I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
(May 12–25, 1943)
1. PRE-CONFERENCE PAPERS
A. PAPERS ON ATOMIC ENERGY

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹

SECRET

LONDON, February 16, 1943.

Prime Minister to Mister Harry Hopkins personal and secret (signed Prime).

Do you remember our conversation about that very secret matter we called “Tube Alloys” which you told me would be put right as soon as the President got home?² I should be very grateful for some news about this, as at present the American War Department is asking us to keep them informed of our experiments while refusing altogether any information about theirs.

PRIME

¹ Manner of transmission not indicated, but presumably by military channels. The source text bears the following typewritten marginal notation dated February 19, 1943: “Remind Mr. Hopkins to speak to General Somervell on this next three or four days.”

² Reference here is presumably to a conversation held at some time in the course of the Casablanca Conference. No record of such a conversation has been found, but see Martin’s message of January 25, 1943, to Hopkins, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 803.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 24, 1943.

Apropos of your request to me regarding Tube Alloys, I have made some inquiry here.² It would be very helpful if Anderson could send me by pouch a full memorandum of what he considers to be the basis of the present misunderstanding, particularly the copies of the original memoranda or any references or conversations which form the bases

¹ Manner of transmission not indicated, but presumably by military channels.

² The Hopkins Papers include a memorandum of February 26, 1943, from Bush to Hopkins, and an enclosed 22-page file of documents bearing on the interchange of scientific information with the British, particularly the initial American-British arrangements of September and October, 1940. According to the Bush memorandum, the file was prepared following a conversation between Hopkins and Bush.
of the misunderstanding. In a casual inquiry here I find that our people feel that there has been no breach of agreement, but I want to go into it thoroughly and a memorandum from Anderson would help.

I do hope you are feeling better.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant
(Hopkins)

SECRET

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins. Personal immediate and most secret. Yours of the 24th.

In my immediately following telegram I send you brief memorandum summarizing history of US UK relations on project known as S-1 or TUBE ALLOYS. If any of documents quoted therein are not available to you, please let me know at once so that I can send you copies by air.

There is no question of breach of agreement. Basis on which all interchange of information has taken place up to this time has been one of complete mutual confidence and of conviction that the most certain and most rapid realization of the project can be attained only through complete cooperation. Suggestion for formal agreement made from our side in August last was concerned more with joint control and post war arrangements than with wartime collaboration in actual work which, after the President's approach to me in October 1941, had always been taken for granted.

We believe that no one will dispute that the American and British scientists and technicians working together as a joint team must achieve success in this difficult and novel project more quickly and efficiently than either group working separately.

When the President and I talked of this matter at Hyde Park in June 1942, my whole understanding was that everything was on the basis of fully sharing the results as equal partners. I have no record, but I shall be very much surprised if the President's recollection does not square with this.

I base my request to you to review the position and restore the

1 Transmitted via military channels.
2 Reference here is to the proposals set forth in letters of August 5, 1942, from Anderson to Bush. The contents of these letters are described in detail in Hewlett and Anderson, pp. 261-263.
3 The approach of October 1941 is described in the document printed infra.
4 No record has been found of the Roosevelt-Churchill discussions of the atomic bomb project during their meetings at Hyde Park in June 1942; see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 482.
original policy of joint work on my conviction that this is necessary
if the joint resources of the two countries are to be used most efficiently.
But I think that memorandum in my immediately following telegram
will show you that, if I had to justify my case on grounds of fair play,
I should have little difficulty in doing so.

I must ask you to let me have very soon a firm decision on US policy
in this matter, as urgent decisions about our programme here and in
Canada depend on the extent to which full collaboration between us
is restored.

PRIME

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to the President’s Special Assistant
(Hopkins) ¹

SECRET

LONDON, February 27, 1943.

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins. Personal immediate and
most secret. My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is memorandum summarizing history of US-UK rela-
tions on project known as S-1 or Tube Alloys.² (Memorandum
begins.)

After the discovery in Germany in December 1938 of the fission of
U 235, research proceeded in France, USA and Britain on the pos-
sibility of using this as a source of energy both for power generation
and as a military explosive.

From the middle of 1940 the work in USA was organized under the
S-1 Committee of NDRC and in UK under the MAUD Committee of
MAP and information was freely exchanged both in written docu-
ments and verbally.

Balchbridge and Lauritsen of NDRC attended MAUD Committee
meetings in April and July 1941 at which complete reviews of the
British work were given.

In a letter dated October 11, 1941 President Roosevelt suggested to
Prime Minister that they should soon correspond or converse “In order
that any extended efforts may be coordinated or even jointly
conducted.” ³

²Transmitted via military channels.
³For the authoritative American history of the collaboration between the
United States and the United Kingdom in the interchange of scientific informa-
tion of military application, particularly atomic energy, from 1940 to January
1943, see Hewlett and Anderson, pp. 256-270.
³Roosevelt’s letter read as follows:

“It appears desirable that we should soon correspond or converse concern-
ing the subject which is under study by your MAUD committee, and by Dr. Bush’s
organization in this country, in order that any extended efforts may be co-
ordinated or even jointly conducted. I suggest, for identification, that we
refer to this subject as MAYSON.

“I send this message by Mr. Hovde, head of the London office of our scientific
organization, as he can, if necessary, identify the subject more explicitly, or
answer your questions concerning the form of organization by which it is now
being handled in this country.” (Roosevelt Papers)
In December 1941 the Prime Minister replied "I need not assure you of our readiness to collaborate with the US administration in this matter".

Meanwhile British work had been reorganized and greatly expanded under a "Director of Tube Alloys" directly responsible to the Lord President. Similar reorganization took place in USA.

Professors Pegram and Urey visited Britain in November 1941. They were allowed free access to all our laboratories, so that they could study our work and new organization in detail.

Full information was also exchanged in writing (letters from Dr. Bush to Sir J. Anderson of December 23, from Mr. Brook to Mr. Hovde of January 20, from Sir J. Anderson to Dr. Bush of March 23 and from Dr. Bush to Sir J. Anderson of April 20.)

All these communications assumed on both sides complete collaboration at all stages of the project.

This policy was fully confirmed when Mr. Akers, British Director of Tube Alloys, accompanied by Professors Simon, Halban and Peierls, visited America between February and June 1942. They gave full and detailed information about our progress and plans and were able to discuss all aspects of the project with US scientists with complete frankness on both sides.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed the question generally at Hyde Park in June 1942, and it is the Prime Minister's clear recollection that the whole basis of the conversation was that there was to be complete cooperation and sharing of results.

Between June and October 1942 correspondence took place between Dr. Bush and the Lord President with the object of finding the most efficient way of using the combined industrial and scientific resources of the two countries to realize the Tube Alloy project in the best interests of the United Nations.

The Lord President suggested that this would best be achieved by arranging for the joint effort to be used in building a plant in North America.

The proposal to build a plant in North America rather than in Britain was not due to any technical inability on the part of the British but to the conviction that this was best on strategic grounds and would involve the minimum interference with the joint war effort.

Throughout this correspondence there is no hint that Dr. Bush contemplated any restriction in interchange of technical information. Wording shows that object of both parties at that time was still to find best means of forwarding a joint cooperative effort.

Contemporaneously with this correspondence there was also an exchange of letters between the Lord President and Dr. Bush in which the former emphasized his conviction that the closest cooperation and exchange of technical information was essential and should be safeguarded by an agreement between the two governments for joint execution of the project and joint wartime and post-war control.

At Dr. Bush's invitation Mr. Akers visited USA from November 1942 to end of January 1943 to inform him of our latest results and to discuss the interlocking of the programmes of the two countries.

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4 Sir John Anderson.
5 Regarding the Roosevelt–Churchill discussions of the atomic bomb project during their meetings at Hyde Park in June 1942, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 432.
After being informed that the US Army was now responsible for all work beyond laboratory research and that it was proposed to tighten up exchange of information solely in the interests of secrecy, Mr. Akers was eventually, on January 7, 1943, given by Dr. Conant a memorandum on the interchange with the British and Canadians on S-1.

This memorandum is stated to derive from the basic principle "That interchange on design and construction of new weapons and equipment is to be carried out only to the extent that the recipient of the information is in a position to take advantage of this information in this war."

The memorandum sets out the logical result of applying this principle to all phases of the S-1 project, in the light of the respective American and British programmes then envisaged. It limits drastically interchange of technical information and entirely destroys the original conception of "A coordinated or even jointly conducted effort between the two countries."

**Prime**

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

**SECRET**

LONDON, March 20, 1943.

From Prime Minister to Mister Harry Hopkins personal and most secret.

I am hoping to receive a reply to my telegram to you of February 27 about Tube Alloys. Time is passing and collaboration appears to be at a standstill. We have made some progress in the last three months.

**Prime**

1 Manner of transmission not indicated, but presumably via military channels.

**Hopkins Papers: Telegram**

*The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill*  

**SECRET**

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1943.

From Mr. Harry L. Hopkins to the Prime Minister personal and most secret.

We have been having very satisfactory talks with Eden.

1 Manner of transmission not indicated, but presumably via military channels.

2 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden visited Washington, March 12–30, 1943, during which time he conferred with President Roosevelt, Hopkins, and other American officials. For documentation on the Eden visit, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. xii, pp. 1 ff. For accounts of Eden's discussions with American officials on the subject of American assistance to meet British shipping needs, see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 699–700, and Behrens, pp. 363–364.
I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

I am working on Tube Alloys and will let you know as soon as I know something definite.

We are looking for good news from Tunisia and I think we are going to get it.

All well here.

HARRY

Hopkins Papers

The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

Re: Interchange on S-1.

On March twenty-fourth the President passed me the accompanying file on interchange with the British on S-1,² and instructed me to prepare a reply, undoubtedly by suggesting material for a reply to you, since the attached cables are marked for your attention.

There is no longer any assertion of breach of agreement. The objection of the British must hence be either to the adopted policy or to the way in which it is being applied. I have discussed this matter again with the Military Policy Committee on the subject, and briefly with Secretary Stimson. None of us can see that the present policy, which was approved by the President after it had had the careful review and approval of General Marshall, Secretary Stimson, and Vice President Wallace, is in any way unreasonable, or such as to impede the war effort on this matter. Neither can we see that the application is at present unwise. I believe, therefore, that it will be necessary to determine more explicitly why the British object, before any modification could be recommended. It is true, as indicated in the last paragraph of CCWD 1744,³ that a prompt resolution of this matter is desirable. However, the present unwillingness of the British to conduct certain scientific interchange, to which we have invited them, merely means that our scientists do not have for the moment the benefit of their collaboration in the studies constantly being conducted. This is of much less importance than a clear understanding on a matter of the unique significance of this. I will therefore review the policy

¹ The source text is accompanied by the following handwritten note of March 31 from Bush to Hopkins: "Dear Harry—You will probably wish to confer on this, and Conant and I will stand by. V.B."

² The file under reference apparently consisted of Churchill's two telegrams of February 27, 1943, to Hopkins, ante, pp. 2 and 3, respectively.

³ The reference is to Churchill's first message of February 27, 1943, to Hopkins, ante, p. 2.
and its application, and I suggest that you request the British for explicit criticism.

The adopted policy is that information on this subject will be furnished to individuals, either in this country or Great Britain, who need it and can use it now in the furtherance of the war effort, but that, in the interests of security, information interchanged will be restricted to this definite objective.

There is nothing new or unusual in such a policy. It is applied generally to military matters in this country and elsewhere. To step beyond it would mean to furnish information on secret military matters to individuals who wish it either because of general interest or because of its application to non-war or post-war matters. To do so would decrease security without advancing the war effort.

