V. POST-CONFERENCE PAPERS
14. POST-CONFERENCE PAPERS

Editorial Note

In the course of compiling the present volume a number of hitherto unpublished documents were found in which important participants in the Cairo and Tehran Conferences made factual statements respecting the proceedings, or portions of the proceedings, at the Conferences themselves. Since these statements supplement the contemporary Conference records, it was felt worthwhile to include them in this volume, although a number of them will doubtless be published in subsequent volumes of Foreign Relations.

In addition to the memoirs and other authoritative sources listed in the Introduction of this volume, the reader may wish to consult the following publications containing post-Conference statements made by participants in the Cairo and Tehran Conferences:

Radio address by President Roosevelt on December 24, 1943, Department of State Bulletin, vol. X, January 1, 1944, pp. 4–5.
Press conferences of President Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, edited by Samuel I. Rosenman:

December 17, 1943—1943 volume, pp. 549–553
May 26, 1944 —1944–1945 volume, p. 137
May 30, 1944 —ibid., p. 142
June 6, 1944 —ibid., pp. 155, 157

Informal remarks of President Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt:

To the personnel at Camp Amirabad, December 2, 1943—1943 volume, p. 538
To a group of military police at Cairo, December 6, 1943—ibid., p. 540
To the officers and men of the U.S. S. Iowa, December 16, 1943—ibid., p. 547
To the Advertising War Council Conference, March 8, 1944—1944–1945 volume, p. 99
To the delegates at Dumbarton Oaks, August 23, 1944—ibid., p. 233

Documents printed in *United States Relations With China*, pp. 488, 491, 499, 557, 558.

Bohlen Collection

*Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen)*

[Secret] [Moscow, December 1943.]

There are given below some incidental remarks which occurred during dinners or luncheons of the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin which were not sufficiently important to include in the regular memoranda or minutes of the conference or were merely briefly mentioned. These are set forth here as of possible general interest.

At the dinner given by Marshal Stalin on November 29 at which Stalin was so industrious in his attacks on the Prime Minister, he told Churchill that there was one thing he was glad of and that was that Mr. Churchill had never been a “liberal”. This was said with an expression of great contempt for the word “liberal”. It is doubtful if the President heard this statement since he remarked that he felt himself somewhat between the two political views as represented by the Marshal and Mr. Churchill.

During this same dinner the Munich agreement was discussed, and the Prime Minister remarked that at the time he had held the same

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1 Bohlen prepared this memorandum from his notes shortly after his return from Tehran to Moscow. Besides the incidental remarks made at the Tehran Conference which are recorded here, an exchange of remarks between Roosevelt and Stalin revealing Stalin’s attitude toward religion, as related by Roosevelt, may be found in Mikołajczyk, *The Rape of Poland*, pp. 60–61. For references to sources which state that Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin inconclusively discussed the post-war development and distribution of Middle Eastern oil, see George Kirk, *The Middle East in the War* (a volume of the *Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946*, published by the Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952), p. 474.
2 *Ante*, p. 552.
3 Agreement signed by France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom on September 29, 1938; *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, series D, vol. II, p. 1014.
views as the Soviet Government as to the stupidity and shame of the Munich agreement. Stalin replied that he personally had never believed that the Czechs meant to fight; that he had sent some Soviet aviation experts to look into the question of the use by the Red Air Force of Czech bases in the event of war; and that they had reported that the Czechs would not fight. He said he knew that this was not in accordance with Mr. Churchill's views. Later on in the discussion, in reply to the Prime Minister's statement that he must admit that after the last war he had done everything in his power to prevent the spread of Bolshevism in Europe and the setting up of Communist regimes, Marshal Stalin said ironically that Mr. Churchill need not have worried quite so much, as they (the Russians) had discovered that it was not so easy to set up Communist regimes.

In one of his toasts to the cooperation of the three countries at his birthday dinner at the British Legation on November 30, the Prime Minister said that the complexion of the world was changing and that a common meeting ground might be found for the different colors. He remarked in this connection that the complexion of Great Britain was becoming "pinker". Stalin interrupted to state, "That is a sign of health." Mr. Churchill agreed provided the process was not carried so far as to induce congestion.

At the dinner in the British Legation, Stalin referred to both the President and Churchill as his "fighting friends" or "comrades-in-arms", but in the case of Churchill he added the observation, "if it is possible for me to consider Mr. Churchill my friend".

At the political meeting on December 1 when the question of the Polish-Soviet frontier was under discussion, Marshal Stalin evinced great interest in the maps which had been prepared in the Department of State and particularly the one showing the ethnological composition of eastern Poland. He came around the table to examine these maps personally and asked Mr. Bohlen who had made up these maps and on the basis of what statistics. Mr. Bohlen told him that they had been drawn up in as objective and scientific a manner as possible on the basis of the best available data. Marshal Stalin replied, after the map had been explained to him, that it looked as though Polish

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* See ante, p. 584.
* See ante, p. 600.
* The maps referred to are presumably the relevant maps prepared in the Department of State in connection with its post-war planning work. One such map, showing the distribution of population in eastern Poland according to mother tongue, is printed in Notter, facing p. 512. Others are filed in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, and the Office of the Geographer, Department of State.
statistics had been used. Mr. Bohlen repeated that the best available statistics had been used, but that since the areas in question had been part of Poland from 1920 to 1939, most available data were of course Polish. Marshal Stalin made a somewhat vague reference to some British statistics on the question but did not pursue the matter further.

At the dinner on December 17 when the declaration on Iran was being put into final form and the Russian and British texts were being compared et cetera, a discussion arose between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin as to the use of the word Persia. The Prime Minister said that he would prefer to have the word Persia rather than Iran used in the declaration and that he had given orders to the British Foreign Office to have the word Persia used in all British public documents in order to avoid confusion between Iraq and Iran. Marshal Stalin brushed this statement aside with the remark that the name of the country they were in was Iran and no other. The President also insisted on the use of Iran in the declaration and the Prime Minister then said he surrendered. When the time came for signature of the declaration, Stalin insisted that Churchill sign first in order, he said, to avoid any further argument as to the designation of the country that they were in.8

During the dinner when the President had made a remark in regard to the shrewdness of Yankee traders, Marshal Stalin replied that there was a Russian saying that “no Jew could earn a living in Yaroslavl because of the shrewdness of the merchants of that city”.

Towards the end of the dinner when Marshal Stalin, who was obviously exhausted and for that reason not in the best of humor, was with close attention examining the Russian text of the communiqué9 with the Soviet interpreter Mr. Pavlov and Mr. Molotov, the President called Mr. Bohlen over to give him a message to translate to the Marshal.10 Stalin, hearing an interruption in his ear and without turning to see who it was, said over his shoulder, “For God’s sake, allow us to finish this work.” Then, when he turned and realized that the interruption had come from the President of the United States, for the first and only time during the Conference he showed embarrassment and turned quickly back to the examination of the communiqué. This remark was not translated to the President.

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7 For an editorial note regarding the dinner, see ante, p. 605.
8 For the text of the declaration, see ante, p. 648. For the order of signature, see ante, p. 649 and post, p. 885.
9 For the text of the communiqué, see ante, p. 639.
10 Bohlen informed the editors that this message concerned the obtaining of Stalin’s autograph.
Secret

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

[Cairo, December 9 (?), 1943.]

509. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Most secret and personal.

1. I gave the paper in my immediately following to Inonu. They have asked for 4 days in which to consult their Parliament but meanwhile will allow build up to begin and 250 specialists are starting forthwith. On the whole I am hopeful. Vyshinsky liked the layout.

2. . . . I am tidying up with the King of Greece and expect a solution and arrangement in harmony with your feelings. Every good wish to you and Harry.

740.0011 EW 1939/82275: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, December 9, 1943.

1997. Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu made following statement at press conference of Allied and Turkish correspondents last evening:

"The Cairo conference was one of the most important events in this phase of the war. We returned from [talks?] in [Cairo?] extremely pleased and extremely satisfied with our conversations. We talked about everything there. All aspects of international politics and of the war were passed in review.

You doubtless know that the invitation to this conference was addressed to the Turkish Government by England, United States and USSR who was to have been represented by M. Vichinsky [Vyshinsky]. But the latter who was at a distant place could not attend our meetings and did not reach Cairo until this morning. But I can tell you that even without M. Vichinsky [Vyshinsky] the Soviets were there.

As you have been able to see from the communiqué our alliance with England has been strengthened by this conference. Our conversations were so intimate and searching that we can likewise say that our relations with the United States and Soviet Union are almost as cordial and strong as those with England.

1 See Roosevelt's telegram of December 1, 1943, to Steinhardt, ante, p. 633.
We studied all aspects of the problems with a frankness which was sometimes brutal but with understanding. We learned a great many things which we did not know. Our friends likewise learned many things of which they were ignorant. We drew closer to them and they drew closer to us for a better mutual understanding of our interests and our possibilities. It is because all our conversations were impregnated with this spirit that we could leave Cairo in an atmosphere of complete cordiality.

I can tell you without going into details that during our conversations we remained on the Axis [apparent omission] of the directives of the peoples party and that our foreign policy remains unchanged.”

STEINHARDT

870.01 A. M. G./21: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 9, 1943—5 p. m.

8552. We again took up the subject matter of the Department's 7742, December 7, 8 p. m., with Nigel Ronald today. He told us that this was one of the matters which had been discussed at the highest level in North Africa but that the Foreign Office had not yet learned of the decision which had been reached. As soon as they did have this information they would be in a position to reply. Ronald stressed the fact that the Foreign Office was as anxious to settle the matter as was the Department.

Bucknell

1 Not printed herein. It concerned a proposal that the United States participate in the work of the British ATB (Administration of Territories—Balkans) Committee, which had its headquarters at Cairo. See ante, p. 777, and post, p. 871.

391.00/2078

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, December 9, 1943.

No. 750

Subject: Declaration by the United States, the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom regarding Iran.

Sir: I have the honor to report, for the Department's background information, the circumstances of the drawing up of the joint declara-
tion regarding Iran signed at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin, and on the same day declared acceptable by the Iranian Government through its Minister of Foreign Affairs.

During a visit by General Hurley and myself to Prime Minister Soheily and Foreign Minister Saed on November 25, 1943, the Iranian officials spoke of the proposed declaration on Iran which was discussed, but not approved, at the Moscow meeting of foreign secretaries October 19 to 30. (See Mr. George V. Allen’s despatch of November 4 from this Legation. I do not know how the Iranian Government learned of this Moscow proposal but assume they were informed by the British.)

General Hurley informed me that on November 28 he discussed with the President the possibility of securing from the conference of the chiefs of governments a declaration pertaining to the status of Iran. The President had authorized him to see Foreign Ministers Eden and Molotov and endeavor to work something out.

On the morning of November 29, when I called at the Foreign Office regarding another matter, Prime Minister Soheily told me [he] had just seen Mr. Eden and had put forward the request that the conference should issue a joint communiqué regarding Iran, to cover the following points:

1) Allied recognition that Iran had given every possible help in the prosecution of the war.
2) Confirmation of the pledges given in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance with respect to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.
3) Assurance that the economic needs of Iran would be considered when the peace treaty should be negotiated.

M. Soheily said that Mr. Eden had agreed in principle but had requested that he approach the Soviet representatives and the American Minister.

General Hurley saw Mr. Eden on November 30 and advised me that he had reached agreement with the British Foreign Secretary on the desirability of a declaration such as that proposed. The Moscow draft declarations were considered, and General Hurley suggested that, in addition to the points which they covered, there should be a reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Mr. Eden assented.

