III. THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE
7. THE PRESIDENT’S LOG AT TEHRAN,
NOVEMBER 27–DECEMBER 2, 1943

White House Files

Log of the Trip

Saturday, November 27th. (Cairo; en route Cairo to Teheran; and at Teheran.)

5:58 a.m. The President and members of his party left his villa for the airport. All hands were up and ready for a 4:30 a.m. departure for the airport but word had been received that our take-off would have to be delayed temporarily due to fog over the field.

6:35 a.m. The President and his party arrived at Cairo West airport. A light fog still persisted over the field so the President and members of his party embarked in their planes to await the lifting of the fog.

7:07 a.m. The fog had lifted by now and the President’s plane took off for Teheran, Iran, where the President was to confer with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin and their respective military staffs and political delegates. Riding in the President’s plane with him were: Mr. Hopkins, Ambassador Harriman, Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, General Watson, Major Boettiger, Lieut-Commander Fox, Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon, Secret Service Agents Reilly, Fredericks and Kellerman, and Steward Prettyman.

7:40 a.m. Our plane passed over the Suez Canal near the town of Isma[il]ia.

1 For the portion of the Log preceding November 27, 1943, see ante, p. 293.

2 In response to a question from the Historical Office of the Department of State, Harriman wrote as follows in a letter of May 25, 1954 (023/5–2554):

“Hopkins and I discussed the question of American aid in repairing economic damage done to the Soviet Union during the war during the flight from Cairo to Tehran on November 27, 1943. I mentioned the matter to President Roosevelt as one of the matters which might be raised by the Russians during the Conference. My recollection, however, is that the subject was never raised or discussed between the President or any of the American delegation with the Russians during the Conference.

“The President authorized me to discuss the matter with Molotov after the Conference was over.”

The subject in fact was taken up with Molotov shortly after Harriman’s return to Moscow following the Conference at Tehran (861.51/30919, 3022).
8:30 a.m. Our plane passed over the city of Jerusalem. Major Bryan took us on a wide-circle tour of the city before continuing on, thus affording all passengers an excellent view of this ancient and inspiring city. Our route from Jerusalem took us east over Lake Habbaniya and the Euphrates River; then we turned northeast, passing Baghdad to the south. Just after we crossed the Tigris River we picked up the Abadan–Teheran motor highway and followed its course generally as far as Hamadan. The Iranian railroad, over which much of our lend-lease supplies for Russia travel, could also be seen at times. From the air we sighted train loads and motor convoys loaded with U. S. lend-lease supplies, bound from the Persian Gulf port of Basra to Russia. Our pilot took advantage of the almost perfect visibility prevailing and never flew above 8000 feet altitude, oftentimes flying through the mountain passes instead of flying over the mountains. From Hamadan we took a direct air-line route for Teheran. This entire flight offered a real bird’s-eye view of the many geological contrasts this generally desolate country has to offer, particularly in the low sandy desert country and in the bleak, nude mountains.

Before landing at Teheran we advanced our clocks and watches one and one-half hours to conform to Teheran local time (Zone Minus 3½ Time).

3:00 p.m. The President’s plane arrived at Teheran at 3:00 p.m., local time, covering the 1,310 miles from Cairo in approximately 6½ hours flying time. Our plane, as well as all other planes bearing members of the American and British delegations, landed at Gale Morghe airport—a Russian Army field—about five miles south of Teheran. This is a modern airfield, and on it were noted a large number of our lend-lease planes now bearing the Red Star of Russia.

The President was met at Gale Morghe airport by Major General D. H. Connolly, Commanding General of our Persian Gulf Service Command. For reasons of security, it had been requested that no other officials meet the President here. There were no honors, which was also by request.

The President left his plane and entered a waiting U. S. Army motor car and proceeded directly to the Ameri-
can Legation where he was greeted by Mr. Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., the United States Minister to Iran, and Brigadier General Patrick Hurley, U.S.A.

The President, Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Major Boettiger and Mr. Hopkins occupied quarters at the American Legation as guests of Minister Dreyfus. The other members of our party were quartered at General Connolly’s compound. Before leaving Cairo the President had been urged to make his quarters in Tehran at both the British and Russian Embassies. The decision to stay at the American Legation was made because of a wish to be more independent than a guest could hope to be and also as the British had issued their invitation first it was felt that the Russians might be offended if it were accepted. Immediately after our arrival at Tehran, Admiral Brown was sent to call on the Russian Chargé d’Affairs to explain why the President had decided to live at the American Legation and why he could not accept the Russians’ invitation.

We learned on our arrival here that Marshal Stalin and his party had arrived in Tehran earlier in the day. The President invited Marshal Stalin to dinner at the American Legation this evening but the Marshal declined because of having had a very strenuous day.

4:30 p.m. Mr. Maximoff, Russian Chargé d’Affairs at Tehran, called on the President at the American Legation.

4:50 p.m. Ambassadors Harriman and Winant called at the Legation.

6:00 p.m. The President retired to his study and wrote a number of personal letters.

7:30 p.m. The President dined at the American Legation and had as his guests Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, General Watson, Ambassador Harriman, Ambassador Winant, and Mr. Hopkins.

10:30 p.m. Lt.-General Ismay called at the American Legation.

He departed at 11:00 p.m.

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See the editorial note, ante, p. 310. The Shah of Iran, when he heard of Roosevelt’s impending arrival, offered the use of one of the royal palaces as a residence and as a conference hall, but the invitation was declined; see post, p. 631. See also Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 172-173.

*See ante, p. 310, and post, p. 475.

*No copies of these messages have been found; presumably they were oral.

*See post, p. 475.

*No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting.

*No record has been found of the discussion that took place during this dinner meeting.
The following is a complete list of those comprising the American party visiting Teheran for this occasion

The President.
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins.
Ambassador Winant.
Ambassador Harriman.
Admiral William D. Leahy, USN.
General G. C. Marshall, USA.
Admiral E. J. King, USN.
General H. H. Arnold, USA.
Lt-General B. B. Somervell, USA.
Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, USN.
Rear Admiral Ross T. McIntire (MC), USN.
Rear Admiral C. H. [E.] Olsen, USN.
Major General E. M. Watson, USA.
Major General J. R. Deane, USA.
Major General R. T. Handy, USA.
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, USN.
Brig. General P. J. Hurley, USA.
Captain W. L. Freeman, USN.
Captain F. B. Royal, USN.
Colonel A. J. McFarland, USA.
Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt, AUS.
Colonel E. O’Donnell, USA.
Commander V. D. Long, USN.
Lt-Colonel Frank McCarthy, USA.
Lt-Comdr. George A. Fox (HC), USN.
Major DeWitt Greer, AUS.
Major George Durno, AUS.
Major John Henry, AUS.
Major John Boettiger, AUS.
Captain G. E. [F.] Rogers, AUS.
Captain H. H. Ware, AUS.
Lieut J. M. Hannon, USNR.
Lieut (jg) W. M. Rigdon, USN.
Lieut (jg) R. P. Meikeljohn, USNR.
Ship’s Clerk E. F. Block, USN.
Warrant Officer (jg) John Deveney, USA.
Mr. Charles Bohlen (State Dept.)
Std 1/c Arthur Prettyman, USN.
Sgt. Robert Hopkins, AUS.
M/Sgt. Frank Stoner, AUS.
M/Sgt. Horace Caldwell, AUS.
Chief Cook A. Orin, USN.
Chief Steward I. Esperancilla, USN.
Chief Steward M. Floresca, USN.
Chief Steward F. Calinao, USN.
Chief Steward P. Estrada, USN.
Chief Cook C. Ordone, USN.
Mr. Russell W. Barnes (O. W. L.)
Corp. W. E. Cru[1]mling, USMC.
Chief Cook A. Javier, USN.
Chief Cook B. Cabera, USN.
Chief Cook M. Corpus[2], USN.
Sgt. D. P. Flanagan, USMC.
T/3 P. J. Levington, AUS.
S/Sgt. R. Morton, AUS.
[M/]Sgt. E. K. Stott, AUS.
Sgt. E. E. Bright, AUS.
T/4 H. Gambaccini, AUS.
Ylc E. J. Maurer, USNR.
Ylc E. G. Peterson, USNR.
Ylc L. W. Karr, USNR.
Y2c D. C. Flickinger, USNR.
T/3 J. J. Lucas, AUS.
Mr. Michael F. Reilly (USSS).
Mr. Guy H. Spanaman (USSS).
Mr. James J. Rowley (USSS).
Mr. Charles W. Fredericks (USSS).
Mr. Vernon Spicer (USSS).
Mr. Robert Holmes (USSS).
Mr. Neil A. Shannon (USSS).
Mr. W. K. Deckard (USSS).
Mr. Robert Hastings (USSS).
Mr. Walter Haman (USSS).
Mr. James M. Beary (USSS).
Mr. Gerald Behn (USSS).
Mr. Frank B. Wood (USSS).
Mr. Roy Kellerman (USSS).

As will be noted, some few members of our party (The President’s party) remained at Cairo, viz:

Warrant Officer (jg) A. M. Cornellius, USA.
Mr. H. S. Anderson (USSS).
Mr. James Griffith (USSS).
Chief Steward S. Abiba, USN.
Chief Cook L. Enrico, USN.
Sunday, November 28th. (At Teheran)

During the forenoon Ambassadors Winant and Harriman, Generals Ismay, Connolly and Hurley called at the American Legation.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{9:30 a. m.} Marshal Stalin sent word through Ambassador Harriman that he was concerned about the distance that separated the American Legation from the Russian Embassy compound, because it was well known that the city of Teheran was filled with Axis sympathizers and that an unhappy incident might occur to any of the Heads of State driving through the city to visit each other.\textsuperscript{11} Ambassador Harriman pointed out that if we persisted in our refusal to accept quarters in the Russian compound we would be responsible for any injury that Marshal Stalin might suffer in driving through the town to consult with President Roosevelt. Mr. Harriman emphasized that the city of Teheran had been under complete German control only a few months before and that the risk of assassination of Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin while coming to visit President Roosevelt was very real. He said that the Russians offered a part of their Embassy that would be under a separate roof and we would have complete independence but that it would bring the three Heads of State so close together that there would be no need for any of them to drive about town. The President accepted the Russian invitation and announced that he would make the move to the Russian Embassy, taking with him his own servants, at 3:00 p.m.

\textbf{11:20 a. m.} The President worked on official mail that had just arrived from Washington. No Congressional matter contained in this mail.

\textbf{11:30 a. m.} The President met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General

\textsuperscript{10} No record has been found of what was said, either within the American Delegation or in any talk or talks with Ismay, during these visits.

\textsuperscript{11} Stalin's invitation had been transmitted to Harriman by Molotov late the preceding evening; see post, p. 476. According to Harriman's letter of May 25, 1954, to the Historical Office of the Department of State (023/3-2554), Harriman discussed the question of Roosevelt's moving with Hopkins, Hurley, Watson, and Brown on the morning of November 28, 1943. The letter continues: "All but one favored the move. When we told the President he was pleased. Churchill, when consulted, was much relieved. He and his colleagues explained that they would have been glad to have the President stay in the British Embassy, but if he went there he would only have a bedroom and sitting room and could not have the privacy with visitors which he would wish."
Arnold, Captain Royal and Lieut-Colonel McCarthy). This meeting adjourned at 1:00 p.m.\textsuperscript{12}

3:00 p.m. The President, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Hopkins and Major Boettiger left the American Legation by auto for the Russian Embassy to live there as guests of the Russian Government.\textsuperscript{13} While the President and his party occupied the main building of the Embassy, Marshal Stalin and his party lived in one of the smaller houses within the Russian Embassy compound. The British Legation was just one block distant.

After seeing the President comfortably quartered at the Russian Embassy, Admirals Brown and McIntire and General Watson returned to the American Legation so as to continue the impression of occupancy of those quarters by the President and his party.

3:15 p.m. Immediately following the President's arrival at the Russian Embassy, Marshal Stalin, accompanied by Mr. Pavlov (his interpreter), called on the President and they had a long private talk.\textsuperscript{14} This was the first meeting of these two distinguished gentlemen. After Marshal Stalin departed, Commissar Molotov called on the President.\textsuperscript{15}

4:00 p.m. The President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, with their respective military staffs and other delegates, met at the Russian Embassy.\textsuperscript{16} This was the first joint meeting of these gentlemen.\textsuperscript{17}

Note: Generals Marshall and Arnold were not present due to a misunderstanding as to the time of the meeting. The meeting had been called on very short notice and at the time General Marshall and General Arnold were on an auto tour of the city of Tehran.

7:20 p.m. The meeting of the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin, together with their military staffs and other delegates, adjourned.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{12} For the minutes of this meeting, see post, p. 476. The minutes do not include McCarthy among those present.
\textsuperscript{13} For the manner in which the move was effected and camouflaged, see Reilly, p. 178.
\textsuperscript{14} For the minutes of this conversation, see post, p. 482.
\textsuperscript{15} See post, p. 486.
\textsuperscript{16} For the minutes of this meeting, see post, p. 487.
\textsuperscript{17} At this point the Log contains the list of those present at the meeting; the list appears post, p. 487.
\textsuperscript{18} According to a press despatch of December 6, 1943, from Cairo, printed in the New York Times, December 7, 1943, p. 3, col. 3, Molotov gave a tea attended by the three Heads of Government after the first plenary meeting.
7:30 p.m. The President summoned Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon and worked on official mail that had arrived during the day. He signed Congressional bills S321, S364, S1336, S1354 and a proclamation entitled “Capture of Prizes”.

8:30 p.m. The President was host at dinner in his quarters at the Russian Embassy to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Ambassador Clark Kerr, Major Birse, Commissar Molotov and Mr. Pavlov. After dinner, this group discussed conference matters until 11:00 p.m.¹⁹

Note: Much credit is due the President’s Filipino mess boys for the success of the dinner this evening. They prepared the entire meal under a real handicap. They had moved into a virtually empty room at the Russian Embassy at 4:00 p.m. Ranges and much kitchen equipment had first to be installed before they could even begin the preparation of the meal. But with their resourcefulness they saw it done and came through with the meal in their usual fine style.

General Watson spent the day today paying up his many “unfortunate” football bets. The Navy defeated the Army at football yesterday (13 to 0) and permitted practically everyone in the party to fatten his purse at the General’s expense.

Monday, November 29th. (At Teheran)

10:30 a.m. The United States, British and U. S. S. R. military conferees met in the board room of the Russian Embassy.²⁰ All joint board meetings, as well as all plenary meetings with the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin, were held in this room while we were in Teheran.

11:30 a.m. Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt arrived in Teheran. He was due to arrive here yesterday morning and his failure to do so caused the President some concern. Colonel Roosevelt’s delay in arriving at Teheran was occasioned by motor trouble at Luxor, Egypt, where he visited prior to his departure from Egypt for Teheran. Colonel Roosevelt lived with the President at the Russian Embassy while he was in Teheran.

¹⁹ For the minutes of this discussion, see post, p. 509. According to the minutes, Hopkins was also present.
²⁰ For the minutes of this meeting, see post, p. 514.
11:30 a.m. The President worked on his mail, clearing up all official mail that had arrived yesterday. There were no additional Congressional matters to be acted on.

2:00 p.m. Ambassador Harriman called at the Russian Embassy.21

2:15 p.m. The President met with the American Chiefs of Staff. Those present were: The President, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Lt-General Somervell, Captain Royal and Lt-Colonel McCarthy.22

2:30 p.m. Major Otis F. Bryan and Mr. M. F. Reilly called on the President.

2:45 p.m. Marshal Stalin, accompanied by Commissar Molotov and Mr. Pavlov, called on the President for an informal talk.23

3:30 p.m. Members of the United States, British and U. S. S. R. delegations assembled in the large board room (conference room) at the Russian Embassy for the ceremony at which the Prime Minister presented, in the name of King George VI of Great Britain, the “Sword of Stalingrad” to Marshal Stalin for the people of the City of Stalingrad.24 An honor guard, composed of both Russian and British soldiers and a Russian Army band, participated in the ceremonies. The Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin entered the room simultaneously; then the President. As the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin entered, the band played the Soviet National Anthem and then the British National Anthem. The Prime Minister then read a description of the sword (see Appendix “C”)25 and with these remarks:

“I have been commanded by His Majesty King George VI to present to you for transmission to the City of Stalingrad, this sword of honor, the design of which His Majesty has chosen and approved. The sword of honor was made by English craftsmen whose ancestors have been employed in swordmaking for generations. The blade of the sword bears the inscription: ‘To the steel-hearted citizens of Stalingrad, a gift from King

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21 No record has been found of the purpose of this call.
22 No minutes of a meeting of this kind at this time have been found in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or elsewhere.
23 For the record of this conversation, including a note on the variations in the sources as to who was present, see post, p. 529.
24 Accounts of the ceremony may also be found in Arnold, p. 467; Churchill, p. 363; Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Tehran Conference, p. 172; King, p. 519; Leahy, p. 207; and Elliott Roosevelt, p. 180.
25 Appendix C, an 8-paragraph technical description, is not reproduced herein.
George VI as a token of the homage of the British people."

The Prime Minister made the presentation to Marshal Stalin, who accepted the sword and responded as follows:

"On behalf of the citizens of Stalingrad, I wish to express my deep appreciation of the gift of King George VI. The citizens of Stalingrad will value this gift most highly and I ask you, Mr. Prime Minister, to convey their thanks to His Majesty the King."

Marshal Stalin then offered the sword to President Roosevelt for his inspection. The President remarked that it was a very fine gift, and added a few words of praise for the people of the City of Stalingrad.

3:45 p.m.

The sword presentation ceremony over, the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin, together with members of their respective delegations, moved to the front portico of the Russian Embassy where moving pictures and still pictures were made of them by United States, British and Russian military photographers and accredited war correspondents.

4:00 p.m.

Plenary meeting of the United States, British and U. S. S. R. Chiefs of Staff and other delegates with the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. Those present included all those present at the 4:00 p.m. meeting yesterday and in addition: Ambassador Harriman, General Marshall, General Arnold, Lt-General Somervell and Captain H. H. Ware, A. U. S., for the United States; Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Lt-General Martel and Brigadier Hollis for Great Britain. The meeting adjourned at 7:15 p.m.26

8:45 p.m.

Marshal Stalin was host at dinner at the Russian Embassy to the President, the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary Eden, Commissar Molotov, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Hopkins, Ambassador Clark Kerr, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Berezkhov, and Major Birse. Conference discussions were held by this party from after dinner until midnight.27

Note: The numerous Russian guards observed about the Russian Embassy yesterday—the day of our moving

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26 For the minutes of this meeting, see post, p. 533.
27 For the minutes of this discussion, including a note on the variations in the sources as to who was present, see post, p. 552.
there—were not so much in evidence now except when Marshal Stalin came to the Embassy proper. The Russian Embassy guard was comprised entirely of Army officers and civilian secret service men.

**Tuesday, November 30th. (At Teheran)**

10:45 a.m. Ambassador Winant called on the President.²⁸

11:30 a.m. The President visited the branch post exchange which had been installed in the Russian Embassy for his convenience through the efforts of Major General Connolly and Captain George B. Silton, A. U. S., and inspected the articles on display. These articles were principally of Persian manufacture.

12:00 (noon) The President received Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi, the Shah in Shah of Iran, together with his Prime Minister (Mr. Saheily), his Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Saed), and his Minister of the Imperial Court (Mr. Hossein Ala).²⁹

While at the Russian Embassy, the Shah and his party also called on Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, in that order.

The Shah presented the President with a very beautiful Persian carpet of Isfahan make. The carpet (18' x 30') was designed by the celebrated Iranian artist Imami.

1:30 p.m. The President was host at a luncheon at the Russian Embassy to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Pavlov, Major Birse and Mr. Bohlen.³⁰

4:00 p.m. Plenary meeting of American, British and Russian Chiefs of Staff and other delegates with the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. Those present were the same as at the 4:00 p.m. meeting Monday, November 29th. This meeting adjourned at 6:15 p.m.³¹

8:30 p.m. The President attended a dinner at the nearby British Legation given in honor of the Prime Minister on the occasion of his 63rd birthday anniversary. Those present: The Prime Minister, the President, Marshal Stalin, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden, Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Sergeant Robert Hopkins, Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy, Commander Thompson, Mr. Bohlen,

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²⁸ No record has been found of what was said during this visit.

²⁹ See post, p. 564.

³⁰ For the minutes of the discussion which took place at the luncheon (which mention Berezhkov as present rather than Pavlov), see post, p. 565.

³¹ For the minutes of this meeting, see post, p. 576.
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Mrs. Oliver, Admiral King, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Major Birse, Field Marshal Dill, Ambassador Harriman, Lord Moran, General Arnold, Lt-General Ismay, Major Boettiger, Mr. Holman, Mr. John F. [M.] Martin, Lt-General Somervell, General Brooke, Mr. Berezhkov, Marshal Voroshilov, Sir Reader Bullard, Commissar Molotov, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Ambassador Winant, Air Chief Marshal Portal, General Marshall and Captain Randolph Churchill. Of particular interest are the following remarks made by Marshal Stalin during the Prime Minister’s birthday dinner:

“I want to tell you, from the Russian point of view, what the President and the United States have done to win the war. The most important things in this war are machines. The United States has proven that it can turn out from 8,000 to 10,000 airplanes per month. Russia can only turn out, at most, 3,000 airplanes a month. England turns out 3,000 to 3,500, which are principally heavy bombers. The United States, therefore, is a country of machines. Without the use of those machines, through Lend-Lease, we would lose this war.”

President Roosevelt presented the Prime Minister with a Kashan bowl for a birthday gift.

11:45 p. m. The President returned to the Russian Embassy and retired for the evening.

Wednesday, December 1st. (At Teheran)

11:30 a. m. The President signed official mail. There were no Congressional matters included in this mail.

11:40 a. m. The President visited the branch post exchange in the Russian Embassy and made several purchases of souvenirs and articles to be used as gifts.

11:50 a. m. A Dr. Millsapgh, an American and the fiscal manager for the Iranian Government, called on the President. Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt left Teheran, in his own

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For the minutes of the discussion which took place at the dinner, see post, p. 582.

Regarding the conversation of Millsapgh with the President, at which Hopkins was apparently also present, and regarding Roosevelt’s ideas on postwar American economic assistance to Iran, presumably expressed in this conversation, see T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952), in the series United States Army in World War II, p. 445, footnote 14, and Arthur C. Millsapgh, Americans in Persia, pp. 8, 206. See also post, p. 629.
plane, for Cairo en route to his post of duty in Northwest Africa.

12:00 (noon) The President met with the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Foreign Minister Eden, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Commissar Molotov, Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Major Birse, Mr. Berezhkov and Mr. Bohlen. The meeting was at the Russian Embassy.\(^{34}\)

1:00 p.m. The President and all those conferring with him since noonhad lunch at the Russian embassy. The party resumed conference discussions immediately after lunch and remained in session until 4:00 p.m.,\(^{35}\) when they adjourned to meet again at 6:00 p.m.

6:00 p.m. The President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin and those conferring with them earlier during the afternoon met again for further discussions.\(^{36}\) These discussions continued right up until dinner time.

8:30 p.m. The President was host at dinner at the Russian Embassy to all those present at the 6:00 p.m. conference. Conference discussions were resumed after dinner and continued until 10:30 p.m.,\(^{37}\) during which the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin agreed on a communiqué to be issued to the press after the President’s subsequent departure from Cairo. A copy of this communiqué is appended, marked Appendix “D”.\(^{38}\)

10:30 p.m. At 10:30 p.m., the President bade the Marshal and other members of the Soviet Delegation goodbye and was whisked away from the Russian Embassy by auto and driven to the nearby U.S. Army Camp Amirabad where he and his party spent the night. We arrived at the camp (Colonels’ quarters D 13–15) at 10:45 p.m. and the President retired shortly thereafter. Camp Amirabad is at the foot of the Elburz Mountains and it was rather cold there. Some of our party required three or more blankets to keep warm that night.

The flight to Teheran from Cairo, and return, had been pronounced practical by Major Bryan provided weather conditions were favorable. During unfavorable con-

\(^{34}\) The discussions, which continued through the luncheon, are covered in the minutes of the luncheon meeting, post, p. 585.

\(^{35}\) For the record of a Roosevelt–Stalin conversation of 3:20 p.m. on this date, see post, p. 594.

\(^{36}\) For the minutes of this meeting, see post, p. 596.

\(^{37}\) For the subjects discussed at the dinner meeting, see post, p. 605.

\(^{38}\) For the text of the communiqué, see post, p. 639.
ditions clouds over the mountain passes would require flying at elevations higher than Admiral McIntire was willing to have the President and some other members of the party go. Weather reports from the westward had, therefore, been watched carefully throughout our stay at Teheran and fortunately conditions had remained ideal. However this (Wednesday) morning information was received of a cold front passing Cairo, which the local aerologists predicted might blank-off the mountain passes on Friday. It was, therefore, decided to make every effort to complete business on Wednesday in order that the President might leave Teheran Thursday morning. Both the Russian and British groups had to readjust their schedule to carry this out and their willingness to do so was another demonstration of the spirit that animated all conference to work harmoniously together.

During the forenoon the President autographed a photograph of himself for presentation to the Shah of Iran. The photograph, mounted in a silver frame, was handed to Minister Dreyfus who was requested to make the presentation.39

Gifts of American cigarettes and chocolate candy bars were presented to all members of the household staff of the Russian Embassy.

The American and British Chiefs of Staff left Teheran today for return to Cairo, where they were scheduled to resume their conferences. Their party stopped over-night at Jerusalem on the way south.

A “Three Power Agreement” (between the United States, Great Britain and Russia) to guarantee Iran’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence was signed at Teheran today by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin.40

Thursday, December 2nd. (At Teheran; en route Teheran to Cairo; at Cairo.)

8:37 p. m. The President, riding in a jeep, left his quarters at [a. m.] Camp Amirabad to inspect the camp and its personnel. In the jeep with the President was Major General

39 For the Shah’s acknowledgment, see post, p. 806.
40 For the text, see post, p. 646.
Connolly. The party proceeded to the area in front of the Commanding General's headquarters, where honors were rendered to the President by an honor company and the post band. From here the President was driven about the camp. The President stopped at the post hospital for a few minutes and, remaining in his jeep, made a few impromptu remarks to a group of Army patients and hospital personnel (approximately 75) who were assembled in front of the hospital. His remarks are appended, marked Appendix "E". The party then returned to the area in front of the Commanding General's headquarters, where some 3,000 personnel of Camp Amirabad were drawn up for the President's inspection. The President's jeep was driven onto a low platform and, again from his jeep, the President made an impromptu speech to those assembled. A copy of his remarks is appended, marked "E".

9:10 a.m. On completion of his address, the President departed Camp Amirabad for Gale Morghe airport. Outside Camp Amirabad the President transferred from the jeep to a staff car for the ride to the airport. Our route from Camp Amirabad to Gale Morghe skirted Teheran to the southward. It was over dirt roads mostly and was very dusty.

9:30 a.m. Arrived Gale Morghe airport. The President and his party embarked in the planes.

9:46 a.m. The President's plane departed Teheran for Cairo. In the President's plane with him were: Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, General Watson, Major Boettiger, Captain Flythe (Medical Corps, U. S. A.), Lt-Commander Fox, Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon, Secret Service Agents Spaman, Fredericks and Spicer, and Steward Prettyman.

12:00 (noon) Our plane passed over Baghdad and circled the city before proceeding on.

3:30 p.m. Our plane crossed over the Suez Canal.

43 Not printed herein.
41 Not printed herein. For a published source containing these informal remarks, see post, p. 635.
42 For the continuation of the Log at Cairo, December 2–7, 1943, see post, p. 655.
Teheran is the terminus of our Persian Gulf supply line for lend-lease material sent to Russia. Actually it is nearby Kazvin where the supplies are turned over to the Soviets. These supplies are shipped by rail and motor convoy from Abadan and Khorro[mshahr through Teheran to Kazvin. Planes are assembled at Abadan (on the Persian Gulf) and flown here for delivery to the Soviets. Some few planes are flown from Abadan by Soviet pilots. All movements of planes north from Teheran and supplies north from Kazvin are handled by the Soviets. To date they have been very careful not to permit our men beyond those points.

Our forces here bring in all of their foodstuffs. Nothing is bought locally. This is done because of the extreme scarcity of foodstuffs in Iran and consequently, in order not to deprive the Iranians of what little there is. This practice also helps greatly in keeping retail prices down. There is real inflation prevalent here—automobile tires are reported to be selling for $2,000 each; a “fifth” of whiskey for $40; a cake of toilet soap for 60¢ (United States currency). Even though there was an absence of fresh vegetables, the diet fed us by the Army while in Teheran was most appetizing.

There are two U. S. Army camps located near Teheran—Camp Amirabad and Camp Atterbury. There are approximately 30,000 officers and enlisted men of our Army stationed in the Persian Gulf Service Command, whose headquarters are at Teheran.

Brigadier General Sweet directs the U. S. Army motor truck transport in Iran and Iraq. He keeps the American supplies rolling through to Russia over the trans-Iranian route.

Major General Connolly and Brigadier General Hurley were both on the job constantly during our visit to personally see that the President and members of his party were well cared for.

The following U. S. Army officers, on duty in Teheran area, served as interpreters for our party while we were in Teheran: Major O. Pantuhoff, Major N. E. Mitchell, Captain Charles Berman, and Second Lieutenant Boris Alexander.

The weather during our entire stay in Teheran was delightful. The days were mild and the nights cold. There was no central heating in Teheran. Most of the buildings are heated by portable oil stoves. The Russian Embassy is the only steam heated building in the city, we were told.

Mount Demavand (Elburz Mountains) near Teheran is 18,456 feet high.

Nice wide streets here. The roadways are paved but most of the sidewalks are not, causing the city to appear very dusty and dirty.
The city's transportation system was apparently most inadequate. It consisted mainly of a very few small buses, which were invariably packed, and horse-drawn "droushkies" [drosophkies].

While in Teheran the President presented autographed photographs (mounted in silver frames) to Marshal Stalin and to the Shah of Iran. It was most evident that every individual member of our Army stationed in Teheran was delighted at our visit and for the opportunity to discuss home and home folks.
8. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1943
BROWN-MAXIMOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 27, 1943, ABOUT 3:30 P. M.
SOVIET EMBASSY

Present

UNITED STATES
Admiral Brown
Mr. Dreyfus

soviet union
Mr. Maximov

Editorial Note

The Log, ante, p. 461, states that Brown was sent to the Soviet Embassy to explain to Maximov why the President had decided to live at the American Legation and why he could not accept the Russians’ invitation.

According to a letter of February 19, 1954, from Dreyfus to the Historical Office of the Department of State (640.0029/2-1954), the circumstances of Brown’s visit to the Soviet Embassy were as follows: Roosevelt had indicated a willingness to stay at the Soviet Embassy if invited to do so by Stalin, and Dreyfus had communicated this fact to Maximov, but no indication of Stalin’s reaction had been received. Brown went to the Soviet Embassy, accompanied by Dreyfus, to see about a reply. Maximov told Brown and Dreyfus that he himself had not yet received a reply from Stalin, but that inasmuch as Stalin had already arrived at Tehran, the matter would be taken up with him there.

ROOSEVELT-MAXIMOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 27, 1943, 4:30 P. M.,
AMERICAN LEGATION

Editorial Note

This meeting is listed in the Log, ante, p. 481, but no record of the conversation has been found. The visit of the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires lasted at most twenty minutes and was presumably in the nature of a courtesy call.

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HARRIMAN–CLARK KERR–MOLOTOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 27, 1943, MIDNIGHT, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr

SOVIET UNION
Foreign Commissar Molotov

Editorial Note

No official record of this conversation has been found. According to a letter of May 25, 1954, from Harriman to the Historical Office of the Department of State (023/5–2554), Molotov asked Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr (British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who was at Tehran) to call on him. He told Harriman and Clark Kerr, on the basis of information which had reached him, that Roosevelt’s presence at Tehran was known to German agents there, that these agents were planning a “demonstration”, that this might involve an attempt at assassination, and that Stalin therefore urged Roosevelt to move to either the British Legation or the Soviet Embassy. A house in the Soviet Embassy compound was being made ready for Roosevelt’s occupancy. Harriman, on returning to the American Legation, discussed the matter with Connolly and Reilly and the three of them agreed to recommend to Roosevelt that he should move to the proffered residence in the Soviet Embassy compound. Roosevelt agreed, and the move took place on the afternoon of the following day. See the Log, ante, p. 463. For a subsequent reference by Roosevelt to his primary motivation in making the move, see post, p. 867.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1943

MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 28, 1943, 11:30 A. M., AMERICAN LEGATION

PRESENT

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Captain Royal,
Secretary
SECRET

The President said he understood that the British felt our forces in Italy could advance to the Pisa-Rimini line. He believed that as we push north into Italy, the Germans will retire behind the Alps.

Admiral Leahy said as he saw it we could do either of two things: (1) Undertake Overlord, or (2) go after Italy and Rhodes, and then Overlord would revert to the status of an operation of opportunity such as Rankin.

General Marshall said that if our forces advance as far as the Ancona line and the Rhodes operation should be undertaken in February, it would mean postponing Overlord probably until about 15 June, possibly July. He said the British want to do Rhodes earlier unless the Andaman operation is thrown out. The British propose to undertake Rhodes in lieu of the Andaman operation. The means which would be sucked in for the accomplishment of the Rhodes operation would be considerable. He pointed out that the Soviets probably want a more immediate operation than Overlord. He said we could probably increase the pressure in Italy and expedite General Eisenhower’s advance. The British are very anxious to bring Turkey into the war and undertake the Rhodes operation. They state that this will result in opening the Straits. General Somervell believes that even should Turkey enter the war, it might be six to eight months thereafter before the Dardanelles could be opened. This consideration is predicated largely on the fact that in order to undertake operations in the Aegean, a change of base will be required, and it always takes considerable time to shift from one base to another.

The President inquired whether the British had explained the total number of men they have in the Middle East.

General Marshall stated that the Prime Minister realizes and desires to deploy these troops. The main problem as regards collaboration with the Soviets is that they desire pressure exerted within the next two months. If, on the other hand, the Soviets decide that they do not really need immediate assisting operations, it might be possible to complete the operation north of Rome, undertake Rhodes, and delay Overlord until about 15 June. The British Chiefs of Staff are in an embarrassing position with regards to giving up Buccaneer. The Prime Minister claims that if Turkey entered the war and we undertake the Dodecanese operation, Bulgaria and Rumania would immediately fall.
The President inquired, "Suppose we can get the Turks in, what then?"

General Marshall said the requirements will be difficult to provide for Aegean operations. The British idea is to have the Turks hold the Straits.

Admiral King added that the British furthermore consider that Rhodes and certain other islands in the Aegean must be taken. He pointed out that we can not do Rhodes before sometime in February.

General Marshall said he believed that we should buck up General Eisenhower without effecting any undue delay in Overlord.

General Marshall added that the Soviets should know better than anyone else about the situation in Bulgaria, whether or not that country could be expected to fall if Turkey entered the war and the Dardanelles were opened.

Admiral King pointed out that General Wilson had stated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff he did not know very much regarding the conditions in Bulgaria.

General Marshall said that the Germans already know considerable about the land and air build-up in the U. K. in preparation for Overlord—also about the concentration of landing craft in the U. K. and they are conscious of the definite gathering of force in the U. K. He added that it looks as though a delay in Overlord would certainly be necessary if we undertake additional commitments in the Mediterranean.

The President said that he understood there were now some 21 German divisions in the Balkans and the Dodecanese. What should we say if the Soviets inform us that they will be in Rumania soon, and inquire what can the United States and Britain do to help them?

General Marshall said that we could certainly do more along the east coast of the Adriatic by opening up small ports and getting supplies in to the Tito forces. He pointed out that communications inland from the coast are very bad. He believed, however, that it would not be difficult to get in munitions, foodstuffs and other supplies for the guerrilla forces. He said that it had been agreed with the British that the Adriatic should be made a separate command under one officer. He pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff had also agreed to a unified command in the Mediterranean, subject to the President’s approval. It was believed that we could put ships into the Eastern Adriatic Coast and assist in supporting Tito.

Admiral Leahy said that General Eisenhower feels that if he can get far enough north in Italy he can push into the northeast toward Austria.

General Marshall added that he could also push with a left wing toward Southern France. These two movements, together with the
limited operations on the Adriatic Coast, could hold several German divisions.

The President made the suggestion that certain special 2,000-ton merchant ships constructed for the U. S. Army be converted to LST(L)'s.

General Marshall said delays would be caused largely by vehicular transportation facilities. LST's would not be the bottleneck in such a movement. On the other hand, LST's are a bottleneck as regards overseas transportation. One LST is equivalent to about six or seven LCT's. He believed that the Prime Minister would use every wile to cut out Buccaneer. He pointed out that the United States have constructed suitable landing fields on captured islands in as short a period as twelve days.

The President pointed out that control of the Andaman Islands would make it possible to cut, by air, supply lines from Bangkok. He said we are obligated to the Chinese to carry out the amphibious operation Buccaneer.

Mr. Hopkins observed that the Prime Minister considers that as between Rhodes and Buccaneer, the former is the more important.

Admiral King pointed out that as an alternative to withdrawing means for the carrying out of Buccaneer, withdrawal of certain shipping earmarked for Overlord had been suggested.

The President observed that the Generalissimo had been told that the British would build up their fleet in the Indian Ocean. The question was, of what value would the fleet be there unless some operation were carried out?

Admiral Leahy pointed out that only a small portion of naval strength would be involved in the Burma operation.

Admiral King said that the Prime Minister told the Generalissimo orally what ships would be available to support the Burma Command. The only place for the use of landing craft is the Andaman Islands.

General Marshall said the British had observed that they can not decide about Buccaneer versus Rhodes until after they have talked to the U. S. S. R. They feel they should not be pressed to carry out an operation for political reasons until the military considerations are proven sound. He, General Marshall, considered that Buccaneer is sound. He said he had talked to Admiral King regarding this matter. As regards the feasibility of constructing only one landing strip in the Andamans, General Marshall said he did not believe it.

The President pointed out that the United States would have more experience with opening up and holding occupied territory.

Admiral King said the British idea is that if they take Rhodes, the Turks will take all other islands. The Allies will have to give material, ships, and supplies for opening up the Dardanelles.
The President felt that the British would probably say after Rhodes was taken, “Now we will have to take Greece.” ... If we should get the Andaman Islands, where would we go? He felt that small groups of commandos, operating in support of Tito along the Adriatic Coast, had great possibilities. Another suggestion would be for a small force to penetrate northward from Trieste and Fiume. He said he was much more favorably inclined towards operations from the Adriatic rather than from the vicinity of the Dodecanese.

Admiral Leahy observed that in order to put forces into Trieste and Fiume, we should have to push the German Army further north into Italy; otherwise they would be on the left flank of the penetrations from Trieste.

The President agreed that the Germans should be pushed on toward the Alps. He thought it would be a good idea to go around the ends into France and Austria. He pointed out that during the last war the Austrians required Germans to help them. He believed that if we push far enough north into Italy, the Germans will retreat behind the mountains.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether or not the Chiefs of Staff were being pressed by the French to go into Southern France, Admiral King replied in the affirmative. He added that if Turkey comes into the war, we certainly will be involved in the Dodecanese.

In reply to a question from the President as to the value of airfields in the vicinity of Smyrna should Turkey come into the war, General Arnold said we could use certain of these fields for heavy bombers and we would be able to help by using other airfields in Turkey for both heavy and medium bombers.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether or not the British had talked about a landing in the vicinity near Salonika, the Chiefs of Staff replied in the negative.

Admiral King observed that neither General Wilson nor General Donovan think the Bulgars will quit.

The President said he did not have the conscience to urge the Turks to go into the war.

In reply to a question from the President, General Arnold stated that the Germans have now about 700 planes in the Balkans; furthermore, the Turks have no really modern planes, all are obsolete.

General Marshall pointed out that the British originally planned to give the Turks 27 fighter squadrons; they finally gave them 17, but more fighter squadrons would have to be given to the Turks.

General Marshall observed that one of the difficulties in the Italian campaign is lack of equipment for troops due to lack of shipping.
There are divisions sitting in North Africa now with insufficient equipment due to lack of shipping. These divisions could be used if the equipment were available. He pointed out that the real issue is, what do the Soviets mean by “immediate help”? The U. S. S. R. evidently wants Turkey into the war as a cold-blooded proposition. The Soviets definitely want something, and we should find out what it is.

The President thought that by January we could mount commando group operations in the Adriatic and the Aegean.

General Marshall questioned whether it would be feasible to undertake very many commando raids. He questioned whether these operations would conflict with planned operations in Italy.

The President pointed out that his idea was that a commando raid should be on a small scale, say with about 2,000 men to a group. These small groups would not require landing craft on the same scale as larger operations.

In connection with a remark from the President regarding retention of landing craft for Overlord, Admiral King pointed out another factor which should be given consideration with regard to the number of landing craft planned to return to the United Kingdom for Overlord. He said we won’t get the 67 retained in the Mediterranean into the U. K. due to the fact that they will have been used in action operations and there will certainly be considerable attrition. He added that all landing craft production after March is earmarked for the Pacific. If there is a delay of one month in Overlord, the one month’s increased production can be diverted to Overlord.

The President observed that we must tell the Soviets that we get just so much production per month. All this production is earmarked for definite planned operations. In order to transfer means such as landing craft, it is necessary to take them away from one place in order to add to the means at another. There is no pool available.

General Marshall observed that when General Eisenhower has one command of the entire Mediterranean, better use of landing craft may be effected.

Admiral King observed that destroyers and other craft could be utilized for commando raids.

General Marshall said the Prime Minister believes he could control the Mediterranean if he could get his own man, General Alexander, in as Commander in Chief.

The President observed that we must realize that the British look upon the Mediterranean as an area under British domination.

General Marshall said the British were wedded to committeeism. Unity of command would expedite operations. General Marshall
explained to the President the relationship between General Eisenhower’s and General Wilson’s command, and the attitude of General Eisenhower’s subordinate commanders in chief versus the independent commanders with General Wilson and the effects of this at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting last Friday.\(^1\) He pointed out that while the United States perhaps does not do committee work as well as the British, nevertheless they (the British) have certainly had a very serious time in the Middle East due to the lack of unity of command.

The President said he was afraid that Marshal Stalin will ask just how many German divisions could be taken off the Soviet Western Front immediately. He said he did not intend to get involved in a discussion as between the relative merits of the Dodecanese and the Andamans.

General Arnold observed that the flow of planes through the Azores has already begun as of yesterday. He said it was planned to pass 147 through in December and as many as 154 in January.

In reply to a question from the President as to how many squadrons of planes were operating in antisubmarine work out of the Azores, Admiral King replied about three squadrons.

\(^1\) See ante, p. 359.

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ROOSEVELT–STALIN MEETING, NOVEMBER 28, 1943, 3 P. M.,
ROOSEVELT’S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY

Present \(^2\)

**UNITED STATES**  
President Roosevelt  
Mr. Bohlen

**soviet union**  
Marshal Stalin  
Mr. Pavlov

\(^1\) The Bohlen minutes list the meeting as having begun at 3 p.m. According to the Log, ante, p. 464, the meeting began at 3:15 p.m. According to Forrest Davis (“What Really Happened at Tehran,” Saturday Evening Post, vol. 216, May 13 and May 20, 1944), Roosevelt discussed with Stalin at Tehran two additional subjects besides those covered in the official record as given here, namely, the structure of the federal system in the United States and the “good neighbor” policy of the United States toward Latin America. The Davis article was based on an “off-the-record” conversation with Roosevelt in March 1944. (Roosevelt Papers)

\(^2\) The listing of those present is based on the Bohlen minutes. Elliott Roosevelt, p. 175, appears to have misunderstood some remarks of his father respecting Bohlen’s presence at the meeting.
SECRET

The President greeted Marshal Stalin when he entered with "I am glad to see you. I have tried for a long time to bring this about." 3

Marshal Stalin, after suitable expression of pleasure at meeting the President, said that he was to blame for the delay in this meeting; that he had been very occupied because of military matters.