The application of this principle is in no way unilateral. In applying the policy in this instance full over-all information has been withheld, for example, from our own Naval Research Laboratory. This has been done with the concurrence of appropriate Naval authority, and in spite of the fact that the Naval Research Laboratory would like to have full information. That laboratory, like other laboratories engaged on the subject, is furnished with all the technical information necessary for full progress on the part of the program which it is carrying forward. To go further would decrease security, and security on this subject is important. In this connection it should be remembered that the Naval Research Laboratory was engaged on aspects of this research very early, in fact I believe as early as any group anywhere, under the guidance of a special committee appointed by the President. This committee was reorganized under NDRC when the latter was formed.

This same policy is applied throughout the OSRD organization. The principle is that no individual receives secret information except as it is necessary for his proper functioning in connection with his assigned duties. It is used by the British themselves, and they occasionally ask us to apply special restrictions on information they furnish us, beyond current practice, when especially secret matters are involved.

I find it hard to believe, therefore, that the present British objection is to the policy. However, the last two paragraphs of CCWD 1807 Z 4 are very pertinent in this connection. The first of these states the principle, and the second states that the application made is a logical result of the principle. It then goes on to say that this "destroys the original conception of 'a coordinated or even jointly conducted

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4 Reference is to Churchill's second message to Hopkins of February 27, ante, p. 3.
effort between the two countries.'" If the application is logical, then
the objection must be to the principle itself. To step beyond this
principle would, however, involve giving information to those who
could use it, not for the best prosecution of the war effort, but rather
for other purposes, such as after-the-war commercial advantages.

I have to conclude, therefore, that the British objection arises be-
cause of our withholding information which they consider might be
of value in connection with their post-war situation. If that is really
their position, then presumably it should be duly considered in con-
nection with the entire post-war relationship between the two countries.
It should be considered on its merits, and in due perspective to other
relations. To transmit such information for such a purpose would
involve our giving to Great Britain information obtained by this
country as a result of great expense and effort, and, while we freely
transmit for the purpose of furthering our joint war effort, we can
hardly give away the fruits of our development as a part of post-war
planning except on the basis of some over-all agreement on that sub-
ject, which agreement does not now exist. The proper conduct of
the secure development of a potentially important weapon should
not be modified to produce this further result simply as an incident.
In this connection I draw your attention to the enclosed memorandum
by Dr. Conant.5

My recommendation, therefore, is that the reply to the appended
telegrams should attempt to fix the issue upon this point, if this is
indeed, as I am inclined to believe, the point which is primarily in
the mind of the British, in order that it may be considered in due
time in connection with the broad problem of post-war relationships.

Specific points of application of the principle other than this are
not, I believe, prominently in the British mind. However, it will be
well to review them briefly; for they are consistent with the policy,
applicable without distinction to UK and US groups, and, I believe,
reasonable, and adapted to best progress with due regard to security.

There has been, from the beginning, full scientific interchange
wherever scientific groups are working, in the two countries, on the
same aspect of the subject. This it is proposed to continue. Recent
failure to do so has been due entirely to British refusal thus to col-
laborate, while a policy to which they object stands.

Thus, there is a group in Chicago working on one part of the pro-
gram, and a group on the same phase is being formed in Canada.

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5 The reference is presumably to a six-page memorandum from Conant to Bush,
dated March 25, 1943, setting forth Conant's thoughts concerning the corre-
spondence between Roosevelt and Churchill on the question of American-British
interchange on the atomic bomb project (Hopkins Papers). Conant's views are
reflected in the Bush memorandum printed here.
We proposed complete scientific interchange between these groups as far as scientific research is concerned, but not on the details of the manufacturing process which we alone are prepared to carry on. Similarly there are groups on the scientific aspects of diffusion, and we proposed continued interchange here on a similar basis.

On the other hand, we have long worked at California on an electromagnetic process, and the British have not worked along these lines. We see no need for furnishing them information on our scientific results on this phase. They do not, I feel, object. They could not use such information, and our scientific group on this phase is fully adequate, and now includes as many scientific men as should work on this phase, at the expense of other scientific phases of the war effort.

We propose shortly to gather a special scientific group at an isolated site to work on some of the phases involved in actual bomb construction. It is essential that this be kept from the enemy at all costs. It is exceedingly difficult in this field, where the general background was known to all sorts of scientists all over the world before the work was brought under control, to secure adequate secrecy. Hence we propose to isolate this group, by special measures, from the rest of the world, including the bulk of our own scientists and of British scientists. However, we are quite willing to invite a British scientist or two to join the group, and have so indicated, provided they will render themselves subject to the same rigid control, for a period which may be several years, as apply to the American scientists that we invite.

We are now erecting manufacturing plants. The information gathered in reducing the manufacture to practice will be extensive, and many inventions will result in patent applications assigned to the United States Government. This is being handled through American companies in which we have confidence. We do not propose to make these manufacturing plans available to any group, British or American, unless it is fully necessary thus to extend information in order to maintain full speed. British commercial interests would like to have these plans, and an account of the operations of plants. So would, undoubtedly, various American companies that are not bound under contract to extend patent rights to the U.S. Government on any invention made by them in this connection.

Finally, there is the matter of military use. This will not come into question for some time. If the war is not of long duration, if there is no danger that the method may be used against us with disastrous results, it may never come into question. When it does, there will undoubtedly be set up special military channels for appropriate
consideration of strategy, tactics, and use. I feel sure there is no concern in the minds of the British on this point.

In conclusion, before making a final reply, it is my recommendation that you again state the case briefly, and inquire where the specific objection now rests.

V. BUSH

Hopkins Papers

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

MOS SECRET AND PERSONAL

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1943.

My DEAR HARRY: Anthony has asked me to give you the following message from him:—

"Have you any news for me about very secret matter we discussed? ¹ You will realize we have various decisions to take if there has to be separate development.² Kindest regards."

I was proposing to write him a secret word about the larger issues we raised together last night,³ so that nobody but he would see it, and explain why for that reason you had nothing to say at the present moment. But you may like to send some message of your own in reply to this.

Yours very sincerely,

EDWARD

¹ In his account of his visit to Washington in March 1943, Eden, p. 440, mentions that he had some discussions, principally with Hopkins, about the atomic bomb project. There is no mention of these discussions in the American records of the Eden visit.
² The message quoted here is dated April 13, 1943, in Eden, p. 657.
³ Hopkins' conversation with Halifax on the evening of April 13, 1943, is described in Eden, p. 657.

Hopkins Papers

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1943.

Personal and Secret to Anthony Eden from Harry Hopkins

Your message regarding secret matter received. I am going to send you on Monday a full telegram about the matter.²

¹ The source text is accompanied by the following covering note from Hopkins to Halifax, dated April 15, 1943: "Dear Edward: Could you send this to Anthony for me?"
² Such a communication has not been found and presumably was never sent. According to Eden, p. 658, the later telegram giving Hopkins' views was never received.
On further inquiry I find it has many ramifications and I therefore am anxious to send you my views fully.
Delighted that you returned safely.

HARRY

B. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to the President’s Special Assistant
(Hopkins)¹

SECRET

LONDON, March 30, 1943.

Mr. Harry Hopkins from Prime Minister personal and most secret.
1. See Bigor number 7892 of March 20, and particularly paragraph five.² I learned from Anthony that the President was worried about the difficulties which are being discovered in planning Husky, and so am I.³ Do you think the President would send you and Marshall out there to meet me and Brooke in the latter part of April, in order to survey and if possible clinch the business or, in the last resort, to explore alternatives?

2. Personally I think they are making heavy weather of it. At present there are only 3 weak Italian Divisions there and no German. Events are moving in Tunisia and the enemy is already preparing to evacuate Sfax and Sousse.⁴

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¹ Transmitted via military channels.
² Telegram 7892, NA 152, March 20, 1943, from Eisenhower (in Algiers) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, reported that study of the original outline plan for Husky had revealed certain deficiencies; revision of the plan had been undertaken (Eisenhower Papers, p. 1045). For an account of the strategic planning for Husky, see Garland and Smyth, chapter III.
³ The discussion of the planning for Husky may have arisen at the White House meeting of March 29, 1943, on the United Nations shipping situation and the capabilities for carrying out planned military operations; see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 699-700. In a note to Roosevelt, dated March 24, 1943, Eden transmitted a personal message from Churchill setting forth the Prime Minister’s anxiety about the shipping situation, particularly the inability of the British to mount their share of the Husky operation without an additional allocation of ships. In a message to Churchill, dated March 29, 1943, Roosevelt stated the following:

"Replying to your message handed me by Anthony, we shall find all the ships for Husky and are going to scrape the bottom otherwise but we cannot escape the fact that something must give if all of our military operations are to be fully supported. I am going into this matter in detail and Anthony will bring you my immediate views." (Roosevelt Papers)

⁴ See Howe, passim, concerning the Allied military campaigns in Northwest Africa culminating in the liberation of Tunisia in May 1943.
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

URGENT

LONDON, April 1, 1943.

2526. Embassy has received for transmission the following message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins:

"1. Many thanks for yours of thirtieth. I look for good and speedy results in Tunisia. I do trust you will give careful consideration to my proposal for a meeting. There are so many things that I want to talk over with you.

"2. I am much concerned at not hearing from you about TUNIS ALLOYS. That we should work separately would be a sombre decision."

MATTHEWS

1 The Department of State's copy of this telegram is filed under 841.24/1788.
2 The message under reference has not been found, but it may be Hopkins' telegram of March 29 to Churchill (Sherwood, p. 718) on the proposed award to MacArthur.
3 For the earlier exchange of messages between Hopkins and Churchill on this subject, see ante, pp. 1-6.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

LONDON, April 5, 1943.

No. 279. Personal and secret, Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

1. I had a long talk with Anthony last night and I thank you for all your kind reassuring messages.

2. I am delighted to hear that there is a prospect of Harry coming here almost immediately. If you could let General Marshall come with him there would be enormous advantages and we could then settle about going on to TOUGH area to discuss possibilities with all our people on the spot there. The battles impending in Tunisia this week should clarify the position a good deal.

3. From what Anthony told me about your ideas for Husky and its exploitation if successful, it seems that we are thinking along the same lines. I therefore send you a copy of the minute which I sent on the second instant to the Chief of Staffs Committee and on which they are now at work. Please keep this to yourself, Harry and General Marshall as I have not yet heard what our Chiefs of Staff have to say about it. It is only intended as a channel for thought and planning. Minute referred to in Paragraph 3 follows:

1 Transmitted via military channels.
1. Assuming, first, that Vulcan is finished by the end of April, or, at worst, by May 15th and no large formed body of German or Italian troops escapes: secondly, that Husky takes place on July 10; thirdly, that there are not more than five Italian divisions, aggregating not more than 50,000 combatants, and not more than two German divisions, aggregating 20,000 combatants, total 70,000 combatants, in Husky-land, and furthermore that we place seven or eight British and American Divisions ashore, at a combatant strength of 15,000 each, total 105,000, and reinforce by another 30,000 British, grand total 135,000: and fourthly, that we win the intense battles which the landing involves:—how long is the subjugation of the armed forces of the enemy in Husky-land estimated to take?

2. In an operation of this kind, everything depends upon the initial battle lasting, say, a week, after which one might reasonably expect that the bulk of the enemy's forces would be destroyed, captured or driven into the mountains. The distances are not great and the resources of the country are small and once we have the ports and the airfields we should be effectively the masters of Husky-land, and be able to disperse by air power, and sea power covered by air power, all attempts by the enemy to reconquer it.

