GREECE

POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE QUESTION OF THE
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF GREECE FOLLOWING LIBERATION
FROM GERMAN OCCUPATION

868.01/227: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, March 2, 1943—7 p.m.
[Received 8:20 p.m.]

444. According to British Embassy source King of Greece ¹ accompanied by Tsouderos ² and certain other members of Greek Government is expected to arrive here some time this month in order to take up permanent residence in Cairo until return to Greece possible. Egyptian Government said to have acquiesced but requested that King not set up court. Embassy source observed that move will in effect constitute transfer of Greek Government from London to Cairo but not clear yet whether transfer would be officially announced and thus raise question of foreign diplomatic representation to Greek Government. Reaction among Greek community expected to be divided since many will undoubtedly interpret transfer as intended to give present Government opportunity to consolidate its position immediately upon liberation of Greece from Axis.

Kirk

868.20/100: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1943—2 p.m.

356. Following received from London:

"1668, March 8, 9 p.m. The Greek ‘army’ in the Middle East has mutinied, Sargent ³ told me this afternoon, following a conversation he had just had with the Prime Minister. Sargent attributed this to ‘Greek politics and Kanellopoulos’ ⁴ recent changes in officer personnel.’ He denied that it was in any sense a revolt against the King and his government. The ‘army’ at present he said consists of two

¹ George II.
² Emmanuel J. Tsouderos, Prime Minister of Greece.
³ Sir Orme Garton Sargent, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
⁴ Panayotis Kanellopoulos, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense in the Greek Government in Exile.
battalions and the third is about to be formed. The Greek Prime Minister has agreed to place the 'army' entirely under the jurisdiction and command of General Wilson."

Please report as fully as possible on this subject.

Welles

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868.00/1193: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, March 13, 1943—6 p.m.
[Received March 13—5:53 p.m.]

505. My 493, March 12, 10 a.m. Office of Minister of State advises that Greek Army crisis has impelled King of Greece to advance date of coming here and now expected imminently. In meantime British are exerting every effort to prevent publication of news of troubles at least until King arrived and it has been suggested that it would be helpful if American authorities could also assist in stopping publicity on matter. Same source adds that British Ambassador to Greece in London will be transferred here coincidental with installation of Greek Government in Cairo and that thereafter Greek affairs here will be handled by Ambassador rather than Minister of State. I shall of course be in personal contact with the King after his arrival.

Kirk

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868.01/328: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, March 15, 1943—11 a.m.
[Received March 15—9:04 a.m.]

508. My 505, March 13, 6 p.m. The King of Greece arrived this morning.

Kirk

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5 Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, British Commander in Chief, Middle East.
6 Not printed.
7 The Minister of State was the representative of the British War Cabinet in the Middle East, with Cabinet rank. His duties included political guidance to the Commander in Chief in the Middle East and he was generally responsible for the conduct of political affairs in the area resulting from the war. The incumbent at this time was Richard G. Casey.
8 Reginald W. Allen Leeper was appointed British Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile on March 11.
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON, March 16, 1943.]

GREECE

In a statement of their policy towards Greece which the British recently gave us, they make it clear that they hope King George II will return to Greece and that they will help him get back. Though they recognize the King’s lack of popularity in Greece and say they “do not intend to restore the King by force”, they aim to “sell the King and the Tsouderos Government” to the Greek people, in part, at least, by persuading them that the King intends to rule as a democratic constitutional monarch. They add that they are themselves satisfied as to the purity of the King’s intentions and that they feel that a monarchial régime would provide a more stable government in Greece than a “republican regime which in the past failed to produce anything but weak and unreliable governments”.

We agree with the British in recognizing the Greek King and exiled Government as the legal Government of Greece and in hoping that all Greeks will subordinate politics to the immediate purpose of winning the war and Liberating the occupied countries. We are also aware that continuity in government until the Greek people have a chance to express themselves is essential.

After giving this question thorough study (see NE’s memorandum of December 28, 1942), we believe this Government should not—in fact, cannot—go along with the rest of the British policy towards Greece. In our view:

(1) The question of the acceptability of King George II by the Greek people is one that can only be determined by the latter, and in view of their known opposition to the King they should be given a chance to express themselves freely on the subject. If the King can

*Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs by Mr. Kohler and sent by the Adviser on Political Relations to the Secretary of State for use in his conversations with Mr. Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, during the latter’s visit to Washington in March 1943; see vol. III, pp. 1 ff. On March 29 Mr. Murray had a conversation with Mr. William Strang, British Assistant Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who accompanied Mr. Eden to Washington. During the course of this conversation Mr. Murray put orally to Mr. Strang two questions on Greek affairs which were based on this memorandum. The questions were: (1) Does the British Government contemplate that the Greek people will be given the opportunity to express themselves as regards the restoration of the Monarchy in Greece or only as regards the composition of the Government? (2) Does the British Government believe that King George and the Government in Exile, or either of them, should return to liberated Greece before the Greek people express their political will? Mr. Strang referred the questions to the Foreign Office for reply, and they were answered in an aile-mémoire of April 24, p. 131.

**Not printed.
“sell” himself to the Greek people, despite having let them down several times before, well and good. The selling job should not, however, be undertaken by a foreign power.

Incidentally, while the various declarations of the Greek King, Premier and Deputy Premier promise that the composition of the Greek Government will be submitted to the will of the people, they carefully avoid any pledge that the people will be invited to pronounce themselves on the question of the form of government (i. e. republican or monarchial).

(2) A British campaign to “sell” the Tsouderos Government to the Greek people, besides constituting intervention in Greek internal affairs, seems likely to stir up political dissension and divide the Greek people on the old Royalist and anti-Royalist lines, rather than to create unity.

(3) The British conclusion that only a monarchial régime will assure stable government in Greece, seems to us to be warranted neither by the facts of recent Greek history nor by a reasonable analysis of the present temper of the Greek people.

(4) Return of the King and Tsouderos Government to Greece under the wing of an Allied military occupation would largely deny to the Greek people the free choice of their own Government promised in Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter. More immediately, it might well involve serious internal disorders, since it appears from reliable indications that both political and military elements in Greece are organized to oppose a restoration of the King.

Under the circumstances, it seems to us essential to get together with the British and decide on a practical method of handling this question and the connected question of other governments in exile. In our opinion it would be advisable for the King and the Tsouderos governments to refrain from returning to Greece until there has been an opportunity for the people to express their will freely under the auspices of an impartial Allied occupation.

There is reason to believe that the Greeks realize that the British intend to restore the King; that they are looking to the United States to see that they get the promised opportunity to express their own will; and that, if we fail them, they will turn to Soviet Russia.

The serious nature of the Greek political problem has been emphasized by the recent mutiny in the Greek armed forces in Syria and the resignation of the young liberal Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister, Panayotis Kanellopoulos, who escaped from Greece and joined the Greek Government some ten months ago.

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31 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941; Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367.
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

London, March 23, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received March 23—5:45 p. m.]

Greek Series 1. From Biddle.  
Your 1670, March 19, 6 p. m.  
As result of my very recent conversations with Greek Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Aghnides (also acting in capacity of “Permanent Undersecretary” directing work of that part of Foreign Office staff which will be left in London) and my British colleague Ambassador Leeper, I learn the following:

That the question of the Egyptian Government’s granting the Greek Government extraterritoriality is still in course of negotiation between the Egyptian and British authorities; that while it may be said that the Egyptian Government has agreed in principle to the establishment of the Greek Government in Egypt, the Egyptian Government’s attitude has not thus far been very forthcoming in matter of granting extraterritoriality. (It is my impression that the Egyptian Government’s reluctance arises from apprehension as to the potential effect of granting such rights, upon Egypt’s status as a non-belligerent ally).

Leeper has received instructions to proceed immediately to Cairo with a view to bringing these negotiations to a definite conclusion. Aghnides will keep me advised as to the progress thereof.

I strongly recommend that, once this question is settled, we adopt the following course: (a) that at the appropriate moment Minister Kirk be temporarily appointed Chargé d’Affaires; and (b) that I be authorized to proceed promptly to Cairo in order (1) to pay my respects to and to take leave of King George II and Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tsouderos, and (2) to “turn over” to Minister Kirk and to fully enlighten him on current political background. (I feel this could be accomplished more satisfactorily in talks than by correspondence.)

I have discreetly ascertained that this would prove a welcome move in the eyes of the British as well as the Greek Government. Furthermore, I strongly believe that this spontaneous gesture would be in keeping with the spirit of this Mission, and in such light would have a stimulating effect upon the present tense frame of mind not only of the Greek, but also of the other Allied Governments here who, as a whole, constantly suffer from supersensitivity characteristic of exiled mentality, and who have recently become increasingly apprehensive.

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13 Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile, at London.
14 Not printed.
15 Thanasssis Aghnides.
concerning their respective roles in the plans to liberate their own countries.

I earnestly hope you may agree with the foregoing recommendations. Should it seem advisable to fly to Cairo before Rudolf Schoenfeld’s¹⁶ return, I recommend that you name Waldemar Gallman¹⁷ Chargé d’Affaires until my and/or Schoenfeld’s return. [Biddle.]

MATTHEWS

868.00/1201: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, March 24, 1943.

[Received March 24—10:18 p.m.]

572. It is announced that following new Ministers this morning joined Greek Government and took oath before King George in presence of Prime Minister Tsouderos:

George Roussos as Vice Premier and Minister of Marine; Byron Karapanayiotis as Minister of War and Acting Air Minister; and Emmanuel Sofoulis as Minister of Public Welfare.

It is also announced that the resignation has been accepted of Admiral Sakellariou as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and that those of Admiral Cavadias as Under Secretary of the Navy, of General Nicolaides as Under Secretary for Air and of Sekeris as Minister of Education had previously been accepted.

Kirk

868.00/1203: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, March 24, 1943—7 p.m.

[Received 10:20 p.m.]

573. My 545, March 20, 7 p.m. and 570, March 24.¹⁸ Commenting on the reformation of the Greek Cabinet, Minister Karapanayiotis this afternoon informed a member of the Legation that, while somewhat less change has been made than was anticipated, particularly in that the Metaxist Minister of Finance Varvaressos has been retained and the nomination of Admiral Voulgaris to the Marine Portfolio has been postponed pending conclusion of the investigation of the Army revolt in which he is alleged to have been implicated in both of which actions the King is stated to have received firm British support, nevertheless the Government as now constituted is generally satisfactory to the Army units. At the same time Karapanayiotis and Sofoulis are both

¹⁶ Counselor of Embassy near the Greek Government in Exile.
¹⁷ First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom.
¹⁸ Neither printed.
reported to have stated that in the negotiations for this democratization of the Cabinet no commitments have been made either by the new Ministers or by the King as to post-hostilities political affairs.

I understand that the King left for Syria this afternoon in company with General Wilson and will visit the Greek troops tomorrow.

Kirk


Attached is a copy in the original Greek and an English translation of a new declaration issued by the Greek King and Government, pleading that the King, as well as the Government, will submit himself to a free expression of the will of the Greek people after the war. Previous declarations have given the same assurance as regards the Government but have carefully avoided any commitment as regards the position, i.e., they have heretofore promised the people a free choice as regards the composition of their Government, but not as regards its form.

The present declaration, which takes the convenient form of a message to the principal guerilla leader in occupied Greece, is a notable step toward the complete acceptance by the Greek régime, as regards themselves, of the provisions of Article III of the Atlantic Charter. As such, it will unquestionably be carefully noted by the other exiled régimes, who may well feel obliged to follow suit at appropriate times. This would go a long way toward clearing up the potential headache of what to do about the exiled governments.

The Greek declaration is the first fruit of the recent “mutiny” in the Greek armed forces in the Near East, whose temper appears to be approximately the same as that of the Greek people in Greece, as nearly as can be judged by the limited information at our disposal. It seems likely that a re-shuffling of the Cabinet on Veniselist lines will be announced shortly and that the King will go to Syria and repeat the new assurances to the Greek troops, probably tomorrow, on the occasion of Greek Independence Day.

