2. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS

A. OCCUPATION AND POSTWAR TREATMENT OF GERMANY

Editorial Note

The documents printed and cited in this section are considerably illuminated by contemporary diary notes and other materials written by a number of the ranking participants in the discussions of this subject within the United States Government. See particularly Hull, pp. 1602 ff.; Stimson and Bundy, pp. 568 ff.; and Morgenthau materials printed in Blum, pp. 339 ff., and Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. I, pp. 415 ff. See also Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. I, pp. 276 ff.

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The Secretary of State to the President

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am attaching a summary of recommendations prepared after careful study in the Department with regard to the treatment of Germany. I am also attaching for your consideration a longer paper giving the reasoning behind the recommendations and a memorandum on the present status of negotiations and discussions with regard to Germany.

This problem is, of course, of great importance and considerable urgency, for until an American policy has been decided upon with regard to the future treatment of Germany, we are not in a position to discuss the matter with the British or Russians. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to study the attached documents and let me have your comments thereon at an early date. The two former documents were

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1 Printed from an uncertified carbon copy which, however, bears the following manuscript endorsement by the Secretary of State's Assistant: “Left with the President by the Secretary. JAMES E BROWN Jr.”

2 The first two attachments to this memorandum are not filed with the source text. They have been supplied from Lot 55 D 375 and the Notter File, Box 18, respectively.

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transmitted to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff about a month ago with a request for their views.\(^3\)

**[Attachment 1]**

*Memorandum by the Committee on Post-War Programs*\(^4\)

**TOP SECRET**

PWC-149c

**WASHINGTON, May 31, 1944.**

**THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

**I. LONG-TERM INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES**

**A. Frontiers**

1. The Danish-German frontier should remain unchanged. (Recommended)

2. The waterboundary between the Netherlands and Germany should be moved from the western shore of the Ems Estuary to the main channel. The landboundary should remain unchanged. (Recommended with request for further study of possible territorial compensation for the Netherlands for areas ruined by flooding.)

3. The Belgian-German frontier should be returned to the 1920–1940 line. (Recommended)

4. Alsace–Lorraine should be returned to France. (Recommended)

5. The transfer of the Sonthofen district from Austria to Germany should be recognized unless there is convincing evidence that the inhabitants wish to return to Austrian rule. (Recommended)

6. The pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia should in principle be restored, subject to any minor rectifications which the Czechoslovakian Government might wish to propose as part of a broader settlement of the issues in dispute between Czechoslovakia and Germany. (Recommended)

7. This Government should not oppose the annexation by Poland of East Prussia, Danzig, and in German Upper Silesia the industrial district and a rural hinterland to be determined primarily by ethnic considerations. The United States, however, would not be disposed to encourage the acquisition by Poland of additional German-populated territory in the trans-Oder region. (Recommended)

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\(^3\) For the memorandum of transmittal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated July 22, 1944, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. 1, p. 251. For the reply of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated September 29, 1944 (after the conclusion of the Second Quebec Conference), see *ibid.*, p. 343.

\(^4\) The source text indicates that the original draft of this memorandum (CAC–1915) had been prepared and reviewed by the Interdivisional Committee on Germany, and that the paper had been reviewed and revised by the Committee on Post-War Programs at meetings held on May 11, 12, 18, 19, 25, and 31, 1944.
8. This Government should oppose the mass transfer to the Reich of Germanic people from neighboring countries immediately after the cessation of hostilities but should approve the removal of individuals and groups who constitute an especially difficult problem; the transfer should be made, so far as may be feasible, under humane conditions and without undue strain on Germany's absorptive capacity. (Tentatively recommended; Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany to study further the question of (a) criteria for selecting populations for transfer, (b) an inter-allied occupation of East Prussia, and (c) establishment of an inter-allied commission to supervise transfers of population.)

B. Political and Economic Conditions

9. This Government should advocate (a) the prohibition for an indefinite period of a German military establishment, (b) the prohibition for an indefinite period of the manufacture and import of arms (except the importation of small arms for police purposes), ammunition and implements of war, together with the prohibition of the manufacture of aircraft and the prohibition of the importation of military aircraft, and (c) a system of international audit, inspection, and enforcement, extending over the whole of Germany, for insuring the observance of disarmament stipulations and for preventing the accumulation of war matériel. (Tentatively recommended subject to further study.)

10. The United States should encourage democratic self-government both at the local and national level as soon as security precautions make it feasible. (Recommended)

11. The German people should be assured that a democratic Germany can, by demonstrating its ability and intention to act as a peace-loving nation, earn an honorable place in the society of peace-loving nations. (Recommended)

12. A “war-guilt” clause should not be written into the surrender instrument or into the peace terms. (Recommended)

13. Partition should not be imposed upon Germany. (Referred to the Secretary for possible consideration with the President.)

14. The victors should make every feasible effort to promote a return to a federal system of government and a division of Prussia into a number of medium-sized states. The imposition of a degree of political decentralization more extensive than that which moderate Germans would be willing to support might defeat its purpose by creating internal confusion and by arousing a lasting antagonism even among liberal and democratic German groups.

15. It should be an ultimate objective of this Government to assimilate Germany into world economy without discrimination other than that necessary for security controls. (Recommended)
16. The large German landed estates should be broken up. (Recommended, with a request to the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany to continue its study of means of implementation.)

17. The great concentration of power exercised by German industrial and financial concerns should be destroyed. (Referred to the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany for further study.)

18. Free labor organizations possessing the power of collective bargaining should be revived. (Recommended)

19. The German people should be permitted, subject to security requirements, and to such international obligations as Germany may be required to assume, eventually to determine the nature of their economic system without foreign pressure or intervention. (Recommended)

C. German Foreign Relations

20. Germany should be admitted, as soon as its good faith is demonstrated, to participation without discrimination, other than for security objectives, in general political and economic arrangements. (Recommended)

21. Germany should not be permitted to use trade policy as an instrument of aggression. (Recommended)

II. TRANSITIONAL PROCEDURES AND ARRANGEMENTS

A. Surrender Terms

22. The victor powers should secure through a single surrender instrument an unequivocal delivery of unrestricted rights and powers over Germany rather than rely on the rights of occupation and conquest or on undefined unconditional surrender. (Recommended)

23. The surrender instrument should be authorized and ratified by whatever German Government is in existence at the time. It should be signed by properly authorized military plenipotentiaries and, if a Nazi or quasi-Nazi Government is in power, by authorized civilian agents. (Recommended)

24. The rights and powers surrendered by Germany should be acquired by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on behalf of the United Nations and should be exercised jointly by their three Governments acting in the interests of the United Nations. (Recommended)

B. Occupation

25. The three principal United Nations should set up a military government which, while making extensive use of German administrative machinery and personnel, should supplant any existing central political authority. (Recommended)
26. While the military occupation of Germany should be effected on a zonal basis, the principal instrumentality of military government should be a tripartite agency in Berlin possessing the power, under instructions from the three Governments, to direct a uniform administration over the whole of Germany and to maintain the unity of those essential administrative functions and economic processes now operated on a nation-wide basis. (Recommended)

27. As soon as military considerations cease to be paramount, the control of Germany should be transferred to an inter-allied civilian agency under whose authority military occupation would be continued. (Recommended)

28. This Government should favor the participation of the other United Nations in so far as would be compatible with the responsibility of the three major powers in planning and executing the measures for the treatment of Germany. (Recommended)

29. The German armed forces should be demobilized and disbanded as rapidly as considerations of internal order and the absorptive capacity of the German economy will allow. (Recommended)

30. This Government is in principle opposed to the use in labor service for an indefinite period of large numbers of Army units, but should not oppose the employment of Waffen SS and other Nazi Party military formations in reconstruction work outside Germany. (Referred to the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany with request for a separate study of this problem.)

31. German arms, ammunition and implements of war should be scrapped except as they are wanted for use in the war against Japan or are adaptable to peaceful uses. (Further study requested of the disposition of German armaments.)

32. All German military and para-military organizations, the General Staff, military training centers, supply services and all directly related groups should be promptly dissolved and permanently prohibited. (Recommended)

33. The manufacture and import of all arms, ammunition and implements of war should be forbidden, necessary security controls established over German economy, and those industrial plants dismantled which are not convertible to peace-time production or which otherwise present insuperable security problems. (Recommended)

34. The National Socialist Party and dependent organizations should be abolished and their records and assets seized. (Recommended)

35. The chief categories of Party “leaders”, both local and national, and other active Nazis, should be removed from governmental service and posts in cultural and economic enterprises. (Recommended)
36. All parties and groups reflecting National Socialist views should be rigorously suppressed, but non-Nazi parties based on democratic principles should be encouraged to organize and appeal for support in so far as their activities do not jeopardize public order. (Recommended)

37. In order to prevent an economic collapse the existing German administrative machinery of economic control should be utilized, with necessary adaptations. (Recommended)

38. The mark should not be deliberately undervalued on the foreign exchanges. (Recommended)

39. Reparation exacted from Germany should be directed mainly to furthering reconstruction. Even though it will not be large enough to meet the total cost, the payments should be confined to early years after the close of hostilities. The transfer of capital equipment should not be large enough seriously to cripple German economy. (Deferred for the consideration of the report of the Committee on Reparation.)

C. Establishment of Permanent Government

40. The direct inter-allied administration of Germany should terminate as soon as the prospects of order and the emergence of an acceptable German Government make it desirable. (Recommended)

41. The process of political reconstruction should begin with the establishment of democratic self-government in local communities and should be extended to larger units as the success of each step becomes apparent. (Recommended)

[Attachment 2]

Memorandum by the Committee on Post-War Programs

TOP SECRET

PWC-1415

[WASHINGTON,] August 5, 1944.

THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY

I. INTRODUCTORY

The following discussion of the treatment of Germany makes a distinction between (1) long-range interests and objectives of the United States and (2) the problems of the occupation period.

The latter category embraces those immediate concerns of the victor powers from the moment of Germany’s surrender or collapse until

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5 The source text indicates that the original draft of this memorandum (CAC-1435) had been prepared and reviewed by the Interdivisional Committee on Germany and that the paper had been reviewed and revised by the Committee on Post-War Programs at meetings held on May 11, 12, 18, 19, 25, and 31, 1944.
a time when it will be safe to establish a permanent system of controls and to permit the organization of a constitutional German Government. The major tasks of this period will be (1) to secure through the surrender instrument and to exercise an unqualified authority over Germany, (2) to establish the machinery of an effective military government, (3) to destroy the National Socialist Party and uproot its influence from German life, (4) to disarm and demobilize the German military machine and establish controls over Germany’s war potential, (5) to institute a program of restitution and reparation, (6) to prevent an economic breakdown and to begin an economic reorganization which will destroy autarky and eliminate, in so far as possible, the economic and social bases of ultra-nationalism and militarism, and (7) to make a start towards the creation of an acceptable and durable political structure in Germany.

If this program is to provide more than temporary security and is to prepare the way for continuing European stability and peace, it must be worked out and applied in the light of long-range objectives with respect to Germany and to Germany’s place in the projected world order.

II. LONG-TERM INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

Axiomatically the basic long-term interest of the United States is peace, and so far as Germany is concerned, consequently, the basic objective is to see to it that that country does not disturb the peace.

Security against a renewal of German aggression must be guaranteed during the foreseeable future—not only during but beyond the occupation period—through a rigorously enforced prohibition of a German military establishment and through vigilant control of German war potential.

An indefinitely continued coercion of more than sixty million technically advanced people, however, would at best be an expensive undertaking that would afford the world little sense of real security and, more important still, there exists no convincing reason to anticipate that the victor powers would be willing and able indefinitely to apply coercion. In the long run, therefore, the best guarantee of security, and the least expensive, would be the German people’s repudiation of militaristic ambitions and their assimilation, as an equal partner, into a cooperative world society.

These considerations dictate the search for a policy which will prevent a renewal of German aggression and, at the same time, pave the way for the German people in the course of time to join willingly in the common enterprises of peace.

The long-range objectives which might best protect the interests of the United States include (1) the settlement of disturbing frontier
problems, (2) the achievement of political and economic reform within Germany, and (3) a constructive role for Germany, both political and economic, in international relations.

A. Frontiers

In order to strengthen the forces of peace throughout the world, it is a continuing interest of the United States that the significance of frontiers be reduced through the development of international organization and of freer international economic relations. In the establishment of post-war boundaries, the objectives of the United States can be best served by territorial settlements which, by doing least injustice to the peoples of all the states concerned, offer the most reasonable prospect of general acceptance and stability. In the case of Germany the principles of minimum change and minimum grievance apply fairly well to her northern, western and southern boundaries.

1. With Denmark.—The existing Danish-German boundary has not been challenged by the Danes, and there is no apparent reason to propose a change.

2. With the Netherlands.—No adjustment of the Netherlands land boundary seems desirable since it has heretofore been no source of disturbance. The Netherlands Government, however, has a justified claim for the relocation of the boundary in the Ems Estuary in the main channel rather than along the western shore as has been maintained by Germany in contravention of an established principle of international law. Unofficial Netherlands spokesmen have recently threatened to claim compensation in adjacent German territory if the German army should destroy the dikes and flood the reclaimed lands of their country.

Further study is being given to the question of possible territorial compensation in such an event.

3. With Belgium.—There appears to be no convincing reason why the 1920 line should not be restored. The justice of the Belgian frontier as established in 1920 was attacked by the Germans, and the pre-1914 line was restored in 1940. Despite Belgian abuse of the open plebiscite, the inhabitants of the disputed region had generally become reconciled to Belgian authority.

4. With France.—The United States Government is committed to the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France. Since there are no strong forces, either political or economic, working toward the creation of a separate state, or federation, composed of French, German, Luxembourg, Belgian and other territories within the watershed of the Rhine River, it would be undesirable for this Government to support such a proposal.

5. With Austria.—It is recommended that the present administrative boundary be maintained as the international frontier. After the
absorption of Austria, the German Government made a slight rectification of the old frontier—now an administrative boundary—for reasons of convenience rather than for political motives. There is no cause to restore the pre-1938 boundary unless that should be desired by the 2000 inhabitants of the small Sonthofen area, which is shut off by mountains from close contact with Austria.

6. With Czechoslovakia.—It is recommended that the pre-Munich frontier be restored without prejudice to any rectifications which the Czechoslovak Government might wish to propose as part of a broader settlement of the issues in dispute between Czechoslovakia and Germany.

Since a viable Czechoslovakia, to whose restoration this Government is committed, must include a substantial German population, it is believed that the pre-Munich frontier with Germany should in principle be restored on grounds of historic, legal and strategic considerations. Such a conclusion is without prejudice to any cessions in the six northern salients (area, 772 square miles; population, 320,000, about 96 percent German) which the Czechoslovak Government might wish to negotiate with Germany or to slight rectifications in favor of Czechoslovakia. If such rectifications should be arranged by the two Governments concerned, this settlement could be approved by this Government, which is not committed to support any specific boundaries.

7. With Poland.—The principle of minimum grievance will be fairly well attained by the dispositions indicated above. In the case of the Polish-German frontier that principle may have to be overridden. To strengthen Poland strategically and economically and to compensate it for prospective losses of territories in the East, the Polish Government urges, with Soviet and British support, that East Prussia, Danzig, and a portion of German Upper Silesia should be ceded to Poland, and will probably insist that the approximately 3.4 million German inhabitants of the ceded areas should be transferred to Germany. The Soviet Government with apparently some British support, has suggested the cession of additional German territory up to the Oder River.

A basic question which has arisen in acute form is whether this Government should enter into active negotiations with the British and Soviet Governments with a view to determining a new Polish-German boundary or whether it should disclaim interest in this question and refrain from expressing approval or disapproval of a settlement agreed upon by its two major allies and Poland. If it is determined that this Government should play an active role, two questions arise. The first is whether a settlement of the future Polish boundaries should be negotiated now or be treated as part of the final peace settlement.
The second is whether this Government should admit the principle of the acquisition by Poland of territories containing large blocs of ethnically German population as compensation for the loss of only partially Polish-inhabited territories to the Soviet Union or for strategic and economic reasons.

Regardless of whether the United States takes an active or passive role with respect to the disposition of East Prussia, Danzig and Upper Silesia, it is recommended that the United States not encourage the cession of German territory in the lower trans-Oder region. The strategic considerations advanced in support of such an annexation are difficult to justify since no frontier arrangement between the two states could of itself suffice to maintain Poland's security against German aggression.

8. Transfer of Germanic Populations.—A problem closely related to that of establishment of equitable frontiers is presented by the presence of considerable German minorities in the various states of Eastern Europe. In particular, the Czechoslovak Government has indicated a desire to transfer a substantial number of the 3,200,000 Germans from that state; Poland will wish likewise to remove the Germans from Poznań, as well as from newly acquired territories; Yugoslavia may desire to take similar action.

These German minorities became the advance guard of National Socialist penetration, and the states which they helped to deliver to Hitler have a well-founded grievance against them. Their transfer to Germany would probably contribute to the tranquility of the countries concerned. Hitler himself has set an example by numerous forced migrations of the peoples of this region of Europe.

The problem, however, is one of enormous proportions. Serious economic injury would be done if these people should be summarily uprooted from their homes and thrown into Germany without compensation for their possessions and without provision for livelihood. By land reform in Germany it would be possible to absorb perhaps one million of the immigrants into agriculture. The great majority would have to enter urban life and would cause considerable strains unless there were an expanding German economy accompanied by an increase in foreign trade.

It is recommended, because of the above consideration, that this Government oppose the mass transfer of these peoples immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. It will perhaps be desirable, however, to sanction the relocation of individuals and groups who have constituted a special problem.

Further study is to be undertaken on the questions of (a) criteria for selecting populations to be transferred, (b) the establishment of an inter-allied commission to supervise transfers of populations, and (c) an inter-allied occupation of East Prussia.
B. Political and Economic Conditions

1. Disarmament.—This Government should advocate (a) the prohibition for an indefinite period of a German military establishment, (b) the prohibition for an indefinite period of the manufacture and import of arms (except the importation of small arms for police purposes), ammunition and implements of war, together with the prohibition of the manufacture of aircraft and the prohibition of the importation of military aircraft, and (c) a system of international audit, inspection, and enforcement, extending over the whole of Germany, for insuring the observance of disarmament stipulations and for preventing the accumulation of war material.

The details of this problem will be the subject of further study.

2. Democracy.—Since a peace maintained only by the continuous coercion of Germany would be a precarious and expensive one at best, it must be an objective of the United States to promote in Germany the largest degree possible of internal stability based on free institutions, on the psychological disarmament of the German people, and on tolerable economic conditions.

The most plausible hope for lasting political reconstruction and orderly development lies in the establishment of a democratic government, despite serious difficulties facing such an attempt. It is therefore recommended that the aim of American policy should be to prepare the German people for self-government as early as that may be compatible with the operation of security controls over Germany and with the functioning of a general system of international security.

The survival of a new democratic regime will depend in considerable measure on the psychological disarmament of the German people as well as on a tolerable standard of living. Although a democracy will labor under a heavy burden because of its necessary submission to the will of the victors, it must be able to offer some claim on German pride and patriotism purged of its aggressive content. In order to encourage a constructive fresh start in German political life, the United States should favor holding out the prospect that a democratic Germany, by demonstrating its ability and intention to act as a peace-loving nation, can earn an honorable place in the society of nations. In order to avoid raising an issue similar to that which, after 1919, was exploited by the nationalists to discredit and destroy all attempts to promote liberalism and international cooperation, this Government should oppose writing into the surrender terms or the peace settlement a verdict of moral guilt against the German people as a whole.

3. Partition.—It is recommended that this Government oppose the forcible partition of Germany. (Referred to the Secretary for possible consideration with the President.)
An imposed dismemberment of Germany into two or more separate states has been advocated as a practicable means of forestalling any renewal of German aggression. Such a measure, however drastic in itself, would not obviate the necessity of imposing and enforcing far-reaching security controls upon Germany for an indeterminate future, whether Germany is left united or is divided. Moreover, because of the high degree of economic, political and cultural integration in Germany, it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed but also maintained by force. Such a drastic interference in German life would evoke a vastly increased resentment over and above the inevitable discontent with defeat and its consequences. The victor powers, by imposing partition, would take on themselves a burdensome and never-ending task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between the partite states and of restraining the nationalistic determination to reunite, which would, in all probability, be the response of the German people. Finally, the disruption of German economic unity would carry with it grave dangers for the economic stability of Europe as a whole, and not merely to Germany.

4. Political Decentralization.—It is recommended that every feasible effort should be made to promote a return to a federal system of government and a division of Prussia into a number of medium-sized states.

In reaction to National Socialist over-centralization, the Germans will probably return, of their own accord, to a considerable degree of federal decentralization, including the breakup of Prussia, which in 1938 included 62 percent of the area and two-thirds of the population of Germany, into several states of moderate size.

Two risks may, however, be incurred by going beyond encouragement of decentralization. The first is that an imposed weakening of the governmental structure more sweeping than that favored by the moderate and liberal parties in Germany would, like an imposed dismemberment, provide a ready-made program for the nationalistic groups. The second risk is that a weak central authority would be unable to cope with the social and economic problems of post-war adjustment. In addition, a return to wide provincial autonomy might again offer to undesirable elements an advantageous means of penetrating the various state governments, as happened prior to 1933, when the National Socialists captured control of several of the smaller states. Finally, even the cumbersome federalism of the Bismarckian empire was no protection against the growth of German power and militarism. Too much importance should not be attached to movements for decentralization, in any case, for the democratic forces have generally favored greater unification of the Reich.

5. Economic Arrangements.—It is to the long-range interest of the United States that Germany be prosperous but that, at the same time,
German economy should not again be directed to war-like purposes. A prime concern of this Government, therefore, is that Germany for the indefinite future be forbidden the manufacture and import of arms, ammunition and implements of war and be denied the right to develop an economically unsound productive capacity convertible to war purposes. This interest points to the termination of an autarkic policy and to the assimilation of Germany, without discrimination other than that necessary for security controls, into world economy, the maximum reduction of the economic significance of frontiers and the development of responsible international agencies for transportation, power, and other functions. It is equally to the interest of this Government that Germany eventually should participate fully in such international economic organizations and agencies, but should not be permitted to use foreign trade or commercial relations as an instrument of nationalistic policy.

In the interest of eliminating the social and economic bases of recurrent militarism, it is recommended that this Government approve a program for destroying the privileged positions of the Junker estate owners and of the great financial and industrial monopolies. The problem of the Junkers can be solved by breaking up the large landed estates; the problem of financial and industrial monopoly could be met in part through disestablishing the top financial structures of the great industrial combines and redistributing the ownership of constituent operating companies, and in part through some effective form of public control exercised through a democratic regime. It is also possible that nationalization of certain industries would contribute to the elimination of militarism and of political and economic abuses arising from the excessive concentration of economic power in private hands. Moreover, this Government should oppose the development of new forms of industrial combinations, whether on a German or international basis, which could contribute to renewed German economic and political aggression in Europe.

Further study is to be undertaken of ways and means of implementing these recommendations with respect to landed estates and industrial concentration.

It is recommended that this Government propose allowing the German people, subject to such requirements as those outlined above, to determine the nature of their economic system. It is to the interest of the United States to see in Germany the revival of free labor organizations enjoying ultimately the rights of association and of collective bargaining. (See also PWC-71a, "General Objectives of United States Economic Policy With Respect to Germany".)

*For the text of this paper, as revised during its consideration by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, see ECEFP D-36/44, August 14, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, p. 278.
C. German Foreign Relations

The position of post-war Germany in world affairs will be conditioned largely by the success or failure of international cooperation for security and prosperity and by the degree to which Germany demonstrates its abandonment of aggressive and totalitarian ambitions. Although deprived for an undefined future of all military power, Germany will remain the most populous and productive country in Europe to the west of Russia. Germany would present a danger to peace only if the victors should fall out among themselves and if either Russia or Great Britain should try to bring Germany into its orbit. The best guarantee against such a development would therefore lie in the continued cooperation of the three principal victors in their treatment of Germany and in the solution of other problems, and in the early establishment of a general international organization within which the security of Germany, like that of other nations, would be assured.

In the post-war period Germany will presumably be debarred by its own weakness and by the continuing resentment of its smaller neighbors from pursuing independently any regional policy in Europe. If, however, European economic interests can be served by promoting, on a non-discriminatory basis, commercial exchanges between Germany and its neighbors to their mutual benefit and without undue advantage to Germany, this Government should be prepared to view such a development with equanimity. It is probable, however, that Germany's overseas trade will play a much larger part than before in an economy reoriented away from war and the pursuit of autarky. Germany should not be permitted to use trade policy as an instrument of aggression.

It is recommended that the United States encourage the earliest possible integration of Germany into the community of peace-loving nations and into world commerce through holding out to a reconstructed Germany the prospect of early admission to the general international organization and of participation without discrimination in world trade.

III. TRANSITIONAL PROCEDURES AND ARRANGEMENTS

A. Surrender Terms

This Government, by public commitment, demands the unconditional surrender of Germany.

1. The Psychological Result.—The exaction of an admission of total defeat might prevent the invention of new legends about the alleged invincibility of German arms. Against this future advantage is to be weighed the immediate disadvantage of the fact that German propaganda, by misinterpreting the intentions of the United Nations
to mean subjugation and destruction, is encouraging the resistance of the German people and is to that extent prolonging the war.

2. The Legal Basis for the Authority and the Acts of the Victor Powers.—The basic problem of the surrender is the establishment of a firm legal basis for the authority and acts of the victor powers. The traditional rights of military occupation do not give all the authority that is necessary for dealing with unforeseen contingencies and for effecting the reforms prescribed by long-term objectives. It is open to question whether an assertion of rights of conquest would provide a more satisfactory legal basis. In any case, unconditional surrender of a state is an innovation which requires exact definition before unusual rights can be derived incontestably from it.

It would seem essential, therefore, that the terms written into the surrender instrument, rather than conventional rights of occupation or the rights of conquest, be the source of the authority of the victors, provided there is a German Government capable of signing, and that the instrument contain a clear and comprehensive statement of that authority.

3. The Extent of the Rights To Be Surrendered.—A further problem is the definition of unconditional surrender in terms of the extent of the rights to be surrendered by Germany. The alternatives are (a) that Germany should deliver all rights and powers to the victors, and (b) that the stipulations of the instrument be limited essentially to military terms.

Previous statements of American policy and the draft terms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have adopted the former interpretation. The British draft likewise embodies this definition. The Soviet view, on the other hand, is that the surrender instrument should contain primarily the military terms designed to render Germany incapable of renewing hostilities with the understanding that other provisions relating to political and economic matters should subsequently be imposed on Germany. In Soviet opinion, German military leaders would more readily accept military terms and would, if confronted with the sweeping demands of the American draft, use them to spur the German people to renewed resistance. It may be said in criticism of the Soviet approach that it would not assure to the victors an adequate legal basis for such measures as the punishment of war criminals, the abolition of the Nazi dictatorship, the reordering of German economy, etc., which are among the aims of this country. Furthermore, the political after-effects of increasing the stringency of the surrender terms step by step would perhaps play into the hands of nationalistic agitators against the peace settlement, as that procedure did after the last war.

4. A Long Versus a Short Surrender Document.—In the discussions of the European Advisory Commission, question has arisen over whether the surrender document should contain detailed provisions or be limited to a general acknowledgment of the comprehensive rights of the victors and the unqualified obligations of the vanquished. Proponents of the longer instrument argue that German acceptance would be more readily given to it than to a "blank-check" instrument and that it would expressly obligate Germany to a complete range of military, political, and economic stipulations without limiting the freedom of the victors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of their short document⁸ argue, in turn, that a comprehensive surrender of powers makes specific provisions unnecessary and that an enumeration of detailed stipulations in the surrender document would carry with it the implication of a limitation of powers to the provisions specified. They attribute certain difficulties in Italy to the restrictive character of the long document used there and contend that the application of the broad authority can best be effected by ordinances of the occupation commanders. The American position is in favor of a short document, and it is probable that the British Government will accept one if there is agreement on proclamations and ordinances designed to give effect to the surrender terms.

5. Who Should Sign for Germany.—The transfer of the full powers implicit in unconditional surrender can be effected only by the German Government, and the signatory or signatories should be duly authorized, therefore, by the Government. For psychological reasons it is desirable that the instrument likewise be signed on behalf of the German High Command and by as important an officer as can be found. In case of the existence at the time of a Nazi or quasi-Nazi Government, the signature of a highly placed civilian representative would be equally desirable. If a moderate regime is in power at the time of surrender, it might well be advisable to compel the military alone to bear the onus of signing. A military signature, however, would have to be authorized by whatever government was in power at that time.

6. Ratification of the Signed Instrument.—A further problem already posed is whether the signed instrument should be ratified by the German Government. Since no official can sign away more authority than he legally possesses, the unqualified legality of the sweeping delivery of powers through surrender will depend in German eyes on whether it is properly authorized by the Government in power at the time. It is recommended that the surrender instrument be ratified by whatever German Government is in power at the time of surrender.

7. Who Should Acquire the Enemy’s Surrendered Rights.—Whatever arguments might be advanced for vesting the rights over Germany in all of the states at war with it, the practical necessities for prompt action, and the responsibilities of the three major powers, make such an arrangement impossible. The real issue, therefore, is whether the rights surrendered by Germany should be transferred to the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Governments jointly, or to each of them separately. A provision in the surrender instrument explicitly naming the three powers as joint recipients would have the advantage of binding the three Governments to act jointly in the post-surrender treatment of Germany, and would help to avoid the confusions and suspicions which would arise if each had the right to deal separately with the defeated enemy. The disadvantage of vesting these powers in all three Governments jointly is that no one of them would, in theory at least, be allowed to act unless all three Governments were in agreement. On balance, however, the likelihood of bringing about a policy of uniform action towards Germany would be improved by vesting power over Germany in the three Governments jointly, and this alternative is consequently recommended.

The rights and powers accruing from the surrender of Germany are to be acquired and exercised jointly by the aforesaid powers in the interests of the United Nations.

B. Occupation

1. Administrative Machinery.—Since the main responsibility for the occupation of Germany must rest with the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, a basic problem arises as to how the interests and policies of the three powers are to be coordinated. The choice of a form of administrative machinery appears to lie between (a) a unified tripartite system, (b) a completely separate and independent administration in each of three zones, and (c) an intermediate arrangement.

Uniformity of procedure throughout Germany would be most easily obtained, and undue exercise of influence by any one of the occupation authorities would be most effectively forestalled, if there were a smoothly working unified tripartite control. Linguistic and other difficulties, however, appear to argue for separate zones to be administered by each of the three armies of occupation. Such an arrangement, while avoiding local friction, would pose the problems of uniform security measures and general coordination of policy in the treatment of Germany as a whole. A strict application of the second alternative, by suddenly breaking the normal unity of the land, might easily lead to economic and social catastrophe. If prolonged prostration is to be avoided, the essential administrative functions and
economic processes now operated on a national basis will need to be left intact and a high degree of uniformity maintained in the administration of any separate zones that may be established.

This Government has recommended the creation of a tripartite civil affairs agency for Germany to coordinate the military government of the proposed three zones of occupation. This plan emphasizes the consultative and advisory role of the tripartite board and the reservation of full administrative powers to the commander of each zone acting under direction of his own military superior. A British plan, questioning the adequacy of a purely advisory agency for coping with the highly unified administration of so many aspects of German life, proposes the establishment of a tripartite administrative board possessing the authority, within the limits of the agreement of the three Governments, to direct the application of approved policies to Germany as a whole. This proposal would limit the duty of the zonal commanders primarily to that of enforcing the administrative regulations of the central tripartite organ.

The American plan, approved by the Department of State and presented to the European Advisory Commission, is general in character. Further clarification as to whether the tripartite agency should be primarily consultative or should constitute a genuine joint administrative authority will be needed.

It is recommended that this Government favor the establishment of a tripartite organization with authority to direct the uniform administration of the whole of Germany.

2. The Delimitation and Allocation of Zones.—It is recommended that, in case three zones of occupation are established, this Government accept the boundaries proposed by the British and Soviet Governments.

This recommendation is made on the grounds that (a) a tripartite governing machinery for the whole of Germany, in which the three powers would be equal partners, would tend to minimize the significance of the exact location of zonal boundary lines, (b) an arrangement which would make each zone contiguous to Berlin is not feasible because of the location of the capital.

A further problem is presented by the allocation of the zones. The plans hitherto advanced agree in assigning the eastern zone to Soviet command. The British and Soviet proposals assign the northwestern zone to British command and the southern to American control. The President has stated, however, that, because of convenience of access, American troops should control the northwestern zone.

3. Military Government and Subsequent Method of Control.—At the time of post-surrender occupation the victors may either (a) set up a direct military government which would supplant the
German political authorities while using more or less fully the administrative machinery, or (b) govern Germany by means of directives to a central political regime.

Although a final decision should be made only after future developments are assessed, it is tentatively recommended that this Government favor the first alternative. Direct military government will probably be necessary because of prospective internal confusion and would, in any case, be an effective means of impressing the totality of defeat on the German mentality. If a quasi-Nazi or military group should be in power at the time of surrender, it would be desirable to have that regime bear the onus of admitting defeat and of executing the orders of the occupation forces, but the procedure would entail the political limitation of dealing with a regime repugnant to the peoples of the victor states. If a group of moderates should gain control of Germany, there might be advantages administratively in working through it. Such a method, however, would have a very heavy disadvantage of exposing the moderates to the charge of being the tools of the allied powers. The moderates would have a better chance of survival in the court of popular German opinion if they came into power as the successors and supplanters of direct military government than as its instrument.

On the assumption of the probability of direct military government, it is further recommended that, as soon as military considerations cease to be paramount, the control of Germany should be transferred to an inter-allied civilian agency.

The importance of strictly military dispositions will tend to recede when the German forces have been disarmed and order is established under allied military occupation. Progressively from the time of surrender, consequently, the major concern of the victors will be the inauguration of political and economic reforms within Germany looking to the uprooting of National Socialism and the eventual integration of Germany into the organized community of nations. It is believed that these functions are more logically the work of the civilian authorities of the Governments concerned and can more effectively be performed by them. This recommendation does not envisage the termination of military occupation at the time of the transfer of authority to the civilian agency, but merely the subordination of the military to the civilian.

The point at which civilian control should supplant the military cannot be determined now, but it is recommended that in principle the change be made as soon as the maintenance of orderly conditions in Germany is assured.

4. Participation of the Smaller United Nations in the Control of Germany.—The primary military responsibility of the three principal United Nations requires that they make the basic decisions regarding
the treatment of Germany in the transitional period and bear the principal burden of enforcing them. At the same time the smaller United Nations in Europe have a vital interest in what is done to Germany as well as in future international organization. Questions therefore have arisen as to their participation in (a) the formulation of surrender terms, (b) the military occupation of Germany, (c) the joint military governmental body, and (d) the proposed civilian control agency.

The first question has been resolved by the offer of the European Advisory Commission to receive their proposals. The others remain unanswered. While it is impossible here to present a comprehensive program for the future, it is recommended that this Government favor the principle of the fullest participation of the smaller United Nations compatible with the major military responsibility of the three Great Powers. Some positive role for the smaller nations, although making decision a more cumbersome process, would help to forestall the formation of a bloc of the lesser states and the appearance of disruptive political maneuvers. It would likewise establish a pattern of cooperation looking forward to international organization.

5. Relation of Machinery for Control of Germany With Machinery for European Reconstruction.—The security political and economic dispositions relating to Germany affect in so many vital respects the general problem of the reconstruction of Europe that the British Government has raised a question as to the advisability of creating some kind of inter-allied body for coordinating policies and actions with respect to Europe as a whole.

Under such a plan an Allied Commission, or a similar body, for control of Germany would report to and receive directives from a European Council or similar body which would coordinate policies relating to Germany with those which affect Europe as a whole. In the absence of such an agency, the various governments and their inter-governmental agencies, such as those relating to economic disarmament, collection and allocation of reparation, regulation of property rights, and revival of international trade, may find themselves working at cross purposes. On the other hand, in view of the risk that the operations of such a regional organization might tend to jeopardize the willingness of the various countries to cooperate in the early establishment of a general international organization, this Government has hitherto tended to discourage establishment of such a European body.

6. Security Functions During Occupation.—The following problems, among others, will require immediate action by the occupation authorities:

a. Demobilization of German armed forces.—Immediately upon the acceptance of Germany's surrender, the allies will be confronted with the problem of dealing with several million German soldiers. The
alternative solutions will be (1) demobilization and disbandment carried out as expeditiously as considerations of internal order and in so far as feasible, the absorptive capacity of German economy will allow, (2) a retention of the troops in their formations under some form of direct control, either to be held in restraint for security reasons or used for labor service until such time as their release will be expedient.

It is recommended that this Government favor in principle the first alternative because of the problems of control and maintenance involved in keeping so many troops in confinement. This recommendation would not exclude the use of Waffen SS and other Nazi military formations in performing labor service for the needs of European reconstruction but would oppose the use in labor service for an indefinite period of large numbers of Army units.

Further study is to be made of the problem of the employment of forced German labor in reconstruction work outside of Germany.

b. Disarmament and the disposition of surrendered German arms and military equipment.—It is recommended that German arms, ammunition and instruments of war be scrapped in so far as they are not wanted for use in the war against Japan or adaptable to peaceful uses.

Total and lasting disarmament of Germany is a formal commitment of the United States Government. Among the proposals for the disposition of German arms, ammunition and implements of war are (1) that they be given to the states overrun by Germany and (2) that they be scrapped in so far as they are not capable of conversion to peaceful purposes. While the first alternative might give Germany’s neighbors a temporary sense of added security, the measure is fraught with dangers. The rearming of European nations with surrendered German war matériel would complicate the problem of restoring political stability, render future disarmament more difficult, tend to make the countries concerned look to Germany for spare parts and replacements, and might inaugurate an armaments race detrimental to international peace and security.

Further study is to be made of the post-surrender disposition of German armaments.

c. Dissolution of military and para-military agencies.—It is recommended that, except for a civil police force adequate to maintain order, the occupation authorities proceed to the immediate dissolution of the army, the General Staff, party military and quasi-military organizations, reserve corps, military academies and military training, the administrative agencies performing military functions, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition. All such organizations should be permanently prohibited.
d. Immediate measures for the control of German war potential.—
The essential first steps in the control of German war potential involve
(1) the immediate cessation of the manufacture of war matériel and
prohibition of resumption except in so far as it may be desired to make
a limited use of German industrial capacity in the prosecution of the
war against Japan, (2) the establishment of controls over industrial
production, importation, and other economic activities, and (3) the
dismantling of industrial machinery and plants not convertible to
peace-time production or presenting an insuperable security problem.
Likewise, the occupation authorities should proceed to the early in-
aguration of reforms designed to eliminate a policy of German
autarky and to integrate Germany into the world economy by in-
creasing its dependence on foreign trade.

C. Political Dispositions

1. Use of German Agencies and Personnel During Military Govern-
ment.—To the end that civilian life continue as smoothly as possible,
it is recommended that the occupation authorities make maximum use
of German administrative machinery in so far as it can serve the
purposes of the occupation authorities and does not perpetuate Nazi
control and abuses, and use of non-Nazi civil servants in so far
as they are efficient and politically acceptable to the occupation
authorities.

2. Treatment of National Socialist Party and Party Members.—The
first act in the fulfillment of the commitment to eliminate National
Socialism should be the abolition of the Party and the impounding
of its assets and records. The numerous affiliated and supervised
organizations should be dissolved promptly, although certain social
services now performed by them should be transferred to state organs
or to newly established voluntary associations.

It is recommended that the occupation authorities impose political
and other restrictions on the categories of the more important leaders,
both national and local, rather than on the whole membership of the
Party. Theoretically the Party has probably more than 5 million
members, about 2 million of whom are considered as “leaders”. To
impose comprehensive disabilities upon all Party members would in-
volve undertaking an enormous administrative task and giving the
same treatment to the active and incorrigible nucleus of leadership
as to a great mass of passive, and by then presumably disillusioned,
followers. The punishment of war criminals will in itself serve to
exclude a certain number of important Nazis. It consequently seems
desirable to favor the exclusion from government office and from
enjoyment of political rights of certain broad categories of Nazis,
rather than of all nominal members of the Party. Careful attention
will have to be given to the elimination of convinced Nazis and other politically objectionable elements from education, journalism, and from control of industrial and financial enterprises.

3. Political Activity and Association.—Upon the establishment of military government, the uncertainties of the first days will probably require a complete ban on political agitation and on the activities of political associations. Commitments require the lasting suppression of parties assuming the trappings of quasi-military organizations or espousing National Socialist ideals.

It is recommended, however, that as soon as military conditions permit, parties opposing Nazi and other kinds of ultra-nationalist ideology be permitted to organize and appeal for support. This recommendation is based on the conviction that the German people will need information, organization and public debate before they are prepared to decide their future form of government and that there is advantage in beginning these activities while National Socialism is under the immediate impact of defeat.

D. Economic Dispositions

1. The Prevention of Collapse.—A major concern of the victors at the time of occupation will of necessity be the prevention of an economic collapse or the revival of economic activity if a collapse has already occurred. A memorandum, which has been presented to the Committee on Post-War Programs (PWC–72a),\(^6\) has outlined a series of measures which appear essential to that end; they include the maintenance and strengthening of the existing machinery for price and credit control, for distribution of food and other civilian supplies, for the control of labor, for the allocation of raw materials and capital in the interest of maintaining production, and for reviving essential foreign trade.

2. Exchange Rate.—The rate of the mark for international transactions will need to be fixed with a view to both economic and political conditions, first consideration being given to stimulating confidence in the value of the currency. A rate which avoids undervaluation will be desirable in facilitating the best possible support for internal and external commerce.

3. Reparation.—The problem of reparation has been the subject of a separate report by the Committee on Reparation, Restitution and Property Rights (PWC–223, 224, 225, 226).\(^10\)

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\(^6\) Not printed.

\(^10\) For the text of this report, as revised during its consideration by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, see ECEFP D–37/44, August 12, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. I, p. 287.
4. Economic Reorganization.—While the immediate economic objective upon occupation is the prevention of collapse, the victor powers can hardly avoid dealing with many of the basic problems of the German economy. Among those problems are: creation of organizations designed to promote the unification of European transport and power and communication facilities; the prohibition or regulation of enduring international agreements between private firms; the breakup of the large landed estates; the reduction of over-concentration of financial and industrial control; the revival of international commerce by the reduction of trade barriers; the eventual development of multilateral trade and elimination of uneconomical enterprises developed under the banner of autarky; finally, the definitive determination of the most effective means for the control of Germany’s economic war potential.

E. Establishment of Permanent Government

The establishment of military government over Germany will give the victors an opportunity to observe the new political conditions which may emerge before making a final decision with respect to a permanent German Government. Certain issues, however, merit consideration at this time.

1. Termination of Allied Government.—It is recommended that this Government favor the policy of terminating direct administration of the German governmental structure, whether by military or civilian agencies, as soon as prospects of order and the possibility of establishing an acceptable and competent German Government make its termination feasible. This recommendation would not affect the continued military occupation of Germany or the exercise of controls, by direct intervention if necessary, on the part of inter-allied agencies.

The duration of direct control, either military or civilian, will depend, among other things, on the continued need for order, on an assessment of the psychological effect of occupation government, and on an estimate of how ready the Germans are to organize a government. It may be anticipated that the major result of military government on German mentality will be achieved within a few months at the most. As they recover from the shock, the people may become progressively resentful over the delay in reviving their political activity, and friction would work to the advantage of the nationalistic elements. It is equally important, however, that the people should not give their decisive votes before an adequate period of public discussion has clarified the issues.

2. Procedures for Restoration of Permanent Government.—There are three general alternatives of procedure: (1) restoration of the pre-
Hitler Weimar constitution; (2) the convocation of a new constituent assembly; and (3) progressive extension of self-government from local units through the states to the federal Reich as the success of each step seemed assured. The principle of continuity would be observed by returning to the original Weimar text. Yet that document, while a good rational product, was not an organic part of German life, and it is doubtful if the mass of Germans would wish to go back to it. A new constitution drawn up after a decade of political sterility, however, might not prove a much more effective instrument. Fear has been expressed that an election for a constituent assembly as the first political experience of the German people would revive the old bankrupt political parties and focus all political attention on the central government to the detriment of healthy local and provincial political life. The third alternative, by reviving free local self-government, would provide a transition period in which the German people could develop new leaders and gain experience in democratic practice, central governmental functions being carried on meanwhile by civil servants under allied control.

If there is a period of direct military government, it is recommended that democratic self-government be established in local communities as soon as military necessities permit. Decision as to when the next step should be taken could profitably be made in consultation with responsible local leaders.

3. The Exercise of External Influence.—In fidelity to their commitment to uproot National Socialism, the victor powers will need to intervene in the process of reconstructing government to the extent of denying political rights to those categories of Nazis adjudged dangerous. An attempt positively to influence political decisions of the German people might be successful if the intervention were the joint work of the major powers, but in the course of time [the] habit of intervention, if developed, would probably outlive joint action, and, if so, Germany would become the hunting ground of competing influences and would be able to play off one rival against another, with disastrous consequences for any system of controls and for the peace.

These considerations point to the desirability of limiting positive influence to the encouragement of popular self-government and not attempting to determine precisely the forms of government to be established. At the same time, however, it is a dictate of security that the victor powers, and after them the international organization, should reserve the right, and be prepared, to intervene in Germany to prevent the re-emergence of dangerous nationalistic activities and to hold Germany to the observance of the obligations imposed by the peace settlement and by the post-war security system.
Memorandum by the Division of Central European Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 22, 1944.

STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS ON GERMANY

NEGOTIATIONS IN THE E.A.C.

The European Advisory Commission, after six months of discussions, has formally recommended the surrender terms for Germany to the Governments of the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. The American Government has notified Ambassador Winant of its formal approval of these terms. Approval by the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. is expected momentarily.

Attached to the recommendation of the Commission is a letter to the European United Nations inviting their views in writing on the question of the surrender of Germany. To date, we are not informed of what views have been submitted to the Commission.

Before the Commission at present are three other important matters: (a) the protocol on the occupation of Germany, (b) the protocol on the occupation of Austria, and (c) proposals for control machinery and military government in Germany.

With respect to the occupation of Germany, the boundaries of the three zones of occupation have been provisionally agreed upon, but the question of whether British or American troops will occupy the northwestern or southern zone is still undecided. The President has indicated he desires the American forces to occupy the northwestern zone and my information is to the effect that he is still awaiting Churchill's agreement on this point. Acting on the authority of the President, Ambassador Winant has agreed to a tripartite occupation of Austria but the protocol on this has not as yet been formally recommended by the EAC.

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[11] This attachment was an abridgement of a memorandum of August 22, 1944 (not printed), from the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) and the Secretary of State (74-0.00119 Control (Germany)/8-2844). The passages of Riddleberger's memorandum which were omitted from the memorandum forwarded to Roosevelt dealt with differences between the military authorities and officers of the Department of State, particularly with respect to matters before the Working Security Committee.


[13] For a summary of Anglo-American differences of opinion on this question in the period before the Second Quebec Conference, see an undated memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey) printed post, p. 146.
With respect to control machinery for Germany, British and American proposals have been before the EAC for some months. The American proposal envisages a Supreme Authority consisting of the three Commanders-in-Chief and advised by a Control Council which would be established on a functional basis (political, economic, military, transport, etc. sections).

Under this proposal the separate American, British and Soviet zonal administrations would retain their identity and operate separately in their respective zones. The policies pursued in the zones would be coordinated by the Control Council in Berlin, which would make recommendations on all policies to be executed throughout Germany.

The British have submitted a somewhat similar proposal, which has likewise been before the EAC for some months. The Russians have not submitted any proposal on control machinery and have recently indicated that they are unwilling to discuss any further questions in the EAC until the dispute between the British and Americans over their respective zones of occupation has been settled.

**DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON ON TREATMENT OF GERMANY**

The Department has prepared, and the Committee on Post-War Programs has approved, a basic policy statement entitled “Treatment of Germany” to which is attached a summary of policy recommendations. This report was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about a month ago through the Working Security Committee. The JCS, however, have not as yet made known their approval to this document or the comments thereon. It is envisaged that as soon as the JCS have acted on it that it will be submitted to the President and, if he approves, will be transmitted to London for the guidance of Ambassador Winant in his negotiations on the EAC. A similar paper on Austria has been approved by the President and transmitted to Ambassador Winant.

In addition to the foregoing, a basic report on economic policy towards Germany and on reparations has been prepared in the Department and has been cleared by the Executive Committee on Foreign Economic Policy. These will be submitted to the Secretary in the near future with a suggestion as to how they should be taken up with the military authorities.

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14 For texts of the United States and British proposals referred to, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. I, pp. 185, 201.
15 Ante, p. 55.
16 Ante, p. 49.
17 See ante, p. 49, fn. 3.
19 See ante, p. 60, fn. 6, and p. 70, fn. 10.
A vast amount of material has been prepared in the Department on a variety of problems which will arise from the occupation of Germany but it has not yet been approved. These papers cover a variety of subjects, of which a few are set forth below for the purpose of illustration:

Abrogation of Nazi Laws
Disposition of Nazi Organizations
Displaced Persons
Control of Political Activities
Supervision of Education
Use of German Officials in Administration
Control of Communications
Control of Industry Potential for War
Disposition of Merchant Shipping, etc.

The Working Security Committee has now drafted a paper entitled "Statement of General Policies To Be Followed in the Administration of Germany". This report will lay down the general policies to be agreed upon by the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. on most important matters requiring agreement by the three powers for the administration of Germany after occupation. It is based upon the assumption that agreement will be reached on zones of occupation and control machinery.

It is anticipated that this paper will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval. If this approval is given, it will be possible for the Department to send to London a vast amount of detailed information respecting the policies to be applied in Germany after occupation.

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRITISH IN LONDON

The British authorities have prepared and submitted to the EAC a number of directives covering policies to be followed in Germany upon occupation. In general, they cover much the same subjects as those which have been prepared in Washington and which are briefly described in the preceding paragraph. On a number of them, our views are not very different from those submitted by the British, but a certain amount of negotiation will no doubt be necessary before complete agreement is reached on all directives submitted by them.

In addition, Ambassador Winant's Planning Group has likewise drafted a number of directives for consideration by the American authorities. The Working Security Committee is prepared to correlate the various statements that have been prepared as soon as the military members have received authority from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to operate under the statement of general policies described above.

For the revision of this paper dated August 30, 1944, see post, p. 77.
CONCLUSION

The slowness in arriving at agreed policies on the treatment of Germany has resulted primarily from the unwillingness of the Russians to discuss the control machinery proposal until the zones of occupation are definitely decided. Without agreement on control machinery, it is difficult for the Department to make any real progress on the detailed planning. We have attempted through the Ambassador at Moscow to get the Russians to continue discussions, but without success to date.

Department of the Army Files

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1944.

DEAR DOC: Enclosed is a telephone conversation I had with Secretary Stimson this morning which I think it might be well for you to consider and perhaps show to the Secretary of State in connection with any meetings that this new group ² may have.

