

II. THE FIRST CAIRO CONFERENCE

4. THE PRESIDENT'S LOG AT CAIRO, NOVEMBER 22-26, 1943

White House Files

Log of the Trip

Monday, November 22nd. (Enroute Tunis to Cairo, and at Cairo)

9:35 a. m. The President's plane landed at Cairo West airport (a Royal Air Force field). This was some two and one-half hours after plane number two of our party had arrived from Tunis, and the late arrival caused some concern at the field as to the President's safety. Two different groups of fighter-planes had been at appointed rendezvous at the scheduled times but each failed to make contact and eventually had to return to their base for refueling. The President's plane, it developed, had detoured southward as far as latitude 28°-00'-00" north and had then turned northward and followed the course of the River Nile up to Cairo. This route took them over the Sphinx and the Pyramids.

The air distance from Tunis to Cairo, over the route flown by the President's plane, was 1851 miles. The President was met at Cairo West airport by Major General Ralph Royce, U. S. A., Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Middle East, and his Chief of Staff, Brigadier General G. X. Cheaves [*Cheves*], U. S. A. The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek and their party had arrived in Cairo from Chungking the evening before our arrival (on November 21st.). Prime Minister Churchill and his party also arrived in Cairo on November 21st.

10:10 a. m. The President disembarked and proceeded via automobile to Ambassador Alexander C. Kirk's villa in the Mena District of Cairo, which is approximately seven miles west of Cairo and out near the Pyramids of Gizeh.

10:30 a. m. The President arrived at Ambassador Kirk's Mena villa. He made this villa his home, at Ambassador Kirk's invitation, during his entire stay in Cairo. This villa is

of medium size and is beautifully furnished. It also has a lovely flower garden in the rear with an overlooking patio, and it was there that the President spent most of his few leisure moments. The general area surrounding the President's quarters was guarded by American soldiers.

Mr. Hopkins and Admiral Leahy lived in the President's villa. Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire and General Watson and other members of our party lived in nearby villas.

The President brought along his own valet and cooks and stewards and throughout our stay here and at Teheran those cooks and stewards prepared the President's meals.

The SEXTANT Conference was held in the Mena House Hotel, located approximately one mile west of the President's villa and right at the very base of the Pyramids of Gizeh.

The President was met at his villa on his arrival by Ambassadors Kirk and Averell W. [W. Averell] Harriman.

During the afternoon, the Prime Minister, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek called on the President.¹

8:00 p. m. Dinner at the President's villa for the President, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy and Prime Minister Churchill.¹

9:00 p. m. Preliminary meeting of the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with their respective military and naval staffs and other delegates. A complete list of those present follows:²

11:10 p. m. The preliminary meeting, as described above, adjourned.

Tuesday, November 23rd. (At Cairo)

During the forenoon the following persons called on the President: Mr. A. Y. Vyshinsky, First Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, U. S. S. R. Mr. Vyshinsky was accompanied by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen of our State Department; Admiral Mountbatten; General

¹ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 307.

² For those present, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 308.

Wheeler; General Wedemeyer; The Prime Minister and his daughter, Mrs. Sarah Oliver; the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek; Generals Shang Chen, Ling [*Lin*] Wei and Chu Shih Ming.³

Ambassadors Kirk and Harriman called at the President's villa during the forenoon.⁴

11:00 a. m. First plenary meeting of the President, the Prime Minister and the Generalissimo with their respective military and naval staffs and other delegates.⁵ Those present for this meeting were the same as for the preliminary meeting held at 9:00 p. m., Monday, November 22nd.

1:30 p. m. The President lunched at his villa with the Prime Minister, Mrs. Oliver, Mr. Hopkins, Commander C. R. Thompson, R. H. [*N.*] (The Prime Minister's Naval Aide), and Mr. J. F. [*M.*] Martin (The Prime Minister's Secretary).⁶

3:15 p. m. The President, together with Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon, worked on his mail from 3:15 until 4:10 p. m., signing the following Congressional bills: HR No. 244, 273, 400, 560, 800, 1049, 1144, 1202, 1206, 1435, 1498, 1555, 1622, 1666, 1769, 1887, 1889, 1918, 1920, 2182, 2244, 2600, 2675, 2824, 2905, 2915, and 3331.

4:15 p. m. With the Prime Minister acting as host, the President, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Oliver, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire and General Watson left the President's villa for an automobile trip to the nearby Pyramids of Gizeh and the Sphinx.⁷ At the Pyramids one of the native guides, who was found by chance at that late hour, was called in to give details of the history of the Pyramids that some members of the party were not familiar with. The visit to the Pyramids was made

³ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 310.

⁴ No record has been found of the substance of the conversation between Kirk and the President. Harriman's visit was in conjunction with that of Vyshinsky. See *post*, p. 309.

⁵ For the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 311. The term "First Plenary Meeting" was applied to this meeting, as it was the first of five plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the President and the Prime Minister (and occasionally others) held at Cairo between November 23 and December 6, 1943.

⁶ No record of the substance of this meeting has been found.

⁷ No indications have been found that matters of substance were discussed. Arnold, pp. 462-463, states that he went with the President to see the Sphinx. Arnold does not mention that any other persons were in the party, and the trip to which he alludes presumably took place the following day, November 24. According to his account, he and the President discussed on that occasion the choice of a Supreme Allied Commander for the European Theater and the quantity of tonnage that could be delivered by air to China.

just at sunset, so that the party had the experience of seeing the sun dip behind the Pyramids, the afterglow, and the dust [*dusk?*] succeeding the sun.

5:15 p. m. The President, the Prime Minister and members of their party returned to the President's villa at 5:15 p. m.

Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt arrived in Cairo this afternoon from his headquarters at Tunis. He was quartered in the President's villa while in Cairo.

8:00 p. m. Dinner at the President's villa. The dinner list included the President, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Hopkins and Colonel Elliot[t] Roosevelt. The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek remained after dinner until 11:00 p. m. conversing with the President and Mr. Hopkins.⁹

A radiogram was received quite late this evening from Moscow informing the President that Marshal Stalin would be at Teheran on November 28th or the 29th.¹⁰ As this was a bit sooner than had been expected, immediate steps were taken to complete the details of our journey to Teheran.

Wednesday, November 24th. (At Cairo)

Callers at the President's villa during the forenoon included Ambassadors Kirk and Harriman and Major Otis Bryan, A. U. S.¹¹

11:00 a. m. The President held a conference with General Marshall, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, General Arnold, Lt-General Somervell, Captain Royal, Air Chief Marshal Portal, Admiral Cunningham, the Prime Minister, General Sir Alan Brooke, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Lt-General Ismay, General Laycock, Brigadier Hollis and Mr. Hopkins. This conference adjourned at 12:40 p. m.¹²

Major John Boettiger, A. U. S., joined the President's party this morning. Major Boettiger is on duty with the Fifth Army in Italy (with the Allied Military Government organization.)

p. m. During the afternoon the President kept appointments with the following personages at his villa:

⁹ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 322.

¹⁰ See *post*, p. 385.

¹¹ No record of the substance of these meetings has been found.

¹² For the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 329.

*Sir Ahmed [*Ahmad*] Mohammed Hassenein Pacha, Chief of the Egyptian Royal Cabinet.

*His Excellency Moustafa El-Nahas Pacha, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Royal Egyptian Cabinet.

(NOTE: King Farouk I had recently been injured in an automobile accident and was unable to call on the President during the time he was in Cairo.)

His Majesty King George II of the Hellenes (Greece).

His Excellency Mr. Emmanuel Tsouderos, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (Greece).

Lord Killearn, British Ambassador to Egypt.

His Majesty King Peter of Yugoslavia.

His Excellency Dr. Boxidar [*Božidar*] Pouritch, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (Yugoslavia).

His Royal Highness Prince Paul, Crown Prince of Greece.

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Commander in Chief British Forces in the Middle East. General Wilson was accompanied by General Royce.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, Officer Commanding Royal Air Force in the Middle East.

Admiral Sir Algerson [*Algernon*] Willis, Commander in Chief, Levant.

General R. G. W. Stone, Commander in Chief, British troops in Egypt.

(The above are listed in the order in which they called.)¹³

5:15 p. m. Ambassador Steinhardt, accompanied by Mr. George Allen, called on the President.¹⁴ Ambassador Steinhardt and Mr. Allen had just arrived in Cairo from Ankara, Turkey.

8:30 p. m. President had dinner at his villa. His guests included Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, and General Watson. The guests remained after dinner until 12:40 a. m., chatting and playing cards.

Thursday, November 25th. (At Cairo).

Forenoon callers at the President's villa included Ambassador Harriman and Sir Alexander Cadogan.¹⁵

* These gentlemen were accompanied by Ambassador Kirk. [Footnote appears in the source text.]

¹³ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 345.

¹⁴ No record of the substance of this meeting has been found.

¹⁵ No record of the substance of these meetings has been found.

- 11:30 a. m. The President signed mail that had arrived earlier today by pouch from Washington. This mail included the Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to take possession of and to operate part of the plant and facilities of the Remington Rand, Inc., Southport, County of Chemung, N. Y.; a message vetoing HR 1155; and a message vetoing SJ Resolution 59.
- 12:00 The President, the Prime Minister, Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, members of their respective military and naval staffs and various other delegates met in the garden of the President's villa where they posed for moving pictures and still pictures for military photographers and accredited war correspondents of the three nations concerned.¹⁶
- 1:30 p. m. The President had luncheon at his villa with Lord Leathers, Mr. L. W. Douglas, Ambassador Winant and Assistant Secretary of War John S. [J.] McCloy.¹⁷
- 2:30 p. m. Mr. M. F. Reilly and Major Otis F. Bryan called on the President to report on their trip to Teheran, from which they had just returned. The President shortly afterwards announced his decision to fly to Teheran, instead of flying only to Basra and proceeding on from there by train. It was considered that the travel by train would be too uncertain in view of the urgent necessity that the President be in Teheran by November 28th.
- 5:00 p. m. The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek had tea with the President at his villa.¹⁸
- 6:15 p. m. Major General Donald H. Connolly, Commanding General of our Persian Gulf Service Command, called on the President to discuss desired arrangements at Teheran.¹⁹
- 8:00 p. m. The President was host at Thanksgiving dinner at his villa.²⁰ He had brought his own turkeys from Washington (they were gifts to him from Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, and Mr. Joe Carter of Burnt Corn, Ala.). The dinner list included: The President, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Oliver, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden, Major Boettiger, Mr. John F. [M.] Martin, Commander Thompson, Lord Moran, Admiral

¹⁶ The photographs appear *ante*, following p. 290.

¹⁷ No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. See, however, the editorial note, *post*, p. 346.

¹⁸ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 349.

¹⁹ No record of this conversation has been found.

²⁰ See the editorial note, *post*, p. 350.

Leahy, Ambassador Winant, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral McIntire, Admiral Brown, Elliot[t], Ambassador Kirk, General Watson, Robert Hopkins, and Ambassador Steinhardt. Music during the dinner was furnished by an orchestra from our Camp Huckstepp. The highlight of the dinner was the President's toast to the Prime Minister. He told briefly the history and origin of the tradition of our annual Thanksgiving Day; of how our American soldiers are now spreading that custom all over the world; and how that he, personally, was delighted to share this one with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister rose to respond at this stage, but the President told him that he had still another toast first. The President then went on to say that large families are usually closer united than are small families; and that, this year, with the United Kingdom in our family, we are a large family and more united than ever before. The Prime Minister responded in his usual masterful and inspiring manner.

10:30 p. m. Lt-General Stilwell called on the President.²¹

Friday, November 26th. (At Cairo)

During the forenoon the President conferred with Mr. James Landis, Ambassador Harriman, Admiral Mountbatten, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Admiral Leahy and Ambassador Winant.²²

2:30 p. m. Generals Marshall and Eisenhower called on the President. The President bestowed the Legion of Merit on General Eisenhower in recognition of his outstanding work in the cause of our country. A copy of the citation is appended, marked "A".²³

4:30 p. m. The Prime Minister, Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Ambassador Harriman, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden and Sir Alexander Cadogan conferred with the President. A press communiqué announcing the completion of the first phase of the Cairo Confer-

²¹ No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. According to Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 160-162, the subjects discussed included Stilwell's difficulties with Chiang and the Chinese Minister of War (General Ho), Lend-Lease to China, the Ledo Road, and the qualities of the Chinese soldier. A brief reference to the meeting may be found in *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 246.

²² No record of the substance of these meetings has been found. See, however, the editorial note, *post*, p. 351.

²³ Not printed herein. The citation was published by the War Department in General Orders No. 6, January 11, 1944.

ence was agreed upon. A copy is appended hereto, marked "B".²⁴ For reasons of security, it was also agreed that this communiqué would not be released to the press until after the completion of the forthcoming conference at Teheran.

6:00 p. m. The President summoned Lieutenant (jg) Rigdon and worked on official mail that had arrived in Cairo today from Washington. There was no Congressional matter contained in this particular pouch. The President worked until 7:00 p. m. with this mail.

7:30 p. m. The President dined at his villa with Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire and General Watson.

10:00 p. m. The President turned in, in anticipation of an early rising and departure (5:00 a. m.) on Saturday for Teheran, Iran.

The weather at Cairo during our first five days there was most pleasant; the days were comparatively warm, but the nights were always cool enough for excellent sleeping.

²⁴ The communiqué is printed *post*, p. 448.

5. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1943

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 22, 1943,
11 A. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Ambassador Winant
Assistant Secretary of War
McCloy
Vice Admiral Willson
Lieutenant General Stilwell
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Wheeler
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild

Major General Chennault
Major General Wedemeyer
Major General Deane
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Hansell
Captain Burrough
Captain Doyle
Colonel O'Donnell
Colonel Ferenbaugh
Colonel Timberman
Colonel Smith
Colonel Bessell
Colonel Hammond
Colonel Todd
Commander Long
Major Chapman

Secretariat

Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WINANT

GENERAL MARSHALL said there was no formal agenda for the meeting which had been called principally for the purpose of hearing the views of Ambassador Winant, Ambassador Harriman² and the representatives of the various theaters present as to the current situation in their particular areas. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff had proposed a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of [at?] 1500 hours in order to consider the matter of the procedure to be pursued during the conference and inquired if there were any objections on the part of the U. S. Chiefs to this proposal.

¹ J. C. S. 127th meeting.

² For the Harriman report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see *post*, p. 327.

THE U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed to meet the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the hour indicated.

GENERAL MARSHALL then invited Ambassador Winant to express his views as to the state of mind of the British with respect to the current situation.

AMBASSADOR WINANT said that he found it difficult to give an accurate picture of British thinking with reference to a purely military conference, the need of which the British had felt some weeks ago. He pointed out that his statements would not in any way present his personal opinions but would indicate British opinion as he saw it. He said that the British felt the position of the United Nations was not sufficiently fluid to take advantage of the victories gained in Italy. These had resulted in the opening up of Mediterranean areas which offered to the Allies an opportunity for profitable action, if seized promptly, and which might assist in getting Turkey into the war. He said that Mr. Eden had differed with the Russian information [*inclination?*] to bring pressure to bear on Turkey and thought that a slow approach to her entry into the war was much better, and he had been able to persuade Mr. Molotov to accept this view.

AMBASSADOR WINANT said that he had recently had a talk with Admiral Sir Andrew Brown[e] Cunningham, the British First Sea Lord. He had been impressed with Admiral Cunningham's knowledge of the personalities who command Turkish policies and felt strongly that a conference with him would prove fruitful.

MR. WINANT said that in his opinion the British had no intention of diverting the means available for action in Burma. With reference to OVERLORD he thought that the British had no idea of abandoning the operation but that they did oppose a fixed date for it. It is the British view that it was not possible to fix far in advance the psychological moment for launching an attack on the Continent and they feared that through the action of the British and U. S. military staffs they had signed a contract, the terms of which took precedence over subsequent changes in the military situation. He felt that the British were genuine in their desire to build up OVERLORD and that the principal difference in opinion as between them and the U. S. was as to timing. He pointed out that OVERLORD lacks a commander and that this lack was adding to the difficulties of the commander of the American forces in England. He said that the British were very anxious to employ fully the resistance possible to be developed among the unorganized forces in the Balkans. He felt that this was sufficient to warrant the expenditure of some means. With respect to Italy, he felt they do not want to advance as far as the Po Valley but only

to go far enough to take Rome and secure the airfields in that area. They are of the opinion that day and night bombing is having tremendous effect in Germany in the destruction of bottle-neck industry. They feel that this bombing has neutralized 17 cities and they hope that a comparable success will continue.

In answer to a question from Admiral King, MR. WINANT stated that the British feel that Russia wants Turkey in the war now and not later. He had been told by Mr. Eden that it was the Prime Minister's opinion that Marshal Stalin is chiefly interested at the present moment in stretching German resources and that his interest in a second front was not nearly so great as it had been. He was still interested in vigorous action against the Germans but was not so much concerned as to the particular area in which it was brought to bear.

GENERAL ARNOLD inquired as to the British view on the possibility of carrying on operations in the Balkans without interfering with scheduled operations.

MR. WINANT replied that the British feel that it can be done without much cost by the employment of what he termed bush-league tactics in the Eastern Mediterranean. He said that the Prime Minister had been considerably upset by the British defeat in the Dodecanese although British military men thought that the Prime Minister's view was considerably out of perspective.

MR. WINANT said that the British feel that they are supreme on the sea and that the British and the U. S. are supreme in the air but that the German is still superior to both in ground operations. Their ground operations in the Dodecanese had confirmed the Prime Minister's views in this regard.

With reference to cross-channel operations he said that the British were disturbed now not so much by the difficulties of landing as by those to be encountered during the first 60 days. They were impressed with the excellent communications which ran from east to west and doubted that by bombing alone it would be possible to prevent the Germans from bringing up sufficient reinforcements to put the issue gravely in doubt.

MR. WINANT reiterated that the British are still behind the OVERLORD operation but wish to be sure that German resistance is properly softened before undertaking the actual landing operation.

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 22, 1943,
3 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Tansey
Captain Doyle
Colonel Roberts

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
General Riddell-Webster
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier McNair

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested, and the COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed, that General Sir Alan Brooke should take the Chair at the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at SEXTANT.

1. CONDUCT OF CONFERENCE

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the future work of the Conference, with particular reference to the necessity for considering operations in the Far East as early as possible.

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY said that he understood it was likely that the President and Prime Minister would hold a plenary session with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at 1700 on Tuesday, 23 November, and that it had been suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Wednesday, 24 November.

GENERAL MARSHALL read out to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a brief memorandum prepared by General Stilwell giving the Generalissimo's views of future operations in the Chinese Theater.² He suggested

¹ This was the 127th meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their first meeting during the First Cairo Conference.

² *Post*, p. 370.

that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff should separately study this memorandum on the following morning³ and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff collectively should consider it at 1430 on Tuesday, 23 November.⁴ These proposals were accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was also agreed that the Generalissimo and his principal advisers should be invited to be present at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting at 1530 on Tuesday, 23 November.⁵

At the suggestion of Admiral Leahy,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that the procedure to be used at **SEXTANT** should follow the lines of that used at the **QUADRANT** Conference, with specific reference to the recording of decisions, the approval of minutes, and the reports to the President and Prime Minister.

2. PROPOSED "SEXTANT" AGENDA
(C. C. S. 404 and 404/1)⁶

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British proposals set out in C. C. S. 404/1 were designed to enable the Combined Chiefs of Staff to study at the earliest possible opportunity operations affecting the Chinese Theater. They could then turn to operations in Europe in order that if possible they should have fully considered these before meeting the U. S. S. R. representatives.

ADMIRAL KING said he felt that the British agenda was acceptable as an outline into which the details suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff could be fitted.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the proposals for the main subjects for discussion on the **SEXTANT** agenda as set out in paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 404/1.

3. "EUREKA"

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the arrangements for **EUREKA**.

4. RELATIONS BETWEEN COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U. S. S. R. AND CHINA

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider the question of their relationship both during the

³ For a summary of the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held November 23, 1943, 11 a. m., see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 61.

⁴ For the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Chinese military officers, November 23, 1943, 2:30 p. m., see *post*, p. 316.

⁵ The meeting with Chiang and his principal advisers was held November 23, 1943, 11 a. m., instead of 3:30 p. m. For the minutes of the meeting, see *post*, p. 311.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 368 and 369.

Conference and in the future, with the military representatives of the U. S. S. R. and China. This seemed particularly important in view of the recent Four-Power agreements concluded in Moscow.⁷ There had already been an intimation from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that he would welcome an invitation for a Chinese military representative to sit with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It might facilitate the development of good faith and mutual understanding with the U. S. S. R. and China if each were invited to have a representative present with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. However, he thought that this should be based on a well thought out scheme, rather than on day-to-day decisions. There might be certain advantages in having the Soviet representatives attend at least some conferences in order that they could appreciate the difficulties of a world-wide war on every front in comparison with their own and China's highly localized operations.

ADMIRAL KING said that the question raised a basic problem in that it might lead to the permanent expansion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff into a Four-Power body. It was pointed out that it would be impossible for the Chinese and the Soviet representatives to sit at the same table since they were not engaging the same enemies, nor could the Soviet representatives attend deliberations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff dealing with the war against Japan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the Chinese and Soviets should, during the present Conference, be invited to be present only when the Combined Chiefs of Staff were discussing the problems of the particular fronts in which each was interested. With regard to the Soviets, it would of course most certainly be necessary, when a Western Front was opened, that our action should be coordinated with theirs and that the delegates attending meetings for this purpose should be able to speak with full authority.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that this would be equally true if Turkey was brought into the war and operations in that area were undertaken.

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY said that at Moscow it had been clear that the Soviet representatives did not realize that the machinery of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was in continuous operation. They would, he thought, expect to be invited only to Conferences such as QUADRANT or SEXTANT, but not to attend all the meetings at these Conferences. There had been no signs of their suggesting permanent representation with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

⁷ For the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed at Moscow October 30, 1943, by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China, and issued November 1, 1943, see *Decade*, p. 11. The records of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, October 18-November 1, 1943, are scheduled to be published in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I.

There was general agreement that, subject to further consideration, the best procedure would be for the Chinese and Soviet Representatives to be invited to attend only those meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at which matters concerning the fronts in which they were interested were under discussion. At EUREKA, however, it would obviously be necessary for the Soviet representatives to attend all meetings held.⁸

5. REAFFIRMATION OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND BASIC UNDERTAKINGS

Without discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the over-all strategic concept and basic undertakings as set out in C. C. S. 380/2.⁹

⁸ The Combined Chiefs of Staff held one meeting at the Tehran Conference (EUREKA) at which the Soviet military representative (Voroshilov) was not present, namely, the meeting of November 30, 1943, 9:30 a. m., *post*, p. 555.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 157.

MEETINGS OF ROOSEVELT, CHURCHILL, CHIANG, AND MADAME CHIANG, NOVEMBER 22, 1943, AFTERNOON, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

Editorial Note

The information given above is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 294. No records of these conversations have been found. An entry in the Leahy Diary for the afternoon of November 22, 1943, reads as follows: "Had tea in Kirk Villa with the President, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang, General Marshall and Mr. Hopkins." Presumably the Churchill visit took place separately from that of the Chiangs. There are no indications that substantive problems were discussed during these visits, which appear to have been in the nature of courtesy calls.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, NOVEMBER 22, 1943, 8 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Admiral Mountbatten

Editorial Note

The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 294. No record of the subjects discussed at

this dinner meeting has been found. For post-conference documents indicating that Roosevelt discussed the future status of Hong Kong with Churchill at Cairo, see *post*, pp. 887, 888. There is no indication of the particular meeting at Cairo in which this discussion took place.

AMERICAN-BRITISH PRELIMINARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 22, 1943,
9 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant-General Stilwell
Lieutenant-General Somervell
Major General Stratmeyer
Major General Wheeler
Major General Chennault
Major General Wedemeyer
Captain Royal

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant-General Ismay
Lieutenant-General Carton
de Wiart
Brigadier Hollis

Editorial Note

No minutes of this meeting have been found and apparently none were taken in view of the informal nature of the gathering. The information given above as to the time of the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log (*ante*, p. 294). Leahy (p. 199) indicates that the Combined Chiefs joined the President's dinner party after the meal and that "Mountbatten outlined his plans and his needs for the Burma campaign which had been assigned to him at the Quebec Conference held in August 1943." Alanbrooke (p. 51) states that the purpose of the meeting was "to discuss Dickie Mountbatten's plans and to prepare for meetings with Chiang Kai-shek." Arnold (p. 461) mentions Chiang as one of the participants, while the Log indicates that Chiang, Madame Chiang, and three Chinese generals were present. It appears doubtful that the Chinese contingent actually attended; see Roosevelt's welcome to the Chinese at the Plenary Meeting on the following morning (*post*, p. 312) and the diary entry for November 23 in Alanbrooke, p. 51.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1943

HARRIMAN-VYSHINSKY CONVERSATION, NOVEMBER 23, 1943,
FORENOON, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Ambassador Harriman
Mr. Bohlen

SOVIET UNION

Mr. Vyshinsky

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SECRET

CAIRO, November 23, 1943.

While waiting to see the President, I followed up Mr. Hopkins' request that I obtain more information about the attitude of the Soviets on some of the Mediterranean problems.

I bluntly told Vyshinski of the serious view we took of the French Committee's actions in Lebanon.¹ I said we could not permit the French Committee to destroy the confidence of the world in the sincerity of American principles on freedom and democracy. I asked him what the Soviet Government's views were in the matter. He said he had not been instructed but he was quite sure there could be no other point of view for his Government.

Next I asked him what he thought about the King of Italy. He said he was going to keep his mind open till he could judge the situation on the ground but he certainly made it clear that he was predisposed not to favor the retention of the King. He said "We have all stated the principles which we are going to apply in Italy as agreed to in the Moscow Conference and these certainly must be put into effect."² He said that any elements or institutions which tend to impede these principles will have to be moved out of the path and anything that assists in the implementation of these principles should be encouraged.

I then asked him whether he had any recent information about Mikhailovic [*Mihailović*]. He said he had none. I said I had none either but I thought it was time to tell Mikhailovic "that he should

¹ The situation in Lebanon, to which reference is made at this point, is described *ante*, p. 84, footnote 2.

² The reference is to the democratic, anti-Fascist principles set forth in the Declaration Regarding Italy, issued on November 1, 1943, at the conclusion of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. For text of the Declaration, see *Decade*, p. 12.

fish, cut bait, or go ashore." He heartily agreed with this statement and added that, from his point of view, up to the present Mikhailovic had not only not been helpful in the prosecution of the war but had even been harmful.

ROOSEVELT CONVERSATIONS WITH VARIOUS CALLERS, NOVEMBER
23, 1943, FORENOON, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

Editorial Note

According to the Log (*ante*, pp. 294-295), the following foreign persons called on the President during the forenoon of November 23: Vyshinsky; Mountbatten; Churchill and his daughter, Mrs. Sarah Oliver; Chiang and Madame Chiang; and the Chinese Generals Shang, Lin, and Chu. The calls were apparently of brief duration and were primarily of a courtesy nature. No memoranda of these conversations appear to have been made either by or for the President.

Vyshinsky was accompanied by Harriman and by Bohlen, who acted as interpreter. From correspondence with Harriman and Bohlen (023/5-2554; 023.1/4-1554) the editors obtained the following information concerning this conversation:

Vyshinsky was on his way to Algiers to serve as the Soviet representative on the Tripartite (Anglo-American-Soviet) Advisory Council for Italy set up at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943. He asked to see the President for the purpose of paying his respects. The President expressed to Vyshinsky the need for close cooperation between the three powers represented on the Council for Italy. The President explained the difficulties he was having with de Gaulle, and he touched on the idea of a trusteeship for immature countries, mentioning Morocco in this connection. Vyshinsky expressed general agreement with the views of the President and appeared impressed with the frank manner in which the President spoke.

For a subsequent reference by Roosevelt to his conversation with Vyshinsky, see *post*, p. 439.

Reilly (p. 171) implies that Vyshinsky conveyed an invitation for Roosevelt to stay at the Russian Embassy in Tehran. Hurley's telegram of November 26 (*post*, p. 439) also suggests that Roosevelt had received such an invitation prior to that date. See also the Log, *post*, p. 461. It appears, however, that Roosevelt did not consider this invitation as fully official until it was repeated more formally with Stalin's express approval. In one of the first Churchill-Roosevelt conversations at Cairo the Prime Minister apparently invited the

President to stay at the British Legation at Tehran. The exact time of this invitation is not known, but it preceded the Russian one; see *post*, pp. 397, 461, 476.

**CHIANG-HURLEY CONVERSATION, NOVEMBER 23, 1943,
FORENOON, CHIANG'S VILLA**

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. The fact that Hurley had an appointment with Chiang on November 23 is indicated in a letter from Hurley's aide (Major John Henry) to Hopkins, dated November 23, 1943 (Hopkins Papers).

In an interview with one of the editors in 1956, Hurley recalled the time and place of the meeting as indicated above. He stated that Madame Chiang was present at the meeting. According to Hurley's recollection, Chiang asked whether Roosevelt and Churchill were to meet with Stalin, to which Hurley replied that such a meeting was scheduled but not for Cairo. Hurley also recalled discussing with Chiang the pending plan for American-British-Chinese military co-operation in Burma. (110.4-HD/12-1756.)

PLENARY MEETING, NOVEMBER 23, 1943, 11 A. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt (in the Chair)
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Stilwell
Lieutenant General Somervell
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Wheeler
Major General Chennault
Major General Wedemeyer

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Carton de Wiart

CHINA

Generalissimo Chiang
Madame Chiang
General Shang
Lieutenant General Lin
Major General Chu

Secretariat

Brigadier Hollis
Captain Royal

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

SOUTHEAST ASIA OPERATIONS

THE PRESIDENT, extending a warm welcome to the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and to the Chinese Delegation, said that this was an historic meeting and a logical consequence to the Four Power Conference recently concluded in Moscow. The effect of this meeting would, he hoped, not only bear fruit today and in the immediate future, but for decades to come. He suggested that Admiral Mountbatten might be asked to give a general survey of intended operations in Southeast Asia. The ground to be covered mainly concerned the land, since seagoing operations were in progress all the time. There was, he felt sure, unanimous agreement that every effort should be made to send more equipment to China, with a view to accelerating the process by which we could launch an air offensive against the heart of Japan itself.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN then outlined the operations he proposed for the coming campaign in Burma. Apart from current air operations by British-U. S. air forces and two Chinese divisions operating from Ledo, the first land movement would take place in mid-January. The 15th British Indian Corps would advance on the Arakan front with a view to taking up an improved line. This Corps would not, however, be restricted to a defensive role, but would exploit success wherever possible. For this purpose a West African brigade would be deployed on an outflanking movement. At the same time the 4th British Indian Corps (Imphal Force) would start operations with the object of capturing Minthami, Mawlaik, and Sittaung and advancing as far as possible to the southeast.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN then explained the natural difficulties with which the Allied Forces had to contend. Our lines of communication ran through one of the most difficult countries in the world, served by a one meter gauge railway which, nevertheless, had been worked up to carry 3,100 tons a day, with the hope that this might be increased by a further 500 tons a day. After leaving the railway and the Brahmaputra River, the communication was by roads now being built. All this was being done in thick jungle and across mountains running north and south across the line of communications. The Japanese in Burma were at the end of an excellent line of communication up the Irrawaddy from Rangoon, with a railway running through Indaw to Myitkyina. They had vast resources and adequate equipment and a force of some five divisions, which was likely to be augmented by a

sixth division. In order to make good the disparity between our extremely difficult and the Japanese relatively good communications, we had adopted the expedient of air supply on a large scale.

In February General Wingate intended to make three thrusts with his Long Range Penetration Groups. One would be from Chittagong; the second would support the 4th Group in the Tamu area; and the third would help the Chinese forces operating from Ledo. It was hoped that the 3rd Group would, by the use of gliders operating ahead of the Yunnan forces, disrupt and muddle the Japanese. Meanwhile, the Ledo forces would move down in the Myitkyina direction to link up at Bhamo with the main operations of the Yunnan forces advancing on Lashio. In mid-March the 5th Indian Parachute Brigade would seize the airfield at Indaw, after which the 26th Indian Division would be flown in to Indaw by transport aircraft and thereafter be maintained by air.

It was hoped in these operations to surprise the Japanese by using novel methods of supply and by the boldness of our advance through what they might consider to be impassable country. Subject to the Generalissimo's permission, General Stilwell had agreed that the Ledo force should come under the 14th Army Commander until it reached Kamaing, after which it would revert to the command of General Stilwell. Admiral Mountbatten enquired whether this arrangement was agreeable to the Generalissimo.

THE GENERALISSIMO said that he would like to see the proposals illustrated on a map before giving his decision.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN then gave certain logistic information for the air route over the "hump." He had promised the Generalissimo to work the supply over this route up to 10,000 tons a month. For November and December the figure would be 9,700 tons. For January and February, however, it would drop to 7,900 tons. In March the figure should rise again to 9,200 tons. Twenty-five additional first-line transport aircraft were required and this demand had been put to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with, he understood, every prospect of the demand being met.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that these were important military operations of a much greater magnitude than ever previously contemplated for this theater. The plans had not yet been examined by the Chiefs of Staff, but this would be done at the earliest opportunity, possibly the same day. In all there was an Allied force of approximately 320,000 men who would apply pressure on the enemy in this theater. They would have a qualitative as well as a quantitative supremacy over the enemy. He had high hopes of these operations, the success of which largely depended on surprise and secrecy and ignorance on the part of the enemy as to the lines of approach and the points of attack.