It is my opinion that the King has a much better chance of retaining the Greek throne by pursuing the present course than by trying to force himself on the Greek people without giving them a chance to express their will.

19 Addressed to the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray), the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling), and the Assistant Chief of the Division (Merriam).
20 Col. Napoleon Zervas.
Statement of King George II

Cairo, March 21, 1943.

The King and the Government received from Colonel Napoleon Zervas, leader of the various guerrilla bands in Greece, a message with expressions of devotion and assurances about the continuation of the struggle. The following answer was given to this message:

"His Majesty and the Hellenic Government thank all the officers and men of the forces fighting in Greece against the enemy and congratulate them for their patriotic activities.

"These activities contribute greatly to the success of the national struggle for the liberation and rehabilitation of our country, to which (struggle) the King and the Government, being established now in Cairo, as well as the Greek Armed Forces in the Middle East, devote all their endeavors.

"The King after his return to Greece, will base himself on the will of the people and will follow the opinion which the people will express freely on all questions concerning them."

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The following summary statement with respect to His Majesty’s Government’s policy towards Greece has been sent to His Majesty’s Minister of State, Cairo.

His Majesty’s Government hold strongly to the principle that the final form of government for Greece is a matter for the Greek people to decide. During the period immediately following the liberation of Greece from occupation by the enemy, especially if military operations are proceeding elsewhere, the existence of a stable Government is the first essential. The only nucleus at present for such a government is provided by the King. The policy of His Majesty’s Government in respect of Greece may, in view of these considerations, be summarised as follows:

(a) Full support to the King and present Government; such support to be manifested in all their contacts in Greece itself and in their propaganda generally;

(b) Approval of declarations by the King and the Prime Minister to the effect that the Government are not exercising dictatorial authority and that they intend to leave it to the Greek people to determine their future political conditions;

Handed on April 27 to Mr. Foy D. Kohler by Mr. Donald Hall, First Secretary of the British Embassy, who stated that it was in response to the questions on Greek affairs put to Mr. Strang of the Foreign Office by Mr. Murray; see footnote 9, p. 126.
(c) The maintenance and strengthening of the King’s personal authority in regard to the Greek Army, Navy and Air Force; the King should therefore not be constrained to compromise with the mutineers in the recent revolt if these are found guilty of disloyalty by the Commission of Enquiry and the King prefers not to show leniency;

(d) Approval of the broadening of the basis of the present Government.

His Majesty’s Government had already come to the conclusion before the recent Army disturbances which make it all the more necessary, that the time had come to concentrate their efforts on building up the King and the present Government and they pressed the latter to establish themselves in Egypt because among other reasons it seemed that this building up could be done more easily and effectively if they were in Egypt and not in London.

Since, as stated above, it is requisite that there should be a strong administration in Greece as soon as liberation takes place or our operational needs demand, it is not the policy of His Majesty’s Government to encourage the idea that immediately Greece is liberated a plebiscite shall be organised under British aegis to determine whether the monarchy shall be maintained or abolished. His Majesty’s Government however approve the intention of the present Government to resign on its return to Greece so as to enable the King to form another Government representative of all those sections in Greece which are ready to collaborate with the King in restoration of the country. Nor would His Majesty’s Government object to the holding of elections at a moment considered appropriate by Allied commanders if an overwhelming demand for an alternative to the Tsouderos Government, even if broadened, were to manifest itself. But His Majesty’s Government strongly deprecate the immediate raising of the Constitutional issue which would call the existing monarchical regime in question. This of course would not preclude the raising of such issue when the period of military necessity has passed.

Meanwhile His Majesty’s Government feel that even during the period of exile the Greek Government should be made as representative of the people as is possible in the circumstances. As soon therefore as His Majesty’s Ambassador to Greece, Mr. Leeper, arrives in Cairo, he will discuss with the Greek Government the possibility of getting suitable political and resistance leaders as well as officials out of Greece who would be prepared to enter the Administration.

Washington, April 24, 1943.
The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy's aide-mémoire of April 24, 1943, setting forth the policy of the British Government in respect to Greece, has been examined with interest.

The Government of the United States is for the most part in agreement with these views. In particular, this Government welcomes the British Government's statements that it holds strongly to the principle that the final form of government for Greece is a matter for the Greek people to decide; and that, while the British Government deprecates the immediate raising of the Constitutional issue which would call the existing monarchial régime into question, this would not preclude the raising of this issue when the period of military necessity has passed.

The American Government recognizes the present Greek régime as the Government of Greece and acknowledges the necessity for continuity in government until the Greek people shall have had an opportunity to express their will.

This Government has welcomed the declarations of the King and Government of Greece that they do not intend to exercise dictatorial authority and will leave to the Greek people the determination of their own future political condition. It would also be pleased to see the present Government broadened by the inclusion of appropriate political and resistance leaders from Greece itself. It shares the confidence of the British Government in the friendly and loyal sentiments of the Greek King and Government and their devotion to the Allied war effort.

The American Government has constantly urged all Greek factions to postpone their political quarrels and remain united in the immediate purpose of helping to win the war and to liberate their occupied homeland. It realizes, however, that there exists among the Greek people widespread hostility to the monarchy, and this hostility appears to have developed certain organizational bases within Greece. In the opinion of this Government this question is one between the Greek people and the Greek King and, in its view, the King must himself satisfy the Greek people that this hostility is unjustified and that his future rule would be in accord with their sentiments and will. This Government believes that the principal Allied Governments should carefully avoid any action which would create the impression that they intend to impose the King on the Greek people under the protection of an Allied invading force or that the Greek

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22 See memorandum by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, March 24, p. 130.
people can secure the rewards of the common victory only at the price of accepting the return of the monarchy. This Government would regard it as a great tragedy should any civil disturbances arise in Greece as a result of internal opposition to the return of the King, in which it might be necessary for Allied troops to intervene.

Consequently, while this Government wishes the Greek King and Government well in any efforts they may make to obtain the support of the Greek people and reenforce their authority in regard to the Greek armed forces, it is not prepared to undertake, or actively to associate itself with measures designed to promote these purposes.

It seems likely that Crete may be freed from enemy occupation prior to the liberation of the Greek mainland. This Government would suggest the desirability, in such event, that the Greek King and Government remain established in Cairo, being requested, however, at an appropriate time, to appoint a Governor-General of the Island, preferably a Cretan acceptable to the local leaders. This would avoid a possible outbreak of civil strife in Crete and would provide an opportunity for first-hand Allied observation of the attitude and temper of the Greek people toward the monarchy as a guide to the course of action which should be followed after liberation of the mainland.

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1943.

868.01/355: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, July 3, 1943—6 p.m.
[Received July 4—8:03 a.m.]

10. King of Greece will broadcast important declaration to Greek people from Cairo, Egypt at 1630 Greenwich time tomorrow July 4th. Prime Minister has emphasized to me importance of this broadcast and while at request of Greek authorities OWI is arranging widest possible American publicity both in English and Greek press, Mr. Tsouderos also indicated that any supporting comment the Department might see fit to make in regard to it would be appreciated.

Brief summary of address which is not to be released for publication prior to delivery follows in my 11, July 3, 7 p.m.

Kirk

Alexander C. Kirk presented his credentials as Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile at Cairo on June 15, 1943, which office he held in addition to that of Minister to Egypt.

Office of War Information.

Infra.
The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, July 3, 1943—7 p.m.
[Received July 3—3:51 p.m.]

Greek Series 11. After mentioning high esteem in which Greece is held by her Allies and quoting tribute from commander of British forces in the Middle East, with whom the Greek Army is serving broadcast reminds people that national unity is essential to success of struggle and must be preserved until the day of liberation when people “will be invited to decide by popular and free vote the institutions with which Greece must endow herself in sympathy with forward march of democracy”.

Address continues with declaration that “as soon as security of country is complete and necessities of military operations allow free and general elections for a constituent assembly will be held and will take place within 6 months as Government has decided. I am confident that no Greek and least of all myself will fail to respect decision of constitutional assembly.”

Address continues: until nation has expressed its sovereign will constitution of 1911 will be maintained in all provisions and when seat of government can be transferred to Greek soil present members will resign as Prime Minister has announced in order that fully representative government can be formed to guarantee freedom and order lines of these elections.

Speech concludes with call to people to dedicate themselves to cause of victory.

Kirk

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk), at Cairo

Washington, July 5, 1943—7 p.m.

Greek Series No. 5. Your 10, July 3, 6 p.m. and 11, July 3, 7 p.m. In response to Mr. Tsouderos’ request, I was glad to make the following comment on the King’s radio address in reply to a question from the press this morning:

“I welcome these declarations of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes. They constitute a reaffirmation of the devotion of the Greek Government to the ideals of democracy and a reassurance to the Greek people that they shall enjoy the full exercise of the sovereign rights of

which they have proven themselves so worthy by their heroic resistance to Axis aggression.”

HULL

868.01/364 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, July 8, 1943—4 p. m.
[Received July 9—8:58 a.m.]

Greek Series 17. Your Greek Series No. 5, July 5, 7 p. m. In reply to a letter to Greek Prime Minister transmitting statement contained in the telegram under reference, I have today received a communication from him as follows:

“The statement made by the Secretary of State Mr. Cordell Hull 27 on His Majesty’s radio to the Greek people was very gratifying to us. It has indeed cast the proper light on this solemn and important declaration of the sovereign which will undoubtedly have a decisive and favorable influence on the solution of the political problems of our country.

The Government and myself have also much appreciated the comments of Senators Guffey and Pepper 28 on the same matter.

I should be grateful if you would kindly transmit to the Secretary of State our sincere thanks for the warm reception which he and other distinguished American personalities gave to His Majesty’s speech thus enlightening the public opinion of the United States on the significance of this grave statement.”

Kirk

868.01/3334

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department’s memorandum of July 2, 1943, regarding British and United States policy towards Greece may now be supplemented by the following remarks:

The Government of the United States has welcomed the declarations of the King of Greece regarding the aims and intentions of himself and of the Greek Government, contained in His Majesty’s radio address to the Greek people on July 4, 1943. The Secretary of State, in reply to a question from the press on July 5, 1943, made the following statement in this regard:

“I welcome these declarations of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes. They constitute a reaffirmation of the devotion of the

27 See supra.
28 Joseph F. Guffey and Claude Pepper, Senators from Pennsylvania and Florida, respectively.
Greek Government to the ideals of democracy and a reassurance to the Greek people that they shall enjoy the full exercise of the sovereign rights of which they have proven themselves so worthy by their heroic resistance to Axis aggression."

This Government has likewise noted with pleasure the statement on this subject made by the British Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons on July 7, 1943,\(^29\) which, it assumes, may be regarded as amplifying the summary of the British Government’s policy toward Greece contained in the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of April 24, 1943.

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1943.

868.01/397

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The memorandum expressing the United States Government’s view on the policy to be adopted towards the King of the Hellenes and the Government of Greece presented by the State Department and dated July 2nd, 1943, has been read with great interest by His Majesty’s Government. While it is observed with pleasure that the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government are in substantial agreement, it is felt that the divergence of view regarding the degree of support which should be given to the King of the Hellenes may lead to difficulties in the future. His Majesty’s Government therefore wish to explain in the following paragraphs the basis of their policy, in the hope that the present divergence of view may be resolved.

His Majesty’s Government consider that a slight distinction should be made between the position of the King and that of his government. Our support for the King is founded on three main considerations:—

(a) He is our Ally, and as such is, in our view, entitled to our full support. He stood by us with the utmost loyalty during the campaign in Greece, and since then has done nothing to suggest that our confidence in him is misplaced.

