PALESTINE

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE ARAB-ZIONIST CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE FUTURE STATUS OF PALESTINE AND THE QUESTION OF JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE

867N.00/611: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, January 11, 1943—11 a.m.  
[Received 5:53 p.m.]

61. Personal for the Secretary and Under Secretary.² Prince Mohammed Ali, heir to the Egyptian throne, has called me to say that he and leaders in the Arab world have lately been disturbed by the utterances from the United States which have placed emphasis on the Jewish aspect of the Palestinian problem to the exclusion of the Arab viewpoint. His Royal Highness added that there was no intention to deny or ignore Jewish rights or aspirations but he hoped that equal consideration was being given to the Arab angle of this problem.

I understand that the Prime Minister of Iraq³ had the intention of approaching you in the foregoing sense and accordingly I submit the Prince’s views in the premises.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Baghdad.

Kirk

867N.00/612: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, January 23, 1943—9 a.m.  
[Received 10:23 p.m.]

153. For the Under Secretary from Lt. Colonel Hoskins:⁴

1. In accordance your suggestion am cabling you direct on one situation in this area that, unless some action is taken, may soon become serious. In venturing any comments on the complicated Arab-Jewish problem I realize I am moving into deep waters where you may prefer

² For previous correspondence concerning this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 538 ff.
³ Sumner Welles.
⁴ Nuri as-Said.
⁴ Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins; for correspondence regarding the dispatch of the Hoskins Mission to the countries of the Near East, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 24 ff.

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I should not enter. However, someone must grapple with the situation. If matter is allowed to drift, a very bloody conflict is in the making, that in addition to its domestic repercussions in Britain and the United States will inflame not simply Palestine but in varying degrees all of Moslem world from Casablanca to Calcutta.

2. From my recent survey trip over Arab Near East I have come to conclusion that unless positive steps are taken to prevent it there may well be a renewed outbreak of fighting between Zionists and Arabs in Palestine before end of the war and perhaps even this spring. In turn such fighting is likely to lead to the massacre of Jews in Syria, Iraq and other parts of Arab Near East. As against this opinion I should also state that although some British officials in this area share my view, most of them do not believe situation is immediately serious. I have, however, found very few who do not at least agree that as things are now going Arab-Jewish conflict will probably break out soon after the war is over.

3. On the Jewish side I have found Zionist officials of the Jewish Agency 5 uncompromisingly outspoken in their determination that Palestine at end of this war shall become not merely a national home for the Jews, but a Jewish state despite any opposition from the 1,000,000 Arabs living there. In various ways main result of many of their efforts seems to be to goad Palestinian Arabs into breaking informal truce that has existed since war began. This enormously increased assurance on part of Jews in Palestine stems from two main sources: (a) Their feeling that they have the increasing support of public opinion in Great Britain and the United States; (b) their confidence in their increased numbers and in their supply of arms that makes them feel they can more than hold their own in actual fighting with Arabs of Palestine.

It is no secret that the Hagana, their secret Jewish military organization, has plans fully made and is well equipped not only with small arms, but also with tommy-guns and machine guns many of them purchased from Vichy French forces in Syria and smuggled into Palestine during past 2 years.

4. Arabs on the other hand feel that during the war Jews have continued their world-wide propaganda for Zionist state. Arabs

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5 Article 4 of the League of Nations Mandate to the United Kingdom for Palestine provided that "An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine ..." (Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. ii, p. 214.) The constitution of the Jewish Agency of August 14, 1929, had the formal approval of the British Government. The Jewish Agency was the recognized representative of the Jewish interest in Palestine, and the Executive of the Agency, located in Palestine, conducted all official negotiations with the Mandatory Power.
fear, therefore, that at the end of war they will be faced with a fait accompli where Palestine will by agreement between the great powers be handed over to Jews. It is this fear that is being constantly played on in Axis propaganda to this area. Furthermore, Nazis have of late been increasingly effectively soft-pedaling any Axis interests in matter and stressing the one fact that a United Nations’ victory means certain loss for the Arabs of Palestine to the Jews.

5. Any serious conflict between Arabs and Jews no matter how it originates will if allowed to continue for any length of time have repercussions over all the neighboring area. From past experience Jews know that when serious Arab-Jewish troubles start in Palestine Arab assistance from eight bordering states will again pour in. This increased opposition, the Jews admit, they are not strong enough to overcome. To meet this situation Jews are counting on British or British and American military assistance. This also the Nazis fully recognize and they are bending their efforts to time any such outbreak for moment when United Nations will least desire to divert from active operations elsewhere fighting troops necessary to quell civil war in Palestine.

6. Meanwhile, even if a detailed solution of the Arab-Jewish problem must await a postwar settlement, much could be accomplished in reducing present tension and helping the situation from boiling over during the war period.

A brief statement by the United States or, even more effective, a joint statement by British and the United States that would rule out in advance any Allied military support for the extreme positions of either Zionists or Arab nationalists would go far toward accomplishing this result.6

7. In addition to issuance now of such a statement I have two other specific suggestions to make:

(a) So that American public opinion may realize more fully that there are two sides to the case and that Palestine is not an uninhabited area into which several million Jews from Europe can at end of war be dropped and immediately find land and livelihood, I suggest that Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, together with a carefully chosen group of five or six moderate Arab nationalists, be permitted to visit the United States. His presence there can, I believe, be utilized as were the visits of King George of Greece and King Peter of Yugoslavia to make clear to American public certain Arab aspects of the problem that are not now understood. Admittedly Abdullah is not a perfect vehicle, but he would appear on the whole to be most satisfactory one that can be found. His entourage should contain moderate

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6 Wallace Murray, the Adviser on Political Relations, sought to implement this suggestion by submitting a proposed draft statement to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on February 1 (867N.01/1841). No action, however, was forthcoming.
Arab nationalists representing various religious faiths and should
include representatives from Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Trans-
Jordan. These men should be chosen on the basis that they are willing
to face the fact that there are 500,000 Jews in Palestine who should
not and cannot be removed, any more than the 1,000,000 Arab in-
habitants. They should be men who are interested in working out an
amicable solution and who start from the facts and conditions as they
are today rather than as they might have preferred them to be. There
are a number of such men available.

(b) On the Jewish side in Palestine there are fortunately also cer-
tain individuals and groups that increasingly realize the necessity of
working out a peaceful solution with the Arabs. Among these are
Mrs. Henrietta S. Zold of the Youth Immigration Bureau, Dr. J. L.
Magnes, President of Hebrew University, and Mr. Bendashov, leader
of one wing of Jewish labor movement, Hashon Mirhatsair. Dr.
Magnes has outlined his ideas of a compromise in the current January
issue of Foreign Affairs. I suggest that these moderates also be al-
lowed to visit the United States to develop their case. In doing so
they would, I believe, gain support of many American Jews who favor
additional home for the Jews in Palestine, but who do not favor
extreme Zionist position of the Jewish Agency.

8. Every effort should be made to enable these two moderate groups
while they are in the United States to reach an amicable solution.
Such an effort would I am sure receive the strong support and as-
sistance of various Christian groups in the United States who are also
anxious to see a peaceful settlement of Palestine problem fair to both
Arabs and Jews. Such Christian groups could rally wide American
support for such a compromise plan if they make clear to the American
people the single fact that effective American support for either ex-
treme solution, whether Arab or Jewish, would in effect be committing
the United States to use of military force in this area and, based on
past British experience, a resulting loss of lives of American soldiers.

9. I have discussed in a general way ideas outlined above with Mr.
Casey and various British and American officials and have found
them sufficiently sympathetic so that they thought I should at least pre-
sent them to you. If you feel they are worth further exploration and
wish me to do so I can develop them more concretely and can, for
example, suggest specific Arabic individuals who I believe would be
interested in working on such a program.

10. Joint United States Chiefs of Staff already have under con-
sideration my cable from Jerusalem to General Deane regarding
my possible activities in Syria. In that cable I suggested advisability
of my being called back to Washington for a brief period of consulta-
tion. If you feel such a step would also be desirable for a detailed

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7 Richard G. Casey, British Minister of State Resident in the Middle East.
8 Telegram No. 10, January 14, not printed.
9 Brig. Gen. John R. Deane, Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
discussion of the above Arab-Jewish suggestions you may care so to advise Admiral Leahy\textsuperscript{10} with whom General Deane is associated. Repeated to Jerusalem and Beirut. [Hoskins.]

KIRK

867N.00/612: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1943—6 p.m.

156. From the Under Secretary for Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins. Your 153, January 23, 9 a.m., has been read with interest and you may be sure that we are giving it careful thought. Our present feeling is that it would be inadvisable to bring groups of Arabs and Jews to this country for a discussion of the Palestine problem. However, the suggestion has been made that Ibn Saud\textsuperscript{11} be asked to designate one of his sons to come here for a visit.\textsuperscript{12} The invitation would, of course, be extended to the King in the first instance but since it is assumed that he would find it impracticable to accept, it would be made clear that we would be glad to have one of his three eldest sons visit this country, should the King himself find it impossible to come. It is felt that such a visit would accomplish at least some of the purposes you have in mind. Please discuss this suggestion with the Minister and let us have your views. [Welles.]

HULL

867N.00/618

The Egyptian Minister (Hassan) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1943.

Sir: At the direction of my Government, I have the honour to hand over to your Excellency the enclosed aide-mémoire in connection with the question of Palestine.

Please accept [etc.]

HASSAN

[Enclosure]

The Egyptian Legation to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The realization of the aspirations of Palestine has always been one of the objectives of Egyptian Policy. The Government of His Ma-

\textsuperscript{10}Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United States Army and Navy.

\textsuperscript{11}Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia.

\textsuperscript{12}For correspondence regarding the visit of Amir Faisal to the United States, see pp. 840 ff.
jesty the King of Egypt have not failed to give evidence to the interest they attach to this problem. Thus, as soon as she joined the League of Nations, Egypt has precisely formulated her point of view on the question of Palestine in a speech delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Assembly of the League held on the 18th of September, 1937.

The speech emphasized the interest of the Egyptian people and their Government in Palestine, on account of close historical and religious affinity existing between the two sister and neighbouring countries as well as the relations of amity and alliance existing between Egypt and Great Britain and the necessity of finding a solution of the various interests involved based on the principles of equity and justice. Guided by these principles, practical suggestions were made on behalf of the Egyptian Government to the effect that Palestine remain in the hands of Palestinians of origin: Mohammedans, Christians and Jews. Moreover, the speech uttered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs recalled the promise made by the British Government to the Arab world in 1917 [1918?] namely the contemplation of the eventual recognition of the independence of all Arab countries including Palestine; it pointed out that, after all, “the Balfour Declaration” itself only envisaged favorably the establishment of a National home for the Jews in Palestine and its endeavours to facilitate the realization of this aim, with the clear understanding, however, that nothing should be done that would prejudice the civilization, the religion and the rights of other communities in Palestine. This could

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13 This is apparently a reference to the Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments, November 8, 1918; for text, see telegram No. 226, November 25, 1918, from Cairo, Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. II, p. 274.

14 In November 1917 the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur James Balfour, wrote the following letter to Lord Walter Rothschild regarding a Jewish national home in Palestine (facsimile copy in Book of Documents submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations Relating to the Establishment of the National Home for the Jewish People . . . 1917-1947, published by The Jewish Agency for Palestine, New York, May 1947):

"Foreign Office, November 2nd, 1917.

"Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

"'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country'.

"I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

"[Complimentary ending illegible] Arthur James Balfour".

Regarding the interest of the United States in the issuance of this statement of policy by the British Government, see Foreign Relations, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, pp. 317, 473, and 483.
only mean that any solution to be adopted, should receive the consent of the Arabs as well as the other communities.

It is of no little interest to mention, in this connection, that the painful events which followed in Palestine have deeply moved the Egyptian people, and the Egyptian Parliament echoed their voice by demanding that the Government intercede and use all its influence with a view of finding a speedy solution to this problem. Consequently, the Egyptian Government approached the other Arab countries and invited them to a convention which took place in Cairo in 1939. The delegates to this convention emphasized the unanimous interest of the Arab countries in the question of Palestine and thus led to the convening of the “London Congress” in the same year.

As a result of elaborate negotiations the British Government published a “White Book,” which consecrated, to a large extent, the Arab revendications and proposed the creation of a Palestinian State, which would attain its independence in a period of twenty years. The same Book also proposed that the continuation of Jewish emigration into Palestine should take into consideration the capacity of absorption by that country as well as the economic conditions, and that, at all events, such emigration should cease as soon as the number of the Jews would attain one-third of the total population and that no further Jewish emigration could take place without the consent of the Arabs. The British Government, in turn, undertook to carry out the conclusions adopted by the “White Book”. A law was to be promulgated to regulate the repartition of the land in Palestine. From that time on, Egypt has followed with great interest the evolution of events in Palestine and, in complete agreement with other Arab countries, watched anxiously the realization of the aspirations in that country, taking also into account the implications of the treaty of amity and friendship between Egypt and Great Britain.

However, the Zionist leaders made no secret of their ambitions to transform Palestine into a powerful Jewish nation and, to attain this end, they have displayed considerable activities in the democratic nations. These activities which are reflected in the Press, have found their echo amongst some of the responsible circles as well as those possessing great political and social influence. These maneuvers have had a deplorable effect on the Arab and Mohammedan world, and it is feared that the success of the Zionist propaganda in the U. S. A. may lead to the erroneous impression that the U. S. Government favor

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15 For correspondence concerning the British discussions at London with Arab and Jewish representatives, February and March 1939, see Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. iv, pp. 694–823, passim.
16 The White Paper was dated May 17, 1939; for text, see British Cmd. 6019: Palestine, Statement of Policy.
the Jews at the expense of the Arabs. In fact, the experience of the past and the success of the Zionist activities during the last war have affected the attitude of the Arabs and have resulted in the difficulties, past and present, encountered by the British policy.

It has been gratifying to witness that during the present world conflict the U. S. A. has intensified her friendly relations with the Arabic and Mohammedi an nations. Egypt, which attaches a special price to her friendship with the U. S. A., is very desirous that nothing should ever obscure their relations and she feels it is her duty to convey to the U. S. Government the painful reaction in public opinion, as a result of the Zionist activities in America; in fact, this reaction may not prove helpful to the task of the Government whose profound sympathies have always gone to the democracies and whose attitude has been most favorable to the Allies. It is the hope of the Egyptian Government, therefore, that the responsible circles of the U. S. A. should not lose sight of these considerations and it is important to emphasize, in this respect, that any promises or declarations made by them to the Zionist cause will only create immeasurable difficulties. Is it necessary to recall, in this connection, how harmful the promises made by Great Britain to the Jews have proved and how far they have contributed to complicate the situation in Palestine?

Needless to add that Egypt will only be too glad to collaborate, in due time, in the solution of this thorny problem.

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867N.00/619

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1943.

The Minister of Egypt called at his request. He handed me an aide-mémoire with a covering note, copies of which are hereto attached, relating to the question of Palestine and the Jewish and Arab problems.

The Minister said that, in his opinion, any controversial proposals and their subsequent discussion relating to the Palestine-Jewish-Arab situation were calculated more to hurt than to help, and that there should be worked out a harmonious understanding in regard to the best solution of these problems. He added that there was keen sympathy on the part of himself and his people for the Jews in their almost universal persecution and suffering in Europe and that the Egyptians were very desirous of seeing the question of the Jews' future safety and welfare solved to the best possible advantage. In this connection, he thought that so far as Palestine was concerned, the ratio of those allowed to remain there should be one-third Jews and two-thirds

\footnote{\textit{Ante}, p. 751.}
Arabs. He felt that the Balfour Declaration was calculated to give more trouble than otherwise.

He then referred with much concern to the signatures of several thousand leading American citizens, published far and wide during recent weeks in the Middle East, and to the serious repercussions and possibilities of uprisings that may be caused by the circulation of these names, et cetera. I remarked that I was under the impression that many of these signatures were picked up casually over a period of one, two or three years, although I was not stating this as a fact, but merely to let him have the benefit of that possibility for whatever it might be worth in appraising the actual value of these signatures.

I then inquired of the Minister as to what his remedy was for the Jewish situation. He replied that speaking for himself only and not for his Government he was of the opinion that a feasible remedy would be for the twenty-nine United Nations to agree to take their proportional share of Jews from all over the world and assure them of their safety and opportunity for a living. I remarked that this idea was very interesting.

C[ORDEL] H[ULL]

8670.00/615: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, February 5, 1943—9 a.m.

[Received February 6—5:18 p.m.]

269. Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent me a copy of aide-mémoire regarding Palestine transmitted to Egyptian Minister in Washington for presentation to Secretary.

Raising of question at this time by Egyptian authorities is regarded as reflecting recently aroused apprehension in Moslem and Christian Arab circles because of apparent effort of Zionists to increase tempo of activity, particularly in United States, with view to obtaining commitments under stress of war which it might be more difficult or impossible to obtain in course of general postwar discussions (see my 61, January 11, 11 a.m.).

In this connection I have noted in discussions with Zionist spokesmen visiting Cairo recently a marked hardening in their attitude (possibly owing in part to increased confidence resulting from alleged large-scale clandestine arming by Jews in Palestine) which in several cases has taken the form of frankly admitting that it is idle to continue to talk of "negotiations" between Arabs and [apparent omission] in balance obvious that any solution satisfactory to Zionists would have to be "imposed" on Arabs by threat or use of force and this latter the only realistic line of action to adopt.
With situation developing in this ominous manner, I submit that our policy should be directed toward damping down these threatening flames rather than throwing coals on the fire in the form of any official commitments regarding Palestine or of countenancing unbridled agitation of a semiofficial character which only serves to bring out the extreme views of one side without regard for the feelings or rights of Moslem and Christian Arabs and even many Jews. A contrary policy would contravene our established stand that our primary object is to exert every effort to defeat the Axis by military force and that regional political problems must be subordinated to that aim.

Therefore, viewing the matter from the more specific point of view of the prosecution of the war, there is no doubt that the raising of the Zionist issue now might serve to undo much of the laborious and constructive work done by Allied and Middle Eastern leaders alike in bringing about an improved situation in this area and, if the impetus appears to come from the United States, it would have the additional effect of vitiating much of the long standing heritage of good will toward the United States in this area as well as to detract from the wartime prestige which we have built up through propaganda and armed successes.

Kirk

867N.00/617: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, February 15, 1943—5 p. m. [Received 5:08 p. m.]

347. For the Under Secretary from Hoskins.

"Regret delay in answering your 156 19 has been due to my absence in Turkey. I can readily appreciate the preference of the Department for not having groups of Arabs and Jews brought to the United States for discussions of the Palestine question during the war if this can be avoided. On the other hand this may prove to be the lesser of two evils if such discussions can prevent the situation in Palestine which is already simmering from boiling over before the war is ended. In this connection you have no doubt noted the spate of aide-mémoires and memoranda that have been received by this Legation in recent weeks from official as well as unofficial sources.

As to your suggestion of a visit to the United States by Ibn Saud or one of his sons there would be no objection to this and much good might result. However Mr. Kirk tells me he has made such suggestions several times but always on the basis that the visit would take place after the war when conditions would be more normal and it

19 January 28, p. 751.
would be possible to show them more appropriate attention. I also feel that in many ways such a visit might prove more satisfactory if made after rather than during the war.