The President inquired as to the situation on the Soviet battlefront. Marshal Stalin answered that on part of the front, the situation was not too good; that the Soviets had lost Zhitomir and were about to lose Koresten [Korosten]—the latter an important railroad center for which the capture of Gomel could not compensate. He added that the Germans have brought a new group of divisions to this area and were exercising strong pressure on the Soviet front.

The President then inquired whether or not the initiative remained with the Soviet forces.

Marshal Stalin replied that, with the exception of the sector which he had just referred to, the initiative still remains with the Soviet Armies, but that the situation was so bad that only in the Ukraine was it possible to take offensive operations.

The President said that he wished that it were within his power to bring about the removal of 30 or 40 German divisions from the Eastern front and that that question, of course, was one of the things he desired to discuss here in Tehran.

Marshal Stalin said it would be of great value if such a transfer of German divisions could be brought about.

The President then said that another subject that he would like to talk over with Marshal Stalin was the possibility that after the war a part of the American—British merchant fleet which, at the end of the war, would be more than either nation could possibly utilize, be made available to the Soviet Union.

Marshal Stalin replied that an adequate merchant fleet would be of great value, not only to the Soviet Union, but for the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States after the war, which he hoped would be greatly expanded. He said, in reply to the President's question, that if equipment were sent to the Soviet Union from the United States, a plentiful supply of the

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3 Regarding Roosevelt's efforts, beginning in 1942, to bring about a meeting with Stalin, see ante, pp. 3 ff.
raw materials from that country could be made available to the United States.

The Conference then turned to the Far East.

The President said that he had had an interesting conversation with Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo, on the general subject of China.\(^4\)

**Marshal Stalin** remarked that the Chinese have fought very badly but, in his opinion, it was the fault of the Chinese leaders.

The President informed Marshal Stalin that we were now supplying and training 30 Chinese divisions for operations in Southern China and were proposing to continue the same process for 30 additional divisions. He added that there was a new prospect of an offensive operation through North Burma to link up with China in Southern Yun[n]an and that these operations would be under the command of Lord Louis Mountbatten.

**Marshal Stalin** then inquired as to the situation in the Lebanon.

The President gave a brief description of the background and events leading up to the recent clashes, and in reply to Marshal Stalin’s question said that it had been entirely due to the attitude of the French Committee and General De Gaulle.\(^5\)

**Marshal Stalin** said he did not know General De Gaulle personally, but frankly, in his opinion, he was very unreal in his political activities. He explained that General De Gaulle represented the soul of sympathetic France, whereas, the real physical France engaged under Petain in helping our common enemy Germany, by making available French ports, materials, machines, etc., for the German war effort. He said the trouble with De Gaulle was that this [his?] movement had no communication with the physical France, which, in his opinion, should be punished for its attitude during this war. De Gaulle acts as though he were the head of a great state, whereas, in fact, it actually commands little power.

The President agreed and said that in the future, no Frenchman over 40, and particularly no Frenchman who had ever taken part in the present French Government, should be allowed to return to position in the future. He said that General Giraud was a good old military type, but with no administrative or political sense, whatsoever. He added that there were approximately 11 French divisions, partly composed of Algerians and other North Africans, in training in North Africa.

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\(^4\) Information regarding conversations between Roosevelt and Chiang at the First Cairo Conference may be found *ante*, pp. 322, 349, 366.

\(^5\) See *ante*, p. 84, footnote 2.

\(^6\) In a copy of the Bohlen minutes in the Hopkins Papers, the word “symbolic” is written in the margin at this point, and parentheses are inserted around “sympathetic”, in a handwriting which has not been identified. See in this connection the use of the word “symbolic” in the section headed “France and the French Empire”, *post*, p. 514.
MARSHAL STALIN expatiated at length on the French ruling classes and he said, in his opinion, they should not be entitled to share in any of the benefits of the peace, in view of their past record of collaboration with Germany.

The President said that Mr. Churchill was of the opinion that France would be very quickly reconstructed as a strong nation, but he did not personally share this view since he felt that many years of honest labor would be necessary before France would be re-established. He said the first necessity for the French, not only for the Government but the people as well, was to become honest citizens.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and went on to say that he did not propose to have the Allies shed blood to restore Indochina, for example, to the old French colonial rule. He said that the recent events in the Lebanon made public service the first step toward the independence of people who had formerly been colonial subjects. He said that in the war against Japan, in his opinion, that in addition to military missions, it was necessary to fight the Japanese in the political sphere as well, particularly in view of the fact that the Japanese had granted the least nominal independence to certain colonial areas. He repeated that France should not get back Indochina and that the French must pay for their criminal collaboration with Germany.

The President said he was 100% in agreement with Marshal Stalin and remarked that after 100 years of French rule in Indochina, the inhabitants were worse off than they had been before. He said that Chiang Kai-shek had told him China had no designs on Indochina but the people of Indochina were not yet ready for independence, to which he had replied that when the United States acquired the Philippines, the inhabitants were not ready for independence which would be granted without qualification upon the end of the war against Japan. He added that he had discussed with Chiang Kai-shek the possibility of a system of trusteeship for Indochina which would have the task of preparing the people for independence within a definite period of time, perhaps 20 to 30 years.

MARSHAL STALIN completely agreed with this view.7

7 On March 17, 1944, in a conversation with Stettinius, Roosevelt recounted what had been said at Tehran regarding Indochina. Stettinius's notes on the conversation, prepared that night, read as follows: "Then at Tehran the President raised the question with Joseph Stalin, who said that Indo-China should be independent but was not yet ready for self-government. He said that the idea of a trusteeship was excellent. When Churchill objected, the President said, 'Now, look here, Winston, you are outnumbered three to one.'" Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians; The Yalta Conference (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1949), p. 238. The number "three" apparently refers to the concurrence not only of Roosevelt and Stalin, but also, at the First Cairo Conference, of Chiang Kai-shek; see ante, p. 325. See also F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928–1945, vol. ii, p. 1489.
The President went on to say that Mr. Hull had taken to the Moscow Conference a document which he (the President) had drawn up for the purpose of a National [International?] Committee to visit, every year, the colonies of all nations and through use of instrumentalties of public opinion to correct any abuse that they find.⁸

Marshal Stalin said he saw merit in this idea.

The President continued on the subject of colonial possessions, but he felt it would be better not to discuss the question of India with Mr. Churchill, since the latter had no solution of that question, and merely proposed to defer the entire question to the end of the war.

Marshal Stalin agreed that this was a sore spot with the British.

The President said that at some future date, he would like to talk with Marshal Stalin on the question of India; that he felt that the best solution would be reform from the bottom, somewhat on the Soviet line.

Marshal Stalin replied that the India question was a complicated one, with different levels of culture and the absence of relationship in the castes. He added that reform from the bottom would mean revolution.

It was then 4 o'clock and time for the General Meeting.

The President, in conclusion, stated that an additional reason why he was glad to be in this house was that of affording the opportunity of meeting Marshal Stalin more frequently in completely informal and different [sic] circumstances.

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⁸ Document 44 of the Moscow Conference. The records of the Moscow Conference are scheduled to be published in Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. 1. For a substantially identical version of the document referred to here, see Notter, p. 470.

ROOSEVELT—MOLOTOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 28, 1943, ABOUT 4 P. M., ROOSEVELT’S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY

Editorial Note

According to the Log, ante, p. 464, Molotov called on Roosevelt after Stalin had departed. No record has been found of the remarks exchanged by Roosevelt and Molotov during this visit. That the visit was short, and may have been limited to an exchange of courtesies, is suggested by the fact that Roosevelt's conversation with Stalin, which preceded it, is stated in the Bohlen minutes to have ended at 4 o'clock, and the meeting which followed it is stated to have begun at that same time. A brief reference to Molotov's call is in Elliott Roosevelt, p. 176.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE 487

FIRST PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 28, 1943, 4 P. M., CONFERENCE ROOM, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
Admiral King
Major General Deane
Captain Royal
Mr. Bohlen

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Field Marshal Dill
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Ismay
Major Birse

SOVIET UNION

Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Marshal Voroshilov
Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Berezhkov

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Minutes

SECRET

The President said as the youngest of the three present he ventured to welcome his elders. He said he wished to welcome the new members to the family circle and tell them that meetings of this character were conducted as between friends with complete frankness on all sides with nothing that was said to be made public. He added that he was confident that this meeting would be successful and that our three great nations would not only work in close cooperation for the prosecution of the war but would also remain in close touch for generations to come.

The Prime Minister then pointed out that this was the greatest concentration of power that the world had ever seen. In our hands here is the possible certainty of shortening the war, the much greater certainty of victories, but the absolute certainty that we held the happy future of mankind. He added that he prayed that we might be worthy of this God-given opportunity.

Marshal Stalin welcomed the representatives of Great Britain and the United States. He then said that history had given to us here a great opportunity and it was up to the representatives here to use wisely the power which their respective peoples had given to them and to take full advantage of this fraternal meeting.

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1 The Log, ante, p. 464, indicates that Marshall and Arnold were not present because of a misunderstanding as to the time of the meeting, which had been called on short notice. A reference to the misunderstanding is also in Elliott Roosevelt, p. 178.

2 According to Churchill, p. 347, he (Churchill) and Stalin had agreed beforehand that Roosevelt should preside at this first conference of the three Heads of Government, and Roosevelt consented to do so. See also Sherwood, p. 778. No official record of this agreement has been found.

3 The allusion is to the previous conferences of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff.
The President then gave a general survey of the war as a whole and the needs of the war from the American point of view. Before turning to the war in the Pacific, the President said he desired to emphasize that the United States shared equally with the Soviet Union and Great Britain the desire to hasten in every way possible the day of victory. He then said that the United States was more directly affected by the war in the Pacific and that the United States forces were bearing the chief burden in that theater with, of course, help from Australian and British forces in that area; the greater part of the U. S. naval establishment was in the Pacific and over a million men were being maintained there. He pointed out as evidence of the immense distances in the Pacific that one supply ship operating from the United States could only make three round trips a year. The allied strategy in the Pacific was based on the doctrine of attrition which was proving successful. We were sinking more Japanese tonnage than the Japanese were able to replace. He said that the allies were moving forward through the southern islands and now through the islands to the east of Japan. On the north little more could be done due to the distance between the Aleutian and Kurile islands. On the west our one great objective was to keep China in the war, and for this purpose an expedition was in preparation to attack through North Burma and from Yun[n]an province. In this operation Anglo-British [Anglo-American] forces would operate in North Burma and Chinese forces from Yun[n]an. The entire operation would be under the command of Lord Louis Mountbatten. In addition, amphibious operations were planned south of Burma to attack the important Japanese bases and lines of communication in the vicinity of Bangkok. The President pointed out that although these operations extended over vast expanses of territory the number of ships and men allocated for the purpose were being held down to a minimum. He summed up the aims of these operations as follows: (1) to open the road to China and supply that country in order to keep it in the war, and (2), by opening the road to China and through increased use of transport planes to put ourselves in position to bomb Japan proper.

The President then said he would turn to the most important theater of the war—Europe. He said he wished to emphasize that for over one year and a half in the last two or three conferences which he had had with the Prime Minister all military plans had revolved around the question of relieving the German pressure on the Soviet front; that largely because of the difficulties of sea transport it had not
been possible until Quebec to set a date for the cross-channel operations. He pointed out that the English channel was a disagreeable body of water and it was unsafe for military operations prior to the month of May, and that the plan adopted at Quebec involved an immense expedition and had been set at that time for May 1, 1944.

The Prime Minister interposed and remarked that the British had every reason to be thankful that the English channel was such a disagreeable body of water.

The President then said that one of the questions to be considered here was what use could be made of allied forces in the Mediterranean in such a way as to bring the maximum aid to the Soviet armies on the Eastern front. He added that some of these possibilities might involve a delay of one, two or three months in the large cross-channel operation and that before making any decision as to future operations in the Mediterranean he and the Prime Minister had desired to ascertain the views of Marshal Stalin on this point. He pointed out that among the possible points of future operation in the Mediterranean were Italy, the Adriatic and Aegean Seas and Turkey. In conclusion the President emphasized the fact that in his opinion the large cross-channel operation should not be delayed by secondary operations.

Marshal Stalin stated that in regard to the Pacific war the Soviet Government welcomed the successes of the Anglo-American forces against the Japanese; that up to the present to their regret they had not been able to join the effort of the Soviet Union to that of the United States and England against the Japanese because the Soviet armies were too deeply engaged in the west. He added that the Soviet forces in Siberia were sufficient for defensive purposes but would have to be increased three-fold before they would be adequate for offensive operations. Once Germany was finally defeated, it would then be possible to send the necessary reinforcements to Siberia and then we shall be able by our common front to beat Japan. Marshal Stalin then gave a brief review of military developments in the Soviet-German front since the German offensive in July. He said that the Soviet High Command had been preparing an offensive of its own but that the Germans had stolen the march on them and attacked first. Following the failure of the German offensive, the Soviet forces had passed over to the attack, and he admitted that the successes which they had achieved this summer and autumn had far exceeded their expectations as they had found the German army much weaker than they had expected. He said that at the present time there were 210 German Divisions

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The records of the First Quebec Conference of Roosevelt and Churchill, August 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the Foreign Relations series. For the military discussions and decisions at the First Quebec (Quadrant) Conference, see Matloff, chapter x.
facing the Soviet armies with six more in the process of transfer from the west. To this should be added 50 non-German Divisions (10 Hungarian, 20 Finnish, 16 to 18 Rumanian), making a total of 260 Divisions facing the Soviet armies with six more on the way. In reply to the President's question, Marshal Stalin stated that the normal battle strength of a German front line Division was from 8,000 to 9,000 but that if Auxiliary corps, supply, etc. forces were added the total strength of each Division was around 12,000. He said that last year the Soviet armies had faced 240 Axis Divisions of which 179 were German, whereas this year they faced 260 of which 210 were German with six more on the way. He said that the Soviet Union had had 330 Divisions at the start of the summer campaign and that it was this numerical superiority over the Germans which permitted the offensive operations to develop so successively [successfully?]. He added, however, that the numerical superiority was gradually being evened up. He said one of the great difficulties encountered by the Soviet armies in advancing was the question of supply since the Germans destroyed literally everything in their retreat. He mentioned that although the initiative on the front as a whole remained in Soviet hands, the offensive because of weather conditions had slowed down in those sectors. In fact, in the sector south and southwest of Kiev the German counteroffensive had recaptured the town of Zhitomir and would probably recapture Korosten in the near future. He said the Germans were using for this counter-attack three old and five new tank Divisions and twenty to twenty-three motorized infantry Divisions in an attempt to retake Kiev.

Marshal Stalin then turned to the allied operations in Italy. He said that from their point of view the great value of the Italian campaign was the freeing of the Mediterranean to allied shipping but that they did not consider that Italy was a suitable place from which to attempt to attack Germany proper; that the Alps constituted an almost insuperable barrier as the famous Russian General Suvorov had discovered in his time. He added that in the opinion of the Soviet military leaders, Hitler was endeavoring to retain as many allied Divisions as possible in Italy where no decision could be reached, and that the best method in the Soviet opinion was getting at the heart of Germany with an attack through northern or northwestern France and even through southern France. He admitted that this would be a very difficult operation since the Germans would fight like devils to prevent it. Marshal Stalin went on to say that it would be helpful if Turkey would enter the war and open the way to the Balkans, but

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5 In the autumn of 1799 a Russian army under Field Marshal Alexander Suvorov suffered a disastrous defeat in attempting to cross the Swiss Alps from south to north.
even so the Balkans were far from the heart of Germany, and while with Turkish participation operations there would be useful, northern France was still the best.\(^6\)

The Prime Minister stated that the United States and Great Britain had long agreed as to the necessity of the cross-channel operation and that at the present time this operation, which is known as Overlord, was absorbing most of our combined resources and efforts. He added that it would take a long statement of facts and figures to explain why, to our disappointment, it would be impossible to undertake this operation in 1943 but that we were determined to carry it out in the late spring or early summer of 1944. He went on to say that the operations in North Africa and Italy had been clearly recognized by both the President and himself as secondary in character but that it was the best that could be done in 1943. He said that the forces which were now in process of execution \([\text{accumulation?}]\)\(^7\) for the Overlord operation involved an initial assault of 16 British and 19 U.S. Divisions, a total of 35. He pointed out that the strength of the individual British and American Divisions was considerably stronger than a German Division. He said it was contemplated to put one million men on the continent of Europe in May, June and July.

Marshal Stalin remarked at this point that he had not meant to convey the impression that he considered the North Africa or Italian operations as secondary or belittle their significance since they were of very real value.

The Prime Minister thanked the Marshal for his courtesy by repeating that neither he nor the President had ever considered the operations in the Mediterranean \([\text{as anything more than a stepping-stone?}]\)\(^8\) for the main cross-channel operation. He said that when the 16 British Divisions earmarked for Overlord had landed in France, they would be maintained by reinforcements, but that no additional British Divisions could be sent to Europe since, taking into consideration the British forces in the Middle East, India and the size of the Royal Air Force which was not idle, this would utilize all British manpower which was based on a population of only 46 million. He added that it was the United States which would send in a steady stream of necessary reinforcements for the development of Overlord. He added, however, that the summer of 1944 was a long way off and that following the capture of Rome, which was

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\(^6\) For prognostications that Stalin might stress operations in the Mediterranean rather than Overlord, see Harrison, pp. 121–123, where the reaction of the American Delegation at Tehran to Stalin’s emphasis on Overlord is described thus: "The Americans were pleased, if somewhat surprised."

\(^7\) Inserted on the basis of Churchill, p. 351.

\(^8\) Inserted on the basis of the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes; see post, p. 502. See also Churchill, p. 351.
hoped would take place in January, 1944, it would be six months before Overlord would begin. He and the President had repeatedly asked themselves what could be done with forces in the Mediterranean area during this period to bring the greatest pressure to bear on the enemy and help relieve the Soviet front. He said he did not wish to have any allied forces to remain idle during this period. He admitted that some of the operations which had been discussed might involve a delay of some two months in Overlord. He added, however, that they are all ready to withdraw seven of the best British Divisions from the Italian theater in preparation for Overlord, but emphasized that the great difficulty lay in the shortage of landing craft and that this constituted a great bottleneck of all allied operations.

Reverting to the Italian theater, The Prime Minister said that the weather had been exceptionally bad in Italy and that General Alexander, who under General Eisenhower was in command of the 15th Army Group in Italy, believed that in taking Rome there was an excellent opportunity of destroying or at least mauling 10 to 15 German Divisions. There was no plan for going into the broad part of Italy subsequent to the taking of Rome, and once the great airfields in the vicinity of that city had been captured and the Pisa-Rimini line had been reached, the allied forces would be free for other operations, possibly in southern France, or an enterprise across the Adriatic.

He said that the operations of the Partisans in Yugoslavia, which had been greater and better than those of Mihailovic, opened up the prospects to the allies to send additional help to Yugoslavia, but there was no plan to send a large army to the Balkans, although through commandos and small expeditions something might be done in that area.

The Prime Minister then said that he had come to one of the largest questions we had before us, namely, the question of Turkey’s entrance into the war which we should urge upon that country in the strongest possible terms. If Turkey would enter the war it would open up the Aegean sea and assure an uninterrupted supply route to Russia into the Black Sea. He mentioned that only 4 Arctic convoys to the North Russian Ports could be considered this season because of the need of escort vessels in connection with Overlord. He then inquired, how shall we persuade Turkey to enter the war and in what manner? Should she provide the allies with bases or should she attack Bulgaria and declare war on Germany, or should she move forward or stay on the defensive on the fortified lines in Thrace. He added that Bulgaria owed a debt of gratitude to Russia for her liberation from Turkish rule.
Marshal Stalin interposed to remark that this liberation had taken place a long time ago.  

The Prime Minister said that Turkey's entrance into the war would undoubtedly have an effect from Rumania from whom peace feelers had already been received, and also from Hungary and might well start a landslide among the satellite States. He added that the Soviet Government had special feelings and special knowledge on these questions and he would welcome their views. The Prime Minister concluded by inquiring whether any of the possible operations in the Mediterranean were of sufficient interest to the Soviet Union if these operations involved a two or three months delay in Overlord. He said that he and the President could not make any decision until they knew the Soviet views on the subject and therefore had drawn up no definite plans.

The President then said that he had thought of a possible operation at the head of the Adriatic to make a junction with the Partisans under Tito and then to operate northeast into Rumania in conjunction with the Soviet advance from the region of Odessa.

The Prime Minister remarked that if we take Rome and smash up the German armies there we will have a choice of moving west or, as the President says, east in the Mediterranean, and suggested that a sub-committee be appointed to work out the details of the various possibilities.

Marshal Stalin inquired if the 35 Divisions which he understood were earmarked for Overlord would be affected in any way by the continuation of the operations in Italy.

The Prime Minister replied that they would not, since entirely separate Divisions were being used in the Italian Theater. The Prime Minister, in reply to Marshal Stalin's questions as to the relationship of the operations which he had outlined, explained that after the taking of Rome there would be available some 20 to 23 British, American, French and Polish Divisions which would be available for operations in the Mediterranean without in any way affecting the preparations for Overlord. He repeated that this force could either move west, or as the President suggested, to the eastern part of the Mediterranean. He said that since shipping was already allocated, any movements of effective between Overlord and the Mediterranean would be very limited. He added that while the Overlord involved an initial assault of 35 Divisions, of which 16 would be British, the development of the operation envisioned by July 50 or 60 Allied Divisions on the continent, but repeated that the additional Divisions would come from the United States and not Great Britain. He added

* The reference is to Russian action in 1877-78.
that the total strength of an American or British Division, including auxiliary forces, amounted to 40,000 men. He also stated that although the British and American air forces were very large and undertaking great operations, it was expected that the United States air force would be doubled or tripled within the next six months. He proposed to make available to Marshal Stalin the exact schedule of movements of supplies from the United States to Great Britain which already involved one million tons of stores.

**Marshal Stalin** then inquired if Turkey entered the war would some Anglo-American forces be allocated to that area.

**The Prime Minister** replied that two or three Divisions, British or British controlled, were available for the capture of the islands of the Aegean, and that as an immediate aid to Turkey it was proposed to send 20 squadrons of fighters and several anti-aircraft regiments, adding that the preparation[s] to send these forces to Turkey were already far advanced.

**Marshal Stalin** replied that in his opinion he questioned the wisdom of dispersing allied forces of [for?] the various operations mentioned such as Turkey, the Adriatic and Southern France since there would be no direct connection between these scattered forces. He said he thought it would be better to take Overlord as the basis for all 1944 operations; that after the capture of Rome the troops thus relieved might be sent to Southern France, and in conjunction with forces operating from Corsica might eventually meet in France the main force of Overlord from the north. These would be in the nature of diversionary operations to assist Overlord. Marshal Stalin said that he favored the operations in Southern France particularly as he thought Turkey would not enter the war. He repeated that he was convinced that Turkey would not enter the war.

**The President** remarked that there would be 8 or 9 French Divisions, which included native Divisions, available for an operation against southern France.

**Marshal Stalin** remarked that in an operation against southern France the transportation difficulties would be greatly facilitated.

**The Prime Minister** said he agreed with Marshal Stalin in regard to the inadvisability of scattering our forces. He pointed out that the squadrons destined for Turkey and the Divisions for the seizure of the Aegean islands were now being used for the defense of Egypt and that their use would not distract in any way from Overlord or the operations in Italy.

**Marshal Stalin** remarked that these operations would be worthwhile only if Turkey entered the war which he again repeated he did not believe would happen.
The Prime Minister replied that he had in mind the six months which would elapse after the expected capture of Rome before the beginning of Overlord, and that both he and the President were most anxious that their troops should not remain idle since if they were fighting, the British and American governments would not be exposed to the criticism that they were letting the Soviet Union bear the brunt of the war.

Marshal Stalin replied that in his opinion Overlord represented a very large operation and that it would be facilitated and, in fact, would be certain of success if the invasion of southern France was undertaken some two months before Overlord. This would divert German troops from the northern part of France and assure the success of Overlord. He said that as an extreme measure he would be inclined to leave 10 Divisions in Italy and postpone the capture of Rome in order to launch the attack in southern France two months in advance of Overlord.

The Prime Minister replied that he was sure Marshal Stalin would permit him to develop arguments to demonstrate why it was necessary for the allied forces to capture Rome, otherwise it would have the appearance of a great allied defeat in Italy. He pointed out the allied forces would be no stronger before the capture of Rome than after, and in fact without the fighter cover which would be possible only from the north Italian fields it would be impossible to invade northern France. In reply to Marshal Stalin’s questions regarding Corsica, the Prime Minister pointed out that there were no adequate airfields on the island.

The President said that he thought the question [of] relative timing was very important and that he personally felt that nothing should be done to delay the carrying out of Overlord which might be necessary if any operations in the eastern Mediterranean were undertaken. He proposed, therefore, that the staffs work out tomorrow morning a plan of operations for striking at southern France.

Marshal Stalin pointed out that the Russian experience had shown that an attack from one direction was not effective and that the Soviet armies now launched an offensive from two sides at once which forced the enemy to move his reserve back and forth. He added that he thought such a two way operation in France would be very successful.

The Prime Minister stated that he personally did not disagree with what the Marshal had said and that he did not think he had said anything here which could possibly affect adversely an operation in southern France, but he added it would be difficult for him to leave idle the British forces in the eastern Mediterranean which numbered
some 20 Divisions, British controlled, which could not be used outside of that area, merely for the purpose of avoiding any insignificant delay in Overlord. He said that if such was the decision they would, of course, agree, but they could not wholeheartedly agree to postpone operations in the Mediterranean. He added, of course, that if Turkey does not enter the war that is the end of that, but that he personally favored some flexibility in the exact date of Overlord. He proposed that the matter be considered overnight and have the staffs examine the various possibilities in the morning.

Marshal Stalin stated that as they had not expected to discuss technical military questions he had no military staff but that Marshal Voroshilov would do his best.\(^9\)

The Prime Minister stated it would not [now?] be necessary to consider how far we could meet Turkey’s request in the event that she agreed to enter the war.

Marshal Stalin replied that Turkey was an ally of Great Britain and at the same time had relations of friendship with the United States and the Soviet Union who as friends could ask Turkey and indeed bring pressure to bear on her to carry out her obligations as an ally of Great Britain. He said that all Neutrals considered Belligerents to be fools and it was up to the countries represented here to show that the Neutrals were the ones that were fools and that we must prove to Turkey that if they stay out of the war on the winning side that they were indeed the fools.

The Prime Minister said he thought it would be an act of supreme unwisdom if the Turks were to refuse an invitation from Russia to join the war on the winning side. He added that Christmas in England was a poor season for Turkeys. When the joke had been explained to Marshal Stalin he said he regretted that he was not an Englishman.\(^11\)

The President then stated that should he meet the President of Turkey he would, of course, do everything possible to persuade him to enter the war, but that if he were in the Turkish President’s place he would demand such a price in planes, tanks and equipment that to grant the request would indefinitely postpone Overlord.\(^12\)

Marshal Stalin repeated his doubt as to Turkey’s intention and said that they had in fact already replied to the suggestion that they enter the war. Although many considered this reply favorable, he personally thought it was negative in character.

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\(^9\) For the minutes of the tripartite meeting of the military staffs, see post, p. 514.

\(^11\) According to the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes of this meeting, Churchill referred at this point to a document which he intended to submit to the Conference. See post, p. 506.

\(^12\) Roosevelt and Churchill did meet with President İnönü of Turkey at the Second Cairo Conference; see post, pp. 662 ff.
The Prime Minister remarked that in his opinion the Turks were crazy.

Marshal Stalin said there were some people who apparently preferred to remain crazy.

The meeting adjourned until 4 P. M., November 29, 1943.

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

U. S. SECRET

The President said, as the youngest of the three Chiefs of State present, he had the privilege of welcoming Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill to this auspicious conference. We are sitting around this table for the first time as a family, with the one object of winning the war. Regarding the conduct of naval and military meetings, it has been our habit, between the British and the United States, to publish nothing but to speak our minds very freely. In such a large family circle we hope that we will be very successful and achieve constructive accord in order that we may maintain close touch throughout the war and after the war. The General Staffs of the three countries should look after military matters. Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister and I have many things to discuss regarding matters pertaining to conditions after the war. If anyone of us does not want to talk about any particular subject brought up we do not have to. The President added that before he came to the discussion of military problems he felt that perhaps the Prime Minister would like to say something about matters pertaining to the years to come.

The Prime Minister said that we represent here a concentration of great worldly power. In our hands we have perhaps the responsibility for the shortening of this war. In our hands we have, too, the future of mankind. I pray that we may be worthy of this God-given opportunity.

The President then turned to Marshal Stalin and said, “Perhaps our host would like to say a few words.”

Marshal Stalin said, “I take pleasure in welcoming those present. I think that history will show that this opportunity has been of tremendous import. I think the great opportunity which we have and the power which our people have invested in us can be used to take full advantage within the frame of our potential collaboration. Now let us get down to business.”

For editorial annotations, see also the Bohlen minutes of this meeting, supra.
The President said he would like to start with a general survey of the war and of the meaning of the war. This survey will be from the American point of view. We earnestly hope that the completion of the war will come just as soon as possible. Let us begin with a subject that affects the United States more than either Great Britain or the U. S. S. R., the subject of the Pacific. It is most important to us to bring back to the United States those forces which are now in the Pacific. We are bearing a major part of the Pacific war. The United States has the greatest part of its naval power in the Pacific, plus about one million men. We are proceeding on the principle of attrition as regards Japan. At the present that policy is being accepted in our country. We believe we are sinking many Jap ships, both naval and merchant—more than they can possibly replace. We have been moving forward toward Japan from the south and now we are moving toward Japan through the islands from the east. There is very little more that we can do as regards operations from the north. On the west of Japan it is necessary for us to keep China in the war. Hence, we have arranged plans for operations through North Burma and into the Yunnan Province. That operation will advance us far enough so that China herself can strike into the Yunnan Province. In addition, we are still discussing an amphibious operation in order to strike at the supply lines from the Jap base at Bangkok. This base is a veritable storehouse for Japan. The whole operation covers a huge territory, and large numbers of ships and men and planes are necessary to carry it out. We must definitely keep China actively in the war.

The President said, in the second place, we hope, by opening the Burma Road and increasing the transportation of supplies by plane into China, we will be in a position to attack Tokyo from China by air this summer. All this is regarding the Southeast Asia operations. But we want to express to you the very great importance not only of keeping China in the war but of being able to get at Japan with the greatest possible speed.

Now to come down to the more important operations which are of immediate concern to the U. S. S. R. and Great Britain. In the last two or three conferences at Casablanca, Washington and Quebec, we have made many plans. As a matter of fact, about a year and a half ago the major part of our plans were involved in consideration of an expedition against the Axis across the English Channel. Largely because of transportation difficulties we were not able to set a definite

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3 The records of the conferences of Roosevelt and Churchill held at Casablanca, Washington, and Quebec are scheduled to be published subsequently in other volumes of the Foreign Relations series. For the military planning at these conferences, see Matloff, chapters I, VI, X.
date. Not only do we want to get across the English Channel but once we are across, we intend to proceed inland into Germany. It would be impossible to launch such an operation before about 1 May 1944—it was decided at Quebec. The Channel is such a disagreeable body of water. No matter how unpleasant that body of water might be, however, we still want to get across it. (Mr. Churchill interpolated that we were very glad it was an unpleasant body of water at one time.) We can not do everything we would like to do in the Mediterranean and also from the United Kingdom, as there is a definite "bottleneck" in the matter [matériel] of war called landing craft. If we were to conduct any large expedition in the Mediterranean, it would be necessary to give up this important cross-Channel operation, and certain contemplated operations in the Mediterranean might result in a delay in Overlord for one month or two or three. Therefore, I pray in this military Conference to have the benefit of the opinion of the two Soviet Marshals and that they will inform us how in their opinion we can be of most help to the U. S. S. R.

The President said that he felt that even though Overlord should be delayed, we can draw more German divisions from the Soviet front by means of that operation than any other. We have the troops in the Mediterranean but there is a shortage of landing craft. We might help the U. S. S. R. by doing certain immediate operations in the Mediterranean, but we must avoid, if possible, delaying Overlord beyond May or June. There were several things we could do: (a) increase the drive into Italy; (b) undertake an operation from the Northeast Adriatic; (c) operations in the Aegean; (d) operations from Turkey. That is what this military conference is concerned with and we want to create a withdrawal of German divisions from the Western Front. (The Prime Minister interpolated "as soon as possible.")

The Prime Minister said we would like to know what we can do that would most gratefully [greatly] help that which the Soviets are doing on their Western Front. He added that we have tried to outline matters in the simplest terms. There are no differences between Great Britain and the United States in point of view except as regards "ways and means." We would like to reserve any further comments until after we have heard from Marshal Stalin.

Marshall Stalin said, as regards the first part of the President's remarks, we Soviets welcome your successes in the Pacific. Unfortunately we have not so far been able to help because we require too much of our forces on the Western Front and are unable to launch any operations against Japan at this time. Our forces now in the East are more or less satisfactory for defense. However, they must be
increased about three-fold for purposes of offensive operations. This condition will not take place until Germany has been forced to capitulate. Then by our common front we shall win.

Regarding the second part of the President's remarks concerning Europe, Marshal Stalin said he had certain comments to make. Firstly, in a few words, he would like to tell how the Soviets are conducting their own operations, especially since they started their advance last July. (Here the Marshal inquired whether he would be taking too much time to discuss the operations on the Soviet front, and the President and Prime Minister both replied emphatically in the negative and requested him to proceed.)

Marshal Stalin said that after the German defense had collapsed, they were prepared to start their offensive, i.e., they had accumulated sufficient munitions, supplies and reserves, etc. They passed easily from the defensive into the offensive. As a matter of fact, they did not expect the successes they achieved in July, August, and September. Contrary to the Soviet expectations, the Germans are considerably weakened. At the present time the Germans have on the Soviet front 210 divisions, plus 6 German divisions that are in the process of being furnished for this front. In addition, there are 50 non-German divisions, which include 10 Bulgarian, 20 Finnish, and 16 to 18 Rumanian.

The President asked what the present strength of these divisions was.

Marshal Stalin replied that the Germans considered a normal division to be eight to nine thousand men, not counting the corps troops, antiaircraft artillery, and so forth. Including these special troops, the divisions totaled about twelve thousand. He said that last year the Germans had 240 divisions on the Soviet front, 179 of which were German. However, this year they have 260 divisions on the Soviet front, 210 of which are German, plus the six that are now moving from the West. The Red Army has 330 divisions opposing the Germans. This Soviet excess of 70 divisions is used for offensive operations. If the excess did not exist, no offensive operations would be possible. However, as time goes on the difference between the German and Soviet strength decreases, particularly as to the result of demolitions which the Germans construct during their withdrawals, which makes supply difficult. As a result, the operations have slowed down, but the Red Army still maintains the initiative. In some sectors the operations have come to a standstill.

Marshal Stalin said that as to the Ukraine, west and south of Kiev, the Germans have taken the initiative. In this sector they have three old and five new tank divisions, plus 22 or 23 infantry or motorized divisions. These are for the purpose of capturing Kiev. Some diffi-
culties may, therefore, be foreseen. All of these factors make it necessary that the Soviets continue operations in the West and remain silent as far as the Far Eastern front is concerned. The above is a description of the Soviet operations during this past summer.

Now a few words as to how the U. S. S. R. believes the forces of the United States and Great Britain could be best used to help the Soviet front. Possibly this is a mistake, but the U. S. S. R. has considered the operations in Italy as of great value in order to permit ships to pass through the Mediterranean. As to other large operations against Germany from the Italian front, it is not considered that operations in Italy are of great value to further the war against the Axis. Thus, it is believed that the Italian operations were of great importance in order to produce freedom of navigation, but that now they are of no further great importance as regards the defeat of Germany. There was once a time when the Soviets tried to invade the Alps, but they found it a very difficult operation.

In the U. S. S. R. it is believed that the most suitable sector for a blow at Germany would be from some place in France—Northwestern France or Southern France. It is thought that Hitler is trying hard now to contain as many Allied divisions in Italy as possible because he knows things cannot be settled here, and Germany is defended by the Alps. It would be a good thing if Turkey could open the way to Germany, and it would then be unnecessary to launch a cross-Channel operation. However, despite the fact that the heart of Germany is far from the Balkans, it would be a better area from which to launch an attack than from Italy. Soviet military authorities believe it would be better to use Northern France for invasion purposes, but it must be expected that the Germans will fight like devils to prevent such an attack.

The Prime Minister then said that the British had long agreed with the United States that an invasion of North and Northwestern France across the Channel should be undertaken. At the present time preparations for such an operation are absorbing the major part of our energies and resources. He said it would take a long statement to explain why the U. S. and U. K. have not been able to strike against France in 1943, but that they are resolved to do so in 1944. In 1943 operations in Africa and across the Mediterranean were the best that could be accomplished in view of the limitations imposed by the lack of shipping and landing craft. He said that the United States and Great Britain had set before themselves the object of carrying an army into France in the late spring or early summer of 1944. The

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3 The reference is to the operations of Russian troops in the Napoleonic Wars: see ante, p. 490, footnote 5.
forces set up for this operation amount to 16 British divisions and 19 U. S. divisions, a total of 35. It must be remembered, however, that these divisions are almost twice as strong as the German divisions. The enterprise will involve a force of a million men being placed into France in 1944.

At this point Marshal Stalin stated that he had not wished to imply that the Mediterranean operations had been unimportant.

The Prime Minister said he was very grateful for the Marshal’s courtesy, but both he and the President had never regarded the Mediterranean operations as more than a stepping stone to the main offensive against Germany. He said that after the British 16 divisions had been committed, there would be no more British divisions available for the operations. The entire British manpower would be necessary to maintain the divisions thus committed in France and elsewhere throughout the world. The remaining build-up for the offensive against Germany would rest with the United States. The Prime Minister said, however, that the summer of 1944 is far away. This particular operation is six months away. It is asked now what can be done in the meanwhile that will be of more use and take more weight off the U. S. S. R., possibly without delaying Overlord more than a month or two. Already seven of the best divisions have been withdrawn from the Mediterranean for Overlord and many landing craft have already gone or are being collected together. These withdrawals, plus bad weather, have resulted in our great disappointment at not now being in Rome. However, it is hoped to be there in January. General Alexander, who is commanding these operations under the direction of General Eisenhower, feels that that offensive might result in completely cutting off the 10 or 12 divisions now opposing the Anglo-American forces. This would result from amphibious operations, flanking movements, which would cut off their lines of withdrawal.

The United States and the British have not come to any decision regarding plans for going into the Valley of the Po or for trying to invade Germany from Northern Italy. It was felt that when the Pisa–Rimini line should be reached we could then look toward Southern France or the Adriatic. It would be possible to use sea power in order to open the way.

The Prime Minister said, however, that the operations referred to above were not enough. Ways of doing much more were now being talked of. Splendid things had been accomplished in Yugoslavia by Tito, who is doing much more than Mihailovich had accomplished. There were no plans to put a large army into Yugoslavia, but a blow could be struck at the Germans by means of assisting the Tito forces through increased supplies.
The Prime Minister said that one of the greatest things under consideration was the matter of bringing Turkey into the war, persuading her in, and opening the communications into the Dardanelles, Bosphorus and the Black Sea. Such operation would make possible an attack on Rhodes and other islands in the Aegean. The above would have a very important effect in that it would be possible for convoys to supply the U. S. S. R. through that route and these convoys could be maintained continuously. At the present time four convoys are scheduled via the northern routes, but it will not be possible to send more because of the necessity of utilizing the escorts for the Overlord build-up.

The Prime Minister said one of the most important questions is how Turkey can be persuaded to come into the war. What should be done about this matter? If Turkey should enter the war, should she be asked to attack Bulgaria or should her forces stop on the Thrace front? What would be the effect of Turkey’s action on Bulgaria? What do the Soviets think Bulgaria would do in the event of Turkey’s coming into the war? How would Turkey’s entry into the war affect Rumania and Hungary? Would not Turkey’s entry into the war and consequent operations in the Aegean bring about a political “turnover” and force a German evacuation of Greece? It would be appreciated if the Soviets would let us know their opinion, political as well as military, on the above questions.

Marshal Stalin said with regard to the remark of the Prime Minister as to whether it was thought Bulgaria would remember the Soviet action in freeing her from the Turks— the liberation of Bulgaria has not been forgotten.

The Prime Minister continued that the objective of operations which were contemplated in the Eastern Mediterranean was to support the Soviets provided the U. S. S. R. considered the matter of sufficient interest for these operations to be undertaken—even if it meant as much as about two months’ delay in Overlord. Until it is known how the Soviets feel about Turkish and Aegean operations, the matter can not be definitely decided. The U. S. and U. K. can only decide this point after consulting with the U. S. S. R.

The President said that possibly an entry through the Northeastern Adriatic for offensive operations against Germany in the direction of the Danube would be of value. Such operations were being considered together with a movement into Southern France. Plans for these operations had not been worked out in detail. Such plans would be based, of course, on the assumption that the Red

\*The reference is to Russian action in 1877-78. With regard to the Churchill remark referred to by Stalin, see ante, p. 492.
Army would at the same time be approaching Odessa. It was thought, however, that it would be desirable to have a subcommittee go into the details of this matter.

The Prime Minister said that if the Anglo-American forces take Rome and break up the German formation south of the Apennines they would then have the choice of proceeding to Southern France or eastward across the Adriatic.

Marshal Stalin said that he understood it would require 35 divisions to invade France. Did these include the forces to be used in the Mediterranean?

The Prime Minister indicated that the Mediterranean forces were entirely separate from those included in the Overlord build-up. He added that after the Italians had been defeated in Italy there remained the possibility of an attack against Southern France or across the Adriatic in the direction of Hungary and the Danube. Entirely separate from the Overlord build-up there would be 22 divisions available in the Mediterranean; these should all be used. However, it was not possible to move more than seven of them to the Overlord build-up because of a lack of shipping. He explained again that the Overlord build-up was to include 16 British and 19 American divisions; that once the 16 British divisions had been committed there would be no more British divisions available. However, the United States would continue to pour divisions into France as fast as they could be shipped across the Atlantic until a total force of 50 to 60 divisions had been reached. He pointed out, incidentally, the British and American divisions with their necessary supporting troops could be roughly estimated at 40,000 men each.

The Prime Minister also spoke of the large air forces being assembled in England. The present R. A. F. has about reached its maximum strength and [will?] be maintained at this strength in the future. However, it is contemplated that the American Air Forces in England will be doubled or tripled in the next six months. The U. S. has already shipped a million tons of stores to the United Kingdom in preparation for the Overlord operation. Mr. Churchill said that the President and he would be delighted to have the whole schedule of the Overlord build-up, both as to personnel and supply, presented to the Soviet authorities and answer any questions which they might have on this subject. He added that the schedule so prepared is being carried out.