(b) He remains the constitutional Head of the Greek State, and it is not in our power to alter this even if we wished to do so. The Greek people are the only authority which can deprive him of this position, but it is clearly impossible for them to pronounce on this question until Greece has been liberated and order restored.

(c) Both from the juridical and from the practical point of view, it is important that the continuity of the Greek Government should be maintained. In the last resort this depends on the King, since no government could be in existence without him. If there is to be a change in the form of regime under which Greece is governed, this can properly take place only when the King has returned to Greece


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and has summoned a government which can hold elections for a constituent assembly or a plebiscite, by means of which the Greek people can make their views known.

Our support for the Government is founded on similar considerations, but in addition there are the great practical advantages which derive from having a strong and representative Greek Government. In the general conduct of the war in so far as it affects Greece, and particularly in the preparations for liberating the country there must be a properly constituted Greek authority with whom we can deal. It is of the greatest importance that we should be able to make arrangements and agreements with them, which will be accepted by the Greek people as a whole and by any succeeding government. There is the further consideration that in the later stages of the war we may wish to use Greece as a base for operations, and we shall then need a strong administration in the country. It is therefore very much in our interest to assist the Greek Government to gain the confidence and support of the Greek people.

On the other hand, we should be the first to recognise that our support alone is not enough to ensure that the return of the government will be accepted by the people, and we have always regarded it as a matter of the first importance that the government should be made as representative as possible of opinion in Greece. The Greek Government have themselves recognised that this is not easy, and they have therefore given assurances that as soon as they return to Greece they will resign in order that a fully representative administration may be formed. Meanwhile they are endeavouring to obtain wider support in Greece and since their arrival in Cairo, negotiations between M. Tsouderos and the political leaders in Greece have been in progress. Although no responsible politicians have yet agreed to come out of Greece to join the Government, the gap between the two points of view appears to have been substantially reduced, and there are reasonable prospects that it will shortly be possible to broaden the basis of the Government by the inclusion of new elements from Greece.

Thus far, I believe, we are on common ground with the United States Government. But the test of any policy will come when an Allied invasion of Greece takes place, and it is at this point that the divergence between the British and American points of view begins to become apparent. The United States Government will no doubt have learnt from their representative on the Allied Territories (Balkans) Committee in Cairo of the plans which are being made for this event. We have found it necessary to formulate certain general principles in regard to the liberation of all the occupied countries, of which the chief one is that there should be a period during which the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the invading forces must be supreme in civil as well as military matters. It is,
however, our desire and intention that, as soon as military considerations permit, the return of the Allied Government should be facilitated. In our view, any Allied Government, which we recognise as the legitimate government of the country, has a right to expect that it will be allowed to return there and resume authority at least over such parts of the country as are not still theatres of war as soon as it is physically possible for it to do so. For purely military reasons it may be essential for the resumption of governmental authority to be deferred until the operational phase is over, but it would be extremely difficult to justify postponement on any other grounds, and we should require to have the strongest and most evident proof that the present government would be unacceptable to the people if we were to insist on their remaining outside their country once the military situation would permit of their return. We do not wish to impose any government on an unwilling people, and if we allow an exiled government to return, this does not mean that we should be prepared to maintain them in power. We anticipate that in most cases it will be impossible to ascertain the sentiments of the people with any accuracy until some time after the exiled government has got back, but if it then becomes clear that the majority of the people are opposed to them, we should expect them to surrender power to more representative leaders.

We are contemplating applying these principles in the case of Greece. This means that, if, as is suggested by the State Department, Crete were to be the first part of Greece to be liberated, the Greek Government would not return there during the operational phase, when the administration would be in the hands of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. This arrangement can be defended as a military necessity, but we do not feel that the Greek Government would be prepared to suspend the exercise of their authority on any other grounds.

The position of the King differs from that of his government, and the State Department will probably be aware that a decision has been taken to allow him to return to Greece with the invading Allied army. He will be acting in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Armed Forces, and his presence in Greece will in no way derogate from the authority of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, to whom the King will specifically entrust the management of civil as well as military affairs. He will not be accompanied by any member of the Greek Government.

One of the reasons which led us to take this decision was that a request from an Allied sovereign to be allowed to return to his country at the earliest opportunity cannot be lightly rejected, and the military considerations which may make it essential to postpone the return of the Allied Government do not necessarily apply in the case of the
sovereign, provided that he does not insist on exercising his powers of government. Secondly, it was clear that if we disregarded the King's wishes in this matter, we should stand to forfeit his cooperation, on which we must count in the planning of operations for the reconquest of Greece. Thirdly it appeared to us, after mature reflection, that the King's return at this stage and his presence in Greece during the operational phase would simplify rather than complicate the problems which will face both ourselves and the Greek nation.

To forecast the effect of the King's return, it is necessary to consider the present state of feeling in Greece and to make some estimate of what the situation may be at the moment of an Allied invasion. Information is necessarily incomplete, but it seems fairly certain that the number of convinced Royalists in Greece is at present small. The representatives of the old political parties in Athens are for the most part Republican, though they have professed their willingness to accept the King if his return were sanctioned by a plebiscite; in any case, they appear to have lost much of their influence in the country. The most powerful organizations in Greece—and the most vocal—are the E. A. M.\(^\text{30}\) and E. D. E. S.,\(^\text{31}\) which have armed bands of guerrillas at their command. Both are Left Wing and the leaders of the E. A. M. are avowed Communists. Colonel Zervas, the leader of the E. D. E. S., holds less extreme views, and has even stated that he would be willing to accept the return of the King, if His Majesty's Government advised this as being in the best interests of Greece. We do not consider that either of these organisations, and still less any of the political leaders, can claim to speak in the name of the whole Greek people. There is no convincing evidence to indicate that the majority of the Greek people are, or are likely to become, Communist. It would indeed be reasonable to suppose that the majority are more concerned with the immediate problems of daily existence than with political questions, and that they hold no very clearcut political views. They would probably accept any democratic regime which offered them relief from their present distress and a prospect of stable government.

The resistance organisations, including the E. A. M. have recently agreed to cooperate with General Headquarters, Middle East, and with one another in the prosecution of the war, but there is no reason to believe that this agreement will continue to be respected once the Axis forces have been expelled from Greece. In the opinion of the British officers now in Greece, both the E. A. M. and E. D. E. S. are mainly concerned to establish a dominant position for themselves, so that they can seize power at the appropriate moment. There is therefore a serious danger of civil war breaking out in Greece between the guerrilla organisations as soon as Axis control is removed, and

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\(^{30}\) Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon, National Liberation Front.
\(^{31}\) Ellinikos Demokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos, Greek Democratic National League.
this danger is, in our view, greater than the risk of disturbances which might be caused by the King's return. It is our hope that the presence of the King with the victorious army of liberation will increase his prestige in Greece, and it is possible that a considerable section of the people will look to him to resolve party quarrels or to prevent the establishment of tyrannical rule by any one individual or group. During the initial period of Allied administration, the King will have an opportunity of studying the situation in the country, and he should thus be able to select a representative provisional government which could remain in power until fresh elections can be held.

Finally, we must take account of the fact that, owing to the long and profound tradition of friendship for England, the Greek people look to His Majesty's Government for guidance, and we cannot therefore adopt the non-committal attitude suggested by the United States Government. We are convinced that the King of the Hellenes and the present government, with all its faults, are in the best position to rally all the forces of Greece against the enemy, and that there is no alternative body which could undertake this task. The Greek Government have as stated above given an assurance that once the country has been liberated, they will resign to make way for a fully representative administration. In his broadcast to the Greek people on the 4th July, the King repeated this assurance and gave the most explicit undertaking that he will respect the will of the people on all constitutional issues as soon as they are in a position to express it. In our view, the programme put forward in the King's broadcast offers the best chances of assuring stability and democratic rule in Greece, and we have had no hesitation in endorsing it. If the King and his government are to be able to carry out their declared intentions, they must be able to rely on our support, and we consider that the interests both of ourselves and of Greece justify us in giving them this support in the fullest measure at our command.

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1943.

368.01/375: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, August 17, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received August 19—11:14 a.m.]

Greek Series 40. My Greek Series 35, August 13, 5 p. m.22 The arrival in Cairo of the six representatives of resistance groups in Greece has precipitated a crisis which has seriously disturbed the Government during the past days.

22 Not printed.
These representatives four of whom are members of EAM and two emissaries of Greek guerrilla leaders declared that the situation in Greece demanded the agreement of the King to postpone his return to Greece pending the expression of the public will in that regard and to assume in the meanwhile the role of chief representative of Greece in relation to foreign governments. Both the King and Tsouderos were dismayed at this development as on the one hand they were loath to meet such demands which affected not only the position of the King but also might entail consequences in so far as the other United Nations were concerned and on the other they foresaw that a refusal might adversely affect the actions of resistance bands in Greece as well as precipitate a ministerial crisis in the Greek Government probably resulting in the resignation of the Vice Premier and three principal Ministers.

Both the British Ambassador and I have counselled the King and Tsouderos to make every effort to convince the above mentioned representatives as well as the Ministers that this was not the moment to raise such an issue as it was not immediate and that such agitation would only serve to detract from the effort of Greece to aid the United Nations in the fight against the aggressors and for the liberation of Greece. Yesterday there was an indication that these efforts were being made but the question that the King may send a message on the matter to the President and Churchill is being seriously considered and may be decided at any moment in the event that it appears impossible to achieve a postponement of this issue at least until a more comprehensive census of opinion in Greece may be obtained.

Kirk

868.01/373: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, August 18, 1943—11 a.m.
[Received 3:35 p.m.]

Greek Series 42. My Greek Series 40, August 17, 8 p.m. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. In my immediately following Greek Series telegram there is transmitted the text of a personal message addressed to the President by the King of the Hellenes which the Prime Minister has just brought to me with the request that it had [be?] laid before the President at the earliest possible moment. Tsouderos said that the King is faced with an immediate Cabinet crisis as outlined in my telegram under reference and does not wish to make

*The President and the Prime Minister were in Quebec for the "Quadrant" Conference. The records of the First Quebec Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of Foreign Relations.
a final decision in the matter with which he finds himself faced until he has received the President's advice.

I am informed that a similar message from the King is being sent to Churchill through the British Ambassador to Greece.

Kirk

868.01/374: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, August 18, 1943—noon.
[Received 3:55 p.m.]

Greek Series 43. For the Secretary and Under Secretary.

"1. On July 4 I declared to my people that after their liberation they will be invited to determine by means of free elections the form of their government.

2. I am now suddenly faced by the most curious situation, of the unexpected arrival of certain individuals from Greece, who are supposed to represent various guerrilla bands. In addition a representative of certain old political parties, who wish to press me to declare that I should only return after a plebiscite which would decide on form of the future regime.

3. This request raises a new issue on which I feel you should be consulted before any decision is made. I am adverse to taking a final decision. For in my opinion what is now proposed although primarily a Greek matter, may have repercussions outside Greece, which might well create precedence or affect political developments in other countries and specially in the Balkans. This apparently local issue may assume a wider character. In these circumstance I would much appreciate your advice as to policy, which would at this time best serve the cause of Greece and the United Nations.

4. My present personal inclination is to continue the policy agreed with Prime Minister Churchill before I left England. I feel very strongly that I should return to Greece with my troops, even if I left my country after a short period, to work its national interests among our Allies, should subsequent developments make it politic for me to do so."

Kirk

868.01/377: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, August 19, 1943—4 p.m.
[Received August 21—10:17 a.m.]

Greek Series 44. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. My Greek Series 42, August 18, 11 a.m. I understand that a copy of the message contained in my Greek Series 43, August 18, noon, was for-
warded yesterday evening to Field Marshal Smuts who is closely interested in Greek affairs in general and in the members of the royal family.