Owing to the surrender of the Italian Fleet and other naval events of a favorable character, a formidable British Fleet would be established in due course in the Indian Ocean. This would ultimately consist of no less than 5 modernized capital ships, 4 heavy armored carriers, and up to 12 auxiliary carriers, together with cruisers and flotillas. This force would be more powerful than any detachment which it was thought that the Japanese could afford to make from their main fleet in the Pacific, having regard to the U. S. naval strength in the Pacific theater. In addition to all this Admiral Mountbatten would have formed by the spring an amphibious "circus" for use in such amphibious operations as might ultimately be decided upon, but for which preparations were now going ahead with all speed.

THE GENERALISSIMO said that in accordance with the view he had expressed at Chungking, the success of the operations in Burma depended, in his opinion, not only on the strength of the naval forces established in the Indian Ocean, but on the simultaneous coordination of naval action with the land operations.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that naval operations in the Bay of Bengal would not necessarily be coordinated with and linked to the land campaign. Our naval superiority in this area should ensure the security of our communications and a threat to those of the enemy. It should be remembered that the main fleet base would be anywhere from 2,000 to 3,000 miles away from the area in which the armies were operating. Thus, no comparison could be made with these operations and with those carried out in Sicily, where it had been possible for the fleet to work in close support of the Army.

THE GENERALISSIMO considered that the enemy would reinforce Burma and that this could only be stopped by vigorous naval operations.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it would be disastrous if we could do nothing to prevent the Japanese bringing large reinforcements by sea through the Malacca and Sunda Straits. We could not guarantee to cut off reinforcements by sea entirely, but we should do everything to prevent their arrival.

THE GENERALISSIMO said he was not clear as to the timing of the concentration of the naval forces in the Indian Ocean. He was convinced that simultaneous naval and land operations gave the best chance of success for the operations. Burma was the key to the whole campaign in Asia. After he had been cleared out of Burma, the enemy's next stand would be in North China and, finally, in Manchuria. The loss of Burma would be a very serious matter to the Japanese and they would fight stubbornly and tenaciously to retain their hold on the country.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was unable to agree that the success of the land operations entirely hinged on a simultaneous naval concentration. The fleet could not, in any event, be assembled by January, nor, indeed, until some time later. The ships had to be tropicalized and fitted with special equipment. Some would be starting soon, but the build-up to full strength would not be achieved until the late spring or early summer of 1944. It seemed, however, on the whole improbable that in the meanwhile the enemy would send naval forces in any strength to the Bay of Bengal.

THE PRESIDENT enquired about the railway communications between Siam and Burma.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the Japanese had recently completed the railway from Bangkok to Thanbyuzayat, 15 degrees 55 minutes N., 97 degrees 40 minutes E. and this would improve their facilities for maintaining forces in Burma to an appreciable degree.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that the Japanese were mainly relying upon road and rail communications from the Malay Peninsula to maintain their forces in Burma. As we did not possess shore air bases, it was not possible for us to threaten the Japanese communications in the Gulf of Siam. He wished to emphasize the great importance he attached to the operations in Southeast Asia, which would be driven forward with all vigor and dispatch. He hoped to have a further talk with the Generalissimo when some other details of the British naval situation would be communicated.

In conclusion, THE PRESIDENT said that the matter could not be carried any further that morning. He hoped that the Generalissimo would take this opportunity of meeting the Chiefs of the American and British Staffs and to discuss these important problems frankly with them.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, NOVEMBER 23, 1943,
1:30 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Oliver
Commander Thompson
Mr. Martin

Editorial Note

The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 295. No record of the subjects discussed

at this meeting has been found. See, however, the editorial note on the Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, *ante*, p. 307.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 23, 1943,
2:30 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Stilwell
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Wheeler
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Major General Wedemeyer
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Tansey
Captain Doyle
Colonel Roberts
Colonel O'Donnell
Captain Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Admiral Mountbatten
General Riddell-Webster
Lieutenant General Carton
de Wiart
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Cobb
Brigadier Head
Brigadier McNair

PRESENT FOR THE LAST ITEM ONLY

General Shang
Lieutenant General Lin
Vice Admiral Yang
Lieutenant General Chou
Major General Chu
Major General Tsai
Major General Chennault

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE 127TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 127th Meeting. The detailed record of the Meeting was also accepted subject to minor amendments.

¹ C. C. S. 128th meeting.

2. THE ROLE OF CHINA IN THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
(C. C. S. 405)²

GENERAL STILWELL informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he had received a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he did not wish any proposals for Chinese action laid before the Combined Chiefs of Staff until he had had a further consultation with the President and General Marshall.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it appeared that the operations set out in subparagraphs 2 *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* of C. C. S. 405 were acceptable. The remaining proposals appeared unrealistic, particularly in view of the logistic difficulties which General Marshall had mentioned at a previous meeting. He could not see how Formosa could be attacked from the mainland of China without any landing craft.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he agreed with Sir Alan Brooke's views. Subparagraphs 2 *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff; the remaining proposals were matters for the future, requiring detailed examination, particularly in view of the serious logistic implications. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should so inform the Chinese representatives.

GENERAL MARSHALL reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that up till now the Generalissimo's sole interest had been in the provision of a large United States Air Force in China and a large number of transport aircraft. He had taken each step in the direction of the formation of ground forces with reluctance. Months had passed before he would agree to the training of the Chinese troops at Ramgarh [*Ramgarh*]. More months had passed before he agreed to an increase in their numbers. Negotiations with the Indian government had necessitated further delay. Yet another period had passed before the Generalissimo would agree to the habilitation of the Yunnan force. Now, for the first time, the Generalissimo had shown an active interest in and an admission of the importance of the formation and employment of Chinese ground forces. He (General Marshall) personally had confidence in the value of Chinese troops provided they were properly led. Their powers of endurance should prove immensely valuable in the type of warfare in which they were to be employed. He considered that the Generalissimo's new proposals should be given the most careful and sympathetic consideration. These factors and the value of China once Germany had collapsed and the flow of supplies to the East had increased, should be borne most carefully in mind when considering the Generalissimo's plan.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the Generalissimo's proposals must be considered in relation to the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan.

² *Post*, p. 370.

He agreed with General Marshall as to the importance of the change of heart shown by the Generalissimo in his latest proposals, and felt that he should not be discouraged if it could possibly be avoided.

GENERAL ARNOLD mentioned the problem of the employment of some two thousand heavy bombers which would be available on the defeat of Germany. Available bases in the Aleutians, Maritime Provinces, and the Islands³ were all of limited capacity.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that this great force might be used against shipping.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the bases he had mentioned would in fact be used by heavy bombers employed against shipping. His point was that only by using them out of China could the heart of Japan itself be attacked. Attacks on Japanese oil resources and shipping, while valuable, would not produce the final result.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's views with regard to the employment of naval forces in the Bay of Bengal.

GENERAL STILWELL said he believed that the Generalissimo would be satisfied if we could guarantee naval security in the Bay of Bengal.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that it would be right to say that we should have general control of the Bay of Bengal but he could not absolutely guarantee its complete security. He believed that the Prime Minister intended in due course to inform the Generalissimo of the British naval forces to be employed in the Bay of Bengal but felt that this information should be imparted by the Prime Minister himself and not by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained that in discussing amphibious operations with the Generalissimo in Chungking, he had pointed out that it was intended to launch an amphibious operation in the spring, probably to synchronize with the Burma land operations. From the air bases made available by the amphibious operation it was hoped to be able to interfere with seaborne supplies, both through Rangoon and Bangkok. He believed that the Generalissimo was in fact interested in this action rather than in the actual provision of naval forces in the Bay of Bengal.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. That the operations proposed in paragraph 2 *a* to *d* inclusive, of C. C. S. 405 are, in general, in consonance with the present concept of operations against Japan as expressed in C. C. S. 397, Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944.⁴

³ Presumably those islands in the Pacific Ocean which were in Allied hands.

⁴ This paper as revised is printed *post*, p. 779.

b. That the operations proposed in paragraphs 2 *e* to *h* inclusive, of C. C. S. 405 go beyond the present concept of operations in China and require detailed examination and study with particular reference to logistic difficulties.

c. That the study indicated in *b* above, together with an examination of the employment for the defeat of Japan of the heavy bombers that would become available when Germany has been eliminated from the war, should be included in the general study of the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan now being conducted by the Combined Staff Planners.

3. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION, 1944—PACIFIC-FAR EAST (C. C. S. 300/2)⁵

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there appeared to be minor discrepancies with regard to the estimate of enemy forces available, which could be discussed by the Combined Intelligence Committee. In other respects the paper could be accepted as an estimate of the situation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed with this view.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted and noted for future information the estimate of the enemy situation, 1944—Pacific-Far East, set out in C. C. S. 300/2.

4. FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (C. C. S. 390/1)⁶

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he noted that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not able to provide the forces necessary for CULVERIN. With regard to BUCCANEER, he would like to defer consideration of this operation until the Conference was further advanced.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the Japanese forces in CULVERIN had increased from one to three divisions. He was, however, prepared to accept a risk and to undertake Operation CULVERIN with smaller forces if this should be considered necessary. His chief concern was to be in a position to cut the Japanese lines of communication into Burma and to obtain an air base from which he could attack the Malacca Straits, Rangoon, and Bangkok. BUCCANEER, though not providing so many airfields, was approximately the same distance from Bangkok as was CULVERIN, and so offered almost equal strategic advantages; it could be undertaken with the forces now available to him. He would propose to launch BUCCANEER probably some two to three days after the launching of the land campaign in North Burma. This would disperse the Japanese air effort. The Burma operations

⁵ *Ante*, p. 232.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 243.

and BUCCANEER each had a considerable effect on the other and had been planned and considered together.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved C. C. S. 390/1 but agreed to suspend final decision regarding Operation BUCCANEER until later in the SEXTANT Conference in order to allow the operation to be considered in relation to the other operations to be undertaken.

5. COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF—UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF
(C. C. S. 406)⁷

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he would like further time to consider the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the United States Chiefs of Staff had given only very brief consideration to this matter but had felt that it would be valuable to outline a possible course of action before pressure was exerted from any quarter to widen the membership of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL KING said that, as he saw it, the United Chiefs of Staff would consist of one representative of the Chiefs of Staff of each nation who would act as spokesman. This proposal would reduce the difficulties to their simplest possible terms if the issue were to be forced upon the United States and British Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer action on this paper.

6. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then entered into a general discussion of the situation in the Southeast Asia Command.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN, in reply to a question, explained that the grounding of a vessel carrying spare aircraft engines would result in a deficit in air lift over the "hump" for December of some 2,100 tons. The backlog thus caused had not been included in his calculations and he suggested that the Combined Planners should look into this question. His plans were not made on wide margins of safety and did not make allowance for acts of God since he realized fully that too heavy demands from his theater would have direct repercussions on the operations in other theaters. In reply to a further question, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that his Royal Air Force transports were being used to the full. They were not being employed in China since there were insufficient numbers to train his parachute troops and long range penetration groups. It had been necessary for United States aircraft to fly in supplies to the British units in Fort Hertz.

⁷ *Post*, p. 379.

GENERAL STRATEMEYER asked if it was possible for the Royal Air Force to provide old bombers which were not operationally fit, for use as transport aircraft.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he did not feel that worn-out aircraft, even if available, could be used for this task. Manpower also was short and the production of British bombers was a direct measure of the weight of attack on Germany.

In further discussion of the possibility of interrupting Japanese communications, SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that air bombing alone could not completely stop the use of enemy ports.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN agreed with this view but explained that he had great hopes that heavy bombing of Japanese occupied ports would result in strikes of dock labor and a resulting slowing up in the flow of supplies.

GENERAL ARNOLD felt that our present calculations with regard to air transport possibilities had been wrongly based on a 100 percent figure of accomplishment. This figure was never achieved, and it would be safer to "lower our sights" with regard to target figures and accept as a bonus any increase on this lower figure.

In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the airport at Blair in BUCCANEER had a 1,650 yard runway and was capable of operating three squadrons.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the above statements.

(At this point General Shang Chen, Lieutenant General Lin Wei, Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan Ch'eng, Lieutenant General Chou Chih Jou, Lieutenant [*Major*] General Chu Shih Ming, Major General Tsai Wen Chih and Major General Chennault entered the meeting.)

SIR ALAN BROOKE, in welcoming the Chinese Representatives, said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were very pleased to have this opportunity to meet with them and discuss around the table plans for future operations in China. These discussions should lead to definite conclusions. Admiral Mountbatten had that morning put forward his plans and he suggested that the Chinese Representatives should ask any further questions that they might wish and put forward their own suggestions with regard to these plans.

GENERAL CHU, on behalf of General Shang Chen, explained that the Chinese Representatives had not had sufficient time to study these plans and would prefer to discuss them on the following day.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN suggested that the Chinese Representatives should give an outline of the state of readiness of the Yunnan Force and of the detailed plans for its employment. He pointed out that the success of our efforts to open the land route to China was dependent

on the successful operation of the Yunnan Force in coordination with the British attacks.

GENERAL STILWELL then outlined in detail the Chinese Forces available and their state of readiness. There were, at present, certain shortages of personnel which were being rapidly made good. The ten assault divisions would first be brought up to strength and any deficiencies in pack transport would be compensated for by the use of manpower.

With the aid of a map ^a GENERAL STILWELL outlined the three coordinated attacks which would be made by the Yunnan force. He believed that sufficient tactical air forces were available to support these operations.

GENERAL CHENNAULT and GENERAL STRATEMEYER explained the arrangements which had been made for the coordination of the air effort with that of the ground forces.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Took note with interest of the above statements.
- b. Agreed to meet again with the Chinese Representatives at 1530 hours on 24 November.

^a Not found with the source text.

ROOSEVELT-CHIANG DINNER MEETING, NOVEMBER 23, 1943, 8 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins

CHINA
Generalissimo Chiang
Madame Chiang
Dr. Wang

Editorial Note

No official American record of the substance of this conversation has been found and apparently none was prepared. In response to an inquiry from the editors in 1956, the Chinese Ambassador at Washington (Dr. Hollington Tong) ascertained that the Chinese Government had in its files a summary record of this conversation in the Chinese language. The Chinese Government kindly prepared an English translation and granted permission for its publication in this volume (023.1/5/21/57). In view of the paucity of authoritative information respecting the Roosevelt-Chiang discussions at Cairo, the Chinese memorandum is reproduced below.

The information set forth above respecting the meeting and the participants is taken from the Chinese record of the conversation.

The Log (*ante*, p. 296) indicates that the Chiangs, together with Hopkins and Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, were dinner guests of the President. Elliott Roosevelt (pp. 142, 164-165) reproduces some of his father's remarks that pertain presumably to this discussion, but there is no indication that Colonel Roosevelt was present at either the dinner or the discussion that followed. The Log does not mention the attendance of Dr. Wang.

According to the account in Elliott Roosevelt, the conversation touched on the following topics that are not mentioned in the Chinese summary record: The formation of a coalition government in China, British rights in Shanghai and Canton, the use of American rather than British warships in future operations based on Chinese ports, and the future status of the Malay States, Burma, and India.

For references to other subjects which were discussed by Roosevelt and Chiang at Cairo and which may have been discussed in whole or in part at this meeting, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 366.

023.1/5-2157

Chinese Summary Record

Translation

(1) *On China's International Position*—President Roosevelt expressed his view that China should take her place as one of the Big Four¹ and participate on an equal footing in the machinery of the Big Four Group and in all its decisions. Generalissimo Chiang responded that China would be glad to take part in all the Big Four machinery and decisions.

(2) *On the Status of Japanese Imperial House*—President Roosevelt enquired of Generalissimo Chiang's views as to whether the institution of the Emperor of Japan should be abolished after the war. The Generalissimo said that this would involve the question of the form of government of Japan and should be left for the Japanese people themselves to decide after the war, so as not to precipitate any error which might perpetuate itself in international relations.

(3) *On Military Occupation of Japan*—President Roosevelt was of the opinion that China should play the leading role in the post-war military occupation of Japan.² Generalissimo Chiang believed, however, that China was not equipped to shoulder this considerable responsibility, that the task should be carried out under the leadership of the United States and that China could participate in the task in

¹ The United States, China, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

² See *post*, p. 864.

a supporting capacity should it prove necessary by that time. The Generalissimo also took the position that the final decision on the matter could await further development of the actual situation.

(4) *On Reparation in Kind*—Generalissimo Chiang proposed that a part of the reparation Japan was to pay China after the war could be paid in the form of actual properties. Much of Japan's industrial machinery and equipment, war and merchant ships, rolling stock, etc., could be transferred to China. President Roosevelt expressed his concurrence in the proposal.

(5) *On Restoration of Territories*—Generalissimo Chiang and President Roosevelt agreed that the four Northeastern provinces of China, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands [*Pescadores*] which Japan had taken from China by force must be restored to China after the war, it being understood that the Liaotung Peninsula and its two ports, Lushun (Port of Arthur) and Dairen, must be included. The President then referred to the question of the Ryukyu Islands and enquired more than once whether China would want the Ryukyus. The Generalissimo replied that China would be agreeable to joint occupation of the Ryukyus by China and the United States and, eventually, joint administration by the two countries under the trusteeship of an international organization. President Roosevelt also raised the question of Hongkong. The Generalissimo suggested that the President discuss the matter with the British authorities before further deliberation.

(6) *On Matters Concerning Military Cooperation*—President Roosevelt proposed that, after the war, China and the United States should effect certain arrangements under which the two countries could come to each other's assistance in the event of foreign aggression and that the United States should maintain adequate military forces on various bases in the Pacific in order that it could effectively share the responsibility of preventing aggression. Generalissimo Chiang expressed his agreement to both proposals. The Generalissimo expressed his hope that the United States would be in a position to extend necessary aid to China for equipping its land, naval and air forces for the purpose of strengthening its national defense and enabling its performance of international obligations. Generalissimo Chiang also proposed that, to achieve mutual security, the two countries should arrange for army and naval bases of each to be available for use by the other and stated that China would be prepared to place Lushun (Port of Arthur) at the joint disposal of China and the United States. President Roosevelt, on his part, proposed that China and the United States should consult with each other before any decision was to be reached on matters concerning Asia. The Generalissimo indicated agreement.

(7) *On Korea, Indo-China and Thailand*—President Roosevelt advanced the opinion that China and the United States should reach a mutual understanding on the future status of Korea, Indo-China and other colonial areas as well as Thailand. Concurring, Generalissimo Chiang stressed on the necessity of granting independence to Korea. It was also his view that China and the United States should endeavor together to help Indo-China achieve independence after the war and that independent status should be restored to Thailand. The President expressed his agreement.³

(8) *On Economic Aid to China*—Generalissimo Chiang pointed out that China's post-war economic reconstruction would be a tremendously difficult task which would require United States financial aid in the form of loans, etc., and also various types of technical assistance. President Roosevelt indicated that close and practical consideration would be given to the matter.

(9) *On Outer Mongolia and Tannu Tuva*—President Roosevelt enquired especially as to the present status of Tannu Tuva and its historical relations with its neighbors. Generalissimo Chiang pointed out that the area had been an integral part of China's Outer Mongolia until it was forcibly taken and annexed by Russia. He said that the question of Tannu Tuva, together with that of Outer Mongolia, must be settled in time to come through negotiations with Soviet Russia.

(10) *On Unified Command*—Generalissimo Chiang proposed the formation of a China-U. S. Joint Council of Chiefs-of-Staff or, as an alternative, China's participation in the existing Britain-U. S. Council of Chiefs-of-Staff.⁴ President Roosevelt agreed to consult the chiefs of staff of the United States in order to reach a decision on the matter.⁵

³ See *post*, pp. 389, 485, 864, 869; *F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, edited by Elliott Roosevelt (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950: 2 vols.), vol. II, p. 1489; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 237-238.

⁴ See *post*, p. 388.

⁵ Roosevelt's answer was negative; see *post*, p. 748. For consideration of this subject by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see also *ante*, pp. 305, 320.

DINNER PARTY OF THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 23, 1943, EVENING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill

Editorial Note

No official record of this informal meeting has been found. The meeting is mentioned in Arnold, p. 462, in Leahy, p. 200, and in Alanbrooke, p. 52, but there are no indications that matters of business were discussed. The meeting took place in the villa occupied by the British Chiefs of Staff.

CHURCHILL-MARSHALL DINNER MEETING, NOVEMBER 23, EVENING**PRESENT**

UNITED STATES
General Marshall

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of this informal meeting has been found. At the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the following day Marshall referred to his dinner conversation with Churchill and indicated that the latter had discussed operations in the Dodecanese, the capture of Rhodes, the deployment of landing craft, the progress of the Italian campaign, aid to the guerrillas in the Balkans, the relation of operations in the Mediterranean to the date of OVERLORD, and coordination of the command of strategic air operations. Churchill discussed the same subjects on the following day at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and himself, *post*, p. 331.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1943**MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 24, 1943,
9:30 A. M., MENA HOUSE¹****PRESENT**

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Ambassador Harriman
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Handy

¹ J. C. S. 129th meeting.

Major General Fairchild
Major General Deane
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Tansey
Brigadier General Whitten
Captain Burrough
Captain Doyle
Colonel Bessell
Colonel Smith
Colonel Roberts
Captain Freseman
Commander Long
Major Chapman

Secretariat

Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland

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At General Marshall's request, AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN expressed his views of the present attitude of the Soviets and their possible reaction to the proposals recommended by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. He said there was no indication that the Soviets will advance any specific strategical plan at the coming Conference. This, he thought, was due to their complete absorption in the war. The only proposals that they had put forward in the Moscow Conference were with reference to the entrance of Turkey and Sweden in the war and these had political as well as military implications.

AS AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN saw it, immediate Soviet interest was focused on the reduction of the German forces by whom they were opposed. He did not believe that the Soviet Staff would be agreeable to any discussions until Marshal Stalin had met with the President and Prime Minister and some basic policies had been agreed upon. He thought it would be unfortunate if the Soviet Representatives were given the impression that the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff were arriving at the Conference with anything approximating a cut and dried plan. He felt that the attitude of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be characterized by perfect frankness and a willingness to weigh thoughtfully any proposals made by the Soviets. They do not like *fait[s] accomplis* and will appreciate being consulted in connection with the plans of the U. S. and the British. While the reasons therefor were not clear, he was convinced that the Soviets were under tremendous pressure to end the war quickly. They appeared confident that a second front would be established; Marshal Stalin had

already communicated this to the Russian people and had indicated to them that it would not be long in coming.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said that our strategy had never before been presented so clearly to the Soviets as it had been by General Deane and General Ismay at the Moscow Conference.² This had had an extremely satisfactory effect. The Soviets had asked many questions but these questions were not critical. He pointed out that no promises had been made to the Soviets but they had been given the outline of the plans for OVERLORD and were being kept informed as to the progress of the buildup. It has been difficult for the Russians to understand why two nations of the strength of the United States and Great Britain have been unable to contain more German forces than they have. He suggested that in the coming Conference, the Chiefs of Staff adopt an attitude of patience and afford the Soviet Representatives ample opportunity to ask questions. Our experience with them has already proved that a frank and sympathetic explanation goes far towards removing suspicion.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN thought that the Soviets had every intention of joining the U. S. and the British in the war against Japan as soon as Germany had capitulated. They fear, however, a premature break with Japan and placed great value on the substantial amount of supplies which they are now receiving through Vladivostok. He reiterated that the pressure on the Soviet Government to end the war could not be over-emphasized.

He thought, that the Chiefs of Staff, in their Conference with the Soviets, should place their sights high and should make unequivocal demands for what they wanted from them. He hoped that the question of Russian participation in the Japanese war would be raised either by the President or by the Chiefs of Staff and indicated that it would be well to point out and to emphasize any advantages which the Soviets would receive from such participation. One difficulty which he foresaw was the Soviet fear that information of the discussions might reach the Japanese and thus provoke a break with them before the Soviets are ready.

GENERAL DEANE stated that his views accorded substantially with those expressed by Ambassador Harriman except perhaps with respect to the degree of emphasis placed on the Russian desire for a second front. He thought that the Soviets viewed the second front more in the nature of desirable insurance than as an immediate necessity. As he saw it, their particular interest at the moment is focused on the assistance necessary to relieve the immediate pressure on them rather than on the opening of a second front.

In reply to a question by General Arnold as to the Soviet attitude

² See *ante*, pp. 137-144.

towards operations in the Aegean Sea, AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said the Soviets had made no proposals as to what we should do. They stated only the results they desired and left the details to us. They were interested, however, in the reasons underlying our actions. He thought, therefore, that if there was to be an alternative to the cross-Channel operation, that it should be explained to the Soviets very frankly. If OVERLORD were to be abandoned, however, in his opinion, it would have to be replaced by an operation equally offensive in nature.

In reply to a question from Admiral Leahy he said that it was his impression that the Soviets were likely to demand immediate action to relieve the pressure on them.

GENERAL DEANE agreed with this, but said that he did not believe the Russians would propose the specific action to be taken. He said that the Soviets were appreciating for the first time the real effect of the bomber offensive on their operations. Marshal Stalin had mentioned it twice to him and it had been mentioned by several others. The effects had been confirmed by reports from prisoners of war. However, he thought it would not be wise to over-emphasize this as it had been exploited rather fully already.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN said that the Soviet Government was now telling the people that they have strong Allies who are fighting hard. In his opinion they were trying to impress them with the idea that the war has proceeded to a favorable point and progress is being made towards its successful completion. He said that the Soviets are blunt themselves and understand bluntness. He had no fear for any basic misunderstanding or any break with them as a result of the coming Conference. He was sure that we had their confidence.

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed his appreciation and the appreciation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the very informative summary presented by Ambassador Harriman. . . .

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, NOVEMBER 24, 1943, 11 A. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt (in the Chair)
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Major General Laycock

*Secretariat*Brigadier Hollis
Captain Royal

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1. OPERATIONS IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

THE PRESIDENT said that at this meeting he hoped there would be a preliminary survey of operations in the European Theater, including the Mediterranean. Final decisions would depend on the way things went at the conference shortly to be held with Premier Stalin. There were some reports that Premier Stalin had no thoughts beyond OVERLORD, to which he attached the highest importance as being the only operation worth considering. In other quarters it was held that Premier Stalin was anxious that in addition to OVERLORD in 1944, the Germans should be given no respite throughout the winter, and that there should be no idle hands between now and OVERLORD. The logistic problem was whether we could retain OVERLORD in all its integrity and, at the same time, keep the Mediterranean ablaze. In his view, Premier Stalin would be almost certain to demand both the continuation of action in the Mediterranean, and OVERLORD. As regards the Eastern Mediterranean, the question arose "where will the Germans go from the Dodecanese." The answer seemed to be "nowhere." If the same question was applied to ourselves, the answer seemed to depend on the action of Turkey. The entry of Turkey into the war would put quite a different complexion on the matter. This would be another question for discussion at the meeting with Premier Stalin.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was in accord with the President's views. We had had a year of unbroken success in North Africa and the Mediterranean, in Russia, and in the Pacific. Alamein and TORCH had paved the way for the extermination of large German forces in Tunisia. This was followed by the highly successful Sicily operation, and subsequently by the daring amphibious landing at Salerno and the capture of Naples. Then came Mussolini's fall, the collapse of Italy and the capitulation of the Italian Fleet. In the whole history of warfare there had never been such a long period of joint Allied success, nor such a high degree of cooperation and comradeship extending from the High Command down to the troops in the field between two Allies. We should, however, be unworthy of these accomplishments and of the tasks lying ahead if we did not test our

organization to see whether improvements could be made. That was the purpose of these periodical meetings.

As a contrast to the almost unbroken successes of the past year, the last two months had produced a series of disappointments. In Italy the campaign had flagged. We did not have a sufficient margin of superiority to give us the power to force the enemy back. The weather had been bad. The departure from the Mediterranean of certain units and landing craft had had, it seemed, a rather depressing effect on the soldiers remaining to fight the battle. The build-up of strategic air forces may also have contributed to the slow progress. The main objective was Rome, for "whoever holds Rome holds the title deeds of Italy." With Rome in our possession, the Italian Government would hold up its head. Moreover, we should then be in a position to seize the landing grounds to the northward.

He, THE PRIME MINISTER, had agreed, but with a heavy heart, to the return of seven divisions from the Mediterranean Theater. The 50th and 51st British Divisions, which were first-class troops, had had their equipment removed in preparation for embarkation. In the meanwhile, the 3rd U. S. Division had been no less than 49 days in constant contact with the enemy, and other U. S. and British units had been fighting without rest for long periods.

Passing across the Adriatic to Yugoslavia, more trouble had brewed up. It was a lamentable fact that virtually no supplies had been conveyed by sea to the 222,000 followers of Tito. These stalwarts were holding as many Germans in Yugoslavia as the combined Anglo-American forces were holding in Italy south of Rome. The Germans had been thrown into some confusion after the collapse of Italy and the Patriots had gained control of large stretches of the coast. We had not, however, seized our opportunity. The Germans had recovered and were driving the Partisans out bit by bit. The main reason for this was the artificial line of responsibility which ran through the Balkans. On the one hand, the responsibility for operations here lay with the Middle East Command but they had not the forces. On the other hand, General Eisenhower had the forces but not the responsibility. Considering that the Partisans and Patriots had given us such a generous measure of assistance at almost no cost to ourselves, it was of high importance to insure that their resistance was maintained and not allowed to flag.

Moving further east to the Aegean, the picture was equally black. When Italy fell, cheap prizes were open to us, and General Wilson had been ordered to "improvise and dare." Although we had not been able to seize Rhodes we had occupied Kos, Leros, Samos and others of the smaller islands. It had been hoped to capture Rhodes in October,

but when the time came only one Indian division was available for the task, and this was considered an insufficient force to eject the 8,000 Germans in the island. The enemy had reacted strongly to our initial moves. He had ejected us one by one from the islands, ending up with the recapture of Leros where we had lost 5,000 first-class troops, with four cruisers and seven destroyers either sunk or damaged. Nevertheless, taking into account the German soldiers drowned and those killed by air attack and in the battle, neither side could claim any large superiority in battle casualties. The Germans, however, were now re-established in the Aegean.

As stated by the President, the attitude of Turkey would have a profound effect on future events in this area. With Rhodes once more in our possession and the Turkish airfields at our disposal, the other islands would become untenable for the enemy.

It was to be hoped that the Russians would share our view of the importance of bringing Turkey into the war. They should see that great possibilities would accrue and a chance to join hands with them by means of sending supplies through the Dardanelles. The effect on Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria would be profound. All this might be done at quite a small cost, say, two divisions and a few landing craft. It might well be that a meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister could be arranged on the way back from meeting Premier Stalin.

Passing now to the Southeast Asia Theater, it was now clear that FIRST CULVERIN would require many more ships and craft than the British alone could supply. If it was thought by the United States Chiefs of Staff that CULVERIN was the best contribution to the Pacific war, then our resources would have to be made up by help from America. If, on the other hand, CULVERIN was thought to be too costly, it might be better to bring back from the Southeast Asia Theater to the Mediterranean sufficient landing craft for an attack on Rhodes. Thus the sequence would be, first Rome then Rhodes.¹ He, the Prime Minister, wished to make it clear that the British had no idea of advancing into the Valley of the Po. Their idea was that the campaign in Italy should have the strictly limited objective of the Pisa-Rimini line. No regular formations were to be sent to Yugoslavia. All that was needed there was a generous packet of supplies, air support and, possibly, a few Commandos. This stepping-up of our help to the Patriots would not involve us in a large additional commitment. Finally, when we had reached our objectives in Italy, the time would come to take the decision whether we should move to the left or to the right.

¹ Compare Churchill's memorandum of November 21, 1943, for the British Chiefs of Staff in Churchill, p. 686.

Turning now to the knock-out blow, OVERLORD, THE PRIME MINISTER emphasized that he had in no way relaxed his zeal for this operation. We had profited very considerably in our experiences of amphibious operations and our landing appliances had improved out of all knowledge. There would be an anxious period during the build-up, when the Germans might be able to concentrate more quickly than we could. Nevertheless, the 16 British divisions would be ready when called upon. It seemed to him that the timing of the operation depended more on the state of the enemy than on the set perfection of our preparations. He agreed with the view that if the Germans did not throw in the sponge by February we should have to expect heavy fighting throughout the summer. In this event, it would have to be realized that the 16 British divisions were the limit of our contribution. The British could not meet any further calls on our manpower, which was now fully deployed on war service.

After reviewing all the various theaters of operations the relationships seemed to work out as follows.

OVERLORD remained top of the bill, but this operation should not be such a tyrant as to rule out every other activity in the Mediterranean; for example, a little flexibility in the employment of landing craft ought to be conceded. Seventy additional LCT's had been ordered to be built in British shipyards. We must see if we can do even better than this.

General Alexander had asked that the date of the return of the landing craft for OVERLORD should be deferred from mid-December to mid-January. The resources which were at issue between the American and British Staffs would probably be found to amount to no more than 10 percent of the whole, excluding those in the Pacific. Surely some degree of elasticity could be arranged. Nevertheless, he wished to remove any idea that we had weakened, cooled, or were trying to get out of OVERLORD. We were in it up to the hilt.

To sum up, the program he advocated was Rome in January, Rhodes in February, supplies to the Yugoslavs, a settlement of the Command arrangements and the opening of the Aegean, subject to the outcome of an approach to Turkey; all preparations for OVERLORD to go ahead full steam within the framework of the foregoing policy for the Mediterranean.

