

6. POST-CONFERENCE CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK

Editorial Note

Roosevelt arrived at Hyde Park, following the Second Quebec Conference, about 9:30 a.m. on September 17, 1944, accompanied by Leahy, Lieutenant Commander Bruenn, Miss Tully, and Mrs. Brady (see the Log, *ante*, p. 294). Mrs. Roosevelt was already at Hyde Park, having left Quebec on September 14 (see the Log, *ante*, p. 291). Hassett flew from Washington to meet Roosevelt at Hyde Park on September 17 (see Hassett, p. 271), and Hopkins arrived at noon on September 18 (see Leahy, p. 263).

Churchill traveled to Hyde Park from Quebec a day after the President, arriving there at 11 a.m. on September 18, accompanied by Mrs. Churchill, the Churchills' daughter Mary, Leathers, Ismay, Moran, Martin, and Thompson (see Hassett, p. 271, Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 160, and Pawle, pp. 323-324). The Churchill party left Hyde Park at 10:30 p.m., September 19, traveling by train to New York, where they boarded the *Queen Mary* for the trip back to England (see Leahy, p. 266).

Other guests who were present during Churchill's visit included the Duke of Windsor, who came to luncheon on September 18 (see Leahy, pp. 263-264); Morgenthau and Mr. and Mrs. Lytle Hull, who came to dinner on that date (see Morgenthau Diary, vol. 772, and Leahy Diary); three Roosevelt cousins—Mrs. Dowd, Miss Delano, and Miss Suckley—who were at luncheon with Mrs. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Leahy on September 19 (see Leahy Diary); and the President's son-in-law, Major John Boettiger (see Leahy, p. 264). Except for Morgenthau and Boettiger (see below), no indication has been found that any of these guests participated in the substantive work of the Roosevelt-Churchill meetings at Hyde Park.

Since Churchill was a guest in the Roosevelts' home, there took place a number of informal and unscheduled conversations between him and Roosevelt, and the President (as was his custom) prepared no minutes or memoranda of conversation on them. The documents which follow constitute the only official papers which the editors have found which were prepared for or relate to the Hyde Park discussions.

Leahy, pp. 264-265, makes brief mention of (1) a discussion of "political questions involving Italy, Yugoslavia, and Russia" before

dinner on September 18; (2) signature of the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on OCTAGON; (3) the drafting of a statement on Italy in which Leahy, Hopkins, and Boettiger took part—possibly the draft printed *post*, p. 493; (4) a luncheon on September 19 at which Mrs. Roosevelt and Churchill discussed means of preserving international peace; and (5) a Roosevelt–Churchill discussion of military and industrial uses of atomic energy, which led to the initialing of an *aide-mémoire* on this subject (see *post*, p. 492).

Morgenthau reported to a group of colleagues at the Treasury Department on September 19 that he had learned at dinner the preceding night at Hyde Park—apparently from Churchill or Martin—that the British Government would name the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir John Anderson) to serve on the committee on lend-lease problems which had been agreed to at Quebec, but that he would probably be represented on the committee by Lord Keynes. Morgenthau further reported that he had said that this would be quite acceptable. (Morgenthau Diary, vol. 772)

It appears from Woodward, pp. 295–296, that Churchill intended to speak to Roosevelt at Hyde Park about armistice terms for Bulgaria and spheres of influence in the Balkans, but no evidence has been found to show that Churchill did in fact raise these questions with the President.

Churchill's Hyde Park visit is mentioned also in Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 160–161, in Hassett, pp. 271–272, and in Pawle, p. 324, but these sources add no information on the substance of the Roosevelt–Churchill conversations.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President*¹

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Since the meeting with you on September 9th attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hopkins, and myself,² I have had an opportunity to read the latest papers submitted to you by the Secretary of the Treasury on the treatment of Germany.³ There is no need to make any extended or detailed reply to these papers. My views have already been submitted to you in other

¹ Concerning the preparation of this memorandum, see Stimson and Bundy, p. 578. Although the paper was prepared during the course of the Second Quebec Conference, it apparently did not reach Roosevelt until the latter had gone to Hyde Park for further conversations with Churchill. See *ibid.*, p. 580.

² See *ante*, p. 144.