I know that Mr. Stimson is feeling very strongly about the wisdom of imprisoning the Gestapo. I have asked our people to check up on the size and extent of the Gestapo, so far as we have any means of checking, with an idea of determining what is involved.

Sincerely,

John J. McCloy

[Enclosure]

SECRET

AUGUST 28, 1944.

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY STIMSON, 12:30 P.M.

Four propositions.

1. Swift punishment should be visited on the Nazi leaders in respect of war crimes.

2. We should then go down by steps into the subordinates responsible for such crimes, beginning with the leaders of the Gestapo and investigating their individual responsibility and punishing it accordingly.

3. As a preliminary step to the above we should immediately upon the occupation of Germany arrest and intern the entire Gestapo and institute careful investigation into individual responsibility for these crimes. Encourage the making of such charges by the German people.

¹McCloy sent copies of this letter to Hopkins, Hilldring, and White.
²i.e., the Cabinet Committee on Germany. See post, p. 90.
4. Institute at once an investigation as to the responsibility of the Storm Troopers and their leaders for similar war crimes. Consider also the method of proceeding against the Storm Troopers in a way similar to that taken against the Gestapo. We should always have in mind the necessity of punishing effectively enough to bring home to the German people the wrongdoing done in their name, and thus prevent similar conduct in the future, without depriving them of the hope of a future respected German community. (Those are the two alternatives.) Remember this punishment is for the purpose of prevention and not for vengeance. An element in prevention is to secure in the person punished the conviction of guilt. The trial and punishment should be as prompt as possible and in all cases care should be taken against making martyrs of the individuals punished.

How far can we go under the Geneva Convention in educating war prisoners against Naziism?

How far can we go in protecting the remainder of the Germans from the contagion of the Nazis?

[[Signed July 27, 1929. For text, see Department of State, Treaty Series No. 846; Department of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949, vol. 2, p. 932; 47 Stat. (2) 2021.]]

Memorandum by the Working Security Committee

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1944.

WS–254b

MILITARY AND POLITICAL POLICIES TO BE FOLLOWED IN ADMINISTRATION OF GERMANY

(The following statement of policies is based on the assumption of prior agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on (a) surrender terms, (b) zones of occupation, and (c) control machinery:)

1. The administration of Germany will be firm but just. The occupation authorities will in particular punish fully and promptly any organization or individual who fails to render satisfactory cooperation with the military government or who fails to comply fully with any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions that will be issued.

[[Hull forwarded this paper to the United States Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Winant) on September 16, 1944, with the following explanation of its status: "This document is now awaiting action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the meantime it is being forwarded . . . in as much as it has been cleared by the Department and represents its views with respect to the principal military and political policies to be followed in the administration of Germany." For the full text of the covering instruction, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, p. 335.]]
2. All German armed forces and all German governmental officials, authorities and agents who are outside Germany at the time of surrender shall be returned as soon as practicable to such German territories as may be specified, subject to such arrangements as may be made with the authorities in the areas in which they are located and to such agreements as may be reached between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

3. As soon as practicable the Supreme Allied Authority shall dissolve the German armed forces and staff organizations, Nazi military, para-military and police organizations, reserve corps, military academies, the administrative agencies performing military functions, and all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military spirit. All such organizations shall be prohibited. The members of all such organizations shall be demobilized and disbanded as soon as practicable except that the respective commanding generals may retain any members of such organizations under their control for such purposes as may be authorized by the Supreme Allied Authority. All military training shall be forbidden and no secret organizations or societies shall be permitted. German civil police forces adequate to maintain order may be permitted.

4. All property acquired or coming under Allied control as a result of German defeat or surrender, including German resources in the respective zones of occupation, shall be disposed of only in accordance with principles established by the Supreme Allied Authority.

5. Prompt measures should be taken to seize and place under protective custody all important records whether governmental, party or private in character. All enemy information and records thus secured by virtue of the defeat and surrender of Germany will constitute a common pool and will be made available to the United States, United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. and upon agreement by them to other United Nations without regard to the physical location or custody of such records.

6. All German arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be destroyed or scrapped except as otherwise agreed by the three Powers. All permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses, and other fortified areas shall be destroyed.

7. The further manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prohibited.

8. The National Socialist Party and all organizations associated with it shall be dissolved. Provision may be made for the continuance by public agencies or voluntary associations of any desirable social services now performed by certain of these organizations. The activities of persons who have been active Nazis shall be restricted with a view to destroying their influence in Germany.
9. The key laws and decrees establishing the political structure of National Socialism and implementing its ideology and objectives shall be systematically abrogated.

10. To the extent possible, German administrative machinery and German personnel shall be used for the execution of Allied policies and for the routine administration of Germany. Active Nazis and persons suspected of being war criminals or otherwise unreliable shall not be employed in German administrative agencies.

11. Political activity shall be prohibited except as authorized by the Supreme Allied Authority. When considerations of military security permit, parties opposing Nazi and kindred ideologies shall be allowed to organize and appeal for popular support.

12. Subject to considerations of military security the Supreme Allied Authority shall authorize the formation of voluntary labor organizations possessing the rights of association and of collective bargaining.

13. The Supreme Allied Authority shall suspend all German laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion and shall take action necessary to annul such laws. In the absence of security objection persons detained under any such laws shall be released.

14. To the extent consistent with military security and the destruction of National Socialism freedom of speech and press and freedom of religious activity shall be permitted.

15. All information services (press, radio, cinema, etc.) and all channels of communication shall be administered under policies formulated by the Supreme Allied Authority and shall be subject to such censorship as will:

insure against further dissemination of Nazi propaganda,
facilitate the revival of free expression so far as consistent with security needs and the destruction of National Socialism, and
implement other policies of the Supreme Allied Authority.

16. The following shall be arrested and held for investigation and subsequent disposition:

(a) Adolf Hitler and his chief Nazi associates,
(b) the officials who have held ministerial and other important governmental positions under the Nazi regime,
(c) comparable officials of other governments which have been at war with any of the United Nations,
(d) persons suspected of having committed war crimes,
(e) nationals of any of the United Nations or associated states alleged to have committed offenses against their national laws, and
(f) any other persons designated by the United States, the United Kingdom or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
17. Schools shall be re-opened as speedily as military considerations permit and as material and personnel requirements can be met. The entire educational system shall operate under the supervision of the Supreme Allied Authority with the fullest possible utilization of reliable German administrators and teachers. Active Nazis shall be removed from the staffs and all Nazi and kindred influences eliminated from the curricula. Positive educational reconstruction shall be left to competent and politically trustworthy German leadership.

18. The administration of justice by civilian courts shall be reestablished as speedily as will be compatible with the elimination of active Nazi personnel and replacement by qualified non-Nazis. Special party-created tribunals shall be abolished.

19. All possible aid consistent with the means at hand will be rendered to Allied prisoners of war, including those persons who have been deprived of this status involuntarily, to the end that their safety and well-being is not jeopardized by the collapse of Germany, and such prisoners of war will be repatriated as soon as practicable upon the cessation of hostilities. The repatriation of prisoners of war will have priority over the repatriation of other displaced persons. No priority with respect to repatriation should be established in advance by which the prisoners of any nation or nations will be favored. The time and order in which prisoners will be repatriated must be determined in the light of the situation existing after the collapse of Germany.

20. Movement of all persons across German frontiers shall be regulated under policies laid down by the Supreme Allied Authority.

21. Relations between Germany and any state still at war with any of the United Nations and associated states shall be broken off. Relations between Germany and any other states shall be carried on to the extent and in the manner determined by the Supreme Allied Authority.

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Hopkins Papers

The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1944.

Dear Mr. Hopkins. Attached is the memo which I promised for use in the meeting at your office tomorrow morning. I shall bring enough copies for all. It’s a rush job, but I think I have hit most of the high spots.

Jimmie Riddleberger

¹This covering memorandum is entirely in Riddleberger’s handwriting.
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1944.

AMERICAN POLICY FOR TREATMENT OF GERMANY AFTER SURRENDER

It is essential that a number of important decisions be made respecting American policy for the treatment of Germany after surrender, particularly as certain of these questions will have to be negotiated with the British and the Russians. There is accordingly set forth below a summary of the decisions that have been made to date and a statement of important problems on which final American policy has not been formulated.

1. Status of Negotiations in the EAC

(a) Surrender Terms. The instrument of unconditional surrender of Germany has been recommended by the European Advisory Commission and has been formally approved by the American Government. It is anticipated that British and Russian approval will be forthcoming. These surrender terms are the outcome of prolonged negotiations in which considerable differences of opinion had to be ironed out. The surrender instrument is essentially a military document in which the German Government and the German High Command announces Germany's unconditional surrender. The first eleven articles relate primarily to military dispositions and are supplemented by a general clause in which it is stated that the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. will exercise supreme authority with respect to Germany and will present additional, political, administrative, economic, financial and other requirements which the German Government, High Command and people will carry out unconditionally.

(b) Zones of Occupation. Tentative, but not formal, agreement has been reached in the EAC respecting the demarcation of three zones of occupation which will be confided to Russian, British and American troops. The Soviet forces will occupy the eastern zone, but whether British or American troops will occupy the northwestern and southern zones is not as yet decided. The protocol on occupation has therefore not been formally recommended by the EAC as the Russians stated they did not desire to submit a document to Moscow containing blank spaces. It has been agreed that Austria will be jointly occupied by the three powers with American military participation limited to a token force. The area of Greater Berlin will likewise be subject to tripartite occupation.

2 Cf. the memorandum on this subject dated August 22, 1944, ante, p. 73.
(c) Control Machinery and Military Government. Both the American and British Governments submitted to the EAC in March 1944 proposals for control machinery and military government in Germany. The Russian delegates refused to discuss these proposals in EAC until the surrender terms had been agreed upon and subsequently refused to discuss them until the occupation protocols had been finally recommended. After some pressure had been exerted in Moscow, the Russians have now agreed to discuss control machinery and have submitted a proposal to the EAC. This proposal has not as yet been received in Washington.3

The American proposal for the administration of Germany contemplates a Supreme Authority consisting of the three Commanding Generals of the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R., which would coordinate Allied activity throughout Germany and supervise such centralized governmental functions and economic activities which the three powers deem essential. A Control Council, composed of representatives in equal numbers from each of the three Allied Governments, will be established by the Supreme Allied Authority and will coordinate the administration of military government throughout Germany, including detailed planning for the execution of directives received from the three governments. The British proposal is not dissimilar in its broad outline from the American plan.

2. Important Problems for Which High Policy Decisions Are Urgently Required

The fundamental question to be decided is what kind of a Germany do we want and what policies should be put into effect during occupation to attain our objectives. The most important of these problems are set forth below with an explanation of the State Department’s attitude to them:

(a) Partition. It must be explained at the outset that “partition” as used here does not refer to frontier adjustments or territorial amputations in the outer borders of the Reich. For example, the annexation of East Prussia and Danzig by Poland is not excluded in the recommendations set forth below on partition. By partition is meant the division of what is left of Germany into two, three or more independent states. While it can be argued that partition is not necessarily an urgent question, it is undoubtedly true that if partition were decided upon, we might desire to determine the zones of occupation to conform to a subsequent partition.

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3 The text of the Soviet proposal was received by the Department of State on September 2, 1944. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, p. 299.
The State Department is, in general, opposed to the forcible partition of Germany. An imposed dismemberment of Germany into two or more separate states has been advocated as a practicable means of forestalling any renewal of German aggression. Such a measure, however drastic in itself, would not obviate the necessity of imposing and enforcing far-reaching security controls upon Germany for an indeterminate future, whether Germany is left united or is divided. Moreover, because of the high degree of economic, political and cultural integration in Germany, it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed but also maintained by force. The victor powers, by imposing partition, would take on themselves a burdensome and neverending task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between the partite states and of restraining the nationalistic determination to reunite, which would, in all probability, be the response of the German people. Finally, the disruption of German economic unity would carry with it grave dangers for the economic stability of Europe as a whole, and not merely to Germany. We should not, however, oppose any spontaneous German movements for partition.

In place of partition, it is recommended that every effort be made to promote a federal system of government in Germany and a division of Prussia into a number of medium-sized states. Prussia in 1938 included 62% of the area and two-thirds of the population of Germany and it may well be that in reaction to Nazi over-centralization many Germans would want to return to a considerable degree of federal decentralization, including the breakup of Prussia.

(b) Dissolution of German Armed Forces. There is general agreement that the German armed forces and staff organizations, Nazi military, para-military and police organizations, reserve corps, military academies, [and] administrative agencies performing military functions shall be dissolved and prohibited. Their members shall be demobilized and disbanded as soon as practicable. All German arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be destroyed or scrapped, except as otherwise agreed, and the further manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prohibited.

(c) Liquidation of the Nazi Party. There is general agreement that the Nazi Party and all organizations associated with it shall be dissolved. The activities of persons who have been active Nazis shall be restricted. In effecting the abolition of the Nazi Party, it is contemplated that it shall be completely destroyed in all of its manifestations, including the SA, the SS, Hitler Youth, the Motor Corps, the Women's League, the Student's League, the University Teachers and all affiliated organizations such as the Labor Front, the Association for
War Victims, the Guardians of the Law, the Public Welfare Organization and special party schools. Party members shall be excluded from political or civil activity and subjected to a number of restrictions. Any laws and decrees establishing the political structure of National Socialism shall be abrogated. Political activity shall be prohibited, except as authorized by the Supreme Allied Authority. All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion shall be annulled.

(d) War Criminals. There is general agreement that Adolf Hitler, his chief Nazi associates, officials who have held ministerial and other important posts, persons suspected of having committed war crimes, and other persons designated by the U.S., the U.K. or the U.S.S.R. shall be arrested and held for "subsequent disposition".

(e) Control of Communications. There is general agreement that all information services (press, radio, cinema, etc.) and all channels of communication shall be administered under policies formulated by the Supreme Allied Authority.

(f) Economic Measures. American economic policy with respect to Germany envisages the reservation of far-reaching rights of control over German economy after surrender. There is no disagreement on this point. However, it is apparent that considerable differences of opinion have developed as to the purpose toward which this control should be directed. The Department of State has drafted and approved a statement on the general objectives of American economic policy and has received the approval to this document by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy. Without attempting to summarize here all of the reasoning contained in this document, there is quoted below the four major objectives to be sought:

1. The performance by Germany of acts of restitution and reparation required by the United Nations.
2. The control of Germany's economic war potential, by the conversion of German economic capacity directed to war purposes, and by rendering vulnerable to outside control the reconversion of Germany into a war economy able to launch and sustain a war of aggression.
3. The elimination of German economic dominance in Europe, which Germany achieved by the systematic exploitation of the so-called "New Order" in Europe and by a series of other practices.
4. Effecting a fundamental change in the organization and conduct of German economic life to the end that German economy can be integrated into an inter-dependent world economy.

These statements, together with the justification thereof, have now been presented to the Secretaries of War and Navy for their comment.\cite{5}

In the meantime, the State Department has received, in the course of drafting instruction[s] to its representative on the EAC, various proposals from the military authorities which apparently contemplate the dismantlement or destruction of all German industry capable of producing war material. Its objection is that such proposals contradict the general objectives quoted above, particularly paragraph 2. They would likewise presumably remove the possibility of extracting reparation goods from Germany.

The problem of German reparations is obviously closely linked to two others: (a) the level of subsistence which will be determined for the German people, and (b) the extent to which German industry may be dismantled or destroyed either for the purpose of long-term security or for short-term reparation payment.

Therefore it seems essential that this Government should determine its basic policy and should decide at an early date what kind of economic structure it proposes to leave to Germany. If a far-reaching program of industrial destruction or dismantlement is agreed upon, it is apparent that, if put into effect, it will bring about extensive and important changes in European economy as a whole. Germany is a deficit country in foodstuffs and it is doubtful if a plan of making Germany predominantly agricultural can be put into effect without the liquidation or emigration of X-millions of Germans. Germany is furthermore an important producer of certain raw materials, namely coal and bauxite, for Europe as a whole, not to speak of the vast amount of industrial goods which Germany normally exports. If we advocate a "wrecking program" as the best means of assuring our security, we may face considerable European opposition on account of its effect on European economy, and if we desire continuing reparations out of Germany, we shall eliminate any such program by a policy of destruction of German industry.

Memorandum Prepared in the Treasury Department

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1944.

SUGGESTED POST-SURRENDER PROGRAM FOR GERMANY

It is suggested that the position of the United States should be determined on the basis of the following principles:

1. Demilitarization of Germany

It should be the aim of the Allied Forces to accomplish the complete demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender. This means completely disarming the German Army and people (including the withdrawal or destruction of all war material) and the total destruction of the whole German armament industry as well as those parts of supporting industries having no other justification.

2. Partitioning of Germany

(a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn’t go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion of Silesia as indicated on the map.\(^2\)

(b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Moselle Rivers.

(c) As indicated in part 3 an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.\(^3\)

(d) Denmark should be given the territories between its present borders and the International Zone, north of the Kiel Canal.

(e) The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous, independent states, (1) a South German state comprising Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and some smaller areas and (2) a North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states.

\(^1\) The source text bears the following manuscript notation by the President’s Naval Aide (Brown): “When received for filing, the originator of this paper was not indicated W B”, but it is undoubtedly the memorandum which Morgenthau gave to Roosevelt on September 2, 1944, at the Morgenthau home near Fishkill, New York. See Blum, pp. 351–354. A copy of the same memorandum in the Hopkins Papers (which has one substantive variation noted in fn. 3, below) bears the following manuscript endorsement by Hopkins: “From Treasury by Harry White”. The memorandum had been drafted, under Morgenthau’s direction, by a committee in the Treasury Department consisting of White, John Pehle, and Ansel Luxford. See Blum, pp. 342–343; Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. 1, p. 426. As it appears in the last-named source, pp. 463 ff., the memorandum is printed with an enclosure in the form of a draft directive for military government in Germany. No such enclosure is filed with the copies of the memorandum in the Roosevelt or Hopkins Papers.

\(^2\) Facing this page.

\(^3\) The copy of this memorandum in the Hopkins Papers has the additional words “and the Kiel Canal” at the end of this paragraph.
There shall be a custom union between the new South German state and Austria, which will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.

3. The Ruhr

Here lies the heart of German industrial power. It should be dealt with as follows:

(a) An International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas. Included in the Zone should be the Kiel Canal and the Rhineland. The Zone should be governed by the international security organization to be established by the United Nations. The approximate borders of the Zone are shown on the attached map.

(b) The internationalization of this area shall in no way interfere with: (a) total destruction of the German armament industry and supporting industries in the Ruhr in accordance with Part 1 of this memorandum, (b) restitution and reparations, including removal and distribution of industrial plants and equipment, in accordance with Part 4 of this memorandum.

(c) Ownership and control of major industrial properties remaining shall be transferred to the international organization.

(d) The international organization shall be governed by the following general principles:

(i) The natural resources and the industrial capacity of the Ruhr area shall not be used or developed so as to contribute in any way to the military potential of Germany or the Ruhr area.

(ii) The Zone will be a free trade area. However, the importation of capital should be discouraged.

4. Restitution and Reparation

Reparations, in the form of recurrent payments and deliveries, should not be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected by the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g.,

(a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them.

(b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition.

(c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition.

(d) by forced German labor outside Germany.

(e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany.
5. Treatment of Special Groups

(a) A particularly intensive effort must be made to apprehend and punish war criminals.

(b) All members of the following groups should be detained until the extent of the guilt of each individual is determined:

(i) The S.S.
(ii) The Gestapo.
(iii) All high officials of the police, S.A. and other security organizations.
(iv) All high Government and Nazi party officials.
(v) All leading public figures closely identified with Nazism.

(c) Apart from the question of established guilt for special crimes, mere membership in the S.S., the Gestapo and similar groups will constitute the basis for inclusion into compulsory labor battalion to serve outside Germany for reconstruction purposes.

(d) The Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations such as the Labor Front, The Hitler Youth, The Strength-through-Joy, etc., should be dissolved and their properties and records confiscated. Every possible effort should be made to prevent any attempts to reconstitute them in underground or disguised form.

(e) All members of the following groups should be dismissed from public office, disenfranchised and disqualified to hold any public office or to engage in the journalist, teaching, and legal professions, or, in any managerial capacity in banking, manufacturing or trade:

(i) The Nazi Party.
(ii) Nazi sympathizers who by their words or deeds materially aided or abetted the Nazi program.
(iii) The Junkers.
(iv) Military and Naval officers.

(f) All Junker estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.

6. There should be abrogated and declared null and void all presurrender laws, decrees, regulations or aspects of the same which discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed or political opinions.

7. Education and Propaganda

(a) All schools and universities will be closed until an Allied Commission of Education has formulated an effective reorganization program. It is contemplated that it may require a considerable period of time before any institutions of higher education are reopened. Meanwhile the education of German students in foreign universities will not be prohibited. Elementary schools will be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available.
(b) All German newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc., will cease publication immediately and shall not resume publication until so directed.

c) All German radio stations will be discontinued immediately and shall not be permitted to resume operations until so directed.

8. Political Decentralization

The military administration in Germany in the initial period should be carried out with a view toward the eventual partitioning of Germany into three states. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles:

(i) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with local governments.

(ii) Encourage the reestablishment of state governments in each of the states (Länder) corresponding to 18 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states.

(iii) Upon the partition of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a loose confederation of states, with emphasis on states' rights and a large degree of local autonomy. Eventually such confederacies would assume sovereign functions, including separate currency and postal systems, powers of foreign representation and negotiation, etc.

9. German Economy

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which are essential to military operations and are indicated above. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

10. United States Responsibility

(a) The responsibility for the execution of the post-surrender program for Germany set forth in this memorandum is the joint responsibility of the United Nations. The execution of the joint policy agreed upon should therefore eventually be entrusted to the international body which emerges from United Nations discussions.

Consideration of the specific measures to be taken in carrying out the joint program suggests the desirability of separating the task to
be performed during the initial period of military occupation from those which will require a much longer period of execution. While the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R., will, for practical reasons, play the major role (of course aided by the military forces of other United Nations) in demilitarizing Germany (point 1), the detailed execution of other parts of the program can best be handled by Germany’s continental neighbors.

(b) When Germany has been completely demilitarized there would be the following distribution of duties in carrying out the German program:

(i) The U.S. would have military and civilian representation on whatever international commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program and such representatives should have adequate U.S. staffs.

(ii) The primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany would be assumed by the military forces of Germany’s continental neighbors. Specifically, these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.

(c) Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time. Actual withdrawal of United States troops should not precede agreement with the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. on the principles set forth in the above parts of this memorandum.

Editorial Note

The following information on a meeting at the White House on September 2, 1944, with reference to Germany is taken from a memorandum of October 28, 1944, from the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius): ¹

"On September 1, 1944, Mr. Harry Hopkins informed the Secretary of the President’s desire to establish a Cabinet Committee on Germany and, with the Secretary’s permission, arranged for a meeting in his office on September 2 of officials of State, War and Treasury Departments. At this meeting Mr. McCloy and General Hilldring of the War Department, Dr. Harry White from the Treasury, and Mr. Matthews and Mr. Riddleberger from the State Department, and Mr. Harry Hopkins were present.

"It was at this meeting that Dr. White produced the Treasury plan for Germany ² and gave a lengthy interpretation of this plan which, in its general tenor, was more extreme than the memorandum itself. The plan contemplated the internationalization of the Rhineland together

¹ For the full text of Riddleberger's memorandum, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 160–163.

² Supra."
with a strip of German territory extending through Westphalia, Hannover and Holstein to and including the Kiel Canal. Poland would receive East Prussia and Upper Silesia; France would receive the Saar and German territory bounded by the Rhine and Moselle rivers. The remainder of the Reich would be divided into two independent states. In explaining this plan, Dr. White insisted that no trade would be permitted between the proposed international zone and the rest of the Reich, and he emphasized that the productivity of this zone should not in any way contribute to German economy. No recurrent reparations deliveries would be demanded and reparations would be dealt with by transfer of territory, equipment and labor service.

"A lengthy discussion followed, in which Mr. Matthews and Mr. Riddleberger presented a State Department memorandum and explained at some length how our views fitted into the British and Russian ideas to the extent which we were aware of them. After a lengthy discussion in which Mr. McCloy pointed out the difficulties which would arise for the military authorities under the Treasury plan, he stated that on many subjects there was a large area of agreement and he suggested that Mr. Riddleberger draft a memorandum for the Cabinet Committee which would include all points on which there was obvious agreement. These points related primarily to the dissolution of the Nazi Party; the demilitarization of Germany; controls over communications, press and propaganda; and reparations. Mr. Riddleberger accordingly drafted this memorandum, which was discussed by the three Secretaries on September 5." (862.50/9–2844)

5 Ante, p. 81.
6 Post, p. 95.

PR 10 Foreign Relations of U.S./8–20/71

Memorandum by the British Lord Chancellor (Simon)

MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

I was asked by the War Cabinet (W.M. (44) 83rd Conclusions) to consider further, and to report upon, proposals for dealing with the major war criminals. The following appear to be some of the principal considerations to be borne in mind:

1. The Moscow Tri-partite Declaration (Nov. 1st, 1943) concluded with the statement that it was made "without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localisation, and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies". This statement has as yet never been amplified either by public announcement, or (as far as I know) by consultation between the Allies.

1 This paper was apparently shown to Roosevelt during the Quebec Conference. See a minute on the subject of war criminals which Roosevelt and Churchill approved at Quebec on September 15, 1944, post, p. 467. Cf. a draft message to Stalin on the same subject, post, p. 489.
2 The War Cabinet papers referred to in this memorandum are not available in United States files.
2. In view of the progress made towards final victory over Germany, has not the time arrived to raise—with President Roosevelt, at any rate—certain questions connected with the carrying out of this announcement of intended punishment? It is much to be hoped that the principal criminals may, before the end, be disposed of by the people whom they have led to destruction, or may take their own lives—but if they fall alive into the hands of the Allies, what is to be done with them?

3. I am strongly of opinion that the method by trial, conviction, and judicial sentence is quite inappropriate for notorious ringleaders such as Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Apart from the formidable difficulties of constituting the Court, formulating the charge, and assembling the evidence, the question of their fate is a political, not a judicial, question. It could not rest with judges, however eminent or learned, to decide finally a matter like this, which is of the widest and most vital public policy. The decision must be “the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies”. The Moscow Declaration, indeed, has already said so.

4. I am equally clear that these leading and notorious criminals cannot be left untouched, while lesser people who have committed atrocities and war-crimes under their orders and with their approval are tried and heavily punished. Such a course would be universally, and rightly, condemned. It may not be essential to make a precise public announcement of Allied intentions as regards the major criminals at present—the Moscow Declaration is itself a general indication, and a new statement might evoke reprisals against Allied individuals in German hands—but it seems to me most desirable to open confidential consultations on the subject with some of our Allies, and to get a decision now as to what is to be done. Otherwise, when the time comes, there may be a disastrous difference of view.

5. The list of war criminals who might be dealt with without trial, which was prepared by the Foreign Secretary* (W.P. (44) 330), was criticised in some quarters for its omissions (W.P. (44) 345), but I am disposed to think that this method will only be considered appropriate and justified in the case of the small group of leaders who are known to have been responsible for the conduct of the war, and who have at headquarters authorised, approved or acquiesced in the horrible atrocities that have been committed.

6. A formula which might meet the Prime Minister’s suggested views would be as follows:—

“I”The Moscow Tri-partite Declaration of November 1st, 1943, announced that the Allies intended to arrange for the trial and punish-

*Anthony Eden.
ment of enemy war criminals who had already been captured or who fell into their hands, but the Moscow Declaration was stated to be made ‘without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localisation, and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies’. The time has come to announce that among these major criminals are Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels and Ribbentrop, but the Allies reserve the right to add to their number. Upon any of these major criminals falling into Allied hands, the Allies will decide how they are to be disposed of, and the execution of this decision will be carried out immediately.”

[LONDON,] 4th September, 1944.

S[imon]

740.00119 EW/9-444

The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1944.

THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY

S—MR. SECRETARY: At the request of the President, Mr. Harry Hopkins has called together several advisers to the Secretaries of the State, War and Treasury [Departments] for an exchange of views prior to a meeting of the three Secretaries to discuss the treatment of Germany. Three meetings were held over the weekend in which the following participated:

Messrs. Dunn, Matthews and Riddleberger for the State Department;
Mr. McCloy and General Hilldring for the War Department;
Dr. Harry White for the Treasury Department.

At the first meeting both State and Treasury presented memoranda relative to the post-surrender treatment of Germany. Copies of these two memoranda are attached hereto.\(^1\) A comparison of these memoranda is set forth below.

1. Points of Agreement

(a) Demilitarization of Germany, including the complete dissolution of all German armed forces and all Nazi military, para-military and police organizations, and the destruction or scrapping of all arms, ammunition and implements of war. Further manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition and implements of war should be prohibited.

\(^1\) See ante, pp. 81, 86.
(b) Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations. Large groups of particularly objectionable elements, such as the SS and the Gestapo, would be arrested and interned and possibly tried. Party members would be excluded from political or civil activity and subject to a number of restrictions. All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion shall be annulled.

(e) There will be extensive controls over communications, press and propaganda.

(d) There will be extensive controls over the German educational system.

(e) A decentralization of the German Government is favored.

2. Points of Disagreement

(a) The State Department is, in general, opposed to the forcible partition of Germany. Such a measure, however drastic, would not remove the necessity of imposing and enforcing extensive security controls upon Germany for an indeterminate future, whether Germany is left united or divided. It would, furthermore, probably lead to a preferred treatment for certain succession states and would create a situation whereby any policy based on "spheres of influence" would have much greater chance of success. Furthermore, the disruption of German economic unity would carry with it grave dangers for the economic stability of Europe as a whole. Finally, the victor powers, by imposing partition, would take upon themselves the burdensome task of preventing surreptitious collaboration and of restraining a nationalistic determination to reunite.

The Treasury memorandum advocates the partition of Germany in the following manner: The Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas of the Rhineland and an area extending to the Kiel Canal should be made an international zone to be governed by the International Security Organization established by the United Nations. The remainder of Germany should be divided into two independent states: (1) A South German state comprising Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and some smaller areas, and (2) a North German state comprising parts of Prussia, Saxony and Thuringia and several smaller states. It is suggested that a customs union be permitted between the South German State and Austria.

(b) Economic Policy. The State Department advocates far-reaching rights of control over German economy after surrender for the purpose of effecting performance by Germany of acts of restitution and reparation. This control would furthermore force the conversion of German economic capacity from a war to a peace production and would eliminate German economic domination in Europe. Its ultimate purpose would be to effect a fundamental change in the organization
and conduct of German economic life so that German economy can eventually be integrated into an interdependent world economy.

The Treasury memorandum contends that reparations in the form of recurrent payments and deliveries should not be demanded; restitution and reparation should be effected by the transfer of German resources and territories, i.e., particularly the internationalization of the Ruhr area.

3. Appointment of an American High Commissioner for Germany

In addition to the subjects discussed above, the Cabinet Committee on Germany might consider another most important question, namely, the appointment in the near future of an American High Commissioner for Germany. Immediately upon occupation many important problems will have to be decided on a tripartite basis. The European Advisory Commission has not been able to consider many of these problems and has concentrated primarily on the organization that would be set up for the control of Germany. Once the first military phase of occupation is completed, it is essential that a tripartite board be established as soon as possible to assume the political and economic responsibility for the control of Germany and to advise the military commanders how the objectives of occupation can best be obtained. The High Commissioner should be a person of great political ability and prestige who would be able to work out with both the British and Russians a common policy and who would be capable of directing the control organization to be established in Germany. This appointment should preferably be made as soon as possible in order that he may meet with officials both here and in London who have been working on these problems.

740.00119 EW/9-444

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger)¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1944.

Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany From the Cabinet Committee for the President

1. Appointment of an American High Commissioner

It has become urgent that an American High Commissioner for Germany be appointed. Immediately upon occupation of Germany

¹ The source text bears the typed endorsement "(O.K. Hull)". The memorandum, which had been drafted by Riddleberger, was presented at the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Germany on September 5, 1944 (see the editorial note, post, p. 97), and was presented to Roosevelt on September 6 (see Hull, p. 1609).
many important problems will have to be decided on a tripartite basis between the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. These problems will have not only important military aspects but will require the working out of a common policy in the political and economic fields as well. The American High Commissioner should be an official of high political ability and considerable prestige who can speak with authority for this Government in all matters where a common policy must be worked out with the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. The appointment should be made as soon as possible.

2. American Policy for the Treatment of Germany

The following policies for the treatment of Germany are recommended as the objectives of the United States, and for which we should seek agreement with the U.K. and the U.S.S.R.:

(a) **Demilitarization of Germany**, including the complete dissolution of all German armed forces and all Nazi military, para-military and police organizations, and the destruction or scrapping of all arms, ammunition and implements of war. Further manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition and implements of war should be prohibited.

(b) **Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations.** Large groups of particularly objectionable elements, especially the SS and the Gestapo, should be arrested and interned and war criminals should be tried and executed. Party members should be excluded from political or civil activity and subject to a number of restrictions. All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion should be annulled.

(c) **Extensive controls should be maintained over communications, press and propaganda** for the purpose of eliminating Nazi doctrines or similar teachings.

(d) **Extensive controls over German educational system** should be established for the purpose of eliminating all Nazi influence and propaganda.

(e) **No decision should be taken on the possible partition of Germany** (as distinguished from territorial amputations) until we see what the internal situation is and what is the attitude of our principal Allies on this question. We should encourage a decentralization of the German governmental structure and if any tendencies toward spontaneous partition of Germany arise they should not be discouraged.

(f) **The American Government has no direct interest in obtaining reparations from Germany** and consequently no interest in building up German economy in order to collect continuing reparations. However, the U.K. and the U.S.S.R., together with a number of smaller states which have been victims of German exploitation, may have claims on German production which they will require for purposes of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Consequently, we should not take a fixed position on reparations at this time but should await the views of governments which have a more direct interest.

(g) **As the great Junker estates have provided the economic basis for the military caste in Germany, these estates should be broken up and the holdings distributed to tenants.**
(h) The primary objectives of our economic policy are: (1) the standard of living of the German population shall be held down to subsistence levels; (2) German economic position of power in Europe must be eliminated; (3) German economic capacity must be converted in such manner that it will be so dependent on imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production.

740.00119 EW/10-1344

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 4 September 1944.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: It is understood that the immediate disposition of units of the German fleet in connection with the imposition of surrender terms upon the defeat of Germany is presently under advisement in the European Advisory Commission, and that it has been tentatively agreed that the ultimate disposition of the units of the German fleet will be a matter for decision by the governments of the United Nations concerned.

It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, except for the retention of a limited number of ships for experimental and test purposes, the German fleet should be completely destroyed.

In the event that agreement cannot be reached with the Russians and the British on this basis, the United States should press for either:

a. A one-third share of each category of ships in the German fleet; or
b. Agreement that all capital ships, such as battleships, pocket battleships and heavy cruisers, and submarines be destroyed, while smaller craft and more lightly armed vessels be shared equally by the United States, Russia, and Great Britain.¹

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

¹ For action taken on this memorandum by Roosevelt after the Second Quebec Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, p. 356.

Editorial Note

The Cabinet Committee on Germany (i.e., Hull, Hopkins, Stimson, and Morgenthau) held its first meeting in Hull’s office on the morning of September 5, 1944. The paper entitled “Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany From the Cabinet Committee for the President”, September 4, 1944, ante, p. 95, was presented at this meet-
ing. No official minutes of the meeting have been found, but information on the meeting is included in Hull, pp. 1608–1609; Stimson and Bundy, pp. 569–570; Morgenthau material printed in Blum, pp. 359–360, and Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. I, pp. 524–528; and Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 161.

740.00119 EW/0-444

The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1944.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: With minor reservations about language which do not affect the intent of the document, “Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President”¹, I approve of it.

If there be agreement on policies, then it becomes of the utmost importance for the proper Government Officials to indicate how the policies in this document are to be implemented.

Sincerely yours, HARRY L. HOPKINS

¹ Ante, p. 95.

Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President²

[WASHINGTON, September 5, 1944.]

I have considered the paper entitled “Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President”, dated September 4th,² submitted to the Committee by the Secretary of State and have discussed it with my colleagues on the Committee.

With the exception of the last paragraph I find myself in agreement with the principles stated therein and they are in conformity with the lines upon which we have been proceeding in the War Department in our directives to the Armed Forces.

The last paragraph, however, is as follows:

“l. The primary objectives of our economic policy are (1) the standard of living of the German population shall be held down to subsistence levels; (2) German economic position of power in Europe must be eliminated; (3) German economic capacity must be converted in such manner that it will be so dependent upon imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production”.

¹ Sent to Hull for forwarding to the President. Stimson sent copies also to Hopkins and Morgenthau. See Stimson and Bundy, p. 570.
² Ante, p. 95.
While certain of these statements by themselves may possibly be susceptible of a construction with which I would not be at variance, the construction put upon them at the discussion this morning certainly reached positions to which I am utterly opposed. The position frankly taken by some of my colleagues was that the great industrial regions of Germany known as the Saar and the Ruhr with their very important deposits of coal and ore should be totally transformed into a non-industrialized area of agricultural land.¹

I cannot conceive of such a proposition being either possible or effective and I can see enormous general evils coming from an attempt to so treat it. During the past eighty years of European history this portion of Germany was one of the most important sources of the raw materials upon which the industrial and economic livelihood of Europe was based. Upon the production which came from the raw materials of this region during those years, the commerce of Europe was very largely predicated. Upon that production Germany became the largest source of supply to no less than ten European countries, viz: Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria–Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria; and the second largest source of supply to Great Britain, Belgium, and France. By the same commerce, which in large part arose from this production, Germany also became the best buyer or customer of Russia, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria–Hungary; and the second best customer of Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark. The production of these materials from this region could not be sealed up and obliterated as was proposed this morning, without manifestly causing a great dislocation to the trade upon which Europe has lived. In Germany itself this commerce has built up since 1870 a population of approximately thirty million more people than were ever supported upon the agricultural soil of Germany alone. Undoubtedly a similar growth of population took place in the nations which indirectly participated in the commerce based upon this production.

I cannot treat as realistic the suggestion that such an area in the present economic condition of the world can be turned into a non-productive “ghost territory” when it has become the center of one of the most industrialized continents in the world, populated by peoples of energy, vigor and progressiveness.

I can conceive of endeavoring to meet the misuse which Germany has recently made of this production by wise systems of control or

¹Morgenthau wrote to Stimson on September 6, 1944: “Thank you for sending me a copy of your memorandum. In reading it over, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that I do not remember anybody suggesting closing down the Saar.” (Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. I, p. 547)
trusteeship or even transfers of ownership to other nations. But I cannot conceive of turning such a gift of nature into a dust heap.

War is destruction. This war more than any previous war has caused gigantic destruction. The need for the recuperative benefits of productivity is more evident now than ever before throughout the world. Not to speak of Germany at all or even her satellites, our Allies in Europe will feel the need of the benefit of such productivity if it should be destroyed. Moreover, speed of reconstruction is of great importance, if we hope to avoid dangerous convulsions in Europe.

We contemplate the transfer from Germany of ownership of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, Alsace and Lorraine (each of them except the first containing raw materials of importance) together with the imposition of general economic controls. We also are considering the wisdom of a possible partition of Germany into north and south sections, as well as the creation of an internationalized State in the Ruhr. With such precautions, or indeed with only some of them, it certainly should not be necessary for us to obliterate all industrial productivity in the Ruhr area, in order to preclude its future misuse.

Nor can I agree that it should be one of our purposes to hold the German population "to a subsistence level" if this means the edge of poverty. This would mean condemning the German people to a condition of servitude in which, no matter how hard or how effectively a man worked, he could not materially increase his economic condition in the world. Such a program would, I believe, create tensions and resentments far outweighing any immediate advantage of security and would tend to obscure the guilt of the Nazis and the viciousness of their doctrines and their acts.

By such economic mistakes I cannot but feel that you would also be poisoning the springs out of which we hope that the future peace of the world can be maintained.

It is primarily by the thorough apprehension, investigation, and trial of all the Nazi leaders and instruments of the Nazi system of terrorism, such as the Gestapo, with punishment delivered as promptly, swiftly, and severely as possible, that we can demonstrate the abhorrence which the world has for such a system and bring home to the German people our determination to extirpate it and all its fruits forever.

My basic objection to the proposed methods of treating Germany which were discussed this morning was that in addition to a system of preventive and educative punishment they would add the dangerous weapon of complete economic oppression. Such methods, in my opinion, do not prevent war; they tend to breed war.

Henry L Stimson
The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 6, 1944.

My dear Cordell: I was delighted at the attitude which you expressed yesterday in regard to the treatment of the German people. We here in the Treasury have prepared a much more detailed memorandum, and I feel that it might serve a useful purpose if the President were given a copy of it. I am also enclosing a copy for yourself.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

HENRY

[Enclosure]

The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the President

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, September 5, 1944.]

Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany

1. Demilitarization of Germany

It should be the aim of the Allied Forces to accomplish the complete demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender. This means completely disarming the German Army and people (including the removal or destruction of all war material), the total destruction of the whole German armament industry, and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength.

2. Partitioning of Germany

(a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn’t go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion of Silesia as indicated on the attached map (Appendix A).  

(b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Moselle Rivers.

(c) As indicated in part 3 an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.

(d) The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous, independent states, (1) a South German state comprising

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1 The ribbon copy of this letter has not been found in Department of State files. The enclosure and appendix B thereto are printed from the Roosevelt Papers.

2 The source text is not dated, but a copy in the Morgenthau Papers bears the following notation: “Treasury—9/5/44. As sent to Hull 9/6/44”. Cf. the Treasury memorandum of September 1, 1944, ante, p. 86, and two papers on this subject dated September 4, 1944, printed in Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. 1, pp. 508–509, 517–519.

3 Appendix A is identical to the map printed facing p. 86.
Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and some smaller areas and (2) a
North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia,
Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states.

There shall be a custom union between the new South German state
and Austria, which will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.

3. The Ruhr Area

(The Ruhr, surrounding industrial areas, as shown on the attached
map, including the Rhineland, the Kiel Canal, and all German ter-
ritory north of the Kiel Canal.)

Here lies the heart of German industrial power, the caldron of
wars. This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing
industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the fore-
seeable future become an industrial area. The following steps will
accomplish this:

(a) Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months
after the cessation of hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment
not destroyed by military action shall either be completely dismantled
and removed from the area or completely destroyed. All equipment
shall be removed from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly
wrecked.

It is anticipated that the stripping of this area would be accom-
plished in three stages:

(i) The military forces immediately upon entry into the area shall
destroy all plants and equipment which cannot be removed.
(ii) Removal of plants and equipment by members of the United
Nations as restitution and reparation (Paragraph 4).
(iii) All plants and equipment not removed within a stated period
of time, say 6 months, will be completely destroyed or reduced to scrap
and allocated to the United Nations.

(b) All people within the area should be made to understand that
this area will not again be allowed to become an industrial area. Ac-
cordingly, all people and their families within the area having special
skills or technical training should be encouraged to migrate perma-
nently from the area and should be as widely dispersed as possible.

(c) The area should be made an international zone to be governed
by an international security organization to be established by the
United Nations. In governing the area the international organization
should be guided by policies designed to further the above stated
objectives.

4. Restitution and Reparation

Reparations, in the form of recurrent payments and deliveries,
should not be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected
by the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g.,
(a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them;
(b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition;
(c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition;
(d) by forced German labor outside Germany; and
(e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany.

5. Education and Propaganda

(a) All schools and universities will be closed until an Allied Commission of Education has formulated an effective reorganization program. It is contemplated that it may require a considerable period of time before any institutions of higher education are reopened. Meanwhile the education of German students in foreign universities will not be prohibited. Elementary schools will be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available.
(b) All German radio stations and newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc. shall be discontinued until adequate controls are established and an appropriate program formulated.

6. Political Decentralization

The military administration in Germany in the initial period should be carried out with a view toward the eventual partitioning of Germany into three states. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles:
(a) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with local governments.
(b) Encourage the reestablishment of state governments in each of the states (Länder) corresponding to 18 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states.
(c) Upon the partition of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a confederation of states, with emphasis on states' rights and a large degree of local autonomy.

7. Responsibility of Military for Local German Economy

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The
Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen [the German economy, except those which are essential to military] operations. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

8. Controls Over Development of German Economy

During a period of at least twenty years after surrender adequate controls, including controls over foreign trade and tight restrictions on capital imports, shall be maintained by the United Nations designed to prevent in the newly-established states the establishment or expansion of key industries basic to the German military potential and to control other key industries.

9. Punishment of War Crimes and Treatment of Special Groups

There is attached (Appendix B) a program for the punishment of certain war crimes and for the treatment of Nazi organizations and other special groups.

10. Wearing of Insignia and Uniforms

(a) No person in German[y] (except members of the United Nations and neutral countries) shall be permitted to wear any military insignia of rank or branch of service, service ribbons or military medals.

(b) No such person shall be permitted to wear, after 6 months from the cessation of hostilities any military uniform or any uniform of any quasi military organizations.

11. Prohibition on Parades

No military parades shall be permitted anywhere in German[y] and all military bands shall be disbanded.

12. Aircraft

All aircraft (including gliders), whether military or commercial, will be confiscated for later disposition. No German shall be permitted to operate or to help operate such aircraft, including those owned by foreign interests.

13. United States Responsibility

(a) The responsibility for the execution of the post-surrender program for Germany set forth in this memorandum is the joint responsi-
bility of the United Nations. The execution of the joint policy agreed upon should therefore eventually be entrusted to the international body which emerges from United Nations discussions.

Consideration of the specific measures to be taken in carrying out the joint program suggests the desirability of separating the task to be performed during the initial period of military occupation from those which will require a much longer period of execution. While the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. will, for practical reasons, play the major role (of course aided by the military forces of other United Nations) in demilitarizing Germany (point 1) the detailed execution of other parts of the program can best be handled by Germany’s continental neighbors.

(b) When Germany has been completely demilitarized there would be the following distribution of duties in carrying out the German program:

(i) The U.S. would have military and civilian representation on whatever international commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program and such representatives should have adequate U.S. staffs.

(ii) The primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany would be assumed by the military forces of Germany’s continental neighbors. Specifically these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.

(c) Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time. Actual withdrawal of United States troops should not precede agreement with the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. on the principles set forth in this memorandum.

14. Appointment of an American High Commissioner

An American High Commissioner for Germany should be appointed as soon as possible, so that he can sit in on the development of the American views on this problem.

Appendix B

PUNISHMENT OF CERTAIN WAR CRIMES AND TREATMENT OF SPECIAL GROUPS

A. Punishment of Certain War Criminals

(1) Arch-criminals.

A list of the arch-criminals of this war whose obvious guilt has generally been recognized by the United Nations shall be drawn up as soon as possible and transmitted to the appropriate military au-
authorities. The military authorities shall be instructed with respect to all persons who are on such list as follows:

(a) They shall be apprehended as soon as possible and identified as soon as possible after apprehension, the identification to be approved by an officer of the General rank.

(b) When such identification has been made the person identified shall be put to death forthwith by firing squads made up of soldiers of the United Nations.

(2) Certain Other War Criminals.

(a) Military commissions shall be established by the Allied Military Government for the trial of certain crimes which have been committed against civilization during this war. As soon as practicable, representatives of the liberated countries of Europe shall be included on such commissions. These crimes shall include those crimes covered by the following section and such other crimes as such military commissions may be ordered to try from time to time.

(b) Any person who is suspected of being responsible for (through the issuance of orders or otherwise), or having participated in, causing the death of any human being in the following situations shall be arrested and tried promptly by such military commissions, unless prior to trial one of the United Nations has requested that such person be placed in its custody for trial on similar charges for acts committed within its territory:

(i) The death was caused by action in violation of the rules of war.

(ii) The victim was killed as a hostage in reprisal for the deeds of other persons.

(iii) The victim met death because of his nationality, race, color, creed, or political conviction.

(c) Any person who is convicted by the military commissions of the crimes specified in paragraph (b) shall be sentenced to death, unless the military commissions, in exceptional cases, determine that there are extenuating circumstances, in which case other punishment may be meted out, including deportation to a penal colony outside of Germany. Upon conviction, the sentence shall be carried out immediately.

B. Detention of Certain Groups

All members of the following groups should be detained until the extent of the guilt of each individual is determined:

(a) The S.S.

(b) The Gestapo.

(c) All high officials of the police, S.A. and other security organizations.
(d) All high Government and Nazi Party officials.
(e) All leading public figures closely identified with Nazism.

C. Registration of Males
An appropriate program will be formulated for the re-registration as soon as possible of all males of the age of 14 or over. The registration shall be on a form and in a manner to be prescribed by the military authorities and shall show, among other things, whether or not the person registering is a member of the Nazi Party or affiliated organizations, the Gestapo, S.S., S.A. or Kraft Korps.\(^3\)

D. Labor Battalions
Apart from the question of established guilt for special crimes, mere membership in the S.S., the Gestapo and similar groups will constitute the basis for inclusion into compulsory labor battalion to serve outside Germany for reconstruction purposes.

E. Dissolution of Nazi Organizations
The Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations such as the Labor Front, The Hitler Youth, The Strength-through-Joy, etc., should be dissolved and their properties and records confiscated. Every possible effort should be made to prevent any attempts to reconstitute them in underground or disguised form.

F. Prohibition on Exercise of Certain Privileges
All members of the following groups should be dismissed from public office, disenfranchised and disqualified to hold any public office or to engage in journalist, teaching, and legal professions, or, in any managerial capacity in banking, manufacturing or trade:

1. The Nazi Party.
2. Nazi sympathizers who by their words or deeds materially aided or abetted the Nazi program.
3. The Junkers.
4. Military and Naval officers.

G. Junker Estates
All Junker estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.

H. Prohibition on Emigration
1. A Proclamation shall be issued prohibiting any person resident in Germany from leaving or attempting to leave Germany, except with permission from the Allied Military Government.

\(^3\) i.e., the motor corps of the Nazi Party (Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps).
(2) Violation of this Proclamation shall be an offense triable by military commissions of the Allied Military Government and heavy penalties shall be prescribed, including death.

(3) All possible steps shall be taken by the military authorities to prevent any such person from leaving (without permission).

HENRY MORGENTHAU JR.

Editorial Note

The Cabinet Committee on Germany met with Roosevelt on September 6, 1944, and discussed the memoranda prepared by the State, War, and Treasury Departments (ante, pp. 95, 98, and 101, respectively). No official minutes of the meeting have been found, but information on the meeting is included in Hull, p. 1609; Stimson and Bundy, pp. 573-574; and Morgenthau material printed in Blum, pp. 362-363, and Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. I, pp. 536-538.

740.00119 Control (Germany)/9-644

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 6, 1944.