THE PRESIDENT said that we could not tell what the state of German military capabilities would be from month to month. The Russian advance, if it continued at its present rate, would bring our ally in a few weeks to the boundaries of Rumania. At the forthcoming conference, the Russians might ask what we intended to do in this event. They might suggest a junction of our right with their left. We should be ready to answer this question.

The Russians might suggest that we stage an operation at the top of the Adriatic with a view to assisting Tito.

Turning to manpower, THE PRESIDENT read out the figures for the U. S. and British air and land forces at present disposed overseas and in the respective home countries.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the staffs had been giving much thought to how we should beat Japan when Hitler was finished. He was determined to solve this problem and the British Fleet would be disposed wherever it could make the best contribution towards this end. The air force build-up would also be studied.

THE PRESIDENT said that he shared the views expressed by Mr. Molotov that the defeat of Japan would follow that of Germany and more rapidly than at present was generally thought possible. It seemed that the Generalissimo had been well satisfied with the discussion held the previous day. There was no doubt that China had wide aspirations which included the re-occupation of Manchuria and Korea.

THE PRESIDENT then referred to the question of Command, remarking that he still received requests for the transfer of shipping and of air forces from one theater to another for a limited period of operations. In his view our strategic air forces from London to Ankara should be under one command. He cited the example of the command which Marshal Foch exercised in 1918.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that once we were across the Channel a united command would be established in the area of operations. He considered that the Combined Chiefs of Staff system had worked reasonably satisfactorily in taking the decision referred to by the President.

THE PRIME MINISTER paid a tribute to the accuracy and effectiveness of the U. S. daylight bombers operating from the United Kingdom.

THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER invited the staffs to study the problems as to the scope and dates of the operations to be carried out in the European and Mediterranean Theaters in 1944, with a view to arriving at an agreed view, if possible, before the coming meeting with the Russians.

CHIANG-MARSHALL LUNCHEON MEETING, NOVEMBER 24, 1943,
AFTERNOON

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Lieutenant General Stilwell

CHINA

Generalissimo Chiang
Madame Chiang

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. At the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff later the same afternoon Marshall reported on a discussion that he had had with Chiang regarding proposed operations in the Southeast Asia Command; see *post*, p. 338. Presumably the discussion to which Marshall referred had taken place at his luncheon meeting with Chiang. The luncheon meeting is also mentioned in *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 246, from which it appears that Stilwell and Madame Chiang were present. There is no indication of where the luncheon took place.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 24, 1943,
2:30 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Brigadier General Kuter
Captain Doyle
Colonel Roberts
Captain Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Admiral Mountbatten
General Riddell-Webster
Lieutenant General Carton
de Wiart
Major General Laycock
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Cobb
Brigadier Head
Brigadier McNair
Lieutenant Colonel Dobson

PRESENT FOR THE LAST ITEM ONLY

General Shang
Lieutenant General Lin
Vice Admiral Yang
Lieutenant General Chou
Major General Chu
Major General Tsai
Lieutenant General Stilwell
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Chennault
Brigadier General Merrill

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland
Commander Coleridge

¹ C. S. 129th meeting.

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SECRET

1. THANKSGIVING DAY

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that since the following day would be Thanksgiving he had made inquiries into the possibility of holding a service in the cathedral in Cairo and had found that this would be possible at 1800 hours. The British members of the Conference would, if agreeable to their American colleagues, like to join them in attending this service.

ADMIRAL LEAHY thanked Sir Alan Brooke for this gesture. It was very much appreciated by the United States Chiefs of Staff, who would gladly attend.

2. CONCLUSIONS OF THE 128TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 128th Meeting. The detailed report of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

3. COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF—UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF
(C. C. S. 406 and 406/1) ²

SIR ALAN BROOKE said the British Chiefs of Staff had considered the U. S. proposals and saw certain difficulties. The United Chiefs of Staff, if organized to exercise executive functions and take decisions, would in effect be superimposed on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Only three members of the United Chiefs of Staff would be able to sit together at any one time since Russia and China were not fighting the same enemies, and the organization would be unable to take the wide global outlook which was the function of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff now functioned day in and day out and dealt with day-to-day problems of global strategy. He felt it better that Russian and Chinese representatives should be asked to attend all future conferences, such as SEXTANT, to discuss matters in which they were directly concerned.

ADMIRAL KING felt it important to have ready some possible plan to meet future demands for stronger representation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he felt sure the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be put under pressure to alter their present machinery. He agreed that no other body could be superimposed above the Combined Chiefs of Staff, since such a body could never take major decisions.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he felt that a distinction should be

² Post, pp. 379 and 390.

drawn between the day-to-day work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington and the major decisions which were taken at the special conferences. He felt that if pressure were applied for permanent representation, the demand would be withdrawn if it were suggested that the Chinese or Russian Representatives concerned would have to be able to speak with the full authority of their governments.

SIR JOHN DILL pointed out the special position of the United States and Great Britain in that they only were fighting a global war and were completely integrated and united on all fronts.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not go further than to agree that, for the present, the Russians and Chinese should be asked to attend those meetings at future special conferences at which their own problems were being discussed.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note of C. C. S. 406 and C. C. S. 406/1.

b. Agreed:

(1) That the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not take the initiative in putting forward any proposals for machinery to secure closer military cooperation with the U. S. S. R. and China.

(2) That if the U. S. S. R. and/or the Chinese should raise the question, the difficulties of and objections to any form of standing United Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to them. It should be pointed out:

(a) That the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington are responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the Anglo-American forces which are closely integrated in accordance with the broad policy laid down at the formal conferences such as Casablanca, TRIDENT, QUADRANT, and SEXTANT which are convened from time to time; and

(b) That the U. S. S. R. and/or Chinese Governments will be invited to join in any formal conferences which may be convened in the future to take part in the discussion of any military problems with which they are specifically concerned.

4. AGENDA FOR "EUREKA"

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he regarded the EUREKA Conference as primarily a political meeting at which certain points would probably be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their advice. He felt that it would be wise to consider at this conference the best method of coordinating Russian military effort with our own, particularly with regard to Russian action during and prior to the OVERLORD assault. It was essential that this attack should not take place during a lull in the fighting on the Eastern front.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed with this view and pointed out that there were several other items which might be raised, including the question of the provision of Russian bases for shuttle bombing. He agreed that

it was wise to have in mind certain special points for discussion but that the work of the conference would be inevitably affected by the political discussions.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. That no formal agenda need be produced at this stage because the military problems to be considered would arise from the political discussions which would be held at the start of the conference.

b. That the three main military topics for consideration would appear to be:

(1) The coordination of Russian operations with Anglo-American operations in Europe.

(2) Turkish action on entry into the war.

(3) Supplies to Russia.

(At this point Admiral Mountbatten, General Wheeler, General Wedemeyer, Brigadier Cobb, and Lt. Colonel Dobson entered the meeting, and Admiral Leahy withdrew.)

5. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

GENERAL MARSHALL reported that he had discussed the proposed operations in the Southeast Asia Command with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.³ The Generalissimo disapproved of the present plan, which he felt would lead to heavy losses and possibly defeat. The Generalissimo had made the following stipulations: Firstly, that there must be an amphibious operation carried out simultaneously with the land attack in Burma. In this connection the Generalissimo had suggested action against the Andaman Islands. Secondly, that the advances by the columns as now envisaged in the plan should all be aimed at a line running east and west through Mandalay, including the occupation of Mandalay by one of the columns. The Generalissimo was satisfied that the Yunnan force should not advance beyond Lashio, its present objective.⁴

He (GENERAL MARSHALL) had pointed out that the plan as explained to the Generalissimo was only the first stage of the operations to recapture Burma and was a conservative one and much less dangerous than that suggested by the Generalissimo. In view of the Generalissimo's extreme interest in the naval situation in the Bay of Bengal, he suggested he be given, as soon as possible, the build-up of the British naval forces. Admiral Mountbatten should see him and explain his plan, pointing out that it was the first step only of a long

³ Presumably the discussion had taken place at the Chiang-Marshall luncheon earlier in the same afternoon. See *ante*, p. 335.

⁴ See Chiang's telegram 955, December 23, 1943, to Roosevelt, *post*, p. 855.

campaign and that it was in the nature of a safe and conservative first step.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained that the plan was based on the principle that the advance should end at the time that the monsoon would break. This would prevent Japanese repercussions. He stressed the point that it would be impossible to remain stationary in the positions captured at the end of the first stage. It would be essential therefore to have collected sufficient resources by October for the next step forward.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in taking the first step we were committing ourselves to the recapture of all Burma. There could be no question of holding a halfway line and we should probably have finally to undertake an airborne attack on Rangoon and amphibious operations. The alternatives were to continue the Burma land campaign to a finish or to give up the campaign altogether and endeavor to open the Malacca Straits. It was probably now too late to reverse our decision. This decision would, of course, affect the final plan for the defeat of Japan, and this must be realized.

ADMIRAL KING said he felt there was one alternative—to attack Bangkok instead. This would sever the Japanese lines of communication into Burma.

In reply to a question, GENERAL MARSHALL confirmed that the Generalissimo did not feel that the Chinese force from Yunnan should advance further than Lashio. The Generalissimo's fear with regard to the present plan was that it would enable the Japanese to attack and defeat in detail the various columns, particularly the Chinese.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN asked for direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to what he should say to the Generalissimo with regard to future operations after the monsoon. These operations were largely dependent on the amount of air transport he could obtain in order to make his columns fully mobile. It might be possible to launch an amphibious operation in the Prome area and to put in more long range penetration groups. He again emphasized that at the end of the monsoon it would be essential either to advance, in which case sufficient resources would have to be provided, or to retire. To remain stationary was impossible. He would have liked to advance as far as Mandalay in the present dry season if the resources had been available but the lines of communication to Mandalay did not permit this. Further, he had no reserve divisions. He hoped to gain his present objectives by early April when it might be expected that the monsoon would break. During the monsoon, long range penetration groups would operate. He asked that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider as early as possible the provision of resources to enable him to renew his advances at the end of the next monsoon.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Chinese fear appeared to be mainly that they might be left to carry out their Yunnan advance unsupported.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the above statements.

6. BOUNDARIES OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (C. C. S. 308/7) ⁵

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered a memorandum presented by the United States Chiefs of Staff on the revision of the boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the proposals in the paper dealing with the boundaries themselves were acceptable to him but he did not believe that a committee sitting in Chungking should deal with political matters in Thailand and Siam. He pointed out that the Kra Isthmus was far removed from Chungking with which there was no communication. The Siamese and the French were not suspicious of the United States or Great Britain acting in concert, but rather of the Chinese themselves. His two main considerations were that pre-occupational activity by such agencies as the S. O. E. and O. S. S. into Thailand and Siam must be permitted from his theater and that political questions should not be dealt with in Chungking, but either through the ordinary machinery of Government or perhaps even by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer action on C. C. S. 308/7.

(At this point General Shang Chen, Lieutenant General Lin Wei, Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan Ch'eng, Lieutenant General Chou Chih Jou, Lieutenant [Major] General Chu Shih Ming, Major General Tsai Wen Chih, Lieutenant General Stilwell, Major General Chennault, Major General Stratemeyer and Brigadier General Merrill entered the meeting.)

7. DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT ON OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked if the Chinese representatives had now had time to consider the plan for operations in the Southeast Asia Command put forward by Admiral Mountbatten.

GENERAL SHANG confirmed that he had had time to study the plan. He had certain questions and comments. Though there might be differences of opinion, these comments were offered in a spirit of helpfulness and he hoped they would be accepted in the same spirit.

With regard to enemy intelligence, there were certain points of difference but he did not propose to raise these at the meeting but

⁵ *Post*, p. 391.

rather to exchange views with the appropriate staff officers. General Shang then put the following questions:

- a.* How many purely British units would be used in the area?
- b.* Would there be any further British units other than those now in the area?
- c.* Were there any armored or special troops?
- d.* What was the fighting experience of the formations which would be engaged?

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN and BRIGADIER COBB outlined in considerable detail the nature of the British and Indian formations which would be engaged in the coming operations. Further details which might be required would be available from the staff of the Southeast Asia Command.

GENERAL SHANG then asked for the plan for the employment of the Imphal column. ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained that this column would fight its way through as far as possible. Strong resistance was, however, expected in the Kalewa area. He had insufficient air transport to supply this column from the air and, therefore, its rate of advance would be limited by the line of communications which could be built up behind them. All of the columns would advance as far as possible and exploit to the full the success they achieved.

GENERAL SHANG then asked for details with regard to the Indaw column.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that Indaw would be captured by the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade and the 26th Indian Infantry Division would then be flown in to hold it. It was essential to hold Indaw since it would serve as an essential base for the operations of long range penetration groups against the Japanese lines of communication. An airfield was essential for this purpose since insufficient parachutes were available to supply the column by this means. The L. R. P. groups were invaluable, not only for harrying lines of communication but also for killing Japanese.

In reply to a further question, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained the operations which would take place from Fort Hertz. He pointed out that the details of the coordination of these operations with those of General Stilwell's Yunnan force had not yet [been] worked out. Plans with regard to amphibious operations could not yet be disclosed. There would, of course, be a land advance in the direction of Akyab which would be exploited to the full. He hoped to put an L. R. P. group in by gliders west of the Salween River, commanded by an officer well known to the Chins who inhabited this area.

GENERAL SHANG then made certain comments. The Generalissimo had instructed him to emphasize his conviction that the land opera-

tions in Burma must be synchronized with naval action and a naval concentration in the Bay of Bengal. The Generalissimo would be most disappointed if he was not fully apprised, before leaving the Conference, of the intention with regard to the strength and time of the arrival of the naval forces in the Bay of Bengal. The Generalissimo also considered that in the present plan the columns did not advance far enough. He considered that the plan also should cover the recapture of all Burma with Rangoon as an objective and the Mandalay-Lashio line as the first stage. Lastly the Generalissimo was insistent that, whatever the needs of the land campaign, the air lift to China must not drop below 10,000 tons a month. Though this might be thought to hinder the land operations, it must be remembered that operations in China and in Burma were closely related and the pressure exerted from China on Japanese forces must be maintained. The Generalissimo was most insistent with regard to the maintenance of the air lift to China.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that he could state definitely that by the time that the land operation in Burma started, there would be adequate naval forces in the Bay of Bengal. The details of strength and date of this concentration would, he was sure, be communicated by the Prime Minister to the Generalissimo.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the plan for the first stage as outlined by General Shang was very similar to the one he had originally considered but logistic difficulties made it impossible. His staff could explain these difficulties in detail to the Chinese representatives. It was illogical to demand in the same breath that this extensive plan should be carried out and a 10,000 ton air lift to China maintained. He then outlined the relatively small reductions below 10,000 tons which would be necessary over a period to enable his present operations to take place. He pointed out that the 10,000 ton lift had never, in fact, been reached and was no more than a target. In his opinion, the U. S. Air Force had achieved miracles in reaching their present capacity over the "hump." It was essential that the Chinese should make up their minds whether to insist on a 10,000 ton lift to China or whether they wished his present operations carried out. The Generalissimo had told him that he would regard with sympathy any small reductions below 10,000 tons necessary to enable the operations to be undertaken which, in fact, were designed to open the Burma Road to China. He must know where he stood. China could not have both the 10,000 tons and the land operations to open the road.

He would like an explanation with regard to the questions asked as to the numbers of British and Indian troops engaged. Did the Chinese Representatives wish to infer that the fighting qualities of the Indian

troops were bad? This suggestion he most strongly refuted. The Indian divisions had fought magnificently in the North African campaigns. If, on the other hand, the Chinese Representatives wished to imply that British troops were remaining in India without playing an active part in the operations, he wished it to be clearly understood once and for all that this was not the case. There were only two British divisions not engaged; one of those was training for an amphibious role and the other was being broken up to form the long-range penetration groups.

GENERAL SHANG explained that he had asked the questions referred to merely in order to have full details of the position and that, of course, he wished in no way to criticize the fighting qualities of either the Indian or British troops. With regard to tonnage over the "hump," 10,000 tons per month was an absolute minimum, essential to maintain and equip the Chinese Army. Had it been possible to obtain it, they would have asked for ten times this amount.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN pointed out that, in order to make the air-line safe or to open the Burma Road, it was essential to put everything into the present battle. He considered that the Chinese, at this stage, should only equip troops which would actually take part in the present battle and that tonnage designed to equip or maintain the remainder must be foregone until the battle had been won.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the present campaign was designed to open the Burma Road, for which the Chinese had asked, and that the opening of the Road was for the purpose of equipping the Chinese Army. The Chinese must either fight the battle for opening the Road or else call for more American planes to increase the air lift over the "hump." Any further increase in those American planes, at this time, he was opposed to. There must be no misunderstanding about this. The battle was to be fought to open the Burma Road. Unless this road were opened there could be no increase in supplies to China at this time since no further aircraft or equipment could be provided from the United States due to commitments elsewhere to meet serious shortages.

GENERAL SHANG said that all were agreed that the Burma Road should be opened but in spite of that he felt that 10,000 tons per month was necessary for the China area. These supplies would not be hoarded or sold but would be used against the enemy. All the 10,000 tons was required for the Yunnan force and for the Chinese Air Force.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the requirements for the campaign had been calculated in consultation with General Stilwell and General Chennault. These requirements were met by the reduced tonnages he had suggested. The figure of 10,000 tons was a purely arbitrary one whereas his own were based on exact calculations. The Generalissimo

had promised him that he would regard minor reductions sympathetically, and he, Mountbatten, hoped that he would now do so.

GENERAL SHANG said that he was not in a position to give any decision with regard to a reduction in the tonnage over the "hump" but would report the points which had been made.

GENERAL STILWELL said that he had been instructed by the Generalissimo to put forward four points which the Generalissimo considered essential: Firstly, naval and amphibious operations to be synchronized with the land campaign; secondly, that the Indaw and Imphal advances should continue as far as Mandalay; thirdly, that the Yunnan force should advance to Lashio; and lastly, that the needs of the Chinese Air Force should be met.

GENERAL CHENNAULT outlined the present and projected strengths of the 14th Air Force and the Chinese Air Force, together with the additional monthly tonnages required to maintain these forces. The present role of the Chinese Air Force was to defend the Szechwan basin, but the Generalissimo considered it must be equipped and trained to undertake an offensive role. The tonnages required by this plan for the two air forces in China amounted to some 10,000 tons per month.

GENERAL ARNOLD asked how it was proposed to use this 10,000 tons which, if all diverted to the air, would leave no lift for the ground forces.

GENERAL CHENNAULT said that it was proposed to build up the Chinese and United States Air Forces equally. The figures he had given were the requirements to meet the plan. He was not putting forward any recommendations.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that the Chinese Representatives should arrange for Admiral Mountbatten to wait on the Generalissimo to explain his operations and the considerations with regard to the air lift to China.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he had believed that the Generalissimo earnestly desired that the Burma Road should be opened. This could only be done if the air lift to China was reduced.

GENERAL SHANG undertook to arrange a meeting between Admiral Mountbatten and the Generalissimo.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

a. Took note with interest of the discussion between the Chinese military representatives and Admiral Mountbatten on the subject of the operations planned in Burma in the Southeast Asia Command.

b. Noted that the Chinese military representatives undertook to arrange a meeting between Admiral Mountbatten and the Generalissimo at which details of the plan, the reasons underlying it, and the

considerable effort involved, could be explained to the Generalissimo as well as the implications on the air lift to China.

ROOSEVELT CONVERSATIONS WITH VARIOUS CALLERS, NOVEMBER
24, 1943, AFTERNOON, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

Editorial Note

According to the Log (*ante*, p. 297) the following foreign persons called on the President during the afternoon of November 24:

Egyptian—Cabinet Chief Hassanayn and Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Nahas.

Greek—King George II, Prince Paul, and Prime Minister Tsouderos.

British—Ambassador to Egypt Killearn, Generals Wilson and Stone, Admiral Willis, and Air Chief Marshal Douglas.

Yugoslav—King Peter II and Prime Minister Purić.

According to Leahy, p. 200, the President also had brief talks on the same afternoon with Turkish Prime Minister Saracoğlu, British Ambassador to Turkey Knatchbull-Hugessen, and the Egyptian heir apparent (Mohammad Ali).

The calls were apparently of brief duration and were primarily of a courtesy nature. No memoranda of these conversations appear to have been made either by or for the President. There is some evidence (*post*, p. 864) that Roosevelt discussed a trusteeship for Indochina with the Turks and the Egyptians in the course of this trip. There is no indication, however, of when these conversations took place. His conversation with King Peter is, however, described in the latter's book, *A King's Heritage*, pp. 195–196. According to this account, the subjects discussed included the reconciling of Commander Tito and General Mihailović, the advisability of Allied landings on the Dalmatian or the French coast, and the development of a joint Allied offensive against Germany on a fixed date.

A conversation at Cairo between the President and General Wilson is recounted in Field Marshal Lord Wilson's, *Eight Years Overseas, 1939–1947*, p. 187. It would appear from that source that the conversation took place during the Second Cairo Conference, but the Log for the period December 2–7, 1943 (*post*, p. 655) does not show that Roosevelt conferred with Wilson during the Second Cairo Conference. According to Wilson, the conversation revolved mainly around the resistance movements in Greece and Yugoslavia.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1943

ROOSEVELT-CADOGAN CONVERSATION, NOVEMBER 25, 1943,
FORENOON, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA*Editorial Note*

No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 297.

ROOSEVELT-LEATHERS LUNCHEON MEETING, NOVEMBER 25, 1943,
1:30 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Douglas
Ambassador Winant
Assistant Secretary of
War McCloy

UNITED KINGDOM

Lord Leathers

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information given above with respect to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 298. See also *post*, p. 415. According to Elliott Roosevelt, p. 157, the principal subject of conversation was supply.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 25, 1943,
2:30 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Admiral of the Fleet
Cunningham
Admiral Mountbatten
(for item 1 only)

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal

¹ C. C. S. 130th meeting.

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

At the request of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN gave an account of his meeting with the Generalissimo the day before on the subject of the plan of operations in the Burma campaign.² At this meeting the Generalissimo insisted that the alternative plan of campaign should be carried out, the plan for which, in fact, the resources were not available and which demanded an additional 535 transport aircraft.

When Admiral Mountbatten expressed his opinion that these aircraft could not be found and insisted that in this event it would be necessary for the Generalissimo to give his enthusiastic and personal support to the less extensive plan being put into effect, the Generalissimo acceded but said that first the Combined Chiefs of Staff must be asked formally to provide the aircraft necessary for the more extensive plan.

The Generalissimo also insisted that an amphibious operation should be carried out at the same time as the land operation in North Burma.

The Prime Minister gave the Generalissimo the details of the British Fleet to be available at which the Generalissimo expressed great pleasure.

Also, the Prime Minister informed him that the amphibious operation would not affect the land battle.

The Generalissimo made the point that it would, in that it would draw off part of the enemy air forces available.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then made it clear that this would act both ways and that for an amphibious operation to be carried out at the same time as a land operation would mean that the whole air force would not be made available for the land operation.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that possibly 25 aircraft could be made available but that the figure of 535 might be impossible to find without taking aircraft away from other operations to which they had already been allotted.

In regard to the amphibious operation, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the Generalissimo must be told that he must wait for the answer as it depends upon progress at SEXTANT. The question of air lift to China was then discussed.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that the Generalissimo had been told

² The meeting is also described in *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 63.

that the average air lift over the "hump" for a period of six months during the course of the operation would be 8,900 tons per month.

The Generalissimo had demanded that the full 10,000 tons per month should be made available.

Admiral Mountbatten had made it clear that this was only a target figure which, indeed, had not been reached hitherto.

The Generalissimo had then said that he would deal direct with General Somervell in the matter.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he would like the Combined Chiefs of Staff to decide that support should not be given to the Chinese Air Force over and above that which had already been agreed upon.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN asked that it should be accepted as a principle that if there should be an increase in the transport available over the "hump," the right to use that additional transport should be reserved to the Southeast Asia Command.

GENERAL MARSHALL said this acceptance could not be given without reference to the President.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that in view of the important issues involved, it was necessary to get a written agreement from the Generalissimo regarding the Burma campaign to be carried out before the monsoon in 1944. He understood that the Generalissimo would give the campaign his enthusiastic support and had accepted the implication of reduced air lift.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed that it would not be possible to find the additional 535 aircraft that would be required for the more ambitious plan of campaign in North Burma to be adopted, and for the increased tonnage over the "hump."

b. Took note that Admiral Mountbatten would draw up a paper for submission to the Generalissimo with a view to getting the latter's written agreement to the Burma operations now contemplated; this paper to be submitted for approval to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible in view of the impending departure of the Generalissimo from SEXTANT.³

c. Agreed that it would be very desirable if Admiral Mountbatten would get a clearance to this paper in view of the dealings he had already had with the Generalissimo in the matter.

2. APPROVAL OF DECISIONS OF C. C. S. 129TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

³ The paper is printed *post*, p. 430.

Accepted the conclusions of the 129th Meeting. The detailed report of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

3. OVER-ALL PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that instructions should be issued to the Combined Staff Planners to have the Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan, now under study by them, completed prior to the return of the Combined Chiefs of Staff from Jerusalem. This date should be assumed to be about 1 December.⁴

4. "OVERLORD" AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Discussed the subject of "OVERLORD and the Mediterranean" in closed session.

⁴ The plan is printed *post*, p. 765.

ROOSEVELT-CHIANG MEETING, NOVEMBER 25, 1943, 5 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Colonel Roosevelt

CHINA

Generalissimo Chiang
Madame Chiang

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The time and place of the meeting are indicated in the Log, *ante*, p. 298, which indicates that tea was served.

Elliott Roosevelt, p. 158, says that Madame Chiang described her plans for future improvements in China, particularly in the matter of literacy. According to the same source, Roosevelt and Chiang again referred to the question of unity in China, "specifically as regarded the Chinese Communists" (see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 323).

Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 65, indicates that operations in the China-Burma-India theater were also discussed and that Chiang "reversed himself on every point." The points in question were those set forth in C. C. S. 411/2 (*post*, p. 430), to which Chiang apparently had agreed in a meeting with Churchill and Mountbatten earlier the same day. See also *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 246.

In a message to Roosevelt, dated March 27, 1944, Chiang wrote: "In the course of our conversations at Cairo I told you that as soon

as the British began large scale amphibious operations along the Burma coast, our main forces would launch a vigorous attack on Burma with all their might." *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 308. See also *post*, p. 874.

It was probably at this meeting that Roosevelt gave Chiang the promise (referred to in Churchill, p. 328) "of a considerable amphibious operation across the Bay of Bengal within the next few months." According to Ehrman (vol. V, p. 165), this promise was given before November 26. Alanbrooke (p. 63), recollected the promise as having been given "on the first day of our Cairo meetings," but this appears unlikely.

Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 64, gives an account of a meeting of Marshall and Stilwell with Roosevelt immediately preceding Roosevelt's meeting with Chiang. At the earlier meeting Roosevelt had promised to speak to Chiang "at once" about granting Stilwell more power over Chinese troops.

For other subjects which were discussed by Roosevelt and Chiang at Cairo and which may have been discussed in whole or in part at this meeting, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 366.

ROOSEVELT THANKSGIVING DINNER PARTY, NOVEMBER 25, 1943,
8 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
Ambassador Winant
Ambassador Steinhardt
Ambassador Harriman
Minister Kirk
Major General Watson
Rear Admiral Brown
Rear Admiral McIntire
Colonel Roosevelt
Major Boettiger
Mr. Robert Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Lord Moran
Mr. Martin
Commander Thompson
Mrs. Oliver

Editorial Note

Accounts of this dinner party, at which President Roosevelt was host, are given in the Log, *ante*, p. 298; Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 159-160; Sherwood, p. 775; Churchill, pp. 340-341; and Leahy, p. 201. Leahy mentions Lord Leathers rather than Lord Moran as being present. There are no indications that substantive problems were discussed.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF THANKSGIVING DINNER PARTY,
NOVEMBER 25, 1943, EVENING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Air Chief Marshal Tedder

Editorial Note

The only information that has been found about this dinner meeting is given in Arnold, p. 463. Apparently no official record of the meeting was made, and there are no indications that substantive problems were discussed. The place of the meeting is not mentioned.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1943

ROOSEVELT CONVERSATIONS WITH MOUNTBATTEN AND MADAME
CHIANG, NOVEMBER 26, 1943, FORENOON, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

Editorial Note

The Log, *ante*, p. 299, indicates that Admiral Mountbatten and Madame Chiang called separately on the President during the forenoon of November 26. Apparently no memoranda of these conversations were made either by or for the President. Elliott Roosevelt, p. 166, contains a reference to the calls. Presumably the principal subject of both conversations was the attitude of Chiang toward the proposed operations in the China-Burma-India theater; see *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 65.

AMERICAN-BRITISH CONVERSATIONS ON CIVIL AFFAIRS, NOVEMBER
26, 1943, AFTERNOON AND EVENING, BRITISH EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Winant
Mr. McCloy

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Jebb
Major Morton

Defense Files

*Memorandum of Conversation*¹

SECRET

Mr. Winant started out by stating our concern, from the point of view of progressing with our planning, over the extent of the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission and the early introduction of the political aspect into the cessation of hostility planning. I then outlined to Eden the inadvisability, from the point of view of U. S. participation in the peace and the reconstruction of Europe, of concentrating too much post hostility planning and decision making in London or of removing the military aspect of such planning, at least while the war was going on. Mr. Eden asked whether it was our desire or intention to play down the Moscow Conference agreements in respect to the EAC.² I told him that I thought too much had been referred to it as a practical matter for it to absorb at the start and the result might well be a serious lack of progress.

When I touched on the necessity of avoiding even the suggestion of moving all these decisions to London and spoke of the need for indulging American sensitivities on these matters if the U. S. was to be a real participant in the peace, he rather strongly reacted. It was clear that he considered the setting up of the London Commission as an achievement of some proportions; that it had Mr. Hull's accord and thus the accord of the U. S. government; that whether for better or worse the entire kit and kiboodle *had* been referred and it would not do to indicate to the Soviets that any attempt was being made to derogate from the jurisdiction of the Commission now. I told him that the U. S., of course, intended to go ahead with the decisions made in Moscow and to bring the Soviets into our councils. This was recognized on all sides as desirable and necessary. The question was a matter of getting on with work that must be done. Already due to the attitude of some agencies in London, the British side of the CCAC, who in themselves were able and reasonable men if given some authority, were completely tongue-tied. The thing to do was to avoid playing up the EAC as the great decider of all post hostility questions; to have the EAC prior to submitting their proposed recommendations to the governments, obtain the comments of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. From there on the recommendations of the EAC can be transmitted to the governments for approval and thence to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a basis for directives to the commanders in the field. Mr. Eden expressed agreement with this procedure

¹ Prepared by McCloy.² *Decade*, p. 10.

and Mr. Jebb, who was with him, also seemed in favor of this arrangement but indicated to Mr. Eden that "London" would be much opposed, i. e., they wanted to shift the CCAC to London. Although no arrangements were confirmed, Mr. Eden indicated he favored this arrangement and would endeavor to carry it into effect. He also said that he thought it wise that no further pressure be exerted toward shifting the functions of the Combined Committee to London.

Winant spoke of the need for a good staff in London to help him out and Mr. Eden said this was most important. He urged that a good military man be sent over immediately (and a good State Department man). He said that if we would agree to treat the EAC seriously he would see that the tongues and minds of the British representatives on the CCAC would be loosened and that he thought that further pressure to set up a CCAC in London would be removed. We touched on many other related things which led up to this tentative conclusion. The discussion was animated at times, but frank.

In the evening Mr. Jebb came to dinner as did Major Morton who briefs the Prime Minister on these matters. Jebb, who was going farther north and east,³ said that after talking with Eden further and consulting Redman and others, the general view among them, again subject to "London" (whatever that means) was that an arrangement would be worked out whereby the tentative recommendations of the EAC would be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their comment and suggestions before being submitted to the governments; that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could refer the matter to the CCAC for advice and the comments could then be returned to the EAC for final submission to the governments which by that time would have been for all practical purposes already in agreement. Thereafter the translation of the policy into the terms of a directive can be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He urged that when the recommendations were submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that we would not take them apart and start all over again. I assured him that we only wanted to make progress and that I could guarantee we would act expeditiously and reasonably.

I told him that though it might not be advisable to suggest to the Soviet member at the outset that certain matters be carved out of the jurisdiction of the Commission, I did feel as a matter of practice they would find that the Advisory Commission would have enough to do to concentrate on broad matters of policy rather than on details of planning which had better be done at COSSAC Headquarters than either in the EAC or Washington. He agreed. Finally I told Mr. Jebb that I thought that unless we could make such an arrangement

³ i. e., to Tehran.

as that outlined we would reach a further impasse and nothing of any substance would result from the London Commission. I indicated to Mr. Eden that Mr. Hull had suggested a Combined Committee to deal with French matters⁴ and this immediately produced a favorable reaction. He asked that study be given to the question of how and where it should be set up.

The conference ended with the understanding that on the return of Jebb from the East we should work on an agreement on the respective functions of the EAC, the Combined Committee and COSSAC.⁵

⁴ See Hildring's telegram of November 25, 1943, to McCloy, *post*, p. 423.

⁵ The draft agreement is printed *post*, p. 446.