³ *Ante*, p. 128.

memoranda.⁴ I merely wish to reiterate briefly that I still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury would in the long run certainly defeat what we hope to attain by a complete military victory,—this is, the peace of the world, and the assurance of social, economic and political stability in the world.

The point of difference is not one of objective,—continued world peace—it is one of means. When we discuss means, the difference is not whether we should be soft or tough on the German people, but rather whether the course proposed will in fact best attain our agreed objective, continued peace.

If I thought that the Treasury proposals would accomplish that objective, I would not persist in my objections. But I cannot believe that they will make for a lasting peace. In spirit and in emphasis they are punitive, not, in my judgment, corrective or constructive. They will tend through bitterness and suffering to breed another war, not to make another war undesired by the Germans nor impossible in fact. It is not within the realm of possibility that a whole nation of seventy million people, who have been outstanding for many years in the arts and the sciences and who through their efficiency and energy have attained one of the highest industrial levels in Europe, can by force be required to abandon all their previous methods of life, be reduced to a peasant level with virtually complete control of industry and science left to other peoples.

The question is not whether we want Germans to suffer for their sins. Many of us would like to see them suffer the tortures they have inflicted on others. The only question is whether over the years a group of seventy million educated, efficient and imaginative people can be kept within bounds on such a low level of subsistence as the Treasury proposals contemplate. I do not believe that is humanly possible. A subordinate question is whether even if you could do this it is good for the rest of the world either economically or spiritually. Sound thinking teaches that prosperity in one part of the world helps to create prosperity in other parts of the world. It also teaches that poverty in one part of the world usually induces poverty in other parts. Enforced poverty is even worse, for it destroys the spirit not only of the victim but debases the victor. It would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victims—it would be a crime against civilization itself.

This country since its very beginning has maintained the fundamental belief that all men, in the long run, have the right to be free human beings and to live in the pursuit of happiness. Under the

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 123, 127.

Atlantic Charter victors and vanquished alike are entitled to freedom from economic want. But the proposed treatment of Germany would, if successful, deliberately deprive many millions of people of the right to freedom from want and freedom from fear. Other peoples all over the world would suspect the validity of our spiritual tenets and question the long range effectiveness of our economic and political principles as applied to the vanquished.

The proposals would mean a forcible revolution in all of the basic methods of life of a vast section of the population as well as a disruption of many accustomed geographical associations and communications. Such an operation would naturally and necessarily involve a chaotic upheaval in the people's lives which would inevitably be productive of the deepest resentment and bitterness towards the authorities which had imposed such revolutionary changes upon them. Physically, considering the fact that their present enlarged population has been developed and supported under an entirely different geography and economy, it would doubtless cause tremendous suffering involving virtual starvation and death for many, and migrations and changes for others. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to understand any purpose or cause for such revolutionary changes other than mere vengeance of their enemies and this alone would strongly tend towards the most bitter reactions.

I am prepared to accede to the argument that even if German resources were wiped off the map, the European economy would somehow readjust itself, perhaps with the help of Great Britain and this country. And the world would go on. The benefit to England by the suppression of German competition is greatly stressed in the Treasury memorandum. But this is an argument addressed to a shortsighted cupidity of the victors and the negation of all that Secretary Hull has been trying to accomplish since 1933. I am aware of England's need, but I do not and cannot believe that she wishes this kind of remedy. I feel certain that in her own interest she could not afford to follow this path. The total elimination of a competitor (who is always also a potential purchaser) is rarely a satisfactory solution of a commercial problem.

The sum total of the drastic political and economic steps proposed by the Treasury is an open confession of the bankruptcy of hope for a reasonable economic and political settlement of the causes of war.

I plead for no "soft" treatment of Germany. I urge only that we take steps which in the light of history are reasonably adapted to our purpose, namely, the prevention of future wars. The Carthaginian aspect of the proposed plan would, in my judgment, provoke a reaction on the part of the people in this country and in the rest of the world which would operate not only against the measures advocated but in its

violence would sweep away the proper and reasonable restrictive measures that we could justifiably impose.

I have already indicated in my memorandum of September 9, 1944,⁵ the lines along which I would recommend that we should go pending further light on other questions which can only be obtained after we have acquired greater knowledge of conditions and trends within Germany as well as of the views and intentions of our Allies.