It is impossible to determine a clear cut issue among the factors involved in the present crisis. You have the domestic political complications inherited from the past and the natural tendency of the Greeks everywhere to indulge in political agitation as a pursuit in itself without regard necessarily for the ultimate good of the country either from the domestic or from the foreign standpoint. You have this basic condition further aggravated by the ruthless occupation of the country by the enemy with the consequent physical and moral deterioration of the people and by the unnatural conditions surrounding an exiled government which in this instance intensifies the discussion in the members of the Government and armed forces as well as among the Greek civilians living abroad. And above all you have the prestige gained by the Greek nation as champion of resistance against the Axis and the consequent special importance ascribed to the conduct and acts of the present Greek Government in the relations of Greece to the United Nations.

As regards the immediate situation with which the King is now confronted it was precipitated by the arrival here, furthered apparently by British agents, of persons claiming to represent the resistance groups in Greece although there is a divergence in view of the exact extent and number. The King is apparently immediately faced with the necessity of accepting this informal partisan ultimatum which would commit him to a limitation of his freedom of action or risking by rejection thereof further dissension in his Government and armed forces outside the country as well as a disruption among the resistance leaders and bands within the country in their present and eventual fight against the enemy. It must be admitted that heretofore the main direct guidance in Greek policy insofar as the King and his Government are concerned, as well as its implementation within the occupied territory, has been in the hands of the British and the criticism has been made that this direction has not always been unified and that the King and his Government have not been always given the facilities and opportunities which they have felt essential to their constructive participation in their own affairs. As a matter of fact, however, the President has now been requested to give his counsel in a set of circumstances which irrespective of the factors in their development actually exist and must be dealt with. It is fully recognized that this is not the movement [moment] when in the scheme of greater considerations a matter such as the present one should have to claim the attention of our leaders or should be publicly aired

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34 Jan Christian Smuts, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa and Commander of Union Defense Forces.
although as regards the latter point there is reason to believe that whatever course the King takes it will be declared in a manner to attract the minimum of public attention. Personally I feel strongly that the main aim for the moment should be to postpone the necessity of making any such decision at this time in order to gain time so that if and when final settlement must be reached it may be at a time and under conditions devoid of the pressure now being exercised. I submit, therefore, that in the event that the President and Churchill choose to advise the King this observation might probably be included.

Kirk

898.01/378: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, August 20, 1943—8 p.m. [Received August 21—8:10 p.m.]

Greek Series 45. My Greek Series 44, August 19, 4 p.m. Exindaris, the four representatives of EAM the representatives of the guerrilla bands EKKA and EDES and Kanellopoulos have signed declaration to Prime Minister Tsouderos dated August 17th, declaring that in the interests of national unity which alone can secure the success of national struggle and the normal development of the political life of the country, it is necessary that authoritative statement be made that King will not return to Greece until people have expressed will as regards form of regime.

Signatories add that as representatives of greatest portion of Greek public opinion they have believed it advisable to convey to the Prime Minister and through him to the members of the Council of Ministers their complete agreement in this matter.

This document was discussed by the Greek Cabinet yesterday evening and the discussions marked the prevailing opposition attitude on the part of the Vice Premier together with the Ministers of War, Navy and Aviation. Although the crisis continues the opinion prevails that matters will remain in suspense pending the replies to the King’s messages to the President and Churchill which it has been suggested may be subject to a certain delay owing to the present conference at Quebec.

Kirk

George Exindaris, former Deputy and Minister of Agriculture in the Greek Government before World War II, accompanied the delegation from occupied Greece as a representative of certain prewar political parties.

Ethnike Kai Koikonike Apelofherosis, National and Social Liberation.

George Roussos.

Byron Karapanayotis.

Sophocles Venizelos.

Rear Adm. Petros Vougaris.
Cairo, August 22, 1943—10 a.m.  
[Received August 23—3 : 05 a.m.]

Greek Series 47. For the Acting Secretary. Certain aspects of the crisis now confronting the Greek King and Government here, described in my Greek Series 45, 8 p.m. and previous messages, impel me to submit some observations and recommendations in regard to the general question of the conduct of what may be termed the pre-liberation or pre-reoccupation activities largely or partially of a military nature which are carried on by the Allies in the occupied territories of governments in exile.

I do not pretend to offer here a judgment on the special factors of the present Greek crisis and I am not qualified to analyze the system of the British in the conduct of the above mentioned activities. Enough has transpired, however, to justify a question as to whether the British system is properly organized and coordinated or effectively administered and whether it is always operated in conformity with high British policy as regards its relation with the respective interested governments in exile. The answer to those questions does not lie with us as long as we ourselves are not involved with the British in those activities but once we do engage in such operations on our own or combine therein with the British and I understand we may be about to or have already done so, it is incumbent upon us to avoid if possible the adverse implications which in some instances at least appear to have marred the British effort in this sphere of action and so to act that we may not be confronted with consequences at variance with our declared policy of noninterference in the political life of foreign countries.

From the little I know I understand that the activities to which I refer are in our case the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and at least in this area are under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief. On that understanding, I make the following recommendations as to the conduct of these operations which should guide us in the case of independent action as should constitute a condition precedent to our association with others in this category of activities.

1. The Commander-in-Chief should exercise the strictest control over the formulation of all plans as well as over the execution thereof.

2. To enable the CinC 44 to exercise that control effectively he should be acquainted with the basic policy of the United States Government with respect to the country or countries involved.

44 Commander in Chief.
3. In order to avoid confusion and obviate unauthorized acts or commitments our CinC should maintain contact with the CinC's of other governments in each area which are directing similar activities in the same occupied territories.

4. Each responsible head of a government in exile should be requested to designate high official of his government who should be consulted by the CinC or his delegate on all matters relating to the operations in the occupied territory of that government which might result in developments or repercussions of a political nature affecting the government itself.

The foregoing is not intended to constitute a comprehensive or rigid chart for this general subject as my information is limited and different areas may require different tactics. I merely take the occasion to emphasize the dangers inherent in this category of operations and to urge that the Department make sure that at least we do not lay ourselves open to the accusation that through defective organization or lack of precaution our independent or associated operations in occupied territories should fail of their purpose or should jeopardize the continuity of exiled governments and our present and future relations with those countries.

Kirk

740.0011 EW/8-2243

Memorandum of Conversation Held During the First Quebec Conference 42

[Extract]

QUEBEC, 22 August, 1943—5:30 p.m.

[Participants:] The President
The Prime Minister of Great Britain
The Secretary of State
Mr. Eden

Present also: Mr. Harry Hopkins 43
Sir Alexander Cadogan 44
Mr. Dunn 45
Mr. Atherton 46

42 The records of the First Quebec Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of Foreign Relations.
43 Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.
44 British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
45 James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.
46 Ray Atherton, Minister in Canada.
6. The King of Greece

This discussion turned on the subject of the message from the King of Greece recently received by the President and the Prime Minister, in which the King of Greece asked advice from the President and Prime Minister as to the action the King should take, in view of the request of certain Greek elements that His Majesty should not return to Greece until after a plebiscite on the subject of the Monarchy had been held.

At the request of the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden read a report on the present political situation of Greece prepared by the British Foreign Office.

At the further request of the Prime Minister, Mr. Cadogan read a communication on the subject from General Smuts, who advocated, as a matter of fair play, that the King of Greece not be precluded from entering his own country and resuming his former position, subject, perhaps, to later decision by the people of Greece as to the future form of the Greek regime.

There was some discussion then on the general subject of the attitude of the British and U. S. Governments toward the constituted governments of the refugee countries. It was decided, in general, that the two Governments should continue to support the governments and regimes as now recognized by them generally through the period up to the defeat of the enemy.

Mr. Hull pointed out that this attitude was in line with the attitude adopted in the statement with respect to administration of liberated areas, decided upon under Subject 2 of the agenda above.

With specific reference to the situation of the Greek King it was agreed between the President and Prime Minister that the British Foreign Office should reply to the King's telegram, supporting his contention that he was prepared to return to Greece as soon as possible and submit the question of the Royal House to plebiscite.

The President said the United States Government would not take any different position.

The Prime Minister further stated, on his own initiative, that the British Government would instruct the British agents who were working with the guerrilla elements in Greece to refrain from encouraging those elements to put forward political claims as to the future form of government of Greece at this time.

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47 i.e., Liberated Areas.
The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, August 31, 1943—9 a.m.
[Received 8:17 p.m.]

Greek Series 52. My Greek Series 42, August 18, 11 a.m. I assume that the Department is aware of the fact that Churchill's reply to the King was received here via London on August 26.

Kirk

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1943.

You will recall that a group of representatives of the political parties remaining in Greece have reached Cairo and have requested that the King agree not to return to Greece until the Greek people have had a chance to determine the regime under which they wish to form a government. The British apparently feel that the King should return to Greece immediately on liberation; to the extent that we assume responsibility there, we feel otherwise, believing that it might create both a political and a military problem. Should the King accept the advice which these representatives from Greece have given him, the question will of course be closed. The Greek Ambassador has informed us that the Tsouderos government has accepted this advice, and has made representations to the King in that sense.

It is evident that the Greek language press in the United States in the main favors the non-return of the King. A large majority of Americans of Greek ancestry are violently anti-monarchist and Venizelist. The Greek National Herald, in Chicago [New York], which has the largest circulation of any Greek paper, is campaigning in that sense; and they may very well make a political issue of it in the elections in the United States.

It seems to me, accordingly, that we would wish to be very cautious about committing ourselves to the line which the British apparently wish to follow. You may wish to consider this a little further with the President and Mr. Churchill during this coming visit.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.
The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It appears that a direct reply should be made to the message recently addressed to you by King George II of Greece, since the British reply spoke for Mr. Churchill and the British Government only.

There is attached for your consideration a suggested reply which conforms to the decisions taken in this matter at Quebec while avoiding the advanced position the British have taken pledging the maximum support in their power to the King, whatever his decision—an assurance which I do not believe we should give.

Copies of the King's appeal and of the British reply are attached for convenient reference.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

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The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 4, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received September 4—3:47 p. m.]

Greek Series 57. My Greek Series 52, August 31, 9 a. m. Prime Minister has advised me that when Churchill's two messages to the King were presented to the Greek Cabinet yesterday afternoon Republican members reacted heatedly bandying threats of resignation but that while one or two resignations may materialize in his opinion it is likely that a solution will be found and calm restored within a few days.

According to a member of the Foreign Office, the realization of the effect which would be caused in British circles and inside Greece by their resigning on account of a statement by Churchill is acting as a deterrent to the opposition members carrying out their threat.

Prime Minister also remarked that the delay in the receipt of the President's reply is occasioning talk in Republican quarters of a divergence between British and American views.

KIRK

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48 Notation on the original: "CH OK FDR".
49 See telegram Greek Series No. 43, August 18, noon, from the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile, p. 143.
50 The draft is identical with the reply sent on September 6, p. 151.
51 British reply not printed.
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk), at Cairo

WASHINGTON, September 6, 1943—6 p.m.

Greek Series no. 26. Your Greek Series no. 43, August 18, noon. Please communicate the following reply from the President to the King of Greece.

"I hope that in the interest of our common war effort all Greeks will accept the program announced in Your Majesty's radio address of July 4 as a guarantee that they will have full opportunity freely to express their political will at the earliest practicable moment and that they will meanwhile subordinate other considerations to the urgent necessity of winning the war and liberating their homeland." 52a

Please inform the King orally that the President would find it difficult to advise him as regards the reply to be made to the Greek emissaries now in Cairo, about whom he has little information. However, he doubts that any further statement by the King at this time would promote the war effort.

Should any of the representatives of the guerrilla or political groups seek your views you may advise them in the sense of the foregoing, though you should of course not quote the President.

HULL

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, September 7, 1943—8 p.m.
[Received September 8—1:40 p.m.]

Greek Series 58. Department's instruction number 26, Greek Series September 6, 6 p.m. was complied with today.