3. Hitherto the capture of Husky-land has been regarded as an end in itself; but no one could rest content with such a modest and even petty objective for our armies in the campaign of 1943. Husky-land is only a stepping stone, and we must now begin to study how to exploit this local success. What has been done about this? Every reasonable alternative should be explored. Now that Anaxim has receded owing to the shipping shortage, Mediterranean operations gain more prominence. If we take the end of July as the date by which we are established in Husky-land, what other operations are open? Of course our choice must depend upon what the enemy do. If large German forces are brought down into Italy and Italian morale and will to fight is thereby enhanced, the scale required for the taking of Rome and Naples might be beyond our power. In that case we must be ready with our plans in the Eastern Mediterranean, and put it hard across Turkey to come in with us. We must be ready for an attack on the Dodecanese and for supporting Turkey if she gets into trouble.

4. If however the Germans do not come, and the Italians crumple, there is no limit to the amount of Italian territory we may overrun. Italy may be forced out of the war. We may become possessed of Sardinia without fighting. Corsica may be liberated. All our available forces, including divisions in Africa not involved in Husky, will have to be moved northward into Italy till they come into contact with the Germans on the Brenner or along the French Riviera. How far have these possibilities been studied?

5. Even if Italy remains in the war with a certain amount of German help we ought, the moment we are masters of Husky-land, to try to get a footing both on the toe and heel of Italy. The possession of Taranto as well as the Isthmus governing the toe would confer great advantages upon us. The Italian fleet would have to decide on which side of Italy it would take refuge. We cannot tell what its position or condition will be as a result of the Husky operation. If it has not
retreated up the Adriatic before we are masters of Husky-land with our air force established there, it will not be able to do so and will have to content itself with Spezia and Genoa. In any case, it must be considered a most important objective to get a footing on the Dalmatian coast so that we can foment the insurgents of Albania and Yugoslavia by weapons, supplies and possibly Commandos. I believe that, in spite of his present naturally foxy attitude, Mihailovic will throw his whole weight against the Italians the moment we are able to give him any effective help. Evidently great possibilities are open in this theatre.

6. The object of this paper is to request with the utmost urgency the close study of these problems, and to obtain from the Chiefs of Staff their view of what can be done and what it is best to do. I hope this work may be pressed forward with the greatest speed because the mere capture of Husky-land will be an altogether inadequate result for the Campaign of 1943.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹

SECRET

London, April 9, 1943.

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins personal and most secret.

I am troubled at not receiving any answer to my telegram unnumbered of 30th March saying how vital it was for you and Marshall to meet me and the CIGS in Torch Land in the near future. Since then I have been greatly cheered to hear that you had telephoned Anthony in Canada, that you would be over here almost immediately. I again telegraphed, see my No. 279 of 5th April to President,² pleading for Marshall too. Nothing could be better than a prompt meeting here and then going on to Torch Land if we thought it necessary. Several days have passed since then and I have no further news of you.

Meanwhile a most depressing telegram No. NAF 201 about Husky has been sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by Ike,³ and our Chiefs of Staff have sent a very strong rejoinder against it. There is also the question “Where do we go from Husky” on which I sent the President a note which I had prepared for the Chiefs of Staff.⁴ All

¹ Transmitted via military channels.
² Supra.
³ Telegram NAF 201, April 7, 1943, from Eisenhower in Algiers to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, not printed; it expressed the view that operation Husky offered little promise for success should the area of the landings contain substantial numbers of well-armed German troops (J.C.S. Files).
⁴ The text of Churchill’s note or minute was included in his telegram 279, April 5, to Roosevelt, supra.
this emphasizes the need I have been pressing for nearly a fortnight past for your visit and that of General Marshall.

Prime

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1943.

Mr. Harry Hopkins to Prime Minister personal and most secret.

Anthony must have misunderstood me relative to my coming to England immediately. The President feels that the time not propitious until situation in Tunisia clarified. He will be in direct touch with you soon.

Harry

1 Channel of transmission not indicated, but presumably military.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[LONDON,] April 11, 1943.

I cannot help being much disappointed by your telegram.

1 Channel of transmission not indicated.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

PRIORITY

London, April 29, 1943.

Former Naval Person to President, Personal and Secret Number 291.

It seems to me most necessary that we should all settle together now first Husky and exploitation thereof and secondly the future of Anakim in light of Burma campaign experiences and shipping stringency. There are also a number of other burning questions which you and I could with advantage bring up to date.

I think I could manage to be with you by Tuesday 11th May. I would bring Wavell, Peirse and Admiral Somerville as well as Pound, Brooke, Portal, Mountbatten and Leathers. Please say whether you

1 Sent to Washington by the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

332-558-70—8
I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

would like this or whether you would prefer to send your people over here which of course would be easier for us.

Hopkins Papers

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1943.

The following is a suggested reply to the Prime Minister’s radio which we discussed today. I have read it to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, to whom Admiral Leahy introduced the subject of the message. They are in agreement with me.

“Reference your radio number 291 regarding general meeting in Washington May 11th or in London:

“Marshall and King are due to leave here for Pacific on May 5th or 6th in order to be back in Washington first week in June for final consideration of post-Husky matters. Their Pacific trip at this time is most important relative to final adjustments of matters pertaining to combined operations in the South and Southwest Pacific areas about to be initiated.

“I suggest that the reactions of the British Chiefs of Staff to your minute of April 5th reference post-Husky operations be made available to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and vice versa, this procedure preliminary to more formal and final consideration early in June in the light of Tunisian and Husky developments.

“I would also suggest that Wavell, Peirse, and Somerville come here immediately in time to discuss with Marshall and King and others in company with General Stilwell and Chennault now here, matters relative to ANAKIM.”

G C Marshall

Chief of Staff

1 Marginal notation, apparently by Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N., Naval Aide to the President, reads “Not sent”.

2 The reference is to Churchill’s note or minute included in his telegram 279, April 5, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 13.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

SECRET

LONDON, May 2, 1943.

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins. Personal and most especially secret.

I should be very glad to receive an answer to my No. 291 to the President. The doctors do not want me to fly at the very great

3 Channel of transmission not indicated, but presumably military. Received May 2, 1943, 7:57 a.m.
heights required in a bomber and the northern route clippers cannot take off on account of late ice till after May 20. On the other hand, I cannot keep the Indian Commanders-in-Chief 2 here indefinitely and would not be willing to send them without their superiors the Chiefs-of-Staff.3 We are therefore coming together by sea. All preparations are being made to start Tuesday 4 night and a good many naval and air movements are involved and actually going on.

Following is absolutely private for you alone. If, as I can well believe, the President is absorbed in the coal crisis and generally with domestic affairs, it might be more convenient for me to stay at the Embassy and come to see him every day from there. I should understand this perfectly and anyhow would like to spend part of the time at the Embassy. What is essential is that our plans should be made and thrashed out and decisions taken as at Casablanca.5 I am conscious of serious divergences beneath the surface which, if not adjusted, will lead to grave difficulties and feeble action in the summer and autumn. These difficulties we must forestall.

2 i.e., Field Marshal Wavell, Air Chief Marshal Peirse, and Admiral Somerville.
3 i.e., General Brooke, Admiral of the Fleet Pound, and Air Chief Marshal Portal.
4 May 4.
5 For documentation regarding the Casablanca Conference, January 14-24, 1943, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill 1

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1943.
PRIORITY

To the Former Naval Person from the President personal and secret No. 275.

I am really delighted you are coming. I agree most heartily that we have some important business to settle at once; the sooner the better. Marshall and King have postponed their Pacific trip. I want you of course to stay here with me.

ROOSEVELT

1 Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels at 4:05 p.m.

Editorial Note

President Roosevelt conferred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the White House on May 2, 1943. No official record of this meeting has been found. Regarding the absence from the official files of such
records, see Matloff, p. 125, footnote 57. According to the very brief account in Leahy, p. 156, Roosevelt, Hopkins, Leahy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were present, and the subject of the discussion was the impending conference with the British. Leahy recalls in particular that consideration was given to the questions of the contemplated Allied military actions in Burma and the supplying of material to the Chinese Army.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

LONDON, May 4, 1943.

No. 298. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret.

Your no 275. Thank you very much. I look forward to our early meeting. Am bringing Averell. Accept my warmest congratulations on the brilliant advance of United States Troops to Mateur. This will greatly help the thrust which we shall make soon in the centre.

PRIME

1 Transmitted via military channels.
2 W. Averell Harriman.
3 The American 1st Armored Division captured Mateur in Tunisia on May 3, 1943. For the account of this action, see Howe, chapter xxxiii.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1943.

Personal and secret for Mr. Stalin from the President.

I want you to know that Mr. Churchill is coming to Washington next week to discuss our immediate next steps. We will of course keep General Belyaev currently informed.

ROOSEVELT

1 Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. In a note of May 7, 1943, to Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov, the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, William D. Stanley, transmitted a paraphrased text of the President's message with the request that it be conveyed to Marshal Stalin. For text of the message as delivered to Stalin and dated May 6, 1943, see Stalin's Correspondence, vol. II, No. 84, p. 64.

President Roosevelt also sent a personal note to Marshal Stalin, dated May 5, 1943, proposing that the two leaders confer together sometime during the summer. The note, which also mentioned that the President and the Prime Minister would be conferring the following week, was delivered to Marshal Stalin on May 21, 1943, by the President's Special Representative, Joseph E. Davies. For text of note, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 3.
President Roosevelt conferred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the White House on May 9, 1943. No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. Regarding the absence from the official files of any records of this meeting, see Matloff, p. 125, footnote 57. According to Leahy, p. 157, and King, p. 433, it was determined at this meeting that a definite commitment from the British would be sought regarding a cross-Channel invasion of Europe at the earliest possible date and the making of preparations for such an operation by the spring of 1944. Leahy also recalls that his own proposal to grant the Chinese request for the use of available air transport for three months to send aviation material from India to China was not supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Stimson, who was not a participant at the meeting, heard about it afterwards, and recorded the following in his Diary for May 10, 1943:

"Marshall told me of the President’s conference yesterday with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and told me that he had ‘in principle’ agreed to the outline which our Chiefs of Staff had prepared as the American policy in the coming conference. Marshall, however, expressed his reservation as to how firmly the President would hold to his acquiescence. I fear it will be the same story over again. The man from London will arrive with a program of further expansion in the eastern Mediterranean and will have his way with our Chief, and the careful and deliberate plans of our Staff will be overridden. I feel very troubled about it. So I spent my morning in carefully going over the views of our Staff which accord with my own views very fully.” (Stimson Papers)

The plan presented to Roosevelt by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at this meeting appears to be J.C.S. 286/1, May 8, 1943, “Recommended Line of Action at Coming Conference”. This paper is described in detail in Matloff, pp. 123–124, and in Romanus and Sunderland, p. 327. The work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in planning for the conference with the British is discussed in Matloff, pp. 120–125, and in Cline, pp. 219–220.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

**Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt**

**SECRET**

[**ON BOARD THE "QUEEN MARY",**] MAY 10, 1943.

Naval Person to President most secret and personal number 294.

Since yesterday we have been surrounded by U. S. Navy and we all greatly appreciate high value you evidently set upon our continued

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1 Sent by the American Embassy at London, presumably via Navy channels.
survival. I look forward to being at White House with you tomorrow afternoon and also to going to Hyde Park with you at weekend. The voyage has been so far most agreeable and Staff have done vast amount of work.

Prime

In Hinge of Fate, p. 789, Churchill recalls that Roosevelt "brushed aside" his suggestion that he stay at the British Embassy. See ante, p. 17.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

[ON BOARD THE "QUEEN MARY", undated.]