DEAR Doc: Here is a draft of our post-surrender directive to Eisenhower. It is something which the Committee, I believe, in view of what has gone before, should approve. It seems to me that this is very much in line with your paper which was discussed in the Secretary's

1 For a draft directive to the three Allied commanders-in-chief relating to the post-surrender period in Germany, prepared by the Planning Committee of the United States Delegation to the European Advisory Commission and dated July 12, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. I, pp. 244-246. In the absence of action on a tripartite basis with respect to such a directive, the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, in C.C.S. 638, August 22, 1944 (not printed), suggested the preparation of an American-British directive to Eisenhower on the military government of Germany after Germany's surrender. This suggestion was referred to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for study and the War Department prepared a draft of such a directive. The draft printed below is not known to have been referred to at the Second Quebec Conference, but it formed part of the background of the discussion of German problems within the Cabinet Committee on Germany and between the Committee and Roosevelt. Following the Quebec Conference an amended version of this draft (dated September 22, 1944) was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as enclosure C to J.C.S. 1067, September 24, 1944, and was forwarded to Winant on September 27. For the covering instruction to Winant and for the text of the draft of September 22, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 142-154.

2 "Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany From the Cabinet Committee for the President", September 4, 1944, ante, p. 95.
office yesterday. We would now be able to add, of course, a provision regarding regional movements. The directive would provide that they should not be discouraged. We are generally working on improving the language and in some cases the order of the document, but in general this is the idea. I think that if the Committee could approve it generally, without going through it with a fine tooth comb, it would leave us room in the [Combined] Civil Affairs Committee to work out the final language and the clearance with the British.

Secretary Stimson was very much disturbed this morning at the line that was taken throughout the discussion on the matter of economic repression of Germany. He felt that the last paragraph of the paper, I believe it was sub-paragraph (h), although objectionable in some form, could be interpreted in a way which would meet his views, but the tone of the discussion convinced him that its interpretation by those present amounted to such severe destruction of values in the case of properties and facilities and such severe limitation on the economy of the individual, that he felt he could not go along with the implications of this paragraph and has so communicated to Mr. Hull.  

I was not present at the discussion, so I do not know what happened. I don't believe that the Secretary, from my long talk with him yesterday, however, is at all at variance with your and my thinking on the subject. I hope you will take a look at Mr. Stimson's comments.

I have one other comment which I did not ask him to include because it was relatively minor. Somewhere in your paper there is a statement to the effect that Party members should not be permitted any political or civic activity. I think this must refer only to the leaders, because Party members who were only such in order to keep jobs will have to be permitted to carry on some civic activity, and possibly political activity if by political activity you mean employment in a government field. The provision as written would preclude any Party member from voting, practising law, or taking any part at all in any municipal or other governmental activity. I just do not believe that this is practicable and some modification of this language may be necessary in order to enable the military government to function.

Sincerely,  

JOHN J McCLOY

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3 See ante, p. 97.
4 See Stimson's memorandum for Roosevelt, September 5, 1944, ante, p. 98, which was submitted via Hull.
Draft of an Interim Directive to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)^

TOP SECRET

INTERIM DIRECTIVE TO SCAEF REGARDING THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE CESSION OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE (POST-DEFEAT)

1. In the event that Rankin "C" conditions obtain in Germany or that the German forces are either defeated or surrender before you have received a directive containing policies agreed upon by the three governments of the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R., you will be guided by the following policies, principles and instructions.

2. Your primary objectives are of short term and military character rather than of a long view governmental policy type. Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. The clear fact of German military defeat and the undesirability of the results of aggression must be appreciated by all levels of the German population. The German people must bear the inevitable

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Not filed with the ribbon copy of McCloy's letter to Matthews, above; supplied from Roosevelt Papers. McCloy also sent a copy of this draft to Hopkins on September 6, 1944 (Hopkins Papers), and another copy is in the Morgenthau Diary, vol. 708 (see Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. 1, p. 509).

At the same time that this draft directive was in preparation, a draft Handbook of Military Government in Germany, prepared to provide guidance to military government officers on the objectives of military government, was under discussion in Washington. Morgenthau called Roosevelt's attention to the Handbook and in a memorandum for the President dated August 25, 1944, quoted extracts which he considered particularly objectionable. Using the Morgenthau memorandum as a basis, Roosevelt instructed Stimson on August 26 to withdraw the Handbook. Roosevelt's memorandum to Stimson stated:

"It is of the utmost importance that every person in Germany should realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation. I do not want them to starve to death but, as an example, if they need food to keep body and soul together beyond what they have, they should be fed three times a day with soup from Army soup kitchens. That will keep them perfectly healthy and they will remember the experience all their lives. The fact that they are a defeated nation, collectively and individually, must be so impressed upon them that they will hesitate to start any new war.

"There exists a school of thought both in London and here which would, in effect, do for Germany what this government did to its own citizens in 1933 when they were flat on their backs. I see no reason for starting a WPA, PWA, or a CCC for Germany when we go in with our Army of Occupation.

"Too many people here and in England hold to the view that the German people as a whole are not responsible for what has taken place—that only a few Nazi leaders are responsible. That unfortunately is not based on fact. The German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decency of modern civilization."

For the text of Morgenthau's memorandum to Roosevelt, see Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. 1, pp. 440-442. For the full text of Roosevelt's memorandum to Stimson, see ibid., pp. 443-445; Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, pp. 544-546.
consequences of their own acts. Your occupation and administration will be just but firm and distant. You will strongly discourage fraternization between Allied troops and the German officials and population.

3. Military government will be established and will extend over all parts of Germany under your command. Your rights, powers and status in Germany are based upon the unconditional surrender or the complete defeat of Germany.

4. a. By virtue of your position you are clothed with supreme legislative, executive and judicial authority and power in the areas occupied by forces under your command. This authority will be broadly construed and includes authority to take all measures deemed by you necessary, desirable or appropriate in relation to military exigencies and the objectives of a firm military government.

b. You are authorized at your discretion to delegate the authority herein granted to you in whole or in part to members of your command and further to authorize them at their discretion to make appropriate subdelegations.

c. You should take the necessary measures to enforce the terms of surrender and complete the disarmament of Germany.

d. The military government shall be a military administration which, until you receive further advices, will show the characteristics of an Allied undertaking acting in the interests of the United Nations.

5. The administrative policies shall be uniform throughout those parts of Germany occupied by forces under your command subject to any special requirements due to local circumstances.

6. Representatives of civilian agencies of the U.S. or U.K. Governments or of UNRRA shall not participate unless and until you consider such participation desirable when it will be subject, as to time and extent, to decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on your recommendation.

7. It is contemplated that a tripartite administration by the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. covering the whole of Germany will be established. You have previously received advices in this connection.

8. You are authorized as SCAEF to enter into arrangements with the U.S.S.R. military commanders as may be necessary for the occupation of Germany by the three powers.

9. Appendix "A", Political Directive; Appendix "B", Financial Directive; Appendix "C", Economic Directive; and Appendix "D", Relief Directive, are attached hereto. At Appendix "E" there is a chart suggestive of the tripartite form which military government for Germany might take. At Appendix "F" there is attached the draft instrument of unconditional surrender for Germany.⁷

⁷ Not attached to the source text.
1. The following persons will be arrested and held, pending receipt by you of further instructions as to their disposition:

(a) Adolf Hitler, his chief Nazi associates, and Nazi officials down to and including the secretaries of local party units.
(b) All persons suspected of having committed war crimes.
(c) The leading officials of all ministries and other high political officials of Germany and those persons who have held high position, either civil or military, in the administration of German occupied countries.
(d) Prominent Nazis holding important and key positions in (1) National and Gau civic and economic organizations, (2) corporations and other organizations in which the government has a major financial interest, (3) industry, (4) finance, (5) education, (6) the judiciary, (7) the press and other agencies disseminating news and propaganda.
(e) All judges, prosecutors and officials of the People’s Court.
(f) Any national of any of the United Nations who is believed to have committed offenses against his national law in support of the German war effort.

2. You will issue a proclamation dissolving the Nazi party and its affiliates throughout Germany. You will take all practicable measures to uproot and discredit Nazi doctrines. No secret organizations or societies of any kind shall be permitted. Property, real and personal, of the Nazi party and its affiliates, wherever found, will be regarded as public property.

3. You will make special efforts to preserve all records and plans of

(a) The German government
(b) German military organizations
(c) All organizations engaged in military research
(d) The Nazi party and affiliated organizations
(e) Security, criminal and ordinary police
(f) Nazi economic organizations and industrial establishments
(g) Institutes and special bureaus established in Germany, devoting themselves to race, political, or similar research.

4. You will take immediate steps to abrogate all laws, decrees, regulations or aspects thereof, which discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed, or political opinions. All persons who are detained or placed in custody by the Nazis on these grounds will be released, subject to requirements of security and interests of the individuals concerned.

*There is the following notation, in an unidentified handwriting, in the margin opposite this paragraph: “How many thousand?”
*There is the following notation, in an unidentified handwriting, in the margin opposite this paragraph: “Are they to be put to work while in custody?”
5. The criminal and civil courts of Germany will be closed. After the elimination of all Nazi elements, at such time and under such regulations, supervision and control as you may determine, you may permit the courts to resume functioning. All politically objectionable courts, e.g., People's Courts, will be abolished. All security and political police, excluding criminal and order [ordinary?] police, but including the Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst der S.S., will be disbanded, arrested and their members disarmed and held for disposition. Criminal and ordinary police, and such others as it may be proper to retain, must be purged of Nazi or otherwise undesirable elements, who will also be arrested and held for disposition. It is imperative to arrest and hold all high police presidents and leaders.

6. No person in Germany, other than United Nations nationals as authorized by you, shall be permitted to possess arms of any character except that such local police as you may utilize to maintain order may be armed with such law enforcement weapons as you may deem appropriate.

7. You will decide whether the objectives of military government are better served by the appointment of officers of the occupation forces or by the use of the services of Germans. It shall be made clear to all other government officials and employees that their continued employment is solely on the basis of cooperation, performance and behavior satisfactory to you. The replacement of any local government officials who may be removed will rest with you. In general, the entire Nazi leadership shall be removed from all posts of authority and no person who was a member of the German General Staff or Supreme Command or the Nazi hierarchy will occupy any important governmental or civilian position. Under no circumstances shall active Nazis or ardent sympathizers be retained in office for the purpose of administrative convenience or expediency.

8. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 and to the extent that military interests are not prejudiced, freedom of speech and press, and of religious worship will be permitted. Consistent with military necessity, all religious institutions will be respected and all efforts will be made to preserve historical archives, classical monuments and fine arts.

9. a. Diplomatic and consular officials of countries at war with any of the United Nations will be taken into protective custody and held for further disposition. Diplomatic and consular officials of neutrals will be dealt with in accordance with instructions to be issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. All German diplomats and consular officials and other agents will be recalled. If their recall cannot be effected or if their recall is not practicable by reasons of nationality, their authority as agents for
Germany will be terminated. All records and files of these agents and officers will be ordered returned to Germany or otherwise made available for appropriate inspection.

10. a. All practical measures will be taken to insure the health and welfare of United Nations nationals and neutral internees, including provision of employment as practicable, and repatriation should be undertaken as rapidly as military conditions permit. It shall be within your discretion to determine whether such persons should or should not be allowed to disperse, pending the completion of plans for their employment or other disposition.

b. Nationals of countries with which any of the United Nations are or have been at war (except Germany) will be identified and registered, and those whose freedom of movement would endanger the security of the armed forces or be otherwise undesirable will be interned or their activities curtailed as may be necessary under the circumstances.

11. a. Propagation of Nazi doctrines and Nazi propaganda in any form shall be prohibited. All schools and universities will be closed. Elementary schools only will be reopened as soon as possible after Nazi personnel has been eliminated and text books and curricula provided which are free of Nazi doctrines. Further guidance on German education and schools will be given to you in a separate directive.

b. No political activities of any kind shall be countenanced unless authorized by you. Unless you deem otherwise, no political personalities or organized political groups shall have any part in determining the policies of the military administration. It is essential to avoid any commitments to or negotiations with any political elements.

c. The publication of all newspapers, magazines, weeklies and other publications and the operation of all German radio stations throughout the area under your command will be suspended. Thereafter you will permit the dissemination of news or information subject to such censorship and control as you consider necessary in the interests of military security and intelligence and to carry out the principles laid down in this directive.

12. No persons shall be permitted to leave or enter the area under your command without your authority.

Appendix "B"

FINANCIAL DIRECTIVE

1. United States, British and other Allied forces will use Allied Military marks and Reichsmark currency or coins in their possession. Allied Military marks and Reichsmark currency and coin now in
circulation in Germany will be legal tender without distinction and will be interchangeable at a rate of 1 Allied Military mark for 1 Reichsmark. Records will be kept of the amounts of the German marks used by the forces of each nation. Reichskreditkassenscheine and other German Military currency will not be legal tender in Germany.

2. In the event, however, that for any reason adequate supplies of Allied Military marks and/or Reichsmarks are not available, the United States forces will use yellow seal dollars and regular United States coins and the British forces will use British Military Authority notes and regular British coins. Records will be kept of the amounts of currencies used by the United States and British forces.

3. If it is found necessary to use U.S. yellow seal dollars and BMA notes, the following provisions will apply to such use:

a. The rate of exchange between the U.S. yellow seal dollar and the BMA notes will be 4.035 dollars to one pound, and the two currencies will be interchangeable at that rate. The United States Treasury will make the necessary arrangements with the British Treasury.

b. You will issue a proclamation, if necessary, requiring all persons to accept U.S. yellow seal dollars and BMA notes at the decreed rates. Transactions at any other rates will be prohibited.

c. The issuance of yellow seal dollars and BMA notes will cease and Allied Military mark and/or Reichsmark currency will be used in their place as soon as available.

d. U.S. yellow seal dollars and BMA notes will be withdrawn from circulation as soon as such withdrawal can be satisfactorily accomplished.

e. Records will be kept of the amounts of such currencies used by the United States, British and other Allied forces.

4. The rate of exchange to be used only for the purpose of paying personnel of the armed forces will be ——\(^{11}\) marks to the dollar and —— marks to the pound sterling. A general rate of exchange may be furnished to you later. Holders of mark currency or deposits will not be entitled to purchase foreign exchange without special permission. They will obtain dollars or pounds, or any other foreign currency or foreign exchange credits, only in accordance with exchange regulations issued by you.

5. The Financial Division of the Civil Affairs Section for Germany will include in its functions the control of all funds to be used by the Allied Military forces within the area, except yellow seal dollars and BMA notes which will be under the control of U.S. and British forces respectively. It will maintain all the accounts and records necessary to indicate the supply, control, and movement of these currencies including yellow seal dollars and BMA notes, and other funds, as well as

\(^{11}\) Blanks in this paragraph appear in the source text.
financial data required for the determination of expenditures arising out of operations or activities involving participation of Allied Military forces.

a. Insofar as operations relate to the provision of currencies for the pay and other cash requirements of military components of the Allied forces, the Financial Division will supply Allied Military marks from currency on hand and will record the debit against the military force concerned at the rate of exchange prescribed in paragraph 4 above.

b. Insofar as operations relate to the provision of currencies for civil administration, the Finance Division will supply Allied Military marks from currency on hand and will record the debit against the Allied Military Government.

c. If found practicable and desirable, you will designate, under direct military control and supervision, the Reichsbank, or any branch thereof, or any other bank satisfactory to you, as agent for the Financial Division of the Civil Affairs Section. When satisfied that the Reichsbank, or any branch thereof, or other designated bank, is under adequate military control and supervision, you may use that bank for official business, and, if necessary, by making credits available, place such bank or banks in a position to finance other banks and branches thereof, for the conduct of their business as approved by the Allied Military authorities.

d. The records of the Financial Division of the Civil Affairs Section established within the area will indicate in all cases in what currency receipts were obtained or disbursements made by the Financial Division.

6. You will take the following steps and will put into effect only such further financial measures as you may deem to be necessary from a strictly military standpoint:

a. You will declare a general or limited moratorium if you deem such measure to be necessary. In particular, it may prove desirable to prevent foreclosures of mortgages and the exercise of similar remedies by creditors against individuals and small business enterprises.

b. Banks should be placed under such control as deemed necessary by you in order that adequate facilities for military needs may be provided and to insure that instructions and regulations issued by military authorities will be fully complied with. Banks should be closed only long enough to introduce satisfactory control, to remove Nazi elements and other objectionable personnel, and to issue instructions for the determination of accounts to be blocked under paragraph e below. As soon as practicable, banks should be required to file reports listing assets, liabilities, and all accounts in excess of 25,000 marks.

c. You will issue regulations prescribing the purposes for which credit may be extended and the terms and conditions governing the extension of credit. If banking facilities are not available you may establish such credits or make such loans as you deem necessary for essential economic activities. These will be restricted to mark credits and loans.

d. You will close all stock exchanges and similar financial institutions for such period as you deem desirable.

e. Pending determination of future disposition, all gold, foreign currencies, foreign securities, accounts in financial institutions, credits,
valuable papers and all similar assets held by or on behalf of the following, will be impounded or blocked and will be used or otherwise dealt with only as permitted under licenses or other instructions which you may issue:

1. German national, state, provincial, and local governments, and agencies and instrumentalities thereof.
2. Other enemy governments, the agencies and instrumentalities thereof and their nationals.
3. Owners and holders, including neutral and United Nations Governments or national authorities, absent from the areas of Germany under your control.
4. Nazi party organizations, including the party formations, affiliates, and supervised associations, and the officials, leading members, and supporters thereof.
5. Persons under detention or other types of custody by Allied Military authorities and other persons whose activities are hostile to the interests of the military government.

f. No governmental or private bank or agency will be authorized to issue banknotes or currency except that, if found practicable and desirable, you may so authorize the Reichsbank and the Rentenbank when they are under adequate military control and supervision.

g. You will issue immediately a proclamation prohibiting all transfers of or other dealings in securities, other than central government securities, for such period as you may deem desirable. You may, however, prohibit or limit dealings in central government securities, but only pending resumption of service on the public debt.

7. All dealings in gold and foreign exchange and all foreign financial and foreign trade transactions of any kind, including all exports and imports of currency, will be prohibited except as permitted under such regulations as you may issue relative thereto. Except as you may otherwise authorize, local banks will be permitted to open and operate only mark accounts, but if yellow seal dollars and BMA notes are legal tender, they may be accepted at the decreed general rate of exchange and will be turned in as directed by you in exchange for mark currency at the decreed general rate of exchange.

8. Non-yellow seal U.S. dollar notes and regular British pound notes will not be legal tender. No person, agency or bank engaged in the exchange of money will acquire or otherwise deal in those notes except as you may so authorize. U.S. Army and Navy Finance Officers and British Paymasters may, however, be authorized to accept non-yellow seal U.S. dollar notes and regular British pound notes from United States and British Military or authorized personnel for conversion into Allied Military mark or Reichsmark currency at the decreed general rate of exchange, after satisfying themselves as to the source of the notes.

9. All bona fide government pensions, allowances, and social security payments will continue to be paid, but steps will be taken as soon as practicable for a study of pensioners' records with a view to nullifying
all unnecessary and undesirable pensions and bonuses of Nazi inception.

10. The railways, postal, telegraph and telephone service, radio and all government monopolies will be placed under your control and their revenues made available to the military government.

11. You will, consistent with international custom and usage, maintain existing tax laws, except that discriminatory taxes introduced under the Nazi regime will be abolished. Prompt action should be taken to maintain the inflow of revenue at the highest possible level. You will resume service on the public debt as soon as military and financial conditions permit.

Appendix "C"

ECONOMIC DIRECTIVE

1. You will assume control of existing German industrial, agricultural, utility, communication and transportation facilities, supplies and services, and of German domestic and foreign trade, for the purposes of

a. Assuring the immediate cessation of the production, acquisition or development of implements of war.

b. Assuring the production and maintenance of goods and services essential

(1) to prevent or alleviate epidemic or serious disease and serious civil unrest and disorder which would endanger the occupying forces and the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation.  

(2) to the prosecution of the war against Japan (but only to the extent that specific directives of higher authority call for such goods or services) and

(3) to the provision of relief and rehabilitation supplies to the Allied nations and to the performance by Germany of such further acts of restitution as may be determined by the Allied governments.  

2. You may impose such other economic measures as you deem necessary to prevent serious civil unrest and disorder which would endanger the occupying forces and the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation.

3. A plan should be prepared by you to prevent transfers of title of real and personal property intended to defeat, evade or avoid the

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13 There is a marginal manuscript notation on the source text that the following language is to be inserted in this paragraph: "and the necessity for the provision of civilian relief".

14 At this point in the source text there is the following addition, in an unidentified handwriting: "(4) to contribute to the expenses of the occupation".

14 A handwritten notation on the source text substitutes "You should take measures" for the first seven words of this paragraph.
orders, proclamations or decrees of the military government or the
decision[s] of the courts established by it.

4. Substantial amounts of private property of various categories
has [have] been seized, looted or otherwise improperly acquired by
various Nazi officials.\footnote{The last four words of this sentence have been changed by hand on the source
text to read “the Nazi Govt, its officials and nationals”.} While it is contemplated that a suitable com-
mision will ultimately deal with this problem, you should take such
steps as may be practicable to collect any available information and
to preserve\footnote{The source text has been changed at this point to read “to identify, preserve
and control”.} any property of this kind found in the area under your
control.

5. All property in the German territory belonging to any country
with which any of the United Nations are, or have been, at war may
be controlled, subject to such use thereof as you may direct.

6. Your responsibility for the property of the United Nations, other
than U.K. and U.S. and their nationals, in areas occupied by Allied
forces shall be the same as for the property of U.K. and U.S. and their
nationals, except where a distinction is expressly provided by treaty or
agreement. Within such limits as are imposed by the military situation
you should take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve and protect
such property.

6. You will permit the formation of democratic labor unions and
other forms of free economic association, exercising safeguards neces-
sary to eliminate Nazi labor institutions and to prevent or eradicate
underground, secret, or subversive activities or organizations.

Appendix “D”

Relief Directive

1. You will be responsible for the provision and distribution of sup-
plies for civilian relief, to the extent defined below, in all areas of Ger-
many under your command. In connection with this responsibility, you
will make maximum use of supplies, stockpiles and resources available
within Germany in order to limit the extent to which imports, if any,
will be required.

2. The scale of relief to be provided will in no event exceed the
minimum quantity of food, fuel, medical, sanitary and agreed essential
supplies necessary to maintain the health and working capacity of the
civilian population, to preserve public order, to develop local resources
in order to lighten the burden on the Allied armies, and to accomplish
the objectives of the occupation.
3. You will provide for importation of civilian supplies into Germany only to the extent that critical shortages of any essential items threaten clear and imminent interference with the policies set forth in paragraph 2 of this directive.

4. You will undertake measures necessary for the control, prevention and treatment of epidemic and other diseases and the promulgation of such medical and sanitation measures, including emergency shelter, as will preserve the state of public health and protect the occupying forces.

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Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of State to the President

[Washington,] September 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In line with our personal conversation about answers to questions that Churchill might ask, I herewith attach several documents which deal with the titles indicated. I believe they will be of some use to you.

C[ordell] H[ull]

[Attachment]

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET

[Washington,] September 6, 1944.¹

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As of possible assistance to you in your conversations with Mr. Churchill, I attach memoranda concerning the following subjects:

[Here follows a numbered list of the titles of ten Department of State briefing papers.²]

C[ordell] H[ull]

[Annex 4]

Department of State Briefing Paper

SECRET

GERMANY: PARTITION

[Undated.]

In discussing the partition of Germany as set forth below, it should be made clear that these views on partition do not, of course, exclude


² Annexes 4 and 5 to this memorandum are printed here. For annexes 1–3 and 6–10, see post, pp. 190, 192, 194, 207, 212, 214, 229, and 172, respectively.
the question of major and minor frontier adjustments affecting present German territory (East Prussia, Danzig, etc.).

This Government has not to date given its representative on the European Advisory Commission any instructions relative to a possible partition of Germany. Shortly after the European Advisory Commission was established, a Sub-committee on Partition was set up but no reports have ever been received and apparently no discussion on this question has taken place in London.

It is the view of the Department of State that this Government should oppose a forcible partition of Germany. An imposed dismemberment of Germany into two or more separate states has been advocated as a practicable means of forestalling any renewal of German aggression. However, such a measure would not remove the necessity of imposing and enforcing far-reaching security control upon Germany for an undetermined period whether Germany is left united or is partitioned.

Furthermore, because of the high degree of economic, political and cultural integration in Germany which has developed over the past 75 years, it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed, but also maintained by force. The victor powers, by imposing partition, would assume a burdensome and continuing task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between the partite states and of restraining a nationalistic determination to reunite, which would probably be the response of the German people. Finally, the disruption of German economic unity might menace the economic stability of Europe as a whole.

In place of partition, the Department of State would favor a return to a federal system of government in Germany, including the division of Prussia into a number of medium-sized states. In reaction to Nazi over-centralization, the Germans might return to a considerable degree of federal decentralization, including the breakup of Prussia which in 1938 included 62% of the area and two-thirds of the population of Germany.

[Annex 5]

Department of State Briefing Paper

SECRET

ARMING OF FRENCH FORCES

[Undated.]

On August 19, 1944 the British Embassy raised with the State Department the question of equipping adequate armed forces of the

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Western European Allies to enable them to maintain security in their own countries and to take part in the occupation of Germany.\footnote{The British aide-mémoire referred to, which was delivered to the Department of State on August 23, 1944, is not printed (840.20/8-1944). On August 25 Hull sent copies of the aide-mémoire to the War and Navy Departments and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a request for the views of those organizations. Replies were not received until after the Second Quebec Conference, and no evidence has been found to indicate that this subject was discussed at Quebec.}

The Netherlands Government has accepted in principle that the Dutch Army will be re-equipped with British types of arms and, while desiring to avoid the appearance of competing with the United States, the British apparently desire to assume the same responsibility for rearming the Belgians, Norwegians and Danes. They suggest that during the next few years the equipping of the French Army should be carried out from American sources, not only because the French land forces are at present provided with American type equipment,\footnote{Concerning the United States role in equipping French forces, see Marcel Vigneras, Rearming the French (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), in the series United States Army in World War II: Special Studies.} but because it would be very difficult for the British to accept the added burden. The British conclude that if this Government is unwilling to accept the proposed commitment they will have to reconsider the situation.

Presumably the technical aspects of the question are being studied by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to whom supporting figures have been furnished by the British. The financial ramifications will also require careful study.

Our present policy toward France is based on the belief that it is in the best interests of the United States that France resume her traditional position as a principal power, capable of playing a part in the occupation of Germany and in maintaining peace in Europe. The recruiting and equipping of French land forces would be a natural corollary of that policy, leaving for decision the question of the source from which the arms should be obtained and the quantity which should be provided.

It would seem advantageous to this country to have the rearming carried out from American sources. Politically it could be portrayed as a further evidence of American friendship for France and a proof of our desire to see France restored to a strong position. American influence and prestige would be enhanced. Furthermore French reliance on the United States for arms would provide us with a lever which might enable us to exercise a certain measure of influence on French policy for a number of years. Conversely it is certain that, in their present highly nationalistic and aggressive frame of mind, the French will make every effort to obtain arms from one source or another. If they obtain them from a source other than the United
States, they may be compelled to accept conditions of a political or
other nature which run counter to American aims.

In making the above recommendation I have not failed to give
careful consideration to the fact that British policy aims at forming,
and playing the leading role in, a group of Western European coun-
tries, including France, and that one of the objects of the British
Government in suggesting the rearming of France by the United States
is thereby to create a link between this country and the Western Euro-
pean nations which might be useful to them in the future. This I be-
lieve is the primary and all important reason behind the British request
and it may, of course, have important long-range strategic
implications.

740.00119 BW/9-944

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I enclose herewith

1. Copy of the memorandum dated September 9th which gives to
the President my general views as to the matters contained in your
memorandum of September 4th1 as well as some comments on the
papers submitted by Mr. Morgenthau 2 to the President with your
aforesaid memorandum of September 4th.

2. My suggested changes to your memorandum of September 4th
which have been under study between Mr. Matthews and Mr. McCloy,
as I told you in the President's conference.3

Faithfully yours, HENRY L STIMSON

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944.

Our discussions relate to a matter of method entirely; our objective
is the same. It is not a question of a soft treatment of Germany or a
harsh treatment of Germany. We are all trying to devise protection
against recurrence by Germany of her attempts to dominate the world.
We differ as to method. The fundamental remedy of Mr. Morgenthau
is to provide that the industry of Germany shall be substantially
obliterated. Although expressed only in terms of the Ruhr, the fact

1 Ante, p. 95.
3 Stimson's Diary for September 7, 8, and 9, 1944, indicates that the two en-
closures were prepared with McCloy's assistance and that Stimson presented
them at a meeting which the Cabinet Committee on Germany had with Roosevelt
on September 9 (Stimson Papers).
of the matter is that the Ruhr and the adjacent territories which Mr. Morgenthau would include in his program constitute, particularly after the amputations that are proposed, the core of German industry. His proposition is

"the total destruction of the whole German armament industry and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength."

In speaking of the Ruhr and surrounding industrial areas, he says:

"This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it cannot in the foreseeable future become an industrial area—all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall either be completely dismantled or removed from the area or completely destroyed, all equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked." 4

I am unalterably opposed to such a program for the reasons given in my memorandum dated September 5 6 which is already before the President. I do not think that the reasons there stated need again be elaborated. In substance, my point is that these resources constitute a natural and necessary asset for the productivity of Europe. In a period when the world is suffering from destruction and from want of production, the concept of the total obliteration of these values is to my mind wholly wrong. My insistence is that these assets be conserved and made available for the benefit of the whole of Europe, including particularly Great Britain. The internationalization of the Ruhr or the trusteeship of its products—I am not prepared at the moment to discuss details of method—constitutes a treatment of the problem in accord with the needs and interests of the world. To argue that we are incapable of sustained effort to control such wealth within proper channels is to destroy any hope for the future of the world. I believe that the education furnished us by the Germans in two world wars, plus the continuity of interest which such a trusteeship would stimulate is sufficient insurance that we can be trusted to deal with the problem. The unnatural destruction of this industry would, on the other hand, be so certain, in my judgment, to provoke sympathy for the Germans that we would create friends both in this country and abroad for the Germans, whereas now most of the peoples of the world are thoroughly antipathetic to them.

The other fundamental point upon which I feel we differ is the matter of the trial and punishment of those Germans who are responsible for crimes and depredations. Under the plan proposed by Mr. Morgenthau, the so-called arch-criminals shall be put to death by the

4 The dash in the passage quoted indicates the omission of several words from the text of the Treasury memorandum. Cf. ante, p. 102.
6 Ante, p. 98.
military without provision for any trial and upon mere identification after apprehension. The method of dealing with these and other criminals requires careful thought and a well-defined procedure. Such procedure must embody, in my judgment, at least the rudimentary aspects of the Bill of Rights, namely, notification to the accused of the charge, the right to be heard and, within reasonable limits, to call witnesses in his defense. I do not mean to favor the institution of state trials or to introduce any cumbersome machinery but the very punishment of these men in a dignified manner consistent with the advance of civilization, will have all the greater effect upon posterity. Furthermore, it will afford the most effective way of making a record of the Nazi system of terrorism and of the effort of the Allies to terminate the system and prevent its recurrence.

I am disposed to believe that at least as to the chief Nazi officials, we should participate in an international tribunal constituted to try them. They should be charged with offences against the laws of the Rules of War in that they have committed wanton and unnecessary cruelties in connection with the prosecution of the war. This law of the Rules of War has been upheld by our own Supreme Court and will be the basis of judicial action against the Nazis.

Even though these offences have not been committed against our troops, I feel that our moral position is better if we take our share in their conviction. Other war criminals who have committed crimes in subjugated territory should be returned in accordance with the Moscow Declaration to those territories for trial by national military commissions having jurisdiction of the offence under the same Rules of War. I have great difficulty in finding any means whereby military commissions may try and convict those responsible for excesses committed within Germany with any relation to the conduct of the war. I would be prepared to construe broadly what constituted a violation of the Rules of War but there is a certain field in which I fear that external courts cannot move. Such courts would be without jurisdiction in precisely the same way that any foreign court would be without jurisdiction to try those who were guilty of, or condoned, lynching in our own country.

The above are the two main points with which I differ from the proposed program submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury.

**Partition**

I have an open mind on partition and although I have given the matter substantial consideration I have, as yet, come to no conclusion.

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*Footnote: i.e., the Declaration of German Atrocities approved at the Tripartite Conference held at Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 768–769; Department of State Bulletin, vol. ix, November 6, 1943, pp. 310–311.*
as to wisdom or method of partition. I feel we cannot deal effectively with that subject until we have had an interchange of views with the English and the Russians. I, myself, seek further light on this subject. I, certainly, would not discourage any spontaneous effort toward separation of the country into two or more groups.

Amputation

I understand that there is some general recognition of the probability of Russia or the Poles taking East Prussia and some parts of Silesia. I suggest that we interpose no objection to this but that we take no part in the administration of the area. On the Western border the primary question is the matter of dealing with the Ruhr but it has also been suggested that the Rhineland and the Saar be delivered to France. Naturally I am in favor of the automatic return of Alsace and Lorraine to France but though my mind is not irrevocably closed against it, I feel that the burden of proof lies on those who suggest giving France more territory. She will come out of this war with her Empire practically intact, with a reduced population and already possessing a very valuable bit of ore in the Longwy-Briey area. To give her a substantial territory of German-speaking and German-bred people would create another problem in the balance of Europe. To counteract this, I would give France a share in the benefits of the internationalization of the Saar and the Ruhr and the advantage which this gives of what would in effect be an international barrier between France and Germany.

There are certain other methods of punishment affecting the personal lives of individual Germans proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury to which I am opposed as constituting irritations of no fundamental value and, indeed, of considerable danger, but these are primarily matters of administration which I think need not be discussed at this time. In some part, at least, they had best be determined by those who have the primary responsibility for the administration of the occupation.

As a suggestion, I propose that during the interim period, which is all that we can deal with at the moment, the President be recommended to approve a program generally in accord with the memorandum submitted by the Secretary of State at the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Tuesday, September 5, except for a modification of subparagraph 2 (h) of that memorandum and certain other additions on which I hope we can all agree, which suggested changes I append hereto.
SECRET

Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson)

SUGGESTED CHANGES IN CABINET COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS AS STATED IN PAPER SEPTEMBER 4, 1944

To paragraph 2 (a) should be added the following:

"At least for an indefinite period Germany shall be denied the means or power to manufacture or design aeroplanes or gliders of any sort whether military, commercial or private, and Germany shall have no license to operate any airlines. During this period no schools or courses for the study of air flight in any form shall be permitted.

"All machines, plants and other instruments which are peculiarly adapted to the manufacture of arms and lethal weapons of any sort shall be dismantled or destroyed."

Paragraph 2 (b) should be rewritten to read as follows:

"Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all its affiliated and associated organizations should be effected immediately and all members of the Gestapo, viz., the so-called security or political police, prominent Nazis in whatever activity they may have operated, substantially if not all members of the S.S. organizations, and others who are suspected of having taken part in or had responsibility for the perpetration of war crimes, should be apprehended and held for further disposition. Prompt and summary trials shall be held of those charged with such crimes and punishment should be swift and severe.

"Studies should be instituted at once to determine the procedures to be followed in such trials, and they should be cleared with the British, Russians, and French as quickly as possible, so that they can be communicated to the appropriate occupying authorities without delay.

"All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed, political activity or opinion, should be annulled."

To paragraph (e) should be added the following:

"The territories of Germany which are to be ceded to other countries are understood to be all or most of East Prussia and some parts of Silesia. The question of the Rhineland and the Saar is closely connected with the treatment of the Ruhr. We recommend as the present view of the United States that a strong control over the products of this area must be maintained by means of some form of international trusteeship of its products and resources. It should not be obliterated as an industrial productive center, but it must be actively managed by others than Germans and otherwise completely taken from German domination.

"On the other hand no efforts shall be made to rebuild any of the destroyed plants in Germany until permission is given by appropriate Allied or United Nations authority."
Substitute for paragraph (b) the following:

"The primary objectives of our economic policy are: (1) the permanent elimination of German economic domination in Europe and (2) the conversion of German economic capacity in such manner that it will be so dependent upon imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production."

Roosevelt Papers

Briefing Book Prepared in the Treasury Department

[WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944.]

[Section 1]

PROGRAM TO PREVENT GERMANY FROM STARTING A WORLD WAR III

1. Demilitarization of Germany

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph 1 of Morgenthau's memorandum of September 5, 1944, ante, p. 101.]

2. New Boundaries of Germany

(a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn't go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion of Silesia. (See map in 12 Appendix.)

(b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Moselle Rivers.

(c) As indicated in 4 below an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.

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1 This briefing book was before Roosevelt during his meeting with the Cabinet Committee on Germany on September 9, 1944. See Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. 1, pp. 608-609. Concerning the preparation of these briefing materials, see ibid., pp. 591-596.

In the Roosevelt Papers these briefing papers are attached to and preceded by:

(1) A typed memorandum reading, "This was done by Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and his people. In the conversations [at Quebec] with the Prof (Lord Cherwell) we used it in discussing the financial problems, but not the recommendations on the allocations of zones in Germany, F.D.R." (2) A table of contents listing serially (from 1 to 11) the titles of the individual sections of the briefing book and identifying the two maps and three charts which were included in the briefing materials. The table of contents indicates, however, that the third appended chart is entitled "Trade Pattern of Europe", whereas the final chart filed in the Roosevelt Papers is entitled "Coal Production in United Kingdom and Ruhr". Cf. ibid., pp. 594-595.

2 In Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany Is Our Problem (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945), a facsimile of this section of the Treasury briefing book is reproduced before p. ix, and identified as "a photographic copy of the memorandum summarizing The Morgenthau Plan" which President Roosevelt took with him to the historic conference at Quebec in September of 1944." The briefing book taken as a whole is the fullest exposition of the "Morgenthau Plan" which has been found.

3 The maps and charts contained in the briefing book were appended in section 12, following the first 11 sections of the book. See post, p. 140.
3. Partitioning of New Germany

[This paragraph is identical with subparagraph 2 (d) of Morgenthau’s memorandum of September 5, 1944, ante, p. 101.]

4. The Ruhr Area

(The Ruhr, surrounding industrial areas, as shown on the map, including the Rhineland, the Kiel Canal, and all German territory north of the Kiel Canal.)

Here lies the heart of German industrial power. This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area. The following steps will accomplish this:

(a) Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall be completely dismantled and transported to Allied Nations as restitution. All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines closed.

(b) The area should be made an international zone to be governed by an international security organization to be established by the United Nations. In governing the area the international organization should be guided by policies designed to further the above stated objective.

5. Restitution and Reparation

Reparations, in the form of future payments and deliveries, should not be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected by the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g.,

(a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them;

(b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition;

(c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition;

(d) by forced German labor outside Germany; and

(e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany.

6. Education and Propaganda

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph 5 of Morgenthau’s memorandum of September 5, 1944, ante, p. 103.]

7. Political Decentralization

The military administration in Germany in the initial period should be carried out with a view toward the eventual partitioning of Ger-
many. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with local governments.

(b) Encourage the reestablishment of state governments in each of the states (Länder) corresponding to 18 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states.

(c) Upon the partition of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a confederation of states, with emphasis on states’ rights and a large degree of local autonomy.

8. Responsibility of Military for Local German Economy

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which are essential to military operations. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

9. Controls Over Development of German Economy

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph 8 of Morgenthau’s memorandum of September 5, 1944, ante, p. 104.]

10. Agrarian Program

All large estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.

11. Punishment of War Crimes and Treatment of Special Groups

A program for the punishment of certain war crimes and for the treatment of Nazi organizations and other special groups is contained in section 11.4

12. Uniforms and Parades

(a) No German shall be permitted to wear, after an appropriate period of time following the cessation of hostilities, any military uniform or any uniform of any quasi-military organizations.

(b) No military parades shall be permitted anywhere in Germany and all military bands shall be disbanded.

4 Post, p. 140.
13. Aircraft

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph 12 of Morgenthau's memorandum of September 5, 1944, ante, p. 104.]

14. United States Responsibility

Although the United States would have full military and civilian representation on whatever international commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program, the primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany should be assumed by the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors. Specifically, these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.

Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time.

[Section 2]

REPARATIONS MEAN A POWERFUL GERMANY

If we were to expect Germany to pay recurring reparations, whether in the form of money or goods, we would be forced at the very beginning to start a rehabilitation and reconstruction program for the German economy. For instance, we would have to supply her with transportation equipment, public utility repairs, food for her working population, machinery for heavy industry damaged by bombing, reconstruction of housing and industrial raw materials. No matter how the program would be dressed up, we would, in effect be doing for Germany what we expect to do for the liberated areas of Europe but perhaps on an even greater scale, because of Germany's more advanced industrialization.

When reparation deliveries cease Germany will be left with a more powerful economy and a larger share of foreign markets than she had in the Thirties.

Therefore, a program of large-scale reparations must be rejected for the following reasons:

1. Politically it would be very difficult to persuade people of liberated Europe and of the other United Nations, including the U.S., to accept a program of immediate reconstruction of the German economy.
2. If liberated Europe becomes economically dependent on Germany for reparations, her economic dependence cannot be broken off when reparations cease. The rest of Europe would continue to be dependent on Germany as a source of supply and as a market. These economic ties would also mean political ties. Germany would be right back where she was in the Thirties when she was able to dominate the rest of Europe economically through her industrial power and to exert her economic power to achieve political domination.
3. An economically powerful Germany *ipso facto* constitutes a military threat to world security.

4. The payment of reparations is directly competitive with the export industries of the U.S., the U.K. and France and would create political dissensions among the United Nations.

(a) Whatever the recipient countries get in reparations they will not buy from the Allied industrial powers in the post-war period.

(b) If Germany is placed on a reparations basis she will have to export industrial goods to non-European markets in order to get the necessary foreign exchange to import the raw materials for her industry. Therefore, she will again compete with England and the United States in the Latin American, African and Asiatic markets.

5. An economically powerful Germany would be able to compete more effectively with other countries as and when the payment of reparations ceases.

A reparations program for Germany after this war holds no greater promise of success than the Dawes and Young plans \(^5\) tried after the end of the First World War.

**[Section 3]**

**ECONOMIC RESTITUTION BY GERMANY TO UNITED NATIONS**

In lieu of recurring reparations payments the nation entitled to such payments will receive from Germany a lump sum payment in the form of German material resources, German human resources and German territory.

This lump sum payment, which may be described as restitution rather than reparations will be effected in the following manner:

(a) The transfer of German territory to liberated countries including the industrial installations located there. It is proposed that the great industrial areas of Silesia be transferred to Poland and the industry of the Saar and the adjacent territories be transferred to France. These territories will represent enormous wealth to the recipient countries.

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(b) By removal and distribution among devastated countries, of industrial plants and equipment and transportation facilities including railroads, situated within the remaining German territory and the Ruhr. It is expected that complete factory units, machinery, equipment, stocks of raw materials, railroad and shipping will be transferred to the devastated countries and will constitute a real basis for the reconstruction and industrialization of liberated Europe. To the extent possible the whole industry of the Ruhr will be so transferred.

(c) By the creation of German labor battalions to be used for reconstruction work outside Germany.

(d) By confiscation of all German foreign exchange assets of any character whatsoever.

The type of restitution described above will be more beneficial both politically and economically to recipient countries than would be any form of recurring reparations payments.

Benefits will be realized almost immediately by the receipt of machinery, equipment and manpower, and the economies of the recipient countries will be strengthened absolutely as well as relatively to that of Germany.

To the extent that the need of these countries for industrial products is supplied by U.S. and U.K. instead of by Germany, the receiving nations benefit by obtaining delivery more rapidly in the immediate post-war period. Also by supplying such goods U.S. and U.K. enjoy expanded foreign post-war markets.

[Section 4]

IT IS A FALLACY THAT EUROPE NEEDS A STRONG INDUSTRIAL GERMANY

1. The assumption sometimes made that Germany is an indispensable source of industrial supplies for the rest of Europe is not valid. U.S., U.K. and the French-Luxembourg-Belgian industrial group could easily have supplied out of unused industrial capacity practically all that Germany supplied to Europe during the pre-war period. In the post-war period the expanded industrial capacity of the United Nations, particularly the U.S., can easily provide the reconstruction and industrial needs of Europe without German assistance.

Total German exports to the entire world in 1938 were only about $2 billion, of which machinery steel and steel products amounted to about $750 million, coal $165 million and chemicals $230 million.

These amounts are trivial in comparison with the increased industrial potential of the U.S. alone, or of the U.K. One-fifth of our lend-lease exports of 1943 would be sufficient to replace the full exports of Germany to the whole world.

2. A claim has been made that Europe is dependent upon Ruhr coal. The French-Belgian steel industry and some of the new industrial units which will arise in Europe after the war will need imported coal
supplies. However, the British coal industry which suffered from German competition before the war will be able to supply a major part if not all of these needs. The coal industries of France, Poland, Silesia and the Saar are also capable of further expansion if the competition of the Ruhr is eliminated. Further supplies if necessary could be obtained from the United States though at a much higher price. The different quality of the substitute coals may require some technological changes but the adjustment can be made.

Germany had a net export of coal of 32 million tons in 1937. The difference between the British coal production in a good year and a depressed year was more than the total German exports of coal. Moreover, at no time in the last 25 years has the British coal industry worked at full capacity.

3. Germany has been important to the rest of Europe as a market principally for surplus agricultural products. In 1937 Germany's food imports from the world were $800 million, of which Europe supplied $450 million. Total German purchases of raw materials from Europe in 1937 were about $350 million. The loss of the German market will be largely compensated for by the following developments:

(a) If German industry is eliminated, no doubt the bulk of the industrial raw materials which Germany used to purchase will now be bought by other European nations which will henceforth produce the industrial commodities which Germany exported before to Europe.

(b) The industrialization and the heightened standard of living of the rest of Europe will absorb a part of the food surpluses which formerly went to Germany.

(c) Those part[s] of Germany which will be added to other countries (the Rhineland, Silesia, East Prussia) may have as high a volume of food imports as before, perhaps higher.

(d) The remaining part of Germany will continue to import some food, perhaps 25%-50% of former food imports.

4. Germany was important to the rest of Europe as a market to the following extent:

Percentage of each country's exports to Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The U.K. exported principally coal and textile materials to Germany and the principal French exports were iron ore and wool. The elimination of German industrial exports will provide adequate markets for these exports and more.

The loss of the German market may be important to the Balkan countries. Agricultural exports of these countries to Germany were abnormally large in 1938 because of Germany’s unscrupulous exploitation through clearing agreements and other devices. These countries will find markets for part of their food surplus through industrialization and a higher standard of living within their own country. German areas will continue to import some food from them. However, there may be a net loss of markets to Denmark, Holland, and Yugoslavia, and these countries will need to make an adjustment in their economies which should not be difficult in the period of greater adjustments which will come with liberation.

5. In short, the statement that a healthy European economy is dependent upon German industry was never true, nor will it be true in the future. Therefore the treatment to be accorded to Germany should be decided upon without reference to the economic consequences upon the rest of Europe. At the worst, these economic consequences will involve relatively minor economic disadvantages in certain sections of Europe. At best, they will speed up the industrial development of Europe outside of Germany. But any disadvantages will be more than offset by real gains to the political objectives and the economic interests of the United Nations as a whole.

[Section 5]

**Why the Resources of the Ruhr Should Be Locked Up and the Equipment Removed**

During the last hundred years the basis of modern German militarism has been the industrial capacity of the Ruhr. Very large resources of high quality coal that lends itself particularly well to the production of coke and a fortunate geographic location which facilitated the importation of iron ore, were the foundation of an industrial apparatus that is unique throughout the world and the development of which has been deliberately guided by military objectives.

The elimination of this industrial apparatus is indispensable to rendering renewed German aggression impossible for many years to come. No other device could serve this main objective of the United Nations with the same effectiveness. Dismemberment of Germany alone would not suffice since political developments several decades hence may make a reunion of the several German states possible. In that case the reunited German State would immediately possess a huge industrial potential unless the Ruhr industry were destroyed.
If the Ruhr industry were eliminated, new iron and steel industries would unquestionably be built up in the rest of Europe to provide for those needs in iron and steel which the Ruhr used to satisfy, and to make use of the French iron ore production. Coal would become available from the Saar, from increased production in France, Great Britain, Silesia and Poland. The elimination of the Ruhr would hence be a welcome contribution to the prosperity of the coal industry of several United Nations. Great Britain has very large reserves of coal; her proved reserves are held to represent, at the present rate of extraction, about 500 years' supply.

Britain's coal production has severely declined in the inter-war period and never again reached its maximum of 1913 (293 million metric tons). The level of production in the years preceding this was that of the turn of the century, the increase between 1900 and 1913 having been lost. The production in 1938 was 60 million tons lower than in 1913.

The new iron and steel industries which will arise in Europe to take the place of the Ruhr will have such a powerful vested interest that they will constitute a permanent and effective barrier to the re-industrialization of the Ruhr.

[Section 6]

HOW BRITISH INDUSTRY WOULD BENEFIT BY PROPOSED PROGRAM

1. The British coal industry would recover from its thirty year depression by gaining new markets. Britain would meet the major portion of the European coal needs formerly met by the annual Ruhr production of 125 million tons. The consequent expansion of British coal output would allow for the development of a coherent program for the expansion and reorganization of what has been Britain's leading depressed industry since 1918 and facilitate the elimination of the depressed areas.

2. The reduction in German industrial capacity would eliminate German competition with British exports in the world market. Not only will England be in a position to recapture many of the foreign markets she lost to Germany after 1918, but she will participate in supplying the devastated countries of Europe with all types of consumer and industrial goods for their reconstruction needs in the immediate post-war years.

3. Transference of a large section of German shipping, both commercial and naval, and shipbuilding equipment to England will be an important item in England's program of post-war economic expansion of restitution.
4. Britain's foreign exchange position will be strengthened and the pressure on sterling reduced by the expansion of her exports and shipping services.

5. The assurance of peace and security would constitute England's greatest single economic benefit from the proposed program designed to put Germany in a position never again to wage effective war on the continent. England would be able to undertake the program for economic and social reconstruction advanced in the Beveridge plan 6 and the Government program for full employment without having to worry about the future financial burdens of maintaining a large army and huge armament industries indefinitely.

6. Britain's political stability would be reinforced by her increased ability to meet the insistent domestic demands for economic reform resulting from the assurances of security and of an expansion of her exports.

[Section 7]

THE WELL-BEING OF THE GERMAN ECONOMY IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GERMANS AND NOT OF THE ALLIED MILITARY AUTHORITIES

The economic rehabilitation of Germany is the problem of the German people and not of the Allied Military authorities. The German people must bear the consequences of their own acts.

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy should be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government should not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

No relief supplies should be imported, or distributed from German stocks, beyond the minimum necessary to prevent disease and such disorder as might endanger or impede military operations or occupation. The Allied Military authorities should have no responsibility for the provision and distribution of relief, including food and medical supplies. German import requirements should be strictly limited to minimum quotas of critical items and should not in any instance take precedence over the supply requirements of liberated territories.

Agricultural supplies in Germany should be utilized for the German population, provided, however, that German consumption shall be

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held to a minimum so as to maximize the surplus of agricultural products available for liberated countries.

Allied Military authorities should not be concerned with restoring any physical destruction caused during hostilities, except as absolutely essential to the health of the population. The Germans will have that responsibility, to do the job as best they can.

