Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1944.

Some three days after my conversation with the British Ambassador on December twenty-second, I had a further conversation with him on the telephone regarding the Jewish question. The Ambassador said that he had just heard from Mr. Eden to the effect that they were giving urgent consideration to my suggestion about the White Paper and related phases of the Jewish situation. I thanked him and said that that in itself would not be sufficient unless he contemplated a further reply which would give this Government a chance to say something publicly on the White Paper. I desired respectfully to urge that the British Government acquiesce in our saying something just as Mr. Churchill was saying something on this question to important people who are interested in it.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 28, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY:

H. RES. 418 AND 419

"Resolved, that the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be

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2 Viscount Halifax.
4 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
5 British Cmd. 6019: Palestine, Statement of Policy, May 1939. The immigration clauses of the White Paper, establishing a new policy for Jewish immigration into Palestine, provided for "... the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. ... After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it. ..." For correspondence regarding American interest in the White Paper, see Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. iv, pp. 792 ff.
6 Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.
opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."

(This is approved by both McCormack and Martin.)

Mr. Sol Bloom telephoned me today to state that the foregoing resolution had been introduced by a Republican and a Democrat, and approved by the majority and minority leaders.

Unless otherwise advised, he plans to call his Committee for Tuesday; have no hearings but merely read Prime Minister Churchill's statement objecting to the White Paper; and then report the resolution out favorably and let it go at that.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

867 N. 01/2192

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] January 28, 1944.

Sir Ronald Campbell came in to see me at my request.

Representative Sol Bloom telephoned me just prior to Sir Ronald's arrival that H. Res. 418 and 419, regarding the opening of Palestine to immigration and its constitution as a democratic Jewish commonwealth, had been introduced with both Republican and Democratic support; and that he expected to put it through his Committee. He asked that we speak to the British about it. I therefore said to Sir Ronald that this was the situation: that, in my judgment, the support of these Resolutions assured their passage; and that we thought his Government should be informed. We should be glad to have any ideas they might have. I added however that, in my judgment, there was real likelihood that the Resolutions would be passed by a large majority, if not unanimously.

A[DLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

7 John W. McCormack, Majority Leader, House of Representatives.
8 Joseph W. Martin, Jr., Minority Leader, House of Representatives.
9 Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.
10 Representatives Ranulph Compton of Connecticut and James A. Wright of Pennsylvania, respectively.
11 The New York Times had reported on January 18, 1944, that the American Jewish Committee, a non-Zionist organization but opposed to the White Paper, had submitted a memorandum to the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, calling attention to the Churchill opposition to the White Paper policy of the 1939 British Government; for Mr. Churchill's speech in opposition in the House of Commons as a private member, on May 23, 1939, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 347, cols. 2167 ff.
12 British Minister.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] January 31, 1944.

Sir Ronald Campbell came in to see me with reference to the resolutions recently proposed in the House asking that Palestine be opened to colonization and set up as a democratic Jewish commonwealth, of which I had previously informed him. He said obviously the British Government would not wish to comment on an American legislative matter; it might be pointed out that such a course involved certain obligations, including military, and that the British policy in this respect might be influenced by American willingness to join in maintaining the ensuing situation. He added that we were quite familiar with their views on the subject.

I thanked him for coming down. I told him that, as he well understood, I had brought this matter to his attention merely for information, and indeed had done so at the suggestion of Chairman Sol Bloom of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It did not follow, of course, that we would want to say anything.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 13,676 London, February 3, 1944. [Received February 22.]

SIR: In a general discussion on Palestinian affairs on January 29th, a Foreign Office official told a member of the Embassy staff that the British Government does not expect any particular trouble on March 31, 1944, the expiration date of the five-year period for the entry of 75,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine as set out in the White Paper. During this period the quota has not been filled, despite the great efforts made by the British to get prospective immigrants out of Nazi-controlled territory. At the present time there are still some 30,000 places to be filled in the immigration, and it has been agreed that these will be permitted to come in after March 31st.

The Foreign Office official said that the present Jewish agitation, which is, of course, extremely strong in the United States, has as its objective the withdrawal of the White Paper. The British Government does not intend, he continued, to give in to this campaign, as it
would raise a storm in the Arab world, and any serious trouble in
the Middle East would constitute a grave menace to the war effort.
For this reason the British believe that no solution of this vexatious
problem will be possible before the conclusion of hostilities. . . .

Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador:
W. J. GALLMAN
Counselor of Embassy

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1944.

DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: I have your letter of February 5, 1944
enclosing a copy of S. Res. 247\footnote{A measure drafted identical to the proposed House Resolution (see memo-
randum by the Assistant Secretary of State, January 28, p. 590) and placed
before the Senate on February 1, 1944, by Senators Robert F. Wagner of New
York and Robert A. Taft of Ohio.} and requesting consideration of
that resolution and a report thereon.

Because of a suggestion that the passage of such a resolution might
have an effect upon the military situation in North Africa and perhaps
other Middle Eastern territories, you inquire particularly as to such
possible repercussions.

The subject of this resolution is a matter of deep military concern
to the War Department. I feel that the passage of this resolution at
the present time, or even any public hearings thereon, would be apt
to provoke dangerous repercussions in areas where we have many
vital military interests. Any conflict between Jews and Arabs would
require the retention of troops in the affected areas and thus reduce
the total forces that could otherwise be placed in combat against
Germany. The consequent unrest in other portions of the Arab
world would keep United Nations resources away from the combat
zone. I believe therefore that our war effort would be seriously
prejudiced by such action.

Sincerely yours,
HENRY L. STIMSON

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1944.

MY DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: I wish to refer to your letter of
February 4, 1944, regarding the resolution introduced into Congress
relative to Palestine, and your letter of February 5, 1944, with which you sent me a copy of your letter to the Secretary of War on the same subject.

This Department has received a copy of the reply which the Secretary of War has addressed to you under date of February 7, 1944, expressing the view that the war effort would be seriously prejudiced by the passage of this resolution. In view of the military considerations advanced in this regard by the Secretary of War, it is believed that without reference to its merits no further action on this resolution would be advisable at this time.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

867N.01/2133

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Siettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] February 9, 1944.

The Egyptian and Iraqi Ministers called on me this afternoon at their request. The conference lasted approximately twenty-five minutes.

The Egyptian Minister opened the conversation by saying he was greatly disturbed over the Resolution that had been introduced on the Palestine question. He stated that he had had several conferences with the President during the past few months in which the President had assured him that he hoped the whole question would be postponed until after the war.

The Egyptian Minister then stated he greatly resented the attack made against his people recently by Congressman Celler of New York and asked if anything could be done. I told him that due to our democratic system of government any member of Congress could speak in any way he wished, and that it was impossible for the Executive branch of the government to exercise any restraint over members of Congress.

The Iraqi Minister then said that he also shared the same concern as the Egyptian Minister over the Palestine matter, and he was hopeful that the whole matter could be postponed. I explained to the gentlemen that Secretary Hull was keeping closely in touch with the entire matter and I told them I appreciated their having come to express their views.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

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14 Neither found in Department files.
15 supra.
16 Mahmoud Hassan and Ali Jawdat, respectively.
The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Baghdad, February 14, 1944—7 p.m.
[Received 7:23 p.m.]

31. Nuri Pasha told me yesterday he would appreciate it if I would inform my Government by telegram of the deep concern of the Iraqi Government lest the pressure which the Zionists are exerting at present on the U.S. might result in responsible American officials or candidates for high office making commitments with regard to Palestine not in conformity with the principles which in past guided American foreign policy in general and which had been incorporated in the Atlantic Charter and the declaration of the United Nations.

As an illustration of Zionist activities he referred to a resolution introduced recently by Senator Wagner in the Senate which he understood had the backing of Senators Taft and Barkley demanding that restrictions upon immigration to Palestine be lifted. He said the Arab world did not have the facilities available to the Zionists for presenting its side of the case to the American Senate, that he hoped that a resolution of the kind would not be passed since its passage would add to certain misconceptions of the Palestine problem which many people in the U.S. seem to have and would strengthen Axis propaganda in this area. He pointed out that the German radio broadcasts in the Arabic language was making wide use of this resolution in an endeavor to create a lack of confidence among the Arabs in the sincerity of purpose of the Allies and of Allied expressions of friendliness toward the Arab world; he and his colleagues sincerely hope that the Zionists will not be successful in making the future of Palestine a political issue during the coming electoral campaign. He added that it would be extremely helpful in combating Axis propaganda and in stilling certain misgivings even among those Arabs most friendly to the Allied cause if assurances could be given that the Government of the U.S. would not decide on what its attitude on Palestine is to be until spokesmen for the Arabs are given a full opportunity to make clear the issues at stake.

During conversation Nuri Pasha cited fact that it was Iraq Government's view that while papers [White Paper] would continue to govern Palestine situation until a final solution of problem could be found.

Henderson

17 Nuri as-Said, Iraqi Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Defense.
18 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367.
20 Alben W. Barkley, Senator from Kentucky.
The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) 21

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1944—6 p.m.

19. Your 31, February 14, 7 p.m. In any future conversations which you may have with Nuri relative to the resolutions introduced into each House of Congress regarding Palestine you should bear in mind that the passage of such resolutions by either or both Houses would be only an expression of the individual members of that House and would not be binding upon the executive branch or an expression of the foreign policy of the United States.

Stettinius

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, February 18, 1944—4 p.m.

[Received 7:33 p.m.]

36. My Iraqi colleague called today “to discuss as matter of courtesy” instructions received from Nuri regarding pro-Zionist resolutions referred to in your 318, February 16, 9 p.m., to Cairo. 22

He is directed to inform Lebanese and [Syrian] Governments and Parliamentary leaders of nature of resolutions (which are described as advocating recognition of Palestine as a Jewish state) and to suggest that Arab cause would be served were they to follow Iraq’s lead in telegraphing protests to American Government and Congress. He is to mention also representations made to Department by Ali Jawdat against Celler’s speech impugning trustworthiness of Arab rulers and to inform them of Under Secretary’s expression of regret and assurance to the effect that “the President’s idea is to leave settlement of the Palestine problem for after the war”. He assured me there is no intention of encouraging local Parliamentary discussion or inciting popular protest but rather that his démarché is motivated by belief that Arab-Allied relations will be troubled anew by present pro-Zionist campaign and that our, as well as Arab, interests will be best served by reaffirmation of Arab solidarity in opposition to establishment of Jewish state or to further Jewish immigration into Palestine.

No mention of resolutions has been made in local press (although Palestine Post, which has small circulation here, has referred to current hearings thereon) nor have any local leaders mentioned matter

21 Repeated to Cairo as telegram 318, February 16, 9 p.m., with the instruction that it be repeated in turn to Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda.

22 See footnote 21, above.
to me. It seems probable however that Foreign Minister 25 will do so after receiving Iraqi démarCHE. I should consequently appreciate receiving any directives (including perhaps texts of resolutions) which Department may see fit to send at this time.

Repeated to Baghdad and Jerusalem.

WADSWORTH

867N.01/2250

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] February 19, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: After Breck Long's 24 call to you on the Palestine question and the matter of making Mr. Stimson's letter public, Mr. Stimson, the President and I had a discussion, in which it was agreed that the War Department would try first to kill the resolution by executive session testimony by Army representatives. If this fails, Stimson will then give consideration to making his letter public. The strongest point in Mr. Stimson's mind was that General Marshall 25 had military considerations in mind and the effect the letter would have on the enemy.

Breck has had a very satisfactory talk with Mr. Connally and Mr. Bloom and they both feel much better about the whole situation. I believe the situation is under control. Incidentally, Connally had in a few of the outstanding leaders of Jewry for a frank discussion.

E[ward] S[ettinius]

867N.01/2282

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 26

[WASHINGTON,] February 19, 1944.

At yesterday's Cabinet meeting the Palestine resolution was thoroughly discussed. The President expressed the opinion to Secretary Stimson that it was important for his letter on the matter to be made public. 27 The Secretary replied that he first wished to try the executive session method and hoped that Mr. McCloy 28 and General Handy 29 would be able to stop the resolution in executive session. He

24 Jamil Mardam.
25 Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State.
26 Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff.
27 Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long), the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray), and the Deputy Director (Alling).
28 The letter (February 7, p. 563) was not made public.
29 John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War.
30 Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy of the War Department General Staff.
added that General Marshall was anxious that the letter not be made public but that he would review the matter with the General again. I stated that the State Department felt it was important for the letter to be made public.

E[WARD] S[TETTINIUS]

867N.01/2205: Telegram

_The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State_

Baghdad, February 23, 1944—3 p. m.
[Received 5:40 p. m.]

35. Information regarding resolutions on Palestine introduced into both houses of Congress contained in Department’s 341 to Cairo 36 relayed here is appreciated. Since Prime Minister’s talk with me described in my 31, February 14 a number of members of the Government have approached me with expressions of concern regarding Senate Resolution. The fact that a similar resolution was also introduced into the House has just become known here.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs 31 has told me that the Government is taking every possible precaution to prevent the resolution from becoming a subject of discussion in the Parliament and press. He said that the Government had been successful thus far, in spite of the efforts of the Axis radio, to limit knowledge regarding the resolution to relatively few persons in the country. If, however, the resolution should be passed he feels that the fact would eventually become known and that it would be impossible to convince the Arab world including the people of Iraq that the resolution did not reflect the views of the American people.

There is no doubt that interest in the fate of the resolution has become so intense here that for the time being it has crowded all other aspects of foreign affairs into the background and that those leaders of the Government who bear the main responsibility for having prevailed upon Iraq to adopt a pro-Allied policy and for bringing Iraq into the fold of the United Nations are deeply worried.

I have been informed that several telegrams have been sent by prominent Iraq officials to members of the Senate expressing the hope that the resolution will not be passed and that additional telegrams will probably be sent to the House now that it is realized that a similar resolution is before that body.

36 Dated February 19, 5 p. m., not printed.
31 Mahmood Subhi al-Daftarl.
In my opinion it would be impossible for the bulk of the politically conscious people of Iraq to reconcile the policies called for in the resolution with the pronouncements of the war aims of the United States and of other members of the United Nations. It is felt here that the successful carrying out of the policies advocated in the resolutions would mean the removal of the keystone of the arch of future Arab unity and an almost irreparable blow towards the eventual setting up of an Arab Commonwealth which would permit the Arab peoples to play the part in the world to which they feel their history and talents entitle them.

The news of the passage of these resolutions would come as a bitter shock even to those Arabs here who have not based their hopes for the future primarily upon an Arab union since the bulk of the population of the country have deep sympathy for their Arab kinsmen in Palestine whom they feel are being pushed about by strong nationalistic minority backed by powerful foreign interests.

Although I believe that the Iraqi Government in case the resolutions are passed would take steps to quiet demonstrations nevertheless the news of the passage would certainly give rise to intense indignation against both the Jews and the United States and possibly by demonstrations of a spontaneous character. I am convinced that the passage of the resolutions would greatly assist the efforts of the Axis to convince the Arabs of this area of the lack of sincerity and of the duplicity of the United States and would more than offset the good will which has been created for the United States in this area by various American governmental organizations during recent years.

Repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut.

HENDERSON

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] February 23, 1944.

In my talk with the President on Tuesday, I asked him if he had any instructions to leave with us on the question of the Palestine Resolution. He did not but he is hopeful that the McCloy-Handy testimony may end the matter but if not he continues to feel the Stimson letter should then be made public.

EDWARD S[ETTINIUS]

32 Regarding the attitude of the United States toward the general question of Arab union, see bracketed note, p. 660.
33 Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) and the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray).
The Chargé at Damascus (Farrell) to the Secretary of State

DAMAScus, February 24, 1944—2 p. m.
[Received 6:42 p. m.]

3. Reference Beirut No. 36, February 18, 4 p. m. Syrian Foreign Office today handed me a note dated February 23 enclosing copy of telegrams of protest despatched yesterday by Speaker Faris al-Khoury and Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee Adnan al-Attassi of Syrian Parliament to their counterparts in Congress, against resolutions demanding creation of Jewish state in Palestine, as follows:

“Motions in Congress demanding continued immigration to create Jewish state in Palestine fatally compromise Arab rights and jeopardize public peace in Arab States in the Middle East where all available resources are being put willingly at the disposal of the Allies for assuring victory. The passing of such motions shakes all confidence in international justice and those good hopes guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter. Rendering service to Jews at the expense of Arabs cannot be justified. We request that full study of the Arab rights in Palestine should be made before bringing the aforesaid motions up for debate.”

Foreign Office covering (full text by air mail) states: Syrian Government fully shares views and cannot conceal surprise that Jewish national home question should be raised without regard to deep effects on Arab opinion at a time when Arab States are giving utmost assistance to Allied cause; warns of grave repercussions if policy of resolutions is adopted and enforced; opines that while Syrian Government will never tolerate settlement of Jews in Palestine at the expense of Arabs, present is inopportune time to raise question, and expects any decision to be deferred to the end of war; concludes that foregoing is clear and frank definition of Syrian Government policy and requests reply to dissipate Arab fears.

I have orally informed Foreign Minister of substance of Department’s No. 19, February 16, 6 p. m. to Baghdad and now request guidance in formulation of expected reply to Foreign Office specifically whether any further expression can be added to that stated therein.

Urgency of matter and probable receipt of Parliamentary protests have prompted me to despatch this message direct from Damascus but further report will reflect consultation with Beirut not immediately possible in person and indiscreet by telephone.

Farrell

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Despatch 81, February 24, not printed.
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling)  

[WASHINGTON,] February 24, 1944.

The Egyptian Minister called today and handed me the attached note regarding the Palestine question. He indicated that it was along the lines of his recent conversation with the Acting Secretary and he stressed the fact that it was being submitted under instructions from his Government.

I told the Minister that I hoped that he understood that Resolutions adopted in Congress on such matters represented only the views of the legislative branch of the Government and did not necessarily reflect the views of the executive. He said that he himself was quite aware of this fact. He went on to say that nevertheless it was difficult to explain our system of government to the man in the street in Egypt and in nearby countries and when they learned from the Axis radio that some prominent Senator or Representative was advocating action in regard to Palestine, it was naturally assumed that such action represented the views of the United States Government.

The Minister said he would appreciate receiving at our early convenience a reply to the attached aide-mémoire, since his Government was anxiously awaiting our views in this important matter.

The Egyptian Legation to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

The Egyptian Government had the honor of submitting two Aide-Mémoires to the Government of the United States, the first dated January 21, 1943, and the other March 23rd, 1943, on the question of Palestine and its immigration. In them it enunciated its point of view as regards this problem, which in turn happens to coincide fully with the views of all the other Arab peoples of the Middle East.

As a result of this démarche on the part of Egypt, she was accorded some satisfaction by the assurances given by the American Govern-
ment to the Egyptian Minister at Washington in March 1943, when it was stated to him "that the Question of Palestine in general will not be considered and threshed out without the consent of all the parties interested in it." 39

But it appears that a new current of opinion is in course of taking shape in certain Congressional circles of the United States, with the final aim of declaring null and void the White Paper which, while never earning the full approval of the people of Palestine, none the less handled the matter in a way which did not bear down too heavily upon them.

Another movement also seems to be unfurling in America, which, while inciting the passions of the Jews in Palestine, at the same time tends to frustrate the Palestinians in their national sovereignty, and aspirations towards political independence; and this has been doubly intensified by the bombastic utterances and writings of certain Congressmen, whose language was aggressive, intolerant and unfair towards the Arabs; and it is feared that the demand for the abolition of the White Paper will hardly meet any opposition in Congress.

The Zionist problem which has already caused no little amount of trouble and bloodshed, tends by a recrudescence of this fresh fiery attitude, and the encouragement given it, to revive even greater troubles and difficulties, and create conflict not only amongst the Palestinian people themselves, but also amongst the Arab nations who are, at this moment, striving to combine and form a united front.

It is useful to recall, in this connection, that the question of persecuted Jews and that of the Zionist problem are not one and the same thing. While the Arab people, in common with the rest of the world, bitterly condemn the barbarous treatment to which the Jews have been subjected, nevertheless they feel that such oppression should not, under any circumstances, serve as a reason for persecuting, in turn, the people of Palestine, made up of Moslems, Christians and Jews, thus subjecting them to the tender mercies of the Zionists! For neither Palestine, nor the neighbouring Arab people, will accept such a situation with equanimity.

The Egyptian Government, which has never ceased to try to conciliate the various elements, and to bring them nearer towards a common understanding along lines acceptable to all, views with no little apprehension and concern the movement which appears to be gaining force now towards converting Palestine into a Jewish homeland.

It is well to recall that the Arabs never failed to give proof of their amity and friendship towards the United Nations; in fact they have given of their best loyalty and unstintedly, spurred on by the idea of

creating a system of universal democracy and political justice. And to this political justice the Arabs have as much a claim as other peoples. They have also found in the Atlantic Charter as much satisfaction for the present, as hope for the future. Firmly united, they find in the aggression on one of them aggression on all; and will thus not tolerate politicians and Zionists denying Palestinians the benefits of the Atlantic Charter.

The Egyptian Government would, therefore, like to emphasise once more the danger and gravity of the declarations of the Zionist leaders, who make no secret of their intention to transform Palestine into a purely Jewish State.

Their concealed activities, which find a ready response in America, has had a deplorable effect on both Arab and Moslem public opinion the world over; for this unfortunate propaganda, unhappily, tends to give the Arabs and the Mohammedans the impression that America is supporting the Jews at the expense of the Arabs.