As to the idea of using the visit of one of Ibn Saud’s sons to accomplish at least some of the purposes suggested in my cable No. 153 20 Mr. Kirk and I both feel that the Arab-Jewish problem is to a considerable extent distinct from Saudi Arabia and we question very much the advisability of injecting any further element into an already complicated situation. There may however be reasons for your suggestion with which we from this end are not very familiar. If so I suggest the matter might rest till my return to Washington as I am planning on leaving Cairo in a few days.”

Kirk

807N.00/627

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William L. Parker of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1943.

Participants: Dr. Chaim Weizmann 21 Mr. Murray
Mr. Moshe Shertok Mr. Alling 23
Dr. Nahum Goldmann 22 Mr. Merriam 24
Mr. Louis Lipsky 22 Mr. Parker

Dr. Weizmann, accompanied by Mr. Shertok, Dr. Goldmann and Mr. Lipsky, called to discuss matters relating to the status of Palestine. Mr. Murray initiated the discussion by addressing a few courteous preliminary remarks to Dr. Weizmann, who replied that Mr. Shertok was present in order to express his views concerning the war effort in Palestine with which he, of course, was familiar as head of the political section of the Jewish Agency at Jerusalem. Before inviting Mr. Shertok to express his views Dr. Weizmann remarked that recently American officials, particularly army officers, returning to this country after brief visits to Palestine, have been indulging in clichés about Palestine unfavorable to the Jewish position there without knowing much about the situation and not having been there long enough to have gained a true understanding of the facts.

Mr. Shertok prefaced his remarks by stating that there have been many changes in Palestine since he met Mr. Murray in Jerusalem in 1938. Since that time the White Paper has been promulgated and
war has descended upon the world. Mr. Shertok declared that the White Paper and the war effort are in conflict because the White Paper forbids immigration at a time when the war effort calls for the greatest mobilization of existing resources in Palestine. He continued along the following lines: The Jews are not in Palestine by accident; they are there as a result of an organized effort. If the power of the Jewish economic machine is to be harnessed to the war effort it is necessary to cooperate with the Jews in Palestine. In order to effect such cooperation, the Jewish authorities in Palestine are determined to alter the White Paper policy in order to derive the most from Palestine as a contribution to the prosecution of the war.

When the war first started, the Jews of Palestine did not expect the British Government to change the White Paper policy immediately but expected that it would be held in abeyance. This belief was held because Palestine 1) was actually threatened with invasion, 2) is against Hitler, 3) is a part of the progressive world.

Palestine has made great contributions to the war effort. There are 30,000 Palestinian Jews in the military services, 20,000 of them in the Army and others in such organizations as the police. There are, however, only about 8,000 Arabs in all of the British Empire forces. Of the Arabs in the armed forces, about 25 per cent desert and about 25 per cent more are dismissed. Desertions and dismissals among the Jews, however, are extremely rare.

In addition to its contributions to the armed forces, the Jewish community of Palestine is turning to industry and to employment of its scientific resources for the benefit of the war effort. There are Jews in war work all over the Near East. Recently the British Army needed some Jews to work in Iraq and took them over the frontier in uniform although they were not military personnel. (Dr. Weizmann remarked that this was "illegal immigration".) Mr. Shertok stated that such action could be condoned as a desperate measure, but he pointed out that the Jews also are waging a desperate struggle for existence. The Jews of Palestine have wondered what it would have been like and what a contribution they could have made if there had been 1,000,000 or 2,000,000 Jews in Palestine instead of only half a million. If the Jews in Palestine had been two or even four or five times as numerous things would have been a lot different. This thought pertains not only to the present but should be projected into the future. What the Jews are doing in Palestine is not an accident; it is the result of a conscious effort. Jews went to Palestine to live there and to earn their living there. Their presence in Palestine has not been the result of the free play of economic forces; it has been the result of governmental decisions that the Jews should go to Palestine.
The economic absorptive capacity of Palestine is not finite; it is the human element which is of importance. The important question is whether the Jews need Palestine, not what the capacity of Palestine might be. Although there may be a limit eventually as to the number of Jews that Palestine may absorb, this limit is very far from being approached. What has been done in Palestine to date is merely of an experimental character. For example, there have been experiments in irrigation; however, these experiments have been only of a local character. Recently these experiments have begun to pass, in a few instances, from the local to the regional. However, no attempt has been made as yet to make irrigation projects country-wide. There are great undeveloped water resources in Palestine which need to be harnessed. If the great water power and irrigation projects which have been developed in the United States could have been accomplished, certainly it would be possible to develop similar projects on a much smaller scale in a little country like Palestine. Then there is the industrial development of Palestine. There has been a substantial industrial output, but this, so far, has been primarily for consumption within the country. There are, however, excellent prospects for exporting Palestinian-made goods to neighboring countries. Before the war these neighboring countries imported approximately £200,000,000 worth of goods from nations now our enemies. Probably after the war these enemy countries will not be in a position to resume manufacturing for export immediately. Presumably the United States and the United Kingdom will participate in this trade, but Palestine desires its share as well. There is no reason why Palestine cannot develop a sizeable industry. Technological developments are tending to make areas less dependent upon local raw materials. For example, there are now European diamond cutters in Palestine. There is no reason why diamonds should travel all the way from South Africa to Europe for cutting when there are expert diamond cutters today to work in Palestine. There are in the country as well other skilled artisans, such as watchmakers, radio crystal makers and pharmaceutical men.

Mr. Shertok continued by saying that the Jews of Palestine are very well aware that they are confronted with a very serious political difficulty. If Palestine were an empty country, this difficulty would not exist, and the world probably would be content to let Jews settle in Palestine. However, the democratic world entertains doubts as to the expediency of letting Jews settle in Palestine in large numbers because of the presence there of Arabs who do not welcome this development. This political difficulty raises two questions: 1) A question of justice; 2) a question of practicability. The first question, the question of justice, presents a dilemma with the alternatives of being
unjust either to the Jews or to the Arabs. There is less injustice to the Arabs involved in awarding Palestine to the Jews than there would be injustice to the Jews in not allowing them to have Palestine. This viewpoint is supported as follows: The Arabs are an undeveloped people. There is plenty of opportunity for them in a developed Palestine which would create employment. Their fears are not justified. If the Italians had invaded Palestine they would have moved all Palestinian Arabs into Syria. Turkey is territorially ambitious too. Iraq went to war principally because it feared that Turkey would demand rectification of the Turko-Iraqi border at the Peace Conference. The Jews in Palestine could help Iraq to develop in order that Iraq would not remain an empty shell. Palestinian Jews could be of assistance to Arabs and to neighboring countries by creating markets and by providing employment. Even now, Iraqis come to Palestine in order to gain scientific knowledge.

Palestine is an Arab country no longer. All Jews feel that the establishment of a large Jewish community in Palestine is essential for the preservation of the race. This is the attitude not only of the Jews of Palestine but of the Jews of all the world. It is necessary, therefore, to bring in as many Jews as possible into Palestine in as short a space of time as possible. The Arabs thus far, according to Mr. Shertok, have accepted the Jews already in Palestine but have objected only to proposals to settle more Jews in the country.

Mr. Murray remarked at this point that this statement did not appear to be quite accurate because each Arab revolt in Palestine may be attributed to an influx of Jews who had actually arrived.

Mr. Shertok admitted that bringing in more Jews would mean a very difficult period indeed. For this reason he contended it is necessary to get over this difficult period as soon as possible by bringing into Palestine large numbers of Jews as quickly as possible.

Mr. Shertok then discussed the possible relationship to each other of Arab countries adjacent to Palestine. Would it be by union, a federation, by treaties, or by what means? This question Mr. Shertok could not undertake to answer. Personally he does not sympathize with the federation idea because that would depend upon the attitude of neighboring countries. With respect to the Jews, the idea of federation does not involve federation with the Jews already in Palestine; the object is to bring more Jews into Palestine.

Mr. Shertok then proceeded to a discussion of King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. He stated that he regards Ibn Saud as the most important Arab alive. However, Ibn Saud does not regard himself as a candidate for an imperial Arab throne. Mr. Shertok stated that he does not consider an Arab empire to be a practical possibility or that Ibn Saud is the man to rule it.
At this point Mr. Alling stated that probably Ibn Saud does not want to rule an Arab empire. Mr. Shertok agreed, adding that Ibn Saud prefers merely to be a man of influence in the Arab world. He might serve as the head of a Pan-Arab union, but he would not make a ruler of an Arab empire.

Mr. Shertok then referred to a suggestion made upon a previous occasion by Dr. Weizmann that a Jewish delegation confer with Ibn Saud in an effort to effect a settlement of Jewish-Arab problems. Mr. Shertok stated that he could not conceive of Ibn Saud’s even receiving a Jewish delegation. Such an event would be explosive in character. The entire Arab world would wonder what was taking place. Arabs would come to him from all directions to warn him to desist. However, Mr. Shertok observed that a British or American representative could discuss matters with Ibn Saud without having such conversations advertised or known to others. If the Jewish-Arab question were discussed with him in this manner, Ibn Saud’s reaction would be negative, but doubtless his interviewer could interpret the degree of his negative reaction from his manner.

Mr. Murray recalled that, after the Palestine revolt of 1936, a great many people endeavored to persuade Ibn Saud to express his views, but Ibn Saud had said nothing. Then later came Ibn Saud’s letter to the President in 1938 in which he took an out-and-out position after a period of two years of silence. Mr. Murray said he wondered why pressure brought upon Ibn Saud previously had proved to be unsuccessful but concluded that Ibn Saud’s letter was in anticipation of the Round Table Conference in London.

Mr. Shertok stated that an Arab federation is an unlikely development because Egypt would not join. However, he added, Egypt might participate in an Arab union if Egypt could be the head of such a union. He expressed agreement with Mr. Murray that Ibn Saud is a man of the desert rather than a potential leader of an Arab empire.

Mr. Weizmann remarked that he would like to say a word about Ibn Saud’s letter to the President. He said that he thought that Ibn Saud wrote this letter because “no Arab could afford to speak less loudly than the other” at that time regarding the establishment of a Jewish national home. Dr. Weizmann expressed agreement with Mr. Shertok that it would be premature for him to go to see Ibn Saud.

Returning to the subject of the status of Palestine Dr. Weizmann declared that we should “grasp the nettle”. It will be easier, he declared, if the United Nations set up a Jewish Palestine now than it would be if the process were dragged out indefinitely. In this connection he referred to the cession of Alexandretta from Syria to

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25 For correspondence relating to this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. iii, pp. 434–459, passim.
Turkey stating that this created no great furor. He continued by saying that what the Jews have achieved in Palestine has been done in spite of British administration.

Dr. Weizmann declared “I affirm again before you that Palestine will never again be an Arab country.” The United States has a moral responsibility with regard to Palestine which it cannot disclaim. The Jews have taken American official attitudes seriously and have spent money on Palestine on this basis. He said, “We will not let you disclaim this responsibility. The Jews will bring moral pressure to bear in order to create a Jewish Palestine.” He continued, “As long as the Middle East will be an empty country it will always be coveted. It should be worked and populated.”

At this point Mr. Murray observed that the people who have to deal with the Palestine question are faced with practical problems. For example, American diplomatic representatives abroad recently have received a number of protests from various Near Eastern governments with regard to the increasing Jewish influence in Palestine. Invariably, periods of pressure of this kind from Arab governments follow statements made in the United States such as those made recently with regard to the formation of a Jewish army. Irrespective of whether such statements may be right or wrong, they do serve to arouse Arab peoples and to occasion protests. The Axis propaganda machine, of course, uses these statements to its own advantage in attempting to foment discontent and antipathy to the United Nations’ cause among the Arab people. As a result, of course, the military situation is affected, in as much as it is essential to have the goodwill and friendship of the populations of Near Eastern countries where United Nations’ troops are stationed. Mr. Murray inquired what the callers thought of this aspect of the situation.

Mr. Shertok replied that Zionist leaders are dealing with democracies, which depend upon public opinion to support national policies. There are many questions being raised at this time regarding the predicament of the Jews in Europe. If anything is to be done about this situation, the question must be presented before the forum of public opinion.

Mr. Murray then inquired if questions are not being raised inopportune by the issuance of public statements. Dr. Weizmann replied that, in order to raise money, it is necessary to make speeches as a means of securing the support of public opinion. Naturally the Axis hears about some of these things but unfortunately that cannot be helped.

\*\* For correspondence regarding this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. II, pp. 1041–1045, *passim.*
Mr. Murray asked whether American Jews feel strongly on the subject of Zionism. There are, he said, many American Jews who are not pro-Zionist. Dr. Weizmann replied that probably over 90 percent of Jews in the United States would like to see Palestine rebuilt by the Jews and are incensed by the White Paper policy. Those who disagree with this majority are a powerful but small minority. This minority which is opposed to a Jewish state is afraid of jeopardizing its own position in the United States. Mr. Murray remarked that that is the very point involved—that there are many Jews in this country who regard themselves as thoroughly American and who do not wish to have their status threatened in any way. Dr. Weizmann then said that the war may end at any time and that the Palestine question is coming to a head. If it were possible to hold a plebiscite in the United States 90 percent of American Jews would favor the establishment of a Jewish state. Mr. Lipsky remarked at this point that dissenters among American Jews are agreeable to immigration into Palestine but balk only at the use of the term “state” with respect to Palestine. Mr. Murray observed that this attitude toward immigration may be attributed largely to sympathy for the predicament of Jews in Europe. Mr. Weizmann then stated that when a man is frightened he is not logical; that it is foolish for American Jews to be afraid that the United States would consider ejecting American Jews and sending them off to Palestine.

At this point the discussion ended and Dr. Weizmann and his associates arose to take their departure. As they were leaving, Mr. Alling asked Mr. Shertok how long he expected to remain in this country. Mr. Shertok replied that he expected “to remain here for the kill”.

Memorandum by Mr. William L. Parker of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1943.

PALESTINE QUESTION

The question of Palestine has been causing the Department increasing concern because of growing resentment toward Zionism on the part of the Arab populations in strategically located Near Eastern countries and in North Africa where American and British troops are stationed. In as much as this growing resentment may be at-

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867N.01/1849

This document was prepared for consultations with the British on the occasion of the visit by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to Washington, March 12–30; for correspondence relating to the Eden visit, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.
tributed in large measure to agitation on the part of Zionist organizations and sympathizers, it is believed that consideration should be given to means of placing Zionist activities upon a more realistic basis.

Near Eastern countries, particularly Iran and Iraq, now serve as supply routes for the shipment of vitally needed war materials for Russia. The predominately Arab-populated countries of French North Africa and Egypt, of course, are being used by United Nations troops as bases for military operations. In order to safeguard vital supply lines and to protect United Nations troops it is necessary to maintain the friendship of the peoples of the Near East and North Africa.

This friendship, however, is being undermined by a growing belief among the Arab peoples, fostered by the Axis propaganda machine, that a United Nations victory would entitle “turning Palestine over to the Jews” to the detriment of Arab interests and aspirations. It is becoming increasingly apparent, therefore, that steps should be taken to allay Arab fears on that score.

In approaching this problem, it is suggested that Mr. Eden be asked whether the British Government has considered the issuance of a statement which would go beyond Mr. Eden’s own statement of May 31, 1941, to the effect that the British Government would view with favor any plan for an Arab federation upon which the Arab peoples themselves could agree. Such a statement might be issued by the British Government itself or by it jointly with this Government. A statement of this kind would refer specifically to Palestine and would be based squarely on principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter.

In a meeting on March 29 with Mr. William Strang, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who accompanied Mr. Eden to Washington, the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) asked Mr. Strang “whether the British Government had considered the issuance of a statement, either by itself or jointly with the American Government, for the purpose of putting an end to the current agitation for a Jewish state in Palestine. Mr. Murray pointed out that the agitation referred to was having dangerous repercussions in the Arab

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20 Apparently a reference to Mr. Eden’s speech, May 29, 1941, on British war aims. Referring to Arab aspirations for unity, he said, “It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries and the political ties too, should be strengthened. H. M. Government will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval. . . .” See British Cmd. 6289, Miscellaneous No. 2 (1941): Speech by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden . . . delivered at the Mansion House on May 29, 1941. For correspondence regarding the interest of the United States in the Eden statement, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. 111, pp. 612–620, passim, and p. 721.

21 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941; for text, see ibid., vol. 1, p. 367.
world and that the declaration, which would be based squarely on the principles of the Atlantic Charter, might go beyond Mr. Eden’s statement of May 31 [297], 1941, by referring specifically to Palestine. Mr. Strang said that he was not familiar with the question of Palestine and could only make a note of Mr. Murray’s suggestion, for reference to his Government.” (711.90/69)

887N.10/628

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON,] March 30, 1943.

The Egyptian Minister called today and handed me the attached copy of a note and memorandum,1 the original of which he proposed subsequently to hand to Mr. Welles. The Minister observed that I would notice that it was again a question of Palestine and the possible entry of a large number of Jews there from the Balkan area. The Minister said he hoped that we would not gain the impression that his country or his people were anti-Jewish. The fact was, however, that the immigration of large numbers of Jews into Palestine created resentment among the Arabs of that country and brought about an unstable situation which had repercussions in his own country. He added that as I knew Jews and Christians, as well as Moslems, had for generations held high offices in Egypt. In this connection he pointed out that one of the Ladies in Waiting to the Egyptian Queen was a Jewess, namely, Madame Cattani.

The Minister went on to say that in his own view after the war had been won by the United Nations and democracy and fair play re-established in Europe, very few Jews would want to leave Europe for Palestine. As a matter of fact, he was inclined to believe that the movement would be in the other direction—that is, from Palestine to Europe. I said that I was inclined to agree with him and that in this general connection, we had just had word of the formation in Tel-Áviv of a group of Austrian Jews who were already making their plans to return to Vienna. I said to the Minister that it seemed to me that the Jews were afforded a much better chance and livelihood through the development of decent institutions in Europe than they would have through a precarious situation in Palestine.

The Minister remarked that he had not received any acknowledgment of the note which he had left with the Secretary of State on February 2. I told the Minister that we thought the Secretary’s oral comments were a sufficient acknowledgment but that if he desired a

1 Note not printed.
written acknowledgment, we should be glad to prepare one. The Minister said that one acknowledgment covering the note of February 2 and the note of today would be adequate.

[Annex]

The Egyptian Legation to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

The persecution of the Jews by the Axis Powers having been just marked by a recrudescence of arrests and executions in Germany and its satellites, it seems that the governments of Great Britain and the United States of America, accordingly, decided to jointly take such steps as may remedy the situation, and ask neutral nations to facilitate the migration of thousands of these Jews from Europe.

Whilst sympathising with this humanitarian action, Egypt, having always taken interest in a fair and equitable settlement of the Palestinian question, wishes to emphasise once again and call for the maintenance of the status quo in Palestine, recommending that the proposed fresh migration of Jews be diverted to lands other than Palestine, better equipped with natural resources and possibilities of production. Besides, it would be contrary to high moral principles, when trying to alleviate the sufferings of the Jews, indigenous inhabitants of Palestine would suffer as a consequence of such process.