Admiralty have now routed us a somewhat longer course and we shall probably be several hours late. I should like to go by train to Washington and will arrive there during the afternoon. I shall be delighted to come to Hyde Park for the week-end, and I dare say we may have better news from North Africa than we did at the time of Tobruk in June. Look forward to seeing you.

1 Channel of transmission not indicated. The receipt date of May 10 is recorded in a handwritten marginal notation.
3 Churchill's party, which had landed at Staten Island, arrived in Washington by train late on the afternoon of May 11, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers

Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President's Secretary (Early)

WASHINGTON, 13 MAY, 1943.

MY DEAR EARLY,

1. I am extremely sorry about the misunderstanding about making public the mode of transport used by the Prime Minister to come to the United States.

The Prime Minister has agreed that it may now be stated that he came by sea, but of course no reference should be made to the name of the vessel, the port of entry and/or the route followed. This decision now supersedes the request made in the Prime Minister's telegram to the President,1 to which you referred when we spoke, and you will certainly wish to have this on official record.

Mr. Morgan did try, I understand, to get in touch with you earlier to-day about this matter. He failed to do so but he hopes to get into touch with you later in order to arrange a co-ordinated release time.

1 The Churchill telegram under reference has not been found.
2. I have spoken to Mr. Morgan about the arrangement we made about releasing Prime Minister's engagements. He will ensure that the release of such information is co-ordinated with you.

Yours sincerely,

T. L. Rowan

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Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, MAY 16, 1943.]

MR. HOPKINS: I attach a list in duplicate of the Prime Minister's engagements. Perhaps you could kindly pass one copy on to Mrs. Roosevelt. I have no doubt that additional engagements, such as meetings with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, will arise.

Perhaps I may mention the following points to which I referred this morning:

a. Thursday, 20th, Admiral Brown and Tommy\(^1\) are arranging the concert. We are fixing the meeting with Empire representatives at 5:45 in the Monroe Room at the White House, which you kindly said we could use.

b. I assume I may inform Mr. Early and Mr. Morgan, our information representative, that the Prime Minister has been invited and will attend Friday's press conference.\(^2\)

c. Week-end. The P.M. feels he must stay at Washington and proposes then to see the many people he should see. He does not wish in any way to interfere with the President's arrangements and has accordingly asked us to arrange that he and his staff should go to the Embassy for the week-end.\(^3\)

I attach a copy of the lists of people for the Prime Minister to see, suggested by the President, and by yourself and Lord Halifax. As I told you, the Prime Minister does not now propose to see Mr. Spangler and feels also that it is rather out of his beat to see Mr. Murray and Mr. Green. You said that if he did not see these two it would be inappropriate for him to see Mr. Tobin. Perhaps you could mention this to the President as it was he who suggested Mr. Tobin.

As regards the address to Congress, I am not certain at what time it is to start, as I have seen various reports.\(^4\) Also, do you know whether it is to be broadcast in U.S. and the U.K. as last time?

T. L. Rowan

16.V.43.

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\(^1\) The reference here is presumably to Commander Thompson, the Prime Minister's Personal Assistant.

\(^2\) Churchill did not, in fact, attend Roosevelt's press conference on May 21. Roosevelt and Churchill held a joint press conference on May 25, for the record of which see post, p. 211.

\(^3\) Churchill apparently returned to the White House on the evening of May 23; see the editorial note, post, p. 183.

\(^4\) Regarding Churchill's address to a joint session of the Houses of Congress at noon on May 19, 1943, see the editorial note, post, p. 117.
### List of Prime Minister Churchill's Engagements

#### ENGAGEMENTS

**Monday 17.**
- Return White House for lunch.  
- 6:00 p.m. Lord Knollys.

**Tuesday 18.**
- 1:30 p.m. Lunch Embassy, Duke of Windsor.  
- Afternoon and after-dinner, prepare speech.

**Wednesday 19.**
- Noon? Address Congress.  
- Lunch at Capitol, followed by interview with Foreign Affairs Committees of both Houses.  
- 5:30 p.m. Mr. Malcolm MacDonald. (Not yet fixed)  
- Mr. Mackenzie King comes to White House for night.

**Thursday 20.**
- Noon Pacific Council.  
- 5:00 p.m. Band concert at White House.  
- 5:45 p.m. Empire Representatives at White House.  
- Dinner at Embassy with Mr. and Mrs. Hopkins and Mr. and Mrs. Harriman.

**Friday 21.**
- 10:30 a.m. Press Conference.  
- 1:00 p.m. Lunch with President and Mme. Chiang Kai Shek.  
- Dine at Embassy to meet U.S. Cabinet Ministers, etc.

**Week-end.** Stay at Embassy.

**Monday 24.** Return to White House.  
- Dine Embassy with Heads of Missions.

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6. Roosevelt and Churchill spent the weekend of May 14–17, 1943, at Shangri La, the President’s mountain camp in Maryland; see the editorial note, *post*, p. 86.

7. Regarding Churchill’s Congressional luncheon meeting, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 117.

8. Regarding the Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King conversation on the evening of May 19, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 123.

9. For the record of the meeting of the Pacific War Council on May 20, 1943, see *post*, p. 134.

10. The Roosevelt-Churchill joint press conference was not held until May 25; for the record of the conference, see *post*, p. 211.

11. This luncheon appears to have been cancelled; for Churchill’s own account of the abortive arrangements for the lunch, see *Hinge of Fate*, p. 797.

12. No record has been found to indicate that Churchill dined with United States Cabinet officers on May 21; for the record of Prime Minister’s luncheon meeting with several United States officials on May 22, 1943, see *post*, p. 167.

13. Churchill appears to have returned to the White House on the evening of May 23; see the editorial note, *post*, p. 183.
List of Persons Suggested to Prime Minister Churchill To See

The President Suggests:
Mr. Phillips—who was in India.
Mr. Tobin.

The Ambassador and Mr. Hopkins Suggest:
The Vice President,
Colonel Stimson,
Colonel Knox,
Mr. Morgenthau,
Mr. Welles,
Mr. Walter Lippmann,
Mr. Harold Ickes,
Mr. Donald Nelson,
General Stilwell,
General Chennault,
Admiral Land,

Mr. Jesse Jones,
General Somervell
Mr. Phil Muray, C.I.O.,
Mr. Bill Green, A.F. of L.,
Mayor Kelly,
Mr. Spangler, Chairman,
Republican Party,
Mr. Frank Walker, Chairman,
Democratic Party and
Postmaster General.

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Footnotes:

14 It is not known how many of the persons herein listed actually met with Churchill. Available information is set forth in the succeeding footnotes.
15 Phillips, who returned from his mission to India at the beginning of May 1943, had an interview with Roosevelt on May 11 and gave the President some additional views in a letter dated May 14, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, p. 220. Regarding the meeting between Phillips and Churchill on the morning of May 23, 1943, see the editorial note, post, p. 177.
16 A participant in the American-British luncheon meeting of May 22, 1943; see post, p. 166.
17 Stimson participated in the American-British luncheon of May 22, 1943, and met privately with Churchill directly afterwards; see post, pp. 166 and 172.
18 For Stilwell's record of his meeting with Churchill on the morning of May 22, 1943, see post, p. 165.
19 According to the account in Claire Lee Chennault, Way of a Fighter (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949), p. 227, Churchill held a private meeting with Chennault at breakfast sometime near the end of the Conference. No official record of the meeting has been found.
2. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 1943

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, MAY 12, 1943, 1 P. M.,
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Beaverbrook

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers).

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT
AND CHURCHILL, MAY 12, 1943, 2:30 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNarney

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Field Marshal Dill
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

The President welcomed Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff. He recalled that it was less than a year ago when they had all met in the White House, and had set on foot the moves leading up

24
to Torch. It was very appropriate that they should meet again just as that operation was coming to a satisfactory conclusion. The meeting at Casablanca had set on foot operation Husky, and he hoped that this would meet with similar good fortune. He thought that the keynote of our plans at the present time should be an intention to employ every resource of men and munitions against the enemy. Nothing that could be brought to bear should be allowed to stand idle.

He then asked the Prime Minister to open the discussion.

The Prime Minister recalled the striking change which had taken place in the situation since he had last sat by the President’s desk, and had heard the news of the fall of Tobruk. He could never forget the manner in which the President had sustained him at that time, and the Shermans which had been handed over so generously had made their reputation in Africa. The British came to the present meeting adhering to the Casablanca decisions. There might have to be adjustments made necessary by our success, which also enabled us to take a longer forward view. Torch was over, Husky was near, what should come next? He would put forward some views which had been formed by careful study. These would not be in the shape of fixed plans, but rather of ideas for the common stock. We had been able by taking thought together to produce a succession of brilliant events which had altered the whole course of the war. We had the authority and prestige of victory. It was our duty to redouble our efforts, and to grasp the fruits of our success. The only questions outstanding between the two Staffs were questions of emphasis and priority. He felt sure that these could be solved by mutual agreement.

He did not propose to deal with the U-boat war, and the aerial bombardment of Germany. There were no differences of opinion on these subjects, though there might be a few points of detail to be cleared up between the two Staffs. He would like to put forward for consideration a number of objectives, and questions which might focus subsequent study. The first objective was in the Mediterranean. The great prize there was to get Italy out of the war by whatever means might be the best. He recalled how in 1918, when Germany might have retreated to the Meuse or the Rhine and continued the fight, the defection of Bulgaria brought the whole of the enemy structure crashing to the ground. The collapse of Italy would cause a chill

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2 For documentation regarding the conference at Casablanca, January 1943, see ibid., pp. 485 ff.
3 For the circumstances in which Churchill learned of the surrender of Tobruk to the German-Italian armies, see Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 382.
of loneliness over the German people, and might be the beginning of their doom. But even if not immediately fatal to Germany, the effects of Italy coming out of the war would be very great, first of all on Turkey, who had always measured herself with Italy in the Mediterranean. The moment would come when a Joint American-Russian-British request might be made to Turkey for permission to use bases in her territory from which to bomb Ploesti and clear the Aegean. Such a request could hardly fail to be successful if Italy were out of the war, and the moment were chosen when Germany could take no powerful action against Turkey. Another great effect of the elimination of Italy would be felt in the Balkans, where patriots of various nationalities were with difficulty held in check by large Axis forces, which included 25 or more Italian Divisions. If these withdrew, the effect would be either that Germany would have to give up the Balkans, or else that she would have to withdraw large forces from the Russian Front to fill the gap. In no other way could relief be given to the Russian Front on so large a scale this year. The third effect would be the elimination of the Italian fleet. This would immediately release a considerable British squadron of battleships and aircraft carriers to proceed either to the Bay of Bengal or the Pacific to fight Japan.

Certain questions presented themselves in relation to the Mediterranean. Need we invade the soil of Italy, or could we crush her by air attack? Would Germany defend Italy? Would Italy be an economic burden to us? He did not think so. Would arguments against a general conquest of Italy apply equally against a toe and heel operation to establish contact with Yugoslavia? Finally, there was a large political question for the British and United States Governments. What sort of life after the war should we be willing to accord to Italy if she placed herself unreservedly in our hands? He might observe that if Italy made a separate peace, we should have the use of Sardinia and the Dodecanese without having to fight for them.