Marshal Stalin said it seemed to him that in addition to the operations to capture Rome and in addition to those envisaged for the Adriatic, an operation in Southern France was contemplated.

The Prime Minister replied it was hoped that an operation against
Southern France might be carried out as a diversion for Overlord but that detailed plans for such an operation had not been worked out.

**Marshal Stalin** asked if Turkey enters the war will Anglo-American forces be allocated to assist them?

The Prime Minister said that speaking for himself, two or three divisions would be required to take the islands in the Aegean that control communications to Turkey, that 20 squadrons of fighter aircraft and several regiments of anti-aircraft artillery could also be supplied by the British without seriously affecting other operations in the Mediterranean.

Marshal Stalin then said that the Anglo-American presentation was clear to him and indicated that he would like to make some comments. He said that it was not worthwhile to scatter the British and American forces. The plans presented seemed to indicate that part would be sent to Turkey, part to be utilized in Southern France, part in Northern France and part for operations across the Adriatic. He suggested that Overlord be accepted as a basis for operations in 1944 and other operations should be considered as diversionary. He thought that after Rome had been captured there might be a chance for an operation against Southern France from Corsica, in which event the Overlord forces plus the Southern France invasion force could establish contact in France. This, he thought, would be a much better operation than to scatter forces in several areas distant from each other. He considered that France was the weakest of all German-occupied areas. He added that he had no hopes of Turkey entering the war and in fact was convinced that she would not, in spite of all pressure that might be exerted.

The Prime Minister said that he and the President had understood that the Soviet authorities wanted Turkey to come into the war. They were prepared to make every effort to persuade or force her to do so.

Marshal Stalin said the Soviets do want Turkey to enter the war but he felt that she could not be taken in by “the scruff of the neck.”

The Prime Minister said that he agreed that the Anglo-American forces should not be scattered but that the operations he had outlined in the Eastern Mediterranean would require only three or four of a total of 25 divisions that might be available. He thought that this could be accomplished without seriously affecting the main operations.

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*According to Churchill, p. 355. Stalin replied as follows to Churchill's question whether it was not intended to renew the effort to induce Turkey to enter the war: “I am all in favour of trying again. We ought to take them by the scruff of the neck if necessary.”*
of OVERLORD. Most of the operations would be done by divisions from the Middle East. The air power necessary to assist Turkey would be taken from that now protecting Egypt and thus they would be brought into a better position to strike at the enemy.

The Prime Minister said he dreaded the six months' idleness between the capture of Rome and the mounting of OVERLORD. Hence, he believed that secondary operations should be considered in order to deploy forces available.

Marshal Stalin said he would like to express another opinion, i.e., that he believed OVERLORD has the greatest possibilities. This would particularly be the case if OVERLORD operations were supported by another offensive movement from Southern France. He believed that the Allies should be prepared to remain on the defensive in Italy and thus release 10 divisions for operations in Southern France. Within two or three months after operations commenced in Southern France and the German forces had thus been diverted, the time would be propitious to start an operation in the North of France such as OVERLORD. Under these conditions the success of OVERLORD would be assured. Rome might then be captured at a later date.

The Prime Minister observed that we should be no stronger if we did not capture Rome. If the airfields north of Rome are not secured it would be impracticable to place adequate aircraft for an attack on Southern France. He said it would be difficult for him to agree not to take Rome this January. He added that failure to do so would be considered as a crushing defeat, and that the House of Commons would feel that he was failing to use his British forces in full support of the Soviet ally. He said that in this event he felt it would be no longer possible for him to represent his government.

Marshal Stalin suggested that an operation against Southern France might be undertaken and given air cover from bases on Corsica.

The Prime Minister said that it would take considerable time to construct the necessary airfields on the Island of Corsica.

The President said that Marshal Stalin's proposals concerning Southern France were of considerable interest to him. He would like to have the Planners make a study of the possibilities of this operation. The question of relative timing in the Eastern Mediterranean with reference to these operations posed a very serious question. The point was whether it would be better to go into the Eastern Mediterranean and delay OVERLORD for one or two months or to attack France one or two months before the first of May and then conduct OVERLORD on the original date. He was particularly desirous that this operation not be delayed if it were possible to avoid it.
Marshal Stalin said as the result of the Soviet experience in the past two years they have come to the conclusion that a large offensive from one direction is unwise. The Red Army usually attacks from two directions, forcing the enemy to move his reserves from one front to the other. As the two offensives converge the power of the whole offensive increases. Such would be the case in simultaneous operations from Southern and Northern France.

The Prime Minister said he agreed with the views expressed by Marshal Stalin but did not feel that his proposals concerning Turkey and Yugoslavia were inconsistent with them. He wished to go on record as saying that it would be difficult and impossible to sacrifice all activity in the Mediterranean in order to keep an exact date for Overlord. There would be 20 divisions which could not be moved out of the Mediterranean because of a lack of shipping. These should be used to stretch Germany to the utmost. He expressed the hope that careful and earnest consideration should be given to making certain that operations in the Mediterranean were not injured solely for the purpose of keeping the May date for Overlord. He added that agreement between the three powers was necessary and would be reached but he hoped that all factors would be given careful and patient consideration before decisions were reached. He suggested meditating on the discussions of the first meeting and reviewing them at the meeting of the next day.

The President said he thought it would be a good idea for the staff to immediately conduct a study on the operations against Southern France.

The Prime Minister agreed that the staff should investigate plans for operations against Southern France but added that they should also work on Turkey.

Marshal Stalin agreed that it would be well to continue consideration of these matters the next day. He had not expected that the conference would deal with purely military questions and therefore they had not brought a large military staff. He added, however, that Marshal Voroshiloff was present and would be available for military discussions.

The Prime Minister asked how the question of Turkish entry into the war should be considered. He asked if she could be brought in, what she should be expected to do in the event that she did come in and what the cost of her entry would be to the three powers concerned.

Marshal Stalin said that the entry of Turkey into the war was both a political and a military question. Turkey must take pride in
the policy of entry from the point of view of friendship. The British and
the United States should use their influence to persuade Turkey
to help. In this way it would be impossible for Turkey to maintain
her position as a neutral and continue to play fast and loose between
our side and the Axis. It was his opinion that if it were not possible
to induce Turkey to enter the war as a matter of friendship, she
should not enter. Marshal Stalin added that all neutral states,
including Turkey, look upon belligerents as fools. We must prove to
them that if they do not enter this war they will not reap the benefits
of the victory.

The Prime Minister observed that Christmas time would be a
dangerous season for Turkey. He added that he proposed submitting
a paper which he would present before the conference, containing six
or seven questions which should be answered in order to clarify the
Turkish situation.

The President said that he would do all he could to persuade the
President of Turkey to enter the war. However, he felt personally
that Turkey would ask such a high price for her entry as a belligerent
that Overlord would be jeopardized.

Marshal Stalin said that the Turks have not yet answered the pro-
posals already made to them but that he expected their reply would be
in the negative.

The Prime Minister said that Turkey would be mad not to accept
the Soviet invitation to join the winning side. If she failed to align
herself with us she would certainly lose [lose] the sympathy of the
British people and almost certainly of the American people.

Marshal Stalin observed that "a bird in the hand is worth two in
the bush." The Turks are now inactive and they should help us.

The Conference then agreed that the plenary session should be held
at 1600 the following day.

The President observed that it would be desirable to have a military
conference first.

It was agreed that a military conference should be held at 1030 the
following day, that Marshal Voroshiloff should represent the
U. S. S. R., Admiral Leahy and General Marshall should represent
the U. S. A. and General Brooke and Air Marshal Portal should
represent Great Britain.

*The paper to which Churchill referred was drawn up by the British Chiefs
of Staff at Tehran and dated November 28, 1943. It was not discussed, however,
at the Tehran Conference. On December 2, 1943, the paper was circulated as
C. C. S. 418 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Cairo. It was discussed at their
meeting on December 3, 1943, and was approved with amendments as 418/1.
See post, pp. 673 and 782, respectively.
TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, NOVEMBER 28, 1943, 8:30 P.M.,
ROOSEVELT’S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Major Birse

SOVIET UNION
Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar
Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

SECRET

During the first part of the dinner the conversation between the President and Marshal Stalin was general in character and dealt for the most part with a suitable place for the next meeting. Fairbanks seemed to be considered by both the most suitable spot.

Marshall Stalin then raised the question of the future of France. He described in considerable length the reasons why, in his opinion, France deserved no considerate treatment from the Allies and, above all, had no right to retain her former empire. He said that the entire French ruling class was rotten to the core and had delivered over France to the Germans and that, in fact, France was now actively helping our enemies. He therefore felt that it would be not only unjust but dangerous to leave in French hands any important strategic points after the war.

The President replied that he in part agreed with Marshal Stalin. That was why this afternoon he had said to Marshal Stalin that it was necessary to eliminate in the future government of France anybody over forty years old and particularly anybody who had formed part of the French Government. He mentioned specifically the question of New Caledonia and Dakar, the first of which he said represented a threat to Australia and New Zealand and, therefore, should be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations. In regard to Dakar, The President said he was speaking for twenty-one American nations when he said that Dakar in unsure hands was a direct threat to the Americas.

Mr. Churchill at this point intervened to say that Great Britain did not desire and did not expect to acquire any additional territory out of this war, but since the 4 great victorious nations—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China—will be

1 Roosevelt was the host at this dinner.
responsible for the future peace of the world, it was obviously necessary that certain strategic points throughout the world should be under the [their?] control.

MARSHAL STALIN again repeated and emphasized his view that France could not be trusted with any strategic possessions outside her own border in the post-war period. He described the ideology of the Vichy Ambassador to Moscow, Bergery, which he felt was characteristic of the majority of French politicians. This ideology definitely preferred an agreement with France’s former enemy, Germany, than with her former allies, Great Britain and the United States.

The conversation then turned to the question of the treatment to be accorded Nazi Germany.

THE PRESIDENT said that, in his opinion, it was very important not to leave in the German mind the concept of the Reich and that the very word should be stricken from the language.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that it was not enough to eliminate the word, but the very Reich itself must be rendered impotent ever again to plunge the world into war. He said that unless the victorious Allies retained in their hands the strategic positions necessary to prevent any recrudescence of German militarism, they would have failed in their duty.

In the detailed discussion between the President, Marshal Stalin and Churchill that followed Marshal Stalin took the lead, constantly emphasizing that the measures for the control of Germany and her disarmament were insufficient to prevent the rebirth of German militarism and appeared to favor even stronger measures. He, however, did not specify what he actually had in mind except that he appeared to favor the dismemberment of Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN particularly mentioned that Poland should extend to the Oder and stated definitely that the Russians would help the Poles to obtain a frontier on the Oder.

THE PRESIDENT then said he would be interested in the question of assuring the approaches to the Baltic Sea and had in mind some form of trusteeship with perhaps an international state in the vicinity of the Kiel Canal to insure free navigation in both directions through the approaches. Due to some error of the Soviet translator Marshal Stalin apparently thought that the President was referring to the question of the Baltic States. On the basis of this understanding, he replied categorically that the Baltic States had by an expression of the will of the people voted to join the Soviet Union and that this question was not therefore one for discussion. Following the clearing up of the misapprehension, he, however, expressed himself favorably in
regard to the question of insuring free navigation to and from the Baltic Sea.

The President, returning to the question of certain outlying possessions, said he was interested in the possibility of a sovereignty fashioned in a collective body such as the United Nations; a concept which had never been developed in past history.

After dinner when the President had retired, the conversation continued between Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill. The subject was still the treatment to be accorded to Germany, and even more than during dinner Marshal Stalin appeared to favor the strongest possible measures against Germany.

Mr. Churchill said that he advocated that Germany be permitted no aviation of any character—neither military or civilian—and in addition that the German general staff system should be completely abolished. He proposed a number of other measures of control such as constant supervision over such industries as might be left to Germany and territorial dismemberment of the Reich.

Marshal Stalin to all of these considerations expressed doubt as to whether they would be effective. He said that any furniture factories could be transformed into airplane factories and any watch factories could make fuses for shells. He said, in his opinion, the Germans were very able and talented people and could easily revive within fifteen or twenty years and again become a threat to the world. He said that he had personally questioned German prisoners in the Soviet Union as to why they had burst into Russian homes, killed Russian women, etc., and that the only reply he had received was they had been ordered to do so.

Mr. Churchill said that he could not look more than fifty years ahead and that he felt that upon the three nations represented here at Teheran rested the grave responsibility of future measures of assuring in some manner or other that Germany would not again rise to plague the world during the [that?] period. He said that he felt it was largely the fault of the German leaders and that, while during war time no distinction could be made between the leaders and the people particularly in regard to Germany, nevertheless, with a generation of self-sacrificing, toil and education, something might be done with the German people.

Marshal Stalin expressed dissent with this and did not appear satisfied as to the efficacy of any of the measures proposed by Mr. Churchill.

For post-Conference references to this matter, see post, pp. 847, 880, 884.
Mr. Churchill then inquired whether it would be possible this evening to discuss the question of Poland. He said that Great Britain had gone to war with Germany because of the latter's invasion of Poland in 1939 and that the British Government was committed to the reestablishment of a strong and independent Poland but not to any specific Polish frontiers. He added that if Marshal Stalin felt any desire to discuss the question of Poland, that he was prepared to do so and he was sure that the President was similarly disposed.

Marshal Stalin said that he had not yet felt the necessity nor the desirability of discussing the Polish question (After an exchange of remarks on this subject from which it developed that the Marshal had in mind that nothing that the Prime Minister had said on the subject of Poland up to the present stimulated him to discuss the question, the conversation returned to the substance of the Polish question).

Mr. Churchill said that he personally had no attachment to any specific frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union; that he felt that the consideration of Soviet security on their western frontiers was a governing factor. He repeated, however, that the British Government considered themselves committed to the reestablishment of an independent and strong Poland which he felt a necessary instrument in the European orchestra.

Mr. Eden then inquired if he had understood the Marshal correctly at dinner when the latter said that the Soviet Union favored the Polish western frontier on the Oder.

Marshal Stalin replied emphatically that he did favor such a frontier for Poland and repeated that the Russians were prepared to help the Poles achieve it.

Mr. Churchill then remarked that it would be very valuable if here in Teheran the representatives of the three governments could work out some agreed understanding on the question of the Polish frontiers which could then be taken up with the Polish Government in London. He said that, as far as he was concerned, he would like to see Poland moved westward in the same manner as soldiers at drill execute the drill "left close" and illustrated his point with three matches representing the Soviet Union, Poland and Germany.

Marshal Stalin agreed that it would be a good idea to reach an understanding on this question but said it was necessary to look into the matter further.

The conversation broke up on this note.
SECRET

Memorandum of Marshal Stalin's Views as Expressed During the Evening of November 28, 1943

During dinner and afterwards Marshal Stalin kept returning to the following subjects:

(1) Treatment to be Accorded Germany

In regard to Germany, Marshal Stalin appeared to regard all measures proposed by either the President or Churchill for the subjugation and for the control of Germany as inadequate. He on various occasions sought to induce the President or the Prime Minister to go further in expressing their views as to the stringency of the measures which should be applied to Germany. He appeared to have no faith in the possibility of the reform of the German people and spoke bitterly of the attitude of the German workers in the war against the Soviet Union. As evidence of the fundamental German devotion to legality he cited the occasion in 1907 when he was in Leipzig when 200 German workers failed to appear at an important mass meeting because there was no controller at the station platform to punch their tickets which would permit them to leave the station. He seemed to think that this mentality of discipline and obedience could not be changed.

He said that Hitler was a very able man but not basically intelligent, lacking in culture and with a primitive approach to political and other problems. He did not share the view of the President that Hitler was mentally unbalanced and emphasized that only a very able man could accomplish what Hitler had done in solidifying the German people whatever we thought of the methods. Although he did not specifically say so, it was apparent from his remarks that he considered that Hitler through his stupidity in attacking the Soviet Union had thrown away all the fruits of his previous victories.

As a war-time measure Marshal Stalin questioned the advisability of the unconditional surrender principle with no definition of the exact terms which would be imposed upon Germany. He felt that to leave the principle of unconditional surrender unclarified merely served to unite the German people, whereas to draw up specific terms, no matter how harsh, and tell the German people that this was what they would have to accept, would, in his opinion, hasten the day of German capitulation.
III. THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE

(2) FRANCE AND THE FRENCH EMPIRE

Throughout the evening Marshal Stalin kept reverting to the thesis that the French nation, and in particular its leaders and ruling classes, were rotten and deserved to be punished for their criminal collaboration with Nazi Germany. In particular he reiterated that France should not be given back her Empire. He took issue with the Prime Minister when the latter stated that France had been a defeated nation and had suffered the horrors of occupation, and denied that France had been in effect defeated. On the contrary their leaders had surrendered the country and “opened the front” to the German armies. He cited as characteristic of French political thinking the views of Bergery, former Vichy Ambassador to Moscow. Bergery had felt that the future of France lay in close association with Nazi Germany and not in association with Great Britain and the United States. When the Prime Minister stated that he could not conceive of a civilized world without a flourishing and lively France, Marshal Stalin somewhat contemptuously replied that France could be a charming and pleasant country but could not be allowed to play any important role in the immediate post war world. He characterized De Gaulle as a representative of a symbolic and not a real France but one who nevertheless acted as though he was the head of a great power. He appeared to attach little importance to De Gaulle as a real factor in political or other matters.

Both in regard to German and French questions Stalin was obviously trying to stimulate discussion and to ascertain the exact views of the President and Prime Minister on these questions without, however, stating clearly what solutions he himself proposed. On all questions of future general security which arose in the discussion of the French and German questions he appeared desirous to ascertain exactly what form of security organization would be developed after the war and how far the United States and British governments were prepared to go in implementing the police power of such an organization.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1943
TRIPARTITE MILITARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 1943, 10:30 A. M., CONFERENCE ROOM, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Colonel McFarland, Secretary
Captain Ware, Interpreter

UNITED KINGDOM
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Brigadier Redman, Secretary
Captain Lunghi, Interpreter

SOVIET UNION
Marshall Voroshilov
Mr. Pavlov, Interpreter
SECRET

GENERAL SIR ALAN BROOKE expressed his pleasure at being able to sit down at a table around which were gathered the military representatives of the U. S., the U. K., and the U. S. S. R. He said that he would run through a brief account of the war as seen by the British representatives at the present moment and then examine the relation of the OVERLORD operation to the other parts of the war effort.

He thought that one of the most important things at the present time was to keep the German divisions actively engaged. For this reason, the British were interested in stopping the movement to the Russian front of all the German divisions which it was possible to hold. OVERLORD would engage a large number of German divisions, but it could not possibly be mounted until 1 May at the very earliest date. Therefore, there would ensue, between the present time and the launching of OVERLORD, a period of some five or six months during which something must be done to keep the German divisions engaged. It was therefore desired to take full advantage of the forces now established in the Mediterranean area.

At this point GENERAL BROOKE expressed the hope that General Marshall would interrupt his statement if anything was said with which General Marshall did not agree or on which he wished to offer any comment.

Continuing his account of the war, GENERAL BROOKE said that for the reasons already stated, all the plans on which we have been working have been designed to deploy the maximum forces on all fronts. Pointing out on a map the present location of the Italian Front, he said that on that line we are assembling the forces in Italy necessary to drive the Germans to the north. There are some 23 German divisions now in Italy, part of them in the south and a part of them in the north. The present conception is to assemble sufficient forces to drive the Germans from their present line to a line north of Rome. To do this it would be necessary to employ amphibious forces around the German flanks (pointing to the west flank), and by these operations it was hoped to engage the 11 or 12 German divisions in the south, render them inoperative, and force the Germans to relieve them. By these means we should be able to contain the German divisions now present in Italy and to reduce their efficiency.

Turning to Yugoslavia, GENERAL BROOKE said that since the withdrawal of Italian forces there, the Germans have found it difficult to maintain their communications in that country. Therefore, full
advantage must be taken of all opportunities to increase the German difficulties in Yugoslavia by assisting the Partisans. It is desired to organize a system by which arms can be supplied to them and air assistance rendered as well.

General Brooke said that there were now some 21 German divisions deployed in Yugoslavia as far down as the Grecian border. Replying to an indication from Marshal Voroshiloff that he did not quite agree with these figures, he stated that this was his information and that he would ask the British Intelligence to check the accuracy of his figures. He said that there were also 8 Bulgarian divisions in addition to the German divisions in the Yugoslav area.

With reference to Turkey, General Brooke said that, looking at Turkey from a military point of view and omitting all political considerations, we see a great military advantage in getting Turkey into the war. By this we shall have an opportunity of opening the sea communications through the Dardanelles. By doing this, the position of Bulgaria and Rumania will become more difficult and the chances of getting them out of the war will be greatly increased. There will also be opened up the possibility of establishing a supply line to Russia through the Dardanelles.

By establishing airdromes in Turkey, it will be possible to launch bombing attacks on German oil establishments in eastern Europe. The shortening of the sea route to Russia will save shipping and thereby assist greatly in the general shipping shortage. In order to open sea communications through the Dardanelles, it is considered that it will be necessary to capture some of the Dodecanese Islands, beginning with Rhodes. With airdromes established in Turkey and with Turkish help, it was not believed that this would be a difficult task nor that it would detract from other operations.

General Brooke said that we have in the Mediterranean now a certain number of landing craft for special operations. These landing craft would be required for the operations he had outlined, and their retention for these operations would require the retarding of the date set for OVERLORD. The landing craft are being used to maintain and build up the forces now in Italy. By the operations he had outlined we should be able to hold and destroy the German forces now in the Mediterranean area while awaiting the date for OVERLORD.

He considered it also of great importance to establish airdromes to the north of Rome in order to bring bombing to bear on German installations. He said that this air operation in conjunction with the operations now being carried on from England would play a great part in the conduct of the whole war.

He pointed out that air attacks were now containing about a million men now held in Germany solely by reason of the bomber offensive.
He said that if we adopt defensive operations in Italy now, as had been suggested at yesterday’s conference,\(^1\) we should still have to maintain strong forces in Italy in order to contain the German forces there. Therefore, there would be left over only very limited forces for the operation against the coast of Southern France. In addition, the landing craft available for that operation would be limited to a very small assault force.

**General Brooke** said that he agreed with Marshal Stalin’s pincer strategy of two cooperating forces whenever such a strategy was possible but he thought that this strategy was better when based on land instead of on long sea communications. In the latter case, the two forces are not sufficiently self-supporting. It is not easy to reinforce one from the other or to keep a reserve from which to reinforce either from a central point. The building up of land forces by sea is a lengthy business.

**General Brooke** said that if the attack against Southern France were launched two months prior to **Overlord**, that it was certain to be defeated before **Overlord** starts. He said that a more nearly simultaneous execution of these operations would be required and also that large numbers of landing craft would be necessary. However, it had been considered that during **Overlord** a small landing might be made in Southern France to draw German forces away from the larger operation.

He said that the difficulties and dangers for **Overlord** would develop during the building up of the forces. It was possible to assault the French coast only with some three or four divisions and the process of building up to 35 divisions would be long and difficult. During this period it was imperative that the Germans should not be able to concentrate large forces against the operation.

**General Brooke** said that this concluded a rough outline of the projected land operations and that Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal would explain the air aspects of the operations.

**Air Marshal Portal** inquired as to whether he should, in his comments, cover the U. S. air operations or whether General Marshall would do this.

In reply, **General Marshall** requested Air Marshal Portal to cover the entire operations and said that he would elaborate as necessary.

In response to Marshal Voroshiloff’s request that the U. S. representatives give their comments on the land operations before the taking up of the air aspects, **Admiral Leahy** requested General Marshall to state the U. S. views.

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\(^1\) See ante, p. 495.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that he should first explain the purely American point of view of this stage of the war. He pointed out that the U. S. now has a going war on two fronts, the Pacific and the Atlantic, and this fact of two major operations at one time presents a dilemma. In contrast to the usual difficulties of war, there is no lack of troops and no lack of supplies. There are now more than fifty divisions in the United States which we wish to deploy as soon as possible in addition to those already overseas. The military problem, therefore, resolves itself almost entirely into a question of shipping and landing craft. While this is, of course, an exaggeration, it might almost be said that we have reached the point of having to ignore strategy in order to advance communications. Our great desire is to bring these troops into action as soon as possible.

When we speak of landing craft we mean, most of all, special craft for the transport of motor vehicles and tanks. As the Chief of the Imperial General Staff has already stated, our problem in the Mediterranean is largely one of landing craft, and of those landing craft, we are particularly concerned with the special craft for transporting motor vehicles.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he wished to repeat and emphasize that there was no lack of troops or of supplies. He said we are deeply interested in the length of voyages, the length of time required in ports, and the over-all time for the turn-around. Our air forces had been sent overseas just as soon as they had been trained and hence, the air battle was far more advanced than the situation on land. One of the delays in the build-up of land forces in Italy had been the getting in of air support and the necessary ground troops to maintain it.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that one reason for favoring OVERLORD from the start is that it is the shortest overseas transport route. After the initial success, transports will be sent directly from the United States to the French ports because there are about sixty divisions in the United States to be put into OVERLORD.

As to the Mediterranean factors in the situation, GENERAL MARSHALL said that no definite conclusions have been reached up to the present as to further operations, pending the results of this conference. The question now before us is: What do we do in the next three months, and then in the next six months? He pointed out that what was done in the second period would necessarily depend on the decisions made in the first period.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he would like to repeat the statement made by General Brooke that it is considered dangerous to launch an operation against the coast of Southern France a long time (that is, what we consider a long time) prior to OVERLORD. On the other hand, action in Southern France has been considered and planned on as very impor-
tant for the support of the operation in Northwestern France. He said that at the present moment he and his U. S. colleagues feel that from two to three weeks should be the maximum limit for launching this operation in advance of Overlord.

General Marshall said he wished to point out, in addition to what General Brooke had said, that the destruction of ports imposes an initial and serious delay in getting heavy equipment and ammunition ashore, and it is necessary that we assume in our planning that the ports will be destroyed. Our engineers have accomplished marvels in restoring the damaged ports but despite this, a considerable period of dangerous delay inevitably follows the initial assault. He illustrated this by reference to the U. S. experience in Salerno, a comparatively small landing. In the first 18 days there had been landed over the beaches a total of 108,000 tons of supplies, 30,000 motor vehicles and 189,000 troops. He wished to emphasize that all of this had to be done over the beaches and that none of it came through a port. The U. S. was fortunate, of course, to have had during this period a very slight enemy air reaction.

General Marshall said that the difficulty in such an operation is to get sufficient fighter air cover. In almost every case it had been found, therefore, that an additional operation was necessary in order to get the airfields for this fighter cover.

In answer to a question from Marshal Voroshiloff as to how long it had taken to land the men and material just enumerated, General Marshall said it had required 18 days; thereafter a port had been secured. Then, beginning with an initial entry of 2,000 tons of supplies, the intake through the port was increased more and more as the demolished equipment was rehabilitated until it was possible to take care of all requirements in this manner.

In summarizing, General Marshall said that he wished to emphasize that shipping and landing craft, with the provision of fighter air cover, are the problems for which we have to find solutions in order to decide the question of Mediterranean operations. He added that over Salerno fighter aircraft had had only 15 or 20 minutes of actual combat flying time.

Marshal Voroshiloff remarked that for Overlord this would be a very short time.

General Marshall replied that a total combat time of 30 minutes had been planned for Overlord.

In reply to Marshal Voroshiloff's statement that he did not think this was sufficient time, Air Marshal Portal explained that the 30 minutes was not measured from take-off to landing but was the actual time in which the fighter planes were actually engaged over the battle area.
In reply to Marshal Voroshiloff's question as to what fighters were envisaged as being in this area, Air Marshal Portal said that these would be the high-performance fighters, like the British Spitfires and American P-51's and P-38's. He explained that the long-range fighters were not so suitable against the German defenses as the short-range.

General Marshall said that in the Mediterranean we face the problem of where to employ our available landing craft. If we undertake certain operations, Overlord will inevitably be delayed. If we confine ourselves to reduced operations in the Mediterranean for the next three or four months, this course entails the least interference with Overlord. He repeated that the problem is not a lack of troops or of equipment. He would like Marshal Voroshiloff to understand that at the present time the U. S. has landing operations going on at five different places in the Pacific, all of which involve landing craft, and that four more similar operations were due to be launched in January.

Admiral Leahy said that he thought the best procedure now would be to have Air Marshal Portal discuss the air aspects of operations and then to ask Marshal Voroshiloff to present any comments or advice he may have.

Air Marshal Portal said that he would speak only of the air war in Europe other than on the battle fronts. He said that the air offensive against Germany was being waged on an ever-increasing scale from the U. K.; from the Mediterranean it was just beginning. As to the scale of attack, the British and Americans together were launching from 15,000 to 20,000 tons of bombs per month on German communications, installations, and battle industry. Our immediate objective is the destruction of the plants and factories on which German battle industry depends. If we can do this and inflict heavy casualties on German fighters, we hope to be able to range over all Germany and destroy one by one every important installation on which the German war effort depends.

The battle is heavy, with heavy losses on both sides. The Germans clearly realize their danger if our plans succeed. This is assured by the disposition of their forces in order to counter our attacks. For instance, for the defense of central and southern Germany the Germans now have deployed between 1,650 and 1,700 fighters. On all other fronts together they have only 750 fighters. These figures cover fighters only; bombers are not included. German sensitiveness to the bombing of their industrial area was recently illustrated when, in response to the comparatively light attacks made from the Mediterranean on this area, the Germans immediately transferred 200 fighters to the area.
AIR MARSHAL Portal said that it was recognized that the bulk of the Soviet planes were now employed in support of the land battle, but when it became possible to spare air forces from the land battle, this would help enormously on all other fronts by causing the Germans to withdraw forces to protect the area threatened by the Soviets.

In response to a suggestion from Admiral Leahy, it was now agreed that it would be helpful if Marshal Voroshiloff would express his opinion on the matters under discussion.

Marshal Voroshiloff said that before making a statement, he would like to ask some questions. He said that he knew from the statements made by the British and American military representatives in Moscow that Overlord is being prepared for next spring, with a target date about 1 May. He had just heard that morning that fifty or sixty divisions would be available from the U. S. for this operation and that the only problem was one of shipping and landing craft. He hoped that it might be possible to have a report on what is being done now to solve the problem of shipping and landing craft and to launch Operation Overlord on time. This constituted his first question.

As to his second question, he said that he had attached great importance to the remarks made by General Marshall from which he understood that the U. S. considers Operation Overlord of the first importance. He wished to know if General Brooke also considered the operation of the first importance. He wished to ask both Allies whether they think that Overlord must be carried out or whether they consider that it may be possible to replace it by some other suitable operation when Turkey has entered the war.

General Marshall said that in answer to Marshal Voroshiloff’s question as to progress from the U. S. side on the build-up for Overlord, all preparations are now under way and have been for some time, for a target date of 1 May 1944, and that the troops are now in motion. As an example he pointed out that we now have in England, well ahead of the troops, a million tons of supplies and equipment, including munitions and heavy supplies of all kinds. It remains now only to bring the troops up to the supplies.

He pointed out that the U. S. had only one division in England in August. There are nine divisions there now with a constant flow of additional troops. There had been a tremendous flow of air personnel for the bomber offensive.

He said that in speaking of divisions, he was including the necessary corps and army troops as well as service troops. He reiterated that the problem is landing craft for Overlord. The question now is: Shall we take any landing craft from Overlord for other operations and thereby delay Overlord? The troops are in motion for
Overlord. The air forces are already there and proceeding with their expansion. The problem is landing craft.

Marshal Voroshiloff said that he had an additional question. He said that General Deane and General Ismay, in explaining the Overlord build-up at the Moscow Conference, had said that both in the U. S. and U. K. there were now being built special landing craft and special vessels for the construction of temporary harbors. He would like to know the present status of these construction programs.

General Marshall said that he would leave the answer as to the special port construction and as to part of the landing craft construction to General Brooke. He said that in the struggle with the landing craft problem, the object of the U. S. is to get more craft in order to be able to undertake some operations in the Mediterranean that could easily be done if more landing craft were available. He wished to make clear that the landing craft program for Overlord is well in hand. General Marshall repeated and emphasized this statement.

Marshal Voroshiloff said that he understood that some shipbuilding yards both in England and America had been taken over for the building of landing craft. He wished to know whether the construction was actually under way or whether it was still only a program.

General Marshall said that General Brooke could answer for the U. K. There was no secret about the matter. He feared that he himself had misled Marshal Voroshiloff in view of the fact that he was answering the Marshal’s question wholly with respect to landing craft for Overlord. For example, it had recently been decided to delay the movement from the Mediterranean to Overlord of sixty landing craft, capable of carrying 40 tanks each, in order to permit General Eisenhower not only to advance more rapidly in Italy but to force the Germans to reinforce their line from the Po Valley. In other words, the object was to absorb more German divisions in view of the fact that General Eisenhower was unable to conduct a turning movement through the mountains during the winter. For this reason it had been decided to delay the movement of these landing craft from the Mediterranean to the U. K. but it was hoped that it would be possible to complete the operations for which they were being retained in the Mediterranean and still get them through on time for Overlord. In the meantime, a tremendous effort was being made both in the U. S. and U. K. to increase the output of landing craft so that Overlord might be made more powerful and more certain of success, and so that it might be possible to undertake the operations in the Mediterranean that additional landing craft would permit. He pointed out

\[2 \text{See ante, pp. 137 ff.}\]
that the problem in the Mediterranean involves at present more troops than can be put into action.

Marshal Voroshiloff said that this answered his question.

General Brooke said, in answer to Marshal Voroshiloff's first question as to the importance in British eyes of operation Overlord, that the British had always considered the operation as an essential part of this war. However, they had stipulated that the operation must be mounted at a time when it would have the best chances of success. He pointed out that the fortifications in Northern France are of a very serious character, that the communications are excellent, and therefore the Germans would have an excellent opportunity of holding up the landings until they could bring their reserves into play. This is the reason for the British stipulations as to the conditions prerequisite for launching the operation. They consider that in 1944 these conditions will exist. They have reorganized all their forces for this purpose. These forces were originally organized for the defense of the U. K. but they are now organized as an expeditionary force for employment on the Continent. Amphibious divisions are now undergoing training for Operation Overlord. Four battle-tried divisions have been brought back from Italy to the U. K. for the operation and, in addition, there have been brought back some of the landing craft which will be required. All details and plans for the operation have been made as far as it has been possible to do so up to the present moment.

It followed, therefore, that the British attach the greatest importance to the execution of this operation in 1944 but, as General Marshall had said and as he (General Brooke) wished to say again, landing craft constituted our tactical necessity. In order to maintain the 1 May 1944 date for Overlord it will be necessary to withdraw landing craft from the Mediterranean now. If this were done, it would bring the Italian operations almost to a standstill. The British wished, during the preparations for Overlord, to keep fighting the Germans in the Mediterranean to the maximum degree possible. In their view, such operations are necessary not only to hold the Germans in Italy but to create the situation in Northern France which will make Overlord possible.

General Brooke said that Marshal Voroshiloff had heard correctly as to the construction of landing craft in England at the present time. The Prime Minister has stopped certain ordinary construction in order to make additional landing craft possible. By, these means it was hoped to make sixty or seventy more craft available in time for Overlord. These are being built now and are in addition to the original program.
With reference to the provision for temporary harbors, he said that the necessary gear was being built for this purpose now. In this connection many experiments have been made, and while some of them had not been as successful as it had been hoped, others had offered considerable promise and it was hoped would give fruitful results. This was a matter of the greatest importance as the success or failure of the operation may depend on these ports. He hoped that these statements would provide a satisfactory answer to Marshal Voroshiloff’s question.

**Marshal Voroshiloff** said he wished to apologize for his failure to understand clearly but he was interested to know whether General Brooke, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, considered **Overlord** as important an operation as General Marshall had indicated that he did. He would like General Brooke’s personal opinion.

**General Brooke** replied that as Chief of the Imperial General Staff he considered Operation **Overlord** as of vital importance, but there was one stipulation that he should like to make. He knew the defenses of Northern France and did not wish to see the operation fail. In his opinion, under certain circumstances it was bound to fail.

**Marshal Voroshiloff** said that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet General Staff attach great importance to **Overlord** and felt that the other operations in the Mediterranean can be regarded only as auxiliary operations.

**General Brooke** said that that was exactly the way he looked at the matter but, unless the auxiliary operations are carried out, in his opinion **Overlord** can not be successful.

**Marshal Voroshiloff** said that he would now express his own point of view. He recalled that Marshal Stalin had said yesterday that he and the Soviet General Staff considered that **Overlord** was a very serious operation and would prove a difficult one. He said that the accomplishments of the U. S. and U. K. in the war to date, especially the brilliant operations of their air forces over Germany, served to indicate the might of these two nations and the superiority of the Allies in the Mediterranean area. If there is added to this the firm will and desire of the U. S. and British staffs, he (Marshal Voroshiloff) felt sure that **Overlord** would be successful and that it would go down in history as one of our greatest victories. He repeated that this view was supported by what all have seen in the fighting in North Africa and the operations of the Allied air forces over Germany.

**Marshal Voroshiloff** said that he had absolutely no doubt that the necessary shipping and landing craft for **Overlord** can be found either by construction of new craft or conversion from merchant craft. He

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*See ante, p. 490.*
was sure these problems can be solved successfully. He understood from the statements made by General Marshall that the U. S. now has nine divisions in the U. K. He pointed out that there are yet six months to 1 May 1944, the target date for OVERLORD. This will permit the U. S. forces in the U. K. to be doubled or tripled and, in addition, make possible the bringing over of tanks and other supplies.

General Marshall said that the nine divisions now in the U. K. consisted of seven infantry divisions and two armored divisions.

Marshal Voroshiloff said that in his opinion this force can be doubled in the next six months, to which General Marshall replied that this is already scheduled.

Marshal Voroshiloff said that he would now discuss the operation itself. He entirely agreed with General Brooke that some small operations in the Mediterranean are necessary as diversions in order to draw German troops away from the Eastern Front and from Northwestern France, but he thought as a military man, and as probably all other military men would think also, that OVERLORD is the most important operation and that all the other auxiliary operations, such as Rome, Rhodes and what not, must be planned to assist OVERLORD and certainly not to hinder it. He pointed out that it was possible now to plan additional operations that may hurt OVERLORD and emphasized that this must not be so. These operations must be planned so as to secure OVERLORD, which is the most important operation, and not to hurt it. The suggestion made yesterday by Marshal Stalin that simultaneous operations should be undertaken from Northern France and Southern France is based on the idea that the Mediterranean operations are secondary to OVERLORD. Germany can not be attacked directly from Italy because of the Alps. However, Italy does offer the possibility of successful defense with a small number of troops. The troops saved by defensive operations in Italy would be available for launching an amphibious operation against Southern France. Marshal Stalin does not insist on this but does insist on the execution of OVERLORD on the date already planned.

Marshal Voroshiloff said, with respect to the action of the air forces and Air Marshal Portal's suggestion of the bombing of eastern Germany by the Russian Air Force, that it must be known to the U. S. and the U. K. staffs that the Germans are still strong on the Russian front. He wished to repeat that, as Marshal Stalin had said yesterday, there are now 210 German divisions on this front and 50 satellite divisions, making a total of 260 in all. The Soviets will, of course, utilize every opportunity of attacking eastern Ger-

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4 See ante, p. 495.
5 See ante, p. 521.
6 See ante, p. 490.
many by air, but these opportunities are not very frequent. No such possibility exists at present because all air forces are employed in support of the land battle.

With respect to the difficulties of the cross-Channel operation, he said that it was understood, of course, that crossing the Channel was more difficult than crossing a large river. He pointed out, however, that during the recent Soviet advances to the west they had crossed several large rivers, the most recent of which was the Dnieper. In the latter case the ordinary difficulties of a river crossing were greatly increased by the high, steep western bank and the low eastern bank, but with the help of machine gun, mortar and artillery fire and the employment of mine throwers it had been found possible to lay down a fire so intense that the Germans could not endure it. It was so in the vicinity of Kiev, Gomel, and other points. He believed, therefore, that with similar aids it will be possible for the Allies to land in Northern France.

General Brooke said that he would like to point out that the question as to whether or not Operation Overlord is to be executed in 1944 has not been under discussion. It has been definitely decided to carry out the operation, and it is recognized that the Mediterranean operations are definitely of a secondary nature. There are certain forces, however, now deployed in the Mediterranean from whose employment a direct benefit can and should be derived. In addition, all operations planned in the Mediterranean area are coordinated in the over-all plan for the war and are projected with a view to their eventual influence on the Eastern Front and on Overlord. He said that he had been studying the Soviet river crossings with the greatest of interest. In his opinion the Soviets had been accomplishing technical marvels.

Marshal Voroshiloff said that the crossings were the result of the efforts of all of their people. They had the will to do it.

General Brooke said that the Channel crossing was a technical matter, the minutest details of which had been under study for several years. It must not be forgotten that the fire support for the operation must come from the sea. With reference to Marshal Voroshiloff's remarks as to artillery and mortar support, he said that the British have equipped landing craft with mortars and have studied every detail of the fire support of the cross-Channel operation from air and sea. He wished to point out the special difficulties existing in connection with this coast because of the long shelving beaches, where the tide goes out a long way. On many parts of the coast this characteristic makes landing operations very difficult and in some places, as at Calais, where the situation most favors air support, the beaches are the worst. He said the British are still engaged in experi-
ments as to the best means of forcing a landing and are adding to the results of these experiments the best experience of the U. S. and British forces in the war to date.

Marshal Voroshiloff referred to newspaper accounts which he had read with reference to large maneuvers held in England and wished to know if these had resulted in any new developments.

General Brooke replied that these maneuvers have been carried out mainly for the purpose of bringing about battles in the air. He said that they had carried out all preparations for the cross-Channel operation as a matter of training, and this had proved of great value to the staffs. The landing craft had been launched toward the French coast in the hope that the German air forces would be induced thereby to come out and fight. The German response had not been in keeping with the British hopes. The maneuvers referred to did not include an exercise in the actual landings. These exercises, however, are continually being carried out in certain areas on the English coasts from which the population has been cleared in order to permit the necessary supporting fire.

 Marshal Voroshiloff said he wished to inquire of Air Marshal Portal what his opinion was as to the sufficiency of the air forces available for Overlord.

Air Marshal Portal replied that there were enough air forces available to insure the success of the landing itself. The Allies would probably be superior to the Germans in the air by five or six to one. It was not, however, in the assault period that the air need would be the greatest, but during the build-up of the invading forces across the beaches. This would constitute the critical period, and it was during this period that the Germans would try to bring to bear their maximum available air power. At the same time a considerable portion of the Allied air forces would have to be used in order to interrupt communications leading from the interior of France to the front.

 Marshal Voroshiloff said he considered an air superiority of five or six to one as satisfactory.

Air Marshal Portal pointed out that all these figures must be judged in the light of distance. He said that the Germans have many airfields located close to the front on their side.

 Marshal Voroshiloff said that these German airfields must be destroyed before the operation is launched. In his opinion it was impossible to begin it without air superiority.

Air Marshal Portal replied that this initial destruction of German airfields was a part of the Overlord plan.

General Marshall said that he wished to offer one comment. The difference between a river crossing, however wide, and a landing from the ocean is that the failure of a river crossing is a reverse while the
failure of a landing operation from the sea is a catastrophe, because failure in the latter case means the almost utter destruction of the landing craft and personnel involved.