CHIANG MEETING WITH CERTAIN AMERICAN GENERALS, NOVEMBER 26, 1943, 11:30 A. M., CHIANG'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Arnold
Lieutenant General Stilwell
Lieutenant General Somervell
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Wheeler
Brigadier General Merrill¹

CHINA

Generalissimo Chiang
General Shang
Lieutenant General Lin
Lieutenant General Chou
Major General Chu
Colonel Liu

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum of Conversation

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

The Conference began with a demand from the Generalissimo to maintain a fixed tonnage of 10,000 tons per month over the hump regardless of any demands which might be made on the equipment to support necessary operations in the South East Asia Command. It was explained to the Generalissimo (1) that all C-46 airplanes are being assigned to this service, (2) that an increase in the efficiency of the service is expected, (3) that efforts are being made to secure 25 C-47 airplanes for Lord [Louis] Mountbatten, and that with these arrangements, the estimated tonnage over the hump would probably not only reach but exceed in due course the 10,000 tons target figure, (4) that the difference between the figure proposed by Lord Mountbatten for the next 7 months, 8,900 tons, and the figures estimated by the Generalissimo would be only 1,100 tons. It was explained that under these circumstances it was possible, even with the diversions asked by Lord Mountbatten, that there might still be 10,000 tons for delivery in China.

¹ *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 246, gives Chennault rather than Merrill as present.

The Generalissimo stated that he felt that his requirements and those of Lord Mountbatten in the South East Asia Theater should be divorced and that they should be handled as separate items. It was explained that owing to the nature of the operation and the fact that the operations themselves were designed to push the Japanese back and thus provide for greater safety of the air route that this could not be done. It was also explained that all concerned had the increase in tonnage over the hump very much at heart and that though only 8,900 tons could be promised, that every effort would be made to increase this figure not only to 10,000 tons but to exceed 10,000 tons.

The Generalissimo concluded the conference by saying that he hoped that Lord Mountbatten and his demands could be separated but that he would accept the figures given to him with the understanding that the ATC would devote its best endeavors to securing the greatest possible increase in the tonnage.

H. H. ARNOLD
J. STILWELL
BREHON SOMERVELL

MEETING OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH INFORMATION OFFICIALS,
NOVEMBER 26, 1943, 11:30 A. M., MENA HOUSE

Censorship Files

*Memorandum of Conversation*¹

SECRET

Present: Colonel McCarthy	U. S. A.
Colonel McClenahan	"
Major Durno	"
Mr. Ryan	M. I. M. E.
Mr. Shea	O. W. I.
Colonel Maunsell	S. I. M. E.
and for part of the time	
Mr. Sinclair	M. I. M. E.
Mr. Barnes	O. W. I.
Major Putman [<i>Putnam?</i>]	P. R. USAFIME

¹ Prepared by one of the officials of the British Ministry of Information, Middle East (M. I. M. E.).

The following conclusions were reached:

Still Photographs

Each party would process their own material in Cairo under Security conditions, would exchange material and send material to London and Washington under the usual arrangements.

Moving Pictures

The U. S. A. would send their material unprocessed to Washington (Public Relations Bureau, War Dept.). Copies of this material when treated would be sent back to Cairo for M. I. M. E.

British material would be processed under Security conditions in Cairo, and "lavenders"² would be given to the U. S. A. authorities here.

The British material would subsequently be sent to London in the usual way.

Release for Pictures

It was agreed that no pictures of any kind should be released until the time of the final release date.

Credit Line

It was agreed, subject to confirmation on the one hand by Mr. Ryan and on the other by Col. McClenahan, that all pictures moving and still taken in connection with the Conference by any of the various official photographers or cinemen should be pooled for all parties concerned and should carry the credit line "United Nations Photographic Pool".

Transmission by Air of Messages Not Yet Releasable

It was agreed that messages now being written by correspondents could be conveyed periodically by the air courier service to London (for the British correspondents) and Washington (for the American correspondents) subject to

- (1) Censorship here before despatch.
- (2) Consignment to the appropriate official authority in the respective countries for holding until the time of release.
- (3) Recensorship before release in the event of any new stops being imposed after the messages have left this country.

Arrangements for Final Release

Mr. Ryan explained the arrangements under consideration. These were:

- (a) Release for publication to be at 23.30 hours G. M. T. on "X" day. This was the hour adopted as standard for important joint an-

² i.e., lavender-colored copies.

nouncements London and Washington in the past. Mr. Ryan had been assured by the American correspondents that it was a suitable time for American release.

(b) It would be impossible for the cable service to carry a fraction of the correspondents' messages within a reasonable time, (e. g. 24 hours) of the start of transmission. The volume of messages could only be handled within a period of 24 hours by wireless transmission and then only by making very special arrangements and suspending certain other normal transmission.

It was therefore proposed that release for transmission by wireless should be at 23.30 hours G. M. T. on X minus 1 day.

It should be realized that this was the moment at which security stopped. Axis monitoring stations would be able to pick up messages sent by this form of transmission.

The present view was that this interval of 24 hours between release for transmission and release for publication would be long enough to get the correspondents' messages off but short enough to prevent any reproduction in the press or radio of broadcasts sent out by Axis stations based on their pick up of transmissions from Cairo.

(c) It is of the utmost importance that correspondents should have a minimum of 12 hours warning, if at all possible, of the time of release for transmission.

(d) These arrangements to be confirmed by Mr. Ryan (who is in consultation with the Ministry of Information, London) and Col. McClenahan.

Issue of Early Communiqué

If an early communiqué was issued and it was desired that there should be no reference to the location of the Conference, transmission by wireless would be out of the question and the cable service would have to be used.

There would have to be an interval between the release for transmission by cable and release for publication. This would require further investigation and Mr. Ryan undertook to get into touch with the cable company (The Hon. Cecil Campbell.)

Mr. Ryan felt considerable misgivings as to whether it would prove practicable to issue a communiqué on this basis without in fact "breaking" the story.

M. I. M. E.

27th NOVEMBER, 1943.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, NOVEMBER 26, 1943,
2:30 P. M., MENA HOUSE¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
General Eisenhower
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral Bieri
Rear Admiral Badger
Major General Sutherland
Major General Stratemeyer
Major General Wheeler
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Major General Wedemeyer
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Tansey
Captain Doyle
Colonel Jenkins
Colonel O'Donnell
Colonel Roberts
Captain Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
General Riddell-Webster
Admiral Cunningham
Air Chief Marshal Tedder
General Wilson
Air Chief Marshal Douglas
Vice Admiral Willis
Major General Whiteley
Major General Lewis
Brigadier de Rhé-Philipe
Captain Power
Colonel Lascelles
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Sugden
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Head
Brigadier McNair

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal
Colonel McFarland
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes²

SECRET

1. OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND
(C. C. S. 411 and 411/1)³

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the amendments to C. C. S. 411 set out in C. C. S. 411/1 and directed that the amended paper, subsequently published as

¹ C. C. S. 131st meeting.

² The source text is evidently a revised version of the minutes, for it incorporates in item 1 a change agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs at their 133d meeting; see *post*, p. 669.

³ Neither printed herein.

C. C. S. 411/2, should be forwarded to the Generalissimo via the Supreme Commander S. E. A. C. without delay.⁴

2. REPORTS FROM COMMANDERS IN CHIEF

a. Report by Commander in Chief, AFHQ

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked General Eisenhower to give his views with particular reference, firstly, to the question of centralization of command in the Mediterranean, and secondly, to the best ways and means of prosecuting the war in the Mediterranean area.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that with regard to the first question, he regarded centralization of command as being absolutely essential. In practice, the air and naval commands were already centralized and he considered the whole command must similarly be coordinated and controlled from one headquarters. With regard to future operations in the Mediterranean, he considered that these had to be looked at under two different assumptions. Firstly, that there would be a full-out effort in the Mediterranean throughout the winter. On this assumption, taking into consideration the Russian advances and the effect of POINTBLANK, Italy was, in his view, the correct place in which to deploy our main forces and the objective should be the Valley of the Po. In no other area could we so well threaten the whole German structure including France, the Balkans and the Reich itself. Here also our air would be closer to vital objectives in Germany. The seven divisions for OVERLORD had all left his theater so that, to implement his suggested course of action, only additional landing craft were needed. It was necessary to keep all that he now had and certain others would be required for certain phases of his operations. His build-up must go on continuously. In addition, it was essential to have enough landing craft to insure that one amphibious division can be always ready to attack. With regard to the timing of operations, it would be quite impossible to reach the Po by 15 January, a date which he believed had been suggested. The fighting was particularly bitter and it was necessary to keep fresh infantry divisions in the front line. Amphibious operations, it must be remembered, depended on weather conditions and therefore the timing of the advances could not be exactly predicted. The next best method of harrying the enemy was to undertake operations in the Aegean. There are sufficient forces in the Mediterranean to take action in this area provided it is not done until after the Po line has been reached. It could then be undertaken while the forces in Italy were reorganizing for thrusts either to the east or west. When the Aegean operations

⁴ C. C. S. 411/2 is printed *post*, p. 430. It was apparently discussed with Chiang at the meeting of the Heads of Government later the same afternoon; see the editorial note, *post*, p. 366.

were undertaken it would be necessary to bring Turkey into the war. The French High Command were most anxious to undertake operations into the south of France but these were ruled out since all available landing craft were required for the Italian campaign.

Turning to operations in the Mediterranean, based on the assumption that only limited means were available, GENERAL EISENHOWER considered that only the line north of Rome could be achieved and that after that he would have to maintain a strategic defensive with strong local offensive action. Lack of landing craft would prevent him from amphibious turning movements designed to cut off enemy forces. The time to turn to the Aegean would be when the line north of Rome had been achieved. German reactions to our occupation of the islands had clearly proved how strongly they resented action on our part in this area. From here the Balkans could be kept aflame; Ploesti would be threatened and the Dardanelles might be opened. Sufficient forces should be used for operations in the Aegean and no unnecessary risks run. He considered that the earlier British occupation of the islands had been right and justified, but the position was now different and strong German reactions could be expected. In either of the two assumptions it was essential to bring Turkey into the war at the moment that the operations in the Aegean were undertaken.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the date of 15 January had been suggested, not for the capture of the Po line but for that of the Pisa-Rimini line. He asked for General Eisenhower's views with regard to action in Yugoslavia.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that on the assumption that he would advance to the Po line, he would propose action to establish small garrisons in the islands on the eastern coast of the Adriatic from which thrusts as far north as possible could be made into Yugoslavia and the Patriots furnished with arms and equipment. If only the Rome line was reached, it would not be possible to thrust as far up the Adriatic as he would have liked.

GENERAL EISENHOWER then outlined the program for the build-up of his forces in Italy. He confirmed that the ground forces available to him should be sufficient to reach the Po line. His present strength was the maximum which the poor lines of communication could maintain. It must be remembered that there was no good port north of Naples until Leghorn was reached. With regard to his air force build-up, GENERAL EISENHOWER said he would like it clearly understood that all of this was not for use in POINTBLANK but much of it took an active part in assisting the land battle. This air force, based in Italy, was twice as effective as if it had remained in Tunisia. Only the initial build-up of the air force was a costly business since, once established, six groups could be maintained for the same tonnage as two divisions.

GENERAL EISENHOWER stressed the vital importance of continuing the maximum possible operations in an established theater since much time was invariably lost when the scene of action was changed, necessitating, as it did, the arduous task of building up a fresh base.

With regard to supply of equipment to the Yugoslavian guerrillas, one officer had now been placed in charge of these operations and arms captured in North Africa and Sicily were being sent in. Italian equipment captured in Italy was at present being used to equip one Italian parachute division, which was believed to be of good fighting quality, and a further division would possibly also be equipped. He believed that all possible equipment should be sent to Tito since Mikhailovitch's [*Mikhailović's*] forces were of relatively little value.

SIR JOHN CUNNINGHAM agreed that everything in our power should be done to support Tito, who had some hundred thousand men under his control. The Germans would have great difficulties operating against the guerrillas since their lateral communications were immensely difficult and there was only one poor railway. They would have largely to supply their forces by sea. It would be impossible, therefore, for them to rapidly concentrate against Tito's forces. He believed that by air and naval action, their seaborne lines of communication could be cut, and in fact, he hoped shortly to be operating destroyers in the Venice-Trieste-Pola area. He questioned whether it would be possible or right to continue to supply Italian equipment since this was rapidly running short.

AIR MARSHAL TEDDER said that the present system of air operations into the Balkans worked reasonably well. The tactical commander in Italy was given his targets from the Middle East. He agreed with Sir Charles Portal that when the joint staff under the officer responsible for operations in the Balkans had been set up, coordination of effort would be more satisfactory.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that he believed that given 50 percent good weather, he would, once his air forces were firmly established in Italy, be able to almost completely cut the seven German lines of communication into Italy and keep them cut.

b. Report by Commanders in Chief, Middle East

GENERAL WILSON, referring to operations in the Aegean, said that it was essential to cut the German iron ring which included Rhodes, Scarpanto, Crete, and Greece. Rhodes was the key to the situation and to capture this, additional equipment would be required from the western Mediterranean. Once Rhodes had fallen, these resources could be returned and the remainder of the operations in the Aegean carried out with the resources available in the Middle East. All of this was based on the assumption that Turkey had entered the war on our side.

For Rhodes, one British division including two assault loaded brigades with previous amphibious experience would be required. These could be withdrawn after the capture of Rhodes. The additional forces required included one armored brigade and one parachute brigade, which were available from the Middle East. He considered that Turkey should be asked to take other islands of the Dodecanese. This he felt should be within their power with the possible exception of Lemnos, which the Germans were using as a base and had reinforced. The commitment to Turkey to protect them against air attack, i. e., Operation **HARDHOOD**, could be met, with the exception of certain administrative units, without affecting Aegean operations.

AIR MARSHAL SIR SHOLTO DOUGLAS said that he would require some 17 to 20 squadrons and these could be provided with certain assistance which Air Marshal Tedder could provide. With this, Smyrna and Constantinople could be protected, Rhodes captured, and convoys to the Dardanelles given adequate cover. He considered that the capture of Rhodes was a prerequisite to running convoys since without it unacceptably heavy losses must be expected.

Most of the airports required in Turkey were already completed with the exception of two in the neighborhood of Rhodes, on which steel mats were now being laid. Negotiations were being undertaken with the Turks to enable us to put into Turkey the necessary equipment to provide R. D. F. cover and operation rooms. Only one of the airfields was situated to the west of the Bosphorus, and he believed the Turkish forces, including the two divisions in the neighborhood of airdromes opposite Rhodes were adequate to protect them even against airborne attack.

GENERAL WILSON stressed the importance of action in support of the guerrillas as far north as possible in Yugoslavia. The islands on the eastern Adriatic would be a valuable stepping stone to the mainland and would assist in the maintenance of guerrillas. Operations in northern Yugoslavia would constitute a serious threat to the Germans' rear.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, GENERAL WILSON said that the Turks had not got the necessary resources for a full-scale amphibious attack but that he believed that with the assistance of air attack and seaborne bombardment and by using local craft and small landing craft, some of which might have to be provided from the western Mediterranean, the Turks could stage the short shore-to-shore assault required for the capture of certain of the islands.

With regard to Rumania, GENERAL WILSON said that he was in touch with resistance groups and that a wireless station had been established in Bucharest. The resistance groups, however, were fearful of the Germans and were taking little action. His knowledge of resistance

in Bulgaria was small but he believed this resistance to be growing. He had discussed with General Donovan the possibility of further efforts being made to establish contact with this country.

In reply to a question by General Arnold, AIR MARSHAL SIR SHOLTO DOUGLAS said that the airfields in Turkey would be ample for the forces he was able to deploy, and consisted of about eight fighter airdromes and six bomber airdromes. Sites had been selected at a reasonable distance back from the coast and all were equipped with hard surfaces except those in the neighborhood of Rhodes, on which work was now in hand.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of the statements of the Commanders in Chief, North African and Middle East Theaters, and of the resulting discussion.

(At this point General D. D. Eisenhower, Admiral Sir John Cunningham, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, General Sir H. Maitland Wilson, Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, Vice Admiral Sir A. U. Willis, Major General J. F. M. Whiteley, Major General R. H. [G.?] Lewis, Brigadier R. [A. T.] de Rhe Phillipe [*de Rhé-Philipe*], Captain M. L. Power, R. N., Colonel J. H. Lascelles and Colonel R. E. Jenkins, U. S. A. withdrew from the meeting.)

3. APPROVAL OF DECISIONS OF C. C. S. 130TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 130th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted subject to minor amendments.

4. "OVERLORD" AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

A. Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1944—Europe (C. C. S. 300/3) ⁵

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the "Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1944—Europe," presented by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 300/3 (SEXTANT).

B. "OVERLORD" and the Mediterranean (C. C. S. 409, 410 ⁶ and 387 ⁷)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff tentatively accepted the proposals for action in the Mediterranean contained in paragraph 6 of C. C. S. 409 as a basis for discussion with the Soviet Staff.

It was the understanding of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the British proposals would include the opening of the Dardanelles

⁵ *Ante*, p. 214.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 409 and 411, respectively.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 150.

and the capture of Rhodes for which the retention of landing craft in the Mediterranean was essential but that the retention of these landing craft would in no way interfere with the carrying out of Operation BUCCANEER.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that BUCCANEER would not be interfered with provided the date for OVERLORD was put back. The British Chiefs of Staff had prepared a detailed examination of the relationship of OVERLORD, Mediterranean and Aegean operations, and BUCCANEER.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the United States Chiefs of Staff tentatively accepted the British proposals for negotiations with the Soviets. He understood that these proposals implied the capture of the Rimini-Pisa line, the capture of Rhodes and the retention of the 68 landing craft until its capture. He understood that Operation BUCCANEER would not be interfered with and that further discussion would take place on these proposals when the Combined Chiefs of Staff returned to SEXTANT.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that if the capture of Rhodes and Rome and Operation BUCCANEER were carried out, the date of OVERLORD must go back.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he quite understood this point. He was of the opinion that it was essential to do Operation BUCCANEER, for the reasons that firstly, not only were the forces ready but the operation was acceptable to the Chinese; secondly, it was of vital importance to operations in the Pacific; and, thirdly, for political reasons it could not be interfered with.

In the course of a full discussion the following points were made:

a. SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it might be necessary to consider earnestly the possibility of putting off Operation BUCCANEER since by so doing the full weight of our resources could be brought to bear on Germany, thus bringing the war as a whole to an end at the earliest possible date. The matter should be looked at from a purely strategical aspect.

b. SIR CHARLES PORTAL felt that the Russians might well say that not only did they agree with the proposed course of action outlined by the British Chiefs of Staff and tentatively accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff but also that they required Operation OVERLORD at the earliest possible date. In this case we must surely consider the possibility of putting off Operation BUCCANEER. He did not believe this operation essential to the land campaign in Burma.

c. ADMIRAL KING considered it unsound to bring back landing craft from BUCCANEER. In his view the land campaign in Burma was not complete without Operation BUCCANEER. Our object was to make use of China and her manpower and the delay of a year in achieving this object must most certainly delay the end of the war as a whole.

d. GENERAL MARSHALL stressed the U. S. contribution to the war in Europe. He believed that the suggestion that putting off the Operation BUCCANEER would shorten the war was an overstatement. The

United States Chiefs of Staff were most anxious that BUCCANEER should be undertaken. They had gone far to meet the British Chiefs of Staff views but the postponement of BUCCANEER they could not accept.

e. ADMIRAL LEAHY said he wished it clearly understood that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not in a position to agree to the abandonment of Operation BUCCANEER. This could only be decided by the President and the Prime Minister.

(At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff continued the meeting in closed session.)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed to the unification of command in the Mediterranean as outlined in C. C. S. 387, and that this unification of command should be made effective forthwith.

b. Tentatively accepted paragraph 6 *b, c, d, e, and f* (modified) of C. C. S. 409 as a basis for discussion with the Soviets, subject to the following understandings and modifications:

(1) That these proposals necessitate a delay in the target date for OVERLORD.

(2) That paragraph 6 *e* includes the capture of Rhodes and the retention of certain landing craft in the Mediterranean.

(3) That in paragraph 6 *f* the words "do everything possible to" in the second line be deleted.

(4) That the United States Chiefs of Staff could not accept the abandonment of the BUCCANEER operation; also that if further discussion should show the postponement of BUCCANEER to be desirable, this would need to be taken up with the President and the Prime Minister.

c. Took note of the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff on the effect of weather on Operation OVERLORD. (C. C. S. 410).

5. COLLABORATION WITH THE U. S. S. R. (C. C. S. 407)⁸

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted C. C. S. 407, with certain amendments as a basis for the agenda at the forthcoming conference with the U. S. S. R. [The amended paper, in which are incorporated the conclusions on this subject reached at C. C. S. 129th Meeting,⁹ has been published as C. C. S. 407 (Revised).]¹⁰

⁸ Regarding C. C. S. 407, see *post*, p. 426, footnote 1.

⁹ See paragraph 4 *b* of the minutes of the 129th meeting, *ante*, p. 338.

¹⁰ Bracketed sentence appears in the source text. C. C. S. 407 (Revised) is printed *post*, p. 426.

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-CHIANG MEETING, NOVEMBER 26, 1943,
4:30 P. M., ROOSEVELT'S VILLA**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CHINA
President Roosevelt Ambassador Harriman	Prime Minister Churchill Foreign Secretary Eden Sir Alexander Cadogan	Generalissimo Chiang Madame Chiang

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 299. According to all reports, the meeting lasted for at least two hours, and it must have begun earlier than 4:30 if Alanbrooke is correct in indicating (p. 57) that the Chiangs were giving a reception in their own villa as early as 5 p. m. on the same afternoon. The Leahy Diary for November 26 says that Churchill and the Chiangs were with Roosevelt "all the afternoon". Elliott Roosevelt (p. 166) states: "The afternoon was given over to a final political conference. The Chiangs, the Prime Minister, Harriman, Eden, and Cadogan were with the President in the garden for some two hours, framing the language of the communiqué . . ."

The Log entry for November 26 states that "A press communiqué announcing the completion of the first phase of the Cairo Conference was agreed upon. . . . For reasons of security, it was also agreed that this communiqué would not be released to the press until after the completion of the forthcoming conference at Teheran." The release of the communiqué was also postponed until Stalin's approval of the text could be obtained at Tehran; see *post*, pp. 449, 566. For drafts of the communiqué, see *post*, pp. 399-404. For the final text of the communiqué and correspondence concerning its release, see *post*, pp. 448-455.

According to *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 65, the conversation also covered the proposed operations in the China-Burma-India theater, in reference to which Chiang is reported as having agreed to every point that he had rejected the day before; see *ante*, p. 359, and *post*, p. 430.

In addition to the subjects mentioned above and those reported as having been discussed at previous Roosevelt-Chiang meetings (see *ante*, pp. 322, 349), certain other subjects apparently were discussed by Roosevelt and Chiang at Cairo in one or more of their several meetings. These subjects and the sources in which they are mentioned are as follows:

The economic situation in China, including currency stabilization, a billion-dollar loan, and the establishment of a Sino-American

Russ - American Economic

Liberal
opinion of British
China will not give up

Outer Mongolia

C says -

It protects India
as a buffer - then
Japan no longer a threat.

India a free port

C says - obviously does
not want us to say
anything about
India to Russia

economic commission: *post*, pp. 441, 804, 845, 861; *United States Relations With China*, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 488, 491, 557; *The Stilwell Papers*, pp. 251-252.

The cost of maintaining American troops in China: *United States Relations With China*, p. 499.

The disposition of Japanese-held islands in the Pacific: *post*, p. 868.

The maintenance of post-war security in the Western Pacific: *post*, p. 868.

The internationalization of the port of Dairen: *post*, pp. 567, 869, 891; *United States Relations With China*, p. 558.

The results of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers: *post*, p. 784.

The general plan for post-war international organization: *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 1944-45 volume, p. 140.

The payment for the cost of the airfields to be constructed at Chengtu: *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 77.

The providing of Lend-Lease equipment for a total of ninety Chinese divisions: *post*, pp. 484, 889-890; *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 64 and 73.

HOPKINS-CHIANG CONVERSATION, NOVEMBER 26, 1943, EVENING, ROOSEVELT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Hopkins

CHINA

Generalissimo Chiang
Madame Chiang

Editorial Note

No official record of this conversation has been found. The only reference to the meeting occurs in the notes by John P. Davies on what Hopkins told Stilwell and Davies on December 6. According to the Davies notes, Hopkins said that he had had a three-hour conversation with the Chiangs on the evening before his departure for Tehran. With respect to subjects discussed, Hopkins mentioned only that the Chiangs had raised the question of the return of Outer Mongolia. This question had been brought up at the dinner meeting on November 23, 1943; see *ante*, p. 325.

The Hopkins notes reproduced on the facing page may pertain to this conversation.

6. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

A. CORRESPONDENCE, DRAFTS, AND PROPOSALS ¹

J. C. S. FILES

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff ²

SECRET

CAIRO, 22 November 1943.

C. C. S. 404

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR "SEXTANT"

1. Agreement as to conference procedure.
2. Over-All Objective; Over-All Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War; Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-All Strategic Concept.
3. European-Mediterranean
 - a. Estimate of the enemy situation.
 - b. Report on the Combined Bomber Offensive.
 - c. Report on anti-U-boat operations.
 - d. Report on status of development of facilities in the Azores, air and naval.
 - e. Readiness report on OVERLORD, RANKIN, and JUPITER.
 - f. Report on Mediterranean operations, including the Middle East.
 - g. Plans for U. S.-British-U. S. S. R. military collaboration.
 - h. Specific operations for the defeat of Germany and her Satellites, 1943-44.
 - i. Policies with respect to military considerations in dealing with neutral, liberated and occupied countries, including agreement as to division of responsibility between the United Nations.
4. Japan
 - a. Estimate of the enemy situation, 1944, Japan (giving consideration to Russian and Chinese intentions).
 - b. Short Term Plan for the defeat of Japan.

¹ See also Grace Tully, *F. D. R., My Boss* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1949), p. 270, for a personal letter of November 26, 1943, from Roosevelt to Grace Tully referring briefly to his role ("that of peacemaker") at the Conference.

² Presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

- c. Report on the general situation in the Southeast Asia Command.
- d. Report on operations in China.
- e. Report on Pacific operations.
- f. Transfer of United Nations efforts to the defeat of Japan upon the defeat of Germany.
- g. Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 1944, including amphibious operations in Southeast Asia.
5. Relation of resources to plans.
6. Final report to President and Prime Minister.
7. Preparation and approval of any directives arising from conference decisions and of any reports to other Allies.
8. Discussion as to the next conference.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 22 November 1943.

C. C. S. 404/1

SEXTANT AGENDA

1. We have considered the Agenda for SEXTANT proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 404) and while we have no specific objections to the subjects set out in their memorandum, we suggest that a more simple agenda would meet the case.

2. We, therefore, propose that the main subjects for discussion should be as follows:

- I. Reaffirm Over-All Objective, Over-All Strategic Concept and Basic Undertakings
(C. C. S. 319/5, paragraphs 2-5 and paragraphs [*paragraph*] 6, as subsequently amended by agreement between Combined Chiefs of Staff (see C. C. S. 380/2))¹
- II. Southeast Asia Operations
- III. "Overlord" and the Mediterranean
- IV. The War Against Japan
- V. Progress Reports

¹ C. C. S. 319/5 was adopted at the First Quebec Conference, August 1943, the documentation of which is scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series. Paragraphs 2-5 of C. C. S. 319/5 are verbally identical with paragraphs 2-5 of C. C. S. 380/2, November 6, 1943, *ante*, p. 157. Paragraph 6 differs in the two papers after subpoint *h*. Extracts from, or the whole of, 39 of the paragraphs of C. C. S. 319/5 are printed in Ehrman, vol. v, pp. 1, 8-10, 12-15.

3. Discussion of the above main subjects would include the introduction of most, if not all, of the points put forward in the American agenda. The arrangements for dealing with the detailed subjects would, however, be made from day to day.

4. It will be noted that Southeast Asia operations have been placed second on the list, in view of the intention to bring the Generalissimo and Admiral Mountbatten into the discussions at the earliest stage.

5. It is thought that the Progress Reports should be left to the end of the Conference when the main items have been disposed of. This procedure will not, of course, preclude points being raised for discussion when the Progress Reports are taken.

A. F. BROOKE

C. A. PORTAL

A. B. CUNNINGHAM

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Generalissimo's Chief of Staff (Stilwell)

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 22 November 1943.

C. C. S. 405

ROLE OF CHINA IN DEFEAT OF JAPAN

1. At QUADRANT an outline plan for operations against Japan was presented in Annex "I" to C. C. S. 319/2.¹ These operations culminated in an invasion of Japan some time after 1947.

2. The question at hand which concerns the China Theater is "what operations can be mounted from China which will have the greatest effect on the course of the war in the Pacific?" This question can be answered as follows:

- a. Assist S. E. A. C. in operations against North Burma—Current.
- b. Develop land route to China and improve internal communications—Current.
- c. Continue to train and improve combat effectiveness of Chinese Army—Current.
- d. Initiate intensive bombing of Japan by V. L. R. bombers—Early 1944.
- e. Recapture Canton and Hongkong—November 1944—May 1945.

¹Not printed herein. The documents of the QUADRANT Conference (Quebec, 1943) are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series. A description of the discussions and decisions of the Quebec Conference of 1943 respecting the war against Japan may be found in Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), in the series *United States Army in World War II*, pp. 357-360, and in Ehrman, vol. v, pp. 10 ff.

f. Carry out intensive bombing of Formosa and P[hilippine] I[slands], deny use of Straits of Formosa and South China Sea to Japan and furnish land-based air support to any U.S. Navy activities in these areas—October 1944—

g. Attack Formosa if required—May 1945–November 1945.

h. Offensive operations towards Shanghai—November 1945.

The above operations are tactically and logistically feasible. The cost is low. There is no competition with other theaters for specialized equipment and there is no conflict with operations projected by other theaters. These operations will:

- (1) *Provide greatest aid possible to other theaters, and*
- (2) *Cut down "QUADRANT" time table for final defeat of Japan by one to two years.*

3. Requirements

a. One U. S. Infantry Division in India by March 1944. Two additional divisions about a month apart thereafter. (These to be definitely earmarked for China Theater.)

b. Continuation of supply program from U. S. for equipping Chinese troops.

c. Setting up India as a base for both China and Southeast Asia Theaters. All U. S. Troops now in India except those necessary for operation of the Communication Zone to be moved to China after recapture of North Burma.

740.0011 PW 1939/12-3143

*Memorandum by Lieutenant General Stilwell's Political Adviser
(Davies)*¹

[CAIRO, November 22(?), 1943.]

THE CHINA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA THEATERS: SOME POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The mission of the South East Asia Command is to defeat the enemy in and presumably occupy former British and Dutch colonies and Thailand. French Indochina may later be included.

In so far as we participate in SEAC operations, we become involved in the politically explosive colonial problems of the British, Dutch

¹ Apparently prepared for use by Roosevelt. The source text is a copy sent by Davies to Ballantine at Washington and submitted by Ballantine to Hull on December 31, 1943, for his information.

and possibly French. In so doing, we compromise ourselves not only with the colonial peoples of Asia but also the free peoples of Asia, including the Chinese. Domestically, our Government lays itself open to public criticism—"why should American boys die to recreate the colonial empires of the British and their Dutch and French satellites?" Finally, more Anglo-American misunderstanding and friction is likely to arise out of our participation in SEAC than out of any other theater.

By concentrating our Asiatic effort on operations in and from China we keep to the minimum our involvement in colonial imperialism. We engage in a cause which is popular with Asiatics and the American public. We avoid the mutual mistrust and recrimination over the colonial question, potentially so inimical to harmonious Anglo-American relations.

General Stilwell has submitted a plan² for increased American effort in the China theater. It envisages, among other things, the recapture of Canton, Hong Kong and Shanghai and a possible attack on Formosa. He proposes to use American and Chinese forces to accomplish this. The Chinese welcome this plan. It gives them something to fight for. They have slight interest in entering Burma, Thailand and French Indochina for only the territorial benefit of the British and the French. But their own territory and Formosa (which they claim) provide a real incentive.

The Chinese Army is great in size. But it is relatively untrained and generally corrupt. However much of the Generalissimo and his Army may in principle wish to assume the offensive, they cannot effectively do so excepting under firm American guidance. American leadership can concretely be exercised only as General Stilwell is given bargaining power, for the Chinese are sharp, practical traders. All aid and concessions to China must therefore be made in consultation with and through General Stilwell.

It is not proposed that with a concentration of effort on the China theater we should forthwith turn our backs on SEAC. In cooperation with SEAC we need to retake North Burma immediately and so reopen a land route to China. But after the recapture of North Burma there comes a parting of the ways.

The British will wish to throw their main weight southward for the repossession of colonial empire. Our main interest in Asia will lie to the East from whence we can strike directly and in coordination with other American offensives at the center of Japan's new Empire.

² *Supra.*

J. C. S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 22 November 1943.

J. C. S. 606

COLLABORATION WITH THE U. S. S. R.

The following paragraph, from a radio from General Deane to General Marshall, is submitted by General Marshall to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration:

"I suggest that the Joint Chiefs of Staff put the Russians on the defensive at once by having some request to make of the Russians. I think it is important that we are not put in a position of doing all the explaining. You might include the following subjects: built [*sic*] bases; improved communications and interchange of weather; shuttle bomber bases, and coordination of timing reference OVERLORD."