HENRY L STIMSON
Secretary of War

⁵ *Ante*, p. 123.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)
to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS

With reference to our recent memorandum² concerning current problems with Italy, we would like to submit the following considerations to the President during his conversations with the British Prime Minister.

Certain areas of Italy's northeastern frontier will probably be in dispute after hostilities. In order that the final disposition of these disputed areas would not be prejudiced by occupation by the armed forces of claimant states, it is suggested that Allied Military Government be extended to all Italian metropolitan territory within its 1939 frontiers. In the South Tyrol and the Istrian Peninsula (Venezia Tridentina and Venezia Giulia), Allied Military Government should be maintained and these areas not restored to Italian administration (as is the present practice with respect to liberated areas in southern Italy). Allied Military Government would thus be maintained until the disputed areas are finally disposed of by peace treaty or other settlement. Any other course, such as letting the Tito forces occupy the Peninsula or Free Austrian forces occupy the South Tyrol prior to final disposition at the peace settlement, would undoubtedly prejudice the final disposition of these territories, cause deep resentment

¹ Hopkins presumably took this memorandum with him to Hyde Park when he went there to participate in the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations of September 18-19, 1944. The source text bears the following manuscript notation at the bottom of the page, made at Hyde Park: "18 Sept. President approves. W[ILLIAM] D. L[EAHY]."

² For the memorandum referred to and the enclosure thereto, see *ante*, pp. 412 and 207, respectively.

on the part of the Italian people, and result in the loss of considerable prestige by the Allies in Italy.

The British have already suggested a plan along these lines and would, it is believed, be willing to maintain Allied Military Government in frontier areas likely to be in dispute for the required period. It is reported that this is also the plan of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater,³ at least with respect to the Istrian Peninsula. On our part, it would mean keeping a certain number of American Military Government officers and soldiers in Northeastern Italy.

H F[REEMAN] M[ATTHEWS]

³ General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

840.50/9-1744

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I note from your record of conversation with the Prime Minister on September 14, 1944² that lend-lease aid during the war with Japan will exceed, in food, shipping, et cetera, the strategic needs of Great Britain in carrying on that war and will, to that extent, be devoted to maintaining British economy. Would it not be well to make clear to the Prime Minister at this time that one of the primary considerations of the Committee,³ in determining the extent to which lend-lease might exceed direct strategic needs, would be the soundness of the course adopted by the British Government with a view to restoring its own economy, particularly with regard to measures taken to restore the flow of international trade? My thought on this, which applies to financial assistance through lend-lease or in other forms, is developed in the last enclosure, of which a copy is attached, to my memorandum to you of September 8, 1944.⁴

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]⁵

¹ A copy of this memorandum was sent to Hopkins and is filed in the Hopkins Papers. It is possible that Hopkins took the ribbon copy to Hyde Park with him for delivery to Roosevelt.

² *Ante*, p. 344.

³ i.e., the committee on lend-lease questions the creation of which was agreed to by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec. See *ante*, pp. 346, 468.

⁴ The attachment was a copy of annex 10 to Hull's memorandum of September 6, 1944, which had been sent to Roosevelt on September 8 under cover of a further memorandum. For the text of annex 10, see *ante*, p. 172.

⁵ The source text bears the following manuscript endorsement: "Approved . . . by telephone by the Secretary, who authorized us to initial the original for him. T[HEODORE] C A[CHILLES]."

Hopkins Papers

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 17, 1944.

Subject: Considerations With Respect to Possible Recognition by Principal Allied Governments of a Provisional Government of France.

In my opinion the time has come to give serious consideration to the question of announcing this Government's recognition of the *de facto* French authority as the Provisional Government of France. Of course, the word "provisional" would not be dropped until after general elections are held in France.

I believe that this step is not inconsistent with the policy which we have carefully followed, namely, to refrain from any action which might have the effect of impairing the opportunity of the French people freely to exercise their will in the choice of their leaders.

The following factors suggest the advisability of taking this step at this time.