The Egyptian Government, therefore, firmly believes that official and responsible circles in America cannot afford to overlook such a state of affairs, already most irritating in itself as it has proved. For Egypt and the other Arab Peoples are firmly resolved to develop even further the friendly ties already binding them with the United States and hope nothing can impair them.

Egypt, thus, finds it incumbent upon herself once again to recall the gravity and import of the declarations made by responsible personages, whether in the form of public utterances, or solemn pledges, in favour of the Zionists. The Egyptian Government, accordingly, trusts that the American Government will give the present Aide-Mémoire its fullest consideration and study.

Hence the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, as well as the rising tide of American interests in the Middle East, both call for a reconsideration of the Palestinian Question. In any event no settlement can be arrived at without the concurrence and approval of the party most directly interested of all, namely, the People of Palestine.

[WASHINGTON,] February 24, 1944.

867N.01/2205 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) 40

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1944—9 p.m.

23. Department's 341, February 19, 5 p.m. to Cairo 41 and your 35, February 23, 3 p.m. It now appears unlikely that the Palestine

40 Repeated, mutatis mutandis, in telegram 408, February 26, 9 p.m., to Cairo, with instructions to repeat in turn to Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda.

41 Not printed.
Resolutions will be reported out of either the Senate or the House Committee. You may make discreet use of this information in any conversations you may have on this subject. In such conversations you should stress (Department's 19, February 16, 6 p.m.) the point that even if the Resolutions had been reported out and passed, such action would merely have represented the views of the members of the two Houses and would not have been binding upon the Executive.

In this general connection the Department is under the impression that few people in your territory, even educated and intelligent leaders, fully understand the structure and method of operation of the American form of government. You should take every opportunity to explain our system, particularly with regard to such matters as the Resolutions under discussion.

STETTINIUS

867N.01/2-2644

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

[WASHINGTON,] February 26, 1944.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In accordance with our telephone conversation I am sending you herewith a memorandum which I prepared for General Marshall at his request, preparatory to his talking to several senators about the pending Palestine resolution.

I do not know what the General actually said to the Senators beyond his statement to me that he had followed the general facts and tone of this memorandum, so I assume that it can be safely treated as a basis for the remarks which he made.

Mr. Bloom, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, has asked me to advise him informally of about what I would say if I were called upon to testify before his Committee, and I propose to testify in conformity with this memorandum.

Sincerely,

JOHN J. McCLOY

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Chief of Staff (Marshall)

[WASHINGTON,] 22 February 1944.

I believe the Secretary before he went away arranged with Wadsworth that an officer to be selected by you and I should attend an Executive Meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee of the House in connection with the pending Palestine resolution. It was originally
arranged that this meeting should take place on Tuesday of this week but it has been postponed until Thursday. Mr. Wadsworth has advised me that the meeting will now take place some time Thursday morning.

In preparation for this meeting I have read the old resolution of 1922 and compared it with the pending resolution. I have also talked to some G-2 officers and gone over some reports, and I intend to testify in general along the following line:

The pending resolution deals with highly controversial issues in that it comes out for unlimited immigration into the area, a matter definitely in sharp issue, as well as for the establishment of a Jewish state as distinguished from a homeland. It also requires that the United States take “appropriate measures” to bring these things about. Our G-2 reports all indicate that there is a high degree of tension in Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews and that each side have substantial quantities of arms. Bombings have occurred in the Migration Offices maintained by the British Government in Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Any action which would tend to increase this tension or threaten an outbreak in this area would greatly compromise our military capacities. Among other considerations there are the following:

1. There are substantial Allied forces in that area which we are seeking to reduce and any outbreak at this particular time would be certain to pin down troops for garrison duty that are badly needed for replacement and other duty both in Italy and for other operations.

2. Our military forces are in contact with the Moslem world not only in Palestine but throughout the entire Mediterranean area and in many places further east. The Palestine issue is a source of more or less concern to all the Moslem population of the Near East and North Africa. The tribes in Morocco are restive and already disturbances have occurred there. These activities are mainly pointed against French dominion but it is known that German agents are active in the area and certainly will use the Arab-Jew issue to the limit in order to foment further disturbances if an opportunity presents itself.

3. We are dependent not only upon peace in the area but our lines of communication throughout Africa are to an important degree dependent upon the cooperation and goodwill of the Arab. His willingness to supply goods and services in furtherance of the Allied effort is a matter of real military importance.

4. The strategic supply routes to Russia via the Persian Gulf as well as the supply routes to the Far East run through Moslem territory and would be subject to constant threat of sabotage and disruption in the event of any disturbances or hostilities. There are Allied Moslem troops scattered throughout the area on whom we depend for active operations as well as supply. Such troops are in Italy at the present time and we intend to use them elsewhere.

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63 War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence.
5. The Near East is an important supply base for European operations. Any threat to it is a great military concern, particularly in respect of oil and aviation gasoline supply. The existing pipeline from Iraq to Palestine could be cut or damaged as it has been in the past. This naturally affects naval and military operations in the Mediterranean which depend on the Haifa refinery for their oil. The Abadan refinery at the head of the Gulf is the only Allied source of aviation gasoline outside the Western Hemisphere. The distances are great and the supply and installations in many places are highly vulnerable. It would require a substantial number of troops to protect them in the event of disorders.

I do not intend to exaggerate the consequences which would flow from the adoption of this resolution as I can not be certain that all these results will flow, but from the foregoing considerations I think it is quite apparent that from a military point of view we would much prefer to let such sleeping dogs lie.

I have debated whether to refer to the pending negotiations for the laying of an oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to the Mediterranean as there may be some controversial aspects to this question. However, Secretary Ickes indicated that the primary purpose of this new pipeline was to provide a reserve of one billion gallons of oil for the United States Army and Navy. I doubt that we could get very far with these negotiations if this issue is agitated in the United States. My rather strong inclination is not to bring this up, however.

The one thing that I imagine we will be pressed for will be to suggest a form of resolution which will not be provocative and which will not in our judgment induce the disorders that we fear. This is a matter on which I feel we should be most reluctant to express any view. What is provocative or unprovocative in the Palestine problem is a political matter on which the State Department rather than the War Department should speak. It has been pointed out to us by the State Department that this resolution does embody burning issues. What lesser position might be taken without offence is not a matter for military determination, but from a military standpoint I think we can and should say that we would be in favor of taking any steps which would postpone without prejudice to either side this issue for determination after the war when military considerations will be less acute.

The State Department has furnished us with a telegram conveying expressions from the Governor [Government] of Iraq to the effect

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44 For correspondence regarding the concern of the United States for the safeguarding and developing of petroleum resources in Saudi Arabia, see pp. 8 ff.
that German agents in the area are using as propaganda against the Allied effort the existence of this resolution.

General Bissell is prepared to go up and give in very general terms the disposition of troops in the area and generally buttress by factual data statements made along the above lines.

I am going to emphasize that I am dealing with the matter purely from the point of view of military considerations and that is the limit of my competence.

I attach hereto a copy of the resolution together with a copy of Secretary Stimson’s letter to Senator Connally.\textsuperscript{45a}

I would like to know how you make out.

\textbf{JOHN J. MCCLOY}

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867N.01/2215: Telegram

\textit{The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State}

JIDDA, February 27, 1944—11 a.m.
[Received February 28—4:35 a.m.]

57. Finance Minister\textsuperscript{46} called yesterday and read me telegram he had just received from King Ibn Saud about Palestine resolution mentioned Department’s 341, February 19, 5 p.m., to Cairo.\textsuperscript{47} After citing news items published in London, King’s message continued in translation as follows:

“Meet American Minister in Jidda; notify him of this news; advise him that the news has disturbed us; that it will have an ill-effect in Arab circles; that we think discussion of the subject of Palestine at this moment premature; that it will stir up emotions and produce uncertainty; that we ask him to refer the matter to his Government in view of the friendship and attachment between us because we know of its good aims toward the Arabs and of the good will and assistance which the friendly American Government and its ally the British have shown and of which the recent incident in the Lebanon\textsuperscript{48} is the greatest proof.”

In reply I explained to Finance Minister sense of Department’s 19 to Baghdad, February 16, 6 p.m.

Sent Department, repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Beirut; Beirut repeat to Damascus.

\textbf{MOOSE}

\textsuperscript{45a} Ante, p. 563.

\textsuperscript{46} Abdullah Suleiman.

\textsuperscript{47} Not printed.

Beirut, February 28, 1944—noon.

[Received 4:15 p. m.]

43. See my 36, February 18, 4 p. m. Foreign Minister has handed me note dated February 26 expressing attitude of Lebanese Government toward pro-Zionist resolutions currently before American Congress. Its principal points are:

Palestine is an Arab country whose fate vitally concerns Lebanon; adoption of proposed measures would have serious consequences, including racial repercussions throughout Arab world; such measures would be directly opposed to democratic ideals because disinheritting a whole people and reducing it to state of servitude; and measures would too be opposed to principles of justice and would undermine Atlantic Charter.

Minister handed me also copy of telegram to be sent to Congress by officers of Lebanese Parliament, stressing first and last of above arguments and urging withholding approval of resolutions before American public opinion is apprised of rights of Arabs.

Minister then elaborated on his note substantially as follows:

We Lebanese too have interest in common Holy Land and are not fanatical. Our Jews are well treated and contented non-Zionists. Our Christians, looking to Atlantic Charter, do not fear domination of Moslem Arabs.

However, we all fear Zionism as a problem of colonization because of its supporters’ money, organization, influence and numbers. To us it is matter of self-defense. We beg America, while aiding persecuted Jews, to refrain from support of political Zionism.

Finally, in course of informal discussion during which I quoted substance of Department’s 318 February 16, 9 p. m. to Cairo, Minister voiced strictly personal view that political settlement of Palestine problem could be based on following elements of solution:

Promise of half our declaration has been fulfilled, a full-fledged Jewish National Home having been established in Palestine; all reasonable future development of that home can be assured by delimitation on [sic] under great powers’ guarantee of Jewish canton or cantons on coastal plain and inland from Haifa where cultural Zionism rooted in Jewish institutions and fostered by Jewish administration could flourish; and spiritual interests of Christians and Moslems, as well as of Jews, would be effectively served by establishment of “a

43 Selim Tada.
50 See footnote 21, p. 566.
small zone of the holy places centered on Jerusalem” under international administration.

Repeated to Baghdad, Jerusalem, Jidda and Cairo.

WADSWORTH

867N.01/2223: Telegram

*The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

**Baghdad, February 29, 1944—10 p.m.**

[Received March 1—9:45 a.m.]

40. Legation received today your 19 February 16. Its delay in transmission has caused no inconvenience since naturally I have lost no occasion to explain to interested Iraqi officials the respective functions and limitations of the legislative and the executive branches of the Government in the field of foreign affairs. My despatch 176 February 18 will make it evident that Nuri was quite well aware during our initial conversation that congressional resolutions of this character could have advisory force only.

During a conversation which I had with the Prime Minister today I told him in confidence I had just received a telegram from the Department (your 23 February 26) which indicated that I was probably correct in expressing to him on February 13 the opinion that the resolution in question would not be reported out of the Senate Committee and that probably the resolution before the House would meet a similar fate. I also endeavored to impress upon him again the fact that the responsibility for making decisions of the kind called for by the resolution created [rested?] upon the executive rather than upon the legislative branch of the Government.

Nuri expressed both appreciation and relief. He pointed out again that even though these resolutions if passed would not have had executive force it would have been difficult nevertheless to convince the Arab world that members of the legislative body of a great democracy such as the U.S. would have voted for them if they had not felt that they were voicing the sentiments of the American people.

Nuri stated that BBC broadcasts had yesterday reported that the Egyptian Government had protested to the American Government with regard to these resolutions and that in view of these broadcasts it had become impossible to keep the matter entirely out of the Iraqi press. He would, however, immediately take steps with the purpose of minimizing the importance of the introduction of the resolution. He was sorry to hear that the Egyptian Government had approached

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83 Not printed.
85 British Broadcasting Corporation.
the American Government formally on the subject; he had suggested to the other Arab Governments that they refrain from taking formal action and that communications be limited to telegrams from prominent Arabs to members of the American Congress. He had taken care that the Iraqi Legation in Washington be not instructed to broach the matter to the State Department.

I told Nuri that I was glad to hear that he was taking steps to minimize the importance of the resolutions, that since it was likely that they would not be reported out of committees in both houses of Congress it did not seem that anything would be gained from keeping the matter alive by sending further messages to members of Congress.

The Iraqi press this morning carried without comment a news despatch from Cairo stating that the Egyptian Government had taken up the subject of the resolutions formally with the American Legation at Cairo.

HENDERSON

867N.01/2225 : Telegram

The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, March 2, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received March 3—10:53 a. m.]

59. Yesterday I conveyed to Finance Minister sense of first part Department's 408 February 26, 9 p. m., to Cairo. He received information with apparent satisfaction and said he would inform King.

Though Department's message to large extent answers objections repeated my 57 February 27, 11 a. m., it is suggested that Department may wish to reply specifically to King's communication. Moose

867N.01/2205 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson)

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1944—7 p. m.

27. Today's press carries reports of a telegram sent by Senator Wagner to the Presidents of the Iraqi Senate and Chamber in reply to their telegram to him. These reports quote the Senator as predicting the ultimate passage of the Palestine resolutions.

See footnote 40, p. 573.

In his telegram 64, March 7, noon, the Minister Resident reported that the King had indicated he would appreciate a reply; the Department replied in telegram 35, March 8, 7 p. m., that the matter was under active consideration (867N.01/2244).

Repeated to Cairo in telegram 446, March 8, 9 p. m., with the instruction to repeat in turn to Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, and Jidda.
The Department, however, is still of the opinion expressed in the Department's No. 23, February 26, 9 p. m., that it appears unlikely that the resolutions will be reported out of committee and you may indicate this continuing belief if you have further discussions on the matter.

Stettinius

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] March 2, 1944.

Mr. Stettinius: At your suggestion I joined Mr. Dunn 56 during a call from Mr. McCloy on Thursday, March 2, to discuss the present status of the resolutions on Palestine.

Mr. McCloy stated that General Marshall had been invited personally by Senator Connally to discuss informally with him in his office and with "several members of the Committee" the War Department's attitude toward the Palestine resolutions. When General Marshall got to Senator Connally's office he found that the whole Committee had regathered there so that his remarks were heard by all the members.

Mr. McCloy also informed me that he had prepared for General Marshall a careful memorandum 57 outlining the points that he should bring out during the discussion with the members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Meanwhile, Chairman Bloom of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House had asked Mr. McCloy and General Handy to appear before that Committee. If and when such an appearance occurs Mr. McCloy said he intends to follow the same line taken by General Marshall upon his, Mr. McCloy's, advice.

Mr. McCloy added that Chairman Bloom was expected to call upon him at the War Department that afternoon and that Bloom was endeavoring to induce the competent officials of the War Department to agree to some substitute resolution on Palestine to be introduced in Congress. Mr. McCloy feels that it would be a mistake for the War Department to be drawn into any discussions of this kind, and I inferred that he expected to tell Congressman Bloom as much.

In conclusion, Mr. McCloy expressed the view that the Department of State should take a more active part in opposing these resolutions since they had political as well as military implications. I reminded

56 James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State.
57 Presumably the memorandum of February 22, p. 574.
Mr. McCloy of the earlier experience the Department had had in endeavoring to obtain the support of the War Department to the issue of a joint American-British statement on Palestine and of the complete lack of cooperation of the War Department in that instance. It was, I added, our distinct feeling that at the present time military considerations far outweigh any possible political implications in this matter, as was clear from the text of Mr. Stimson’s letter to Senator Connally on this subject.

With reference to Mr. Stimson’s above-mentioned letter, I informed Mr. McCloy that the competent officials of this Department were strongly of the opinion that the letter should be published at the earliest possible moment. Mr. McCloy remarked that he did not know why Mr. Stimson had hesitated to publish the letter but believed it was because he was not sure that General Marshall would approve. I expressed the view that since the President himself desired the letter published and since the substance and the purport of the Stimson letter were pretty generally known on the Hill, there would seem to be no compelling reason for withholding publication at this time. Mr. McCloy did not disagree with this view.

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.00/3-344

Amir Abdullah of Transjordan to President Roosevelt

AMMAN, March 3, 1944.

The deliberations of Congress affecting Palestine and the formation of a Jewish State therein have caused a great and heartfelt distress throughout the East. I say and I am convinced that the absence of sufficient information in the House of Congress respecting the true situation has facilitated the way to those in sympathy with the Zionist cause to further these deliberations. Remembering the great respect and admiration in which I hold you, your country and the American people, I say that while you are fighting with the United Nations for the freedom of the world and the removal of oppression at the same time the present deliberations are I feel contrary to that principle and would lead to the greatest sorrow and suffering if the intentions of the promoters of those deliberations were to be realized. I mention this personally in my capacity as a close neighbor of Palestine and as a loyal friend of the United Nations.

abdullah

58 For correspondence regarding this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 747 ff., passim.
59 Dated February 7, p. 563.
The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, March 4, 1944—11 a.m.
[Received March 6—10:42 a.m.]

503. Following is essential part of communications left with me last night by El Sayyid Hussein El Kobsi, representative of King Yemen in recent Arab Union discussions, regarding proposed congressional resolution on Palestine:

“His Majesty, The King of Yemen and Commander of the Faithful, Yehya Ibn Mohamed Hamid El Dine, and His Majesty’s Government disapprove of the resolution submitted to the American Congress designed to remove restrictions imposed on the immigration of Jews into Palestine. His Majesty disapproves everything that causes trouble to the rightful owners of Palestine—Moslems, Christians and native Jews—and although he condemns every cruelty to which Jews in Europe are subjected he does not consider that it justifies the oppression of the Arabs of Palestine in their own legal abode.”

Text of communication was carried in this morning’s Al Misri in verbatim form except for omission of phrase “Moslems, Christians, and Jews”.

Repeated to Jerusalem, Jidda, Baghdad and Beirut.

Kirk

The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Baghdad, March 4, 1944—11 p.m.
[Received March 6—12:45 p.m.]

47. 1. The information contained in your 27, March 2 has been most helpful.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call on him this morning. The following contains the substance of some of the statements which he made to me:

a. Iraqi Government deeply regrets the publicity which has been given in the last 3 days in the Iraqi press to Zionist activities in the United States and to the resolutions in particular. The Government had endeavored to keep the matter from becoming public but following announcements made by the BBC and Reuters regarding the protest of the Egyptian Government it was compelled to issue its communiqué on March 1.

b. The Government has since been under fire on the ground that it had failed to take stronger steps and that it had concealed a matter of grave importance from the public. It had already been

46 British news agency.
attacked in Parliament and was preparing to meet further attacks. It was handicapped because it could not divulge all that had taken place without adding fresh fuel to the flames.

The Iraqi Legation in Washington had reported that it had refused to accept for transmission a nonsympathetic message from Senator Wagner to the President of the Iraqi Senate. The message was reported to be coming through other channels but had not as yet been received. Since the matter had become public the Foreign Office was being bombarded with enquiries from all sides. The diplomatic representatives in Baghdad of other Arab States had been approaching it several times daily for information regarding developments.

3. I replied to the Foreign Minister along the lines suggested in second paragraph of telegram under reference. I said that the endeavors of the Government to prevent the matter from developing in a manner that might adversely affect Iraqi-American relations were appreciated. I pointed out, however, that it seemed to me that the Government was itself partly responsible for the embarrassment which it was experiencing. So far as I could see the Government had not made any real attempt to make the situation clear to the public. In Iraq for instance one of the leading papers of Baghdad in its leading editorial of March 1 had given the distinct impression to its readers that the United States was embarking on a policy to deprive the Arabs of their rights in Palestine. Relatively few of the numerous articles which had appeared in the last few days in Baghdad press had left the impression on the readers that the resolutions were thus far merely the expressions of the Congressmen who had introduced them and had no connection with the policy of the American Government.

4. The Foreign Minister promised that he would discuss my remarks with the Prime Minister and try to make the situation more clear for the public.

5. Beginning March 1 the resolutions and activities of the Zionists in the United States have been the chief topic of discussion of the Iraqi press and people with the result that in some quarters there is considerable feeling against the United States and even against the local Jews. Students of the secondary schools yesterday desired to make a demonstration before the Legation but the Government refused to permit them to do so. It was suggested to some of the Jewish students that they refrain from attending their schools yesterday since there was a danger that while on route they would be attacked by Arab students for whom Friday is a holiday.

6. Various rumors are current in the bazaars as to the real reasons behind this agitation. There is a tendency in some quarters as might
be expected to credit the British with stirring up feeling against the United States in order (a) to make it difficult for the United States to exploit its oil concessions in fear of Arab hostility or (b) to place the onus on the United States for any decision unpleasant to the Arab world which Great Britain might reach in regard to Palestine. The Legation has not been able to find any evidence which I got [which might?] substantiate these rumors, however the British censorship in control of the local press has prohibited the publication of the articles in question.

7. It would appear from articles published today that the campaign is losing its anti-American tone and is developing into agitation for Arab unity and/or Arab control of Palestine.

8. Translation of the Government communiqué of March 1 the tone of which is mild in comparison with that of articles appearing in the press is being sent in telegram No. 48 of today’s date.61

Paraphrases by pouch to Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, Beirut.