F. B. ROYAL

A. J. MCFARLAND

Joint Secretariat

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

CAIRO, 22 November 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

I have arrived in Cairo this morning and begin [*begun?*] discussions with the Prime Minister. Conferences will follow with the Generalissimo by the end of the week. He will thereupon return to China. The Prime Minister and I with our senior staff officers can then proceed to Teheran to meet you, Mr. Molotov and your staff officers. If it suits your convenience I could arrive the afternoon of November 29. I am prepared to remain for two to four days depending upon how long you can find it possible to be away from your compelling responsibilities. I would be grateful if you would telegraph me what day you wish to set for our meeting and how long you can stay. I realize that bad weather sometimes causes delays in travel from Moscow to Teheran at this time of the year and therefore would appreciate your keeping me advised of your plans.

I am informed that your Embassy and the British Embassy in Teheran are situated close to each other whereas my Legation is some

¹ Sent by Harriman at Cairo to Spalding at Moscow, via Navy channels, for delivery to Stalin, with the suggestion that the reply be sent via Spalding to Harriman. Stalin's reply is printed *post*, p. 415.

distance away. I am advised that all three of us would be taking unnecessary risks by driving to and from our meetings if we were staying so far apart from each other.

Where do you think we should live?

I look forward to our talks with keen anticipation.

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Soviet
Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Molotov)* ¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 22 November 1943.

The British and ourselves are sending representatives from Cairo to Teheran tomorrow, November 23, to make the physical arrangements for the Conference including the living quarters and security in all details. It would be helpful if you would advise our Commanding General in Teheran, General Con[n]olly, what representative of the Soviet Government he should get in touch with to coordinate our planning with yours. I would be grateful if you would also cable me in Cairo that this has been arranged.

I had a most hospitable welcome and interesting afternoon during our unexpected stop in Stalingrad ² for which I am very grateful.

I look forward to seeing you. Regards.

¹ Sent to Spalding at Moscow, via Navy channels, for delivery to Molotov, with the suggestion that Molotov's reply be sent via Spalding. Molotov's reply is printed *post*, p. 424.

² The plane carrying Harriman and others from Moscow to Cairo developed engine trouble and made an emergency landing at Stalingrad. See Deane, p. 35.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President ¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull:

Steinhardt reports Turkish Government has now made official reply to Eden's recent proposals,² summarized as follows:

1) Turkey does not share British opinion that war between Turkey and Germany would not result from Turkey's granting air bases, and Turkey is consequently unwilling to do so.

¹ Presumably sent via military channels.

² See Kelley's telegram 1844 of November 10, 1943, *ante*, p. 174.

2) Turkey believes she should take effective part in war on Allied side.

3) However, the British have not supplied indispensable minimum arms promised by Churchill at Adana, nor has German strength deteriorated to extent contemplated at Adana before Turkey would be asked to come in.

4) Consequently, Turkey's coastal cities, communications, military bases, and industries would be promptly destroyed and Turkey would become liability instead of asset.

5) Moreover, Eden's proposals would leave Turkey as isolated belligerent, since they do not provide for collaboration of Turkey in action undertaken by Great Britain as contemplated in Anglo-Turk Alliance.

6) Thus, demand that Turkey enter war before end of year would entail sacrifices beyond Turkey's material capacity and inconsonant with Turkish Government's elementary duty toward the people.

Steinhardt also reports from reliable Turkish sources that:

1) Von Papen recently informed Turkish Government cession of even one Turkish air base would lead to immediate war declaration by Germany and Bulgaria with disastrous consequences for Turkey.

2) Bulgaria has decided on active and effective cooperation with Germany in event of Turkish concessions to Allies, agreeing to immediate joint attack to occupy Thrace and Straits within three days, meanwhile destroying Istanbul from air and paralyzing Turkish communications in order to make prompt Allied assistance impossible.

Helsinki reports November 19 that it is clear that the Finnish Government as a result of intense German pressure, and despondency following Moscow Declaration³ has decided to continue in more strict collaboration with Germany.

The Chargé at Lisbon⁴ has been unable to arrange an interview with the Prime Minister⁵ before November 22.⁶ The Chargé has learned that the Portuguese apparently do not wish to be consulted or informed regarding the use of facilities at Horta and Teceria [*Terceira?*] by United Nations' forces, since they consider this to be a matter entirely between the British and the Americans.⁷ The Chargé intends to ask Salazar to confirm this position particularly as it applies to the use of American engineering personnel.

I assume that the British are keeping you informed on developments in Lebanese crisis.⁸ We have been supporting the British from

³ The communiqué and declarations issued on November 1, 1943, at the Moscow Conference are printed in *Decade*, pp. 9-14.

⁴ George F. Kennan.

⁵ Antonio de Oliveira Salazar.

⁶ Kennan was to deliver to Salazar Roosevelt's letter of November 4, 1943, printed in *F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, vol. II, p. 1466.

⁷ See *ante*, p. 260.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 84, footnote 2.

the beginning. Murphy informs us the question of authorizing Catroux to order recall Helleu approved by Committee by vote of 12 to 3. Three dissenting members were de Gaulle, Pleven and Diethelm.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Hopkins Papers

*United States Delegation Memorandum*¹

CAIRO, November 23, 1943.

COMMENTS ON REPORTS THAT THE GENERALISSIMO IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD HIS REGIME AND ITS INTENTION TO SUPPORT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

In Moscow there are definite indications that the Soviet Government:

1. In the post war period wants peace within China and a strong central government,

2. Recognizes that this objective can be obtained only through the Generalissimo,

3. Will insist on a more liberal policy based on democratic principles and improvement in social conditions,

4. Desires some solution of the Chinese communist problem either by the Generalissimo's acceptance of them as an independent political² party or by bringing them into the Government in some manner,

5. Does not have ambitions in respect to Chinese territory in general. This view is supported by their recent withdrawal from the Province of Sinkiang. The recognition of Outer Mongolia's independence was for military protection against the Japanese advance. There is no indication yet as to the Soviet Government's attitude regarding the question of a warm water port, although it would be consistent for them to agree to the independence of Korea under some type of trusteeship in which the four great powers would participate.

The Chinese Ambassador in Moscow³ has expressed opinions along these lines.⁴

¹The author of this memorandum was presumably Hopkins. Harriman indicated to the editors in 1956 that Hopkins had handed the paper to him to read; that he had added the sentence at the end; and that he had returned it to Hopkins (023.1/5-256).

²The word "political" is a handwritten interlinear addition.

³Foo Ping-sheung.

⁴The final sentence was added in handwriting by Harriman.

Hopkins Papers

The President to the President's Personal Representative (Hurley)

[CAIRO,] 23 November 1943.

MY DEAR GENERAL HURLEY: You are directed to proceed to Tehran in Iran for the accomplishment of a mission on the conditions outlined in the Secretary of State's message to you dated at Washington, November 5, 1943, as modified by the Secretary of State's message to you dated at Washington November 19, 1943.¹

As my personal representative you are also directed to perform additional duties, the nature and the object of which I have outlined to you personally.²

Yours very sincerely,

[No signature indicated]

¹ The messages under reference authorized Hurley to proceed to Iran for the purpose of coordinating the activities of the several American agencies operating in Iran and of effecting closer cooperation between the American, British, Soviet, and Iranian agencies in that country (123 Hurley, Patrick J./119).

² The additional duties which Hurley was asked to perform apparently related to the selection of the quarters in which Roosevelt would reside while in Tehran; see *post*, pp. 439-440.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 23 November 1943.

C. C. S. 401/1

V. L. R. AIRFIELDS (B-29) IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA AREA

1. As the United States Chiefs of Staff will be aware, the President has already telegraphed to the Prime Minister with regard to the provision of suitable airdromes in India and China for the operation of B-29 aircraft against Japan in the spring of 1944.¹ The Prime Minister has instructed the Commander in Chief, India, to render every possible assistance in the construction of the four air bases in India and has so informed the President. An examination of the project has been undertaken and we are satisfied that the difficulties involved, including the movement of the extra tonnage required through the port of Calcutta, can be overcome.

2. We therefore accept the recommendations of the United States Chiefs of Staff contained in paragraph 7 of C. C. S. 401² and are issuing the necessary instructions to the British authorities concerned.

¹ See Roosevelt's telegram to Churchill, November 10, 1943, *ante*, p. 172.

² See *ante*, p. 187.

3. If the necessary work in India is to be completed in time, it is essential that the United States units and equipment required should arrive in Calcutta by 15 January; otherwise the work will not be completed by 1 April and in fact would have to be stopped to allow resources temporarily diverted owing to airfield construction to be sent through to Ledo.

Hopkins Papers

*The Prime Minister's Private Secretary (Martin) to the President's
Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

SECRET

[CAIRO,] November 23, 1943.

MR. HOPKINS. (Private)

Colonel Warden¹ asked me to send you this telegram to see. Could you please let me have it back.²

J. M. MARTIN

[Enclosure]

*The British Minister in Saudi Arabia (Jordan) to the British
Foreign Office*

SECRET

JEDDA, 15 November 1943.

War Cabinet Distribution—Repeated to Minister of State Cairo.³

475. My telegram No. 455.⁴

Ibn Saud has sent me a message from Mecca to the effect that United States representative in Jedda asked him the following questions on November 13th.

1) Has Saudi Arabian Government asked His Majesty's Government for arms?

2) If so when did they make their request to His Majesty's Government?

3) What arms did Saudi Arabian Government ask for?

4) Has anything been promised by His Majesty's Government?

5) What has arrived?

6) Are arms being supplied by His Majesty's Government as a gift or against payment?

¹ Churchill.

² There is no evidence of a written reply from Hopkins to Martin. Hopkins did however, obtain the comments of the American Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) on the enclosed telegram from the British Minister. See *post*, p. 447.

³ Richard Casey.

⁴ Not found in United States files.

7) Did His Majesty's Government offer to supply arms or did the question arise out of a demand from Saudi Arabian Government?

2. Ibn Saud informed my United States colleague that His Majesty's Government had promised to supply 50 light reconnaissance cars but that none had arrived to date. He did not know if payment was expected or whether they were being supplied under Lease Lend in accordance with the list of Saudi Arabian arms requirements submitted to His Majesty's Government by Saudi Arabian representative in London for supply under Lease Lend.

3. I feel my United States colleague's action in putting these questions to Ibn Saud is unfortunate as it would appear to show 1) a lack of collaboration between His Majesty's Government and United States on this question and 2) United States distrust of any information given them by His Majesty's Government.

4. I venture to suggest that we should come to some agreement with United States over the quantities of war material to be supplied to Saudi Arabian Government as soon as possible and inform Ibn Saud accordingly.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 23 November 1943.

C. C. S. 406

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF—UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF

Reference: CCS 127th Meeting, Item 4¹

1. The discussion in the C. C. S. 127th Meeting concerning the Chinese military representatives meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff was the first of a series of such problems which will arise, particularly as our cooperation with the Soviets and Chinese develops. It would seem highly desirable to find a solution which will permanently (a) maintain the exclusive American-British character of the Combined Chiefs of Staff while avoiding these embarrassing complications and (b) furnish adequate and satisfactory machinery for discussions by the principal Allies at the Chiefs of Staff level, as military problems arise or political considerations make such meetings desirable.

2. As a solution it is suggested:

a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff be recognized as an exclusive American and British Body, and

¹ See *ante*, p. 305.

b. That a "United Chiefs of Staff" be set up at the Chiefs of Staff level to include the principal Allies—that is, for the present, the four "Moscow" powers.²

3. The United Chiefs of Staff would function only when necessity arose, and would provide for attendance either by all members or by only those concerned in the problems to be discussed. This arrangement would give an "out" to China or Russia as the case might be. The proposed United Chiefs of Staff should consist of a single representative of the Chiefs of Staff of each nation. This representative would not necessarily have to be the same official at all meetings. Our Allies could not complain of being left out of Combined Chiefs of Staff discussion, since in theory, at least, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be the lesser of the two bodies.

4. Such a "United Chiefs of Staff" should be considered as a flexible organization designed to meet situations as they develop, including possible inclusion of other Allies at a later date, on the same basis of participation when concerned.

² Parties to the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed at the Moscow Conference on October 30, 1943, and issued November 1, 1943, i. e., the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China; *Decade*, p. 11.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President to the Director of War Mobilization (Byrnes) ¹

URGENT

23 NOVEMBER 1943.

Extremely important and urgent that I know at once whether the present schedules for production and completion of landing craft can be increased during January, February, March, April and May. On the assumption that landing craft takes precedence over all other munitions of war will you let me know how many additional landing craft by types can be delivered during the months of January, February, March, April and May? List each month separately. Call conference of all interested departments. Very urgent.²

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to Mathewson at the White House for delivery to Byrnes. Mathewson was instructed to send copies of the message to Horne and to Nelson.

² For an account of Byrnes' action on this matter and for a facsimile of a private letter of November 23, 1943, from Roosevelt to Byrnes, see James F. Byrnes, *All In One Lifetime* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), pp. 202-203.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull:

As the Russian Army approaches the Polish frontier the Polish Government is showing its extreme anxiety over the future of Poland and I believe that I should send you a rather full summary of developments.

The following are the principal points of a confidential memorandum from the Polish Premier to you which has been handed to me by the Polish Ambassador:²

The Prime Minister referred to the Polish Government's memorandum of October 6³ which among other things expressed the hope that normal Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations could be restored in order that the Polish and Soviet Governments could then endeavor to settle their mutual problems and asked for British-American guarantees of the independence and integrity of Polish territory as well as the security of its inhabitants. To assure this the October 6 memorandum made the impractical suggestion that American-British troops should be stationed in Poland to prevent friction and possible reprisals. That memorandum indicated that if the Soviet Government should openly attempt to communize Poland after its armies had occupied Polish territory this might cause the Polish population as an act of desperation to retaliate in self defense.

The latest memorandum dated November 18 appeals to you "to intervene with Marshal Stalin with a view to restoring Polish-Soviet relations, safeguarding the interests of the Polish State and the life and property of its citizens after the Soviet troops have entered Poland."

The memorandum asserts that "the unwillingness of the Polish Government to enter into discussions on frontier questions is based on the following considerations:"

1. Poland has never given up the fight against Germany since 1939 and is fully entitled to emerge from the war without reduction of territory.

2. Soviet claims to Eastern Poland comprises half of total Polish territory and contain important centers of Polish national life.

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.

² The memorandum from the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) was dated November 18, 1943, and the one from the Polish Premier (Mikołajczyk) was dated November 16, 1943 (760.61/2120). For a similar memorandum dated November 16, 1943, from Mikołajczyk to Churchill, see Stanisław Mikołajczyk, *The Rape of Poland* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948), p. 267.

³ Not printed herein.

The memorandum continues: "The Polish Government could not see their way to enter into a discussion on the subject of territorial concessions above all for the reason that such a discussion in the absence of effective guarantees of Poland's independence and security on the part of the United States and Great Britain would be sure to lead to ever new demands. The attribution to Poland of East Prussia, Danzig, Opole, Silesia and the straightening and shortening of the Polish Western frontier are in any case dictated by the need to provide for the stability of future peace, the disarmament of Germany and the security of Poland and other countries of Central Europe. The transfer to Poland of these territories cannot therefore be fairly treated as an object of compensation for the cession to the USSR of Eastern Poland which for reasons adduced above does by no means represent to the USSR a value comparable to that which it has for Poland. The attempt made to prejudice the fate of Polish Eastern territories by means of a popular vote organized under Soviet occupation by the occupying authorities is without any value either political or legal. It would be equally impossible to obtain a genuine expression of the will of the population inhabiting these territories in view of the ruthless methods applied there today and those which have been applied in the past by consecutive occupants."

The memorandum then states that "a rising in Poland against Germany is being planned to break out at a moment mutually agreed upon with our Allies either before or at the very moment of the entry of Soviet troops into Poland.

"In accordance with the principles adopted in Quebec,⁴ the Polish Government is entitled to exert sovereign authority over Polish lands as they are liberated from the enemy. Consequently, in case the entry

⁴ The reference here is apparently to a proposed joint statement regarding liberated areas, the text of which was agreed upon by Roosevelt and Churchill at a meeting on August 22, 1943, during the First Quebec Conference. It was decided at that meeting that the statement would first be communicated to the Soviet and Chinese Governments and the refugee governments directly concerned, with a view to its eventual publication on or about September 15. The statement was duly transmitted to the Soviet and Chinese Governments; but on September 11 the Department informed Biddle, in London, that at the request of the British Government the date for communication of the statement to the refugee governments had been postponed. On September 15 the Department instructed the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) and the Chargé in China (Atcheson) to inform the respective Governments that issuance of the statement had been postponed and that it should continue to be regarded as confidential. On September 28 Campbell, of the British Embassy, stated to Dunn, of the Department of State, his Government's view that the time and appropriateness for the issuance of the statement had passed and its desire that the statement as agreed upon at Quebec be "definitely cancelled". Dunn thereupon agreed to the cancellation. The documents available do not indicate from what source the Polish Government learned of the proposed statement. (800.0146/155½, 159a, 160, 160a, 161, 161a, 163a, 164, 165, 170, 171a, 209, 228)

of Soviet troops into Poland takes place after the reestablishment of Polish-Soviet relations, the Polish Government would be anxious, as it has already informed the American Government, to return immediately to Poland together with the Commander-in-Chief, and to co-operate there in the further struggle against Germany.

"The entry of Soviet troops on Polish territory without previous resumption of Polish-Soviet relations would force the Polish Government to undertake political action against the violation of Polish sovereignty while the Polish local administration and army in Poland would have to continue to work underground. In that case the Polish Government foresee the use of measures of self-defence wherever such measures are rendered indispensable by Soviet methods of terror and extermination of Polish citizens."

Asserting that the Moscow Conference did not bring the question of resumption of Polish-Soviet relations nearer to a satisfactory solution, the memorandum states that the Polish Government has reason "to fear that in present conditions the life and property of Polish citizens may be exposed to danger after the entry of Soviet troops into Poland and the imposing on the country of Soviet administration. In that case desperate reaction of the Polish community may be expected following the violation of the principle adopted in Quebec assuring to the United Nations their liberty and their own administration."

The memorandum further indicates that the Polish Government does not believe that the principles applied to Italy as adopted at the Moscow Conference⁵ would be satisfactory for Poland which is not an enemy country but a member of the United Nations. Moreover, it is stated that the presence of a few American and British liaison officers in Poland would not assure proper safeguards in the administration of the territory occupied by the Red Army.

When the Ambassador handed me the above memorandum he also delivered a personal message to you from the Polish Prime Minister stating that he is anxious to submit to you personally and verbally certain alternatives for the solution of existing difficulties and would be grateful for the opportunity of doing so. He added "I am ready to undertake the necessary journey at any time and in complete secrecy."

In presenting the Polish Prime Minister's request to see you the Ambassador indicated that Mikolajczyk wished to join you and Mr. Churchill to which I replied that I did not believe it would be possible to arrange this since you would be busily engaged in military matters of great urgency.

Subsequent to this Ambassador Biddle telegraphed on November 20 that Mikolajczyk and the Polish Foreign Minister had insisted that

⁵ For the Declaration regarding Italy, November 1, 1943, see *Decade*, p. 12.

they should be consulted in advance concerning any decisions that might be taken involving Polish interests.

The Poles indicated that decisions taken without full consultation with the Polish Government upon which the underground in Poland stakes its hope would undoubtedly lead to a serious crisis in that quarter. Furthermore, it would create a crisis in Polish circles in England, the Middle East, and might have "serious repercussions among Americans of Polish origin." Mikolajczyk interjected that even a man condemned to death was granted a last word before the court.

The Polish Foreign Minister referred to a formula which Mr. Eden, he said, is considering which envisaged dividing Poland into regions in which respectively the military administration of the "liberating forces" and the Polish Government might function. He added that it was logical that whatever formulae were advanced would meet with counter proposals and the Polish Government considered it of the utmost importance that its representatives be on hand during these discussions.

In pressing for arrangements so that he could meet you Mikolajczyk said that there were things he could present orally but could not put in writing at this time.

On the basis of the foregoing and the extremely agitated state of mind of the Polish Ambassador here it is apparent that the Polish Government feels that it is in a desperate position. This may well lead to unfortunate public outbursts. In an effort to calm the Ambassador I made it clear to him that I had emphasized at Moscow my friendly and earnest interest in his country and had urged Molotov to find a basis for reestablishing diplomatic relations with Poland; that once these relations were restored ways and means could be found to work out and adjust their differences. I told the Ambassador that as a friend of Poland I would continue to watch every opportunity to be of service to both Governments.

I also pointed out to the Ambassador that I regretted to find on my return Polish attacks on the Four-Nation Declaration when this Declaration means everything to the future of Poland. I also indicated my regret at shortsighted Polish agitation in this country of a thoroughly unfriendly nature which has manifested itself in other ways than condemning the Four-Nation Declaration.

We are making every effort here and through Biddle in London to convince the Poles, official and unofficial, that they must take a calmer outlook and not prejudice their case by undue public agitation regarding our policies.

With the approach of the Red Army to former Polish territory it would appear that every friendly opportunity should be taken to

bring about a resumption of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations. If this is not possible at the moment, I believe we should exert all our influence to persuade the Polish Government to give instructions to its underground army to launch at the opportune moment a full-fledged attack on the Germans behind their lines and to assist the Red Army in its battle. The Polish Government should realize that if this is achieved the British and ourselves will be in a better position to convince the Soviet Government of the Polish Government's desire to make a material contribution to the shortening of the war, and to collaborate with the other United Nations after the war in working for the establishment of an organization of peace-loving nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

HULL

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] November 23, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull

Marshal Stalin, who is at the front, states that he will arrive not later than the 28th or 29th at the appointed place.²

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels. The message from Stalin had been incorporated in a note dated November 22, 1943, from Molotov to Hamilton, who transmitted it the same day to the Department in telegram 2013, signed Harriman (811.001 Roosevelt, F. D./9551½).

² i. e., Tehran.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] November 23, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull:

Lisbon reports that an interview with Salazar regarding Azores facilities has been fixed for November 23, 1943, 5:00 p. m. The British Ambassador² has received instructions to support approach to Portuguese. The Chargé³ plans to ask Salazar to confirm that Portuguese

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels. The telegram was actually sent at 2:15 a. m. on November 24, 1943, but retained the date of November 23.

² Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

³ George F. Kennan.

Government does not object to use by American forces of Horta and Terceira facilities or to participation by United States engineering units in improvement of these facilities. The Chargé intends at the same interview, informally to sound out Salazar regarding desire United States Army and Navy for the further facilities required.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] November 24, 1943.

The Lebanon matter looks better this morning but Prime Minister is being very firm and Eden arrives here tonight Wednesday.

The conferences are going well and we will finish matters with the Generalissimo in two or three days. He will then return home and we start on next leg of our trip.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to Washington via military channels and forwarded by the White House Map Room to the Department of State.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 24 November 1943.

From the President to Ambassador Steinhardt, Ankara, Turkey. Personal and secret.

Our next plans have been advanced. Hope to see you in Cairo in about a week,² and in regard to your number one³ will advise you in a day or two.

¹ Sent to Washington via military channels, forwarded by the White House Map Room to the Department of State, and relayed by the Department to the Embassy at Ankara (740.0011 EW 1939/32811b).

² Steinhardt arrived in Cairo at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the same day. See the Log, *ante*, p. 297; see also *ante*, p. 100.

³ President İnönü of Turkey. For subsequent correspondence regarding arrangements for İnönü to come to Cairo, see *post*, pp. 633, 662.

Hopkins Papers

*Memoranda by the Chinese Government*¹

[CAIRO, November 24, 1943.]

ESTABLISHMENT OF A FOUR-POWER COUNCIL OR A COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

I. Pending the formation of a Council of the United Nations, the United States, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R., and China should establish at the earliest practicable date a Four-Power Council for the discussion of questions connected with the Four-Power Declaration.²

II. The Council shall maintain a Permanent Standing Committee in Washington. The Committee may, as occasion arises, hold meetings in London, Chungking, or Moscow.

III. The Council is charged with the duty of organizing a Council of the United Nations.

IV. As regards the organization of the Council of the United Nations, the Chinese Government endorses the proposed scheme of the Government of the United States: viz., Eleven of the United Nations shall form an executive body, with the United States, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R., and China acting as a Presidium.³

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DURING THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION

I. The United States, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R., and China should establish an Inter-Allied Military Technical Commission to consider all military questions concerning the organization and maintenance of international security.

II. For the successful organization and maintenance of international security, a certain number of International Naval and Air Bases will be established. Such Bases should be located at strategic points all over the world, the selection of which should be based upon the opinion of experts and subject to the consent of the States wherein such Bases are to be situated.

¹ Handed by Wang to Hopkins by direction of Chiang, for transmission to Roosevelt—not as formal proposals but as an indication of the problems which, the Chinese felt, might suitably be discussed, and “as reference material for the committee responsible for the drafting of the communiqué”. This footnote is based on, and the quoted words are taken from, a letter of May 21, 1957, from the Chinese Ambassador at Washington (Tong) to the Historical Office, Department of State (023.1/5-2157). It does not appear that any committee was appointed to draft the communiqué; see *post*, pp. 399–404.

² For the text of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed at the Moscow Conference on October 30, 1943, and issued November 1, 1943, see *Decade*, p. 11.

³ The “proposed scheme” was apparently a reflection of the Draft Constitution of International Organization, dated July 14, 1943; see Notter, p. 473.

EUROPEAN QUESTIONS AND THE SURRENDER OF GERMANY

Any discussion on European questions among the United Nations should be communicated forthwith to the Chinese Government. China should be invited to participate in any decision concerning the surrender of Germany.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE FAR EAST

I. *Formation of a Far Eastern Committee.*

China, Great Britain, and the United States should set up a Far Eastern Committee to facilitate joint consultation on political problems arising from the progress of the war in the Far East. The participation of the U. S. S. R. in this Committee is welcomed at any time.

II. *Creation of a Unified Command.*

With a view to unifying the strategy and direction of the war of the United Nations against the enemy in the Far East, the existing Anglo-American Council of Chiefs-of-Staff in Washington should be enlarged to be a tripartite council, that is, a Council of Chiefs-of-Staff of China, the United States, and Great Britain; or in the alternative, a Sino-American Council of Chiefs-of-Staff should be established for the direction of the Chinese and American forces in the Far East.

III. *Administration of Enemy Territory and Enemy-held Territories following Allied Occupation.*

(A) On the occupation of the territory of the enemy, the army of occupation shall exercise the powers of military and civil administration. However, if the army of occupation should be neither Chinese nor British nor American, then all political problems concerning the said territory shall be settled by a specially created Joint Council, wherein China, Great Britain, and the United States, even though without an army in the said territory, shall fully participate for the control of the said territory.

(B) On the liberation of any part of the territory of China, Great Britain, or the United States, the powers of military administration shall be exercised by the army of occupation; and the powers of civil administration, by the State which rightfully has sovereignty over the territory in question. Matters touching on both the military and the civil administration shall be settled by consultation between the army of occupation and the civil administrative organ of the said State.

(C) On the liberation of any part of the territory of other United Nations, the powers of military administration shall be exercised by

the army of occupation; and the powers of civil administration, by the State which rightfully has sovereignty over the territory in question, subject, however, to the control of the army of occupation. (In other words, China endorses the proposed scheme of Great Britain and the United States regarding the administration of liberated territories in Europe.⁴)

IV. *Settlement with Japan upon Her Defeat.*

(A) China, Great Britain, and the United States should agree upon certain guiding principles for the treatment of Japan after her defeat—principles similar to those adopted by the Tripartite Conference in Moscow regarding the treatment of defeated Italy.

(B) China, Great Britain, and the United States should agree upon a program for the punishment of the leaders in Japan responsible for the war and of the officers and men of the Japanese armed forces responsible for the atrocities perpetrated during the war,—a program similar to the one adopted by the Tripartite Conference in Moscow for the punishment of Nazi war criminals.⁵

(C) China, Great Britain, and the United States should agree to recognize the independence of Korea after the war. The adherence of the U. S. S. R. to this agreement for the recognition of Korea's independence is welcomed at any time.

(D) Japan shall restore to China all the territories she has taken from China since September 18, 1931. Japan shall also return Dairen and Port Arthur, and Formosa and the Pescadores Islands to China.

(E) For the settlement of questions relating to territories in the Pacific, China, Great Britain, and the United States should agree upon certain basic principles and also establish a Committee of Experts to make recommendations for the settlement of these questions. If such a Committee is not established, its work shall be undertaken by the projected Far Eastern Committee.

(F) All Japanese property in China, private as well as public, and the Japanese mercantile fleet shall be taken over by the Chinese Government as indemnification in part for the losses sustained by the Chinese Government and people in the war. For the maintenance of peace in the Far East after the war, Japan's ammunition and war materials, her war vessels and her aircraft, which may still remain at the end of hostilities, shall be placed at the disposal of the Joint Council of Chiefs-of-Staff of China, the United States, and Great Britain, or in the alternative, of the projected Far Eastern Committee.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 382, footnote 4.

⁵ Declaration of German Atrocities, November 1, 1943; *Decade*, p. 13.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 24 November 1943.

C. C. S. 406/1

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF—UNITED CHIEFS OF STAFF

We have studied the question of the possible formation of a United Chiefs of Staff organization and, alternatively, of the possible representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff of powers other than the U. S. and the British.¹ We appreciate, moreover, the need for us all to have our minds made up on this subject, in view of the increasing pressure that is likely in the future. Our views are as follows:

a. The chief need is that the best possible coordination of our military effort with that of the Russians and of the Chinese should be ensured. We feel strongly that, whereas the integration of U. S. and British forces is complete and worldwide, this is in no way the case with regard to the Russians or the Chinese, whose outlook, indeed, is largely confined to their own particular main front. We feel, therefore, that no change whatever should be made in the present Combined Chiefs of Staff standing organization, and that it should remain essentially U. S.-British.

b. We have considered whether there should be any other organization, such as a United Chiefs of Staff, and have come to the conclusion that it would not be desirable to establish any form of *standing* machinery. Relations of such a body to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be very difficult. It might even claim to be the more representative body, and therefore to exercise jurisdiction over the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The representatives of such a body would not have the authority to make big decisions, and in consequence, such an organization could serve no useful purpose, excepting as a means of improving liaison. This could be done better by improving the arrangements already existing in Washington, London, Moscow and Chungking.

c. Our final conclusion, therefore, is that the best way of ensuring inter-Allied coordination and at the same time meeting the Russian and Chinese susceptibilities, is to ensure that whenever the Combined Chiefs of Staff meet for a big conference such as *SEXTANT*, they should be invited to attend to discuss the military problems with which they are concerned, as has been done on the present occasion.

¹ See C. C. S. 406, *ante*, p. 379.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 24 November 1943.

C. C. S. 308/7

BOUNDARIES OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

1. The Generalissimo has indicated his objection to the boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command proposed at QUADRANT¹ and in lieu thereof, after conferences with Admiral Mountbatten and Lieutenant General Somervell, has indicated his views as follows:

The Generalissimo approves wholeheartedly unity of command under Mountbatten for the Burma campaign. Under existing circumstances he feels that the inclusion of Thailand and Indochina in the Southeast Asia Theater would not be practicable and would deter rather than further the success of any project designed to defeat Japan. He cites as his reasons for this belief the effect which a change of boundary would have on the Chinese people, on Chinese troops, on the people of Thailand and Indochina and on the Japanese. The Chinese people and army are aware that those countries were included in the China Theater of War and that now to make the change would strike a blow at their morale which would affect the conduct of the coming operations and attitude of the people and troops towards the war. This is borne out by the effect of the announcement in the British press that such a change was contemplated. This caused repercussions involving necessity for the Chinese news agency to deny the statements. Japanese propaganda has been directed to convincing people of Indochina and Thailand that the British intended to hold those countries after the war. A change in boundaries at this time would tend to convince people that Japanese were correct and thus incur hostility to our cause and lastly the change would permit Japanese propaganda in China to be more successful in creating a breach in present happy British, American, and Chinese relations.

The China Theater comprises Thailand, Indochina, and the whole of China. As the war develops, the scope of operations of the United Nations' Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater newly created, besides Burma and Malaya, may involve Thailand and Indochina. In order to enable the two theaters to cooperate closely and

¹ See Ehrman, vol. v, pp. 135 ff., and *post*, pp. 886-887.

satisfactorily, the Generalissimo deems advisable to reach the following arrangements in advance:

a. When the time comes for two theaters to launch assaults upon the enemy in Thailand and Indochina, the Chinese troops will attack from the north, and the troops under the command of the Southeast Asia Theater, Mountbatten, are expected to make full use of facilities afforded by the ports and air bases under its control and attack from the south. If the troops are landed in those countries, the boundaries between the two theaters are to be decided at the time in accordance with the progress of advances the respective forces made.

b. All matters of political nature that arise during operations will be dealt with at a Chinese-British-American committee which is to be located in the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the China Theater.

2. Admiral Mountbatten has accepted the suggestions of the Generalissimo insofar as the boundaries are concerned but objects to the political commission.

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff and the President have approved the proposal of the Generalissimo as it stands and recommend British acceptance of his proposals.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull

You will recall that just prior to my departure for Moscow you approved a paper entitled "Civil Affairs for France"² which outlined the basic principles under which the Supreme Allied Commander would operate with regard to civil administration of liberated French territory on the mainland during the period of hostilities. This paper had likewise received the approval of our War Department and subsequently was approved by the British Government. It was submitted to the Moscow Conference and by agreement with the British and Russian Delegations was referred to the European Commission. In view of the urgency of the matter and possible delay in setting up the Commission we suggested informally to the British that the For-

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

² Not printed herein. Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in another volume of *Foreign Relations* pertaining to 1943.

eign Office might wish to take immediate steps to clear it in London through the American and Soviet Embassies.