(1) There is every indication that General de Gaulle has been accepted for the initial period as the national leader in liberated France. This is fully corroborated by reports from our military authorities, who have been in touch with the local population in many parts of France. It likewise does away with the possibility of this

¹ The date of this memorandum suggests that it was prepared with a view to its use in the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations at Hyde Park. It is clear from the covering memorandum quoted below that it was written in ignorance of the existence of the Roosevelt-Churchill minute of September 15, 1944, on the subject of recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation (see *ante*, p. 469). Hull's memorandum was not transmitted directly to Roosevelt at Hyde Park, but was sent to Hopkins under cover of the following memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews):

"DEAR HARRY: I took this up personally with the Secretary and he is in full agreement with the policy recommended in the memorandum. The Secretary has approved its immediate transmission to the President. I leave to your judgment whether to present it to the President now in view of the speed with which events are developing, or whether you think it better for the Secretary to take it up personally with the President upon his return. Without knowing whether the question came up at Quebec, I am inclined to feel the sooner we get moving on this the better. . . . Very sincerely, Doc." (Hopkins Papers)

This covering memorandum was dated September 18, 1944, and as Hopkins arrived at Hyde Park at noon on that day (see Leahy, p. 263), Hull's memorandum could not have reached Hopkins before the latter left Washington for Hyde Park. The presence of the ribbon copy of Hull's memorandum in the Hopkins Papers and a note of September 23, 1944, by Hopkins establish that the Hull memorandum of September 17 did not reach Roosevelt before Churchill's departure from Hyde Park. Hopkins' memorandum of September 23 stated: "I talked to Matthews about this. He tells me that the Secretary sent a further note to the President on this same subject and that this memo [Hull's memorandum of September 17], therefore, need not be delivered." (Hopkins Papers) For the text of the "further note" referred to, which was dated September 21, and with which Hull enclosed a copy of the memorandum of September 17, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 737-738.

Government ever being charged with imposing General de Gaulle on the French people.

(2) There are increasing indications that the resistance groups and others in France have no intention of permitting the establishment of a personal dictatorship under General de Gaulle. The base of the governing authority has already been broadened by the inclusion of numerous representatives of metropolitan resistance. General de Gaulle's desire to maintain the thread of legal continuity and to work with democratic elements is likewise shown by the appointment of M. Jeanneney, President of the Senate.

(3) The Political Advisor on General Eisenhower's staff (Reber) reports that the Committee, with possible occasional changes of individual Commissioners, should be able to maintain control in France until such time as elections can be held.

(4) It will probably be many months before elections can take place owing to the absence of over a million prisoners-of-war and deportees in Germany.

(5) Lack of recognition will make it more difficult for the Committee to maintain the internal stability necessary for the prosecution of the war and orderly rehabilitation of the country.

(6) Our present popularity in France is high. It will suffer if we delay recognition unduly. Many Frenchmen undoubtedly understand and sympathize with our refusal to recognize the Committee when it was established in Algiers, but they will not understand this refusal now that France is largely liberated.

(7) General Eisenhower's headquarters agree that there is no reason to delay a further degree of recognition from a military point of view.

(8) Recognition would greatly simplify the solution of a number of practical problems of an economic and financial nature.

(9) A number of Governments have already extended recognition to the Committee as the Provisional Government of France and there are indications that the British and Canadians may shortly take this action even if we do not. American prestige would suffer severely if we were to be the only major power withholding recognition.

If you agree to the desirability of taking this step, either of the following two possibilities would present a suitable occasion for the extension of recognition, after consultation and agreement with Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

(1) The passage of a vote of confidence in General de Gaulle, and the *de facto* French authority as presently constituted, by the Provisional Consultative Assembly, established in Paris and broadened to include at least fifty percent of resistance membership.