**Marshal Voroshiloff** said that he appreciated the frankness of these statements.

**General Marshall** went on to say that his military education had been based on roads, rivers, and railroads and that his war experience in France had been concerned with the same. During the last two years, however, he had been acquiring an education based on oceans and he had had to learn all over again.

**General Marshall** said that prior to the present war he had never heard of any landing craft except a rubber boat. Now he thinks about little else.

**Marshal Voroshiloff** replied, “If you think about it, you will do it.”

To this **General Marshall** replied, “That is a very good reply. I understand thoroughly.”

**Marshal Voroshiloff** said that he wished to emphasize that if in Operation Overlord our forces were launched against the hostile coast without previously destroying the enemy positions, there could, of course, be no success. He thought that the procedure must be similar to that followed on land. First the enemy positions must be destroyed with artillery fire and bombing from the air; then light forces, including reconnaissance groups, would land and take the first ground; when this had been done, the large forces would come in later. Therefore, if the advance forces were unable to land and were destroyed in the attempt, the larger forces would not be destroyed also. He felt that if the operation were conducted in this way, it would prove to be a brilliant success and not result in catastrophe.

**General Marshall** emphasized that no catastrophe was expected, but that everyone was planning for success.

**Admiral Leahy** suggested, in view of the lateness of the hour, that the meeting adjourn and reconvene later.

**General Brooke** suggested the possibility of convening again Tuesday morning at 1030. He said that he had some questions he would like to ask Marshal Voroshiloff.

**Marshal Voroshiloff** thought it desirable to reach some conclusions as a result of the discussion.

**General Brooke** suggested that the conclusions would properly follow the second meeting, to which **Marshal Voroshiloff** agreed.

The meeting accordingly adjourned, to reconvene at the Russian Legation [Embassy], Tehran, Iran, on Tuesday, 30 November at 1030.7

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7 For the decision not to hold this proposed second meeting of the three military staffs, see post, p. 539.
ROOSEVELT–STALIN MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 1943, 2:45 P. M.,
ROOSEVELT’S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY

Present

United States
President Roosevelt
Mr. Bohlen

Soviet Union
Marshall Stalin
Mr. Bereszhkov

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Minutes

THE PRESIDENT opened the conference by saying that he wished to lend to Marshal Stalin a most interesting report from an American Army officer who had spent six months in Yugoslavia in close contact with Tito. This officer had the highest respect for Tito and the work he was doing in our common cause.

MARSHAL STALIN thanked the President and promised to return the report when he had read it.

THE PRESIDENT then said that during the Moscow Conference, the American Delegation had introduced a proposal to make available to the United States Air Forces, air bases in the USSR for the primary purpose of the shuttle-bombing between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. He handed Marshal Stalin a memorandum on the subject and expressed the personal hope that the Marshal would give this project his support. He then said that this was of great future importance and he wished to tell the Marshal how happy he would be to hear his word in the conference in regard to the defeat of Japanese forces and victory over Germany. He said however, that we must be prepared for that eventuality and do some advance planning, and he therefore was giving the Marshal two papers, one on the air operations against Japan and the other relating to naval operations. In handing these papers to Marshal Stalin, THE PRESIDENT emphasized that the entire matter would be held in the strictest security and any contacts between Soviet and American officers on the subject would be strictly secret.

MARSHAL STALIN promised to study the documents the President had given him.

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1 The listing of those present is based on the Bohlen minutes. As regards those present for the United States, Elliott Roosevelt (pp. 178–180) mentions his father and himself but not Bohlen. As regards those present for the Soviet Union, Elliott Roosevelt (p. 179) and the Log (ante, p. 400) mention Stalin, Molotov, and Pavlov but not Bereszhkov; and Churchill (p. 363) mentions Stalin and Molotov.

2 See post, p. 606.

3 See ante, p. 136.

4 See post, p. 617.

5 See post, pp. 618 and 619, respectively.
THE PRESIDENT then said he had a great many other matters relating to the future of the world which he would like to talk over informally with the Marshal and obtain his view on them. He said that he hoped to discuss some of them before they both left Tehran. He said that he was willing to discuss any subject military or political which the Marshal desired.

MARSHAL STALIN replied there was nothing to prevent them from discussing anything they wished.

THE PRESIDENT then said the question of a post war organization to preserve peace had not been fully explained and dealt with and he would like to discuss with the Marshal the prospect of some organization based on the United Nations.

THE PRESIDENT then outlined the following general plan:

(1) There would be a large organization composed of some 35 members of the United Nations which would meet periodically at different places, discuss and make recommendations to a smaller body.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether this organization was to be world wide or European, to which the President replied, world-wide.

THE PRESIDENT continued that there would be set up an executive committee composed of the Soviet Union, the United States, United Kingdom and China, together with two additional European states, one South American, one Near East, one Far Eastern country, and one British Dominion. He mentioned that Mr. Churchill did not like this proposal for the reason that the British Empire only had two votes. This Executive Committee would deal with all non-military questions such as agriculture, food, health, and economic questions, as well as the setting up of an International Committee. This Committee would likewise meet in various places.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether this body would have the right to make decisions binding on the nations of the world.

THE PRESIDENT replied, yes and no. It could make recommendations for settling disputes with the hope that the nations concerned would be guided thereby, but that, for example, he did not believe the Congress of the United States would accept as binding a decision of such a body. THE PRESIDENT then turned to the third organization which he termed "The Four Policemen", namely, the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and China. This organization would have the power to deal immediately with any threat to the peace and any sudden emergency which requires this action. He went on to say that in 1935, when Italy attacked Ethiopia, the only machinery in existence was the League of Nations. He personally had begged France to close the Suez Canal, but they instead referred it to the League which disputed the question and in the end did nothing. The
result was that the Italian Armies went through the Suez Canal and destroyed Ethiopia.⁶ The President pointed out that had the machinery of the Four Policemen, which he had in mind, been in existence, it would have been possible to close the Suez Canal. The President then summarized briefly the idea that he had in mind.⁷

Marshal Stalin said that he did not think that the small nations of Europe would like the organization composed of the Four Policemen. He said, for example, that a European state would probably resent China having the right to apply certain machinery to it. And in any event, he did not think China would be very powerful at the end of the war. He suggested as a possible alternative, the creation of a European or a Far Eastern Committee and a European or a Worldwide organization. He said that in the European Commission there would be the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and possibly one other European state.

The President said that the idea just expressed by Marshal Stalin was somewhat similar to Mr. Churchill's idea of a Regional Committee, one for Europe, one for the Far East, and one for the Americas. Mr. Churchill had also suggested that the United States be a member of the European Commission, but he doubted if the United States Congress would agree to the United States' participation in an exclusively European Committee which might be able to force the dispatch of American troops to Europe.

The President added that it would take a terrible crisis such as at present before Congress would ever agree to that step.

Marshal Stalin pointed out that the world organization suggested by the President, and in particular the Four Policemen, might also require the sending of American troops to Europe.

The President pointed out that he had only envisaged the sending of American planes and ships to Europe, and that England and the Soviet Union would have to handle the land armies in the event of any future threat to the peace. He went on to say that if the Japanese had not attacked the United States he doubted very much if it would have been possible to send any American forces to Europe. The President added that he saw two methods of dealing with possible threats to the peace. In one case if the threat arose from a revolution or developments in a small country, it might be possible to apply the quarantine method, closing the frontiers of the countries in question and imposing embargoes. In the second case, if the

⁶ Regarding the Ethiopian-Italian conflict, see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. 1, pp. 594 ff., including the reference on p. 742 to the question of blocking the Suez Canal.
⁷ For a facsimile reproduction of a sketch made by Roosevelt at Tehran to illustrate his concept of the postwar international organization, see post, p. 622.
threat was more serious, the four powers, acting as policemen, would send an ultimatum to the nation in question and if refused, [it] would result in the immediate bombardment and possible invasion of that country.

**Marshal Stalin** said that yesterday he had discussed the question of safeguarding against Germany with Mr. Churchill and found him optimistic on the subject in that Mr. Churchill believed that Germany would not rise again. He, Stalin, personally thought that unless prevented, Germany would completely recover [recover] within 15 to 20 years, and that therefore we must have something more serious than the type of organization proposed by the President. He pointed out that the first German aggression had occurred in 1870 and then 42 [44] years later in the 1st World War, whereas only 21 years elapsed between the end of the last war and the beginning of the present. He added that he did not believe the period between the revival of German strength would be any longer in the future and therefore he did not consider the organizations outlined by the President were enough.

He went on to say that what was needed was the control of certain strong physical points either within Germany along German borders, or even farther away, to insure that Germany would not embark on another course of aggression. He mentioned specifically Dakar as one of those points. He added that the same method should be applied in the case of Japan and that the islands in the vicinity of Japan should remain under strong control to prevent Japan’s embarking on a course of aggression.

He stated that any commission or body which was set up to preserve peace should have the right to not only make decisions but to occupy such strong points against Germany and Japan.

**The President** said that he agreed 100% with Marshal Stalin.

** Marshal Stalin** then stated he still was dubious about the question of Chinese participation.

**The President** replied that he had insisted on the participation of China in the 4 Power Declaration at Moscow, not because he did not realize the weakness of China at present, but he was thinking farther into the future and that after all China was a nation of 400 million people, and it was better to have them as friends rather than as a potential source of trouble.

**The President,** reverting to Marshal Stalin’s statements as to the ease of converting factories, said that a strong and effective world

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*See ante, p. 511.
* For the text of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed at Moscow October 30, 1943, and issued November 1, 1943, see Decade, p. 11.
organization of the 4 Powers could move swiftly when the first signs arose of the beginning of the conversion of such factories for warlike purposes.

Marshal Stalin replied that the Germans had shown great ability to conceal such beginnings.

The President accepted Marshal Stalin's remark. He again expressed his agreement with Marshal Stalin that strategic positions in the world should be at the disposal of some world organization to prevent a revival of German and Japanese aggression.

SECOND PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 1943, 4 P. M., CONFERENCE ROOM, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Major General Deane
Captain Royal
Captain Ware
Mr. Bohlen

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Field Marshal Dill
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham

SOVIET UNION

Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Marshal Voroshilov
Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Berezhkov

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Minutes

SECRET

The President said that since there was no agenda for the conference he thought it would be a good idea to have a report from the

1 The listing of those present is based on the Bohlen minutes. The Log (ante, p. 467) and the list that originally accompanied the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes (post, p. 540) also include, in the list of those present, Somervell of the American Delegation and Hollis of the British Delegation.

2 Arnold, pp. 465-467, describes a conversation that he had with Stalin (presumably in conjunction with this plenary meeting) in which Arnold offered additional American bombers in return for permission to use Soviet bases for shuttle bombing. Deane, p. 45, recounts a conversation in which Marshall, Voroshilov, and he participated and which may have occurred at the close of this meeting or of the only other meeting at Tehran (third plenary meeting) attended by these three; the conversation related to Deane's authority to speak for the American Chiefs of Staff. Somervell stated, in a letter of November 30, 1943, to the Persian Gulf Command, that Stalin had expressed to him (at a time unspecified, perhaps at this meeting) general satisfaction with the work of the Command in delivering supplies to the Soviet Union; see John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954) in the series United States Army in World War II, p. 80, and the file cited ibid., p. 79, footnote 13.
military staffs who had met this morning, and if there was no objection they might hear from General Brooke, Marshal Voroshilov and General Marshall.

General Brooke said that the committee had not finished its work and had merely made a survey of the various operations mentioned, and had also examined the operation Overlord, taking into account the period of time which must elapse before Overlord was put into effect. He said that the committee considered the fact that if active operations were not undertaken in the Mediterranean during this period it would provide the Germans with an opportunity to remove their forces from that area either for the Soviet front or for the defense against Overlord. The committee also examined the advantages of continuing the operations up the leg of Italy until they had brought the Germans to a decisive battle. The committee briefly reviewed the question of providing the Partisans in Yugoslavia with aid and supplies in order to assist them in containing German forces. The advantages of Turkey's participation in the war from the point of view of opening up the Dardanelles, the supply route to Russia and its effect on the Balkans was [were] also considered. The possibility of an operation in southern France in connection with Overlord was also briefly discussed. The effect of the air attacks on Germany was outlined to the committee by Air Marshal Portal, and General Marshall provided the figures of the United States build-up in England, and General Brooke himself had described the changeover from the defense to offensive preparations in England. General Brooke concluded that Marshal Voroshilov had put forth a number of questions and had received answers.

General Marshall said he had little to add to what General Brooke had said and he did not intend to go into any detail. He said that the chief problems were landing craft and suitable airfields to afford fighter protection for any operation. He emphasized that the question of adequate landing craft came first in importance, and added that by landing craft he meant those capable of carrying 40 tanks. He said that he had endeavored to make clear to the committee the manner in which preparations for Overlord were proceeding; that the flow of troops from the United States were [was] on schedule and that one million tons of material had already been shipped to England. He repeated that the variable factor was production of landing craft and that the schedule of production had been stepped up. He said that some veteran divisions had already been transferred from the Italian theater to England.

* See ante, p. 514.
MARSHAL VOROUSHILOV said that the answers which he had received to his questions at the committee meeting had been confirmed here at the conference by General Brooke and General Marshall. He added that the questions of Yugoslavia and Turkey mentioned by General Brooke had not been considered in detail.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired who will command OVERLOAD.

THE PRESIDENT replied that it had not yet been decided.

MARSHAL STALIN said that nothing would come out of the operation unless one man was made responsible not only for the preparation but for the execution of the operation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that General Morgan had been in charge of the preparatory work for some time but that the actual Commander had not yet been appointed. He said the British Government was willing to have a United States General in command in view of the fact that from the United States would come the bulk of the troops, and that possibly the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean would be a British General. He suggested that the question of who should command OVERLORD had best be discussed between the three of them rather than in the large meeting.

THE PRESIDENT said that the decisions taken here will affect the choice of the particular officer to command OVERLORD.

MARSHAL STALIN stated that the Russians do not expect to have a voice in the selection of the Commander-in-Chief; they merely want to know who he is to be and to have him appointed as soon as possible.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed agreement and said that he thought the appointment could be announced within a fortnight. He then went on to say that he was a little concerned at the number and complexity of the problems which were before the conference. He said many hundreds of millions of people are watching this conference, and he hoped that it would not break up until an agreement had been reached on big military, political and moral questions. He said that the British Staff and himself had given prolonged thought to the Mediterranean theater and that they were most anxious to have the armies there fight against the enemy and not have them stripped of essential elements. He stated that their Soviet allies had now had an opportunity to survey the scene and that he would appreciate learning their views as to the best [use?] which could be made of the British forces in the Mediterranean area. He said the question of what help could be given from the Mediterranean theater to OVERLORD and the scale and timing of such help was of great importance. The operation into southern France from northern Italy had been mentioned but not studied and should, therefore, be explored more fully between the United States and British Staffs. MR. CHURCHILL said that Marshal Stalin had correctly stressed the value of pincers move-
ment but that the time element was important and a premature subsidiary attack might be wiped out. He went on to say that personally all he wanted was landing craft for two divisions in the Mediterranean and that with such a force many operations would be feasible, for example, it could be used to facilitate the operations in Italy or to take the island of Rhodes if Turkey will enter the war, and could be used for these purposes for at least six months and then employed in support of OVERLORD. He pointed out that this force of landing craft could not be supplied for the forces in the Mediterranean without either delaying OVERLORD six to eight weeks or without withdrawing forces from the Indian theater. That is the dilemma. He said he would appreciate the views of Marshal Stalin and his military aides on the general strategy. The Prime Minister continued that the questions of Yugoslavia and Turkey were more political than military. He said that there are now in the Balkans 21 German Divisions and 21 Bulgarian Divisions, a total of 42. He added that there were 54,000 Germans scattered around the Aegean islands which would be an easy prey. If Turkey came in, the nine Bulgarian Divisions from [in?] Yugoslavia and Greece would be withdrawn, thus endangering the remaining German Divisions. No important operations were envisaged for the Balkans but merely supply and commando raids to assist Tito and his forces to contain the German forces there. Mr. Churchill added that Great Britain had no ambitious interests in the Balkans but merely wanted to pin down the German Divisions there. With regard to Turkey Mr. Churchill said that the British Government as allies of Turkey had accepted the responsibility to persuade or force Turkey to enter the war. He would need, and he hoped to obtain, help from the President and Marshal Stalin in his task in accordance with the agreement reached at Moscow. He added that the British Government would go far in pointing out to the Turks that their failure to respond to the invitation of our three great powers would have very serious political and territorial consequences for Turkey particularly in regard to the future status of the straits. He said this morning the military committee had discussed briefly the question of aid to Turkey, but it appeared to be more political than military, and there was no thought of using a major army, and that at the most two Divisions apart from the air and anti-aircraft forces would be sent to Turkey. Mr. Churchill proposed that the two foreign secretaries and the representative of the President meet to discuss the political aspects of the Turkish question as well as other political questions involving the Balkans area. Mr. Churchill said that he had asked

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4 See Harriman’s telegram of November 2, 1943, to Roosevelt, ante, p. 147.
5 For the minutes of the luncheon meeting of Hopkins, Eden, and Molotov, November 30, 1943, see post, p. 568.
some questions yesterday regarding Bulgaria, in particular if Bulgaria attacked Turkey would the Soviet Government consider Bulgaria as a foe. The Prime Minister concluded that if Turkey declared war on Germany it would be a terrible blow to German morale, would neutralize Bulgaria and would directly affect Rumania which even now was seeking someone to surrender unconditionally to. Hungary likewise would be immediately affected. He said that now is the time to reap the crop if we will pay the small price of the reaping. He summed up the task before the conference as: (1) to survey the whole field of the Mediterranean, and (2), how to relieve Russia, and (3), how to help Overlord.

Marshal Stalin said that Mr. Churchill need not worry about the Soviet attitude toward Bulgaria; that if Turkey entered the war the Soviet Union would go to war with Bulgaria, but even so he did not think Turkey would come in. He continued that there was no difference of opinion as to the importance of helping the Partisans, but that he must say that from the Russian point of view the question of Turkey, the Partisans and even the occupation of Rome were not really important operations. He said that Overlord was the most important and nothing should be done to distract attention from that operation. He felt that a directive should be given to the military staffs, and proposed the following one:

(1). In order that Russian help might be given from the east to the execution of Overlord, a date should be set and the operation should not be postponed. (2). If possible the attack in southern France should precede Overlord by two months, but if that is impossible, then simultaneously or even a little after Overlord. An operation in southern France would be a supporting operation as contrasted with diversionary operations in Rome or in the Balkans, and would assure the success of Overlord. (3). The appointment of a Commander-in-Chief for Overlord as soon as possible. Until that is done the Overlord operation cannot be considered as really in progress. Marshal Stalin added that the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief was the business of the President and Mr. Churchill but that it would be advantageous to have the appointment made here.

The President then said he had been most interested in hearing the various angles discussed from Overlord to Turkey. He attached great importance to the question of logistics and timing. He said it is clear that we are all agreed as to the importance of Overlord and the only question was one of when. He said the question was whether to carry out Overlord at the appointed time or possibly postpone it for the sake of other operations in the Mediterranean. He felt that the danger of an expedition in the eastern Mediterranean

* See ante, p. 492.
might be that if not immediately successful it might draw away effectives which would delay OVERLORD. He said that in regard to the Balkans, the Partisans and other questions are pinning down some 40 Axis Divisions and it was therefore his thought that supplies and commando raids be increased to that area to insure these Divisions remaining there. The President then said he was in favor of adhering to the original date for OVERLORD set at Quebec, namely, the first part of May.

Marshal Stalin said he would like to see OVERLORD undertaken during the month of May; that he did not care whether it was the 1st, 15th or 20th, but that a definite date was important.

The Prime Minister said it did not appear that the points of view were as far apart as it seemed. The British Government was anxious to begin OVERLORD as soon as possible but did not desire to neglect the great possibilities in the Mediterranean merely for the sake of avoiding a delay of a month or two.

Marshal Stalin said that the operations in the Mediterranean have a value but they are really only diversions.

The Prime Minister said in the British view the large British forces in the Mediterranean should not stand idle but should be pressing the enemy with vigor. He added that to break off the campaign in Italy where the allied forces were holding a German army would be impossible.

Marshal Stalin said it looked as though Mr. Churchill thought that the Russians were suggesting that the British armies do nothing.

The Prime Minister said that if landing craft is [are] taken from the Mediterranean theater there will be no action. He added that at Moscow the conditions under which the British Government considered OVERLORD could be launched had been fully explained, and these were that there should not be more than 12 mobile German divisions behind the coastal troops and that German reinforcements for sixty days should not exceed 15 Divisions. He added that to fulfill these conditions it was necessary in the intervening period to press the enemy from all directions. He said that the Divisions now facing the allies in Italy had come from the most part in France [for the most part from France?], and to break off the action in Italy would only mean that they would return to France to oppose OVERLORD. Turning again to the question of Turkey, the Prime Minister said that all were agreed on the question of Turkey's entrance into the war. If she refused, then that was the end of it. If she does enter, the military needs will be

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7 The records of the Roosevelt–Churchill conference held at Quebec in August 1943 are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the Foreign Relations series.

8 See ante, p. 140.
slight, and it will give us the use of Turkish bases in Anatolia, and the
taking of the island of Rhodes which he felt could be done with one
assault Division. Once Rhodes was taken the other Aegean islands
could be starved out and the way opened to the Dardanelles. Mr.
CHURCHILL pointed out that the operation against Rhodes was a limited
operation and would not absorb more effective, and that in any case
the troops for this purpose would come from those now used for the
defense of Egypt. Once Rhodes was taken these forces from Egypt
could proceed forward against the enemy. All he wanted was a small
quantity of landing craft. He then said that he accepted Marshal
Stalin’s suggestion that terms of reference be drawn up for the military
staffs.

MARSHAL STALIN interposed to ask how many French Divisions were
being trained in North Africa.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that for the present there were five Divi-
sions ready and four in training, and that one of these five was in Italy
with the American Fifth Army and another was en route. He said
that from the battle experience gained it would be possible to decide
how best to utilize the other French Divisions.

THE PRESIDENT then proposed that instead of three directives to the
three Staffs that one directive be agreed upon here. He then pro-
posed a joint directive as follows: (1). That the military staffs should
assume that OVERLORD is the dominating operation. (2). That the
Staffs make recommendations in regard to other operations in the
Mediterranean area, having carefully in mind the possibility of causing
a delay in OVERLORD.

MARSHAL STALIN said he saw no need for any military committee
here, that the questions involved should be decided at the conference.
He also saw no need for any political sub-committee. MARSHAL STALIN
then said he wished to ask Mr. Churchill an indiscreet question,
namely, do the British really believe in OVERLORD or are they only
saying so to reassure the Russians.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that if the conditions set forth at
Moscow were present it was the duty of the British Government to
hurl every scrap of strength across the channel. He then suggested
that the British and American Staffs meet tomorrow morning in an
endeavor to work out a joint point of view to be submitted to the
conference. It was further agreed that the President, Marshal Stalin
and the Prime Minister would lunch together at 1:30, and that Mr.

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9 This is apparently a reference to Churchill’s suggestion on the subject, which
is reported in the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes (see post, p. 549) but not in
the Bohlen minutes.

10 For the minutes of the meeting referred to, see post, p. 555.
11 For the minutes of the meeting referred to, see post, p. 565.
Eden, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Hopkins would likewise lunch together separately. 12

The meeting adjourned until 4 P. M., November 30, 1943.

12 For the minutes of the meeting referred to, see post, p. 568.

SECRET

The President said he had no formal agenda for today's meeting. He thought it would be a good idea if Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister, and possibly Marshal Voroshilov, would give the meeting their ideas.

Marshal Stalin asked whether the military committee had completed its work.

General Brooke gave an outline of the proceedings of the conference this morning. (See Minutes of Military Conference, 29 November 1943 at 1030.)

General Marshall stated that he had little to add to the statement of General Brooke but that the problems concerning the United States are not those of troops nor equipment but rather problems of ships, landing craft and airfields in sufficient proximity to the scene of immediate operations under consideration. Furthermore he said, in speaking of landing craft, he was speaking particularly of a special type which carries about 40 tanks or motor vehicles. He said he desired to make clear, as far as the United States forces for Overlord are concerned, that the build-up has proceeded according to schedule. Especially should it be noted that the supplies and equipment have now been assembled to the extent of one million tons in the United Kingdom, in advance of the arrival of the troops anticipated. All supplies and equipment have been set up according to schedule. The variable or questionable factor is the subject of landing craft. He said there was a schedule of landing craft construction which had been accelerated both in the United Kingdom and the United States. The purpose of this acceleration is involved with two considerations, (a) the matter of the initial assault for Overlord, and (b) operations in the Mediterranean, which could be done if additional landing craft could be made available. In brief, the Overlord build-up is going ahead according to schedule as regards ground troops, air forces and

1 For editorial annotations, see also the Bohlen minutes of this meeting, supra.
equipment. Discussions and problems regarding OVERLORD were related almost entirely to the employment and movement of available landing craft. Transfer of certain United States and British divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for the OVERLORD build-up had virtually been completed at the present time.

Marshal Voroshiloff said that the information given by General Brooke and General Marshall corresponded to the talks which had been held this morning on the questions concerning OVERLORD—specifically, technical questions. Continuing, Marshal Voroshiloff said as far as the matters discussed by General Brooke concerning [concerned?] Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Southern France, it was hoped that these matters would be the subject of the next meeting of the ad hoc committee. The committee also had under discussion the date of OVERLORD and the details of that operation, with the thought that they would be able to discuss these matters further at the next meeting.

Marshal Stalin asked who will be the commander in this Operation OVERLORD. (The President and Prime Minister interpolated this was not yet decided.) Marshal Stalin continued, “Then nothing will come out of these operations.” He further inquired as to who carries the moral and technical responsibility for this operation. He was informed by the President and Prime Minister that the British General Morgan, who is Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate), is charged with the plans and preparations which have been and are continually being made and carried out by a Combined U. S.–British Staff.

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin as to who has the executive responsibility for OVERLORD preparations, the President replied that we have already decided the names of all the commanders except that of the Supreme Commander.

Marshal Stalin said that it could happen that General Morgan might say that all matters were ready; however, when the Supreme Commander reports, he, the Supreme Commander, might not think that everything necessary had been accomplished by the Chief of Staff. He felt that there must be one person in charge.

The Prime Minister informed Marshal Stalin that General Morgan had been charged with the preparation and carrying out of plans in the preliminary stages for OVERLORD. His Majesty’s Government had expressed willingness to have Operation OVERLORD undertaken under the command of a United States commander. The United States will be concerned with the greatest part of the build-up, and this United States commander will have command in the field.

Mr. Churchill added that in the Mediterranean the British have large naval and air forces which are under direct British command
under the Allied Commander in Chief. A decision had not yet been reached between the President and Prime Minister regarding the specific matter of high command. Decisions here at this conference will have a bearing on the choice. Therefore the President can name the Supreme Allied Commander for Overlord if he desires to accept the British offers to serve under a United States commander. The Prime Minister further suggested that Marshal Stalin be given an answer in confidence between the three Chiefs of State regarding who the Supreme Allied Commander would be.

Marshal Stalin said he desired it to be understood that he did not presume to take part in the selection of a commander for Overlord but merely wanted to know who this officer would be and felt strongly that he should be appointed as soon as possible and be given the responsibility for preparations for Overlord as well as the executive command of the operation.

The Prime Minister agreed it was essential that a commander be appointed for the Overlord operation without delay and indicated that such an appointment would be made within a fortnight. He hoped that it might be accomplished during his current meeting with the President.

The Prime Minister then went on to say that he was concerned with the number and complexity of problems which presented themselves before the conference. He said that the meeting was unique in that the thoughts of more than 140,000,000 people were centered upon it. He felt that the principals should not separate until agreements on political, moral, and military problems had been reached. He said that he wished to present a few points which would require study by a subcommittee. Both he and the British Staff had given long study to the Mediterranean position, in which area Great Britain has a large army. He was anxious that the British Mediterranean army should fight throughout 1944 and not be quiescent. From that point of view he asked the Soviets to survey the field and examine the different alternatives put before them and submit their recommendations.

The Prime Minister said that the first point which required study was what assistance could be given to the Overlord operation by the large force which will be in the Mediterranean. He asked in particular what the possibilities of this force might be and what should be the scale of an operation that might be launched from Northern Italy into Southern France. He did not feel that such an operation had been studied in sufficient detail but he welcomed the opportunity to give it close examination. He thought it might be well for the U. S. and U. K. staffs to consider this matter together in the light of their special knowledge concerning resources available. He pointed out
that Marshal Stalin had stressed the value of pincer operations. He said that for such operations timing is of great importance. A weak attack several months in advance might result in it[s] being defeated and permit the enemy to turn his whole strength to meet the main attack.

The Prime Minister said he wanted landing craft to carry at least two divisions. With such an amphibious force it would be possible to do operations seriatim, that is, first, up the leg of Italy by amphibious turning movements, thus offering the possibility of cutting off the enemy’s withdrawal and capturing the entire German force now in Central Italy; second, to take Rhodes in conjunction with Turkey’s entry into the war; and, third, to use the entire force for operations six months hence against the southern coast of France in order to assist Overlord. He said that none of these operations would be excluded but that the timing would require careful study. This force of two divisions cannot be supplied in the Mediterranean without either setting back the date of Overlord for six or eight weeks or without drawing back from the Indian Ocean landing craft which were now intended to be used against the Japanese. He said that this is one of the dilemmas which the Anglo-American staffs are balancing in their minds. In reaching their conclusions they would be greatly assisted by the views of Marshal Stalin and his officers. He welcomed these views because of his admiration for the military record of the Red Army. He therefore suggested that the military staffs continue to study these subjects.

The Prime Minister then said that the second matter which must be settled was political rather than military because of the small military forces involved. He referred to the question of Yugoslavia and the Dalmatian Coast. He said that in the Balkans there were 21 German divisions plus garrison troops, of which 54,000 troops are spread about among the Aegean Islands. There were also about 21 Bulgarian divisions or a total of 42 divisions in all. (The Prime Minister later corrected these figures to indicate that there were 42 divisions in all, 12 of which were Bulgarian divisions in Bulgaria.) He said that if Turkey came into the war the Bulgarian divisions would be used to face the Turks on the Thrace front. This withdrawal of Bulgarian divisions as garrison troops in the Balkans would endanger the remaining German divisions left on that duty by operations of the guerrillas. He said that he did not suggest that the Anglo-American forces put divisions into the Balkans, but he did propose that there be a continuous flow of supplies, frequent commando raids and air support furnished as and when needed. He felt it was short-sighted to let the Germans crush Yugoslavia without giving those brave people now
fighting under Tito weapons for which they might ask. He emphasized that the Balkan operations would be a great factor in stretching the Germans and thus giving relief to the Russian front. He added that the British had no interests in the Balkans that were exceptional or ambitious in nature and all they wanted to do was to nail the 21 German divisions in that area and destroy them. He suggested that the Foreign Secretaries of the U. K. and the U. S. S. R. and a representative of the United States whom the President might designate should hold discussions to see if the proposed activities in the Balkans presented any political difficulties.

The Prime Minister then came to his last point, which was in reference to Turkey. He said that the British are allies of Turkey and that the British have accepted the responsibility of endeavoring to persuade or force Turkey into the war before Christmas. He said that if the President would come in with the British or take the lead, it would be agreeable to him, but he should certainly want all possible help from the U. S. and U. S. S. R. in accordance with the agreements made at the Moscow Conference.

The Prime Minister said that the British would go far in warning Turkey that her failure to enter the war would jeopardize her political and territorial aspirations, particularly with reference to the Dardanelles, when these matters were being discussed at the peace table.

The Prime Minister indicated that the military staffs had already discussed the military aspects of Turkey's entry into the war. He said, however, that the question was largely political since only two or three divisions of soldiers were involved. He again posed the question as to how the U. S. S. R. would feel about Bulgaria. Would they be inclined to tell Bulgaria that if Turkey did enter the war against Germany and Bulgaria helped Germany, the U. S. S. R. would regard Bulgaria as a foe? He felt that such a statement might have a great influence on Bulgaria's attitude because of her relationship with the Soviets. He suggested that the Foreign Secretaries study this matter, also particularly as to the methods to be used and the results which might be expected. He said that he personally felt that the results might well be decisive, particularly in their moral effect. He said that Turkey, being an ally of Germany in the last war and now turning against her, would have a profound effect on the remainder of the Balkans. He pointed to Rumania's desire to present an unconditional surrender at this time and to other indications of unrest in the Balkans, as evidence of the fact that Turkey's entry into the war would have a great effect.

The Prime Minister concluded by saying he felt that the whole Mediterranean situation should be carefully examined to see what could be done to take weight off the Soviet front.
MARSHAL STALIN said, as far as the question of the U. S. S. R. versus Bulgaria is concerned, as soon as Turkey comes into the war we can consider that the matter is closed. The U. S. S. R. will take care of Bulgaria. If Turkey declares war on Bulgaria, the U. S. S. R. will declare war on Bulgaria. Even under these circumstances Turkey will not enter the war.

As far as military matters are concerned, MARSHAL STALIN said he understood that two or three divisions would be made available to help Turkey should she come into the war or to help in the Partisan movement in Yugoslavia. There is no difference of opinion on this point. We feel it desirable to help in Yugoslavia and to give two or three divisions if it would be necessary to do so. The Soviets do not think, however, that this is an important matter. Even the event of the entry of Turkey into the war or the occupation of Rhodes is not the most important thing. If we are here in order to discuss military questions, among all the military questions for discussion we, the U. S. S. R., find OVERLORD the most important and decisive. MARSHAL STALIN said he would like to call the attention of those present to the importance of not creating diversions from the most important operation in order to carry out secondary operations. He suggested that the ad hoc committee, which was created yesterday, should be given a definite task as to what they were to discuss. He said if a committee is created in the U. S. S. R., we always give that committee a specific directive or instructions. MARSHAL STALIN suggested that the military ad hoc committee be given a specific directive. He said it was, of course, true that the U. S. S. R. needed help and that is why the representatives of the Soviet are here at this conference. He said the Soviets expect help from those who are willing to fulfill Operation OVERLORD. The question now was what shall be the directive to the ad hoc committee? What shall be the instructions that should be given to the committee under the guidance of General Brooke? First of all, this directive must be specific with regard to the fact that OVERLORD should not be postponed and must be carried out by the limiting date. Secondly, the directive to the committee should state that Operation OVERLORD must be reinforced by a landing in the South of France a month or two before undertaking the OVERLORD assault. If not possible two or three months earlier, then the landing in the South of France should be at the same time. If a landing can not be effected in the South of France at the same time as OVERLORD, possibly this operation could be mounted a little later than OVERLORD.

MARSHAL STALIN thought this operation in the South of France would be an auxiliary or supporting operation and would help and be considerably effective in contributing toward OVERLORD. On the
other hand, operations against Rhodes and other operations in the Mediterranean would be diversions. Operations in the South of France would influence and contribute directly to Overlord. He said that the directive to the ad hoc committee must also state that the appointment of the Supreme Commander for Overlord should be made forthwith. The decision regarding the Overlord commander should be made here in Tehran. If it can not be done here, it should be done within a week at the latest. The Soviets believe that until such a commander has been appointed, no success from Overlord can be expected in the matter of organization for this operation. He added that it is the task of the British and the United States representatives to agree on the commander for Overlord. The U.S.S.R. does not enter into the matter of this selection but the Soviets definitely want to know who he will be. The above are the points of the directive which should be given to the ad hoc committee, and the work of this committee should be completed immediately.

Marshall Stalin asked the conference to seriously consider the points which he had just outlined. He added that he felt if the three points he had made were carried out, they would result in the successful and rapid accomplishment of Overlord.

The President said he was tremendously interested in hearing all angles of the subject from Overlord to Turkey. He said that if we are all agreed on Overlord, the next question would be regarding the timing of Overlord. Therefore, if we come down to a matter of questions, the point is either to carry out Overlord at the appointed time or to agree to the postponement of that operation to some time in June or July. There are only one or two other operations in the Mediterranean which might use landing craft and air forces from some other theater. The President said there are two dangers in creating a delay in Overlord. One of them is that the use of two or three divisions in the Eastern Mediterranean would cause a delay to Overlord and would necessitate the sending of certain landing craft for those operations which in turn could not be withdrawn from the Eastern Mediterranean in time to return for the Overlord date. He said it was believed that once we are committed to specific operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, we would have to make it a supreme operation and we probably could not then pull out of it.

Marshall Stalin observed that maybe it would be necessary to utilize some of the means for Overlord in order to carry out operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The President continued that in the Balkans and Yugoslavia he believed all aid should be given which could be possibly sent to Tito without making any particular commitment which would interfere with Overlord. He said he thought that we should consider the value
of the 40 divisions the Germans have in the Balkans and if we can do certain operations with a minimum effort, these divisions might be placed in a position where they could no longer be of any value.

The President said he felt that commando raids should be undertaken in the Balkans and that we should send all possible supplies to Tito in order to require Germany to keep their [her?] divisions there.

Marshal Stalin said that in Yugoslavia the Germans have eight divisions; they have five divisions in Greece, and three or four divisions in Bulgaria. He stated that the figures given by the Prime Minister regarding German divisions in the Balkans were wrong.

In reply to a question, Marshal Stalin said there were 25 German divisions now in France.

The President said we should therefore work out plans to contain these German divisions. This should be done on such a scale as not to divert means from doing Overlord at the agreed time.

Marshal Stalin observed, regarding the President's statement, "You are right"—"You are right."

The President said we again come back to the problem of the timing for Overlord. It was believed that it would be good for Overlord to take place about 1 May, or certainly not later than 15 May or 20 May, if possible.

The Prime Minister said that he could not agree to that.

Marshal Stalin said he observed at yesterday's conference that nothing will come out of these proposed diversions. In his opinion Overlord should be done in May. He added that there would be suitable weather in May.

The Prime Minister said he did not believe that the attitudes of those present on this matter were very far apart. He said he (the Prime Minister) was going to do everything in the power of His Majesty's Government to begin Overlord at the earliest possible moment. However, he did not think that the many great possibilities in the Mediterranean should be ruthlessly cast aside as valueless merely on the question of a month's delay in Overlord.

Marshal Stalin said all the Mediterranean operations are diversions, aside from that into Southern France, and that he had no interest in any other operations other than those into Southern France. He accepted the importance of these other operations but definitely considered that they are diversions.

The Prime Minister continued that in the British view their large armies in the Mediterranean should not be idle for some six months but should be, together with the United States Allies, working toward the defeat of Germany in Italy, and at the same time be active elsewhere. He said for the British to be inert for nearly six months would be a wrong use of forces, and in his opinion would lay the British
open to reproach from the Soviets for having the Soviets bear nearly all the burden of land fighting.

Marshal Stalin said that he did not wish the British to think that the Soviets wished them to do nothing.

The Prime Minister said if all the landing craft were taken away from the Mediterranean they will not affect the battle. Marshal Stalin must remember that at Moscow it was stated under what conditions OVERLORD could be mounted and that under those conditions alone could it be launched. Operation OVERLORD was predicated on the assumption that not more than 12 German mobile divisions would be located behind the coastal troops, and furthermore, that not more than 15 reinforcement divisions could enter the fray within 60 days. He said that that was the basis on which Mr. (Churchill) had stated the British would do OVERLORD. On those conditions, the Allies will have to utilize as many divisions in the Balkans and so forth as are necessary to contain German troops. If Turkey comes into the war, this will be particularly necessary. The German divisions now in Italy have largely come from France. Consequently, if there should be a slackening off in Italy, it would mean that the German divisions would withdraw and appear in the South of France to meet us there. On the other hand, if we do the Eastern Mediterranean, we will contain more German divisions and will create conditions indispensable to the success of OVERLORD.

Marshal Stalin inquired, “What if there are 13 divisions, not 12?”

The Prime Minister replied, “Naturally.” He continued by saying there was one more word about Turkey. All are agreed here that she should enter the war. If Turkey does not enter the war, then that ends that. If she does enter, the only necessary thing to do would be to use an air attack from the Turkish bases in Anatolia and an operation to take the Island of Rhodes. For the purpose of the Rhodes operation, one assault division would be ready in the near future and that would be sufficient. Having gotten Rhodes and Turkish air bases, a course could be steered north and operations undertaken to drive and starve all German divisions out of the Aegean and then open the Dardanelles. Essentially, these specific operations were limited operations, and therefore they could not be considered as military commitments of an indefinite character. If Turkey comes into the war and we get the air bases, it would be a simple matter to open the Straits.

If Turkey does not come in, we do not pay any further attention to the matter. If Turkey comes into the war and we hold Rhodes and the Aegean, we will be able to use the air squadrons now in Egypt. All could move forward and help the Soviets. They now play no part except in the defense of Egypt. We can use the same troops
which are now guarding Egypt to drive the Germans back. This is a big matter and should not be lightly considered.

**The Prime Minister** said he felt that our future will suffer great misfortune if we do not get Turkey into the war, for in such case troops and planes will stand idle.

**The Prime Minister** added that he agreed with General Marshall in his statement that the chief problem is one of transportation across the water and that that matter is largely a question of landing craft. He said that the British were prepared to go into the matter in great detail, and a very small number of landing craft could make the subsidiary operations feasible. If these landing craft cannot be kept in the Mediterranean because of Overlord or cannot possibly be found from some other arrangement [area?] such as the Indian Ocean, then this matter should be resolved by the technical committee. A landing in Southern France will require a great number of landing craft. He begged that this important point should be carefully weighed.

**The Prime Minister** said in conclusion that he accepted the proposal that a directive should be drawn up for this technical committee. He further suggested that the Soviet Government draw up terms of reference, that the United States draw up terms of reference, that Great Britain draw up terms of reference and then he felt sure that all three nations would not be far apart.

**The President** inquired how long will the conference be in session until the staff comes to a conclusion on these matters.

**The Prime Minister** in this connection said he can give his own opinion on behalf of the British Government tonight.

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin as to how many French divisions were in the Allied Armies and how many troops there were in French divisions, **The President** replied he understood there were now five combat divisions and four more will soon be ready, making a total of nine. Some of these divisions are now engaged in Sardinia and Corsica.

**General Marshall** said that the French Corps is to become a part of the U. S. 5th Army in Italy and will occupy the left flank. He said that one division was now en route to the Front and will get a trial of battle. As a result of this it would be possible to judge better regarding the employment of other French divisions. All equipment for the French divisions is now in North Africa. There was some delay in four or five divisions being brought up to strength and completing their training. He said the French divisions were training with United States equipment and under the instruction of United States officers and non-commissioned officers.
In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin as to how many men there were in these French divisions, General Marshall replied, French divisions have the same number of men as the United States—15,000 men per division. The men are mostly native troops with French officers and some noncoms. In the armored command only one quarter are native troops.

Marshal Stalin said, with regard to the remarks of the Prime Minister, if Turkey does not enter the war it cannot be helped.

The Prime Minister replied if Turkey does not come into the war, he had no intention of asking for any troops for operations in Rhodes or Asia Minor.

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin as to how many more days this conference would continue, The President said that he was willing to stay here until the conference is finished.

The Prime Minister said he would stay here forever, if necessary.

The President suggested that if the three Chiefs of State were in agreement, the committee need not have any written directive because they have been confronted with every suggestion made at this afternoon’s meeting. He said if the Chiefs of State could agree on the proceedings of the afternoon conference as a directive, then the staff would definitely have only one directive.