The second objective was the taking of weight off Russia. He was much impressed by Stalin’s attitude, in spite of the stopping of the Arctic convoys.* For the first time, in his recent speech, Stalin had acknowledged the efforts and victories of his Allies.† But we should never forget that there were 185 German Divisions on the Russian

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† Regarding Stalin’s Order of the Day of May 1, 1943, see telegram 388, May 2, 1943, from Moscow, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, p. 519.
Front. We had destroyed the German Army in Africa, but soon we would not be in contact with them anywhere. The Russian effort was prodigious, and placed us in their debt—a position from which he would like to emerge. As he had already mentioned, the best way of taking the weight off the Russian Front in 1943 would be to get, or knock, Italy out of the war, thus forcing the Germans to send a large number of troops to hold down the Balkans.

The third objective had already been mentioned by the President in his opening remarks. It was to apply to the greatest possible extent our vast Armies, Air forces, and munitions to the enemy. All plans should be judged by this test. We had a large Army and the Metropolitan Fighter Air Force in Great Britain. We had our finest and most experienced troops in the Mediterranean. The British alone had 13 Divisions in that theater. Supposing that Husky were completed by the end of August, what should these troops do between that time and the date 7 or 8 months later, when the cross-Channel operation might first be mounted? They could not possibly stand idle, and he could not contemplate so long a period of apparent inaction. It would have a serious effect on relations with Russia, who was bearing such a disproportionate weight.

The objectives he had so far mentioned all led up to Bolero, Sledgehammer, and Roundup. By Bolero, he meant the administration arrangements necessary for the movement and reception of large American forces in the United Kingdom. He could not pretend that the problem of landing on the Channel coast had been solved. The difficult beaches, with the great rise and fall of tide, the strength of the enemy’s defenses, the number of his reserves, and the ease of his communications, all made the task one which must not be underrated. Much, however, would be learned from Husky. The question arose whether anything could be done this year before the weather broke in August or September. All the British landing craft had gone from the United Kingdom to Husky, and owing to priority having been rightly given to Sickle, only one U. S. Division was so far available in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, plans were being made for an operation to provoke an air battle, and we were standing ready to exploit a German collapse, should this by any chance take place. He wished to make it absolutely clear that H. M. Government earnestly desired to undertake a full-scale invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom as soon as possible. They certainly did not disdain the idea if a plan offering reasonable prospects of success could be made.

The fifth objective was aid to China. As a result of Casablanca, Field Marshal Wavell had prepared the best plan he could for opera-
tion Anakim, and he thought that it had some prospect of success. The difficulties of fighting in Burma were apparent. The jungle prevented the use of our modern weapons. The monsoon strictly limited the length of the campaigning season, and there was no means of bringing sea power to bear. Should, however, Anakim be successfully carried out, he was advised that it would not be till 1945 that the Burma Road could be reopened, and even then its capacity would not be more than 20,000 tons a month. Nevertheless, he had not gone back on the status of Anakim. He attached the same degree of importance as before to activity in the Indian Ocean theater of war. Was there any means by which China could be helped in 1943 other than the air route? How could this be improved? The British readily shouldered their responsibility to establish and guard the air facilities required in Assam. If further study showed that it would be better to by-pass Burma, he was anxious that another means should be found of utilizing the large forces standing in India. He thought that this alternative might well be found in an operation against the tip of Sumatra and the waist of Malaya at Penang. He was most anxious that we should find in that theater some means of making use of those advantages which had been so valuable in Torch. In that operation, sea power had played its full part; complete surprise had been possible; we had been able to seize a territory of importance which not only brought in a new Army on our side, but forced the enemy to fight in a place most disadvantageous to him. These conditions might apply to an attack on the area he had described. The fleet to cover the operation would come from the Mediterranean after the elimination of Italy. This meant that the operation could not be launched before March, 1944, which would, however, be a suitable moment from the point of view of weather.

He felt that the time had now come to study the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan. He would like once more to state the British determination to carry the struggle home to Japan. The only question was how best to do it. He thought that the United States Chiefs of Staff should lead in a joint study, on the assumption that Germany would be out of the war in 1944, and that we could concentrate on the great campaign against Japan in 1945. If the underlying strategic conception was agreed, then operations could be planned to fit in, and the requisite specialized apparatus could be got ready in time.

If, of course, Russia could be brought in against Japan, that would prove the best solution of all. Stalin had shown plain indications

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6 Regarding General Stilwell's effort to refute this British contention about the Burma Road in a memorandum to General Marshall, May 13, 1943, see Matloff, p. 140.
that Russia would want to be in at the death, but the timing of Russian action must obviously depend upon what happened to Hitler, and when.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that he hoped his remarks would be of use in framing an Agenda for Combined Chiefs of Staff Conferences, and would be some guide as to the emphasis and priorities which should be assigned to the various theaters of operation as well as to their relationship and reciprocal reactions.

The President expressed his gratitude to the Prime Minister for the open manner in which he had presented his views. He said that the Combined Staffs must approach their problems with open minds, giving full consideration to the priorities and relative importance of the many problems which they would consider in the course of the conferences.

The President stated that he has always been a firm believer in attrition as an effective weapon. He pointed to the North African campaign and suggested that it might not have been so successful had sufficient force been sent to capture Tunisia on the initial landing. As a result of the Tunisian campaign there will be perhaps some 200,000 enemy casualties. He felt there would have been considerably less had Tunisia been taken at the outset.

He pointed out that the United Nations are now out-producing both the Germans and the Japanese and that if we break even in our losses of airplanes and other munitions we are, in effect, forging ahead.

The President then said that with the large armies and naval forces that are available to the United Nations every effort should be made to keep them engaged with the enemy. He felt that the United Nations were losing ground when their forces remain idle.

The President expressed optimism as far as the situation in Turkey was concerned. When the Prime Minister went on his fishing trip after the Casablanca Conferences he, the President, had been surprised by the cordial reception that the Prime Minister had received. He felt that Turkey was now in a better political position than she had ever been before. Perhaps Turkey could be brought to a favorable attitude toward the United Nations by diplomacy alone. If so, this would permit the use of her airfields for combined air operations against Ploesti and the Germans’ right flank and their lines of communication. If Turkey could be brought into the war, there would be the possibility of combined operations toward the Adrianople line, thus threatening Bulgaria, and inducing that country to withdraw.

7 Prime Minister Churchill met with Turkish President İnönü and Ministers at Adana, Turkey, January 30–31, 1943. For documentation regarding the exchange of messages between President Roosevelt and the Turkish President regarding the conference at Adana, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 1058 ff.
from the war. He felt that the Russians would welcome any effort on the part of the United Nations which would result in breaking the Germans’ lines of communication. He pointed out also that attrition would be at work during any operations from Turkey.

The President then asked “Where do we go from Husky?” He said he had always shrunk from the thought of putting large armies in Italy. This might result in attrition for the United Nations and play into Germany’s hand. He indicated that a thorough investigation should be made of what an occupation of Italy proper, or of the heel or toe of Italy, would mean as a drain on allied resources. At the same time, he pointed out that the Mediterranean area contained large armies of the United Nations, perhaps about a total of 25 divisions, and that these must be kept employed. He said there was not much time in 1943, because planning future operations is a lengthy procedure. The question to be decided quickly, is how to use the Mediterranean troops this year. He said that conditions in Italy are known to be precarious. Italy might drop into the lap of the United Nations, who would then have the responsibility of supplying the Italian people. Everyone was agreed that Italy must be reconstituted, but that the mistakes regarding possession of the Northern Adriatic, which occurred at the peace table after the last war, must not be repeated.

Summing up, the President said a survey should be made to determine the cost of occupying Italy or parts of it as opposed to the cost of achieving the same results by air offensives from Sicily or the heel and toe of Italy.8

The President said that regardless of operations undertaken in the Mediterranean there would be a surplus of manpower. He said that this surplus should be used to build up Bolero. Preparations for such build-up should begin at once. He felt that all were agreed that no Roundup or Sledgehammer was possible of accomplishment this year, but if one or the other were to be mounted in the spring of 1944, preparations should begin now. Roundup and Sledgehammer have been talked about for two years but as yet none of these operations had been accepted as a concrete plan to be carried out at a certain time. Therefore he wished to emphasize that Sledgehammer or Roundup should be decided upon definitely as an operation for the spring of 1944.

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8According to the summary of remarks at the First Plenary Meeting in Leahy, p. 159, President Roosevelt directed his staff to look into the possibility, from a military point of view, of launching an attack upon Germany through Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey. The President, according to this same summary, said he would examine the political aspects of such a move. Leahy also indicates the readiness of the President to undertake the seizure of Sardinia.
The President then directed his remarks toward the Pacific. He said that at the present time a landing was being made in the Aleutians, on the Island of Attu. Approximately 3,000 men had already been put ashore. By this operation it was hoped to put Kiska in a box between Attu and Amchitka which would also result in imposing attrition on the enemy. So far, the operations in the Aleutians had resulted in a net gain to the United Nations. The operations in the Solomons and in New Guinea had had the same result.

The President said that while things are apparently going along all right in the Pacific, attention must be devoted to the length of the Japanese supply lines. He likened them to a segment of pie in which Japan proper was at the apex, and the line from the Solomons through the Dutch East Indies to Burma represented the outer crust. While there was some attrition going on against the outer crust, the most effective way to get at the Japanese shipping was to strike at the apex. So far the United Nations have done well in sinking Japanese merchant tonnage. Proof of this has been in the fact that the Japanese have been taking shipping from the Yangtze and using it, together with junkes they are building, for coastal runs, in order to release coastal shipping for ocean work. Since the war started the Japanese have suffered a net loss of 1,000,000 tons of shipping or approximately one-seventh of the shipping which they had available at the beginning of the war. If they continue to lose shipping at this rate they can not maintain the outer rim of the pie and will have to contract in their operations. The President said that the same was true with regard to aircraft. Attrition suffered by the Japanese air forces has resulted in their having less strength available now than at the beginning of the war.

The President repeated that the most effective way to strike the Japanese shipping was to strike it leaving Japan proper. This could best be done from bases either in China, or from China and Russia. Therefore much depends upon keeping China a going concern. He said he did not believe the Chinese were crying wolf when reporting the critical condition which exists in their country today. He said that the conference could not justify overlooking the possibility of a Chinese collapse. This brought up the question of the priority for aid to China with regard to 1943 and 1944.20

Anakim and similar plans proposed at Casablanca might not have an effect which would be immediate enough to keep China in the war;

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20The U.S. 7th Division landed on Attu on May 11, 1943; the Japanese garrison was defeated and rounded up by the end of the month.
21For an account of the discussions in Washington in late April and early May 1943, involving the President and high-ranking War Department officials, regarding the various proposals on the scope and nature of aid to China, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 317–327.
the results of Anakim would not be felt until March or April of 1944 and the Burma Road would not be fully open to traffic until 1945. The necessity was for doing something for China now. **The President** said that the question resolves itself to assisting China by air.

**The President** said that to assist China by air it was essential to reconstruct and maintain the security of the airfields in Assam to the west of the mountains. They must be made secure regardless of the cost in manpower and matériel, and they must also be protected. On the east side of the mountains the Chinese are building landing fields and now have five or six fields in good condition. General Stilwell has two divisions in training for the protection of these fields. **The President** said that the Generalissimo does not fear a ground attack in Yunnan.

He said that air in China would accomplish three objectives: it would be able to harass Japanese troops South of Hankow or those advancing from the South against Chungking; it could harass Japanese attacks against Chungking from the North; and it could stop Japanese attacks against Chungking which might be made up the Yangtze. **The President** said he doubted if reliance could be placed on the Chinese army, excepting those troops being trained in Yunnan and Ramgarh. However, he thought it important to give the Generalissimo, who is the head of both the Army and the State, what he wants at this time. This, he said, is a strong build-up of the American-Chinese Air forces. Such an air force can be built up to strike against Japanese shipping and against Japan itself. He emphasized that the Chiefs of Staff must bear in mind the political fact that China is in danger of collapse.