[Section 8]

**CONTROLS OVER DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN ECONOMY**

A long range program should be put into effect for the purpose of controlling the strategic elements in the German economy for a prolonged period, at least 20 years. The elements which should be controlled are:

1. German foreign assets, including patents and copyrights.
2. German foreign trade.
3. Clearing and trade agreements with foreign countries.
5. Industries producing strategic materials other than those for which special provision has been made.
6. The German commercial and fishing fleet.
7. Inland navigation, e.g., canals and rivers.

It is essential that the foregoing strategic elements in the German economy be controlled lest through their use, the Germans once again proceed to build up various aspects of their industrial and economic structure for future militaristic and aggressive purposes. Germany has been the leader in the world in using customs tariffs, trade preferences, foreign exchange control, control over transit trade, import quotas, international cartels, patents and copyrights for discriminatory and unfair trade advantages against her neighbors. It has been the focal point for many of the festering sores and competitive trade wars throughout the 1920's and 30's.

[Section 9]

**WHAT TO DO ABOUT GERMAN EDUCATION**

The militaristic spirit which pervades the German people has been deliberately fostered by all educational institutions in Germany for many decades. Schools, Colleges and Universities were used with great effectiveness to instill into the children and the youth of the nation the seeds of aggressive nationalism and the desire for world domination. Re-education of the German people must hence be part of the program to render Germany ineffective as an aggressive power.

Re-education cannot be effectively undertaken from outside the country and by teachers from abroad. It must be done by the Germans
themselves. The hard facts of defeat and of the need for political, economic and social reorientation must be the teachers of the German people. The existing educational system which is utterly nazified must be completely reorganized and reformed. The chief task will be to locate politically reliable teachers and to educate, as soon as possible, new teachers who are animated by a new spirit.

A United Nations Commission of Education should be created which will have supreme authority in all matters of education and organs of public opinion. All educational institutions of any type and character will be closed. Their reopening will depend (1) upon the possibility of assembling faculties in whom political confidence can be placed; (2) upon reorganization of curricula; (3) upon the completion of new text books to replace the utterly unusable books of the past. During a preliminary period only[,] appointments to faculties of educational institution[s] should be subject to the approval of the United Nations Commission of Education. While it may be possible to reassemble faculties for primary schools after a relatively short time, all institutions of higher learning, the chief centers of militaristic, pan-German propaganda in the past, may have to remain closed for a number of years.

[Section 10]

**German Militarism Cannot Be Destroyed by Destroying Nazism Alone**

(1) The Nazi regime is essentially the culmination of the unchanging German drive toward aggression.

(a) German society has been dominated for at least three generations by powerful forces fashioning the German state and nation into a machine for military conquest and self-aggrandizement. Since 1864 Germany has launched five wars of aggression against other powers, each war involving more destruction over larger areas than the previous one.

(b) As in the case of Japan, the rapid evolution of a modern industrial system in Germany immeasurably strengthened the economic base of German militarism without weakening the Prussian feudal ideology or its hold on German society.

(c) The Nazi regime is not an excrescence on an otherwise healthy society but an organic growth out of the German body politic. Even before the Nazi regime seized power, the German nation had demonstrated an unequaled capacity to be seduced by a militarist clique offering the promise of economic security and political domination in exchange for disciplined acceptance of its leadership. What the Nazi regime has done has been to systematically debauch the passive Ger-
man nation on an unprecedented scale and shape it into an organized and dehumanized military machine integrated by all the forces of modern technique and science.

(2) The dissolution of the Nazi Party will not, therefore, by itself ensure the destruction of the militaristic spirit instilled into the German people over generations and given an overwhelming impetus in the last decade. This will of necessity be an arduous process, and for a long time to come it would be gambling with the very destiny of civilization to rely on an unproven German capacity for self-regeneration in the face of its proven capacity for creating new weapons of destruction to be used in wars of aggression. Therefore, in addition to disarming and weakening Germany as a military power, the interests of world security will best be promoted by:

(a) Forcibly reducing Germany's industrial capacity so that she will cease to be a major economic, military and political power.

(b) Strengthening all Germany's neighbors politically and economically relatively to Germany. The more powerful her neighbors, the more likely she is to realize the futility of the militarist philosophy from which aggression ensues.

[Section 11]

PUNISHMENT OF CERTAIN WAR CRIMES AND TREATMENT OF SPECIAL GROUPS

[Paragraphs A and B of this section are identical with paragraphs A and B of appendix B to Morgenthau's memorandum of September 5, 1944, ante, p. 105.]

C. Registration

An appropriate registration program will be formulated designed to identify all members of the Nazi Party and affiliated organizations, the Gestapo, S.S. and S.A.

[Paragraphs D–F are identical with paragraphs D–F of appendix B to Morgenthau's memorandum of September 5, 1944, ante, p. 107.]

G. Prohibition on Emigration

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph H of appendix B to Morgenthau's memorandum of September 5, 1944, ante, p. 107.]

[Section 12]

[An appendix to the briefing book includes (1) a map (not printed herein, but reproduced in Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. I, facing p. 554) on which the information shown is identical with that on the map printed ante, facing p. 86; (2) a map (not printed herein) entitled "Map of Lorraine Iron Districts and Tributary Coal Fields"; and (3) the three charts which follow.]
PRODUCTION OF COAL, IRON AND STEEL IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES IN 1937

(MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coal</th>
<th>Iron Ore</th>
<th>Pig Iron</th>
<th>Steel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ruhr</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium and Luxembourg</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COAL PRODUCTION IN UNITED KINGDOM AND RUHR

Yearly, 1922-1938
The Cabinet Committee on Germany met with Roosevelt on September 9, 1944, and discussed the postwar treatment of Germany. No official minutes of the meeting have been found, but for information on the meeting based on Morgenthau material see Blum, pp. 367-368, and Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. I, pp. 608-611.

Memorandum by the Political Adviser on Germany (Murphy)

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

The President began with an account of his boyhood studies in Germany when, he said, he grew fond of the German people as they were in the 1890's—their music and love of liberty, and the absence of militarism. No one at that time wore a uniform. Even the railroad station masters would wear civilian clothes, with only a uniform cap. The President said that four years later he visited Germany again and found a great change in this respect—the students had started wearing uniforms and were marching in formation. Militarism took the ascendancy from then on.

The President stated his belief that all of this must be eradicated and a new process of demilitarized education begun. This might well take forty years to accomplish.

The President mentioned the report that the Germans were flooding parts of Holland. He said that where sea water is allowed to flood land it ruins it for agricultural purposes for as much as twenty-five years. Therefore, if Holland suffered this loss, it would seem to be fair that Holland receive certain compensation from German territory. In that connection he spoke of an international zone or trusteeship which would be created embracing the territory, roughly, from the Kiel Canal down to about Hanover, including the Ruhr and a strip of territory west of the Rhine, but not including the city of Cologne, down to and including the Saar. The President was non-committal as to whether the trustees under such an arrangement should include more than the three great powers, France for example. He did indicate that he considered that France would emerge from this war in a strong position, relatively stronger, he said, than Great Britain, with the French Empire probably intact.

The President said that the United States was not interested in reparations from Germany, but that he realized that other countries were, and was in accord that the Soviet Union, Great Britain and
others should benefit by the use of German labor and equipment. He expressed the opinion that the British Empire was bankrupt and that we could not afford to see it disintegrate. He was willing to see Great Britain, as he was the Soviet Union, profit by German assets.

The President also expressed the view that it might be better for the Allies in concluding hostilities with the Germans to deal only with local commanders and authorities, rather than with a central authority and the German high command. This, he indicated, would protect us from the charge of having made a deal with anybody or to have become affiliated with a group which, while pretending to be anti-Nazi, might be a cover for unwelcome elements.

War criminals, the President hoped might be dealt with summarily. His principal preoccupation was that they be properly identified before being disposed of, but he expressed himself as very much opposed to long, drawn-out legal procedure.

The President also discussed French and Italian affairs, and I gathered from his comments on the French situation that he believed some time would elapse before a stable French central government is established. He asked a number of questions about Italian affairs, particularly the status and future possibilities of Umberto, the Prince of Naples. He seemed to favor economic cooperation with Italy and a friendly effort to improve the condition of the Italian people.

R[OBERT] D M[URPHY]

Roosevelt Papers

**Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey)**

[Undated.]

**ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN EUROPE**

At the Quebec Conference of the President and Prime Minister Churchill with their Chiefs of Staff in August 1943, an outline plan was presented by Lieutenant General Morgan for an emergency return to Europe by Allied troops should German resistance in the West suddenly weaken or collapse before the Invasion of France was launched in the Spring of 1944. General Morgan had been appointed

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1 Elsey informed the Historical Office of the Department of State on January 12, 1955, that he had prepared this memorandum “immediately prior to” the Second Quebec Conference at the request of the President’s Naval Aide (Brown). “Knowing that the subject of zones of occupation would have a prominent place on the agenda of that conference, Admiral Brown directed me to write a briefing paper on the issues between the United Kingdom and the United States on zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, the paper to be based on the Map Room files and the files of Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy and the President.” (Historical Office Files)

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in May 1943 as Chief of Staff to
the Supreme Allied Commander (abbreviated to COSSAC) to begin
planning for the invasion, and, as a corollary, to prepare plans for the
emergency return should that become possible. The purpose of
COSSAC's plan, named RANKIN, was to introduce as many Allied
troops into western Europe as possible to prevent chaos and ruin re-
sulting from disintegration of the German war machine. RANKIN pro-
posed that France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Rhine Valley to
Düsseldorf be regarded as a sphere under U.S. control while Holland,
Denmark, and northwestern Germany from the Ruhr Valley to Lü-
beck be controlled by British forces.*

RANKIN was approved "in principle" by the Combined Chiefs on
August 23, 1943.† On the same day, at the second and final meet-
ing of the President and the Prime Minister with the Chiefs of Staff at
the Citadel, the President inquired if plans were being made for an
emergency return to the continent and added that he desired United
Nations troops to reach Berlin as soon as did the Russians.‡ The Presi-
dent was informed of the COSSAC plan and in the final report of the
conference submitted to him the next day a statement on RANKIN was
included. "We have examined," the Chiefs of Staff said, "the plans
that have been proposed [prepared] by General Morgan's staff for an
emergency operation to enter the Continent. We have taken note of
these plans and have directed that they be kept under continuous
review."§

By concurring with the British Chiefs in approving "in principle"
the recommendations of COSSAC, the United States Joint Chiefs
of Staff were accepting without thorough examination and without
guidance or direction from the President the proposal that in any
emergency entrance into the Continent U.S. forces would occupy
France and Belgium and southwestern Germany. This decision was
to have far-reaching consequences and was to become, in short order,
a bone of contention between Great Britain and the United States
which has not yet been buried.

After the Quebec Conference the U.S. Joint Chiefs shelved the
question of RANKIN but the British Chiefs and COSSAC continued
active study and planning.

In early November, on the eve of departure of the President and the
Chiefs of Staff for the Sextant Conference at Cairo, General Morgan

* C.C.S. 320, 20 August 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations,
The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, p. 1010.]
† C.C.S. 115th Meeting, 23 August 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid.,
p. 940.]
‡ Second Citadel meeting, 23 August 1943 (Minutes printed in Quadrant Con-
ference report.) [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., p. 942.]
§ C.C.S. 319/5, 24 August 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., p. 1121.]
* See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.
submitted in person to General Marshall a proposed revision of the 
Rankin plan approved "in principle" at Quebec. The major change 
was in the delineation of spheres to be controlled by Great Britain 
and the United States. In discussing the problem, COSSAC stated: 
"In making our original recommendation . . . *we were handicapped 
by the fact that at that time (August 1943) no consideration had been 
given by the Allied Governments as to their policy for the disarm 
ament and control of Germany." He had assumed, however, that Anglo-
American forces would be required at least to control the Rhine and 
Ruhr Valleys and northwest Germany and to assist in the restoration 
of France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark and had made his original 
recommendation for the two spheres on that assumption. After 
Quadrant, the British Chiefs of Staff had examined Rankin care 
fully and had asked COSSAC to reexamine the plan with a view to 
establishing mobile land and air forces in the best strategic positions 
from which control of German industry could be ensured. COSSAC's 
staff had consulted the Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee of 
the War Cabinet and documents prepared by the British Planning 
Staff and the Foreign Office. As a result of this additional study, 
COSSAC now wished to withdraw his original recommendation on 
zones and substitute a new one along the lines of the Post-Hostilities 
Committee's zoning. Accordingly, he now proposed that the U.S. sphere 
should comprise southern Germany, Austria and France and the Eng 
lish sphere should consist of northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxem 
bourg, Holland and Denmark. The Russians should occupy territory 
and the eastward. This zoning, COSSAC remarked in his recommenda 
tion to General Marshall, provides a more equitable sharing in the 
task of restoring liberated countries than the original scheme and 
leaves the U.S. forces free to devote full attention to the "sufficiently 
formidable task of France." General Morgan added that planning was 
in progress on this basis.†

The changes proposed by COSSAC did not involve large areas. Bel 
gium and Luxembourg were transferred from the American to the 
British zone and Austria was added as an American responsibility 
whereas it had not been included in the original COSSAC plan. 
France, with the largest population and area of the "liberated coun 
tries", remained American. The significance of the new COSSAC 
proposal was that it focused American attention on Rankin as it had 
not been before. The allocation of spheres had been tentatively set down 
as "strategic recommendations" in August but now the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff learned that full-scale planning and preparations were pro 
ceeding in London along British lines.

[†J.C.S. 577, 8 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]]

*Marks of ellipsis throughout this document appear in the source text.
†C.C.S. 320/2, 8 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]
General Morgan's recommendations were reviewed by the U.S. Joint Staff Planners who reported that action on them by the Joint Chiefs should be deferred pending information on our post-war political and economic policies. It was at once apparent to the Planners that COSSAC's plan reflected deep and careful study; he had coordinated his efforts with the Foreign Office and the War Cabinet; and his plan reflected British political and economic as well as military policy. Similar guidance and direction was needed, they felt, by the U.S. Chiefs before commitments on the COSSAC plan were made.**

The U.S. Joint Chiefs acted on their Planning Committee's advice at once. At a meeting held aboard the USS Iowa on 17 November, en route Cairo, the Chiefs prepared a paper for the British Chiefs stating that they had not approved the revision of Rankin which appeared to have far-reaching political and economic implications extending beyond their cognizance and on which the Department of State and the President had not expressed themselves.††

On the same day, the Joint Chiefs addressed a letter to the President. Explaining the new COSSAC proposals which divided Europe into three spheres of responsibility, the Chiefs stated that exact boundaries between U.S., British and Soviet zones could not be defined until agreement on the subject had been reached by the three governments. Due to a rapidly developing military situation it was necessary to come to this agreement as soon as possible but before it could be done, they needed guidance so that an occupation plan would be in accord with American political and economic policies and with international agreements.††

The President replied immediately to the request of the Joint Chiefs for advice and for information on U.S. policy. He informed Admiral Leahy that he could not agree to the areas of occupation which General Morgan had proposed and that he wished American forces to occupy northern Europe, that is, Scandinavia, Denmark, and northern Germany and not the area which COSSAC had recommended.§§

On November 19, while still embarked in the Iowa, the President met with the Joint Chiefs for a full discussion of the problem. He again defined the area which he wished American forces to occupy, and stated that the British should be responsible for France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and southern Germany and that the U.S.S.R. should occupy eastern Germany.

**J.C.S. 577, 8 November 1943. J.C.S. 577/1, 16 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]
††J.C.S. 520/3, 18 November 1943. J.C.S. 124th Meeting, 17 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]
‡‡J.C.S. 577/2, 17 November 1943. Memorandum for the President from Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]
§§J.C.S. 125th Meeting, 18 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]
The President also discussed other implications of Rankin. He told the Joint Chiefs that British political considerations were very evident in the COSSAC plan and he again emphasized that we should get U.S. troops into Berlin as soon as possible after German collapse or surrender.\\

After the President had expressed his views to the Chiefs, it was possible for planning groups to initiate definite studies. The Joint Staff Planners examined the feasibility of American occupation of the northern area proposed by the President and concluded that it was more advantageous from a military as well as a political point of view. The people in the northern area are more stable racially and politically, ports and lines of communications are better and less liable to sabotage, and they concluded that we should have to remain there less time. The defeat of Japan is a primary concern, taking priority over restoration and rehabilitation of Europe; supplies and shipping must not be tied up in Europe when they can be used in the Pacific war. Hence the area committing least forces for the shortest time is most desirable for American occupation. The Joint Staff Planners also considered the problem of “cross-over”. Plans for the invasion of France called for American forces on the right or west flank of the Normandy coast and British on the east. Should Germany not weaken suddenly or collapse and should we have a prolonged engagement in France, the line of battle would swing to a north-south axis with Americans still on the right and hence southern flank. Thus, if the U.S. should occupy northwestern Germany after her defeat or collapse as the President proposed, U.S. troops would have to transfer through British forces moving into southern Germany. This would be difficult with railroads, bridges and highways damaged by air bombardment but by careful coordination with the British our Staff Planners considered it feasible.\\

By Presidential direction and with this military study supporting their position, the U.S. Joint Chiefs on December 4 at Cairo replied to the British proposal on division of occupied territories. Rather than permit COSSAC to continue planning on American occupation of southern Germany and British occupation of the northwest, the U.S. Chiefs proposed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct him to revise his planning at once on the basis of the U.S. in the general area of the Netherlands, Northern Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, with the British west and south of the American position.*

* Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President, 19 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 253-256, 261; Matloff, map facing p. 341.]
** J.C.S. 577/3, Sextant, 2 December 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]
* C.C.S. 320/4, Sextant, 4 December 1943. [Footnote in the source text. For the text of C.C.S. 320/4, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 786-787. Cf. ibid., p. 688, fn. 11.]
To this reallocation of zones which was a complete reversal, the British Chiefs refused to consent. At the end of the Conference the British and U.S. Chiefs were still in disagreement and after lengthy discussion they could agree only that COSSAC should be directed to “examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres.”‡

Here the matter rested for a month, during which the COSSAC staff continued planning on the basis of Americans in southern Germany and British in the north. On January 7 the British Chiefs replied to the American proposal made at Cairo. “The difficulties in implementing it are such,” they stated, “that it should not be proceeded further with.” In a very lengthy report they elaborated the difficulties. If the occupation of Germany were not to occur until the invasion of France was well under way, transport difficulties of a “cross-over” would be insurmountable, as U.S. Army staffs operating in the southern sector would have to occupy later the northern area. COSSAC also believed that working up intelligence on the whole area from Denmark to the Swiss frontier which would be necessary for each Army Group would be too great a burden for the staffs. The greatest objection which COSSAC had to the change, however, was that diversion of his own staff to the replanning of RANKIN would be so serious a detriment to preparations for OVERLORD that the invasion target date would have to be postponed.†

The U.S. Joint Staff Planners studied this rebuttal of their earlier recommendations and prepared a counter-claim. They informed the Joint Chiefs that they agreed that logistic difficulties of a “cross-over” would be great, but they strongly disagreed that they were insurmountable. As for replanning causing postponement of the invasion, they presented a letter from Lieutenant General Devers, Commanding General of the European Theatre of Operations, which stated changes could be made on the part of U.S. Forces without any prejudice to OVERLORD. The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department added that the proposed revision would not create additional burdens nor present additional difficulties; it was possible and desirable. The Staff Planners’ paper concluded with the comment that “the most important point is that time is working against us. If the U.S. proposal is to be put into effect, the decision should be announced without delay.”§

The Joint Chiefs on January 25 made formal reply to the British refusal to accept their proposals. Denying that a change in zones would

‡C.C.S. 134th Meeting, SEXTANT, 4 December 1943. C.C.S. 320/4 Revised, SEXTANT, 4 December 1943. C.C.S. 428/1, SEXTANT, 6 December 1943. (Final Report of Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister.) [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 688, 780–787, 818.]

†C.C.S. 320/8, 7 January 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

§J.C.S. 577/6, 23 January 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
so absorb planning staffs that Overlord would be postponed as a result, and suggesting ways to avoid “cross-over” difficulties by supplying British troops for the southern area from the Mediterranean theatre, the Americans again recommended that Rankin be replanned on the U.S. basis.\

On February 2 the British replied and added new objections to the change which they had not previously presented. Now they spoke about the desirability of British control of German naval bases in the Baltic and their close working relationship with the air forces and navies of Belgium and Norway during the war, and added the usual comments about the difficulties of “cross-over.” Pointedly, they noted that the U.S. had failed to advance reasons for the proposed change but had simply demanded it and denied the difficulties of its execution.\

There was now a deadlock. The COSSAC Staff, becoming General Eisenhower’s staff when he assumed command of the Allied Expeditionary Force in January, had been directed to make plans for an emergency return to the continent in the case of the complete collapse or sudden surrender of Germany. These tentative plans had been approved “in principle” only by the Combined Chiefs at Quebec in August. The deadlock resulted because, without direction and without approval by the Combined Chiefs, General Morgan proceeded to make specific plans for the occupation by British and U.S. forces on the basis of zones proposed by the British War Cabinet and Foreign Office. When the U.S. Chiefs had been informed what the boundaries of these areas were, they ascertained the views of the President and protested, recommending that the zones be changed. The British Chiefs had refused the change. A series of papers had been exchanged without result. Now, on February 4 the Combined Chiefs agreed that they could not reach a decision, that the matter was beyond their cognizance, and that it would have to be referred to the President and the Prime Minister for decision.**

The President acted at once. On February 7 he sent a dispatch to the Prime Minister outlining the impasse confronting the Combined Chiefs. A decision by them was necessary, he said, before the invasion. He put the problems squarely to the Prime Minister: “I am absolutely unwilling to police France and possibly Italy and the Balkans as well. After all, France is your baby and will take a lot of nursing in order to bring it to the point of walking alone. It would be very difficult for me to keep in France my military force or management for any length of time.”††

††Message from the President for the Prime Minister, Number 457, 7 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, p. 166.]}
The Prime Minister's reply on February 23 echoed the old cries of the British Staff. He complained that the U.S. Chiefs had never given reasons for the reallocation of spheres. He ran through the standard objections: "crossing" of lines of communication, British need to control German naval ports on the Baltic, and the relationship between the RAF and Norwegian and Netherlands air forces. The Prime Minister failed to understand, he said, the President's aversion to police work in France. Communications through France did not in his estimate involve policing and in any case, the French provisional government would be in effective control. The Prime Minister rejected the President's appeal. "All our thoughts and energies must be given to making a success of Overlord," he concluded. "I consider that only reasons of over-riding importance could justify such a fundamental change of plan as that proposed."††

The President provided such reasons in a letter to the Prime Minister on February 29. "'Do please don't' ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity of Belgium, France and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for their schooling now."§§

To this letter Prime Minister Churchill made no reply.

Time was short before Overlord, and inasmuch as planning and preparations continued along the lines of British desire, every delay strengthened the British position and made it more difficult to advance our own views. When no reply had come from the Prime Minister after two months, the President in Georgetown, South Carolina, directed General Marshall, senior member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, to prepare a directive to General Eisenhower. The directive should order Eisenhower to plan to send U.S. troops to the Netherlands and northwest Germany as occupation forces when the armistice should be signed.|| On April 25 General Marshall sent such a directive to the President.¶¶ The President approved it but took no action for one more month. He then reconsidered it and inasmuch as there was still no reply from the Prime Minister to his letter of February 29, and on General Marshall's suggestion, the President sent the proposed directive to Mr. Churchill for his concurrence on May 27.*

††Message for the President from the Prime Minister, Number 559, 23 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, pp. 180-182.]
§§Letter from the President for the Prime Minister, 29 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., pp. 188-189.]
||White House Map Room message from Admiral Leahy for General Marshall (BLACK 61), 23 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
¶¶White House Map Room message from Admiral Leahy for General Marshall (WHITE 116), 25 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
*Memorandum from the President for Admiral Leahy, 22 May 1944. Message from the President for the Prime Minister, Number 545, 27 May 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, p. 223.]
The directive stated:

"You are hereby directed to make such plans as are practicable to send American troops to the Netherlands and northwest Germany as forces of occupation when hostilities with Germany cease. For planning purposes, the area in Germany to be occupied by U.S. Forces will comprise the states of Schleswig, Hanover, Brunswick, Westphalia, Hesse-Nassau and the Rhine Province.

"It will be assumed in this plan that France, Austria and the Balkans will not be included in an American zone of responsibility and that Berlin will be occupied jointly by the U.S., British and Soviet Forces."

The Prime Minister's reaction was immediate. He said that he had not heard of the matter since he had rejected the President's first approach on February 23 and he had assumed that the subject was settled. This of course was ignoring the President's letter of February 29 which was the strongest statement of the American case. "A change of policy such as you now propose would have grave consequences" was the Prime Minister's manner of disapproving the proposed directive.†

The next round was the President's. By dispatch on June 2 he repeated his letter of February 29 and remarked that he had been awaiting the Prime Minister's reply to it. He had expected, he said, as a result of that letter that at least tentative plans would have been made for the occupation of northwestern Germany by American forces. "In view of my clearly stated inability to police the south and southwestern areas ... I really think it is necessary that General Eisenhower should [shall] even now make such plans as are practical to use American forces of occupation in northwestern Europe during the occupation period. ... There is ample time for this," the President continued, "unless Germany suddenly collapses. ... Under my plan all of your needs can and will be taken care of in the northwest area, but I hope you will realize that I am in such a position that I cannot go along with the British General Staff plan. The reasons are political, as you well know, though, as a result, they enter necessarily into the military."‡

The Prime Minister never replied to this dispatch.

The Chiefs of Staff had been unable to solve the problems of post-war occupation because complex political factors beyond their scope confronted them. They had referred the problem to "highest quarters"; here the complexity of political factors was such that the Prime Minister chose to reject the American proposals when first presented to him and to fail to answer them when re-presented. The deadlock

†Message for the President from the Prime Minister, Number 658, 31 May 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, p. 224.]
‡Message from the President for the Prime Minister, Number 549, 2 June 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., p. 232.]
confronting the Combined Chiefs now extended to the President and Mr. Churchill.

While the President had been pressing the Prime Minister for a decision, preparations for occupation along British lines had been continued by General Eisenhower’s staff. And, as the invasion date drew near, the European Advisory Commission in London intensified its work on surrender terms for Germany and control machinery for the post-surrender period. The Commission was a product of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of October–November 1943. Members were appointed at the Cairo–Teheran Staff Conferences and their first meeting was held in London in December. On January 15, the British proposals for surrender terms were presented to the Commission for consideration. The terms were based on the assumption that Germany would be divided into three zones for control purposes. The zones were those proposed by the Foreign Office and War Cabinet and were the same which the British Chiefs had introduced into Combined Chiefs of Staff discussions in November.

British and Soviet foreign secretaries had agreed to this delineation of areas even before the Commission had been organized; hence the Soviet draft of surrender terms presented on February 16 proposed the same zones. In addition, the Soviets recommended that Austria and Berlin be occupied jointly by British, American and Red forces. The American representative, Ambassador Winant, lacked specific instructions on the American point of view and was unable to present the American case to the Commission until instructed. Hence on February 19 the Acting Secretary of State wrote to the President asking for information. “We do not know what your thinking on this subject has been,” wrote Mr. Stettinius, “and we have been unable to give instructions to Ambassador Winant relative to the American position.”

The President outlined American policy with respect to post-war occupation of Europe very thoroughly in his reply to the Department

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5 With respect to the work of the European Advisory Commission on questions of terms of surrender, zones of occupation, and control machinery for Germany, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, pp. 100 ff.
7 See ibid., 1944, vol. 1, pp. 112 ff.
8 Memorandum for the President from the Acting Secretary of State, 19 February 1944, J.C.S. 577/9, 12 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., pp. 179–180.]
9 Message for the Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant, 17 June 1944, quoted in J.C.S. 577/15, 3 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., pp. 436–437.]
11 J.C.S. 577/8, 27 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
12 Memorandum for the President from the Acting Secretary of State, 19 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. The passage in quotation marks is a paraphrase rather than an exact quotation from Stettinius’ memorandum. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, pp. 179–180.]
of State. At the outset he denounced the British proposal that the United States should occupy southern Germany and France or have any responsibility for Italy and the Balkans. The burden of reconstruction of those areas is "not our natural task at a distance of 3500 miles or more." The President defined the principal object of the United States as "not to take part in internal problems in southern Europe but . . . rather to take part in eliminating Germany as a possible and even probable cause of a third world war." This we could best do from the northwest. British objections to American occupation of this area were dismissed by the President. "Cross-over" of military forces is entirely feasible, the British desire to control naval bases on the Baltic is a question of long-range security, not of first occupation, and there will be, thought the President, ample time to work that out. "Americans by that time will be only too glad to retire all their military forces from Europe." Supply and shipping problems for our war with Japan will provide enough problems at a distance of 3500 sea-miles without our becoming involved in land transport to the center of the continent of Europe. The President nailed down tightly his arguments in conclusion, "If anything further is needed to justify this agreement [disagreement] with the British line of demarcation, I can only add that political considerations in the United States make my decision conclusive."††

This statement of American policy was sent to Ambassador Winant on February 25 [26] together with a copy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposals which had been submitted to the British Chiefs at Cairo in December.††† Ambassador Winant replied, in response to these instructions, that he was unable to present the Chiefs of Staff proposals to the European Advisory Commission. It was now out-dated by late developments. The area boundaries defined by the United States would cut the Soviet area into half of that already agreed upon by the British and the Soviets. Such a counter-claim without adequate reasons to substantiate it, and these had not been furnished, would only jeopardize relations with the Soviet Union. Furthermore the Ambassador felt that the Joint Chiefs' proposals were faulty in that the zone lines did not follow German administrative boundaries. Mr. Winant therefore asked for a restatement of the American position which he could present to the Commission and he recommended that we accept the occupation boundaries as agreed upon by the British and the Soviets withholding, of course, approval of the allocation of southern Germany to the United States.‡‡‡

††Memorandum from the President for the Acting Secretary of State, 21 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, p. 184, fn. 12.]
†††J.C.S. 577/8, 27 February 1944. Memorandum for the President from General Marshall for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., p. 184.]
‡‡‡J.C.S. 577/9, 12 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., p. 200.]
The President approved the Ambassador's recommendation and the Working Security Committee, representing the State, War and Navy Departments, prepared a new statement of policy. Their restatement, in brief, concurred in the British-Soviet boundary lines, re-emphasized the original instructions of February that the northwestern area should be American and the southern British, and recommended that Austria be occupied by British forces alone. ||

This restatement received the imprimitur of the Joint Chiefs and the President and on May 1 was forwarded by the Secretary of State to Mr. Winant. || The Ambassador presented the "restatement" to the European Advisory Commission and in short order the Commission agreed upon the area of Russian jurisdiction which Mr. Winant had defined as "the objective of importance." The dividing line between northern and southern German occupation zones was also settled but inasmuch as Mr. Winant stoutly supported the President's views, within and without the Commission, that the British allocation of the two zones should be reversed, deadlock resulted again. * Here as with the Chiefs of Staff and in the discussion between President and the Prime Minister it was still an open question which should be British and which American.

The problem became acute in early August. The Soviet member of the European Advisory Commission declared that unless a decision were reached at once on assignment of occupation zones between England and the United States, the Soviets would refuse to continue discussions on surrender terms and machinery for post-war control. In forwarding this information to the President, who was at sea in the Pacific, on August 2, Mr. Stettinius suggested a compromise to end the long drawn-out controversy. The British should agree to occupy France, Italy and the Balkans should that become necessary; the United States and Great Britain should have joint use or control of northwest German ports thus avoiding any American dependence on French routes; and American forces should occupy southwestern Germany. To encourage acceptance of the compromise, Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the northern area would be more difficult than the southern to control (contrary to estimates of the Joint Chiefs) and that whoever accepted responsibility for it would have to remain "in residence" longer. This State Department compromise of course put American occupation forces in the area against which we had been

|| J.C.S. 577/10, 24 April 1944. Memorandum for the President from Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text.] || J.C.S. 577/11, 1 May 1944. White House Map Room message from the President for the Secretary of State (BLACK 85), 30 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text. Cf. Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, p. 211.]

*Message for the Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant, 17 June 1944, quoted in J.C.S. 577/15, 3 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See ibid., pp. 436-437.]
protesting for nine months but other provisions were designed to eliminate many of our objections to that area. The Undersecretary of State urged the President to approve because there was danger of a bad situation developing between Great Britain and the United States of which the Russians would be well aware. Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal concurred in this proposal.†

The President replied the next day. “It is essential,” he said in rejecting the compromise, “that American troops of occupation will have no responsibility in southern Europe and will be withdrawn from there [Europe] at earliest practicable date.” He foresaw no difficulty with England in regard to her naval problems in northwest Germany and he re-asserted the need for our use of Hamburg and Bremen in view of 3000 miles of transport. The President awaited, he informed Mr. Stettinius, an agreement from the Prime Minister that we would police only Northwestern Germany and he could see no reason why the Soviets should express concern at this time since their area was agreed upon.‡

The Soviets did not make good their threat to walk out of the European Advisory Commission discussions, but their ultimatum had served to call attention again to the deadlock on the allocation of zones at a time when Allied armies in France were advancing at so fast a pace that optimists were predicting the end of the war in two months.

It was this lightning advance in fact which caused discussion to open upon a “fourth front.” The Combined Chiefs of Staff, the President and the Prime Minister, and the European Advisory Commission had been unable to agree; now the Allied Military Commander in the field raised the question. General Eisenhower reported to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on August 17 that he might be faced with the occupation of Germany sooner than had been expected. The only possible planning which he could attempt was on a “purely military basis,” the rapid follow-up of his armies by direct pressure on the enemy. His armies, as deployed in France, were placed with the British on the left or northern flank and the Americans on the right or southern flank. Hence Eisenhower found himself, due to the exigencies of war and the absence of basic decision on zones of occupation, making plans for the occupation of southern Germany by his American troops and northwestern Germany by the English.§ Quite naturally this solution pleased the British Chiefs of Staff, since it was in perfect accord with their views, and on August 19 they reported to the U.S. Joint Chiefs

†White House Map Room message for the President from [the] Acting Secretary of State (Red 225), 2 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, p. 263, fn. 8.]

‡The word in brackets appears in the source text.

§White House Map Room message from the President for the Acting Secretary of State (Blue 72), 3 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text. Cf. idem., p. 284.]

§Message for the Combined Chiefs of Staff from General Eisenhower (Scar 65), 17 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
that they were in complete agreement with General Eisenhower's solution.||

On August 23 General Eisenhower elaborated his estimate of the situation. Surrender terms as proposed by the European Advisory Commission and tentative control machinery were apparently based, reported the General, on the expectation that the German Army at some time would surrender en bloc. That now seemed very improbable and he believed it entirely possible that the German Army as a whole would never actually surrender, that Allied forces might enter the country finding no central German authority in control, "with the situation chaotic, probably guerilla fighting and possibly even civil war in certain districts. In these conditions the occupation of Germany will be a continuation of active operations. There can be no question of establishing central tripartite control . . . until Germany is occupied and order established." ||

That is how the question now stands. On the eve of another conference between the President and the Prime Minister, basic decisions on Allied zones of occupation in Europe still have to be made. The Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander made plans in the Fall of 1943 for an emergency return to Europe by British and U.S. forces should Germany weaken or collapse before the invasion of France was launched. Allocation of territory to be occupied by the two nations was on the basis of recommendations of various British agencies. This allocation was not to the liking of the President nor of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, but all efforts by the Chiefs to change it were fruitless, the President's appeals to the Prime Minister were unanswered, and the European Advisory Commission was deadlocked. COSSAC was superseded by the Supreme Allied Commander in January 1944 but planning along British lines continued as before. As the target date for the invasion drew near, and it was obvious that Germany would not collapse beforehand, the RANKIN plan was transformed from occupation of Europe after an "emergency return" to occupation after defeat in the field but areas to be occupied by Great Britain and the United States remained the same. The American reason for demanding a change in the allocation of occupation zones has remained the same throughout nine months of discussion—the political and military desire to be committed as little as possible in Europe after the defeat of Germany in order that our full attention can be devoted to the war with Japan. How effectively we can realize that desire will be determined by the second Quebec Conference.10

[[C.C.S. 320/23, 10 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

*Message for the Combined Chiefs of Staff from General Eisenhower (SCAF 68), 23 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

10 For an appendix to this paper, entitled "Occupation of Austria and the Balkans", see post, p. 216.
B. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM

Hopkins Papers

Memorandum by the British Treasury Representative (Brand)\(^1\)

[WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1944.

1. What is fundamental to us as regards Stage 2\(^2\) is that, as stated in REMAC 638,\(^3\) the U.S. Administration shall act in such a manner as to recognize the need for a reasonable measure of recovery of U.K. civilian economy and the progressive restoration of U.K. export trade. It should be easy to explain to the American people the justice of such a claim, but it requires explanation first to the authorities at the top, and then to the people, and through the people to Congress. The only men who can put our case broadcast to the American people are (1) the President, or (2) the Prime Minister. Presumably it must be done by the President.

2. Following are a few notes on the British position which indicate to my mind that it would not be difficult to put forward a very compelling case.

3. For the British people the end of the German war must be the end of the war which really matters to them. It will be the end of danger at their doors, the end of bombs on England, the end of blackout. They will still be at war, but they will feel more like what the American people feel now than what they have felt during the last five years.

4. After five years of danger, incessant effort and privation, endless blackout, there must be some let up if the British population is to go on making a great effort; some variation in food, some more clothes, and boots and shoes, some relaxation of effort, some more home life for women, some more holidays. If the U.K. is to continue to fight the Japanese war, as it must, and to play its heavy part in the occupation of Europe, it cannot abandon everything, as now, to the war effort. It must begin to pay more attention to how to pay its way, how to feed and clothe its people, out of its own resources. It must increase its civilian production, it must begin to restore its lost export trade.

5. Consider what the alternative would be. The British people, with the Dominions, is the only nation which has been in the front line from the first to the last day of the German war. It has expended itself in the effort, and unlike any other of the United Nations, has burdened

\(^1\) This memorandum was probably given to Hopkins as a follow-up to Churchill's telegram to Hopkins of August 10, 1944, ante, p. 16.

\(^2\) The phrases "stage II" and "phase II" refer to the furnishing of lend-lease aid in the period between the surrender of Germany and the surrender of Japan.

\(^3\) For background on Anglo-American discussions on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. III, pp. 31 ff.; Hancock and Gowing, pp. 515 ff.; Hall, pp. 434-447.

\(^*\) Not printed.
itself for a generation or more. Beyond that, and to a greater extent than any other nation, it has endangered for the transition period after the war, its actual means of livelihood. Now unlike any other European nation, except perhaps the Dutch, it must continue to fight the Japanese war, but much more than that it must face the heaviest burden in occupying Europe. It could not be that the liberated countries, the neutrals, even Germany and Italy, should all be at peace and all turn to the arts of peace, all restore their civilian life, all restore their export trade, while the British people, having fought from first to last, having conquered their enemies and liberated their friends, staggering under the burden of this great effort, and with the heavy task of occupying Europe and keeping up their production of all munitions, should remain sunk in total war, mobilized almost to the full, daily adding to their foreign debt, their export trade still languishing, nothing but extreme austerity and still greater trials for many years to come before them. Yet that would be almost the case if the theory of the American Military authorities were to rule, and only such war supplies be found under Lend Lease as it was impossible for the U.K. to make itself. Clearly to hold up such a view to the British people at the end of the German war would be to risk a political explosion.

6. That the American people should be asked explicitly to continue Lend Lease in order that the U.K. may be able to divert capacity to civilian production, whether for home consumption or for export, is undoubtedly, as Remac 638 says, “hard political doctrine for the President to put over”. It can to my mind only be put over by some very broad statement by the President of the true position, but this never will and never can be done unless the President is fully seized of the true picture.

Hopkins Papers

Memorandum by the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1944—5 p. m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT

Subject: British Munitions Requirements After the Collapse of Germany

I told the President that either at our request or on British initiative the British had submitted a list of military requirements¹ for a period of one year after the collapse of Germany; that these requirements were obviously made by the British with full consideration of

¹ Not printed.
their internal economy and particularly their export trade. In effect
the British are asking us to produce munitions for them at a very high
rate while they would turn many of their factories over to consumer
production—much of it for export.

I told the President that the merits of the British position were being
discussed on a low level within our army and navy and that it did
not seem to me that this was the proper place to discuss this and, under
any circumstances, the British contribution to the final defeat of Japan
had not been determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, therefore, I
could not see how it is possible to even discuss requirements at this
time.

I told the President that I thought, in effect, the British Government
should withdraw their requirements; that we, on our part, should not
reduce the production facilities now available to the British; that he
and Churchill discuss this matter at Quebec and that a final decision
be postponed until the extent of British participation in the war
against Japan was determined upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The President agreed with this.

I told him I was going to tell the British in the morning.\(^2\)

The President commented further that, in his opinion, it would be
very unwise to make formal commitments tying up our industrial
machinery, because he felt it quite possible that, with the defeat of
Germany, Japan might well cave in. The primary reason would be that
Russia might well tell the Japanese that Russia’s hands are now free;
that Russia will not tolerate Japanese forces in Manchuria, China or
Korea; that, in effect, will be an ultimatum to Japan to withdraw from
these countries. The implications of that ultimatum will be such that
the President believes that Japan may throw up the sponge immedi-
ately. If this should occur, then the whole requirements picture would
be immediately changed. All of this is an added reason for not settling
the problem of British requirements at the moment.

Since talking to the President I have an agreement on this policy
with Secy. Morgenthau, Admiral Leahy, Leo Crowley, Dean Acheson,
and General Clay who is going to communicate it to Admiral Reeves.

I have arranged an appointment with Ambassador Halifax at the
British Embassy tomorrow morning to acquaint him of the decision
of our government.\(^3\)

\(^2\) See Hopkins’ telegram to Churchill of August 19, 1944, ante, p. 17.

\(^3\) No record of Hopkins’ conversation with Halifax has been found.
Washington, August 23, 1944.

Dear Mr. President: Your remarks at the Cabinet meeting on Friday, August 18, in regard to our relations with the British Government were of special interest to me. While I realize that these matters are being carefully considered in the State Department and in inter-departmental circles, their special significance for agriculture leads me to submit certain points for your consideration and for possible background in connection with your forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Churchill.

After the war the United States and a good many other countries will have substantial surpluses of agricultural products for export. Even if it were to prove possible to maintain a high level of employment and purchasing power in the United States and abroad, the world agricultural surplus disposal problem would still be substantial. To protect their farmers against this situation, countries throughout the world are setting up national programs involving price supports and governmental control of foreign trade. It is important, it seems to me, to minimize or forestall clashes between these national programs.

At recent international conferences, it has been agreed that the problem of agricultural surpluses is international in scope and should be approached through multilateral rather than unilateral action. This means the negotiation of international arrangements with respect to individual commodities, in which all producing and consuming countries, large and small, having a substantial interest in the commodity would have an opportunity to participate. Such arrangements could make possible an orderly expansion in world trade and consumption. This approach was specifically endorsed by the Hot Springs Conference. Moreover, in its First Report to the Governments of the United Nations, released to the press yesterday, the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture recommended that a special conference be held to set up an international commodity organization.

Under these circumstances we in this Department are much concerned as to the implications of the present British policy of negotiating bilateral purchase contracts which discriminate against United States agriculture in the postwar British market. The British Ministry of Food has contracted with the governments of Canada and New

\(^2\) Roosevelt forwarded this letter to the Under Secretary of State (Stetinius) on August 24, 1944, with the request that the Department of State draft a reply. See Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt of September 2, 1944, post, p. 163.


\(^4\) For text, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. xi, August 27, 1944, pp. 207-208.
Zealand to buy their surplus meat and dairy products for four years ending in 1948 and have given price guarantees for 1945 and 1946. Negotiations with Australia are under way and I understand that an inquiry has been made by the British Ministry of Food as to the attitude of this Government toward their making a similar commitment to buy Argentine beef. It seems to me that these contracts, especially if they represent settled policy rather than mere temporary measures, run counter to Section 7 of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement and Paragraph 4 of the Atlantic Charter.

It would, therefore, be helpful if the views of the Prime Minister were ascertained on the following points:

1. Does the British Government consider the present bilateral purchasing arrangements and those under negotiation as no more than stop-gap measures to be replaced in due course by multilateral arrangements?

2. Is the British Government now ready for the early convening of an international conference to formulate principles for international commodity arrangements and to establish an international commodity organization?

Respectfully,

Claude R. Wickard
Secretary

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

[ROME,] 23 August 1944.

766. As you see our point about getting a new meat contract with Argentina, for which I am thankful, we are moving ahead with these difficult negotiations and I hope that they won't be upset. To present the Colonels with anything they can construe as a triumph of diplomacy is neither desired nor intended by us.

In my speech on August 2nd I made reference to Argentina, which I hope you liked. From all accounts the Argentines did not, I hope

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1 Channel of transmission not indicated, but presumably sent via London through military channels. The White House Map Room sent a copy of this message to Hull for his information on August 23, 1944.

2 Roosevelt had told Churchill on July 22, 1944, that the United States would do nothing to prevent the British from getting a new contract for Argentine meat. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. viii, p. 333.

3 For the text of Churchill's statement concerning Argentina in the House of Commons, August 2, 1944, see ibid., pp. 337-338.
we can agree on tactics, since we seem to be in accord on objectives. Until we discuss with you what we think the situation requires, we will neither recognize the Argentine Government nor permit our Ambassador to return. Our views have been passed to our Embassy, which has given them to your State Department. An opportunity for both of us to examine a common policy and the Argentines a chance to mend their ways, which under the glare of public indictment they can never do, seems to be in order. For that reason, now that we have said in public just what we think of the present Argentina Government, I do most earnestly hope that you will ignore the Colonels for a good many weeks.

*Sir David Kelly.*

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841.244/8-2544: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

**SECRET**

**LONDON, August 25, 1944.**

**US URGENT**

6927. In following up my 6510 of August 14 I am cabling you below the text of a letter dated August 25 which I have received from Mr. Eden regarding the meat negotiations and the freezing of Argentine funds:

"Thank you for your letter of the 14th August containing the State Department’s suggestions as to the handling of our meat negotiations with Argentina, the freezing of Argentine funds in the United States and the discontinuance by our two Governments of all non-essential purchases of Argentine products.

I had already heard from Law about his conversation with Stettinius. We are fully alive to the desirability of not allowing the Argentines to derive any unnecessary comfort from the renewal of our meat contract, and we are consulting the Ministry of Food as to what we can do to meet this point. I hope to be able to let you have our reply in a few days.

On the question of the freezing of Argentine funds contemplated by your Government, I note that action has now been taken by the United States Treasury that has the effect of placing Argentina in the same class as other neutrals whose funds have been frozen. As the State Department appreciate, His Majesty’s Government themselves apply similar restrictions to Argentina as a neutral.

We could clearly not wish to discourage your Government from discontinuing any inessential purchases from Argentina at the present juncture. We should, however, hope that, if it is decided to take such
action, it will be taken in the spirit of the quiet period which we have advocated.
I shall be very surprised if it is found that we ourselves are making
any purchases in Argentina which are not essential for the prosecution
of the war or the maintenance of the essential economy of this coun-
try. I am, however, consulting the Ministry of Supply on this point
and will let you have a reply in a few days."

\[\text{Winant}\]

\[\text{Roosevelt Papers: Telegram}\]

\[\text{President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill}\]

\[\text{TOP SECRET}\]

\[\text{WASHINGTON,} 26 \text{ August 1944.}\]

\[\text{PRIORITY}\]

\[\text{Number 607, secret and personal, from the President for the Former}\]
\[\text{Naval Person.}\]

\[\text{Your 766. We are watching with sympathetic interest your efforts}\]
\[\text{to get Argentina in line with our appetites, and we hope your efforts}\]
\[\text{will be crowned with success. I have no doubt that a satisfactory meat}\]
\[\text{contract will be arranged. After all they must sell their beef and no}\]
\[\text{other diner is in sight.}\]

\[\text{Roosevelt}\]

\[\text{\[1\] Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels. The}\]
\[\text{White House Map Room sent a paraphrase of this message to Hull for his informa-}\]
\[\text{tion on August 28, 1944 \[841.244/8-2844\].}\]

\[\text{\[2\] Ante, p. 163.}\]

\[835.01/8-444\]

\[\text{The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)}\]

\[\text{WASHINGTON, August 30, 1944.}\]

\[\text{EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Sir}\]
\[\text{Ronald Campbell's note No. 487 of August 4, 1944\[1\] transmitting the}\]
\[\text{views of your Government with respect to Argentina.}\]

\[\text{10. Consistently with the desire of the Government of the United}\]
\[\text{States to consult fully with the British Government prior to taking}\]
\[\text{new action with relation to Argentina, this Government has resorted}\]
\[\text{to various channels to bring its views with regard to a possible next}\]
\[\text{step fully to the attention of the British Government.}\]

\[\text{On August 9 the Acting Secretary of State met with Sir [Mr.]}\]
\[\text{Richard Law, Sir Ronald Campbell, and Mr. Robert Henry Hadow,}\]

\[\text{\[1\] See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vii, p. 338.}\]

\[\text{\[2\] Paragraphs 6-8 of this note, omitted here, are printed ibid., pp. 345-347.}\]
and stated that while the Government of the United States fully appreciates the British desire to obtain adequate meat supplies, it trusts that the negotiations with Argentina can be so handled as to reinforce our common political position. The Acting Secretary urged that the negotiations be prolonged and that any contract which may eventually be concluded be for a short term. Mr. Stettinius also emphasized the hope of this Government that the meat purchase may be treated as an isolated commercial transaction dictated by special war needs and, therefore, entirely separate from fundamental political and economic policies. In the same meeting, Mr. Stettinius informed the representatives of the British Government that we are considering a cut in our purchases from Argentina by from 40% to 60% and that serious consideration is being given to the freezing of Argentine funds.

On August 2 and again on August 11, Ambassador Winant was instructed to inform the Foreign Secretary of our views both with respect to the meat contract and with respect to possible reduction of purchases and freezing of Argentine funds.

In connection with the proposed reduction of purchases, Ambassador Winant was instructed to express our hope that the British Government may be prepared to take parallel action, thus eliminating all purchases of Argentine products not essential for the satisfaction of immediate needs.

Ambassador Winant has now informed the Department of State that he has received a letter from Mr. Eden dated August 25, in which the Foreign Secretary states that the British Government is fully alive to the issue raised by our messages relative to the meat contract. In his letter, Mr. Eden also recognizes the reasons why we propose to discontinue non-essential purchases at the present time and states that he is consulting the Ministry of Supply with respect to possible reduction of British purchases. With respect to the matter of freezing Argentine funds, the Foreign Secretary assumes that the action of our Treasury Department in recently prohibiting the export of two shipments of Argentine gold is tantamount to the freezing of funds and adds that the British Government has already applied "similar restrictions to Argentina as a neutral".