Marshal Stalin said he considered that the ad hoc committee was unnecessary. It could not raise any new questions for the military conference. He believed that all that was necessary to be solved was the selection of the commander for Overlord, the date for Overlord and the matter of supporting operations to be undertaken in Southern France in connection with Overlord. He furthermore believed that the committee of Foreign Secretaries proposed by the Prime Minister was unnecessary. He considered that all matters could be solved here and that committees were unnecessary. He said he must leave on the first, anyway, but that he might stay over until the second of December if it had to be—then he must go away. He said that he must know when he can get away. There are two days remaining, the 30th of November and the first of December. He said the President would remember that he had said he could come to the conference for three or four days.\(^2\)

The President then read a proposed directive for the Ad Hoc Committee of the Chiefs of Staff:

1. The Committee of the Chiefs of Staff will assume that Overlord is the dominating operation.

\(^2\)Roosevelt’s message to Stalin of November 8, 1943, had proposed three or four days, and Stalin had accepted. See ante, pp. 72, 78. See also ante, p. 373.
“2. The Committee recommends that subsidiary operation(s) be included in the Mediterranean, taking into consideration that any delay should not affect Overlord.”

Marshall Stalin observed that there was no mention regarding the date of Overlord in the proposed directive. He said for the U. S. S. R. it is important to know the date Overlord will be mounted in order that the Soviets could prepare the blow on their side. He said he insisted on knowing the date.

The President remarked that the date for Overlord had been fixed at Quebec and that only some much more important matter could possibly affect that date, that is to say, this was the President’s view.

The Prime Minister said he would like to have an opportunity to reply to the President’s remarks. He said there was no decisive difference in principle. He would be very glad to stay until the first of December and make a decision. It was not clear to him what the President’s plans were, however. He said he was in favor of the continuance of the ad hoc committee if that could be done. With regard to the political subcommittee, Marshal Stalin has clarified matters with regard to Bulgaria and help to Yugoslavia. Therefore, the meeting between the two Foreign Secretaries and Mr. Hopkins would be of great advantage. It would throw light on the problems and would be particularly important on the political questions. He would be grateful for Marshal Stalin’s prompt answers to his questions. If it were decided to do so, the Prime Minister thought that on the whole this procedure would be of advantage. He considered that the timing of the supreme Operation Overlord as regards any subsidiary operations would be most necessary as a condition for the success of Overlord. Furthermore, he believed that the ad hoc staff committee should recommend what subsidiary operations should be carried out. The Prime Minister believed that we should take more time in drawing up a proper directive to the ad hoc committee.

The President said he found that his staff places emphasis on Overlord. While on the other hand the Prime Minister and his staff also emphasize Overlord, nevertheless the United States does not feel that Overlord should be put off.

The President questioned whether it would not be possible for the ad hoc committee to go ahead with their deliberations without any further directive and to produce an answer by tomorrow morning.

Marshall Stalin questioned, “What can such a committee do?” He said, “We Chiefs of State have more power and more authority than a committee. General Brooke cannot force our opinions and there are many questions which can be decided only by us.” He said he would
like to ask if the British are thinking seriously of Overlord only in order to satisfy the U.S.S.R.

The Prime Minister replied that if the conditions specified at Moscow regarding Overlord should exist, he firmly believed it would be England’s duty to hurl every ounce of strength she had across the Channel at the Germans.

The President observed that in an hour a very good dinner would be awaiting all and people would be very hungry. He suggested that the staffs should meet tomorrow morning and discuss the matter.

Marshal Stalin said that he believed that that was unnecessary. The staffs will not in any way speed our work; they will only delay matters. It is proper to decide matters more quickly.

The Prime Minister said he thought the talks of the foreign officers would be most profitable.

The President observed that a few political problems might be discussed during luncheon together by the Foreign Secretaries and Mr. Hopkins in a different place from that where the Chiefs of State had their luncheon.

Marshal Stalin commented, “Then at four o’clock tomorrow afternoon we will have our conference again.”

The President suggested that the Chiefs of State have luncheon together tomorrow about one thirty.

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**TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 1943, 8:30 P.M., SOVIET EMBASSY**

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<th>UNITED STATES</th>
<th>UNITED KINGDOM</th>
<th>SOVIET UNION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President Roosevelt</td>
<td>Prime Minister Churchill</td>
<td>Marshal Stalin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Hopkins</td>
<td>Foreign Secretary Eden</td>
<td>Mr. Berezhkov</td>
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<td>Mr. Harriman</td>
<td>Sir Archibald Clark Kerr</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Bohlen</td>
<td>Major Birse</td>
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1 Stalin was the host at this dinner. The Bohlen minutes list the dinner as having begun at 8:30 p.m. According to the Log *(ante, p. 467)*, the dinner began at 8:35 p.m.

2 The listing of those present is based on the Bohlen minutes. As regards those present for the United States, Churchill, p. 373, and Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 186-191, state that Elliott Roosevelt came in and was seated during the dinner. As regards those present for the Soviet Union, the Log *(ante, p. 467)* and Churchill, p. 373, mention Molotov as among those who attended.
SECRET

The most notable feature of the dinner was the attitude of Marshal Stalin toward the Prime Minister. Marshal Stalin lost no opportunity to get in a dig at Mr. Churchill. Almost every remark that he addressed to the Prime Minister contained some sharp edge, although the Marshal's manner was entirely friendly. He apparently desired to put and keep the Prime Minister on the defensive. At one occasion he told the Prime Minister that just because Russians are simple people, it was a mistake to believe that they were blind and could not see what was before their eyes.

In the discussion in regard to future treatment of Germans, Marshal Stalin strongly implied on several occasions that Mr. Churchill nursed a secret affection for Germany and desired to see a soft peace.

Marshal Stalin was obviously teasing the Prime Minister for the latter's attitude at the afternoon session of the Conference, he was also making known in a friendly fashion his displeasure at the British attitude on the question of OVERLORD.

Following Mr. Hopkins' toast to the Red Army, Marshal Stalin spoke with great frankness in regard to the past and present capacity of the Red Army. He said that in the winter war against Finland, the Soviet Army had shown itself to be very poorly organized and had done very badly; that as a result of the Finnish War, the entire Soviet Army had been re-organized; but even so, when the Germans attacked in 1941, it could not be said that the Red Army was a first class fighting force. That during the war with Germany, the Red Army had become steadily better from [the] point of view of operations, tactics, etc., and now he felt that it was genuinely a good army. He added that the general opinion in regard to the Red Army had been wrong, because it was not believed that the Soviet Army could reorganize and improve itself during time of war.

In regard to the future treatment of Germany, Marshal Stalin developed the thesis that he had previously expressed, namely, that really effective measures to control Germany must be evolved, otherwise Germany would rise again within 15 or 20 years to plunge the world into another war. He said that two conditions must be met:

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*See also (1) the Bohlen memorandum summarizing incidental remarks made at various meetings during the course of the Conference, post, p. 836, and (2) the indications, post, pp. 854-855, 862-863, that the subject of unconditional surrender was discussed at this dinner. For an exchange of remarks between Roosevelt and Stalin, perhaps at this dinner, regarding Russian champagne, see Grace Tully, *F. D. R., My Boss*, p. 271.

408336—61—41
(1) At least 50,000 and perhaps 100,000 of the German Commanding Staff must be physically liquidated.

(2) The victorious Allies must retain possession of the important strategic points in the world so that if Germany moved a muscle she could be rapidly stopped.

Mashal Stalin added that similar strong points now in the hands of Japan should remain in the hands of the Allies.

The President jokingly said that he would put the figure of the German Commanding Staff which should be executed at 49,000 or more.

The Prime Minister took strong exception to what he termed the cold blooded execution of soldiers who had fought for their country. He said that war criminals must pay for their crimes and individuals who had committed barbarous acts, and in accordance with the Moscow Document,\(^4\) which he himself had written, they must stand trial at the places where the crimes were committed. He objected vigorously, however, to executions for political purposes.

Mashal Stalin, during this part of the conversation, continuously referred to Mr. Churchill's secret liking for the Germans.

With reference to the occupation of bases and strong points in the vicinity of Germany and Japan, The President said those bases must be held under trusteeship.

Mashal Stalin agreed with the President.

The Prime Minister stated that as far as Britain was concerned, they do not desire to acquire any new territory or bases, but intended to hold on to what they had. He said that nothing would be taken away from England without a war. He mentioned specifically, Singapore and Hong Kong. He said a portion of the British Empire might eventually be released but that this would be done entirely by Great Britain herself, in accordance with her own moral precepts. He said that Great Britain, if asked to do so, might occupy certain bases under trusteeship, provided others would help pay the cost of such occupation.

Mashal Stalin replied that England had fought well in the war and he, personally, favored an increase in the British Empire, particularly the area around Gibraltar. He also suggested that Great Britain and the United States install more suitable government[s] in Spain and Portugal, since he was convinced that Franco was no friend of Great Britain or the United States. In reply to the Prime Minister's inquiry as to what territorial interests the Soviet Union had,

\(^4\) Declaration of German Atrocities, November 1, 1943; Decade, p. 13.
Marshal Stalin replied, "there is no need to speak at the present time about any Soviet desires, but when the time comes, we will speak."

Although the discussion between Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister remained friendly, the arguments were lively and Stalin did not let up on the Prime Minister throughout the entire evening.

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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 30, 1943,
9:30 A.M., BRITISH LEGATION

PRESENT

**UNITED STATES**

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Captain Preseman

**UNITED KINGDOM**

General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay

**Secretariat**

Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

Sir Alan Brooke began by saying that the problem was to arrive at an agreed basis for discussion with the Soviets at this afternoon’s Plenary Meeting. He then went on to consider operations in the Mediterranean from west to east. It had always been agreed that some operation should take place against the South of France. In Italy he felt that it was agreed we should not stay in the position now reached and must advance farther. For political and other reasons, it was important to get Rome, and he thought it was probably generally accepted that we should advance as far as the Pisa–Rimini line. For operations in Italy it was clear that landing craft would be wanted. General Eisenhower had asked for the retention of the landing craft due to return to Overlord until 15 January. This would have a repercussion on the Overlord date.

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¹ This was the 182d meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their first meeting during the Conference at Tehran.
² See Harrison, p. 118.
In Yugoslavia it was important to give all possible help to the
Partisans and there was general agreement regarding this. As
regards Turkey and operations in the Aegean, agreement was much more
in question. If Turkey were to be brought into the war, it would be
desirable to open the Dardanelles and operations in the Aegean would
be necessary. If Turkey were not to come into the war, the operations
in the Aegean would not be called for.

If examination showed the operation against the South of France
to be feasible, sufficient landing craft might be provided for the pur-
pose. The sequence would then be Italian campaign, Rhodes (only if
Turkey comes into the war), South of France, landing craft from
Rhodes returning in time for the South of France. The date for the
South of France operation would therefore be affected by the under-
taking of the Rhodes operation.

Admiral Leahy said that the problem seemed to be a straightfor-
ward one of the date of Overlord. The Russians wanted Overlord on
a fixed date in May. They also wanted an expedition against the
South of France at the same time, or perhaps a little earlier or a little
later. As far as he could see, the date of Overlord was the only point
confusing the issue. If this matter was settled, everything would be
settled. If Overlord was to be done by the date originally fixed, other
operations could not be carried out. It was entirely agreed, he felt,
that the operations in Italy must be carried on. On the U. S. side
it was felt that this could be done without interfering with Overlord
and, indeed, the U. S. Planners were of the opinion that the operation
against the South of France could be undertaken as well, without
interfering with Overlord. If the landing craft were to be kept in
Italy until 15 January, the U. S. calculation was that they could still
be back in time for Overlord.

Sir Alan Brooke said that this was not thought by the British to
be the case. Landing craft would need repair and there were also
training demands. According to British calculations, even the date
of 15 December for returning landing craft to Overlord was rather
tight and it would be a great help if U. S. repair facilities could be
made available for the British landing craft returning.

General Marshall then said that the paper submitted the day
before by the United States Chiefs of Staff on the operation against
the South of France had been produced at Cairo but was based on
logistic and other data prepared in detail before Sextant. He said
that four questions had been put to the U. S. Planners. Firstly,

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*Not found, but presumably similar to an unnumbered draft dated November 29, 1943, in the J. C. S. Files. For the approved paper on this subject, see C. C. S. 424, December 5, 1943, post, p. 797.*
assuming that the operations against the South of France, set out in the paper in question, were undertaken, could OVERLORD take place on 15 May? In this connection the answer had been that, with the possible exception of transport aircraft, this date would still be possible for OVERLORD. There was reasonable expectation that the transport aircraft would be available from elsewhere. It was possible, moreover, that an airborne division might be brought from the U. S. by cargo ship infiltration, thus making it unnecessary to bring an airborne division late from the United Kingdom.

As regards the timing of the operation against the South of France, he considered that it should not be carried out more than two to three weeks before OVERLORD.

The second question asked the U. S. Planners was how long the 68 LST's could remain in the Mediterranean and still arrive in time for an OVERLORD date of 15 May. The U. S. calculation was that the landing craft must be released 2½ months before OVERLORD in order both that the necessary repair of craft could be effected and that the craft might be available for training purposes. This gave a date of 1 March. The time for training might be reduced by using more fully the craft already in the United Kingdom. It was clear that all U. S. resources must be used to assist in the repair of the landing craft returning late from the Mediterranean.

The U. S. calculation was that, after allowing for losses, the landing craft remaining in the Mediterranean after the departure of the 68 LST’s for OVERLORD would be sufficient to lift 27,000 troops and 1,500 vehicles.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the British felt that 100 days were necessary instead of the 2½ months calculated by the U. S. This put 15 February as the latest date to which the landing craft could be retained.

Admiral King agreed and said that therefore it should be safe to leave the landing craft in the Mediterranean until 1 February.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that this also might allow for some small refits to be carried out in the Mediterranean before returning to the United Kingdom.

General Marshall then went on to the third question which had been asked the U. S. Planners, which was that if the Rhodes operation had to be undertaken as well as the operation against the South of France, how would OVERLORD be affected? It was difficult to get an answer to this question. In the first place, the dates were quite uncertain. Rome had not yet been taken and the date of the

* Repairs.
amphibious operation in Italy must be dependent on land operations. Moreover, in an amphibious operation such as might be carried out in the Italian campaign maintenance across the beaches might be necessary, which would delay accordingly the availability of landing craft. It was understood, however, that the amphibious operation contemplated was such that the main forces would join up quickly with it. Assuming that the Rome operation would have been completed by the end of January, the landing craft required for Rhodes could be in the Middle East by 15 February; the Rhodes operation could take place then on 21 March. Allowing a month for the operation, the landing craft could return to Corsica on 21 April, arriving 30 April. A month would probably be necessary for the repair of landing craft before the operation against the South of France which could, therefore, be undertaken at an earlier stage [at the earliest, say?]—15 July. Moreover, the total landing craft available would be barely sufficient for operations against the South of France, and this was not allowing for any losses that might occur.

The Planners were also asked how long OVERLORD would be delayed if the 68 LST's were never returned to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD. The answer to this was that these craft represented a three months' production and, in consequence, three months' delay to OVERLORD. As the landing craft could be made available alternatively only by withdrawing them from allocations to the Pacific, operations there would also be put back by three months.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the only landing craft that had not been mentioned were those allocated to Operation Buccaneer, in which 20 LST's and 12 LSI (L)'s were involved. He then read certain extracts from NAF 492, giving General Eisenhower's views on operations against the South of France.

General Marshall expressed himself as being opposed to an early date for the attack against the South of France in advance of the OVERLORD date. He was more inclined to a simultaneous operation.

Admiral King considered that D-day should be the same for both operations and that this would provide a much better basis for planning. This met with general agreement.

Sir Alan Brooke then referred to the U. S. paper on the operation against the South of France and said that the paper would need careful examination as to the number of divisions that were available

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*Telegram from Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, October 29, 1943 (J. C. S. Files). The telegram stated, among other things, that an assault on the German forces in northern Italy might prove a more valuable help to OVERLORD than an attack on southern France, and that the making of an assault on southern France should therefore be considered as only one of various alternative methods of assisting OVERLORD. See also Harrison, p. 125.

*See ante, p. 556, footnote 8.
from Italy for such an operation, and the number that would need
to be retained for the operations in Italy.

General Marshall explained that the figure of four British divi-
sions represented garrison requirements in Italy outside the immediate
zone of operations.7

Sir Alan Brooke thought the figure of 10 divisions and an am-
phibious lift of 2 divisions, available from Italy for the South of
France operation, to be too high.7

Admiral King stressed the importance of insuring that landing
craft were employed for the purposes for which they were designed
and not diverted to other uses for convenience. This had happened
in the Pacific and no doubt also in the Mediterranean and it was
necessary to be firm in view of the importance of the landing craft
factor.

Sir Andrew Cunningham agreed and said that once the assault was
over and ports were open, all landing craft should be withdrawn for
refit for the next operation. It was true that although in the Medi-
terranean the Commanders were alive to the situation and had tightened
up matters considerably, there was still some misuse of landing craft.

In this connection, Sir Charles Portal referred to the tendency to
be too conservative in the build-up. He referred particularly to the
large stocks that had been accumulated in Sicily as an insurance.
Probably there was a tendency to over-insure.

There was general agreement on the above considerations and some
discussion ensued in which two extremes were quoted, one, in which
the 8th Army landing in Sicily had taken a bare minimum of transport
and in consequence had been delayed in their subsequent advance; and
the other, in the planning for Overlord in which so many vehicles had
been put down to accompany the leading formations, that the whole
operation would tend to be hampered thereby.

As regards relief work, Admiral King considered that it was neces-
sary to be hard-hearted and to cut out anything that was being taken
across beaches which was not absolutely necessary. There was gen-
eral agreement regarding this.

Sir Charles Portal then referred to the aspect of fighter cover
for the operation against the South of France. He said he was not
satisfied that the range from the available air bases would allow of
adequate air support and thought the matter would need to be ex-
amined carefully. In Avalanché two alternative plans had been
considered and one of these had had to be turned down because fighter
cover could not be insured. Salerno had been 180 miles from available
fighter strips in North Sicily. Marseilles was 190 miles from the

7 These figures refer to estimates in the United States planning paper.
nearest part of Corsica and 225 miles from the eastern side on which the best air bases were sited. We might want to go farther than Marseilles.

Admiral Leahy questioned as to why we should need to go as far west as Marseilles. There were good beaches at various places along the coast.

General Arnold agreed that the whole question would have to be studied very carefully. He stated that the estimates in the U. S. draft paper on operations against Southern France had been based on the use of long-range fighter aircraft.

Admiral King then asked whether he was correct in understanding that, should all other operations be dropped, the landing craft would not be available for Overlord to take place on 1 May.

Sir Alan Brooke replied that this was the case and that if the landing craft due to return to Overlord did not leave the Mediterranean until 15 January, 1 June would be the earliest date possible for Overlord because of the need for repairing the landing craft and using them for training purposes.

Admiral Leahy pointed out that the U. S. figures did not agree with this and that if the landing craft were retained until 15 February, Overlord would still be possible by 15 May.

Admiral King said that any U. S. facilities available for the repair of landing craft would be placed at the disposal of the Commander of Overlord for this urgent task.

Sir Charles Portal then made the suggestion that [if?] an amphibious lift of one division were left in Italy until the capture of Rome and one division with its amphibious lift were kept mounted in the Middle East until the middle of February, by then it would be known whether Turkey would come in. If Turkey did not come in, the division could be dismounted and the landing craft made available for Overlord.

Sir Alan Brooke said, in reply to this, that he felt that the landing craft that would be required for this division for the Aegean were already being used for the Italian campaign.

Admiral Leahy said that if the proposed operation were to take place after 15 February, this would surely delay Overlord.

Sir Charles Portal agreed but suggested that we might have two alternative dates for Overlord—the one if Turkey were to come into the war, and the other if Turkey were not to come in.

Admiral King made it clear that whereas the operations against Rhodes and the Dodecanese were contingent upon Turkey entering the war and were not concerned with Overlord, the operations against the South of France and in Italy were completely interlocked with
OVERLORD. It should be possible for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to work out roughly on these bases two alternative dates for OVERLORD, as suggested by Sir Charles Portal.

Sir Charles Portal remarked that while he agreed with Admiral King, he could not accept that the entry of Turkey into the war would have no effect on OVERLORD.

General Marshall then said that disregarding the question of postponing the date for OVERLORD and considering the matter of landing craft only, it seemed to him that the suggestion of Sir Charles Portal would involve the dividing of the resources of landing craft available in the Mediterranean so that no real strength would be left anywhere. This, he thought, was serious as it would be splitting the most potent means of influencing the war. It would reduce correspondingly the effort in Italy and might have serious consequences. General Eisenhower’s views were different from those expressed formerly, and he now talked of a two division amphibious lift whereas formerly he had only asked for one.

General Marshall felt, moreover, that there was the chance that the landing craft so withdrawn to the Aegean, to which Sir Charles Portal referred, might never be used. He said that he agreed completely with the Prime Minister as to the importance of keeping a tighter hold on supply. There was general agreement in this connection.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the OVERLORD plan should be coordinated with the plans for a Russian offensive. No Russian offensive had ever started before the end of May. Marshal Stalin clearly, and quite reasonably, would like us to draw the German strength away from the Russian front before the Russian offensive started.

A general discussion then ensued as to the answer that could be given to the Russians regarding the date on which it would be possible to undertake OVERLORD.

Sir Alan Brooke said that unless we could give the Russians a firm date for OVERLORD, there would be no point in proceeding with the Conference. As far as he could see, we could do OVERLORD in May if we did not undertake other operations. Sir Alan Brooke said that he did not think that 1 May would be possible although 1 June might be. This brought us back to the Buccanneer operation to which, of course, there was a political background. He still thought that it would be better to use the landing craft allocated to Buccanneer for this main effort against the Germans. In response to a question of Admiral Leahy as to whether the Buccanneer landing craft would help OVERLORD at all, Sir Alan Brooke replied that it would, as it could

* See ante, p. 365.
be used both in the Aegean and against the South of France. Moreover, the amphibious lift for Overlord was itself all too small. It was even smaller than it had been at Salerno.

Admiral Leahy said that this affected the validity of the whole of the Overlord plan.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that if Overlord were delayed it would make more landing craft available.

Sir Charles Portal remarked that whatever operations were undertaken in the European theater, the Overlord operation would undoubtedly be helped indirectly.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that unless Buccaneer landing craft were to be used, it would not be possible, except at the expense of Overlord, to have more than a one-division lift for the South of France operation, a lift which, in his opinion, was not sufficient.

Admiral King said that the Prime Minister had laid great stress on the importance of keeping actively employed all forces now in the Mediterranean. He agreed with this in principle but drew attention to the 2½ months' inactivity that would ensue for 35 divisions in the United Kingdom if the Overlord date was postponed from 1 May to 15 July. He had always felt that the Overlord operation was the way to break the back of Germany.

Sir Andrew Cunningham questioned the 2½ months referred to by Admiral King, saying that the earliest date possible for Overlord would be 1 June. Both Admiral King and Admiral Leahy then said that this came to them as a complete surprise as 1 May was the date agreed upon.

Admiral Leahy asked Sir Alan Brooke whether he believed that the conditions laid down for Overlord would ever arise unless the Germans had collapsed beforehand.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he firmly believed that they would and that he foresaw the conditions arising in 1944, provided the enemy were engaged on other fronts as well.

Sir Charles Portal said that it was still in the balance as to whether we would overcome the German increase in fighter production. The success of the combined bomber offensive had not been as complete as had been hoped for. The Germans were making tremendous efforts and were aiming at a production of 1,600 to 1,700 fighters per month. If they succeeded, the Overlord operation might be faced by a very strong fighter force acting against it.

General Arnold then said how important it was to examine carefully the whole question of air strengths throughout the world in order to ensure that our great air superiority could be applied to best advantage.
Sir Charles Portal expressed his opinion that from the air point of view a June or July date for Overlord would seem to be better, as regards weather, than one in May.

Admiral Leahy suggested that the Russians would not refuse a 1 June date for Overlord but that we would have to be firm about it.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the date would have to be fixed earlier than 1 June because of the need to retain landing craft for Italy until 15 January. It would be possible to fix a Rankin date for 1 May when probably an attack could be made across the Channel with about two-thirds the strength now envisaged for Overlord. It was generally felt that the Russians would not understand the Rankin operation if it were put to them. He reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that 1 May had been settled at Trident as the date for Overlord by splitting the difference between the U. S. suggestion of 1 April and the British suggestion of 1 June. It had not been based on any particular strategic consideration.

General Ismay said that at Moscow the Russians had been told that the operation was scheduled for some time in May. They had not been told 1 May.

Sir Alan Brooke said that we might tell the Russians that Overlord could be undertaken not later than 1 June but that we would expect, in that case, the Russian offensive to take place also not later than 1 June.

Sir Andrew Cunningham agreed that 1 June could be adhered to.

Sir Charles Portal said that Marshal Stalin’s statement that the Russians would enter the war against Japan when Germany had been defeated, seemed to alter the whole relative importance of the war in Europe and the Pacific, and to shift the emphasis rather towards Europe for the time being.

There was some further discussion in which the dependence of the attack upon moon and tide and weather conditions was considered, and also the desirability of giving a bracket of dates instead of a fixed target date for the operation.

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—*

Agreed:

a. That we should continue to advance in Italy to the Pisa-Rimini line. (This means that the 68 LST’s which are due to be sent from

*An undated typewritten page in the Hopkins Papers appears to be a first version of that portion of this minute which begins at this point and runs to the end of the minute, including the two-paragraph “Note” at the very end. The page referred to contains two headings, one reading “Conclusions of the C. C. S. 152d Meeting”, and the other reading “(The minutes are being processed and will be distributed later.)”. It corresponds to the text printed here, except that (1) in paragraph c, it reads “by 1 June” where this text reads “during May”, and (2) there are minor differences in spelling (e. g., “L. S. T.” in place of “LST’s”).*
the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for Overlord must be kept in the Mediterranean until 15 January.

b. That an operation shall be mounted against the South of France on as big a scale as landing craft permit. For planning purposes D-day to be the same as Overlord D-day.

c. To recommend to the President and Prime Minister respectively that we should inform Marshal Stalin that we will launch Overlord during May, in conjunction with a supporting operation against the South of France on the largest scale that is permitted by the landing craft available at that time.¹⁹

Note:²¹ The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed to inform each other before the Plenary Meeting this afternoon of the decisions of the President and Prime Minister respectively on the above point.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were unable to reach agreement on the question of operations in the Aegean until they had received further instructions from the President and Prime Minister respectively.

¹⁹ The Roosevelt Papers contain an undated document, without any descriptive heading, which may be the recommendation (or a draft of the recommendation) referred to here. On it, there are typewritten (1) the word “Agreed:—” and (2) a paragraph reading “To inform Stalin that we will launch Overlord by June 1st and will simultaneously make the biggest attack on Southern France that is permitted by the landing craft available at that time.” The words “by June 1st” are crossed out, and in their place there is written, in Roosevelt’s handwriting, “during the month of May”. The words from “and will simultaneously” to the end of the paragraph are also crossed out, and in their place there is written, in an unidentified handwriting, possibly Leahy’s, “in conjunction with a supporting operation in Southern France of the largest scale that is permitted by the landing craft available at that time”. See also Churchill’s telegram 536, January 7, 1944, post, p. 865, and Churchill, pp. 448–449.

²¹ This two-paragraph note appears as part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes.

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WITH THE SHAH OF IRAN, NOVEMBER 30, 1943, NOON, ROOSEVELT’S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY

Present

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
General Hurley
Mr. Dreyfus
Colonel Roosevelt

IRAN

Shah Pahlevi
Prime Minister Soheily
Foreign Minister Sa’eed-Maragheh’l
Mr. Ala

Editorial Note

No official minutes of this meeting have been found. Apparently the principal subjects discussed were Iran’s economic problems and the
desire of the United States to assist in their solution. The list of those present and this reference to the subjects discussed are based on (1) the Log, ante, p. 468; (2) a memorandum of January 29, 1954, by a Department of State historian of a conversation with Hurley (023.1/-2954); (3) a letter of February 19, 1954, from Dreyfus (640.0029/2-1954); and (4) Elliott Roosevelt, p. 192.

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-STALIN LUNCHEON MEETING, NOVEMBER 30, 1943, 1:30 P.M., ROOSEVELT’S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY**

**Present**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
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<tr>
<td>President Roosevelt</td>
<td>Prime Minister Churchill</td>
<td>Marshal Stalin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Bohlen</td>
<td>Major Birse</td>
<td>Mr. Berezhkov ¹</td>
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**Bohlen Minutes**

SECRET

Before luncheon, at the Prime Minister’s request, The President read to Marshal Stalin the recommendations of the combined British and American Staffs,² which had been approved by himself and the Prime Minister.

Majorsal Stalin expressed his great satisfaction with this decision. He added that the Red Army would at the same time undertake offensive operations, and would demonstrate by its actions the value it placed on this decision. He asked when the Commander in Chief would be named.

The President said he had to consult with his Staff, but that he was sure that the Commander in Chief would be named in three or four days or, in other words, immediately following his return, and that of the Prime Minister, to Cairo. The President said that there were a number of questions in regard to command which he had had to discuss with Mr. Churchill. He added that the Commander in Chief of Overlord would operate from England, and that there would be a Commander in Chief for the Mediterranean area. And one question was, under whose command the operations in Southern France would fall.

¹ According to the Log, ante, p. 468, Pavlov rather than Berezhkov was present.
² See ante, p. 563.
At this point The Prime Minister interrupted to say that the operations in Southern France should be under the Commander in Chief of Overlord, but the operations in Italy, which must be intensified to coordinate with the operations in France, would be under the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean theater.

Marshal Stalin expressed agreement with this idea, and said it was sound military doctrine.

For the next part of the luncheon the conversation was general, until The Prime Minister asked Marshal Stalin whether he had read the proposed communiqué on the Far East of the Cairo conference.²

 Marshal Stalin replied that he had and that although he could make no commitments he thoroughly approved the communiqué and all its contents. He said it was right that Korea should be independent, and that Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores Islands should be returned to China. He added, however, that the Chinese must be made to fight, which they had not thus far done.

The Prime Minister and The President expressed agreement with Marshal Stalin’s views.

After some discussion of the great size of the Soviet Union, during which Marshal Stalin admitted frankly that had Russia not had at her disposal such a vast territory the Germans would have probably won the victory, The Prime Minister said that he felt that such a large land mass as Russia deserved the access to warm water ports. He said that the question would of course form part of the peace settlement, and he observed that it could be settled agreeably and as between friends.

 Marshal Stalin replied that at the proper time that question could be discussed, but that since Mr. Churchill had raised the question he would like to inquire as to the regime of the Dardanelles.² He said that since England no longer objected, it would be well to relax that regime.

The Prime Minister replied that England had now no objections to Russia’s access to warm water ports, although he admitted that in the past she had. He questioned, however, the advisability of doing anything about the Straits at the time, as we were all trying to get Turkey to enter the war.

 Marshal Stalin said there was no need to hurry about that question, but that he was merely interested in discussing it here in general.

² Ante, p. 448.
THE PRIME MINISTER replied that Great Britain saw no objections to this legitimate question, and that furthermore we all hoped to see Russian fleets, both naval and merchant, on all seas of the world.

MARSHAL STALIN said that Lord Curzon had had other ideas.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that that was true, and that it would be idle to deny that in those days Russia and England did not see eye to eye.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Russia also was quite different in those days.

THE PRESIDENT reverted to the question of the approaches to the Baltic Sea, which he had previously discussed with Marshal Stalin. He said he liked the idea of establishing the former Hanseatic cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Lubeck into some form of a free zone, with the Kiel Canal put under international control and guaranty, with freedom of passage for the world’s commerce.

MARSHAL STALIN said he thought that that was a good idea, and then asked what could be done for Russia in the Far East.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that it was for this reason that he had been particularly glad to hear the Marshal’s views on the Cairo communiqué, since he was interested to find out the views of the Soviet government on the Far East and the question of warm water ports there.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that of course the Russians had their views, but that it would perhaps be better to await the time when the Russians would be taking an active representation in the Far Eastern war. He added, however, that there was no port in the Far East that was not closed off, since Vladivostok was only partly ice-free, and besides covered by Japanese controlled Straits.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought the idea of a free port might be applied to the Far East besides, and mentioned Dairen as a possibility.

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not think that the Chinese would like such a scheme.

To which THE PRESIDENT replied that he thought they would like the idea of a free port under international guaranty.

MARSHAL STALIN said that that would not be bad, and added that Petropavlovsk or [on?] Kamchatka was an excellent port, and ice-free, but with no rail connections. He pointed out in this general connection that Russia had only one ice-free port, that of Murmansk.

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5 See ante, p. 510.
7 Regarding the discussion of this matter with Chiang at the First Cairo Conference during the preceding week, see ante, pp. 324, 367.
8 For a reference by Harriman in 1944 to this discussion, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 378.
THE PRIME MINISTER then said that it was important that the nations who would govern the world after the war, and who would be entrusted with the direction of the world after the war, should be satisfied and have no territorial or other ambitions. If that question could be settled in a manner agreeable to the great powers, he felt then that the world might indeed remain at peace. He said that hungry nations and ambitious nations are dangerous, and he would like to see the leading nations of the world in the position of rich, happy men.

THE PRESIDENT and MARSHAL STALIN agreed.

It was then decided that after a short session this afternoon at 4:30 there would be no more full sessions of the conference, but at 4:00 o'clock tomorrow the President, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister, together with Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Hopkins, would meet to discuss political matters, and reference was made to Poland, Finland and Sweden as possible subjects of discussion.  

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HOPKINS-EDEN-MOLOTOV LUNCHEON MEETING, NOVEMBER 30, 1943, 1:30 P. M., BRITISH LEGATION

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Hopkins  
Captain Ware

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden  
Captain Lunghi

SOVIET UNION

Foreign Commissar Molotov  
Mr. Pavlov

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Ware Minutes

SECRET

Mr. Hopkins brought up the question of the “strong points” to which reference had evidently been made previously in discussions with Mr. Molotov and Marshal Stalin about postwar Europe.  

Mr. Molotov specifically mentioned Bizerte and Dakar and was interested in the question of the sovereignty of Bizerte. He said it would be difficult to realize how the war could not but affect such places, and that this was Marshal Stalin’s point of view also.

He added that it would be difficult also to comprehend how France, specifically, could be considered for treatment which would exclude

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1 See ante, pp. 532, 554.
punishment for her hostile acts committed in the past—in other words, how France could go unpunished for these acts.

Mr. Hopkins, specifically mentioning Belgium and Holland, brought out the implications of the fact that these countries were in close proximity to Germany and questioned the ability of such countries to defend themselves after this war.

Mr. Molotov said it had been shown once more that they are unable to defend themselves. Regarding France, however, he stated that this was a different matter. He said that France did not want to defend herself and in this respect she could be held much more responsible for her hostile acts than could Belgium and Holland.

Mr. Eden very willingly admitted that Great Britain should have given France more help.

Mr. Molotov indicated that France was not merely a country overpowered by the Germans but in fact was now with the Germans actively supporting German strategy. He added that France was not weak and that France did not want to join the Allies but wanted to collaborate with Germany. He said that the former French government had collapsed and that France made an alliance with Germany.

Mr. Eden, in reference to possible future attitudes toward France, said that nothing was too bad for the Lavals and Petains.

Mr. Molotov repeated that they are supporting Hitler now and that regarding France it is not just a matter of weakness.

Mr. Hopkins mentioned as an example the possibility of a strong point and airbase in Belgium and wanted to know what sort of agreement could be worked out in regard to who would operate such a base and under what right or authority.

It was pointed out that it would perhaps be easier just to arrange for the use of such bases for the Allies following the war in countries which had been enemy countries, and that in order to get the use of such bases in friendly countries, certain complications and rights of sovereignty might arise.

Mr. Eden suggested that the leasing of bases in the West Indies to the United States by Great Britain might serve as a rough example of these future arrangements.

Turning to Mr. Hopkins he said that it seemed that this was an exchange of bases for United States ships but really it was because "We like the United States to be there." He asked Mr. Hopkins if he did not think that was really it.

Mr. Hopkins indicated that he would object to any such conclusion.

Mr. Molotov indicated that it would be hard to realize how such future arrangements for strong points could not but affect the countries where such bases were located but that at the present time it
seemed uncertain what countries would be so affected. He said that he felt he was expressing the views of Marshal Stalin in stating that after the war in order to assure that there would be no future big war, the States particularly responsible for securing the peace will have to see to it that the main strategic bases will be in their control.

Regarding the strong points which will be taken from Germany or Japan, he remarked that these could be under the control possibly of Great Britain or the United States or both.

Specifically concerning Bizerte and Dakar, he mentioned United States or British control.

It appeared that he assumed there would be United States control in the Atlantic, and he asked if this was the correct understanding.

Mr. Eden said that the Prime Minister had stated that he did not want any more territory and that in regard to strong points taken from Germany and Japan, there might be joint control by the United States and Great Britain or United Nations control.

Regarding French bases, he could not say, since this matter would take great consideration, particularly in view of the fact that for many years England had been very close to France.

It might be supposed that the French could make a contribution by placing their bases under some United Nations control. In this way it would be possible for France to give something, and this should not in any way hurt the pride of France.

Mr. Molotov agreed that these sounded like legitimate demands.

Mr. Hopkins indicated that the place and strength of these future strong points would have to be worked out with a view as to who would possibly be a potential future enemy. He said that the President feels it essential to world peace that Russia, Great Britain, and the United States work out this control question in a manner which will not start each of the three powers arming against the others.

He indicated that the people would select as likely future enemies, Germany and Japan.

He said that the question of building up bases in the Pacific would not be a difficult one. Specifically in regard to the Philippines [Philippines], he indicated that following their independence we would still consider it advisable to have naval and air bases there. He indicated that we feel such bases in the Philippines would not be under United Nations control but rather United States control.

In the event that Formosa was returned to China, naval and air bases would be desired there also.

The size, character, and duties of occupying forces on such bases would have to be worked out.

Mr. Eden said he agreed also.
Mr. Hopkins said that there are two problems which disturb the President in this connection. We do not want sovereignty over any islands which will be free [freed?] from Japanese domination. The United Nations may perhaps exercise some sort of protective influence.

The problem remains as to the type of base and as to who will operate them. The three great powers should decide these basic questions regarding strong points and who will control these. This control will involve air, naval, and ground forces.

Mr. Hopkins pointed out that it is relatively easy for the United States to discuss the question of strong points because the United States is not located under any possible immediate danger from Germany. The difficult problem will be to enforce peace upon Germany. The Russian and British strong points located nearer to Germany would involve more immediate problems in connection with the enforcing of peace on Germany.

The question of the location of strong points should not be too difficult once the most difficult problems in this connection have been basically agreed upon here. This whole question of strong points is one of the most important postwar problems.

Mr. Hopkins mentioned that there had been a brief discussion between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin on this subject and that it would be fully worthwhile, he believed, if the President, Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin could further discuss this problem but that he understood that time was short and that possibly we could go into this matter now.

Mr. Molotov indicated that of course the heads of the governments had greater authority and would be more fully competent to talk through the issue but that possibly we could clarify the matter now.

Mr. Eden said he would like to know what Mr. Molotov recommends on the matter. Then he turned to the problem of Turkey.

He said that the Turkey problem had been thought over carefully and that it was his suggestion that we should make a joint summons to Turkey to enter the war. This summons would be made to Turkey, making clear what consequences would follow if Turkey refused, with all three of us backing the demand. He indicated that if it were agreeable to Mr. Molotov, an invitation could be extended to President Imonu of Turkey to come to Cairo where he could meet with the Prime Minister and the President if the President would be willing to stop over for this purpose in Cairo on his way back.

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1This may have been a reference to the conversation which took place between Churchill and Stalin at the tripartite dinner meeting of November 28, 1943, after Roosevelt had retired; see ante, p. 511.
Mr. Eden said to Mr. Molotov that he would like to have Russian participation also and that it would be good if they would send someone representing the Soviet Government to the proposed meeting with the Turkish President in Cairo.

Mr. Eden added that it may be likely that President Inonu would not come; that he might make a constitutional excuse. But in case President Inonu does refuse to come to Cairo, he would suggest that the President or the Prime Minister should not go to Turkey. If President Inonu does not come, perhaps an Ambassador or better yet, some special messenger should be sent to President Inonu in Turkey with our demands.

Mr. Eden emphasized that he thought there should be a special person sent and asked who this person should be.

Mr. Molotov stated that he was in favor of bringing Turkey into the war not in the distant future, but now, this year.

Mr. Eden remarked that the problem then is not what we want but how. He stated that he understood that Marshal Stalin does not believe that Turkey will go to war, but Mr. Eden added it should be tried.

He said to Mr. Molotov that it was his feeling that the Soviet position was of much greater optimism in regard to the possibility of getting Turkey into the war at the time of the Three Power Conference in Moscow.3

Mr. Molotov indicated that following the Numan request and the negotiations with Turkey conducted by Mr. Eden in the name of the Three Powers,4 that the reply which Great Britain had received from Turkey 5 had caused the Russian loss of optimism.

Mr. Hopkins said that he understood that the Russians had wanted Turkey to enter the war particularly for immediate military benefit which the Russians had felt they would derive from having this action force more German troops away from the Soviet front.

He understood that the Prime Minister had discussed with Marshal Stalin on several occasions, the Turkey problem and that Marshal Stalin had emphasized his desire to have Turkey in the war now.6

He said that the President would want to know more about the present Soviet attitude on this question. He assumed that all of us would want Turkey in the war and wanted to know whether there was actually a change in emphasis in the Soviet analysis of this situation.

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3 See ante, pp. 117 ff.
4 See ante, pp. 161, 164, 174, 180, 190.
5 See Hull’s telegram of November 22, 1943, to Roosevelt, ante, p. 374.
6 Churchill and Stalin had discussed the entrance of Turkey into the war at the first plenary meeting, November 28, 1943, ante, pp. 490 ff., and 503 ff., and at the second plenary meeting, November 29, 1943, ante, pp. 536 ff., and 544 ff.
Mr. Eden, in answer to a question put to him, stated that he had spoken in Turkey on behalf of the three countries.

Mr. Molotov remarked that under the authority of the protocol of the Three Power Conference, this was as it should be.

Mr. Hopkins indicated that it was quite all right for Mr. Eden to speak for the United States.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the reply made by Turkey was very bad and could not but affect the Soviet point of view which he understood had been made clear to Mr. Churchill by Marshal Stalin.

Mr. Molotov then added that if Turkey does declare war on Germany and if Bulgaria continues to take a hostile attitude, the Soviet Union will not only break diplomatic relations with Bulgaria but will be at war with Bulgaria. This all goes to show, he indicated, that the Soviet Government does attach importance to the participation of Turkey in the war.

Mr. Eden said that when he first learned of this Soviet analysis in regard to Bulgaria in this connection, and that he had heard about this at the conference yesterday, that he was frankly surprised.

Mr. Molotov said that this was a brief exposition of the Soviet point of view.

He asked Mr. Eden if he could elucidate a statement made at the conference yesterday by Prime Minister Churchill to the effect that if Turkey refuses the demands, that Turkey's post-war rights in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be affected. He asked Mr. Eden what Mr. Churchill meant by this.

Mr. Eden replied "frankly I do not know."