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1 See ante, pp. 131, 133.
2 Not printed herein.
4 Ante, pp. 118–119.
It was further agreed that the provision of the Moscow draft calling for support for foreign advisers in Iran should be omitted.

General Hurley advised me that, inasmuch as the Moscow draft had not been approved by the Russians, he and Mr. Eden had agreed it would be appropriate to have the Iranian Prime Minister present his request himself to M. Molotov and endeavor to obtain Soviet consent to the new proposal. Later that same day, the Iranian Foreign Minister told me that Premier Stalin and Foreign Commissar Molotov had expressed their willingness to meet the request for a declaration. However, from information reaching General Hurley, it appeared that Soviet concurrence was not certain, and the following day he requested the President to speak to Marshal Stalin on the matter. General Hurley tells me he was afterwards informed that the President had done so.

December 1 was the last day of the meeting at Tehran, and there was no time for joint discussions among the American [.] Soviet and British representatives with respect to the text of the proposed communiqué. In consultation with General Hurley, this Legation had prepared a tentative draft, which was the first draft to include specific affirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It was approved by the American delegation to the conference and was submitted to Mr. Eden and M. Molotov late in the afternoon of December 1. With a few minor changes in wording, this draft was accepted by the final plenary session of the conference, held that evening. I understand time was so short that it was not practicable to make three original copies, and that only one was signed, this original remaining in possession of the American delegation. A copy of the final text is enclosed herewith.\textsuperscript{5}

I had previously given the Iranian Foreign Minister a copy of the Legation’s first draft, which he had discussed with the Prime Minister. I had also informed him that the proposal would be discussed by the chiefs of government on December 1. Accordingly, when the conference session ended at about 11 o’clock in the evening, General Hurley and I took a copy of the final draft to the Foreign Ministry and went over it word by word with M. Saed, explaining the slight changes which had been made in the phraseology. The Foreign Minister called the Prime Minister on the telephone and read him the altered phrases. He then informed us that the revised text was acceptable to the Government of Iran. He initialed a copy which we had brought for that purpose.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{5} The final text is printed ante, p. 646.
\textsuperscript{6} A facsimile of the copy initialed by Soheili was obtained by the Department from Hurley (023.1/6-454).
The Foreign Minister agreed to give no publicity to the Declaration until it should have been released by the three signatory governments. It was explained to him that this would probably be delayed for several days.

In the course of our conversation with M. Saed, General Hurley emphasized that the American representatives had given special support to the proposed declaration, that certain objections had been encountered, but that we had, happily, been able to secure the agreement of the British and Soviets. Since the Foreign Minister also could see for himself that the Legation’s draft declaration had been adopted almost in toto by the conference, I think there can be little doubt in his mind that the United States played a large part in the issuance of the declaration.

As the Department will recall, the Soviet delegation at the Moscow Conference resolutely opposed the issuance of any statement regarding policy toward Iran. I was, therefore, surprised at the readiness of Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov to agree to a substantially similar proposal when made at Tehran only a few weeks later. It may well be that the President’s personal appeal, coming at the end of a successful conference, was the deciding factor, although I am inclined to think that some general shift in Soviet attitude toward Iran may also have taken place in recent weeks. (As I have previously reported, there are indications that Irano-Soviet relations have attained a more friendly basis.) Contributing or alternative reasons for Soviet acquiescence at Tehran may have been:

1) The opposition at Moscow may have originated with subordinates, such as former Ambassador Smirnov, who were not present here and so could not bring their views to the attention of the chiefs.

2) At Moscow, the proposal was made by the British and supported by the Americans, no Iranian representatives being present. At Tehran, the proposal came from the Iranians themselves, and the Soviets may have felt that they could not well oppose it without placing themselves in an unfavorable light vis-a-vis the Iranian Government, especially after both the American and British representatives had indicated agreement.

3) The Soviet leaders may have thought this a more appropriate occasion to make a gesture toward Iran, since the meeting was taking place on Iranian soil.

Respectfully yours,

LOUIS G. DREYFUS, JR.
Moscow Embassy Records: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

ANKARA, [December 10, 1943.]

Personal and strictly confidential for the Ambassador:

The recent meeting at Cairo was most helpful in drawing Turkey much closer to the Allies; although nothing definite was agreed upon for the time being. I hope the foregoing gives you the present picture.

STEINHARDT

885.01/416: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, December 12, 1943—10 a.m.

Greek Series 128. I am reliably informed that during a long session on December 8 with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden the King of Greece steadfastly refused to make a declaration proposed by them to the effect that he will not return to Greece unless and until called for by the Constituent Assembly \(^1\) to the formation of which he agreed in his declaration of July 4.

I saw the President on December 3 and advised him regarding this proposal and after he had seen the King \(^2\) he desired me not to associate myself with any effort to force him to a course of action against his will. This I have been careful not to do both before and since. I understand that the President told the King that there was no necessity for him to make any declaration whatever unless he so desired.

In this connection the British appear to have been influenced in taking the attitude they did chiefly by a change in military plans regarding operations in Greece and by the anti-British and anti-King propaganda being spread there to the benefit of the Communist leadership. They hoped to kill this propaganda and deprive this leadership of many recruits by making clear now that no possibility exists of the King's being forced on the country. Because of the present and probable future Republican make up of the Greek Government the solution arrived at may be regarded as amounting to much the same thing in effect as the original proposal.

MACVEAGH

\(^1\) See post, p. 851.
\(^2\) See the editorial note, ante, p. 740.
POST-CONFERENCE PAPERS

893.5151/976 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

URGENT

CHUNGKING, December 14, 1943—8 p. m.

2417. To Secretary of Treasury from Adler. . .

2. I indicated that the price of United States dollars had become an outstanding issue for all United States Government agencies in China relations and that the working out of a satisfactory arrangement was advisable from point of view of Sino-American relations. Kung replied that "the Generalissimo had said no." When I inquired again into the possibility of the sale of gold, Kung informed me that Chinese Government sales had been quite small, its policy being to buy back a substantial part of what it had sold to keep up price which is now around CN 13,000 per Chinese oz. selling in Chungking.

3. Kung intimated that Generalissimo had discussed exchange rate with President in Cairo but did not inform me of content of discussion.

GAUSS

740.0011-EW/12-1543

Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen)¹

[Moscow,] December 15, 1943.

The attitude of the Soviet Government toward each one of the questions listed in the attached document of course deserves detailed and special study. There are three, however, which are of particular interest since they form a pattern of Soviet views concerning post-war Europe. These three are: (1) Soviet opposition to federations; (2) Soviet determination to break up Germany; and (3) the harsh attitude toward France. To this should be added the Soviet preference for strong points or bases in Europe to be held by the three victorious powers as trustees. The most important indication of the Soviet concept of political organization after the war is found in the attitude toward France. The reasons advanced by Stalin for this attitude are not in themselves convincing and the facts in the French situation do not support the harshness of the treatment suggested. The real motive very probably lies elsewhere.

¹The source text bears no signature or indication of addressee. In a memorandum to the Historical Office, dated June 30, 1949, Bohlen stated that he had prepared the memorandum for the consideration of Harriman (FW 740.0011 EW/12-1543).
While this pattern obviously cannot be regarded as conclusive, it is sufficiently clear to afford a glimpse of the Soviet idea of post-war continental Europe. Germany is to be broken up and kept broken up. The states of eastern, southeastern and central Europe will not be permitted to group themselves into any federations or association. France is to be stripped of her colonies and strategic bases beyond her borders and will not be permitted to maintain any appreciable military establishment. Poland and Italy will remain approximately their present territorial size, but it is doubtful if either will be permitted to maintain any appreciable armed force. The result would be that the Soviet Union would be the only important military and political force on the continent of Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced to military and political impotence.

There is no attempt here to analyze the motive which may lie behind the Soviet concept of post-war organization of Europe but merely to set forth the facts.

[Attachment]

SECRET

ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL QUESTIONS AS EXPRESSED BY MARSHAL STALIN DURING THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE.

These views have all been recorded in the official records of the Conference and of the conversations which took place, but as they occurred at various times and in various circumstances they are summarized here for convenient reference.

1. International security after the war.

No form of international organization by itself will be sufficient to restrain Germany or Japan from recovering and reembarking on a course of aggression. Only if the victorious nations acting perhaps as trustees for some such organization retain in their hands bases and other strong points in the vicinity of those countries and in general the important strategic points of the war, will the world be assured against the recrudescence of German or Japanese militarism. These bases will be held as trustees for the international organization, but they should probably be operated in that capacity by individual nations, particularly the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. The United States might retain in that fashion bases in the Azores and at Dakar; Great Britain might increase her bases in the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa. (No specific mention was made of bases which might be held by the Soviet Union.)
2. Treatment of Germany.

The Soviet Government does not consider that any international organization could prevent the revival of Germany within fifteen or twenty years. Any form of production could be transferred into war industry and supervision could not prevent this process being concealed. Germany should be broken up and kept broken up. The various parts of Germany should not be permitted to group themselves together in any federation either among themselves or in association with other central European states. To do so would provide Germany with the framework for developing another great aggressive state. Strong points (see 1. above) should be held in and in the vicinity of Germany’s “moving a muscle”.

3. France.

The Soviet Government feels that France should be punished for its criminal association with Germany. De Gaulle represents symbolic France, while the physical France with which he has no connection is cooperating with Nazi Germany. France should be stripped of her colonies and not permitted to retain beyond her borders any strategic points. To permit France to be treated as one of the victorious powers and retain such bases would imperil the future peace of the world. Nine-tenths of the French intelligentsia are corrupt and infected with Nazi ideology. The entire French people must bear a measure of responsibility for the actions of their leaders. France should be reduced to an insignificant military power and become a charming but weak country.

4. Confederations.

The Soviet Government is violently opposed to the creation of any federations in eastern, southeastern and central Europe for the reasons set forth at the Moscow Conference.

5. Poland.

The Soviet Government considers the Polish Government-in-exile to be agents of Hitler and charges its representatives inside Poland of murdering partisans engaged in fighting the Nazis. Before the Soviet Government would consider reestablishment of relations with the Polish Government-in-exile it must order its agents in Poland to cease fighting the partisans and must utilize its troops and call on the Polish people to fight actively against Nazi Germany. The Soviet Government, provided it is given the northern part of east Prussia including Königsberg and Tilsit, is willing to accept the Curzon Line, thereby returning to Poland those areas primarily inhabited by Poles. Although the city of Lwow is admittedly more than half Poles, it is in the center of a definitely Ukrainian area and could not be returned to Poland for that reason. The Soviet Government is
prepared to help Poland achieve a western frontier along the Oder River.

6. Finland.

Although dubious of the result, the Soviet Government is willing to have Finnish negotiators come to Moscow to discuss peace. The Soviet conditions are:

(1) The restoration of the treaty of March 1940 and the reestablishment of the frontiers set forth in that treaty.

(a) The Soviet Government would, however, be willing to release the base at Hango in return for Petsamo, the latter town to pass into the permanent possession of the Soviet Union.

(2) The Finnish army to be demobilized to peacetime strength.

(3) Finland to make reparations in kind for fifty percent of the physical damage done to the Soviet Union because of Finnish participation in the war against the Soviet Union; these reparations in kind to be paid over a period of from five to eight years and if Finland should default the Red Army will occupy certain areas of Finland.

(4) Finland to break off all association with Germany and expel the German forces from her territory.

If peace is established on these terms, the Soviet Government has no intention of subjugating all Finland and transforming it into a province of the Soviet Union.

