<sup>4</sup> The Tydings-McDuffie Act, approved March 24, 1934; 48 Stat. 456.

in exile in Washington, with Mr. Quezon as president, would return to the Islands almost as soon as the reoccupation occurred and that it would be ready to resume its functions as the regularly constituted government of the Philippine Islands. I said that the officials are experienced in Philippine affairs and that they were selected by popular vote of the Filipino people and that they had a burning desire to return to their duties in the Philippines as quickly as possible and that legislation had recently been enacted<sup>5</sup> providing for the succession to the Presidency as soon as the Commonwealth Government returns to the Philippines.

It was pointed out that there is a strong personal and official relationship between the President of the Commonwealth Government, Mr. Quezon, and General MacArthur<sup>6</sup> and that the latter had repeatedly announced his determination to return to the Philippines with his troops and that my own personal view was that he would see that Mr. Quezon and the Commonwealth Government would return almost simultaneously with him. The actual time of renewing Government functions in the Philippines would in my judgment have to be determined by agreement between General MacArthur and President Quezon, with perhaps the sanction of the President and the Secretary of War; that the question of when and how the Commonwealth Government would enter the scene seemed to be one to be determined largely on the basis of military exigencies then existing.

I discouraged any idea on the part of Col. Boekel that General Stilwell's command should make any definite plans for setting up a special new civil government in the Philippines following reoccupation of the Islands, the reasons being substantially those set forth above. I said that the situation in the Philippines, on this point, was distinctly different from areas which our forces have occupied in Northern Africa, Sicily and Italy in that an adequate and legally constituted government of our own creation is already in existence and that it would be a mistake to repudiate it and set up, or attempt to set up, a new administration. While Col. Boekel did not so declare himself, I received the impression at the close of the interview that he was satisfied with the situation as unfolded to him and that he would do nothing to disturb the present arrangement which apparently could take over civil functions in the Philippines at the proper time and administer them in an entirely satisfactory manner.

FRANK P. LOCKHART

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<sup>5</sup> Public Law 186, approved November 12, 1943; 57 Stat. 590.

<sup>6</sup> Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Commander of United States Army Forces in the Far East.

811B.01/640

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson)*

WASHINGTON, February 28, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The receipt is acknowledged of your Department's letter of February 20, 1944,<sup>7</sup> in which you state that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, have designated the War Department as the agency to plan for the administration of civil affairs in the Philippines during the initial military period, and that it is desirable to coordinate the activities of civilian agencies engaged in planning and making preparation for the return of United States forces to the Philippines with the plans to that end of the military authorities. You propose that an *ad hoc* committee be formed composed of representatives of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy and Interior, respectively, and of the Foreign Economic Administration and you request, if the Department of State approves of the proposal, that a representative thereof be appointed.

I approve of the formation of an *ad hoc* committee as above outlined and have appointed as this Department's representative Mr. James C. Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs, with Mr. Frank P. Lockhart, Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs, as alternate.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

811B.01/642

*Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State*<sup>8</sup>

President Quezon's letter<sup>9</sup> under reference proposes an amendment to S. J. Resolution 93, now pending in the House of Representatives, which would add an additional section expressly stating that nothing in the joint resolution should be construed to authorize the postponement of Philippine independence beyond July 4, 1946.

There would appear to be some question whether the joint resolution which was approved by the President on November 12, 1943 [Public Law 186, 78th Congress]<sup>10</sup> has any effect upon those provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act of March 24, 1934, as amended, which provide for the granting of independence to the Philippines on July 4, 1946.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.<sup>8</sup> Sent on March 9, 1944, to Chairman C. Jasper Bell of the House Committee on Insular Affairs.<sup>9</sup> Dated January 12 to Congressman Bell, not printed; copy sent to the Secretary of State by Mr. Bell with his letter of March 1 (not printed).<sup>10</sup> Brackets appear in the original.