**The President** pointed out that aid to China at the present time does not have an immediate effect of taking weight off Russia but that it would have an ultimate effect when Russia joins up with the United Nations in their war against Japan. This he predicted would take place within 48 hours after Germany has been defeated.

**The President** said, with regard to taking weight off Russia, that the United Nations should continue with strategy which would compel the Germans to fight. It was for that reason that he questioned the occupation of Italy, feeling that this might result in releasing German troops now in that country. He said he felt the most effective way of forcing Germany to fight was by carrying out a cross-Channel operation.

**The Prime Minister** said that he did not feel that an occupation of Italy would be necessary. In the event of an Italian collapse, the United Nations would occupy the necessary ports and air bases from which to carry on operations against the Balkans and Southern
Europe, but they should let an Italian Government control the country, subject to supervision on the part of the United Nations.

The President and the Prime Minister then indicated that the possibility of securing the use of the Azores was under consideration. An attempt would be made to accomplish this by diplomacy, and, if necessary, the diplomacy might be coupled with threats or an actual surprise arrival of forces. They thought that an arrangement might be made with Portugal whereby the use of the Azores could be obtained on a rental basis. However, they indicated that the question was largely political.

Field Marshal Sir John Dill asked if consideration had been given to the present attitude of Spain.

Both the President and the Prime Minister indicated that they felt that Spain was much relieved by the turn of events in Africa, that it was becoming more favorably disposed toward the United Nations, and that it had in mind constantly the threat of the American forces facing Spanish Morocco.

The President announced that the next meeting would be on Friday, 14th May, at 2:00 P.M., at which time it was desired to have the Commanders in Chief, India, and Generals Stilwell and Chennault present to discuss conditions in the Burma-China Theater.

THURSDAY, MAY 13, 1943

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-BENEŠ MEETING, MAY 13, 1943, FORENOON, THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
President Beneš

Editorial Note

No official record of this meeting has been found. President Beneš was on a wartime visit to the United States and Canada during May and early June 1943. According to the brief account of this meeting in Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beneš: From Munich to New War and New Victory (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1954), p. 187, Beneš had been invited to attend so that he could explain to Roosevelt and Churchill his views on the partition of Germany. Beneš also set forth his views regarding the necessity to try German war criminals, reeducate the German people, decentralize the German administration, and substantially change the German social structure. Accord-
ing to a summary of a report to the Czechoslovak State Council on Beneš' conversations in Washington, a copy of which was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to dispatch 61, May 28, 1943, from the Ambassador to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile in London (neither printed), numerous questions of European politics as well as problems of future international organization and the guaranteeing of peace and security were discussed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Beneš at this meeting.

For Beneš' own description of his other meetings with Roosevelt and other American officials during his Washington visit, see *Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beneš*, pp. 180–187 and 193–196. For the memorandum by the Secretary of State of a conversation with Beneš on May 18, 1943, see *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. III, p. 529.

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**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 13, 1943, 10:30 A.M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING**

**Present**

**UNITED STATES**

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNarney
Commander Freseman
Commander Long

**UNITED KINGDOM**

General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay

**Secretariat**

Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

**SECRET**

**Admiral Leahy**, on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff, expressed his pleasure at having the British Chiefs of Staff present for this series of meetings. He appreciated that they have come so far and left their duties for this purpose. He felt that it was important that by personal conferences the problems which had arisen since their last meeting should be resolved.

**Admiral Leahy** said he would like to outline brief proposals with regard to the conduct of the Conference. He suggested the meetings

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1 C.C.S. 83rd Meeting. The meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were numbered consecutively from the establishment of the organization, which held its first meeting in Washington on January 23, 1942. The 83rd Meeting was the first held in connection with the Third Washington Conference.
should take place daily, including Sundays, from 10:30 to 12:45, followed by a luncheon in the Map Room of the Public Health Building. If acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff, the United States Chiefs of Staff would like to have with them at these meetings their three senior planning officers, together with one member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and two officers responsible for supply problems. These officers would not take part in the discussion nor sit at the table. He felt that many of the problems could be more quickly resolved if those involved were present and could hear at first hand the views of the Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that the number should be kept down as much as possible but agreed with Admiral Leahy’s suggestions. He would like the British Directors of Plans also to be present.

Sir John Dill suggested that to assist the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in their duties after the Conference itself had ceased, it would be helpful if they also could attend.

Admiral Leahy agreed that this was an excellent suggestion.

Admiral Leahy further suggested that with regard to the recording of decisions, nothing in the minutes should be regarded as an agreed decision unless it were recorded as such in the conclusions. Agreed decisions should be taken as the first item at the subsequent meeting. With regard to the final report to the President and the Prime Minister, he suggested that any preliminary reports presented should be regarded as tentative only and that in the final report an effort should be made to arrange approved existing and projected strategic undertakings in their order of priority. He suggested the first two sessions should be given up to a general discussion and exchange of ideas on global strategy, both in Europe and the Pacific; after that, post-Husky operations in 1943 and beyond, both in the Mediterranean and Western Europe; and finally a review of the China situation, operation Anakim and the Pacific. At the conclusion of these first two general discussions, the Combined Planners should be asked to prepare a detailed agenda. The war against Japan should perhaps be discussed first since the Commanders in Chief in the Far East might wish to return to their posts.

Admiral Leahy then read out a memorandum giving the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the global strategy of the war (Annex “A” to these minutes).²

Sir Alan Brooke thanked Admiral Leahy for the warm welcome which he had given to the British Chiefs of Staff. He felt it was appropriate that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet at the

² Post, p. 222.
conclusion of the successful operations in North Africa. It was also appropriate that he should choose this moment to express the admiration of the British Chiefs of Staff for General Eisenhower’s conduct of these operations, and above all, for his success in obtaining and maintaining the utmost cooperation and harmony throughout his command and complete absence of friction.

Sir Alan Brooke said he was in entire agreement with the proposals for the Conference suggested by Admiral Leahy. With regard to the memorandum on global strategy which Admiral Leahy had read, the British Chiefs of Staff would like time to consider this paper, since it embodied the foundations of our future strategy.

Sir Alan Brooke then read out a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff containing their views on the conduct of the war in 1943-1944 (attached as Annex “B” to these minutes). In reading this memorandum, he amplified in certain respects that part of paragraph 2 dealing with the directive to General Morgan. This directive included instructions to prepare for a feint designed to bring about an air battle on the western front, an operation (a reverse Dunkirk) in which all available forces should be put forth onto the Continent by any possible method to take advantage of a crack in German morale, and finally, instructions to prepare for a full-scale assault against opposition. Shipping remained the stranglehold on all our operations. It would be necessary to keep this factor in mind in all considerations. It was suggested, however, that the desirability of possible operations from a military viewpoint should first be assessed, and when agreement had been reached on this, the possibilities of carrying them out should be related to the shipping position. As regards the order of discussion, he suggested that since there was no immediate urgency for the return of the Commanders in Chief to India, the global strategy should first be discussed, then European strategy (since Germany was agreed to be the main enemy) and finally the Pacific.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, Sir Alan Brooke said that if Husky was launched on the 10th of July, it was estimated that the operation should be completed within one month.

General Marshall said that the United States Planners had estimated that the revised Husky might take until the middle of September.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he considered that the new plan with its stronger lodgments should not take much longer than the old one.

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3 Post, p. 223.
4 On April 13, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had accepted July 10 as the date for Operation Husky. For a discussion of the selection of this invasion date, see Garland and Smyth, pp. 88-90.
since our air superiority should be able to cut the enemy’s lines of reinforcement.  

Sir John Dill suggested that the rapid collapse of the Axis forces in Tunisia might be taken as indicative of what the future held for us.  

Sir Charles Portal said that the weakness of the new plan lay in its failure to seal the island to reinforcements. He agreed, however, that with our large air superiority, if sufficient pressure could be maintained, it would not be easy for the Axis to reinforce since they would find difficulty in keeping their ports open. The impression from General Eisenhower’s signal on the revised plan was that it inferred that he anticipated but little delay due to the changes made.  

General Marshall asked the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the results to be expected on Germany by the progressive and cumulative effect of the combined bomber offensive this summer up to the fall.  

Sir Charles Portal said that he built great hope on these attacks if the build-up could be maintained. It was hoped to have between eight and nine hundred United States heavy bombers and four hundred United States medium bombers in the United Kingdom by the 30th of June.  

General McNarney confirmed that this number of heavy bombers would be available, though there might be a slight diminution in the number of mediums.  

Sir Charles Portal said that the effect of some thousand day bombers and between 1,000 and 1,200 night bombers would be considerable. The results of day bombing had been most encouraging and must achieve the withdrawal of German fighters from other fronts since the Germans could not afford to ignore the material and morale effect of these attacks. The American day bombing plan aimed not only to shoot down enemy fighters but to destroy fighter factories.  

General Marshall asked for the Chief of Air Staff’s views on the effect of concentrating all available air power in support of a land battle.  

Sir Charles Portal said that this largely depended on the targets offered. Our air superiority would be overwhelming within a circle of 120 to 150 miles. The Germans could only provide some two to three hundred bombers and five to six hundred fighters, whereas the British had some 1,500 fighters and the United States would have

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5 The revised plan for Husky was accepted by Eisenhower in early May 1943. For an account of the formulation of this revised plan, see Garland and Smyth, chapter III.  
6 The reference here is presumably to telegram NAF 215, May 4, 1943, from Eisenhower in Algiers for the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which outlined the revised plan for Husky. For text, see Eisenhower Papers, p. 1112.
about a thousand. If replacements were available, this superiority after a few days would defeat the German fighter defense and enable the bombers to attack their targets relatively unmolested. The essential problem was to insure that the German Air Force gave battle.

General Marshall then raised the question of the results of turning our air power in North Africa onto the Italian fleet once bases were available in Sicily.

Sir Charles Portal said that the present task of the Air in North Africa was to insure air superiority over Sicily. The northern Italian ports were out of range from the United Kingdom in the summer. The attack must be based either on Sicily or North Africa.

Sir Dudley Pound said that if they were bombed out of Spezia, the Italian fleet might make for Toulon. The modern Italian battleships of the Littorio class had left Spezia after the last bombing, but had then returned. The older battleships were at Taranto and were immobilized for the present since the necessary destroyers had been used for ferrying troops to Tunisia. There they had sustained considerable losses, but he believed that there were still enough destroyers available to escort the Italian fleet to sea.

Admiral King agreed with Sir Dudley Pound that it was desirable to drive the Italian fleet into the Adriatic but doubted if those in the northwestern Italian ports would run the gauntlet through the Straits.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, Sir Charles Portal said that the Italian fleet in the north was only vulnerable to day attack by U.S. bombers since the short nights did not permit of British night bombers being used. He did not believe that the Italian fighter defense was good but ships were difficult to sink, particularly since the vessels of the Littorio class had heavy deck armor.

General McNarney said that all Italian ports, including Toulon and Trieste, were in easy range of B-17 and B-24 aircraft based on North Africa. American bombers were developing a new technique for low altitude attacks. Experience in the South Pacific went to show that good results could be achieved in spite of heavy anti-aircraft fire, though the question of defense against fighters was another matter and must be taken into account since the Italian ships would be in ports out of range of our escorting fighters.

General Marshall then asked for an estimate on a time basis of the vulnerability of the Ploesti oil fields to attack by aircraft based either on Aleppo or Libya.