It has been the opinion of this Government that these economic steps constitute a necessary implementation of the nonrecognition policy. In view of Mr. Eden's recognition of the reasons which have induced that opinion, we are considering taking the indicated action at an early date. However, having in mind the thought expressed by Mr. Eden, we hope so far as possible to avoid undue publicity.

Accept [etc.]

Cordell Hull

* See ante, p. 104.
The Secretary of State to the President

[WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Argentina

I attach hereto a draft of telegram which I would suggest that you send to the Prime Minister, if you agree.\[ORDELL\] [ULL]

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Roosevelt sent the suggested message to Churchill on August 31, 1944. See infra.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 31 August 1944.

Number 613, personal and top secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

In connection with the Argentine meat negotiations you have no doubt seen the message to Buenos Aires from the Argentine Ambassador in London in which the Ambassador warned his government that its difficulties were "no longer centered on suspension of relations with the United States" and that Argentina was being placed "in a position of isolation vis-à-vis the Allied and friendly nations." He added that according to a "big meat packer the Allied Nations are now in a position to do without Argentine meat for six months with no trouble at all and for twelve months with some sacrifice." The Ambassador also said that his information tallies with that from the Argentine Commercial Counsellor in Washington and with the view expressed for some time past by the Ambassador himself that the United Nations may make fewer purchases from Argentina.

Since we know that the Colonels are falling all over themselves to get you to buy their meat, I am confident that you will agree that the Ambassador’s message was an extremely bad piece of news for them.

All the evidence that has come to my attention reinforces our belief that you are in an excellent position to use the negotiations to support the whole Allied stand in this Hemisphere against this broad Fascist movement. You will certainly have no trouble on the beef and mutton matter in any event.

ROOSEVELT

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1 Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.
2 Miguel Angel Cárdeno.
3 Miguel E. Quirino-Lavalle.
The Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1944.

My Dear Mr. President: I attach hereto a letter which you may wish to send to the Secretary of Agriculture in answer to his letter to you of August 23 regarding the recommendation of the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture on an international commodity organization, the general problem of agricultural surpluses and bilateral purchase contracts.

As you know, about a year ago we held, in cooperation with the interested agencies of the government, including the Department of Agriculture, informal conversations with both the British and the Canadians on the implementation of Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreements. These discussions covered commercial policy, commodity policy, cartel policy and state trading. The specific points raised in Mr. Wickard’s letter were covered in a preliminary way in these discussions.

It was our understanding when the talks terminated last year that conversations would be resumed at an early convenient date. Our latest on this is a telegram from Ambassador Winant dated August 11, stating that Mr. Ronald of the Foreign Office gave the impression that a date for resumption of conversations might be arranged in the autumn to suit our convenience.

Interdepartmental committees including representatives of the Department of Agriculture have been active on this group of problems. Reports of these committees come to me through the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy. In the near future I shall place before you definite recommendations on these matters. Taking everything into consideration, we believe that the conversations should be resumed before the end of October, preferably about the middle of the month. Rather than talking with the Prime Minister on the specific questions suggested by Mr. Wickard, we believe that it would be most desirable if you could gain the wholehearted support of Mr. Churchill for the resumption of conversations about the middle of October on the whole range of subjects covered in a preliminary way last year. In these second conversations with the British the objective would be to obtain agreement not only on principles, but also on the text of a draft multilateral convention to serve as the basis for similar conversations with representatives of other governments, looking toward a conference of the United and Associated Nations.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

1 Not printed.
2 Ante, p. 162.
Memorandum Prepared in the British Treasury

TOP SECRET

[LONDON, September 4, 1944.]

LEND-LEASE SUPPLIES FOR BRITAIN IN STAGE II

1. The President, in transmitting to Congress the Sixteenth Quarterly Report on Lend-Lease Operations, has recommended that “until the unconditional surrender of both Japan and Germany, (the United States) should continue the Lend-Lease programme on whatever scale is necessary to make the combined striking power of all the United Nations against our enemies as overwhelming and as effective as we can make it”. There are several problems concerned with the application of this policy which require decision at the forthcoming Conference.

2. The object of Lend-Lease assistance hitherto has been to satisfy our justifiable requirements in excess of those which we can furnish ourselves in conditions of full mobilisation of manpower for war purposes. In other words, Lend-Lease has been treated hitherto as residual. If it is accepted that during Stage II the continuance of Lend-Lease assistance should be compatible with some appropriate degree of war demobilisation in the United Kingdom below the 1944 level, the above criterion of Lend-Lease availability will no longer be applicable. The appropriate criterion henceforward must necessarily be one of what absolute amount of assistance is appropriate to the changed conditions. The President will be asked to recognise this new situation by agreeing to the preparation of a firm agreement specifying the amount and character of the assistance on which we can rely.

3. Until strategical plans are completed, Britain’s requirements for munitions in Stage II cannot be stated with precision. Our production plans are for the moment based on the estimate that the strategy will require the provision for the Forces under British supply responsibilities of something over 60 per cent of the present volume of munitions over the first year, as a whole, falling to something over 50 per cent by the end of the year.

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1 In the Hopkins Papers this memorandum, which bears the typed notation “Note for President of U.S.A.”, is filed with the following typed note dated September 10, 1944: “This was handed to me today by Sir Ronald Campbell and indicates what Churchill is going to say, at Quebec, to the President about Lend-Lease. H[arry] L. H[erbert].” Cherwell gave another copy of this memorandum to Morgenthau at Quebec, as indicated by the following memorandum from Morgenthau to Roosevelt dated September 25, 1944: “While at Quebec, Lord Cherwell handed me the enclosed memorandum from the British Treasury. I only noted the other day that it was addressed to you, so I am sending it to you for your records.” (841.24/9-2944)

2 For the text of Roosevelt’s letter of transmittal, dated August 23, 1944, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. xi, August 27, 1944, p. 205.
4. The munitions supplies of the British Empire have been drawn during the German war from a number of sources. A little under 60 per cent has come from Britain; about 27 per cent has come from the U.S.A.; about 10 per cent has come from Canada; the remainder has been drawn from other countries in the British Empire. If the total of British munitions requirements had to be provided from British Empire sources, there could be little if any reduction from the present output of munitions in the United Kingdom, even if production could be switched to other types of munitions in time to make them effective.

5. At the end of five years of war, some relaxation in the pressure on British civilian standards of life is necessary. It is necessary also to begin to rebuild the damaged cities, to devote more work to the overdue repairs to industry and public utilities, and to make first steps towards restoring our export trade; without exports Britain can neither meet her immediate obligations nor assure her purchases of necessary imports. These needs cannot be further deferred.

6. In working out the assistance to be afforded, a simple principle, which in practice would probably yield the minimum required—and might at the same time be regarded as rough justice—would be that the proportion of our total munitions supplies furnished on Lend-Lease should be the same in Stage II as it has been in 1944. If, for example, our munition needs from all sources are reduced by, say, one third, the amount of munitions furnished on Lend-Lease should also be reduced in the same proportion of one third.

7. The President will be asked for a firm commitment that we shall be given munitions on Lend-Lease terms on some such scale; this would either fix the total volume of munitions assistance in Stage II or would endorse the principle outlined above. It would then be possible for our respective officers to work out the detailed programme of supply correspondingly.

8. The amount of non-munitions assistance covering food, shipping, oil, raw materials, etc., which we shall continue to require would not depend to any great extent on the degree of our domestic reconversion, since only a small part of such assistance has been concerned with goods which we are in a position to produce. Some reduction is, however, possible in so far as such supplies have been for the purposes, not of civilian consumption, but of armed forces. For this reason the aggregate requirements of the United Kingdom are put at about $3 billions during the first year of Stage II compared with $3.9 billions in the programme for the current year.

9. To sum up, Britain's needs can only be met by a continuance of Lend-Lease through Stage II. The result of our examination is to show that we shall need:—
(a) Lend-Lease for munitions on a scale to be defined at the Conference.

(b) Lend-Lease for foodstuffs, raw materials, oil, shipping, etc., sufficient to meet the reasonable needs in these respects of the United Kingdom for supplies from U.S. sources.

10. In order to give effect to those decisions it is suggested that the President and the Prime Minister should appoint a Committee with power to appoint technical Sub-Committees which would of course report to the main Committee. One Sub-Committee would, as a matter of urgency, consider the proposals of the British Government's representatives for the munitions asked for under Lend-Lease, with the aim of reaching agreement as to:

(a) the amount involved by the application of the principle of proportionate aid (unless this has been determined at the Conference itself).

(b) the most appropriate sub-division of that amount between the various broad classes of equipment for each of the Services.

(c) the arrangement for settling the details of the munitions programme as quickly as possible within that broad pattern.

11. The instructions to the main Committee should, of course, cover the whole ground of Lend-Lease Munitions and Non-Munitions, Reverse Lend-Lease and Export Policies and might be somewhat as follows:

(a) So far as munitions are concerned, it would be the duty of the Committee to approve a report of the Sub-Committee mentioned above embodying a programme capable of fulfilling the agreed conditions in the manner most convenient and efficient from the point of view of the Government.

(b) So far as non-munitions are concerned, the Committee, through such Sub-Committees as might be found convenient, would examine the British position with a view to determining the appropriate scale of assistance and should in this connection consider the advisability of possible modification in the fields to be covered by Lend-Lease and Reverse Lend-Lease respectively with a view to simplification and concentration.

(c) So far as exports are concerned, it should be an instruction to the Committee to propose the principles which should govern henceforth the relationship between Lend-Lease and Reverse Lend-Lease assistance and the export policies of the two countries, with a view to minimising the measures of restriction and regulation; and in arranging in detail the character of the aid to be furnished under the above Lend-Lease programme they should bear in mind the object of facilitating and simplifying the application of the principles, which they are proposing, in a manner likely to interfere with the respective export programmes of the two Governments to the least possible extent.

(d) Thus, generally the Committee and its Sub-Committees would be charged with the task of drawing up and agreeing [upon] pro-
grammes which would implement the decisions reached by the Conference. It would not be competent for them to reopen these decisions.

12. Since it is unlikely that the Committee could complete its deliberations, except on munitions, before, say, November, it is essential that a Directive should be given meanwhile which would prevent any steps being taken during the intervening weeks likely to be prejudicial to the carrying out, should they be approved, of any proposals which are brought before the Committee.

4th September, 1944.

841.244/8-3044

The Secretary of State to the President

[WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

[Subject:] British Beef Purchases

We have been informed by Marvin Jones that we will soon have substantial supplies of so-called commercial and utility grades of beef which can be made available to the British. I therefore suggest that when you see the Prime Minister you discuss the possibility of British reduction of purchases from Argentina in the amount that we may be able to allocate from our supplies. It is believed that with supplies that we can make available, a considerable reduction of British meat purchases from Argentina may be entirely feasible.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Roosevelt Papers

Department of State Briefing Paper ¹

SECRET

[Undated.]

CREDITS FOR GREAT BRITAIN: COMMERCIAL POLICY

There are growing indications that the British Government contemplates approaching us concerning the seriousness of their financial situation. At one time they contemplated sending Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the Exchequer, to Washington for this purpose. It is understood, however, that they have decided to defer Anderson's visit for several months. The Prime Minister may possibly raise this question with you at your forthcoming meeting.

¹ Annex 10 to Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See ante, p. 120.
It seems to me that it is in the interests of the people of the United States that we extend such credits and other financial assistance to the United Kingdom as may be necessary to reconstitute and restore what has traditionally been the largest market for American goods.

At the same time it is of fundamental importance to the interests of the United States and to the establishment of the kind of economic conditions which we hope to see prevail in the post-war world that we not blindly grant credits to the United Kingdom without taking into consideration the kind of commercial policy and trade practices which it may adopt.

The British may seek to take the position that unless wholly satisfactory financial arrangements are made for assisting them in meeting their admittedly serious balance-of-payments problems, they cannot pursue the liberal, multilateral trade policies we have advocated. That position would not be sound and we should not accept it.

Our position should be that whatever the British balance-of-payments problems may be and to whatever extent they may receive our help in meeting them, those problems will in our view be less difficult in a world in which the United States and Britain take the leadership in bringing about the greatest possible expansion of international trade on a multilateral nondiscriminatory basis; that balance-of-payments problems will be more difficult to meet if bilateralistic practices on the German pattern, high tariffs, quotas and discriminations result in a scramble among nations for a diminishing volume of world trade.

In brief, in dealing with the British in regard to financial and other economic problems, I believe our basic position should be that the trade policies we advocate are not something the British should do for us in return for our financial help, but that, irrespective of such help, liberal trade policies designed to bring about an expanding world trade are in Britain’s own interest.

Obviously, therefore, we should not offer to extend generous credits to Great Britain at a low rate of interest in return for commitments regarding commercial policy and imperial preference (which we already have, in preliminary form, in the Basic Lend-Lease Agreement). The field for bargaining about these matters should be the narrow one of respective tariff concessions. It seems to me, however, that we may properly bear in mind that the United Kingdom will not be a good credit risk unless she embarks on a sound commercial policy.

The discussion of trade policies which may take place with the British in the near future will be more fruitful from our standpoint, if there can be complete understanding on the above point before those discussions are undertaken.
Memorandum Relative to "Policy Concerning Disposition of Lend-Lease Material Following the Defeat of Germany"

References:  
1. J.C.S. 771/3; 771/4
2. J.C.S. 162nd Meeting, Item 3
3. J.C.S. 165th Meeting, Item 5

I think that this document should not be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the following reasons:

1. In Paragraph 3, Page 18, the report states—"Following the defeat of Germany, Lend-Lease nations outside the Western Hemisphere should be notified of and should accept their obligation to return to the continental United States or to the control of the United States Government, as may be determined by and in the priorities to be established by the United States, etc."

This action is contrary to a formal agreement between the allied nations, including Great Britain and Russia. Article 5 of the first Master Agreement between Great Britain and ourselves provides that "The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President, such defense articles, etc." Similar provisions are contained in all other Master Agreements. There is no language in these agreements that implies, directly or indirectly, that this action will be taken until the defeat of all our enemies.

2. The J.C.S. 771/6, in Paragraph 3, further states—"Such munitions transferred under Lend-Lease as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed and as, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

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1. None printed. The references are those cited in J.C.S. 771/6 (not printed), of which Hopkins had a copy. J.C.S. 771/3 was the source of a memorandum containing the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on "Policy Concerning Assignments of Lend-Lease Munitions Following the Defeat of Germany", which the President had approved on May 10, 1944. J.C.S. 771/6 proposed a further memorandum to the President seeking approval of a more detailed elaboration of the policy. Following receipt of Hopkins' memorandum of September 7, and more particularly following receipt by Marshall and King of Roosevelt's letter of September 9 (post, p. 180), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meeting at Quebec on September 12, suspended action on J.C.S. 771/6 and

2. Took note of the President's wish that no policy for lend-lease be established for the future until further instructions from him.

3. Instructed the Secretaries to inform all agencies to whom J.C.S. 771/3 had been forwarded that the paper had been withdrawn." (J.C.S. Files)


5. Signed at Washington, February 23, 1942. For text, see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 241; 56 Stat. (2) 1433.
are not required by such nations for their use against Japan in accordance with our agreed strategy or for other purposes within their cognizance as may be specified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

This, I believe, is contrary to an agreement between the American and the British Governments and, if not a formal agreement between the two governments, at least an agreement between the President and the Prime Minister. This agreement provides that the entire munition resources of Great Britain and the United States will be deemed to be in a common pool and that a Combined Board will advise on all assignments, both in quantity and priority, whether to Great Britain and the United States or other of the United Nations.

3. It seems to me that apart from the above reasons, at this particular stage of the war, such a unilateral action on our part is fraught with probabilities of unnecessary friction which should be, at the least, delayed until after the collapse of Germany. At that time the American policy in relation to this matter should be discussed fully with our allies.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

841.244/9–844 : Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, September 8, 1944.

7352. I am cabling you below the text of a letter dated September 7 which I have just received from Mr. Eden in relation to the renewal of the British meat contract with Argentina:

"In my letter to you of the 25th August, I explained that I was consulting the Ministry of Food about the renewal of our meat contract with Argentina in the light of certain observations of the State Department which you were kind enough to send me on the 14th August. I am now in a position to give you our answer on the general question of the particular points to which the United States Government attach importance.

The State Department suggest that, by prolonging the negotiations and taking a firm stand on price and other terms of the contract, these negotiations could be utilized to strengthen our common political stand. We have always been, as you know, most anxious to maintain a close parallel policy with the United States Government towards Argentina, and in the present instance, you may certainly rely on us to do everything we can to avoid allowing the Argentines to derive any political comfort or encouragement from the renewal of the contract. It is indeed inherently a commercial question and we anticipate

2 See ante, p. 164.
3 Not printed.
period of hard commercial bargaining before the negotiations reach their eventual conclusion. In the nature of things, we have no interest in giving the Argentines any particular reason to suppose that a successful outcome is assured in advance or in agreeing to terms which they could interpret as reflecting any condonation of their political shortcomings.

Mr. Stettinius, in his recent conversation with the Minister of State, expressed the hope that the contract would cover only a short term. The question of the duration of the contract is, of course, a relative one, but we have to look to the needs of ourselves and our Allies during the critical post-war period as well as for the period of actual hostilities. We have no desire to conclude a contract running for a longer period than is strictly necessary. If nothing else, our own interests would dictate that the duration of the contract should be as short as possible since our meat purchases constitute one of the few weapons which we have left to protect our large interests in Argentina, which are threatened as never before by the present virulently nationalistic regime. This weapon would, for instance, normally be extremely useful in, say, a couple of years' time, when the imminent termination of the Mitre Law (in 1947) governing our railway concessions will leave these particularly vulnerable. But our paramount duty both to our own people and to certain of our Allies is to ensure that, during the acutely difficult post-war years, they shall be adequately fed; and the case made out by our Ministry of Food that only a longer contract will ensure this is as regards meat is entirely convincing. I need not, I think, go into all the technical details including the reasons why it is so important that theCombined Food Board should be able to count not merely on obtaining Argentine meat at a reasonable commercial price, but on continuing to command the total exportable surplus. The British Food Mission in Washington are, of course, in possession of all the technical details involved and if it would interest the State Department to have a complete summary of the technical aspects of this complex question, we shall be ready to arrange for this to be given to them. Meanwhile, I trust that we can continue to enjoy the confidence of the United States Government while we play our difficult hand in this important matter which we shall hope to do without giving the Argentines any avoidable political advantages. We shall do our best to keep the Argentines guessing about all the aspects of this negotiation as far as is consistent with eventually bringing it to a successful conclusion and to see to it that the present regime derives no strength or authority from this commercial transaction in their own or anybody else's eyes. In this we should, of course, be helped by the absence of embarrassing press speculation, whether emanating from Washington or London."

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3 Richard Law.
5 The reference is to article 8 of Argentine Law No. 5315 of October 1, 1907. The provisions of this article, which dealt with duty-free importation of materials used in railroad development in Argentina, were to expire in 1947. For text of the law, see Registro nacional, vol. IV, 1907, p. 441. For an English translation, see General Railway Law and Regulations, translated by the Buenos Aires Great Southern and Buenos Aires Western Railways (Buenos Aires: The English Printery, 1940), p. 191.
In connection with the foregoing, please see my 6927 of August 25 and Department's 6091 of August 2 and 6339 of August 11.\footnote{\textit{Ante}, p. 164.} \footnote{See \textit{Foreign Relations, 1944}, vol. VII, p. 337.} \footnote{See \textit{ibid.}, p. 342.}

\textbf{WINANT}

\textbf{Roosevelt Papers}

\textbf{The Secretary of State to the President}

\textbf{WASHINGTON, September 8, 1944.}

\textbf{LEND-LEASE AND GENERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN “PHASE 2”}

1. The most important international economic problem of the transition and post-war periods will be the situation of the United Kingdom: the sterling-dollar relationship, the change in Britain's creditor position, the prospects for British export trade, and the commercial and financial policies which she will adopt in the light of the situation. This problem has its long run aspect—associated with the loss of overseas investment; the probable reduction in shipping, international banking, and insurance earnings; and the difficulty of reestablishing and expanding British export markets in the post-war world. The main outlines of this problem have been developing for several decades, although war has accentuated the difficulties. It is the Department's view that it is in the best interests both directly of the British and of the world in general if this long run problem is attacked by the adoption by the British of a liberal commercial policy with foreign exchange and investment operations handled in accordance with the principles of Bretton Woods.\footnote{See \textit{Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944} (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948; Department of State publication 2866, 2 vols.); \textit{Foreign Relations, 1944}, vol. II, pp. 106 ff.}

2. Nevertheless, strong economic and political pressures will be brought to bear upon the British Government to adopt restrictive policies of commerce and finance, and these pressures will be in considerable measure induced by pressing, critical, short run problems of British economic adjustment at the close of the war. The United States can contribute greatly to the possibility of Anglo-American collaboration in sound post-war economic policies and relationships and to the attainment of high levels of economic activity and international commerce in and between the two nations and the rest of the world, by doing everything in its power to permit and assist Britain to enter "Phase 3"\footnote{i.e., the period following the surrender of Japan.} on as sound an economic foundation as possible.
3. The potentialities of Anglo-American and general international economic collaboration in the reconstruction and development of the world economy in “Phase 3” are large. They include the establishment of the Fund and Bank blueprinted at Bretton Woods, and the setting up of machinery for collaboration in the commercial policy field. Direct assistance, largely of a financial character, will in all probability be essentially on a loan and repayment basis. The institutions for carrying out these programs have yet in the main to be created.

4. In “Phase 2” there is more which we can do quickly and directly to set the stage for a favorable but slower development in the post-war period.

5. Turning first to the military situation, I must of course defer to the armed forces in matters of strategic policy and decision. Nevertheless it is clear that one of the most important objectives of United States policy must be to bring the British into the war operations in the Far East to the greatest possible extent. The advantages of such a course are obvious in producing an early end of the war, with the resultant saving in human and material costs. The disadvantages of the failure of the British to participate to the full in the war in the Far East deserve special emphasis:

   a. Political—any indication that British participation in the Far Eastern struggle is at a rate below their utmost capabilities will produce immediate and hostile public reaction in the United States.

   b. Economic—a great expansion of British exports with relatively weak British participation in the Far Eastern war will stir up the resentment of our export manufacturers and traders.

   c. Lend-Lease—a failure to obtain full British participation in the Far Eastern military operations will be regarded as at least a partial failure of lend-lease policies and will create unfortunate circumstances in which to arrange for lend-lease settlement.

   d. General Post-War—all of these factors will combine to produce the most difficult of circumstances in which to attempt to build Anglo-American and general political and economic collaboration to face the problems of the post-war world.

6. The economic problem then in “Phase 2” will be to permit a reasonable degree of reconversion in the United Kingdom, to be divided among reconstruction, the satisfaction of domestic needs, and the reestablishment of exports to pay for the imports which are essential to the economic life of Great Britain. This must be done in such a way as to:

   a. Meet the immediate British problem of avoiding economic disaster.

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The reference is to the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
b. Avoid the creation of obligations that will later plague Anglo-American relations.

c. Reduce to a minimum tendencies towards the adoption of discriminatory trade policies by the British.

d. Be politically acceptable to the American public.

7. It has been indicated that in “Phase 2” American production for war may be reduced by as much as 40 percent with a resultant reconversion to meet domestic civilian demands as well as to permit some increase in commercial exports. It is essential that there be a synchronized British reconversion program. The strain of five years of war, with bombing, severe rationing, and the dislocation of life produced by national service, will require, from the point of view of any government in the United Kingdom, substantial improvement in the conditions of civilian life. The necessities of British physical reconstruction and balances of payments will almost certainly mean that British civilian standards will remain far below those in the United States. This should be recognized here as a laudable determination of the British to restrict consumption in accordance with the realities of their economic position.

8. If British reconversion is coordinated with our own, it will be right and proper, and it should be possible to justify to the Congress and the American people, to continue lend-lease aid on a reasonable scale to the British during the continuance of the Pacific war. It is my understanding that the British as yet have made no definite proposals for their overall lend-lease needs in “Phase 2”, as they feel that the nature of these proposals must depend to a large degree on the strategic plans for the Far Eastern war. In view of the speed of military developments in Europe it is most important that we come to an early understanding with the British on this matter, so that a program of lend-lease can be worked out that will be fair to all concerned.

9. I therefore recommend the adoption of the following key economic policies with respect to the British in “Phase 2”:

a. Synchronization of the American and British reconversion programs, recognizing that a greater proportion of the British productive capacity released from war production will be devoted to exports.

b. Maintenance of lend-lease deliveries to the United Kingdom in “Phase 2” reduced by about one-third overall. Lend-lease deliveries upon such a scale would recognize the continued British production for war, would not hamper reconversion in this country, and through the continuance of civilian items such as food (many items of which are likely to be in surplus in this country) would assist British reconversion without assuming responsibility for it.

10. These efforts to assist the British to enter “Phase 3” on as sound an economic foundation as possible must be accompanied by vigorous
British efforts to join with us in pressing a world-wide program of multilateral reduction in barriers to international trade. The Bretton Woods agreements with respect to exchange manipulations, restrictions, and discriminations constitute a very important part of our commercial policy program. The British must be urged to implement these arrangements, and to join with us—through the Article VII conversations and otherwise—in thorough consideration of the remaining elements of our international economic program. It is of fundamental importance to the interests of the United States and to the establishment of the kind of economic conditions which we hope to see prevail in the post-war world that in formulating a lend-lease policy for “Phase 2” which will further these objectives we have assurances from the British that they will actively cooperate with us in achieving them. You are aware of the political situation in the British government which has impeded this, and I know you will agree that it is time that some forward steps be taken to resolve it.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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Hopkins Papers

The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I think it is important, in Quebec, that you tell the Prime Minister how strongly you feel about knocking down some of the trade barriers to get somewhere in terms of world trade.

I have a feeling that the Prime Minister thinks that that is a pet hobby of Secretary Hull’s and that you may not think it of great importance.

I think it is essential to our future bargaining with Great Britain that you disabuse the Prime Minister’s mind of this.

I rather think that he thinks that the genius of this program in America lies with Secretary Hull, while the truth of the matter is that it is a program that, from the beginning, has been pushed by you.

H[ARRY] L. H[OPKINS]

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Roosevelt Papers

The President to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There has been a good deal of discussion within the several Government Departments relative to our Lend Lease policy after the collapse of Germany.
It is my wish that no Department of the Government take unilateral action in regard to any matters that concern Lease Lend, because the implications of any such action are bound to affect other Departments of the Government and, indeed, our whole national policy. I am particularly anxious that any instructions which may have been issued, or are about to be issued regarding Lease Lend material or supplies to our allies after the collapse of Germany, be immediately cancelled and withdrawn.

I intend to give instructions to all Departments relative to the Lease Lend policy of this government at an early date.

Will you be sure, therefore, that your several bureaus and divisions are advised of my position at once?

I am sending identical letters to the Chief of Staff, 1 the Chief of Naval Operations, 2 the Secretary of the Treasury, 3 the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration 4 and the Administrator of the War Shipping Administration. 5

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

1 General George C. Marshall.
2 Admiral Ernest J. King.
3 Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
4 Leo T. Crowley.
5 Vice Admiral Emory S. Land.

C. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND AID TO THE WARSAW RESISTANCE

Editorial Note

For documentation dated in August 1944 concerning aid to the Polish underground army which had risen against the Germans in Warsaw as the Soviet Army approached that city, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. III, pp. 1372–1395; Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, pp. 308 ff.; Woodward, pp. 300–305; Ehrman, pp. 369–375. 3

3 As of September 1, 1944, an answer was still pending to President Raczkiewicz’ message to Roosevelt of August 12 (see Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, pp. 339–340). The Department of State, after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had submitted to Roosevelt a draft of a reply on August 31, but neither that draft nor the final text of the reply has been found in United States files, nor is the reply printed in Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations. The reply was sent by pouch to the American Embassy near the Polish Government in exile at London on September 8, 1944, for transmittal to Raczkiewicz (740.0011 E.W./S-1344).
Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
C.C.S. 618/1

MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET-BRITISH MILITARY EFFORT

Reference: C.C.S. 618

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff agree that additional machinery is necessary to coordinate the military efforts of the United Nations forces on the European fronts.

2. It is considered that the present relationship between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Soviet General Staff through the medium of the United States and British Missions in Moscow on over-all strategy must be retained until the matter can be discussed further at the next United Nations Staff Conference.

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the machinery for the coordination of day-to-day United States-British-Soviet operational matters be established by attaching a Soviet liaison group to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. An additional Soviet liaison group could be sent to Allied Force Headquarters if needed.

4. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatch the enclosed directive relative to machinery for the coordination of our common military effort to the British and United States Military Missions in Moscow with information copies to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

Enclosure

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that the Heads of the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow open discussions with the Soviet General Staff along the lines indicated in the following paragraph. When the Soviet views on the proposal have been obtained you will submit them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff together with your comments thereon.

The creation of machinery for the coordination of Soviet-British-American military efforts is increasingly necessary. It is therefore proposed that the machinery for coordination of day-to-day operational matters should be established by attaching a Soviet liaison

\[\text{\footnotesize \cite{1}} \, \text{\footnotesize Ante, p. 9.}\]
group to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force and, if needed, to Allied Force Headquarters. Strategic direction would of course be retained by the Chiefs of Staff of the three nations.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 29 August 1944.

C.C.S. 618/2

MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET-BRITISH MILITARY EFFORT

References: C.C.S. 618 and 618/1

1. In C.C.S. 618 we circulated the text of certain messages which had been exchanged between the Head of the British Military Mission in Moscow and the British Chiefs of Staff concerning a proposal put forward by Marshal Stalin to the United States Ambassador in Moscow at the end of June, to the effect that it might be desirable to create some machinery through which the efforts of our respective forces could be coordinated.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff have since discussed this matter with General Burrows and have instructed us to put forward the attached memorandum which represents their views.

3. The British Chiefs of Staff have been informed of the text of C.C.S. 618/1 and suggest that the whole matter should be discussed at the next Conference.

Enclosure

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

PROPOSED COMBINED COMMITTEE IN MOSCOW

1. We have now discussed with General Burrows, the proposal put forward by Marshal Stalin to the United States Ambassador in Moscow at the end of June, to the effect that it might be desirable to create some machinery through which the efforts of our respective forces could be co-ordinated.

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1 For the discussion of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see post, p. 397.

2 Ante, p. 9.

3 Supra.

4 Lieutenant General Montagu Brocas Burrows.

5 W. Averell Harriman.

6 According to Deane, pp. 152–153, Stalin made this proposal to Harriman on June 28, 1944.
2. We get the impression that Marshal Stalin’s proposal was very tentative but we conclude that he is interested in it, in view of the fact that Marshal Vassilievsky referred to the matter in conversation with General Deane during the latter’s visit to the Russian front. In the course of this conversation Marshal Vassilievsky stated that the Soviet General Staff would be interested in the formation of some sort of Combined Committee in Moscow, and would like to know what are the proposals of the Chiefs of Staff in this respect. It therefore appears that nothing is likely to materialise unless we make the next move. Whether we should, or should not, do so depends upon the character and scope of the responsibilities with which the proposed combined committee is to be charged.

3. It will be recalled that the possibility of setting up a United Chiefs of Staff organisation was discussed at Sextant. On that occasion, we expressed the view that the relations of such a body to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be very difficult, and that it might even claim to be the more representative body, and, therefore, to exercise jurisdiction over the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We emphasised that the representatives of such a body would not have the authority to make big decisions and that, in consequence, the organisation would serve no useful purpose, except as a means of improving liaison; and we added that this could be done better by improving the arrangements already existing in Washington, London and Moscow.

4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with these views and agreed:—

(a) that they should not take the initiative in putting forward the proposal; and

(b) that if the U.S.S.R. should raise the question the difficulties of, and objections to, any form of standing United Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to them.

5. We, ourselves, stand today exactly where we stood at Sextant. We are wholly opposed to the creation of a United Chiefs of Staff Committee of the character suggested at Sextant.

6. On the other hand, we think that there is much to be said for improving our liaison with the Soviet Military authorities. This might well be achieved by the creation of a Combined British, American and Soviet Committee in Moscow, provided that it is clearly understood that this Committee:—

(a) is purely consultative and advisory and has no power to make decisions;

(b) that it deals solely with operational and intelligence matters, and does not impinge upon the work that is at present being done by the European Advisory Commission, such as civil affairs, etc.

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7. We propose that the senior members of the existing Military Mission in Moscow should be the British representatives on this Committee. Any other arrangement would inevitably detract from their prestige and usefulness.

8. If the United States Chiefs of Staff accept the above lay-out, we suggest that Generals Burrows and Deane should be instructed to take the matter up with the Soviet military authorities immediately on their return to Moscow.

A. F. BROOKE
C. PORTAL
ANDREW CUNNINGHAM

860c.01/9-244: Telegram

The Chargé Near the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

PLAIN

LONDON, September 2, 1944.

POLES 92. From Schoenfeld.

Premier Mikolajczyk in a broadcast message yesterday to the Polish people on the fifth anniversary of the German attack on Poland made reference to the struggle in Warsaw and addressed a direct appeal for aid to Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Defending the decision of the Polish forces in Warsaw to fight in the open Mikolajczyk said:

"You acted in the same way as your brothers did everywhere east of Warsaw from March, 1944, and as they continue to do, at the same time helping the heroic and victorious Soviet armies in their fight with the enemy ... you have the right to assistance. No one has the right to lower the value of your struggle, undertaken with the purest intentions, for the sake of some opportunist motive or political intrigue.

You did not receive such help as was due to you in spite of all the devotion of the British, South African, and Polish airmen. Lately the latter were the only ones who helped you. We do all we can to obtain help for you in adequate time and measure. I have not lost hope that it will be obtained. Would this help not be given I will notify you of it.

I address myself once again in public to Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, and Mr. Churchill: leaders of great powers, commanders of powerful and victorious land and air armies, Warsaw is waiting, the whole Polish nation is waiting, public opinion throughout the world is waiting. Do all you can to provide means for further fighting and to liberate this city and the population fighting in her ruins, drenched with blood. These people fight and die for Poland, but their desire to live for Poland is equally strong."

1 Sent over the signature of Winant.
2 Ellipses in the source text.
The Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1944.

S—Mr. Secretary The Polish Ambassador called on me today and left with me the attached memorandum reporting an urgent appeal from Prime Minister Mikolajczyk and Foreign Minister Romer for additional help to the Polish Underground fighting in Warsaw. The Ambassador said that he had just come from seeing Admiral Leahy, who has promised to take the matter up tomorrow with the President and Joint Chiefs of Staff and endeavor to ascertain whether there was any possibility of sending, by American military effort, additional help to Warsaw.¹

The Ambassador said he had come to see Admiral Leahy because the President had told him during Mikolajczyk's visit² that if any particularly urgent question involving the Polish Underground on military questions came up, he could go direct to Admiral Leahy. The Ambassador said, however, he wished to make sure that the Department of State was fully informed and therefore had brought in the attached memorandum. I told the Ambassador that I assumed there was little the Department could do since the matter was under active consideration by American military authorities to which he fully agreed.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN³

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski)

SECRET

The Polish Ambassador received an urgent secret telegram from Minister Romer dated London, September 3rd, concerning the situation of Warsaw and the most urgent necessity of help in the form of food, arms, munitions and medical supplies to the fighting garrison of the Polish Home Army. Foreign Minister Romer informs the Ambassador that Premier Mikolajczyk personally submitted to Prime Minister Churchill on September 1st the desperate situation in Warsaw, which the Germans have now threatened to burn down entirely.

¹ For Ciechanowski's report to his government on his conversation with Leahy, see Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, pp. 383–84.
³ Bohlen's initials were written on his behalf by a secretary.
The simultaneous evacuation of German forces from the eastern bank of the Vistula westwards appears to prove that the liberation of the town may be close. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the Polish Home Army fighting in Warsaw should be able to continue its fight and be helped at this moment by substantial aid from the air of arms, munitions, food and medical supplies. It is likewise urgent that the objectives held by the Germans be bombed.

In view of the decreasing effectiveness of the nightly very reduced flights of the Polish air crews from Bari, Prime Minister Churchill promised Premier Mikołajczyk once more to investigate the possibilities of one large-scale operation which would be undertaken by the British R.A.F. from British and Italian bases and would not exclude even the risk of forced landings on Russian air bases. Unfortunately, the technical investigation carried out on September 2nd showed that this intention could not be carried out from bases accessible to the British forces.

The Polish Ambassador is instructed by Minister Romer confidentially to inform the competent authorities of the United States Government about the opinion of Prime Minister Churchill that there appears to exist the possibility for American Air Forces, at present closer to Warsaw than the British, to carry out such an operation.

The latest reports received by the Polish Government from the High Command of the Polish Home Army, dated September 2nd, are to the effect that the Germans succeeded in taking from the Home Army the district of "Old Town" (Stare Miasto), which has created a very serious breach in the defense system of Warsaw. General Bór communicates that munitions are almost exhausted. The spirit of the soldiers is good. The population is suffering from lack of food, which has been rationed up to September 7th only, of water, of shelter, of clothing, and is in very bad sanitary conditions. The morale is still good, but it must be regarded as dependent on hope that the end of the fighting will come soon or that aid will really be forthcoming.

Minister Romer stresses the need for utmost urgency.

WASHINGTON, September 4th, 1944.

740.0011 E.W./9-444: Telegram

The Acting Political Adviser in Italy (Office) to the Secretary of State
SECRET

CASCERTA, September 4, 1944.

282. General Sosnkowski informed SAC that he received yesterday a message from General Bór, Polish commanding general Warsaw, stating loss of old town has opened a serious breach in defenses

¹ General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.
of Polish home army. Now increased pressure from enemy is to be expected against remaining portions of old town aiming at annihilation of Polish resistance. Bór added he had decided to defend Warsaw to limit of his means. Bór’s message went on to state food supply would hold out till September 7, bread till September 5. Ammunition supply is being exhausted. Polish morale is good. Civilian population suffering from lack of food water housing clothing and health, a degree of hope for rapid end of fight or on amount of assistance obtained. Holding out possibilities do not depend on Polish endurance only but on material help and on rapidity of successful Red Army operations in that locality.

Sosnkowski appeals to General Wilson for large scale air operations from Italian bases with participation of British crews as an indispensable measure to save situation and concludes with statement that he feels he would have failed in his duty if he did not bring foregoing to attention of General Wilson.

OFFIE

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt 1

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 4th September 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 779.

1. The War Cabinet are deeply disturbed at the position in Warsaw and at the far-reaching effect on future relations with Russia of Stalin’s refusal of airfield facilities.

2. Moreover as you know Mikołajczyk has sent his proposals to the Polish Committee of Liberation for a political settlement. 2 I am afraid that the fall of Warsaw will not only destroy any hope of progress but will fatally undermine the position of Mikołajczyk himself.

3. My immediately following telegram[s] contain the text of a telegram which the War Cabinet in their collective capacity have sent to our Ambassador in Moscow and also of a message which the women of Warsaw have communicated to the Pope 3 and which has been handed by the Vatican to our Minister. 4

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1 Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, as telegram No. Rep 369.

2 For the text of the proposals referred to, which were transmitted to the Soviet authorities on August 30, 1944, and forwarded to the Lublin Committee, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. III, pp. 1315–1317.

3 Not printed herein. For the text of Churchill’s telegram No. 781, forwarding this appeal to Roosevelt, see Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 143.

4 Sir D’Arcy Osborne.
4. The only way of bringing material help quickly to the Poles fighting in Warsaw would be for United States aircraft to drop supplies using Russian airfields for the purpose. Seeing how much is in jeopardy we beg that you will again consider the big stakes involved. Could you not authorize your Air Forces to carry out this operation, landing if necessary on Russian airfields without their formal consent? In view of our great successes in the west, I cannot think that the Russians could reject this fait accompli. They might even welcome it as getting them out of an awkward situation. We would of course share full responsibility with you for any action taken by your Air Force.5

PRIME

5 Roosevelt, by telegram No. BLUE 139, directed Leahy to take the subject matter of this telegram up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with Hull and to prepare a reply. A draft reply, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State, was forwarded to the President at Hyde Park on September 5 in telegram No. Red 374, and was approved by Roosevelt without change (telegram No. BLUE 140). For the text of the reply, see post, p. 190.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt 1

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 4th September 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 780.

Following is text of telegram sent to Moscow this evening mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram:

"1. The War Cabinet at their meeting today considered the latest reports of the situation in Warsaw which show that the Poles fighting against the Germans there are in desperate straits.

2. The War Cabinet wish the Soviet Government to know that public opinion in this country is deeply moved by the events in Warsaw and by the terrible sufferings of the Poles there. Whatever the rights and wrongs about the beginnings of the Warsaw rising, the people of Warsaw themselves cannot be held responsible for the decision taken. Our people cannot understand why no material help has been sent from outside to the Poles in Warsaw. The fact that such help could not be sent on account of your Government's refusal to allow United States aircraft to land on aerodromes in Russian hands is now becoming publicly known. If on top of all this the Poles in Warsaw should now be overwhelmed by the Germans, as we are told they must be within two or three days, the shock to public opinion here will be incalculable. The War Cabinet themselves find it hard to understand your Government's refusal to take account of the obligations of the British and American Governments to help the Poles in Warsaw. Your Government's action in preventing this help being sent seems

1 Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, as telegram No. Red 370.
to us at variance with the spirit of Allied cooperation to which you and we attach so much importance both for the present and the future."  

PRIME

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2 The text of this message as printed in Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 142-143, has the following additional paragraph:

"Out of regard for Marshal Stalin and for the Soviet peoples, with whom it is our earnest desire to work in future years, the War Cabinet have asked me to make this further appeal to the Soviet Government to give whatever help may be in their power, and above all to provide facilities for United States aircraft to land on your airfields for this purpose."

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill* 1

[HYDE PARK,] 5 September 1944.

SECRET

PRIORITY

Number 619, personal and secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Replying to your 779, ² 780 ³ and 781, ⁴ I am informed by my Office of Military Intelligence that the fighting Poles have departed from Warsaw and that the Germans are now in full control.

The problem of relief for the Poles in Warsaw has therefore unfortunately been solved by delay and by German action and there now appears to be nothing we can do to assist them.

I have long been deeply distressed by our inability to give adequate assistance to the heroic defenders of Warsaw and I hope that we may together still be able to help Poland be among the victors in this war with the Nazis.

ROOSEVELT

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¹ Sent by the White House Map Room to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels, after Roosevelt had approved the text. See ante, p. 189, fn. 5.

² Ante, p. 188.

³ Supra.

⁴ Not printed herein. See ante, p. 188, fn. 3.

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Roosevelt Papers

*Department of State Briefing Paper* 1

[Undated.]

TOP SECRET

ANGLO-AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Great Britain has long profited from her ability to shift the balance of power in Europe and has traditionally sought the role of the

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¹ Annex 1 to Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See ante, p. 120.
"honest broker" between other nations. The present preponderance of Russia outweighs the rest of Europe and Great Britain combined. It is accordingly natural that the British should seek to maintain a balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and to play the role of "honest broker" between them.

The absence of any conflict of vital interest between the United States and the U.S.S.R., however, and the number of points at which British and Soviet interests impinge make it appear probable that we, whether we choose it or not, may be forced to play such a role. The vital importance which the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff attach to solidarity between the three great powers is concisely stated in the following excerpt from a letter of May 16, 1944 from Admiral Leahy:

"From the point of view of national and world-wide security, our basic national policy in post-war settlements of this kind should seek to maintain the solidarity of the three great powers and in all other respects to establish conditions calculated to assure a long period of peace, during which, it may be hoped, arrangements will be perfected for the prevention of future world conflicts. The cardinal importance of this national policy is emphasized by a consideration of the fundamental and revolutionary changes in relative national military strengths that are being brought about in Europe as a result of the war.

"It would seem clear that there cannot be a world war, or even a great war, which does not find one or more of the great military powers on each side. At the conclusion of the present war, there will be, for the foreseeable future, only three such powers—the United States, Britain, and Russia. Since it would seem in the highest degree unlikely that Britain and Russia, or Russia alone, would be aligned against the United States, it is apparent that any future world conflict in the foreseeable future will find Britain and Russia in opposite camps.

"In appraising possibilities of this nature, the outstanding fact to be noted is the recent phenomenal development of the heretofore latent Russian military and economic strength—a development which seems certain to prove epochal in its bearing on future politico-military international relationships, and which has yet to reach the full scope attainable with Russian resources. In contrast, as regards Britain several developments have combined to lessen her relative military and economic strength and gravely to impair, if not preclude, her ability to offer effective military opposition to Russia on the continent except possibly in defensive operations in the Atlantic coastal areas. In a conflict between these two powers the disparity in the military strengths that they could dispose upon that continent would, under present conditions, be far too great to be overcome by our intervention on the side of Britain. Having due regard to the military factors involved—resources, manpower, geography and particularly our ability to project our strength across the ocean and exert it de-

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2 For the paragraphs of Leahy's letter of May 16, 1944, not included in this briefing paper, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 106–107, fn. 4.
cisively upon the continent—we might be able to successfully defend Britain, but we could not, under existing conditions, defeat Russia. In other words, we would find ourselves engaged in a war which we could not win even though the United States would be in no danger of defeat and occupation.

“It is apparent that the United States should, now and in the future, exert its utmost efforts and utilize all its influence to prevent such a situation arising and to promote a spirit of mutual cooperation between Britain, Russia and ourselves. So long as Britain and Russia cooperate and collaborate in the interests of peace, there can be no great war in the foreseeable future.

“The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between Britain and Russia would seem to grow out of either nation initiating attempts to build up its strength, by seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary. Having regard to the inherent suspicions of the Russians, to present Russia with any agreement on such matters as between the British and ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result in starting a train of events that would lead eventually to the situation we most wish to avoid.”

It seems probable that solidarity can best be attained if none of the three powers seeks the role of intermediary between the other two and each of the three works directly with the other two. We should, however, make every effort to prevent discord developing between the other two.

In particular we should:

1. Endeavor to prevent the development in Europe or elsewhere of British and Soviet spheres of influence, with the inevitable potentialities of friction and conflict which that would entail; and
2. Make every effort to secure the full participation of the Soviet Union in the General International Organization and to induce the Soviet Government to settle its international problems through the Organization.

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Roosevelt Papers

Department of State Briefing Paper

SECRET

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Our overall objective in our relations with the Soviet Union is the establishment of the closest, most cooperative relationship on the basis of the mutual acceptance and observance of the essential principles of good international conduct.

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1 Annec 2 to Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See ante, p. 120.
Because of the over-riding wartime necessity of avoiding friction which might jeopardize military cooperation, more emphasis has hitherto been placed on cooperating with the Soviet Union per se than on finding an agreed basis upon which the cooperation must be established if it is to endure and form one of the foundations of a secure and peaceful world order.

An excellent start was made at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences toward establishing a common agreement in regard to the broad principles of international cooperation. Recent Soviet policy with regard to Poland, however, its adamant attitude on the Baltic States, and [the policy?] indicated in other areas have been far from encouraging in this respect.

There is a danger that the Soviet Government may mistake friendliness for weakness and continue to operate in the belief that it can obtain all the benefits of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain no matter what policies it pursues in regard to its neighbors unless the British and ourselves demonstrate more forcefully that observation by the Soviet Union of accepted principles of international conduct is both to its own ultimate advantage and essential to lasting cooperation with the Western Powers.

Nothing should be done along political lines which might jeopardize Soviet military cooperation against Germany but, as and when the military situation in Europe permits, increased emphasis should be placed on the principles upon which enduring cooperation must be based. This would require greater willingness on our part to risk Soviet displeasure and franker and more realistic discussions with the Soviet Union in regard to its policies in Europe. It would, of course, be against our interest to seek (or to follow the British in seeking) points of friction or to obstruct or deny legitimate Soviet interests.

It is nevertheless important that the Soviet Government realize that, while we desire its cooperation in world affairs as much as it desires ours, we do not intend to acquiesce in Soviet policies which we consider internationally destructive merely for the sake of avoiding unpleasant issues. Cooperation on that basis is perilously close to collusion. A greater degree of firmness in our attitude and policy toward the Soviet Union would avoid more serious difficulties in the future and would place our relations with it on a firmer foundation.

For the records of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 558 ff. For the records of the Tehran Conference, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 475 ff.
THE SECOND QUEBEC CONFERENCE

Roosevelt Papers

Department of State Briefing Paper

SECRET

[Undated.]

THE POLISH PROBLEM

Recent developments regarding Warsaw make it appear that Stalin may have decided that the Polish Government forces in Poland must be destroyed, despite possible unfortunate repercussions inside Poland and abroad and the inevitable lessening of the chances of an arrangement with Mikolajczyk, in order that the Soviet-sponsored Committee\(^2\) can gain the upper hand. This thesis is borne out by his persistent refusal to assist the British or ourselves in efforts to strengthen the Warsaw garrison.

He may have come to believe that the strength of the Polish Government forces both in Warsaw and elsewhere in Poland was such as to make it unlikely that his Polish Committee could control the situation if Mikolajczyk and a few of his ministers were allowed to form a government in Warsaw. The reversal of his decision to aid the insurgents may have been made in the thought that it would undermine the position and prestige of Mikolajczyk and minimize the possibility of the latter’s return to Warsaw.

In any event, the decision was clearly political and appears to indicate Stalin’s determination that the Soviet-sponsored Committee gain as full control as possible of the country.

Possible Results of These Developments

1. The possibility of Mikolajczyk’s forming a coalition government in Warsaw is very small. He might be acceptable to the Soviet Government if he came as an individual to join the Committee, which he probably would be reluctant to do.

2. When the refusal of the Red Army to give aid to Warsaw becomes known, it may cause many pro-Soviet Poles to change their attitude and force the Soviet Government to rule Poland more severely than it otherwise planned.

3. Reactions abroad to the Russian methods used in settling the Polish problem may seriously affect United Nations conversations, including those on security.

4. When the Red Army captures Warsaw, the Soviet propaganda machine will be turned on in full to convince the world that the Warsaw uprising was brought about by a small group of reactionaries and

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\(^1\) Annex 3 to Hull’s memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See ante, p. 120.

\(^2\) A Polish Committee of National Liberation had been formed at Lublin on July 23, 1944.
that the rest of the population is one hundred percent behind the Soviet-sponsored Committee.

5. The Committee will be assisted by the Soviet authorities to hold elections and set up a Government as soon as practicable.

Possible American Policy

Until Stalin has definitely closed the door to any compromise solution with the Polish Government in London we should continue to urge upon him in every possible manner the necessity of some solution of the Polish question which would be acceptable to world opinion. We should at the same time support Mikołajczyk and his supporters in their efforts to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement with Moscow. While any possibility remains of an agreement between the Polish Government and the Soviet-sponsored Committee, any indication on our part of a change of attitude toward the London Polish Government would lessen the already slim chances of agreement.

Should Stalin proceed, despite all our efforts and those of the British, to a unilateral and arbitrary solution of setting up his own group as the government of Poland, we will have to consider our policy in the light of developments as they occur. In any event we should move very slowly in extending any form of recognition to such a group.

J.C.S. Files

The Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944.

My Dear General McFarland: With reference to our telephone conversation, I enclose a copy of a telegram which a member of the British Embassy handed me last evening. That telegram embodies the instructions sent by the British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador at Moscow with regard to a joint Anglo-American approach to the Russians with respect to Norway.