Moreover, Palestine is already overpopulated, and a fresh influx of émigrés cannot but tend to accentuate even further an already acute food problem, her possibility for the absorption of fresh arrivals having already surpassed her capacity for such. In fact, the bitter experiences of the immediate past tend to show the unwisdom and perils of a continuation of Jewish immigration into Palestine.

For under whatever guise or pretext such immigration is tolerated and countenanced, such activities cannot but prove detrimental to the Arabs, who have repeatedly and justly complained of the Zionist activities.

At the moment that the United Nations proclaim the necessity of the Arab peoples to unite in evolving and contributing to a new order of civilisation, it would be most unfortunate, indeed, to lose sight of the fact of Palestine seeking to have the question of her independence transcend all other issues.

Moreover, all fresh immigration into this land cannot but give rise to troubles and difficulties at a period when the maintenance of peace and tranquility in this part of the world is most essential and indispensable.

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1943.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] March 30, 1943.

The Egyptian Minister called to see me this morning at his request. He left with me the note attached herewith.22 The Minister talked at some length along the lines of the communication he was instructed to make. He added the bright thought that a good thing for the United Nations now to do with regard to the Jewish refugees who might be brought out from Europe would be to send a batch of them to each of the United Nations, the number in each batch to be in proportion to the total population of the country to which the group was sent.

I told the Minister that I believed that after the war was won and the principles for which we were fighting in Europe had been established, the overwhelming majority of Jewish refugees would wish to return to their countries of origin, and in that way the grave problem which we had been discussing would in great part be solved. I said it was true in my judgment that a small number, for one reason or another, would wish to seek new homes in other lands, but that I had no reason to believe that the majority of even this small group would desire to proceed to Palestine. I said furthermore that it was the hope of this Government that a solution of the question of Palestine after the war would be brought about through the negotiation of a friendly agreement on the part of the peoples directly concerned.

I said, however, that the immediate problem before us was the appalling situation resulting from the apparent willingness of the Bulgarian Government to give in to German pressure by deporting to Poland the Jews of Bulgaria, and that the immediate question, therefore, was to try to find the way in which this atrocity could be prevented. I said it was not the thought of either the British or United States Governments that these refugees, if they could be extricated, be sent to Palestine. I said that the lack of shipping facilities alone would make such a movement very difficult of accomplishment. I explained to the Minister in general terms the hope we had expressed to the Turkish Government that we might obtain the assistance of the Turkish Government in solving this problem for the duration of the war, with the guarantee that any Jews that were admitted into Turkey would be repatriated at the end of the war.

The Minister seemed to be quite satisfied with the statement I made to him and decidedly apologetic for having had to carry out the instructions communicated to him by his Government.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

22 Note not printed; for memorandum attached to the note, see supra.
WASHINGTON, April 10, 1943—10 p. m.

105. A Jewish Telegraphic Agency report states that, in an address before a Jewish sport organization on April 4th, Ben-Gurion advocated the use of "Jewish might" and "physical power" to defend the Jewish position in Palestine. Please seek the views of the High Commissioner and other British officials regarding the significance and effect of Ben-Gurion's address and endeavor to ascertain whether this address is symptomatic of a developing attitude on the part of the Jewish community which may affect the general situation in Palestine.

In connection with the general situation not only in Palestine but throughout the Near East the Department is concerned over the statement in your despatch no. 672 of March 15th that there is among the Arabs in Palestine "a smouldering resentment of the reported American pro-Jewish attitude". As you know there are American troops stationed in North Africa and in various countries in the Near Eastern area, where vital military supply lines are located. The Axis propaganda machine unceasingly proclaims to the Arab peoples that American policies and attitudes are inimical to their interests in an effort to arouse hostility toward Americans on the part of the populations of North Africa and the Near East as a means of hindering military operations. Developments in the Near East and attitudes of the peoples of that area, therefore, have a vital bearing upon the security of American troops and supply lines. For this reason you should keep the Department currently and fully informed by telegraph of all developments in Palestine affecting or likely to affect this situation.

HULL

Cairo, April 17, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 9:40 p. m.]

723. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. The greater part of my conversation with Ibn Saud and his advisors during my visit at his desert camp midway between Riyadh and Dhahran was confined to

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\(^{33}\) David Ben-Gurion, Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency at Jerusalem. (See also footnote 5, p. 748.)

\(^{34}\) Not printed.

\(^{35}\) At this time Minister Kirk was also accredited to Saudi Arabia.
supply and Lend-Lease matters \(^\text{36}\) and to an exchange of cordialities which this time were especially marked on the part of the Saudi Arabians. On the day of my departure, however, the King sent for me and in a private audience said there was a matter which he desired to discuss with me personally and in strictest confidence and which he would request that I bring to attention of President. He referred, he said, to the Arab question and particularly to certain aspects thereof in respect of Palestine and Syria.

Turning first to Palestine he said situation there was of more concern to him than to any other Arab leader because Jews had been hostile to Arabs from time of Prophet Mohammed to present and he, Ibn Saud, as the leading Arab and Moslem, therefore, had a special interest in developments in Palestine where, because of vast wealth at their disposal and their influence in Britain and the United States Jews were steadily encroaching on Arabs. If this trend was allowed to continue it could only be expected that Jewish-Arab conflict would become more acute, which would be deplorable from Arab standpoint and would also cut across Allied war effort.

Recently he had heard of representations in respect of Palestine made to American Government by Egyptians and certain Arabs had urged him to do likewise, but he had hitherto refused for following two reasons:

1. He had made his views on subject known to President on a previous occasion and had received President’s reply.\(^\text{37}\)

2. He did not want to do anything at present time which would cause difficulty to United States at a time when it needed to devote its undivided attention to prosecution of war. Thus should he write the President and receive a reply favorable to Arabs, Jewish antagonisms would develop and, should reply be favorable to Jews or no reply at all made, Arabs’ dissatisfaction would be aroused. Were it not for these considerations arising out of war he would feel obligated to act, but under existing circumstances his sympathy for the United Nations’ cause and his friendship for the United States had led him to conclude that it would be preferable to remain silent.

Although Palestine received the chief emphasis the King also referred to question of Syria and said Syrians were his friends and independence of country was of great personal concern to him. He had noted in this connection the announced intention of the Allies to give Syria complete independence and he felt he must believe in their sense of justice and fidelity to their given word. In this case, like

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\(^{36}\) For correspondence regarding Lend-Lease assistance to Saudi Arabia, see pp. 854 ff.

\(^{37}\) For King Ibn Saud’s letter of November 29, 1938, see Foreign Relations, 1938, vol. II, p. 994; for President Roosevelt’s reply of about January 9, 1939, see ibid., 1939, vol. IV, p. 696.
that of Palestine, he had desired, therefore, to maintain silence in order to avoid causing embarrassment to Allies.

In adopting this policy of silence, however, he said that it was obvious that he, as the leading Arab and Moslem, would be placed in a difficult position if the American Government should respond favorably to the overtures of others since it might be made to appear that his silence had been motivated by lack of interest on his part, whereas the contrary was the case. He, therefore, wished to be advised whether President concurred in his views regarding the maintenance of silence for the time being. Should such not be the case, he had certain plans for action clearly in mind. On the other hand, should President agree, he would appreciate being so advised and at same time receiving an assurance that he would be informed in advance of any affirmative steps which American Government might contemplate taking in response to overtures by other Arab persons or agencies in order that he might consider possible adjustments in his policy. Since his own decision in matter had been taken in deference to our vital interests he hoped he could count on our being equally understanding of his position.

Turning from specific question of Syria and Palestine, King said he had heard indirectly of recent proposal to call Arab conference but that he had not been approached by sponsors of idea who had apparently been guided by knowledge of his policy of not desiring to do anything to make trouble for Allies. Whether he was or was not invited in this particular instance was a matter of relative indifference to him because he knew full well that no bona fide Arab conference could achieve any important results without his participation. He was, however, concerned by the fact that much of this present Pan Arab agitation emanated from Iraq and had as its ultimate purpose the extension of Hashemite power. Ibn Saud emphasized that he had no personal territorial ambitions outside his own country but merely wished to see Syria and Palestine attain individual independence and take their place alongside Saudi Arabia and Iraq in a balanced comity of Arab states; in other words Syria for the Syrians, Palestine for the Palestinians, et cetera. There was, however, strong indication (mentioning Nuri, Abdullah [Abdul Nâh?] and Abdullah by name) that an effort was being made to use Pan Arabism as

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28. The family of Hussein, Sherif of Mecca and guardian of the Moslem holy places in the Hejaz, who, in alliance with the British, led the Arab Revolt during World War I which resulted in the detachment of the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire from Turkish sovereignty. Although Hussein's claim to be "King of the Arabs" was never recognised by Great Britain and France, and the kingdoms of "Syria" and the Hejaz were lost to the family by 1920 and 1925, respectively, Hashemite dynasties were successfully established by sons of Hussein in Iraq and Transjordan.

29. Perhaps Nuri as-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq; Amir Abdul Ilah, Regent of Iraq; and Abdullah, Amir of Transjordan.
a means for formation of Iraq, Palestine and Syria into a Hashemite bloc. Such a development he could only view with gravest apprehension in view of traditional hostility of Hashemites to House of Saud and King trusted Allies would not countenance materialization of such a serious threat to Saudi Arabia.

In conclusion King stressed confidential nature of his observations and asked that they be revealed to no one not even the British although latter were cognizant of his general views. He also requested that any reply of President to question regarding his present policy of silence in respect of Palestine and Syria should be transmitted only to Prince Faisal 40 or Shaikh Yousef Yassine.41 King referred on several occasions in course of his remarks to friendly private and official relations which had so happily developed between Saudi Arabia and United States and suggested that American interests in Saudi Arabia were such as to justify its occupying a special place in the formulation of American policy in Near East.

In transmitting this message from Ibn Saud for the President, it is difficult if not impossible without incurring the criticisms of hyperbole or even emotionalisms, adequately to reflect the sincerity of the King and his profound conviction in the virtue of his own judgment. He is simple, honest and decisive and these qualities transcend the limited formula of his special experience. He believes that we are his friends and to him friendship bespeaks complete confidence. Compromise is inadmissible. He truly feels that his problems are ours and ours are his and in giving this message for the President, he confirmed throughout an absolute faith in the justice of the democracies and a conviction that the order which is to follow their victory will justify that faith.

Kirk

867N.00/630 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (P.inkerton) to the Secretary of State

Jerusalem, April 17, 1943—7 p.m.

[Received 10 p.m.]

102. In the absence of High Commissioner in Iran I have consulted Chief Secretary who is acting and have discussed situation generally with him and other officials of the Secretariat. Following information and expression of opinion arises from discussion with Palestine

40 Amir Faisal, eldest son of the King, was Foreign Minister.
41 Amir Faisal’s representative at Jidda, seat of the diplomatic missions accredited to Saudi Arabia.
officials. It is assumed Department’s telegram 42 refers to speech made by Ben-Gurion before Maccabee organization on April 1. On this as on numerous occasions recently Ben-Gurion and other extremist Zionist leaders have made speeches visualizing use of force if necessary for the attainment of Jewish nationalist aims in connection with the post war settlement. Majority of Jews of Palestine share these aims. How many agree with use of force to achieve them is uncertain but Chief of CID 43 estimates forty percent of population will follow into violence if necessary. Community has been influenced into acceptance of extremist policy and more moderate portion of community although generally perturbed are ineffectual in opposition to advocates of extremist backed by organizations said to be controlled by Jewish Agency.

British authorities have been aware for some time that secret caches of arms and ammunition were being built up in Jewish settlements ostensibly with sole object of defence against Arab attack. Action to prevent this has been hampered by British desire to avoid major clashes with sections of Jewish community which they say could only have led to a showdown with Jewish Agency with consequent undesirable repercussions on war effort. I have been informed in strict confidence by Secretariat that of late thefts by Jews of military arms and explosives have reached alarming proportions and recent hauls have included two consignments of some 300 rifles each, more than 20 machine guns and over three tons of gelignite and other explosives. Evidence points to organized arms racket involving Jewish units of the British Army employed on guard duties. Investigations are still proceeding. Secretariat states that extent of arms thefts and reports regarding nature of illegal military training now being conducted in Jewish settlements indicates that action contemplated is offensive as well as defensive, stress on offensive side having been intensified.

Neither side wishes to risk being blamed for embarrassing war efforts by starting violence now but officials say greater danger is at present from Jews who are well prepared. General opinion is that serious trouble need not be anticipated until near or at end of war. Both races however are excitable and feelings may quickly boil over. Each side would naturally be glad to see the other blamed for initiating disturbances.

It is generally agreed that eventual showdown is inevitable unless extremism on both sides can be checked. British efforts to soften both parties on basis of common interests have so far resulted only in Zionist opposition to local government which Ben-Gurion character-

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42 Telegram No. 105, April 10, p. 768.
43 Presumably the Criminal Investigation Department.
izes as White Paper government and in Arab accusations of appeasement of Jews.

Pinkerton

King Abdul Azis Ibn Saud to President Roosevelt

EXCELLENCY: In this great world war in which nations are shedding their blood and expending their wealth in the defence of freedom and liberty, in this war in which the high principles for which the Allies are fighting have been proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter, in this struggle in which the leaders of every country are appealing to their countrymen, allies and friends to stand with them in their struggle for life, I have been alarmed, as have other Moslems and Arabs, because a group of Zionists are seizing the opportunity of this terrible crisis to make extensive propaganda by which they seek on the one hand to mislead American public opinion and, on the other hand, to bring pressure upon the Allied Governments in these critical times in order to force them to go against the principles of right, justice and equity which they have proclaimed and for which they are fighting, the principles of the freedom and liberty of peoples. By so doing the Jews seek to compel the Allies to help them exterminate the peaceful Arabs settled in Palestine for thousands of years. They hope to evict this noble nation from its home and to install Jews from every horizon in this sacred Moslem Arab country. What a calamitous and infamous miscarriage of justice would, God forbid, result from this world struggle if the Allies should, at the end of their struggle, crown their victory by evicting the Arabs from their home in Palestine, substituting in their place vagrant Jews who have no ties with this country except an imaginary claim which, from the point of view of right and justice, has no grounds except what they invent through fraud and deceit. They avail themselves of the Allies' critical situation and of the fact that the American nation is unaware of the truth about the Arabs in general and the Palestine question in particular.

On November 19 [29], 1938 (Shawal 7, 1357 H.) I wrote to Your Excellency a letter in which I set forth the true situation of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. If Your Excellency would refer to that letter, you will find that the Jews have no right to Palestine and that their claim is an act of injustice unprecedented in the history of the human race. Palestine has from the earliest history belonged to the Arabs and is situated in the midst of Arab countries. The Jews only occupied it for a short period and the greater part of that period was full of massacres and tragedies. Subsequently they were

44 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Egypt in his despatch No. 1034, May 11; received May 25.
driven out of the country and today it is proposed to re-install them in it. By so doing the Jews will do wrong to the quiet and peaceful Arabs. The Heavens will split, the earth will be rent asunder, and the mountains will tremble at what the Jews claim in Palestine, both materially and spiritually.

Having sent to Your Excellency my above-mentioned letter, I believed, and I still believe, that the Arab claim to Palestine had become clear to you, for in your kind letter to me dated January 9, 1939 46 you made no remark about any of the facts which I had mentioned in my previous letter. I would not have wasted Your Excellency’s time over this case nor the time of the men at the head of your government at this critical moment but the persistent news that these Zionists do not refrain from bringing forth their wrong and unjust claim induces me to remind Your Excellency of the rights of Moslems and Arabs in the Holy Land so that you may prevent this act of injustice and that my explanation to Your Excellency may convince the Americans of the Arabs’ rights in Palestine, and that Americans whom Jewish Zionism intends to mislead by propaganda may know the real facts, help the oppressed Arabs, and crown their present efforts by setting up right and justice in all parts of the world.

If we leave aside the religious animosity between Moslems and Jews which dates back to the time when Islam appeared and which is due to the treacherous behavior of the Jews towards Moslems and their Prophet, if we leave aside all this and consider the case of the Jews from a purely humanitarian point of view, we would find, as I mentioned in my previous letter, that Palestine, as every human creature who knows that country admits, cannot solve the Jewish problem. Supposing that the country were subjected to injustice in all its forms, that all the Arabs of Palestine, men, women and children, were killed and their lands wrested from them and given to the Jews, the Jewish problem would not be solved and no sufficient lands would be available for the Jews. Why, therefore, should such an act of injustice, which is unique in the history of the human race, be tolerated, seeing that it would not satisfy the would-be murderers, i.e., the Jews?

In my previous letter to Your Excellency I stated that if we consider this matter from a humanitarian point of view, we would find that the small country we call Palestine was crammed at the beginning of the present war with nearly 400,000 Jews. At the end of the last Great War they only constituted 7% of the whole population but this proportion rose before the beginning of the present war to 29% and is still rising. We do not know where it will stop, but we know that a little before the present war the Jews possessed 1,000,332

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donams out of 7,000,000 donams which is the sum total of all the cultivable land in Palestine.

We do not intend, nor demand, the destruction of the Jews but we demand that the Arabs should not be exterminated for the sake of the Jews. The world should not be too small to receive them. In fact, if each of the Allied countries would bear one tenth of what Palestine has borne, it would be possible to solve the Jewish problem and the problem of giving them a home to live in. All that we request at present is that you should help to stop the flow of migration by finding a place for the Jews to live in other than Palestine, and by preventing completely the sale of lands to them. Later on the Allies and Arabs can look into the matter of assuring the accommodation of those of the Jews residing in Palestine whom that country can support provided that they reside quietly and do not foment trouble between Arabs and the Allies.

In writing this to Your Excellency I am sure that you will respond to the appeal of a friend who feels that you appreciate friendship as you appreciate right, justice, and equity, and who is aware that the greatest hope of the American people is to come out of this world struggle, rejoicing in the triumph of the principles for which it is fighting, i.e., to ensure to every people its freedom and to grant it its rights. For if—God forbid!—the Jews were to be granted their desire, Palestine would forever remain a hotbed of troubles and disturbances as in the past. This will create difficulties for the Allies in general and for our friend Great Britain in particular. In view of their financial power and learning the Jews can stir up enmity between the Arabs and the Allies at any moment. They have been the cause of many troubles in the past.

All that we are now anxious for is that right and justice should prevail in the solution of the various problems which will come to light after the war and that the relations between the Arabs and the Allies should always be of the best and strongest.

In closing, I beg you to accept my most cordial greetings.

Written at Our Camp at Roda Khareem on this the 25th day of Rabi’Tani, of the year 1362 Hegira corresponding to April 30, 1943.

890F.00/84: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Shullaw) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, May 3, 1943—7 p. m.
[Received May 4—7: 13 a. m.]