Sir Charles Portal said he did not believe that an adequate scale of attack could be brought to bear except from Turkey or the mainland of Italy or Greece. Only B-24's based on North Africa could reach the oil fields, and these were neither numerous enough nor
were they as well able as the B-17’s to beat off an attack. If Turkish, Italian or Greek bases could be used, an attack should produce a very serious effect on the refineries, and hence on Germany's petroleum situation.

General McNarney said that a plan which had great possibilities had been worked out for attacking Ploesti oil fields by low level bombing attacks from bases in Bengasi, using 500-pound delay action bombs, the force to consist of 153 Heavy Bombers. He believed that such an attack would render any further operations against the refineries unnecessary for a period of some six months. This attack could be carried out without waiting for the Turkish or Italian air fields to be available, and the numbers required could easily be built up of B-24’s with some additional B-17’s temporarily diverted from the United Kingdom.

General Marshall said it was important in considering our future strategy to carefully assess the possibilities and destructive capacity of air attacks. We should take advantage of this strength in planning our future operations, particularly in the Mediterranean where it should be possible to use air power rather than additional ground forces. The enemy must not be allowed to relax, however. Damage to the Italian fleet might prove sufficient to release British surface vessels for employment in the Far East. The plan for Ploesti outlined by General McNarney seemed well worth the gamble. The destructive power against fighters shown by the B-17’s had been encouraging, as had also their accuracy in bombing which had forced enemy fighter reaction to their attacks. Attacks on the Italian fleet, and on the oil fields of Ploesti could be undertaken. These would not be too heavy a logistical burden. All these possibilities had a bearing on what could be achieved to hasten the collapse of Italy by air action alone. An Italian collapse might have a political reaction on the Turks which would enable us to get the use of their air bases. The results of our air superiority in Tunisia had proved crippling to the enemy.

Operation Husky should provoke further air fights which would weaken the enemy and might leave us in a position to bomb Italy almost unmolested. Since correct application of air power was all important, the Chiefs of Staff would deeply regret any failure to exploit a favorable opportunity which might be presented to use its cumulative effect in the Mediterranean at this time. Effective use of air power might enable us to economize in the use of ground forces in

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the Mediterranean Area. They would also deeply regret not being ready to make the final blow against Germany, if the opportunity presented itself, by reason of having dissipated ground forces in the Mediterranean Area.

Admiral Leahy asked for an estimate as to how long it would require to establish ourselves in a position in Turkey or in the heel of Italy to undertake air attacks on Ploesti.

Sir Charles Portal said he estimated that from seven to nine weeks would be required before we could operate from Turkish air fields or from three to four weeks if a Turkish acceptance could be taken for granted and the necessary concentrations in Syria made beforehand. Air fields in Turkey sufficient to operate 25 squadrons were now available and air fields for another 20 squadrons should be ready by October. It was difficult to estimate the time factor if the heel of Italy was used. A considerable amount of shipping would be required, and the timing would depend on the amount of land forces engaged and requirements for tactical air forces which would take up the air fields otherwise available for the strategic bombing force. Broadly, he felt that it was unlikely that an air attack on Ploesti could take place from Italian bases sooner than from seven to nine weeks after the launching of the land operations against the heel. He feared that an initial ineffective attack on Ploesti might lead to great strengthening of the defenses. It was unwise to underestimate the meteorological and geographical difficulties in attacking this target. A very high degree of training and good luck with regard to the weather were essential.

Admiral Leahy emphasized the importance of the time element in bombing of the Ploesti fields.

Admiral King said that the Russians might undertake an attack on Ploesti since they had large air forces and bases near the target.

Sir Charles Portal said this had been suggested to the Russians, but he believed their air forces were too closely committed to the ground battle.

General Marshall said that permission had been sought from the Russians, prior to the first Ploesti raid, for the U.S. aircraft to land in Russia. This permission, however, had been received a week too late to be of any use, and the Russians had never agreed to permit U.S. aircraft to take off for the raid from Russian fields.

Sir Charles Portal said that the British Chiefs of Staff had brought with them their study on the possibility of bombing Ploesti and the results which would be achieved. He suggested that the

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8 For an account of the circumstances of the American air raid against Ploesti on June 11, 1942, see Dugan and Stewart, Ploesti, chapter 1; see also Craven and Cate, vol. ii, p. 10.
Combined Chiefs of Staff should instruct the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a report on this matter.

**Admiral King** suggested that the Russians should again be approached on the desirability of bombing Ploiești or the use of their airfields by U.S. or British bombers for this purpose.

**Sir Charles Portal** concurred.

**Sir Alan Brooke** agreed that full use must be made of air power in the Mediterranean but considered that this must be examined in relation to the whole picture of the value of knocking Italy out of the war.

**General Marshall** felt that in looking at the whole picture we should direct our attention to knocking Germany out of the war.

**Sir Alan Brooke** said that the enemy were certain to resist to the best of their ability our plans for putting shipping through the Mediterranean, and this should produce heavy air attacks. The enemy's one hope of victory lay in the success of his operations by submarine and air against our surface ships. The capture of Sicily would help us to open the Mediterranean route, but even then Axis air based on Sardinia would endeavor to cut the line of communication.

**Sir Alan Brooke** said that the British Chiefs of Staff doubted if bombing by air alone would cause the collapse of Italy. If Italy collapsed, Germany would be faced with the necessity of taking over the garrisoning of the Balkans from the Italians. Some 43 Italian divisions were now employed on this task. The Germans might use fewer. If they used only 20, it would mean 20 less on the Russian Front. Further, unless Germany allowed us to occupy the whole of Italy, including her northern airports, Germany would have to send troops to resist our attacks. The Balkans were economically valuable to Germany. Troops could not be withdrawn from them altogether since Mihailovich in Yugoslavia would rise and Greece and Albania would be inflamed. If we could knock out Italy and thus divert at least 20 divisions from the Russian Front, and if the Russians could keep up the pressure during 1943, the Germans might crack. It was essential, therefore, that we must use every means to insure a collapse of Italy.

**Sir Alan Brooke** said that if Italy should crumble as a result of **Husky**, we must consider what action should be taken. Troops for the occupation of Italy would be necessary. He did not believe that Germany would try to control an Italy which was not fighting. Continental communications were designed for an east and west flow of traffic. Communications north and south were bad, as were lateral communications along the southern outposts of German power in the Mediterranean. German resistance in Tunisia had crumbled/more quickly than we had been led to expect from our previous knowledge.
of German troops. They had suffered a terrific defeat with loss of some 150,000 men. None of their North African troops were available to increase the defenses of Sicily. Operation Husky might be easier than we thought, and on the completion of a successful Husky, the Germans might be forced to divert troops to the various islands and threatened points in southern Europe.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he believed that German strategy on the Eastern Front would be mainly an offensive-defensive. They now only had 185 divisions on this front. No Italian divisions were left there and far fewer Hungarians and Roumanians. Action of ours in the Mediterranean, which would force the collapse of Italy, would necessitate the Germans withdrawing additional troops from Russia to meet Italian commitments, including the 7 Italian Divisions in southern France which would then be threatened by the Allies. An Anti-Fascist Government might request our support against the Germans or a state of anarchy might exist. The first alternative would be more difficult to deal with. In any event, German commitments resulting from the collapse of Italy would help our final re-entry into northern France, since only from there or from the Russian Front could the necessary additional troops be found.

The capture of Corsica and Sardinia would assist an attack on southern France, and since German forces would have to be diverted for the protection of this coast, the re-entry into north France would be assisted. He was entirely in agreement that air forces should be used to the maximum but linked with appropriate ground forces.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, Sir Dudley Pound said that the Germans now had a strong force including the Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, one pocket battleship, and one 8-inch cruiser concentrated in the north of Norway. An additional battle cruiser would not be fit for service for many months, and the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin, although completed, would probably not be operationally fit for several months. Admiral Doenitz, on assuming command, had stated that the whole German Navy would be used for an attack on shipping. This might mean that the crews of the surface ships might be used to reinforce the submarines or that the surface fleet itself would be used against our convoys. In this latter event the fleet could be more easily used to attack Russian convoys than to break out into the Atlantic. They were at present concentrated in the north in expectation of another convoy being run. The short nights of summer made it difficult for them to elude our very long range aircraft if they tried to break out in the Atlantic. No German tankers were known to have gone to sea, and this was usually the prelude to a breakout.
He did not believe that a breakout was likely until the autumn. The degree of cooperation between the German and Japanese fleets was not known, but it was possible that the Japanese had convinced the Germans that the most useful purpose which their fleet could serve was to remain in harbor thus containing a superior British force.

Reverting to the revised Husky plan, Admiral King said that he appreciated the arguments in its favor. He was anxious, however, as to the lack of ports available in the early stages through which our forces could be maintained. The revised plan, however, had the merit of simplicity and concentration. He did not believe that the Italian fleet would try to pass through the Sicilian narrows though it was possible that it might attempt a passage through the Straits of Messina. He felt it unwise to overlook enemy naval potentialities in the Mediterranean. He asked for information with regard to the rehabilitation of the French fleet.

Sir Dudley Pound agreed with Admiral King as to the advantages of the new plan in that only one end of the island required cover. He believed that two French 6-inch cruisers and a few contre-torpilleurs were being repaired.

Admiral King, referring to Roundup, stated that the results of Sickle might prove to be overwhelming. We must be ready to exploit this by cross-Channel operations. It appeared to him that our large air forces could be used for destruction of critical bridges such as those across the Seine, ammunition and supply dumps and lines of communication. We must therefore be very firm in our determination to mount Roundup in April, 1944. He believed that the vast concentration of air forces available in the United Kingdom might prove the determining factor in the success of Continental operations.

Admiral Leahy said that it was generally agreed that the elimination of Italy would have extremely valuable results, but he agreed with Admiral King’s thought that it might be unwise to divert to or maintain in the Mediterranean forces which could be used in a cross-Channel assault or as a prelude to such an attack. If we weakened our potentialities for a cross-Channel assault by continuing to confine forces to the Mediterranean, it might preclude a major effort against Germany on the Western Front.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he believed that if we did not continue operations in the Mediterranean, then no possibility of an attack into France would arise. Even after a bridgehead had been established, we could get no further. The troops employed would for the most part be inexperienced. The force available, some 15 to 20 divisions,
was small and could not be regarded in the same category as the vast Continental armies which were counted in 50's and 100's of divisions. Before undertaking operations across the Channel, it was essential that we should create the right situation to insure its success.

General Marshall stated that the discussion was now getting to the heart of the problem. Experience in Husky had shown that initial estimates of requirements were always exceeded. The only limit to Torch had been the availability of shipping. The Tunisian campaign had sucked in more and more troops. Operations invariably created a vacuum in which it was essential to pour in more and more means. Once undertaken the operation must be backed to the limit. He felt deeply concerned that the landing of ground forces in Italy would establish a vacuum in the Mediterranean which would preclude the assembly of sufficient forces in the United Kingdom to execute a successful cross-Channel operation and Germany would not collapse unless this occurred from air bombardment alone. If further Mediterranean operations were undertaken, then in 1943 and virtually all of 1944 we should be committed, except for air attacks on Germany, to a Mediterranean policy. This would entail a very serious state of affairs in the Pacific. It would mean a prolongation of the war in Europe, and thus a delay in the ultimate defeat of Japan, which the people of the U. S. would not tolerate. We were now at the crossroads—if we were committed to the Mediterranean, except for air alone, it meant a prolonged struggle and one which was not acceptable to the United States.