You will note that paragraph 5 of the enclosure suggests that the State Department might send similar instructions to Ambassador Harriman for the purpose of giving some political background to General Deane.

Since the State Department is not informed as to the nature of the instructions sent to General Deane, we are not in position to judge how much of the background and suggestions contained in the British telegram is already in Deane’s possession. I presume you have briefed General Deane on the three points contained in numbered paragraph 3. We do believe it advisable to give General Deane, either
through Ambassador Harriman or otherwise, some indication of the importance of communicating to the Russians the fact that the planning question was conceived some time ago in order to dispel possible Russian suspicions that it is something improvised overnight, so to speak, as a counterweight to possible entry of Russian troops into northern Norway.

If you will let me know your views on reading the attached, I will be glad to see that immediate action, if desirable, is taken.

Sincerely yours,

H. Freeman Matthews
Deputy Director
Office of European Affairs

[Enclosure—Telegram]

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Clark Kerr)

TOP SECRET [LONDON, September 5, 1944.]

2874. As you may know, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have recently instructed the American and British Military missions in Moscow to discuss with the Russians the question of our plans for the occupation of Norway.² No conversations were to be initiated prior to the return of General Burrows with whom we had discussed the political background. Burrows does not expect to be back for ten days, however, and United States Chiefs of Staff are anxious to begin these discussions without further delay in view of development of the Finnish situation. Chiefs of Staff are agreeing that it is undesirable to postpone matters any longer and have approved our suggestion that you should explain to Brinckman political background which is as follows:

2. S.H.A.E.F. have for some time past been under strong political pressure from the Norwegians to send troops to northern Norway in the event of German withdrawal because of their fears of a possible Russian permanent occupation of that area. Such fears are, in the Foreign Office view, exaggerated since we have no evidence to support this idea and since the Soviet Government have signed a Civil Affairs agreement with the Norwegian Government similar to the Anglo-Norwegian and American-Norwegian agreements.³ In point of fact

¹ For McFarland’s reply, see post, p. 399.
² See post, p. 399.
³ For text of the Norwegian-American agreement referred to, signed May 16, 1944, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1514; 66 Stat. (2) 1581. Similar arrangements were signed on the same day between Norway and the United Kingdom and between Norway and the Soviet Union.
it may be that the Russians will be assisting the Finns in capture and
disarmament of German forces in northern Finland and the course of
events may make it more natural and easy for the Russians to follow up German withdrawal from northern Norway than that an expedition should be despatched from this country. In these cir-
cumstances S.H.A.E.F.'s proposal to send such an expedition might well appear to the Russians as designed mainly to forestall their own forces. It was clearly important that this impression should be avoided.

3. Chiefs of Staff suggested therefore to Combined Chiefs of Staff that plans should be concerted with the Russians and that it should be emphasized that S.C.A.E.F.'s proposal was purely provisional and based on:

(1) Military necessity of harassing the enemy during his with-
drawal.

(2) Advantage of stimulating Norwegian resistance by sending in
Norwegian forces as soon as possible and,

(3) Desirability of establishing a naval base for escorts protecting convoys to Russia.

We assume that instructions sent by Combined Chiefs of Staff to heads of military missions have been drawn up accordingly since United States Chiefs of Staff agreed. It was felt that for the matter to be han-
dled through military channels as a purely military problem would assist in avoiding appearance of political motives.

4. The Russians may suspect that it is the Soviet-Finnish armistice negotiations and consequent possible proximity of the Russians to northern Norway that have made us propose plan for occupation of Northern Norway by Anglo-American-Norwegian forces at this juncture. In order to dispel such a suspicion it might be well to em-
phasize that plans have been ready for some time and that it is (?pre-
cisely) (?the possibility) that owing to the capitulation of Finland the Russians may have forces in the neighbourhood of the Norwegian frontier when the Germans start to withdraw that has made it des-
sirable to discuss plans with the Russians now.

5. Please discuss the handling of the matter with Brinckman. His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington is being instructed to suggest to the State Department that your United States colleague might be sent similar instructions.

*These two parenthetical suggestions for correcting a garble in the message as received in Washington appear in the source text.*
Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹

TOP SECRET

ROUTINE

Moscow, [September 9, 1944.]

Personal and top secret for Harry Hopkins from Harriman.

I feel that I should report to the President at the earliest convenient time and place. Now that the end of the war is in sight our relations with the Soviets have taken a startling turn evident during the last two months. They have held up our requests with complete indifference to our interests and have shown an unwillingness even to discuss pressing problems.

We started the proposal for winter program for Frantic at the end of June and formally presented it to the Foreign Office in early July. No acknowledgement even of my letters or numerous talks has been received. All requests for PR unit have been unacted upon for the last several weeks. Prior to that time they were operating several a day. No answer or permission to transport trucks to our air forces in China has been received. There has been no reply to our request presented a week ago followed by urgent conversation with Molotov to allow General Eaker’s bombing appraisal party to visit Ploesti. The Soviets' indifference to world opinion regarding their unbending policy toward Poland and ruthless attitude toward the uprising in Warsaw are best described by Molotov’s statement that the Soviets would judge their friends by those that accept the Soviet position.² In spite of Stalin’s promises no action has been taken on major future planning. These are only a few examples.

I have been conscious since early in the year of a division among Stalin’s advisors on the question of cooperation with us. It is now my feeling that those who oppose the kind of cooperation we expect have recently been getting their way and the policy appears to be crystallizing to force us and the British to accept all Soviet policies backed by the strength and prestige of Red Army.

¹Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. The White House Map Room sent the text of the message to Roosevelt, at Quebec, on September 11, 1943, and at the President’s direction a paraphrase was given to Churchill at Quebec. Hopkins discussed the message with the Department of State on September 10 or 11, and a paraphrase was sent to Hull on September 14.

²Molotov had made this statement in a conversation with Harriman and Clark Kerr reported in Harriman’s telegram No. 3049 of August 17, 1944, not printed (740.0011 E.W./8-1744).
Demands on us are becoming insistent. You have seen a part of it in the negotiations over financial terms of the Protocol in Washington. We have other examples here. The general attitude seems to be that it is our obligation to help Russia and accept her policies because she has won the war for us.

I am convinced that we can divert this trend but only if we materially change our policy toward the Soviet Government. I have evidence that they have misinterpreted our generous attitude toward them as a sign of weakness, and acceptance of their policies.

Time has come when we must make clear what we expect of them as the price of our good will. Unless we take issue with the present policy there is every indication the Soviet Union will become a world bully wherever their interests are involved. This policy will reach into China and the Pacific as well when they can turn their attention in that direction. No written agreement[s] can be of any value unless they are carried out in a spirit of give and take and recognition of the interests of other people.

I am disappointed but not discouraged. The job of getting the Soviet Government to play a decent role in international affairs is however going to be more difficult than we had hoped. The favorable factors are still the same. Ninety percent of the Russian people want friendship with us and it is much to the interest of the Soviet Government to develop it. It is our problem to strengthen the hand of those around Stalin who want to play the game along our lines and to show Stalin that the advice of the counselors of a tough policy is leading him into difficulties.

I realize I cannot in a cable convey to you a fully comprehensible picture of the perplexing developments. However, what I say is fully endorsed by General Deane, the air officers here and the Embassy officers.

The relation[s] of Deane and our other officers with the Red Air Force are good. The Soviet officers have shown embarrassment at the attitude expressed through the Foreign Office. The influences that I speak of are as unpopular with this group as with us. When it comes to the question of what we should do in dealing with the situation I am not going to propose any drastic action but a firm but friendly *quid pro quo* attitude. In some cases where it has been possible for us to show a firm hand we have been making definite progress.

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9 The reference is to the “Soviet supply protocols”. Concerning the 1944 negotiations with the Soviet Union about assistance from the United States, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, pp. 1032 ff.
I feel that I should urgently report personally to the President these recent developments and my recommendations. I would appreciate your discussing this message with the President and advising me.4

Hopkins sent Roosevelt the following telegram (MR-out-384) on September 11, 1944:

"Have talked to Chip Bohlen and he tells me Secretary Hull feels very strongly that Harriman should not come back immediately.

"We are in the critical stage of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and Gromyko may not get his instructions for a few days and we cannot take any chance of having that hitched up. Furthermore, a cable which you now have in your hands [presumably Harriman's telegram of September 9] indicates Harriman's immediate point of view and I doubt if he could tell you much more than is indicated in that message.

"Unless you disagree I propose to wire Harriman today that you do not wish him to come home at this moment but will expect to see him later." (Hopkins Papers)

Roosevelt replied later on September 11 that Hopkins' proposed message to Harriman was approved (MR-tr-142). Hopkins thereupon sent Harriman a telegram, also dated September 11, informing him that Roosevelt "thinks it best, therefore, that you delay your departure until he gives you the green light which I assure you will be soon as he wants to go over with you personally all the problems which you raised in your cable." (Hopkins Papers)

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 10th September 1944.

1005. Winant to President Roosevelt.

The following three messages have been received from Clark Kerr of the British Embassy Moscow today, the first two this morning and third this noon. They have been forwarded to the Prime Minister and have just been given to me by Eden. The British Chiefs of Staff have met and telegraphed General Eisenhower explaining the situation and asking that he plan an air mission to carry supplies to the people of Warsaw.2 I understand that copies of this cable have been forwarded to General Spaatz, to the British Military Mission in Moscow and to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The three messages follow in the order of their receipt.

Number 1 begins:

My immediately preceding telegram.3

In his covering letter M. Molotov goes on to refer to letter which I sent him after discussion with head of air section of Military Mission on receipt of your telegram No. 2743.4 He repeats that there has been no occasion on which Soviet Government refused to give assist-

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1 Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then en route from Hyde Park to Quebec, as telegram No. MR-out-379.
2 See post, p. 205.
3 The reference is presumably to message No. 2, quoted below.
4 Not found in United States files.
ance to damaged British or American aircraft. "It could not have been otherwise in view of the friendly relations between our two countries. It should however be borne in mind so far as the Warsaw area is concerned that uninterrupted fighting is going on with the Germans on land and in the air and that the unexpected appearance on that front of aircraft which do not belong to the Soviet Air Forces might cause sad misunderstanding to which I draw your attention."

Message number 2 begins:

Your telegram No. 2855.\(^5\)

Mr. Molotov has asked me to convey the following reply to His Majesty’s Government. (Begins):

Message of Soviet Government in reply to message of British Government of September 5th, 1944.

The Soviet Government on September 5th received a message from British Government on the question of Warsaw.

The Soviet Government has already informed the British Government of their opinion that members of Polish Emigré Government in London are responsible for Warsaw adventure undertaken without the knowledge of Soviet Military Command, and in violation of the latter’s operational plans.

The Soviet Government would like an unprejudiced commission to be organized with the object of ascertaining exactly by whose order the rising in Warsaw was undertaken and who was to blame for the fact that Soviet Military Command was not informed thereof in advance. No command in the world, neither British nor American, can tolerate the fact that a rising is organized in a large city opposite the front line of its troops without the knowledge of that command and contrary to its operational plans. Of course Soviet Command cannot be an exception. Undoubtedly if before the Warsaw rising Soviet Command had been asked about the desirability of organizing a rising in Warsaw at the beginning of August, the Soviet Command would have advised against such an attempt because the Soviet troops who had advanced fighting for over 500 kilometres and were in a state of fatigue were not at that time prepared to take Warsaw by storm bearing in mind that the Germans had at that time transferred their tank reserves from the west to the Warsaw area.

Nobody will be able to reproach Soviet Government with the allegation that they rendered inadequate aid to the Polish people including Warsaw. The most practical form of help is active military operations of the Soviet troops against the German invaders of Poland and the liberation of more than one fourth of Poland. All this is the work of the Soviet troops and of the Soviet troops only who are shedding their blood for the liberation of Poland. There is again the hardly effective form of help to Warsaw people namely the dropping of weapons, medical stores and food from aircraft. We have several times dropped both weapons and food for Warsaw insurgents but we have each time re-

\(^5\) No message bearing this number has been found in United States files, but it was probably the telegram containing the message of the British War Cabinet to the Soviet Government quoted in Churchill’s telegram No. 780 to Roosevelt, ante, p. 189.
ceived information that the load dropped had fallen into the hands of the Germans. However, if you are so firmly convinced of the efficacy of this form of assistance and insist upon Soviet command organizing jointly with British and Americans such aid, the Soviet Government are prepared to agree to it. However it is necessary to render this aid in accordance with a pre-arranged plan.

As regards your attempt to make Soviet Government in any degree responsible for Warsaw adventure and for the sacrifices of the Warsaw people, the Soviet Government cannot regard this otherwise than as a wish to shift responsibility “from a sick head to a clear one”. The same must be said on the point that the Soviet Government’s position in the Warsaw question is apparently contrary to the spirit of Allied co-operation. There can be no doubt that if the British Government had taken steps to see that the Soviet Command had been warned of proposed Warsaw rising in good time, then events in Warsaw would have taken a totally different turn. Why did the British Government not find it necessary to warn the Soviet Government of this? Was it not a repetition of what happened in April 1943 when Polish Émigré Government, in the absence of resistance on the part of the British Government, came out with their slanderous statement hostile to USSR about Katyn? It seems to us that the spirit of Allied collaboration should have indicated to the British Government a different course of action.

As regards public opinion in various countries the Soviet Government express their complete confidence in the fact that true statement of the facts regarding events in Warsaw will give public opinion every reason unconditionally to condemn the authors of Warsaw adventure and correctly to understand the position of the Soviet Government. It would only be necessary to try to enlighten public opinion thoroughly about the truth of the events in Warsaw.

Message number 3 begins:

My telegram No. 2379.
Following for Secretary of State.
Personal.

This is an unexpected and remarkable climb down. That it is tucked away in the middle of a preposterous Pi-Jaw is true to Kremlin form. They are still not grown up enough to come clean when they know they have made a bad mistake. It would I think be imprudent in us to let any natural inclination to counter all verbiage divert us from this most important if belated surrender. I suggest that in the belief that there may be still in Warsaw something to save, that most immediate instructions be sent to British and American Military Missions to arrange co-operation that is now offered. The whole thing seems to me to give fresh hopes of a settlement with Poland.

I am in touch with United States Ambassador.

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* See Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, pp. 374 ff.
* Gromyko forwarded the Russian text of this communication to Hull on September 13, 1944 (740.0011 EW/9–1344).
* Presumably message No. 2, quoted above.
SECRET

US URGENT

3413. Secret for the President and the Secretary from Harriman.

The British Ambassador has shown me a message from the Soviet Government which he has been asked to transmit to his Government in answer to the War Cabinet’s message regarding aid to Warsaw. You will undoubtedly receive this in full. Briefly, however, after a lengthy recital of the circumstances and a statement that the really effective aid will come from the advance of the Red Army, the message states in paraphrase as follows:

“In addition there is the form of assistance to the people in Warsaw which can hardly be considered effective; namely, the dropping by airplane of weapons, food and medical supplies. We have dropped both weapons and food for the insurgents in Warsaw on several occasions, but each time we have received information that these supplies have fallen into German hands. If you are so firmly convinced, however, of the efficacy of this form of assistance and if you insist that the Soviet Command organize jointly with the Americans and British such aid, the Soviet Government is prepared to agree to it. It will be necessary, however, to render this aid in accordance with a prearranged plan.”

The message ends by implying that the British were partly to blame for the fact that the Soviet Command was not informed in advance of the Warsaw uprising. Reference is also made to British failure to prevent the Poles from their action in connection with the Katyn incident.

This message is obviously an extremely shrewd statement for the record, and places the responsibility now on the British and us for the decision whether the dropping of supplies should be attempted at this late date. I have no recent information as to the size of the area still held by the Insurgents in Warsaw and whether it is practicable to parachute supplies from a sufficiently high altitude to avoid unconscionable losses to our flyers. I assume urgent instructions will be given General Deane or myself on what our position now is and whether or not negotiations with the Red Army staff are to be entered into to render aid.

HARRIMAN

1 Sent to the Department of State via Army channels.
2 The text of the message referred to is contained in Winant’s telegram of September 10, 1944, to Roosevelt, supra.
3 Ante, p. 189.
The Polish Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) to President Roosevelt

LONDON, September 10, 1944.

Mr. President, The reports which the Polish Government receive from Warsaw show that the situation is desperate and that the fight against the overwhelming German power may cease at any moment, unless sustained from outside.

Our urgent appeals for a large scale operation which would combine the bombing of German concentrations with the dropping of supplies at [to?] the home Army in Warsaw are still under consideration by the British Government and no decision has been taken so far. This decision if favorable may come too late.

I therefore beseech you Mr. President and you Mr. Prime Minister to take a bold and immediate decision which could save Warsaw and its inhabitants from total destruction and at the same time give new hope to millions of Poles to whom the fight in Warsaw is a symbol of Poland’s will to live.

I also feel obliged to stress that should the Warsaw rising be crushed by the Germans without a last minute attempt at succour from Poland’s mighty western allies, the tragedy of Warsaw may cast a deep and lasting shadow on the Polish nation’s attitude towards its traditional friends. I beg you to weigh this in your minds, Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister, when taking your decision at this fateful hour.

ST. MIKOŁAJCZYK

Transmitted in telegram No. 97 from the Chargé to the Polish Government in exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State, and forwarded to Roosevelt at Quebec. Schoenfeld reported that Mikołajczyk had requested him to transmit this "urgent message" and that an identical message was being given to the British Foreign Office for transmittal to Churchill. As received at Quebec, the message appeared to be from the President of Poland. For Roosevelt’s reply, dated September 11, 1944, see post, p. 397.
The Polish Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) to President Roosevelt

[LONDON, September 10, 1944.]

The Soviet Government, having now agreed to collaboration in the so urgent matter of aid to Warsaw, I appeal to you, Mr. President, to issue a directive to General Dwight D. Eisenhower for immediate air operations in support of the defenders of Warsaw.

Should the Soviet Government begin to discuss the plan of aid and raise reservations, so much time would elapse that it might be too late to save Warsaw.

Stanisław Mikołajczyk

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1 Sent to the Polish Ambassador at Washington (Ciechanowski), who incorporated it into a memorandum of September 11, 1944, with the request that it be transmitted immediately to Roosevelt. Bohlen forwarded Ciechanowski's memorandum to Hopkins with the following comment: "It is obvious that the British have informed the Polish Government of the change in attitude of the Soviet Government. While it does not add anything to what the President already knows, it probably should go on to him." Hopkins forwarded Mikołajczyk's message to Roosevelt at Quebec in telegram No. MR-out-388, September 11, 1944. (Hopkins Papers)

2 The date of Mikołajczyk's message is not indicated in the source text, but a different translation of the message printed in Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, p. 389, is dated September 10.

3 See ante, p. 202, regarding the Soviet action referred to.

J.C.S. Files: Telegram

The British Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)

SECRET

LONDON, 10 September 1944.

URGENT

OZ 5157. Following for General Eisenhower from Chiefs of Staff. Reference AGWAR telegram W 80785 of 15th August.

British Ambassador to Moscow reports Russians state that if we remain firmly convinced that dropping of supplies to Warsaw will be of real assistance to Poles and we insist that Russians cooperate with British and Americans in organizing such assistance, Soviet Government is prepared to agree provided this aid is rendered in accordance with prearranged plan. His Majesty's Government earnestly desire that no opportunity of aiding Poles in Warsaw be missed.

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1 Repeated to other addressees, including the United States Military Mission, Moscow, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Quebec. The message was relayed to Quebec by the War Department as telegram No. 29923 and was received at Quebec on September 14, 1944, as telegram No. OCTAGON-IN-95.

2 Not printed.
Request you consider possibility of mounting operation to drop supplies on Warsaw at earliest possible date. Our representatives in Moscow are aware of Russian decision, and we have requested them to do all possible to make necessary arrangement with Russians.

Presume you will inform General Deane of your decision and of your requirements from Russians through your usual channels.

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D. ITALY

865.48/9-144 : Telegram

The President's Personal Representative at Vatican City (Taylor) to the President and the Secretary of State

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

VATICAN CITY, September 1, 1944.

This message is urgent and strictly confidential for the President and the Secretary.

It is extremely important before your reported conference with the Prime Minister that you have a frank talk with General O’Dwyer regarding Italy, its relief needs, and plans to meet the situation. To accomplish this will you request Secretary Hull or Leo Crowley to telegraph O’Dwyer personally to report to Washington for consultation without delay.

TAYLOR

865.48/9-144 : Telegram

The President to the President’s Personal Representative at Vatican City (Taylor)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 3 September 1944.

Please ask General O’Dwyer to report to me as soon as possible, preferably Washington by Friday morning, or if he cannot make this then in Quebec on Monday morning the eleventh.

ROOSEVELT

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1 Sent to the Commanding General, Allied Force Headquarters, Italy, via Army channels, with instructions to pass to Taylor at Vatican City.
2 September 8.
The Italian Situation

Bonomi’s Government has successfully weathered its first two months. Its position, however, will remain precarious without tangible proof of Allied sympathy, especially as the industrial north is liberated.

The British last May proposed the conclusion of a “preliminary peace treaty”. They felt that this would end the anomalous situation whereby Italy is both defeated enemy and co-belligerent, clear the way for normal relationships, and yet not prejudice the ultimate peace settlement. We agreed to discuss possible terms but differed from the British thesis that no concessions should meanwhile be made to Italy. The more urgent problems should be solved wherever possible without delay. Mr. Churchill has now told Ambassador Kirk in Rome that he disapproved of a preliminary treaty and preferred UNRRA participation in Italian relief and “a recognition of the present government along the lines already accorded by the Soviet.” Press reports portraying the Prime Minister as sympathetic to the Bonomi Government and convinced that the Italian[s] have “worked their passage” foreshadow a more favorable British policy toward Italy. We should welcome such a change in attitude, having felt for some time that it is to the general interest to strengthen Italian confidence in democratic government and in the democratic powers.

The most urgent problems are those of civilian relief and rehabilitation. The physical obstacles to their solution have been augmented by divergences in British and American views.

Economic Problems. The civilian supply program thus far has been entirely a military responsibility, of which the U.S. Army now wishes to be relieved. It is proposed to finance United States supplies, except such limited supplies as the Army may temporarily continue to provide, by making available to the Italians under appropriate Allied controls the equivalent in dollars of lire paid to our troops in Italy. Though willing for us to finance our own share in this way, the British have questioned extending the present limited military scope of the supply program and appear sensitive about the reaction of our European Allies to any appreciable aid to Italy. We believe the most essen-

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1 Annex 6 to Hull’s memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See ante, p. 120.
2 See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iii, p. 1117.
3 This passage is quoted from Kirk’s telegram No. 231 to Hull, dated August 24, 1944, not printed (865.01/8-2444).
tial items of rehabilitation should be included to help the Italian economy to begin functioning and are seeking British agreement.

We have intended proposing at the UNRRA Council meeting in September limited UNRRA participation in relief activities in Italy, involving care and repatriation of displaced persons and public health activities including the furnishing of needed medical supplies and technical assistance. The total estimated cost would be between 35 and 50 million dollars. There has been some indication of British reluctance to support such a program.

The present food supply in Italy would suffice for bare subsistence rations if means of transportation from one region to another were available. Additional trucks and coal to operate local railroads are needed.

Other major questions now in the foreground are:

**Allied Control Machinery.** Military interest in the Allied Control Commission is decreasing. It will be necessary to determine its future status, particularly whether its control functions should continue after they are no longer needed to protect military operations. This will depend on (a) the status to be accorded Italy, (b) Italy’s relations with bordering states pending a final peace settlement, and (c) the internal situation. Such of its economic functions as must continue after termination of military control can be handled either through a control organization as at present or an economic mission to the Italian Government.

Ambassador Kirk believes that the Commission should now be headed by a civilian, who would continue for the present to be responsible to the Theater Commander. Kirk also recommends appointment of an American, who should be an expert on economic matters. The British might agree. It is expected that the Commission’s Economic Section will shortly be staffed by civilian experts, continuing, however, under military command. Many other functions of the Commission can soon be abandoned or turned over to the Italians.

The Moscow Declaration ⁴ provided that the Theater Commander would in time turn over his presidency of the Commission to the Advisory Council. We have recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Advisory Council be tied in more closely with the day to day problems of the Commission both to improve its present advisory role and to prepare it to assume the above functions if this course proves desirable.⁵

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⁴ The provision referred to is contained in paragraph 7 of annex 3 to the secret protocol signed November 1, 1943, at the conclusion of the Tripartite Conference held at Moscow. See *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. 1, pp. 758–760; Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949*, vol. 3, p. 624.

⁵ Recommendation not printed.
The Armistice Terms. The severe long terms of surrender are a source of weakness to any Italian government. They are unquestionably out of date, and many of them have never been applied. In reply to the Bonomi memorandum of July 22, we agreed to study any specific suggestions for their revision. We have not pursued this question in view of the British proposal for a preliminary peace to replace the armistice regime.

We did not wish to publish the long terms until some step to offset the reaction could be announced. Pressure in Italy for publication is growing, however, and we have advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that if this becomes advisable the Italian government itself should take the responsibility for publication.

Italian Armed Forces. The Italians continue to press for fuller military participation. It has finally been decided to furnish combat equipment for three divisions of the Corps of Liberation. General Wilson also recommends increasing the Italian armed forces from 444,300 to 470,000 men.

Prisoners of War. Italian troops captured before the surrender continue to be prisoners of war, even those now employed in combat zones as service units. It should be possible to remove that stigma without prejudice to any military interest. In June we recommended this course to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, who referred it to the British Chiefs of Staff and AEFHQ.

Italian Participation in International Affairs. The Italians should not be precluded from all international contacts. We proposed inviting an Italian observer to the Bretton Woods Conference. The British, French and Yugoslavs were opposed, while the Russians and Greeks agreed. We also favor Italy's participation in such bodies as the International Labor Office.

Some form of Italian representation with the Allied Governments besides the U.S.S.R. seems advisable. We have informed Bonomi of our willingness to receive in an unofficial capacity an Italian technical representation to discuss financial and economic questions and report.

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* Signed at Malta, September 29, 1943; terms modified by a protocol signed at Brindisi, November 9, 1943. For texts, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; Department of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1945, vol. 3, pp. 775, 854; 61 Stat. (3) 2742, 2761.


* See ibid., p. 1145.

* The communication referred to is not printed (740.00119 Control (Italy)/8-1944).

* Recommendation not printed.

* The Soviet Union had established relations with the Italian Government in March 1944, without prior notice to the United States and British Governments. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. IV, pp. 1048 ff.
directly to the Italian Government on such matters as the treatment of Italian prisoners of war here.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Territorial Problems.} Our preliminary studies have been based on the criteria: (1) territory should not be taken from Italy merely to punish a defeated enemy or reward an ally; (2) ethnic considerations should predominate, though economic and strategic factors would be kept in mind; (3) as to colonies, native welfare is the first concern; other colonial empires should not be aggrandized by the addition of Italian colonies; and, if Italian colonies are placed under international trusteeship, efforts might be made to place under similar trusteeship at least some other colonial possessions.

In order not to prejudice final settlements, we have advised the extension of Allied Military Government to all metropolitan territory within the 1939 frontiers as liberated; administration thereof by Anglo-American military forces exclusively; and in disputed areas the employment of more Allied and fewer local Italian officials than elsewhere in Italy.

\textsuperscript{13} See \textit{Foreign Relations, 1944}, vol. iii, p. 1146.

Hopkins Papers

\textit{The Chief of the Economic Section of the Allied Control Commission for Italy (O'Dwyer) to the President}\textsuperscript{1}

\textbf{SECRET}

\textbf{[WASHINGTON,]} September 8, 1944.

\textbf{REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE ITALIAN SITUATION}

\textbf{I. HEALTH, SUPPLY AND SHIPPING SITUATION}

The plight of the Italian people is serious as a result of Nazi and Fascist rule and the battle destruction on its soil. The accumulated result of years of undernourishment and the destruction caused by the fighting has already begun to show up and is likely to show up in accelerated form in the near future. From available information, including the official Allied government medical opinion, the general health of the people seems to be bad. Serious outbreaks of illness are to be expected beginning with winter conditions. The low resistance of the people is said to be the result of continued low consumption under Fascist occupation. The dangerous period is said to be from January to July, 1945. Increased food supply is prescribed by the Allied Con-

\textsuperscript{1} The source text is filed with the following undated handwritten chif: "Mr. Hopkins:—This is the memo of which I spoke to you last evening. Bill O'Dwyer". It is not known whether O'Dwyer actually gave a copy to Roosevelt, but, if not, he presumably gave the President the gist of the memorandum during a meeting which he and Crowley had with Roosevelt at 11:15 a.m., September 8 (Roosevelt Papers).
trol Commission Health Subcommission. Any added quantities of food needed will obviously require more shipping space than presently allocated shipping. In view of the responsibility of the Allied governments, present policy should be amended to include adequate shipping allocation immediately.

II. ITALIAN UNEMPLOYMENT

Universal unemployment is foreseen for the coming winter, mainly due to the thoroughness of the demolition of power plants by the enemy forces. Next in importance to an increased food supply will be a partial restoration of power. Without adequate food supply and partial restoration of manufacturing the result may well be rioting, bloodshed and anarchy. Without these two basic aids the Italian people and the government will be in a desperate plight. A relatively slight change in present policies may help to correct this situation.

III. INLAND TRANSPORTATION

The present condition of transportation is haphazard and grossly inadequate. Any plan to maintain a food supply and to put the Italian people in a position where they can help themselves must include adequate transportation. Adequate transportation should be made available following relief of the strain caused by military necessity. Food, medical and other vital supplies landed in Italy are of no use unless they are gotten to the people who vitally need them. To do this adequate transportation is essential.

IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION AND THE ITALIANS' CO-Belligerent Status to the Supply and Economic Situation in Italy

It is desirable to take every step necessary to develop the initiative of the Italian people.

The Italian mind is friendly toward the Allies but confused. The difficulties arise from an inability to understand the distinction between the status of a defeated enemy as against the status of a co-belligerent. Despite the fact that there are Italian divisions fighting side by side with the Allies, and despite the fact that there is unrestricted use of Italian resources to serve Allied military needs, there are still Italians held as prisoners of war.

It is generally believed that government responsibility in liberated Italy might well be placed without any major restrictions in the hands of the Italian government, that the formal state of war between the Allies and Italy should be discontinued, and that the Allied Control Commission in liberated Italy should be abolished and its functions placed in the hands of civilian experts.
Department of the Army Files

The President to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

As a result of years of Fascist and Nazi rule and the destruction resulting from the battles on its soil, I understand that the supply situation in Italy is critical.

This situation should be corrected as effectively and as quickly as possible.

The War Department should, therefore, take immediate action to make available the additional essential civilian supplies and shipping necessary to remedy this condition.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

E. AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS

Department of State Briefing Paper

SECRET

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE BALKANS

American planning for civil affairs in the Balkans is restricted to Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania on the theory that these will be liberated territory. No American participation in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary is contemplated in present plans, unless it is found that these countries have surpluses of foodstuffs or products useful in the war, for the handling of which American personnel in Allied missions might be desirable.

The U.S. Army has set up, under authorization of the President, a combined Anglo-American Military Headquarters for relief and rehabilitation in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia, the American participation being limited to sixty-three, all officers, while British personnel will number several thousand. On our initiative an agreement has been made between UNRRA and the military authorities whereby UNRRA will serve as the agency of the combined military headquarters for the distribution of the supplies during the military period.\(^1\) In view of the American origin of the bulk of the supplies and

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1 Annex 7 to Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See ante, p. 120.

the limited American military participation, this arrangement may
serve to prevent the distribution from being controlled solely by [the]
British military and for British political ends. Since these territories
would be supplied by UNRRA after the military period, it also seems
desirable to have UNRRA on the ground at once.

There has been some difference of opinion between the British and
Americans as to the extent of UNRRA's responsibility during the
military period. The American position is that UNRRA should be
given the maximum possible responsibility under the direction of the
military headquarters. The British would prefer to limit UNRRA's
role principally to the furnishing of certain personnel who would, as
individuals, advise and assist the military. The Combined Civil Affairs
Committee is now trying to reach agreement on this point. The British
plan for the distribution of supplies in Albania and Yugoslavia has
contemplated delivery of supplies at ports, to the local authorities,
with practically no control to assure their distribution in accordance
with our policy of non-discrimination because of race, creed or politi-
cal affiliation. The American plan urges agreements with local authori-
ties providing for such non-discriminatory distribution, and sufficient
personnel, either of UNRRA or the military, within the countries to
make sure of compliance with this policy. We feel strongly that relief
and supplies should not be used as a political weapon to help any
one faction. Particularly in the case of Yugoslavia the scheme of de-
ivery to the people easiest at hand would be sure to give to that
faction a powerful implement in the civil strife within the country.
It is to the American long-range interest that we should not become
a party to such a program. A clear understanding with the British on
this point is essential.

The British plan for Greece envisages a rather elaborate military
organization to supervise distribution, restore port facilities, railroads
and other utilities. This work will also be facilitated by the organiza-
tions already familiar with the problem and the trained personnel
available.

We think the Russians should be fully informed of all these activi-
ties, through a representative who would be in close touch with the
combined military headquarters. Suspicions would be allayed and a
precedent established which might advantageously be used in reverse
in other areas where Russia is primarily concerned. There has been a
reluctance on the part of a number of British officials to agree to keep-
ing the Russians fully informed.

One of the major problems is the lack of contact with the military
authorities of the Governments in question. Agreements providing for
their cooperation would be desirable with a view to securing both in-
formation and the utilization of the services, personnel and admin-
istration which will be under their control. In the case of Greece it has now been proposed that the Theater Commander be authorized to discuss these problems with the Greek authorities.

The Yugoslav Government presents a particular problem in this connection, since the reported unity established between the Government-in-exile and the Tito organization is of a very dubious nature, with the additional complication that neither of them has control or more than a claim to authority in Serbia, the heart of the country. It may, therefore, be necessary to continue the planning without much consultation with Yugoslav officials until there is some clarification of the authority and popular support of the respective groups. Unfortunately, the Yugoslav officials have been so preoccupied with their political troubles that they seem to have made no serious plans of their own. Actual relief operations may in fact have to be postponed while the civil strife continues.

In Albania there is no government with which to deal. Civil affairs operations will of necessity require considerable improvisation, but should present no major problems.

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Roosevelt Papers

*Department of State Briefing Paper*¹

SECRET

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS HUNGARY

The Hungarians have failed to take any realistic action to withdraw from the war, though they have repeatedly avowed their desire to do so. The difficulty has been their hope that the “Anglo-Americans” would protect them against Soviet Russia, and their unwillingness to part with territories acquired with German aid. The country is now in ferment, however, and events may move rapidly.

Draft armistice terms for Hungary, having the approval of the Joint Chiefs, were sent to the European Advisory Commission several months ago.² Subsequently revised terms, including certain inducements to the Hungarians while maintaining the principle of unconditional surrender, were sent forward.³

The United States does not contemplate participation in military operations in Hungary or in the occupation of that country. American troops in that area could probably be used more effectively, in the

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¹Annex 8 to Hull’s memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See ante, p. 120.


³Not printed.
political sense, than either British or Soviet armies, but such participa-
tion would inevitably involve this Government as an active agent in
the political questions of Southeastern Europe. Although planning for
civil affairs administration in Hungary after surrender is under the
jurisdiction of AFHQ in the Mediterranean Theater, American rep-
resentatives have taken no part in whatever planning has been done.
The United States will, however, desire political representatives in
Hungary in the period after surrender. Such representation is desir-
able for the execution of the political terms of the armistice, for sup-
porting our general objectives of promoting a just and stable political
and territorial settlement, as well as for securing accurate first-hand
political and economic information, and protecting American interests.

As a long-term objective the United States favors the establishment
of a broadly-based provisional government, designed to carry through
by democratic means the transition to a permanent regime. There are
revolutionary forces in Hungary working for land reform, electoral
reform and the overthrow of the present ruling group. We acknowl-
edge the need and the strong public demand for changes in the Hun-
garian system, and must expect that these reforms will not be
accomplished without some violence.

In regard to the territorial settlement, the United States favors, as
a matter of principle, the restoration of the pre-Munich frontiers, and
any consideration of the boundary disputes between Hungary and its
neighbors should start from that point. However, we do not regard
the pre-Munich boundaries as unchangeable and believe certain
changes to be desirable in the interest of a stable settlement.

Thus, in the case of the frontier with Czechoslovakia, if an oppor-
tunity arises for revision by agreement which would leave to Hungary
certain overwhelmingly Magyar-inhabited districts, the United States
would favor such a solution. In the case of the frontier with Yugo-
slavia, the United States sees some merit in a compromise solution
which would leave to Hungary the northern part of the Voyvodina,
although this Government should not, we feel, press for such a solu-
tion. In the case of the frontier with Rumania, the American position
will be more or less frozen by our agreement to the armistice terms for
Rumania which provide for the restoration to that country of "all or
the major part of Transylvania, subject to confirmation at the peace
settlement." 4 In the final settlement the United States would favor,
at the least, a revision of the pre-war frontier on ethnic grounds, trans-
ferring to Hungary a small strip of territory given to Rumania at the
end of the last war.

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OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS

Decisions concerning post-surrender occupation of Austria and the Balkans were made easily in contrast with decisions concerning Germany and France. In May, General Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a directive to allow him to plan for the occupation of southeastern Europe, an area which had not been covered by COSSAC's planning as it was out of his sphere. The British Chiefs prepared a draft directive for General Wilson and sent it to the U.S. Chiefs for concurrence.*

They approved the draft but felt that a statement of U.S. policy should be included, a paper which should of course be approved by the President since it involved major political and economic considerations. The statement of our Balkan policy which the Chiefs prepared for Presidential study was based on the two letters of the President to the Secretary of State of February 21 ("I do not want the United States to have the post-war burden of reconstituting France, Italy and the Balkans") and April 30 ("This Government is of the opinion that the southern zone and Austria should be occupied by British Forces"). The President approved the following statement on May 27 and the Joint Chiefs then sent it to the British Chiefs of Staff:

"With regard to the occupation of southeast Europe the policy of the United States may be summarized as follows:

A. No United States forces will be employed as occupational forces in southern Europe, including Austria, or southeast Europe, including the Balkans. Such United States forces as may be present in these areas due to military operations will be withdrawn as soon as practicable after the cessation of hostilities.

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*This paper was an appendix to Elsey's memorandum on zones of occupation in Europe, ante, p. 145. Elsey informed the Historical Office of the Department of State on January 12, 1955, that he had prepared the memorandum "immediately prior to" the Second Quebec Conference at the request of the President's Naval Aide (Brown). "Knowing that the subject of zones of occupation would have a prominent place on the agenda of that conference, Admiral Brown directed me to write a briefing paper on the issues between the United Kingdom and the United States on zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, the paper to be based on the Map Room files and the files of Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy and the President." (Historical Office Files)

* C.C.S. 520/14, 10 May 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

* See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, p. 154, fn. 12. Roosevelt's memorandum to Stettinius of February 21, 1944, is not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/2-214).

* Not printed (740.00119 EAC/172c).

† J.C.S. 577/12, 18 May 1944. J.C.S. 577/13, 20 May 1944. J.C.S. 577/14, 28 May 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
“B. United States participation in civil affairs in southern and southeast Europe will be limited to procurement and shipment of supplies to Albania, Yugoslavia, and Greece, and to the employment of a small number of officers in connection with distribution until such time as U.N.R.R.A. can take over these duties.”

These paragraphs were incorporated into the British directive to General Wilson and it was sent to him on June 9. The problems with respect to Austria and the Balkans which seemed to have been so quickly solved was [were] suddenly confused, however, by twin inquiries from the Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff requesting clarification of our position. The British commented that the June 9 directive to General Wilson stated that we would not occupy Austria, whereas on May 31 Ambassador Winant had informed the European Advisory Commission that “he was authorized to accept the proposal for the tripartite occupation of Austria.” The State Department was taken by surprise and telegraphed Winant on June 15 that, so far as it knew, our policy on Austria had not changed; we still believed that “Austria should be occupied by British forces.”

Mr. Winant replied two days later. He explained that, although Russia and Great Britain had agreed on tripartite occupation of Austria, he had had no instructions on the subject. “On the last day I was in Washington [May 26],” he wrote, “I accordingly took this matter up with the President and obtained his permission to agree to the tripartite control of Austria on the understanding that I would in no way commit us respecting the size of the contingent that we might be willing to contribute for this occupation. In working on the drafts concerning the subject of occupation of Austria, I rejected, for example, the phrase ‘will be occupied by the forces of three countries’ and have used the less concise phrase ‘tripartite control.’ When General Marshall was here I discussed this question with him and explained our limited position.”

Ambassador Winant’s belated account of his discussion with the President clarified the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the British Chiefs on 12 July, in answer to their query, that “there is no change in the policy of the United States Government as regards occupational forces for Austria except that a token force similar to the

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2C.C.S. 320/18, 11 June 1944. [Footnote in the source text. For a portion of the text of the directive to Wilson dated June 9, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, p. 434.]


5 See ibid., p. 435.

6J.C.S. 577/15, 3 July 1944. C.C.S. 320/20, 7 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

7 The bracketed date appears in the source text.

8J.C.S. 577/15, 3 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text. For the full text of Winant’s telegram No. 484 to Hull, dated June 17, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, p. 436.]
force planned for Berlin may be sent to Austria in connection with a tripartite control of Austria that may be agreed upon.†† The State Department made a similar reply to the Foreign Office.**

Meanwhile General Wilson had continued his planning for the occupation of Austria and at the end of July he reported that he plans, with General Eisenhower's approval, to occupy Austria with four British divisions.††

†† C.C.S. 220/21, 12 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
** J.C.S. 577/15, 19 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text. For Hull's telegram No. 5387 to Winant on this subject, dated July 15, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 451.]
†††Message for the Combined Chiefs of Staff from General Wilson (NAF 749), 29 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

F. BASIC STRATEGY AND POLICIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

J.C.S. Filies

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 August 1944.

C.C.S. 634

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE

Reference: C.C.S. 426/1

The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve these basic policies for the next United States-British staff conference:

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agree that the following statement of basic strategy and policies will be used as a basis for the next United States-British staff conference.

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

II. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan.

3 "Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister", December 6, 1943. For text, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 810.
with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and
attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced.
The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given
consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

5. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other
Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources
of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest
possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all
strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a
first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation:

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western
Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.

d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.

e. Continue the offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

f. Continue to aid the war effort of Russia.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in
order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base
for operations against Japan.

h. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable
them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and
Far East as a matter of highest priority as soon as the German situa-
tion allows.

j. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion
of Japan.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 2 September 1944.
C.C.S. 654/1

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF
CONFERENCE

References:  a. C.C.S. 654 ¹
                b. C.C.S. 426/1 ²

1. The British Chiefs of Staff recommend acceptance of the fol-
lowing amendments to the proposals put forward by the United States
Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 654.

¹ Supra.
² See ante, p. 218, fn. 1.
(a) Paragraph 6 f

f. Continue to aid the war effort of Russia. 3 Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia including the coordinated action of our forces. 4

This wording was used in C.C.S. 426/1, paragraph 6 g, and the British Chiefs of Staff feel that the coordination of action of our forces with the Russians will be of increasing importance as they converge.

(b) Paragraph 6 h

h. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces, and be prepared to assist other co-belligerents, to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

This amendment is designed to cover, for example, supplies to Turkey and Axis satellites turning over to our side.

(c) Paragraph 6 i

i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows.

2. In all other respects the proposals put forward are acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff.

3 Canceled type in the source text represented a proposed deletion.
4 The words printed in italics throughout this document, except for paragraph headings, were underscored in the source text to represent proposed additions.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 8 September 1944.

C.C.S. 654/5

Basic Policies for the Next United States-British Staff Conference

References:  a. C.C.S. 654 1
b. C.C.S. 654/1 2

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the amendments to the basic policies for the next United States-British Staff Conference as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 654/1. They agree with the amendments proposed in paragraphs 6 f and 6 i, subject to the rewording set forth below. As to the change suggested in paragraph 6 h, the United States Chiefs of Staff prefer to consider these matters separately as they arise.

1 Ante, p. 218.
2 Supra.
The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that paragraphs 6f, 6h, and 6i should read as follows:

a. Paragraph 6f.

"f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces."

b. Paragraph 6h.

"h. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers. Within the limits of our available resources, to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able effectively to employ this assistance against the Axis Powers in the present war."

c. Paragraph 6i.

"i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed commitments as soon as the German situation allows."

G. THE WAR IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

TOP SECRET

London, 29 August 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, Personal and Top Secret, number 772.

General Alexander received a telegram from SHAPE asking for efforts to be made to prevent the withdrawal of more divisions from the Italian Front. This of course was the consequence of the great weakening of our Armies in Italy and has taken place entirely since the attack on the Riviera.\(^3\) In all, four divisions have left including a very strong Panzer en route for Chalon. However, in spite of the weakening process Alexander began about three weeks ago to plan with Clark to turn or pierce the Apennines. For this purpose the British 13 Corps of four divisions has been placed under General Clark's orders and we have been able to supply him with the necessary artillery of which his army had been deprived. This army of eight divisions—four American and four British—is now grouped around Florence in a northerly axis.

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1 Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.
2 According to Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 122–124, he sent this message from Naples on August 28; it was relayed via London.
3 i.e., the Allied landings which took place on the southern coast of France on August 15, 1944 (Operation DRAGOON).
By skimming the whole front and holding long stretches with nothing but anti-aircraft gunners converted to a kind of artillery-infantry and supported by a few armoured brigades, Alexander has also been able to concentrate ten British or British controlled divisions representative of the whole British Empire on the Adriatic flank. The leading elements of these attacked before midnight on the 25th and a general barrage opened and an advance began at dawn on the 26th. An advance of about nine miles was made over a large area but the main position, the Gothic Line, has still to be encountered. I had the good fortune to go forward with this advance and was consequently able to form a much clearer impression of the modern battlefield than is possible from the kinds of pinacles and perches to which I have hitherto been confined.

The plan is that the Eighth Army of ten divisions very heavily weighted in depth will endeavour to pierce the Gothic Line and turn the whole enemy's position entering the Po Valley on the level of Rimini but at the right moment depending on the reactions of the enemy Mark Clark will strike with his eight divisions and the elements of both armies will converge to Bologna. If all goes well I hope that the advance will be much more rapid after that and that the continued heavy fighting will prevent further harm being done to Eisenhower by the withdrawal of divisions from Italy.

I have never forgotten your talks to me at Teheran about Istria and I am sure that the arrival of a powerful army in Trieste and Istria in four or five weeks would have an effect far outside purely military values. Tito's people will be awaiting us in Istria. What the condition of Hungary will be then I cannot imagine but we shall at any rate be in a position to take full advantage of any great new situation.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 30 August 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 611, personal and top secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 772. I was very glad to receive your account of the way in which General Wilson has concentrated his forces in Italy and has now renewed the offensive. My Chiefs of Staff feel that a vigorous attack,

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1 Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

2 Supra.
using all the forces available, should force the enemy into the Po Valley. The enemy may then choose to withdraw entirely from northern Italy. Since such action on his part might enable the enemy to release divisions for other fronts, we must do our best to destroy his forces while we have them in our grasp. I am confident that General Wilson has this as his objective.

With an offensive under way and being pressed full strength in Italy, I am sure that General Eisenhower will be satisfied that everything possible is being done in the Mediterranean to assist him by mauling German divisions which might otherwise be moved against his forces in the near future. I understand all available British resources in the Mediterranean are being put into Italy. We are pressing into France all reinforcements and resources we can in order to guarantee that General Eisenhower will be able to maintain the impetus of the joint victories our forces have already won. With the smashing success of our invasion of southern France and the Russians now crumbling the enemy flank in the Balkans, I have great hopes that complete and final victory will not be long delayed.

It is my thought that we should press the German Army in Italy vigorously with every facility we have available and suspend decision on the future use of General Wilson’s armies until the results of his campaign are better known and we have better information as to what the Germans may do.

We can renew our Teheran talk about Trieste and Istria at OCTAGON.

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

TOP SECRET LONDON, 31 August 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 774.

Your No. 611² SOP.

Now all operations in Italy are conceived and executed by General Alexander in accordance with his general directives from the Supreme Commander. You will see that he is now in contact for twenty miles on the Adriatic flank with the Gothic line, and a severe battle will be fought by the Eighth Army. Also General Clark with the Fifth Army has made an advance from the direction of Florence. I have impressed most strongly upon General Alexander the importance of pressing with his utmost strength to destroy the enemy’s armed forces as well

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.
² Supra.
as turn his line. It will not be easy for the Germans to effect a general retreat from the Gothic line over the Alps especially if we can arrive in the neighbourhood of Bologna. The western passes and tunnels into France are already blocked by your advance into the Rhone Valley. Only the direct route to Germany is open. We shall do our utmost to engage, harry and destroy the enemy. The decisive battle has yet, however, to be fought.

2. In view of the fact that the enemy on the Italian front has been weakened by four of his best divisions, we no longer ask for further American reinforcements beyond the 92nd Division, which I understand will shortly reach us. On the other hand, I take it for granted that no more will be withdrawn from Italy, i.e., that the four divisions of Clark's army and the elements remaining with them will continue there: and that General Alexander should make his plans on that basis. So much for the present.

3. As to the future: continuous employment against the enemy will have to be found for the Eighth and Fifth Armies once the German armies in Italy have been destroyed or unluckily made their escape. This employment can only take the form of a movement first to Istria and Trieste and ultimately upon Vienna. Should the war come to an end in a few months, as may well be possible, none of these questions will arise. Anyhow, we can talk this over fully at OCTAGON.

4. I congratulate you upon the brilliant success of the landings in Southern France, I earnestly hope the retreating Germans may be nipped at Valence or Lyons and rounded up. Another mob of about 90,000 is apparently streaming back from the south via Poitiers.

J.C.S. Files: Telegram
The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Wilson) to the British and United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

AFHQ, 2 September 1944.
FX 91375, Medcos 181. Following is a review of the situation in the Mediterranean Theatre.