7. The British Empire.

Because of British military contribution, the Soviet Government considers that there should be no reduction in the British Empire, but on the contrary it should if necessary be increased by turning over to Great Britain on the basis of trusteeship certain bases and strong points throughout the world.

8. The Dardanelles.

The Soviet Government would like to see the Montreux Convention in regard to the straits replaced by a regime affording freer navigation to merchant and naval vessels both in war and in peace. This question was not pursued in any detail.

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to the British Minister of Information (Bracken)

[WASHINGTON,] December 18, 1943.

Dear Brendan: Since my return to Washington, I have received a more complete report of the confusions over publicity which arose at Cairo and Teheran.
Whatever the causes, I am greatly disturbed at the results. Not only did the newspapers, news services, and broadcasters of the United States suffer a heavy penalty because they kept confidence and observed the designated release dates, but non-observance elsewhere has engendered bitter reproaches and many charges of bad faith. Such a condition is distinctly damaging to that unity of purpose and action which the conferences at Cairo and Teheran were designed to promote.

I am resolved that we will not risk a repetition. Consequently, I have decided that hereafter no news having a security value will be issued by the Government for future release, but that all such news will be given out instead at the earliest moment consistent with safety, for immediate publication and broadcast. I have issued instructions to that effect to the various departments and agencies.¹

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

¹ In his reply, dated March 6, 1944, Bracken did not mention the incidents at Cairo and Teheran, but he expressed his entire agreement with Roosevelt’s decision regarding the future handling of press releases (Roosevelt Papers).

Roosevelt Papers

**Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt**¹

**Translation**

**Personal and Secret Message to President Roosevelt From Premier Stalin**

I thank you for Your letter which Your Ambassador has extended to me on December 18th.²

I am glad that fate has given me an opportunity to render you a service in Teheran. I also attach important significance to our meeting and to the conversations taken place there which concerned such substantial questions of accelerating of our common victory and establishment of future lasting peace between the peoples.³

**DECEMBER 20, 1943.**

¹ Sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington.
² The letter from Roosevelt dated December 3, 1943, ante, p. 785.
³ For a further reference, in the post-Conference Roosevelt–Stalin correspondence, to the cooperative spirit which prevailed at Teheran, see Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. II, p. 119.
The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1943.

Dear Cordell: Here is a memo which Eden handed me in confidence in Cairo, which apparently was prepared for Eden by some of his associates prior to his talk with the King of Greece.

Mr. Eden told me that he followed this line of argument with the King and I gather he made it pretty strong.¹

Cordially yours,

Harry L. Hopkins

[Attachment]

The British Embassy Accredited to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)

[Cairo, November 25, 1943.]

Main Talking Points With the King of the Hellenes

1. Refer again to your previous conversation when you told the King that the strategical situation had changed and that it was most [un]likely that any but quite inconsiderable British forces would be sent to Greece when the Germans evacuate.

2. Point out that at the time when we thought a considerable British army would go to Greece to drive the Germans out, we strongly supported your desire to enter Greece with the British and Greek forces. Under the changed conditions such British forces as might go to Greece would be mainly concerned in ensuring law and order and in assisting in the distribution of relief supplies.

3. It would be essential for the Greek Government to function at the earliest possible date in close association with the British and in an atmosphere as far removed as possible from political controversy. This Government would have to be mainly composed of leading personalities who have lived in Greece during the period of the occupation.

4. During the whole period of the German occupation acute controversy has continued and grown increasingly strong on the subject of the King’s return before the will of the people has been expressed. The immediate return of the King in the teeth of this opposition would inevitably raise this controversy to fever point, and it would be impossible for the King himself to remain outside political dissension. He would find himself confronted with a situation even more acute

¹ Regarding a conversation of Churchill and Eden with the King of Greece, see ante, pp. 839, 844.
than that which led to the Metaxas Dictatorship, and would therefore start under every disadvantage, which would make it impossible for him to return in the role which he and we desire for him—that of a constitutional monarch.

5. The immediate confusion that will result from the difficult social and economic conditions caused by the occupation will make it essential for the Government [to] be in the hands of a leading personality, who has made his mark through his bold resistance to the Germans within the country. He will have to form an emergency Committee prepared to act firmly and to put down disorder. The first administration to be formed will be of a temporary character to tide over the period until normal conditions can be established and elections held. It would be an undesirable situation for the King, when he first returned to Greece, to be associated directly with an administration bound to become unpopular and unable to accord all those freedoms associated with a constitutional monarchy.

6. In these circumstances, the King should consider the choice of the most suitable personality to head a Regency Committee in Athens the moment the Germans evacuate. Archbishop Damaskinos is prepared to undertake this responsibility, but must know in advance that he can announce to the Greek people, as soon as the Germans quit Athens, that he has the legal authority of the King for so doing.

7. There is therefore every advantage for the King, in his own interests as well as those of his country, to make it clear now to his people that he does not intend to return to Greece until such conditions have been established as will allow him to function as a constitutional monarch. He has no desire to return to Greece unless he can so function, but he also has no desire to return unless he is convinced by a clear expression of the people's will that the system of constitutional monarchy is desired by them.

8. An immediate declaration to this effect would rally moderate opinion against any attempt made by a small section, who seek to impose their will by force as soon as the Germans leave Athens. This section have made capital out of the failure of the King so far to make such a declaration.

9. There is reason to believe that if Zervas knew that such a declaration would be made by the King, he would immediately ask that his irregular forces should be incorporated in the Greek regular Army. If this were immediately granted by the King it would act as a magnet to draw large numbers of the officers and men in the ELAS forces to break away from purely sectional political control and make a similar request for incorporation on the same terms as those accorded to Zervas. This would bring the Greek Government in Cairo into close
association with the resistance movements inside Greece, and would thereby enormously enhance the authority and prestige of the King and his Government, which would then be reformed to include personalities from Greece and would consequently provide a Government of which Archbishop Damaskinos could avail himself when he set up his Regency Committee in Athens.

**British Embassy to Greece,**

**Cairo.**

**25th November, 1943**

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

**SECRET**

Moscow, 20 December 1943.

Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.

At the Teheran Conference you and the Prime Minister agreed that the Italian ships requested by the Soviets should be delivered on one February.² Request that I be informed of the action taken to carry out this commitment as I shall undoubtedly be queried by Molotov at a meeting with him scheduled for Friday or Saturday³ to discuss unfinished business of Teheran.

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¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.
² See ante, p. 597.
³ December 24 or 25.

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Roosevelt Papers

*The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*²

**SECRET**

[Washington,] 21 December 1943.

**PRIORITY**

For Ambassador Harriman from the President. Repeated to Prime Minister

Referring to your message [Alusna Moscow 201719 December ²] it is my intention that Italian surrendered ships to a number of one-third of the total be allocated to the Soviet war effort as rapidly as they can be made available from their present employment in the Allied war effort commencing about February first.

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¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.
² Supra.
Title of ownership to be decided after the surrender of our common enemies.
I have requested combined Chiefs of Staff to issue necessary orders to General Eisenhower.

ROOSEVELT

841d.01/228: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 22, 1943—4 p.m.

8893. Personal and secret to the Secretary.

Your 8004, December 18, Department’s 7184, November 13, was held by the Embassy until my return and because of the absence of both Eden and the Prime Minister. I explained the British position on this issue to the President in Cairo, having taken the matter up at great length with the Prime Minister on my journey out there with him. I understood the President would talk with the Prime Minister on this subject but do not know the results of their discussion.

WINANT

1 Neither printed herein. The subject of these telegrams was the desire of the United States for British concurrence in a proposed request to Ireland for the use of naval and air facilities if needed during the war. According to Hull (vol. ii, p. 1357), the British reaction was unfavorable to the American proposal.

2 According to the Log, ante, pp. 298, 299, 656, Winant conferred with Roosevelt at Cairo on November 25, November 26, and December 3, 1943.

3 See Winant’s telegram of November 8, 1943, to Roosevelt, ante, p. 73.

890E.00/340

The Diplomatic Agent in Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

241. BEIRUT, December 22, 1943.

I should, I believe, add the following report regarding my brief conversation in Cairo with the President:

Summoned by telephone message from Mr. Kirk, I arrived in Cairo the evening of December 2 and was received by the President the following afternoon. In reply to questions, I gave a brief review of the Lebanese crisis; then presented President Khouri’s letter.  

4 Not printed herein. The letter notified Roosevelt of al-Khour’s election.
I explained that I had brought the letter personally in the thought that, should it be thought appropriate that personal reply be made from Cairo, an expression of satisfaction at the outcome of the crisis might be added to the usual formal acknowledgment and good wishes.

The President appeared to welcome this suggestion and asked that a reply in the suggested sense be drafted for his signature. He asked that it include mention of the fact that, had time and duties permitted, he would have desired personally to visit Lebanon. I was, too, to convey to President Khouri, but not to include in the letter, Mr. Roosevelt’s keen personal interest in reforestation, a subject which possesses particular historical as well as current interest to Lebanon.

The latter message has been delivered. It was received with evidently sincere interest and appreciation.

The aspect of the Lebanese crisis in which President Roosevelt seemed to take special interest was as to whether General de Gaulle was personally responsible for the dictatorial action taken by Monsieur Helleu in suspending the Lebanese Constitution, proroguing Parliament and imprisoning President and ministers.

I could only answer that rumour and report in Beirut, which I tended to credit, had it that Helleu had acted under de Gaulle’s general instructions and that de Gaulle had later approved Helleu’s action in the matter. General Catroux, I added, had been categorical in insisting that, in his opinion, Helleu had misinterpreted and exceeded them.

GEORGE WADSWORTH

740.00119 EW 1939/2036

The British Embassy to the Department of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1943.

AIDE MÉMOIRE

The Tehran Conference considered the question of a joint declaration to the German people on the basis of unconditional surrender. Marshal Stalin informed President Roosevelt on November 29th that he thought this would be bad tactics vis-à-vis of Germany and sug-

1 The statements made in the first paragraph of this document were communicated by Hull to Roosevelt in a memorandum of December 22, 1943 (not printed herein.).
gested instead that the Allied Governments concerned should work out terms together and make them generally known to the German people.²

Mr. Eden suggests that this matter should be dealt with as soon as possible by the European Advisory Commission. He hopes that, if the United States Government agree, they will send appropriate instructions in this sense to their representative on the Commission.

² According to the Bohlen minutes, the subject of unconditional surrender came up at the dinner meeting of November 28, 1943 (at which Churchill and Stalin continued to discuss Germany after Roosevelt had retired); see ante, p. 513. For the British record, indicating that the subject came up on November 29, 1943, see post, p. 863.

740.00119 EW 1939/20574

The President to the Secretary of State ¹

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This ² I think should be taken up by Winant with Prime Minister Churchill as soon as the latter gets back. It was not brought up in any way at Teheran in my presence.

F. D. R.

¹ A paraphrase of this memorandum was cabled by Hull to Winant on December 24, 1943.

² The matter referred to in the preceding document.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt ¹

CHUNGKING, 23 December 1943.

SECRET PRIORITY

955. I have received your telegram of December 21st.² Since our meeting at Cairo, I have been even more keenly aware of your friendly assistance to and deep concern for China, and have therefore accepted your suggestion of delaying our all-out offensive in Burma until we can have a large scale amphibious operation as outlined in your telegram of December 7th.³ As regards the general strategy decided by the British-American council of Chiefs of Staff to use all available resources to defeat Germany first, I was not present during the

¹ Sent via Army channels, “eyes only”, from Hearn to Marshall for relay to Roosevelt.

² Summarized in Stilwell’s Command Problems, pp. 79–80.