If the Act of November 12, 1943 does not affect the independence provisions of the Act of March 24, 1934, it would seem that a somewhat embarrassing question might well arise in the event that the conditions envisaged in the Act of November 12, 1943 (which would appear clearly to include expulsion of the Japanese from the Philippine Islands) should not have developed prior to July 4, 1946. Should the Japanese still be in occupation of the Philippines at that time, it would appear that we might be faced with formal independence of the Philippines (and consequent dissolution of the Commonwealth Government) while at the same time pursuant to legislative enactment by the Government of the United States the present President and Vice President of the Commonwealth would be continued in their respective offices. If, on the other hand, it should be determined that the Act of November 12, 1943 does modify the date of independence as specified by the Act of March 24, 1934, then the proposed amendment to S. J. Resolution 93 might not accomplish its purpose unless it specifically reaffirmed the date fixed in the Act of March 24, 1934 regardless of all other existing legislation.

A further question of interpretation would appear to be raised by the present form of S. J. Resolution 93. Section 1 declares it to be the policy of the Congress that the United States should establish the complete independence of the Philippines after having driven the Japanese from the Islands. Section 3, however, expressly authorized the President to advance the date of the independence in order to effectuate the policy declared in Section 1. With or without the amendment proposed in its present form by President Quezon there would seem to be serious question whether S. J. Resolution 93 would, if enacted, authorize postponement after July 4, 1946, in the event that the Islands have not been reoccupied by American forces prior to that date. If it does not, an amendment of the kind proposed by President Quezon would appear to be unnecessary, except perhaps in connection with the questions raised in the preceding paragraph.

(2) It would seem that apart from questions of interpretation referred to above there are serious questions of policy. It is not believed that American public opinion would support any policy which would place the United States Government in the position of formally granting independence to the Philippines while they remained under Japanese occupation. Such a situation would be adverse to our broad national interests in the Far East as well as in the Philippines themselves and would contribute in no way to the benefit and welfare of the Filipino people. Furthermore, our action would probably be widely interpreted as abandoning the Philippines in their hour of peril. It would, as indicated above, raise serious questions as to the legal status of any group outside the Islands which might

claim to be the lawful Government of the Philippines and it would at the same time strengthen the hold of any group of puppet officials who might, at the time independence is granted, be functioning in the Philippines under Japanese sponsorship.

(3) It is suggested that for the present it would be advisable not to complicate the Philippine question further by adopting the amendment requested by President Quezon. It is impossible at this time to predict with certainty whether or not our forces will have reoccupied the Philippines by July 4, 1946 and it seems doubtful whether public discussion at this time of that question would be in the national interests. Expressly to reaffirm the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act might, for reasons indicated above, result in unfortunate consequences to correct which would require further legislation before July 4, 1946. The possibility that such further action might have to be taken would seem to militate against the desirability of reaffirming the July 4, 1946 date at this time.<sup>11</sup>

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811B.01/643

*The Secretary of State to the Philippine Resident Commissioner to the United States (Elizalde)*

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. ELIZALDE: Reference is made to Mr. Stettinius' letter of February 29, in reply to your letter of February 24, 1944,<sup>12</sup> regarding a proposal to establish an Office of Exterior Relations and National Economy as a part of the Commonwealth Government and referring to other matters associated with that proposal.

The Department is not unmindful of the desirability of having within the Commonwealth Government a regularly organized and smoothly functioning department which would deal adequately with many of the matters to which reference is made in your letter of February 9 to President Quezon.<sup>13</sup> In that connection the Department has assumed that President Quezon would not wish, in advance of the complete independence of the Philippines as pledged in the Act of March 24, 1934, to take any step which would nullify the right of this Government, when and where the need arises, to act on behalf of the Commonwealth Government and all matters concerning its foreign relations. Reference to Section 2, paragraph 10, of the above mentioned Act will show that it was the clear intent of

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<sup>11</sup> Legislation authorizing the President of the United States to advance the date of Philippine independence was enacted as Public Law 380, approved June 29, 1944; 58 Stat. 625.