The British Foreign Office has, however, now come back with suggestions for an entirely different approach communicated in a memorandum left with the Department by the British Embassy.³

The British memorandum sets out that the British Government feels "that in view of recent changes at Algiers and in particular of the fact that the French resistance movements, whose role will be of such importance when Allied landings take place, are now strongly represented on the Committee, the collaboration of the French Committee and of the French military authorities may be impossible to obtain unless the matter is cleared on the *Governmental* level with the French Committee before the Allied military authorities get into touch with the French military authorities in the matter. And French co-operation in the planning, and later in the actual work of civil administration, is essential to its success."

The memorandum also states that the British Government anticipates that since the Russian Delegates raised the matter at Moscow the Russians will again revert to the question of "the status and role of the French Committee" as soon as discussion is resumed with them. Consequently the British feel, the memorandum continues, that "since this question raises an important aspect of a combined Anglo-American operation, it would be desirable that Anglo-American agreement should be reached before discussions are opened with the Soviet Government" and that for these reasons the British Government sees "no practical alternative to an early discussion of the whole problem with the French Committee, and feels ⁴ that this ought to be done very soon if events are not to overtake action."

A similar approach has been made by Peake of the Foreign Office to Phillips in London and COSSAC requests an early reply. Phillips telegraphs in part as follows:

"(3) The proposed basic scheme envisages a French director of civil affairs. Manifestly his authority and responsibility would not extend to appropriate parts of the zone of operations until military conditions therein permit. However, under RANKIN 'c' conditions, which envisage a Nazi collapse and the cessation of organized resistance by the German forces, on or before *d* day, there would arise an almost immediate need for the establishment of a provisional French administration for virtually all France. It would appear that the only available organization capable of handling such a situation in the large areas outside the corridors through which our forces will pass, is the French National Committee which now has the support of the resistance groups. The foregoing refers only to RANKIN 'c'.

³ Not printed herein.

⁴ Reads "feel" in the original British memorandum.

(4) In the case of OVERLORD, this situation would probably not arise until very extensive areas of France have been liberated. Until this situation arises, the French director's responsibility would be necessarily limited to providing civil administration in areas to the rear of the fighting zone and then only as the military situation permits a progressive transfer of civil responsibility to him.

(5) Therefore, the immediate and pressing problem now before us is related [to planning⁵] for the cooperation of RANKIN 'c'."

As you will observe, giving the changes in the French Committee as their reasons, the British have now advanced a basic contention that we should agree to negotiations with the French Committee relative to the basic civil affairs formula on a *governmental* level rather than the previous arrangement of dealing with French military authorities on a combined military operational level.

I should appreciate receiving your instructions as to the nature of the reply you wish made to this British suggestion as well as to the proposal that the French Committee be permitted to assume control of "virtually all France" under RANKIN "c" conditions.

HULL

⁵ These two words in Phillips' telegram of November 19, 1943, were inadvertently omitted in the extract as sent by Hull to Roosevelt.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull:

Mr. Kennan conversed with Dr. Salazar for two hours yesterday afternoon and presented the President's personal letter.² The letter clearly made a profound impression on the Prime Minister.

The conversation was cordial and friendly throughout. Dr. Salazar said he could not answer authoritatively offhand.

Dr. Salazar had expected us to use naval facilities granted the British as occasion required, without requesting permission.

He was not unsympathetic about facilities in Terceira and was ready to seek a formula to reconcile our use of the airport with the terms of the British agreement.³ He wondered whether we could not

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

² The letter under reference, dated November 4, 1943, is printed in *F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, vol. II, p. 1466.

³ For the text of the agreement of August 17, 1943, between Great Britain and Portugal regarding facilities in the Azores, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1946 (vol. 146), p. 447.

consider aircraft being delivered by ferry command to England as having British status from departure in this country until after passage through Portuguese territory, and said in this case he would not be interested in nationality of crews or ground forces serving such aircraft. Answering a specific question from Kennan he said this would apply to construction and engineering personnel.

As for facilities beyond those granted the British, his primary reaction was that this was tantamount to proposing Portugal's entry into the war. He dwelt at length on his efforts to preserve Portuguese neutrality, and said the British alliance⁴ had afforded the pretext for giving the British their facilities while continuing to claim neutrality. He recognized the need for closer collaboration with Atlantic nations. Should he enter the war he would extend us all facilities, but he questioned the advantage of Portuguese belligerency.

Kennan stressed the importance of obtaining our facilities promptly and asked Dr. Salazar to bear this in mind.

Kennan considers Dr. Salazar's reaction encouraging and hopes indications of British support, which will be conveyed by the British Minister [*Ambassador*]⁵ today, will further improve our position. He is sure that Dr. Salazar, after reading the President's letter and observing recent events, is not unreceptive to our use of the Islands but is seeking a formula to reconcile his action with neutrality.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁴ For the texts of the treaties constituting the alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1812-1814 (vol. 1, pt. 1,) pp. 462 ff.

⁵ Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Director of War Mobilization (Byrnes) to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1943.

Reference yours of 23 November.²

Based on Bureau of Shipping predictions, program "C"³ can be increased in

January	0
February	2 to total of 447,
March	5 to total of 477,
April	15 to total of 517,
May	28 to total of 770;

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via Army channels.

² *Ante*, p. 380.

³ LST's.

LCIL increased in

January	0
February	3 to total of 508,
March	10 to total of 547,
April	20 to total of 597,
May	38 to total of 665;

LCT-7, no increases in months specified;

LCT-5 and 6, increased in

January	0
February	10 to total of 724,
March	21 to total of 785,
April	35 to total of 860,
May	50 to total of 950;

LCM-3 increased in

January	0
February	300 to total of 6,079,
March	300 to total of 6,829,
April	300 to total of 7,629,
May	300 to total of 8,469;

LCVP, increased in

January	0
February	200 to total of 9,646,
March	200 to total of 10,596,
April	200 to total of 11,546,
May ...	200 to total of 12,496;

LCC, increased in

January and February	0
March	15 to total of 69,
April	15 to total of 84,
May	15 to total of 99;

LVT, no increases considered feasible before June; any increases in LCPL and LCSS would be at the expense in equivalent reduction of LCVP. Headquarters ships AGC can be increased

1 April delivery

2 May.

Above figures result of conference of all interested agencies based on assumption that landing craft takes precedence over all other munitions including Russian protocol. Dates represent delivery tide-water ports United States. Will affect Army truck, Naval construction and to some extent high octane. Deliveries depend upon promptly directing priorities. Shall I proceed? ⁴

⁴ The reply is printed *post*, p. 617.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

The Supervising Agent, United States Secret Service (Reilly) to the Agent at Cairo (Spaman) ¹

TEHRAN, November [24], 1943.

Inform President that the United States Legation is adequate and is located one mile from the British Legation and Russian Embassy, which adjoin each other. The route between presents no security problems. The maximum altitude between Cairo and Teheran direct is no more than eight thousand feet. The railroad reaches an altitude of eight thousand feet. To obtain the train equipment, it will be necessary for us to notify the Shah. Plans are being made for both a direct flight from Cairo to Teheran and also for a flight from Cairo to the field at Abadan and then by rail to Teheran. The railroad terminal is located at Khorram Shahr which is seven miles from Abadan and it will be necessary to cross the Karoon river in a small boat. The railroad presents many dangerous security problems. General Hurley informs me of his conversation with the President.² We have made no commitments as to a residence for the President. He can stay at the United States, the British or at the Russian Embassy if invited. You must leave Cairo at six a. m., Cairo time, on the 26th. Arriving Abadan at 3 p. m. Then depart Khorram Shahr by rail at 4 p. m. Arrive Andimeshk at 9 p. m. Depart Andimeshk at 8 a. m. on 27th and arrive Teheran at 5 a. m. on the 28th. This schedule must be maintained if you expect to see any scenery. Urgently recommend you fly direct to Teheran, in which event you can depart Cairo at

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated. The date "26 Nov." appears in handwriting on the source text, but from internal evidence and from the Log (*ante*, p. 298) it is clear that the telegram was sent on the 24th.

² Hurley's conversations with Roosevelt at Cairo are summarized in Lohbeck, pp. 208-209. See also Hurley's telegram of November 26, 1943, *post*, p. 440.

7:30 a. m., Cairo time, and arrive Teheran at 3:30 p. m., Teheran time the same day. Otis Bryan concurs in all this. Urgently request decision as to whether you will fly direct or proceed by rail be sent to me tonight. Otherwise I will depart Teheran at 7 a. m. on the 25th and will arrive Cairo at 1 p. m. Cairo time the same day. McCarthy says facilities fine for Chiefs of Staff and requests you notify Captain Royal at Mena House that he will be in at 1 p. m. Cairo time tomorrow with full details. Have three cars meet special plane at Payne Field tomorrow at one.

From Reilly to Spaman. Show this message to Admiral McIntire, Mr. Hopkins, General Watson, Admiral Brown, and the President.

*American Draft of the Communiqué With Amendments by
President Roosevelt*¹

DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUE.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK, AND
PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MILITARY LEADERS,
HAVE COMPLETED A CONFERENCE SOMEWHERE IN AFRICA. THE SEVERAL
MILITARY MISSIONS HAVE AGREED UPON FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS
DIRECTED AGAINST JAPAN FROM CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE

PLANS, THE DETAILS OF WHICH CANNOT BE DISCLOSED, PROVIDE FOR
VIGOROUS OFFENSIVES AGAINST THE JAPANESE. WE ARE DETERMINED

TO BRING UNRELENTING PRESSURE AGAINST OUR BRUTAL ENEMY BY

SEA, LAND, AND AIR. THIS PRESSURE IS ALREADY UNDERWAY. ~~THE~~

~~TIME, PLACE, AND SCOPE OF OUR JOINT OFFENSIVES IN THIS AREA~~

~~CANNOT NOW BE DISCLOSED, BUT~~ JAPAN WILL KNOW OF ^{IT} ~~THEIR~~ POWER.

WE ARE DETERMINED THAT THE ISLANDS IN THE PACIFIC WHICH
HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED BY THE JAPANESE, MANY OF THEM MADE POWERFUL
BASES CONTRARY TO JAPAN'S SPECIFIC AND DEFINITE PLEDGE NOT TO
MILITARIZE THEM, WILL BE TAKEN FROM JAPAN FOREVER, ~~AND~~ THE
TERRITORY THEY HAVE SO TREACHEROUSLY STOLEN FROM THE CHINESE,
SUCH AS MANCHURIA AND FORMOSA, WILL OF COURSE BE RETURNED TO THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA. WE ARE MINDFUL OF THE TREACHEROUS ENSLAVEMENT

¹ The text as typed was dictated by Hopkins to Warrant Officer Cornelius in the solarium of the President's villa on the afternoon of November 24, 1943 (letter from Albert M. Cornelius to the Historical Office, 023.1/3-257). The date is confirmed by the fact that one of the carbon copies of this original draft bears the typewritten notation "11/24/43 edition". According to Cornelius, Hopkins dictated without reference to any previously prepared notes or papers. The changes made on this draft are in Roosevelt's handwriting. They were incorporated in the revised version of November 25, 1943 (*post*, p. 402).

OF THE PEOPLE OF KOREA BY JAPAN, AND ARE DETERMINED THAT THAT COUNTRY, AT THE ^{proper} ~~proper~~ MOMENT AFTER THE DOWNFALL OF JAPAN, SHALL BECOME A FREE AND INDEPENDENT COUNTRY.

WE KNOW FULL WELL THAT THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN IS GOING TO REQUIRE FIERCE AND DETERMINED FIGHTING. OUR ~~OUR~~ COUNTRIES ARE PLEDGED TO FIGHT TOGETHER UNTIL WE HAVE RECEIVED THE UN-CONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN.

THE GENERALISSIMO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE, MADAM CHIANG KAI-SHEK, ~~WHO TOOK PART WITH THE GENERALISSIMO IN SEVERAL OF THE CONFERENCES WITH OUR MILITARY LEADERS.~~

Roosevelt Papers

*American Draft of the Communiqué, With Amendments by the
President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUÉ

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, and their respective military leaders, have completed a conference somewhere in Africa. The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations directed against Japan from China and Southeast Asia. The plans, the details of which cannot be disclosed, provide for vigorous offensives against the Japanese. We are determined to bring unrelenting pressure against our brutal enemy by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already underway. The time, place, and scope of our joint offensives in this area cannot now be disclosed, but Japan will know of their power.

We are determined that the islands in the Pacific which have been occupied by the Japanese, many of them made powerful bases contrary to Japan's specific and definite pledge not to so militarize them, will be taken from Japan forever, and the territory² they have³ so treacherously stolen from the⁴ Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China. We are mindful of the treacherous enslavement of the people of Korea by Japan, and are determined that that country, at the earliest possible moment after the downfall of Japan, shall become a free and independent country.

We know full well that the defeat of Japan is going to require fierce and determined fighting. Our three countries are pledged to fight together until we have received the unconditional surrender of Japan.

The Generalissimo was accompanied by his wife, Madam Chiang Kai-shek, ~~who took part with the Generalissimo in several of the conferences with our military leaders.~~⁵

¹ The draft as typed is the same as the draft submitted to Roosevelt (*supra*) except for the addition, on a separate sheet, of the last three paragraphs naming the conference participants. The handwritten amendments by Hopkins were made prior to the revised version of November 25, 1943 (*infra*).

² In the margin, near this point and perhaps intended to be associated with the phrase "territory . . . stolen", are the words "all conquered" and the words "violence & greed". Both these groups of words are in Hopkins' handwriting.

³ At this point Hopkins inserted the words: "occupied belonging to the Dutch".

⁴ At this point were inserted the words "Dutch and the", in a handwriting which has not been identified.

⁵ These words were apparently stricken out by Hopkins. Beneath this sentence appear the following words, in Hopkins' handwriting: "We are determined that Japan shall give up all her conquests past & present in addition to mandates."

The conference was attended on behalf of the United States by: Admiral William D. Leahy; General George C. Marshall; Admiral Ernest J. King; General H. H. Arnold; Lt. General B. B. Somervell; Major General Edwin M. Watson; Rear Admiral Wilson Brown; Rear Admiral Ross McIntire; Mr. Harry Hopkins; Ambassador W. Averell Harriman; Ambassador J. G. Winant;⁶ Mr. L. Douglas; Mr. J. J. McCloy.

British representatives were: General Sir Alan Brooke; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal; Admiral Sir A. Cunningham; Lord Leathers; Lt. General Sir Hastings Ismay.

The Chinese mission included:⁷ General Shang Chen; Dr. Wang Chung-hui; Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan-chen [*Hsuan-ch'eng*]; and Lt. General Chow [*Chow*] Chih-jou.

⁶ At this point Hopkins added the name "Steinhardt".

⁷ At this point the words "amongst others" were added in Hopkins' handwriting.

Roosevelt Papers

*Revised American Draft of the Communiqué*¹

DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUÉ.

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, and their respective military leaders, have completed a conference somewhere in Africa. They issued the following joint statement:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations directed against Japan from China and Southeast Asia. The plans, the details of which cannot be disclosed, provide for continuous and increasingly vigorous offensives against the Japanese. We are determined to bring unrelenting pressure against our brutal enemy

¹ This revised draft was dictated by Hopkins to Warrant Officer Cornelius on the morning of November 25, 1943 (letter from Albert M. Cornelius to the Historical Office of the Department of State, 023.1/3-257). A typewritten notation on one of the carbon copies of this draft reads "11/25/43 edition".

by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already underway. Japan will know of its power.

"We are determined that the islands in the Pacific which have been occupied by the Japanese, many of them made powerful bases contrary to Japan's specific and definite pledge not to militarize them, will be taken from Japan forever.

"The territory that Japan has so treacherously stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China. All of the conquered territory taken by violence and greed by the Japanese will be freed from their clutches.

"We are mindful of the treacherous enslavement of the people of Korea by Japan, and are determined that that country, at the proper moment after the downfall of Japan, shall become a free and independent country.

"We know full well that the defeat of Japan is going to require fierce and determined fighting. Our countries are pledged to fight together until we have received the unconditional surrender of Japan."

The Generalissimo was accompanied by his wife, Madam Chiang Kai-shek.

The conference was attended on behalf of the United States by Admiral William D. Leahy; General George C. Marshall; Admiral Ernest J. King; General H. H. Arnold; Lt. General B. B. Somervell; Major General Edwin M. Watson; Rear Admiral Wilson Brown; Rear Admiral Ross McIntire; Mr. Harry Hopkins; Ambassador W. Averell Harriman; Ambassador J. G. Winant; Ambassador Steinhardt; Mr. L. Douglas; Mr. J. J. McCloy.

British representatives were General Sir Alan Brooke; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal; Admiral Sir A. Cunningham; Lord Leathers; Lt. General Sir Hastings Ismay.

The Chinese mission included, among others, General Shang Chen; Dr. Wang Chung-hui; Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan-chen [*Hsuan-ch'eng*]; and Lt. General Chow [*Chou*] Chih-jou.

Roosevelt Papers

*British Draft of the Communiqué*¹10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.PRESS COMMUNIQUE

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising.

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, ^{Such as} ~~including particularly~~ ^{and Pescadores,} Manchuria and Formosa, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view the three Allies, ^{those of} ~~in~~ ^{at war with Japan} ~~the rest of~~ the United Nations, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

¹The handwriting appears to be that of Churchill. Date and authorship not indicated, but the text as amended is very similar to the final version printed post, p. 448.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 25 November 1943.

C. C. S. 408

COMMAND OF BRITISH AND U. S. FORCES OPERATING AGAINST GERMANY

1. Current operations in the war against Germany and those approved for the immediate future are grouped geographically and functionally into three categories:

a. Operations in the Mediterranean area involving combined forces with land, sea, and air components.

b. Operations in the northwestern part of Europe, also involving combined forces with land, sea, and air components.

c. Operations against interior Germany involving combined strategic air forces based both in the Mediterranean area and in northwestern Europe.

2. Each of these operations is an entity requiring unity of command over the forces which are engaged.

3. These operations are all intimately related to each other, with a common, over-all objective—Defeat of Germany. Events in the Mediterranean area attract enemy forces and affect enemy capabilities, which in turn have an important bearing upon our capabilities in northwestern Europe, and vice versa. Strategic air operations against interior Germany strongly affect our capabilities in both areas. Furthermore, the flexibility of the strategic air forces permits their employment in varying degree to assist the Allied forces in either area.

4. The United States Chiefs of Staff now consider that the war in Europe has reached a stage where the necessity for command direction over all these forces, in conformity with general directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is clearly indicated. This command should be vested in a single commander, and he should exercise command over the Allied force commanders in the Mediterranean, in northwest Europe, and of the strategic air forces. The immediate appointment of this commander is, in our opinion, most urgently necessary. Even if he is appointed now, it is improbable that he will be able to organize his staff and begin to function before the end of January 1944. The situation which may develop in Europe by that time requires a more positive over-all command arrangement than that now functioning under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Any delay in setting up such a command may lead to confusion and indecision at a critical time, thus delaying the attainment of early victory in Europe.

5. In matters pertaining to strategic bombing, it is imperative that unified Allied command be established. The rapidity with which decisions regarding air operations must be made demands command control, as opposed to general directives or occasional direct action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We cannot escape the responsibility for adopting every means known to us to save the lives of our men and the planes they fly. The one effective method is to insure the rapid coordinated employment, on a day-to-day operational basis, of the United States Air Forces in both the U. K. and Mediterranean by day and R. A. F. bomber units by night in order to obtain the maximum dispersion of enemy air and anti-aircraft defense, and to take the greatest possible advantage of weather conditions in both theaters. This unified command must, therefore, be established without delay and must embrace all the strategic air forces engaged against Germany, including the United States Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.

6. The British Chiefs of Staff have proposed the establishment of unified command in the Mediterranean area.¹ We are in accord with this proposal, with the proviso that the U. S. Fifteenth Air Force should be specifically excepted and commanded as in paragraph 5 above.

7. The United States Chiefs of Staff propose to the British Chiefs of Staff:

a. That a Supreme Commander be designated at once to command all United Nations operations against Germany from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic under direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. That an over-all commander for northwestern European operations be appointed, under the Supreme Commander.

c. That a strategic air force commander be appointed, under the Supreme Commander, to exercise command over the U. S. Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.

d. That the Commander of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean shall come under the Supreme Commander.

8. The United States Chiefs of Staff further propose that the Supreme Commander be directed to carry out the agreed European strategy, and

a. Be charged with the location and timing of operations;

b. Be charged with the allocation of the forces and matériel made available to him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and

c. That his decisions on the above questions be subject to reversal by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.²

¹ See memorandum dated November 3, 1943, *ante*, p. 150.

² A chart attached to this paper is the same as the one printed *ante*, p. 207.

Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill*¹

MOST SECRET

[CAIRO, 25 November 1943.²]

1. The difficulties and short-comings in our conduct of the war since the Battle of Salerno have arisen from divergencies of view between our two Staffs and Governments. It is not seen how these divergencies would be removed by the appointment of a Supreme Commander working under the Combined Chiefs of the Staff and liable to have his decisions reversed by them. The divergencies, which are political as much as military, would still have to be adjusted by the present methods of consultation between the Combined Staffs and the Heads of the two Governments. Thus the Supreme Commander, after being acclaimed as the world war-winner, would in practice find his functions restricted to the narrow ground between the main decisions of policy and strategy which can only be dealt with by the present methods, and the spheres of the two chief regional Commanders.

2. This would certainly not be sufficient to justify arousing all the expectations and setting up all the apparatus inseparable from the announcement of a "Supreme Commander for the defeat of Germany."

3. On the other hand, if the power of decision is in fact accorded to the Supreme Commander, the work of the Combined Chiefs of the Staff would be virtually superseded and very great stresses would immediately arise between the Governments and the Supreme Commander. Without going into personalities, it is greatly to be doubted whether any single officer exists who would be capable of giving decisions over the vast range of problems now dealt with by the Heads of Government assisted by the Combined Chiefs of the Staff.

4. The principle which should be followed as far as possible between Allies of equal status is that the Command in any theatre should go to the Ally who has the largest forces deployed or about to be deployed there. On this it would be natural that the Command in the Mediterranean should be British and that the Command of OVERLORD should be American. Such Commands would also correspond with the outlook of the two Governments, the Americans regarding OVERLORD of overwhelming importance, while the British

¹ Churchill, p. 340, states that he handed this paper to Roosevelt before they left Cairo for Tehran but that the paper was not discussed by them during the First Cairo Conference.

² The source text is undated and bears no heading, but the text as given in Churchill, p. 338, is dated "25 Nov. 43" and bears the heading "Supreme Commander of All Operations Against Germany" and the subheading "Note by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence". Churchill, p. 338, indicates that this memorandum was written after, and was based upon, the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff written on November 25 and circulated on November 26, 1943, as C. C. S. 408/1, *post*, p. 424.

believe that the greatest and most immediate results can be obtained in the Mediterranean and that OVERLORD is a knock-out blow, the timing of which must be settled in relation to the condition and dispositions of the enemy.

5. If the two Commands are merged under a Supreme Commander, the British would have available against Germany in May decidedly larger forces than the United States. It would therefore appear that the Supreme Command should go to a British officer. I should be very reluctant, as Head of His Majesty's Government, to place such an invidious responsibility upon a British officer. I have very little doubt that he would concentrate his main effort on the Mediterranean and treat the OVERLORD sphere as a highly important but none the less residuary legatee. This point of view would certainly not be accepted by the Government or Staff of the United States. If, on the other hand, disregarding the preponderance of forces involved, the Supreme Command was given to a United States officer and he pronounced in favour of concentrating on OVERLORD irrespective of the injury done to our affairs in the Mediterranean, His Majesty's Government could not possibly agree. The Supreme Commander, British or American, would therefore be placed in an impossible position. Having assumed before the whole world the responsibility of pronouncing and being overruled by one Government or the other, he would have little choice but to resign. This might bring about a most serious crisis in the harmonious and happy relations hitherto maintained between our two Governments.

6. It is not seen why the present arrangement should not continue, subject to any minor improvements that can be suggested. Under this arrangement, an American Commander would conduct the immense Operation OVERLORD and a British Commander would conduct the war in the Mediterranean, their action being concerted and forces assigned by the Combined Chiefs of the Staff working under the Heads of the two Governments. Regular periodic conferences should be held at Gibraltar between the two Commanders, at which they could adjust minor differences about the movement of units, landing-craft etc., so as to help each other as much as possible, and they should also prepare together the timing and concert of their respective operations. More frequent meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should also be arranged, and possibly visits of one weeks' ³ duration by the Chairman of each Chiefs of Staff Committee alternately to London and Washington.

³ The word "one" is a handwritten substitution for the typewritten word "six". In the text as printed in Churchill, p. 340, the word "monthly" appears before "visits" and "weeks" reads "week's".

J. C. S. Files

Note by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 25 November 1943.

C. C. S. 409

OVERLORD AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

1. For some time past it has been clear to us, and doubtless also to the United States Chiefs of Staff, that disagreement exists between us as to what we should do now in the Mediterranean, with particular reference to the effect of future action on OVERLORD. The point at issue is how far what might be termed the "sanctity of OVERLORD" is to be preserved in its entirety, irrespective of developments in the Mediterranean Theater. This issue is clouding the whole of our future strategic outlook, and must be resolved at SEXTANT.

2. At the outset we must point out that, since the decisions taken at QUADRANT, there have been major developments in the situation. The Russian campaign has succeeded beyond all hope or expectations and their victorious advance continues. Italy has been knocked out of the war; and it is certainly not beyond the bounds of possibility that Turkey will come in on our side before the New Year. In these changed conditions, we feel that consideration of adjustments of, if not actual departures from, the decisions taken at TRIDENT and QUADRANT are not only fully justified but positively essential.

3. Nevertheless, we emphasize that we do not in any way recoil from, or wish to sidetrack, our agreed intention to attack the Germans across the Channel in the late spring or early summer of 1944, or even earlier if RANKIN conditions were to obtain. We must not, however, regard OVERLORD on a fixed date as the pivot of our whole strategy on which all else turns. In actual fact, the German strength in France next spring may, at one end of the scale, be something which makes OVERLORD completely impossible and, at the other end, something which makes RANKIN not only practicable, but essential. Consequently, to assume that the achievement of a certain strength by a certain date will remove all our difficulties and result in shortening the duration of the war is entirely illusory. This policy, if literally interpreted, will inevitably paralyze action in other theaters without any guarantee of action across the Channel.

4. With the Germans in their present plight, the surest way to win the war in the shortest time is to attack them remorselessly and continuously in any and every area where we can do so with superiority. The number of places at which we can thus attack them depends mainly on the extent to which they are stretched. Our policy is

therefore clear; we should stretch the German forces to the utmost by threatening as many of their vital interests and areas as possible and, holding them thus, we should attack wherever we can do so in superior force.

5. If we pursue the above policy we firmly believe that OVERLORD (perhaps in the form of RANKIN) will take place next summer. We do not, however, attach vital importance to any particular date or to any particular number of divisions in the assault and follow-up, though naturally the latter should be made as large as possible consistent with the policy stated above. It is, of course, valuable to have a target date to which all may work, but we are firmly opposed to allowing this date to become our master, and to prevent us from taking full advantage of all opportunities that occur to us to follow what we believe to be the correct strategy.

6. In the light of the above argument, we submit the following proposals for action in the Mediterranean:

a. Unification of Command

Unification of Command in the Mediterranean, as outlined in C. O. S. (W) 919¹ is an essential and urgent measure which should be put into effect irrespective of any other decisions taken about this theater.

b. The Italian Campaign

The Offensive in Italy should be nourished and maintained until we have secured the Pisa-Rimini line.

c. Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania

Our policy should be to place on a regular military basis and to intensify our measures to nourish the Partisan and irregular forces in these countries.

d. Turkey

We should bring Turkey into the war this year.

e. The Dardanelles

We should aim to open the Dardanelles as soon as possible.

f. The Balkans

We should undermine resistance in the Balkan States and do everything possible to promote a state of chaos and disruption in the satellite Balkan countries.

7. If the above measures necessitate putting back the date upon which the forces agreed to be necessary for OVERLORD will be available in the United Kingdom, this should be accepted since it does not by any means follow that the date of the invasion of France will be put back to the same extent.

8. To sum up, our policy is to fight and bomb the Germans as hard as possible all through the winter and spring; to build up our forces

¹ This document transmitted the text which became C. C. S. 387, November 3, 1943, *ante*, p. 150.

in the United Kingdom as rapidly as possible consistent with this; and finally to invade the Continent as soon as the German strength in France and the general war situation gives us a good prospect of success.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 25 November 1943.

C. C. S. 410

THE EFFECT OF WEATHER ON OPERATION "OVERLORD"

1. The following examination has been made regarding the limitations imposed by weather conditions on the postponement of Operation OVERLORD.

2. Suitable weather conditions are required for two phases of the operation, firstly, the assault for which a four-day fine weather period is required; secondly, the maintenance and build-up period for which suitable weather for a decreasing degree of beach maintenance is required for about three months.

THE ASSAULT

3. In order to launch the assault a quiet spell of four days with winds of force 3 or less is desirable. Over ten consecutive years there were quiet spells for four or more consecutive days on the following number of occasions:

April	18 times
May	21 times
June	19 times
July	16 times
August	23 times
September	17 times
October	14 times

It will be seen that there is no serious deterioration in the chances of launching the assault between the months of May and September with the exception of July, where the incidence of a fine spell is only slightly less than in the month of June. It is therefore considered that, purely from the assault aspect, the operation could be postponed up to the month of September.

4. For tidal reasons the assault is limited in each lunar month to two periods of five or six days, which occur at times of full and new moon. The air lift can only be carried out in the full moon period. It therefore follows that if the full moon period is missed on account of the weather conditions being unsuitable, the assault must be

postponed for 24 days. By sacrificing the air lift this postponement could be reduced to 10 days.

AIR FACTORS AFFECTING THE ASSAULT

5. *a.* For fully effective operation of air forces the following conditions must be satisfied :

	<i>Night</i>	<i>Day</i>
Minimum horizontal visibility	5 miles	5 miles
Minimum cloud base above ground level	3,000 feet	11,500 feet
Maximum cloud	6/10	10/10
Maximum wind at ground level	20 m. p. h.	20 m. p. h. (if airborne forces are used by day)
Minimum moon	5 days each side of full. Moon 20° above horizon.	

b. If high level bombing is abandoned, the cloud conditions by day are then limited by the requirements of the fighter cover over shipping and beaches. These are 10/10 at not less than 5,000 feet.

c. The chances of obtaining these conditions are not yet available, but it is evident that they will lengthen the odds against launching the assault to some extent, although settled summer weather suitable for the landing will most probably be suitable for the air operations.

MAINTENANCE AND BUILD-UP PERIOD

6. COSSAC has stated that, making full use of every captured port, large and small, 18 divisions must be maintained over the beaches during the first month of the operations, 12 divisions during the second month, and a number rapidly diminishing to nil during the third month. It is believed that the use of MULBERRIES will approximately halve this commitment for beach maintenance. Therefore, during this period there will be at first a considerable, and later a gradually dwindling dependence on fine weather conditions. In assessing suitable weather for carrying out beach maintenance any day with wind of not more than Force 3 on shore and not more than Force 4 off shore has been accepted. In the OVERLORD area the average number of suitable days per month is as follows :

April	21
May	23
June	25
July	25
August	24½
September	23½
October	18½
November	20
December	20

It is apparent from the above figures that a marked deterioration does not occur until October. Although the months of October, November, and December appear to provide a reasonable number of quiet days, it is considered that this proportion cannot be fully relied on owing to the severe weather which may occur during unsuitable days, thereby producing conditions of sea or swell which will render beach maintenance impracticable on the subsequent quiet day or days.

7. It is impossible to calculate what loss in expectation of suitable maintenance days can be accepted by COSSAC during the second and third months of the beach maintenance period without a very intimate knowledge of his maintenance and build-up plan; but it would appear that weather should be suitable for sufficient beach maintenance at least up to the end of September and possibly, in view of the dwindling commitment in this respect, up to the middle or end of October.

CONCLUSION

8. It is not possible to submit a firm recommendation on this subject, but from the limited facts available for this brief examination, there does not appear to be any overriding reason why the assault could not be carried out up to about the middle of July.

9. This means that the target date should be in the middle of June to allow for a postponement of 24 days in case weather conditions are unsuitable.

10. Thus if the target date is mid-June and the air lift is not sacrificed, only two periods of four or five days when Moon and Tide conditions are suitable will occur in 1944; and these must coincide with a four day spell of fine weather.

Roosevelt Papers

The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the President

[CAIRO,] 25 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

THE EFFECT OF NORTH BURMA OPERATIONS ON CARGO DELIVERY TO CHINA

1. The following data pertains to the current discussion between Lord Mountbatten and the Generalissimo, concerning the conflicting requirements between tonnage over the Hump and projected operations in North Burma.¹

¹ See the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, November 25, 1943, *ante*, p. 348.