³ Sent from Cairo December 5, 1943; ante, p. 863.
deliberations and was therefore not in position to express my views. I place the greatest confidence in the soundness of your judgment. I must however say quite frankly that judging by the latest military dispositions and activities the Allied strategy of relegating the China War Theater to the background has given rise to serious misgivings on all sides. The success or failure of the Burma campaign is a matter of life and death for China. You will recall that while at Cairo I emphasized the fact that to dispatch our Yunnan troops to begin operations in south Burma to outflank the enemy is to court disaster—a plan of campaign to which I am unable to agree. . . .

*See ante, p. 336.*

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President

SECRET

Moscow, 23 December 1943.

(Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.)

Referring to your cable to me USNAVCOM 211720 of December, I beg respectfully to mention that the request Stalin made to you and the Prime Minister at Teheran was for the fulfillment of the Soviet request for a specific number of Italian ships, namely one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four submarines for dispatch to North Russia and 40,000 tons displacement of merchant shipping for use in the Black Sea.

After some discussion both you and the Prime Minister agreed that the Soviet request should be approved and that the delivery of the ships was to be made by the 1st of February. No mention was made at Moscow or Teheran of their getting additional ships up to one-third of those captured.

I believe Stalin expects all the ships he requested will be turned over to the Soviet Government's control by February first.

If for any reason it is not now advisable to meet this commitment on time I recommend that the facts be given to the British Minister and myself in Moscow as promptly as possible with instructions that we go directly to Stalin to explain to him the situation in full. Under this method of handling I have no doubt that Stalin will be reasonable.

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1 Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. The copy of the message as relayed to Roosevelt at Hyde Park via Army channels bears the handwritten notation "Leahy to prepare reply. FDR."

2 Dated December 21, 1943, ante, p. 852.

3 Presumably John Balfour, Counsellor of the British Embassy at Moscow with the local rank of Minister.
and cooperative. On the other hand if the commitment cannot be carried out and we wait for him to bring pressure on us to carry out our earliest commitment resulting from Teheran I am afraid that suspicion might be aroused in his mind or in the minds of his associates who were not present as to the firmness of the other commitments taken at Teheran.

I interpret your cable as being for my information and if queried by Molotov will simply advise him that you are giving active consideration to the matter.

Hopkins Papers

_The British Ambassador (Halifax) to President Roosevelt_¹

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, Mr. Eden has asked me to let you know that the question of Italian ships for the Russians, which was dealt with in your telegram No. 422 of December 21st to the Prime Minister,² has been considered in London in the light of the telegram which you sent to Mr. Harriman.

There is a further point on which there appears to be some uncertainty in London. According to our record of what was said at Teheran, it seems to have been agreed there between yourself and the Prime Minister to assign "a battleship and a cruiser" for Soviet use "about the end of January", the title of ownership to be decided upon after the surrender of Germany. The suggestion mentioned in your telegram to Mr. Harriman of handing over to the Russians a third of surrendered Italian ships appears to be a different one. (The request which the Soviet Government made at the Moscow Conference was for one battleship, one cruiser, 8 destroyers, 4 submarines and 40,000 tons of merchant shipping.)

Eden has not specifically asked me to put to you the point contained in this last paragraph, but he has put it to our Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow, who may therefore be speaking to Harriman about it.

Believe me, Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

HALIFAX

¹ On January 4, 1944, Roosevelt sent this note to Hopkins with a memorandum reading "Does this need an answer?" An endorsement of February 11, 1944, reads "No answer necessary—file per HLH".

² No. 422 was the repetition to Churchill of Roosevelt's telegram to Harriman, ante, p. 552.
MOST SECRET

ANKARA, December 24, 1943.

DEAR PAUL: The minutes of the various Anglo-American-Turkish meetings in Cairo having now been approved by the British, I enclose a set for your information and for the records of the Department. In so doing, I should make it clear that these minutes have not been shown to the Turks or the Russians and accordingly are in no sense binding on either of them. They merely reflect the composite belief of the British and ourselves as to what was said. They are, in my opinion, full and complete, subject always to the misunderstandings—great or small—that inevitably arise when the conversations are carried on in three languages, English, French and Turkish, with only two or three individuals present who speak all three languages fluently.

Subject to the foregoing qualification, but taken as a whole, I think they clearly reflect in detail the views expressed at the Conference. One point will puzzle you which George has probably already cleared up. That is the status of the Russians at the Conference. Vinogradov’s instructions were delayed in transmission and he had not received them at the time we left Ankara. Hugessen and I persuaded him to go along “as President Inonu’s guest”. On his arrival in Cairo his instructions to go to Cairo caught up with him but they failed to authorize him to participate in the Conference specifically stating that Vishinsky would represent the Russian Government. As George has doubtless explained to you, Vishinsky’s arrival in Cairo was delayed until some hours after the Conference had closed and about twelve hours after President Roosevelt and Hopkins had departed. Vishinsky telephoned me at midnight an hour or two after his arrival in Cairo and in the course of our ensuing talk convinced me—beyond a doubt—that his delay had been in no sense intentional but had resulted from his instructions arriving in Algiers a few hours after he had left there for Naples and when they finally caught up with him he left immediately for Cairo but the delay of two days prevented him from arriving there in time.

After I outlined to him what had taken place at the Conference, he seemed quite satisfied with the outcome—and what impressed me more than anything else—clearly indicated that he had not expected any commitment by the Turks to enter the war by December 31st and

1 These are the minutes printed ante, pp. 690, 711, 726, 740, 751.
2 George V. Allen.
would not be surprised at their unwillingness to commit themselves irrevocably on February 15th. I gained the impression after my talk with him that the Russians will be satisfied if the Turks enter the war at such time in the spring as may fit in with the overall Allied plans.

As you know, we returned to Ankara the next morning. I understand that Vishinsky had a long talk with Eden after our departure in the course of which Eden outlined the position to him. I have no knowledge as to the outcome of the talk between Vishinsky and Eden after my departure from Cairo but Vinogradov tells me that he has received no instructions to make any representations to the Turkish Government and so I am inclined to the view that the Russians are permitting the British to take the lead in dealing with the Turks from now on subject only to the political discussions concerning the Balkans in general and the position to be taken by Russia vis-à-vis Bulgaria should the latter declare war on Turkey, aid the Germans or permit the passage of German troops through Bulgaria.

The enclosed minutes are copy No. 8. By agreement with the British only ten copies exist of which they hold six and we hold four, each of us to assume responsibility for the utmost secrecy in respect of the copies in our possession.

With every good wish [etc.]

LAURENCE A. STEINHARDT

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Churchill had informed Roosevelt by a telegram of December 9, 1943, that Vyshinsky had approved of the arrangements with the Turks; ante, p. 889.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President

SECRET

Moscow, 27 December [1943].

Unnumbered. Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.

At a meeting with Molotov last night he gave me a memorandum in reply to the memorandum you handed Stalin at Teheran asking for action on the proposals presented by the United States Delegation at the Moscow conference concerning use of air bases for shuttle bombing, communications, etc, paraphrase of which follows:

"There is no objection in principle, as was indicated previously from the Soviet side, to the granting of air bases in the territory of

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1 Sent via Army channels.

2 Roosevelt's memorandum of November 29, 1943, ante, p. 617.
the USSR for American military airplanes for the purpose of carrying out the shuttle bombing of Germany. The organization of such bases, however, and the use of the appropriate airfields for this purpose must be coordinated with the plans of the Command of the military Air Force of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Air Force Command will be instructed for this purpose to begin preliminary conversations on the above question with the appropriate military representatives in Moscow with the subsequent consideration of this question by the Soviet High Command. It goes without saying that there will be made available, after a definite decision of the question concerning the organization of air bases from the Russian side, all necessary information concerning weather related to the operation of shuttle bombing.

With regard to the establishment of air communications between the USSR and the United States along the Moscow-Teheran-Washington route, there is no objection from the Soviet side to the renewal of conversations on this question between representatives of the Chief Administration of the Civil Air Fleet of the USSR and the corresponding American representatives at Moscow for the conclusion of an agreement on a reciprocal basis. December 25, 1943.\(^3\)

Molotov also gave me a preliminary reply to the two other memoranda you handed Marshal Stalin at Teheran concerning advance planning in the North West Pacific for Naval operations and for air operations\(^3\). Reading from a paper he made the following statement orally which he preferred not to give me in writing:

"Under point A of the President’s memorandum concerning Naval operations in the Pacific the Soviet Government is prepared to utilize existing facilities to obtain intelligence information concerning Japan and to make such information available to the United States authorities through the United States Military Mission in Moscow.

With reference to weather information referred to in the President’s memorandum concerning air operations in the Pacific the Soviet Government agrees to furnish the necessary supplementary information concerning the weather in the Far East. Instructions to this effect will be relayed to the Soviet Meteorological Services and information will be exchanged through the United States Military Mission in Moscow or through such other channels as the American Government may prefer. This exchange of information is to be on a reciprocal basis.

[In] Regard to the other questions contained in the President’s memoranda, certain of these questions, because of their importance and complexity require more time for study by the Soviet Government. Others for reasons which the American Government will understand it is difficult for the Soviet Government to give affirmative answers to at the present time."

In making this statement Mr. Molotov said he desired to emphasize the words “at the present time”.

\(^3\) \textit{Ante}, pp. 618–619.
I thereupon said I knew you would be glad to learn that the Soviet Government was ready to begin cooperation in regard to the Pacific war. I pointed out, however, that Marshal Stalin had indicated to you at Teheran that it was of equal importance to the Soviet Union as to the United States to bring the war against Japan to a successful conclusion at the earliest date. Molotov interrupted me to say that Stalin had made this quite clear.

I explained further in considerable detail the need for immediate planning in order to make possible the achievement of Stalin's objectives.

Molotov appeared to accept the validity of my statement and indicated that the subject was being actively studied.

Marshal Stalin, however, had just gone to the front and I do not expect to get any further reply for some days.

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893.51/7725

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1943.

The indications are that the Chinese Government has applied to this Government for a loan of $1,000,000,000, and this memorandum will be posited on an assumption that such is the fact.

There are indications that the subject of this loan was broached by Chiang at the Cairo Conference. There have been heard rumors to the effect that Chiang was given encouragement to believe that the requests by China for such a loan would meet with favorable response. There are indications, also, that Chiang strongly urged that a campaign for the reopening of the Burma Road be embarked upon at once; and rumors have been heard and have been seen in print to the effect that Chiang was told that this could not be done. Whatever the facts may be so far as the Cairo Conference is concerned, China's desire for a loan has apparently been formally expressed and operations for the reopening of the Burma Road have not been embarked upon.

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1 This memorandum bears no title, addressee, or signature. There are indications that it was prepared in the office of Stanley K. Hornbeck, then Adviser on Political Relations (memorandum of conversation with Hornbeck, 893.10/2-559).

2 Roosevelt told Stilwell and Davies at Cairo on December 6, 1943, that Chiang had asked for a loan of one billion dollars; see Stilwell, p. 251. The Davies notes on this conversation contain the same assertion by Roosevelt.
Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Moscow, 30 December 1943.