I. Operation "DRAGOON"

1. Thanks to the skill with which it was mounted and carried through by all three services Operation DRAGOON has been an outstanding success. Once ashore the skill of the commanders combined with the determination and speed of manoeuvre of all forces coupled

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1 This message was sent separately to the British Chiefs of Staff, to the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington for the United States Chiefs of Staff, and to Eisenhower's headquarters. For the discussion of this report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see post, p. 302.
with effective assistance from the French Forces of the Interior have produced a situation in which the whole of southeastern France east of the Rhone and south of Lyons as far east as Nice is under the control of the Allied armies. Some 50,000 prisoners have been captured and very heavy losses have been inflicted on the enemy though some 1½ divisions have escaped to the north after having suffered heavy losses in men and material. The capture ahead of schedule of the ports of Toulon and Marseilles coupled with our unexpected success in securing control of the Port de Bouc practically undamaged have resulted in a situation in which by the middle of September the ports of Southern France will be able to handle any foreseeable demands which may be placed upon them. Subsequently the logistical bottleneck will be the capacity of the railway leading north through the Rhone Valley, but thanks to the speed of our advance and the consequent reduction in the expected scale of demolitions, Seventh Army expect to be able to maintain a force of one armoured division and four infantry divisions north of Lyons by 15th September at earliest. By 1st October it is estimated that a double line of railway will be working as far as Lyons which will by that date place the supply facilities for Allied armies operating in southeastern France on a satisfactory basis. A preliminary estimate, taking into account facilities offered by the use of the Rhone Canal, some 10,000 tons per day might be delivered in the Lyons area from that date. The general tactical plan of Commander Seventh Army which I have approved is that after the capture of Lyons the general grouping of his forces will be that the French Armée “B” will undertake the protection of the right flank facing the Franco-Italian frontier and will operate east of the Rhone with an axis of advance Bourg–Besançon. In the execution of its security mission along the Franco-Italian frontier it will be assisted by the United States Divisional Airborne Division, and First Special Service Force. At the same time the VI American Corps will be regrouped so as to operate west of the Rhone on the line Autun–Dijon–Langres with the object of making contact with the American Third Army. I would propose that at this stage of the operations the command of the forces in France should be transferred to General Eisenhower. While the forces at present employed under the command of the Seventh Army might not appear to be of sufficient magnitude to warrant the formation of 6th Army Group, I consider that in view of the length of communications, the very heavy responsibilities for port maintenance and civil affairs and matters connected with the French resistance movement together with the possibility that forces from the right wing of American armies already in France might either be placed under its command or main-

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2 Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch.
tained from Mediterranean ports, it is desirable that the 6th Army Group should take over command of southern France. Anticipating that this will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff I am sending General Devers to consider plans with General Eisenhower. As regards administration, I have sent a planning representative to SHAEF to discuss the time when SHAEF should assume administrative responsibility. I would suggest that this matter be left for final settlement between SHAEF and my Headquarters. As regards the large areas in France west of the Rhone, I consider that no military action is required to deal with such small German forces as are still in this area and which are being rapidly rounded up by the French Forces of the Interior, and I feel that any divergence of regular troops would be a waste of effort.

2. Airl. I have recently discussed with General Eaker and General Spaatz proposals for the disposition of United States tactical air forces between Italy and southern France which have my full approval and which are now being discussed with General Eisenhower. Their general effect would be that continued offensive operations in the autumn and winter by the Allied armies in Italy would continue to receive very powerful air support from United States Army Air Force fighter-bombers as well as by medium bombers. The detailed deployment and distribution of the tactical air forces cannot and need not be decided until we see the outcome of the present offensive in the Po Valley. Meanwhile I am satisfied that that offensive as well as the operations in the Dragoon area are receiving most adequate and effective support. At the same time certain administrative measures such as holding up the shipping to France of aviation engineers and steel planking have been taken to facilitate any redeployment of the tactical air forces that may be decided upon.

II. Italy

In the Italian Theatre the enemy now has a total of some 26 divisions which are estimated to be the equivalent of some 16 to 17. As a result of the deterioration in the situation in northern France the Germans have withdrawn two Panzer Grenadier Divisions from this theatre which have now been identified in central France. On the other hand the success of our cover plans which have been designed to make the enemy think that one of our objects was to secure Genoa and the Ligurian Coast together with the enemy's fear that the landings in southern France might be the prelude to an invasion of Italy from the west, have resulted in the enemy disposing some five divisions, including three Italian divisions to meet this threat. As a result his forces holding the Gothic Line have been considerably weakened, and until the last few days the enemy did not apparently appreciate the threat
to his left flank. He has, however, now realised to some extent the seriousness of this threat and has moved two divisions into the line northwest of Pesaro and further movements to this flank may well be expected. With the reduction in the number of divisions available to him consequent upon the decision to launch Operation Dragoon, General Alexander changed the plan for the major offensive in Italy, which was to be launched at the end of August. Whereas in the original plan the main blow was to be launched on the general axis Florence–Bologna with the object of breaking the enemy’s centre and pinning the eastern portion of his forces back against the sea, the new plan is to launch the main blow along the Adriatic Coast north of Ancona where the Apennines present the least obstacle to movement. This main offensive was started on 26th August and is being conducted by the Eighth Army with a force of nine divisions. Good progress is being made and considerable penetration[s] of the Gothic Line have been made on a front extending some 20 miles westwards from Pesaro. As soon as the enemy starts to move reserves to this area, General Alexander plans to start a second offensive to be launched by the Fifth U.S. Army which now commands the XIII British Corps northeast of Florence in the direction of Bologna. I have every hope that as a result of these two offensives the Allied armies will secure control of the line Padua–Verona–Brescia within a few weeks and thus secure the destruction of Kesselring’s Army by preventing its withdrawal through the Alpine passes. To complete this task it will be necessary to have available the full resources now at General Alexander’s disposal. Further the limited communication facilities which are available to the enemy in northern Italy point to the fact that the use of the air will be a major factor in completing his destruction and facilitating our advance. There will therefore be ample scope for the employment of medium bomber forces throughout the whole operation and it is also to be noted that if medium bombers are established in the Florence–Ancona area, heavy and sustained attacks can be delivered by such air forces well into Austria. In view of the developments which are daily occurring in the general war situation it does not appear to me possible to undertake any further definite commitments. Should, however, the war be further prolonged and the enemy endeavour to withdraw from Greece and the Balkans with the object of holding a line from Trieste through Zagreb and Belgrade to Turnu Severin and the Transylvanian Mountains, the best course would be to regroup our forces and to move northeastwards with the object of securing control of the Ljubljana Gap. Such an operation would require the maximum co-operation with Tito’s forces and the occupation of the port of Trieste. Amphibious resources in this theatre are not available to mount a seaborne attack on Trieste this
year and consequently unless German resistance collapses it is unlikely that another major offensive could be mounted until the spring of 1945. Concurrently with an advance northeastwards it will be well to clear the enemy completely from northwestern Italy and this should be completed as rapidly as possible with the minimum forces required to establish control and law and order. Provided that demolitions through the Maritime Alps are not too severe it might well be possible to establish land communication with the forces in France.

III. Balkans

1. All information goes to show that the enemy is faced with an increasingly difficult situation throughout the Balkans and the Islands of the Aegean. This situation is likely to be further accentuated by the situation in Roumania and the probable defection of Bulgaria. Though it is estimated that a proportion of the troops are suitable from the training and equipment point of view for use elsewhere, there is little evidence at the moment that any substantial withdrawal is taking place. However, I anticipate that the Germans now faced with the necessity of finding some reserves in the Balkan area will be forced to regroup and make available four or five divisions if they are to hold either the Bulgarian frontier or the Zagreb–Belgrade line later.

2. Balkan Air Force. Since its formation, the Balkan Air Force has been successful in maintaining pressure against the enemy forces in Yugoslavia and Albania and inflicting continuing losses upon him. On 1st September as a result of consultations with Marshal Tito a concentrated attack on enemy communications in the Balkans began with the object of further embarrassing him and preventing the regrouping of forces. This operation has the code name Ratwerk and appears suitably timed. Stimulation of Partisan activity in Greece and Albania is also in hand.

3. Greece. Arrangements are in hand in the event of German withdrawal or surrender for the rapid occupation of Athens with its ports and airfields with a view of ensuring order and stability and the commencement of relief measures.

4. Rankin "C." I wish to draw the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the unsatisfactory situation in which I am placed with regard to the policy to be pursued in the event of a German collapse. If prompt and effective action is to be taken it is essential that I should receive immediate direction as to the extent of my commitments in regard to occupational forces and as to the formation which I am permitted to employ to carry out the tasks assigned to me.
President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Number 616. Personal and top secret. From the President for the Prime Minister.

Your Number 774.2

I share your confidence that the Allied divisions we have in Italy are sufficient to do the task before them and that the battle commanders will press the battle unrelentingly with the objective of shattering the enemy forces. After breaking the German forces on the Gothic Line, we must go on to use our divisions in the way which best aids General Eisenhower’s decisive drive into the enemy homeland.

As to the exact employment of our forces in Italy in the future, this is a matter we can discuss at OCTAGON. It seems to me that American forces should be used to the westward but I am completely open-minded on this and, in any event, this depends on the progress of the present battle in Italy and also in France where I strongly feel that we must not stint in any way the forces needed to break quickly through the western defenses of Germany.

The credit for the great Allied success in southern France must go impartially to the combined Allied force, and the perfection of execution of the operation from its beginning to the present belong[s] to General Wilson and his Allied staff and to Patch and his subordinate commanders. With the present chaotic conditions of the Germans in southern France, I hope that a junction of the north and south forces may be obtained at a much earlier date than was first anticipated.

Roosevelt

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1 Sent via the White House Map Room to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels. This message was based on a draft which Leahy had sent to Hyde Park in telegram No. Red 357 of September 3, 1944, which had been approved by Roosevelt with the insertion of the words “but I am completely open-minded on this and” in the second substantive paragraph.

2 Ante, p. 223.

Roosevelt Papers

Department of State Briefing Paper

SECRET

SANTA MARIA AIRFIELD

Mr. Churchill probably will not raise the question of the second Azores airfield our Army Air Corps is anxious to operate on Santa

1 Annex 9 to Hull’s memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See ante, p. 120.
Maria. The British are in agreement with us that this is a matter for direct negotiation as between us and the Portuguese. The British Ambassador in Lisbon did not mention Santa Maria in communicating to Dr. Salazar the Combined Chiefs of Staff decision respecting Portuguese participation in a Timor expedition.

It would appear unnecessary, and perhaps unwise, for us to take the initiative in reopening with the British any discussion of the airfield now under construction by us in the Island of Santa Maria, or of American use and control of the airfield when constructed.

Should Mr. Churchill raise the question it would be well to make clear to him that the negotiations leading up to the granting of this facility by the Portuguese Government have been conducted directly between the American and Portuguese Governments and have not been related in any way to the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of August 17, 1943 or to the alliance of 1873; and that our Air Corps expects to operate the field directly. In these negotiations it has been agreed that the guise of an American commercial enterprise, namely Pan-American Airways, would be employed to cover the interest of the American Government in the project. No question of control or utilization of the field for post-war civil aviation purposes is involved.

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2 Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.
3 For correspondence on Portuguese interest in the liberation of Timor and on negotiations for the construction of facilities on the Island of Santa Maria in the Azores, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.
4 No evidence has been found that Churchill raised this question with Roosevelt at the Second Quebec Conference.
5 For text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxliv, p. 447; Documentos relativos aos acordos entre Portugal, Inglaterra e Estados Unidos da América para a concessão de facilidades nos Açores durante a guerra de 1939-1945 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional de Lisboa, 1946), p. 10.

J.C.S. Files: Telegram

The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Wilson) to the War Department

TOP SECRET

URGENT

FX 93838, NAF 774. The general situation in this theatre has already been reported to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Memo 181. The following is an amplification of this telegram, taking into account the developments which have occurred since it was written.

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1 Sent also to the Headquarters, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, and to Eisenhower's headquarters in London. For the discussion of this message by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see post, p. 302.
2 Ano, p. 224.
I. Operation "Dragoon"

This is developing most satisfactorily. All arrangements for transfer of control to SHAEF are in hand and I have nothing further to add.

II. Italy

I am confident from the progress of General Alexander’s offensive from 26th August until the present date that the enemy will be driven completely from the Gothic Line. On the other hand, he is fighting very hard behind its eastern sector and I am not yet in a position to guarantee that this offensive will achieve decisive results. Considering, however, that the enemy has been forced to engage the bulk of his reserves to meet the thrust of the Eighth Army, I feel confident that as a result of the second offensive to be launched very soon by the Fifth Army the destruction of Kesselring’s Army may yet be achieved.

Should Kesselring’s Army be so hammered that it is unable to carry out an orderly withdrawal, I consider that with our great superiority in armour there is every chance of achieving really decisive results similar to those which have been secured in France. On the other hand, if he has time and opportunity to carry out a coordinated demolition programme, and particularly if bad weather should restrict the movement of armoured vehicles off the roads and limit operations of the air force as it may well do, then he may well be able to withdraw a considerable proportion of his forces intact and we may find them facing us behind the Po. Bearing in mind however that he is unlikely to have sufficient troops to hold the Po indefinitely, the course of operations would probably be a gradual withdrawal behind the line of the Alps and the Piave.

To sum up, it appears therefore that operations will develop in one of two ways:

a. Either Kesselring’s forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana Gap and across the Alps through the Brenner Pass, leaving a small force to clear up northwest Italy, or,

b. Kesselring’s Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event it does not seem possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Difficult terrain and severe weather in the Alps during winter would prevent another major offensive until spring of 1945.

III. The Balkans

Up to date information goes to show that the enemy is engaged in a large scale withdrawal from the Aegean Islands and from southern Greece with the object of finding mobile forces to hold the Bulgarian frontier and Yugoslavia.

At the same time, I anticipate that the enemy will retain static garrisons at important points and airfields with the object of preventing unopposed entry into the Balkans.
It would appear however that owing to the rapid advance of the Russian Army to Turnu Severin, and according to latest reports, the success of air and Partisan attacks on his Balkan communications (mentioned as Ratweek in part III of Medcos 181) is seems to be probable that the enemy will be unable to achieve his purpose, nor will he be able to withdraw any substantial forces to assist him in his battles in Italy or in Central Europe.

I therefore consider that we can anticipate a situation in which the bulk of the German forces south of a line Trieste–Ljubljana–Zagreb and the Danube is immobilized and will so remain until their supplies are exhausted in which case they would be ready to surrender to us or will be liquidated by Partisan or Russian forces.

As long as the battle in Italy continues, I have no forces to employ in the Balkans except:

a. The small force consisting of two paratroop brigades and an improvised brigade group from Alexandria which is being held ready to occupy the Athens area and so pave the way for the commencement of relief and the establishment of law and order and the Greek Government in the first of the countries which is likely to be liberated, and,

b. The small land forces Adriatic which are being actively used primarily for commando type operations.

Further, to intensify the enemy’s difficulties in the Aegean, a force of four carriers with cruisers and destroyers is now on its way under the command of Admiral Troubridge to the Aegean to carry out attacks on all enemy seaborne movement.

J.C.S. Files: Telegram

*The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)*

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

**TOP SECRET**

Fwd 14276, SCAR 77. 1. Following are my recommendations relative to assumption of command of DRAGOON forces.

2. It is estimated that by 15 September the DRAGOON forces will be located in strength in the Dijon area, that Seventh Army Headquarters will be north of Lyons and that an advance echelon of General Devers’ Army Group Headquarters will be near Lyons. At that time, therefore, operational control should pass to me and I will transmit

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*Circulated as the enclosure to the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 674, “Assumption of Command of ‘DRAGOON’ Forces by Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force”, September 11, 1944): “The enclosed message (SCAR 77) from the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” For the discussion of this message by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see post, p. 305.*
operational directives direct to General Devers with copies to SACMed and the Commanding General, Seventh Army.\footnote{Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch.}

3. Coincident with my taking operational control of the Dragoon forces, the Commanding General, Ninth Air Force\footnote{Major General Hoyt Vandenberg.} will assume operational control of the XII Tactical Air Command of 1st Fighter Group and auxiliary units which is actually with the Seventh Army. The Ninth Air Force will augment the XII Tactical Air Command as now constituted as necessary in order to support the Army Group adequately. The Twelfth Air Force in support of the Allied Armies in Italy will continue to support the Dragoon forces until the Ninth Air Force can assume this responsibility.

Subsequently when General Devers' Army Group comprises the French Army and at least 1 United States Army and provided the Twelfth Air Force can be spared from Italy, it should be transferred to Dragoon. Alternately should existing conditions in Italy make such a transfer undesirable, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Twelfth Air Force will furnish a command and staff echelon to General Devers' Army Group for the necessary coordination of air operations and for complete air liaison with SHAPE. Under this alternative it may be that we shall have to obtain at least 1 more fighter-bomber group from the Twelfth Air Force.

4. The exact date when administrative control should pass to me cannot be stated at the present time. Logistical support and maintenance for the Dragoon forces should continue from the Mediterranean Theater so long as United States supplies are in excess of reserves needed for other United States units in that theater. Thereafter maintenance may continue through southern France ports or be shipped to other routes if the latter prove more advantageous. Close coordination with the Mediterranean Command will be essential while resources are being shipped through the ports of southern France, whether from the United States or from North Africa or a combination of the two. I recommend that the terminating date of this responsibility be arranged by mutual agreement between Generals Wilson and Devers.

5. It is suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive to General Wilson and me regarding my assumption of command of the Dragoon forces be based upon the recommendations presented in the foregoing paragraphs.
The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

SHAEP, 9 September 1944.

FWD 14376, SCAP 78. Progress of the battles on the Continent has been thoroughly covered in my daily and periodic reports. Consequently I am transmitting a brief outline only of the present situation together with a more complete statement of my intentions in response to the request of the Combined Chiefs of Staff contained in reference cable (WX 26682 7 September 1944).²

PART I. SITUATION AS OF 9TH SEPTEMBER 1944

Today, on D plus 95, almost the whole of northern France has been liberated as have substantial parts of Belgium. Our forces have entered Holland and are close to the German Frontier at more than one point. In Brittany only the Channel Islands, Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire hold out, and on the channel coast only Le Havre, Boulogne and Calais. The hostile occupation in force of the Dutch Islands at the mouth of the Schelde is certain to delay the utilization of Antwerp as a port and thus will vitally influence the full development of our strategy.

In the south of France the Seventh Army in its rapid advance to the north has already reached Besançon and will shortly join forces with the central group of armies.

Enemy resistance, which has shown signs of collapse during the past few weeks, is stiffening somewhat as we approach the German Frontier. Nevertheless my belief is that the only way he can effectively oppose our advance into Germany will be by reinforcing his retreating forces by divisions from Germany and other fronts and manning the more important sectors of the Siegfried Line with those forces. It is doubtful whether he can do this in time and in sufficient strength but, were he to succeed, he will be likely to concentrate on blocking the two main approaches to Germany, i.e., by way of the Ruhr and the Saar. Of these he will probably regard the approach to the Ruhr as the more important, but in any event he will employ his forces to oppose a deep penetration.

¹ Sent also to the War Department, the London headquarters of the European Theater of Operations, Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta, and SHAEP, Main. The message was relayed by the War Department to Quebec as telegram No. 28393 and was received there September 10 as telegram No. OCTAGON-IN-11. For the discussion of this message by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see post, p. 301.

² See ante, p. 32, fn. 5, concerning the message to which Eisenhower was replying.
Naval operations have in general proceeded according to plan, and attempts by the enemy to interfere with our sea lines of communications have been countered effectively. Consequently our losses due to enemy action have been light. However, the unexpected small losses in the assault were largely counterbalanced by the effects of a north-easterly gale in June and by the longer shipping turn-round time than had been anticipated. The scale of enemy minelaying and his use of new types of mines have strained our minesweeping resources to the utmost. These factors and systematic demolitions have retarded the development of ports.

Air operations have also proceeded as planned. The Pointblank program has been and is being pressed very successfully. Current priorities being as follows: Oil, production of aircraft parts, armored fighting vehicle parts industries, automobile plants.

The advance of the ground forces have [has] largely removed the flying bomb and rocket threats and necessity for substantial air effort against Crossbow.

PART II. INTENTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE

General. My intention is to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and occupy the heart of Germany. I consider our best opportunity of defeating the enemy in the west lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar confident that he will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential areas. The first operation is one to break the Siegfried line and seize crossings over the Rhine. In doing this the main effort will be on the left. Then we will prepare logistically and otherwise for a deep thrust into Germany. The immediate missions assigned the army groups are set forth below.

Northern Group of Armies. Antwerp having been seized, the northern group of armies and that part of the central group of armies operating northwest of the Ardennes will breach the sector of the Siegfried line covering the Ruhr and seize the Ruhr.

The First Allied Airborne Army supports the northern group of armies in the attainment of first objectives. An operation to seize the crossings over the Rhine and in the area Arnhem–Nijmegen has been twice postponed on account of weather and only awaits favorable weather conditions. Plans for other airborne operations in support of both groups of armies have been prepared.

Central Group of Armies. The central group of armies less that portion operating northwest of the Ardennes will:

a. Capture Brest.
b. Protect the southern flank of the Allied Expeditionary Force.
c. Occupy the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Saar and then seize Frankfurt. This operation is to start as soon as possible in
order to forestall the enemy in this sector but troops of the central
group of armies operating against the Ruhr northwest of the Ardennes
must first be adequately supported.

d. Take advantage of any opportunity to destroy enemy forces with-
drawing from southwest and southern France.

The ports of Lorient, St. Nazaire, Nantes and the area of Quiberon
Bay are no longer essential for maintenance of United States forces.
Central group of armies have therefore been instructed that it is
unnecessary to reduce St. Nazaire and Lorient by force of arms and
that the German garrisons isolated in these areas may for the present
merely be contained.

Link up with Dragoon Forces. Recommendations have been trans-
mittet to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that operational control of
Dragoon Forces will pass to this headquarters on the 15th September
1944. At present the Dragoon Forces have been directed on the area
Dijon–Besançon–Vesoul in preparation for further advance on Mul-
house and Strasbourg.

Future Intentions. Once we have the Ruhr and the Saar, we have a
strangle hold on two of Germany’s main industrial areas, and will
have largely destroyed her capacity to wage war whatever course
events may take. During the advance to the Ruhr and the Saar we will
be opening the deep water ports of Le Havre and Antwerp or Rotter-
dam which are essential to sustain a power thrust deep into Germany.
I wish to retain freedom of action to strike in any direction so far
as the logistical situation permits. At the moment and until we have
developed the channel ports and the rail lines therefrom, our supply
situation is stretched to the breaking point, and from this standpoint
the advance across the Siegfried Line involves a gamble which I am
prepared to take in order to take full advantage of the present dis-
organized state of the German armies in the west. The possibilities
for further advance, depending on the situation at the time, are:

a. The Ruhr via Hanover on Hamburg or Berlin.
b. Frankfurt via Leipzig or Magdeburg on Berlin.
c. A combination of both.

Secondary operations such as the occupation of the Nuremberg–
Munich area will depend on the logistical situation at the time.

The stage at which TALISMAN conditions will obtain cannot be
forecast. Operation TALISMAN will be conducted as an extension of the
military operations in progress when and if TALISMAN conditions
arise. The necessary instructions to all concerned for the disarmament
of the enemy forces, the occupation of specific targets in the Allied
spheres and for the care and repatriation of prisoners of war are ready
for issue and some are being issued.

*See Eisenhower’s telegram No. SCAF 77, September 9, 1944, supra.*
Logistical Developments. Lines of communications are strained to keep up with present advances, and every effort is being made to develop railroads and ports to support rapid exploitation. Our main requirement is deep water ports east of the Seine, Brest and Le Havre will probably be opened initially for the central group of armies and Low Countries port[s] initially for the northern group of armies. When the full capacity of rail lines operation from the original lodgement area to Paris, the Valenciennes coal field and north Belgium has been developed, considerably augmented forces can be supported in the advance into Germany. Air supply and special supply arrangements are being utilized to the maximum to support our rapid advance.

Operation Other Than OVERLORD Operation Against the Channel Islands. A force formed from sources outside the OVERLORD troop basis and consisting of 1 infantry brigade, reinforced, is being held in readiness in the United Kingdom to occupy the Channel Islands in the event of surrender by the garrison. Steps are being taken to induce surrender by means of psychological warfare, and I do not intend to take the Islands by force of arms.

Operation Into Norway. In the event the enemy withdraws from Norway or surrenders I propose to send to Norway an Allied force of the order of 1 British division and 1 United States regimental combat team, together with certain Norwegian troops.

Operation POINTBLANK. Strategic air forces will continue POINTBLANK operations to a successful conclusion. Priorities may change from time to time in accordance with the situation.

J.C.S. Files

Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee

SECRET

Enclosure to C.C.S. 660/1

[WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944.]

PROSPECTS OF A GERMAN COLLAPSE OR SURRENDER

(AS OF 8 SEPTEMBER 1944)

THE PROBLEM

1. To review the principal factors bearing on German surrender or the collapse of German resistance and to estimate the form which such an event is likely to take and the time when it is likely to occur.

DISCUSSION

2. See Appendix.

1 Submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of a note (not printed) by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 660/1) dated September 9, 1944. This report was noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944. See post, p. 805.
3. The German strategic situation has deteriorated to such a degree that no recovery is now possible. In addition to the disintegration of the German front in the West, the crumbling of the German position in the Balkans, and the penetration of German defenses in Italy, the general decline in Germany's war potential brought about mainly by Allied bombing and by German losses of manpower has contributed largely to this situation.

4. The present German Government, or any Nazi successor, is unlikely to surrender. Control by the Party appears strong enough to prevent governmental overthrow or internal disintegration prior to an extensive collapse of military resistance.

5. Although causes for collapse are undoubtedly present, the lack of visible symptoms indicates that German national life is still mobilized behind the war effort. This support is not likely to break down until the final military debacle has reached its final stage.

6. The collapse will probably take the form of piecemeal surrenders by field commanders, who will be influenced both by the tactical pressure on them and by their individual appreciation of the hopeless strategic situation, and possibly by their disagreement with the policy of the Central Government.

7. Unmistakable signs of the imminence of collapse are unlikely to be apparent until the end of resistance is close at hand, but collapse, once begun, is likely to spread rapidly. We consider that organized resistance under the effective control of the German High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) is unlikely to continue beyond 1 December 1944, and that it may end even sooner.

Appendix

1. Strategic Situation

   a. **Ground.** Prior to the opening of the summer offensives, German strategy had as its primary goal the crushing of any Allied attempt to establish a front in western Europe. In order to accomplish this, Germany was prepared to yield ground elsewhere under pressure in the hope that, after defeating Allied operations in the West, she might be able to retrieve such situations as had worsened in the meantime.

   This strategy failed to produce the desired results. In France the German front has virtually ceased to exist. Since the break through in Normandy, the Germans have been unable to hold any line and the Allies are advancing against very light resistance to the German Frontier. In Italy, the German defenses based on the Gothic position have been penetrated. In the Balkans, the whole German position is crumbling. In the East, although the Germans have, at the moment, an
organized front between the Russian and the German Frontier, they cannot be confident of holding their present line in Poland against a renewal of the Russian offensive.

The aim of German strategy must be to prolong the war and to prevent, for as long as possible, the invasion of the Reich itself; but the speed of recent events has taken Germany completely by surprise and has left her without the resources and apparently without any coordinated plan to meet her radically altered strategic position.

Sound military strategy would long ago have seemed to dictate territorial retrenchment in order to concentrate additional forces in the decisive areas. This, however, would have involved grave political dangers, the very weakness of Germany’s position making it imperative for her to disguise the true state of affairs as long as possible, not only from her enemies, but from the wavering satellites and neutrals, the restive populations in occupied territories, and her own people.

We believe that Hitler may now have realized that his only hope of using some of his troops, now in outlying parts of Europe, for the prolongation of the war and the defense of the Reich, lies in withdrawing them immediately. There is evidence that this process has already started from the most outlying areas. Even so, he has waited too long. During September he might be able to make available for the defense of the West Wall, in addition to the divisions he is able to extricate from France, the equivalent of 10-15 full divisions from elsewhere, excluding the Eastern Front. These would include some ten low category divisions at present forming in Germany, but they are generally under strength, inadequately trained, short of artillery, and fitted only for static defense, and are considered equivalent to about five full-strength divisions. We are also unable to exclude the possibility that some divisions might even be transferred from the Eastern to the Western Front. Any divisions which Germany can make available will be sent to the West so long as this front presents the most immediate threat. However, if these transfers do take place, they will not be sufficient to hold the Allied attack in the West.

b. Air. The offensive strength of the German Air Force has declined to negligible proportions. In view of Germany’s increasing shortage of oil and air crews no revival of effort on an intensive or sustained scale is possible.

In order to provide for the defense of vital strategic objectives in the Reich against Allied bombing operations, the Germans have already found it necessary to curtail drastically air support of their military operations on all fronts and the air defense of occupied territories. Nevertheless, the German Air Force is unable to prevent heavy and systematic destruction of high priority objectives by Allied
bombing attacks, nor will it be able to prevent the invasion of the Reich or exert any important influence on the final outcome of that invasion. Although some temporary increase in fighter strength may be achieved by the avoidance of combat, the shortages of fuel and of trained pilots probably preclude any substantial improvement in defensive capabilities.

Jet propelled aircraft have now appeared operationally in relatively small numbers. Although this may necessitate some slight revision of Allied air tactics, it is highly unlikely that a sufficient number of this type will become operational before the end of the war to change substantially the present over-all ineffectiveness of the German Air Force.

c. Sea. The German operations against Allied shipping and against Allied supply lines to the Continent have degenerated into harassing activities owing principally to the success of Allied anti-submarine measures and, to some extent, to the impotence of the German Air Force.

The enemy still disposes of a large U-boat fleet and is now constructing improved types. An increase of activity may be expected in the autumn. When these new types become operational, it is likely that these operations may temporarily meet with more success than has been the case for some months past. Operations will, however, be seriously hampered by the loss of bases in the Biscay and consequently by the disadvantages of being forced to use Norwegian ports. Such operations are, therefore, unlikely to achieve a sufficient degree of success to exert any important influence on the course of the war.

The German surface forces may still be able to delay further deterioration of the situation in the Baltic, where all the major units except the Tirpitz are now concentrated, but it is very unlikely that they will be able to influence appreciably developments in any other theater. No forces remain in areas south of the Straits of Dover.

New technical developments in U-boat equipment and in such weapons as torpedoes, bombs and mines may, as in the past, prove of material value to the enemy. The operation of "Small Battle Units," comprising one-man torpedoes, explosive motor boats, and such weapons, may be intensified. It is very unlikely, however, that the enemy will be able by these means to exert any important influence on the course of the war.

d. Manpower. Lack of combat-fit manpower constitutes one of the most critical over-all weaknesses in the German situation. The number of physically fit young men remaining in the entire German population is already substantially less than the minimum requirements of the armed forces. German losses in manpower have already been enormous. These can no longer be replaced nor can the fighting effective-
ness of her combat units be maintained in the face of this heavy attrition. Mobilization of the civilian labor forces is already virtually complete and the importation of more foreign workers is not now possible on any substantial scale and would increase the already grave potential source of danger they represent. Announced German measures for “full mobilization” of the home front therefore cannot have any substantial effect in alleviating the manpower crisis.

e. Political and Psychological Factors. The strongest elements in the German strategic situation are the political and psychological forces which maintain the German will to resist in spite of the overwhelming pressure exerted by the adverse military situation. Nazi controls governing every aspect of German life continue to be outwardly effective. As a result of the attempted coup d’etat of 20 July, Nazi control has been further extended into the Wehrmacht. Undoubtedly, the extent of the plot, which came to light on 20 July after brewing for months, indicates serious discontent in the armed forces, especially in the officer corps. This discontent is being kept in check only at the expense of further weakening the fighting power of the army through the replacement of disaffected officers by Nazi officers of less ability and experience.

The attitude of the civilian population continues to oscillate between apathy and hopes for a negotiated peace. The complete Party control of the home front, in any case, renders the likelihood of purely civilian revolt extremely remote.

f. Economic. There is evidence that the Allied attacks on Germany’s oil production, stocks, etc., are now confronting her with disaster. This is the most serious shortage of material with which Germany is at present faced, and seriously reduces her capacity to deal with the catastrophic developments in her strategic situation. Other shortages, especially in ferro-alloys, will become increasingly acute.

The German war economy is now clearly unable to meet Germany’s military requirements. Shortage of tanks, military vehicles, and even ammunition is now seriously affecting operations on the fighting fronts. Losses in equipment have been enormous and cannot possibly be replaced.

The civilian supply position, although increasingly tight, is unlikely directly to cause military difficulties or to precipitate a civil revolt. Lack of civilian goods may cause some political difficulties and may reduce labor efficiency.

g. Occupied and Satellite Countries. The satellite states are increasingly concerned to save themselves from the effects of a German defeat. Rumania has already proclaimed her surrender and declared war on Germany. Bulgaria has asked for an armistice and is reported to have declared war on Germany. Finland has accepted Soviet conditions for
the opening of armistice negotiations and claims to have received Germany’s agreement to the withdrawal of German forces from her territory. Hungary still remains in the war because she is unwilling to restore to Rumania the ceded territories in Transylvania and because she fears the U.S.S.R.²

The Germans are reported to be already withdrawing from Finland, but it is unlikely that more than one-half of the total force can be withdrawn sufficiently rapidly to be effective as reinforcements. German withdrawal from southern Greece and the Aegean Islands may have begun already. The only area from which German withdrawal is unlikely is Norway which now provides the only bases from which German U-boats can hope to operate in the Atlantic.

h. Relations With Neutrals. The remaining European neutrals may be expected to cling to their neutrality; they will nevertheless give greater assistance to the United States and Great Britain at Germany’s expense despite the apprehensions of some of these neutrals over the increase of Soviet influence on the Continent. As her position deteriorates, Germany will get less and less economic aid from the neutrals.

i. German Hopes. For many months the only bases for German hopes of avoiding unconditional surrender have been the possibility of division among the United Nations, the possibility of new weapons that would affect fundamentally the course of the war, and the possibility of war weariness or discouragement in one or more of the United Nations. At present the relations of the three major United Nations are more harmonious than ever. Secret weapons cannot, of course, be evaluated precisely in advance, but the overwhelming weight of scientific and military conjecture holds that the Germans are not likely to produce a new weapon that can fundamentally alter the course of the war. The Allied advance in the West has already occupied or cut off all the main areas from which ground-launched flying bombs or long-range rockets can be operated against England and has thus destroyed German hopes of influencing the course of the war by the use of these weapons. War weariness among the United Nations can scarcely be expected to become critical at a time when their military progress is more rapid than in any former period. Thus, the virtual hopelessness of the German situation is driven home more forcefully week by week as the hope of being able to prolong the war recedes.

2. Explanation of Continued German Resistance

The preceding paragraphs indicate that the factors which should produce a collapse or surrender are already present in the German

²For documentation on these developments, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vols. III and IV.
situation. Continued German resistance is chiefly due to the fanatical
determination of the Nazi Party leaders to fight to the end and to their
possession of the necessary political and psychological control within
Germany. This determination is based on the doctrine held by the
Nazis that Germany surrendered too quickly in 1918; their fear for
their own safety; a fanatical belief in their own capabilities which
prevents them from accurately appraising the situation; and the lack of
any alternative to continued resistance which would seem to offer
opportunities for a later revival of their power. It is possible that
preparations are being perfected to maintain, even after defeat, an
underground organization. The failure of the coup d'état of 20 July
has given the Party still more complete control of both the home front
and the Wehrmacht. The civilian population alone has neither the
courage nor the capacity to risk revolt, even if it is beginning to ap-
preciate the hopelessness of continued resistance. In the Army, disci-
pline remains reasonably firm although the confidence of the rank
and file is being undermined by the shortage of men, munitions, motor
transport, and liquid fuels and by the inescapable contrast between
German and Allied artillery and air power. Therefore although the
strategic situation indicates certain defeat, German resistance is likely
to continue beyond the time when any rational objectives within the
immediate or distant future seem to be served by doing so.

3. Symptoms of German Collapse or Surrender

There are still no certain indications that German groups are acting
as though collapse or surrender is imminent. Despite the plot of 20 July
and the fact that the promotion of SS officers had a bad effect on the
morale of officers of the Army proper, there is no evidence that the
officer corps or the rank and file of the Army has been generally and
seriously demoralized. Although surrenders are occurring more
readily than formerly, large scale mutinies or desertions have not yet
developed. In certain areas German soldiers continue to fight tena-
ciously but elsewhere they have lost the will to resist and only disci-
pline prevents a complete collapse of morale. On the home front,
strikes and demonstrations have apparently not yet assumed danger-
ous proportions. Serious peace feelers have not been put forth by the
Germans, but the satellite states, which might be expected to break
away from a defeated Germany before final collapse, have already
begun to do so.

4. Form of Surrender

Since it is unlikely that the present German Government or any
Nazi successor will surrender, the end of German resistance is most
likely to come through a series of piecemeal surrenders by German
armed forces in the field. Individual commanders who find themselves
in difficult situations will be influenced to surrender by their own appraisal of the general strategic situation and possibly by their disagreement with the policy of the Central Government. Once the tendency toward piecemeal surrender gathers momentum, elements of the Wehrmacht which have retreated into Germany under arms may even carry out the actual final expulsion of the Nazi regime. But this possibility cannot be envisaged until one or more of the main fighting fronts has collapsed.

5. Time of Surrender

We believe that organized German resistance under the effective control of the German High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) is unlikely to continue beyond 1 December 1944. In reaching this conclusion we consider the collapse of the German front in the West, the rapid deterioration of the position in the East, especially in the Balkans, the impotence of the German Air Force, and increasing shortages of oil and weapons of war which will have become most critical by that date. The military situation therefore is ripe for a collapse. It is impossible to forecast the date at which this collapse might begin, but once begun it is likely to spread rapidly. We therefore believe that organized resistance may end even sooner than 1 December.

H. THE WAR IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Top Secret
Enclosure to C.C.S. 452/18

[London, undated.]

1. As agreed at the Sextant Conference we have devoted prolonged study to the strategy for the war against Japan. We have considered how best our forces can be disposed and what operations they should carry out, taking into account the undertaking given by His Majesty’s Government at the Casablanca Conference that on the defeat of Germany we should assist the United States to the utmost of our power in defeating Japan.

2. Several important developments have taken place since the Sextant Conference.

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1 Circulated under cover of a memorandum (not printed) by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff at Washington (C.C.S. 452/18, “British Participation in Far Eastern Strategy”, August 15, 1944). The text here printed has been amended in accordance with corrigenda circulated on August 22 and 23, 1944. For the discussion of the subject of this memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 174th Meeting, September 14, 1944, see post, p. 331. For information on the discussions within the British Government leading to the proposal contained in this memorandum, see Ehrman, pp. 493–500.
(i) The advance of the United States Forces across the Pacific has been accelerated.
(ii) The Japanese have strongly reinforced Burma and their strength in that country has risen from four and a half to 10 Divisions.
(iii) The capture of Myitkyina rules out as was always foreseen any purely defensive policy in North Burma.
(iv) The likelihood of aggressive action by the Japanese Fleet in the Bay of Bengal is now remote.
(v) Progress of the war against Germany on all fronts has been such as to render possible the partial or total collapse of Germany which might free forces from the European Theatre in the coming months.
(vi) We now have overwhelming air superiority in the South East Asia Theatre.

The following paragraphs contain our proposals in the light of the above developments.

**OPERATIONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA THEATRE**

3. The present directive to South East Asia Command prescribes as a first task the protection of the air link to China and so far as is possible the support of the further construction of the Burma Road (which cannot be completely opened until 1946) and of the pipelines to Yunnan (which are also progressing slowly), in addition we have of course to defend the frontiers of India. We are thus committed to a long drawn out struggle in the jungles and swamps against an enemy who has superior lines of communication to those which we possess. The wastage from sickness and disease amounted during the Campaign of 1944 up to 30th June alone to 282,000 in addition to a loss in killed, wounded and missing of approximately 40,000. Clearly therefore we should make every effort to liquidate this highly undesirable commitment if it can by any means be done.

4. Admiral Mountbatten has put forward two plans. The first plan (CHAMPION) is to continue to engage the Japanese in North Burma. This, in our opinion, will merely lead to a continuation of the present unsatisfactory state of affairs and we feel bound to reject it.

5. The second plan (VANGUARD) put forward by Admiral Mountbatten is to capture Rangoon by an airborne operation to be followed by the opening of the port of Rangoon and the maintenance of the expedition by sea. This plan is now rendered practicable by the large measure of air superiority which we enjoy in this theatre and by the Japanese inability any longer to dispute our sea lines of communication to Rangoon.

6. The capture of Rangoon and Pegu (20 miles distant) will at a stroke sever the enemy’s main lines of communication to the interior of Burma by road, river and rail. This will give us the opportunity of liquidating once and for all under the most favourable Military
conditions our commitments in Burma by the destruction of the Japanese Forces.

7. Until such time as the Rangoon operation can be launched it will be essential to contain the Japanese by offensive action South of Myitkyina.

8. The bulk of the necessary resources for Rangoon are already available and we now ask the Combined Chiefs of Staff to agree to the above plan in principle and that every effort should be made to provide from our combined resources the balance of the Forces required. We propose that General Wedemeyer should proceed to Washington as soon as possible to expound the outline plan to the United States Chiefs of Staff and to provide them with any local information they may require.

9. We are now building up a strong fleet in the Bay of Bengal the bulk of which including our newest battleships will not be required for the operations outlined above in the South East Asia Theatre. It is our desire in accordance with His Majesty’s Government’s policy that this fleet should play its full part at the earliest possible moment in the main operations against Japan wherever the greatest Naval strength is required, and thereafter its strength should be built up as rapidly as possible. This fleet by mid-1945 could probably comprise 4 battleships of the King George V class, 6 Fleet carriers, 4 Light Fleet carriers, 15 Escort carriers, 20 cruisers, 40–50 Fleet destroyers, 100 escorts and a considerable Fleet Train, the whole constituting a force which could make a valuable contribution in the crucial operations leading to the assault on Japan. This fleet built up as fast as possible would operate under United States Command.

10. If for any reason United States Chiefs of Staff are unable to accept the support of a British Fleet in the main operations (which is our distinct preference), we should be willing to discuss an alternative. The suggestion that we would make in this event is the formation of a British Empire Task Force under a British Commander consisting of British, Australian and New Zealand land, sea and air forces to operate in the South West Pacific Theatre under General MacArthur’s Supreme Command. This alternative if decided upon would still enable the British Fleet to be well placed to reinforce the U.S. Pacific Fleet if this should later be desired.

11. We ask for an early expression of the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on all the above proposals. The urgency is dictated by the need to work out as soon as possible the logistic problems involved including the development of the necessary base facilities.
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Lord Halifax
Mr. Matthews

Lord Halifax called on me this morning at his request and left with me the attached Aide-Mémoire raising certain questions with regard to the French role in military operations in the Far East, with particular reference to French Indochina. The Ambassador stated that the question has become one of considerable urgency since Mr. Eden is anxious to give M. Massigli an answer to two definite points before the latter leaves London on August 29. The two specific questions on which Mr. Eden desires to give M. Massigli an affirmative answer are: (1) the attachment to the South East Asia Command headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blaizot, and (2) the establishment in India of a “Corps Léger d’Intervention” (apparently already set up at Algiers). Lord Halifax said that the British Chiefs of Staff had informed him that our military people are in complete accord.

I told Lord Halifax that I would endeavor to obtain some rapid decision on the question, but that as he knew the matter was one which would involve a decision at a very high level. He said that he was aware of this fact but hoped that a favorable answer can be obtained sometime Monday. ¹

H F[REEMAN] M[ATTHEWS]

[Attachment]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty’s Government have given consideration to a request by the French Committee of National Liberation that the French should take a more active part in the war against Japan.

2. In brief, their proposals are:—

(i) That a French Military Mission should be attached to the headquarters of South East Asia Command.
(ii) That French Forces should take a more active part in the war in the Far East.

¹ August 28.
(iii) That they should participate in the planning of the war against Japan.
(iv) They should participate in the planning of political warfare in the Far East.

3. His Majesty’s Government’s views on the above proposals are as follows:

(i) The establishment of a French Military Mission with South East Asia Command would facilitate the work of SOE/OSS and would serve as the nucleus of the operational headquarters which may be required later. If the Mission is not accepted the French will probably concentrate on Chungking, where it would be harder to control them. The function of the Mission would be confined mainly to matters concerning Indo-China and it would not participate in questions of general strategy. It would therefore be much on the same basis as the Dutch and Chinese Missions attached to South East Asia Command.

(ii) The use of French land and air forces would stimulate resistance to the enemy among the French officials still in Indo-China, but with the administrative difficulties that would be involved now, His Majesty’s Government think that the offer of these forces should only be accepted in the later stages of the war and on the understanding that they are made up of good and experienced fighting men. The French have also proposed the establishment in India of a “Corps Léger d’Intervention” composed at the start of 500 men, and designed to operate exclusively in Indo-China on Japanese lines of communication. His Majesty’s Government understand that the Corps Léger is in being at Algiers and they think that it should be accepted, provided it is properly handled and kept apart from regular military information [formations?].

(iii) His Majesty’s Government feel strongly that the French should take no part in military planning for the war against Japan until the detailed preparation of plans for the liberation of Indo-China is undertaken.

(iv) There would seem to be no objection in principle to French participation in political warfare in the areas in which the French are interested. This should be a matter for arrangement between South East Asia Command and the French Military Mission.

4. Lord Louis Mountbatten is prepared to accept the French Mission providing it is a small one consisting of a General and, say, three other officers. He is also prepared to accept the Corps Léger and foresees considerable advantage in its employment.

5. The French are very keen to take their share in the war against Japan, and the Far East is the only area in which they are now not represented. The presence of Richelieu in Far Eastern waters means that they are already participating in fact if not in name.

6. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were invited by the British members to concur in paragraph 3 in the early part of this month.2 No

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2In C.C.S. 644, “French Participation in the War Against Japan”, August 5, 1944, not printed. Paragraphs 2-5 of C.C.S. 644 are substantively identical to paragraphs 2-5 of the aide-mémoire of August 25.
reply has, however, yet been received from the American members. Monsieur Massigli is pressing His Majesty’s Government for a decision regarding the attachment to South East Asia Command headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blaizot, and the establishment in India of a “Corps Léger d’Intervention” (see paragraph 3 (i) and (ii) above). It is suggested that a decision could be taken regarding the “Corps Léger d’Intervention”, whose numbers are small and whose activities correspond to those of American and British secret operations organisations, without prejudice to the wider question of from what source French forces operating in the Far East should be equipped. His Majesty’s Government are particularly anxious to be able to give him an answer on these two points before he leaves London on August 29th.

WASHINGTON, August 25th, 1944.

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851g.00/8-2644

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached herewith a copy of an aide-mémoire ¹ left with the Department of State this morning by Lord Halifax in which the latter raises certain questions with regard to the French role in military operations in the Far East, with particular reference to French Indo-China.

The Ambassador stated that the question is of considerable urgency owing to Mr. Eden’s desire to give an answer on two definite points before the latter leaves London on Tuesday, August 29. The two specific questions on which Mr. Eden desires to give an affirmative answer are:

(1) The attachment to the South East Asia Command Headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blaizot, and

(2) The establishment in India of a “Corps Léger d’Intervention” which apparently has already been established at Algiers.

Although these suggestions are ostensibly military in character, they have wide political implications and for this reason they are being referred to you for decision. If more time is needed for decision we can so inform Lord Halifax.²

C[ordell] H[ull]

¹ Attachment to Matthews’ memorandum of conversation, supra.
² Matthews sent a copy of this memorandum and of the enclosed aide-mémoire to Leahy on August 26, 1944 (851g.00/8-2644).
The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1944.

Office Memorandum

S—Mr. Secretary Reference is made to the aide-mémoire left on August 26 by Lord Halifax . . .

[Here follows a summary of the aide-mémoire of August 25, 1944, printed ante, p. 247.]

I believe it desirable to call to your attention that the French request to the British Government was submitted in a note from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the representative of the British Government in Algiers on May 24, an English translation of which was transmitted by the American Ambassador, Mr. Murphy, under date of June 10. The French note does not include the two last mentioned proposals but it does point out that the British S.O.E. in the Indies “are already carrying out the instructing and training of a large number of French officers with a view to officering of the light intervention force”.

It is, also, to be noted from the attached cable no. 231 from Colombo of July 25 that some weeks ago the British dropped a de Gaullist agent in Indochina utilizing American facilities in China for the purpose and making efforts to prevent General Chennault from learning the exact nature of the operation; that at a recent staff meeting, S.E.A.C., presided over by Lord [Louis] Mountbatten, it was decided to proceed with two additional operations proposed by the British S.O.E. to drop de Gaullist agents in Indochina by parachute, one of whom is said to carry a holographic letter from de Gaulle; that the American staff officer responsible for coordination of S.O.E. and O.S.S. was not present having been told the meeting was cancelled; that he had been asked his approval in advance but declined as these operations are apt to be of far more political than military importance, and he was unwilling to assume responsibility of approving as an American officer British political policies and programs for Indochina which might not coincide with American policies and programs; that because of the political implications of the operations and the reluctance of American officers to give approval it was decided to seek approval of the American Government through regular diplomatic channels via London; that the British intended, however, to proceed with the first operation planned at the recent meeting even though clearance with the Department could not have been obtained.

1 Not printed (740.0011 PW/7-2644).
through London by then. It is to be noted that American facilities have to be used in all of these operations. To date, there has been no approach to the American Government through diplomatic channels for approval of these operations.

A memorandum to you with a proposed memorandum to the President was approved by me on July 27, but was withdrawn when I was advised that the issue raised by the use of American facilities in this manner was being taken up directly with the President by the American military authorities. I have now been informed that the military authorities have decided not to raise the question with the President and this matter presumably has not been brought to his attention.

Attention is further called to cable no. 146 of August 16 stating that the American Ambassador has been “informed by usual reliable source that British have approved immediately the sending of a French military mission with limited personnel who would be accredited to Lord Mountbatten’s command to discuss questions relating to Indochina and control use of the light intervention force”; that “agreement has supposedly been reached also” between French and the British on the sending of a light intervention force; and that the “question of sending later on a French expeditionary force has not yet been worked out but it is expected that some progress will be made during Massigli’s present trip to London”.

You will recall that on July 7 you sent a memorandum to the President advising him of the French request for British approval of the proposed military mission to Lord Mountbatten; of the sending of the light intervention force to India; and, at a later date, of a French expeditionary force to participate in the liberation of Indochina.

The foregoing is submitted for your information in connection with the pending decision of the President on the proposals for which the British aide-mémoire requests approval.

J[oseph] C. G[rew]

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851g.01/8-2844

The President to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In regard to your memorandum of August 26th on the subject of questions raised by Lord Halifax in reference to French Indo-China,

1 Ante, p. 249.
I suggest this matter be deferred until after my meeting with the Prime Minister in Quebec.2

The same thing applies to the Aide-Mémoire covering the French Committee’s proposals.3 It should be remembered that in relation to (iv) participation in the planning of political warfare in the Far East involves one of the principal partners i.e. China.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[oosevelt]

2 Roosevelt also told Hull orally that he planned to discuss the French proposals with Churchill at Quebec. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. III, p. 776.
3 Ante, p. 247.

740001 P.W./8-2944

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 29 August 1944.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the views of the British Chiefs of Staff regarding a request by the French Committee of National Liberation that the French should take a more active part in the war against Japan as set out in the enclosure.1

Indo-China is in the China theater of war, and therefore is an area of United States strategic responsibility. The question of the boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command were discussed at Sextant and while no affirmative action was taken, the discussion indicated that the President and the United States Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with the views expressed by the Generalissimo,2 as follows:

“a. When the time comes for two theaters to launch assaults upon the enemy in Thailand and Indo-China, the Chinese troops will attack from the north, and the troops under the command of the Southeast Asia Theater, Mountbatten, are expected to make full use of facilities afforded by the ports and air bases under its control and attack from the south. If the troops are landed in those countries, the boundaries between the two theaters are to be decided at the time in accordance with the progress of advances the respective forces made.