<sup>12</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>13</sup> Not printed; copy transmitted to the Department with letter of February 24.

the Congress that the foreign relations of the Commonwealth Government should be under the direct supervision and control of the Government of the United States until such time as the Philippines become free and independent. In view of this condition and notwithstanding the Philippines even now possess many of the attributes of an independent state, the Department does not feel that it would be free to acquiesce at this time in the establishment of any department, bureau or office in the Commonwealth Government possessing functions which would permit it directly to conduct relations of a diplomatic character with foreign governments in a capacity such as is customarily vested in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the understanding, therefore, that jurisdiction in such matters would remain, as at present prescribed by act of Congress, with the Government of the United States until full independence is granted to the Philippines, the Department would certainly offer no objection if President Quezon should establish a bureau or office in the Commonwealth Government designed to work specifically along the lines described in the second and third paragraphs of page three of your letter of February 9 to President Quezon, namely, to make a thorough study of trade treaties and their possibilities with respect to the Philippines, to make plans for the organization of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of a Foreign Service to function when the Philippines become independent, to effect a better liaison between the Commonwealth Government and the Department of State, to effect a method of exchanging information between the Commonwealth Government and the Department of State on Pacific affairs and on all subjects of actual or possible concern to the Philippines, and to effect coordination in all matters relating to special studies and special researches undertaken to promote the mutual interests of the two governments. I am sure that a bureau or office created to deal exclusively with such matters would be of the greatest benefit to the Commonwealth Government pending the granting of full independence.

With reference to the training of a limited number of pensionados, as mentioned in President Quezon's letter to you of February 16, 1944,<sup>14</sup> the Department is prepared to offer facilities for training in diplomatic and consular work to a few especially selected young men whom the Commonwealth Government might recommend for that purpose. It would be expected that no young man would be recommended for this training who had not, in advance of his appointment, been given a deferred status by the Selective Service System for a cause satisfactory to the Department. If the Commonwealth Government should decide to avail itself of this offer, the details of the

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<sup>14</sup> Not printed; copy transmitted to the Department with Mr. Elizalde's letter of February 24.



arrangement could be worked out at a later date between representatives of the Commonwealth Government and of the Department of State. It would scarcely be possible to afford facilities, initially, for more than ten or twelve pensionados, but it might be possible to increase this number later if so desired by the Commonwealth Government and if in practice it is found that the plan is feasible.

This letter is intended to be an acceptance in principle of the suggestion looking to the training of a limited number of pensionados in the manner described above. To the end that arrangements may be concluded with as little delay as possible the Department is prepared to designate a representative, or representatives, to confer with one or more representatives of the Commonwealth Government at such time as may be mutually agreed upon to devise a plan which will make available to the appointees a broad and useful training program. The Department stands ready to lend its fullest cooperation in this matter in every feasible way.<sup>15</sup>

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

811B.00/10-1044

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Lockhart) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Grew) and the Deputy Director of that Office (Ballantine)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1944.

The most important recent development in Philippine affairs is the departure about a week ago of President Osmeña,<sup>16</sup> accompanied by Colonel Romulo, Philippine Resident Commissioner to the United States,<sup>17</sup> and other Filipinos of cabinet rank, for the Philippines via

<sup>15</sup> On December 29, 1944, the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs sent to the Philippine Secretary of Finance at Washington (Hernandez) an "informal and unofficial" memorandum entitled "Preparations for the Handling of the Future Foreign Affairs of the Philippine Republic" (811B.021/12-2944). No copy of this memorandum has been found in Department files. The transmitting letter cited an earlier memorandum handed to President Quezon by Francis B. Sayre, United States High Commissioner to the Philippines, at an undisclosed date. This memorandum, of identical title, not printed, was prepared in the Office of Philippine Affairs on June 4, 1940, and transmitted by the Secretary of State to the High Commissioner on June 11, 1940 (811B.01/450a).