HENDERSON

867N.01/2228: Telegram

The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Baghdad, March 4, 1944.
[Received March 5—1 p. m.]

48. The following is the translation of the communiqué of the Iraq Government of March 1:

"The Iraq Government has been informed of the endeavors of Zionist propagandists in the United States of America in regard the question immigration into Palestine with a view to obtaining support in the American Senate and Congress for a proposal to open the doors of immigration into Palestine for the Jews in contravention of the British White Paper. The Iraq Government has taken all necessary steps to defeat those endeavors (which are based on an attempt to exploit public sympathy in America and to enlighten public opinion about the real situation). Sayid Jamil Almajdafi, President of the Senate, and Ridha Alshabibri, President of the Chamber of Deputies, have sent telegrams to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in America as well as the American Senators who submitted the proposal explaining the harmful repercussions and pointing out what [that?] it would transgress on the rights of the Arabs in Palestine. The Governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Lebanon have taken similar action. These efforts have lead to satisfactory results."

HENDERSON

* Infra.

354-184—65—38
The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, March 4, 1944—noon.
[Received March 5—11:08 a.m.]

510. My 503, March 4, 10 [11] a.m. In conversation preceding delivery of communication Yemen representative outlined its contents and I was afforded opportunity for explaining situation along lines of Department’s telegrams on subject. Most of his conversation, however, was devoted to professions of sympathy of Moslems with democratic cause and more particularly to expressions of friendship toward United States with which he said it was desire of Yemen to become more closely associated after war owing to reputed interest without ulterior motives of United States in small states.

Kirk

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1944.

You will recall some weeks ago you and I had quite a discussion relative to the Palestine situation with the possibility of the British and ourselves issuing a joint statement. At that time you did not think you wished to take any action until later on. Since then there have been quite a number of new developments, which are summarized below, and I would urge that you have a talk with Colonel Hoskins relative to the whole question if it is possible for you to do so in the relatively near future.

I am attaching a paraphrase of telegram No. 57, February 27, 11 a.m., from our Legation at Jidda, which transmits a protest from

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52 Marginal notation: “ERS Jr. OK FDR”. In a memorandum of March 8 to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) the Under Secretary wrote:

“The President has just returned to me the memorandum which I sent to him on March 4 regarding Palestine, copy of which I enclose herewith.

“Would you be good enough to give the most careful thought to the question of exactly when and how we should take up with the British the issuance of a joint statement on Palestine.” (867N.01/2275a)

53 Regarding the decision “to review from time to time the question of issuing a joint statement in regard to Palestine,” made by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill at the First Quebec Conference, August 17–24, 1943, see telegram 6063, October 1, 1943, to London, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, p. 814; also the memorandum of August 21 and footnote 88, ibid., p. 804. Documentation concerning the First Quebec Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of Foreign Relations.

54 Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, Special Representative of President Roosevelt on two missions to the Near East in 1942 and 1943; for correspondence relating to these missions, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 24 ff., and ibid., 1943, vol. iv, bracketed note on p. 19.

55 For text of telegram, see p. 577.
King Ibn Saud against the Palestine Resolutions in Congress. Pro-
tests have also been received from the Egyptian, Iraqi and Syrian
Governments.

I am more and more convinced that the time has come to clarify the
situation through the issuance of a joint American-British statement
affirming (after a suitable introduction);

(a) that no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine will
be taken without full and prior consultation with all concerned, in-
cluding both Arabs and Jews;

(b) that if, prior to the conclusion of the war, the interested Arabs
and Jews can reach a friendly understanding through their own ef-
forts, such a development will be most welcome; and

(c) that in the absence of such an understanding, there will be a
review of the Palestine situation after the war has been won, with the
objective of establishing a just and definitive solution equitable to all
parties concerned.

The British have indicated that they would welcome such a state-
ment, and if you approve, I shall promptly take the matter up with
them. I shall, of course, submit for your final approval the exact text
which may be agreed upon with the British Foreign Office.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

867N.01/2280

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the
Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: Last Saturday I forwarded to the President a
memorandum suggesting that, in view of the concern manifested in
the entire Arab world by the Palestine resolutions now before the
Congress, it might be wise to consider taking up with the British the
possibility of issuing a joint statement which would postpone the set-
tlement of the Palestine question until after the war unless the inter-
ested Arab and Jewish parties could reach a friendly understanding
through their own efforts. The President subsequently returned this
memorandum to me with his approval.

I wish you would consider whether the matter should be taken up
now with the British Embassy with a view to issuing a statement
before I leave for London or whether you would prefer to have Mr.
Murray and me raise the question with the British in London.\(^6\) In
view of Secretary Stimson's letter and General Marshall's statement

\(^6\) For correspondence regarding the Stettinius Mission to London, to engage
in general and informal conversations with officers of the British Foreign Office,
April 7–April 20, 1944, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.
to the Foreign Relations Committee, I believe we are fully covered this time with regard to the military phase of the situation. Needless to say, information about the proposed statement should in no way be allowed to leak.

I think that when a statement is issued, it should be released by the White House rather than by the Department.

During my absence you may wish to consult with Mr. Murray, and if you should decide to have the negotiations with the British here, I think you should ask Mr. Murray to initiate them promptly.²⁶

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

⁶⁶§67N.01/2251: Telegram

The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, March 11, 1944—9 a. m.
[Received March 11—8:30 a. m.]

56. A Reuters despatch which has thus far been withheld from publication here by the British reads as follows:

"Rabbis Stephen Wise and Abba Silver⁷⁷ representing Zionist Palestine movement said today that President Roosevelt authorized them to make this statement:⁷⁸ American Government has never given its approval to White Paper of 1939. President is happy that doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees. When future decisions are reached full justice will be done to those who seek Jewish national home for which our Government and American people have always had deepest sympathy—and today more than ever in view of tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees."⁷⁹

I should appreciate receiving confirmation or correction of the statement allegedly authorized by the President. If the statement is substantially as authorized please instruct me how to reply when I am approached by the Iraqi Government since the statement must eventually become known.

HENDERSON

⁶⁶Wallace Murray was later detailed to accompany the Stettinius Mission to London.
⁷⁷Dr. Stephen S. Wise and Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, co-chairmen of the American Zionist Emergency Council.
⁷⁸Copies of the statement were handed out at a dinner of the American Palestine Committee held in Washington on the evening of March 9, 1944.
⁷⁹Telegram 586, March 11, 8 a. m., from Cairo reported that text of this statement was printed in the Arabic language paper Al Misrīt that day (§67N.01/ 2255).
867N.01/2254: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, March 11, 1944—7 p. m.
[Received March 11—4:19 p. m.]

598. Following is pertinent portion of letter received today from Egyptian Prime Minister. 70

"The papers of this morning published a Reuters despatch dated March 10 of which I enclose a copy. Given the importance of the questions for Palestine and all the Arab world, I request your Excellency to be so good as to advise me regarding the facts of the matter."

Enclosure was copy of Reuters despatch referred to in my 585, March 11, 7 [8] a. m. 71

In acknowledging the receipt of the letter I stated that inquiry had been transmitted to my Government and accordingly I request instructions as soon as possible.

Strong reaction is appearing in local press which is being telegraphed.

Repeated to Jerusalem.

KIRK

867N.01/2185: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 72

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1944—7 p. m.

38. Your 57, February 27, 11 a. m. You are authorized to reply to the Finance Minister in the following sense:

The President has read with interest the message from the King. You may state that the President was glad that the King communicated his views frankly to this Government and that the President considered this as a manifestation of the attachment and friendship existing between the United States and Saudi Arabia. You may further advise him that the President is in agreement with the views regarding the Palestine resolutions contained in the Department’s telegram no. 408, to Cairo, 73 the substance of which you have already conveyed to the King. You may also say that the President wishes to renew the assurances he has previously given to the King that it is the view of this Government that no decision altering the basic

70 Mustapha Nahas Pasha.
71 Not printed.
72 Marginal notation: “OK FDR”.
73 See footnote 40, p. 573.
situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

Hull

867N.01/2304

The Egyptian Minister (Hassan) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1944.

Sir: I have the honour to inform you of the following:

"His Majesty the Imam Yehya of Yemen has requested His Excellency Mustapha Nahas Pasha, President of the Council of Ministers of Egypt, and its Minister of Foreign Affairs, to express through him, his and his people's dissatisfaction and disapproval of the Resolution of the American House of Representatives purporting to create a National Home for the Jews in Palestine.

"His Majesty re-affirms the traditional and firm friendship of the Arabs for the Anglo-Saxon allies, and, therefore, deems it unfair and unjust to usurp the long-established rights of the Arabs in the Holy Places.

"His Majesty, accordingly, has fully empowered Nahas Pasha to protest on his behalf in this matter; and in carrying out this mission, Nahas Pasha renews his hope that the Government of the United States of America will, accordingly, give due consideration to the apprehensions of the whole Arab World in regard to this subject."

While bringing this matter to the attention of Your Excellency, I avail myself [etc.]

M[ahmoud] Hassan

867N.01/2255: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1944—9 p. m.

531. Your 593, March 11, 7 p. m. In replying to the Egyptian Prime Minister you may state that the President in fact authorized the statement made by Zionist leaders and that this statement was substantially as summarized in your 585, March 11, 8 a. m. You should point out that the statement of the Zionist leaders mentions a Jewish national home rather than a Jewish commonwealth as re-

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74 Copy of text forwarded to President Roosevelt under cover of a memorandum of March 22 in which the Secretary of State said: "We are replying to this note along the lines which you have previously approved." (867N.01/2291a) For text of reply, see the Secretary’s note to the Egyptian Minister, March 31, p. 598.

75 Marginal notation on the original: "Approved by the President".

76 Not printed.
ferred to in the resolutions recently introduced into Congress. You should say that while it is true that the American Government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939, it is also true that this Government has never taken a position with regard to the White Paper. You should in addition assure Nahas that it is the view of this Government that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

Repeat to Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem and Jidda for their information. A separate message is being sent to Baghdad.  

HULL

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867N.01/2276a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1944—midnight.

565. Following statement regarding the proposed resolutions respecting Palestine was issued by the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on March 17:

“At an executive meeting held today by the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. Res. 418 and H. Res. 419, and following the receipt of a letter from the Secretary of War, the Committee approved the issuance of the following statement:

'Advice and information given to us by those responsible for the conduct of the war, have convinced the Committee that action upon the resolutions at this time would be unwise.'"

The above-mentioned letter of the Secretary of War to the Chairman is dated March 17 and reads as follows:

"Concerning our conversation with respect to House Resolutions 418 and 419, it is the considered judgment of the War Department that without reference to the merits of these resolutions, further action on them at this time would be prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war."

Inform appropriate authorities.

Repeat to Jerusalem, Jidda, Baghdad and Beirut for repetition to Damascus.

HULL

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77 As telegram 34, March 15, 6 p. m., with the following instruction: "You may reply along similar lines to the Iraqi Government (your 56, March 11, 9 a. m.) if approached by the latter." (867N.01/2254)
Memorandum by Mr. Evan M. Wilson of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1944.

PALESTINE: TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE BRITISH

1. Implementation of the White Paper.

The immigration clauses of the British White Paper of 1939, under which Jewish immigration into Palestine would be prohibited after March 31, 1944 except with the consent of the Arabs of Palestine, have been modified in fact if not in substance by the recent decision to permit some 31,000 potential immigrants now in occupied Europe to proceed to Palestine after that date. The Arabs have protested this arrangement and will undoubtedly oppose any further modification of the White Paper provisions. The Jews are putting pressure both on ourselves and on the British Government to have the White Paper abrogated and to permit free entry of Jews into Palestine. We understand that the British Cabinet is split on this question, with certain members in favor of making no further concessions to the Jews and others, including Mr. Churchill, opposed to the White Paper policy and presumably favoring some relaxation of its provisions. We have received no definite indication of the intentions of the British Government in this regard, and it would be of the greatest interest if we could learn whether a decision has been reached, and if so, what the Government plans to do.

2. British Conversations with Zionist Leaders.

Several prominent Zionists, including Rabbi Israel Goldstein, the head of the Zionist Organization of America, and Dr. Nahum Goldmann, who represents the World Jewish Congress and the Jewish Agency in this country, are now in London where they are conferring with Dr. Weizmann, the head of the world Zionist organization, and presumably with high British officials. Various rumors are

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"Article 4 of the Mandate for Palestine made provision for the recognition of a Jewish Agency "... as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine..." (Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. II, p. 214), and from 1922 until 1928 the (World) Zionist Organization acted as such. In 1929 agreement was reached between Zionists and non-Zionists for the inclusion of the latter in the Agency, as provided for in the same Article 4, and the enlarged Jewish Agency was officially recognized by the British Government in a letter dated August 6, 1930. The Executive of the Agency, located at Jerusalem, came to function virtually as a government existing side by side with the Mandatory Government."
circulating as to these conversations, and it is obvious that the Zionists have lost no opportunity to put pressure on the British Government to adopt a solution favorable to the Jews. We should, of course, be interested in learning the nature of these conversations and of any decision reached.

3. Partition.

The British may suggest partition of Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews. This solution, when first advanced in 1937, was rejected by both Arabs and Jews and was superseded by the White Paper of 1939. There have been many reports in recent months that this question has been or will be revived by the British, but we have obtained no confirmation of these reports. If the British raise the question with us, we should avoid any commitment on this point at present.

4. Post-war settlement.

A study has been made in the Department of the post-war status of Palestine and a tentative plan has been reached, of which a summary is attached. This plan is based upon the idea of trusteeship and provides for the constitution of Palestine as an international territory with a Board of Overseers representing the three world religions as an advisory body. The plan names Great Britain as the trustee power. We may wish to discuss this plan informally with the British and in any case, it would be useful to ascertain what views, if any, they have regarding a post-war settlement for Palestine and whether they are receptive to the idea of trusteeship.


The President has approved a proposed joint American-British statement, submitted to him by the Department, deferring a decision on the Palestine question until after the war. We want to get British concurrence to this statement. They agreed to such a statement last year but we were not able to concur at that time. We are attempting to clear the attached statement with the British in the immediate future, but if this cannot be accomplished, the matter will have to be discussed with the British in London. In any case, we should take this statement with us so as to be able to show the actual text to the British.

1. With the failure of twenty-five years of government in Palestine, a radically different settlement, freed from the commitments arising from World War I, seems to be required.

2. A Trusteeship for Palestine exercised by the three religious groups would be a failure. However, there is moral and political justification for the proposal that the three principal religious groups should be associated with the future plan of government.

3. It is recommended that Palestine be constituted as an International Territory under a charter; that a great power be appointed Trustee; that a Board of Overseers representing the three world religions be set up as an advisory body. The reasons and conditions that support this recommendation are as follows:

   a. The administrator of Palestine must be capable of firm, decisive and prompt action. This requires experienced officials under central control.

   b. Firm, decisive and prompt action cannot be taken if sectarian and political differences are allowed to exercise their divisive and delaying influences.

   c. The political and economic problems being highly complex and interwoven with hitherto irreconcilable religious differences, only a centralized and experienced rulership will guarantee justice.

4. It is recommended that the Trusteeship should be awarded to Great Britain by the United Nations Organization under the charter. The charter would recognize the interest in Palestine of Christians, Jews, and Muslims. It would establish the Arab and Jewish communities as autonomous political entities with wide powers of local self-government.

5. The advantages of the proposed settlement are:

   a. It would eliminate the difficulties that arise because of the conflicting commitments of the past.

   b. It would place Palestine outside the bounds of both nationalist and imperialist ambitions.

   c. It would provide means by which to solve the basic economic problems.

   d. It offers a better prospect than any other plan yet proposed for cooperation in the government of Palestine and for eventual self-government of the people of Palestine.
DRAFT STATEMENT

The Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom have been in consultation in regard to Palestine. The common war effort compels both Governments to concentrate all energies on the primary objective of winning the war. They therefore look with concern on any activities which may delay the final victory.

The American and British military authorities attach the highest importance to the maintenance of order in the Middle East. Accordingly the two Governments are agreed

(a) that no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine will be taken without full and prior consultation with all concerned, including both Arabs and Jews;
(b) that if, prior to the conclusion of the war, the interested Arabs and Jews can reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts such a development will be most welcome; and
(c) that in the absence of such an understanding, there will be a review of the Palestine situation after the war has been won, with the objective of establishing a just and definitive solution equitable to all parties concerned.

In the meantime the British Government, which is responsible for the administration and security of Palestine, wishes to make it clear that it has no intention of permitting or acquiescing in any changes brought about by force in the status of that country or in its administration.

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] March 18, 1944.

Mr. Stettinius: I think you would wish to know that after the meeting of your group 89 yesterday in the Secretary’s office, Dr. Bowman 91 and I had a moment to discuss with the Secretary the attached draft text of a joint American-British statement on Palestine.92

As you will recall, you sent the President the substance of such a statement during the Secretary’s absence 93 and the President approved of issuing it after consultation with the British.

89 Members of the projected mission to London.
91 Isaiiah Bowman, president of Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
92 Supra.
93 See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, March 4, p. 586.
During our conversation with the Secretary yesterday on this subject he expressed general approval of the attached form of the statement but suggested that we might hold it for discussion with the British when we get to London.

I think this procedure is a good one, particularly for the purpose of avoiding leaks that are almost inevitable if we start exchanging telegrams with London on this subject. Meanwhile, however, the Secretary said he wished to clear the draft statement in its present form with the President at an early moment, and I have left a copy with him for that purpose.

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.01/2403: Airgram

The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, March 23, 1944—12:30 p. m.
[Received April 8—8 a. m.]

A-25. The contents of the Department's telegram no. 566 [565] March 17, 10:00 p. m. [midnight] to Cairo have been transmitted to King Ibn Saud. While local people have had their interest in proposed Resolutions stimulated by radio broadcasts in Arabic, there is nothing to show that there was any alarm nor that the standing of the United States was affected.

Copy to Cairo, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Beirut and Damascus.

MOOSE

867N.01/2284a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton)²⁴

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1944—8 p. m.

54. Please convey the following message, which you may deliver in person at your discretion, from the President to the Emir of Trans-Jordan in reply to the latter's telegram of March 3 to the President regarding the Palestine resolutions:

"I have received Your Highness' telegram of March 3, 1944 in which you refer to the resolutions which have been introduced into Congress relative to Palestine. I appreciate the friendly sentiments which you express regarding the American people and the United Nations. In so far as Palestine is concerned, I am glad to convey to you the assur-

²⁴ Marginal notation: "OK FDR."
ance that in the view of the Government of the United States no
decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached
without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews."

HULL

867N.01/2222

The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister (Hassan)"

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1944.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to your communication dated Febru-
ary 24, 1944, with which you transmitted an aide-mémoire bearing the
same date relative to immigration into Palestine."

Due note has been taken of the considerations outlined in this aide-
mémoire relative to the Palestine problem and to those aspects of the
matter which are mentioned therein. You are, I am sure, familiar
with the American form of government and with the freedom afforded
thereunder to individuals, whether private citizens or members of the
different branches of the Government, to express their opinions from
time to time regarding current matters.

In this connection I wish to assure you that although Palestine is
primarily a British responsibility, it is the view of the Government of
the United States that no decision altering the basic situation of Pales-
tine should be taken until an appropriate time is reached and that at
such a time the governments responsible for the establishment of peace
and the maintenance of law and justice in the world should come to
an equitable settlement of all the questions involved in full consulta-
tion with both Arabs and Jews.

Accept [etc.]

Cordell Hull

867N.01/2206 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Damascus (Farrell)

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1944—5 p. m.

5. You are authorized to reply to Syrian Foreign Office (your tele-
gram no. 3 and your despatch no. 81 of February 24, 1944) in
the same sense as the Department’s reply, text of which is being re-
peated telegraphically to you through Cairo, to the Egyptian Minis-
ter’s note regarding immigration into Palestine.

Hull

55 Text transmitted to Cairo in telegram 657, March 28, 9 p. m., with instructions
to repeat to Baghdad, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus and Jidda.
56 Note not printed; for aide-mémoire, see p. 571.
57 Latter not printed.
58 See note to the Egyptian Minister, March 28, supra.
59 See footnote 55, above.
The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State \(^{51}\)

CAIRO, March 29, 1944—4 p.m.
[Received March 30—11:30 a.m.]

750. Following is the substance of letter received from Nahas Pasha dated March 27 replying to letter of March 17, communicating substance of Department’s 581, March 5 [15], 1 [9] p.m.

(Begin summary) Regrets that President authorized Palestine declaration but happy that supplemental clarification partially attenuates declaration without, however, entirely reassuring Palestinians nor Arab peoples in general. The assurance that no decision regarding Palestine would be taken without consultation with Arabs and Jews is in accord with Egyptian policy, but in meantime it would seem desirable that responsible political personnages refrain from declarations liable to mislead Palestine and the Arab countries. The recent declaration coming from a great statesman justly regarded as greatest champion of liberty and democracy had been regarded by Arabs as official support of Zionism and had caused a wave of protest which Nahas had sought to calm by assuring neighboring countries that he was looking into matter.

As was stated in recent Egyptian aide-mémoire, Jewish persecution in Europe is deplored but Zionism merely substitutes one persecution for another by depriving Palestinians of their absolute right to sovereignty.