2. General Stilwell maintains that the minimum tonnages which must be delivered over the Hump to maintain the Yunnan Force, the 14th Air Force, and the Chinese-American Composite Wing, is as follows:

		Total	For 14th Air Force & China-US Comp Wg	For Yunnan Force
November		9,700	6,500	3,200
December		9,700	6,500	3,200
January	<i>8,050</i> ²	7,900	4,700	3,200
February	<i>8,050</i>	7,900	4,700	3,200
March	<i>9,000</i>	9,200	6,000	3,200
April	<i>9,500</i>	9,200	6,000	3,200
May	<i>9,700</i>	9,200	6,000	3,200
June ²	<i>10,000</i>			

3. Lord Mountbatten considers that these above tonnages should be accepted only as target amounts rather than guaranteed minimums. He must employ portions of the Air Transport planes to support the operation "TARZAN".

4. The Generalissimo demands that 10,000 tons be delivered over the Hump each month, regardless of the logistics requirements of the Burma Campaign.

5. An optimistic estimate of the Air Transport Command's ability to transport supplies over the Hump during the period of the North Burma operations, and with no diversion for these operations, is as follows:

November	9,000
December	9,000
January	9,444
February	11,000
March	12,000
April	12,000
May	12,000

Furthermore Lord Mountbatten has indicated a positive requirement for an additional 25 operating C-46 aircraft to make possible the Burma operations' logistic requirements.

6. There is a project in the China-Burma-India theater to build a 4-inch pipe line from Assam to Kunming. The project has 16 C-47's and 40 C-46's allocated to it. In view of changes in the original plans for the pipe line, it may later be found possible to divert the 16 C-47's to Lord Mountbatten.

7. It is suggested that in your discussions with the Prime Minister and the Generalissimo on this subject, you establish the following;

² The italicized word and figures appear in Roosevelt's handwriting.

a. First priority in the use of U. S. Army transports on the India-China Wing to be assigned to the delivery of the minimum tonnages recommended by General Stilwell for the 14th Air Force, the Yunnan Forces and the composite Chinese-American Wing (Air).

b. All Air Transport Command capacities or facilities in the China-Burma-India Theater, beyond those required to meet the guaranteed minimum tonnages, are to be available to Lord Mountbatten for the support of the Burma Campaign.

c. No additional transports can be promised for over the Hump activities or the Burma Campaign, beyond the 16 additional referred to in paragraph 6 above.

W. D. LEAHY
Admiral, U. S. N.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*¹

SECRET

Moscow, November 25, 1943.

URGENT

Personal and strictly secret from Premier Stalin to President Roosevelt. Your message from Cairo² received. I will be at your service in Teheran the evening of November twenty-eighth.

¹ Sent by Spalding at Moscow to Harriman at Cairo, via Navy channels.

² Telegram of November 22, 1943, *ante*, p. 373.

Hopkins Papers

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[CAIRO,] 25 NOVEMBER 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS:

I did not get a chance to give you all the information I had gathered from the British Joint Secretaries on this matter of Civil Affairs. I did not think that I could or should talk very much at lunch in front of Lord Leathers.

Brigadier Redman told me this morning that the Prime Minister had been "strongly" briefed on the question and was going to take the matter up with the President at an early date and that the matter would not be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff until after the Prime Minister had his talk with the President. He also indicated that the Prime Minister's line would be the foreign office approach, namely the introduction into the occupied area of civilians following

the "forward zone" of military operations and the establishment in London of a Combined Civil Affairs Committee to do the operating from there rather than via the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Washington. The obvious implication was that the President should be briefed to prepare himself for the Prime Minister's presentation.

The British Combined Chiefs of Staff, I find, likewise agree with us and so does Sir John Dill. I had dinner with Cunningham and Brooke last night and they gave every indication of their concurrence. I am seeing Eden in the morning and in the meantime I am giving you herewith two papers which I believe could serve as the basis for the briefing of the President. I have an idea that the Prime Minister is going to bring the matter up on the way north.¹ Don't allow any commitments to be made until the President understands all the implications. I hope that Eden, Winant and I can work out something. In the meantime, I will stick around and await further word from you as to what if any help I can be on this or any other subject.

Sincerely,

JOHN J. McCLOY

[Attachment 1]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

There has been a very definite and noticeable effort in the past few months on the part of the British government to transfer to London all determinations of our occupational and post-hostility policy. It has been the policy of the American government to base considerations of civil administration in liberated or occupied territory primarily on military policy so long as the war continues. On the American side provision was made for obtaining the views of the political and economic side of the government but the machinery for this was lodged in the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The British were, of course, a part of this machinery and by means of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee a program was carried out with respect to Sicily and Italy, which was mutually satisfactory. As the program developed, however, and issues arose which had to be referred to London, a strong tendency on the part of London developed to limit the activities of the CCAC, ending in what amounted to a complete frustration of the committee. As to Western Europe, London took the position that no matters at all could be discussed, and even in respect to Italy methods

¹ i. e., en route to Tehran.

were employed to avoid consideration of such matters by the Committee. Examples of this circumvention were the Norwegian Agreement² and the comprehensive surrender terms for Italy.³

Today we are at an impasse in getting work done because of this conflict and presumably some attempt will be made at the forthcoming conference to settle it.

There is more involved than the usual conflict of jurisdiction between agencies. It is, or may be a development that may affect the attitude of the U. S. toward all post-hostility policy. The introduction at Moscow of the plan for the Advisory Commission on European Affairs with its site in London⁴ is of large significance and it was particularly so as Eden first proposed the plan. There was no great enthusiasm for it on the part of the Soviet Union and certainly the U. S. representatives there had a very restricted view of its powers. However, as the thing is now developing, and the scope of the matters which appear to be on the verge of consideration by it increases, it seems inevitable that its conclusions will have gathered such momentum that it will be most difficult either to disregard them or to relegate them to minor importance.

It should always be recognized, however, that in the long run the prejudice of the American people to European conferences is profound; that there is a constant fear that the Atlantic theater of war will be weighted against the Pacific, and that the nature and extent of our participation in Europe and world politics have yet to be determined. As the war progresses toward a favorable conclusion two great tendencies will develop. One is the desire, stimulated on the part of our soldiers by their wish to get home, to liquidate the European involvement. The national reaction which followed the last war both in the U. S. and Canada will set in again though presumably with considerably less chance of success. The other great tendency will be the feeling on the part of other countries that now that the war is on its way to being won and the invader is no longer at the door, the dependence on the U. S. should promptly be liquidated except in matters of relief. The development of both tendencies is fatal to both British and American interests. The Prime Minister has written it down as one of the great achievements of his career that his policy was so guided as to make it clear to America that she must enter the war on

² An arrangement of May 19, 1943, between the British Government's Administration of Territories Committee (Europe) and the Norwegian Government in Exile.

³ The text of the "comprehensive surrender terms" for Italy may be found in 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2742-2765.

⁴ The records of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, October 18-November 1, 1943, are scheduled to be published in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I.

the side of Britain—"But westward lo the sky is bright." It may be more of an achievement and of more importance to Britain, in the long run, to convince America that she must enter the administration of the peace.

Twice within a generation Britain has had to have American aid in order to cope with a European attack. The resources on which she must draw are, in great quantity, located on the American continent and strong as Britain may feel herself to be after each successful war, other wars are coming and there is no certainty of either avoiding or winning them without the fullest communion with America. People on both sides give firm utterance to this sentiment, but it takes *doing*. One of the best ways to do it is to convince the United States, not only its leaders, but its citizens, that the United States has a major part in directing the war.

It is vitally necessary to indoctrinate the American people to a recognition of the national responsibility of the country in world affairs. It is essential that the people of America become used to decisions being made in the United States. On every cracker barrel in every country store in the U. S. there is someone sitting who is convinced that we get hornswoggled every time we attend a European conference. European deliberations must be made in the light of the concepts of the new continent because that continent has now, for better or for worse, become a determining factor in the struggles of the older one. What may be lost through not moving to London in the way of better and more accessible records or a greater familiarity with local conditions, will be made up in a readier assumption of responsibility on the part of the U. S. and perhaps in a greater objectivity of decision.

All this and more can be said against the spirit which motivates the London tendency. One cannot control the shift of power (if that is the heart of the matter) by such artificial devices in any event.

The immediate question, however, is what machinery to erect which will most satisfactorily take into account these imponderables and yet get the necessary work done in time to be of effect.

The British proposal to shift the Combined Committee to London is no solution as it merely accentuates the tendency. The British proposal would leave the American Committee to determine only matters of supply, which is no concession whatever as the U. S. will have to make by far the greater contribution of material in any event. In all other purposes the American Committee would become no more than a sort of amanuensis for the decisions of the London Committee. The proposal is basically objectionable. Moreover, there is no procedural or practical need for it.

The CCAC has operated efficiently. Even the British members have testified to the directness and highly satisfactory character of the decisions and the discussions which it produces. It affords a very simple method by which the attitude of the American Government on all occupational and cessation of hostility questions can be learned. In Mr. Dunn the Committee has a State Department representative very close to Mr. Hull and through the Chairman prompt definitions of American policy where needed can be cleared by the Secretary of War, Mr. Hopkins, or Admiral Leahy. General Hilldring enjoys the confidence and respect of General Marshall and has ready access to him. The Committee's connections with the Treasury are excellent, and Treasury policy is always available.

The Committee is an adjunct of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It is military in its aspect although the Chairman is the Assistant Secretary of War. In his absence General Hilldring or General MacCready [*Macready*] succeeds to the chair. The connection of the Committee with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and its military aspect are consistent with the American point of view that during the progress of the war the introduction to all political decisions should be based on military consideration.

In short, the existing Committee has functioned well in the past, has prompt means of clearing American policy, and is readily available to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as it should be.

It is readily recognized, however, that all decisions cannot be made from Washington and there must be set up in London a machinery whereby detailed plans can be made and on-the-spot questions settled.

It has never been the policy of the Washington Committee to do more than prescribe the bare outline of the policy to be followed in each country. The general directive, e. g., the HUSKY directive,⁵ does not purport to do anything more. For the day-to-day planning for civil affairs the people on the ground must have the responsibility. That planning, to be effectively tied into the operations, must take place in the particular headquarters involved, e. g., for France in COSSAC. It will become the duty of that headquarters to take the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive, put it in force with such additions as local circumstances require. It will thus be made available for use by the commanders of the operation and the chief civil affairs officer of the expedition.

In practice no need has developed for a London Combined Committee except at the detailed planning level. The overall policy will

⁵ Directive of January 23, 1943, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower, agreed upon at the Casablanca Conference. The records of the Casablanca Conference are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

be established by the advisory council as it is cleared by the respective governments. That policy is communicable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the CCAC of that body can translate it into military directives as it has in the past. If the Washington Committee had been permitted to function no difficulty would have ensued and none will ensue if London permits the British members of it to operate. On the other hand to center in London the Advisory Council,⁶ the Combined Committee and the detailed planning centralizes too much authority on vital post-war questions in London for the interests of both the U. S. and Britain.

[Attachment 2]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War. (McCloy) ⁷

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 22 November 1943.

PROBLEM

1. At the Moscow Conference there was established the European Advisory Commission composed of representatives of the U. S., U. K., and Soviet Governments.⁸ The commission will sit in London as soon as possible to make recommendations with respect to matters connected with the cessation of hostilities in occupied and liberated countries. As the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the commission are closely connected with military considerations it becomes necessary to establish a procedure [by?] which the Combined Chiefs of Staff may be advised of and can act upon such policies as are recommended by such Council and are approved by the respective governments.

DISCUSSION

2. a. The European Advisory Commission will be called upon for recommendations as to the terms of surrender to be imposed upon each of the European enemy states and as to the machinery required to execute these terms. It will also deal with such policy questions relating to Axis-occupied friendly nations as are referred to it. It is indicated further that the Commission will study [such?] other questions connected with and flowing from the cessation of hostilities in Europe as are referred to it by agreement of the three governments.

⁶ i. e., the European Advisory Commission.

⁷ The source text is headed "Draft". This draft was also sent by McCloy to the Joint Staff Planners, presumably for consideration as a paper to be submitted by the United States Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

⁸ See the communiqué issued by the Moscow Conference, November 1, 1943, in *Decade*, p. 10.

b. With respect to all of its deliberations, the Commission has no executive power and is confined to the position of making recommendations within its field to the respective governments.

3. When the Commission starts operating, it is envisaged that each Government will examine and reconcile the recommendations of the Commission with its own national policies and transmit its views as so reconciled to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. It will become the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to resolve these views into military directives for the appropriate Supreme Allied Commander. In conforming to this responsibility it is contemplated that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will combine to perform the function of preparing suggested forms of directives based upon the necessary political and military considerations and conforming to the reconciled views of the respective governments. It will also combine to act in an advisory and planning capacity to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on all matters relative to civil affairs. It has been suggested that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee be transferred to London or that a new committee performing substantially the same functions be set up in London.

This is objectionable from the U. S. point of view for the following reasons:

a. In order to perform its functions adequately and expeditiously it is necessary that the Committee should be near the Combined Chiefs of Staff which must remain in Washington.

b. The military aspect of the initial stages of civil affairs planning should continue to be emphasized as long as either the war against Germany or Japan lasts. To establish a Combined Committee on a ministerial level would be inconsistent with this policy. The existing committee is merely an adjunct of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

c. The existing committee is experienced and well known; it has facilities for promptly clearing U. S. national policy and has operated (until recently when its activities were restricted through the limitations imposed on the British representatives) efficiently and expeditiously.

As it is not the function or intention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to do any more than prescribe to the broadest terms of the policies under which the commanders in the field are to be guided there is no force to the argument that all procedures be transferred to London as greater information and contacts are available there. The methods and details by which the policy is to be carried out and as to which the information contacts and skills will be most useful are matters for the Civil Affairs Division of the appropriate head-

quarters to work out. (In the case of France and the Low Countries, presumably COSSAC).

CONCLUSION

The existing arrangement whereby the Combined Chiefs of Staff operating from Washington and utilizing the services of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee furnish basic directives governing civil affairs and matters relating to the cessation of hostilities to the appropriate combined commanders should be continued.

The U. K. and U. S. Governments should state to the Combined Chiefs of Staff their views in matters relating to civil affairs and the cessation of hostilities; these matters may be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff either on their own initiative or as a result of the action taken of the European Advisory Commission.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in any directives carried to the appropriate commanders shall follow the normal practice of confining such directives to basic matters, leaving to the commanders and their staff the duty of working out the methods and details by which the policies as stated in such directives shall be executed.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the two governments agree to the conclusions set forth above and that for this purpose the Combined Chiefs of Staff transmit to the two governments a letter in substantially the form attached hereto as Enclosure A.⁹

⁹ Not found.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON, November 25, 1943.]

For the President from the Secretary of State

Lisbon's cable no. 2835 of November 23, 1943² announces the departure on the preceding day of the group of Army and Navy technicians from Horta for Terceira Island, and adds that the early departure of these American technicians was thanks to British cooperation in Horta.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

² Not printed herein.

Defense Files : Telegram

*The Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department
(Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 25 November 1943.

PRIORITY

(Eyes only, for McCloy from Hilldring signed Marshall¹)

1074. Conference with Secretary Hull and Mr. Dunn indicates State Department view that there is no preference between allocation on [of] northern or southern areas to United States under RANKIN (C). However, the State Department suggests that serious consideration be given organization of a combined U. K.-U. S. commission to deal with French political situation irrespective of allocation of primary obligation under RANKIN (C) for operations in French territory. This commission would have approximately the same representation as the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, but would be responsible to the SAC and its jurisdiction would be confined to civil affairs problems in France. The obvious advantage of such a commission would be to give Anglo-American sanction to all policies followed in French civil affairs, regardless of whether these policies were administered by the U. S. or the U. K. Aside from comments given above, Mr. Hull has no official comments to make with regard to RANKIN (C). However in discussing the RANKIN (C) plan and your radio number 10013² on that subject Mr. Hull expressed some doubt as to the wisdom of allocating separate spheres of responsibility if, from a military point of view, this could be avoided. With respect to the spheres of responsibility, if assigned, it is Mr. Hull's opinion that firm declarations should be made by the governments of the occupying forces to the effect that no advantage shall accrue to the U. S. or to any of our allies in the area in which the armed forces of any united nation are located. Generals McNarney and Hull are acquainted with the contents of this cable.

¹ Certain telegrams sent by the War Department in this period bore the standard notation "signed Marshall", despite the fact that Marshall was at Cairo.

² In telegram 10013, November 22, 1943 (not printed), McCloy had (1) asked Hilldring to consult Dunn and wire the views of the Department of State on the zones of occupation in Europe and (2) observed that he had found Roosevelt opposed to "our occupying France in the event of RANKIN (C) occurring".

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman)*¹

URGENT

Moscow, 25 November 1943.

Personal and secret from the Peoples Commissar of Foreign Affairs VM Molotov to the American Ambassador Mr. Harriman.

I thank you for your message from Cairo.² General Connolly may address himself through the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Teheran³ to General Arkadiev with respect to questions which interest him regarding coordination of measures. I hope to meet with you soon. Most cordial greetings.

¹ Delivered to Spalding at Moscow on November 26, 1943, and forwarded by him to Harriman at Cairo via Navy channels. Received at Cairo November 27.

² Telegram of November 22, 1943, *ante*, p. 374.

³ Mikhail Alexeyevich Maximov.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

C. C. S. 408/1

COMMAND OF BRITISH AND U.S. FORCES OPERATING AGAINST GERMANY

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have given careful consideration to the proposal put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 408¹ that "a Supreme Commander be designated at once to command all United Nations operations against Germany from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic." This proposal has immense political implications and is clearly a matter for the most earnest consideration of the U. S. and British Governments. Nevertheless, the British Chiefs of Staff must say at once that, from the military point of view, they profoundly disagree with the proposal. Their reasons are set out in the paragraphs that follow.

2. Total war is not an affair of military forces alone, using the word "military" in the widest sense of the term. There are political, economic, industrial, and domestic implications in almost every big war problem. Thus it seems clear that the Supreme Commander for the war against Germany will have to consult both the U. S. and the British Governments on almost every important question. In fact, it boils down to this, that he will only be able to make a decision without reference to high authority on comparatively minor and strictly military questions, such as the transfer of one or two divisions, or a

¹ Memorandum of November 25, 1943, *ante*, p. 405.

few squadrons of aircraft, or a few scores of landing craft, from one of his many fronts to another. He will thus be an extra and unnecessary link in the chain of command.

3. There is no real analogy between the position of Marshal Foch in the last war and the position now contemplated for the Supreme Commander against Germany. Marshal Foch was responsible only for the Western Front and the Italian Front. His authority did not extend to the Salonika Front, the Palestine Front, or the Mesopotamian Front. Under the arrangements now contemplated, the Supreme Commander will have not only OVERLORD and the Italian Front under his authority, but also the Balkan Front and the Turkish Front (if this is opened). There must be some limit to the responsibilities which Allied Governments can delegate to a single soldier and the sphere now proposed seems to exceed these limits considerably.

4. The United States Chiefs of Staff propose (see paragraph 8 *c*) that the decisions of the Supreme Commander should "be subject to reversal by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." If the main object of this new arrangement is to insure rapid decisions, it looks as though the above proviso will lead to deplorable consequences. Instances will occur in which the Supreme Commander has issued orders and the troops have marched in accordance with these orders, only to be followed by a reversal of the order by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and consequent confusion. Again it may happen that the British Chiefs of Staff agree with a decision taken by the Supreme Commander, while the United States Chiefs of Staff totally disagree with it. What happens then? Or again, the Combined Chiefs of Staff may wholeheartedly support on military grounds a decision taken by the Supreme Commander, only to find that one or other of the Governments concerned is not prepared to ratify it. Then what happens?

5. If the Supreme Commander is going to exercise real control, he will need to assemble the whole paraphernalia of Intelligence, Planning and Administration on an unprecedented scale. This staff will merely be a great pad between the theater commanders and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

6. Finally, it is not admitted either that the existing machinery for the higher direction of the war has failed, or that the situation which now confronts us is so inherently different as to demand a revolutionary change.

7. The conclusion to be drawn from the above arguments is that the Supreme Commander of the war against Germany will never have, under the system of government which now obtains in the U. S. A.

and U. K., authority to deal with anything but strictly military, and comparatively minor, problems. He will be boosted by the Press and public opinion as a superman who is going to lead the two nations to victory. This is a mere delusion. His position will be a sham. In important matters, he will not be able to do anything more than is now done by the theater commanders.

8. If the well tried machinery that has led us safely through the last two years has failed in the smaller problems, it would be better to examine that machinery and see how it could be speeded up and adjusted, rather than to embark upon an entirely novel experiment, which merely makes a cumbrous and unnecessary link in the chain of command, and which will surely lead to disillusionment and disappointment.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

C. C. S. 407 (Revised)¹

COLLABORATION WITH THE U. S. S. R.

1. During the forthcoming conference with the Soviets it is recommended that the following broad lines of action be adopted:

a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree upon the U. S.-British strategy in Europe and seek the approval of the President and Prime Minister before meeting the Soviets.

b. That the Soviets be urged to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations offensive by effective coordination with OVERLORD.

c. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree to consult together before making reply to proposals upon which there has been no previous agreement.

d. That, specifically, an agreed answer be obtained to any Soviet proposals which involve the undertaking of major operations through the Balkans or the Aegean.

e. That a common policy be adopted concerning Turkey, to include briefly the support of the Soviet proposal to force Turkey into the war² but to stand firm on the principle that no diversion of forces or supplies for Turkey can be accepted to the prejudice of approved operations elsewhere.

¹ C. C. S. 407, dated November 25, 1943, differed from this document in that, among other things, it did not contain, in the enclosure, the items numbered 3 and 4 in the enclosure to this document, and it contained, as numbered items in the enclosure, the material which was subsequently incorporated in C. C. S. 407/1 (*infra*) under the headings lettered A, B, and C.

² See *ante*, p. 135.

2. Throughout the deliberation with the Soviets it should be made clear that the United States and Great Britain are involved in military operations not only in the European Theater but also in the Pacific-Asiatic Theater, and that their heavy commitments of resources throughout the world compel them to decide on operations only after careful analysis of the over-all situation.

3. At the Moscow Conference, the United States and British representatives were primarily engaged in explaining and defending their own position. In the future, the United States and Great Britain should make specific requests on the Soviets.

4. A proposed agenda is attached as an enclosure.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR U. S.-BRITISH-U. S. S. R. CONFERENCE

1. *Coordination of Military Effort*

The coordination of Soviet operations with Anglo-American operations in Europe.

2. *Italy*

Discuss current and planned military operations in and from Italy.

3. *Turkey*

Turkish action on entry into the war.

4. *Supplies to Russia*

5. *Strategic Bombing*

Discussion of Soviet capabilities to initiate strategic bombing of targets in Germany or her satellites in extension of POINTBLANK. (Current intelligence indicates German fighter strength is extremely weak on the Russian front—130 serviceable fighters.)

6. *Japan*

On the assumption that the U. S. S. R. will bring up for discussion its entry into the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany, the following should be considered:

a. Request Soviets to furnish combat intelligence information concerning Japan; if agreed to we will present specific questions through the military mission at Moscow.

b. Request Soviets to indicate whether they consider it desirable at this time to set in hand arrangements to base Soviet submarine force in U. S. territory.

c. Request Soviets to indicate what direct or indirect assistance they will be able to give, if it is found possible to launch an attack on the Northern Kuriles.

d. Soviets to indicate what ports, if any, they could allow the Allies to use. Request Soviets to furnish data on ports through Military Mission in order that we may determine the size and type of Naval Task Forces we can employ.

e. Soviets to indicate what air bases, if any, they could allow our air forces to use for operations against Japan, and what facilities, including gasoline and bombs, could be supplied. What air routes to these bases could be provided?

J. C. S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

C. C. S. 407/1

COLLABORATION WITH THE U. S. S. R.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 131st Meeting, Item 5,¹ agreed that the following items, which are currently under discussion as a result of the Moscow Conference, should be discussed between the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow and the Soviet authorities concerned:

A. Shuttle bomber bases

(1) When will the U. S. S. R. be prepared to designate air bases for our use? What are presently available locations, facilities, and capabilities? The United States tentatively desires 10 bases so distributed as to permit shuttle bombing from Italy and United Kingdom.

(2) When may we begin sending the required service personnel into the U. S. S. R. to the designated bases?

(3) What is Soviet proposal for handling the close operational liaison required?

(4) What signal communications with the United Kingdom and Italy can be provided?

B. Air transport routes

Request establishment of U. S. Air Transport Service on a minimum frequency basis of one round trip weekly on three routes in the following order of priority:

¹ See *ante*, p. 365

(1) Alsib

In order that the U. S. may have a direct and independent air line of communications with the U. S. S. R.

In order that the basic machinery may be set up and be in operation to provide a direct U. S.-U. S. S. R. aerial route of supply to support any future U. S. S. R. military air operations.

(2) U. S.-U. K.-Moscow

Primarily to support shuttle bombing operations.

(3) Tehran-Moscow

In order to transport munitions and spare parts required in connection with shuttle bombing operations and to connect Moscow with our Mediterranean and S. E. Asia fronts. This will provide an alternative during the winter months when the northern route (U. S.-U. K.) is not operating regularly.

C. *Weather information*

(1) Request Soviet basic weather ciphers in order to interpret weather broadcasts. The U. S. will furnish weather ciphers desired by the U. S. S. R.

(2) Alternatively if foregoing is not acceptable to the Soviets, U. S. desires weather data on specific areas, using special ciphers as follows:

(a) Shuttle bombing areas.

(b) Tehran transport route; data west of Long. 75° E.

(c) From 60° E. to 160° E., (for operations in China).

(d) From 90° E. to 180°, (for the Alsib route).

(3) Request U. S. S. R. to indicate the procedure they suggest in the mutual exchange of weather information. We propose exchange of meteorological liaison officers for coordination of technical details and arrangements for distribution of weather codes and ciphers.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire their respective missions to make periodic reports to the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding progress made in the negotiations on the above subjects.

H. REDMAN

F. B. ROYAL

Combined Secretariat

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO, November 26, 1943.]

C. C. S. 411/2

POINTS ON WHICH GENERALISSIMO'S AGREEMENT SHOULD BE OBTAINED

1. Since the Combined Chiefs of Staff are unable to find the 535 additional transport aircraft which are required for the Mandalay plan,² it is agreed that the plan presented by Admiral Mountbatten at the First Plenary Session³ shall be accepted.

2. The stipulation which the Generalissimo has made that an amphibious operation is to be carried out in March⁴ is noted, and will be taken into consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when amphibious operations in all parts of the world are reviewed in about a week's time.⁵ Meanwhile preparations are being pushed forward in the Southeast Asia Theater for an amphibious operation to meet this date, should approval be subsequently given.

3. A fleet of adequate strength to cover such an operation and to obtain command of the Bay of Bengal will be assembled by the beginning of March.

4. The Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command,⁶ will be authorized to divert not more than an average of 1,100 tons per month from tonnage over the "hump" to the requirements of the Burma campaign. Diversions in excess of this figure may be made by him only to meet sudden and critical emergencies of the battle or by permission of the highest authority. The Air Transport Command will use its utmost energy to raise the efficiency of its operation and increase

¹ In response to a suggestion from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Mountbatten prepared on November 25, 1943, a list of the points with regard to operations in the Southeast Asia Command on which Chiang's concurrence should be obtained before his departure from Cairo. The document here printed is Mountbatten's list as amended by the Combined Chiefs and approved by them on November 26; see *ante*, p. 358. The paper is undated but was subsequently circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on December 2, 1943. The substance of this paper was apparently discussed with Chiang at the meeting of the Heads of Government on the afternoon of November 26, 1943, at which time Chiang agreed to all points set forth therein; see *ante*, p. 366. *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 65, states that Chiang reversed himself the following morning (November 27) shortly before leaving Cairo. According to this account Chiang asked Stilwell to remain at Cairo and to insist on the airborne assault on Mandalay and the delivery of 10,000 tons of supplies per month by air to China.

For an amended version of paragraph 4 of this paper, see C. C. S. 411/5, *post*, p. 821.

² Regarding the Mandalay plan, see *ante*, pp. 338, 347.

³ See *ante*, p. 312.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 314; see also p. 347.

⁵ See *post*, pp. 675 ff.

⁶ Admiral Mountbatten.

the "hump" tonnage to a full 10,000 tons per month into China by the late winter and a further increase in the spring.

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is delegating his command over the Chinese-American Task Force starting from Ledo to Lieutenant General Slim commanding the 14th British Army, until the main body reaches Kamaing, when he will place the force under the command of Lieutenant General Stilwell.

6. It is the intention to resume the offensive in October 1944, when the monsoon stops; it is, however, too far ahead to decide the precise resources which will be available.

J. C. S. Files

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

SECRET

[ALGIERS,] 26 November 1943.

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN CAIRO CONFERENCE

An extract of a letter received today by the Commander in Chief Allied Forces, from General Giraud, is quoted for the information of the Allied Chiefs of Staff and such action as they desire to take:

"The conversation which I had with you this morning has confirmed my conviction that the point of view of the French High Command should be explained at the Cairo Conference, before any decision determines definitely the conduct of operations in Western Europe.

"Indeed, if France is to be the theater of new operations, you will understand, I am sure, how anxious I am to contribute to the studying of these operations with all the competence which a thorough knowledge of our territory has given me, and also to take my share of responsibility in the operation where the use of underground forces and resistance groups share[s] the preponderant role.

"If it is not considered necessary that I go personally to this Conference, though I do hold myself at the disposal of President Roosevelt and of the British Prime Minister, I would consider it most useful to have one officer of my staff present to explain my views before the Allied Chiefs of Staff.

"In the event where such a solution would not be possible, I do rely upon you to defend the interests of France and the French Army with the friendship and understanding which you have always shown us."²

¹ Circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as C. C. S. 413.

² The reply of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is printed *post*, p. 786.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

C. C. S. 400/1

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN NORTHWEST EUROPE AND THE
MEDITERRANEAN

1. In C. C. S. 400¹ the United States Chiefs of Staff have proposed that the U. S. Strategic Air Forces operating from the United Kingdom and from Mediterranean bases, the 8th and 15th Air Forces respectively, should be placed under a single Command—the U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe—with a Headquarters in the United Kingdom. The object of this proposal is to achieve the more effective exploitation of U. S. heavy bomber capabilities which, it is hoped, the new Headquarters will secure in two ways:

a. By organizing mutually supporting operations of the two Strategic Air Forces in order to obtain the maximum dispersal of enemy defenses;

b. By enabling advantage to be taken of changing weather and tactical conditions by switching heavy bomber forces quickly from one theater to another.

2. This proposal affects directly only U. S. heavy bomber forces, and we recognize the ultimate right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to decide the organization of U. S. forces in any theater of operations. We feel bound, however, to record our view that the adoption of this proposal would entail serious disadvantages far outweighing any advantages to be derived from it.

3. To deal first with the advantages which are expected from the present proposal:

a. Great operational benefit would undoubtedly result if an effective combination of operations in the two theaters could be achieved. The operation of a large force of heavy day bombers is however a considerable undertaking and a period of up to 24 hours is required for the preparation and loading of aircraft and the briefing of crews. Unfortunately, the weather in the European theater is so uncertain that the decision to dispatch heavy bomber forces can only be taken a few hours before the time of take-off and it is then too late to make changes in targets and the timing of attacks. The conduct of operations in accordance with a settled policy in either theater is therefore a matter of great difficulty and frequently much effort is wasted, both in abortive operations and in standing by for operations which have to be canceled. A fortiori, the detailed coordination of attacks from two bases so far apart as the U. K. and Italy would be still more difficult and would in fact prove impossible. A commander set up to control

¹ *Ante*, p. 228.

the two forces would find in practice that he could do no more than insure that the subordinate commanders in each theater worked to a general plan and kept him and each other closely informed of the situation on their own front so that the general plan could be altered as necessary. Coordination of this type can be secured with the present organization without the introduction of a new headquarters.

b. The possibility of switching heavy bomber forces from one theater to another is at first sight an attractive one. In order to obtain full benefit from the plan, it would however be necessary to build up a margin of facilities in the two theaters involving the preparation of heavy bomber airfields, runways, and maintenance depots over and above what is required for the forces already based in the theater, and the locking up of additional maintenance personnel. If these additional facilities were not provided, the serviceability and effectiveness of the heavy bombers would fall considerably as soon as they were transferred and the operations carried out would be on a smaller scale and less effective than if the forces had to remain at their normal bases. The Air Ministry have, in the past, given very careful consideration to this plan but they have been forced to the conclusion that, except on rare occasions, the results would not justify the effort involved. Such occasional transfers of forces as are likely to be profitable can be secured by the present machinery.

c. The provision of the necessary margin of facilities which, if a large transfer of force is envisaged, may be considerable, must of necessity conflict in the U. K. with other service and governmental requirements. In Italy or other active theaters of war they can only be provided at the expense of other service requirements.

There is therefore a potential conflict of interest between the commander of the Strategic Air Force on the one hand and the U. K. Government and theater commanders on the other.

4. Our conclusion is that the setting up of a new higher headquarters would not achieve the advantages which are claimed from it and would not in fact be any improvement over the existing machinery. It would, moreover, entail certain disadvantages which we consider to be serious, namely the following:

a. The most serious disadvantage is that it would destroy the present arrangements for the close coordination of the 8th Air Force and the R. A. F. including the 2nd Tactical Air Force. This depends for its effectiveness on the fact that general direction over their operations is exercised by the Chief of the Air Staff, R. A. F. The latter, with his headquarters in London, possesses not only a complete operational staff but is also served by the central Intelligence Staff of the three Services, the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and the Secret Intelligence Service, and is in the closest touch with the Admiralty, Foreign Office, Ministry of Home Security, and other Government departments. The Air Staff is also in constant touch with the Mediterranean Air Command on matters concerned with operations and Intelligence, and very close liaison arrangements have been made between the different commanders in the Mediterranean theater and in the United Kingdom.