40. My 38, April 27.44 In a conversation today with the British Chargé Wikeley, I learned that Ibn Saud will send a letter to the

44 Not printed.
President on the subject of Palestine. The letter presumably will be
along the lines of November 1938 letter with an indication that the
views advanced by His Majesty on that occasion continue valid today.
Wikeley's information indicates that Ibn Saud's letter may or may
not include a suggestion that further Jewish immigration to Palestine
be forbidden. A ban is favored by Yusuf Yassin, who has further
indicated to me in conversations that recent Jewish arrivals should
after the war be removed to other countries. Yusuf Yassin is leaving
tomorrow for Egypt and intends to visit Syria, in whose future he is
much interested, and possibly Palestine before returning to Jidda.
In matters affecting Syria and Palestine he probably has considerable
influence with Ibn Saud.
Repeated to Cairo.

SHULLAW

121.891/74

Brigadier General Patrick J. Hurley, Personal Representative of
President Roosevelt, to the President

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

Cairo, May 5, 1943.

PART I

[Here follows section describing in general terms General Hurley's
visit to French Morocco, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria.]

PART II

Running through all the discussions in the Middle East, most
definite emphasis is placed not on war and not on peace but on the
issue of establishing or not establishing a Jewish Political State in
Palestine.

It is unnecessary for me to discuss for you in this report the
arguments based on Scripture, on history, on the Balfour Declaration, on
the Palestine Mandate, on the Joint Resolution of the United States
Congress, on the British White Paper, or on the speeches of leading
nationals pertaining to the Jewish National Home and a Jewish
Political State in Palestine.

The debate on the issue of a Jewish Political State in Palestine
in many quarters has become acrimonious. Among the Jews them-


48 President Roosevelt had designated General Hurley as his Personal Re-

presentative to act as observer and to report directly to him upon general con-

ditions in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia.

49 President Roosevelt on May 18 directed that a copy of this report be trans-

mitted to the Department of State, with the request that the Department for-

ward to him a recommendation regarding the message.

For its part, the Zionist organization in Palestine has indicated its commitment to an enlarged program for (1) a sovereign Jewish State which would embrace Palestine and probably Transjordania, (2) an eventual transfer of the Arab population from Palestine to Iraq, and (3) Jewish leadership for the whole Middle East in the fields of economic development and control.

In Palestine itself there are considerable numbers of Jews who consider themselves primarily Europeans, and who would prefer to return to Europe if security of life can be assured there. There are others who would accept life in Palestine under advantageous conditions but who shrink from possible violence or the hard life of pioneers. Since the Zionist organization in Palestine exercises major control over the means of livelihood of the refugee Jews of that country, it is difficult to assess precisely the strength of actual or potential opposition to the organization program. Nevertheless it is clear that such opposition exists among the Palestine Jews themselves and that it will become more manifest when democratic regimes are reestablished in Europe.

Jewish communities in the Middle East, outside of Palestine, are long established and important, socially and economically. Leaders, and I believe a majority of members of these communities, view the Zionist program with a degree of distrust and alarm based on (1) fear that it may imply forced migration to Palestine, (2) fear that any attempt to implement the program would lead to persecution, and (3) religious differences among the Jews themselves.

Among the Arabs, there is little or no anti-Jewish sentiment as we ordinarily use the term; nor is there serious opposition to the concept of a Jewish National Home. There are racial relationships between the Arab and the Jew. Notwithstanding these factors, there is deep-seated Arab hostility to any immigration program intended to create a Jewish majority in Palestine and to the establishment of a Jewish sovereign state.

There is hostility also toward the Jewish claim that they are the "chosen people" and hence entitled, even though they are a minority, to special privileges. One leading Arab spokesman described this "chosen people" concept as kindred to Nazi doctrine.

The basic fear of the Arab leaders seems to be that a Jewish Political State in the Middle East, due to the influence of world Jewry on the great powers, would become the means by which imperialism would continue to dominate the Middle East. Such a condition would, of course, obstruct the establishment of really independent Arab political states in an Arab union.

Nuri Pasha es-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq and one of the long-time proponents of Arab Federation, has suggested a compromise.
solution. This solution is sufficiently close to that set forth in the British White Paper of 1939 as to entitle it to the sympathetic consideration of the British Government. The Nuri proposals differ from the White Paper principally in that they would expedite the assumption of independence by Palestine; they would not recognize a continued British special interest in Palestine based on strategic considerations; and they would establish an Arab Federation embracing Palestine, Transjordania, the Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and such other Arab states as might desire adherence. The Jewish population in Palestine, with immigration limited by law so as to prevent such immigration from creating a Jewish majority, thus assuring an Arab majority, would have autonomous rights within the districts in which they constituted majorities. The Lebanese Christian community would have the same rights. These rights are to be protected by international guarantees.

Some such solution very probably would meet with acceptance by a majority of Moslem Arab leaders, of the leaders of Jewish communities in the Middle East outside of Palestine, and of significant numbers of the Jews within Palestine.

Throughout the Arab nations I found a well defined opinion prevailing that the United States, and not Great Britain, is insisting on establishing a sovereign Jewish State in Palestine.

Mr. Ben-Gurion, the Zionist leader in Palestine, discussed at length and with unusual eloquence the Jewish claim to political control of Palestine. Throughout his argument, Mr. Ben-Gurion assumed and asserted that the Government of the United States is committed and obligated, repeat obligated, to establish a Jewish Political State in Palestine.

This alleged obligation was said to derive from: (1) Scriptural promises and historical logic, (2) the investment in Palestine of Jewish American capital in reliance on the protection of the U.S. Government, (3) support accorded by the U.S. Government to the establishment of the Palestinian Mandate, and (4) support of the Zionist program implied in the Joint Resolution of Congress of 1922.

These Zionist arguments, intended to prove that the United States is obligated to establish a Jewish Political State in Palestine, do have an appeal and do encourage acceptance but they are in fact incorrect. It seemed wise, therefore, to point out to Mr. Ben-Gurion that none of the evidence offered revealed any obligation of the U.S. Government or the American people to support the present Zionist demand for creation of a Jewish majority and establishment of a Jewish Political State in Palestine. The documents involved in (3) and (4) were produced and it was shown clearly that the U.S. Government merely consented to the British Mandate for Palestine and, in the
joint Resolution, favored only the establishment of a National Home for the Jews insofar as such a home would not trespass on the rights of Christian and other non-Jewish community in Palestine.

Speakers opposing the Zionist position emphasized to me that the handing over of the Government of Palestine to the Jewish minority would violate the fundamental principles of Americanism, the Atlantic Charter and the four freedoms. They pointed out further that if it is admitted that a minority has a perpetual right to restitution of territory taken from it by conquest, the enforcement of that principle would destroy the British Empire and would require the United States to make restitution to Mexico of much of our West and Southwest.

Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, leader of the Arab Moslem majority in Palestine, presented to me the argument in opposition to the establishment of a Jewish State there. He asserted that Washington appears to be lending its strength to this plan of minority rule for the people of Palestine, and to be supporting a program of Jewish migration to Palestine sufficient in extent to give the Jews an eventual majority over the Arabs. He considers such policy unjust and certain to provoke hostilities against the Jews not only in Palestine but in all other Arab nations.

I asked Auni Bey the basis for his assertion. He replied first that he was informed that the Jewish minority in the United States and in fact in many other nations controls the most powerful means of propaganda; that the Zionist organization has forced Washington to oppose the Balfour concept of a Jewish National Home and that Washington in turn has forced the British Government to acquiesce in the establishment of a Jewish Political State in Palestine.

I suggested to Auni Bey that he was still speaking in generalities and asked him if he could state specifically the source of his information. He replied that Sir Ronald Storrs, former High Commissioner to Palestine, who recently revisited Palestine and other Arab States, had told him personally that His Britannic Majesty’s Government is opposed to the establishment of a Jewish Political State in Palestine and still adheres to the Balfour Declaration and British White Paper policy for establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine but that Washington is forcing British acquiescence in the establishment of a Jewish Political State. He said that many other British spokesmen had expressed the same opinion.

The widespread circulation of this opinion was revealed to me, but not at other times attributed to Sir Ronald Storrs, during conversa-
tions in Damascus, in Beirut, in Baghdad and in Tehran—with Moslems, Christians, Arab leaders, American missionaries, and others.

This line of propaganda is distinctly helpful to British prestige with the Arabs. I am convinced, however, that the British officials and leaders with whom I have conferred in the Middle East are definitely opposed to the establishment of a Jewish Political State in Palestine and are in favor of a settlement of the issue on the basis of the British White Paper.

There is another predominating rumor, which is so widely circulated and believed that it has assumed some of the definite attributes of a fact. It purports to be a quotation from a private conversation with Winston Churchill in Cairo, in which the Prime Minister allegedly said, “I am committed to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine and the President will accept nothing less.” If this statement was made, the Prime Minister unquestionably shares full responsibility with you for whatever decision is reached.

Without attempting to assess responsibility for the Arab-Jewish problem, even while recognizing that the Middle East has been and is a zone of British influence, I believe the British are no longer able by themselves to settle this and kindred problems in the Middle East. Specifically it is my opinion that the British and the Americans must come together and share equally in the final decision for or against the establishment of a Jewish Political State and must share also the responsibility for the consequences of such a decision.

I am, sir, yours respectfully, PATRICK HURLEY

867N.00/682

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Shullaw) to the Secretary of State

No. 108

JIDDA, May 6, 1943. [Received June 1.]

Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s strictly confidential instruction no. 36 dated March 20, 1943* with which was transmitted a memorandum of a conversation** relating to Palestine between Dr. Chaim Weizmann and certain of his associates and officers of the Department.

In the past there have been three great bases for Ibn Saud’s policies: firstly, his religion; secondly, his Arabism; and thirdly, his friendship with the British Government. Of the three the first has always been dominant and in the event of any conflict with the third factor of friendship with the British Government, the religious motif would undoubtedly prevail. Aside from the religious convic-

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* Not printed.
** March 3, p. 757.
tions of Ibn Saud which would prevent him from ever agreeing to Palestine becoming a Jewish state, practical considerations of his position in his own country would bar acceptance of any such plan. In the larger sphere of the Arab world any indication that he was willing to consider a scheme which would place an Arab state under Jewish control would be sufficient to seriously weaken or destroy his prestige. This Ibn Saud fully realizes and quite apart from considerations of his own prestige he undoubtedly feels most sincerely his responsibilities to the Arab world as an Arab leader.

There is little likelihood that Ibn Saud under any circumstances would receive a Jewish delegation such as that mentioned in the memorandum under reference. His reaction could conceivably vary from a flat refusal to a suggestion that anything which Jewish leaders might wish to tell him should be transmitted through regular diplomatic channels. In no case could it be expected that the King's position would be altered by any communications addressed to him by the Zionists. His stand was taken in the letter of November 1938 addressed to President Roosevelt 54 and as reported in my telegram No. 40 dated May 3, 7 p. m., this exposition of Ibn Saud's views will shortly be reiterated in a second letter to the President.

In this connection the statement made by Dr. Weizmann that Ibn Saud had written the 1938 letter because "no Arab could afford to speak less loudly than the other" at that time regarding the establishment of a Jewish national home is true only so far as it relates to the timing of the letter. The same comment might be made at the present time when Ibn Saud is sending a second letter on the subject of Palestine to the President. Now the voices of many Arab leaders are being raised with various proposals and counter proposals and the King no doubt feels that he should also make some use of his influence in the cause of Arabism. There is no question now, or was there previously, of Ibn Saud's sincere interest in the Arab position in Palestine.

Respectfully yours,

J. Harold Shullaw

811.20290B/14a

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 55

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will recall last October your insistence that an American mission should go to the Near East to assist the cause of the United Nations by taking advantage of the goodwill...

55 Notation by the President: "CH OK FDR."
that exists for the United States in that area. The final agreement with the British was for Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, A.U.S., 56 and one officer to make a survey trip.

Colonel Hoskins has now returned after three and one-half months in which he visited all of the Near East and North Africa.

During the course of his visit he saw and talked to British, French, and American military and political officials, and to a large number of the leading Arab and Jewish officials and prominent persons in that area. A copy of his report is attached. 57

I believe that at least the summary warrants your careful reading. I also trust I may have your approval for further efforts along the lines indicated and for the wording of the proposed United Nations' declaration attached hereto, which, if you concur, we could first discuss with the British and subsequently with other United Nations.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

[Enclosure 1]

SUMMARY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAROLD B. HOSKINS' REPORT ON THE NEAR EAST

Part I gives the outstanding facts developed in the course of his three and one-half months' trip through the Near East and North Africa and may be summarized as follows:

(1) The most important and most serious fact is the danger that, unless definite steps are taken to prevent it, there may be a renewed outbreak of fighting between Arabs and Jews in Palestine before the end of the war and perhaps even during the next few months. Such fighting in Palestine is almost certain to lead to the massacre of Jews living in the neighboring states of Iraq and Syria as well as in other places in the Near East.

The tension is growing steadily and as a result the Arabs are likely to be goaded as their only effective means of protest into breaking the informal truce which has existed in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in 1939. The Arabs feel that the Zionists, by continuing a world-wide propaganda for a Jewish State in Palestine, have not kept their part of the bargain. There is therefore in the minds of the Arabs a growing fear that unless they do something, they will be faced, when the war is over, with a decision already taken by the Great Powers to turn Palestine over to the Jews. This fear is, of course, one on which Axis propaganda to this area has constantly and effectively harped.

56 Army of the United States.
57 Report of April 20, 1943, not printed; a summary of the report, also enclosed, is printed below.
(2) The Jews feel that with their increased numbers and with their increased stocks of arms they can more than hold their own in actual fighting with Palestinian Arabs. However, from previous experience the Jews realize that, whenever serious fighting with the Arabs starts in Palestine, assistance from neighboring Arab states will again pour in. It is this increased opposition that the Zionists admit they probably do not have the power to overcome without outside assistance from British or British and American military forces.

(3) There is an ever-present Arab fear of American support for political Zionism with its proposed Jewish State and Jewish Army in Palestine. This is now extending to the further fear of American support for the penetration of Jewish people into Syria and other neighboring Arab areas, once Palestine has been fully populated.

(4) There is also a growing Syrian fear of American support for, or at least acquiescence in, a continuation of French control in Syria after this war is over. The Syrians remember that, after the last war and despite an overwhelming preference for the United States and specific objection to France, the mandates for Syria and Lebanon were nevertheless given to France.

In fact, the fear that already haunts all of the Near East is that at the end of the present World War the United States may again return to isolationism. Even today this is the cause of such worry that reference is made to it in almost every conversation held with private or official individuals.

(5) Tension and difficulties with the Arabs in North Africa have already been reported to the War Department by General Eisenhower.58 The unenthusiastic, and in some places uncooperative, attitude of the North African Arab populations reflects hostile propaganda that has claimed that American successes in North Africa would aid the Jewish cause in Palestine.

Obviously the security of American or United Nations troops in the Arab or Moslem world has not yet reached a critical stage. But the situation is definitely unhealthy. The experiences of British troops during their retreat in Burma are a grave and recent warning of the serious effects that a hostile, rather than friendly, native population can have on our military operations.

(6) Since Zionist propaganda in the United States is much greater than corresponding Arab pressure, it is important for the American people to realize that, in the Moslem world, Arab feelings remain uncompromisingly against the acceptance of a political Zionist State in Palestine.

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It should be very clear to the American people, therefore, that only by military force can a Zionist State in Palestine be imposed upon the Arabs.

Part II notes some of the effects of the Arab-Jew conflict in Palestine on the United States.

Our domestic disunity is aggravated by dissension among American citizens of various foreign born groups and increasing conflicts among various Jewish groups, as well as increasing anti-Semitism.

An unfortunate effect for the Jews themselves has resulted from mixing together two problems that should be kept quite separate. Support for all-out aid to persecuted Jews in Europe, on which there can be no difference of opinion, should not be diminished by tying it up with the extremely controversial proposal to establish a Jewish political state in Palestine.

Part III suggests a specific step toward winning wartime support for our United Nations' cause of the 60 million Arabs in North Africa and the Near East.

(1) By the issuance now of a brief statement by the United Nations (or at least by the four major powers) giving assurances regarding the procedure that will be followed in arriving at a post-war settlement of Palestine. Such a statement need only restate as official policy of the United Nations, in regard to Palestine what the United States, Great Britain, and their Allies have already announced as their general policy in regard to territorial problems everywhere. This assurance can be very brief and need only consist of two points: (1) that no final decisions regarding Palestine will be taken until after the war; (2) that any post-war decisions will be taken only after full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

A statement along these lines issued as soon as possible would go far to relieve existing tension in the Near East and would, in the opinion of officials in that area, be the military equivalent of at least several extra divisions of troops.

Part IV outlines a post-war solution.

The existing population of one million Arabs and one-half million Jews in Palestine is not to be moved and is to form a bi-national state within a proposed Levant Federation. This independent Levant Federation would be formed by the re-uniting of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan that, prior to their dismemberment after the last war, had for years been one natural economic and political unit. The Holy Places, including Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Bethlehem, are to be an enclave under United Nations’ control. The cession of some specific territory other than Palestine for a Jewish State is proposed—possibly northern Cirenaica, which is now virtually uninhabited.
The Jewish refugee problem is met to the extent that, under the proposed plan, the Jews could put another half million in Palestine so as to reach parity with the Arabs and up to a half million Jews in northern Cirenaica.

[Enclosure 2]

PROPOSED DECLARATION

The United Nations, having in mind the terms of their Declaration of January 1, 1942, are agreed that while public discussions on controversial international questions are in general desirable, in order to promote an informed public opinion and clarification of the issues involved, it is undesirable that special viewpoints should be pressed while the war is in progress to such a degree as to create undue anxieties among United Nations and other friendly governments and peoples.

In this connection, the United Nations have taken note of public discussions and activities of a political nature relating to Palestine and consider that it would be helpful to the war effort if these were to cease. Accordingly, the United Nations declare it to be their view that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be considered until after the conclusion of the war. When the matter is considered, both Arabs and Jews should be fully consulted and their agreement sought.

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The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Shullaw) to the Secretary of State

No. 109

Jidda, May 8, 1943.

[Received June 1.]

Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s strictly confidential instruction no. 41 dated April 6, 1943 concerning a conversation which took place on March 30, 1943 between the Under Secretary of State and the Egyptian Minister.

The remark of the Minister that each of the United Nations might well take a proportionate number of Jewish refugees is interesting in view of the fact that King Ibn Saud in his letter to President Roosevelt dated April 30, 1943 makes somewhat the same suggestion but in an oblique manner. The King’s advisor, Shaiikh Yusuf Yassin, several times recently has suggested that each of the United Nations should provide homes for the refugee Jews and should not look to Palestine, a small country, to carry the burden. Yusuf Yassin’s sug-

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*Not printed.
gestion relates not only to the settlement of refugee European Jews at the present time but to a possible reduction in the Jewish population of Palestine after the war. His ideas, or perhaps only the presentation of them, have undergone an evolution in the past few months. In his first remarks to me on the subject he appeared to favor only the stopping of further Jewish immigration into Palestine. Later the idea was added that after the war recent Jewish arrivals in Palestine should be removed from the country since Palestine otherwise would be sheltering a disproportionate share of the world's responsibility of furnishing homes for the Jews.

Respectfully yours,

J. Harold Shullaw

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943—5 p. m.