Middle East had greeted Atlantic Charter as message of hope and Palestine question should be treated in accordance with its principles and care taken to avoid giving Arab peoples impression that Charter might be a “mere oral manifestation”. Charter, of which President was author, is regarded as expression of his determined will and it was feasible that implicit confidence was placed therein. Desiring to see this confidence shared by all the Arabs request that foregoing be communicated to American Government in conviction that United States will pursue policy of recognizing legitimate claims of Palestine people. (End summary)

Text being transmitted by air pouch.\(^{52}\)
Text to Jerusalem, Jidda, Beirut and Baghdad.

Kirk

The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister (Hassan) \(^{53}\)

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1944.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note dated March 14, 1944 conveying a communication, transmitted through the

\(^{51}\) Copy transmitted to President Roosevelt under cover of a memorandum by the Secretary of State, April 1 (not printed).
\(^{52}\) Transmitted in despatch 1705, March 28, not printed.
\(^{53}\) Text communicated to the Minister in Egypt in telegram 692, March 31, 1 p.m., with the instruction that a reply in the same sense be made to El Sayyid Hussein El Kobsi and that the telegram be repeated to Jerusalem, Baghdad, Jidda, Damascus, and Beirut for their information (867N.01/2307).
Prime Minister of Egypt, from His Majesty the Imam Yehya of Yemen relative to Palestine.

I should appreciate it if you would be good enough to request His Excellency Mustapha Nahas Pasha to inform His Majesty the Imam Yehya that his message has been received by this Government and that careful consideration has been accorded to the views put forward therein. I should be grateful if the Prime Minister would express to His Majesty the appreciation of the Government of the United States for the friendly spirit which prompted him to send this message.

With reference to the resolutions which were introduced into the Senate and House of Representatives respecting Palestine, it should be pointed out that these resolutions have not passed either House of Congress and, in fact, are not likely to be acted upon at this time.

In communicating this message to His Majesty the Imam Yehya, His Excellency Nahas Pasha may wish to express the assurance conveyed in my communication to you dated March 28, 1944, in which it is stated that although Palestine is primarily a British responsibility, it is the view of the Government of the United States that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be taken until an appropriate time is reached and that at such a time the governments responsible for the establishment of peace and the maintenance of law and justice in the world should come to an equitable settlement of all the questions involved in full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

Accept [etc.]

Cordell Hull

867N.01/2239: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)\(^*\)

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1944—1 p. m.

737. Your 750, March 29, 4 p. m. You may inform the Egyptian Prime Minister that his message has been communicated to the President. You may wish to refer in your reply to the assurances and observations contained in the Department's 657 and 692\(^*\) as well as other recent communications on the subject.

Repeat to Jidda, Baghdad, Jerusalem, Beirut and Damascus.

Hull

\(^*\) The substance of this telegram was approved by President Roosevelt.

\(^*\) See footnotes 86 and 93, pp. 597 and 598, respectively.
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

LONDON, April 11, 1944.

Participants:  Sir Maurice Peterson, K.C.M.G., Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. C. W. Baxter, C.M.G., M.C., Head, Eastern Dept
The Honorable R.M.A. Hankey, Eastern Department
Mr. Wallace Murray, Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State
Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Department of State
Mr. Foy Kohler, Department of State
Mr. Robert Coe, American Embassy

Sir Maurice expressed the pleasure of the Foreign Office in having members of the State Department present to discuss Middle Eastern questions and stated that he believed it had been agreed that the talks were to start with Palestine.

British White Paper Policy

By way of introduction Sir Maurice said that a principal concern of the Foreign Office was Zionist agitation in the United States and the desirability that this be kept in hand during the war.

Sir Maurice went on to say that the Foreign Office does not consider the question of Palestine urgent, explaining that there is still a quota of about 27,500 open for Jewish immigrants of which only about 8,000 are presently earmarked. In view of the difficulty of arranging the release and transportation of Jewish refugees from Europe he felt that this number is more than ample for foreseeable emigrants from Europe during the course of the war. The White Paper he felt, so far as the Foreign Office is concerned, will certainly be maintained during the war. However, it must be regarded as provisional to be superseded by some definitive solution following the termination of hostilities. Sir Maurice thought that the continuance of the immigration quota would enable the British Government to withstand the pressure from Dr. Weizmann and the Zionists during the course of the war. As to the post-war settlement Sir Maurice said that there were many schools of thought and many proposals. Particularly in political circles in Britain he said that there is a strong feeling for partition.

In this connection Mr. Murray said that the Zionists in the United States were using very effectively Mr. Churchill's statement of 1939 opposing the White Paper. Sir Maurice confirmed that Mr. Churchill does in fact continue to be opposed to the White Paper. He said that
he had not himself discussed the question recently with Churchill, who goes back in his stand to the Balfour Declaration. However, Sir Maurice commented that he had been associated with Lord Balfour in those times and that he was satisfied that Balfour had at no time considered that a Jewish state in Palestine had been promised to the Jews. Mr. Murray stated that he understood that Lord Balfour had been somewhat vague about the implications of the Declaration and that whenever concrete problems had arisen he referred them to someone else to work out. Sir Maurice replied that this was so. He said Lord Balfour had hardly been aware of the existence of the Arabs, but that he suddenly became acutely conscious of their existence when he went to Damascus in 1922 and they stoned him in the streets!

[Here follows brief discussion regarding visit of certain American Zionists to Great Britain, concerning which Sir Maurice indicated that he had no information.]

Post-War Status of Palestine

Sir Maurice then went on to expound his own conception of post-war settlement in Palestine. He thought that Palestine should be a bi-national state of Arabs and Jews with a single Palestinian citizenship and that the Jewish population should be permanently limited to something less than the Arab population. He mentioned for example that the Jewish population should be restricted permanently to a figure of 100,000 less than the Arab population. Palestine should be continued under a mandate or some similar assignment of responsibility to a single power (presumably Great Britain; here there was some bantering discussion of United States refusal to accept any mandates after the last war) by whatever international organization that may be then set up. Under the central mandatory government there would be local Jewish and Arab communal governments; for example, Tel-Aviv would be governed by the Jews; Jaffa by the Arabs; and areas with mixed populations perhaps by mixed commissions.

This latter point was developed by Dr. Bowman who went on to outline briefly the conception of a trusteeship for Palestine along the lines we have been discussing in the Department. Sir Maurice replied that he could not speak of course for the British Government, since Cabinet members totally unconnected with the foreign field were liable to have concrete, though sometimes extraordinary, opinions about the Palestine question, but that he could say that the Foreign Office would go all out for such a solution as that suggested by Dr. Bowman.

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96 Contained in a letter concerning the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine written by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur James Balfour, to Lord Walter Rothschild on November 2, 1917; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1913, vol. iv, p. 752, footnote 14.
Sir Maurice felt that a Palestinian state of this type might develop cultural and economic ties with the major Arab states but he did not contemplate the political inclusion of Palestine in any Arab union; he expressed considerable skepticism in fact on the subject of Arab unity and opined that we would not see political union among the Arab states in our day.

During this phase of the discussion Mr. Baxter mentioned that some Zionists in Britain are thinking of a possible fusion of Transjordan and Palestine with the idea that such fusion would placate the Arabs and allow room for Jewish administration and settlement. Mr. Murray also mentioned the thought which had been expressed in Zionist circles in the United States that the development of Iraq might encourage considerable Arab emigration from Palestine to that country and thus provide for expansion of Jewish settlement in Palestine.

Proposed Joint Statement on Palestine

Mr. Murray then recalled the efforts which had been made last year to secure the issuance of a joint Anglo-American statement on Palestine and inquired about the present British attitude. Sir Maurice replied that there had been a number of developments since last year; that the British Government had particularly desired to make clear that it had no intention of permitting or acquiescing in any changes brought about by force in the status of Palestine or in its administration; and that the recent outbreaks on the part of Jewish extremists had given them the occasion to demonstrate this attitude in no uncertain terms. He added, however, that the British Government is always prepared to join in the issuance of such a statement if it would be useful on the other side of the Atlantic. Mr. Murray said that he thought the issuance of such a statement should be determined principally by the possibilities of an explosion in Palestine which might deflect troops to that area to maintain order and that he wondered what the British estimate of the situation would be in that regard. Sir Maurice replied that he thought that the Arabs were on the whole satisfied with the White Paper and that they were conscious that their interests lay with a victory of the United Nations. Consequently, he did not fear trouble from them as long as the White Paper was maintained. With respect to the Jews he was a little less certain. He said that the Jewish extremists had murdered seven British policemen during the last few weeks and he did not think it unlikely that they might attempt to assassinate prominent British officials in that country. He said that the moderate Zionists deplored these outbreaks of the extremist elements but that they were either unable or unwilling to help much in their suppression. Referring particularly to the Stern gang, he characterized this as an underground
organization, the extent of which was difficult to estimate but said the Foreign Office thought its membership limited to about 200 to 250 persons.

**Attitude of Arabs toward Palestine**

[Here follows expression of personal views by Sir Maurice Peterson.]

There was some discussion of the Zionist resolutions recently introduced into the American Congress. Mr. Murray outlined the sequence of events in this connection and the attitude taken by the War Department and the Chief of Staff which had led to the indefinite shelving of the resolutions. Sir Maurice mentioned the Arab protests against the resolutions, explaining that His Majesty's Government had had nothing whatsoever to do with these protests despite reports to the contrary. Mr. Murray replied that there had indeed been an impressive Arab unanimity on this subject, but that the protests had all arrived after the stand of the military authorities had already caused the resolutions to be shelved.

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**Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs**

**British**

Participants: Sir Maurice Peterson, K.C.M.G.

Mr. C. W. Baxter, C.M.G., M.C.

Hon. R. M. A. Hankey

**American**

Mr. Wallace Murray

Mr. Foy D. Kohler

Mr. Robert Coe

London, April 19, 1944.

At today's meeting Sir Maurice reported that the draft statement on Palestine had now been discussed with the Colonial Office and other interested authorities. He said that the British had welcomed this opportunity of studying the matter again and would retain the draft on a basis for future discussions with the State Department; but that after thorough consideration they believed that it would be inadvisable to issue it at present. They felt that issuance now might well irritate rather than calm the Zionists in the United States and this was their principal worry. They do not expect any trouble, either from the Arabs or from the Jews in Palestine, which they will be unable to handle, despite the current activities of the Jewish extremists. If only the United States Zionists can be kept quiet the situation will remain under firm control.
Mr. Murray expressed appreciation of this exposition of the British position and agreed that if the British consider that there is no present threat of a blow-up in Palestine which would impede the war effort we should let well enough alone. He recalled in this connection that the British military at Quebec had been very concerned about the situation and very anxious to secure the issuance of a joint statement. As regards the question of Zionist agitation in the United States he felt that the pressure had been eased for the moment by the stand our own military had taken against the resolutions in Congress, but that the agitation might spring up again at any time. Sir Maurice said that he hoped not, but that it would be very useful to have the Department’s draft for consideration if there should be a recrudescence of American Zionist agitation.

840.48 Refugees/6–2644 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, June 26, 1944—6 p.m.
[Received 8:15 p.m.]

84. Palestine Government has informed Jewish Agency that British passport officer in Spain may grant immigration certificates to refugees in Spain, Portugal, and Tangier up to total 600 principal immigrants, although information has been received from London that Spain has now threatened to stop refugees entering Spain until those already there are removed. Government has declined to make additional allotment for Southern Italy, Yemen, and other safe countries except in unusual individual cases. British passport officer in Turkey continues to have authority to grant Palestine visas to bona fide refugees from occupied countries without referring cases to Jerusalem and with no numerical limitation except White Paper totals. Jewish Agency is pressing hard for certificates for refugees from Yemen now in Aden.

Pinkerton

867N.01/7–1844 : Telegram

The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Baghdad, July 18, 1944—1 p.m.
[Received 6:55 p.m.]

167. 1. Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 15 and the Prime Minister on the 16th told me that the members of the Iraqi Govern-

\(^{97}\) Arshad al-Umari.

\(^{98}\) Hamadi al-Fachachi.
ment were perturbed at the insertion in the Republican Party platform of a Zionist plank and said they hoped that the plank did not express the true feelings of the large number of American citizens who belonged to the Republican Party.

2. Foreign Minister said that the matter had been discussed in the Cabinet, that it had been decided to ban its publication in the local press at least for the time being in order to avoid the stirring up of resentment and that he had been deputized to suggest that I transmit to my Government the deep concern of the Iraqi Government lest the Zionists in the United States, taking advantage of the internal political situation, succeed in committing both major American political parties to a course of action which is not in accord with the principles for which the United Nations are fighting.

3. The Foreign Minister said that he appreciated that American political parties did not speak for the American Government, that a party platform was quite different from a Government policy. Nevertheless, pre-election commitments may have an influence upon post-election Government policies.

4. The Iraqi Government was convinced that the maintenance of really friendly relations between the Arab world and Great Britain and the United States was important to the development of the Arab countries. The policy of the Government was assiduously to cultivate those relations. However, if the British and American Governments under the pressure of Zionist schemers should turn Palestine over to Zionist control, no Government of Iraq could stem the wave of indignation which would spontaneously sweep the country. The Foreign Minister said that he felt he should be frank in saying that all that had been accomplished in building up friendly relations between Iraq and Great Britain and the United States would be instantly undone.

5. The Minister said that he was not making a protest since there was no ground for protest. He felt, however, that it was his duty to make clear the concern of his colleagues and himself and to let the American Government know of the serious nature of the problems the Iraqi Government would face if the Zionist plank of the Republican Party should become a policy of the American Government.

6. I thanked the Minister for his frankness and pointed out that he was quite correct in distinguishing between party platforms and

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99The statement of the Republican Party platform adopted at Chicago on June 27, 1944, was as follows: “In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women, and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of a Republican Congress in 1922 [June 30, 1922, Congressional Record, vol. 62, pt. 10, p. 9790], Palestine may be constituted as a free and democratic Commonwealth. We condemn the failure of the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provision of the Balfour Declaration and of the mandate while he pretends to support them.” (House Report No. 1997, 78th Cong. 2d sess.)
Government policies. I said that I hoped that the Government would bear in mind that in the United States no one speaks for the Government except the Government and that neither Government nor the Iraqi press should become unduly excited at statements that would be made during the coming campaign. I added that in making this statement I did not wish him to obtain the impression that I was given any intimation of what might eventually be the policy of the American Government towards Palestine. I did not know and I doubted whether anyone else in the United States knew precisely what that policy would be, that in any event the United States at present was not determining or carrying out Palestine policy.

HENDERSON

867N.01/7-1844

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] July 26, 1944.

I believe that you will be interested in the attached paraphrase of a telegram from our Minister in Baghdad, Loy Henderson, summarizing conversations which he has had with members of the Iraqi Government regarding the Palestine plank in the Republican platform. (This plank is similar to that just adopted by the Democratic Convention and in effect provides for free immigration into Palestine and the creation there of a Jewish State.)

You will note that while the Iraqi Government appreciates the fact that a party platform is not the same as a Government policy, the Cabinet decided to ask Mr. Henderson to inform us that the Iraqi Government is deeply concerned lest the Zionists take advantage of the political situation in this country to commit both major parties to a course which would not be in accord with the war aims of the United Nations.

I have no doubt but that the reaction in the Arab world to the Democratic plank on Palestine will be similar, and in view of the strategic importance to us of the Near East, I believe that it would be advisable for leaders of both parties to refrain from making statements on Palestine during the campaign that might tend to arouse the Arabs or upset the precarious balance of forces in Palestine itself.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

1 The telegram printed supra.

2 The plank in the platform of the Democratic National Convention adopted at Chicago on July 24, 1944, reads as follows: "We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth." (House Report No. 1997, 78th Cong., 2d sess., p. 3.)
The First Secretary of Legation in Syria (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, August 3, 1944—5 p. m.
[Received 5:08 p. m.]

17. Prime Minister Jabri (in the absence of the Foreign Minister) sent for me this morning to express verbally and in a friendly manner the anxiety and even provocation which the statements on Palestine in the Democratic and Republican Party platforms have caused in Syria. Remarking that these statements have been a blow to American prestige here he mentioned the especially high esteem in which the United States has been held in this country since the days of the King-Crane Commission as expressed at that time in the overwhelming vote for an American mandate. He also mentioned the close cultural relations between our two countries; the moral as well as material interest which the United States has in maintaining Syria’s friendship; the fact that Syrians have been at the forefront of Arab movement; and in conjunction with our petroleum policy Syria’s very close friendship with Saudi Arabia. He likewise reviewed the familiar arguments regarding Arab rights in Palestine including that of the comparable justice of giving the United States back to the Indians.

The Prime Minister asked me to transmit the views of his Government to my Government which I said I would be glad to do notwithstanding the fact that the party platforms were unofficial and could not be considered as an expression of American policy. He said he was aware of this and was for that reason making a verbal rather than a written protest.

SATTERTHWAITE

867N.01/8-344: Airgram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, August 5, 1944—9 a. m.
[Received August 12—8 a. m.]

A–36. Reference my telegram no. 154 of August 2, 3 p. m. regarding the resolution on the Palestine question voted at the July 25 sitting of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies.


*Not printed.
A member of the Legation staff obtained from the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 1 a copy of the Arabic text of what was stated to be the official text of the resolution in question. It reads, in close translation, as follows:

The Lebanese Chamber of Deputies opposes any move which aims at the establishment of a Zionist National Home in the long-established Arab land of Palestine, for Lebanon considers itself directly threatened by the Zionist menace. The Chamber requests the Ministry to notify the ambassadors of the great Allied Powers of its decision, so that they may be kind enough to transmit this decision to the American, British, and French Governments. The Chamber considers that the principles of the Atlantic Charter are contrary to the idea of turning any part of the Arab Lands into a National Home for Zionism.

The Chamber of Deputies hopes that the Allied Powers will take the side of the Arabs in their just cause, and that they will take note of the feelings of the allied Arab countries.

Copies mailed to Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Algiers, Jerusalem and Naples for Murphy.

WADSWORTH

867N.01/8-1044 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, August 10, 1944.
[Received August 10—10:37 a. m.]

2363. Last night at Senate’s closing session Prime Minister Nahas in reply to a formal question by Senator Abdel Meguid Ibrahim Saleh Pasha made an important pronouncement on Egypt’s attitude toward Palestine question with special reference to electoral platforms of Republican and Democratic Parties.

Senator asked, “What action has the Government taken by diplomatic and other means respecting programs of political leaders in democratic USA which advocate ceding Palestine to Jews as national home when for 13 centuries that country has been an Arab patrimony?”

Prime Minister’s answer postponed several days by conferences in Alexandria stressed special interest he had always taken in Arabs of Palestine and his solicitude in defending their interests. Declared he had been increasingly aware of unfavorable public opinion manifesting itself in United States and had neglected no opportunity to protest to American Government.

Nahas then proceeded to enumerate his successive démarches.
(1) In January 1943 directed Egyptian Legation to transmit to
State Department his memorandum defending Arabs of Palestine and
stressing unfortunate effects of Zionist propaganda on Egypt and
Middle East.

(2) In March 1943 transmitted not [note] to Department urging
maintenance of status quo respecting immigration into Palestine urging
that persecuted European Jews emigrate to other areas capable
of absorbing them.

(3) In February 1944 pointed out that congressional resolutions
advocating termination of White Paper were flagrantly incompatible
with principles of Atlantic Charter submitting memorandum to this
effect through Egyptian Legation Washington and also stressing
unfortunate repercussions in Egypt of such measures.

(4) In March 1944 transmitted a similar message to United States
Government on behalf of Imam of Yemen.

(5) Later at time of officially sponsored Silver-Wise statements
exchanged views with American Minister here.

Declared that these various protests had had in some measure favor-
able results in that White Paper still applied and American Govern-
ment had given assurances that no decision affecting Palestine would
be reached without full consultation of Jews and Arabs.

Regarding declarations of Republican and Democratic Parties
Nahas continued:

“There is no doubt that they are of the utmost importance and
gravity for they indicate that American politicians have agreed that
Palestine shall be torn from its rightful Arab owners who have been
settled there for several centuries in order to offer it as bait to the
Jews. What is particularly regrettable is that this tends to shake the
confidence of the Arab peoples and of other small nations in the
promises made by the United Nations and particularly the United
States concerning the rights of peoples and the triumph of justice.

However we are not dealing with an act of government but with
an electoral campaign and international law does not permit in such
cases the official exchange of views by governments. That is why
although Mustapha Nahas, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs, has not been able to take official action in this regard he has
nevertheless not failed to protest strongly to the two American po-
itical parties as president of the Wafd Party and leader of the
Egyptian people.”

Senator thereupon thanked Prime Minister for his enlightening
address declaring that humanitarian public opinion was appalled to
see the leading politicians of a great democracy making statements
at variance with former promises and with that country’s declared
principles which for the past 4 years have given hope to all peoples
who aspire to liberty and independence.
The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Baghdad, August 18, 1944.
[Received August 30.]

Sir: I have the honor to attach hereto a memorandum which contains a summary of statements made to me on August 10, 1944, by Arshad al-Umari, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, outlining the policy which the Iraqi Government has decided to adopt with regard to the activities of Zionists in the United States.

It will be observed that the Iraqi Government plans to prevent the appearance at least during the next few months in the local press of articles criticizing the United States and Great Britain because of the activities of Zionists in those countries and hopes after the American presidential elections have taken place to establish in cooperation with other Arab countries bureaus in the United States and Great Britain for the purpose of explaining to the public the Arab side of the Palestine problem.