(2) The setting up, with the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander, of zones of the interior, thereby emphasizing the change from a strictly military to a predominantly civilian administration.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Roosevelt Papers

*Draft by Prime Minister Churchill*¹DRAFT OF A SUGGESTED TELEGRAM TO BE SENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND
THE PRIME MINISTER TO MARSHAL STALIN²

1. In the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers before Teheran, the Prime Minister of Great Britain submitted a draft proposing the local punishment of war criminals in the countries and, if possible, at the scenes where their atrocities had been committed.³ With some small amendments⁴ this document was approved and has been published to the world with general acceptance and approval.⁵ This document however did not attempt to deal with the cases of the major war criminals "whose offences have no particular geographical localization". This matter was touched on in conversation at Teheran without any definite conclusion being reached.⁶ It has now become important for us to reach agreement about the treatment of these major criminals. Would you consider whether a list could not be prepared of say 50 to 100 persons whose responsibilities for directing or impelling the whole process of crime and atrocity is established by the fact of their holding certain high offices? Such a list would not of course be exhaustive. New names could be added at any time. It is proposed that these persons should be declared, on the authority of the United Nations, to be world outlaws and that upon any of them falling into Allied hands the Allies will "decide how they are to be disposed of and the execution of this decision will be carried out immediately". Or alternatively, "the nearest General Officer will convene a Court for the sole purpose of establishing their identity, and when this has been done will have them shot within one hour without reference to higher authority".

2. It would seem that the method of trial, conviction and judicial sentence is quite inappropriate for notorious ringleaders such as Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Apart from the formidable difficulties of constituting the Court, formulating the charge and assembling the evidence, the question of their fate is a political and not a judicial one. It could not rest with judges however eminent or learned to decide finally a matter like this which is of the

¹ Cf. the agreed minute on war criminals which Roosevelt had initialed at Quebec on September 15, 1944, *ante*, p. 467, and a memorandum on this subject by Lord Simon dated September 4, 1944, *ante*, p. 91.

² This message was never sent to Stalin. On October 22, 1944, following conferences which Churchill had had with Stalin at Moscow, Churchill informed Roosevelt: ". . . I do not wish to press the memo I gave you which you said you would have examined by the State Department. Kindly therefore treat it as withdrawn." See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 400.

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. I, pp. 556-557.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 768, fn. 21.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 768-769.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 554.

widest and most vital public policy. The decision must be "the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies". This in fact was expressed in the Moscow Declaration.

3. There would seem to be advantages in publishing a list of names. At the present time, Hitler and his leading associates know that their fate will be sealed when the German Army and people cease to resist. It therefore costs them nothing to go on giving orders to fight to the last man, die in the last ditch, etc. As long as they can persuade the German people to do this, they continue to live on the fat of the land and have exalted employments. They represent themselves and the German people as sharing the same rights and fate. Once however their names are published and they are isolated, the mass of the German people will infer rightly that there is a difference between these major criminals and themselves. A divergence of interests between the notorious leaders and their dupes will become apparent. This may lead to undermining the authority of the doomed leaders and to setting their own people against them, and thus may help the break up of Germany.

4. We should be very glad to have your views upon this proposal at your earliest convenience. It is of course without prejudice to the great mass of German war criminals who will be handed over for the judgment of the countries where their crimes have been committed.

17.9.44.⁷

⁷ This draft was typed on the Prime Minister's stationery, bearing the address "10, Downing Street, Whitehall", in preparation for Churchill's conversations with Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

PR 10 Foreign Relations of U.S./8-20-71: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden) ¹

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET

Following for Foreign Secretary from Prime Minister.

My immediately preceding telegram.²

Following is text of message for Marshal Stalin.³

¹ This message was typed on the Prime Minister's stationery, bearing the address "10, Downing Street, Whitehall", and the source text indicates that it was dispatched to London in the GUNFIRE series.

² Not available in United States files.

³ According to a minute of September 10, 1944, by Churchill's Principal Private Secretary (Martin), this message to Stalin was "a draft provisionally agreed between the President and the Prime Minister during their discussions at Hyde Park on September 18. After further consideration however they decided not to send a message of this character to Marshal Stalin at present." (PR 10 Foreign Relations of U.S./8-20-71)

1. We are sending a full account of the conclusions which we have reached in our Conference here.⁴ We both much regretted that circumstances which we well understood made it impossible for you to be present with us and thus to repeat the historic precedent of Teheran.