19. Your 38, April 27, 8 p. m. The Department, of course, is reluctant to pass judgment upon any plan the Saudi Arabian Government may have in mind in giving publicity in this country to the King's views on the Palestine question. However, if a suitable opportunity occurs and you perceive no objection to doing so, you might express doubt as to whether the plan to distribute copies of Ibn Saud's letter of 1938 to the President in the United States is well suited to American conditions. You might suggest that the Saudi Arabian Government might find it advisable to study conditions in this country in order to reach a considered conclusion as to the best means of presenting its point of view with respect to matters with which it is concerned.

Hull

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1943—6 p. m.

714. Your 723, April 7 [17], 10 a. m. Please arrange for the transmission of the following message from the President to King Ibn Saud through the confidential media he indicated:

"The American Minister, Mr. Kirk, has communicated to me Your Majesty's expression of friendship for the United States and sympathy for the United Nations' cause, which I am most grateful to receive.


62 The Department subsequently authorized Minister Kirk to transmit this message to the Appointed Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose), for conveyance to King Ibn Saud in the exact wording of the English text (S90F.00/90).
He has informed me also how Your Majesty has manifested this friendship and sympathy by remaining silent in regard to issues affecting the Arab peoples among whom Your Majesty is revered as a distinguished leader.

In conveying my appreciation of Your Majesty’s sympathetic understanding and helpful cooperation, I wish to express my thorough agreement with Your Majesty’s considered opinion that continued silence with respect to such matters would prove most helpful to the United Nations in their bitter struggle to preserve the freedom of mankind. Nevertheless, if the interested Arabs and Jews should reach a friendly understanding in regard to matters affecting Palestine through their own efforts before the end of the war, such a development would be highly desirable. In any case, however, I assure Your Majesty that it is the view of the Government of the United States that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

I take this opportunity to express my best wishes for Your Majesty’s good health and for the well-being of your people. Franklin D. Roosevelt.”

HULL

867N.01.5-2643

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) 65

[WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1943.

It is stated in the Jewish Telegraphic Agency Bulletin of May 25, 1943 that Dr. Weizmann has announced the establishment in Washington of an office of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, under the direction of Dr. Nahum Goldmann in collaboration with Mr. Louis Lipsky.

It may be recalled that the Jewish Agency was established under the provisions of Article 4 of the Mandate for Palestine:

“An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

“The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty’s Government to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.”

The question now arises as to the attitude which the Department should adopt with respect to the Washington office of the Jewish

65 Addressed to the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Ather- ton), the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn), the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle), the Under Secretary of State (Welles), and the Secretary.
Agency and its representatives who may call at the Department. It is believed that the answer to this question may be found in Article 4 of the Mandate, with reference to the provision therein that the Jewish Agency shall operate "subject always to the control of the Administration". It is recommended, therefore, that no official recognition be accorded to this Washington office of the Jewish Agency, and that Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Lipsky, and any other representatives of this office be received and treated in the same manner as they have been heretofore upon the occasion of their visits to the Department to discuss matters relating to Palestine. In the event that they have anything to communicate to the Department on behalf of the Jewish Agency, it is recommended that they be informed that such communications should be transmitted to the Department through the British Embassy.

WALLACE MURRAY

890F.00/92: Telegram

*The Appointed Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State*

JIDDA, June 6, 1943—2 p.m.
[Received 4:15 p.m.]

51. Legation's telegram No. 50, June 3, 3 p.m. The President's message was delivered to Amir Faisal yesterday for transmission to King Ibn Saud. Faisal was cordial and apparently pleased. Despatch will follow.

Repeated to Cairo.

Moose

890F.00/98

*The Appointed Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State*

No. 125

JIDDA, June 7, 1943.
[Received June 28.]

Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram no. 19, May 25, 5 p.m., 1943, and to report that when I called on the Amir Faisal, Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs, at Taif, on June 5, 1943,

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44 Not printed.
45 See telegram No. 714, May 26, p. 786.
46 Despatch No. 124, June 7; Minister Moose stated in part, "The Minister of Foreign Affairs was more cordial than I had seen him on any previous occasion." (890F.00/95).
the Amir Faisal on his own initiative brought up the problem of securing adequate publicity in the United States for the Arab point of view with regard to the problem of Palestine.

He stated that the Jews in the United States had used their money and position in the United States to justify Zionist claims in the eyes of the American public, to the prejudice of Arab rights. Therefore, the Amir Faisal thought that favorable publicity in the United States would be beneficial in supporting the Arab point of view.

Advantage was taken at this moment of the opportunity to deliver to the Amir Faisal verbally the sense of the Department’s telegram cited above.

Then the Amir Faisal continued by saying that Palestine is a small country: too small to be a National Home for all the Jews, even if the Arabs were to be crowded out. He stated that the Arab population of Palestine had already been afflicted enough by Jewish penetration. Arabs had lost their lands and in some cases had been forced to emigrate from Palestine. To the Amir Faisal, it seemed to be only elementary justice that the Arabs should not be called upon to suffer further Jewish immigration.

He pointed out that the Arab quarrel was essentially with the Zionists and with those who aided and abetted Zionism, and not necessarily with the Jews; recalling at the same time that Jews and Arabs had dwelt peaceably in Palestine, side by side, for many years before the Zionist colonization of the country began.

Later in the conversation, the Amir Faisal revealed that his father, King Ibn Saud, was considering a request for an interview with an Associated Press Correspondent named Clyde Farnsworth, and the King was considering the request solely on the basis of possible favorable publicity in the American press if the interview were granted, or possible adverse comment if it were not granted.

So far as I am aware, the King’s apparent solicitude for American public opinion is a recent development. That he is in fact interested in the attitude of the American public may be inferred from (1) the recent visit of Noel Busch, correspondent of Life, to Riyadh, (2) the King’s desire, or that of Shaikh Yussuf Yassin, to publish the King’s 1938 letter to the President,\(^7\) (3) the basis on which the King is considering Mr. Farnsworth’s request for an interview, and possibly (4) the King’s letter to the President dated April 30, 1943, transmitted through the Legation at Cairo which is drawn up in a style which might be considered suitable for eventual wide distribution.

Respectfully yours,

JAMES S. MOOSE, JR.

President Roosevelt to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud

Great and Good Friend: I have received Your Majesty’s communication of April 30, 1943, relating to matters affecting Palestine, and I appreciate the spirit of friendship you have manifested in expressing these views to me.

I have noted carefully the statements made in this communication, as well as those contained in Your Majesty’s letter of November 19[29], 1938, and the oral message conveyed to Mr. Kirk, the American Minister, at the conclusion of his recent visit to Riyadh.

Your Majesty, no doubt, has received my message delivered by Mr. Moose to His Highness the Amir Faisal. As I stated therein, it appears to me highly desirable that the Arabs and Jews interested in the question should come to a friendly understanding with respect to matters affecting Palestine through their own efforts prior to the termination of the war. I am glad of this opportunity, however, to reiterate my assurance that it is the view of the Government of the United States that, in any case, no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

I renew my expressions of best wishes for Your Majesty’s good health and for the well-being of your people.

Your Good Friend,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

Washington, June 9, 1943—7 p. m.

3536. You are requested to inform the Foreign Secretary without delay that this Government is deeply concerned over Arab-Jewish tension in Palestine. Reliable information made available to our representatives, principally by British official sources, in Palestine and neighboring areas, is to the effect that both Arabs and Jews are well armed and confident and that each side is merely awaiting what it deems to be suitable provocation before resorting to force in furtherance or defense of its supposed interests.

The serious effects which such an eventuality would have upon the populations of vast areas which are vital to the military effort require, of course, no elaboration. Moreover, Zionist political agitation in

*8* Copy transmitted to the Appointed Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia by the Secretary of State in his Instruction No. 51, June 19; copy in Department’s files undated.

*9* Notation on the original: “OK FDR.”
the United States and elsewhere has already caused in the Arab countries alarm and political reactions which in turn produce a still higher pitch of Zionist activity. A spiral of increasing tension has thus been created which feeds on itself and, unless the tension is abated, disastrous results might well occur in the immediate future. In any event, it would appear that the large amount of attention and energy which is being devoted to the Palestine question is causing serious distraction from the war effort.

It appears to us, and we hope the British Government will agree, that the time has come to deal effectively with the situation. To that end we suggest the issuance of the following statement which is designed to postpone a decision on the Palestine question for the duration of the war. The suggested statement is believed to be in harmony with declared British policy, and the text given below has the approval of the President:

"The United Nations, having in mind the terms of their Declaration of January 1, 1942, are agreed that while public discussions on controversial international questions are in general desirable, in order to promote an informed public opinion and clarification of the issues involved, it is undesirable that special viewpoints should be pressed while the war is in progress to such a degree as to create undue anxieties among United Nations and other friendly governments and peoples.

In this connection, the United Nations have taken note of public discussions and activities of a political nature relating to Palestine and consider that it would be helpful to the war effort if these were to cease. As in the case of other territorial problems, it is not in their view essential that a settlement of the Palestine question be achieved prior to the conclusion of the war. Nevertheless, if the interested Arabs and Jews can reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts before the end of the war, such a development would be highly desirable. In any case, no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews."

It will be observed that the statement has been drafted for issuance by the United Nations. We feel that there are definite disadvantages as well as advantages in having a statement on the subject by all of the United Nations. For this and other obvious and essential reasons we are seeking the views of the British Government before taking the matter up in any other quarter.

Among the disadvantages are the length of time which would be required to consult the other United Nations; the possibility that one or more of them might not feel able to subscribe to the statement; and the fact that some of them presumably have little interest in the Palestine question. On the other hand, a statement by the United Nations would have great weight.
We are prepared to consider whether, taking things all around, issuance of the statement (with changes of wording to take account of the fact that it would not be issued by the United Nations) might not be preferable on the part of a smaller group of countries such as China, Great Britain, Soviet Russia and the United States.

For your information, we should not object to issuance of a joint statement or of essentially similar and concurrent separate statements by the British and American Governments should the British suggest and show a marked preference for either procedure, in which case you are authorized so to state.

HULL

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Memorandum by Dr. Chaim Weizmann

June 12, 1943.

The appointment with the President was set for June 11th, 12 noon, but Mr. Sumner Welles suggested that I should meet him in the State Department at 11.45, and he would bring me to the President.

I met Mr. Welles about 11.50 a.m. and he took me over by a short cut from the State Department to the White House, which we reached about a few minutes before 12, and while we were waiting to be received by the President, I had a short talk with Mr. Welles. I pointed out to him that I was anxious to discuss with the President the situation in Palestine, along the same lines as we had pursued in our various interviews, namely, that the matter cannot be allowed to drift; that the Arabs must be told that the Jews have a right to Palestine.

To this Mr. Welles replied that it is quite right that the President should be told explicitly what our wishes are . . . Mr. Welles stated that the next three or four months will be a period of crystallization and a great many things are being discussed and will be shaped, and therefore it is very timely that the Palestine problem should be dealt with now.

At this stage we were interrupted and asked to come into the President’s room. He greeted us very cordially and began by saying that he had a talk with Mr. Churchill about our affairs; that he had

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*In a memorandum of September 21 to the Secretary of State, forwarding the Weizmann memorandum, the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) wrote: “The original of this memorandum was prepared by Dr. Weizmann for the British Foreign Office and a copy of it was furnished to Colonel Harold Hoskins during his recent visit to Saudi Arabia on a special mission for the President. As far as I am aware, no other record exists of these important conversations regarding the future of Palestine which took place in the White House last June.” (867N.01/19934)

*Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.
gotten Mr. Churchill to agree to the idea of calling together the Jews
and the Arabs, and I understood him to say that he and Mr. Churchill
would be present at such a meeting.

I at once remarked that it is most important that the mistakes made
at the St. James Conference in London \(^2\) should not be repeated; that
such mistakes can be avoided if the Arabs are told beforehand that
the Democracies mean to affirm the Jewish rights to Palestine; that
the Arabs have got out of the two wars a great deal, owing to the
blood and treasure spent by the Democracies, who therefore have the
right to determine what sort of settlement they consider fair. The
Arabs must be told that the reasons which have brought about the
Balfour Declaration and the subsequent development in Palestine
have not lost their meaning,—on the contrary.

The President then asked another question: He is being told that
Jewish colonization is running a deficit all the time, which deficit is
being filled up by charitable contributions from abroad, chiefly from
America. I replied that such a report is incorrect, that any country
which receives new immigrants is bound to spend money on develop-
ment, and therefore would have apparently an unfavorable trade
balance, but if one estimates the moneys spent for the development of
Palestine and the assets created, and takes into account the production
of Palestine, then the trade balance is far from being unfavorable.

The President then reverted to the idea of the conference, on which
he and Mr. Churchill agreed, and he said,—of course, you will see
Mr. Churchill and you will discuss it with him,—and then interjected
the question,—Did you see Mr. Churchill here? And I said, no, Mr.
Churchill doesn't like to see me because he has very little to tell me.
At which he laughed and said he knows that it is the case; that it may
be different now in London.

I then emphasized the necessity of doing things now and not wait-
ing for the end of the war; \((a)\) because one would not like to allow
things to harden; \((b)\) Something may happen in Palestine which may
create a very difficult position; \((c)\) and this uncertainty is always
contributing towards tension. Mr. Welles at that stage said, with the
approval of the President, that he fully agrees with such a view, and
there is not going to be a line of demarcation between the cessation of
hostilities and the beginning of peace. A great many questions are
beginning to shape themselves now, like the Food Conference.\(^2\)

\(^2\) The so-called London conferences, or Round Table Conference, of February-
\(^2\) The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, held at Hot Springs,
Virginia, May 18–June 3; for correspondence regarding this Conference, see
vol. i, pp. 820 ff.
The President then asked, Where would you be if a conference does take place? To which I replied that, all being well, I shall see that I find myself on the spot where the conference does take place.

Mr. Welles then asked the President whether he would like to send someone to Ibn Saud to prepare the ground, to which the President said that that would be an excellent idea, but Mr. Churchill must be consulted first, and his agreement secured. Several names were mentioned in this connection, like Philby \(^4\) and Mr. Hoskins. Mr. Welles suggested that Mr. Hoskins may serve us well in this capacity.

Dr. Weizmann then took the opportunity of reverting again to the main problem by suggesting that the present situation is most unsatisfactory and dangerous, and these 500,000 Jews in Palestine have begun to feel themselves in a trap, and this, added to the general position of Jewry, naturally creates a very serious state of mind, and the sooner this position is settled and the Jews know that there is a future for them in Palestine, the better. The idea that the Arabs would revolt is always there and I do not think that it would materialize if the Arabs would really feel that the democracies really mean business.

The President then raised the question of the difficulty of finding Arab leaders, to which I said that that is a really serious difficulty. When there was a competent and authoritative leader, it was not difficult for him and myself to come to a very important agreement,—and I briefly told the story of my first talk with Feisal \(^5\) and Lawrence, \(^6\)—which obviously was new to the President.

That terminated the interview, which lasted about a short hour. I thanked Mr. Welles most warmly in the presence of the President for the great kindness and services which he has rendered in this difficult situation, and when Mr. Welles took leave from me outside the gates of the White House I again thanked him, to which Mr. Welles said: You should know, Dr. Weizmann, that I am deeply interested.

On our way out of the office Mr. Welles said that I may hear from him in about six weeks, and that if I want to communicate something to him I can do it through Ambassador Winant.

\(^4\) H. St. John Philby, British Orientalist, formerly British Political Agent and later personal adviser to King Ibn Saud.

\(^5\) A son of Hussein, Sherif of Mecca and leader of the Arab Revolt of 1916 against Ottoman Turkey. Feisal was briefly King of Syria (Greater Syria) in 1920 and King of Iraq, 1921–33.

\(^6\) Col. Thomas Edward Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), British Army officer who won fame as an organizer of the Arab Revolt of 1916.
WASHINGTON, June 12, 1943—8 p. m.

3649. Please inform the Prime Minister that the President has recently received two communications from King Ibn Saud expressing his opposition to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine or any further increase of Jewish influence in that country. In this general connection, the President, within the past few days, has discussed the Palestine situation with Dr. Chaim Weizmann. As a result of this discussion, the President believes that the time has come when an approach should be made to Ibn Saud with a view to seeing whether any basis for a settlement can be found. If the Prime Minister agrees with this conclusion, the President would propose to send to Saudi Arabia to initiate discussions Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Hoskins, Army of the United States. Colonel Hoskins is thoroughly familiar with the current situation in the Near East through a recent visit to that area and for a long time has been a close student of the Arab-Jewish problem. He speaks Arabic fluently.

Please mark your reply “Secret for the Secretary and Under Secretary”.

Hull

LONDON, June 29, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received June 29—8:38 p. m.]

4286. In regard to the Department's 3942, June 28, midnight, the question dealt with in the Department's 3586, June 9, 7 p. m., will be considered by the War Cabinet on Thursday and I have been promised a reply shortly thereafter.

I have just received from Mr. Eden the following reply to the question treated in the Department's 3649, June 12, 8 p. m.

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77 An attached memorandum of June 15 by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling) reads: “The attached telegram to London was drafted upon instructions from Mr. Welles following a conference which he had at the White House with the President and Dr. Chaim Weizmann.”

78 Not printed; it requested information regarding the present status of the matters mentioned in Department's telegrams No. 3586, June 9, p. 790, and No. 3649, June 12, supra.
"In a letter dated June 14 you informed the Prime Minister that President Roosevelt believed that the time had come when an approach should be made to Ibn Saud with a view to seeing whether any basis for a settlement of the Palestine question can be found and suggested that Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins might go to Saudi Arabia to initiate discussions.

In view of the importance of preserving political tranquility in the Arab countries, we are naturally anxious not to awaken wide public controversy there on this subject at the present juncture in the war. Moreover, General Hurley has recently seen Ibn Saud and the reports which we hear of his conversations do not lead us to suppose that Ibn Saud’s attitude would be such as to facilitate agreement between Jews and Arabs on the Palestine question.

Nevertheless, in view of the importance of President Roosevelt being fully informed and of increasing our own knowledge on this subject, we have not the slightest objection to the President’s proposal to send Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins to see Ibn Saud. If he goes, we should be grateful if he could receive general directives for his conversations somewhat on the following lines:

(a) No suggestions involving territorial alterations in other Arab countries should be put forward by him;
(b) The conversations should be purely exploratory in nature and should not in any way prejudice the interests of other Arab countries; and the visit should be carried out as unobtrusively as possible.

These points may seem self-evident, but we attach importance to them, owing to the feelings which have already been aroused in the Arab world on this question.

I need hardly say that we should be grateful if we could be kept most fully informed as to the tenor and outcome of Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins’ conversations."

WINANT

867N.01/1877

The Secretary of State to Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1943.

MY DEAR COLONEL HOSKINS: At the direction of the President, you are to proceed at once to Saudi Arabia in order to make an inquiry of King Ibn Saud, on behalf of the President, regarding the King’s attitude with respect to a matter regarding Palestine.

In your conversation with the King, you should confine yourself exclusively, after making appropriate preliminary remarks, to obtaining the King’s reply to the following specific question: Will King Ibn Saud enter into discussions with Dr. Chaim Weizmann or other representatives selected by the Jewish Agency for the purpose of seeking a solution of basic problems affecting Palestine acceptable to both Arabs and Jews?
I am confident that you will exercise good judgment and discretion in carrying out this important mission on behalf of the President. Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

867N.01/1868 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1943—7 p. m.