Then he went on to add that he supposed the Prime Minister had meant that the present cordiality and support being offered Turkey would be changed; in fact that the whole basis of relationship with Great Britain would be changed.

He offered to ask Mr. Churchill for further elucidation if Mr. Molotov would so desire.

Mr. Molotov indicated that he would like to know.

Mr. Eden then asked Mr. Molotov if specifically his government would agree to the suggestion to try to bring President Inonu of Turkey to Cairo.

Mr. Molotov said that he thought it would be a good idea but that he would ask Marshal Stalin.

Mr. Eden thanked Mr. Molotov very much.

Mr. Hopkins, turning to Mr. Eden, stated that he had good reason to believe that a substantial understanding on these points under
discussion would be arrived at between Marshal Stalin, the Prime
Minister, and the President.

Mr. Molotov said he was convinced that the results of this confer-
ence would add vigor to the people of our respective countries and
that the coming together of the three heads of government would do
still more toward improving the morale in our countries.

Mr. Hopkins indicated that if large undertakings were started fol-
lowing Turkey’s entry into the war, and if in this connection the
island of Rhodes were occupied and attacks were made on the
Dodecanese Islands, that such large commitments which would in-
evitably follow, would possibly cause at least a delay of Overlord.
However, he stated that aside from the military situation which might
be of sufficient importance that also there might be a psychological
advantage in developing the war in this area at this time which would
justify a delay in Overlord. Among other things, this might force
Finland to ask for peace from Russia.

Mr. Molotov asked if he was to understand that the entry of Turkey
into the war at this time was connected with a delay in the timing of
Overlord in the opinion of Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. Hopkins said that the President was under this impression
and so also our Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Molotov said that Marshal Stalin would be against getting
Turkey into the war now if this necessarily meant a delay of Overlord.

Mr. Hopkins said he hesitated to be too encouraging but that he
might be mistaken and that possibly a formula was being worked out
whereby this possible action in the Eastern Mediterranean could take
place without interfering with Overlord.

Mr. Hopkins said that he understands there were three questions of
urgent importance to the Russians in regard to Overlord as stated at
the conference yesterday:

1. The assurance that Overlord will take place and on time.
2. The Commander of Overlord.
3. The supporting action in Southern France.

Mr. Eden then turned to the question of aid to Tito in Yugoslavia.
He made mention of a mission with United States Officers in it and
suggested to Mr. Molotov that the Russians might also want to send
a mission and that maybe the Russians would want to have an airbase
in Northern Africa.

Mr. Eden stated that the British were ready to provide that base.
Mr. Molotov said thank you.
Mr. Eden went on to explain that the British airbase for sending
supplies to Tito is located at Cairo and asked Mr. Molotov where he would like to have a base for the Russians.

Mr. Molotov answered that he would leave that to the discretion of Mr. Eden and that as Mr. Eden suggested Cairo he thought that would be a good location for the Russians too.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet General Staff plans to send a mission to Yugoslavia and that on his return to Moscow he will be able to state who is taking part in this mission.

Mr. Eden said that he would try to get preliminary arrangements made and a place ready for an airbase for the Russians at Cairo and assured that such a base would be made available.

Mr. Molotov asked whether it would not be better to have a mission to Michaelovich [Mihailović] rather than to Tito in order to get better information.

Mr. Eden said that he would know better tomorrow but that from reports he had received from British Officers, Michaelovich would not be good to deal with, but he said that maybe it would be good for the Russians to send some of their people to Michaelovich.

Then he brought up the question as to whether the territory occupied by Tito was or was not separated by German forces from the area or areas occupied by Michaelovich.

Mr. Eden then referred to Mr. Molotov, making reference to what he termed an "indiscreet conversation" held between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin the other day on the subject of Poland.¹⁹

He added that the British have only one desire—to prevent the problem from becoming a source of friction between our countries. He said that if the question of two steps to the left was to be considered for Poland, then he would want to know how large these steps would be. He said that if he knew what was in the minds of the Russians on this question he would then be able to ask them for some sort of an agreement of opinion. Therefore he suggested that this problem should be carefully looked over.

Mr. Molotov added that he agreed.

Mr. Hopkins said that he was under the impression that the President had spoken quite openly and frankly with Marshal Stalin and that he had told him or would tell him all that he had on his mind on this subject and that he was sure the President and Prime Minister had talked over the question of Poland.

¹⁹ For an account of Churchill's after-dinner conversation of November 28, 1943, with Stalin regarding Poland, after Roosevelt had retired, see ante, p. 512.
III. THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE

THIRD PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 30, 1943, 4 P. M., CONFERENCE ROOM, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT 1

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Major General Deane
Captain Royal
Captain Ware
Mr. Bohlen

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Field Marshal Dill
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General
Ismay
Lieutenant General
Martel
Major Birse

SOVIET UNION
Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar
Molotov
Marshal Voroshilov
Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Berezhkov

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Minutes

SECRET

The President opened the proceedings by stating that while most of those present were aware of what had occurred this morning at the meeting of the British and American Staffs,2 he wished personally to express his happiness at the decision reached which he hoped would be satisfactory to Marshal Stalin. He proposed that Sir Alan Brooke, British Chief of Staff, report for the Combined Chiefs.

General Brooke said that sitting in combined session the United States and British Staffs had reached the following agreement, which had been submitted for the approval of the President and the Prime Minister. It was agreed:

(1). That Overlord will be launched during the month of May, 1944.

(2). That there will be a supporting operation in southern France on as large a scale as possible, depending on the number of landing craft available for this operation.

The Prime Minister stated that it was important that close and intimate contact be maintained with Marshal Stalin and the Soviet General Staff since it was important that in closing on the wild beast all parts of the narrowing circle should be afame with battle. All operations must be considered, and if Turkey entered the war her

1 The listing of those present is based on the Bohlen minutes. The Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes also include in the list of those present, Somervell of the American Delegation and Hollis of the British Delegation.
2 See ante, p. 555.
action as well as the resistance operations in Yugoslavia should also be coordinated with the actions of the allied army.

Marshal Stalin said he fully understood the importance of the decision reached and the difficulties which would be encountered in the execution of Overlord. He added that the danger in the beginning of the operation was that the Germans might attempt to transfer troops from the eastern front to oppose Overlord. In order to deny to the Germans the possibility of maneuvering he pledged that the Red Army would launch simultaneously with Overlord large scale offensives in a number of places for the purpose of pinning down German forces and preventing the transfer of German troops to the west. He said that he had already made the foregoing statement to the President, and Mr. Churchill but he thought it necessary to repeat it to the conference.

The President said that we were all aware of the importance of maintaining the closest cooperation between the three Staffs, and now that they had gotten together he hoped they would stay together. He went on to say that he had already told Marshal Stalin that the next step would be the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief for Overlord, and that he was confident that this appointment would be made within three or four days or immediately after he and the Prime Minister had returned to Cairo. He suggested that if Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister had no objection it might be advisable for the British and American military staffs to return to Cairo tomorrow as they had a great deal of detail work to do in working out the decisions reached here. Both Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister agreed.

The Prime Minister stated that having taken this important decision the main question now was to find enough landing craft for all our needs. He said he could not believe that the great resources of the United States and England could not make available what was needed. He said he had caused an inquiry to be made in regard to the total number of landing craft in the Mediterranean, and that upon their return home his military staff would have this information. Mr. Churchill added that he wished to state that now the decision had been taken he felt that Overlord should be delivered with smashing force and he hoped that it would be possible to add to the strength.

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3 See ante, p. 505.
4 Sherwood, p. 791, states: “It is not a matter of record, but it is the testimony of some who were present at this conference [the Tehran Conference] that Stalin was told, unofficially (and not by Roosevelt) that the President would appoint Marshall to the Overlord command and that Stalin made evident his conviction that no wiser or more reassuring choice could be made.” On December 6, 1943, Roosevelt informed Stalin that he had decided on Eisenhower as the Commander of Overlord. See post, p. 518.
of the operation as he wished to place that man in a position where there was no way out for him; if he put force in the west he would be smashed on the Soviet front, and if he attempted to hold firm in the east he would be smashed on the west. He went on to say that the present conclave might now break up as the military questions had been settled. Some political questions remained to be discussed and he hoped it would be possible on December 1st and 2nd to discuss these questions since he felt it would be of great value to be able to tell the world that full agreement had been reached on all questions at this conference. He expressed the hope that the President and Marshal Stalin would be willing to remain in Tehran through December 2nd if necessary. Both The President and Marshal Stalin agreed.\(^5\)

The President then said it would be necessary to consider the text of the communiqué to be issued and suggested that the military staffs before their departure work out a draft of the military aspects of the conference for their consideration. This was agreed.\(^6\)

The Prime Minister then said some form of cover plan should be worked out in order to confuse and deceive the enemy as to the real time and place of our joint blows. He said that the vast preparations in England could not be concealed from the enemy, and it was therefore important that every effort be made to confuse and mislead him. He said that “truth deserves a bodyguard of lies”.

Marshal Stalin then described the methods used on the Soviet front to conceal the location and timing of Soviet offenses. This was done through the use of dummy tanks, aircraft, fake landing fields and false information on the military radio.

The formal conference then closed with the agreement that the President, Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden and Mr. Hopkins would meet tomorrow to discuss political questions.

\(^5\) Regarding the subsequent decision to end the Conference on December 1, 1943, see the Log, ante, p. 471.

\(^6\) For the texts of the communiqué and of the military conclusions, see post, pp. 639 and 651, respectively.

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*\(^1\)

SECRET

In opening the meeting, The President said he assumed that most of those present were familiar with what had transpired at the meeting of the British and American staffs earlier in the day, but he

\(^1\) For editorial annotations, see the Bohlen minutes of this meeting, supra.
suggested that General Brooke be asked to read the conclusions which were reached at that meeting.

**Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister** agreed.

**General Brooke** said that at the meeting of the British and American staffs they had agreed to recommend to the President and Prime Minister that they should inform Marshal Stalin that the Anglo-American forces would launch **Overlord** during the month of May, in conjunction with a supporting operation against the South of France, on the largest scale that would be permitted by the landing craft available at that time.

**The Prime Minister** said it is of course understood that we shall keep in close touch with Marshal Stalin and the Soviet military authorities in order that all operations may be coordinated with each other. He said that the Anglo-American-Soviet forces would be closing in on Germany from all parts of a circle and it was essential that the pressure be exerted by all forces at the same moment. For this purpose he proposed to keep the Soviet authorities informed of the Anglo-American plans. He added that it would be possible to hold 8 to 10 German divisions on the Italian front, and he expressed the hope that the Yugoslavs could continue their good work in holding German divisions in that country. He said that if Turkey could be brought into the war, so much the better, and emphasized again the necessity for the three great Powers to work together as one team.

**Marshal Stalin** said that he understood the importance of the decision that had been reached by the Anglo-American staffs. He emphasized that there would be difficulties in the beginning and possibly dangers. The greatest danger would be that at the time of the attack the Germans might endeavor to transfer divisions from the Eastern Front to meet it and attempt to prevent its success. In order to deny the Germans freedom of action and [not to?] permit them to move their forces to the West he stated that the Soviets would undertake to organize a large-scale offensive against the Germans in May in order to contain the maximum number of German divisions on the Eastern Front and thus remove the difficulties for **Overlord**. He added that he had already made such a statement to the President and Prime Minister but felt it necessary to repeat it at the Plenary Session of the conference.

**The President** said that the Marshal’s statement concerning the timing and coordination of operations was extremely satisfactory and it forestalled a question on that subject he was about to ask. He suggested that now that the staffs of the three nations had gotten together it was essential they should maintain close contact with
each other, with particular emphasis on making certain that all future operations were timed with relation to each other.

The President then said he had told Marshal Stalin that the next step was the appointment of the Supreme Commander for the Overlord operation. He said that he and the Prime Minister would take up this matter with their staffs and make the decision within three or four days, certainly soon after their arrival in Cairo.

The President said that the only military matters remaining for consideration were details of the Overlord operation which would have to be worked out between the combined British and American staffs, and suggested it might be more convenient for them to return to Cairo at once for this purpose.

After ascertaining from Marshal Stalin that he had no more matters which he wished presented to the Combined British and American Staffs, The President and Prime Minister agreed that the staffs should return to Cairo on the following day.

The Prime Minister said there are many details about the Overlord operation which remain to be settled. He said that the necessary landing craft would have to be found, but he could not believe that the two nations, with their great volume of production, could not make the necessary landing craft available. He said also that he would like to add weight to the operation as it is now planned, especially in the initial assault. In all events, he wished to make sure that the armed forces of the three nations would be in heavy action on the Continent of Europe during the month of June. If this were so, he added, it would make it very difficult for "that man." If Hitler attempts to meet the Soviet attack from the east, the Anglo-American forces will move in on him. On the other hand, if he attempts to stop the Anglo-American forces, the Soviet forces will be able to advance into Germany.

Marshal Stalin said that he understood the necessity for the detailed staff planning and concurred that it would be a good idea for the staffs to return to Cairo at once.

The Prime Minister then indicated that since the military business of the conference was concluded, there were some political matters of extreme importance which remained to be decided. He hoped it would be possible for the three Heads of State to meet on the first and second of December and not to leave Tehran until December 3. He said it would be well if they remained until all questions of importance had been decided. He indicated that he was prepared to delay his departure, and The President and Marshal Stalin agreed to stay the extra day.
The President brought up the subject of the communiqué, particularly as it referred to the military decisions. He suggested that the military staffs draft something for the President and Prime Minister's approval.

Marshal Stalin agreed that this should be done insofar as military matters taken up at the conference were concerned.

The Prime Minister said he thought the communiqué should strike the note that all future military operations were to be concerted between the three great Powers.

Marshal Stalin added, certainly those in Europe from both the east and west.

The Prime Minister said that the preparations for Overlord are bound to be known to the enemy. Numerous depots are being constructed in Southern England, the entire appearance of the coast is changing and photographs indicate these changes in detail.

Marshal Stalin said that it was difficult, if not impossible, to hide such a large operation from the enemy.

The Prime Minister then asked if any arrangements had been made to provide a combined cover plan for the operations in May as between the three great Powers.

Marshal Stalin said that on such occasions the Soviets had achieved success by the construction of false tanks, airplanes and airfields. They move these items to sectors in which no operations are planned, and such movements are immediately picked up by the German intelligence. In sectors from which blows are to be launched, all movements are made quietly and mostly under cover of darkness. In this manner they had often succeeded in deceiving the Germans. He noted that at times up to 5,000 false tanks and 2,000 false airplanes had been used, as well as the construction of a number of airfields which were not actually intended to be used. Another method of deception practiced by the Red Army was by the use of radio. Unit commanders communicate freely by radio giving the Germans false information and evoke immediate attacks from the German air forces in areas where such attacks can do no harm.

The Prime Minister observed that truth deserves a bodyguard of lies.

Marshal Stalin said, "This is what we call military cunning."

The Prime Minister said that he considered it rather military diplomacy. He suggested that arrangements be made for liaison to be established between the three great Powers as regards the deception and propaganda methods to be adopted.

It was agreed that the Chiefs of State and their Foreign Ministers should meet on the following day at 1600.
TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, NOVEMBER 30, 1943, 8:30 P. M.,
BRITISH LEGATION

PRESENT

Major Boettiger
Lieutenant General Ismay
General Arnold
Lord Moran
Mr. Harriman
Field Marshal Dill
Major Birse
Marshall Stalin
Prime Minister Churchill
President Roosevelt
Mr. Bohlen
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Admiral Leaby
Section Officer Sarah
Churchill Oliver
Admiral King
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sergeant Robert Hopkins

Mr. Holman
Mr. Martin
Lieutenant General Somervell
General Brooke
Mr. Berezhkov
Marshal Voroshilov
Sir Reader Bullard
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Eden
Mr. Hopkins
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Winant
Air Chief Marshal Portal
General Marshall
Captain Randolph Churchill
Colonel Elliott Roosevelt
Commander Thompson

Bohlen Collection

Boettiger Minutes

Thirty-three members of the American, British and Russian representatives [delegations?] at the Teheran conference gathered with Mr. Churchill for dinner on the occasion of his 69th birthday. A list of the guests, and the seating arrangement at the dinner-table, is attached.

It was clear that those present had a sense of realization that historic understanding had been reached and this conception was brought out in the statements and speeches. Back of all was the feeling that basic friendships had been established which there was every reason to believe would endure.

This strong feeling of optimism appeared to be based on the realization that if the three nations went forward together, there was real hope for a better world future, and that their own most vital interests dictated such a policy.

President Roosevelt sat on the Prime Minister's right, and Marshal Stalin on his left. All speeches took the form of toasts, following

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1 Churchill was host at this dinner.
2 The listing of those present is based on the Boettiger minutes and follows the seating order at table. According to Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Tehran Conference, p. 176, Hurley was also present. Churchill, pp. 387-388, states: "I had not invited Randolph and Sarah to the dinner, though they came in while my birthday toast was being proposed, but now Stalin singled them out and greeted them most warmly, and of course the President knew them well."
3 See also the Bohlen memorandum summarizing incidental remarks made at various meetings held during the course of the Conference, post, p. 837.
the Russian custom and the policy established at the Stalin dinner at the Soviet Embassy on Sunday [Monday] night.

The President opened the proceedings with the first toast, an unusual departure from rote in that he, instead of the host, proposed the traditional toast to the King. The President said that as an old friend of King George he had requested of Mr. Churchill the privilege of offering the toast.

The Prime Minister then paid a warm official and personal tribute to the President, whom he characterized as a man who had devoted his entire life to the cause of defending the weak and helpless, and to the promotion of the great principles that underlie our democratic civilization. Following this with a toast to Marshal Stalin, he said the latter was worthy to stand with the great figures of Russian history and merited the title of “Stalin the Great”.

The President spoke of his long admiration for Winston Churchill and his joy in the friendship which had developed between them in the midst of their common efforts in this war.

Marshal Stalin said the honors which had been paid to him really belonged to the Russian people; that it was easy to be a hero or a great leader, if one had to do with people such as the Russians. He said that the Red Army had fought heroically, but that the Russian people would have tolerated no other quality from their armed forces. He said that even persons of medium courage and even cowards became heroes in Russia. Those who didn’t, he said, were killed.

The Prime Minister spoke of the great responsibility that rested on the three men who have the power to command some 30 million armed men, as well as the vast number of men and women who stood behind these men in their work in field and factory, which makes possible the activities of the armies. In a personal toast to Franklin Roosevelt, the Prime Minister expressed his opinion that through the President’s courage and foresighted action in 1933, he had indeed prevented a revolution in the United States. He expressed his admiration for the way the President had guided his country along the “tumultuous stream of party friction and internal politics amidst the violent freedoms of democracy”.

Among the many toasts of the evening was one by President Roosevelt to Sir Alan Brooke, the British Army Chief of Staff. Marshal Stalin stood with the others, but he held his glass in his hand, and when the others had drunk he stayed on his feet. He said he wished to join in the toast of General Brooke, but wished to make certain observations.

Acknowledging the General’s greatness, Marshal Stalin, with a twinkle in his eye, said he regretted that Sir Alan was unfriendly to the Soviet Union, and adopted a grim and distrustful attitude toward
the Russians. He drank the General’s health in the hope that Sir Alan “would come to know us better and would find that we are not so bad after all”.

Some time later, in reply to Stalin, General Brooke rose and with some stiffness of manner declared that the Marshal had made note of the means used by the Russians in deceiving the enemy on the Eastern front. For the greater part of the war, he went on, Great Britain had adopted cover plans to deceive the enemy, and it was possible that Marshal Stalin had mistaken the dummy “tanks and airplanes” for the real operations. “That is possible” interjected Stalin, dryly, bringing chuckles around the table. His real desire, continued Brooke, was to establish closer collaboration with the Russians. “That is possible”, Stalin repeated, “even probable”. And there were more chuckles. It was thought that General Brooke would wind up with a toast to Marshal Voroshilov, the Russian chief of staff, but instead he broke away completely from his [this?] vein and abruptly proposed the health of Admiral Leahy.

Mr. Churchill took indirect note of the incident and seemed inclined to soften the effect of it, and in a subsequent toast he observed that he had heard the suggestions concerning changing political complexions in the world. He said that he could not speak with authority concerning the political view which might be expressed by the American people in the coming year’s elections, and that he would not presume to discuss the changing political philosophy of the Russian nation. But, he continued, so far as the British people were concerned, he could say very definitely that their “complexions are becoming a trifle pinker”. Stalin spoke up instantly: “That is a sign of good health!”

In what he declared would be the concluding toast of the evening, Mr. Churchill referred to the great progress which had been made at Teheran toward solution of world affairs, and proposed a joint toast to the President and Marshal Stalin.

But before the dinner could break up, Stalin requested of his host the privilege of delivering one more toast. Mr. Churchill nodded assent and Stalin then said he wished to speak of the importance of “the machine” in the present war, and to express his great admiration for the productive capacity of the United States. He had been advised, he said, that the United States would very soon be producing 10,000 planes every month. This compared, he said, with 2,500 to 3,000 planes which the Soviet Union was able to produce, after making every effort to speed the task, and with a somewhat similar number of planes produced monthly by Great Britain.

Without these planes from America the war would have been lost, said Stalin with emphasis. He expressed his gratitude and that
of the Russian people for the great leadership of President Roosevelt which had developed the great production of war machines and made possible their delivery to Russia. He wound up with a warm toast to the President.4

Then The President sought the privilege of adding a last word, and he said these meetings at Teheran had raised all our hopes that the future would find a better world, an ordered world in which the ordinary citizen would be assured the possibility of peaceful toil and the just enjoyment of the fruits of his labors.

"There has been discussion here tonight of our varying colors of political complexion", he said. "I like to think of this in terms of the rainbow. In our country the rainbow is a symbol of good fortune and of hope. It has many varying colors, each individualistic, but blending into one glorious whole.

"Thus with our nations. We have differing customs and philosophies and ways of life. Each of us works out our scheme of things according to the desires and ideas of our own peoples.

"But we have proved here at Teheran that the varying ideals of our nations can come together in a harmonious whole, moving unitedly for the common good of ourselves and of the world.

"So as we leave this historic gathering, we can see in the sky, for the first time, that traditional symbol of hope, the rainbow".

4 See also the quotation from Stalin's remarks which appears in the Log, ante, p. 469.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1943 1

TRIPARTITE LUNCHEON MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 1943, 1 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY 2

PRESENT

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<tr>
<th>UNITED STATES</th>
<th>UNITED KINGDOM</th>
<th>SOVIET UNION</th>
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<tr>
<td>President Roosevelt</td>
<td>Prime Minister Churchill</td>
<td>Marshal Stalin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Hopkins</td>
<td>Foreign Secretary Eden</td>
<td>Foreign Commissar</td>
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<td>Mr. Harriman</td>
<td>Sir Archibald Clark Kerr</td>
<td>Molotov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Bohlen</td>
<td>Major Birse</td>
<td>Mr. Pavlov 3</td>
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1 For an account—based on a conversation with Roosevelt—of jocular remarks at Churchill’s expense, made by Roosevelt to Churchill and Stalin apparently on December 1, 1943, and not recorded in the minutes, see Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946), p. 84.

2 According to the Log, ante, p. 470, this meeting began about noon. Bohlen has stated to the editors that the minutes presented at this point cover the discussions immediately preceding the luncheon as well as those during the luncheon.

3 The listing of those present is based on the Bohlen minutes. According to the Log, ante, p. 470, Berezikov was present rather than Pavlov.
During the first part of luncheon the text of a telegram to be dispatched to the British and American Ambassadors in Ankara to deliver orally an invitation to the President of Turkey to meet the President and Mr. Churchill in Cairo on December 3rd, 4th or 5th, was discussed and was agreed to.

Mr. Hopkins then stated that before any meetings with the Turkish President, it was essential that we were agreed as to exactly what form of military assistance could be rendered to Turkey in the event she agreed to enter the war.

The President agreed with Mr. Hopkins, and said that the American Staff had not yet worked out anything in detail on that question.

The Prime Minister said that he only intended to offer the Turks 20 squadrons, mostly of fighter aircraft, and some 3 anti-aircraft regiments, but he had no intention of offering any land forces at this time.

The President remarked that the big problem confronting his Staff was the number of available landing craft in the Mediterranean and how much would be needed for the Italian operations, those in Southern France and in England, as well as for the operations in the Indian Ocean.

Marshal Stalin then said that as he understood it, if Turkey entered the war there would only be made available the air force and anti-aircraft force mentioned by the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister agreed and spoke of the great assistance to the Allied cause that would result from obtaining Turkish air bases, with the possibility of continual bombing of the Ploesti oil fields. He added that he wanted landing craft only for the assault on the Island of Rhodes, which would be a temporary operation in the month of March.

The President stated that he desired to have military advice on the subject, as he did not know whether it would be possible to sandwich in, between the Italian and Overlord operations, for any operation in the Aegean, the landing craft which the Prime Minister desired.

The Prime Minister repeated that he had made no promises to

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*Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen and Laurence A. Steinhardt, respectively.
*For the text of the telegram sent by Roosevelt to Steinhardt, see post, p. 633. It would appear from the phrasing of the telegram to Steinhardt that Stalin agreed to send a similar telegram to the Soviet Ambassador at Ankara (Vinogradov).
Turkey, and would make none beyond the aircraft and anti-aircraft of which he had spoken.

He said if the Turkish President, which is possible, would be unable to come to Cairo, that he proposed himself to go to Ankara subsequently and present to him the ugly case which would result from the failure of Turkey to accept the invitation to join the war, and the unappetizing picture of what help could be afforded her if she did.

Mr. Hopkins again pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff had not given consideration to the detailed requirements of the Turkish operation. The whole of the Mediterranean was soon to come under the Combined Chiefs of Staff—hence the resources must be examined in the light of that fact.

It should be clearly understood that the American side believe that there are no landing craft available for an attack on Rhodes—and more important still that even if the landing craft were available, no decision has been reached as to whether or not the landing craft could not be used to better advantage in some other operation.

Under any circumstances it should be clearly understood that no mention can be made to President Inonu, implied or otherwise, that an amphibious landing can be made on Rhodes. 6

The Prime Minister said he thought we could have the precise information desired by Mr. Hopkins within three days, and in any event before any meeting with the Turkish President. He went on to say that landing craft was the bottleneck, and it might be possible to divert some from the Pacific theater, but that one thing was certain after yesterday’s decision, and that was that OVERLORD not suffer.

The President said, with reference to the Southwest Pacific, that it was absolutely impossible to withdraw any landing craft from that area. The distance alone from the Mediterranean would make it impossible, and besides all landing craft out there were urgently needed for the operations in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, and for the Burma campaign.

Mr. Eden then explained that in his conversations in November with the Turkish Foreign Minister in Cairo 7 he had only asked for bases from Turkey, and had made no mention of any assistance other than the air forces mentioned by the Prime Minister, and no reference whatsoever to any other forces. He said that he had expressed the view that Turkey could make available these bases to the Allies without being attacked by Germany, but the Foreign Minister had not agreed with this opinion.

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6 According to Sherwood, p. 793, this four-sentence summary of what Hopkins said was written out by Hopkins for inclusion in the minutes, in order that the record might be straight. The handwritten summary is in the Hopkins Papers. A facsimile of the summary appears in Sherwood, pp. 794–795.

7 See ante, pp. 162, 163.
The Foreign Minister then repeated what he said about the advantages of acquiring bases in Turkey; that it would permit healthy battles with the German Air Force in that region, and in all probability starve out the German garrisons on the Aegean Islands. It might not even be necessary to take Rhodes by assault.

Marshal Stalin expressed agreement with this view, and felt that the German garrisons would be so demoralized following the loss of air superiority that they would be easy prey. He added, however, that he thought some bombers would be necessary for any such operations.

The President then said he was in favor of meeting the Turkish Prime Minister, but he intended to make no offer of any amphibious operations to Turkey whatsoever, and that any commitments should be confined to the air forces referred to by the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister then summed up the advantages to Turkey which would accrue if she accepted the invitation to join the war, and mentioned particularly the possibility of sitting alongside the Soviet Union at the peace table.

In reply to Mr. Eden’s question as to the exact attitude of the Soviet Union towards Bulgaria, which Marshal Stalin had referred to at the formal conference, Marshal Stalin replied that if Turkey declares war on Germany and Bulgaria, or if Bulgaria attacks or goes to war with Turkey, the Soviet Union will break relations or declare war on Bulgaria.

He also inquired what other assistance would be required of the Soviet Union in such an event.

The Prime Minister replied that they were seeking nothing more of the Soviet Union, but that it was obvious that if the Soviet Armies approached Bulgaria, the pro-German Bulgarian circles would be in great fear.

Marshal Stalin inquired what particularly the Turkish Army lacked in the way of armaments.

The Prime Minister replied that the present Turkish Army would have been a good army at the end of the last war, but that when they had seen the modern Bulgarian equipment received from French arsenals, the Turks realized that their army was not a modern one.

He pointed out that they had brave infantry, but lacked anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft, and airplanes. He mentioned that 25 million pounds worth of military equipment, mostly American, had been sent to Turkey.

Marshal Stalin then said it was possible that Turkey would not have to go to war if she granted bases to the Allies; that she need not

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*a See ante, pp. 537, 545.*
attack; and that it was possible that neither the Bulgarians nor the Germans would do so.

The President then mentioned the case of Portugal as an example of the granting of bases without the involvement in war.

With reference to Mr. Eden’s remarks that the Turkish Foreign Minister had preferred to go right into war rather than to be dragged in by bases, the Prime Minister said that was Turkey’s usual behaviour. If you suggested a small move they said they preferred the big. And if you suggested the big, they said they were not ready. Mr. Churchill said that he personally preferred that we offer something substantial to the Turks, and that if they refused, then they would wash their hands of Turkey, both now and at the peace table.

In reply to Mr. Eden’s question, Marshal Stalin stated that it was expected that Turkey would declare war only on Germany, and not on Bulgaria. If Bulgaria attacks or declares war on Turkey, the Soviet Union goes to war with Bulgaria.

Marshal Stalin mentioned that there was one other possibility, and that was that if Turkey declared war on Germany, and Bulgaria refused to accede to German demands to go to war, the Germans might occupy Bulgaria. In which case Bulgaria might ask help from the Allies, and what then would be our position?

The Prime Minister replied that in such an event great strain would be put on Germany’s strength, and undoubtedly result in the removal of some German divisions from the Eastern front.

Mr. Molotov said that he had talked the day before yesterday with the Prime Minister, who had referred to the idea that if Turkey would refuse an invitation to enter the war, Great Britain would tell her that her interests in the Straits and in the Bosporus would be adversely affected. He wished to know what this meant.

The Prime Minister replied that he was far from his cabinet, but he personally favored a change in the regime of the Straits if Turkey proved obdurate.

Mr. Molotov said that he had merely meant to indicate that the Black Sea countries were very much interested in the regime of the Straits.

The President said he would like to see the Dardanelles made free to the commerce of the world and the fleets of the world, irrespective of whether Turkey entered the war or not.

After agreeing [after agreement had been reached?] that the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey would come to Cairo and Mr. Bushinsky

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9 For Churchill’s reference to this idea at the plenary meeting of November 29, 1943, see ante, pp. 536, 544.
10 See ante, p. 563, footnote 4.
11 Sergei Vinogradov.
[Vyskin'sky] would come to Cairo from Algiers for the meeting with the Turkish President, if it occurred that the Turkish president was present, The President then said he would like to take up the question of Finland. He said that he wished to help in every way to get Finland out of the war, and he would like to have the views of Marshal Stalin.

Marshal Stalin replied that recently the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Boheman, had inquired of the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm as to what were the Soviet Union's intentions regarding Finland, saying that the Finns were afraid that the Russians intended to make good the Russian promise and destroy the independence of Finland, and added that the Finns would like an opportunity to talk to the Russians.

The reply from Moscow was to the effect that Russia had no designs on the independence of Finland, if Finland by its behaviour did not force Russia to do so. Also that the Soviet Government had no objection to the Finns coming to Moscow for conversations, but would like to have the conditions in [on?] which the Finns would negotiate, in advance.

He added that only today they had had word of a Finnish reply through the Swedish [Svedes], but did not yet have the full text. The gist of the reply was, however, to the effect that the Finns desired to take as a basis the 1939 frontier, and made no mention of disassociation from Germany. Stalin said in his opinion that this unacceptable reply indicated that the Finns were not anxious to conduct serious negotiations, since they knew that such conditions would be unacceptable.

The President said that the Marshal's statement had been most interesting, but also unsatisfactory.

Marshal Stalin replied that the Finnish ruling groups obviously had hopes still of a German victory.

The President inquired whether Marshal Stalin thought it would be any help if the United States suggested that the Finns send a delegation to Moscow.

Marshal Stalin said he personally had no objections.

The Prime Minister outlined the change in his own and British feeling that had occurred toward Finland from 1939 to the present as a result of the Finnish associations and the German attack on Russia. He said that Great Britain was at war with Finland, and the first consideration was that the city of Leningrad would be secure, and also that the position of the Soviet Union as the leading naval and air power in the Baltic Sea should likewise be secure.

12 Erik Boheman was Secretary-General of the Swedish Foreign Office.
13 Mme. Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay.
He said, on the other hand, he would greatly regret to see anything done to impair the independence of Finland, and would therefore welcome the Marshal's statement on that point. He went on to say that an indemnity would not be much good from a country as poor as Finland.

Marshal Stalin expressed disagreement, and said that payments in kind over a period of from 5 to 8 years, such as timber, paper and other materials, would cover some of the damage done by Finland during the war, and that the Soviet Government intended to demand such reparation.

Mr. Churchill developed at some length the reasons why he did not consider reparations, in regard to such a country as Finland, either desirable or feasible. And he said in his ears there was an echo of the slogan “No Annexations and No Indemnities”.

Marshal Stalin laughed, and replied that he had already told Mr. Churchill that he was becoming a Conservative.

The Prime Minister stated that he attached a great importance to Finland’s being out of the war and Sweden’s being in, at the moment of the great attack in May.

To which Stalin expressed assent.

The President then inquired whether Marshal Stalin thought that the Finns could expel the Germans from their country by their own efforts.

Marshal Stalin replied that there were 21 Finnish divisions on the Soviet front, and that while they were expressing their desire to negotiate, they had recently increased their divisions to this number from 16.

Marshal Stalin agreed on the desirability of getting the Finns out of the war, but not at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that for 27 months the Finns and the Germans had had Leningrad under artillery fire.

The President said that according to his information the Finns were willing to remove the frontier a long distance from Leningrad, but hoped to have Viborg [Viborg] (Marshal Stalin interrupted to say that this was impossible). The President went on to say that Hango should be demilitarized and made into a bathing beach.

The Prime Minister said he did not wish to press his Russian friends, but he would like to know what their conditions were; that the British Government was leaving the initiative entirely in the hands of the Russians.

Marshal Stalin replied that in February the Soviet Government had told the United States Government what the conditions were, and the British Government had been likewise informed, and that since the
United States Government did not transmit these terms to the Finns it was obvious that it was not believed that the Finns would accept them.

The President agreed that at that time it was felt that the Finns would not go along with any proposals.

Marshal Stalin said that the Treaty of 1940 was broken and must be restored, but if Hango were belonging to the Finns he was willing to accept Petsamo instead, which would give them a common boundary with Norway. He added that Petsamo had been in the first instance a gift from Russia to Finland.

The Prime Minister said that the British Government desired first of all to see the Soviet Government satisfied with the border in the west, and secondly would like to see Finland remain independent.

Marshal Stalin thought that it was all right to let the Finns live as they wished, but they must pay half of the damages they had caused.

The President asked if it would be helpful if the Finns would go to Moscow without any reservations or conditions.

Marshal Stalin replied that if there was no prospect of success, such a move might play right into the hands of the Germans, since the reactionary group in Finland would exploit such a failure and pretend that it was impossible to talk with the Russians. He added, however, that if the President insisted, let the Finns come to Moscow, but who could they send?

Mr. Churchill interjected that the British Government was not insistent on anything regarding the Finns.

Marshal Stalin said that allies could occasionally use pressure on one another, and repeated that if the President thought it was worthwhile, an attempt might be made.

The President said that in his opinion the present Finnish Government was pro-German, and that nothing could be done with them, but that it might be possible to send other Finns.

Marshal Stalin replied that of course that would be better, that they had no objection to anyone the Finns wanted to send, even Ruti [Ryti], or even, he added, the devil himself. Stalin then outlined the Soviet terms, as follows:

1. The restoration of the Treaty of 1940, with the possible exchange of Petsamo for Hango. However, whereas Hango had been leased, Petsamo would be taken as a permanent possession.
2. Compensation for 50% of the damage done to the Soviet Union by the Finns, the exact amount to be discussed.
3. Break with Germany, and the expulsion of Germans from Finland.
4. Reorganization of the army.

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14 For an English translation of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Peace, signed at Moscow March 12, 1940, see the Department of State Bulletin, vol. ii, April 27, 1940, p. 453.
THE PRIME MINISTER and MARSHAL STALIN entered into a friendly discussion as to the advisability of reparations from Finland, and MARSHAL STALIN made clear his determination that Finland should pay.\textsuperscript{15}

The meeting adjourned until 6 o'clock.

[Annex] \textsuperscript{16}

DECEMBER 1, 1943.

At the beginning of luncheon today after the President had mentioned to Marshal Stalin that his son, Colonel Elliot\textsuperscript{[t]} Roosevelt was in charge of 250 observation and scouting planes, Ambassador Harriman told the Marshal that Colonel Roosevelt was very anxious to obtain permission to land in the Soviet Union, thus flying straight through from Italy, photographing the Danube Basin, and landing in Russia.

Marshal Stalin agreed to give this permission, and said that the exact airfields and other details could be discussed with the United States Military Mission in Moscow.

He also agreed to make available for similar purposes fields in the Northern part of Russia, to permit through flying from England over enemy territory to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} For a post-Conference reference to this discussion, see Harriman's telegram 43, January 6, 1944, post, p. 865.

\textsuperscript{16} This memorandum appears in the Bohlen collection, without any heading, immediately after the minutes of the luncheon meeting.

\textsuperscript{17} For Roosevelt's request of November 29, 1943, for agreement on this point, see post, p. 617.

Hopkins Papers

\textit{Hopkins Notes}\textsuperscript{1}

1. Turkey should be asked to come into the war & invite President of Turkey to come to Cairo to meet the President of U. S. A. & Prime Minister.

Mr. Eden asked Marshall [\textit{Marshal}] Stalin whether the Soviet Government wished to send a representative—if so he would of course be welcomed.

M. Stalin answered that he would send such a representative.

Proposed telegram to Pres. Inonu was presented and discussed.

\textsuperscript{1} These notes, in Hopkins' handwriting, are headed "Mr. Eden['s] report of Foreign Minister Committee". The material reproduced here ends at the middle of a page and appears to be incomplete. No other Hopkins notes of this meeting have been found.
III. THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE

ROOSEVELT-STALIN MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 1943, 3:20 P. M.,
ROOSEVELT'S QUARTERS, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

SOVIET UNION
Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Collection

Bohlen Minutes

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT said he had asked Marshal Stalin to come to see him
as he wished to discuss a matter briefly and frankly. He said it re-
ferred to internal American politics.

He said that we had an election in 1944 and that while personally
he did not wish to run again, if the war was still in progress, he might
have to.

He added that there were in the United States from six to seven
million Americans of Polish extraction, and as a practical man, he
did not wish to lose their vote. He said personally he agreed with the
views of Marshal Stalin as to the necessity of the restoration of a
Polish state but would like to see the Eastern border moved further
to the west and the Western border moved even to the River Oder.¹
He hoped, however, that the Marshal would understand that for
political reasons outlined above, he could not participate in any de-
cision here in Tehran or even next winter on this subject and that
he could not publicly take part in any such arrangement at the present
time.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that now the President explained, he had
understood.

THE PRESIDENT went on to say that there were a number of persons
of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian origin, in that order, in the
United States. He said that he fully realized the three Baltic Re-
publics had in history and again more recently been a part of
Russia and added jokingly that when the Soviet armies re-occupied
these areas, he did not intend to go to war with the Soviet Union on
this point.

¹ For post-Conference references to what Roosevelt said at Tehran about
Polish boundaries, see Churchill's telegram 739, October 18, 1944, to Roosevelt,
post. p. 884, and Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945,
He went on to say that the big issue in the United States, insofar as public opinion went, would be the question of referendum and the right of self-determination. He said he thought that world opinion would want some expression of the will of the people, perhaps not immediately after their re-occupation by Soviet forces, but some day, and that he personally was confident that the people would vote to join the Soviet Union.

Marshal Stalin replied that the three Baltic Republics had no autonomy under the last Czar who had been an ally of Great Britain and the United States, but that no one had raised the question of public opinion, and he did not quite see why it was being raised now.

The President replied that the truth of the matter was that the public neither knew nor understood.

Marshal Stalin answered that they should be informed and some propaganda work should be done.

He added that as to the expression of the will of the people, there would be lots of opportunities for that to be done in accordance with the Soviet constitution but that he could not agree to any form of international control.

The President replied it would be helpful for him personally if some public declaration in regard to the future elections to which the Marshal had referred, could be made.

Marshal Stalin repeated there would be plenty of opportunities for such an expression of the will of the people.

After a brief discussion of the time of the President's departure and that of Marshal Stalin, The President said there were only two matters which the three of them had not talked over.

He said he had already outlined to the Marshal his ideas on the three world organizations but he felt that it was premature to consider them here with Mr. Churchill. He referred particularly to his idea of the four great nations, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, policing the world in the post-war period. He said it was just an idea, and the exact form would require further study.

Mr. Molotov said that at the Moscow Conference, in accordance with the Four Power Declaration, it had been agreed that the three governments would give further study as to the exact form of world organization and the means of assuring the leading role of the four great powers mentioned.

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2 See ante, p. 530.
3 Decade, p. 11.
During the conversation, in reply to the President’s question, Marshal Stalin said that he had received the three papers which the President had handed him the day before yesterday, one in regard to air bases, and the other two in regard to secret contacts involving the Far East, but said he had not had time to study the documents carefully, but would take it up in Moscow with Ambassador Harriman.

At this meeting, Stalin, referring to his conversation with the President on November 28 [29] on the world organization, said that after thinking over the question of the world organization as outlined by the President, he had come to agree with the President that it should be world-wide and not regional.  

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**TRIPARTITE POLITICAL MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 1943, 6 P. M., CONFERENCE ROOM, SOVIET EMBASSY**

**Present**

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<tr>
<th>UNITED STATES</th>
<th>UNITED KINGDOM</th>
<th>SOVIET UNION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President Roosevelt</td>
<td>Prime Minister Churchill</td>
<td>Marshal Stalin</td>
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<td>Mr. Hopkins</td>
<td>Foreign Secretary Churchill</td>
<td>Foreign Commissar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Harriman</td>
<td>Sir Archibald Clark Kerr</td>
<td>Molotov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Bohlen</td>
<td>Major Birse</td>
<td>Mr. Pavlov</td>
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Bohlen Collection

**Bohlen Minutes**

The President stated he thought that there were two main questions to be discussed—the question of Poland and the treatment of Germany.

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1 The fact that the meeting took place in the conference room of the Soviet Embassy does not appear on the minutes but was indicated to the editors by Bohlen.