The interposition of a new link in the chain of control would, we are convinced, cause a reduction in the efficiency of these arrangements, and the reduction would be even more serious if, as indicated in paragraph 3 of the directive proposed to [in?] C. C. S. 400, the Commanding General of U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe is placed as an interim measure directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This latter proposal would mean the termination of the arrangement agreed to at Casablanca² whereby the C. A. S. exercises general direction over the operations of the 8th Air Force in furtherance of the combined bomber offensive and would, in our opinion, be a retrograde step. It would in fact mean that the ultimate control required for the direction of the bomber offensive would have to be effected in Washington rather than as at present in London. Since all the Intelligence and administrative services which are essential for the efficiency of the bomber offensive are centralized in London, there could not fail to be a grave reduction in efficiency from this change.

The final arrangement proposed is that the new Commander should come directly under the Command of the Supreme Allied Commander for Operations in N. W. Europe. In our opinion, it would be fundamentally wrong in principle that the direction of a large part of the strategic bomber offensive which affects operations on all fronts in the European theater should be exercised by the Theater Commander of any single theater.

b. The new Commander would presumably require a large staff of all kinds in order to exercise operational and the necessary administrative control. We cannot help thinking that the provision of the large numbers of specialized and skilled staff officers needed must be a matter of considerable difficulty at the present time and, since the benefits expected from this proposal are in fact attainable under the present organization, that it would be highly wasteful in skilled manpower.

c. The proposal would also cause serious difficulties in the Mediterranean Air Command not only by a division of operational from administrative responsibility but also because it would mean that the night bomber component of the Mediterranean Strategic Air Force would be served by a different chain of information and would be under a different authority from the day bombing component though operated by the same headquarters staff in the Mediterranean theater. This could only make for confusion.

5. To summarize, we consider that the present proposal:

a. Would not secure any advantage over the present system of control;

b. Would mean breaking up the present highly integrated system of control, which has achieved considerable success, and the replacement of it by a less closely integrated and less effective system;

c. Would be wasteful in skilled staff.

² See Matloff, p. 29. The records of the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the *Foreign Relations* series.

We recognize however that there is much to be gained by having a single authority charged with the general direction of the heavy bomber offensive against Germany—someone who can interpret the Combined Chiefs of Staff directives by issuing detailed instructions from time to time according to the changing situation and who can exercise a general supervision over all bomber operations against Germany and the administrative support that they require, and over the provision of Intelligence and Tactical information so as to secure the most effective use of the heavy bomber forces engaged in the Combined Bomber Offensive. We do not see how such an authority can be on a lower level than a Chief of Staff since only on this level can the supervising authority keep in touch with all the strategical political and administrative factors which affect the bombing programme. Our conclusion is that the authority best able to exercise this general control is the Chief of the Air Staff. The latter, acting as the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is already charged with the coordination of the operations of the 8th Air Force and the R. A. F. This coordination has been of the closest and, in our opinion, has enabled the best possible use to be made of the available forces. It would not be difficult to extend this system to the 15th Air Force by giving the C. A. S. authority to regulate, in conformity with the plans of the Commanders of R. A. F. Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force in this country, the priority of objectives to be attacked by the 15th Air Force. The C. A. S. would also be in a position, subject to the Theater Commander's assessment of his administrative capacity, to transfer strategical forces from the United Kingdom to the Mediterranean and back if this seemed profitable.

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff may wish to consider this alternative arrangement to secure the advantages which they have in mind in putting forward their present proposal.³

³ The comments by the United States Chiefs of Staff were set forth in C. C. S. 400/2, *post*, p. 787.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East (Landis)
to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

CAIRO, November 26, 1943.

DEAR HARRY: Herewith is a memorandum that Averill¹ asked me to prepare for you this morning.

¹ W. Averell Harriman.

I am grateful to you for your kindnesses to me this morning and for the opportunity that it gave me to put a few of the significant issues that we face in this area.

You know that at any time I am at yours and the Boss's beck and call for anything.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES M. LANDIS

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Director of Economic Operations in the
Middle East (Landis)*

MEMORANDUM ON CONSUMER GOODS IN IRAN

Of course it is impossible to obtain absolutely accurate figures in view of the lack of statistical information in Iran, but these figures I think represent the situation fairly accurately on consumer goods.

As of January 1, 1943, the total quantity of all consumer goods, not including cereals and other bulk foodstuffs, in all Persian warehouses at the beginning of the year was 80,000 tons. Recent information indicates that between 15,000 to 18,000 tons are still at Persian Gulf ports alone. In an attached memorandum, I am breaking down the 80,000 tons of the various different categories. I can give you an even more detailed breakdown but I do not believe that this is necessary for your purposes.

The difficulty in Iran lies in the existence of an adequate distribution system and not in the absence of consumer goods. If you have time, go down to the central bazaars in Tehran and not only look at the goods that are available there in the shops but go in behind to the warehouses that are in the rear of these shops and see the masses of goods that are piled up there. Of course the prices are quite beyond reach. Some economic theorists believe that it might be advisable to throw consumer goods into Iran in order to break these black market prices. But the answer to that is that we have neither the tonnage nor the goods to create surpluses of such a size that black market prices would be permanently broken.

I might add a little about the truck situation. I think it is true that there are perhaps less trucks in Iran than there were in 1938, but not very many less. We are just compiling figures on this now. But the trucks that are in Iran are neither kept at jobs that are essential nor are they kept in repair. Of some 400 Lend-Lease trucks in Tehran I saw 83 of them in one yard alone that were laid up because of lack of repair facilities. Here again the trouble is not spare parts but the want of efficient management.

Attached herewith are data for specific items of consumer goods—the important ones being sugar, tea, drugs and cotton piece goods.²

The following data is given for specific items:

(a) *Sugar* (October 30th)

UKCC Stocks	6500 tons
Government Stocks	24000 tons
Total	30500

MESC has now programmed for Iran during 1944, 5000 tons per month.

(b) *Tea* (October 30th)

Government Stocks 800 tons.

An additional 2,000 tons are to be imported during November and December, with a total 1944 program of 6,800 tons. This latter figure represents 90% of pre-war consumption.

(c) *Coffee*: Stocks unknown, but believed to be extremely small. The 1944 program is set for a total of 300 tons.

(d) *Cocoa*: None heretofore furnished by MESC. 1944 program includes 100 tons which is now available in Palestine for shipment at any time.

(e) *Whiskey and Gin*: Stocks negligible since there was no quota for 1942-43. Present recommendations are for 1944 quota of 6,600 cases subject to approval by London and Washington.

(f) *Drugs and Pharmaceuticals*: Lend-Lease Representative MacDonald estimates sufficient supply for one year, not including items now under procurement. In addition to stocks held by the Government, 85 tons of drugs and instruments have been held in ports for over a year.

(g) *Cigarettes and Tobacco*: There are no imports of cigarettes since Iran is self-sufficient. At present they have on hand a nine months' stock of unmanufactured cigarette tobacco, and a seven months' stock of unmanufactured pipe tobacco.

(h) *Cotton Piecegoods*: Estimated stocks on hand September 7th: 21,263 bales exclusive of very considerable stocks held by private merchants, and the products of Iranian Government textile factories (which have held back from the distribution authorities more than 4,500 bales during the past eight months).

Estimated stocks of cotton piecegoods as at January 1st, 1943 is 5,000 tons, of which 80% is probably Government.

(i) *Woolen Piecegoods*: Iran is self-sufficient generally, but a quota of 80 tons has been assigned for 1944 in order to provide cheap clothing for low-paid Government servants. This, however, is subject to non-interference with minimum demands of other territories.

(j) *Toothbrushes*: Stocks believed to be extremely low.

² This paragraph ends at the bottom of the first page of the memorandum. The next paragraph appears on a separate, unnumbered page.

- (k) *Bicycles*: 500 were recently imported but are believed to have been sold to users, making a total of 22,616 in operation with no unsold stocks.
- (l) *Glassware and Crockery*: Reports indicate that "two warehouses are full" of glassware. Iran is self-sufficient in crockery and in fact has offered to export to other countries at high prices.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Director of War Mobilization (Byrnes) to the President*¹

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1943.

Cablegram for the President:

Increased landing craft program submitted Wednesday² possible only if we immediately issue directive giving priority over all programs any kind. Please wire whether I shall have Nelson issue directive.³

BYRNES

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.

² November 24, 1943; *ante*, p. 395.

³ For the reply sent by Hopkins, see *post*, p. 617. Byrnes states (*All In One Lifetime*, p. 204) that he sent another telegram to Roosevelt later the same day in which he suggested that the President might count on 15 percent more output than was indicated in the cautious figures in his telegram of November 24, 1943. It has not been possible to find a copy of this additional telegram of November 26 in official files.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Thank you much for your message of November 23rd informing me of your intention to reach Teheran on the 28th or 29th.² I expect to reach there on the 27th. It will be good to see you.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent by Harriman to Spalding at Moscow, via Navy channels, for delivery to Stalin.

² See *ante*, p. 385.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

[CAIRO,] 26 November 1943.

In reply to your message transmitted as White 38,² I am convinced that this is not the time to make any final decisions or plans relating to Civil Affairs for France. The whole situation in North Africa is complicated but the general attitude of the Committee and especially De Gaulle is shown in the Lebanon affair. De Gaulle is now claiming the right to speak for all of France and is talking openly about how he intends to set up his government in France as soon as the Allies get in there.

I am increasingly inclined to the thought that the occupation when it takes place should be a wholly military occupation.

I see no need for any further discussion at this time, though I may discuss it informally when I see the Russians.³

I saw Vishinsky four days ago⁴ and I don't believe the Russians will press for any immediate action. I am showing this to Churchill and I hope we can hold up the whole matter until we can see the picture more clearly.

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room, via military channels, and presumably forwarded by the Map Room to the Department of State; Department of State copy not found.

² Telegram of November 24, 1943, *ante*, p. 392.

³ For the discussion of problems concerning France at the Tehran Conference, see *post*, pp. 484, 509, 514.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 310.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President's Personal Representative (Hurley) to the President*¹

[TEHRAN,] November 26, 1943.

This morning I informed Russian Chargé d'Affaires² that you would reside at your own Legation. I told him that this decision in my opinion was final and was made before any invitation had been received by you from Russia.³ All this was satisfactory at that time. At three o'clock this afternoon, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires called on me to say that the Russian Government cordially invites you to be its guest at its Embassy while here. I told him I would convey to you this generous invitation but inasmuch as you had already decided to reside at your own Legation and all preparations had been made

¹ Sent via Army channels.

² Mikhail Alexeyevich Maximov.

³ See the editorial note, *ante*, p. 310, and Lohbeck, p. 210.

accordingly I thought that perhaps it would be too late to make another change, although I knew that you and Stalin would spend a great deal of time together while here. In the meantime DARKY⁴ is inspecting suggested quarters, Russian Embassy, so that if you should decide to accept the invitation, all details regarding quarters will be in hand.

⁴ Code name for James J. Rowley of the United States Secret Service.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President's Personal Representative (Hurley) to the President*¹

[TEHRAN,] November 26, 1943.

Since wiring you I accompanied General Connolly and Rowley together with the Russian Charge d'Affaires and other Russian security officers for an inspection of quarters which the Russians propose to give to you as their guest. For Reilly's information the quarters are in the same building inside the Russian Embassy compound which he inspected and consist of six rooms to the left of the entrance to the building. The suite contains one large reception or assembly room, four smaller rooms that could be used as bedrooms and one large bedroom with adjoining bath. For the other four rooms there is but one bath, making two baths and toilet facilities for the entire suite which is the same number as in the American Legation. In the suite there is also a large dining room and below the main bedroom a kitchen which can be used by your staff for you. The building is steam heated. The suite they are offering you is on the same floor with and adjoins the large conference room. No one else is living in this building but two other rooms are being used as a Russian communications office. There is also a private entrance to the suite. The only work needed to be done on the suite is to re-install bathtubs and toilets which have been removed but can be replaced quickly. List of necessary furnishings being given Russians by DARKY. From the standpoint of your convenience and comfort, from the standpoint of conference communications and security, these quarters are far more desirable than your own Legation. As I told you in my earlier wire, I have advised the Russians that you have definitely decided to use your own Legation. The Russians still most cordially solicit your acceptance of their invitation.

HURLEY

¹ Sent via Army channels.

Roosevelt Papers

The President to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

[CAIRO,] November 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: AMBASSADOR KIRK

Please have Wadsworth, Consul General at Beirut, come down here when I get back here—I think about Thursday or Friday.¹

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

¹ December 2 or 3, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to the Chinese Minister of Finance (Kung)

[CAIRO,] November 26, 1943.

MY DEAR DR. KUNG. It was good of you to think of me and I am delighted to have that delicious Chinese tea ¹—especially because I am more and more substituting tea for coffee.

Our visit here in Cairo with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang has been not only very delightful but it has been a true success. It is the beginning of many such conferences, I hope. They have spoken to me in regard to the inflation problem and when they get back to Chungking they will speak with you in regard to a suggestion which I have made.² I have not, of course, had a chance to talk with the Secretary of the Treasury ³ about it but I will do so just as soon as I get home.

I do hope that I shall have the pleasure of seeing you one of these days very soon. My warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT]

The Honorable Dr. H. H. Kung,

The Executive Yuan,

Chungking, China

¹ On Madame Chiang's return from the United States to China earlier in the year, Roosevelt had sent with her a letter (not printed herein) and a box of cigars for Kung. Kung replied to Roosevelt in a letter (not printed herein) of November 17, 1943, which was forwarded from Washington to Cairo. A gift of tea accompanied this letter.

² Regarding the suggestion referred to here, see *post*, p. 804, and *The Stilwell Papers*, pp. 251-252.

³ Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

Roosevelt Papers

Madame Chiang to President Roosevelt

CAIRO, 26 November 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will, I hope, forgive me for this uncertain handwriting, for I am still Cyclops, and the letters all run together very unneatly. But the Generalissimo wishes me to tell you again how much he appreciates what you have done and are doing for China. When we said goodbye to you this afternoon, he could not find words adequately expressive to convey his emotions and feelings, nor to thank you sufficiently for your friendship. He felt too the wistfulness of saying farewell, although he feels that only a short while will elapse before his next meeting with you. Meanwhile he hopes that you will consider him as a friend whom you can trust. He on his part finds joy and comfort in the thought that as time goes on, the bonds of affection and similarity of motives between you and him will be strengthened.

Will you please overlook this very inadequate interpretation of his views, for I have had a full day, and my brain simply cannot encompass what he conveyed to me to pass on to you.

On my own behalf, Mr. President, please remember that as I write this, my heart overflows with affection and gratitude for what you have done, and for what you are.

MAYLING SOONG CHIANG

Defense Files : Telegram*The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Secretary of War (Stimson)*

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 27 November 1943.

PRIORITY

[10064] (To Stimson attention Hilldring and Dunn from McCloy)

Had talk yesterday with Eden.¹ Quite evident he feels European Advisory Commission in London important achievement and does not wish to derogate in any way from the authority which he feels was given it by the terms of reference and documents which were referred to it at Moscow. He wants to dignify it and have us send a small but good staff to London immediately to assist Winant whom the President has advised Prime Minister he intends to appoint to Commission. However, Eden has agreed and I believe favors submission by Advis-

¹ See *ante*, p. 351.

ory Commission of their tentative recommendations to Combined Chiefs of Staff for comment and suggestion by them prior to any final submission of recommendation by commission to Governments. Also has tentatively agreed to remove further pressure for removal of Combined Civil Affairs Committee to London and if we are prepared to take step one above will agree to permit British representatives CCAC to take full part in all discussions relating to U. K. based operations, perhaps sending to Washington a man with substantial authority to augment or replace existing British representation. Under this arrangement very important we should send good military man to act on Winant's staff, and that State Department should nominate their men. Eden pleaded that this staff be sent to London immediately. British want a military man who is familiar with CCAC procedures in London to help Winant. . . . Will have to await return of party from the East² and further confirmation by British of their agreement as above-outlined. Above entirely satisfactory to me and best arrangement I think we can make under the circumstances but would like to have your views. For information Dunn, Eden seemed much interested in Combined U. K.-U. S. Commission to deal with French political situation suggested in your number 1074.³ Question was raised by British as to where such a Commission could be located most effectively, whether in London, Washington or Algiers. Eden agrees with Hull on political desirability of avoiding separate spheres of responsibility but both military groups here feel this is impractical. Eden also expressed prompt approval of Hull's opinion as to declaration by Governments of occupying forces as expressed in 1074.

² i. e., from Tehran.

³ *Ante*, p. 423.

Defense Files: Telegram

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 27 November 1943.

PRIORITY

10065 (To Stimson from McCloy)

Have had talks with Joint Chiefs and British on civil affairs matters and discussions with others including President, Winant and Eden.¹ Feel that if British confirm agreement outlined in my 10064 we have accomplished all that we have set out to do on civil affairs matter.

¹ See *ante*, pp. 351, 415, and telegram printed *supra*.

Though I have only been on fringe of strategical discussions, it is clear that all decisions of important matters are held up pending results Eastern conference² to which I did not go though I was requested to stay on here pending their return.

² Conference at Tehran.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Director of War Mobilization (Byrnes) to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] November 27, 1943.

For the President from Justice Byrnes

Francis Gibbs advises me that if immediately authorized, forty to fifty additional ships nearly identical with LCIL but having speed of twelve knots probably can be delivered within specified time by converting army cargo vessels under contract in Gulf intended for duty in MacArthur theatre. Could probably start deliveries within sixty days. If these ships are held not suitable for all functions of LCIL they can at least be substituted for non-combat duty of LCIL and LST releasing the latter. If you approve please wire me authority to proceed.²

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels. The draft copy of the telegram in the O. W. M. Files is classified as secret.

² No reply specifically to this message has been found. See, however, Hopkins' telegram of November 28, 1943, *post*, p. 617.

Defense Files : Telegram

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)

[WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1943.

Eyes only to McCloy from Stimson

1124. Hull and I agree with the suggestion that the tentative recommendations of the European Advisory Commission be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for comment and suggestion by them prior to any final submission of recommendations by the commission to Governments. We are pleased to note Eden's tentative agreement to remove further pressure for removal of Combined Civil Affairs Committee to London, and to permit British representatives Combined Civil Affairs Committee to take full part in all discussions relating to operations based on UK. . . . State Department believes that UK-US Commission to deal with French political situation should be located in

London. I congratulate you heartily on having worked out thus far such satisfactory solution of these problems.

Roosevelt Papers

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[CAIRO,] 30 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS:

We have worked out with the British an arrangement for handling civil affairs, so called, in conjunction with the European Advisory Commission which I think will be satisfactory:

First, we agree to treat the EAC seriously and to put good men who are familiar with what has already been going on, on the staff to help Winant.

Second, they agree to forget their idea of moving the Combined Civil Affairs Committee to London and will empower their representatives in Washington to go ahead and function.

Third, all recommendations made by the EAC will be first submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington for their comments and suggestions before being submitted as final recommendations to the respective governments.

Fourth, the Combined Chiefs of Staff will prepare the final directives for the commanders in the field, based on the determinations of the three governments as thus obtained—the detailed planning to be carried forward by the local command.

This general setup was agreed to in my conference with Eden¹ and later Jebb, his assistant, before leaving for Tehran said he felt "London" (whoever that was) would go along. He asked me to prepare a memo embodying this agreement for final confirmation on his return which I have done.²

This in my judgement is the best that can be done and I have gotten Hull's and Stimson's approval of it.³ If you say O. K. I think it can be put across. My only concern is as to how expeditiously the EAC will function. I do not get the impression that Winant is a fast administrator but we will give him as good a staff as we can collect. If it works at that end it will work at ours.

Will you phone me?

Sincerely,

J. J. [McCLOY]

¹ Regarding the conversations of Winant and McCloy with Eden and Jebb on November 26, 1943, see *ante*, p. 351.

² *Infra*.

³ See *supra*.

Hopkins Papers

*Draft Agreement Prepared by the United States Delegation*¹

SECRET

[CAIRO,] 30 November 1943.

LIAISON BETWEEN EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION AND COMBINED
CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. At the Moscow Conference there was established the European Advisory Commission to which there has been referred civil affairs matters closely connected with military considerations of primary interest to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. It is essential that a liaison procedure be established between the European Advisory Commission and the Combined Chiefs of Staff whereby they can readily exchange views and comments on civil affairs matters.

3. With these considerations in mind the following principles are laid down as satisfactory liaison procedure between the European Advisory Commission and the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

a. Tentative recommendations of the European Advisory Commission will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their comment prior to final submission of recommendations by the Commission to the three governments.

b. The governments will transmit approved recommendations of the Commission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who will prepare and transmit final directives to the appropriate commanders. Detailed planning will be carried forward at the headquarters of the commanders concerned.

c. The British representation on the CCAC will be instructed to participate and empowered to act in all civil affairs matters relating to combined operations, without limitation as to area, that are brought before the committee.

Accepted at SEXTANT Conference
CAIRO, EGYPT

.....
.....

¹The genesis of this draft agreement is explained in the memorandum from McCloy to Hopkins, *supra*.

Roosevelt Papers

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[CAIRO,] 30 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS:

In the course of my talk with Eden¹ I brought up Hull's suggestion² of a Committee set up somewhat as the Combined Committee to deal with all French questions. All matters relating to our dealings with the French would for the time being be cleared through that committee. Hull's idea was that this would eliminate the irritation and distrust that now arises in connection with our respective French policies. Eden expressed prompt approval of the idea and today Hull cabled through Stimson³ to the effect that he thought it would be well to set such a group up in London. I gather it would be most informal and could consist of a military man and a foreign affairs man from each of the governments, calling on other agencies for such economic and other help as they need.

Would the President think well of this idea? If so, I can see that it is pushed along.

Sincerely,

J. J. [McCLOY]

¹ See *ante*, p. 351.

² See Hilldring's telegram of November 25, 1943, to McCloy, *ante*, p. 423.

³ *Ante*, p. 444. The telegram in question had been sent on the evening of November 28.

Hopkins Papers

*Memorandum by the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose),
Temporarily at Cairo*

BRIEF COMMENT ON MR. JORDAN'S TELEGRAM OF NOVEMBER 15, 1943,
ABOUT ARMS FOR SAUDIA ARABIA¹

In the first paragraph the question numbered (6) was not asked, though the answer was supplied by the King's messenger. The remainder of the first paragraph is correct, and the second paragraph, insofar as it goes.

What does not appear from Mr. Jordan's telegram is that King Ibn Saud was informed as a preface to the inquiry that the American and British military authorities in Washington were in consultation on the problem of arms for Saudi Arabia. The King was further

¹ See *ante*, p. 378.

informed that the subject of the inquiry would be discussed with the British Minister in Jidda; and the American Minister Resident did discuss it with the British Minister on a date which cannot be stated exactly without reference to records in Jidda, but which may have been November 16 or November 17, 1943.

A noteworthy feature of Mr. Jordan's telegram is that his concern over apparent lack of collaboration did not lead him to refer to his American colleague to verify the completeness or accuracy of his information before reporting to the Foreign Office, nor did he mention it when discussing arms with the American Minister Resident on or about November 16, 1943. It is also worthwhile to note that the British Foreign Office (or Ministry of State) attributed sufficient importance to this point of procedure to refer it to the highest authority.

CAIRO, November 30, 1943.

J[AMES] S. M[OOSE] JR.

B. THE COMMUNIQUÉ AND ITS RELEASE

Cairo Legation Records

*Final Text of the Communiqué*¹

PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising.

"The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other terri-

¹ This is the agreed text as it was given by Hopkins to Kirk on the afternoon of November 26, 1943; see the memorandum by Kirk, *infra*. For earlier drafts of the communiqué, see *ante*, pp. 399-404. The communiqué was released to the press by the White House on December 1, 1943, and was printed, with slight editorial variations, in the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, December 4, 1943, p. 393.

tories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

Cairo Legation Records

Memorandum by the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)

SECRET

CAIRO, November 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

On this afternoon Mr. Harry Hopkins handed me a copy of the communiqué to be issued in regard to the Anglo American Chinese talks in Cairo and asked me to hold it pending the receipt of instructions from Tehran as to its release. Mr. Hopkins said that the matter of the release had not been decided upon and that I would be given 24 hours notice so that the release by the three interested countries might be simultaneous. Mr. Hopkins added that I should notify the Chinese¹ when I got instructions from Tehran. At the conclusion of the conversation I said that it seemed that all I was to do was to see that the U. S. correspondents in Cairo got the communiqué through O. W. I. and Mr. Hopkins replied in the affirmative.

A[LEXANDER] K[IRK]

¹ i. e., the Chinese Legation at Cairo.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins), Temporarily at Tehran*¹

[CAIRO,] 28 November 1943.

Immediate and urgent for Harry Hopkins signed Kirk.

With reference to document which you gave me for safe keeping pending instructions from Tehran I learn from Ryan of Ministry of Information that British have communicated text in code through British Embassy here to Foreign Office in London preparatory to release upon notification flash from your party. Ryan states such

¹ Sent via Army channels.

release will be immediate without twenty-four hour advance notice mentioned and that Cairo handout will be for background only and not for transmission.

In view of this situation I would appreciate immediate detailed instructions as to action to be taken by me so that there may be no slip-up by the Legation and in order that I may notify Chinese as you requested. Russell Barnes of Office of War Information now in Tehran is familiar with set-up here and can furnish you with any additional information in that regard.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

*The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins), Temporarily at Tehran*¹

URGENT

CAIRO, November 29, 1943.

SECRET

With reference to my message of yesterday Chinese Chargé² has just called to say that he has cabled text of document to Chungking with instructions to hold release pending flash from him.

I told him that I had been instructed to notify him when I received word from Tehran of date of release. As matters now stand therefore texts of document in question are in Foreign Offices in London and Chungking, but unless you have sent text direct there is none in Washington. Do you wish me to cable text in advance to State Department to be held pending instructions as to date of release or are you taking action in Tehran?

KIRK

¹ Sent via Army channels.

² T'ang Wu.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)*¹

TEHRAN, 29 November 1943.

Your instructions are as follows: Give text of communiqué to OWI with instructions that it is released for publication at 2330 hours Greenwich Meridian Time Wednesday December 1st under Cairo date line. News services will be given text of communiqué at 1700 hours Cairo time Tuesday November 30 to facilitate transmission.

¹ Sent via Army channels.

Release terms must warn that all material is secret and confidential until the hour for published release and must not be discussed outside newspaper offices or speculated upon in any way. No pre-announcement will be made concerning tendency of important announcement and newspapers and radio stations are directed not to make advance statements of any kind whatsoever until exact hour of release. Background material at Cairo is subject to same release conditions. Stories released must include information all principals have left Cairo for unannounced destinations. Pictures are released same hour or whenever transmission is possible. These instructions are approved by the President. Notify Chinese Minister in detail.² Also send immediately highest priority full copy these instructions with text communiqué to Steve Early, Secretary to the President, Washington, D. C.³

² Chargé T'ang Wu was notified on November 29, 1943. The newly appointed Minister, Hsu Nien-tseng, had apparently not yet arrived at his post. He presented his credentials in January 1944.

³ This message was repeated, with the text of the communiqué, in a telegram of November 29, 1943, from Kirk to Early, sent via Army channels.

Cairo Legation Records: Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk)*¹

SECRET

[TEHRAN, November 30, 1943.]

To Kirk for Frank Shea from Hopkins.

Re Shea's query² instructions are as follows: Eliminate or hold for later release all references to Mena House, villas occupied by any members of party, or Mena itself. It is permissible to release details of trip to Pyramids and Sphinx and other color stories so long as no hint or disclosure of local conference locations is given. Cairo date-line still stands. Text of communiqué unchanged. Repeat this message to Steve Early for reference to Surles.³

¹ Sent via Navy channels.

² Shea at Cairo, in a telegram to Hopkins at Tehran ("for Russell Barnes"), had noted that the communiqué merely gave "in North Africa" as the location of the Conference, and he queried whether specific mention of Mena in the background material was permissible (copy sent to Early; Roosevelt Papers).

³ Sent to Early in paraphrase, via Army channels.

Censorship Files

*The Director of the Office of War Information (Davis) to the British Minister of Information (Bracken)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1943.

PRIORITY

I must enter the most energetic protest against the Reuter[s] dispatch purporting to come from Lisbon and distributed today.² While I realize that Reuters is a purely private institution on which the British government has not the slightest shadow of influence, this dispatch is reported to have been passed by the British censorship for radio transmission abroad though we understand it was not published in the United Kingdom. I need hardly point out to you the very unfortunate consequences. First is a serious and perhaps perilous violation of security. Second, the political warfare value for both the American and British governments of the meetings and the decisions made thereat will be materially lessened by premature disclosure of the fact which enables the Germans and the Japanese to blanket the world with their version of the story before the actual announcement is on the record. Finally, a consideration not without importance is the universal indignation of the American press at Reuters disclosure here though not in British Isles of facts this morning imparted to American newspapers with instruction to observe extraordinary precautions to preserve secrecy. As you know this is far from the first time that such an incident has occurred though this exceeds all its predecessors in flagrancy. This practice could become one of the most serious obstacles to Anglo-American understanding. In the

¹ Sent to Carroll, Director of the London bureau of the Office of War Information, for transmittal to Bracken.

² The Reuters dispatch, as printed in the *New York Times* of December 1, 1943, p. 1, col. 1, read as follows:

"Lisbon, Portugal, Nov. 30—President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill have completed a long conference in Cairo and are now en route to somewhere in Iran to meet Premier Stalin, it is known here definitely.

"Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek took part in the Cairo conference and will also meet Premier Stalin.

"A communiqué agreed on after the Cairo conference will be published later this week. The three statesmen met on one occasion in a tent in the shadow of the Pyramids.

"During the conference Cairo was cut off from communications with the rest of the world. President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who was accompanied by Madame Chiang, traveled to Cairo by air, while Prime Minister Churchill traveled by sea."

interest of that understanding, as well as of our coordinated propaganda against the enemy, I most urgently request you to see that censorship holds Reuters in line hereafter.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The President's Secretary (Early) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] 2 December 1943.

For Harry Hopkins from Mr. Early

Cairo communiqué enthusiastically received throughout country. Great praise jubilation prevails all quarters. This despite premature release by Reuters in dispatch under Lisbon dateline of virtually complete story of Cairo conferences almost twenty-four hours before official communiqué was released thus most unfortunately discounting communiqué and enabling German Japanese propagandists meanwhile to broadcast to world their versions of conference. Urge reduction of time interval between distribution and publication should other official communiqués be issued. Also suggest strict prohibition against export of contents of future communiqués prior to release date.

¹ Sent via military channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President's Secretary (Early)*¹

[TEHRAN,] 2 December 1943.

For Mr. Early from Mr. Hopkins

Text of Teheran Communiqué² will be released for publication 1300 hours Washington time, 2000 hours Moscow time, December 6th. Details of release will be sent later. Please send report concerning treatment of Chinese communiqué including any violations release date or unauthorized premature publication facts concerning Cairo or Teheran Conferences and your suggestions.

¹ Sent via military channels.

² *Post*, p. 639.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The President's Secretary (Early) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] 2 December 1943.

From Mr. Early to Mr. Hopkins.

Supplementing White 74,² also acknowledging your Black fifty.³ Reuters' treatment Cairo story provoked bitter resentment by American newspapers. Protests have been sent to Bracken and according to press reports today Reuters premature release was subject of heated debate in House of Commons today.⁴ Bracken disclaimed responsibility. However, the Reuters story, circulated generally elsewhere some 33 hours ahead of official release[,] was not permitted by British censors to be published in England.

I am receiving protests, including one from Roy Roberts. Ever since your departure we have pleaded with British censorship and government for greater security. Reuters action seems most reprehensible to us. Their reports gave away practically the entire Cairo story except actual text of communiqué. The text was about all they did not publish in advance of communiqué. Washington correspondents are disposed to place the responsibility for Reuters' actions on the British, not on us. They appreciate we did everything possible to protect story.

They are making on their own responsibility formal protest to Halifax here.

Our press, of course, published Reuters' reports but carefully refrained from publishing anything else although they had received fullest advices from their own correspondents. None of the latter was published until the release hour fixed by Cairo. As Roy Roberts protests "The release by Reuters destroyed much of the effect of what should have been one of the epochal highspots of the war."

Press here received today from London following, "Ankara reported Stalin Roosevelt arrived Teheran." To date except for speculative pieces that Roosevelt moved from Cairo to meet Stalin presumably in Teheran, nothing important has been published yet about Teheran conference.⁵

¹ Sent via military channels.

² Early's previous telegram of December 2, 1943, *ante*, p. 453.

³ Telegram printed *supra*.

⁴ See *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 395, cols. 517-520.

⁵ For premature releases concerning the Tehran Conference, see *post*, pp. 641 ff.

Only suggestions I have to make were included in previous dispatch. However, I urgently repeat that those suggestions be enforced.⁶ I repeat that despite Reuters' actions, the Cairo conference reaction most favorably received by people of this country and the morale effect of the three power pledges is evident everywhere.

Regards to all.

EARLY

⁶ For Roosevelt's decision altering the method of handling press releases, see *post*, p. 848.