Your 291729. The minutes prepared by Bohlen relating to the question of the Italian ships will be found beginning with the 2nd paragraph of the minutes of the 6 pm meeting 1 December. These minutes are as follows [Here follow paragraphs two through twelve of the Bohlen minutes, ante, p. 596.] I have compared Bohlen's notes with those of Major Birse now in Moscow who acted as interpreter for the Prime Minister and they agree on all points of substance. Major Birse has some more detail in regard to the Prime Minister's explanation as to why the delay of a couple of months was necessary and the desire of Great Britain to help in the reconditioning of Soviet ships when the Dardanelles was open. Both Bohlen and Birse recall the Prime Minister asking Eden during the discussion how many war vessels were covered by the Soviet request and Eden replied "1 battleship, 1 cruiser and 8 destroyers and 4 submarines". This is the number which the Soviet Government asked for at the Moscow Conference. My recollection is quite clear[ly] confirmed by both Bohlen and Birse that the number of ships under discussion at the meeting recorded above was that requested at the Moscow Conference and no mention was made of 1/3 of the Italian Fleet being turned over to the Soviet Union, nor do we know of any discussion about Italian ships at any other time during the Teheran Conference.

1 Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.
2 The telegram of December 29, 1943, under reference (which is in the Roosevelt Papers) asked for the pertinent passages of Bohlen's minutes regarding the Tehran agreement on turning over Italian ships to the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

LONDON, 2 January 1944.

530. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

Hull tells Eden that you have no recollection of any remarks by UJ about unconditional surrender. I certainly heard, with great interest,

1 Presumably sent via military channels.
2 See ante, p. 855.
him saying something to the effect that he thought it might be well to consider telling the Germans at some stage what unconditional surrender would involve, or perhaps what it would not involve. After that we began talking about the 50,000 and your compromise and my high falutin, and I finished up by no means certain that the Germans would be reassured if they were told what he had in mind.3

Find also Anthony telegraphed to the Foreign Office on November 30 as follows:

“Last night (November 29th) Marshal Stalin spoke to the President about unconditional surrender. Marshal Stalin said he considered this bad tactics vis-à-vis Germany and his suggestion was that we should together work out terms and let them be made known generally to the people of Germany”.

Perhaps this may give you a cue to what Anthony and I had in our memories and you may feel inclined to join with us in asking UJ whether he would care to develop his theme to us. If however, you prefer we can of course leave things where they are for the time being.

3 Churchill’s reference is to the discussion at the dinner meeting on November 29, 1943; see ante, p. 554.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President

SECRET

London, 3 January 1944.

To the President from Winant.

After reading the Prime Minister’s number 530 to you, I wanted you to know that a message from Mister Hull instructed me to take up the question of what was said in relation to unconditional surrender at Teheran with the Prime Minister on his return to London.2 I hope the Prime Minister’s query to you was in a form acceptable to you. Eden meant it to be so and the Prime Minister followed his suggestion in his cable to you. Eden thought that the subject had come up at a luncheon conversation at the Russian Embassy. There has been no further word from Stalin.

1 Presumably sent via military channels.

2 See ante, p. 855.
Memorandum by the Secretary of State

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

[WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1944.

Subject: Status of Indochina After the War
Participants: Secretary of State Hull and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax

The British Ambassador called at his request and remarked that information had come to him from his Foreign Office that in a conversation with the Turks, Egyptians, and perhaps others, during his recent trip to the Near East, the President spoke rather definitely about what purported to be his views to the effect that Indochina should be taken away from the French and put under an international trusteeship, et cetera. . . .

[C[ORDELL] H[UILL]]

The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Stevens) to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 12

Chengtu, January 5, 1944.

Sir: I have the honor to report that on January 4, 1944 I called by appointment on General Chang Ch'un, Chairman of the Szechwan Provincial Government, who received me at his private residence south of the West China University campus. . . .

. . . I inquired whether the Chinese Government had any plans for sending Japanese-trained administrators to Japan to assist in restoring order. He assured me that this question had been fully discussed and settled at the Cairo Conference ¹ and that the Generalissimo had informed him recently that the conferees had agreed that as soon as Japan's military power had been broken the Japanese in Japan proper would be permitted to work out their own destiny without outside direction. . . .

¹ See ante, p. 323.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, January 6, 1944.

43, January 6, 4 p.m. Personal and secret for the President and the Secretary from Harriman:

Molotov 1 continued that Marshal Stalin at Tehran had outlined the terms which the Soviet Government were prepared to accord Finland and, as he recalled it, the President and Mr. Churchill had expressed no objection to these terms.²

HARRIMAN

¹ In the course of a conversation with Harriman on December 31, 1943.
² See ante, p. 592.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt ¹

SECRET

LONDON, 7 January 1944.

No. 536. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret.

Bedell Smith and Devers came through here morning of 8th. Bedell told me that he and Montgomery are convinced that it is better to put in a much heavier and broader OVERLORD than to expand ANVIL above our pre-Teheran conception and that he is putting this to Eisenhower and your Chiefs of Staff... .

It also seems to me from what I heard very probable that the Y Moon (see my immediately following) ² will be at the earliest practicable date. I do not see why we should resist this if the Commanders feel they have a better chance then. At Teheran, however, C. O. S. recommendation was Y1 or one day earlier which you and I agreed to express more agreeably as "During May". ³ In conversation with U. J. we never mentioned such a date as May 5th or May 8th but always spoke to him around 20th. ⁴ Neither did we at any time dwell upon the exact phase of the operation which should fall on any particular

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.
² Telegram 537 reads: "... Y date is June 2d."
³ See ante, p. 564.
⁴ See ante, p. 547.
day. If now the Y date is accepted as final I do not feel that we shall in any way have broken faith with him. The operation will anyhow begin in May with feints and softening bombardments and I do not think U. J. is the kind of man to be unreasonable over 48 hours.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Further references of 1944 by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin to the Tehran agreement on the invasion of Europe will be found in Stalin's Correspondence, vol. II, pp. 138, 145.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill\(^1\)*

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, 8 January 1944.

Personal and secret, Number 437. For the Former Naval Person from the President.

As I told you in my 422,\(^2\) Harriman requested information on the action we were taking to carry out our commitments to turn over Italian ships to the Soviet by 1 February so that he could discuss the matter with Molotov if he were queried. I told him it was my intention to allocate one-third of the captured Italian ships to the Soviet war effort beginning 1 February as rapidly as they could be made available.

Harriman then reminded me that Stalin's request at Teheran was a reiteration of the Soviet request originally made at Moscow in October (namely for one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four submarines for North Russia and 40,000 tons displacement of merchant shipping for the Black Sea) and that no mention was made at Moscow or Teheran of the Russians' getting additional ships up to one-third of those captured. Accordingly Harriman regarded my cable of December 21 as being for his information and he has not discussed the question of one-third with Molotov.

Harriman also emphasized the very great importance of fulfilling our pledge to yield these ships. For us to fail or to delay would in his opinion only arouse suspicion in Stalin and in his associates as to the firmness of other commitments made at Teheran.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

\(^2\) No. 422 was the repetition to Churchill of Roosevelt's telegram of December 21, 1943, to Harriman, ante, p. 552.

\(^3\) The remainder of this message dealt with the implementation of the Tehran agreement on the transfer of Italian ships to the Soviet Union.
The President to the President's Personal Representative (Hurley), Temporarily in Iran

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1944.

DEAR PAT: I am given to understand by the State Department that the Foreign Minister of Iran is very much perturbed about the stories the American press and radio have carried about a reported plot to assassinate the various Heads of State during the conferences at Teheran in December.¹

I wish you would explain to the Foreign Minister that there was never any question of suspicion about any Iranian, but that the report of threatened violence involved German agents who were believed to have entered Iran without authority. As you know, my move from the American Legation was made primarily in order not to expose any of the conferees to the risk of attack by Axis agents while coming to visit me. I hope that you can put at rest any misunderstanding about the incident. I do not wish to make any further statement to the American press about it as such action would only increase general attention to the matter.

I hope that you may be making fine progress in your work.

With all good wishes [etc.]  

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

¹ See ante, p. 476. Roosevelt had mentioned the plot at his press conference on December 17, 1943; Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1943 volume, pp. 551-552.

The Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I wish to refer to telegram no. 9050 of December 29 from Ambassador Winant which reads in part as follows:

"The Department will be familiar with the Soviet accusations against the Polish resistance groups in Poland which were lodged at Teheran ¹ to the effect that these resistance groups were actually cooperating with the Germans in that they were fighting the so-called partisans which were really Russians dropped by parachute."

It would be helpful to me and to the senior members of the Department who are handling Soviet-Polish matters if the pertinent sections

¹ See ante, p. 599.
of the report on the Tehran Conference with regard to the aforementioned Soviet accusations might be made available to the Department.

\[\text{C[ORDELL] H[ULL]}\]

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Roosevelt Papers

Minutes of a Meeting of the Pacific War Council\(^1\)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM

The thirty-sixth meeting of the Pacific War Council was held in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, D. C., at 12:30 p.m., on Wednesday, January 12, 1944.

Present:

The President.
The Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. A. Loudon.
The Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Wei Tao-ming.
The Canadian Ambassador, Hon. Leighton McCarthy.
Vice President Sergio Osmeña, representing Hon. Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine Commonwealth.
The New Zealand Minister, Dr. Walter Nash.
The Australian Minister, Sir Owen Dixon.
Sir Ronald Campbell, E. E. and M. P., representing Viscount Halifax, the British Ambassador.

... President Roosevelt informed the Council that his discussions with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and with Marshal Stalin were highly satisfactory—in that both had agreed that Japan should be stripped of her island possessions\(^2\) and that the civil control of the islands north of the equator should be taken over by the United Nations,\(^3\) while the policing of the Western Pacific and, therefore, the necessary air and naval bases should be taken over by those powers

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\(^1\)The Pacific War Council consisted of representatives of those signatories of the Declaration by United Nations which were fighting in the Pacific. It met from time to time at Washington under Roosevelt as chairman.

\(^2\)For the Cairo Declaration, December 1, 1943, in which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek stated that it was "their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914", see ante, p. 448. For Stalin's concurrence in the Cairo Declaration, see ante, p. 566.

\(^3\)For statements by Stalin indicating agreement with the idea that the islands in the vicinity of Japan should remain under strong control, and that "strong points" then in the hands of Japan should remain in the hands of the Allies, and for Molotov's statement that "strong points" taken from Germany or Japan could be under the control of Great Britain or the United States or both, see ante, pp. 532, 554, and 570, respectively.
capable of exercising effective military control. Marshal Stalin had specifically agreed to the idea that Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores should be returned to China; that the Koreans are not yet capable of exercising and maintaining independent government and that they should be placed under a 40-year tutelage; that Russia, having no ice-free port in Siberia, is desirous of getting one and that Marshal Stalin looks with favor upon making Dairen a free port for all the world, with the idea that Siberian exports and imports could be sent through the port of Dairen and carried to Siberian territory over the Manchurian Railroad in bond. He agrees that the Manchurian Railway should become the property of the Chinese Government. He wishes all of Sakhalin to be returned to Russia and to have the Kurile Islands turned over to Russia in order that they may exercise control of the straits leading to Siberia.

President Roosevelt stated that it was extremely gratifying to him to find that the Generalissimo and Marshal Stalin saw “eye to eye” with him on all major problems of the Pacific and that he felt that there would be no difficulty in reaching agreements about the control of the Pacific once Japan had been completely conquered.

President Roosevelt stated that he thinks the Pacific War Council is the body that should work out preliminary studies about the final solution of the Pacific problems as all interested powers are represented in the Council except Russia, whose agreement might be expected in view of the discussions the President had already had with Marshal Stalin.