2 See also the Bohlen memorandum summarizing incidental remarks made at various meetings held during the course of the Conference, *post*, p. 836.
Mr. Molotov inquired whether it would be possible to obtain any answer on the Soviet Union's request for Italian ships.¹

The President replied his position on this question was very clear; that the Allies had received a large number of Italian merchant ships and a lesser number of warships and that he felt they should be used by our three nations in the common cause until the end of the war when the division based on title and possession might be made.

Mr. Molotov answered that the Soviet Union would use these ships during the war in the common war effort, and after the war the question of possession could be discussed.

The Prime Minister asked where the Soviet Union would like to have these ships delivered.

Marshal Stalin replied in the Black Sea if Turkey entered the war. If not, to the northern ports.

The Prime Minister said it was a small thing to ask in the face of the tremendous sacrifices of Russia.

Marshal Stalin said that he knew how great the need for war vessels was on the part of England and the United States but that he felt the Soviet request was modest.

Both the President and the Prime Minister said they were in favor of acceptance of the Soviet suggestion.

The Prime Minister said it would require some time to work out the arrangements and that he personally would welcome the sight of these vessels in the Black Sea and hoped some English war vessels could accompany them in action against the enemy in those waters.

He said it would take a couple of months to work out the arrangements with the Italians, since they wish to avoid any possibility of mutiny in the Italian Fleet and the scuttling of the ships.

It was agreed that the ships would pass over to Soviet command sometime around the end of January, 1944.²

The Prime Minister remarked that it would be one of the advantages to be attained from Turkey even if she did not enter the war; namely to permit the passage of war vessels through the Dardanelles.

The President, turning to the subject of Poland, said it was his hope that negotiations could be started for the re-establishment of relations

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¹ With respect to the Soviet request, see ante, pp. 112, 120, 126–129, 133.
² For post-Conference references to this discussion, see post, pp. 852, 862, 873, 875–878.
between the Polish and Soviet Governments. He felt that the re-establishment of relations would facilitate any decisions made in regard to the questions at issue. He said he recognized the difficulties which lay in the way.

Marshal Stalin replied that the Polish Government in exile were closely connected with the Germans and their agents in Poland were killing partisans. He said it is impossible to imagine what is going on in Poland.

The Prime Minister said the great question before the English was the fact that they had declared war because of the German invasion of Poland.

He said he personally had been astonished when Chamberlain had given the guarantee in April, 1939 to Poland when he had refused to fight for the Czechs. He had been astonished and glad.

He said that England and France had gone to war in pursuance of this guarantee and it was not that he regretted it, but still it would be difficult not to take cognizance of the fact that the British people had gone to war because of Poland.

He said he had used the illustration of the three matches the other evening in order to demonstrate one possible solution of the questions.

He said that the British Government was first of all interested in seeing absolute security for the Western frontiers of the Soviet Union against any surprise assault in the future from Germany.

Marshal Stalin replied that Russia, probably more than any other country was interested in having friendly relations with Poland, since the security of Soviet frontiers was involved.

He said the Russians were in favor of the reconstitution and expansion of Poland at the expense of Germany and that they make distinction between the Polish Government in exile and Poland.

He added that they broke relations with Poland not because of a whim but because the Polish [Poles] had joined in slanderous propaganda with the Nazis.

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5 The Soviet Union had broken relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile at London on April 28, 1943, following the appeal by the latter to the International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate German charges against the Soviet Union of the wholesale murder of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest.
7 See ante, p. 512.
He inquired what guarantee could there be that this would not be repeated. He said they would like to have a guarantee that the Polish Government in exile would cease the killing of partisans in Poland and secondly to urge the people to fight against the Germans and not to indulge in intrigues.

The Russians would welcome relations with a Polish Government that led its people in the common struggle but it was not sure that the Polish Government in exile could be such a government. However, he added, if the government in exile would go along with the partisans and sever all connections with the German agents in Poland, then the Russians would be prepared to negotiate with them.

The Prime Minister said he would like to obtain the views of the Soviet Government in regard to the frontier question, and if some reasonable formula could be devised, he was prepared to take it up with the Polish Government in exile, and without telling them that the Soviet Government would accept such a solution, would offer it to them as probably the best they could obtain. If the Polish Government refused this, then Great Britain would be through with them and certainly would not oppose the Soviet Government under any condition at the peace table.

He said the British Government wished to see a Poland strong and friendly to Russia.

Marshal Stalin replied this was desirable, but it was not just for the Poles to try and get back the Ukraine and White Russia; that the frontiers of 1939 had returned the Ukrainian soil to the Ukraine and White Russian soil to White Russia. The Soviet Government adheres to the 1939 line and considers it just and right.

Mr. Eden said that was the line known as the Ribbentrop–Molotov Line.

Marshal Stalin said call it what you will, we still consider it just and right.

Mr. Molotov interjected to say that the 1939 frontier was the Curzon Line.\(^8\)

Mr. Eden said there were differences.
Mr. Molotov replied in no essential points.
There was then an examination of maps as to the exact location of
the Curzon Line, and its location was finally established.⁹

The President inquired whether in the opinion of Marshal Stalin,
East Prussia and the area between the old Polish frontier and the
Oder was approximately equal to the former Polish territory acquired
by the Soviet Union.

Marshal Stalin replied he did not know.

The Prime Minister said that if it was possible to work out some
fair solution that it would be up to the Polish [Poles] to accept it.

Marshal Stalin replied that the Soviet Union did not wish to
retain any regions primarily occupied by Poles even though they were
inside the 1939 Line.

The President inquired whether a voluntary transfer of peoples
from the mixed areas was possible.

Marshal Stalin said that such a transfer was entirely possible.

Turning to the question of Germany, The President said that the
question was whether or not to split up Germany.

Marshal Stalin replied that they preferred the dismemberment of
Germany.

The Prime Minister said he was all for it but that he was primarily
more interested in seeing Prussia, the evil core of German militarism,
separated from the rest of Germany.

The President said he had a plan that he had thought up some
months ago for the division of Germany in five parts. These five
parts were:

1. All Prussia to be rendered as small and weak as possible.
2. Hanover and Northwest section.
4. Hesse–Darmstadt
   Hesse–Kassel and the area South of the Rhine
5. Bavaria, Baden, and Wurttemburg [Württemberg]

He proposed that these five areas should be self-governed and that
there should be two regions under United Nations or some form of
International control. These were:

*See the map facing page 601. For further details on this discussion, see
post, p. 887.
EXPLANATORY NOTE REGARDING MAP OF POLAND: EASTERN FRONTIER

This map had been prepared in the Office of the Geographer of the Department of State, working in conjunction with the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. (See Notter, pp. 150, 173, 178, 492-513.) The significance of the colored lines indicated in the legend is as follows:

Line A—Polish-Soviet boundary, 1921–1939;
Lines B, C, and D—Hypothetical Polish-Soviet boundaries;
Line E—The “Curzon Line”;
Line F—Portion of the German-Polish boundary, 1939–1941.

The map was taken to Tehran for possible reference use, and when the question arose, at the Tripartite Political Meeting on December 1, as to the location of the “Curzon Line,” Bohlen put the map on the table for consultation. The note that Bohlen later attached to the map reads as follows:

“The marks in red pencil on the attached map were made by Stalin himself to illustrate the fact that if part of eastern Prussia, including the ports of Königsberg and Tilsit, were given to the Soviet Union he would be prepared to accept the Curzon line (the blue line “E” on the map) as the frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland. The red pencil marks to the east of the 1941 Soviet-Polish frontier [the red line “F” on the map] and to the west of the Curzon line were put on the map by Stalin to show the areas which would go back to Poland. The small area marked in red west of the River Bug northeast of Lublin was put on by Stalin as indicating a place where there would remain in Poland a small area chiefly inhabited by Ukrainians. The Soviet Union, however, would not claim this area but would accept the Curzon line running along the River Bug. Although it was admitted that the city of Lwów was predominantly Polish, it was situated in the heart of an overwhelmingly Ukrainian region and for that reason [according to Stalin] could not be returned to Poland.” (Bohlen Collection)
1. The area of the Kiel Canal and the City of Hamburg.
2. The Ruhr and the Saar, the latter to be used for the benefit of all Europe.¹⁰

THE PRIME MINISTER said, to use an American expression, "The President had said a mouthful."

He went on to say that in his mind there were two considerations, one destructive and the other constructive.

1. The separation of Prussia from the rest of the Reich.
2. To detach Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemburg [Württemberg] and the Palatinate from the rest of Germany and make them part of the Confederation of the Danube.

MARSHAL STALIN said he felt if Germany was to be dismembered, it should really be dismembered, and it was neither a question of the division of Germany in five or six states and two areas as the President suggested. However, he said he preferred the President's plan to the suggestion of Mr. Churchill.

He felt that to include German areas within the framework of large confederations would merely offer an opportunity to the German elements to revive a great State.

He went on to say that he did not believe there was a difference among Germans; that all German soldiers fought like devils and the only exception was the Austrians.

He said that the Prussian Officers and Staffs should be eliminated, but as to the inhabitants, he saw little difference between one part of Germany and another.

He said he was against the idea of confederation as artificial and one that would not last in that area, and in addition would provide opportunity for the German elements to control.

Austria, for example, had existed as an independent state and should again. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria likewise.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed with the Marshal, particularly in regard to the absence of differences between Germans. He said fifty years ago there had been a difference but since the last war it was no longer so.

He said the only difference was that in Bavaria and the Southern part of Germany there was no officer caste as there had been in Prussia. He agreed with Marshal Stalin that the Austrians were an exception.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not wish to be considered as against the dismemberment of Germany—quite the contrary, but he felt to

¹⁰ For Stalin’s recollection at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 that control of the Ruhr by the great powers had been discussed at Tehran, see Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1955; 2 vols.), vol. 1, p. 406.
separate the parts above would merely mean that sooner or later they
will reunite into one nation and that the main thing was to keep
Germany divided if only for fifty years.

Marshal Stalin repeated what he had said as to the danger of the
re-unification of Germany. He said no matter what measures were
adopted there would always be a strong urge on the part of the
Germans to unite.

He said it was a great mistake to unite Hungary with Germans
since the Germans would merely control the Hungarians and to
create large frameworks within which the Germans could operate
would be very dangerous.

He felt the whole purpose of any international organization to
preserve peace would be to neutralize this tendency on the part of
the Germans and apply against them economic and other measures
and if necessary, force, to prevent their unification and revival. He
said the victorious nations must have the strength to beat the Germans
if they ever start on the path of a new war.

The Prime Minister inquired whether Marshal Stalin contempl-
plated a Europe composed of little states, disjoined, separated and
weak.

Marshal Stalin replied not Europe but Germany.

He supposed for example that Poland would be a strong country,
and France, and Italy likewise; that Rumania and Bulgaria would
remain as they always had; small States.

The President remarked Germany had been less dangerous to
civilization when in 107 provinces.

The Prime Minister said he hoped for larger units.11

The Prime Minister then returned to the question of Poland and
said he was not asking for any agreement nor was he set on the mat-
ter but he had a statement which he would like to have the Marshal
examine.

This statement suggested that Poland should obtain equal com-
pen-sation in the West, including Eastern Prussia and frontiers on
the Oder to compensate for the areas which would be in the Soviet
Union.12

The President interjected to say that one question in regard to
Germany remained to be settled and that was what body should be
empowered to study carefully the question of dismemberment of
Germany.

11 For post-Conference documents bearing on this discussion, see post, pp. 877,
879, 881, 883.
12 The text of the statement has not been found. It may have been the
It was agreed that the European Advisory Committee [Commission] would undertake this task.\textsuperscript{13}

The Prime Minister said in his opinion the Polish question was urgent.

He repeated if it would be possible to work out a formula here, and then [sic] he could go back to the Polish Government in London and urge on them the desirability of at least attempting to reach a settlement along those lines, without however indicating any commitment on the part of the Soviet Government.

Marshal Stalin said that if the Russians would be given the northern part of East Prussia, running along the left bank of the Niemen and include Tils[i]t and the City of Königsberg, he would be prepared to accept the Curzon Line as the frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland.

He said the acquisition of that part of Eastern Prussia would not only afford the Soviet Union an ice-free port but would also give to Russia a small piece of German territory which he felt was deserved.

Although nothing definitely was stated, it was apparent that the British were going to take this suggestion back to London to the Poles.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} For a post-Conference reference to the task assigned to the Commission at this time, see \textit{post}, p. 883.

\textsuperscript{14} At the Potsdam Conference in 1945, Stalin referred to the discussion at Tehran of the city of Königsberg and said that Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed to the acquisition of some German territory by the Soviet Union; see Truman's \textit{Memoirs}, vol. I, p. 378.
According to the Log, ante, p. 470, this dinner meeting lasted until 10:30 p. m. No official minutes of the conversation appear to have been prepared, but a memorandum prepared by Bohlen a few days later (post, p. 838) indicates that the Declaration on Iran and the Conference communiqué were discussed and put into final form.
9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

A. CORRESPONDENCE, DRAFTS, AND PROPOSALS

023.1/10-2954, 1-28/55

Report From the Office of Strategic Services

SECRET

BARI, ITALY, 29 October, 1943.

Subject: Preliminary Report on a visit to The National Army of Liberation, Yugoslavia.

To: Major Louis Huot, OSS Advance Base, Bari

1. The following conclusions were formed as a result of personal observation in the field with the National Army of Liberation during the period from 17 September to 27 October 1943.

2. The Partisan movement is of far greater military and political importance than is commonly realized in the outside world.

3. The Partisans have created solely by their own efforts in the face of the Germans, Italians, Ustasha, and Chetniks a free community of no mean size entirely encircled by enemy forces. Within this area, Mohammedans, Christians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Communist Party members, any person of any religion or political belief can express an opinion concerning the way in which he believes the affairs of the community should be conducted.

4. The above situation is probably unique in all Occupied Europe. The Partisans are in contact with liberation groups in all the adjoining countries. A considerable number of Italian troops are fighting with them as organized units. It seems quite certain that the manner

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1 Reference may also be made to an exchange of messages between Roosevelt and Churchill, on November 29, 1943, in which Churchill invited Roosevelt to lunch with him, Roosevelt declined, and Churchill then insisted on being the host at a dinner to be held on November 30; see Churchill, p. 303, and Sherwood, p. 784. These latter messages may have been oral. No textual copies of them have been found.

2 See ante, p. 529. No record has been found of the return by Stalin of the copy lent him by Roosevelt. Copies of the report had been sent in 1943, by the O. S. S., to Roosevelt, Hull, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The office having custody of the report in 1954, in furnishing the Department of State with a copy to replace the missing copy sent to Hull in 1943, stated: "Subsequent reports prepared by Major Farish indicate that the opinions on the Partisan movement expressed by him in his memorandum of 29 October 1943 were considerably modified later". (023.1/10-2954)
in which the movement develops, the way of life which they decide to adopt, will have a great effect upon all the Balkan states and probably upon the greater portion of Europe.

5. The initial resistance against the occupying Axis forces and their native Quislings after the defeat of the regular Yugoslav Army stemmed from the indomitable will of various isolated groups to remain free. Peculiarly favorable geographic conditions aided these bands to persist in the face of utterly overwhelming odds.

6. The Communist Party, especially after the German attack on the Soviet, actively recruited resistance groups, but their principal initial function in the Partisan movement was to supply the underground organization whereby the isolated groups could communicate with each other and weld themselves into a common body.

7. The Communist Party failed in its initial attempt to organize the movement strictly along Party lines and sensibly decided to concentrate every available force of any character against the common enemy. Thus, the Communist Party is in theory only one element within the Partisan movement, but it is a very active one, and there is every evidence that strongly indoctrinated Party members are working hard to shape the structure of this newly born state according to their social, political, and economic beliefs.

8. The average Partisan soldier and civilian was undoubtedly pleased to meet the members of the Allied Mission. As an American, the observer was at times embarrassed by the enthusiastic reception which he received and the implicit faith of the people that the United States would come to their aid. This was especially true in the case of those who had relatives or friends in America, and there was never a village, a unit, or group of any kind visited that there were not people in this category. This is a factually true statement concerning which the observer paid particular attention.

9. In view of the facts stated above, it seems quite evident that, if an atmosphere of free and enlightened discussion can be maintained, there is a wonderful opportunity for the Partisans to select for themselves those portions of all forms of government and way[s] of life which they believe would be suitable to their temperament and environment. In such a case, it seems quite probable that a state will emerge which will be a meeting ground between political beliefs which are now widely separated in their extreme phases. The Partisans are very favorably placed in this regard due to the fact that they can directly incorporate into their way of life those portions of these divergent beliefs which they think would be good for them without going through the slow and cumbersome processes of any existing
legislative system. It was in such an environment and under similar conditions that the beginnings of the United States were established.

10. There can be no question of a doubt that the Partisan forces dedicated themselves to the fight against the Axis from the beginning; that they have always fought them; that they are fighting them at this time, and will fight them to the end. The story of this struggle is at times almost beyond the imagination. It is so immense that only a suggestion of it can be given in this short report. The observer must content himself with the statement that if ever a movement had the background of indomitable will and courage with which to build to great things, it is to be found in Yugoslavia. It may not take place, but, nevertheless, all of the necessary elements are there, and it will be to the eternal discredit of the leaders of the Partisan movement if they do not build wisely and unselfishly upon the solid foundation of this tremendous human effort. We have sent representatives to the Partisans and have been supplying them with weapons and materials. If the Partisan movement should fail, and if such failure could be directly attributed to our improper appraisal of the situation or lack of effective material support, then we, also, must accept our portion of the responsibility.

11. Whereas the Partisans have fought steadfastly against the Axis occupying forces, other Yugoslav groups have not done so. The Ustasha are the Himmerlite [Himmlerite?] terrorists of the Croatian puppet state and the evidences of their ferocious treatment of Partisan communities can be seen on all sides. The Domobrands are the conscripted soldiers of the puppet state. They have never fought effectively and never attempted to do so. The Chetniks under Col. Mihailovitch and other officers of the Yugoslav Army fought for a time against the occupying Axis troops in conjunction with the Partisans. But Mihailovitch made the fatal mistake of allowing his political beliefs and his plans for the future to overcome his better judgment. He feared Communism more than he feared the common enemy. He and his leaders were more concerned with their plans for themselves after the war than with the actual ending of the war by defeating the Axis. Acting upon these misconceptions, Mihailovitch ordered his Chetniks to attack the Partisan forces, and thus commenced the bitter civil war which has become so savage that it is difficult to see how a reasonable understanding can be brought about.

Not all the Chetnik leaders obeyed the order to attack the Partisans and some of them came over to the Partisans. Since then more have come and are coming over every day. The above is the story they tell. Unquestionably it will not be the story of Mihailovitch, but
that the Chetniks are now fighting the Partisans is a fact to which
the observer can personally testify. Furthermore, the Allied Mission
has numerous captured Chetnik documents including routine cor-
respondence, orders, pay books, pay rolls, etc. which afford ample
concrete evidence that the Chetnik forces have been fighting with
the Germans and Italians against the Partisans.

12. The presence of this civil war in Yugoslavia is unfortunate.
As in any civil war, it is extremely difficult for a foreign observer to
understand the no quarter ferocity with which it is being fought.
But these facts stand out from a military standpoint:

a. Repeating, the Partisans have always fought the Germans and
are doing so now.

b. They are a more potent striking force at this time than they
have ever been before. They are better trained and equipped, and
there is every evidence that, provided they can obtain the necessary
arms and supplies, their army will constantly increase in size and
efficiency. Their present strength is given by them as 180,000 men
which are included in 18 divisions, garrison troops, and detachments
guarding the lines of communication.

c. These forces control one large mountainous area extending from
the Montenegro-Serbian border northwest through Herzegovina to
Western Bosnia. Other mountainous portions of Croatia, Slovenia,
Slavonia, and the Pola Peninsula are also in their hands.

d. All of the Adriatic Coast, with the exception of the principal
seaports, such as Zara, Sibenik, Split, Makarska, Dubrovnik, and
Kotor, is controlled by the Partisans, as well as the coastal islands,
with the possible exception of Peljesac where fighting is now taking
place.

e. The Germans and their Ustasha Quislings hold all of the prin-
cipal cities but outside of few miles radius of these points their
control of the country ceases. The observer does not have accurate
information at his disposal concerning the strength of the German,
Ustasha and Chetnik forces, but he does know from personal experi-
ence that it is in no way sufficient to prevent the Partisans from
travelling almost at will throughout the length and breadth of the
country, from Albania to Austria, from the Dalmatian Coast to
Belgrade. The observer states without hesitancy that, provided the
Partisans are efficiently and immediately supplied with food, clothing,
medical equipment and supplies, transport, weapons, and other ma-
terials which are needed to properly equip their present forces and
the recruits which are available, Allied personnel can in comparative
safety be conducted to any point from the Adriatic Coast to the
Danube Basin. A communication system to the outside world can
be established, airfields constructed, supply dumps established, and
any other projects of military importance accomplished. But in all
this it must be remembered that this report could not be written and
these plans could not be envisaged if it had not been that a compara-
tive handful of men, betrayed and harassed by a portion of their own
countrymen, had the courage and faith to stand up to what was at
that time the most powerful military power the world had ever seen.
These few people have made such things possible. Now they compose the backbone of the National Army of Liberation and they are justifiably proud of the fight they have made. It is time they received full credit, and we must work directly through them and with them in this strategically important gateway to the Danube Basin and the Northern Balkans.

13. Their favourable geographical position, knowledge of mountain warfare, and great courage enabled the Partisans to defeat a sustained well-planned German offensive against them in Montenegro during the first six months of 1943 in which several divisions of German, Italian, Chetnik and Ustash troopers encircled 8,000 fighting troops of the Partisan Army. Led by Tito himself, this force fought its way out to the north through successive enemy positions, passing within a few miles of Sarajevo. By their tenacity, their resourcefulness, and their ability to withstand extreme hardships, these people discouraged the German High Command. The Partisans broke through and established themselves in the easily defended Vrbas Valley by taking the towns of Mrkonic Grad, Jajece, Donji Vakuf, and Bugojno. We, of course, can feel a certain satisfaction in the thought that perhaps these events were influenced by the offensives which the Allies were conducting against the Germans on several fronts but, nevertheless, a lesser people than the Partisans could not have withstood the hardships and apparently hopeless positions in which they often found themselves.

One extremely important point is that the Partisans had fought themselves clear and had established themselves in the Vrbas Valley before the capitulation of Italy.

Following the Italian surrender, the Partisan First Division occupied the Adriatic seaport of Split, capturing a large amount of Italian equipment and recruiting 9,000 men, a considerable contingent of Italian troops joining them as well. At that time they asked for Allied air support against the garrison towns of Sinj, Knin, Imotski, Zara, and Gospic, signifying their intention of attacking Sinj, Knin and Gospic, with the idea in mind of severing the coastwise communication system of the Germans, isolating the ports of Zara and Sibenik, thus establishing themselves firmly on the Dalmatian coast with free access to the interior mountainous regions of Herzegovina and Bosnia. They also asked for the delivery of essential war materials to Split, the evacuation of Italian prisoners and seriously wounded Partisans.

The Partisans received no response to these requests except that some 3,000 Italian prisoners were evacuated. The Germans attacked Split from Knin, Sinj, and Imotski in such numbers that the Partisans were forced to fight their way out and retreat into the mountains of Bosnia taking with them as much of the Italian equipment as possible.
Merely as a matter of incident, they overran the strongly garrisoned Ustasha towns of Livno and Kupres in order to clear a way for the transport [of] field guns, and tanks which they had been able to bring out of Split. These events took place during the latter part of September and early October. The bulk of the captured equipment arrived at Bugojno during the second week of October. It can never be determined whether the Partisan plans for the occupation of the Dalmatian coast were too ambitious for the resources of the Partisan Army, but two things are important so far as the Allies are concerned, namely (1) the military strategy was sound, and (2) no Allied air assistance was forthcoming.

14. It is hoped that from this brief outline the military position of the Partisan forces can be roughly established. Their potentialities are great, but their position can be improved. The observer believes that two factors are of great importance: (1) immediate delivery of supplies by sea and air, and (2) a limited amount of air support along the Dalmatian Coast in order to protect the supply lines, as well as the German held town of Travnik in Central Bosnia.

Travnik is not a natural German position. This enemy position is only 22 miles airline to southeast of Jajce, the GHQ of the Partisan forces where Tito is in residence. Travnik is well into the mountains and is not an integral portion of any enemy supply line. The observer obtained private information that it is strongly fortified and garrisoned by 2,600 well equipped German troops with tanks. There are Ustasha troops there also. The position was attacked by the Partisans in mid-October, and possibly in the earlier part of the month, but they could not take it.

The importance of Travnik may be summarized as follows:

a. It constitutes a direct threat to the very heart and GHQ of the Partisan positions.

b. At least two of the best Partisan divisions must be held in the mountains to guard against this potential threat. In the Central Bosnian area there cannot be over three Partisan divisions sufficiently well equipped and trained to stand up to the Germans.

c. The observer believes that an attack on the Partisan communications and garrisons on the Dalmatian Coast and islands would be logical German strategy as soon as the snow blocks the mountain passes. If this attack is forthcoming, the Partisans will be faced with the problem of reinforcing the Dalmatian forces, but if they withdraw troops from Bugojno or Donji Vakuf they will expose themselves to the threat from Travnik.

The Partisans have asked for air support for an attack upon Travnik, and the observer believes that this support should be offered to them as soon as it is possible to do so. From a military standpoint it will be nothing more than a bombing and strafing attack in prepara-
tion for a ground operation by Partisan troops. The distance from Bari to Travnik is approximately 800 miles. A courier can proceed to the Partisan GHQ, offer the air support and obtain all the necessary information relative to timing, objectives, enemy positions, A/A defenses, air strength, etc. This journey can be made in something in the order of four days.

The observer cannot express too strongly the great moral effect that such air support would have on the situation in Yugoslavia. The Germans, of course, would not be seriously affected except by the manner in which their military position is weakened. The Ustasha, whose morale is deteriorating rapidly, would be thoroughly shaken. This would be particularly advantageous if the Germans have left them as garrison troops following the repulse of the Partisan attack. The Chetniks would also be shaken, as they have been spreading the rumour, and no doubt believe, that no Allied support will be given to the Partisans. The Partisans themselves will be the most affected. Even if the military operation attains no great success, the effect will be tremendous. They have been subjected to enemy air attacks for over two years without once seeing a friendly aircraft. Anyone who has been in an area of complete enemy air control will know what this means. A great many Partisans have completely lost faith in the possibility of any Allied air support and have asked the observer some rather embarrassing questions about the leaflet load of the Halifax and the Liberator.³

For morale effect the flight in and out should be over as many Partisan headquarters as possible with the aircraft flying low in order that the markings can be clearly seen. These are also the safest routes. These Partisan positions are—the islands of Vis, Brac, and Hvar, and the inland towns of Livno, Kupres, Bugojno, Donji Vakuf, Jayce and Mrknoic Grad. Localities to avoid are Metkovic, Makarska, Split, Sibenik, Zara, Mostar, Imotski, Sinj, Knin, Gospic, Bihac and Banjaluka. Attacks may come from enemy airfields at Mostar, Knin, Gospic, Bihac, and Bajaluks, but it is not believed that they will be heavy. The Partisans should be asked for detailed information concerning the number and types of aircraft at these or any other adjacent enemy airfields.

The observer believes this offer of air assistance to be of prime importance. As to the morale effect, the observer can only state what it would have meant to him to have seen one of his aircraft during his short stay in Yugoslavia. What it would mean to men who have stood two years of defenseless attack can only be conjectured.

15. The one most important factor in regard to the military effectiveness of the Partisans is that of supply. The needed materials

³ Allied aircraft.
may be roughly classified as clothing, food, medical supplies, transport, weapons (rifles, light machine guns, anti-tank rifles, mortars, and ammunition), light tanks, mines and explosives, grenades, signal equipment and other miscellaneous articles. Considering the scale and complicated nature of modern warfare, these supplies are simple in character, small in quantity, and not of any great value.

The primary factor in the matter of supply must be speed. Winter is fast approaching, when the roads through the mountains will be blocked by snow just at the time when the materials will be the most acutely needed. The supply line passes within a few miles of enemy held towns which are peculiarly non-resistant at this time. A portion of the route is actually used by both the Partisans and the enemy. The observer feels that the apparent indifference of the enemy to an obvious situation is due to the fact that he has plans for the future when the snows have blocked the high mountains and he will have an overwhelming advantage on the Dalmatian Coast.

The observer has never believed that supplies can be dropped from the air in quantities proportionate to the needs of the Partisan Army. Airborne supplies are, however, of vital importance in connection with isolated areas or where hard pressed troops are in need of immediate supply. It seems probable that instances falling within these categories will increase during the winter months.

From personal experience, the observer believes that the efficient dispatch of supplies by air depends to a great extent upon a completely adequate communication system. Those who are within the country and aware of the situation must be able to transmit to the supply base the lists of materials needed together with the exact location and time when they can be received. It is then the duty of the base organization to see that these conditions are met precisely as laid down. If there is any discrepancy whatsoever, those who are working internally must be immediately advised in order that they can make their plans accordingly.

This, then, is the observer’s conception of the problem of delivery of supplies to the Partisans: (1) bulk supplies landed by sea transport to the Dalmatian coast, and (2) airborne supplies, necessarily in smaller and more exact quantities, to isolated internal areas, or to hard pressed troops. These are actually two separate operations under very divergent conditions and involving correspondingly different transport methods and equipment, personnel and stores. The first involves stores, ships, and personnel for the movement across the Adriatic of large quantities of supplies of general categories. This operation requires a minimum of personnel and communication within Yugoslavia, but necessitates a maximum of bulk stores in Italy. The
second operation is exactly the reverse. It requires a maximum of personnel and communication within Yugoslavia, and a minimum of carefully chosen stores at the operational base. These operations are of equal importance and at the present time the Partisan Army cannot be adequately supplied without the efficient operation of both.

The actual policy of supply to the Partisans has not actually been a matter of debate for some months. When the first airborne supplies were dropped to the Partisans, that policy was established insofar as they were concerned. Our only problem now is whether we supply them adequately, inadequately, or not at all. Thus, by force of circumstance, we are forced to supply them efficiently, rapidly, and in proportion to their needs.

Cold, hungry and inadequately armed men will surely remember from whence aid came when they were fighting for their very existence. The observer feels certain that one modern, efficiently staffed field hospital will be equal to all the most eloquent words which can be written or spoken in a lifetime.

16. A situation such as exists in Yugoslavia is not easy to assess. It is even more difficult to place these assessments on paper in a coherent manner. The following are a few facts which seem to stand out, no matter from what angle the situation is viewed:

a. The Partisan movement is of far greater magnitude and military importance than is commonly known in the world outside.

b. The Partisans are fashioning themselves a way of life which will surely have a great effect upon the Balkans and probably upon all Europe. It can be a meeting place between divergent political beliefs.

c. The Communist Party has played a leading role in the organization of the movement, but has not been able to indoctrinate it along strictly Party lines.

d. The average Partisan is very sympathetic to the USA and the Allied cause. He is steadfast in his belief that we will come to his aid.

e. The Partisans have steadfastly fought the common enemy from the beginning while other factions within Yugoslavia have not.

f. The Partisan forces have control of a militarily strategic area and travel almost at will in a much larger area.

g. Air support should be offered to the Partisans in an effort to eliminate dangerous enemy strongpoints.

h. By dropping supplies from the air to the Partisan forces for some months, we have committed ourselves to the policy of aiding them. We must, therefore, send them the supplies they need, efficiently and promptly, in order that they may continue their fight against the enemy with increasing intensity, and so that they will feel sympathetically inclined toward us.

i. The supply problem consists of two distinct operations: (1) the transport by sea of bulk supplies across the Adriatic from Italy to the Dalmatian Coast, and (2) the delivery of selected supplies by air to isolated positions in the interior.
j. Speed, efficiency, and complete cooperation between all Allied services is essential.

17. The writer served in Yugoslavia in the dual capacity of an American observer and as a member of the staff of the Allied Military Mission headed by Brigadier Maclean. He wishes to thank the other members of the Mission, all British but one, for their comradeship and complete courtesy and consideration. Yugoslavia is obviously a country where it would be most difficult to conduct efficient operations without complete British and American cooperation toward a common end.

18. The issues in Yugoslavia are confusing and the feeling is so intense that it is almost impossible to obtain and get an unbiased opinion. The conclusions set forth in this report are based solely upon the writer’s personal observations and such other information as he believed to be authentic.

There are other reports which must be taken into consideration, notably those from our Mission to the GHQ of Mihailovitch. There are also the reports of other members of the Allied Mission, some of whom have been in Yugoslavia much longer than the writer.

19. Personalities are of no importance in a matter of this kind. Our sole object must be to correctly assess the potentialities of the Partisan movement. The observer sincerely believes that the most serious mistake which could be made would be to underestimate it.

LNN M. FARISH
Major, AUS.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Supervising Agent, United States Secret Service (Reilly) to the White House

[Tehran], 27 November 1943.

Mike Reilly to Chief Wilson and Agent Lowery

The President arrived Teheran to-day. He is well and we feel confident we have done everything possible to insure his protection. Stalin and Churchill are here also and we are working in close cooperation with their security officers. We are at the American Embassy [Legation]. Plans for the return are most indefinite, however we will return to Cairo when this conference is over. I am making every effort to have the party return via Khartoum, Kano and then Dakar where we would meet Capt. McCrea. We will probably arrive in the United States about December 12th.
III. THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 27, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull

As you know, the British have named Strang and the Russians Gusev as their principal representatives on the tripartite European Advisory Commission agreed upon at the Moscow Conference. While we of course have no intention of playing up the importance of this body, it would seem advisable to have a representative fully capable of taking care of our interests and feel that it will be a full-time job. I therefore venture to suggest the following names of possible American representative for your consideration: Joseph Grew, Jefferson Caffery, and Herschel Johnson. I have some doubts, however, whether Caffery can be spared from Rio at this time. May I have your instructions?

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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1 Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

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Bohlen Collection

Foreign Commissar Molotov to President Roosevelt

TRANSLATION1 OF COMMUNICATION NOVEMBER 28, 1943, FROM MR. MOLOTOV AT TEHRAN

Marshal Stalin has acquainted himself with the communiqué concerning the conference of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, which took place in North Africa in the second half of November this year.2

Marshal Stalin expresses his thanks for the information and states that he has no observation at all to make in regard to the communiqué.3

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1 The translation was made by Bohlen. The Russian text has not been found.
2 For the text of the Cairo communiqué, see ante p. 448.
3 For Stalin’s oral comments on the communiqué, see ante p. 506.
The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Director of War Mobilization (Byrnes)¹

[TEHRAN,] November 28, 1943.

Extensive studies of various problems required before decision can be reached.² In meantime you should proceed as before the question of increase in landing craft was raised.

¹ Sent to Washington via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Byrnes.
² See Byrnes' telegrams of November 24 and 27, 1943, pp. 395 and 444, respectively.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President to the Director of War Mobilization (Byrnes)¹

[TEHRAN] 28 November 1943.

The increase in critical types of Landing Craft proposed in your message (White 37) of 25 November,² coupled with unstated effect on other critical programs, does not become effective soon enough to justify change in present construction programs.³

¹ Sent to Washington via military channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Byrnes.
² Telegram of November 24, 1943, ante, p. 395.
³ Despite the negative tenor of this message, Byrnes' exchange of telegrams with Roosevelt resulted in the adoption in Washington of the program described by Byrnes in his telegram of November 24, 1943. See George E. Mowry, Landing Craft and the War Production Board (Special Study No. 11 in the series Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production Board; published at Washington by the Civilian Production Administration, 1946), p. 51; Civilian Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940–1945 (General Study No. 1 in the series Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production Board; published at Washington by the Government Printing Office, 1947), vol. I, p. 608; James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 20.

Bohlen Collection

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin¹

SECRET

Proposals Presented by United States Delegation at Moscow Conference

During the recent Moscow Conference the United States Delegation proposed that air bases be made available in the U. S. S. R. on which

¹ For references to this document in the Conference discussions, see ante, pp. 529, 596.

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United States aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired and rearmed in connection with shuttle bombing from the United Kingdom. It was also proposed that a more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented and that both signal and air communication between our two countries be improved.\(^2\)

It was my understanding that the U. S. S. R. agreed to these proposals in principal \([principle]\) and that appropriate Soviet authorities would be given instructions to meet with my Military Mission for the purpose of considering concrete measures which would be necessary to carry out the proposals.

I hope that it will be possible to work out these arrangements promptly.

\[\text{Tehran,] November 29, 1943.}\]

\(^2\) See ante, p. 136.

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Bohlen Collection

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin\(^1\)

SECRET

ADVANCE PLANNING FOR AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTHWESTERN PACIFIC

With a view of shortening the war, it is our opinion that the bombing of Japan from your Maritime Provinces, immediately following the beginning of hostilities between the U. S. S. R. and Japan, will be of the utmost importance, as it will enable us to destroy Japanese military and industrial centers.

If agreeable, would you arrange for my Military Mission in Moscow to be given the necessary information covering airports, housing, supplies, communications, and weather in the Maritime Provinces and the route thereto from Alaska. Our objective is to base the maximum bomber force possible, anywhere from 100 to 1,000 four-engined bombers, with their maintenance and operating crews in that area; the number to depend upon facilities available.

It is of the utmost importance that planning to this end should be started at once. I realize that the physical surveys by our people should be limited at this time to a very few individuals and accomplished with the utmost secrecy. We would of course meet any conditions you might prescribe in this regard.

If the above arrangements are worked out now, I am convinced that

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\(^1\) For references to this document in the Conference discussions, see ante, pp. 529, 596.
the time of employment of our bombers against Japan will be materially advanced.

[TEHRAN,] November 29, 1943.

Bohlen Collection

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

SECRET

ADVANCE PLANNING FOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN NORTHWESTERN PACIFIC

I would like to arrange with you at this time for the exchange of information and for such preliminary planning as may be appropriate under the present conditions for eventual operations against Japan when Germany has been eliminated from the war. The more of this preliminary planning that can be done, without undue jeopardy to the situation, the sooner the war as a whole can be brought to a conclusion.

Specifically, I have in mind the following items:

a. We would be glad to receive combat intelligence information concerning Japan.

b. Considering that the ports for your Far Eastern submarine and destroyer force might be threatened seriously by land or air attack, do you feel it desirable that the United States should expand base facilities sufficiently to provide for these forces in U.S. bases?

c. What direct or indirect assistance would you be able to give in the event of a U.S. attack against the northern Kuriles?

d. Could you indicate what ports, if any, our forces could use, and could you furnish data on these ports in regard to their naval use as well as port capacities for dispatch of cargo?

These questions can be discussed as you may find appropriate with our Military Mission in Moscow, similar to the procedure suggested for plans regarding air operations.

[TEHRAN,] November 29, 1943.

1 For references to this document in the Conference discussions, see ante, pp. 529, 596.

Tehran Legation Files

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the President's Special Representative (Hurley)

SECRET

TEHRAN, November 29, 1943.

MY DEAR GENERAL HURLEY: This morning the Prime Minister, M. Soheily, told me he had seen Mr. Eden today and had taken up with
him the possibility of the issuance, at the end of the conference, of a joint communiqué along the following lines:

(1) The Allies recognize that Iran has given them every possible help, etc.
(2) The independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran is confirmed, as already set forth in the Tripartite Treaty.
(3) The economic needs of Iran will be considered when the peace treaty is negotiated, etc.

According to M. Soheily, Mr. Eden agreed to this in principle but requested that the Prime Minister approach me and the Soviets to get our agreement to go ahead.

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS G. DREYFUS, JR.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 29, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull:

The Embassy at Chungking reports that, according to a Chinese source who recently saw high Japanese and puppet officials at Nanking, Japan continues to make unsuccessful peace offers to Chungking. According to the same source, Matsuoka, former Foreign Minister, left Japan for the Soviet Union on October 7 to try to arrange peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.

The Consul at Kweilin reports that Changteh, Hunan Province, was reportedly in flames; and that it was believed by observers in Kweilin that Changsha would soon be attacked by the Japanese with little possibility that the defense would be other than perfunctory.

Salazar spoke to the National Assembly on November 26, concerning the Anglo-Portuguese Azores agreement and the Timor situation. He emphasized the importance of British and American assurances respecting Portuguese sovereignty, and in Portuguese press accounts American participation in these assurances was stressed by italics and subtitles.

Dr. Salazar pointed out that facilities granted the British had resulted from loyalty to an old alliance and were not to be regarded as a business deal.

1 Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.
2 Agreement of August 17, 1943, on British use of facilities in the Azores; British and Foreign State Papers, 1946 (vol. 148), p. 447.
Dr. Salazar said relations with Japan were entirely unsatisfactory, and contrasted this with the cordiality of Portuguese relations with the Anglo-Saxon powers.

In the course of the speech Dr. Salazar showed some preoccupation for Portuguese relations with Spain.

C[ordell] H[ull]

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] 29 November 1943.

For the President from the Secretary of State.

There is a danger that unless we move ahead in our study of post-war international civil aviation problems, we may find that the present fluid situation will become jelled in the minds of some of our Allies along lines that may not parallel your own thoughts. I feel therefore that it is urgent and important for us to move ahead in preparing the groundwork which is an essential preliminary to any discussions with other countries. As a practical and feasible way to proceed what would you think of a Committee consisting of Secretary Stimson, Knox and myself meeting to consider the complicated problems involved. Further that we three be authorized to select an able and disinterested man such as Owen D. Young or someone else of equal stature that you may suggest, to give his thought to this question and to draw up a report and recommendations to submit for your consideration.

¹Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels. A copy of this message in the Hull Papers is labeled “Secret”.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*²

[TEHRAN,] 29 November 1943.

Deliver to Secretary Hull from the President. Your message transmitted as White 55,² I think it more advisable to appoint Winant as our representative.³

²Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.
³Telegram printed ante, p. 616.
³On November 2, 1943, Winant at London had cabled Roosevelt at Washington that he “would like to have a chance to serve on the European Advisory Commission”. (Roosevelt Papers)
III. THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE

Hopkins Papers

Sketch by Roosevelt To Illustrate His Concept of the United Nations Organization

[Diagram showing symbols and text]

1. The words in the upper right corner "T[ehran]-miscellanous" were added subsequently as a file indicator. The writing enclosed in the circles reads: "40 U. N., "Executive" Committee", and "4 Police[men]." The words below the left-hand circle are "International Labor Organization-Health Agriculture-Food."

Roosevelt Papers

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

SECRET

[TEHRAN,] 30 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From: The United States Chiefs of Staff.

Subject: Allocation of Italian Ships to the U. S. S. R.

The question of the allocation of Italian ships to the U. S. S. R., as requested at the Moscow Conference,1 may be brought up during the Eureka proceedings.

The original Russian request was for 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers, 4 submarines and 40,000 displacement tons of merchant shipping. This request is the subject of the exchange of a number of dispatches between our delegation in Moscow and the President.2 During

1 See Hull's telegram 1704 of October 23, 1943, 2 p. m., ante, p. 112.
2 See ante, pp. 120, 126-129.
these exchanges the allocation, or possible allocation, of one-third of the Italian Fleet for the use of the U. S. S. R. was concurred in by the United States. However, it is understood that the U. S. S. R. would not be prepared at this time to man and employ one-third of the Italian Fleet.