The Foreign Minister in outlining the decisions of the Iraqi Government in this respect to the British Chargé d’Affaires added that it was hoped that Nuri Pasha, the former Iraqi Prime Minister, might be appointed Iraqi Minister in London where he would be in a position to play an important role in directing the work of the Arab bureaus and in explaining the Arab cause to the British Government and people.

The fact that there has been a decline in references in the Iraqi press to the Zionist planks in the platforms of the Republican and Democratic Parties indicates that the Iraqi Government is already applying its new policy. Among Iraqis interested in international affairs these planks continue to be the favorite topic of conversation.

Respectfully yours,

Loy W. Henderson

867N.01/8-3144: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson)

Washington, August 31, 1944—6 p. m.

154. Department has been informed by OWI that a report has been received from OWI Baghdad to the effect that the Iraqi Government censorship is planning to release in the near future a “deluge” of press accounts received through Reuters respecting statements made by Americans in favor of Zionism.

*Not printed.
*Geoffrey H. Thompson.
*Office of War Information.
If circumstances warrant, you should discuss this matter with the appropriate authorities with a view to clarifying this matter locally. On the assumption that the censorship is British controlled, you might wish to point out to the local British authorities that any attempt, such as appears on the basis of the report under reference to be under contemplation, to initiate a campaign which would have the effect of discrediting the United States in the Arab world would clearly be contrary to the spirit of joint American-British cooperation in the Near and Middle East as set forth in the Department's telegram no. 80 of May 17, 10 p. m. and other instructions on this subject.

You may also wish to point out in this connection that members of the British Government have on many occasions expressed to members of this Government their concern at the possible repercussions which Zionist activities in the United States might have upon the political situation in the Near East as well as their hope that it might be possible for this Government in some way to curtail those activities. It would clearly be inconsistent with the attitude of the British Government in this regard if the British officials in question were to contribute in any way to the undoubtedly harmful effects which the release of a sizeable volume of pro-Zionist statements attributed to American leaders would have upon the situation in Palestine and in the neighboring Arab countries.

You should bear in mind in this connection that a distinction is to be drawn between statements which may have been made informally by various persons in the United States, in Government circles as well as in private life, on the one hand and on the other the formal attitude of this Government toward the Palestine question, as set forth in such recent instructions as the Department's telegram no. 34, March 15, 6 p. m. to you and the Department's 657, March 28, 9 p. m. to Cairo, repeated to you.8

HULL

840.48 Refugees/8-3144: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, August 31, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 9:34 p. m.]

123. Retel 84, June 26, 6 p. m. Total Jewish immigration to Palestine for first 7 months of 1944 was 9,348 which included 5,290 from

8 See footnote 7, p. 7; for correspondence regarding the exchange between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding cooperation of the two Governments in the Near and Middle East, see pp. 6 ff.

8 See footnotes 77 and 85, pp. 591 and 597, respectively.
Europe. State of White Paper quota as of July 31 was as follows: 18,000 vacancies against which there were commitments amounting to about 12,000 leaving actual vacancies of about 6,000. These commitments were 5,000 certificates allotted to protecting power for veteran Zionist party members, persons escaping from Rumania for whom 2,000 reserved for next 2 months, and about 5,000 for unused past quotas including 2,000 provisionally reserved for wives of soldiers, deserters from armies rec [etc?]. Refugees through Turkey continue to be admitted without numerical limitation but persons from liberated territory and safe countries including Spain, Portugal and North Africa admitted only in unusual individual cases approved in Jerusalem. Jewish Agency continues to press for allotment covering Yemenite refugees now in Aden as it understands Aden Government may return them to Yemen unless provision is made for their maintenance which has heretofore been arranged by Joint Distribution Committee. JDC has advised Agency it will not be able to continue beyond September 3.

Immigrants charged against quota of 75,000 to July 31 were 37,000 legal and 20,000 illegal immigrants.

Pinkerton

867N.01/9-544 : Telegram

*The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

Baghdad, September 5, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received September 5—12:30 a. m.]

201. 1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me today that his Government had been informed that Zionists had handed the Dumbarton Oaks Conference 10 a memorandum demanding that a Jewish national state be established in Palestine, that his Government could not permit such a document to remain unanswered, that it was therefore instructing the Iraqi Legation in Washington in case it was confirmed that the Zionists had actually made a démarche to reply in behalf of the Iraqi Government.

2. The Minister thereupon read to me a draft of the reply which he planned to send to the Iraq Legation and asked if I had any suggestions. The draft was comparatively restrained in tone and contained the usual Arab arguments against the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. I said that I knew nothing whatsoever regarding any Zionist approach to the Conference and that in any event I did not believe that the agenda of the Conference would permit to con-

10 See vol. I, section entitled “Preliminaries to the establishment of an international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security”, part II, Dumbarton Oaks Conversations.
sider such a memorandum. I said that it might be wise for the Iraqi Minister in Washington before submitting a reply to endeavor to ascertain by informal inquiry in the Department of State whether such a Zionist document if submitted could properly be incorporated in the proceedings of the Conference. It might be preferable for the Legation not to undertake to reply to a document which was not being made a matter of record. The Minister indicated that he could adopt my suggestion. It is possible, therefore, that the Iraqi Minister may in the near future make appropriate inquiries in the Department.

3. During our conversation the Minister stated that in pursuance of the policy of the Iraqi Government as outlined by him in our conversation of August 10 (redes 399, August 18,) the Iraqi Government would make every effort to prevent the Iraqi press from learning or at least from discussing any protest which might be submitted. His Government has determined that until after the American elections at least the Iraqi press would not be used in a campaign against pro-Zionist activities in the United States.

4. I told him that I had informed my Government of his remarks to me of August 10 and that my Government was appreciative of the efforts of the Iraqi Government not to permit Iraqi displeasure at Zionist activities in the United States to express itself in a senseless press campaign which might stir up feeling among the Iraqi Arabs of unfriendliness against the United States—feelings which would not be in the interests of either the United States or Iraq. I added that I had recently heard a rumor which I was not disposed to credit to the effect that the Iraqi censorship authorities were planning to release a number of articles containing pro-Zionist statements made by a [sic] prominent American citizens. The Minister replied that such a rumor was of course without basis and that the policy of present Government as outlined to me had undergone no change.

5. In view of the Minister's statement to me and of the restraint which the Iraqi press has been showing in dealing with American pro-Zionist activity I am inclined to believe that in spite of the report referred to in the first paragraph of Department's 154, September 1 [August 31] the Iraqi Government is not contemplating any kind of a campaign in the immediate future which will tend to arouse feelings against the United States. Undoubtedly the Iraqi Government censorship is holding numerous press accounts from abroad respecting statements made by Americans in favor of Zionism. I would be surprised, however, if these statements are released in the immediate future. Various conversations which I have had with the British Ambassador \textsuperscript{11} and the British Chargé in the last few months cause me to believe that the British Embassy would not encourage at the

\textsuperscript{11} Sir Kinahan Cornwallis.
present time any kind of a press campaign against the United States based on American Zionist activities. Zionists are also not inactive in Great Britain.

6. I took occasion during the course of my conversation with the Foreign Minister again to draw his attention to the attitude of the American Government towards the Palestine question as outlined in Department's 34, March 16 [15] to me and 657, March 28 to Cairo.\textsuperscript{12} The Minister expressed his appreciation of this reminder.

HENDERSON

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson)

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1944—1 p. m.

163. RELegs 201, September 5, 7 p. m. It is likely that the Foreign Minister referred to a memorandum which was reported in the press to have been submitted to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on August 25 by the new Zionist organization of America (Revisionists). There is no record, however, of the receipt of such a memorandum nor is there any indication that any statement was submitted by the regular Zionist organization.

Department has not been approached by Iraqi Legation in this regard. You may, if you deem it desirable, inform the Foreign Minister of the foregoing, and you should in this connection point out that in any event the informal conversations being held at Dumbarton Oaks are concerned entirely with the principles of a general international organization, and no questions of a territorial character are being considered. You may also in your discretion convey to the Foreign Minister the Department’s appreciation for the policy of restraint mentioned in your despatch no. 399\textsuperscript{13} as well as your telegram under reference.

HULL

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray)\textsuperscript{14}

[WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1944.

This Military Attaché report from Beirut\textsuperscript{15} is of considerable interest as illustrating the effect which continued tension in Arab-Jew-

\textsuperscript{12} See footnotes 77 and 85, pp. 591 and 597, respectively.
\textsuperscript{13} Dated August 18, p. 610.
\textsuperscript{14} Addressed to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State.
\textsuperscript{15} Dated August 11, not printed; Maj. Virgil A. Jackson was the Military Attaché in Syria and Lebanon.
ish relations will have, not only upon the local situation in the Near East, but also upon the relationship between Soviet Russia on the one hand and Great Britain and the United States on the other.

The report summarizes a conversation which the Assistant Military Attaché had with the Assistant Chief of the British Security Mission for Syria and Lebanon, who made the following points:

1. Continued unrest between Arabs and Jews affects not only the local situation but the over-all relationship between the United States and Great Britain on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other. The Arabs, suspecting that Great Britain and, to a larger extent, the United States may have "sold out" to world Zionism, are turning to the Soviet. More significantly, Russia is reciprocating as shown again by the recent recognition of Syria and Lebanon. It is to be noted that the Russian representative in the Levant States will reside in Moslem Damascus rather than in Christian Beirut.

2. Fundamentally the Arabs and Jews get on well together, and their hostility toward each other has been caused by the mistaken Allied policy of over-emphasizing Jewish aims.

3. The United States and Britain should give their strong support to movements for Arab-Jewish rapprochement such as that of Dr. Magnes, of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, so as to give full rein to the creative qualities of both peoples.

4. If such a policy is not followed, the extremists in both camps will gain control, and an equitable solution will then be impossible.

This report is just one of many indications which we continue to receive regarding the present tension in the Near East, and its implications for the future.

WALLACE MURRAY

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President Roosevelt to Senator Robert F. Wagner

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1944.

DEAR Bob: Knowing that you are to attend the forty-seventh annual convention of the Zionist Organization of America, I ask you to convey to the delegates assembled my cordial greetings.

Please express my satisfaction that, in accord with the traditional American policy and in keeping with the spirit of the "four freedoms," the Democratic Party at its July convention this year included the following plank in its platform:

"We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."

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18 Maj. Duncan D. MacBryde.
17 Lt. Col. C. Reid.
15 The Four Freedoms were enunciated by President Roosevelt in the State of the Union Message, January 6, 1941, Congressional Record, vol. 87, pt. 1, p. 44.
Efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable. I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim and if reelected I shall help to bring about its realization.

[Franklin D. Roosevelt]

867N.01/10-1944: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, October 19, 1944—4 p.m.
[Received 8:12 p.m.]

153. Arab reaction to recent American statements on Palestine\(^{19}\) has been heretofore restricted to rather mild newspaper editorials and private conversations protesting against them. There have been no organized protests. Yesterday afternoon, however, Arab Chamber of Commerce canceled appointment with Culbertson Mission\(^{20}\) members now visiting Palestine and said, “We would like this action of the Chamber to be read as a protest against the President’s pronouncement, and as a sign of our unlimited disappointment.” Mission left this morning for Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jaffa where it expects to meet Jewish and Arab organizations and upon its return I will report as to its reception in those cities. Mr. Culbertson himself has not yet arrived in Palestine.

Pinkerton

867N.01/10-2144: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, October 21, 1944—5 p.m.
[Received 7:44 p.m.]

156. Retel 153, October 19, 4 p.m. Members of Culbertson Mission visited Haifa October 19 where meeting with Arab Chamber of Commerce was scheduled but this meeting was cancelled. Chamber addressed letter to this Consulate which was received 1 day after time of meeting saying “We cannot but accept the one and only interpretation of such political influence as Jewish complete mastery of the

\(^{19}\) See letter from President Roosevelt to Senator Wagner, October 15, supra; for statements by Governor Thomas E. Dewey and others, see footnotes 21 and 24, pp. 617 and 618, respectively.

\(^{20}\) For correspondence regarding the Special Economic Mission to the Middle East, headed by William S. Culbertson, see pp. 38 ff.
economic, social and political life of America and, therefore, as no useful purpose would be served by the meeting of the Arab Chamber of Commerce of Haifa with the American delegation the Chamber has decided not to meet the delegation.  

Arab press has been increasingly drastic in its criticism but formal protests have not been made to this Consulate by Arab organizations or individuals other than letters from Jerusalem and Haifa Chamber of Commerce.

PINKERTON

867N.01/10-2144 : Telegram

**The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State**

**BAGHDAD, October 21, 1944—10 p.m.**

[Received October 22—1:58 p.m.]

230. See Legation's 201, September 5. Dewey's recent statement regarding Palestine has created a sensation in Iraqi Government circles.  

I have been reliably informed that the Prime Minister after referring to it with considerable heat stated during a personal conversation that Iraqi Government and Arab nationalist circles in Iraq had been following a policy of ignoring pro-Zionist utterances on the part of leading American officials and citizens on the ground that such utterances should not be given face value during an American electoral campaign, that however while the Arabs were remaining quiet the Zionists were endeavoring irrevocably to commit the future American administration to the carrying out of the Zionist program and that he did not believe that it would be possible much longer to restrain the Iraqi press from commenting on the wooing of the Zionists by American political leaders of both parties.

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21 On October 12, 1944, Governor Thomas E. Dewey, of New York, the Republican candidate for President, issued the following statement:

"I heartily endorse the Palestine plank in the Republican Party platform. Again I repeat what I previously stated to the great leader of the American Zionist movement and distinguished American, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, that I am for the reconstitution of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth in accordance with the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of the Republican Congress in 1922. I have also stated to Dr. Silver that in order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jews driven from their homes by tyranny, I favor the opening of Palestine to their unlimited immigration and land ownership.

"The American people have time and again declared themselves in favor of these principles. The Republican Party has at all times been the traditional friend of the movement.

"As President I would use my best offices to have our Government working together with Great Britain to achieve this great objective for a people that have suffered so much and deserve so much at the hands of mankind."  (H. Rept. 1997, p. 3; copy filed in Department under 867N.01/12-244.)
(2) The recent letters of Sumner Welles,22 Ickes 23 and Stimson 24 regarding Palestine have added to the irritation of those Iraqis who have known about them.

(3) Several days ago the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that the Dewey statement as reported by Reuters and the Egyptian press but not thus far published in Baghdad had deeply angered local Arab leaders. He said that the President of the Senate was planning to send a telegram to Dewey on the subject. British Ambassador tells me that Prime Minister also mentioned the matter to him and that he informed the Prime Minister that in his opinion it would be wiser to ignore Dewey's statement at least for the time being.25

(4) The recently established leftist pro-Soviet newspaper Ash Sha'b yesterday broke the silence which has been observed by the Iraqi press with regard to Zionist propaganda in the United States with a series of brief articles summarizing the statements made by Dewey, Welles, Ickes and Stimson. The statement credited to Welles that the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine should be a part of the future peace appears particularly to have attracted attention since Welles is regarded here more as an authority on American foreign policy than a politician.26 The statement credited to Stimson that the solution of the Palestine problem will undoubtedly depend upon "political considerations" is regarded here as a signal for the Zionists to begin to press their cause with all the weapons at their disposal. No other Baghdad newspaper has thus far referred to these various statements and no editorial comment has appeared.

(5) A Foreign Office official told me this morning that Foreign Office had just received a Reuters dispatch stating that in view of President's statement on Palestine, Arab Chambers of Commerce in Palestine had decided to boycott the Culbertson Mission. In reply to his question I said that I had no knowledge of any recent statement made by the President on the subject of Palestine. He also told me that the articles referred to in paragraph (4) of this telegram had been taken from the Egyptian press and had been published without the knowledge of Foreign Office. There was no intention of changing

22 Former Under Secretary of State.
23 Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior.
24 Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, had written a letter on October 10 to Senator Robert A. Taft withdrawing his earlier objection to the proposed Palestine Resolution, stating, "In my judgment, political considerations now outweigh the military, and the issue should be determined upon the political rather than the military basis." (867N.01/12-244)
25 A telegram of protest was sent by the Presidents of the Iraqi Senate and Chamber of Deputies to Governor Dewey on October 19 (867N.01/10-2644).
26 In transmitting this telegram to the Under Secretary of State, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs commented: "It is interesting to note that according to our Minister in Baghdad, Loy Henderson, particular attention has been attracted by Mr. Sumner Welles' statement as he is regarded in Iraq as an authority on American foreign policy rather than a politician." (867N.01/10-2614)
the policy of press silence laid down by the Foreign Minister at least until his return within the next few days following which the matter would probably be reconsidered in the Cabinet. He added that since Egyptian newspapers are giving wide publicity to pro-Zionist statements of rather responsible American Government officials and other prominent Americans it was becoming increasingly difficult for the Iraqi Government to restrain the local press.

Henderson

867N.01/10-2344

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 27

[WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1944.

I believe that you will wish to note the two attached telegrams from Jerusalem 28 regarding the action of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Jerusalem and Haifa in cancelling meetings which had been scheduled with the Culbertson Mission.

That this action was taken in protest against the President’s recent message to the Zionists is quite evident from the statement of the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem to the effect that:

“We would like this action of the Chamber to be read as a protest against the President’s pronouncement, and as a sign of our unlimited disappointment.”

[Here follows additional quotation and comment based on telegram 156.]

Episodes of this kind may, if they spread to other parts of the Arab world, create a very serious problem for American interests in that area. To be specific, if King Ibn Saud ever adopts this form of reasoning, our great economic stake in Saudi Arabia might well become so compromised that our efforts through ordinary diplomatic channels to protect our interests there might be unavailing.

Wallace Murray

867N.01/10-2344

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 27

[WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1944.

Referring to recent developments on the Palestine question, I wish to call your attention to the attached Daily News Bulletin of the

27 Addressed to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State.
28 Telegrams 153, October 19, 4 p. m., and 156, October 21, 5 p. m., p. 616.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency which purports to give on page 3 the text of the statement made by Congressman Bloom on October 15 regarding the Palestine resolutions.

You will recall that Mr. Bloom was reported in the press to have announced that hearings on the resolutions would be resumed next month. The attached article, however, attributes to him the additional statement that:

"... In view of the approval of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War I have no doubt but that the resolution will be favorably reported by the Foreign Affairs Committee without delay."

While the recent letter of Secretary Stimson to Senator Taft withdrawing the War Department's objections to the Palestine resolution might be interpreted as indicating approval of the resolutions, it is not, of course, correct that you have ever given your approval, and when the occasion arises you may accordingly wish to bring this to Mr. Bloom's attention.

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.01/10-2644: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1944—3 p. m.

8925. Department is informed by JDC30 that British Government in London has approved allotment of 10,300 additional Palestine immigration certificates, to be distributed as follows: 3,200 for children (comprising 1,000 for Switzerland, 2,000 for France and 200 for Belgium); and 7,100 others (comprising 5,000 for Rumania and Bulgaria, 1,000 for the Yemen, 900 for Italy and 200 for Turkey); these 10,300 certificates to be issued at the rate of 1,500 monthly for each of the 3 months of the present quarter (October, November and December) without decision as to the subsequent rate of issuance. JDC states that this appears tantamount to the using up of the outstanding certificates under the White Paper quota, that it was taken following a recent interview between Weizmann and Premier Churchill, and that it portends an early decision regarding the political future of Palestine, possibly in the direction of partition.

Please report promptly any confirmation of the foregoing which you may be able to obtain informally.

30 See footnote 24, p. 618.
3 Joint Distribution Committee.
PALESTINE

Sent to London repeated to Jerusalem as No. 174 with reference to its No. 123, August 31, 6 p.m.

STETTINIUS

867N.01/10–2744 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, October 27, 1944—noon. [Received 12:55 p.m.]

30. The Syrian public and press are expressing increasing alarm over statements of Roosevelt, Dewey and other American statesmen advocating a Jewish Commonwealth and unrestricted immigration into Palestine as American electoral campaign draws to its close. Former students of the American University at Beirut and of American universities now holding prominent positions are particularly disturbed and have taken the lead in organizing an association to carry on counter-propaganda in defense of Arab cause in Palestine. According to reliable reports a demonstration in protest will be held in Damascus, November 2, the anniversary of Balfour Declaration.

The Syrian Government itself has not as yet made any new official démarche (see my 17, August 3) presumably because of its preoccupation with more immediate political problems but is the subject of some criticism for its failure to do so.

The press is giving increasing prominence to this question and has published conspicuously the various declarations of American statesmen defending Zionism and particularly the decision of Arab Chamber of Commerce in Palestine to boycott the Culbertson Mission. Practically all local newspapers are devoting their daily editorials to the subject in which they repeat the various arguments previously reported and note especially their disillusionment at the alleged disregard of Arab rights in Palestine by American politicians for the purpose of winning votes. They repeatedly assert that the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms are thus being utterly disregarded and ask why the Arabs should be the ones made to suffer as a result of German persecution of the Jews. The editorials also assert that these American statements are encouraging the terrorists in Palestine.

Inasmuch as most of the editorial comment gives favorable mention to the British position regarding Palestine there is a belief on the part of some well-informed Syrians that the campaign against the United States is receiving the active encouragement of the British press authorities.

SATTERTHWAITE
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1944.