Prime Minister states that as in case of Churchill's messages (see my Greek Series number 52, August 31, 9 a.m.) the President's message will be presented to Greek Cabinet and will be communicated to Greek emissaries now in Cairo and that he has asked British Ambassador to obtain Churchill's permission to give publicity to his messages. Tsouderos asked me to request same permission as regards the President's message.

I submit, as an entirely personal observation, that, whereas it is understandable that Greek Government should wish to avail itself of value of the President's and Churchill's messages in so far as the effect

52a For summary of speech, see telegram Greek Series No. 11, July 3, 7 p.m., from the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile, p. 135.
52b Telegram Greek Series No. 61, September 9, 5 p.m., from Cairo (not printed) transmitted a reply from King George II expressing gratitude for this message.
they would have on population within Greece and Greek Armed Forces outside the country is concerned in view of way in which present emergency has arisen, the wisdom of giving publicity to the messages through publication in the press might well be questioned. I assume, however, that if permission is given to give publicity to the President’s message, decision as to the nature and extent of publicity will rest with Greek Government.

Kirk

808.01/389 : Telegram
The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
Cairo, September 10, 1943—7 p. m.
[Received September 12—3 a. m.]

Greek Series 63. My 57, September 4, 5 p. m. The Greek Prime Minister informs me that the crisis precipitated by the arrival of the six so called representatives from Greece is less acute. The messages from the President and Churchill have produced a calming effect on the Greek Cabinet and recent military developments have overshadowed the internal fracas. The plan now seems to be for the King, who is leaving for Syria shortly to recuperate from a recent illness, to preside at a Cabinet meeting upon his return in about 3 weeks when this and other matters will be discussed.

Kirk

808.01/3332
The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy’s memorandum of August 4, 1943 has received careful consideration, in the light of the further statement regarding British policy toward Greece presented to the Quebec conference on August 22, 1943, and of the discussions of this matter which took place at Quebec.

Under date of September 6, the President addressed the following reply to the recent message of King George II:

“I hope that in the interest of our common war effort all Greeks will accept the program announced in Your Majesty’s radio address of July 4 as a guarantee that they will have full opportunity freely to express their political will at the earliest practicable moment and that they will meanwhile subordinate other considerations to the urgent necessity of winning the war and liberating their homeland.”

See minutes of a meeting held during the First Quebec Conference, August 22, p. 147.
Ambassador Kirk was authorized to inform the King orally that while the President would find it difficult to advise the King as regards the reply to be made to the Greek emissaries in Cairo, about whom he had little information, he doubted the desirability of any further statement by His Majesty at this time.

As the Embassy knows from the Department’s Aide-Mémoires of July 2 and 17, 1943, this Government has considered that it would not interpose objection to the return of the King and Government to Greece as soon as the military situation should permit, in accordance with the assurances and procedure which they have from time to time announced, notably in the King’s radio address of July 4, 1943, unless it should become clear during the military operations that such return would be overwhelmingly contrary to the wishes of the people and could only result in civil warfare.

With specific reference to the situation of the Greek King, it is the Department’s understanding that the President discussed the matter with the Prime Minister and understood that the British Foreign Office would reply to the King’s telegram, in the sense that the British Government would support the King’s contention that he was prepared to return to Greece as soon as possible and would submit the question of the Royal House to plebiscite.

As regards the general principles applying to liberated countries, this Government is in substantial agreement with the statement of such principles set forth in the fifth paragraph of the Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of August 4, which are reflected in the proposed statement on this subject approved at Quebec.

In this connection, the British Embassy’s attention may be called to the reference in its Aide-Mémoire regarding the United States “representative on the Allied Territories (Balkans) Committee in Cairo”, from which it would appear that the Foreign Office was not aware that the only American connected with this Committee was in fact an “observer” from General Brereton’s 44 staff whose functions were limited to military supply matters. This and related questions were discussed at Quebec between the British Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State, who agreed generally as to the necessity of establishing some definite machinery for discussing and reaching agreement on political and economic aspects of future military operations on the Continent. Consequently, in view of the obviously urgent need for a more direct method of consultation as regards Southeastern Europe, the Department of State, with the approval of the President, has instructed Ambassador Winant to propose to the British Government that United

States political and economic representatives be appointed to participate in the work of the AT (B) Committee in Cairo.

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1943.

740.0011 European War 1939-21529: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, October 13, 1943—6 p.m.
[Received October 13—2:15 p.m.]

Greek Series 80. Reports have been received that within last 4 or 5 days active fighting between ELAS guerrilla bands belonging to EAM organization on one side, and Zervas, Psarros, and smaller bands on other has broken out and spread widely through country. It is implied that expecting early withdrawal of Germans from Greece each side wishes to establish exclusive control before liberation. Furthermore, it is said that Germans are making no effort to interfere in situation and that for past 2 or 3 weeks they have been moving heavy equipment out of Crete and Peloponnese and have been dismantling factories and sending machinery north. These reports have given rise to speculation as to whether Germans may be contemplating withdrawal from Greece in near future and whether German reign of terror in Crete during past fortnight, combined with costly efforts to retake Crete and Leros may be covering such withdrawal.

KIRK

868.00/1291: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, October 27, 1943.
[Received October 27—6:23 p.m.]

Greek Series 93. My A-18, October 26, 5 p.m. In statement released yesterday afternoon for publication as background to radio broadcast last week by General Wilson (see my telegram number 90, October 23d), British explain at length origin of formation in Greece of guerrilla bands of Colonel Zervas (EDES) and guerrilla forces (ELAS) directed by EAM, and, stating that most likely interpretation of present conflict between them is that it results from direct German incitement to each, report that EDES is continuing to resist the Germans at same time as it is countering unprovoked

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55 Administration of Territory (Balkans) Committee.
56 Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos, National Peoples Liberation Army.
57 Not printed.
ELAS attack. While Zervas is willing to settle differences statement concludes that he feels initiative for solution should come from ELAS which so far has only responded evasively to General Wilson’s appeal repeating unfounded and obviously German inspired allegation that EDES is collaborating with enemy.

KIRK

868.00/1292 : Telegram
The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, October 29, 1943.
[Received October 29—8:40 p.m.]

Greek Series 94. Prime Minister Tsouderos in a message broadcast last night from Cairo to Greek people on Third Anniversary of Italian attack after eulogizing the heroic struggle of Greece and summarizing the course of the war to date, continued with a plea for unity emphasizing the importance at the moment when the liberty of Greece is at hand of putting aside internal differences in order not only to achieve freedom more quickly but to hasten the creation of the new Greece. This new Greece he then briefly described as characterized by: (1) satisfaction of national aspirations including a defensible frontier, (2) a genuinely democratic political system, (3) a free press, (4) social security, (5) control of capital for the public benefit, (6) industry adapted to needs of the country with workers sharing in profits, (7) agricultural prosperity, (8) modernized towns and villages healthful and comfortable, (9) Church and schools cooperating to stimulate moral virtues and social solidarity, (10) higher education accessible to all qualified.

KIRK

868.001G291/171 : Telegram
The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, November 23, 1943—5 p.m.
[Received 10:20 p.m.]

Greek Series 110. My 77, October 9, 2 p.m. and previous. Prime Minister informed me yesterday that King has addressed letter to him advising that at proper time he will examine question of his return to Greece and depending on his own appraisal of military and political situation at that happy time, he will make his decision.

58 Not printed.
Prime Minister added that Cabinet was at first pleased with this development but that later, apparently believing that moment might be ripe to get further concession (i.e., a clear statement that King would not return to Greece prior to elections) four Republican members of Cabinet had another attack of chronic hysteria and situation is now delicate.

Kirk

Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] December 10, 1943.

Fighting Between Guerilla Groups in Occupied Greece

There have been many fragmentary and often conflicting accounts in the press and from our own offices regarding internecine strife in Greece.

Lieutenant Colonel James G. Basbas, Acting Military Attaché at Cairo has now attempted to assemble the available information into a general picture. His reports may be summarized as follows:

1. Up to March 1943, the British had been furnishing equipment and supplies to the fighting arm of the leftist and strongly anti-monarchist EAM (National Liberation Front).
2. Thereafter, fearing the powerful growth of an organization violently opposed to the King’s return, and hence to British policy of support for the King, the British began first to divide their support with, and then deliberately to favor, EDES (National Democratic Greek Army) another organization similar in purpose which was gaining in local popularity because of its anti-communist stand. EDES, too, was anti-King, but being more conservative in character the British felt that EDES would be more tractable on this point.
3. In July 1943, the British liaison mission in Greece succeeded in securing a cooperative pact between EAM and EDES, acceptable to the former though essentially favorable to the latter.
4. This pact was, however, not destined to last long, as a direct clash was precipitated by the Italian surrender. Allegedly at the instigation of British liaison officers, the Italians in Thessaly surrendered to EDES. Since Thessaly was EAM territory, EAM began disarming both the Italians and the EDES members who had taken Italian arms. EDES thereupon asked British aid against EAM. When this was refused because of the relative strengths of EAM and EDES (said to be 35–40 thousand compared to 10–12 thousand), EDES also became anti-British.
5. The EDES–EAM struggle for position, which has been marked by relatively little violence, was intensified after the return of the guerilla emissaries from Cairo, reporting lack of success in securing acceptance of their demand that the King stay outside Greece until a plebiscite had been held. EAM presumably decided thereupon that it could ensure acceptance of its demand only by being in complete and firm control of the country.
6. High-ranking British officials admit the failure of British policy, and realize that attempts to build up EDES at the expense of EAM can only lead to further strife.

Colonel Basbas himself believes that no reconciliation between EDES and EAM is possible until a clear statement is made that the King will not return to Greece before a plebiscite, which statement can be made only when the British change their policy. Even so, he suggests that only an American officer or a real Allied Mission consisting of a group of American (Senior Officer of Mission), British and Greek officers can effect reconciliation.

868.01/416: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, December 12, 1943—10 a.m.
[Received 5:30 p.m.]

Greek Series 128. I am reliably informed that during a long session on December 8 with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden the King of Greece steadfastly refused to make a declaration proposed by them to the effect that he will not return to Greece unless and until called for by the Constituent Assembly to the formation of which he agreed in his declaration of July 4.

I saw the President on December 3 and advised him regarding this proposal and after he had seen the King he desired me not to associate myself with any effort to force him to a course of action against his will. This I have been careful not to do both before and since. I understand that the President told the King that there was no necessity for him to make any declaration whatever unless he so desired.

Now the King has written a letter to his Prime Minister for release today agreeing that when the time comes for him to decide whether or not to return he will make his decision "in agreement with his Government."

This appears to represent a compromise suggested by Mr. Tsouderos and according to Mr. Venizelos with whom I talked this morning will be acceptable to those "Republican" members of the Cabinet who have been pressing for such a declaration as the British. It will probably also appeal to the British as better than nothing.

In this connection the British appear to have been influenced in taking the attitude they did chiefly by a change in military plans

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59 Ambassador MacVeagh presented his credentials to the Greek Government on December 2.

60 President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were at this time in Cairo; for correspondence relating to this conference, see Foreign Relations, the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.
regarding operations in Greece and by the anti-British and anti-King propaganda being spread there to the benefit of the Communist leadership. They hoped to kill this propaganda and deprive this leadership of many recruits by making clear now that no possibility exists of the King’s being forced on the country. Because of the present and probable future Republican make-up of the Greek Government the solution arrived at may be regarded as amounting to much the same thing in effect as the original proposal.

MacVeagh

868.01/416: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1943—midnight.

Greek [Series] 63. A complete reversal of British policy toward the Greek King seems indicated in your Greek 128, December 12, 10 a.m. and 130, December 14, 10 a.m. Please report any obtainable information as to reasons for this change.

Hull

868.01/421: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, December 22, 1943—8 p.m.

[Received December 23—7:10 p.m.]