President Roosevelt also recalled that Stalin is familiar with the history of the Liuchiu Islands and that he is in complete agreement that they belong to China and should be returned to her and further

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4 For discussions of the control of strategic “strong points” by sufficiently powerful countries or by a world organization in the interests of preserving peace, see ante, pp. 510–511, 533.
5 See the Cairo Declaration and Stalin’s concurrence therein.
6 In the Cairo Declaration, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek expressed the determination of their three countries that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent”. No other record has been found of agreement at Cairo or Tehran that the Koreans should be placed “under a 40-year tutelage”.
7 See ante, p. 567, and Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 378–379, 768.
8 No other record has been found of agreement by Stalin at Tehran that the Manchurian Railway should become the property of the Chinese Government. For a reference to the lack of rail connections at Petrogradovsk, see ante, p. 567. According to United States Relations With China, p. 113, footnote 1, Soviet use of the Manchurian railways was discussed informally during the Tehran Conference. The authority for this statement has not been ascertained.
9 No other specific record has been found of the expression of these desires by Stalin at Tehran. For statements by Stalin concerning the control of the islands in the vicinity of Japan and the control of the Straits in the approach to Vladivostok, see ante, pp. 532, 567. See also Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 378–379.
10 No other record has been found of any expression of views by Stalin at Tehran concerning the Ryukyu (Liuchiu) Islands.
that the civil administration of all islands now controlled by Japan should be taken over by the United Nations with, as stated before, military control of specific strong points assigned as necessary to maintain the peace. President Roosevelt stated that he believed that everyone agreed that the civil administration of the Pacific Islands is a responsibility that should be carried out for the benefit of the populations and that their administration will always be a source of expense rather than profit.

\[\text{Wilson Brown}\]
\[\text{Rear Admiral, U. S. N.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{11} For discussions at Tehran concerning the welfare of dependent peoples, see ante, pp. 485, 486, 517.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{12} For a reference to the costs of occupation of bases which might be placed under trusteeship, see ante, p. 554.}\]

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\textbf{Roosevelt Papers: Telegram}

\textit{President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill \textsuperscript{1}}

\textbf{SECRET}

\textbf{OPERATIONAL PRIORITY}

Number 441, personal and secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 536.\textsuperscript{2} It is my understanding that in Teheran U. J. was given a promise that \textit{Overlord} be launched during May and supported by strongest practicable \textit{Anvil} at about the same time and that he agreed to plan for simultaneous Russian attack on Eastern front.\textsuperscript{3}

\[\text{Roosevelt}\]

\[\textsuperscript{1} \text{Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.}\]
\[\textsuperscript{2} \text{Ante, p. 865.}\]
\[\textsuperscript{3} \text{See ante, pp. 576–577.}\]

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\textbf{Roosevelt Papers: Telegram}

\textit{The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President \textsuperscript{1}}

\textbf{SECRET}

\textbf{LONDON, 14 January 1944.}

\textbf{For the President from Ambassador Winant.}

1. I have just received the following confidential communication dated January 13th from Mr. Eden regarding a matter which you discussed with him at your recent meeting in Egypt:

\[\textsuperscript{1} \text{Presumably sent via military channels.}\]
"13th January, 1944. My dear Ambassador,
"1. Before I left Egypt the President mentioned to me that Father Hughes, an English priest who is at present in charge of the Apostolic Delegation in Cairo, had complained to him of the treatment by the authorities concerned of Italian priests and nuns who had been arrested or interned. ¹ I told the President at the time that I was sure that there was another side to this question, and informed Lord Killearn of the conversation. I have now in front of me several reports from Lord Killearn which show that I was right, and that Father Hughes, in making these complaints, had, to say the least, allowed his heart to rule his head."²

² See ante, pp. 739, 750.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt ¹

SECRET


Number 545. Prime Minister to President. Personal and most secret.

I... My recollection is clear that nothing was said at Teheran about "one third" but that promise was made to meet the Russian claim put forward at Moscow to have transferred to them one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines, and forty thousand tons of merchant shipping.

¹ Presumably sent via military channels.

870.01  A.M.G./21

The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, January 19, 1944.

Memorandum for the President

On September 25 you authorized the Department to propose to the British participation of American political (Lincoln MacVeagh) and economic (James Landis) representatives on the ATB (Administration of Territories—Balkans) Committee in Cairo in order to meet the increasingly urgent need for a direct method of Anglo-American collaboration as regards the Balkans, and with a view to full American participation in the execution of agreed political and economic policies in that area. The ATB was then a British military-civilian committee, after having started out as a purely military body.
Although Ambassador Winant has subsequently pursued this matter, under instructions, he has been unable to get any concrete response from the British. Finally, in December, the British said this question had been "discussed at the highest level in North Africa" and promised a definite reply as soon as they knew the results of these discussions.¹

So far nothing has been received. Before instructing Winant to take the matter up again, I should appreciate being informed whether this question was in fact covered in your recent discussions; and, if so, what decisions were reached.²

CORDELL HULL

¹ See Bucknell’s telegram of December 9, 1943, to the Secretary of State, ante, p. 840.

² The following reply in Roosevelt’s handwriting appears on a copy of this memorandum which Roosevelt returned to Hull: "C.H. I don’t remember any discussion on this in Cairo or elsewhere[.]. FDR" (870.01 A. M. G./21). According to Army files, McCloy raised with Roosevelt at the Second Cairo Conference a related matter, namely, the question of sending a military mission to the Balkans, which had been under discussion between the Department of State and the War Department, and Roosevelt told McCloy that he regarded such a mission as unnecessary, since existing supply personnel could be used until greater needs developed.

The President to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I saw Halifax last week and told him quite frankly that it was perfectly true that I had, for over a year, expressed the opinion that Indo-China should not go back to France but that it should be administered by an international trusteeship.¹ France has had the country—thirty million inhabitants for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning.

As a matter of interest, I am wholeheartedly supported in this view by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and by Marshal Stalin.² I see no reason to play in with the British Foreign Office in this matter. The only reason they seem to oppose it is that they fear the effect it would have on their own possessions and those of the Dutch. They have never liked the idea of trusteeship because it is, in some in-

¹ The substance of the remarks made by Halifax to Hull on January 3, 1944 (see ante, p. 864), had been conveyed by Hull to Roosevelt in a memorandum of January 14, 1944 (851.014/134a).

² See ante, pp. 325, 485.
stances, aimed at future independence. This is true in the case of Indo-China.

F[ranklin] D[Roosevelt]

Roosevelt Papers

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Translation

Personal and secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to Presiden[t] Fr[a]nklin D. Roosevelt and Prime-Minister Winston Churchill

29 January 1944.

On January 23 I have received your two joint messages, signed by you, Mr. President, and you, Mr. Prime-Minister, on the question of transference for the use of the Soviet Union of Italian vessels.¹

I have to say, that after your joint affirmative reply in Teheran to my question regarding the transference to the Soviet Union of Italian vessels before the end of January, 1944, I considere[d] this question as settled and it did not occur to me that there was a possibility of revision of this accepted and agreed upon, among the three of us, decision. So much the more, as we came to an agreement, that in the course of December and January this question should have been settled with the Italians as well. Now I see that this is not so, and that the Italians have not been approached on that question at all.

In order not to delay, however, this matter, which is of vital importance for our common struggle against Germany, the Soviet Government is ready to accept your proposal . . .²

In your reply, however, is no mention made of the transference to the Soviet Union of eight Italian squadron destroyers and four submarines, regarding the transference of which to the Soviet Union still at the end of January, you Mr. President, and you Mr. Prime-Minister, gave your consent in Teheran. Undoubtedly for the Soviet Union primarily is this question, the question regarding destroyers and submarines, without which the transference of a battleship and

¹ Roosevelt's copy was presumably sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington.
² The joint message of January 23, 1944, printed in Stalin's Correspondence, vol. II, p. 115, conveyed to Stalin (1) the conclusions set forth in the memorandum of the Combined Chiefs of Staff mentioned in Churchill's telegram of January 16, 1944, ante, p. 871, and (2) a proposal, which Churchill had made to Roosevelt in the same telegram, for the temporary transfer to the Soviet Union of certain non-Italian ships instead of the surrendered Italian ships.
³ The omitted passage, which does not refer to the Tehran Conference, is printed in Stalin's Correspondence, vol. II, p. 117.
a cruiser is of no value. You will understand yourself that cruisers and battleships are powerless without destroyers escorting them. Since you have at your disposal the whole Italian naval fleet, fulfillment of the decision agreed upon in Teheran pertaining to the transference for the use of the Soviet Union of eight destroyers and four submarines from this fleet should not be difficult. I agree, that instead of Italian destroyers and submarines the Soviet Union be given to use the same number of American or English destroyers and submarines. Besides, the question of transference of destroyers and submarines cannot be postponed, but must be solved simultaneously with the transference of the battleship and cruiser, as it was agreed upon, among the three of us, in Teheran.4

4 Churchill, in a telegram to Roosevelt dated February 1, 1944, repeated the text of this message which he had received from Stalin and added the comment: “What can you expect from a bear but a growl?” (Roosevelt Papers). Further passing references to the Tehran agreement on Italian ships, in correspondence of February 1944 with Stalin, will be found in Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. 11, pp. 118, 122.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt1

SECRET

CHUNGKING, 3 February 1944.

I appreciate your desire to open the Ledo Road, a desire which is also my great concern since it is only thru the opening of this land route that China may quickly obtain the heavy equipment much needed by her Army. You doubtless recall that at Cairo I reiterated and emphasized the fact that I am ready to send the Yunnan troops into Burma at any moment that large scale amphibious landing operations can be effected at strategic points.2

I stand ready to adhere to this decision, and hope that we can carry out operations even before November of this year, which date you mentioned as possible and probable for the diverting of the amphibious equipment to Burma.

1 Sent via Army channels from Hearn to Marshall, “eyes only”, for delivery to Roosevelt.
President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

SECRET
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 23 February 1944.

Personal and secret from the President for Marshal Stalin.

It is clear to me that there is a manifest need for United Nations machinery for joint planning of the procedures by which consideration should be given to the various fields of international economic cooperation, the subjects which should be discussed, the order of discussion, and the means of coordinating existing and prospective arrangements and activities. . . . What I am raising here is the question of further steps toward the establishment of United Nations machinery for post-war economic collaboration, which was raised by the Secretary of State at the Moscow meeting 2 and was discussed by you, Prime Minister Churchill, and myself at Teheran. 3

Roosevelt

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1 Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.
2 See ante, p. 118.
3 See ante, pp. 530-531.

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

LONDON, 3 March 1944.

599. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret.

Reuter[s] announces the message in my immediately following. Can this be true?

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1 Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

LONDON, 3 March 1944.

600. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret.

Reference my immediately preceding telegram. Washington Friday from Reuter[s]. Time of receipt 1720 3rd March. Msg begins:

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1 Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.
President Roosevelt today announced that Italian warships are ready to be sent to the Russian Navy. Discussions for transferring roughly 1/3 of the Italian Fleet to Russia, the President said, were about half completed.

President Roosevelt said that the U. S. and Britain are already using some Italian tonnage. Efforts are now being made to determine how many of these ships or their equivalent can be turned over to the Russian Navy. Marshal Stalin had raised the question through his Ambassador in Washington.

President Roosevelt stressed that so long as the war lasted the Allies will use everything afloat against the enemy. After the war something more permanent would have to be decided. Asked whether the ships would be manned by Italians, the President replied that some may and some may not. Italian ships which had escaped to the Balearic Islands, he said, were a Spanish problem.

President Roosevelt explained that since Italy surrendered to the U. S., Britain and Russia, it was thought advisable to distribute the Italian Fleet roughly on the basis of 1/3 each. He would not say how much tonnage was involved.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

[WASHINGTON,] 3 March 1944.

486. In reply to insistent questioning at a press conference today I stated that Italian merchant ships and war ships are now being used in our war effort by the Allied Mediterranean command and that some of the Italian ships or substitutes therefor from the British and American tonnage will be allocated to the Soviet Navy to assist in their requirements for their war effort.