<sup>16</sup> Sergio Osmeña became President following the death of President Quezon on August 1 at Lake Saranac. In a letter to Mr. Osmeña on August 2, Acting Secretary of State Stettinius stated that officers of the Department stood ready to render him "all appropriate assistance" and gave assurances "that it is the purpose of this Government for its part to see that the happy and mutually helpful relations which have so long subsisted between the peoples of the United States and the Philippines will continue during the present period of transition and under the independent government which the Congress has authorized." (811B.001 Osmeña, Sergio/8-244) For text of the Acting Secretary's statement on the death of President Quezon, released on August 1, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 6, 1944, p. 134.

<sup>17</sup> Col. Carlos P. Romulo became Resident Commissioner on August 10.

New Guinea. It has been learned from Commonwealth authorities now in Washington that President Osmeña and his party arrived in Hollandia the day before yesterday. The Commonwealth authorities in Washington do not wish this information to be made public, in as much as it was the understanding with Mr. Osmeña that any publicity regarding his future plans or movements would be issued on his direct authority wherever he might be.

For background information it may be appropriate to recount, briefly, some of the events that led up to President Osmeña's departure. General MacArthur, some weeks ago, telegraphed directly to the then President of the Commonwealth, Mr. Manuel Quezon, and requested him to formulate and submit to General MacArthur plans for civil government and relief on the return of the Commonwealth Government to the Philippines. It was desired that these plans be correlated with military requirements. Mr. Quezon was also further requested to send a member of his cabinet to Australia at once to discuss the matter with General MacArthur. Due to President Quezon's illness, no action was taken on this message and subsequent to his death a similar telegram was sent to President Osmeña.

President Osmeña at first declined on the grounds that he was badly needed in Washington and would be more valuable here. Subsequently, General MacArthur exerted extreme pressure on President Osmeña to induce him to come to Australia immediately. General MacArthur sent a member of his staff, General Marshall,<sup>18</sup> to Washington to exert pressure to that end and also sent General Valdes<sup>19</sup> with letters from guerrilla leaders to the effect that they expected Osmeña to arrive in the Philippines with the first troops. It will be recalled that President Quezon had broadcast his intention to return to the Philippines with General MacArthur and this was used as a means of bringing pressure on President Osmeña, it being inferred that unless he returned to the Philippines with the American forces his prestige would suffer. President Osmeña entertained serious doubts concerning the propriety of his proceeding on the sole request of General MacArthur. He felt that the Commonwealth Government had been ordered to Washington by the President of the United States and that it should return only under orders from the President. He also entertained fears concerning his status if he complied with General MacArthur's request, since he felt that he might find himself under the direct control of General MacArthur without any clear understanding of his (President Osmeña's) powers and responsibilities. Accordingly, President Osmeña arranged for an interview

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<sup>18</sup> Maj. Gen. Richard J. Marshall, Deputy Chief of Staff to Gen. MacArthur.

<sup>19</sup> Maj. Gen. Basilio J. Valdes, Secretary of National Defense in President Osmeña's cabinet.



with the Secretary of the Interior,<sup>20</sup> who in turn arranged for President Osmeña and himself to call on the President. This took place at noon October 2. The result of the interview is not known but since President Osmeña left that afternoon it is presumed the President told him that he should leave at once for the Philippines.