Greek [Series] 140. I believe that the developments reported in my telegrams number 128 and 130 referred to in the Department’s 69, December 18, midnight should be taken not as indicating any reversal or even alteration of British policy toward the Greek King but rather as representing a change in tactical procedure for the fulfillment of established policy, prompted by changes in the military and political situation.

From conversations with the British Ambassador and from confidential documents which he has made available to me, it seems clear that British policy continues to be based on the hope that the King will be restored to his throne as a constitutional monarch by the will of his people. However when Allied strategical plans were so changed recently as to make it seem unlikely that any large military force would occupy Greece upon evacuation by the enemy, it occurred to the British Embassy here, which was advised of the growth of anarchy within the country, that the King’s early return with only the

*1 Latter not printed.
small forces envisaged would be inadvisable. In the circumstances, as I saw them, which appeared to necessitate a certain lapse of time before conditions of tranquillity could be obtained, requisite to the determination of the people's will regarding the regime, it felt that the most hopeful procedure would be to secure some suitable person who had resisted the Axis in Greece and who might be expected to command general respect such as the Archbishop of all Greece to be appointed by the King to head a Regency committee to exercise constitutional authority during the immediate post-liberation era, the King remaining abroad. This idea was I am convinced conceived purely with a view to giving the Royal regime the best possible chance of survival though it is true that many employees and agents of the British Government now working on Greek affairs both within and without the country are personally anti-royalist in sentiment.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that the question of the King's return has become within Greece as well as outside increasingly controversial, the British Embassy felt that a public announcement that the King did not intend to return until called for by his people would tend to counteract the activities of political agitators now capitalizing on the absence of such a statement and might likewise influence the guerrillas particularly Zervas but also members of ELAS to seek closer affiliation with the Middle East Command. This suggestion seems also to have been made with the interests of the King's regime in mind.

The Foreign Office appears to have agreed with the British Embassy from the outset as to the probable inadvisability of an immediate return under the new military conditions but to have resisted for some time the plan proposed including the King's declaration feeling that it would constitute too definite a move in the existing circumstances. Mr. Eden is even reported to have rejected the plan at one time and only during his latest visit to Cairo does it seem that the British Embassy was able to persuade him possibly because of the fact that in the interval it had become more likely that Britain's guerrilla protégé Zervas would find it difficult to gain the upper hand over ELAS. The principal argument used with Mr. Eden at this time seems indeed to have been that a declaration by the King would alienate moderate political elements from EAM and ELAS and deprive these last of one of their chief propaganda weapons. In all this the established policy of supporting the King would appear to have been in the mind of the Foreign Office as well as that of the Embassy.

The task then fell to Mr. Eden to persuade Mr. Churchill who saw the King with Mr. Eden in attendance. How deeply Mr. Churchill himself felt the importance of the plan I am not informed but he appears to have counselled the King to accept it. However, in doing

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Archbishop Damaskinos.
so he is said to have told the King "I am a Royalist" which if the report be true would seem to clinch the matter of the fundamental policy involved.

Finally I would add that I have secured from the British Ambassador a copy of the brief which he prepared and gave to Mr. Eden entitled "Main Talking Points with the King of the Hellenes" and am forwarding it to the Department by airgram. This brief ties in the proposed tactical plan very closely with British interest in the regime and explicitly mentions "the King's return in the role which we desire for him—that of a constitutional monarch".

MacVeagh

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In view of the Civil War started in Greece by the E. A. M.-E. L. A. S. groups against other organisations in the middle of last October, His Majesty's Government have recently had their policy towards Greece under consideration and have been in consultation with the Royal Hellenic Government in this connection.

2. M. Tsouderos has proposed the following plan, based on King George's letter of November 8th to M. Tsouderos in which the King stated that at the moment of liberation he would reconsider the date of his return to Greece in the light of political and military conditions then prevailing and would make his decision in agreement with the Royal Hellenic Government:

A) The King and his Government will entrust their representation in Greece to the Archbishop of Athens and to a secret committee composed of reliable persons.

B) Adequate facilities will be provided by the Allies to the King and his Government to maintain close contact with the Archbishop at Athens and his committee.

C) All matters concerning guerilla bands and organisations and resistance in general against the enemy in Greece, shall be determined by a joint executive committee of the Greek Government and the British authorities.

D) As soon as communications are established with the Archbishop of Athens, he will without delay enter into negotiations with political parties in Athens and with such national bands as are resisting the enemy and have purely military aims. The object of these negotiations will be to secure the fullest possible co-operation in the common struggle against the enemy. The Greek Government will be prepared to include the representatives of the above organisations in the Government in Cairo.

* A-31, December 23, 6 p. m., not printed.
* Presumably the letter referred to in telegram No. 110, November 23, 5 p. m., from the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile, p. 155.
E) At the appropriate moment the Greek Government in consultation with British authorities, will agree to any request made by the national bands for incorporation in the Greek regular forces.

F) The future regime and Government in Greece will be decided by the Greek people at the elections to be carried out in Greece after liberation in accordance with the King’s declaration of July 4th.

G) All discussion about the date of the King’s return to Greece shall be considered definitely closed once the King’s letter to his Prime Minister of November 8th has been published in its revised form.

3. Certain modifications in the above plan recommended by the British Ambassador to the Greek Government in Cairo have been approved by His Majesty’s Government and are as follows:

The Greek Government should be invited to address an appeal to Zervas and Sarafis (Commander-in-Chief of E. L. A. S.) to conclude an armistice on the following lines:—

A. Zervas will confine his bands to a specified area in the Epirus and E. L. A. S. will withdraw from this area.

B. E. L. A. S. bands in this area will have safe conduct to withdraw and E. D. E. S. bands similar safe conduct to withdraw from E. L. A. S. area.

C. When the withdrawals have been completed the Greek Government shall offer to incorporate in the Greek regular army any bands prepared to resist the enemy under the direct operational instructions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The Greek Government will then request the latter to renew supplies of arms for this purpose.

4. Before the Greek Government address this appeal (which should be done publicly) they should first put their proposals to His Majesty’s Government, the United States Government and the Soviet Government and seek their approval together with authority to quote this approval in the appeal made to both sides.

5. It is suggested that these modifications are advantageous insofar as:

A. They bring in the three Allied Governments and thus make it practically impossible for E. L. A. S. to refuse. If E. L. A. S. do refuse, the help given to Zervas will be justified to the full, whilst the authority of the E. L. A. S. leaders will at the same time be undermined;

B. The authority of the Greek Government will be enormously strengthened in Egypt and in Greece;

C. His Majesty’s Government will avoid any direct responsibility of taking sides in Greek international [internal?] affairs;

D. The chances of a renewal of resistance to the enemy will be quickened.

6. His Majesty’s Ambassador to the Greek Government in Cairo has reported that the publication of the King’s letter and the attention given Greek affairs by leading British and American personalities during the Cairo Conference has greatly enhanced the prestige of the
Greek Government. The moment is therefore suitable for adding still further to their prestige by the steps suggested above and there is reason to hope that a policy based on their increased authority both in Greece and abroad would have good prospects of success.

7. It will take some little time to obtain the approval of the Greek Government's appeal. During this period it will be His Majesty's Government's object to keep the guerilla movement in existence, but at the same time not to assist E. L. A. S. to attack their rivals. Lest maintenance of the ban on army supplies to the E. L. A. S. bands should have a serious effect on the guerilla movement as a whole, His Majesty's Government are considering the possibility of continuing to furnish the non-E. L. A. S. bands with supplies and arms during the interim and of sending medical and relief stores to the E. L. A. S. bands where these are required. They may also send some arms to the latter in the cases where, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East and the other British authorities concerned, these arms would be used against the enemy.

8. These proposals have still to be considered by the Middle East Defense Committee and will also require discussion with the Greek Government. His Majesty's Ambassador to the Greek Government will consider them with his United States colleague as soon as possible, and Lord Halifax has been instructed to inform the State Department of the position. As soon as agreement has been reached in Cairo the way will be clear for the matter to be raised with the Soviet Government.

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1943.

Memorandum by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] December 22, 1943.

Mr. Murray informed the British Ambassador orally that the Secretary agreed that Mr. Tsouderos' appeal for unity among the Greek guerillas should be supported and that a message to this effect would be sent promptly to Ambassador MacVeagh at Cairo for delivery to the Greek Premier.

Lord Halifax said he would telegraph Mr. Eden of this Government's concurrence.

Mr. Alling has made a similar oral communication to the Greek Ambassador.***

*** British Ambassador in the United States.

** Climon P. Diamantopoulos.
The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, December 23, 1943—noon.
[Received 12:29 p.m.]

Greek [Series] 130. Greek Prime Minister Tsouderos in a broadcast Tuesday night from Cairo directed toward the guerrilla factions in Greece, pointed out first the disastrous consequences of the civil war in aiding the enemy by weakening the guerrilla forces, and in exposing the civilian population to German reprisals, which drive them into the mountains, where not even the Red Cross can help them, while enemy propaganda blames their sufferings on the guerrillas.

Urging them to remove from their ranks any persons whose motives were personal or suspect, he said that he did not believe that any Greek was collaborating with the enemy, but “I am not now alluding to the pseudo government of Athens and I make an exception in their case. And the exception is still more explicit if it be true that they have armed Greeks whom, under the name of ‘security units’ they have sent with Germans against those of our guerrillas whom they call anarchists”.

After a reference to General Wilson and the statement that “only those who unite will be considered as part of the Army of the Middle East”, he assured the guerrillas that in this appeal he had the full support of the Allies, “who will regard with particular sympathy those who will undertake the initiative in reconciliation.”

Stating that all preparations for liberation were being made, he said, “You know that the King has already given the example of unity by his declaration of the 4th July and subsequently by his letter of 8th November.” He concludes with this final plea: “Unite against the common enemy or return to your peaceful occupations, because if you continue this fratricidal strife you are only serving the enemy’s cause. Let everyone’s watchword be that the unity of all Greeks is the nation’s strength.”

MacVeagh

865.00/1321

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo

Washington, December 23, 1943—9 p.m.

Greek [Series] 66. The British and Greek Ambassadors have both requested the public support of this Government to the Greek Pre-

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*December 21.*
mier’s radio appeal of December 21 for Greek unity. I understand that a similar request has been made of the Soviet Government.

You are authorized to deliver to the Prime Minister for use as he desires the message contained in the Department’s next following telegram.\

HULL

868.00/1322b: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (McVeagh), at Cairo

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1943—10 p.m.

Greek [Series] 67. For M. Tsouderos.

“I have read with approval Your Excellency’s radio address of December 21, appealing for Greek unity.

Reports of fratricidal strife within Greece have shocked the American Government and people to whom the heroic and united resistance of the Greek people against Axis aggression and occupation has been a constant inspiration.

We earnestly hope that the Greek resistance groups will no longer dissipate their strength in internal quarrels but will promptly unite among themselves and with us in the struggle against our common enemy. Such united collaboration will speed the day of victory and liberation when the Greek people, proud and honored, will again be masters of their own destiny.”

HULL

868.01/422: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 26, 1943—4 p.m.

[Received 10 p.m.]

2325. The Greek Ambassador has advised me of the request made by his Government that his Prime Minister in his next broadcast to the Greek people be authorized to state that the three great Allies, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, approve of his appeal for unity among the resistance movements within Greece.

The Greek Ambassador told me that the British Government had approved and that you had also given your approval. The Soviet Foreign Office has informed the Greek Ambassador, however, that as they had no information as to Greek internal affairs, they did not consider it appropriate for the Soviet Government to become involved in them.

*Infra.*
The British Minister 70 has advised me to the same effect with the addition that on instructions from Mr. Eden he had seen Molotov 71 to convey Mr. Eden’s hope that the Soviet Government would accede to the Greek request and to state that you had given your approval.

I have received no information on this subject from the Department.72

HARRIMAN

868.00/1328: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, December 28, 1943—4 p. m.
[Received December 28—8:34 a.m.]