4165. Your 4286, June 29, 11 p. m. In as much as it was contemplated that the matter dealt with in the Department’s 3586, June 9, 7 p. m., was to have been considered by the War Cabinet on July 1st, it would be appreciated if the Department might be furnished with a reply as soon as possible.

Hull

867N.01/1875 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 14, 1943—9 p. m.
[Received July 14—8:31 p. m.]

4592. Department’s No. 4165, July 9, 7 p. m. Mr. Eden has just given me the following letter and proposed statement to be issued by our two Governments regarding Palestine:

“In your letter of the 10th June you were good enough to inform me that your Government, being deeply concerned over Arab-Jewish tension in Palestine, suggested that a statement, of which you enclosed a draft, should be issued by the United Nations with a view to postponing for the duration of the war a decision on the Palestine question. In subsequent conversation you mentioned that the State Department saw certain disadvantages as well as advantages in a statement on this question by all the United Nations and would have no objection to the issue of a joint statement by His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government.

We warmly welcome this proposal, which we think will be most valuable in preventing any further aggravation of the position in Palestine. But we think that the disadvantages of a statement by all the United Nations outweigh the advantages, and we should prefer a joint statement by our two Governments.

The last sentence of the draft which you enclosed recalls a statement made by Lord Cranborne in the House of Lords on the 6th

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See telegram No. 3586, June 9, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 790.

Robert Cecil, Viscount Cranborne, Government Leader in the House of Lords.
May 1942, and we have therefore suggested an amendment to that sentence which brings this out more fully. We have also thought it well to add that we shall not permit or acquiesce in any changes brought about by force in the status of Palestine or the administration of the country.

I enclose a re-draft of the suggested statement incorporating these amendments and I very much hope that the United States Government will agree that it can be issued in its present form.

[Here follows text of suggested statement substantially the same as that printed on page 799.]

WINANT

867N.01/1869 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1943—2 p. m.

4329. Your 4286, June 29, 11 p. m. Please inform Mr. Eden that we appreciate his letter of June 14 [29?] and that Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins has departed by air for Saudi Arabia to consult with King Ibn Saud. Please assure Mr. Eden that Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins’ instructions are such as to conform fully with the wishes expressed in the latter part of Mr. Eden’s letter.

HULL

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: With your approval, we recently suggested to the British Government the issuance of a statement on Palestine, in order to reduce Arab-Jewish tension. Our suggestion was in the form of a statement by the United Nations, but we stated to the British that we saw both advantages and disadvantages in a United Nations’ statement on the subject, and that if the British preferred a joint Anglo-American statement, such would be agreeable to us.

Mr. Eden has now informed our Ambassador at London that the British Government warmly welcomes our proposal and thinks it will be most valuable in preventing any further aggravation of the posi-

81 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 5th series, vol. 122, col. 943. Lord Cranborne had said, in response to a question, “My Lords, while I would make it clear that there has been no change in the policy of His Majesty’s Government with regard to Palestine, the noble Lords may rest assured that His Majesty’s Government will not enter into commitments regarding the future of that country without prior consultation with all those, including both Arabs and Jews, whom they may judge to be concerned.”

82 Notation on the original: “CH OK FDR.”
tion in Palestine. The British believe that the disadvantages of a statement by all the United Nations outweigh the advantages, and prefer a joint statement by the United States and British Governments.

Our proposed statement meets with the full approval of the British. However, they suggest an expansion of the concluding sentence to take account of a statement made by Lord Cranborne in the House of Lords on May 6, 1942. They also desire to add that the British Government will not permit or acquiesce in any changes brought about by force in the status of Palestine or the administration of the country, and that we are in full accord with that policy.

We consider that the British redraft is fully acceptable, apart from inconsequential wording due to differences in usage, and we shall have the statement issued here in accordance with American practice. These minor changes have already been cleared with the British Embassy.

Provided you perceive no objection, we shall immediately arrange with the British for simultaneous issuance of the statement in Washington and London at the earliest possible moment. The statement which we intend to issue here is attached.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

[Enclosure]

Statement for Issuance by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom Regarding Palestine

The Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom, having in mind the terms of the United Nations declaration of January 1, 1942, are agreed that while public discussions on controversial international questions are in general desirable, in order to promote an informed public opinion and clarification of the issues involved, it is undesirable that special viewpoints should be pressed while the war is in progress to such an extent as to create undue anxiety among United Nations and other friendly governments and peoples.

In this connection, the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom have taken note of public discussions and activities of a political nature relating to Palestine and consider that it would be helpful to the war effort if these were to cease. As in the case of other territorial problems, it is not, in their view, essential that a settlement of the Palestine question be achieved prior to the conclusion of the war. Nevertheless, if the interested Arabs and Jews can reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts before the end of the war, such a development would be highly desirable. In any case, the British Government has already stated that no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine would be reached without full consultation
with all concerned, including both Arabs and Jews. But the British Government wishes to make it clear that it has no intention of permitting or acquiescing in any changes brought about by force in the status of Palestine or the administration of the country. The United States Government is in full accord with this policy.

867N.01/1875: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1943—2 p. m.

4403. Please inform the Foreign Office that this Government is entirely in accord with the redraft Office that this Government is entirely in accord with the redraft statement on Palestine transmitted by your 4592, July 14, 9 p. m. We intend to issue the statement here on July 27, at 12 o'clock noon, Eastern War Time, and presume that the British will desire to issue the statement simultaneously in London.

The statement to be issued here will contain a few inconsequential changes of wording to accord with American usage, but not affecting the substance thereof, which have been cleared with the British Embassy in Washington.

Please inform us at the earliest possible moment whether this procedure is agreeable to the Foreign Office.

Hull

867N.01/1885: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, July 29, 1943—9 a. m.
[Received July 26—7:40 a. m.]

1307. From Hoskins for Murray and Alling. In line with your suggestion that I send you a draft of my proposed remarks to Ibn Saud, these have been prepared on the assumption that there has been no decision to which I can refer in regard to the proposed statement as to the status of Palestine. If, however, before I see the King I receive word from you of its approval you may wish to indicate to me by cable the extent to which I can make reference to it in my audience with Ibn Saud.

Proposed remarks to Ibn Saud.

1. The President, as you know, has received your letters regarding Palestine and has sent you his thanks for keeping him informed of your own point of view and of the general aim and view towards this problem. It is, as you fully appreciate, a complicated problem
to which the President, Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles have in recent months been giving increasing attention.

2. As Your Majesty is aware, it has become the generally established policy of the Government of the United States and I believe also of the Government of Great Britain, as far as possible, to postpone until after the Axis has been defeated the discussion of the many territorial and boundary problems that exist in various parts of the world. Our primary and pressing objective is to win the war.

3. At the same time the Prime Minister and the President would be derelict in their duties if they overlooked any possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the problem of Palestine even before the end of the war, provided such a solution could be reached by voluntary agreement between the interested parties concerned.

4. Knowing from your letters of your special interest in this problem, President Roosevelt has sent me to see Your Majesty. He instructed me to ask you whether or not, in your opinion, it would be desirable and useful at this time for you, or someone designated by you, to meet Dr. Chaim Weizmann or some designated official of the Jewish Agency for the purpose of seeking a solution of basic problems affecting Palestine acceptable to both Arabs and Jews.

5. In this connection I may add that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden have been informed by the President of my visit to Riyadh and are in accord.

6. I wish also to make clear to Your Majesty that the President, in submitting the suggestion of such a meeting, leaves the decision entirely in your hands and refrains from advising that such a meeting should now take place unless you feel that for [from] such a meeting there might result a fair and just solution of the problem of Palestine. The willingness of Dr. Weizmann or of his representative to participate has already been indicated to us.

7. After you have had an opportunity to consider this matter, I shall appreciate your advising me of your decision so that I can in turn make my report to the President.

[Hoskins]
Kirk

867N.01/1883: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 23, 1943—2 p.m.

[Received July 23—8:50 a.m.]

4792. I have just been in touch with Mr. Eden who tells me that the procedure for the issuance of the statement on Palestine suggested in your 4403, July 22, 2 p.m., is agreeable to the Foreign Office.

WINANT

83 The capital of Saudi Arabia.
84 After two postponements it was decided not to issue the statement; see telegram No. 4767, August 7, 5 p.m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 803.
The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State

Jidda, July 24, 1943—noon.
[Received 4:50 p.m.]

71. Personal for Alling. Department’s 911 to Cairo, July 10, 10 p.m. Hoskins now in Cairo has just advised me of purpose of his mission but gave few details. Although I will do everything possible to assist him, I am not hopeful of any beneficial result. The King will not be happy to have to choose between prejudicing his position in the Moslem world or refusing the proposals of his friends. He will not compromise his principles as he conceives them.

Moose

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

Washington, July 31, 1943—5 p.m.

1059. Your 1307, July 23, 9 a.m. For Hoskins from Murray and Alling. We are pleased with your proposed remarks to Ibn Saud but suggest that you eliminate paragraph 6 entirely. [Murray and Alling.]

Hull

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON,] August 6, 1943.

Memorandum for the files in relation to the proposal to request a cessation of Jewish agitation in this country to the extent and in a manner calculated to create serious controversy in the Palestine area, and so operate to the serious detriment of the military situation.

A short while ago I had opportunity fully to examine this proposal. I sent it to the War Department with a statement that since this is primarily and essentially a military matter, it was the responsibility of the War Department to set out in writing the conditions of danger from such agitations that would create such a military exigency, or possibility of such exigency, as would move the War Department to

* Not printed.
request that such agitation in this country be desisted in, and that otherwise the State Department would, of course, have no function requiring it to take the initiative in the matter. I brought the matter up in a telephone conversation with Secretary Stimson and recited all the facts and circumstances which are essential.

On yesterday Secretary Stimson called me over the telephone and said he had investigated the matter, and had come to the conclusion that the security situation in Palestine was not so serious as to warrant any action from a military point of view, and that the War Department did not propose to take the matter up. I thanked him and said that ended it so far as the State Department is concerned. I added that for some months intimations had been coming from some persons or officials in the War Department in favor of such proposals; that I understood these intimations were based upon reports from military authorities in the Middle East and upon reports from our diplomatic and consular officers which had been made available to the War Department; and that they had apparently influenced some of my associates in the State Department.

CORDELL HULL

867N.01/1885a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1943—5 p.m.

4767. Department's 4483, July 26, 7 p.m.* Please inform the Foreign Office that following further discussions with the War Department it has been decided not to issue the proposed joint statement regarding Palestine. It had been our understanding that the military authorities considered the security situation in the Middle East to be such as to require some action calculated to reduce agitation and to eliminate the possibility of disturbances in Palestine. Upon reexamining the matter, however, the War Department has come to the conclusion that the security situation is not so serious as to require any action at this time. In as much as the sole purpose of the proposed statement was to ameliorate a condition which was thought to be dangerous to the military security of Allied forces in the Middle East no basis now exists, so far as the United States is concerned, for issuing the statement.

HULL

* Not printed.
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, August 10, 1943—4 p.m.
[Received August 10—11:30 a.m.]

5235. In accordance with the Department's 4767, August 7, 5 p.m., I informed Mr. Eden of the decision not to issue the proposed joint statement regarding Palestine. He and Colonel Stanley 87 were both very disappointed.

Winant

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Basra (Fletcher)

Washington, August 16, 1943—11 p.m.

109. From Alling for Colonel Hoskins who is expected to arrive in Basra about August 27th: In the interests of secrecy please do not telegraph your report. Instead please send your full report by air pouch from the Legation at Cairo. [Alling.]

Hull

Memorandum Concerning the Proposed Joint Statement on Palestine 88

It is not apparent why the United States Government should think that the situation in Palestine is less inflammable. An American-Jewish congress is to be held at the end of this month which may well put forward the most uncompromising demands. Much publicity has recently been given to talks between the Prime Ministers of Iraq and Egypt on Arab federation which, though innocuous in themselves, might lead to agitation in the Arab world about Palestine. A further incident which might set a match to the flames is the recent discovery of large-scale thefts of arms by Jews in Palestine. Investigations have disclosed the existence of a highly-organised racket, and these investigations may well lead direct to the Jewish Agency.

87 Col. Oliver Stanley, British Colonial Secretary.
88 In a memorandum of August 28 to the Secretary of State the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) wrote: "The attached paper . . . received from the British at Quebec . . . It is my understanding that agreement was reached at Quebec to hold the statement in abeyance on a month-to-month basis. . . ." In his Memoirs, vol. II, p. 1533, Secretary Hull states that this decision was made by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 22. Correspondence regarding the First Quebec Conference, August 17–24, 1943, is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of Foreign Relations.
martial have been held on some British soldiers, who have been condemned to terms of penal servitude, and the trial is now proceeding of two Jews. The High Commissioner reports that if these Jews are convicted, a violent outbreak is possible. It is clear, therefore, that both in America and in the Middle East, the need for some sedative joint statement is as urgent as ever. Such a statement would not of course be directed solely against the Jews, but applies equally to agitation from Arab or any other quarter. It is not easy to understand the Zionists' opposition to it, except on the assumption that they wish to bring the Palestine question to a head at a moment inconvenient to us from the point of view of the war. If a statement is to be issued, the sooner it appears the better.

QUEBEC, 21 August, 1943.

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S67N.01/1980

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam)

[WASHINGTON,] August 25, 1943.

Participants: Mr. Ali Jawdat, Minister of Iraq
Mr. A. M. Gailani, Secretary of the Iraqi Legation
Mr. Murray
Mr. Merriam, NE

The Iraqi Minister handed to Mr. Murray a strong and rather lengthy statement *8 which the Minister said he was considering issuing to the press to counteract recent resolutions in regard to Palestine which had been adopted by the Legislatures of eight States. The resolutions advocate, in effect, unlimited immigration of Jewish refugees into Palestine. Mr. Jawdat, who was considerably concerned over these resolutions, said that before taking this step, he desired to talk it over with Mr. Murray.

Mr. Murray made it clear that he could give no official advice in such a matter, which was entirely for decision by the Minister and his Government. Quite informally, however, Mr. Murray suggested that the issuance of such a statement by the Minister would involve him in acrimonious controversy which would be highly undesirable from every point of view. It was also suggested that the Minister might give further thought to the significance of the resolutions, considering that only eight of the forty-eight States had taken action on the present phase of the Palestine question, and that, under the Constitution, the State Legislatures have no authority as regards foreign affairs.

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*8 Not found in Department files.
Mr. Murray said that, of course, the Minister had the privilege of addressing the Secretary of State on matters of interest to his Government. Consequently, if his Government felt that any useful purpose would be served in so doing, the Minister was at liberty to ask the Secretary to communicate the observations of the Iraqi Government to the respective Governors of the States concerned, and doubtless the Secretary would give the matter careful attention.

Mr. Murray pointed out to the Minister, however, that such action on his part would very likely give rise in certain quarters to the charge that the Iraqi Government was interfering in American internal affairs. Such a charge would probably be made even though the Arabic press in Palestine had already pointed out that, to begin with, American State Legislatures had no business voting resolutions concerning foreign affairs.

In conclusion, Mr. Murray stated that the question the Minister had raised was a very difficult one and that although certain considerations in regard to it had been set forth most informally, it was a matter which the Minister and his Government would have to decide.

As the only Arab diplomatic representative in Washington, the Iraqi Minister obviously felt strongly that the resolutions in question should not be allowed to go unanswered, but was somewhat baffled as to how to proceed.

867N.01/1937: Telegram

The Consul at Basra (Fletcher) to the Secretary of State

BASRA, August 27, 1943—7 p.m.
[Received August 28—9:58 p.m.]

122. Following for Alling from Hoskins.

"Your 109. Am proceeding direct to Cairo by next plane due to arrive there August 29. Before you can receive airmail report from me, I fear leak of information from some Saudi Government source concerning results of my visit. Meanwhile, I have wired Moose asking if, in view of instructions in your cable, he can make sure no news is given out from any Saudi source or, if it is, to inform me in Cairo at once. In view of this possibility would it not be well for me to send you brief report by cable from Cairo which is ready to send.

In this connection I am bringing with me two aide-mémoires, one on the subject of my directive and one on Arab federation as well as a personal letter and several verbal messages for the President.

However from your telegram I am not clear whether you still wish me to return to Washington with this material as originally planned
or whether you have some other assignment for me prior to my return. Please answer to Cairo.

Also, in view of assistance Mr. Casey rendered me in Cairo, it is going to be somewhat embarrassing to be there without at least giving him the answer to the main question I asked, especially if he gets from some other source the same information as am afraid might happen. Therefore your instructions on this point as well are requested. [[7]]

FLETCHER

867N.01/1937: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1943—6 p.m.

1255. Following for Colonel Hoskins from Wallace Murray. Your 122, August 27, 7 p.m. from Basra. You are requested not to telegph a report concerning your visit. We have no other assignment for you prior to your return and consider that since you bear messages for the President you should return without delay [[2]] to deliver them and to make your report. We cannot, of course, control what Ibn Saud may see fit to divulge regarding the conversations. You, however, as the bearer of messages from the King to the President cannot with propriety disclose the conversations to a third party until the messages are delivered and the President’s directions obtained as to what quarters shall be informed of them. We feel sure that Mr. Casey will understand your position.

It is suggested that you reduce your oral messages to writing in Cairo, and that you (1) leave one copy of them and of your two aide-mémoires in the Legation’s secret archives, (2) send one copy of each paper to the Department by pouch in a sealed envelope marked “Personal and Strictly Confidential for Alling, Division of Near Eastern Affairs”, and (3) bring with you the two aide-mémoires. [Murray.]

HULL

867N.01/2009a

Memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins

CAIRO, August 31, 1943.

(1) In accordance with Secretary Hull’s directive of July 7, 1943, I have visited Riyadh and put to His Majesty King Ibn Saud the question requested as to whether he would enter into discussions with Dr. Chaim Weizmann or some representative selected by the Jewish

[[1]] Richard G. Casey, British Minister of State Resident in the Middle East.
[[2]] Telegram No. 1605, September 6, 7 p.m., from the Minister in Egypt reported the departure of Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins (867N.01/1953).
Agency for the purpose of seeking a solution of the basic problems affecting Palestine acceptable to both Arabs and Jews.

(2) During the week in which the King considered the matter I saw him daily. In long conversations he voluntarily outlined fully and frankly his ideas on various subjects. The fact that he could talk to me directly in Arabic, often without any one else present, allowed him, he said, to be more frank than would otherwise have been the case since his best interpreters are not Saudi Arabians by birth. He said he was most anxious to have the President and the State Department know as nearly first hand as possible his ideas and he welcomed a chance to tell them to some one specially sent from Washington who was going back there directly. I therefore had only to be a good listener and make very few comments since he carried on ninety-five percent of the conversation.

(3) His conversations, of which I made full notes, covered the following general subjects:

(a) His domestic problems including his pressing need for silver coins and for an additional two hundred motor cars, both items to be available before the next pilgrimage which begins about the latter part of November.

(b) His relations past and present with various foreign powers.