Other activities of General MacArthur which are believed to be highly significant include (1) the insistence by General MacArthur on a civil affairs directive which would place him in supreme control and authority not only during military operations but also during the period of civilian military administration, with the right to delegate powers to the Commonwealth Government as he saw fit. (2) General MacArthur is understood to have requested the War Department to provide a total of \$75,000,000 worth of civilian relief supplies for use in the Philippines. It was stated that this enormous quantity of relief supplies would be distributed by the Army, which fact may, or may not, have political implications. It is known that the Commonwealth Government feels that it must have an important part in any and all relief plans. (3) General MacArthur has distributed by plane, submarine or other methods substantial quantities of propaganda materials consisting of matches, cigarettes, soap, et cetera, much of which bore the legend, "I will return. Douglas MacArthur". It is stated that in some cases General MacArthur's picture was also on the packages. It is understood that these packages contained no reference either to the United States or Commonwealth Governments. (4) General MacArthur maintains a staff said to number about 45 individuals engaged solely in publicity and propaganda work. This appears to be a highly effective organization, judging from the flood of publicity articles now appearing in newspapers and magazines.

From all of the foregoing it is obvious that General MacArthur wishes to have President Osmeña and responsible members of the Commonwealth Government close at hand prepared to accompany him into the Philippines when American forces are returned there. There have been indications in connection with the preparation in War Department conferences of the civil affairs directives for the use of General MacArthur in the Philippines that the General's plans contemplate making extensive use of the Commonwealth Government in the administration of Philippine affairs following the return of our troops to the Islands. Although the fact is not definitely established, there are reasons to believe that General MacArthur would prefer to have Philippine civil affairs administered without the aid and assistance of an American High Commissioner. A revised directive, however, gives General MacArthur certain discretionary powers

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<sup>20</sup> Harold L. Ickes.

in utilizing the services of officials of the United States Government in the administration of civilian affairs in the Philippines.<sup>21</sup>

Definite plans for the reopening of the American Consulate in Manila are being made by the Department and the matter has been formally brought to the attention of the Secretary of War<sup>22</sup> with a view to obtaining his cooperation and the cooperation of General MacArthur in completing the arrangements for the reopening.

In the course of the last few weeks information from a reliable source indicated that General MacArthur wished to employ at least two divisions of Australian troops in the Philippine operations. Later information indicates that this proposal has been abandoned.

The above plans indicate that the recovery of the Philippine Islands is closer at hand than we had hoped some months ago would be the case. The activities of the puppet government authorities in the Philippines, as broadcast by the Japanese radio, leave a distinct impression that the Japanese and their puppets are now convinced that the attack may come soon. Among such signs is the fact that "President" Laurel of the puppet government, following the first bombing attack on the Philippines, issued a proclamation declaring war on the United States and Great Britain.<sup>23</sup> This declaration of war was not submitted to the Philippine Assembly before the proclamation was issued, but it is now claimed that it later received the sanction of the Assembly. The puppet government is taking strenuous measures to persuade the people of Manila to go to the interior to avoid bombings and other direct consequences of war. It may be significant that Laurel has announced that there will be no conscription of a Philippine Army. Commonwealth authorities in Washington have expressed the view that this failure to form a Philippine Army was at the instance of the Japanese, who fear that such an army would turn against them when the fighting is renewed in the Islands. To support this view it is known that there are many instances in which members of the constabulary have been armed, after which they proceeded to the interior to join up with the guerrillas.

Mr. Jaime Hernandez, Secretary of Finance, has been placed in charge of Commonwealth affairs in Washington. This has been done by Executive Order No. 20-W,<sup>24</sup> signed by President Osmeña on September 27, 1944.

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<sup>21</sup> For an account of plans, during 1944, for the administration of civilian affairs in the Philippines, see M. Hamlin Cannon, *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*, in the official Army history *United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 198-200.

<sup>22</sup> Henry L. Stimson.

<sup>23</sup> The Domei News Agency reported that Laurel's declaration was made on September 23.

<sup>24</sup> *Official Gazette*, vol. 41, No. 1, p. 40.

There is a very hopeful atmosphere in Commonwealth circles in Washington.