Greek [Series] 148. I have delivered to the Greek Prime Minister the Secretary’s message as instructed in Department’s No. 66, Greek Series of December 23, 9 p. m., and its immediately following telegram, and in reply Mr. Tsouderos has asked me to convey his warmest thanks to the Secretary for the help given to him and also, as he feels, to the entire Greek people.

I understand from the British Ambassador that an encouraging message has been received from London and that the receipt of a text similar to the Secretary’s for use as the Prime Minister desires is shortly expected.

Regarding Russian participation I am informed that Mr. Molotov has refused on the grounds that he knows little about internal Greek affairs, while both the Russian Foreign Office and the Ambassador here have made inquiries of the Greek representatives in Moscow and the Greek Government, which betray same anxiety as to whether there may not be a “Mihailovitch” 73 somewhere in the Greek situation. Mr. Tsouderos tells me that he has explained to the Russian Ambassador that this last is not the case and that Mr. Movikof “seemed satisfied”. In addition, Mr. Eden has telegraphed the British Ambassador here that they are “having another go” at Molotov. He is communicating to the latter the message he is sending for the Greek

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70 John Balfour, Minister Plenipotentiary and Chargé d’Affaires of the British Embassy in Moscow.
71 Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
72 Telegrams Nos. 66 and 67 to Ambassador MacVeagh, supra, were quoted to Ambassador Harriman on December 28 in Department's telegram No. 1469, with the following instruction: “If you deem it advisable you may upon a suitable occasion advise Molotov of my message to Tsouderos. However, I do not believe it advisable to go any further. This refers to your 2225, Dec. 26, 4 p. m.”
73 Gen. Dragoljub Mihailovitch, Minister of War in Yugoslavia in the Royal Yugoslav Cabinet and leader of the Chetnik Partisans.
Prime Minister's use and the British Ambassador here is doing the same thing with the Secretary's message, the hope being that the Russian Foreign Minister will perceive the high grounds of mutual United Nations interest on which this effort towards securing internal Greek unity is being made and accordingly lend his support in the spirit of the recent joint conferences.

MacVeagh

868.00/1331 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, December 31, 1943—10 p.m.
[Received January 2, 1944—2:47 p.m.]

Greek [Series] 153. The Greek Prime Minister broadcasting tonight a second appeal (the first was reported in my No. 139, Greek Series, December 22 [23], noon and my despatch No. 14, Greek Series, December 28 *) to the Greek guerrillas to unite will quote in full the Secretary's message transmitted in the Department's Nos. 66 and 67, Greek Series, December 28, 9 p.m. as well as a message of similar import from Mr. Eden. In referring to these messages Mr. Tsouderos will say "I expect that more will follow from other Allied Governments" indicating his hope expressed informally to the Embassy that the Russian Government which has not yet agreed to support the appeal (my No. 148 Greek Series, December 28, 4 p.m.) will eventually do so.

Following two messages the body of the speech will be devoted to the argument that a continuation of the civil war or a successful attempt by either faction to establish itself as the sole authority in the country will inevitably prove a boomerang to the people against them. The full text is being transmitted to the Department by despatch.

MacVeagh

* Latter not printed.
PARTICIPATION BY THE UNITED STATES IN ARRANGING FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES FOR AXIS-occupied GREECE AND FOR GREEK REFUGEES; ARRANGEMENT FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

888.51/1668

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1942.

The so-called “Swedish scheme” for Greek relief involves the use of eight Swedish vessels. These are nominally chartered by the Swedish Red Cross but the payment obligation, amounting to $900,000 to $1,000,000 per month, falls to the Greek Government in exile. That Government appealed to the Greek War Relief Association of New York to relieve it of this burden: The Association undertook to do so, to the maximum extent of its ability, and applied to the President’s War Relief Control Board for permission to raise $12,000,000 from the American public for this purpose. The Board, while granting provisional permission for a campaign for $6,000,000 for six months, decided, in consultation with the Department, that it was undesirable for a private organization to endeavor to support an undertaking of this magnitude by public subscription. In practice the Association has in fact been able to collect and pay only about $200,000 per month towards the charter of these ships, and the balance has fallen upon the Greek Government.

The resources and income of the Greek Government are very limited and are rapidly approaching exhaustion. Some time ago they appealed to us for financial assistance, and it is our understanding that the President has decided that some arrangement must be made whereby the Greek Government can be kept going.

Full consideration of the method and extent of the aid to be extended will of course depend upon a study of the detailed account of its financial position which the Greek Government is supplying to us. However, we know from the preliminary figures which have been submitted

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77 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. II, pp. 724 ff. and pp. 798 ff.
78 Addressed to the Secretary of State, Under Secretary of State Welles, and Assistant Secretaries of State Long, Acheson, and Berle.
79 The History of Lend-Lease, pt. 2, Section XXI, Greece, prepared by the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner in the Department of State in 1947, states:

"The Swedish Red Cross originally chartered a fleet of eight Swedish vessels to carry the relief supplies to Greece. . . . Later, an additional vessel was added to the original fleet. This vessel, however, operated only between the Greek mainland and the islands of the Aegean Sea. Still later, five more vessels were added, making a total of fourteen vessels in all." (p. 5).
81 See report of October 15, 1942, by the Greek Minister of Finance handed to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs by the Greek Ambassador shortly before December 10, 1942, and footnote 73, ibid., p. 804.
and from the information given us by the British, that the cost of the relief vessels and of caring for Greek refugees in the Near East are among the principal financial burdens falling on that Government. It also seems desirable to us that our aid to the Greek Government be as much as possible by the method of taking over its financial burdens, rather than by cash advances.

A considerable start could be made in this direction if the Lend-Lease Administration would take over the payment of the charter-moneys on these eight Swedish vessels. This would not only relieve the Greek Government directly of their expenditures on this account, but would permit the Greek War Relief Association to assume the burden now falling on the Greek Government in connection with caring for the 15,000 or more Greek refugees in the Near East, which involves an estimated expenditure of about $1,250,000 per annum.

This matter has been discussed informally with Dr. John E. Orchard of the Lend-Lease Administration, who has indicated that the Administration is able and willing to take over the payments on this account if the State Department so recommends.

I may add that there is every reason to believe that both the Greek and British Governments would welcome this plan. Its merits as regards the building of good-will toward this country on the part of the Greek people are, I believe, obvious.

If you approve this proposal, we shall be glad to take the necessary steps to put it into effect.\textsuperscript{80}

\textbf{Wallace Murray}

\textsuperscript{80} After lengthy consideration in the Department, the proposal was approved by the Secretary of State in an undated memorandum received in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on February 28, 1943.

\textsuperscript{81} Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, p. 792.
Werna, 1170 tons dead weight at 40 shillings per dead weight ton per month.

The conditions are as follows:

(1) The ship is to be delivered to the charterer at Gothenburg and returned to owners at the same place; (2) The charterers are to provide and pay for bunkers and lubricants; (3) the charterers are to be guaranteed repayment, as for the eight ships already chartered.

The British Minister states that the high charter price is accounted for by the tonnage which is much smaller than in the case of the ships already chartered. He recommends that the vessel to be chartered should be selected and guarantee of repayment given as soon as possible in order that the Swedish Government may arrange for safe conduct. He states that from the point of view of the Commission one of the two ships last mentioned would be preferable.

The Foreign Office is prepared to agree to either the Wiril or Werna and has no objections to conditions (1) and (3) as stipulated. With respect to condition (2) it states that it is normal for the bunkerer to pay the cost of bunkers and lubricants; the Swedes will of course have to supply the initial bunkers and lubricants but could be allowed an equivalent increase in their quota imports. A point that will have to be taken up with the Swedes is the question of where such supplies are to come from when the ship arrives in Greek waters.

Following the precedent in the case of the eight ships already chartered the procedure is that the Greek representative in Stockholm will invite the Swedish Red Cross to charter the vessel in return for a written agreement by the Greek Government to repay the cost. The Foreign Office has already written the Greek Embassy proposing that this course be followed, subject to the views of the United States Government; it has also advised the Greek Government that the ship owner might be asked to accept the current rate of the Anglo-Swedish shipping terms which work out at a price of 30 shillings and 9 pence.

The Foreign Office desires to know whether the United States Government has any observations to make and whether it agrees to action in concert with the Greek Government as proposed.

MATTHEWS

868.48/3409 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1943—2 p.m.

479. Your 319, January 13, 4 p.m. This Government is prepared to agree to this proposal as outlined.

We would have no objection to granting the Swedes an increase in their oil quotas to compensate for the initial bunkers and lubricants
furnished for this vessel within a maximum of 150 tons of diesel oil and 5 tons of lubricants. If other arrangements could not be made, we would also be prepared to permit the export of reasonable quantities of bunkers and lubricants on the relief vessels from Canada for operation of the ship in Greek waters, provided satisfactory assurances were received that the supplies would be strictly controlled by the Relief Commission and used only for the relief ship, and that full reports would be submitted regarding their use.

Repeated to Stockholm.

HULL

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868.48/3453: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 27, 1943—4 p.m.
[Received 5:13 p.m.]

693. Embassy’s 319, January 13, 4 p.m. Foreign Office has written to the Embassy regarding the substance of the last sentence of the antepenultimate paragraph of the telegram under reference. Foreign Office has now heard from the British Minister in Stockholm that the Swedish Government is informing the Axis Governments that it assumes that the latter will provide bunkers at the Piræus for their [the?] vessel while it is in Greek waters. The British Minister added that the alternative would be the periodical transfer of oil from the bunkers of ships arriving from Canada; and the Minister has asked what would be the attitude of the United States and British Governments if the Axis should refuse to provide these bunkers.

Foreign Office has replied to the Minister that it considers that the Axis should provide these bunkers in Greece and that it does not wish to prejudge its attitude in the event of Axis refusal.

Foreign Office has requested our views on the point raised. Please advise.

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868.48/3453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews)

WASHINGTON, February 4, 1943—midnight.

776. Your 693, January 27, 4 p.m. We approve the Swedish Government’s approach to the Axis Governments regarding bunkers for the relief vessel in Greek waters, and agree that they should pro-
vide these bunkers. However, in order to obtain the widest practicable extension of the relief scheme to the islands, in case of Axis refusal, it would seem to be necessary to permit the transfer of oil and lubricants from the ships arriving from Canada under the conditions set forth in the Department's 479, January 13 [22], 4 [3] p. m.

HULL

868.48/3682

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling) 83

[WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1943.

We have now begun to receive, principally through our Legation at Stockholm, reports regarding the operation of the Greek relief scheme which indicate that the Relief Commission in Greece is tackling an enormous task with reassuring thoroughness and has made rapid progress in building up an effective control organization.

The Commission is composed exclusively of Swedes and Swiss, under the Presidency of Mr. Paul Mohn,* Swedish governmental official, and delegate of the Swedish Red Cross. It has 550 carefully selected employees. Though the Greek members of the old IRCC 84 organization have been eliminated, an advisory committee of outstanding Greeks is being formed. Four offices have been created, each headed by a member of the Commission:

1. Distribution Service.
2. Documentation and Coordination.
3. Transport Service.
4. Medical and Children's Service.

Mr. Swen Allard, Swedish Chargé at Athens, carries on negotiations with the Axis authorities and works actively with the Commission. The local Greek authorities have been cooperative, and the collaboration of the Agricultural Bank, which has branches throughout the country, has been particularly useful and effective.