(c) His relations with each of his neighboring states and his frank estimates of the various political figures in power there.

(d) His ideas on Arab federation. On this subject I wrote a memorandum of our conversation,\(^4\) with a summary of his ideas as I understood them, that I submitted to His Majesty and to which I received his specific approval.

(4) As from my daily conversations with the King I became increasingly impressed with the certainty of his refusal to meet Dr. Weizmann personally, I thought it advisable to develop more specifically an alternative question to which there might be a favorable response. This second question was as follows: If the King will not meet Dr. Weizmann himself, will he appoint a representative who might meet elsewhere than in Riyadh, perhaps even outside the country, in Cairo, for instance, with Dr. Weizmann or his representative?

(5) At the end of a week the King gave me verbally his answers to the two questions I had put to him and in both instances they were clear and categorical refusals. He expressed again great appreciation at my having been sent to see him and outlined in a most friendly way his reasons in detail for his refusals. These reasons he confirmed in a memorandum\(^{4}\) which he handed me at the end of our conversation.

(6) His refusals and his reasons seemed to me entirely consistent with his character and with his policies as he had explained them to

\(^4\) Not printed.
me during the previous week. They are based on his own religious and patriotic principles and reflect his sound political sense in recognizing clearly his limitations, both spiritual and physical, in this matter. He realizes that, despite his position of leadership in the Arab world, he cannot, without prior consultation, speak for Palestine much less "deliver" Palestine to the Jews, even if he were willing for even an instant to consider such a proposal.

(7) His Majesty went on to explain, he said for the first time to anyone, the reason for his personal hatred of Dr. Weizmann. He said that during the first year of the present world war Dr. Weizmann had impugned his (the King's) character and motives by an attempted bribe of £20 million sterling. Furthermore, the promise of payment, the King was advised, would be guaranteed by President Roosevelt. His Majesty said he had been so incensed at the offer and equally at the inclusion of the President in such a shameful matter that he had never mentioned it again. He now explained it in detail and gave me the name of the intermediary, St. John Philby, so that I could understand more clearly his reasons for having nothing whatsoever to do with Dr. Weizmann or any of his associates.

(8) As a result of my visit I had a chance to become convinced that there has been no change in the attitude of His Majesty toward the Jewish question in Palestine as expressed in his two confidential letters to President Roosevelt under dates of November 19 [29], 1938 95 and April 30, 1943.96 His recent statement to an editor of Life magazine merely gave public utterance to what he had already written privately and reflects his sincere opinion from which there will, I believe, be no deviation. Furthermore, he cannot but have realized, by the flood of telegrams and letters of congratulations which he received from Moslems in all parts of the world, that, by his frank and unequivocal statement regarding Palestine, he has gained still greater moral and even political prestige not only throughout the Arab world but among Moslems in Turkey, Russia, India and even China.

(9) The King did not say so, but he clearly has the political acumen to realize that, even if he had no religious convictions on the subject, he still could not afford to support any Jewish claims to Palestine. For in the light of what he has said and written he would by so doing lose the moral and spiritual leadership of Moslems everywhere that he now enjoys.

(10) The conclusion, it seems quite clear from my visit to Riyadh, is that His Majesty's silence in regard to Dr. Weizmann's proposal put to him by Philby has been completely misinterpreted by certain British officials as implying a possible willingness on the part of the King to consider the proposal. Actually I am convinced that there

96 Ante, p. 773.
never was any possibility of acceptance and there is none today. The King may not feel he can prevent by force the establishment of either Palestine as a Jewish State or even a Jewish State in Palestine. He is, however, firmly opposed to both solutions and I see no possibility of his being of any assistance to the Zionists in their efforts to come to terms with the Arabs in Palestine.

(11) In addition to the two written memoranda which I am bringing with me, the King has given me a personal letter ⁹⁷ to the President and has asked me to transmit certain personal messages. Also His Majesty has agreed to our communicating to the British Government the contents of these two memoranda if the President, after he has seen them, desires to do so.

H[AROLD] B. H[OSKINS]

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867N.01/1940; Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 1, 1943—9 a.m.
[Received September 2—2:00 a.m.]

1571. For Alling from Hoskins. In connection my cable August 27 ⁹⁸ from Basra Moose cabled from Jidda on August 30 that Yusuf Yassin on Saturday gave Wikeley detailed account of my discussions in Jidda. Moose said he assumed London probably knew results of my visit already. [Hoskins.]

KIRK

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867N.01/1950

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to my conversations with you early in August regarding a proposal for the issuance of a joint statement by the American and British Governments regarding Palestine.

As the result of the opinion which you expressed to me on August 5 that the situation in Palestine is not serious enough from a military point of view to warrant the issuance of a statement along these lines, we informed the British Government that in view of this opinion of the War Department no basis exists, so far as the United States is concerned, for issuing the statement, in as much as its sole purpose was to ameliorate a condition which was thought to be dangerous in the

⁹⁷ Not printed.
⁹⁸ Telegram No. 122, p. 806.
military sense. The British Foreign Minister and Minister for the Colonies stated that they were greatly disappointed at this decision.

At Quebec, on August 21, the British handed to us a communication concerning the present situation and outlook with respect to Palestine, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. I should be grateful if, after reading the British communication, you would let me have your views regarding it.

Sincerely yours, 

CORDELL HULL

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have examined the British communication of August 21st from Quebec concerning the proposed joint United States-British declaration regarding the Jewish-Arab controversy in Palestine. I regret that the British Foreign Minister and Minister for the Colonies are disappointed in the opinion which I have previously expressed. However, I observe nothing in the British representations to cause a change in my views that there is insufficient military basis for the United States to initiate any action with regards to the situation in Palestine. The War Department will not oppose the action of the State Department on the proposed declaration, but, from the standpoint of the War Department, I am still of the opinion that it is unwarranted.

Sincerely yours, 

HENRY L. STIMSON

(WASHINGTON,) September 27, 1943.

1. I had an hour with the President, during which time he gave me an opportunity to outline in full the results of my mission to Saudi Arabia and to report to him in detail on much of the political information regarding the whole Middle East that King Ibn Saud had given me. During the course of our conversation the President read the letter that the King had sent to him and also the aide-mémoire given to me by the King which outlined in detail the reasons of the King for being unwilling to meet Dr. Weizmann or anyone connected with the Jewish Agency. I also showed to the President photographs of the presentation of the Jeep and of the

Footnote:

99 Ante, p. 804.
1 Neither printed.
Walkie-Talkie to the King, as well as photographs of the irrigation
project at el Kharj, 75 miles south of Riyadh.

(2) The President expressed understanding of the King’s refusal
to see Dr. Weizmann in view of the attempted bribe that had been
made. The President also expressed surprise and irritation that
his own name as guarantor of payment had been in any way brought
into this matter since there was of course no basis in fact for doing
so. The only suggestion that the President had ever made that even
bordered on this subject was, he said, in a talk that he had had with
Dr. Wise ² several years ago in which he had suggested that if the
Jews wished to get more land in Palestine they might well think of
buying arable land outside of Palestine and assisting Arabs financially
to move from Palestine to such areas.

(3) The President seemed much interested in learning of the wide
grasp of world affairs that the King had obtained in considerable
part at least through his radio monitoring service whereby he is kept
informed several times a day of what the radio in various Axis and
Allied countries is saying. Mr. Roosevelt also was advised in regard
to various facets of the King’s character, especially his fundamental
honesty and his deep religious sincerity as well as his sound recogni-
tion of his own limitations in dealing with any matters outside of
Saudi Arabia. At the same time I pointed out that the King’s moral
leadership extended not only throughout the Arab world but through-
out the whole Moslem world as well. Furthermore, his standing had
grown even greater in recent months as a result of his forthright
statement to the editor of Life magazine regarding Palestine and the
Jewish problem.

(4) As to the Jewish refugee problem the President mentioned
the fact that he had been receiving an increasing amount of infor-
mation that indicated that many European Jews after the war would
not care to migrate to Palestine but would prefer to return to their
countries of origin in Europe. This of course was based on the
assumption that in returning to the countries where they had lived
before the war these Jews would be assured of security for them-
selves, their property and their belongings. Because of this situa-
tion as well as because of the large number of Jews that have been
massacred by the Axis, the President felt that the number of Jews
pressing to enter Palestine after the war may be substantially less
than was originally anticipated.

(5) As to Jewish refugees who may wish to move out of Europe
the President said that he was still working on the possibility of
at least a certain number of them being settled in the trans-Andean
portions of Colombia in South America.

² Dr. Stephen S. Wise, American Zionist leader.
(6) In regard to Palestine, the President seemed well informed on the complications with the Arabs not only in Palestine but throughout all the Middle East if a Jewish State were established in Palestine. I had the opportunity to emphasize again what he had already been told—that the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine can only be imposed by force and can only be maintained by force. The President pointed out that there was no agreement between the Zionists and the non-Zionists in regard to the number of additional settlers that Palestine could absorb. He realized, however, that any substantial number of additional Jewish settlers on the land in Palestine can at best only be accomplished slowly and only after further considerable expenditures of time and money.

(7) As to a solution of the Palestine problem, the President stated that his own thinking leaned toward a wider use of the idea of trusteeship for Palestine—of making Palestine a real Holy Land for all three religions, with a Jew, a Christian, and a Moslem as the three responsible trustees. He said he realized it might be difficult to get the agreement of the Jews to such a plan but if Moslems and Christians of the world were agreed he hoped the Jews could also be persuaded. This concept to be successful would, he also realized, have to be presented as a solution larger and more inclusive than the establishment of an Arab State or of a Jewish State. He realized that this idea of course required further thought and needed to be worked out in greater detail, but at least that was the line along which his mind was running.

(8) I said I believed that the Arabs could probably be brought to agree to such a plan if proper assurances were given them by both Great Britain and the United States that Palestine would never under any circumstances become a Jewish State. The Arabs, I explained, feared that any further substantial increase in the number of Jews in Palestine was simply a first step toward making the Jews a majority in Palestine. The next step might then be a further change in policy that would give to the Jews control over the Arabs in Palestine. This the Arabs were of course entirely unwilling to agree to. In this connection I referred to the proposed statement regarding Palestine that both he and the British Government had approved as giving to the Arabs the kind of assurance they desired. In answer, the President stated that he did not expect this statement would be issued as, I understood him to say, that both governments had now withdrawn their support of it.

(9) As to the United States political set-up in the Middle East I outlined the fact that we did not always have a coordinated political policy because our American ambassadors and ministers tended to think primarily in terms of American relations to the country to which each was accredited. The result was that at times there was
a lack of a regional or area point of view in regard to various problems that extended over the whole Middle East area and beyond the confines of any one country. For example, I pointed out that an intelligent American policy in regard to the Moslems should be framed not simply in the light of conditions in any one state in the Middle East but should include consideration of Moslem attitudes in neighboring Middle Eastern States as well as in North Africa, India, and even Russia and China. I said that the recent appointment of Mr. Landis with the personal rank of minister to deal with economic problems of the Middle East area was an excellent first step and I hoped that a similar step on the political side could also be taken.

(10) The President inquired regarding the position and influence of Prince Feisal on the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia so that he might be guided accordingly in his conversations with the Prince on Thursday, September 30. I explained that, although the Prince was Foreign Minister in name, actually King Ibn Saud kept in his own hands all matters of foreign policy. In this regard I pointed out that, for example, during my recent visit to Riyadh, all my conversations had been with the King alone, although no doubt Prince Feisal was later informed of what occurred.

(11) The President suggested that he would like to talk to me further after he had seen Prince Feisal on Thursday and said he would get in touch with me at that time.

867N.01/1898 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1943—10 p.m.

6063. Department’s 4767, August 7, 5 p.m. and your 5235, August 10, 4 p.m. Please inform the Foreign Office of our understanding that agreement was reached at Quebec to review from time to time the question of issuing a joint statement in regard to Palestine. We have no new suggestions to offer at the moment, although we are aware of the delicacy of the situation resulting from the outcome of the arms trial in Palestine, the resolution on Palestine adopted by the recent American Jewish Conference, et cetera.

The Foreign Office will, we think, be interested to know that a copy of the British memorandum on Palestine dated August 21 which was handed to us at Quebec was communicated to the Secretary of War.

*James M. Landis, American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East, and principal American civilian representative at the Middle East Supply Center, Cairo; for correspondence regarding decision of the United States in 1942 to participate with the British in the operations of the Middle East Supply Center, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.

* For correspondence relating to the visit of Amir Faisal, see pp. 840 ff.
who has replied expressing regret that the British Foreign Minister and Minister for the Colonies are disappointed in the opinion previously expressed by him. The Secretary of War observes, however, that the British representations have not caused him to alter his view that there is not sufficient military basis for the initiation of any action by the United States respecting the situation in Palestine. While the War Department will not oppose action by the Department of State on the proposed declaration, the Secretary of War remains of the opinion that it is unwarranted from his standpoint.

Berle

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1943.

In view of the confidential nature of Colonel Hoskins' recent mission to see the King in Saudi Arabia, he was asked on completion of his mission to return to Washington and to deliver his report to you in person. As a result of following this procedure, his mission was accomplished with a minimum of publicity or leakage, and at the same time a more complete picture of the situation in Saudi Arabia was obtained.

You will recall that on June 29 when the British Foreign Office was informed of the purpose of Colonel Hoskins' mission to Saudi Arabia they asked specifically that they be "fully informed of the tenor and outcome" of his mission. As yet we have given them no information.

I believe that the most satisfactory procedure for informing the British will be for Colonel Hoskins to proceed to London and to give to Mr. Churchill and to the Foreign Office at first-hand the results of his mission. Also, while he is there, he can see Dr. Weizmann and inform him of King Ibn Saud's answer.

May I have your approval to this procedure?

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] October 15, 1943.

As you may be aware, the President, in a recent conversation with Colonel Harold B. Hoskins after his return from Saudi Arabia, where

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5 Notation on the original: "ERS OK FDR."
6 Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) and the Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius). Notation by Mr. Berle: "I think this better await the Secretary's return. It is pretty serious." Secretary Hull was at this time en route to Moscow to participate in the Conference of Foreign Ministers, held October 18-November 1; for correspondence on this Conference, see vol. i, pp. 513 ff.
he was sent by the President on a confidential mission, indicated that, as a solution of the Palestine problem, his own thinking at present leans toward the idea of a trusteeship for Palestine which would make that country a real holy land for all three religions, with a Christian, a Moslem and a Jew as the three responsible trustees.

I think you will find of very considerable interest the attached memorandum based on the President's idea of a solution to the Palestine question prepared by Mr. Gordon Merriam, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

It seems to me that the President's present suggestion of a solution of the Palestine problem is particularly timely...

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.01/2068

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam)

[WASHINGTON] October 15, 1943.

PALESTINE QUESTION

The following is taken from a memorandum by Colonel Harold B. Hoskins of a conversation he had with the President on September 27, 1943:

"As to a solution of the Palestine problem, the President stated that his own thinking leaned toward a wider use of the idea of trusteeship for Palestine—of making Palestine a real Holy Land for all three religions, with a Jew, a Christian, and a Moslem as the three responsible trustees. He said he realized it might be difficult to get the agreement of the Jews to such a plan but if Moslems and Christians of the world were agreed he hoped the Jews could also be persuaded. This concept to be successful would, he also realized, have to be presented as a solution larger and more inclusive than the establishment of an Arab state or a Jewish state. He realized that this idea of course required further thought and needed to be worked out in greater detail, but at least that was the line along which his mind was running."

It is apparent from the foregoing that the President is aware that for the time being, at least, the development of Palestine along normal "A" Mandate lines is impossible due to the two strongly competing nationalistic movements there present. Since development along national lines is stultified, he turns to a religious basis or framework for a solution.

*Infra.
PS has gone into the question of the internal administration of Palestine, and it is suggested, particularly in view of the President’s interest, that PS may now desire to consider how the basic relationship of Palestine to the rest of the interested world can be worked out in a satisfactory way.

NE believes that the conclusion implicit in the President’s remarks—that the handling of Palestine as an “A” Mandate has been a failure and will continue to be a failure if persisted in under existing circumstances—is entirely sound. His thought that Palestine be viewed in a religious rather than a political light may also be sound and at any rate is thoroughly worth exploring. Certainly the Christian (numerically the greatest) interest in Palestine, taken as a whole, is in the main religious. There is more alloy in the Moslem religious interest, but it is probable that the Moslem and, specifically, Arab political interest in Palestine, which furnishes the base metal, is more defensive against Zionist political ambitions than aggressive furtherance of Arab political ambitions. As to the Jews, while the Zionists are much heard from at present, that is because of the compassion felt for the Jews in Europe, and there is ground for believing that even now the main interest of most Jews in Palestine is religious and humanitarian, not political.

However, the governing of Palestine is a political, not a religious, job, and the normal and effective expression of interested outsiders toward Palestine is through governments. The Jews, being unamalgamated and a minority everywhere, are an exception. They cannot express themselves effectively as Jews through a government (though they frequently try to do so) but only through their own lay and religious organizations, which overlap and compete. The “mechanics” of expressing the Jewish attitude towards Palestine or even of the various Jewish attitudes toward Palestine thus presents a difficult problem.

With a view to outlining a basis for thought and discussion, the following suggestions are offered:

1. Great Britain to remain the mandatory power for Palestine.

While the British have incurred a good deal of criticism for their handling of Palestine, there are three points in favor of their continuing to do so which seem impressive: (a) The trained administrative personnel of some one country is required to handle the exceptionally difficult job of governing Palestine. So much pulling and hauling for political and other reasons would occur in any international administration that it would be almost certain to fail; (b) With all the mistakes of the British, no other country is in sight.

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* Division of Political Studies.
* Division of Near Eastern Affairs.
including our own, which would be likely to do a better job in Palestine; (c) The British have learned a great deal by their experience of the past twenty years in Palestine.

2. The present conception of the Mandate for Palestine—preparation for independence—is to be abandoned until such time as the basic conditions in Palestine are far more propitious for independence than is now the case. Instead, Palestine is to be regarded primarily, for the time being, as a sacred repository of the interests of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism.

3. The basic responsibility for Palestine is to be removed from the League of Nations and reposed in interested Christian and Islamic nations and the Jews.

Great Britain would operate the mandate under the new conception, using Palestinians as much as possible in the work of governing. The economic development of Palestine would be encouraged, but not in derogation of the rights of any of the inhabitants. The development of the inhabitants along the road of common Palestinian interests in all fields and of a common Palestinian consciousness would be encouraged and the ultimate goal of independence would be kept constantly in sight and worked for, but the mandatory would not, as at present, be under legal obligation to hurry the pace.

4. Palestine to be opened up to Jewish immigration to the extent of its economic absorptive capacity, except that the number of Jews in Palestine is not, by reason of immigration, to exceed the number of Moslems there at any given time.

This would open up Palestine to about 500,000 Jews, which is the upper figure cited by such careful students of the problem as Dr. Nelson Glueck, of European Jews who will have to be taken care of outside Europe. If that number cannot be absorbed quickly, temporary provision for them could be made in Libya, for example. Of course, if it is not necessary to put 500,000 more Jews in Palestine, it would make things that much easier all around. As the Zionists wish for political reasons to place as many Jews in Palestine as possible, it will be necessary to see to it that European Jews are not dragooned into emigrating to Palestine in excess of the emigration that is absolutely required by their situation.