ROOSEVELT

1 Presumably sent via military channels.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

LONDON, 4 March 1944.

601. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and most secret.

About the Italian ships et cetera. I was much startled by the press accounts of your talk with them. The Russians have never asked for

1 Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.
one-third of the Italian ships, but only for the specific vessels mentioned at Moscow and agreed to by us at Teheran. See list which follows. We have never agreed, as you know, to anything beyond this...

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

LONDON, 4 March 1944.

602. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret.

My immediately preceding telegram. The Admiralty state that one third of the Italian ships in our possession would amount to:

1.7 battleships
2 6 inch cruisers
0.7 5.3 inch cruisers
3.3 destroyers
7.7 torpedo boats
6.7 corvettes
7.3 submarines

Whereas what the Russians ask for and what the British agreed to was:

1 battleship
1 cruiser
8 destroyers
4 submarines
40,000 tons of merchant shipping.

Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to Congressman Mruk

PRIVATE

[WASHINGTON,] March 6, 1944.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN MRUK:—I am afraid I cannot make any further comments except what I have written to you before—there were no secret commitments made by me at Teheran and I am quite sure that other members of my party made none either. This, of course, does not include military plans which, however, had nothing to do with Poland.

Very sincerely yours,

[No signature indicated]
Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

LONDON, 7 March 1944.

No. 608. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and most secret. About the Italian ships.

1. I have never agreed nor have you ever asked me to agree to a division of the Italian Fleet into 3 shares. If this claim were to be based on the fact that we 3 Powers signed the Italian Armistice together, what about all the other Powers that fought Italy? Greece for instance would have an irrefutable claim. It was not until after the Cairo conference that I heard you had mentioned about the ¼ for Russia. Averell was however able to assure you that nothing of the sort had been said to the Russians. See your number 437. You are therefore quite uncommitted so far as they are concerned.

2. His Majesty’s Government would not be able to agree to a division of the Italian Fleet by ¼ or a pro rata division among signatories to the Armistice.

5. At the Moscow conference the Russians asked for certain specified types of Italian ships, namely

1 Battleship
1 Cruiser
8 Destroyers
4 Submarines
and 40,000 tons of merchant shipping.

At Teheran we assented to this...

1 Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.
2 Ante, p. 866.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

LONDON, 9 March 1944.

613. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and secret...

1. You will remember that we discussed the dollar balances in Cairo on December 8th and that I gave a memorandum to Harry.

1 Presumably sent via military channels.
2 For the full text of this telegram, see Churchill, p. 697.
3 Roosevelt left Cairo on the morning of December 7, 1943. For what is believed to be the memorandum given to Harry Hopkins, see ante, p. 822.
I certainly understood that you felt we ought not to be treated worse than France or Russia in these matters.

740.00119 Control (Germany)/4-2244

Memorandum by the Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs (Matthews), Temporarily at London

MOST SECRET

LONDON, April 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Partition of Germany

Participants: Sir William Strang
             Mr. H. Freeman Matthews

Following our meeting with Dr. Bowman, Troutbeck, O'Neil and Harrison, Strang took me aside and permitted me hastily to read in strictest confidence the British minutes of the Tehran Conference having to do with the ideas of the three leaders as regards the partition of Germany. The minutes were about four pages in length and apparently concerned two conversations, one between Stalin and Churchill alone, and one at which President Roosevelt was present. These minutes revealed several things quite clearly:

1) All three favored some partition.
2) Churchill seemed inclined to a division of Germany into three parts, the first comprised of Prussia to which area he ascribed all the evil that exists in Germany. (Neither Stalin nor the President appeared to concur in this view, both holding that the peoples of other areas of Germany were equally predatory and militaristic.) The second zone was Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden; and the third comprised the rest of Germany. Churchill did say that some of his advisers held different views on partition.
3) The President suggested a five-zone division and spoke strongly in favor of partition as the best means of preventing German rearmament and a resurgence of German nationalism. He made it clear, however, that he had reached no final conclusions.
4) Stalin throughout was most outspoken in his determination to see Germany completely crushed and never again permitted to be a menace to the peace of the world. He said that he preferred the President's five-way partition plan to the Prime Minister's three-way partition and indicated an even greater number of separate states would please him better. When the Prime Minister said that this

1 This may refer to the discussion of this subject at (1) the tripartite dinner meeting of November 28, 1943, at which the Churchill–Stalin conversation continued after Roosevelt had retired, ante, p. 511, and (2) the tripartite political meeting of December 1, 1943, ante, p. 600.
might merely give incentive to the states to join together again, Stalin briskly stated that the Allies should see to it that this did not happen and that as long as he lived Russia would prevent any such efforts. He did not want to see Austria reunited to Hungary or any other strong unit formed. When the President spoke of controlling the German armament industries Stalin remarked: "What about the watchmakers and the tablemakers? Experience has shown that such industries can readily be transformed into arms manufacturers." Any reference to the need for German reconstruction to teach them ways of peace or the need of a healthy Germany to have a healthy Europe he dismissed abruptly. He once questioned the depth of Churchill's determination to keep Germany weak. When Churchill asked if Stalin favored having only small states on the continent he replied that France and Poland were large states who might help keep Germany down and that was enough. He emphasized throughout, however, that it was the duty of the three major Allies to keep Germany weak and poor.

H F[reeman] M[athews]

800.796/6-1044

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1944.

Subject: Aviation Policy

Participants: The President
Senator Bennett Champ Clark
Mr. L. Welch Pogue, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board
Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr.

The President asked Senator Clark, Mr. Pogue, and myself to meet him at the White House at 12:30 on June 9, which we did. After some general conversation largely relating to political conditions, the President raised the question of aviation policy. . .

The President said that he had discussed this matter a little with Stalin at Tehran in the general sense that Soviet planes desiring to fly over American territory ought to have the right to land and refuel, though not to take on and discharge passengers or cargo; we would want equivalent rights in the Soviet Union. Stalin thought something could be worked out.\(^1\)

A. A. B[erle, Jr.]

\(^1\)There appears to be no direct reference to such a discussion in the available records of the Tehran Conference. For an additional reference, however, see ante, p. 860.
Treasury Files

Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury
(White)\(^1\)

[London, August 13, 1944.]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY'S FILES:

Conference at Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden's home, Sunday, 3 p.m., August 13, 1944. Participating in the discussion were Sir Anthony Eden, Secretary Morgenthau, Ambassador Winant, H. D. White. Robert Sherwood joined the group later.

(Sitting on the lawn near by were Mrs. Eden, a Major in the United States Army and some young lady relative of the Eden family, all of whom could have overheard parts of the conversation).

Secretary Morgenthau spoke of his concern over the trend in thinking with respect to plans for civil control by military forces of Germany immediately after occupation . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Eden replied that he had been waiting for the European Advisory Committee [Commission] to prepare, in accordance with the decision made at the Teheran conference, a program for reparations and other controls over postwar Germany. He said time was short and asked Winant when the E. A. C. was coming out with a report.

Ambassador Winant explained that the E. A. C. had worked out what they regarded as the most urgent part of their assignment, namely, to formulate the terms of surrender and the allocation of areas of control by the British, American and Russian military authorities. He added that to his knowledge the final decision had not yet been made with respect to allocation of the area of control as between the British and American military authorities.

With respect to the report of which Eden was inquiring, he said they had not yet begun working on it. He went on to explain that he was waiting to receive from Washington memoranda or decisions of policy with respect to reparations and other postwar measures regarding Germany. . . .

\(^1\) For an account of the discussions covered in this document and in the one immediately following, see the article by Fred Smith, formerly Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, reprinted in Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments (The Harry Dexter White Papers), Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 84th Congress, 1st session, part 30, pp. 2640-2641.
Eden said that he was a little surprised that the general policy with respect to the treatment of Germany after victory wasn't known. He said that at the Teheran conference it had been agreed that E. A. C. should be instructed to work out plans for the dismemberment of Germany. Eden said that Russia was determined on one thing above all others, namely, that Germany would not again disturb the peace of Europe; that "Uncle Joe" Stalin was determined to smash Germany so that it would never again be able to make war. At the Teheran conference "Uncle Joe" had insisted that Germany be dismembered to the end that she would be unable to make war again. Eden said Roosevelt had agreed with Stalin, but Churchill was at first reluctant to accede. He (Churchill) was willing to make Austria independent and to take East Prussia away, but was doubtful about going beyond that. After conversing with him, Eden, Churchill decided, in view of the attitude of Roosevelt and Stalin, to go along with them on that program and so it was definitely decided that the E. A. C. was to prepare a program for the dismemberment of Germany. Eden said that he assumed that their people (the British technicians) were working along the lines necessary to carry out the decision at Teheran. He had assumed he said that the E. A. C. was going ahead on that basis.

Eden said that much of that was in the reported minutes of the meeting at Teheran which possibly the Secretary had seen. The Secretary replied that he had not seen them and inquired whether or not it would be possible. Mr. Eden said that of course, that he had them in his office and he would arrange to have the Secretary see them there.

I mentioned that I understood that some of the thinking among the British, particularly among the British Treasury technicians, was that a restoration of the Germany [German?] economy was desirable because prior to the war Germany had been the most important customer of Great Britain and that Great Britain could not afford to lose so excellent a market for her goods. Eden appeared shocked that such views should be held in the British Treasury and said that they were not in accord with the decisions arrived at at Teheran.

H. D. White
Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (White)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY’S FILES

[LONDON,] August 15, 1944.

Conference at Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden’s Office at 4 P.M.

Present: Sir Anthony Eden
Mr. W. Strange [Strang], British member of the EAC
Secretary Morgenthau
Ambassador Winant
Mr. H. D. White

The conference had been arranged by Sir Anthony Eden on previous Sunday, who had suggested that if the Secretary could come to his office he could show him that portion of the Tehran conference dealing with the decision on partition of Germany.

Eden began reading excerpts from a report on the Tehran conference. He said that the report had been prepared by Archibald Kerr and was sort of a telegraphic report and not a verbatim report. The gist of the excerpts which Eden read was as follows: President Roosevelt said that he would like to discuss the question of the partition of Germany. (At this point Eden explained parenthetically that Churchill had been pushing the Polish question and that Stalin was trying to get away from it and he feared likewise President Roosevelt, but that Churchill kept trying to bring the Polish matter back into the discussion. President Roosevelt said that Germany could be divided into three or fifteen parts. Stalin indicated smilingly that Churchill wasn’t listening because he doubted whether Churchill was in favor of dividing Germany. Churchill replied that he hadn’t yet left Lwow (thereby indicating that he still wanted to discuss the Polish question). The President expressed the view that the European Advisory Commission should be instructed to report on the problem of partitioning Germany. Stalin agreed. Since Stalin and Roosevelt felt strongly about the point Churchill said he was willing to agree that the Commission should examine and report on the question of the partition of Germany.

... I asked Winant if as a member of the EAC representing the United States he had ever [been?] instructed to go forward on a study based on the assumption tentatively decided upon at Tehran

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1 See supra.
that Germany was to be separated into many parts. The Ambassador replied that he had been at Tehran and knew that decision had been made but that he didn’t know how much he was supposed to tell to his own Department back home and that he had never received instructions from his own Department to work on such proposal.

H. D. White

Treasury Files

Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (White)

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY’S FILES

Dinner at the Citadel, Quebec, Wednesday, September 13, 1944, 8:00 p. m.