“b. All matters of a political nature that arise during operations will be dealt with at a Chinese-British-American Committee which is to be located in the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the China theater.”3

Admiral Mountbatten was willing to accept the suggestion of the Generalissimo in so far as the boundaries were concerned but objected to the political commissions.

It would seem that in view of our arrangements with the Dutch relative to the Dutch East Indies, and of our impending conversations with the Portuguese concerning Timor, we should recognize, in so far

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1 Concerning the enclosure, C.C.S. 644, see ante, p. 248, fn. 2.
2 Chiang Kai-shek.
as they are consistent with our national policies, the French desires concerning Indo-China. The extent and timing of such arrangements should be under continuing examination with the view of best serving our over-all interests.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from a military point of view, concur with the British views set forth in the enclosure except that they believe French participation in the planning of political warfare (paragraph 2 (iv) of the enclosure) should be restricted to the area of the Southeast Asia Command.  

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D LEAHY  
Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

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4 The text of this letter was communicated to the British authorities in CCS 644/1, August 30, 1944. There was no further action on the CCS 644 series until after the Second Quebec Conference.

740.0011 Pacific War/8-2944

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Mr. D. D. Maclean, British Embassy,  
Mr. Matthews.

I telephoned Mr. Michael Wright of the British Embassy and referred to Lord Halifax's call upon me on August 26th 1 with regard to the British desire to agree with M. Massigli to the attachment to the South East Asia Command headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blaizot and the establishment in India of a "Corps Leger d'Intervention". I told Mr. Wright that we had now received an indication from the President that the matter was one which should be deferred until the forthcoming meeting between high British and American authorities. 2 Mr. Wright said he understood.

Mr. Maclean of the British Embassy called me back later in the day to say that he had a copy of the attached letter dated August 29, 1944, 3 (he did not say where it had been obtained) in which our Joint Chiefs of Staff gave some indication that there was no military objec-

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1 See ante, p. 247.  
2 See ante, p. 251.  
3 Supra.
tion to acceding to the British request. I informed Mr. Maclean that I had not yet seen the letter; that when I did I would get in touch with Admiral Leahy, but that I did not see how the letter could in any way modify the President's reply. Upon receiving the Joint Chiefs of Staff letter shortly thereafter, I telephoned Admiral Leahy and then informed Mr. Maclean that the Joint Chiefs of Staff letter to the Secretary of State was merely intended to convey their views on the military aspect of the questions posed and could in no way of course be considered as modifying the position which the President had taken of which I had informed Mr. Wright, namely, that consideration of the question must be deferred until the meeting in question.

H F[Reeman] M[atthews]

*No record has been found of a discussion of this specific matter at the Second Quebec Conference, and an aide-mémoire from the British Embassy dated November 22, 1944, stated: "It was anticipated that this discussion would take place at the Quebec Conference, but in fact the subject was never raised." See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. III, p. 782. Cf. post, p. 298.*

Hopkins Papers

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

LONDON, September 1, 1944.

DEAR HARRY: You do not know how greatly your decision not to go on to the Conference has been regretted by our friend here. His message to the President will have told you of his illness on arrival which is only known to a dozen people here. Tonight his temperature is back to normal and he seems on the way to a quick recovery. But each journey has taken its toll and the interval between illnesses has been constantly shortened. There is no one that I have known here who cares so much about friendly relationships between Great Britain and the United States, and few people anywhere who have been more loyal in their friendship to the President.

The Conference will undoubtedly consider the planning [of] the war against Japan. No thoughtful person can approach the problem without remembering that Great Britain has been fighting for five years and that they are at the bottom of the barrel as regards manpower. Men from 16 to 65 are conscripted, and women from 18 to 50. The country has been on short rations for this entire period. I live on them and know what this means. The British Army is older than our Army. The British Navy is older than our Navy. The British merchant seamen are older than our merchant seamen. Only the Royal Air Force

*Churchill.*

*Ante, p. 26.*
has been able to continue to recruit the youth of the country. In the Battle of Britain it saved Britain. In the intervening years its continuous operation has done much to save life in the other services, but it has taken a frightful toll of the youth of the country.

When the war with Germany is over the war with Japan will begin for Great Britain, in spite of the early defeats at Hong Kong and Singapore, and the fighting in Burma. I have talked about this with many soldiers and sailors and airmen. I knew General Wingate well, and had something to do with his assignment to the Far East. He told me once that out of every 100 men they sent him, sixty had to carry forty. That means that you have to have a selective army if you are to fight the Japanese successfully in tropical areas. I have talked with Admiral Cunningham, and he told me that special arrangements should be made for Navy personnel who move to the Far East. Men should have better wages than at present and both soldiers’ and sailors’ families should be given larger family allowances if the wanted men are to continue in active service. The Royal Air Force is better positioned to move eastward but adjustments would also have to be made in that service.

The careful planning that General Marshall has made to prepare our armies for the transition period as we move from the western theater eastward, by educational films and in other ways, has no counterpart in the present British thinking. The whole field of psychological preparation for what for them will be the second war has been largely neglected.

It has always interested me that the plans for demobilization following the defeat of Germany have been treated with the utmost secrecy for fear of creating misunderstandings in the United States in relation to the serious intentions of Great Britain to fight a war against Japan. And yet there are many people who are now mobilized in the war against Germany who would be utterly useless in fighting a war against Japan. I have never questioned this policy since the President is a friend of Great Britain, and even a sensible demobilization in a presidential campaign might be used against him.

All that is one side of the picture. The really gallant people of Great Britain are as anxious to join us in the fight against Japan as we are ourselves to defeat Japan, and yet for all that there has seeped into this country through military channels a belief that the British Navy is not wanted in the Pacific. I know the practical side that many of our Navy men feel that the British Navy was built for short hauls with available ports that ringed the world, and that conversion would mean clogging our navy yards and strengthening the British Navy in the postwar years. There is some truth to it all, and yet if we allow the British to limit their active participation to recapture areas that are
to their selfish interests alone and not participate in smashing the war machine of Japan, if British soldiers don’t cross the Atlantic to our ports and electrify our Pacific ports in order to move against Japan, and if we shuck the British air force in order to prove our own dominance in the air, we will create in the United States a hatred for Great Britain that will make for schisms in the postwar years that will defeat everything that men have died for in this war. Repetition of the tragedy of 1918 will be unforgivable.

I have not found more than a dozen Englishmen interested in this problem, and no one from the United States in any way concerned about it.

What are you doing about it? I hope the President is interested.

Sincerely,

JOHN GILBERT WINANT

Hopkins Papers

The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON] September 4, 1944.

DEAR GIL: I hasten to reply to your letter relative to the implications of the British participation in the war against Japan. First of all I want to assure you that a number of us are greatly concerned about it and I am very hopeful that the President will lend up on the right side of this problem.

I am well aware of the attitude in certain circles here, but I am convinced that they are not, in any sense, representative of public opinion. The difficulty, in matters of this kind, is that public opinion gets no opportunity to express itself and, indeed, can know nothing about it until the damage is irrevocable.

There, obviously, must be some demobilization of the British Armed Forces after the collapse of Germany, just as I have no doubt there will be some of our own. Ours will be less dramatic and, therefore, will receive far less attention. It will, no doubt, take the form, first, for practical purposes, of stopping of enlistments and inductions in the Armed Forces, but I have no doubt that hundreds of thousands of men will be quietly separated from the Armed Forces for good and sufficient reasons. It is quite easy to accelerate the discharges either simply by raising the standards as to physical fitness or age. The same will not be true in England. There is no possibility of her transferring the whole of her Armed Force[s] either to the occupation of Germany or for the war against Japan. Such a force as England now has under arms will not be required, but I hope the British will continue their

\[Supra.\]
policy of playing this down for nothing could be worse than to have any public announcement of British plans for demobilization.

We simply must find a way to have Great Britain take her full and proper place in the war against Japan. This, with the best goodwill in the world, is full of many difficulties—transportation, supply, etc.

You know as well as I that we do not have a chance to get a genuinely good peace unless Russia, Great Britain and the United States can see eye to eye and this means far more than the narrow confines of government in the Foreign Offices. It means, so far as Great Britain and the United States are concerned, that great masses of people must approve our policies. The more I see of the problems and conflicts engendered by the kind of thing that you have written me about, the more I realize how essential it is for us to have men managing our affairs who have a deep and profound conviction not only about world peace and the harnessing of Japan and Germany, but about the bold moves which must be made if a world economy is to be developed which can provide the environment without which our goals can never be attained.

In saying all this, I would say that I hope very much that you, personally, are going to remain close to this thing in some capacity or other for the next few years. Needless to say, I believe the President is essential to it and there is little hope of accomplishing much without his re-election. This, I should tell you, I believe will take place, but I am the world’s worst political guesser.

As ever, with this note I send my warmest and affectionate regards.

Cordially yours,

Harry L. Hopkins

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

C.C.S. 452/25

[WASHINGTON.] 8 September 1944.

British Participation in the War Against Japan

Reference: C.C.S. 452/18

The United States Chiefs of Staff accept the British proposal in C.C.S. 452/18 for the formation of a British Empire task force under a British commander, consisting of British, Australian, and New Zealand land, sea and air forces to operate in the Southwest Pacific Theater under General MacArthur’s supreme command. It is noted that this will enable the British Fleet to be well placed to reinforce the U.S. Pacific Fleet if this should later be desired.

1 For the discussion of the subject of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 147th Meeting, September 14, 1944, see post, p. 331.
2 Ante, p. 244.
The Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command (Mountbatten) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

KANDY, 8 September 1944.

266. Reference WarX 26742. Top secret for Combined Chiefs of Staff information British Chiefs of Staff cite 273.

PART I. PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS

1. 11th Army Group

a. XV Ind. Corps. Operations in Arakan largely confined to active and offensive patrolling much hampered by monsoon conditions and thick jungle. No major changes in dispositions, though units of 81st (WA) Division have been moved to counter possible Japanese threat to our Chittagong–Dehazari line of communications from the Moythee–Labawa area.

b. XXXIII Ind. Corps

(1) **Enemy.** No reports yet of any strong Japanese defensive position capable of holding up our advance for any appreciable period either in the Dabaw Valley or on the Tiddim Road. In the former there are reports of small numbers of Japanese at Yazagyo and Yedok, and on the Tiddim Road there may be an attempt to hold us up in the area just north of Tonnang. The Japanese on the Chindwin and Tiddim front show every sign of complete disorganization and lack of coordinated control. There are signs, however, of an attempt to gather together the remnants of 15th and 31st Divisions east of the Chindwin.

(2) **Own troops.** Operations to clear the enemy from west of the Chindwin have proceeded satisfactorily and there are no new enemy on this side of the river north of Sittauung. The latter was occupied by our troops on 4th September and active patrolling is taking place northwards and southwards on the west bank of the Chindwin down the Tiddim Road, has progressed speedily and has now reached MS114, 48 miles north of Tiddim.

Japanese opposition has not been strong and the rate of progress has been largely dictated by the state of the road.

In the Rabaw Valley, our rate of advance has been satisfactory though hampered by swollen streams. Leading troops have now reached a point approximately half way between Memu and Kalemyo, without encountering any serious opposition.

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1. *Sent also to the War Department and to Eisenhower's headquarters at London. The message was relayed by the War Department to Quebec as telegram No. 26380 and was received there September 10 as telegram No. Octagon–ix–9. It was noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 174th Meeting, September 14, 1944. See post, p. 335.*

2. *See ante, p. 32, fn. 5, concerning the message to which Mountbatten was replying.*
2. Northern Combat Area Command and Yunnan Force

a. 36th Division has reached Pinbaw in the Mogaung–Katha railway corridor. Patrols have entered Hopin without encountering enemy resistance. 29th Brigade has reached Pinbaw. 72nd Brigade is based in the area of Namana.

b. On the Myitkyina–Bhamo Road Chinese forces have reached Kazu. Patrols are operating five miles south of Kazu without making enemy contact. It is reported that there are no Japanese troops north of Nalong.

c. The Japanese are withdrawing from the Hopin area, and a Prisoner of War report gave Mawhun as the next area of strong resistance in the Hopin–Indaw corridor. There are indications of a build-up along the Katha–Shwebo–Bhamo line.

d. Present directive to Northern Combat Area Command remains to secure the Myitkyina–Mogaung area. In pursuance of this directive the line Pinbaw–Kazu has been occupied.

e. Offensive operations by Yunnan force are in progress in the areas of Tengchung, Lungling and Sungshan.

3. Air

Allied air forces have now gained almost complete air superiority in this theater. The following air activities are now in progress:

a. A strategic air offensive against enemy lines of communication and supply bases by bombers and long range fighters. These operations include the bombing of the Burman-Siam railway, and minelaying in the main rivers and harbours of Burma.

b. Direct support by Third Tactical Air Force of our land forces pursuing the enemy towards the river Chindwin and Tiddim, and XV Corps in the Arakan.

c. Direct support by Tenth U.S. Army Air Force of the Northern Combat Area Command Forces advancing from Mogaung and Myitkyina, and of the Chinese forces west of the Salween.

d. Transport of troops and supplies to forward areas.

PART II. IMMEDIATE INTENTIONS

4. Enemy Situation in Burma

a. Ground. Japanese have at present nine divisions in Burma and 10th division expected shortly. Three divisions on the Chindwin and two in north Burma are estimated as 30 percent to 40 percent effective, two in northeast Burma probably 60 percent effective, remaining two in Arakan 100 percent effective. Continued arrival of replacements at recent rates would enable Japanese forces to be brought up to 80 percent effectiveness by end of year.

Present indications Japanese may try and carry out offensives in Arakan and Salween early in dry season, probably with primary
object of causing diversion and thus gaining time to reform their forces.

b. Air. Current first line strength in SEAC is estimated at 450 aircraft with 165 in Burma–Siam/South FIC of which 70 (all fighters) are in Burma. By the end of the monsoon there may be a total of 410 first line aircraft in SEAC of which Burma–Siam/South FIC would have an estimated 200 (of which half are fighters).

5. Intentions

a. The intention is to take advantage of the enemy disorganization by pressing as far as possible down the Tiddim Road and the Kabaw Valley and if opportunity offers to secure Kalewa and Kalemyo.

The Japanese are unlikely to resist us in strength north of the areas Yazagyo (in the Kabaw Valley) and Tonzag (at Milestone 133 on the Tiddim Road), but may do so there or further south. It is too early to say whether they will. If they do not the present operations should result in the capture of Kalemyo by about mid-November.

If, on the other hand, they do, then an airborne operation will be necessary. Conditions in the Kabaw Valley prohibit movement of medium artillery and tanks until the roads are sufficiently dry, and Mawlaik must be secured in due course to remove any threat from that area. Having secured Kalemyo the intervening ground is of such a difficult nature that there may be some delay before we can capture Kalewa. Preparations must therefore be continued for an airborne operation.

c. In the Arakan, 3rd SS Brigade will be used to carry out minor amphibious operations to threaten the enemy line of communications and possibly divert his strength from the Kaladan Valley. 3rd SS Brigade would be released from these operations as necessary for Dracula.

d. In northeast Burma I intend to continue operations to secure the Mogaung–Myitkyina area.

d. Air operations on existing scale will continue with intention to harass enemy land and water lines of communication and continue tactical support of land forces.

The Chief of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Moffat) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1944.

S—Mr. Secretary: At the conclusion of a conference with Mr. Dunn and Mr. Grew on the policies suggested in the attached memorandum
for the President; I was requested to indicate to you that these are included in the memorandum so as to emphasize the need for correlating policies towards Indochina with policies towards the other regions in Southeast Asia; so as to have before the President, should the subject be raised in his conversations with Mr. Churchill, the objectives which EUR, FE and NEA agree to be the most desirable for the United States; and so as to secure, if possible, basic guidance for the development within the Department of necessary policies and procedures relating to the regions of Southeast Asia.

\[\text{Infra.}\]

\[\text{S31g.01/9-844}\]

\textit{The Secretary of State to the President}

\textbf{TOP SECRET}

\textbf{WASHINGTON, September 8, 1944.\textsuperscript{1}}

\textbf{MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT}

[Subject:] Indochina and Southeast Asia

The French seek restoration of Indochina and have promised some reforms to offset the independence sentiment which exists among the Indochinese and to enlist American support which they presently consider vital. They are fearful of Chinese ambitions. The French and British believe that French participation in the liberation of Indochina will stimulate Free French resistance within the country and thus aid military operations, but the extent and value of such aid is open to question. It is thought that the Japanese may shortly disarm all French troops and take over the country, possibly establishing an independent puppet regime. It seems doubtful if outside assistance could prevent such Japanese action. . . . There is much mutual distrust among the French with whom our people have come in contact. The French divisions in Indochina are considered ineffective.

Despite Mr. Eden’s apparent approval in March 1943 of placing Indochina under trusteeship,\textsuperscript{2} British policy has swung behind restoration of French authority. It is believed that an important factor in the British position is a desire to strengthen their claim for restoration of Hong Kong. In May the French, it is thought at British instigation, requested the British, with Lord [Louis] Mountbatten’s approval, for permission to send a military mission to SEAC, a light intervention force to India for subsequent use in Indochina, and, later on, an expeditionary force to Indochina. They have also asked to participate

\textsuperscript{1} The source text bears the following manuscript endorsement by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Coordination and Review: “Actually delivered to White House Sept 9. S[arik] D M[oore].”

in planning political warfare in the east and in planning military operations against Japan. The British have indicated they approve of all but the last.9

Although Indochina is not at present in the SEAC theater, it is to be noted the British desire that the details of the proposed French political warfare be worked out between SEAC and the proposed French military mission. Even prior to May the British SOE was training a large number of French officers for officering the light intervention force. Recently, using American facilities and misleading Chennault as to the purpose, the British dropped a de Gaullist agent in Indochina and agreed on two such further operations (one agent carrying a letter of credentials from de Gaulle) despite insistence by American officers attached to SEAC that the purpose was primarily political and not military and must be approved in Washington.

Reports indicate a British hope to extend the SEAC theater so as to include Indochina, most of the Dutch East Indies, Borneo and Hong Kong.

The Chinese are actively backing the Annamite Revolutionary party which seeks Indochinese independence. There are persistent reports that the Chinese hope for political ascendancy in northern Indochina, or at least creation of a free port and release from the economic stranglehold on southeast China which the French formerly exercised through the Yunnan railroad. They are particularly concerned over the danger to Chinese security inherent in French control of the railroad and their inability to defend it. The Chinese have indicated interest regarding the military government to be established in Indochina.

It would seem of substantial military importance to secure for the United Nations the good will of the native peoples of southeast Asia among whom, for some years, there has been increasing nationalistic sentiment, and who, for the past three years, have been subjected to intense Japanese propaganda exploiting the old slogan of “Asia for the Asiatics”. In this objective Indochina cannot be considered apart from other countries of southeast Asia.

It is suggested that early, dramatic and concerted announcements by the nations concerned making definite commitments as to the future of the regions of southeast Asia would save many American and Allied lives and facilitate military operations. It would be especially helpful if such concerted announcements could include (1) specific dates when independence or complete (dominion) self-government will be accorded, (2) specified steps to be taken to develop native capacity for self-rule, and (3) a pledge of economic autonomy and equality of economic treatment towards other nations. Such announcements might

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9 See ante, p. 248.
well be accompanied by a reaffirmation of American determination to grant Philippine independence, a joint commitment to restore the independence of Thailand, and a pledge to establish a regional commission for consultation on social and economic problems in the region, on which all countries and peoples concerned would be invited to have membership. The value of such concerted announcements would be still further enhanced if each of the colonial powers concerned would pledge a formal declaration of trusteeship under an international organization for the period of tutelage, but it might be unwise for the United States to attempt to insist upon such a declaration of trusteeship by one country if similar declarations could not be secured from the others.

In addition to their great value as psychological warfare, such announcements would appear to be directly in line with American post-war interests. These areas are sources of products essential to both our wartime and peacetime economy. They are potentially important markets for American exports. They lie athwart the southwestern approaches to the Pacific Ocean and have important bearing on our security and the security of the Philippines. Their economic and political stability will be an important factor in the maintenance of peace in Asia. Emergence of these regions as self-governing countries would appear desirable as soon as they are capable of self-rule, either as independent nations or in close voluntary association with western powers, for example as dominions. Such association might indeed lend them political and economic strength (the weakness of Asiatic powers has long been a cause of war) and help prevent future cleavage along regional or racial lines.

Failure of the western powers to recognize the new conditions and forces in southeast Asia and an attempt to reestablish pre-war conditions will almost surely lead to serious social and political conflict, and may lead to ultimate unifying of oriental opposition to the west.

A memorandum on British attitudes towards southeast Asia, generally, is attached.

Will you advise me if you wish the Department to develop details of policy along the lines indicated in the above suggestions.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Attachment]

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Southeast Asia: British Attitudes. There are persistent reports of a British desire to create a Southeast Asia federation of Burma,
Malaya, Thailand and Indochina under British aegis, if not direct control. This apparently develops from a report prepared last year by five officers of the Burma government. It is strongly denied in London which points to the expectation of eventual dominion status for Burma and British support of French restoration in Indochina. However, the British anticipate a fairly extended military occupation of Thailand and anticipate the need of strong economic control of all these regions to assure revival of sound industrial and agricultural practices. It seems clear that the British envisage economic ascendency in these areas.

It is significant that the British government has refused to make a public statement in line with yours and the Generalissimo’s on the restoration of the independence of Thailand. They have suggested that security questions may be involved in the Kra Peninsula (rich rubber area of Thailand) and have raised the question of boundary adjustments. Winant has been instructed to secure, if possible, at least a confidential statement of the position of the British government. There is strong evidence that the British hope to gain predominant influence over the post-war government of Thailand.

Desire for dominion status for Burma has received public British affirmations but is apparently distant. Military government is believed planned for a considerable period and various liberal reforms reportedly urged by the Burmese government-in-exile are believed to have been rejected by London.

In Malaya also it is understood that military government is planned for a period of at least two years. Reform in administration has been urged by business interests and elimination of special treatment and “protection” of racial groups.

Despite rumors of British desire to secure Sumatra, it is believed that the British are in favor of restoring Dutch authority in the Netherlands Indies. A desire to strengthen the restoration of British prestige and controls in Southeast Asia is believed to be an important factor in this position.

All reports indicate that the military operations of SEAC are aimed primarily at the resurgence of British political and economic ascendency in Southeastern Asia and the restoration of British prestige. To minimize American association in the public eye with restoration of British imperialism which is admittedly highly unpopular in Asia,

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*The reference is to a broadcast made by Chiang on February 26, 1943, and to a subsequent comment thereon by Roosevelt at his press conference of March 12, 1943. See* Foreign Relations, 1943, China, pp. 13, 24n, 36-37.*
no American civil affairs officer is to serve in any area in the SEAC theater unless under independent American command, and no American officer may collaborate in SEAC political warfare.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 9 September 1944.

C.C.S. 417/8

OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944-45

References: a. C.C.S. 417 Series
b. C.C.S. 426 Series

1. The agreed over-all objective in the war against Japan has been expressed as follows:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:

(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockade, conducting intensive air bombardment and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

1 For the discussion of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 173d Meeting, September 13, 1944, see post, p. 321. Although the schedule of operations defined in this paper was accepted as a basis for planning, certain of the target dates were overtaken by events during the Quebec Conference and the Combined Chiefs of Staff therefore omitted the schedule from their report to Roosevelt and Churchill (J.C.S. Files).

2 For C.C.S. 417, “Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan”, December 2, 1943, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 765. Concerning C.C.S. 417/1, see ibid., p. 736. C.C.S. 417/2, December 23, 1943, circulated the text of C.C.S. 417 as amended by C.C.S. 417/1. In C.C.S. 417/3, July 11, 1944, the United States Chiefs of Staff proposed a redefinition of the over-all objective in the war against Japan (this proposed redefinition is quoted in paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 417/8, printed here). Marshall explained privately that this new definition was designed to allow for an invasion of the Japanese home islands (see Ehrman, p. 498). In C.C.S. 417/4, July 29, 1944, the British Chiefs of Staff agreed to the proposed redefinition, subject to certain assurances. These assurances were given by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 417/5, August 4, 1944, in the following terms: “The proposed amendment to the over-all objective in the war against Japan is in consonance with the Over-all Objective and with the Over-all Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War, as expressed by C.C.S. 426/1 [see fn. 3, below]. The United States Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the existing agreements relative to the priority of operations OVERLORD and DRAGOON. They also reaffirm existing agreements relative to the effect on the over-all objective of extension of operations in the Pacific.” C.C.S. 417/6 and 417/7 are not printed. For the action taken at the Second Quebec Conference on the proposed redefinition, see C.C.S. 417/9, post, p. 440.

3 For C.C.S. 426/1, “Report to the President and Prime Minister” on the conclusions of the Second Cairo Conference, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 510.
2. Pursuant to the above, the United States Chiefs of Staff have evolved a course of action for planning purposes. The schedule of major operations comprising this course of action follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Date</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 October 1944</td>
<td>Talaud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 November 1944</td>
<td>Sarangani Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 December 1944</td>
<td>Leyte-Surigao Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1945</td>
<td>Formosa-Amoy Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February 1945</td>
<td>Luzon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the Formosa operation is undertaken, the following operations have been approved for planning purposes:

| April 1945          | Bonins                     |
| May 1945            | Ryuukyus                   |
| March to June 1945  | China coast                |
| October 1945        | (Foochow—Wenchow Area)     |
| December 1945       | Southern Kyushu            |
|                     | Tokyo Plain                |

A course of action to follow the Luzon operation, if undertaken, is under study.

3. It is believed that operations should be devised to accomplish the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible date and to that end plans will retain flexibility and provision will be made to take full advantage of favorable developments in the strategic situation which may permit taking all manner of short cuts. It is proposed to exploit to the fullest the Allied superiority of naval and air power and to avoid, wherever possible, commitment to costly land campaigns. Unremitting submarine warfare against enemy shipping will be continued. Very long range bomber operations against Japan proper will be continued from China bases and will be instituted from bases being established in the Marianas and from bases to be seized in the future. The air forces in China will continue to support operations of the Chinese ground forces and will also provide the maximum practicable support for the campaign in the Pacific.

4. It is agreed that every effort should be made to bring the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date and planning for such contingency is continuing.

5. The views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on British participation in the war against Japan and operations in the Southeast Asia Command are contained in C.C.S. 452/21 and C.C.S. 452/25.

6. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff note the foregoing.

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4 "Plans for Operations in Burma", August 31, 1944, not printed.
5 Ante, p. 257.
J.C.S. Files

Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee

SECRET

Enclosure to C.C.S. 643/1

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944.

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, PACIFIC–FAR EAST

THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate the enemy situation and intentions in the Pacific and Far East.

SUMMARY

2. Political and psychological. (See Appendix “A.”) Japan has sought to enlist the support of her most populous conquered areas by powerful propaganda and by grants of specious independence. For the present, Japan desires to avoid war with the U.S.S.R. in order to be free to direct all her energy against her enemies.

As a result of their fundamental beliefs, the morale of the Japanese populace, and especially of the armed forces, has remained relatively high, but a continuing series of sharp defeats will tend further to confuse and bewilder the Japanese. Such defeats, combined with a collapse of Germany, might conceivably cause a reshuffling of the ruling clique followed by an attempt to secure a negotiated peace. Japanese propaganda has already shifted from self-assured offensive to defensive.

3. Economic factors. (See Appendix “B.”) Production of high-priority armament items such as aircraft may continue to expand for some time, even though the rapid growth of Japan’s basic industry has been levelling off since the beginning of 1944. Further substantial growth of the Japanese steel and other basic industries is believed impossible in the light of the present Japanese shipping position. Shipping is now barely adequate to sustain current production rates in the basic industries, and sinkings exceed launchings. The largest and most essential economic commitment for shipping is within the Inner Zone.* Japan is continuing to develop raw material sources in the Inner Zone in an attempt to achieve self-sufficiency there, but is unlikely to achieve this goal. She is particularly dependent on the Outer Zone for oil. Inner Zone production and stockpiles of fuel oil are at best estimated as sufficient for about nine months but may be much less. In other essential raw materials not available in sufficient

*Submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of a note (not printed) by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 643/1) dated September 9, 1944. This report was noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 173d Meeting, September 13, 1944. See post, p. 320.

†Japan Proper, Korea, Manchuria, North China, Formosa, and Karafuto (Japanese Sakhalin). [Footnote in the source text.]
quantity in the Inner Zone, Japan is believed to have stockpiles to carry her for longer periods.

Japan's civilian supply position is stringent but not yet critical with respect to food and is generally bad and deteriorating with respect to other commodities, e.g., clothing.

4. Military factors. (See Appendix "C.") Realizing that the war potential of her enemies is increasing much more rapidly than her own, Japan has been compelled to adopt the strategic defensive. She hopes that tenacious resistance along successive lines of defense may eventually result in war weariness and possible division among the United Nations, which would enable her to conclude a satisfactory peace. In the past year her air force has deteriorated in quality of personnel and has operated less aggressively; her navy has suffered serious losses; only her ground forces have maintained their strength and fighting qualities.

Although Japan will continue to use caution in the employment of her air power and especially her battle fleet, we believe, nevertheless, that Japan now intends to make vigorous efforts to resist any Allied penetration of her inner defense line Japan–Formosa–Luzon–Mindanao. Her ground forces will offer maximum resistance at all points with little regard for losses; her air power will be committed to a scale of defense proportionate to the strategic importance of each area, and her battle fleet will attack should local circumstances develop which seem to offer opportunity for an effective blow.

In the Bonins, at Palau, and at Halmahera local Japanese ground forces will resist to the maximum extent of their capabilities, but without strong naval and air support.

5. Intentions in specific areas. (See Appendix "D.")

a. Japan Proper. As the war draws nearer to Japan we may expect to find an increasingly large percentage of her naval and air forces based nearby and all home defenses considerably strengthened.

b. Northern Pacific. Japan will continue her present policy of gradually strengthening her garrisons and other defenses in the Kuriles and Japanese Sakhalin.

c. Manchuria. In view of the Soviet threat, Japan is unlikely to release any appreciable ground forces from Manchuria unless they can be quickly restored. She will continue to maintain a strong defensive position there, but is unlikely to undertake any offensive action unless she becomes convinced that the U.S.S.R. is about to enter the war against her.

d. China. We believe that the Japanese are now conducting operations with the intentions of neutralizing Allied air forces in China and also of establishing overland communication from Manchuria to south China. Japan hopes, by such moves, to improve her strategic position in central and south China.
e. Burma. The Japanese will continue to attempt to deny the Allies a land route to China and to maintain their position in Burma as an anchor for their western perimeter defenses. They will only undertake limited offensive action for the purpose of breaking up Allied operations.

f. Malaya-Sumatra. Although this area is of great importance to the Japanese, both for its own resources and as a barrier on the approaches to the South China Sea from the west and south, we anticipate no substantial reinforcement of it until a major threat is more clearly apparent.

g. East Indies. We believe that Japan will maintain her hold on the East Indies as long as possible, even though her sea communications should be severed.

h. Formosa-Luzon-Mindanao. The Japanese are busily engaged in strenuous efforts to reinforce this line. They will resist fiercely any penetration of this line, particularly the Luzon-Formosa area. They will accelerate the rate of reinforcement should the Allies occupy the western Carolines.

i. Central Pacific. In the Bonins, at Palau, and at Halmahera local Japanese ground forces will resist to the maximum extent of their capabilities, but without strong naval and air support.

6. A detailed estimate of enemy order of battle and deployment will be available as Annex “A” when required.  

Appendix “A”

Political and Psychological Factors

1. External politics.

a. General. Japan has propounded two powerful propaganda themes: “Asia for the Asiatics” and “The Co-Prosperity Sphere,” and has adopted such relations with neighboring peoples as she believes will contribute to the fulfillment of her plans. Following are the steps which have been taken, but they represent changes in form rather than in substance.

(1) Relations with China. Japan has recognized the “independence” of China, as represented by the Nanking puppet government, and has sought to enlist Chinese nationalism in support of that regime by surrendering to it various foreign concessions, notably those at Shanghai.

(2) Relations with subject peoples. Japan has granted “independence” to Burma and the Philippines, seeking to enlist the relatively developed nationalism of those countries in her favor; she has hinted that other occupied areas (e.g., Java) may receive similar grants of “independence,” and she has rewarded Thailand for cooperation by

*Not printed.
the cession of certain neighboring territory to which Thailand had some pretensions.

b. Relations with the U.S.S.R. There exists between Japan and the U.S.S.R. a basic conflict of interest. Japan's concept of strategic security cannot be satisfied without gaining control of the eastern region of Siberia. For the present, however, Japan desires to avoid war with the U.S.S.R. in order to be free to direct all her efforts against her enemies.

c. Relations with the Axis. Japan's connection with the Axis is a matter of expediency only. Her action will be coordinated with that of Germany only insofar as she believes that such coordination will contribute to the realization of her basic aims.

2. Psychology and morale. The Japanese, traditionally, are an intensely nationalistic and close knit family whose broad characteristics are a toughness of fiber and a fatalistic singleness of purpose. They have been taught that they are of divine origin, that the Emperor is directly descended from the god-founder of the nation and that the Japanese are divinely and infallibly guided towards the establishment of a new world order. The Japanese soldier is taught to give blind obedience and to regard death in the service of the Emperor as an honor. He is told that he is invincible and that to show weakness or to surrender is to accept disgrace.

As a result of these teachings, the morale of the Japanese populace, and especially of the armed forces, has remained high, but the unfavorable course of the war has caused some disillusionment. Moreover, since much of popular morale is based upon the theory of invincibility, a series of sharp defeats, as they are brought home to them, will tend further to confuse and bewilder the people as a whole.

Real power in Japan rests in the hands of small groups of leaders capable of exploiting the position of the Emperor. The collapse of Germany will have a tremendously depressing effect upon such leaders. This, combined with ever increasing United Nations pressure and approach to the homeland, might conceivably bring about a reshuffle of the ruling cliques followed by an attempt to secure a negotiated peace.

Official propaganda on the home front has lost its self-assured tone and determination to fight for existence is replacing exaltation in victory. The potential of the United Nations is admitted to be high, and the government has announced its intention to prepare for the defense of the homeland. Japanese withdrawals are admitted. It is implied that the Japanese have finished winning independence for other Asiatic countries and now must prepare to defend their own islands from frontal attack. The government is also preparing the Japanese people for more serious German reverses in Europe.
Appendix "B"

ECONOMIC FACTORS

1. General. Though Japan may still be able to increase production of certain high priority armament items, e.g., aircraft, the expansion of her basic industry, which had ceased by the end of 1943, almost certainly cannot be resumed during this war. Lack of shipping is the most important limiting factor on the expansion of basic industry. Japan still depends on the Outer Zone for certain essential raw materials, especially oil. The Japanese have partially succeeded in reducing this dependence by stockpiling materials in the Inner Zone where nearly all Japanese industry is concentrated. The stockpiling program has fallen short because of lack of shipping.

2. Shipping. Japan's shipping position is her most critical weakness and is deteriorating rapidly. We estimate that Japan now has much less shipping than she needs to carry out military commitments and at the same time to utilize her industrial capacity to the full. This condition will grow progressively worse. We believe, however, that Japan will not voluntarily abandon any strategic outpost because of a shipping stringency alone, but will accept a curtailment in her basic over-all industrial production by reducing the import of raw materials. Should the sinking rate increase, as it has increased in recent months, the Japanese would be forced to accept this import reduction proportionately sooner. Sufficient shipping should be available, if necessary, by diversion from trade, for essential troop movements.

We estimate that Japan will be unable to build more than 800,000 gross tons of steel merchant vessels in 1944, which is far behind the rate required to replace losses, and that her ship repair facilities are heavily overburdened. Great emphasis has been placed on wooden shipbuilding, but this program is not believed to be progressing as well as planned and could not, in any event, offset the discrepancy between losses and construction of steel ships. Japan's shipping position would be relatively easier were she cut off from the Outer Zone.

3. Petroleum and other raw materials. In general, Japan's industrial machine is dependent upon raw materials which must come from outside Japan Proper and thus the continuance of supply depends upon transportation. The most essential raw material contribution from the Outer Zone is oil. Other critical materials which Japan obtains from the Outer Zone include nickel, chrome, iron ore, manganese, lead, copper, zinc, bauxite and phosphates. Her dependence on the Outer Zone for these materials is however less than in the case of oil either because of the existence of relatively large stockpiles or the possibility in some cases of increasing Inner Zone supplies or of substituting other materials.
Among petroleum products, Japan's position is weakest in fuel oil. Inner Zone production and stocks are believed sufficient for about nine months and estimated present over-all production roughly balances consumption at the present calculated scale. Furthermore, about 75 percent of production is in the East Indies, Japan is developing new synthetic facilities in the Inner Zone, but present fuel oil output there would, we estimate, operate her naval fleet and merchant marine at less than one-third their present rate of activity, if stocks are not drawn upon. In aviation gasoline, Japan is similarly dependent upon the East Indies, 80 percent coming from there, but stocks, chiefly in the Inner Zone, are believed sufficient for somewhat more than a year at the present rate of consumption.

Japan's tanker fleet has been reduced far below the minimum tonnage required to move fuel oil and aviation gas out of the East Indies to all consumption centers, and the deficit has been only partially offset by diversion of dry cargo vessels to oil-carrying. We believe that Japan will continue this diversion at the expense of other cargoes in order to keep the oil line full and moving.

Although about 20 percent of Japan's iron ore is now derived from Outer Zone areas, we believe that Inner Zone production, most of which is outside Japan Proper, could fill all essential needs. Nearly all of Japan's coal supply is in the Inner Zone, but more than 50 percent of it lies outside of Japan Proper. Thus iron ore and coal constitute the greatest burden of Japanese shipping. Japan is almost completely dependent on north China and Manchuria for coking coal since the supplies available to her elsewhere are generally of too poor quality to make high grade coke without the admixture of the coal from north China.

Stockpiles of bauxite and the possibility of producing alumina from inferior ores in the Inner Zone reduce Japan's dependence on bauxite supplies from Bintan Island (Malaya) and Indochina. Though Japan's copper stockpile is relatively small, she produces more than half her requirements at home. The lead stockpile, supplemented by Inner Zone production, would last at least a year. Japan's zinc position is more stringent; the Inner Zone produces not more than two-thirds of Japan's requirements and stocks are believed to be low.

Japan's major source of nickel is Celebes and if this source were cut off her position would be difficult. A conservative use pattern probably has been observed, however, and we believe that the full effects would not be felt in less than a year. The first results of a sharp reduction in use of nickel would be impairment of the quality of war material.

In chromium and manganese, Japan's position is believed to be somewhat better. For both, Inner Zone production, plus stocks, is believed sufficient for more than a year's consumption. The Philippines
are the major source of both, contributing a large portion of new chromium and nearly 40 percent of the new manganese.

The comparative dependence of Japan on specific Outer Zone areas is in the following order:

Sumatra: Fuel oil and aviation gasoline.
Borneo: Fuel oil.
Philippine Islands: Chrome, manganese, copper.
Celebes: Nickel.
Bintan Island: Bauxite.

4. Industry. Japanese industrial production expanded generally up to the beginning of 1944, when it levelled off because of basically restrictive factors (e.g., lack of shipping) which the Japanese are not expected to overcome during this war. However, production of certain high priority finished products, such as aircraft, continues to increase. Japan will attempt to increase the production of such instruments as fire control gear, radar, and other types of precision electrical equipment, but because of technical and organizational difficulties, we believe that she will not be able to accomplish any great expansion in this field. There is still a slight cushion in consumer and civilian goods which can be sacrificed in all out efforts to increase the production of military armaments. Japanese industry is almost wholly concentrated in Inner Zone areas (southern Hokkaido, central Honshu, northern Kyushu, northern Korea, southern Manchuria and Formosa). Finished munitions production is heavily concentrated in Honshu, although Manchurian industry, with help from Japan Proper, largely supports the Japanese Army in Manchuria.

5. Food. The 1944 rice consumption in the Inner Zone is higher than anticipated because of reduced wheat and barley crops. For this and other reasons, we now believe that Japanese rice reserves are uncomfortably low and that Japan must next year depend upon shipments from Indochina and Thailand for an essential portion of rice supplies. Food rations can be reduced without causing actual starvation or serious political consequences, but any reduction will result in decreased industrial efficiency and further deterioration of public health.

Appendix "C"

MILITARY FACTORS

1. General. The rapid build-up and advance of Allied forces in the Central and South Pacific have brought home to Japan the realization that she must prepare to meet steadily increasing Allied strength. In addition, Japan’s relations with the U.S.S.R. are uneasy because of the ever present fear that one day that country may join the forces arrayed against her. Forced to accept the strategic defensive, Japan
is attempting to consolidate and make secure her greatly expanded empire. She is developing successive defense lines to hold off her enemies in the hope that they, wearied by the war in Europe and perhaps divided among themselves, will attack her ineffectively or compromise to her advantage.

2. Air forces. The Japanese Air Force finds itself totally unable to match the constantly growing strength of our opposing air forces and is irrevocably committed to a strategic defensive role. Strictly offensive operations have become progressively more limited in scope and less frequent. Meanwhile, the highest priority is being given to aircraft production, and latest estimates suggest that at least 1200 combat aircraft are now being produced each month. A strenuous effort is being made to overcome qualitative inferiority by better protective armament, greater fire power, self-sealing fuel tanks, and engines of increased power. Already there has been a marked improvement in the quality of Japanese fighter aircraft. All available indications show that the combat efficiency of the Japanese Air Force is at present suffering seriously from a shortage of fully trained and experienced pilots and crews. Currently expanded facilities for individual and group training are being completed, but in periods of high attrition the Japanese will find it difficult to provide replacement of effectively trained personnel. We believe that a combination of difficulties will make it impossible for Japan’s air forces to improve materially their present qualitative inferiority so long as continued and heavy pressure is brought against her.

Although the Allies will probably meet increasingly strong numerical air resistance as they attack successive lines of defense, the scale and duration encountered at each point of attack is likely to be conditioned by Japan’s intention to preserve air strength for the final defense of those areas which she considers vital to the defense of the homeland and its critical supply lines.

3. Naval forces. Japan’s naval strength is inadequate for the defense of her outer perimeter. She is only able to concentrate portions of her fleet at a few strategic bases to parry thrusts at key points of her defense line. Allied strength is denying the Japanese Fleet the use of all but a small part of the Pacific Ocean. With her present relatively small operational fleet, Japan does not dare risk possible heavy attrition by launching any major offensives. Although she is striving to increase her fleet strength by new units, the appearance of such new ships has been so rare as to suggest difficulties in the outfitting of such forces. We believe that Japan is primarily engaged in building small escort vessels to counter the heavy toll of merchant ships taken by our submarines.

We believe that in the future the Japanese will deploy their fleet so as to be able better to meet readily the next estimated Allied blow.
With their fleet concentrated in the Celebes Sea the Japanese had hoped to counter vigorously Allied thrusts at the Philippines. Subsequent to the battle of the eastern Philippines the main elements of the fleet were obliged to retire for reequipping and reorganization. As a result of the threat to the Bonins and the homeland, developed by our advance to the Marianas, the Japanese are likely to dispose their heavy surface units along the Kyushu-Formosa line. However, the fuel oil situation, the shipping stringency and Allied air power will have a bearing on ultimate fleet deployment.

While the Japanese Fleet suffered a heavy loss of aircraft and some carrier units in the recent battle of the eastern Philippines, Japan still retains a battle fleet of considerable power. Despite recent actions we believe that while the Japanese High Command will be cautious in the use of their battle fleet, they will continue to make vigorous efforts to oppose any Allied penetrations of the line Japan-Formosa-Luzon-Mindanao. The main considerations governing the strength, disposition, and employment of Japanese naval units opposing our advance are: local control of the air, strength of Allied forces, and the time factor. If, at any time, the Japanese should gain local control of the air, which is unlikely, we must expect heavy attacks upon our units by task forces composed of carriers, battleships, cruisers, etc. Lacking such air control or strong land-based air cover, the Japanese would use some carriers to attempt attacks on our flanks, and also light task forces might attempt night surface torpedo attacks. We can expect the Japanese to be cautious in all-out attacks on a vastly superior force, such attacks only materializing if local control of the air has been established. The element of timing will be affected by the rapidity with which the High Command reaches the conclusion that an actual occupation is threatened. In any event, our carriers will be the primary target for enemy aircraft, with our transports as secondary. Our transports will be the primary target for enemy surface forces, with our own striking forces as secondary.

4. Ground forces. Japan's greatest armed strength lies in her large, fairly equipped and very well trained army. Because of the nature of the war in the Pacific to date, the United Nations have been unable to inflict any serious attrition on the over-all strength of the Japanese ground forces, which are as strong or stronger than in 1941.

At the present time the Japanese army ground forces total approximately 3,500,000 men. These troops are organized into about 85 divisions plus many independent units and garrisons, which have been so deployed that Japan now maintains a strong strategically defensive position. In addition, Japan has organized in Manchuria and China puppet units totaling approximately 300,000 and 400,000 men respectively. The strongest concentrations of forces are in Japan Proper, Manchuria and China. Since United Nations forces have
begun to threaten seriously Japan's position in the Central and Southwestern Pacific areas, Japan has accelerated her preparations for the defense of the vital East Indies and has reinforced her southern forces, particularly in the Philippines area.

The formation of puppet units has been general throughout Japanese occupied territory, but only on a large scale in Manchuria and China. Puppet troops in other areas have been formed primarily for purposes of political propaganda, and their military value to Japan has been negligible. The actual value of the Manchurian and Chinese puppet troops to Japan cannot be accurately assessed. They are only lightly equipped and, although some have been used in combat against the Chinese, the majority of them have had relatively little training. They are at present being used mainly as garrison units and for the maintenance of order in Japanese occupied territory. Because their loyalty is doubtful, it is unlikely that the Japanese would use them in a major engagement against well trained and equipped troops.

We believe that Japan intends to maintain generally the present strategic disposition of her ground forces after further substantial reinforcement of Formosa and the Philippines.

Appendix "D"

MILITARY INTENTIONS IN SPECIFIC AREAS

1. Japan Proper. As the war draws nearer to Japan, we may expect to find an increasingly large percentage of Japan's heavy naval forces based in contiguous waters to protect the home islands and the essential transport routes between the home islands and the rest of the Inner Zone. Similarly, a large percentage of Japan's total combat aircraft, particularly fighters, will be kept at bases in the homeland to protect against bombing of the concentrations of Japanese armaments production there. Also the formation of new divisions will be expedited and Japanese home defenses strengthened.

2. Northern Pacific. In view of the American position in the Aleutian Islands and the possibility of eventual Allied air and naval action from Soviet bases in Kamchatka and Soviet Sakhalin, Japan will continue her present policy of strengthening her defenses in the Kuriles and Japanese Sakhalin.

3. Manchuria. Japan has built up in Manchuria a large and highly developed army. It is largely sustained by Manchurian agricultural and industrial production, which is developing more rapidly than any other section of the Japanese Empire. The purpose of this army is to provide a force of sufficient strength to protect Manchuria from any Soviet threat and also to provide a striking force powerful enough to attack Siberia and the Maritime Provinces should Japan consider the
latter course to be necessary. The Japanese High Command has abandoned hope of any German victory. Japan must appreciate that following peace with Germany, Soviet military capabilities in the Far East will increase progressively and, in fact, the initiative along the Manchurian border will eventually pass to the U.S.S.R. In view of the Soviet threat, Japan is unlikely to release any appreciable forces from Manchuria unless they can be quickly restored. She will continue to maintain a strong defensive position there, but is unlikely to undertake any offensive action unless she becomes convinced that the U.S.S.R. is about to enter the war against her.

4. **China.** Allied air action from China is increasingly menacing Japan’s present economic and defensive position, and the Japanese are taking stronger counter measures by the occupation and neutralization of some of the more accessible Allied bases.

The Japanese have now completed military operations between the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers and are in process of consolidating their position in this newly captured territory while reconstructing the railroad line linking Hankow with Peking. The primary objective of current operations south of the Yangtze is to deny to the Allies air bases in southeastern China. In order to accomplish this we believe that they intend to occupy the railway line between Hengyang and Kweilin and also eventually to establish overland communications between their forces in central and south China by occupation of the railroad line between Hengyang and Canton.

The Japanese have the capability of successfully carrying out these intentions. Whether or not they will commit sufficient forces for the final completion of such operations may however be influenced by the rapidly increasing threat from the Pacific. We believe that the Japanese do not intend to weaken the ground forces they now have based in China unless in due course some of these divisions are urgently required for the defense of Japan Proper or Formosa.

5. **Burma.** The main object of Japanese operations in Burma will be to contain large Allied forces in terrain favorable to the Japanese and to prevent the reopening of the land route to China. The Japanese will, when possible, continue to undertake limited offensive action designed to break up Allied offensive preparations and to divert as large a part as possible of the forces of the Southeast Asia Command.

6. **Malaya—Sumatra.** This area is of great importance to the Japanese, both for its own resources and as a barrier on the approaches to the South China Sea from the west and south. The Japanese, however, presumably consider their present strength there adequate to meet any threat likely to arise during 1944. In view of their preoccupation with more immediate threats to Japan Proper, Formosa, and the Philippines from the Pacific and by air from China, as well as the
potential threat from Siberia, we anticipate no substantial reinforce-
ment of Malaya–Sumatra until a threat to that area is more clearly
apparent, and then only as may be warranted by the then existing
over-all situation.

7. **East Indies.** We believe that Japan will not in any circumstances
voluntarily relinquish her hold upon the East Indies, but will con-
tinue to maintain in the area the strong ground forces which already
have been deployed for their defense. Although the Japanese in due
time will appreciate that their sea communications to the Indies may
be severed, they will consider the continued denial of the area to the
United Nations forces as of such strategic importance as to warrant
the sacrifice of forces stationed there.

8. **Formosa–Luzon–Mindanao.** Currently the Japanese are engaged
in strenuous efforts to reinforce and build up ground, air and naval
defenses in these areas. Allied attack upon any part of the line will be
fiercely resisted by all forces immediately available, the scale and
intensity of such resistance progressively increasing from the southern
to the northern part of this strong eastern defense to the vital line of
sea communications with the East Indies. Although Allied occupa-
tion of Mindanao would greatly increase the threat to Japan’s position,
the occupation of Luzon would make the passage of shipping through
the South China Sea highly precarious, while the capture of Formosa
would substantially sever all sea communications to the south and in
addition offer a strong base for direct assault upon Japan Proper. We
believe that the Japanese intend to have deployed in the immediate
future all forces which they consider can be spared for the defense of
the southern Philippines, whereas land and air strength in Luzon and
Formosa will continue to build up at an accelerated rate should the
Allies occupy the Palaus.

9. **Central Pacific.** In the Bonins, at Palau, and at Halmahera local
Japanese ground forces will resist to the maximum extent of their
capabilities, but without strong naval and air support. The scale of
naval resistance will be governed by the number of their own land-
based aircraft immediately available, the strength and dispositions of
our own forces, and the time at which they determine that further
occupation is threatened.