2. In sending you our account of this essentially military conference we feel that we should be less than frank if we did not also express to you certain anxieties which are much in our minds about political developments in Europe. With the defeat of the enemy's armies, political problems will arise in all parts of Europe. It is essential that we should work together to solve these. We mention in particular the situation in Yugoslavia and Greece, in both of which countries there has been, and in the former of which there still is, the danger of civil war. There is also the position in Poland, which causes us much anxiety. We were all much encouraged by the success of the visit of Monsieur Mikołajczyk, the Polish Prime Minister, to Moscow, and we hope that the conversations which were there opened can be carried to a successful conclusion with your help. It would be gravely embarrassing to the smooth working of our affairs if events should so fall out that we were left recognizing Monsieur Mikołajczyk and his Government while you supported some other authority in Poland.

3. These and all other matters which affect our relations towards other powers we are at all times ready to discuss with you, in order to seek agreement through the diplomatic channel or by any other means. As you know we think it extremely important that we should meet on this and other important topics as soon as the war situation allows.

W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]

[HYDE PARK,] September 18, 1944.

⁴ i.e., at Quebec. For the account referred to, see *ante*, p. 478.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 18 September 1944.

To the President from Winant.

Immediately following your directive that a mission to drop supplies on Warsaw was authorized² clearance was obtained from Moscow and the project organized. Bad weather has delayed the mission. I thought you would like to know that I just received a message which was flashed back stating that one hundred and seven ships today in clear weather had dropped supplies over Warsaw.³

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room at Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded to Roosevelt, at Hyde Park, as telegram No. MR-out-420, September 18, 1944.

² See *ante*, p. 397.

³ This mission of B-17's of the Eighth Air Force, using shuttle-bombing bases in the Soviet Union at the end of the flight, dropped 1,284 containers of arms, food, and medical supplies intended for the Warsaw insurgents. Of the supplies dropped, not more than 288 containers (and perhaps as few as 130) reached Polish hands. A second proposed mission was not cleared by the Soviet authorities. See Craven and Cate, pp. 316-317.

Roosevelt Papers

*Aide-Mémoire Initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[HYDE PARK, September 19, 1944.]

TUBE ALLOYS

AIDE-MÉMOIRE OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE
PRIME MINISTER AT HYDE PARK, SEPTEMBER 18, 1944²

1. The suggestion that the world should be informed regarding TUBE ALLOYS, with a view to an international agreement regarding its control and use, is not accepted. The matter should continue to be regarded as of the utmost secrecy; but when a "bomb" is finally available, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese, who should be warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they surrender.

¹ Some of the background for the inclusion of the third paragraph in this *aide-mémoire* appears from a memorandum of September 22, 1944, by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) concerning a conference with Roosevelt which Bush had attended on that date at which Leahy and Cherwell were also present. Bush recorded:

"The President stated that Mr. Justice Frankfurter had visited him a few weeks ago and expressed himself as very much worried about the future handling in the post-war period of matters pertaining to the secret project. The President apparently professed ignorance of what Frankfurter was talking about, although I do not know how far this went, and I certainly gained the impression that the President did not tell Frankfurter any more than he knew when he came. Frankfurter insisted that Bohr should see the President, as he and Bohr had discussed the future state of the world from this standpoint and Bohr had some very striking ideas. This was apparently arranged and the President had seen Bohr for a short time and listened to him. The President, however, was very much disturbed in regard to security and wished to know how far Bohr had been taken into the matter, whether he was trusted, and also how Mr. Frankfurter happened to know anything about the subject whatever. Lord Cherwell traced the history of Bohr's escape from Denmark, his introduction to this country, and so on. He stated that Bohr had similarly seen the Prime Minister after having insisted on doing so in Britain and had told him his ideas about future handling of this subject. These ideas, I believe, revolve about immediate disclosure of the subject, its use as a threat against Germany, and similar matters, and also a control by the British and Americans of the subject after the war, and I judge the maintenance of a peace by the Anglo-Americans on this basis. I then traced the way Bohr had been introduced into this country and in particular the care that had been taken to be sure that he was handled in such a manner that we became sure of his discretion before introducing him to parts of the project. Both Cherwell and I brought out the fact that he was a very important physicist who had been able to contribute and also that he had given us some ideas as to what was going on in Germany that were quite valuable. It also appeared in this discussion that Bohr had been invited by the Russians to visit Russia but had declined." (A.E.C. Files, Historical Document No. 185)

For further information on Bohr's views and the manner in which they were brought to Roosevelt's attention through Frankfurter, see Liva Baker, *Felix Frankfurter* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1969), pp. 271-278.