MR. STETTINIUS: I believe that you will wish to note the attached extract from the Daily News Bulletin of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, which carries an item (page 2) dated October 25, 1944 from Cairo stating that as a result of recent pro-Zionist manifestations in this country the Cairo newspaper Al Wafd al Misri has proclaimed a boycott of American goods and has called on the entire Egyptian press to take similar action. While we do not as yet have any further details regarding this development, it is significant of the growing reaction which is appearing in the Near East as a result of certain recent declarations in the United States in favor of Zionism.

WALLACE MURRAY

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1944.

MR. STETTINIUS: I think you will wish to note with particular care the attached memorandum containing the highly important information, obtained from the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Ankara, that the Soviet official position is opposed to an independent Jewish state in Palestine.

If the Soviet Government continues in this attitude of opposition to Zionist ambitions in Palestine it may have far-reaching effects on the position both of ourselves as well as of the British in the Arab world. The prestige of the United States in the Arab world will undoubtedly seriously deteriorate by reason of recent official declarations in this country by the President and by Mr. Dewey supporting the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. The British have already been improving their position in the Arab world by pointing to the far greater official support given to Zionism in this country than is the case in Great Britain. If now the Soviet Government comes out opposing all Zionist ambitions in Palestine, it will have an electrical effect among the Arabs and will place us in a greatly inferior position to the British and the Russians in that area. When we think of our stake in Saudi Arabia alone, this situation should

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82 Not reprinted.
83 Sergey Sergeyevich Mikhailov.
cause us to do some very serious thinking regarding the future of our interests in the Arab world and particularly in Saudi Arabia.

WALLACE MURRAY

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 84

[WASHINGTON,] October 25, 1944.

Of unusual interest as indicating the attitude of Soviet Russia toward the Palestine question is the following extract from a memorandum 85 prepared by Mr. Hirschmann, who until recently was War Refugee Board representative at Ankara, following a conversation on October 3 with Mikhailov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy there. Mr. Hirschmann states:

"Early in the conversation, Mikhailov asked whether I had any opinion on the Arab Conference, which was currently in session in Alexandria with relation to Palestine. I replied that I was not familiar with the reasons for the convocation of the conference or the complex political situation in Palestine, but that I was planning to spend three or four days in Palestine with a view to learning something more about the country, the people and its possibilities; that Palestine was the one center where it had been possible to send homeless refugees; and that it interested me as a creative force in a world in the process of war.

"Mikhailov volunteered that he had spent some weeks in Palestine making a study and that he was convinced that the country could not justify its aims as an independent Jewish State; that it was economically unsound and politically unnecessary. 'With the United States treating its Jewish citizens as Americans, the British treating its Jewish citizens as Britains and the Soviet treating its Jewish citizens as Russians, there is no necessity in the future for a separate Jewish State,' Mikhailov stated. He asked whether I had any opinion regarding the British attitude towards the Arabs and the Jews from a political point of view. I stated that I did not; though I had read a number of conflicting articles about this. Mikhailov then adroitly indicated, by implication rather than by a categorical statement, that the British skirts might not be entirely clean where the Arab unrest was concerned.

"I stated that I had read in a magazine . . . 86 an article indicating that the Soviet policy regarding Palestine as an independent Jewish State had recently undergone a change in the direction of favoring such a State. Mikhailov stated that he did not know of this article or any propaganda tending to suggest this change. I then asked Mikhailov if he could tell me the official position of the Soviet Gov-

84 Addressed to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State.
85 Memorandum not printed; copy sent to Moscow in instruction 346, November 7 (not printed).
86 Omission indicated in the original memorandum.
ernment with regard to Palestine. After some hesitation, Mikhailov stated that the Soviet official position, as he knew it, was opposed to an independent Jewish State in Palestine in view of the lack of need for such a state in the new society and political orientation that would be developed in the future.

"I gathered from this statement that Mikhailov was indicating his own definite views which unquestionably must have some support in official circles; although my impression was that the subject was one which was under consideration and was probably not closed or settled in principle from the Soviet point of view.

"I referred again to the creative force and contribution that was apparently being made in Palestine as a good society, but these opinions apparently fell on barren soil."

We have every reason to believe that this interview provides a plausible indication of the official Soviet attitude toward Palestine, since it has been our belief for years that the Soviets were hostile to Zionism. In addition, the fact that the Arabs outnumber the Jews so overwhelmingly in the Near East as a whole would make it unlikely that the Russians, who undoubtedly are showing a greater interest in the area, would adopt a pro-Zionist policy in the face of clearly expressed Arab opposition.

WALLACE MURRAY

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1944.

MR. STETTINIUS: I have come to the conclusion that the reaction in the Near East to recent developments in this country affecting Palestine is going to have so serious an effect upon our foreign relations as to make it advisable for you to discuss this matter with the President at the earliest opportunity.

The Arabs of Palestine and Iraq have already protested, and it is most likely that this reaction will spread to neighboring Arab countries and will become intensified. Such a development will have such far-reaching effects upon our relations with the area that I feel you would be entirely justified in bringing it to the President’s attention, even at this time. In discussing this with him, you will, of course, wish to make it quite clear that we entirely appreciate the present domestic position. The endorsement of a Jewish state, however, goes beyond any previous official American pronouncements on Palestine, which have been limited to expressing sympathy with the idea of a

37 A reference to the presidential election campaign; the election was held on November 7, 1944.
Jewish national home rather than a Jewish Commonwealth. It is inconsistent, moreover, with the assurance which the President gave to King Ibn Saud on two occasions during 1943, to the effect that both Arabs and Jews would be consulted in the reaching of any definitive settlement of the Palestine question.\textsuperscript{38} Finally, on several occasions early in the present year the President authorized us to inform a number of Near Eastern Governments and political leaders that in the view of this Government no decision should be reached without full and prior consultation with all concerned, including both Arabs and Jews.

It is difficult to see how recent developments can be taken by the Arab countries as showing anything but a lack of good faith and an intention on the part of this Government not to carry out its previous commitments when political expediency dictates otherwise. Such an impression, if not speedily and completely counteracted, would seriously prejudice our ability to afford adequate protection to American interests in the Near East.

This does not only imply that our prestige, which has been declining for some months as a result of recent pro-Zionist manifestations in this country, will reach a new low in the Near East. It does not simply mean that the Department and the Foreign Service will be placed in a difficult position in attempting to promote American business and philanthropic interests in that area. It means, specifically, that the basic long-term American economic interest in Saudi Arabia will be seriously threatened and possibly jeopardized. King Ibn Saud, whose wholehearted opposition to Zionism has been made known in no uncertain terms, will now undoubtedly be inclined to question the sincerity of this Government's intentions toward Palestine as previously communicated to him. Since the King is in entire control of his country's policy, this in turn will have a very definite bearing upon our relations with Saudi Arabia and upon the future of the American oil concession in that country, which is of incalculable value to the present and future strategic requirements of the United States.

Another aspect of the matter which is rather disturbing is the effect which these developments will unquestionably have upon our position in the Near East vis-à-vis the two other great powers who are now interested in that area, Great Britain and Soviet Russia. The British, whose situation with regard to Palestine is admittedly a difficult one and who must realize the conflicting nature of the commitments which

\textsuperscript{38} See undated letter from President Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud (about June 12, 1943), \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1943, vol. iv, p. 790; see also telegrams 1307, July 23, 1943, 9 a.m., from Cairo, and 1039, July 31, 1943, 5 p.m., to Cairo, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 800 and 802, respectively, concerning remarks to be made to the King by Lt. Col. Harold R. Hoskins, on special mission for President Roosevelt to confer with King Ibn Saud.
they themselves have made regarding that country, welcome any development, such as this, which strengthens their own position with the Arabs by putting us in an unfavorable light.

Even more serious are the implications as far as Russia is concerned. We have had the most definite indications that the Soviet Union is showing growing interest in the Near East and that this is no temporary manifestation. The Russians are in effective occupation of a considerable portion of Iran, and we have recently received reports to show that they would like to expand their influence and gain some sort of long-term foothold, through the concession of a free port or by other means, upon the shores of the Persian Gulf. This, of course, would place the Russians within a very short distance not only of the oil fields in southern Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, but also of those in Bahrein and eastern Saudi Arabia.59

As far as the Soviet position toward Palestine is concerned, we have never had any reason to doubt that the Soviets were opposed to Zionism. We now, as you will recall, have pretty definite evidence that Soviet Russia opposes the creation of a Jewish state. This, of course, would be completely consistent with the recent manifestations of Soviet interest in the Arab world.

The situation as I have tried to outline it above is so serious that I have no hesitation in urging you to find an early opportunity to discuss frankly with the President its implications from a realistic point of view. Needless to say, I would be pleased to discuss this entire question with you at your convenience.

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.01/10–3144 : Telegram

The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, October 31, 1944—1 p. m.
[Received November 1—9:33 a. m.]

237. ReLegs 230, October 21. The Iraqi press continues to remain editorially silent regarding the subject of Zionist activities in the United States. The Conservative Arab nationalist an-Nida on October 24 carried a Reuters despatch reporting a statement by Rabbi Wise to the effect that the President in his capacity as a presidential candidate has promised to support unlimited immigration into Palestine and to send a message to the Forty-Ninth [Forty-Seventh] American Zionist Congress. The pro-royal family al-Bilad on October 27 published a collection of statements relating to Palestine ostensibly emanating from various parts of the world. These statements were

59 For correspondence concerning the Soviet interest in oil concessions in Iran, see pp. 445 ff.; regarding the Soviet interest in a free port on the Persian Gulf, see telegram 737, October 7, 3 p. m., from Tehran, p. 454.
so arranged that those showing sentiments in the United States favorable to the Zionists alternated with those indicating British support of the Arab cause. No other statements of this kind have thus far been published except those reported in my 230.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that these statements have been published without his knowledge and contrary to his directions and that he is again requesting the Ministry of Interior to keep stories of this nature out of the press, at least until after the American elections. He states that knowledge gained from articles condemning pro-Zionism in the United States which are appearing in the press of neighboring Arab countries and information gleaned from foreign radio broadcasts are rendering it increasingly difficult for the Government to restrain the local press.

3. The Minister says that he will be compelled to lift the lid after the elections. He will do everything possible to prevent a sudden avalanche of news on the subject and to prevail upon the press to handle pro-Zionist activities in the United States in such a manner as to create a minimum amount of resentment in Iraq against the Government and people of the United States.

He hopes that he will be successful in view of the importance to Iraq of the maintenance of friendly relations with the United States in convincing the press that it could best serve the Arab cause by concentrating its fire upon the Zionist cause, methods and activities rather than upon the United States and [apparent omission] Americans whose support of Zionism he is still convinced is primarily due to ignorance or misinformation. He points out, however, that if the United States Government actually begins to take steps to implement pre-election statements supporting the Zionist cause, Arab friendship for and trust in the United States will change instantly in spite of any restraining measures which the Government might take into a feeling of betrayal and into a resentment which will render further friendly relation impossible. Such a development, he says, might appear unimportant to a great power like the United States but it would represent a bitter defeat to those forces in Iraq who have been endeavoring to lead the Arab people along the paths of the great Western Democracies and who have been pinning their hopes for the future upon the maintenance of good will between the Arabs and the democratic Western World.

4. The Minister adds that he has reminded his colleagues who have been disquieted lest they find themselves facing a fait accompli in Palestine of the statement of the American Government to the effect that the settlement of the Palestine question should be taken only after a full discussion with the Arabs as well as the Jews.
The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Baghdad, November 1, 1944—6 p.m.
[Received November 4—2:23 p.m.]

238. Most Iraqis interested in international affairs, while cognizant of certain Zionist sympathies in the United States, have never really been convinced that the United States intended actively to espouse the Zionist cause. Recent information coming in from abroad by radio, press and word of mouth however is causing them for the first time to believe that the United States may have the intention to intervene in Palestine on behalf of the Zionists. As this belief is deepening their first reaction appears to be one of bewilderment accompanied by bitter disappointment and a feeling of betrayal; their second, growing resentment.

Their bewilderment arises from the fact that for many years most of the better educated and more progressive Iraqis have been accustomed to regard the United States as the one great power which could be trusted to strive for a fair solution of international problems. They fail to find principles in international justice or any factors connected with the preservation of world peace which would justify American support of Zionist demands. They find it difficult to reconcile themselves to the belief that the United States merely for the sake of internal political expediency is favoring a course in Palestine which in their opinion not only would be unjust, but would inevitably lead to bloodshed and to misery for all concerned. They can perceive no reason for the recent pronouncements and promises of American Government and political leaders who should have a complete understanding of the Palestine situation other than a desire to obtain the support of the American Zionists. They are asking whether it is possible that American foreign policy in the future is to be shaped in such a manner as to meet the demands of private pressure groups possessed of ample funds and exercising extensive control over American channels of information. Their disappointment arises not merely from their conviction that the [a?] victory for Zionist [Zionism?] would mean a death blow to their hopes for Arab unity but because they feel that the United States, the most idealistic of all the great powers, commits itself to following a policy in the case of Palestine which they find so inconsistent with the terms of the Atlantic Charter and other noble pronouncements of the United Nations; the general outlook in the postwar world for the Arabs is sure to be bleak. Those Iraqis possessed of Western education who have been hoping that Arab
civilization will look westward for its inspiration are particularly concerned. They feel that a loss of confidence by the Iraqi Arabs in the fairness and good intentions of the United States would effectively nullify the efforts of the advocates of a Western democratic civilization for Iraq, would strengthen the forces of autocracy and reaction, and would eventually throw Iraq if not also some of the other Arab countries into the arms of the Soviet Union which would at once extirpate all elements favoring the adoption by Iraq of the Western democratic way of life. Those groups which believe merger with the Soviet Union is the most desirable solution of all problems are making strenuous efforts to complete the disillusionment of those who are still inclined to look to the West for inspiration and guidance.

3. The swelling resentment has not as yet made itself manifest partly because there is still some hope that what appears to be a unanimous sentiment for Zionism in the United States will not transfer itself into concrete measures and partly because the Government has blocked the channels through which increasing Arab anger can readily be expressed. If the United States does take steps to implement the Zionist program the feeling in Iraq is likely to be more intense than in most Arab countries. The desire for Arab unity here is especially deep in part because it is closely linked with a desire for closer tie-up with the West—most politically conscious Iraqis desire their country to face the Mediterranean and beyond instead of the Persian Gulf, India and the Far East—in part because the fires of Arab nationalism have burned with particular brightness in Iraq ever since the days of Arab rebellion.46 As I have already pointed out, the Iraqis are convinced that the success of Zionism would mean a decisive defeat for the cause of Arab unity.

4. The British here do not appear to be particularly disturbed by the situation although the Ambassador and members of the Embassy have told me that they deplore the publicity which has been given to the American pronouncements. Certain British subjects particularly those engaged in commercial pursuits who have a dread of possible American trade rivalry are said to be pleased at growing Iraqi hostility towards the United States. A few of the more thoughtful Britshers, however, who realize that Arab loss of confidence in the integrity of the United States is likely to be accompanied by a disillusionment with regard to Western civilization as a whole and a consequent decline in British influence in this area, are becoming increasingly concerned.

HENDERSON

46 A reference to the Arab Revolt of 1916 against the Turks.
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 2, 1944—7 p.m.

[Received 11:07 p.m.]

9498. See the Department's 8925 of October 26, 3 p.m. We had occasion to discuss with the Foreign Office today the Palestinian situation. The Foreign Office does not anticipate any change in policy regarding the situation in Palestine, but an official said that "sooner or later" (when the immigration quotas have been exhausted) the British Government would have to reach a new decision on the problem. He did not believe that this would be before the early days of next summer. He said that it is obviously to the Allied interest to have a quiescent situation in the Middle East and that no chances could be taken that might lead to major disorders on the part of the Arabs.

The official said that the statements made during our presidential campaign on the Jewish question have not aroused as much reaction among the Arabs as had been expected.

We are attempting to confirm the figures contained in the telegram under reference.

GALLMAN

The Chargé in Syria (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, November 3, 1944—4 p.m.

[Received 6:50 p.m.]

31. Demonstrations protesting against a Zionist state in Palestine were held in Damascus yesterday the 27th anniversary of Balfour Declaration as foretold in my 30, October 26 [27]. They were, however, very orderly and the Government, apparently fearing that demonstrations might get out of hand and be used for political purposes, did not permit any portion of the city to be closed as originally planned.

The demonstrators were mostly composed of students and were addressed by the Prime Minister.41 One group of about 100 Moslem students marched to the Legation but caused no disturbance. Their representatives and those of the university students called on me, however, to protest against the statements of American politicians advocating a Jewish commonwealth. Two committees representing the association [of] organized former students of the American University at Beirut mentioned in my telegram No. 30 and another asso-

41 Faris el-Khoury.
cation of leading deputys and journalists also called and left notes of protest. A number of telegrams of protest were also received from various associations.

While earnestly defending their cause and expressing disappointment in the attitude toward Palestine of President Roosevelt, Dewey and others the visitors took pains to express their admiration and friendliness otherwise for the United States.

Satterthwaite

867N.01/11-444

The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray)

Baghdad, November 4, 1944.42

Dear Wallace: Please don't get the idea from my two long telegrams No. 237 and No. 238,42 relating to Zionism and the problem of Palestine that I have any intention of flooding the Department with telegraphic messages of this kind.

I am fully aware that my despatch of these two telegrams may cause certain members of the Department, and perhaps government officials outside the Department who see them to believe that I am attaching too much importance to the policy which we shall eventually adopt with regard to Palestine. Furthermore, the readers of these telegrams are likely to feel that I am rabidly anti-Zionist. I can only say that intervention by the United States on behalf of Zionists in Palestine would, in my opinion, adversely affect our relations with Iraq in every field. I have no intention of taking sides in the Palestine dispute. I am merely endeavoring truthfully to inform my Government what results might be expected in this area from its espousal of the Zionist cause. If it decides to do so, and I am so informed, I shall, of course, try in every possible way to soften the impact on Iraq. Such a task would not be easy, but I have faced tasks of a similar nature in other posts.

I sent in these telegrams because I had come to the conclusion that it was my duty to inform the Department with force and bluntness of the situation here as I see it. I felt that for me to mince words in order to save myself from hostile criticism would be cowardly. I did not send these telegrams until I had discussed them thoroughly with members of my staff and with representatives of OSS,44 OWI and of

42 Received about November 14.
43 Dated October 31, 1 p. m., and November 1, 6 p. m., pp. 626 and 628, respectively.
44 Office of Strategic Services.
the Military Attaché’s office. These telegrams, therefore, represent our consensus, not merely my personal views.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs spent more than two hours last Sunday morning, October 29, discussing the feelings in this country with regard to Zionist activities in the United States. Our conversation was friendly and informal. He made it clear that what he said represented his own personal views and that he was making no representations of any kind to me. He appears to be deeply disturbed because of the rapidly increasing influence of the Soviet Union in this area. He said that those left-wing pro-Soviet elements in Iraq who claim to have inside knowledge of Soviet foreign policy were assiduously spreading the news that the Soviet Union if necessary would intervene to prevent the United States and Great Britain from establishing a Jewish State in Palestine and that at the proper time the Soviet Union would demonstrate to all the world whom the true friend of the Arab was. He said that recent developments in Iran had greatly strengthened and encouraged friends of the Soviet Union in Iraq. He stated that he feared that Sa’ed would lose out in his struggle not to become a Soviet puppet and that this struggle would continue until the Government of Iran would degenerate into a mere Soviet tool.

The Foreign Minister continued that Iraq could not remain independent if it maintained close friendly relations with only one Great Power. That was one of the reasons why the Iraqi Government was so anxious to have relations with the United States as friendly as the relations which it has with Great Britain. If the American Government would prefer the support of the Zionists to the friendship of the Arabs, the Iraqis would have the choice of complete subservience to Great Britain or the establishment of close relations with the Soviet Union. Many of the more intelligent Iraqis were convinced that if Iraq is a British dependency the improvement in their political and economic conditions would be extremely slow, and would, therefore, turn to the Soviet Union which they had been taught during the present war to admire and regarding which they had little actual knowledge. He felt that in any struggle between the Soviet Union and Great Britain for predominance in Iraq, the Soviet Union would be the victor in view of its proximity and its willingness to make use of all weapons at its command in order to attain its international aims.

Sincerely,

LOY W. HENDERSON

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45 Col. Paul H. M. Converse was the Military Attaché in Iraq.
46 With regard to Soviet pressures being exerted upon the Iranian Government at this time, and in particular against the Prime Minister, Mohammed Saed, see pp. 415 ff., passim.
P.S. Now that I have told my story I shall settle down to the usual routine of reporting developments.

L. W. H.

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Temporarily in Washington

[WASHINGTON], November 4, 1944.

Referring to our conversation respecting the Soviet attitude toward Palestine and other Near Eastern matters, we have telegraphed to the Embassy in Moscow and have also drafted an airmail instruction along the lines which we discussed.47

I am attaching as of possible interest and as background for your forthcoming talk with the President on this subject a number of memoranda 48 which we have recently sent to Mr. Stettinius outlining the sharp reaction in the Arab world to recent pro-Zionist pronouncements in this country and the consequent effect upon our position in the Near East. Four of these memoranda are concerned specifically with the reaction of the Arabs, while the fifth summarizes the extremely interesting conversation between Mr. Hirschmann, of the War Refugee Board, and Mr. Mikhailov, of the Soviet Embassy in Ankara, regarding the attitude of Soviet Russia toward the Palestine problem.