However, the President came back to the German problem several times very nicely and did not recede from his position. He reminded Churchill that Stalin at Teheran had said: “Are you going to let Germany produce modern metal furniture? The manufacture of metal furniture can be quickly turned into the manufacture of armament.”

H. D. White

* The date “9/25/44” which appears at the end of the memorandum is evidently the date of typing.
* See ante, p. 511.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt ¹

TOP SECRET

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 799.

3. . . . I have already informed Parliament in open session of our support of Curzon Line as a basis for frontier settlement in the east,²

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.
² The Curzon Line was mentioned at the tripartite political meeting held at Tehran on December 1, 1943; see ante, p. 599. The proposal to move the Soviet-Polish boundary westward was also discussed, without specific reference to its being moved to the Curzon Line, on other occasions at the Tehran Conference; see ante, pp. 512, 594.
and our twenty year treaty with Russia makes it desirable for us to define our position to a degree not called for from the United States at the present time.

4. I should however mention, though no doubt Averell will have reported, that Molotov stated at our opening meeting with the London Poles that you had expressed agreement with the Curzon Line at Tehran. I informed Stalin afterwards that neither I nor Eden could confirm this statement. Stalin thereupon said that he had had a private conversation with you, not at the table, when you had concurred in the policy of the Curzon Line, though you had expressed a hope about Lwow being retained by the Poles. I could not, of course, deal with this assertion. Several times in the course of my long talks with him, he emphasized his earnest desire for your return at the election and of the advantage to Russia and to the world which that would be. Therefore, you may be sure that no indiscretion will occur from the Russian side.

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3 W. Averell Harriman.
5 For the Polish minutes of the meeting, see the Appendix to Special Report No. 1, Communist Takeover and Occupation of Poland, of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives on Communist Aggression (House Report No. 2684, 82d Congress, 2d session, part 4; 1953), pp. 115 ff., especially p. 122.
6 For the Bohlen minutes of the Roosevelt–Stalin meeting of December 1, 1943, at which Poland was discussed, see ante, p. 594. For Roosevelt’s reference at the Yalta Conference to his views on the Curzon Line as expressed at the Tehran Conference, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 667. For other post-Conference references to the discussion of Polish boundaries at Tehran, see Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. II, pp. 113, 133.

Hopkins Papers

Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman)1

SECRET

WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 13, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

Subject: Teheran Declaration on Iran

On the last night of the Teheran Conference (Dec. 1–2) I was assigned the responsibility of seeing that agreement was finally reached as to the text of the Iran Declaration, which had been previously accepted in principle, and that the President, Marshal Stalin

1 This memorandum was prepared in connection with a search in the White House Map Room for the signed original of the Declaration on Iran. Shortly thereafter the signed original (printed ante, p. 646) was located in the files of the President’s Naval Aide (Brown). See also Lohbeck, pp. 491–492.
and the Prime Minister signed the Declaration. I showed the English
draft to Marshal Stalin, and asked him whether he wished it trans-
lated into Russian in order that there might be both a Russian and an
English text to be signed. Stalin asked Pavlov to translate it to him
verbally, and in my presence and Mr. Bohlen's said that he approved
the Declaration and that, in view of the shortness of time, it was not
necessary to have a Russian text. I then asked Stalin to sign the
Declaration. He said he would do so after the President. I then
took the Declaration to the President, who signed it. Thereupon
Stalin signed it forthwith. I do not recall at what moment Mr.
Churchill signed it, but I am positive that all three signatures were
attached.

W. A. HARRIMAN

Note: I confirm completely Ambassador Harriman's recollection
that the document was signed in the manner described above. Charles
E. Bohlen.

740.0011 PW 1939/1-945

The Consul at Colombo (Bishop) to the Secretary of State
(Stettinius)

SECRET

COLOMBO, January 9, 1945.

No. 22

Sir: . . . I have the honor to report that the British Political Ad-
viser\(^1\) to the Supreme Allied Commander\(^2\) has recently stated that
SEAC considers French Indochna to be "open territory" in which
SEAC may operate at any time that it is militarily feasible.

This official pointed out that at the Cairo meeting Admiral Mount-
batten discussed the question of Thailand and French Indochna as
military theatres with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek\(^3\) and asked
the Generalissimo to agree to the inclusion of French Indochna in the
SEAC theatre. The Generalissimo refused to give his agreement,
and Admiral Mountbatten then suggested that, although the U. S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the inclusion of Thailand in
SEAC, Admiral Mountbatten was willing not to publish this fact
provided the Generalissimo agreed to SEAC operations in Indochna
if they became militarily feasible. In other words, it was suggested
that the two Supreme Allied Commanders agree orally that forces

\(^1\) Maberly Esler Dening.
\(^2\) Admiral Mountbatten.
\(^3\) See ante, p. 391.
under either one might operate in either French Indochina or Thailand and that those areas would become a part of the theatre of the commander whose forces reached there first. The Generalissimo is said to have accepted this arrangement.

Respectfully yours,

Max W. Bishop

FE Files

Memorandum by the Co-Chairman of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (Taussig)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1945.

HONGKONG

The President told Stanley ¹ in detail of his discussions on Hongkong with Churchill at Cairo. Briefly—the British to make a beau geste: announce the return of Hongkong to China; Ch[i]ang “or his successor” in three days time to announce that Hongkong is a free port and open to the entire world on equal terms; no one in Hongkong to be deprived of his property as of the period prior to the Japanese invasion.

¹ The reference is to Oliver F. G. Stanley, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, who was in the process of discussing colonial problems with officials of the Department of State; see Nottet, p. 389.

740.0011 PW 1939/1-1945

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

INDOCHINA

The Department has received the following estimate of the present British point of view about Indochina, sent from Kandy on January 4, 1945. As the source of this estimate was Mr. Dening, the Foreign Office official who is Chief Political Adviser under SEAC, I feel that it is of sufficient importance to transmit to you for your information.

In this estimate it is stated that:
"As a result of his verbal agreement with the Generalissimo at Cairo the Supreme Commander still considers that the status of Indochina is as it was in the days of the ABCD [ABDA?] Agreement, namely that Indochina and Thailand are free-for-all areas open to whichever allied military force gets there first. The reason for this is that when it was proposed to the Generalissimo that French Indochina be included in the SEAC theater he objected because of the loss of face involved and the alternative suggested by SAC, and agreed to by the Generalissimo, was that the decision of the Combined Chiefs that Thailand was in SEAC theater should not be released to the public and that both countries would be considered on a free-for-all basis."

JOSEPH C. GREW

893.00/5-2945

The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the Secretary of State (Stettinius)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 29 May 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The following message from Ambassador Hurley to the President, is forwarded requesting the preparation of a reply for the President's consideration: 1

The Generalissimo amplified Roosevelt's position by stating to me that Roosevelt said to him at Cairo that he was in favor of the return of Hongkong to China and had so advised the British. He then asked the Generalissimo if on the return of Hongkong the National Government of China would declare Hongkong a free port. The Generalissimo said the Government of China would make Hongkong a free port. I am familiar with the Roosevelt policy in regard to Hongkong but I do not have a written directive on that subject.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

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1 This and subsequent references to the President (except where otherwise indicated) are to Truman, who succeeded Roosevelt upon the death of the latter, on April 12, 1945.

2 The source text is a copy typed in the Department of State. The original sent to the Secretary of State has not been found.

3 Grew's telegram of June 10, 1945, to Hurley at Chungking, containing Truman's reply, is scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the Foreign Relations series.
The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State (Byrnes)

CONFIDENTIAL

Chungking, August 11, 1945.

1330. . . The Generalissimo has mentioned to me frequently President Roosevelt's statement at Cairo to the effect that the United States would equip ninety Chinese divisions. Thirty divisions (X force) to be equipped immediately. Thirty divisions (Y force) as soon as first thirty divisions were completed and finally the arming of thirty additional divisions (Z force) making a total of ninety American armed divisions which would constitute the Chinese peacetime army.

Chiang Kai-Shek said Harry Hopkins was present when commitment was made.

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET


Memorandum for the President

Re: Chinese matters arising out of conversations with T. V. Soong.

2. Lend-Lease Military Equipment.

T. V. Soong inquires whether we are prepared to complete our commitment to equip 100 Chinese divisions? This commitment is said to have been made to Chiang by President Roosevelt at Cairo. The commitment apparently is not in writing. Mr. Hopkins affirms that some such commitment was made at Cairo when action in the Chinese theatre was agreed upon, and apparently after Teheran, Chiang, who was disturbed by the postponement at Teheran of the action planned for the Chinese theatre, was assured that the commitment would be kept. The form of the commitment apparently was vague and loose. While no one anticipated the Japanese war would end so quickly, it is hard to believe that the parties believed the commitment to be wholly independent of the Japanese war. Certainly both Roosevelt and Chiang must have been thinking of Chinese troops to fight the Japs. And it is difficult to treat our Chinese com-
ments different from other commitments under the Lend-Lease Act.\footnote{Act of March 11, 1941 (55 Stat. 31), as extended by the Act of April 16, 1945 (59 Stat. 52).}

So far as I can ascertain about 30 divisions have already been equipped under our commitment to Chiang. Soong speaks of 60 additional divisions to be equipped.

\[\text{James F. Byrnes}\]

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893.20 Mission/9-745

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson)

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Furnishing to China of military advisory groups; Economic aid for China.

Participants: The President;
            Dr. T. V. Soong;
            Acting Secretary, Mr. Acheson

At eleven o’clock this morning, at the President’s request, I was present when he received Dr. T. V. Soong. The President stated that he had been giving very considerable thought to the communications from the Generalissimo relative to the furnishing of a military advisory group of American military, naval and air personnel and to the arming of additional Chinese divisions. . . . He [the President] said that he could say categorically to Dr. Soong that personnel could and would be furnished to advise on these military matters. He said that a careful search of the records had been made and had not disclosed anything relative to the commitment to which the Generalissimo referred as having been made at the Cairo meeting.

Dr. Soong interrupted the President to ask whether he had consulted Mr. Harry Hopkins. The President said that he had talked with Mr. Hopkins and would talk with him again. The President added that, with the cessation of hostilities, his powers in certain respects had changed and that he had to consider the views of the Congress in this matter.
POST-CONFERENCE PAPERS

740.0011 EW 1939/9-2448 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State (Marshall)

NANKING, September 24, 1948.

1756. At weekly press conference of September 23, 1948, Doctor Hollington K. Tong, Director of Chinese Government Information Office, replied as follows to questions:

Query: “Have you any comment to make on Harry L. Hopkins’ article in August 28 Colliers, which has been commented on editorially by Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, stating that President Roosevelt discussed disposal of Dairen with Generalissimo at Cairo, long before Yalta agreement?”

Answer: “Now it happens that I was present at Cairo on occasion of meeting which Mr. Hopkins cites.

“According to my recollection President Roosevelt, in one of his conversations with President Chiang at Cairo, inquired about possibility of conversion of Dairen into free port at end of war. The reply of President Chiang was that he might give consideration to such a proposal when time came, provided there was no infringement of the sovereignty of China.

“The nature of the commitment later made by President Roosevelt at Yalta differed from what President Roosevelt himself had suggested to President Chiang at Cairo. The Yalta commitment was not known to the Government of China at the time it was made.”

Dr. Tong was later asked if he was personally present during conversation referred to between President Roosevelt and Generalissimo. He evaded question by replying that Madame Chiang had acted as interpreter for Generalissimo.

Sent Department 1756, repeated Shanghai 845.

Stuart

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1 The article under reference was not by Hopkins but was a serialized portion of Sherwood’s Roosevelt and Hopkins. The passage in question appears in the book at the top of p. 792.

2 Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.