² This *aide-mémoire* was initialed in duplicate. On the copy kept by the British Government there is the following marginal manuscript notation at this point by Churchill's Principal Private Secretary: "actually 19th J[OHN] M[ILLER] M[ARTIN]." Concerning the circumstances in which Churchill sent Stimson a photocopy of the British original of the *aide-mémoire* on July 18, 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. II, p. 1370.

2. Full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing TUBE ALLOYS for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement.

3. Enquiries should be made regarding the activities of Professor Bohr and steps taken to ensure that he is responsible for no leakage of information, particularly to the Russians.

F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT] W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]
18.9

Roosevelt Papers

The President to the Secretary of State

[HYDE PARK,] September 19, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have had lengthy talks with the Prime Minister in regard to recognition of the Provisional Government in France. He and I are both very much opposed to it at this time. The Provisional Government has no direct authority from the people. It is best to let things go along as they are for the moment.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

Roosevelt Papers

*Draft of a Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

[Undated.]

The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our enemies.

Italy has made real progress these last twelve months.² We believe the United States and Great Britain should give her ³ greater political

¹ Attached to this draft in the Roosevelt Papers is the following typewritten notation: "This was not sent. It was one of many drafts. F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]. (Quebec Conference File)".

² This sentence has been crossed out by hand on the source text.

³ The word "her" has been changed to "Italy" by hand on the source text. The manuscript changes described in this footnote and in those which follow are all in Boettiger's handwriting.

recognition, and we propose to invite the Italian government to send its own direct representatives to Washington and London, and on our part we will give our representatives at Rome the status of ambassadors.

First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we have instructed our representatives at the pending conference of UNRRA to declare for the sending of food and clothing and medical aids⁴ to Italy.

Along with this is the need for first steps to be taken⁵ toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy—an economy wrecked⁶ under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. We should assist the Italians in the restoration of their power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications, and send our engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to speed the work of rehabilitation.

The Italian prisoners of war should be given opportunity to volunteer their full efforts in the fight against the enemy, to carry the flag of Italy into battle against Germany and Japan.

We should all look toward that day⁷ when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain—the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy.⁸

⁴ The words "and other essential supplies" have been inserted by hand at this point.

⁵ This passage has been changed by hand to read: "At the same time, first steps should be taken".

⁶ The word "wrecked" has been changed by hand to "laid low".

⁷ This passage has been changed by hand to read: "We all wish to speed the day".

⁸ The following clause has been added by hand at the end of this sentence: "and when Italy can begin to take her own high place in the great family of democratic nations."

Roosevelt Papers

*Draft of a Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

The President and the Prime Minister held further discussions Monday and Tuesday at Hyde Park, on subjects dealing with post-war

¹ This paper bears the notation "Original Draft" in Leahy's handwriting, and was the text tentatively approved by Roosevelt and Churchill at Hyde Park on September 19, 1944, subject to possible amendments to be worked out after it had been reviewed by Eden, who had returned to London from Quebec and to whom Churchill telegraphed the text. Concerning British suggestions for amendments, see the editorial note, *infra*.

policies in Europe. The result of these discussions cannot be disclosed at this time for strategic military reasons, and pending their consideration by our other Allies.

The present problems in Italy also came under discussion, and on this subject the President and the Prime Minister issued the following statement:

"The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

"We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies.²

"An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian Administration, subject of course to that Administration proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed 'The Allied Commission'.

"The British High Commissioner in Italy³ will assume the additional title of Ambassador. The United States representative in Rome⁴ already holds that rank. The Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London.

"Our governments are also willing to consider a revision of the present long terms of the Italian armistice,⁵ to bring them more in line with the present realistic situation.⁶

"First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we have instructed our representatives at the pending conference of UNRRA to declare for the sending of food and clothing,⁷ medical aids and other essential supplies to Italy.

"At the same time, first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy—an economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

"These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat

² An earlier, undated draft in the Roosevelt Papers has the following additional paragraph at this point:

"The American and British people are of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome [the lynching on September 18, 1944, of Donato Carretta, former vice director of the Regina Coeli Prison], but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts."

³ Sir Noel Charles.