When we consider that there are according to our best estimates about 50 million Arabs in the Near East and North Africa, as compared with half a million Jews in Palestine, it is not difficult to see why the Soviet Union, in pursuing a realistic and active policy in the Near East, should be inclined to give its support to the Arabs.

When the attached memoranda have served their purpose, we would very much appreciate your returning them, together with any comments which may occur to you.49

Wallace Murray

47 Telegram 2591, November 2. 11 p. m., and instruction 346, November 7, respectively, to Moscow, neither printed. The telegraphic instruction directed that the Department be furnished with "full coverage to press articles or other developments bearing upon what is evidently a growing Soviet interest in Near Eastern affairs"; the Chargé was requested further to furnish a report on information, said by Ambassador Harriman to be in the Embassy files, concerning the Soviet attitude on Near Eastern matters, especially the Palestine question (867N.01/11-244).

48 Five memoranda from the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to the Under Secretary of State: for those dated October 23 and October 27, see pp. 619 and 622, respectively; others not printed.

49 Apparently Ambassador Harriman did not make any written commentary.
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 8, 1944.

You will undoubtedly have noted the news flash which came over the ticker this morning to the effect that the assassins of Lord Moyne in Cairo have confessed that they were members of the Stern Gang and that they came to Egypt from Palestine for the specific purpose of killing him.

This incident, of course, is bound to have the most serious repercussions not only in Palestine, but throughout the Near East, since it serves to point up once again the underlying instability in the Palestine situation and the potential threat which is thereby presented to the security of the entire region. In the face of these developments it is difficult to see how the Secretary of War can claim, as he recently did, that the military situation in the Near East has eased to such an extent that the ventilation of the Palestine issue, for example by the reintroduction of the Congressional resolutions, would no longer interfere with the war effort.

On the contrary, I am more and more of the opinion that the question of security in Palestine is a very serious one and that ill-considered statements in this country for political purposes have indirectly contributed to the present insecurity by giving encouragement, albeit unwittingly, to the more extreme Zionist elements such as the assassins of Lord Moyne represent.

For your background, the Stern Gang (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) is one of the two principal secret, illegal Jewish military organizations in Palestine, the other being the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization). Both of these groups are made up of fanatical young Jews who are completely unscrupulous and who, as recent events have shown, will stop at nothing in what they consider to be a just battle for freedom from “oppression”, i.e., from the British administration. These groups are offshoots of the extreme right-wing of the Zionist movement, the Revisionists or New Zionists, and their training and methods are essentially totalitarian.

Information about the two organizations is hard to get because of their secret nature, but a British official told us recently that the Stern Gang had from one hundred to two hundred members and the Irgun about four thousand. The Stern Gang was formed about three years ago by one Abraham Stern, who was subsequently killed by the police. It is difficult to say today wherein the difference between the two

60 Lord Moyne, British Minister of State in the Middle East, resident at Cairo, was assassinated in Cairo on November 5, 1944.
groups lies, and, in fact, we have reason to believe that they are no longer distinct organizations, but rather are two parts of one secret terroristic organization which seeks the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine through the overthrow by violent means of the present administration there. It was the Stern Gang, you will recall, that boasted openly that they had tried (unsuccessfully) to assassinate the High Commissioner.\footnote{On August 8, 1944, an attempt had been made on the life of Sir Harold A. MacMichael, the retiring High Commissioner; Field Marshal Lord Gort’s appointment had been announced on July 19, 1944.}

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.01/11-944 : Telegram

The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Baghdad, November 9, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received November 10—2:05 p. m.]

244. The Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me today. He said that he wished to express the gratification of the Iraqi Government upon the reelection of President Roosevelt. The Iraqi Government had felt that it would be disastrous to the world for any change to take place in the Presidencies of the United States at this time. The Arabs continue to look to President Roosevelt for leadership in bringing about a peaceful post-war world based on principles of justice. He added that statements made during the presidential campaign had unfortunately been extremely discouraging to the Arab people. He then repeated his statements made to me previously as reported in the first 2 sentences of paragraph 3 of my 237, October 31. He said that the Arabs were now fully awake to the fact that if they did not exert themselves to the full the Zionists would be successful in closing the door to Arab unity. He added that it was his personal hope and that of his Government that the Arab struggle against Zionism would not adversely affect the friendly relations between the United States and the Arab countries.

2. The Minister referred to the publicity given during the last few days in the Iraqi press to a letter written by Senator Bailey\footnote{Apparently Senator Josiah W. Bailey, of North Carolina; letter not printed.} and a memorandum submitted to the Department by the American Council for the Jews\footnote{Not printed.} both of which opposed Zionist ambitions. He said that he had caused these documents to be published and that during the course of the campaign against Zionism, which would be conducted in Iraq, every effort would be made to give publicity to anti-Zionist statements made in America in order to combat the idea that America was irrevocably committed to Zionism.

Henderson
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] November 11, 1944.

I had an opportunity to talk with the President yesterday about the American position in the Near East and I suggested that he discuss the question of the Soviet policy with Ambassador Harriman. The President asked for a memorandum covering this whole matter and I agreed to send him one promptly. I would appreciate it if you would have something prepared which I might send to him. 54

[Here follows statement of administrative detail.]

EDWARD S[TELLINUS]

867N.01/11-1444 : Airgram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 14, 1944.

[Received November 21—1 p. m.]

A—1366. With reference to Department's telegram No. 8925, October 26, 3 p. m., and supplementing the last sentence of Embassy's telegram No. 9498, November 2, 7 p. m., the following information was received in a communication dated November 11, 1944, from the Foreign Office regarding the number of immigrants permitted by the Government of Palestine to enter that country, which confirms the figures set forth in the Department's telegram under reference:

"A re-allocation of part of the balance of places still available under the White Paper of 1939 has been made in the light of recent developments in the Balkans. It has been decided to provide for the entry into Palestine of Jews to the total of 10,300 persons as follows:

- Roumania and Bulgaria ....................... 5,000
- Italy ........................................ 900
- France (children) .......................... 2,000
- Switzerland (children) ................. 1,000
- Belgium (mostly children) ............. 200
- Yemeni Jews in Aden ...................... 1,000
- Turkey (mostly children)............... 200

Total 10,300 souls"

54 The rapidly changing situation in the weeks immediately ahead resulted in the discarding of two draft memoranda prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs before a final draft of December 4 was sent to President Roosevelt on December 13; see p. 648.
sphere as regards absorption of immigrants have been taken into account. Further, for the present not more than 1,500 immigrants will be permitted to enter Palestine in any one month from the 1st October; the monthly rate of entry may be reviewed at the 1st January, 1945 in the light of the position at that time."

GALLMAN

867N.01/11-1544

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1944.

Congressman Bloom has inquired what the attitude of the Department would be toward the reconsideration by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the proposed resolution on Palestine.55

The resolution looks forward to the free migration of Jews into Palestine and to the ultimate reconstitution of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.

Last spring the Foreign Affairs Committee deferred action on the resolution on the grounds that it might have an adverse military effect upon the conduct of the war. Secretary Stimson has since withdrawn his objections in a letter to Senator Taft, which has been made public.

867N.01/11-1744: Telegram

The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, November 17, 1944—6 p.m.
[Received November 23—11:20 a.m.]

251. Tahsin Qadri, Iraqi Minister at Beirut now in Baghdad, told me today that the new Soviet Minister to Syria and the Lebanon 56 has told him in confidence that the Soviet Government is unqualifiedly opposed to the Zionist program. ReDept's circular info tel November 14, 6 [10] p.m.57 Wadsworth is undoubtedly in a better position than I to evaluate the reliability of the Iraqi Minister.

Repeated to Beirut.

Henderson

55 In a memorandum of November 15 the Acting Secretary informed the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) as follows: "The President feels it would be a mistake to have the Palestine Resolution re-introduced at this time. I have advised Sol Bloom and Dr. Wise to this effect." (867N.01/11-1544)

56 In a meeting with the Acting Secretary on November 9, 1944, Dr. Stephen S. Wise, co-chairman with Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver of the American Zionist Emergency Council, had asked whether the Department would object to introduction of the Palestine Resolution into the current session of Congress. The Acting Secretary had told him that it was a matter he wished to discuss with the President.

57 Not printed. In reply to an inquiry from the Department, the Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) in telegram 277, December 6, 4 p.m., stated that he had been informed by the Iraqi Minister that the Soviet Minister had told him that the Soviet Union would do nothing to support Zionism. Mr. Wadsworth expressed confidence in the Iraqi Minister's statement.
The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, November 21, 1944—8 a.m.
[Received 3:30 p.m.]

3534. Some 500 members of various Arab groups, including Fuad Abaza’s Arab Union Society, Ikwan Al-Muslimin and representatives of neighboring Arab states including Tunisians and Moroccans, Christians as well as Moslems, assembled at Young Men’s Moslem Association on November 19 to consider telegram will [to] be sent to President Roosevelt protesting against American policy toward Palestine.

Speeches by Fuad Abaza Pasha, Allouba Pasha and other leaders emphasized following points.

1. Palestine question must be settled in a manner favorable to paramount Arab interests.

2. If Palestine is thrown open to Jews as national home it will be a source of constant trouble throughout Arab world after the war.

3. Roosevelt should, therefore, publicly retract Zionist declarations made during the campaign.

Text of conference’s telegram which has been [apparent omission] by United Press follows [in] airgram. It is learned that some of the speeches were couched in rather violent terms, Allouba, for instance, vowing that if the Jewish national home policy was not retracted he would be the first to denounce United States as a false champion of freedom and democracy. Another speaker was loudly acclaimed when he swore that Arab societies believed that American Zionism was more than just a vote-getting election formula and they would go “to any lengths” to support their Palestine brethren against Jewish encroachment. Atmosphere of the meeting was described as heated and observers believe it may be precursor of similar unofficial manifestations to come.

Copies to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem and Jidda by pouch.

Tuck

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, November 21, 1944—11 a.m.
[Received December 6—2 p.m.]

A–634. Reference Legation’s telegram no. 3534 of November 21, 8 a.m. Fuad Abaza Pasha called on me this morning bearing the Arabic text of the protest referred to in my above telegram. During

— See A–634, November 21, 11 a.m., infra.
the course of the conversation, it developed that for various reasons it had been decided not to send the telegram to the President, and one object of the visit appeared to be a hope of inducing the Legation to transmit it on his behalf. When I explained the impracticality of such a scheme, he gave me the Arabic text which reads in translation as follows:

"To the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, The White House, Washington.

"1. The Arabs, who are anxious to maintain cordial relations with America, do not wish to attach great importance to certain declarations regarding Palestine which were made during the recent political campaign, for they realize, on the one hand, that these declarations were made in abnormal circumstances and they consider, on the other hand, that the declarations contradict the spirit of justice sponsored by you and by the noble American Nation, and are prejudicial to the cause of peace for which America is fighting. Moreover, they are contrary to the right of Arabs to live freely in their own country.

"The American political campaign is now over, and Arabs expect you, Mr. President, to dispel their fears, restore their faith in American justice, and draw closer the bonds of friendship planted by American schools and nurtured by American teachings and doctrines in the Middle East.

"2. No country in the world has suffered a greater injustice than Palestine. From time immemorial it has been an Arab country. Jews entered it as invaders and only occupied it for a short time; for they were constantly at war with the aborigines, and other invaders soon drove them out until the Arabs, more than thirteen centuries ago, finally liberated the country and settled it.

"3. Palestine is, by the will of God and the patriotism of its people, an Arab country and will forever remain so. Seventy million Arabs, supported by three hundred million Moslems, are determined to redeem it with their lives. Neither the Balfour Declaration, nor the declarations of statesmen and the power of Zionism employing various measures of force and coercion can change the course of history or dissuade Arabs from defending Palestine and checking the tide of Zionism.

"4. Arabs have always sympathized with Jews in their afflictions in past, mediaeval and modern times, and history bears witness to this fact. But Zionism has met this kindness by conspiring against Arabs and attempting to wrest Palestine from them. This has naturally led to feuds and bitter feelings which have left no hope of reconciliation or mutual understanding.

"5. The project of installing Jews in Palestine will undoubtedly lead to permanent conflicts which will not only come to an end by one people destroying the other, not only in Palestine but in the whole East as well. This fact is worthy of your attention and the attention of all those who are anxious to establish universal peace and tranquillity in the future.

"6. Arabs cannot believe that Democratic America is capable of helping usurpers, encouraging injustice, sacrificing her reputation, repudiating her mission in this world, discarding her friendship with
the Arab world, and foregoing the moral and material interests which she has in Arab and Moslem countries, all for the sake of a race which is widely scattered in the world, and which only relies on the power of money for the realization of its designs.

“For the above reasons, Arabs meeting in Congress hope that you will uphold them in their own country and that Zionism will be given no support by you, your Government or your people.”

(Signed) The Arab Union Society,

Fouad Abaza Pasha, President
Assad Dagher, Secretary General.
The Young Men’s Moslem Association,
Dr. Dardiri, Secretary General.
Executive Committee of the International Arab Parliamentary Union Conference,
Mohamed Aly Allouba Pasha, President.
El-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin,
Hassan El-Banna, President.
Moslem Sefie Sects,
Shaikh El-Sayed Ahmed Al-Bakri, President.
Higher Committee for the Defense of Palestine,
Haned El-Meligui Bey, Secretary General.

Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem and Jidda.

TUCK

867N.01/11-2344

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 23, 1944.

Senator Wagner telephoned to me today from New York to inquire whether there was now any objection to the reporting of the resolutions regarding the Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. I told the Senator that at the request of Rabbi Wise I had discussed this matter with the President only a few days ago. I said it was the President’s considered judgment that in view of the recent murder of Lord Moyne in Cairo and the generally delicate situation in the Middle East, it would be unwise to bring out the resolutions at this time. I explained further that, as the Senator knew, the President would meet some time in the future with high representatives of other governments, and he was hopeful that at that time he could be helpful in arranging a suitable solution. Senator Wagner indicated that he would go along with the President’s views. I indicated that of course the President could not be quoted on this matter, but that I would explain the situation to Senator Connally, whom I expected to see within the next day or two.
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1944.

MR. STETTINIUS: A telegram from our Minister at Baghdad no. 251, November 17, states that the Iraqi Minister at Beirut, now in Baghdad, has told Mr. Henderson that the new Soviet Minister to Syria and Lebanon has told him in confidence that “the Soviet Government is unqualifiedly opposed to the Zionist program”.

I have, as you will recall, on several occasions pointed out that the attitude of the Soviet Government toward Zionist ambitions in Palestine, once that attitude becomes publicly known, will undoubtedly turn out to be the most important card in the deck.

The American Government and both political parties in this country have gone far out on a limb in support of Zionism despite the fact that the long-range interests of the United States clearly indicate the importance of establishing ourselves solidly in the good will of the Arab world and particularly in Saudi Arabia, where we have a great stake.

I discussed this situation with Mr. Harriman and found him deeply impressed with its significance. As you may know, he brought the matter up with the President and discussed it at length with Harry Hopkins.59

Soviet prestige is already rising in the Arab world like a star in the East. It requires no particular knowledge of the situation to predict that on the day when the Soviet Government publicly announces that it is opposed to Zionist ambitions in Palestine, both the British position in the Arab world and more particularly ours will start on the downgrade, and we shall eventually lose out altogether unless we have meanwhile shown by deeds and not merely words that we appreciate the importance of our relations with the Arab world of 50,000,000 people.

WALLACE MURRAY

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1944.

Senator Wagner called upon me this morning with Dr. Abba H. Silver. Senator Wagner had received your note on not pressing for the passage of the Palestine Resolution at this time. The Senator

59 Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.
still feels that no damage would be done by its passage now and that it does nothing more than endorse the statement you made to him on October 15 which I quote below:

"Efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable. I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim and if reelected I shall help to bring about its realization."

In the afternoon I went to Senator Connally's office to review the matter and informed him of your letter to Senator Wagner which I termed official. It has, therefore, been made clear both to Senator Wagner and to Senator Connally that it is felt it would be a mistake to allow the Resolution to pass at the present time.

The question will probably come up for discussion at a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow. My feeling is that Senator Wagner will still press for passage but that Senator Connally will be able to persuade the Committee not to take action at this time. He feels he has the situation in hand and that he will not have to ask me to testify. I shall advise you of the result.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: There recently came to our attention a letter, of which I am attaching a copy, from Dr. Weizmann the head of the World Zionist Organization to Rabbi Silver in Washington, giving some very interesting information regarding a recent conversation which Weizmann had with Prime Minister Churchill.

The highlights of this conversation were:

1. The British Government has not yet made a decision regarding the future of Palestine and nothing will be decided until after the end of the war with Germany.
2. Mr. Churchill, (whose sympathy to Zionism is well known), frankly recognizes the opposition to Zionism within the Cabinet but believes he can carry the day with the support of President Roosevelt. He stresses the need for American participation in the settlement.
3. Partition is under consideration, but no definite plan has evolved which will recognize the need, which Weizmann claims Churchill recognizes, for bringing one and one-half million Jews into Palestine in the next ten years.

69 Not attached to file copy of memorandum.
4. The Prime Minister was very critical of the opposition to Zionism advanced by certain American Jews such as Baruch.  

Dr. Weizmann accordingly urges upon Rabbi Silver that the two following steps be taken by American Zionists: 1) men like Baruch, Secretary Morgenthau, Eugene Meyer, Felix Frankfurter and Ben Cohen, should impress it upon the President that while they are opposed to the creation of a Jewish state, they desire unrestricted immigration into Palestine; and 2) a project like that of Dr. Lowdermilk of the American Department of Agriculture for developing Palestine’s resources should be endorsed by the President.

I am sure that you will agree with me that the comments of both Mr. Churchill and Dr. Weizmann regarding American participation in the Palestine settlement are of the greatest significance. We also have in this letter a very clear indication as to the policy which the Zionists are likely to follow in the next few months.

Wallace Murray

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

Washington, December 6, 1944.

The Foreign Relations Committee insisted that I appear this morning on five minutes notice to testify on the Palestine Resolution. Senator Connally telephoned me himself saying that unless I came up and made an official statement to the Committee for the Administration saying we thought this legislation was unwise at the present time, it would be immediately voted out favorably and we would have to take the responsibility. He said he had gone as far as he could.

I immediately went over and testified in secret session of the Committee, making clear that this was a highly delicate matter; that I would talk to them in absolute confidence; and that there might be serious repercussions if there was any violation of this confidence.

I explained the delicate situation in the Arab World; that you, yourself, had not yet had an opportunity to deal with this question as exhaustively as you have in mind; and that we felt that passage of the Resolution now would tie your hands and not leave you in a flexible position. The general sentiment of the Committee was that they would be willing to leave the entire matter in the hands of the Executive for the time being and not report out the Resolution. However,

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* Bernard Baruch, prominent financier and “elder statesman”.
* Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.
* Editor and publisher of the Washington Post.
* Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
* Benjamin V. Cohen, lawyer; holder of numerous and important legal positions in the Executive Branch of the Government at various times.
* Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
they insist on a public statement from the Executive, saying that in our judgment the passage of this legislation at this time would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation.

We must give Senator Connally a prompt answer since the Committee will meet again on Friday.

Would you please advise me by wire whether, because of the broad issues involved, you would be willing to make the statement, or whether you prefer that the statement be issued from the State Department.

The statement would be simply

"It is felt that the passage of the Palestine Resolution at the present moment would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation."

STETTINIUS

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 67

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1944.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee discussed the Palestine Resolution this morning but took no final action. It will consider the resolution again on Monday. Senator Connally read confidentially to the committee the following statement which we may issue if necessary; however, our decision as to whether to issue this statement will not be made until we see what happens on Monday.

"Resolutions pertaining to Palestine have recently been before the appropriate committees of the Congress, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has inquired as to the attitude of the State Department toward these resolutions.

The Department has the utmost sympathy for the persecuted Jewish people of Europe and has been assisting them through active support of the work of the War Refugee Board and in every other possible way. The Department considers, however, that the passage of the resolutions at the present time would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation, and has so informed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations."

The Zionist leaders have been told that we may issue this statement and they hope very much that it will not be issued. It is possible, therefore, that between now and Monday they may indicate to Congressional leaders that they will not push for the passage of the Palestine resolution at this time.

We have been in touch with Chairman Sabath of the House Rules Committee and he informed us very confidentially that he may be able to get that committee to defer action on the House resolution.

67 President Roosevelt was at Warm Springs, Ga., at this time. Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
If you have any suggestions would you be good enough to give them to me by wire. 68

E. R. STETTINIUS

867N.01/11-1044

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 8, 1944.

These two despatches from Beirut and Damascus, 69 respectively, give further information regarding the reaction in the Near East to pro-Zionist statements in this country and are worth your glancing through if time permits.

Our Minister at Beirut, Mr. Wadsworth, says that the reaction in Lebanon was one of “shocked disillusionment that the author of the Four Freedoms, joint author of the Atlantic Charter and champion of democracy should have so sacrificed principles for votes”. His despatch summarizes the press comment and describes a mass meeting in Beirut attended by some two thousand persons. Mr. Wadsworth also transmits several protests, including one from the students of the American University at Beirut which is remarkable for its restraint.

The second despatch, from our Chargé at Damascus, fills in the picture by showing that the reaction in Syria was parallel to that in Lebanon and that the press constantly referred in this connection to the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms.

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.01/12-1144

Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 11, 1944 70

Resolutions pertaining to Palestine have recently been before the appropriate Committees of the Congress, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has inquired as to the attitude of the Department of State toward these resolutions.