If the allocation of Italian ships to the U. S. S. R. is brought up at this time, the action agreed upon should be solely with regard to its influence on the prosecution of the war. The following factors are to be considered:

a. The turning over of Italian ships to the Russians at this time would have a serious adverse effect on the prosecution of the war in Italy and in such other places as Italian forces are now cooperating. It seems quite possible that the Italian crews, before surrendering the ships to the Russians would scuttle. Italy has been accepted as a co-belligerent. The surrender of Italian ships would provide valuable propaganda for use by the enemy with the Italians in Germany, occupied Italy, even elsewhere.

b. Italian ships would not come provided with spare parts and ammunition. Further, they would probably require some modernization, especially as regards antiaircraft armament, which the U. S. S. R. has no means of effecting.

It is recommended that it continue to be agreed in principle that one-third of the Italian warships that are allocated for transfer to powers other than Italy be allocated for the use of the U. S. S. R. It is further recommended that any question of the allocation of Italian naval ships to other powers be deferred, at least until after the conclusion of Allied offensive operations in Italy.

William D. Leahy
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

The source text is unsigned, the name being typewritten below the signature space. Attached to the source text is a memorandum of November 30, 1943, from Royal to Leahy, stating that this paper had been “prepared at the instance of Mr. Hopkins, to be available if needed”, and had been cleared by Marshall, King, and Arnold.

Hurley Papers

Draft Declaration on Iran

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—A rough draft of a declaration on Iran was prepared by Jernegan on November 29. At Hurley’s request this draft was shortened considerably and was altered in a number of respects, one of which involved the insertion of a reference to the Atlantic Charter. The draft presented here is the draft as shortened and
amended in accordance with Hurley's suggestions. For the preparation and negotiation of this document, see the statement by Jernegan, *post*, p. 648, and the one by Dreyfus, *post*, p. 840. See also Lohbeck, pp. 215–216. The Hurley Papers also contain a draft with additional amendments. This draft as amended is the same as the final text, except that in the second paragraph it reads "primarily" where the final text reads "particularly", in the fourth paragraph it reads "on an equal basis with" instead of "along with", and in the final paragraph it reads "complete independence" instead of "independence".

**[TEHRAN,] November 30, 1943.**

**Suggested Draft Declaration**

The Governments of Iran, the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom, having consulted together, desire to make plain their common policy with regard to the prosecution of the war and their complete agreement with respect to the special economic questions with which the war has confronted Iran.

By subscribing to the Declaration by United Nations,¹ all four governments have already declared their joint determination to press the war to a victorious conclusion. They are further agreed that Iran can make its most useful contribution to this end by facilitating the movement of essential supplies from overseas to the U. S. S. R. and they recognize the assistance along this line which Iran has already rendered. All four governments intend to continue and intensify the cooperation in this respect which has been established. It is clearly understood that any armed forces of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom which are, or may be, established on Iranian territory are solely for the purpose of furthering the common war effort and will be withdrawn as soon as the needs of that effort permit, in accordance with the published agreements already concluded between Iran and the other three Governments.²

The four Governments are in agreement that the maximum benefit from their combined efforts can be obtained only if the essential economic needs of Iran are met, and they reaffirm their intention to cooperate closely to achieve this objective. The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such financial and material

¹ For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. i, p. 25, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1600.
² The Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance, signed January 29, 1942, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. vi, March 21, 1942, p. 249. Correspondence on negotiations for a treaty between the United States and Iran, which would govern the stationing of American troops in Iran during the war, is scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.
assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption. The four Governments will work together in planning the importation of essential goods into Iran, and, in general, they will act in close consultation with regard to all economic matters which may affect the war effort in Iran.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the conclusion of hostilities should receive full consideration, on an equal basis with those of other members of the United Nations, by any conferences or international agencies which may be set up to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are as one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the complete independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, along with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

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For text, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1603.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President

[WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull

Winant would certainly be a fine choice. Our representative on the Commission will have a full time job and much detailed drafting and discussion will be essential. I don't see, therefore, how one man can combine the exacting duties of American Ambassador to Great Britain with those of our representative on the Commission if these two important jobs are to be effectively done. Have you any further com-

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Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.
ment or suggestions in the light of the foregoing, in other words do you still desire him to hold both positions? ²

[ORDELL] [ULL]

² For Roosevelt's reply, see post, p. 784.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President ²

[WASHINGTON,] 30 November 1943.

From the Secretary of State for the President

Following the sinking by a German submarine of a small Colombian Vessel in the Caribbean (The second such sinking) the Colombian Government with the approval of the Senate proclaimed a state of belligerency with Germany. This will involve the adherence of Colombia to the United Nations declaration.

President Lopez of Colombia is in the United States on leave of absence. The reason for his trip is his wife's need for medical attention. However, the President's political position, while improved, has not entirely recovered from the recent political crisis. It is generally believed that he will return to Colombia to resume his office within a few weeks.

Senator Butler's article in Readers Digest and his address and reports to the Senate on his trip to the other American Republics ² have caused a sensation. However, his charges which are as sweeping as they are unfounded have been vigorously challenged by the Vice President and by Nelson Rockefeller. The general effect in the other American Republics cannot be minimized although the majority of those commenting have shown a good understanding of the situation here. Senator Butler's elaborate report will when available be analyzed in detail by the different agencies concerned. ³

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels. A copy of this message in the Hull Papers is labeled "Secret".

² Hugh A. Butler, "Our Deep, Dark Secrets in Latin America", Reader's Digest, vol. 49, December 1943, p. 21; address before the Senate, November 26, 1943, Congressional Record, vol. 89, pt. 8, pp. 10002-10006; country-by-country report and other material printed as Senate Document No. 132, 78th Congress, 1st session (1943). Butler was critical of United States aid programs in Latin America.

³ For statements on the subject released by the Department of State in December 1943, see the Department of State Bulletin, vol. 10, December 18, 1943, pp. 430-431, and December 25, 1943, pp. 443-447.
The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Legation in Iran.

[Teheran, December 1, 1943.]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On this occasion when with the help of God Almighty this happiness and honor have come to this ancient land of Iran, our dear homeland, which is the place of conference of the august leaders of the three big allies of Iran, when one of the important events of history in this era happens in Iran for the solution of international difficulties and the establishment of permanent peace and tranquility and insurance of the future life of all of the nations of the world on the foundation of justice and equality which are the ideals of the United Nations, and on which the Atlantic Charter is based, it is a most suitable opportunity to bring to your knowledge the longings of the Iranian people.

The present condition of Iran, which has come to exist as a result of the efforts, pains and sacrifices of all the classes of this country for several years and which has been fully utilized by the allies for the promotion of the designs and speeding up of victory, necessitates that the Iranian Government and people should be certain that the allies will not refrain from lending Iran any kind of assistance at the present and in the future.

In view of the hearty desires and prominent and effective steps that Iran has taken in helping the allies Iran has shown in practice her desire that the war should come to an end as soon as possible with the victory of the allies.

Iran which by showing cordial and sincere cooperation in conformity with the tri-partite pact and by full collaboration with the allies shares in this victory and triumph, is positively certain that

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1 This aide-mémoire was sent to Eden and Molotov, as well as to Dreyfus. See Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Tehran Conference, p. 28, where a somewhat different English version of the aide-mémoire (referred to hereafter as the "published version") appears. The American Legation received a Persian-language text of the aide-mémoire and possibly also an accompanying English version. It is not clear from the Legation files whether the English version here reproduced is a translation made by the Legation or an English text received with the Persian text. Substantive differences between the English version reproduced here and the published version are indicated in footnotes.

2 The phrase in the published version corresponding to "insurance of the future life" is "future security".

3 The phrase in the published version corresponding to "which has been fully utilized by the allies" is "which has been a great source of help to the Allies".

4 Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Iran, signed January 29, 1942; Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40, March 21, 1942, p. 249.

5 The phrase in the published version corresponding to the word "shares" is "considers herself entitled to a share".
the allies would take into full consideration all the troubles and damages which have been inflicted on Iran through conditions of war.

In view of the tests of cordial cooperation and sincere collaboration shown during this period by the Iranian people and Government in all fields and stages, and in view of her efforts to insure allied victory and to eradicate cruelty and oppression from the world to an extent which has been above Iran’s ability and power, supporting as she did innumerable economic difficulties, and consequently by declaring war against Germany having won the full confidence of the allies, Iran expects that the allies would make a special effort in turning over the vital threads of the affairs of the country which are at present in their hands and in leaving to the military and security forces of Iran herself the maintenance of security in the country and safeguarding all the means of this work in order that existing trust and confidence may assume a practical shape.

The Iranian Government and people confidently hope that the written promises and oral assurances given by the Allies in regard to the integrity and full independence of Iran will be strengthened through moral and material help in all political and economic realms and that Iran may be able in this way to continue to play in the future the honorable role which she had in the past among the civilized countries of the world.

The Iranian Government and people, in consideration of this demonstration of sincerity and unity, give the assurance that in the same way that in the most difficult times of war they did not refrain from lending cordial cooperation and showing sincere friendship for a speedy Allied Victory, hereafter, too, they will continue this traditional policy in respective international questions and will fully cooperate with their Allies.

Now that the august leaders of the three big powers are staying in Iran, the Iranian Government and people expect that a communiqué will be issued substantiating the foregoing and, in this way, specifying once more the good will that they have repeatedly shown toward Iran orally and in writing.

Tehran, Azar 9, 1322 (December 1, 1943).

*The word in the published version corresponding to “security” is “civil”.

7The word in the published version corresponding to “communiqué” is “declaration”.*
The Administrator General of Finances of Iran (Millspaugh) to President Roosevelt

[TEHRAN,] December 1, 1943.

My Dear Mr. President: In our conversation today, you were good enough to give me permission to write you a personal note about the American effort in Iran.

Iran has on three occasions obtained American administrative assistance:

1. The Shuster Financial Mission in 1911, dismissed the same year following a Russian ultimatum.²

2. The first Millspaugh Financial Mission, 1922-27, with other missions for agriculture, highways and railway construction.

3. The second Millspaugh Financial Mission, 1943—with other missions in the Ministries of War, Interior (Gendarmerie and Police), Agriculture, and Health.

Each of these Missions came at or following a time of political, economic and financial disturbance and danger. Each had, from the Iranian point of view, two main purposes:

1. A political purpose—to hold the balance between British and Russian imperialisms and thus safeguard the independence of the country.

2. A financial and economic purpose—to help Iran to put its own house in order, to conserve its financial and economic resources, and in this way to prevent Britain and Russia from having an excuse to take over the country.

In general, the Americans in Iran are employees of the Iranian Government, with a period of service that will terminate in about four years. But we feel that we are here and that we can and do appropriately act, not only as administrative employees of the Iranian Government, but also as the practical instruments for implementing your international policies.

Iranians welcome American assistance because they know that Americans are neutral, non-imperialistic, honest, and sincere. But I am convinced that, if Americans are to work effectively over a period of years in this country and really implement your policies, the independence of the country must be safeguarded by an understanding among the three powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.

¹ Sent by Millspaugh to Hopkins, with a covering letter of December 1, 1943, for presentation to Roosevelt (Hopkins Papers). Covering letter not printed herein.
² See ante, p. 469.
³ See Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 679 ff.
Because of fifteen years of dictatorship, because of the War, and because of the Allied occupation, Iran and the Iranians are at present in a condition of inconceivable disorganization, demoralization and corruption. If American assistance is withdrawn at the end of four years, our effort will be largely wasted. To do a permanent job, fifteen or twenty years will be required.

As I see it, therefore, the suggested understanding should provide:

1. For exclusively American administrative and technical assistance to Iran over a period of fifteen or twenty years;
2. For the divestiture of this American effort from American commercial interests;
3. For the harmonizing of this effort with the political independence of Iran, with Iranian self-government through constitutional democratic forms and procedures, and with some form of protection against the reestablishment of dictatorship; and,
4. For assurances to be given Great Britain and the Soviet Union that Americans in Iran are to be neutral as between these two powers and friendly to both.

The Iranians look to you, Mr. President, to guarantee them freedom from fear. With American administrators to help the Iranians to help themselves, the Iranians can, should and will do the rest. Iran seems to me to be a clinic—a testing ground—for the practical execution of your international policies. Finally, the doing of the job here need not cost the American taxpayers a cent, and need not require any armed intervention.

Permit me to thank you, Mr. President, for seeing me in the midst of your immense responsibilities and let me convey to you on behalf of my Mission our best wishes for your health and continued high accomplishment.

Respectfully yours,

A. C. MILSPAUGH

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to the Shah of Iran

TEHRAN, December 1, 1943.

YOUR MAJESTY, I was very much pleased to see you yesterday when you welcomed me to your country in the name of the Iranian people. Your gesture is one that emphasizes again the more than friendly feeling that has always existed between our two nations. I was delighted to have had this chance to make Your Majesty’s acquaintance.

I have received the magnificent carpet, the gracious gift of Your Majesty. This carpet will serve to remind both myself and the

1 See ante, p. 564.
2 See ante, p. 468.
American people of the generous hospitality of the Iranian nation. I am truly grateful.

Your Majesty's invitation to be a guest at your palace as well as your offer to meet me at the airport upon my arrival and to provide a guard of honor have been conveyed to me and I am most appreciative. Much to my regret, the circumstances of my visit, as you are no doubt aware, have made it impossible for me to avail myself of these kind offers, much as I would have liked to have done so.

I cannot emphasize too strongly how much I have been touched by all of these truly friendly gestures on the part of Your Majesty. I shall leave Iran with regret at not having had an opportunity to extend my acquaintance with you and to have seen more of your country and your people. The American people have for many years been cognizant of the friendly sentiments of the Iranian people, and the hospitality shown by Your Majesty in their name will serve to keep this realization alive for many years to come.

Iran has always occupied a warm spot in American hearts, more than ever now that we are brothers in arms. We know the part Iran is playing in the common struggle and our hope is that when peace at last comes, the spirit of working together that now exists between our two peoples will continue unchecked in peaceful labors.

I take this opportunity to thank Your Majesty again for all the gestures of friendliness and hospitality you have shown me and to wish Your Majesty the greatest happiness both for yourself and for the people of your ancient land.

With my sincere regards, I am, Faithfully yours, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

I greatly hope that we shall have the pleasure of a visit from you to Washington.

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9 See ante, p. 461, footnote 3.

* On signing the letter as submitted to him by Dreyfus, Roosevelt penned this additional sentence below his signature and near the left margin.

Roosevelt Papers

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

TEHRAN, 1 December 1943.

MY DEAR FRANKLIN, I was indeed touched by your kind present. It is a beautiful bowl, and I shall always treasure it as a reminder

1 See ante, p. 469. According to Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Tehran Conference, p. 176, Roosevelt had sent the following signed message to accompany the bowl: “my affection, may we be together for many years”.

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of our sunlit days in Tehran and of the most memorable of my Birthdays.

I cannot thank you enough for all your friendship and support in the years in which we have worked together, and I am glad of this occasion to send you a message of sincere affection and gratitude.

Yours always, 

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) ¹

SECRET

URGENT

Cairo, December 1, 1943.

For immediate delivery to Harry Hopkins visiting party from Kirk. I have received an urgent but garbled message from Steinhardt at Ankara from which I gather that he wishes me to inform you that neither he nor the British Ambassador at Ankara ² has received any message from your party and that he believes that communications from Tehran may be temporarily suspended.

¹ Sent via Army channels.
² Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen.

740.0011 European War 1939/32357: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State ¹

ANKARA, December 1, 1943—1 p.m.

1958. The following telegram has been sent to Cairo,² repeated for the Department’s information:

Most Immediate December 1, 1 p.m. Most secret for the President.

In a conversation with the Foreign Minister ³ this morning he referred to your presence in Cairo and again expressed the hope that a meeting could be arranged between Inonu and yourself.⁴ He intimated

¹ For earlier correspondence relating to arrangements for the Second Cairo Conference, see ante, pp. 43, 386.
² Not found in the Roosevelt Papers.
³ Numan Menemencioğlu.
⁴ For the previous expression of hope for such a meeting, see Steinhardt’s telegram 1809 of November 14, 1943, 5 p.m., ante, p. 86.
that given sufficient notice Inonu could meet you in Aleppo, just across the Turkish frontier.

For your information Aleppo is about 26 hours by special train from Ankara and would seem satisfactory from a security point of view.

Please instruct the Security Officers to transmit any reply you may send me as quickly as possible.

STEINHARDT

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

_The President to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)\(^1\)_

SECRET

[TEHRAN\(,\)] December 1, 1943.

Please pass following message immediately to President Inonu from President Roosevelt:

“Prime Minister Churchill and I, having had our meeting with Marshal Stalin, will be in Cairo next Saturday and Sunday,\(^2\) accompanied by a representative of the Soviet Government. We should greatly value a meeting with Your Excellency and hope it might be possible for you to join us in Cairo.”

You should if possible hand this message in person to the President, and you must of course impress upon him its extreme secrecy.

Your American [British\(^3\)] and Soviet colleagues are being instructed to convey similar messages to President and you should concert with them simultaneous presentation.

You are authorized to tell President Inonu that we have no objection to his consulting his Parliament in secret session regarding his leaving his country if he finds it necessary to do so.

It would be useful if you could accompany the President.

ROOSEVELT

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\(^1\) Sent to Washington via military channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to the Department of State; and forwarded further by the Department to Steinhardt, in paraphrase, as telegram 924, December 1, 1943, 2 p. m. (740.0011 EW 1939/32358a). Regarding the preparation of the message to Steinhardt, see ante, pp. 596, 598.

\(^2\) December 4 and 5, 1943.

\(^3\) This inadvertent reference to Steinhardt’s “American and Soviet colleagues”, instead of his “British and Soviet colleagues”, may have resulted from a confusion of _mutatis mutandis_ instructions to the typist in connection with the sending of a message on this subject by Churchill to the British Ambassador at Ankara (Knatchbull-Hugessen), which is mentioned in Churchill, p. 415. The error was corrected in the paraphrase sent by the Department to Steinhardt.

405533-61—46
The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President, and the President’s Reply

[TEHRAN, December 1, 1943.]

MR. PRESIDENT: What do you think of letting the Russians give dinner tonight—your last chance at Russian food

HARRY

OK but I have to leave early as we sleep at the camp.

FDR

1 According to Sherwood, p. 796, these messages were exchanged near the end of the tripartite luncheon meeting of December 1, 1943 (ante, p. 585). For a facsimile reproduction of the messages, which were handwritten, see Sherwood, p. 797.

The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President

[TEHRAN, December 1, 1943.]

MR. PRESIDENT: It is 8.10. Do you wish at dinner to introduce the method of our occupation of Germany after her collapse.

HARRY

1 This message, which is handwritten, was presumably passed by Hopkins to Roosevelt near the end of the tripartite political meeting, December 1, 1943, ante, p. 596.

Communiqué: First Draft

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—This draft was apparently an American paper. No evidence has been found of its being considered outside the American Delegation. The purport of the statements that appear in the third paragraph, however, was discussed at the Plenary Meeting on November 30, 1943. See ante, p. 581, and Churchill, p. 384.

The draft contains handwritten changes or corrections which, according to an attached note of December 2, 1943, were made by Roosevelt and Hopkins. The changes or corrections are indicated here as follows: words which were crossed out are printed in canceled type; words which were substituted for the crossed-out words, or added, are printed in italics; and other handwritten notations are described in footnotes.

Of the principal changes, the following are in Roosevelt’s handwriting: the substitution of “determination”, the addition of “greater
part of the", the substitution of "war", and the substitution of "fact". The handwriting of the addition, at the end, of the names of the Heads of Government, and perhaps of the other changes (e. g., the correction of "he" to "we"), is Hopkins'.]

DRAFT

We—The President of the United States, The Prime Minister of Great Britain, and The Premier of Soviet Russia, Marshal of the Red Army, have met these four days past, in this city of Teheran, and have bent our united efforts toward solutions of our military and political problems.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war—our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the final destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken from the East, West and South, and arrangements were made to ensure intimate and continuous cooperation.

As to peace—the road is still bloody and hard and long. But the common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to post war plans—our mutual understanding gives us courage to hope for an enduring peace. We recognize fully our great responsibilities to help in the writing determination of a peace which will meet approval of the greater part of the peoples of the world, and ensure a lasting successe from war.

With our diplomatic advisors we have surveyed the problems of the future, and we now reiterate our aim to strengthen democratic principles in the world. We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose people in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

We say to the German people:

"We do not seek to enslave you. We do mean to destroy not only your military forces, but also the false leaders who have led a generation of Germans into bitter excesses against common decencies,"

1 A handwritten question mark was inserted over the word "understanding".
2 The remainder of the sentence was bracketed in pencil, as an indication of its suggested deletion.
3 This line and the first of the two quoted paragraphs which follow were bracketed in pencil, as an indication of their suggested deletion.
culminating with your being plunged, by this same leadership, into a useless war which has caused millions of your sons to die, and may sacrifice millions more."  

"No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their submarines by sea, and their industrial war plants from the air. Our attack will be relentless."  

Emerging from these conferences we look with confidence toward the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit as well as in purpose.

And we shall meet again as the war—and the peace—progresses!

Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston Churchill
Joseph Stalin

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The quotation mark at the end of this paragraph was crossed out, apparently before the bracketed suggestion of deletion was made.

The quotation marks at the beginning and end of this paragraph were crossed out.

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Roosevelt Papers

*Communiqué: Second Draft*

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—As in the case of the first draft, this was apparently an American paper. No evidence has been found of its being considered outside the American Delegation.

The handwritten changes or corrections (indicated typographically as in the first draft, printed supra) appear to be wholly or in part in Roosevelt’s handwriting; possibly some are Hopkins’. Some of the changes made on this draft were not incorporated in the typewritten text of the third draft (printed infra). From this, it may be surmised that such changes were written in on this draft—possibly by Hopkins—at the same time they were written in on the third draft by Roosevelt.]

**SECOND DRAFT**

WE 2—The President of the United States, The Prime Minister of Great Britain, and The Premier of Soviet Russia, Marshal of the Red Army, have met these four days past, in this city of Teheran, and have

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1 In the upper left-hand corner of this draft appears the handwritten date “12/2/43”, presumably associated with the procedural note of December 2, 1943, referred to in the editorial note to the first draft, supra.

2 This word was underlined by hand.
bent our united efforts toward solutions of our military and political problems.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war—our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the final destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken from the East, West and South, and arrangements were made to ensure intimate and continuous cooperation.

The road is still bloody and hard and long. But the common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace—our mutual belief we are confident that it will our concord gives us courage to hope that we may make it endure. We recognize fully great the supreme responsibilities resting upon us & all the United Nations to help in the determination making of make a peace which will meet approval of the greater part command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world, and ensure a lasting suercease from war banish the scourge & terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisors we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their submarines by sea, and their war plants & armies from the air.

Our attack will be relentless increasing.

Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence toward the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, un-

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2 Over the word "our" was written the word "their", which, in turn, was crossed out.
4 The word "our" was crossed out, and the word "their" was written above it. The word "their" was then crossed out, and the word "our" was written below the deleted typewritten "our".
6 After the word "problems" was written "of the three great allies", and these words were crossed out. In the left-hand margin, apparently as a substitution for the portion of the sentence following the word "Teheran," were written the following words: "& have shaped & formed confirmed our united policy. for the future."
7 The word "our" was presumably intended to be crossed out.
8 The words "mutual belief" were struck over with typewritten "x's".
8 The word "and" was presumably intended to be crossed out.
9 After the word "of" appears an undecipherable typewritten word of five letters which was struck over with typewritten "x's".
touched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit as well as in purpose.

And we shall meet again as the war—and the peace—progresses!

Roosevelt Papers

Communique: Third Draft

[Editorial Note.—As in the case of the first two drafts, this was apparently an American paper. Presumably this was the draft that was discussed and put in final form at the dinner meeting on December 1, 1943. See ante, p. 605, and post, p. 842.

The draft contains handwritten changes, additions, and notations which appear to have been made by Roosevelt and Hopkins. They are indicated here as follows: words which were crossed out are printed in canceled type, and words which were substituted for the crossed-out words, or added, or written as procedural notations, are printed in italics.

Three of the handwritten changes or additions—the insertion of the word "Communique" (in capital letters) above the typewritten words "Third Draft"; the change from "Soviet Russia" to "the Soviet Union" in the second line of the typewritten text; and the insertion at the end of "Teheran, Iran" and "December 1, 1943"—were apparently made by Hopkins. The other changes, additions, and notations were made by Roosevelt.]

COMMUNIQUE

THIRD DRAFT

We—the President of the United States, The Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Red Army, have met these four days past, in this city of Teheran, the capital of our ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our mutual common policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war—our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the final destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations which will to be undertaken from
the East, West and South, and arrangements were made to ensure intimate and continuous cooperation.

The road is still bloody and hard and long. But the common understanding which we have reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace—we are confident sure that our concord will make it win an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world, and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisors we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants and armies from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence toward the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

And we shall meet again as the war—and the peace—progresses!

F. D. R.
S
C

Teheran, Iran
December 1, 1943.

As corrected this becomes the final draft.

B. THE COMMUNIQUÉ AND ITS RELEASE

Roosevelt Papers

The Agreed Text of the Communiqué

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—The copy reproduced here contains the text agreed to by Churchill and Stalin (see Harriman’s handwritten note,
printed below). This copy is referred to below as the “agreed text”.

Material which was crossed out by hand on this copy—whether before or after it was shown to Churchill and Stalin, is not known—is printed here in canceled type. A handwritten notation by Harriman, in the lower left corner of the single sheet comprising this copy, is printed here in italics.

A copy of the communiqué in the Bohlen Collection is identical with the agreed text as changed; i.e., the material deleted at the end of this text does not appear in the copy in the Bohlen Collection.

The text as released by the White House in mimeographed form for publication on December 6, 1943 (referred to below as the “release text”), corresponds in some respects to the agreed text and in other respects to the third draft as amended. The release text was based on a cablegram of December 4, 1943, from Hopkins, at Cairo, to Stephen Early, Secretary to the President, at Washington, filed in the Roosevelt Papers.

Differences in phrasing between the agreed text and the release text are indicated in the footnotes below. Differences in capitalization, punctuation, and spelling are not indicated. The insignificant differences between the release text and the text printed in the Department of State Bulletin, vol. IX, December 11, 1943, p. 409, are also not indicated.]

To be released to the Press,
8:00 p.m. Moscow Time,
December 6, 1943.

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS

We—the President of the United States, The Prime Minister of
Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these
four days past in this, the capital of our ally, Iran, and have shaped
and confirmed our common policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together
in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war—Our military staffs have joined in our round table dis-
cussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the
German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the
scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken from
the East, West and South.

The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees
that victory will be ours.

¹This passage reads, in the release text, “operations to be undertaken”.
And as to peace—we are sure that our concord will make it an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations, to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world, and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these friendly conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

Signed at Teheran, Iran, December 1, 1943.

F.D. ROOSEVELT
J. STALIN
W. CHURCHILL

Text agreed to by the P. M. & the Marshall [Marshal] W. A. H.

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This passage reads, in the release text, "our concord will win an enduring peace".

The fourth word in the paragraph, in the release text, is "cordial" instead of "friendly".

The release text gives this line below, rather than above, the names of the Heads of Government.

The names in the agreed text are typewritten. The three Heads of Government do not appear to have signed any copy of this document, which was intended primarily as a press release. The release text reads as follows, on one line: "Signed: Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin."

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740.0011 EW 1939/32185: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 4, 1943.

8476. Announcement by Moscow radio of Tehran conference is carried in late editions of this morning's London papers, but
last not received in time for editorial comment. Speculative stories
during past two days had been largely based on German press and
radio campaign to prepare enemy populations for anticipated news of
meeting. Senator Connally’s speech at Fort Worth was also widely
reported.¹

BUCKNELL

¹ In a radio address at Fort Worth, Texas, on December 2, 1943, Connally had
said that “another great conference is taking place in the Middle East between
President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill” (New York
Times, December 3, 1943, p. 5, col. 5).

740.0011 EW 1939/32882a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)¹

CONFIDENTIAL  WASHINGTON, December 4, 1943—midnight.
(PART RESTRICTED)

1342—1344.² Morning press in the United States headlined stories
from London that the Moscow radio had announced in an official
Soviet news agency broadcast for provincial Russian papers that:

“A few days ago, in Teheran, a conference took place between the
leaders of the three Allied powers, President Roosevelt, Prime Min-
ister Churchill and Premier Stalin. Diplomatic and military re-
presentatives took part in the conference.

“At the conference, questions on the conduct of the war against
Germany were discussed as well as a number of political questions.
“Corresponding decisions were adopted which will be made public
later.”

No word having been received in this country of the conclusion
of the conference and there being nothing to announce in the United
States, the publication in Moscow has created a furor in the press.
OWI Director Elmer Davis has requested the Department to ascer-
tain the circumstances of the announcement and particularly whether
this was a violation of any release date agreed upon by the conferees.
We had all assumed that an arrangement would be made for simul-
taneous publication in the USSR, Great Britain and the United
States but so far have no definite information about such an arrange-
ment. Any information you are able to send us about the Moscow
broadcast will assist greatly.

HULL

¹ Harriman did not return to Moscow from Tehran until December 5, 1943.
During his absence, however, no officer at the post was designated as Chargé.
² This telegram was sent in three sections.
Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President's Secretary (Early) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹

[WASHINGTON,] 4 December 1943.

For Mr. Hopkins from Mr. Early.

All press and radio here headline today Moscow radio reports received via London that Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin had met in Teheran few days ago and discussed questions related to war against Germany and including political war issues. The reports added that the conferences have been concluded and detailed statement is expected momentarily. This comes from the government controlled Moscow radio and further complicates the situation resulting from the British Reuters premature disclosures concerning Cairo conference.² If mechanically possible and in face of these developments, I urge quickest possible release and publication of Teheran communiqué. Regards.

¹ Presumably sent via military channels.
² See Davis' message of November 30, 1943, to Bracken, ante, p. 452.

740.0011 EW 1939/32176: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State¹

U. S. URGENT Moscow, December 4, 1943.

2113. The Roosevelt-Stalin-Churchill conference in Teheran is reported in the Moscow newspapers for December 4 in the following Tass dispatch datelined Teheran December 3.

[Here follows, in a slightly different translation, the text quoted in Hull's telegram of December 4, 1943, to Harriman, ante, p. 642.]

HARRIMAN

¹ See Hull's telegram 1342-1344, of December 4, 1943, ante, p. 642, footnote 1.

Censorship Files: Telegram

The Director of the Office of War Information (Davis) to the Director of the London Bureau of the Office of War Information (Carroll)¹

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1943.

RAPID

Please transmit following to Bracken: Now that the Russians have set us both back on our tails perhaps we can get together on some

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.
measures to prevent repetition of these deplorable incidents. I have asked State Department to make inquiries in Moscow as to how this Russian thing happened and whether it broke an agreed release date, on which latter point I am not yet informed. Meanwhile I am meeting with Price and Early and hope we can agree on some ideas for improved arrangements which will be forwarded for your comment. Eventually we may perhaps be able to agree with information agencies of other governments on program which can be made as a united recommendation to our principals. Regarding Connolly, he does not appear to have said anything more than was contained in Reuter[s] Lisbon story and other speculations earlier in the week. I share your wish that all rumors and conjectures on such meetings could be silenced but doubt if it could be done by domestic censorship in either country since we cannot control the enemy. All we can hope to do is to refrain from giving his speculations confirmation. Hope that we shall be able to concur in recommendations which will avert these painful episodes in future. End message to Bracken; remainder for Carroll. Sorry you have had to be in the front line and take the heat in this matter but believe Russian performance will measurably reduce inflammation of Anglo-American relations. Also may have salutary effect of persuading our betters to consult their hired experts on such matters hereafter.

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740.0011 EW 1939/32208: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

U. S. URGENT

Moscow, December 6, 1943—7 p. m.

2131. The announcement in Moscow in the newspapers for December 4 of the Conference was a complete surprise to me. There was agreement at the Conference that the two agreed declarations were to be released for publication not before December 6, 8 p. m., Moscow time. Your 1344 December 4, midnight, not urgent, which was received here December 6, 3 p. m. and promptly decoded. Release was to be made simultaneously in London, Moscow and Washington. It was my distinct understanding, and I was present, that it was understood that no mention of the Conference would be made

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\[\text{See ante, p. 642.}\]

\[\text{See ante, p. 462.}\]

\[\text{The recommendation under reference took the form of a letter from Roosevelt to Bracken, post, p. 848.}\]

\[\text{Ante, p. 642.}\]
before that time for security reasons. Since my return last night I
have not seen Molotov who, I believe, only arrived back today and I am
therefore unable at present to give an explanation of the reason which
led the Soviet Government to authorize the announcement. It is not
unlikely that the original reference by Reuters in Lisbon to a meeting
of The Three and reports that Senator Connally in a broadcast had
stated that a meeting was then taking place in the Middle East caused
the Soviet Government to make the announcement in question.
I assume you have full information now as to the arrangements for
simultaneous publication. I personally gave Major John Boettinger
[Boettiger], of the President's press staff, authentic copies of the two
declarations\(^2\) in order that he might make the necessary technical
arrangements.
I shall take the first suitable opportunity to ascertain from Molotov
the reasons which led the Soviet Government to make the announce-
ment.

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\(^2\) The communiqué and the Declaration on Iran.

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740.0011 EW 1939/32243: Telegram

_The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State_

Moscow, December 8, 1943—9 a. m.

2144. Supplementing my 2131, December 6, 7 p. m.
I had occasion to ask Molotov last night how it had happened that
Tass had made a statement regarding the conclusion of the Tehran
Conference. He explained that (one) Reuter's [Reuters] from Lis-
bon had predicted the meeting and (two) Senator Connally had an-
nounced it was going on. Tass could not ignore these reports and
therefore stated the truth to end further rumors which were con-
sidered to affect adversely our mutual interests. It is my personal
opinion that the British and we have more to explain to the Soviet
Government than they have to us. I therefore recommend that we
do not pursue the matter further with the Soviets.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) It does not appear that the matter was pursued further in Moscow, but the
method of handling releases to the press was altered by decision of Roosevelt;
see post, p. 848.
C. THE DECLARATION ON IRAN AND ITS RELEASE

The Declaration on Iran

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—As to the preparation and signing of the declaration, see (1) ante, pp. 619, 623, and post, pp. 648, 838, 840, 885; (2) Leahy, p. 211; (3) Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 192-193; and (4) Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 4, p. 2833. A text described as “cabled from Tehran” is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, vol. IX, December 11, 1943, p. 499; it differs from the signed original in certain details, such as the spelling out of the abbreviated name of the Soviet Union, the addition of “of America” after “United States”, and the omission of the signatures. A Russian-language version, apparently prepared later, is printed in Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Tehran Conference, p. 68.

The signed original was transmitted to the Department of State by the White House on February 4, 1946, photostat copies having been furnished to the Department previously. White House memorandum of November 18, 1944, to the Secretary of State, 891.00/11-1844; White House memorandum of April 19, 1945, Roosevelt Papers; Leahy’s letter of February 4, 1946, to the Secretary of State, 740.0011 EW 1939/2-446 (none printed).]

To be released to the Press
8:00 p.m. Moscow Time
December 6, 1943

Dec. 1, 1943.

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS REGARDING IRAN

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U. S. S. R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

1 On the signed original, the typewritten date “November 30” is crossed out, and “Dec. 1” is substituted, in a handwriting believed to be Churchill’s. See testimony of Patrick J. Hurley, Military Situation in the Far East, part 4, p. 2834. See also Lohbeck, p. 491.
2 On the signed original, the typewritten heading is “Suggested Draft Declaration”. The words “Suggested Draft” are crossed out, and the words "of the Three Powers regarding Iran" are added after the word “Declaration”, in a handwriting believed to be Churchill’s.
3 The Shah and the Prime Minister (Ali Soheli) had conferred with the three Heads of Government successively on November 30, 1943. See ante, p. 564.
The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
H. СТАЛИН
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
The Third Secretary of Embassy in Iran (Jernegan) to Brigadier General Hurley's Aide (Henry)

[Tehran], December 3, 1943.

Major Henry: So far as my knowledge runs, the following are the main facts in connection with the "Declaration by Three Nations Regarding Iran":

A) Prime Minister Ali Soheily spoke to Mr. Eden and Minister Dreyfus, separately, on the morning of November 29 and requested that the conference issue a joint communiqué regarding Iran, to cover three main points:

1) Allied recognition that Iran had given every possible help in the prosecution of the war.
2) Confirmation of the pledges given in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance of January 29, 1942 regarding the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.¹
3) Assurance that the economic needs of Iran would be considered when the peace treaty should be negotiated.

According to Soheily, Mr. Eden had indicated his agreement in principle but had asked that he approach the American Minister and the Soviet representatives to determine their attitude.

B) Minister Dreyfus informed General Hurley, who immediately saw the President about it. The President approved the idea and asked General Hurley to see Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov and try to get their agreement.

C) I showed General Hurley a rough draft of a declaration which I had worked up in anticipation that the question might be broached at the conference, and he suggested certain changes. I then prepared a shorter draft, which was submitted to General Hurley and which eventually became the basis for the final declaration.²

D) General Hurley saw Mr. Eden on November 30, and they agreed that a declaration would be desirable, but that the Iranians should be told they must endeavor to get Soviet consent. The same evening, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammed Saed, told Minister Dreyfus that Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov had agreed in principle. (This, however, does not check with Molotov's own non-committal remarks to General Hurley the next day.)

E) On December 1, General Hurley saw the President and told him that British agreement had been obtained but that the Soviets were doubtful. He asked the President to speak to Marshal Stalin. The

² This is the draft printed ante, pp. 624-625.
President did so and told General Hurley afterwards that he had made a strong personal request and that Stalin had consented.

F) On the afternoon of December 1, the short draft which General Hurley had approved was shown to Ambassador Harriman, who made some slight changes and then got the O. K. of Mr. Hopkins. Copies of the corrected draft were sent to Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov immediately. Just before dinner, the draft was considered by the conference and was accepted with two or three additional minor changes in wording. It was signed by Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt, in that order, at the end of the final session that night. 3

G) Minister Dreyfus had informed Saed that the matter was being considered, and had given him a copy of our original draft. As soon as the final session of the conference ended, the Minister and General Hurley went to the Foreign Office and showed the Foreign Minister the text which had been signed. After consulting with the Prime Minister by telephone, Saed said the text was acceptable and initialed a copy. 4 He agreed not to release it until the general release on the conference should be made.

So far as I know, neither the British nor the Russians took any initiative in the matter at any time, although the British were obviously favorably disposed from the beginning. I am quite sure that neither of them prepared a draft. There is no doubt that it was only General Hurley’s interest in the matter, and especially his intervention with the President and the latter’s intervention with Stalin, which prevented the proposal from being blocked or ignored by the chiefs of government and their immediate entourages.

Of course, we could not put much of the foregoing into the press release. 5 One point which might be stressed is that the Iranian Government was kept informed and that the declaration had its full approval. I am not sure that it would be a good idea to say that the Iranian Government made the original suggestion. That might be checked first with the British and Russians and then with the Foreign Minister. If they think it advisable, I see no objection.

I think the Minister should see the press release before it is put into final form.

John D. Jernegan

3 Apparently Roosevelt signed before Stalin but left a space for Stalin’s signature; see post, p. 886.
4 A facsimile of the copy bearing Sa’ed’s initials was received by the Department of State from Hurley with a letter of June 4, 1954 (223.1/8-454).
5 No press release or draft press release regarding the development of the Declaration on Iran has been found in official files. The Hurley Papers, however, contain copies of (1) a document which was apparently used by the Legation in informing the press regarding various details of the Tehran Conference and (2) the script of a “Radio America” broadcast of December 6, 1943, at Tehran on the subject.
The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 3, 1943—1 p. m.

1086. December 1 a declaration was signed here in which United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Great Britain stated mutual agreement regarding policy toward Iran containing following points.

One. Three powers recognize Iranian contribution to war effort against common enemy.

Two. They realize war has caused special economic difficulties in Iran. Three powers express their intent to continue to provide such economic assistance as they are able.

Three. Three powers agree that Iranian postwar economic problems should receive full consideration by international agencies and conferences which may be created or held to deal with such matters.

Four. They reaffirm their desire for maintenance of sovereign independence and territorial integrity of Iran according to Atlantic Charter. Text has been submitted to Iran Government which has declared it acceptable. It is understood publicity will be withheld until December 6 when full text will be released. Issuance of declaration along these lines was requested by Iranian Prime Minister November 29. The President approved and directed General Hurley to obtain consent of other parties, which he and the Legation working together were able to do. Hurley and I feel that this has strengthened United States position in Iran and should have beneficent effect.

DREYFUS

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 5, 1943—4 p. m.

1090. Persian language newspaper Friend of Iran published by (reference my 1086, December 3) Soviet Embassy press section this morning carried full text of declaration regarding Iran signed here December 1.

So far as I know, no other Tehran morning paper published text of referred to declaration in any way. However, upon learning of its publication in Soviet paper, Prime Minister Soheily this morning released it to Tehran press and it will undoubtedly appear in all afternoon newspapers.

General Hurley and I had understood definitely that no release was to be made by anyone until 8 tomorrow night, Moscow time, and neither the British nor ourselves had released anything regarding
the conference or the declaration on Iran. We shall still delay until tomorrow in accordance with instructions.

Repeated to Moscow and Cairo.

DREYFUS

891.00/2072: Telegram

The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 8, 1943—5 p. m.

1096. In reply to my inquiry as to reason for premature publication of declaration regarding Iran, my 1090, December 5, Soviet Chargé \(^1\) told me he had heard Iranians were going to release text on morning of December 5 and that his Embassy therefore rushed publication in order not to be left behind.

In a separate conversation with an officer of this Legation and Major Henry, Hurley’s aide, Soviet Press Attaché denied all knowledge of any agreement regarding release date for publicity on Tehran conference and further intimated he had not understood declaration on Iran to form part of general release.

It is obvious that these two statements are conflicting and both seem implausible. If Soviet Chargé had heard of Iranian intention to break deadline, he could easily have intervened with the Iranian authorities, at same time notifying his American and British colleagues. Likewise, the Press Attaché’s plea of ignorance is vitiated by fact that he was present at meeting with Major Henry and British representatives on December 4 at which release arrangements were discussed. However, I have not pressed the point and shall take no further action unless instructed.\(^2\)

DREYFUS

\(^1\) Mikhail Alexeyevich Maximov.

\(^2\) It does not appear that further action was taken on this matter in Tehran or Moscow. For Roosevelt’s decision changing the method of handling releases to the press, see post, p. 848.

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D. THE MILITARY AGREEMENT

L/T Files

The Military Agreement

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—The only reference in the minutes to the drawing up or consideration of this document appears ante, pp. 578, 581. According to Churchill, p. 404, it was initialed on the evening of December 1, 1943. The initialed original was received by the Department of
State from the White House February 4, 1946 (Leahy’s letter of that date; 740.0011 EW 1939/2-446). The text was released to the press by the Department March 24, 1947 (press release 240 of 1947). For references by Roosevelt in June and July 1944 to his understanding of the military plans agreed upon at Tehran, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 66, 721, 723.]

SECRET

MILITARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE

The Conference:—

(1) Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations:

(2) Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year:

(3) Took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria. The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war:

(4) Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. The latter operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability of landing-craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front:

(5) Agreed that the military staffs of the three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending operations in Europe. In particular it was agreed that a cover plan to mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the staffs concerned.

F. D. R.
H. C.
W. S. C

TEHERAN, December 1, 1943.

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1 See *ante*, pp. 537, 545, 588.
2 See *ante*, pp. 565, 577, 579.
3 I. S.