5. Transjordan to be released from mandate status and to form an independent Emirate presumably in treaty relations with the British and with adequate treaty safeguards for the United States and possibly other countries. Transjordan would have a customs union with Palestine or free-port and free-transit facilities there, but would be free to make political combination with one or more neighboring Arab states. It might be feasible to attach Transjordan to Syria and the Lebanon in the near future.
6. The following has to do with the basic responsibility for Palestine and suggests an arrangement for replacing the existing (on paper) League of Nations-Mandate Commission framework.

A body representing those nations which manifest a legitimate interest in Palestine and the Jews, will sit permanently in Palestine. The mandatory is to report to this body, at stated intervals and in response to the body’s specific requests which may be made at any time. Such reports and the body’s recommendations, if any, to be transmitted to the member nations and Jewish organizations. Complete suggestions for the body’s duties and privileges towards the mandatory and the member nations need, of course, further elaboration which is not attempted here.

Considering that there are in the world some 585,000,000 Christians, 220,000,000 Moslems, and 15,000,000 Jews, the body might have a membership of 6, consisting of 3 Christians, 2 Moslems, and 1 Jew. Each appointment might be for two years, one year for the appointee to learn his job and one year in which he could be really useful. As to the Christian appointees, one would be appointed by a predominantly Catholic country among the interested nations, one by a predominantly Protestant country, and one by a predominantly Orthodox country. The turn of each country to appoint one of its nationals would be reached by rotation in each group. The British Government would not appoint a representative (Protestant) but the self-governing Dominions would be included in the rotation of Protestant countries.

If it were desired to reflect the numbers of communicants more accurately, the body could consist of 6 Christians, 2 Moslems, and 1 Jew. There are about 338 million Roman Catholics, 135 million Protestants, and 128 million Orthodox. There might therefore be 3 representatives from Catholic countries, 2 from Protestant, and 1 from Orthodox. As the Catholics would be somewhat under-represented, they could perhaps be compensated by having permanent representation from the Vatican in one of the Catholic seats.

As to the Moslem appointees, instead of having differentiation on a sectarian basis, relative propinquity to Palestine and hence relative economic and political, as well as religious, interest in Palestine might form the basis. Thus one appointment could be from the group Syria-Iraq-Saudi Arabia-Egypt in rotation; the other appointment from the more outlying Moslem countries such as Turkey, Iran, Yemen, Afghanistan, India (a Moslem to be chosen by the Government of India), North Africa (a Moslem to be chosen or approved by the French).

One Jew representing, in rotation, Zionists, non-Zionists, and anti-Zionists. There may be a better basis of differentiation amongst the elements of the Jewish world but at the moment the foregoing appears
to reflect the major attitudes of Jewry toward Palestine. The Zionists, at the present time, have a world organization to select the Zionist representative; the non-Zionists and the anti-Zionists do not. But, as each group would be called upon to make an appointment only once every six years, it might not be too much to expect that ad hoc arrangements could be made. The Jewish Agency could continue to be the mouthpiece of Jewry with respect to the Government of Palestine, as at present.

The British Government might appoint an Englishman to preside over the body, but he would have no vote except in case of a tie. Decisions would be reached in the body by majority vote.

7. Broadly speaking, the advantages of some such arrangement as the foregoing would appear to be as follows:

All of the religious interests concerned would be represented in a more logical and a fairer manner than is now the case.

Direct impact of pressure groups would be taken off the mandatory and individual countries such as our own. If a group were dissatisfied, its complaints would be to the body in Palestine which is always there to consider them. If the complaining group were in Palestine, the complaint would be submitted directly to the body. If the complaining group were outside Palestine, its complaint would be transmitted to the body through the government of the country where the complaint originated, to the proper representative on the body in Palestine, who would lay it before the body as a whole, which after considering the matter and making its investigations, inclusive of hearing the explanation of the mandatory, would take appropriate action; i.e. either reply that the complaint was unjustified or adjusted; or, if some major remedy seemed to be required, the matter could be submitted to all of the interested nations and to the Jewish organizations for decision by the majority of them.

The arrangement would have this advantage for the Jews: if, for example, a Zionist were sitting on the body and American non-Zionists did not like the way things were going, they could take their choice of presenting their complaints through the Zionist representative in Palestine or, through the United States Government, to the Protestant representative there.

In short, all complaints and suggestions relating to Palestine would first be sifted by the body in Palestine; and if it by majority vote considered that a remedy was required, it would submit the matter to the majority opinion of all the nations interested in Palestine and to the representative Jewish organizations, whereupon the mandatory would be appropriately instructed and would be bound to give effect to the directive. Alterations in the terms of the mandate might be similarly handled. We could cooperate and at the same time protect our position by suspending our existing treaty with respect to Pales-
tine (after first making sure that the terms of the new mandate give us what we want), thus ensuring the maintenance of our rights if the new mandate breaks down or if Palestine eventually achieves independence.

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1943.

MR. MURRAY: I have read with interest your memorandum of October 15 relative to the President's idea that possibly Palestine should be handled on a trusteeship basis. He also mentioned that to me once briefly in conversation. I am inclined to think that detailed consideration of this should await the Secretary's return, but in the meantime I shall, if I have an opportunity, attempt to get from the President more background on his thinking on this.

E[DWIGHT] S[TETTINIUS]

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1943.

DR. BERLE: I agree with your suggestion that detailed consideration of the President's thought of possibly handling Palestine on a trusteeship basis should await the Secretary's return. The President also mentioned this idea to me briefly once in conversation and if an appropriate opportunity arises I may in the meantime attempt to get from him a little more background as to his thinking on this.

E[DWIGHT] S[TETTINIUS]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1943—9 p. m.

6754. Colonel Hoskins has returned from his trip to Saudi Arabia, reference your cable 4286, June 29, and has reported in detail to the Department and to the President on the results of his mission and on other information that he collected during his visit.

In his letter to you dated June 29 Mr. Eden expressed a wish that the British Government might be "kept most fully informed as to the tenor and outcome" of Colonel Hoskins' mission. The President has approved my suggestion that Colonel Hoskins visit London so as to give in person and in such detail as may be desired the results of his
visit to the Prime Minister and to other British officials interested. Please advise the Foreign Office of Colonel Hoskins' prospective visit and assist him during his stay in London.

**Stettinius**

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 26, 1943.

The Secretary: I enclose for your information Mr. Wallace Murray's memorandum of October 15 and Mr. Merriam's memorandum of the same date on the Palestine question. These memoranda relate especially to the suggestion which the President has made both to Colonel Harold B. Hoskins and to me that perhaps a solution to this problem would be a trusteeship by means of which Palestine would be made into a real holy land for all three religions by having trustees of the three faiths—Christian, Moslem and Jewish.

I am considerably impressed by the President's philosophy on this problem as expressed in the enclosures. I should greatly appreciate your reaction to it. Do you feel the Department should favor this approach, and, if so, I am wondering if you think we should do anything to implement the idea now such as having preliminary discussions on it with the British or do you think such steps should await the termination of the war?

Edward S[ettinius]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

[WASHINGTON,] December 9, 1943.

Dr. Nahum Goldmann came to see me today at his own request. He took up with me several matters relating to the Jewish difficulties and then gave me the following information:

Dr. Weizmann in London had been in direct contact with the Prime Minister. The meeting was arranged through General Smuts who

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21 Ante, pp. 815 and 816, respectively.
22 No record has been found in the Department's files of Secretary Hull's reaction to this memorandum. He does, however, in his Memoirs, vol. ii, p. 1534, make the observation that "... the impossibility of bringing the Jews and Arabs together on a common, friendly ground at that time, and the danger of stirring the sands of the Near East by a premature attempt to settle the question of Palestine made it wiser to postpone action until a more propitious time."
23 Dr. Goldmann was at this time head of an office which had been established in Washington by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, to which the Department had accorded no recognition; see memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations, May 26, p. 787.
24 Jan Christian Smuts, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.
has long been a friend of Zionism. At the conference Mr. Churchill stated that he had not changed at all in his attitude toward Zionism. He had not changed at all in his attitude toward the White Paper. He was certain that some adjustment of the matter should be made. It was a question of timing. The question was presented further whether some change of policy should be made during the war or whether the matter should be postponed for determination after the war. That was a question which had to be decided but the fact that there must be a change of British policy in Palestine was definite in his mind.

Furthermore the present British representative in Palestine had not been friendly to the Jewish cause. It had been decided that when his term expired next May he would not be reappointed. Dr. Weizmann had been assured to that effect by the Prime Minister.

B[reckinridge] L[ong]

867N.01/2056

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 13, 1943.

The British Ambassador\(^{15}\) called at my request. I proceeded to refer to certain phases of the Jewish relief situation and particularly to the provision of the White Paper\(^{16}\) relating to the discontinuance of immigration into Palestine after March 31, 1944. I said that, of course, this Government has been exerting itself in every possible way, both individually and collectively, to render every possible aid and relief to the Jewish people in connection with their persecutions, and in connection with every and all kinds of injuries inflicted upon them by Germany and other enemies, particularly during the period of the present war. I said that, of course, this Government has not only thus striven to be of aid, but it has been sympathetic with any and all efforts of groups of individuals and other governments to give aid and comfort to the Jewish people; and that this relates to the complaint by the Jews of the threatened termination by the British Government of the immigration provisions of the MacDonald White Paper on next March thirty-first. I continued by saying that the President and myself, and other officials of this Government, in the light of our international interest in the Jewish situation, based primarily on the residence and citizenship of some five million Jews in this country, are in earnest sympathy with the proposal of the Jews that the immigration provisions be extended by the British Government beyond March

\(^{15}\) Lord Halifax.

\(^{16}\) See British Cmd. 6019: Palestine, Statement of Policy, issued by the British Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, May 17, 1939. See also Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. iv, pp. 750 ff.
thirty-first, and that in every other possible way, relief and aid be
given to the Jewish people. I concluded by saying that I was desirous
of talking freely with the British Ambassador on these matters, and
that I would appreciate anything he might say that would be helpful
in the premises.

The Ambassador said he could understand the situation of this Gov-
ernment with respect to the question in regard to the White Paper to
which I had referred, and as to our sympathy with the Jewish request
that the immigration provisions not be terminated on March thirty-
first. He then added that his Government found that there were
more than thirty thousand Jewish people entitled to go into Palestine
before March thirty-first under the provisions of the White Paper, and
that his Government had agreed or was in the act of agreeing that
these thirty thousand might come in after March thirty-first, the date
of the expiration of the immigration provisions aforesaid. The Amb-
assador then said that Mr. Churchill had always supported the Bal-
four declaration and its operation, and had been opposed to the Mac-
Donald White Paper. I thereupon handed him a copy of the conversa-
tion between Mr. Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State,
and Dr. Nahum Goldmann upon this subject of the White Paper, on
December 9, 1943, copy of which is attached.\(^\text{16}\) The Ambassador then
repeated what he had said about Mr. Churchill's attitude; he took no
issue with the statement of Dr. Goldmann to Mr. Long. Dr. Gold-
mann rested his statement mainly upon a quotation from Dr. Weiz-
mann in London, who was understood to have been in recent direct
contact with the Prime Minister.

I emphasized repeatedly to the Ambassador that in harmony with
the past course, attitude and activities of this Government to aid in
every possible way in Jewish relief and assistance, we could not help
but be thoroughly sympathetic with the Jewish request not to ter-
minate the immigration provisions of the White Paper on March thirty-first, and that the only question is how I could best define the
attitude of this Government publicly without seriously embarrassing
the British in dealing with the military situation. I emphasized that
it was difficult to keep this matter from reaching the public much
longer, and that it is only being kept confidential on account of mili-
tary considerations and its probable or possible effect on them. I said
that I should like to make public reference to what we have talked
about, namely that this Government is deeply interested in the phase
of the MacDonald White Paper already pointed out.

The Ambassador then proceeded to speak, off the record, for two or
three minutes.

\(^{16}\text{Supra.}\)
Memorandum of Conversation, by Lieutenant Colonel
Harold B. Hoskins

[WASHINGTON], December 14, 1943.

Participants: U—Mr. Stettinius
A-B—Mr. Berle
A-L—Mr. Long
PA/M—Mr. Murray
NE—Mr. Alling
NE—Colonel Hoskins

At Mr. Stettinius' request Colonel Hoskins, based on his recent trip to the Middle East and to the United Kingdom, gave the highlights on the situation and prospects in Palestine as indicated by the headings in the outline attached.

After the situation in Palestine and in London had been reviewed there followed a discussion of the situation in the United States and particularly in Washington. Mr. Long referred to certain domestic political complications in dealing with this subject during the coming months and the consequent necessity of moving very carefully.

Then followed a discussion as to the scope and location of the conversations on Near East matters that had been suggested by the Foreign Office and of the invitation that had been issued to Mr. Murray to visit London. Mr. Murray mentioned the preference of the Secretary that such conversations should take place in Washington rather than in London.

It was agreed (1) that no further steps could be taken until after the President's return and (2) that, after the necessary information from the President had been received in regard to any conversations on Palestine that he may have had with the Prime Minister, the Under Secretary would then call together the above group for a further discussion of the suggestions made in Colonel Hoskins' report.

[Annex]

Highlights regarding Palestine
By Lt. Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, A.U.S.

I. Basis of my Report and Conclusions

Two trips to Middle East and one to London during past year—over seven months' travel.

17 For correspondence regarding the British request to hold conversations on problems of the Near and Middle East, see pp. 6 ff.

18 President Roosevelt had been attending the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran; he returned to Washington on December 16. For correspondence concerning these Conferences, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.
First-hand conversations with Arab and Jewish leaders, with British officials in Middle East and London, and with American Government Officials in Middle East and Washington.

II. Summary of Present Situation

A. In Palestine

(1) Increased tension on both sides
   —arming and arms trials
   —minor outbreaks despite armed forces
(2) No indications of any compromise by leaders, either Arab or Jew; I've talked to both.
   —Irreconcilable conflict between Arab desire for independence and Zionist desire for a Jewish State.
(3) No signs of amicable cooperation between the Arab and Jewish people in Palestine or in neighboring Arab States. This confirms major conclusion of Royal Commission of 1937 as given in their 400-page report.\(^\text{19}\)
(4) Today, though lack of cooperation since 1937 confirmed, main change is that the shoe is on the other foot—today the Arabs are afraid of the Jews. This is the significant change from 1937.
(5) Palestine Arabs more restless because of growing independence of Arabs in surrounding countries.

B. In London

(1) Uncertainty and indecision in War Cabinet opinion—as indicated by Law's luncheon for me.
(2) Constant Jewish Pressure on government and public opinion—Weizmann, Namier, Manchester Guardian.
(3) Realization of Need for Decision
   —leaning toward partition as ultimate solution—an Arab State, a Jewish State and Holy Places
(4) Recognition by British of increasing permanent interests of United States in Palestine and Middle East.
(5) Desire for Anglo-American conversations and for Anglo-American cooperation.

C. In Washington

(1) Increasing Zionist political pressure, I gather, on State Department, Congress and leaders of both political parties.

(2) Desirability of Anglo-American conversations in Washington if not London re Middle East problems.

\(^{19}\)British Omd. 5479, July 1937.
(3) Advisability of making some decisions on American policy toward Middle East if possible, so as to clarify and assist position of our diplomatic representatives in the field.

III. Next Steps

(1) Conferences within State Department and with War and Navy Departments, aimed at clarifying our own minds as to proper United States policy in the Middle East.

(2) Followed by conferences with British re possibilities of agreement on Anglo-American policies to apply in Middle East.

(a) for war period

Anglo-American declaration re Palestine or regional declaration aimed at preventing a blow-up between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, and at postponing discussions and decisions re Palestine till war is won.

(b) for postwar period

Agreement on joint Anglo-American policy to be applied in Middle East to extent American interests warrant and American strength will support enforcement.

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 22, 1943.

The British Ambassador called at his request and handed me a memorandum on Palestine in response to a recent request for further information and explanation of the British position in regard to the White Paper, in order that this Government might make public some of the conversations had with the British Government in regard to this subject. The Ambassador submitted a suggested draft of a statement that I might make, as follows:

"United States Government, having regard to the fact that there are something like 4 million Jews in the United States, are particularly interested in problems concerning the present plight of the Jews and are giving close and constant attention to all proposals that seem likely to alleviate the Jewish lot or contribute to solving their special problems. One problem is that of Palestine and this too, though its Government and its security are a British and not an

28 The papers quoted below are the only ones attached to this memorandum of conversation. The draft statement may be the memorandum meant.
American responsibility, is receiving close attention and it is Mr. Hull’s constant hope that an eventual solution will be found that would benefit all Palestine’s inhabitants, Arabs and Jews alike. If interested Jews and Arabs within Palestine’s borders and without could reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts, this would be beneficial to the United States."

I said that this was not quite definite enough; that I would like to take it and see what I could develop and then possibly show it to him a little later.

I then asked him to hand me a copy of his memo of our conversation on this matter which he sent to his Government some days ago. He did so and the memo read as follows:

"2. The sort of thing he had it in mind to say was. Begins. That United States Government and His Majesty’s Government were of course at one in their feeling of sympathy for the cruelties to which the whole Jewish race had been subjected and that one of the purposes of victory in this war was to secure justice for Jews. As to Palestine, this was of course within the responsibility of His Majesty’s Government but the United States Government, having regard to the fact that there was something like four million Jews in the United States could naturally never be disinterested in the problem, and were following with close and constant attention all facts and factors that affected it. More than this he could not at present say. Ends."

(This does not mean necessarily that I subscribe to all that he said in his attempt to quote me.)

867N.01/20714

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1943.

Dear Mr. Hull: During our conversation yesterday on the subject of Palestine I showed you a telegram from Eden in which he expressed the hope that you might perhaps feel able to do something to dissuade the Zionist leaders here from the course of action they are now pursuing. You said that I might send you a copy of what he said on this point.

The relevant extract was as follows:

"Since Mr. Hull has consulted us I think we should take the opportunity to express our candid view that in the long run it would be advantageous to all parties if, apart from a public statement, he felt able to warn Zionist leaders of the dangers of their present policy. Mr. Hull will have seen reports stressing the grave danger of an outbreak of violence in Palestine if the Zionists press their maximum demands. We hope therefore that Mr. Hull using his great prestige will be able to see Zionist leaders and warn them of the disaster that they may bring on the Jews in Palestine and the damage they may
cause to the common war effort if their attitude continues strident and provocative.

"Possibly the President on his return will be reporting to Congress publicly or privately about his journey. If he could say something about the recent tension in the Eastern Mediterranean (not solely in Lebanon ²¹) and the necessity for opinion in the United States to look at the Middle East area as a whole, that might also be most useful. The mistake extreme pro-Zionists make is in treating Palestine in isolation not as a part of the Arab world as a whole." ²²

I am sure that if it were possible for the President and yourself to say something in this sense, it would be of the greatest value.

Halifax

²¹ For correspondence regarding the attitude of the United States toward the constitutional crisis in Lebanon, see pp. 953 ff.