68 Subsequently the Secretary of State received from the White House a memorandum dated December 9 concerning a telegram from President Roosevelt which read: “I think your course in regard to the Zion Resolution is just right.” (Hyde Park files)
69 Despatch 559, November 10, and despatch 193, November 15, neither printed.
70 Text sent to Cairo in telegram 3596, December 11, with request that it be repeated to Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus and Jidda; a separate telegram, No. 263, was sent on the same date, to Baghdad.

The Secretary read this statement while testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on December 11, in opposition to the proposed Palestine resolution; the Committee voted 10 to 8 to take no action on the resolution but asked the immediate issuance of the statement.
The Department has the utmost sympathy for the persecuted Jewish people of Europe and has been assisting them through active support of the work of the War Refugee Board and in every other possible way. The Department considers, however, that the passage of the resolutions at the present time would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation, and has so informed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

867N.01//12-1344: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 13, 1944—10 p. m.
[Received December 14—6:50 a. m.]

4812. ReDeptel 2757, November 30, 2 p. m. The Embassy has little direct information other than that already available to the Department of the Soviet attitude toward Palestine, Zionism, the Arab union movement, and Soviet policies generally on Near Eastern questions. We have however come to the following conclusions based on the information available and the general trends of Soviet policy:

Specifically regarding the conversation of Mr. Hirschmann with the Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Ankara covered by the Department’s instruction to Moscow No. 346 of November 7 we have every reason to believe that the Soviet official correctly interpreted Soviet policy toward an independent Jewish state in Palestine and the Soviet attitude generally toward the Jewish question. The absence of editorial comment in the Soviet press on these questions leads to the conclusion that either the Soviet Government considers it premature to take a definite position or that a definite line has not yet been established on the highest [apparent omission]. It may be assumed however that the newly established diplomatic missions in Arab countries are privately circulating the views expressed by the Soviet official. The aims would appear clear, namely to create an atmosphere of friendship for the Soviet Union in the Arab world, to break down existing suspicions of and hostility to Soviet Communist doctrine, and to obtain Arab support in furthering any specific Soviet objective which may develop. Mr. Shchiborin, recently appointed Soviet Minister to Egypt, has guardedly questioned me regarding the campaign statements of the President and Dewey in respect to Palestine and in-

71 Copy transmitted to President Roosevelt under cover of a memorandum by the Secretary of State, December 19 (not printed).
72 Not printed; it repeated a request made initially in telegram 2591, November 2, 11 p. m., to Moscow (see footnote 47, p. 633).
73 Not printed; see footnote 47, p. 633.
dicated that he was familiar with the adverse reaction among Arabs. I doubt whether the Soviet Government wishes to come out openly against American and British policies in this connection at this time. On the other hand we may be sure that the Soviets will use this issue to increase Soviet influence to the detriment of Great Britain and the United States among the Arab states. The reason for Soviet reluctance to come out in the open may be their consistent desire not to weaken the relationships with their major Allies in the prosecution of the war and for the peace, and also the Soviets may wish to await a more precise formulation of American and British policy on Palestine. A step for increasing Soviet prestige in the Arab world has been the development of the recently established diplomatic missions in Arab states. The activities of these missions can best be reported by our own diplomatic missions in these localities. It may be expected however that the size and competence of these missions will expand and the penetration of Soviet concepts and accomplishments increase. The affinity with the Moslems in the Soviet Union will be emphasized and Soviet success in improving the economic situation of these people will undoubtedly be effectively used. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Soviets appear to be using the close affinity of the various peoples within the Soviet Union with those of the Near and Middle East to provide convenient channels of contact. These include the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Turko-Tartar peoples, as well as in the religious field the Orthodox Christians. The Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem have recently been invited to attend the forthcoming election of the new Russian Patriarch. Although the Soviets may find it difficult to support all of these conflicting groups it is in accordance with Soviet tactics to cultivate them all in order to break down the prejudices of a generation and to create sympathetic interest in the Soviet Union.

On the Arab union movement there has been only one brief item in the press reporting the establishment of the league of independent Arab countries at the Alexandria conference last October. The Soviet attitude probably conforms to the general Soviet view on the subject of international blocs: Favorable if the Soviet Union can dominate the bloc, strongly opposed if it is outside the orbit of Soviet influence or potentially directed against the Soviet Union. The absence of Soviet editorial comment on the Arab union movement accordingly indicates that the Soviet Union either feels that the league will not operate in such a manner as to affect Soviet interests adversely or that through increasing Soviet influence in the Arab world it may be useful in the furtherance of Soviet interests.

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*See bracketed note, p. 660.*
A fuller report discussing Soviet policy toward the individual countries of the Near and Middle East follows by air. Since this message was called for by the Department, I have not repeated it to other missions and leave it to the Department to make such distribution of it as it sees fit.

Harriman

867N.01/12-1344

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] December 18, 1944.

Attached is a brief summary statement of the effect on our position in the Near East of recent developments on the Palestine question based on the best information from the field available to the Department.

I am sending this to you so that it will be readily available to you for background purposes in the event that this issue continues extremely active.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

As agreed in our recent conversation regarding Palestine, I am giving below a brief account of the effect upon our position in the Near East of recent developments.

The bipartisan endorsement of a Jewish state during the recent campaign in this country produced a strong reaction in the Near East. You will recall in this connection that last year assurances were given on your authority to King Ibn Saud that in our view no decision should be reached regarding Palestine without consultation with both Arabs and Jews. These assurances were repeated subsequently to various Governments in the Near East and are regarded by them as a solemn commitment in harmony with the Atlantic Charter.

The recent pro-Zionist statements in this country accordingly gave rise to a wave of shocked disillusionment and protest in the Near East. There were demonstrations in Syria, an intensive anti-American campaign was carried on in the press of several countries, and many telegrams of protest were dispatched to political leaders in this country as well as to our representatives in the field. In Palestine itself, the reaction took the form of a boycott of the Culbertson Economic Mission, and there was a press campaign in favor of a complete boycott of American trade. A significant comment was that made by the

15 Despatch 1319, December 20, not printed.
Amir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, who suggested that economic concessions might well be withheld from countries which did not respect "Arab rights".

If this trend should continue, it would seriously prejudice our ability to afford protection to American interests, economic and commercial, cultural and philanthropic, throughout the area. It, of course, would have a very definite bearing upon the future of the immensely valuable American oil concession in Saudi Arabia, where the King's opposition to Zionism is well known.

From the broad political view, moreover, our position in the area vis-à-vis Great Britain and Soviet Russia would be weakened. The British, whose situation with regard to Palestine is already difficult, naturally welcome any development which strengthens their own position with the Arabs. The Russians are showing a growing interest in the Arab world and are quite plainly anxious to expand their influence in the area, particularly toward the Persian Gulf. Such expansion would of course, be in the direction of the oil fields in Saudi Arabia and Bahrein as well as those in Iran, Iraq and Kuwait. The Soviet Union has never endorsed Zionism. In fact, and on this point you recently had some first-hand information from Ambassador Harriman, we now have reason to believe that Soviet Russia definitely opposes a Jewish state and is actively cultivating the goodwill of the fifty million Arabs.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

867N.01/12-1944: Airgram

The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, December 19, 1944—6 p. m.
[Received January 3, 1945—3 p. m.]

A–75. 1. Several weeks ago the Foreign Office asked me informally if I possessed any details regarding the resolutions relating to Palestine which had been presented to the appropriate committees in Congress. I replied in the negative and was informed that the Iraqi Legation in Washington had reported that the House Committee had already approved the resolution which had been placed before it. The Foreign Minister informed me several days later that the resolutions had been discussed at a Cabinet meeting; that the Government was extremely disturbed at what the effect in Iraq would be if the resolutions would be passed; and that it had decided to send a friendly note on the subject to the American Government. Judge Lloyd, who still acts occasionally in a drafting capacity for the Prime Minister, and Jamali, the Director General of the Foreign Office, told me sub-

70 Judge H. L. Lloyd, British Adviser to the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
sequently that they were working on the draft of such a note. At various times members of the Government and other prominent Iraqis mentioned to me their concern lest these resolutions should be passed and their passage should become known to the Iraqi public. No mention of the resolutions, however, was permitted to appear in the Iraqi press.

2. On the morning of December 12 Jamali informed me by telephone that the Foreign Office had received a message from Washington to the effect that the Secretary of State had advised the Senate Committee that, in the opinion of the Department, it would be unwise at the present time for the resolutions to be passed, and asked me to let him know in case I should receive any confirmation of this report. Several hours later I was able to give to the Foreign Office the contents of the Department's telegram No. 263 of December 11.77 On the evening of the same day the Minister of Foreign Affairs made a special point of telling me how deeply the Iraqi Government appreciated the action of the Secretary of State. He said his Government regarded this action as convincing evidence that the United States really had an interest in maintaining good relations with the Arab world.

3. Following a dinner given by the Prime Minister on December 14, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Finance Minister 78 called me to one side in order again to express the appreciation of the Iraqi Government of the action of the Secretary of State. They said that they hoped that the statement of the Secretary would definitely put an end attempts of the Zionists to achieve their ends by resorting to internal political pressure in the United States; that the American Government would be free in the future to consider the problem of Palestine purely upon its merits and would be able to apply to the solution of that problem the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter and in the Declaration of the United Nations. They said that it was extremely important to Iraq and to other Arab countries that future relations between the United States and the Arab World be close and friendly and that they were relieved that a threat to these relations had been removed, at least for the time being.

4. The Minister of Foreign Affairs informed me several days ago that the Cabinet had decided, despite the Secretary's statement to the Senate Committee, to send a note to the American Government on the subject of the passage of resolutions in Congress relating to Zionism. He said that his Government felt that it was its duty to have a formal expression of its feelings on the subject on record in the

77 See footnote 70, p. 645.
78 Saleh Jabur.
Department of State. It is probable that such a note will be handed to me in a few days.

5. No mention other than that referred to in paragraph number 6 below has appeared in the Baghdad press of the Secretary’s statement to the Senate Committee and the fact that he has made such a statement is thus far known to relatively few people. The Foreign Minister informs me that since the Iraqi press was not permitted to publish announcements with regard to the resolutions, it considered it inadvisable to give to the press at present the contents of the Secretary’s statement on that subject.

6. The only reference to the resolutions which has appeared in the Iraqi press was a story published in As Sa’ar, a conservative Shia newspaper, of December 18, and repeated with several variations in An-Nida of December 19. Both of these papers are in opposition to the present Government. This story pointed out that following a visit of the Secretary of State upon the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, it had been announced that the discussion of the resolution would be postponed to an indefinite date. The article added that it had been learned that the White House was opposed to the passage of the resolution just now and that the White House opposition arose from the possible effect of the passage upon “American-Saudi Arabian economic and political relations”. The Director General of the Foreign Office informs me that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has complained because the Iraqi censor permitted this article to be published. He says that it was apparently based on stories coming out of Egypt and that the reference to Saudi Arabia was included in it in order to make it appear that the present Iraqi Government had been inactive in the matter.

HENDERSON

867N.01/12-1944

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: More than a week has passed since we issued our statement in connection with the Palestine Resolutions, and I believe that it is highly significant that this matter appears to have attracted comparatively little attention among the Zionists.

We have received only a few letters or telegrams in connection with our action, and I understand that the same is true of the Division of Public Liaison, which handles the “public comment” mail. The press coverage of the incident both here and in New York has also been fairly light, although there were a few critical articles as well as one
cartoon in the *New York Sun* lampooning the Department for its attitude.

The most likely explanation for the comparative absence of adverse comment is undoubtedly the split within the Zionist leadership, notably the difference of opinion between Rabbi Wise and Rabbi Silver resulting in the resignation of the former [latter] as Co-Chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council.

As far as the Arabs are concerned, we have had very little reaction to the postponement of the resolutions, although the Egyptian Minister did telephone to congratulate us on our action.

Wallace Murray

867N.01/12-2144: Airgram

*The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State* 79

**Baghdad, December 21, 1944—9 p. m.**

[Received January 3, 1945—3 p. m.]

A–77. Reference is made to my airgram A–75 of December 19, referring to a note which I was expecting from the Iraqi Foreign Office relating to Congressional Resolutions on the subject of Palestine.

The note in question bearing today’s date was received this afternoon. The English translation of this note made in the Legation reads as follows:

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the American Legation in Baghdad and has the honor to state that, being motivated by a feeling of sincere friendship toward the Government of the United States of America, the Iraqi Government wishes to draw the American Government’s attention to the difficult situation in which it finds itself. This situation is created by the deep feeling of the Iraqi people for the Arabs of Palestine and by their anxiety over the future of their brethren in that country, an anxiety which is heightened whenever the Foreign Affairs Committee in each of the two Houses of Congress are presented resolutions recommending the taking of decisions favoring the unrestricted opening of the doors of Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state therein.

“Iraq and the other Arab countries consider Palestine to be an Arab country not dissimilar in any way from the other Arab Wilayets (provinces) which were attached to the Ottoman Empire and which have all now become independent Arab States.

“The Palestinian incidents which took place on several past occasions have had direct effects on Iraq. It has, therefore, become incumbent upon the Iraqi Government to be constantly vigilant. These circumstances have impelled it to explain the situation to the friendly Gov-

79 In airgram A–16, January 20, 1945, the Minister in Iraq was informed that copies of the note of the Iraqi Government, transmitted herein, were furnished to the Chairmen of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and that he might so inform the Foreign Office (867N.01/12-2144).
ernment of the United States. The Iraqi Government is exceedingly anxious that American-Iraqi relations shall be developed in an atmosphere fraught with sincere friendship and mutual confidence, and it is feared that such resolutions and events might affect the situation and disturb the calm, all of which is not desirable to anyone.

“The Ministry wishes to state that it may be remembered that there are still many people in the world who are interested in creating difficulties and disturbances among the members of the United Nations and that the propaganda of the Axis powers is persisting in a fiendish effort to affect the unity of the United Nations by taking advantage of the Palestine question; this behooves us to avoid giving such opportunities to the enemy.

“The position of the Iraqi Government is rendered more difficult when the committees of such important institutions as Congress make such recommendations. The Iraqi Government cannot remain as a spectator of the tragedy which the Zionists wish to enact on the stage of the world.

“The resolution for the adoption of such a decision is directly opposed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and violates all the lofty principles of humanity. It undoubtedly arises from the effect of Zionist propaganda on the statesmen in America which leaves no scope for many of them to study, to investigate the justice of the case, and freely to hear the opposite point of view. The principle of interference in the destiny of the countries of others is an extremely dangerous one. This war is raging to exterminate that principle and to bring about justice among the peace-loving nations. It is not reasonable for a power permeated with the spirit of justice to give Arab Palestine away to the Jews in contravention of these lofty principles. This reassures us that the Palestine cause would inevitably and ultimately be solved in the interest of its Arab inhabitants.

“All the Arabs are completely confident of the justice of their cause in Palestine and of the transgression resulting from Zionist interference therein. Nothing shall, therefore, prevent them from fighting in defense of their legitimate right in Palestine regardless of costs. The Arabs appeal to the leaders of America to weigh the Zionist cause and the benefits which may result from supporting it against the sacrifices and efforts which America has made in the Arab and Islamic countries and the firm traditional friendship and material and moral interests which these sacrifices and efforts have created now and will create in the future in the Arab countries, and also against America’s reputation for upholding justice and right. Only then will appear the wide difference between the profit and loss which America will experience in the event she supports the unjust Zionist policy.

“The Iraqi Government is fully cognizant of the fact that the Constitution of the United States of America imposes the principle of the division of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches. It, therefore, hopes that the American Government will, in its Executive capacity, make the viewpoint of the Iraqi Government known to the Legislative authority. It must be stated in this connection that the statement which Mr. Stettinius has recently sent to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee has more or less alleviated the crisis which has arisen in the hearts of the Iraqi people. But we wish to be reassured that the American Government will not be affected by Zionist
attempts which are undoubtedly contrary to the principles of right and justice. We likewise wish to reiterate here that the continued application by the Zionists of their plans for the realization of their unlimited ambitions will inevitably lead to the occurrence of unrest and disturbances and the shedding of blood in this part of the world. We do not believe that this will gain the support of the American nation which is famed for its adherence to the principles of justice and peace.

“The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and respect.”

HENDERSON

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 86

[WASHINGTON,] December 22, 1944.

We have sent you considerable material in recent weeks bearing upon the reaction of the Arab statesmen and politicians in the Near East to pro-Zionist pronouncements in this country. In this connection I think that you will be interested in noting the following extract from a letter to a member of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs from an official of the OWI who had occasion to discuss various matters with the Iraqi delegation to the International Business Conference:

"Every member of the Delegation gave me to understand in no uncertain terms that the fair settlement of the Palestine issue is the most important condition for creating and building up any friendly relations between the Arab people of Iraq and those of the United States. They said heretofore the contributions of such institutions as the American University of Beirut, as well as the friendly feelings brought back by Iraqi students who had studied in the United States, were very instrumental in creating in Iraq a friendly disposition towards this country. The recent actions of various groups and legislative bodies in America regarding Palestine, however, have counteracted this friendly orientation to a large measure. Every member of the group assured me that this feeling was shared by every Arab citizen of Iraq and that the feeling on this question was very intense."

I think this statement is of considerable significance, coming as it does not from any official source or from any political group in the Near East, but from a representative group of Iraqi business men. It shows that the anti-Zionist sentiment is not confined to the political leaders in the Near East, but is a universal feeling which we must constantly take into consideration.

WALLACE MURRAY

86 Addressed to the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary (Grew), and the Assistant Secretary (Dunn).
Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] December 23, 1944.

MR. MURRAY: I had the memorandum you prepared on Palestine with me when I saw the President yesterday. When I mentioned the subject, he complimented us on the fine manner in which this problem had been handled in his absence and then expressed the hope that he would not have to get into it again for some time. It therefore seemed inappropriate for me to bring up your memorandum and I think we should not send it over for the time being. It can be worked into our general preparation for what is ahead which we shall be undertaking on a broad scale in the Department in the next few weeks.

EDWARD S[ETTINIUS]

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON [undated].

I believe the time has come when we should decide upon the next step to be taken with respect to the Palestine problem. After consultation within the Department, I submit herewith, for your consideration, a course of action in regard to Palestine in view of the projected meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin.

[Subannex]

Suggested Procedure Regarding the Palestine Question

In determining what action should be taken in regard to the Palestine question, the following are the principal factors to be considered:

1. The Department's policy up to the present time has been directed primarily at forestalling any action which would be likely to create a situation in the Near East that would endanger the war effort and jeopardize American interests in that area.

This preventive policy cannot be continued indefinitely. The adoption of a more positive policy is clearly desirable. The coming meeting would seem to be the appropriate time to initiate such a policy.

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81 Marginal notation on the original: "Held for preparation. Not sent."
82 A reference to the forthcoming Conference at Yalta, February 4–11, 1945. Documentation on this Conference is printed in Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945; no record has been found of discussion regarding Palestine at the Conference.
83 Marginal notation on the original: "Not sent."
2. Ibn Saud and the heads of other Governments in the Near East have been informed, with the President’s concurrence, that it is the view of the United States that no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine should be made without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

3. The British Government has officially stated that it will not enter into commitments regarding the future of Palestine without prior consultations with all those, including both Arabs and Jews, whom it may judge to be concerned.

4. Soviet officials have stated recently that the Soviet Government does not favor the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.

In view of the foregoing factors, it would be inadvisable for the United States at the present time to take a definite attitude toward the future of Palestine. It also follows that it would be inadvisable for the United States and Great Britain to undertake any long-range settlement for Palestine without the approval of the Soviet Government. We should not give the Soviet Government an opportunity to augment its influence in the Near East by championing the cause of the Arabs at the expense of the United States or at the expense of both the United States and Great Britain.

It would be inadvisable, also, to discuss, or for any of the three great powers to formulate, a Palestine settlement until there has been full consultation with both Arabs and Jews in accordance with commitments made both by us and the British. It is therefore suggested that the President might raise at the forthcoming meeting the question of initiating consultations with Arabs and Jews and representatives of the three religions interested in Palestine. Specifically it is proposed that the British Government be asked to take steps to implement its commitment to consult Arabs and Jews and other interested parties by inviting them to present their views regarding a Palestine settlement in writing to the British Government.

The proposals submitted by these groups should be made available to the Soviet and United States Governments for their consideration in the formulation of a proposal for a Palestine settlement, which would have concurrence of the three great powers. This body of material might be presented, at an appropriate time after the cessation of hostilities, to any future international conference at which a Palestine settlement was under consideration.

It is thought that the present unprofitable and increasingly dangerous activities of both Arab and Jewish pressure groups would in part be checked, if all the interested groups were to occupy themselves with the organization and presentation of proposals to the British Government with respect to the post-war settlement for Palestine.

It is thought, also, that this procedure would give the more moderate and less vociferous groups among both Arabs and Jews, who now lack
the means to present their views, an opportunity to do so officially. It would also make it possible for ecclesiastical organizations with important interests in the Palestine settlement to give expression to their views in regard to the future of the Holy Land.

In view of the widespread humanitarian interest in the fate of Jews whose lives are or may be jeopardized in Axis Europe, the British should at the same time be asked to consider formulating and announcing the immigration policy which they will pursue in Palestine between the time when the White Paper quota becomes exhausted and the time when a long-range settlement of the Palestine question becomes operative.