⁴ Alexander C. Kirk.

⁵ Signed at Malta, September 29, 1943; amended by a protocol signed at Brindisi, November 9, 1943. For texts, see Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604*; Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, vol. 3, pp. 775, 854; 61 Stat. (2) 2742, 2761.

⁶ This paragraph does not appear in the draft referred to in fn. 2, above.

⁷ The words "food and clothing" do not appear in the draft referred to in fn. 2, above.

Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications as enter into the war situation, and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation.

"The application to Italy of the Trading with the Enemy Acts should be modified so as to enable business contacts between Italy and the outside world to be resumed on the basis of exchange of goods.

"We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain—the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy, and when Italy can earn her proper place in the great family of free nations."

[HYDE PARK,] September 19, 1944.

Editorial Note

The issuance of the proposed Roosevelt-Churchill statement with regard to Italy was postponed at Eden's request. Eden's comments on the draft statement, transmitted to the Department of State as an annex to a memorandum from the British Embassy at Washington dated September 22, 1944, were as follows:

"1. I much hope the President will agree to leave out paragraph referring to a revision of long armistice terms. We did not include this in our original list of concessions because (i) to do so opens the whole of our position in relation to Italian surrender and would enable Italy to call in question all its provisions including fleet, colonies, etc., (ii) We could not do this without prior consultation with Russia who is also a party to armistice terms. To omit such consultation would cause great offence. Dominions who have also approved armistice terms would certainly expect consultation before any announcement was made. It should also be remembered that long armistice terms have never been made public and that military authorities have hitherto been unwilling to do so. Parliament would certainly press to see terms if their revision is announced.

"2. As regards paragraph dealing with relief of hunger and sickness, as we understand it UNRRA's help will be solely in medical side, supplies for child welfare and displaced persons. Therefore it seems unwise to mention specifically foodstuffs and clothing which would certainly make more difficult the task of our representatives at UNRRA in obtaining agreement. I suggest therefore that these words 'foodstuffs and clothing' should be left out.

"3. Paragraph dealing with trading with the enemy as at present worded with its reference to exchange of goods would give Italy privileged position over all our allies and ourselves and would undermine United States-United Kingdom supply machinery. To avoid this danger I suggest that in this paragraph we should therefore omit last words: 'on basis of exchange of goods'."

Eden also suggested that the other members of the Advisory Council for Italy be informed before the statement was issued, and recommended a further postponement of ten to fourteen days. (865.01/9-2244)

Following a telegraphic exchange (not printed) between Roosevelt and Churchill, the British Embassy informed the White House on September 26, 1944, that the British War Cabinet had approved the release of the statement, as amended, for the morning papers of the following day. The Embassy also suggested a further amendment to bring up to date the paragraph relating to the session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration which was then meeting at Montreal. This amendment was accepted and the statement was released to the press in Washington late on September 26, 1944, for the morning papers of September 27. For final text, see *infra*.

Roosevelt Papers

*White House Press Release*¹

[WASHINGTON,] September 26, 1944.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

The President and the Prime Minister held further discussions Monday and Tuesday, September 18 and 19, at Hyde Park, on subjects dealing with post-war policies in Europe. The result of these discussions cannot be disclosed at this time for strategic military reasons, and pending their consideration by our other Allies.

The present problems in Italy also came under discussion, and on this subject the President and the Prime Minister issued the following statement:

"The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

"We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies.

"The American and the British people are of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome, but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts.

"An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian Administration, subject of course to that Administra-

¹ Printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XI, October 1, 1944, p. 338.

tion's proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed 'The Allied Commission.'

"The British High Commissioner in Italy will assume the additional title of Ambassador. The United States representative in Rome already holds that rank. The Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London.

"First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we instructed our representatives at the UNRRA Conference to declare for the sending of medical aids and other essential supplies to Italy. We are happy to know that this view commended itself to other members of the UNRRA Council.

"At the same time, first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy—an economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

"These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications as enter into the war situation, and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation.

"The application to Italy of the Trading with the Enemy Acts should be modified so as to enable business contacts between Italy and the outside world to be resumed for the benefit of the Italian people.

"We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, and when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain—the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy, and when Italy can earn her proper place in the great family of free nations."

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