FRANK P. LOCKHART

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130 (1940)/759

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization (Dickstein)*<sup>25</sup>

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. DICKSTEIN: The Department has been importuned at various times to support legislation to make Filipinos eligible to naturalization in the United States. While I am not unmindful of the fact that the question whether the privilege of naturalization should be extended to members of any race not now eligible to naturalization is a matter involving legislative policy, I do not consider that I would be unwarranted in pointing out that the Filipino people have long shown their attachments to the ideals and principles of the United States; that they have a long and unbroken record of loyalty to the United States; that they have valiantly resisted the invaders of the Philippines and are continuing to do so; that Filipino soldiers fought courageously against the Japanese in the Philippines, especially at Bataan; that many Filipinos are now serving in the military forces of the United States, the maritime service and the essential war industries in this country and that Filipinos in the United States have always been held in high esteem by the American people. While I could cite many reasons why Filipinos should be made eligible to naturalization, I know of no reason why they should not be.

I have ascertained that there are now pending before Congress a number of bills to authorize the naturalization of Filipinos. One such bill, H. R. 4826 which was introduced in the House of Representatives on May 18, 1944 by Representative McGehee and which was referred to your Committee, comes nearest to meeting the views of the Department. Its enactment would make Filipino persons or persons of Filipino descent eligible to naturalization in the United States. The Department believes, however, that a proviso should be added to Section 1 of the bill reading somewhat along the following lines:

“Provided that no certificate of arrival shall be required of any Filipino person or person of Filipino descent who is now a citizen of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and who entered the United States prior to May 1, 1934 and has since continuously resided in the United States.”

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<sup>25</sup> Copy sent on November 20 to Chairman Richard B. Russell of the Senate Committee on Immigration.

Prior to May 1, 1934 Filipino persons or persons of Filipino descent who owed allegiance to the United States generally were not considered aliens for immigration purposes and no record could have been made of their entry into the United States as aliens upon which a certificate of arrival could be issued. Since May 21, 1934, records have been made of the admission to the United States of all such persons as aliens. It would seem inequitable for a Filipino person or a person of Filipino descent who is now a citizen of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and who entered the United States prior to May 1, 1934 and has since continuously resided herein to be unable to become naturalized because of his inability to obtain a certificate of arrival. For this reason a proviso such as that suggested would seem desirable and just.

I should be pleased if the Congress in its wisdom should approve H.R. 4826 with the amendment above suggested or any similar bill having the same purpose.<sup>26</sup>

The Department has been informed by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the transmission of such report as the State Department may deem appropriate after considering the suggestions made by the Attorney General in his letter dated October 17, 1944, of which a copy is enclosed,<sup>27</sup> together with a copy of the letter of transmittal from the Bureau of the Budget.<sup>28</sup>

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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[Further legislation authorizing the naturalization of Filipinos was introduced into the 79th Congress as H.R. 776. In commenting on this bill in a letter of February 2, 1945, to Chairman Dickstein, Acting Secretary of State Grew stated: "I desire to say that it is the considered opinion of the Department that the privilege of naturalization should be extended to Filipino persons and persons of Filipino descent." (130 (1940)/783) The Acting Secretary of State sent a letter of similar import to Chairman Russell on May 22, 1945.

The House of Representatives and the Senate passed differing versions of H.R. 776 on April 17, 1945, and June 14, 1946 (*Congressional Record*, vol. 91, pt. 3, p. 3454 and *ibid.*, vol. 92, pt. 6, pp. 6933-6934) but the measure did not go to conference. Instead, legislation of similar purport was enacted as part of Public Law 483, approved July 2, 1946 (60 Stat. 416).]

<sup>26</sup> In Report No. 1940, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., submitted on November 27, 1944, to the Committee of the Whole House, the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization recommended passage of the bill with amendments. The measure was discussed in the House on December 4 (*Congressional Record*, vol. 90, pt. 7, p. 8765) but no action was taken.

<sup>27</sup> Letter of Attorney General Francis Biddle to Harold D. Smith, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, not printed.

<sup>28</sup> Letter of November 18 not printed.