For the distribution of bread in the Athens region, the Commission has taken over direct control of the principal mills and of the baking establishments, and has secured the passage of a law permitting it to close up any establishment guilty of abuses. Distribution to mills and bakers is well documented and closely controlled. Distribution to the public had to be on the basis of the existing ration cards, but

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83 Addressed to the Advisers on Political Relations (Murray and Dunn); the Assistant Secretaries of State (Acheson, Long, and Berle); the Under Secretary of State (Welles); and the Secretary of State.
84 In view of the increasing importance of the Commission, Mr. Mohn has now been replaced by a distinguished Swedish jurist, Judge Emil Sandstrom. [Footnote in the original.]
85 International Red Cross Committee.
great efforts are being made to eliminate illegally held cards. The total had been reduced from 1,337,000, as of March 31, 1942, to 1,225,000, as of September 30. It is estimated that 100,000 illegal cards are still in circulation. Daily rations are 60 drammes (about 7 ounces), costing 30 drachmas (nominally about 20 cents, but now negligible in view of the inflation of the currency), with supplementary rations of 40 drammes for certain laborers, notably in public utilities, and 30 drammes for invalids and tuberculosis sufferers.

The Soup Kitchens, which rendered such service to the poor during 1941-42, were a problem because of their invasion by persons of questionable eligibility. In October 1942, 600,000 persons were enrolled in the public soup kitchens, and 300,000 more in private canteens. To eliminate those who could and should prepare and consume their food at home, the Commission undertook to distribute directly to each person 1½ okes of gruel, flour and pasta in November and 2 okes in December, giving the individual his choice of taking it in kind, through the grocers, or in meals from the soup kitchens. This was expected to reduce the soup kitchen clientele to about 20 percent of the population (about 300,000?), considered a reasonable figure.

Of the wheat received, 96 percent becomes flour. The 4 percent of bran and millings are traded, respectively, for milk and eggs. This results in a daily supply of 3,000 okes of milk and an unspecified number of eggs for children and hospitals.

The bread ration in the provinces, where some local produce is available, has been set at 40 drammes per person per day. Thorough studies have been made of local needs and resources everywhere. Distribution is accomplished through 1,600 local committees, with the aid of the Agricultural Bank branches, and under control of traveling Greek, Swedish and Swiss inspectors. In October one million persons in the provinces were aided, despite the almost insuperable problem of transportation.

Distribution to the islands has so far been on a very small scale and has been limited to those close to the Greek mainland or to Turkey, but negotiations are now in course to secure a small Swedish motor vessel to operate in Greek waters, which will permit the transport of supplies to the various islands.

Medicines are stored and distributed under control of the Swiss Red Cross mission, about 40 percent going to Athens–Piraeus, 20 percent to Salonika and Macedonia, and 40 percent elsewhere.

Mr. Allard declares that the occupation authorities have made no attempt to appropriate any relief foodstuffs and that he expects no difficulties on this score. While he confirms that Greek native produce has been consumed by the Axis forces in Greece and exported since the occupation, he has been successful in having these exports stopped since September 1, 1942, and in negotiating a plan for the implementation of
the original condition No. 4 of the scheme, which provided for the reservation of native Greek produce for the normal peacetime inhabitants of the country, except in so far as local foodstuffs consumed by the armed forces and officials of the occupying powers or exported as bona fide surpluses with the Commission’s consent, be compensated by equivalent imports from Axis sources. We have given our approval to this plan, in close consultation with the British, Governor Lehman’s 85 office and the Board of Economic Warfare and subject to a review of our position after three months experience, and it will shortly be put into operation. It may be briefly described as follows:

(a) Substantial quantities of foodstuffs would be imported from Axis sources, and these imports as well as all the more important foodstuffs locally produced would be allocated according to agreed quotas for distribution to (1) the civilian population; (2) occupation troops; and (3) export. Foodstuffs for the civilian population would be distributed by the Commission in the same way as the relief imports, which would, of course be outside this scheme.

(b) In assuming practical control of the civilian production and consumption in Greece, the Commission proposes to enter into the actual acquisition of hoarded stocks of olive oil, on the basis of the barter of wheat and other foodstuffs for oil, in collaboration with the German and Italian occupation authorities. While a portion of the oil thus collected would be allocated, by agreement, to the occupying troops, the Commission would obtain stocks for distribution under its control to the civilian urban population, which has heretofore received practically no olive oil at all except through the black market and at fantastic prices.

While the Commission’s own reports so far received concentrate upon the operation, rather than the results, of the scheme, reports from other sources (principally Istanbul and Cairo) indicate that the food situation in Greece has greatly improved since it came into operation and that the appalling rate of death from starvation, which last year threatened the entire Greek nation with extermination, has been definitely arrested.

Paul H. Alling

868.48/6601 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, April 1, 1943—11 p.m.

379. We understand from the British that discussions are in course between the Swedish Government and the International Red Cross Committee regarding the allocation of responsibility for the control of the Greek relief scheme.

85 Herbert H. Lehman, Director, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations of the Department of State.
We are highly appreciative of the activities of the IRCC and are grateful for their work in distributing the Sicilia shipment last spring and the relief supplies sent last year from Turkey and Allied sources in the Near East. However, as regards the relatively large scale program now in operation we feel that it is essential, and in the best interests of all concerned, including the IRCC, that the Swedish Government have responsibility for the scheme’s operation and that it serves as the channel for communications regarding the scheme.

Hull

868.51/1675

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1943.

My Dear Mr. President: You will recall that King George and Prime Minister Tsouderos of Greece, during their visit to this country last June, stated that the resources of the Greek Government were declining rapidly and appealed for financial assistance. You indicated that some arrangements should be made whereby the Greek Government could be kept going.

A financial report was eventually received from the Greek Government, and was supplemented by figures obtained from the Treasury and the British Government, with which we discussed this question. It appeared, in brief: That the Greek Government would nearly exhaust its immediate resources early this year and be faced by a prospective deficit of some $10,000,000 in the fiscal year 1943–44; that the British have been aiding the Greeks by equipping their armed forces in the Middle East and are prepared, in general, to meet Greek needs within the Middle East area; and that our problem was thus mainly one of providing aid required by the Greek Government in meeting its dollar expenses.

As you know, there is no legislative authorization for direct credits to the refugee Governments, although the question of possible legislation for this purpose has been under consideration for some time, principally in connection with Polish needs. In any case, however, it seemed preferable to meet the Greek appeal under existing legislation if this were possible, and the matter has been pursued on this line.

By far the heaviest dollar obligation burdening the Greek Government was the payment of the charter-hire on Swedish vessels engaged in the Greek relief scheme, amounting to approximately $1,000,000 per month. Following discussions between the interested agencies

56 For information concerning the visit to the United States of George II, King of the Hellenes, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. II, p. 797.
57 See memorandum of June 15, 1942, by the Greek Prime Minister, ibid., p. 798.
and on the recommendation of this Department, the Lend-Lease Administration has taken over this expenditure as from January 1, 1943.

I believe that this assistance should adequately meet the need of the Greeks for dollars, at least for the time being. They appear still to have a small dollar balance of Government funds on hand and to have a modest dollar income from a few Greek vessels chartered to the Swiss. Their other expenditures requiring dollars consist principally of expenses connected with the maintenance of their representation in countries outside the sterling block. These can probably be met for an indefinite period from the Greek Government’s own resources, possibly supplemented by modest advances from their own Bank of Issue, which holds some $19,000,000 in dollar balances.

In addition, the Greek War Relief Association of New York is planning, with the approval of the President’s War Relief Control Board and of this Department, to undertake a program of assistance to the Greek refugees in the Near East and Africa. This will provide further financial relief for the Greek Government, which has been obliged to support a constantly increasing burden in caring for these persons.

I attach for your consideration and approval a copy of a note which I propose to send to the Greek Ambassador regarding this question.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

865.51/1675

The Secretary of State to the Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos)

WASHINGTON, MAY 4, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I am glad to inform you that the report of the Greek Minister of Finance, which you submitted to the Department last December, has had the earnest and sympathetic attention of this Government in connection with its consideration of your Government’s request for financial assistance.

Discussion of this matter with the British having indicated that they were, generally speaking, prepared to provide the sterling credits which may be needed by your Government, we have endeavored principally to find means of assisting, within the limits of existing legisla-

88 Letter of April 14, 1943, from Assistant Secretary of State Long to W. M. Simmons, Assistant Administrator of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, not printed.

89 Marginal notation by President Roosevelt on April 29: “CH OK FDR”.

Infra.

91 Acknowledged by the Greek Ambassador in note No. 949, May 12, with his “thanks for this further evidence of the American Government’s sympathetic interest in Greece” (865.51/1675).

92 See footnote 79, p. 167.
tive authorization, in meeting your Government's urgent needs in the dollar field. It was evident that the bulk of the dollar expenditure falling upon your Government was payment of the charter-hire for the Swedish vessels engaged in transporting relief shipments to Greece. As you already know, arrangements have been made for these charges to be taken over by the Lend-Lease Administration, for the period beginning January 1, 1943 and continuing until June 30, 1944, unless the Greek relief operation shall have been terminated prior to that date.

In addition, the Greek War Relief Association, Incorporated, of New York, is planning, with the approval of this Department and of other appropriate agencies of this Government, to undertake a program of assistance for the Greek refugees in the Near East and Africa, which should likewise lighten the burden of the increasing charges which the Greek Government is having to meet in this connection.

I hope that these steps will prove adequate to enable your Government to meet its pressing financial needs.

Sincerely yours,

COBELL HULL

[Copies of the letter of April 26 to President Roosevelt and of the letter of May 4 to the Greek Ambassador were transmitted to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in instruction No. 2682, May 5, not printed. The Ambassador was "requested to express to the Foreign Office the Department's appreciation of the information transmitted in his telegram under reference and to inform it of the steps which have been taken to assist the Greek Government financially."

The telegram under reference was No. 5202, September 17, 6 p.m., Foreign Relations, 1942, volume II, page 808.]

868.45/3817c: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1943—10 p.m.

632. During their visit to this country last June the Greek King and Premier stated that the Greek Government's sources were rapidly declining and appealed for financial assistance. The President indicated that means should be found to keep the Greek Government going.

In pursuance of this directive arrangements have been made, with the President's approval:

1. For the Lend-Lease Administration to take over from the Greek Government the costs of the Swedish vessels transporting relief supplies to occupied Greece, amounting to approximately $1,000,000 per month;

2. For the Greek War Relief Association to relieve the Greek Government of its burden of expense in connection with the care of Greek refugees in the Near East and Africa.

It is intended that the latter project, which has been warmly welcomed by the Greek Government, should be carried out within the framework of the Middle East Refugee Relief Administration, with appropriate changes in this organization to permit participation of personnel of the Greek War Relief Association in the direction and operation of the Administration’s activities insofar as they relate to Greek refugees.

There is transmitted in a following telegram,\(^\text{84}\) for delivery to the Middle East Refugee Relief Administration, a message prepared by the Greek War Relief Association, in consultation with the American Red Cross, formulating certain preliminary inquiries and proposals. Please discuss this matter with the appropriate British and Greek authorities and assist in every proper way in working out arrangements which will be satisfactory to all interested parties.

HULL

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868.48/3824: Telegram

_The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State_

**CAIRO, May 17, 1943—1 p. m.**

[Received 3:18 p. m.]

901. Department’s 632, May 7, 10 p.m. and my 898, May 15, 6 p.m.\(^\text{85}\) Greek Prime Minister in acknowledging communication advising him of decisions taken with the President’s approval regarding financial assistance for the Greek Government, which he describes as “a new token of the sympathy and generous interest which President Roosevelt personally and the American Government and people demonstrate toward Greece” requests me to convey to the Department his “deep appreciation of the spirit in which these decisions aiming at alleviating the financial burdens of the Greek Government have been taken.”

Prime Minister also states he is looking forward to discussing arrangements regarding refugees and adds that Greek Minister of Finance\(^\text{86}\) in London has been informed.

**Kirk**

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\(^{84}\) No. 633, May 7, 11 p. m., not printed.

\(^{85}\) Latter not printed.

\(^{86}\) Under Secretary of State for Finance George Mantzavinos.