Admiral Leahy said that the Pacific could not be neglected; it was too vital to the United States. Immediate action was necessary to maintain China in the war. The war in Europe must be brought to a rapid decisive close at the earliest possible date.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he agreed that the European war must be ended as fast as possible. He believed, however, that to cease Mediterranean operations on the conclusion of Husky would lengthen the war. The seizure of the Brest Peninsula, which was all we could now achieve, would merely lock up 20 divisions. Russia was the only Ally in possession of large ground forces, and our strategy must aim to help her to the maximum possible extent. Only by continuing in the Mediterranean could we achieve the maximum diversion of German forces from Russia. The transshipment of Allied Divisions from the Mediterranean to England was a difficult shipping commitment. A lodgment in the Brest Peninsula would not be a decisive blow. There were only some ten to twelve British Divisions available in England.

General Marshall said that if a maximum effort was made, some
eleven U. S. Divisions could be made available in the United Kingdom by April, 1944.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that these combined forces would only be sufficient to hold a bridgehead and would not be large enough to debouch into the Continent. Now was the time when action was required to relieve the pressure on Russia. No major operations would be possible until 1945 or 1946, since it must be remembered that in previous wars there had always been some 80 French Divisions available on our side. Any advance towards the Ruhr would necessitate clearing up behind the advancing Army and would leave us with long lines of communications. Our air force in U.K. was at present largely on a static basis though it was being converted now for use with the expeditionary force. The British manpower position was weak, and to provide the necessary rearward services for continental warfare, two of our twelve divisions now in U.K. would probably have to be cannibalized.

General Marshall said that it appeared that Roundup was still regarded as a vague conception. Did this mean that the British Chiefs of Staff regarded Mediterranean operations as the key to a successful termination of the European war?

Sir Charles Portal explained that the British Chiefs of Staff did not believe that a force of some 20 to 25 divisions could achieve important results across the Channel on the Continent of Europe unless almost the entire bulk of the German Army was in Russia or the Balkans. Our ability to operate across the Channel later was dependent on the extent to which we could help Russia now. This in turn was dependent on the possibilities of knocking out Italy this year. If this could be achieved, then in 1944 a successful re-entry into northwest Europe might well be possible, but a re-entry now with some 12 to 15 divisions against the German forces available could achieve nothing.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he did not visualize an increase in the existing ground forces in the Mediterranean. The only cost would be in shipping to mount subsequent operations.

General Marshall, referring again to the build-up for Roundup, stated that if we were ever to get the forces in the United Kingdom, we must begin now. Further operations in the Mediterranean would, in his opinion, create a vacuum which would constitute a drain on our available resources.

Admiral Leahy asked if it was believed that the Russians would be satisfied with an attack on Italy if this meant postponement of Roundup.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he was convinced that a Russian failure would prolong the war for many years. He believed it far better, from the Russian point of view, that we should attack Italy now rather than start preparing for cross-Channel operations which could not be of any real importance until 1944. What the Russians wished us to achieve was a withdrawal of German forces from their front. The problem was how this could best be done. He believed that only by attacking in the Mediterranean could we achieve immediate results and that this was more valuable than building up for a 1944 Roundup which might not even then be possible.

General Marshall said that he thought that Sir Alan Brooke forgot the fact that there would be continual air operations in the Mediterranean. Germany would not know when we were about to strike a blow, and her troops would be contained in the area. We had built great hopes of crippling Germany by air attack, and he felt, therefore, that this would be more successful against Italy where the resistance would be less. He believed that land operations in the Mediterranean Area would prolong the European war and hence the time when a decision could be achieved in the Pacific. The build-up of forces in Great Britain for Bolero would constitute a threat which would demand a German reaction.

Sir Charles Portal said that he would be satisfied with this plan if he believed that Italy could be knocked out by air alone and that we could thus gain the Italian air fields on the plains of Lombardy and the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica. He was doubtful, however, if air alone would achieve the desired result. It had never been claimed that Germany could be knocked out by air alone, but rather that it would reduce her power to such an extent that her forces available against Russia and ourselves would be so weakened as to permit of her defeat. Our object was to assist Russia, and we must achieve this object as early as possible.

Sir Alan Brooke said that operations in the Mediterranean were important from the Turkish point of view. The Turkish attitude depended both on Russian successes and our operations against Italy. The additional shipping for operations in the Mediterranean could only be found at the expense of Bolero. The reduction in Bolero build-up resulting from the undertaking of operations in the Mediterranean would only be some three to four divisions in 1943 and none in 1944. Operations in the Mediterranean were not an unlimited commitment. We must take immediate advantage of the deterioration in Italian morale. Even if we occupied all Italy, a serious shipping commitment would not arise since the Italian ships would them-
selves be sufficient to bring nearly all the necessary food to Italy, and only some 10 ships a month would be required for coal.

**Admiral King** reminded the Chiefs of Staff of the danger of [to] the lines of communication to the Mediterranean passing through the Straits of Gibraltar. The Germans had not yet taken action in this area, but we might be faced with a difficult position if they concentrated submarines in the approaches.

**Sir Dudley Pound** said that on a previous occasion when the Germans had operated in the actual approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar, they had suffered serious losses.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, **Sir Alan Brooke** said that the advantages of obtaining the Azores were obvious. An examination had been made of possible German reactions. A German advance into Spain and Portugal would require some 15 to 20 divisions and would be met with resistance, if only guerrilla. The Germans would then be faced with a difficult economic situation and the logistic problem of bad communications and different rail gauge. The British Chiefs of Staff did not believe that Germany would undertake this operation. A difficult situation, however, existed with regard to Portugal. If we ask the Portuguese to allow us the use of the Azores, she might well require a guarantee from us that she would be defended. This would be difficult to give since it would entail keeping forces and ships ready to meet this commitment. It would therefore be desirable, if possible, to give Portugal no guarantee and to assure her that the risk of a German reaction was very remote.

**Admiral Leahy** said that this seemed largely a political question. It was unwise to offer guarantees and better to take the islands without previous notice, at the same time giving assurance that they would be returned to Portugal at the end of the war.

**Sir Hastings Ismay** said that the British were in a difficult position since they had entered into negotiations with the Portuguese and had staff conversations with a view to assisting Portugal in defending the islands against attack. It might therefore be better for the United States to occupy these islands.

**General Marshall** suggested that a possible timing for the occupation of the Azores might be just after Husky had been launched in order to utilize the shipping returning from this operation. There were sufficient troops in Northwest Africa for use in Portugal.

**Sir Hastings Ismay** said that a telegram had just been received from the British Cabinet stating that the Foreign Secretary believed that the Portuguese might agree to an occupation of the islands. He
offered to circulate to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a British study on the whole problem.\(^9\)

**THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:**

_a. Agreed:_

(1) That nothing be considered as an agreed decision during the **Trident** Conferences which does not appear in the conclusions of the minutes.

(2) That during the **Trident** Conferences the conclusions of each meeting be read and approved as the first item of the succeeding meeting.

(3) That when any Summaries of Conclusions are given to the President and the Prime Minister during the period of the Conference, it should be explained to them that these would only be tentative and that, at the end of the Conference, a final Agreed Summary of Conclusions would be submitted.

(4) That in the preparation of the Final Summary of Conclusions, effort should be made to set out an order of priority of existing and projected strategic undertakings.

(5) That at the end of the 84th Meeting the Combined Staff Planners should be directed to prepare a detailed agenda for the remaining Conferences.

_b. Agreed that the possibilities of launching a decisive air attack on the Ploesti Oil Fields from Russia should be explored by the Combined Staff Planners._

c. Took note that a paper that had been prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff on the subject of the use of Portuguese Islands in the Atlantic would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a basis of future discussion.

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\(^9\)Report by the British Chiefs of Staff Committee entitled “Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands” was circulated for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 16 May 1943, p. 304.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, MAY 13, 1943, 1 P. M.,
THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

**UNITED STATES**

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Prime Minister Churchill
Air Chief Marshal Portal

_Editorial Note_

No official record of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the President’s Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers).
HULL–CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 13, 1943, THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Secretary Hull

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

740.0011 EW/29478

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1943.

Subject: Russia; Trade Agreements Program; de Gaulle

I called on Prime Minister Churchill at the White House at his request. He proceeded first to express his extreme gratification at the final and complete military victory in Africa. I interjected to say that “your” and our Vichy policy has been justified and vindicated 100 percent. He promptly replied with enthusiasm that it had been vindicated 140 percent, and then went on to say that it was one of the greatest classical operations, perfect in every essential respect in that the air, land and naval forces and the diplomatic activities of our Governments were all synchronized together with marvelous precision and thrown against the enemy with the most powerful effect. He said that the United States had not received credit for the two years’ work of preparation and of paving the way for the African expedition under our Vichy policy. I said I must agree with him on that, but that one of these days the full facts would come out.

I brought up the need for a more full and complete understanding with Russia on the part of Great Britain and the United States and went on to repeat in substance what I had said to Foreign Minister Eden on his recent visit here in regard to the extreme importance of our two countries proceeding systematically through carefully selected persons to talk Mr. Stalin out of his shell, so to speak, away from his aloofness, secretiveness and suspiciousness until he broadened his views and visualized a more practical international cooperation in the future; at the same time indicating Russia’s intentions both in the East and the West.¹ Mr. Churchill thought that Russia would help fight Japan when the war in the West was over, to which

¹ For documentation regarding Eden’s visit to Washington in March 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
I replied that so far as I knew, there was no evidence or intimation of any kind as to what Russia would do in this respect; that it was my opinion that if she eventually should come into the war in the Pacific, it would probably be two or three weeks before victory, during which time she could spread out over Manchuria and other large areas and then be assured of sitting in at the peace conference. I said she may come into the war in the East, but the point I was emphasizing was that I could not get any intimation as to her future plans except in regard to certain territorial matters on her borders in Europe.

I then referred to our commercial policy and trade agreements program and elaborated on that in ways that are familiar to all. I expressed the opinion that we would receive the support of the public in carrying forward this combined program of liberal commercial, monetary and other related policies. He said very little on this question but appeared definitely interested.

He then said that the President had suggested that he might talk to me about de Gaulle. He proceeded to say that he was not pushing forward de Gaulle, although he had heard it reported that we felt that de Gaulle was receiving British financial support with which to do the things that are most objectionable to us. The Prime Minister said that he and Eden found de Gaulle terrible to get on with and that he wanted it understood that they were not undertaking to build him up. He added that we on the other hand must not get behind Giraud and pit him against de Gaulle, one reason being that de Gaulle was considered a symbol of French resistance and the British just could not throw him overboard, notwithstanding his many very objectionable and difficult ways. I said that the one big point in the situation that should appeal to both Governments alike was that if this de Gaulle matter is allowed to go forward as it has been, it will undoubtedly bring about serious friction between our two Governments; that large cross sections of people in this country will finally become aroused through false propaganda and constant agitations and machinations on the part of the de Gaulle organization, and in turn the Governments will be subject to repercussions that will seriously affect the relations between the two. I said that there was nothing personal implied in my remarks but I wished to point out with emphasis the poisonous propaganda activities of the de Gaulle organization both in this country and in North Africa where the purpose seemed to be to under-
mine and break down support for Giraud and then for de Gaulle to take charge politically from the top to the bottom and transplant this organization to Metropolitan France. I repeated with emphasis that inevitably friction will arise between our two Governments if this sort of propaganda work, which is so false and misleading in so many ways, is kept up by the de Gaulle organization. I elaborated in other ways in regard to the offer of higher wages to take sailors off their ships and for similar purposes thereby keeping everything in an uproar wherever a de Gaulle representative goes. I also made it very emphatic more than once the universal belief that the British are definitely behind these operations with money, the aid of the radio and with other methods. The Prime Minister maintained, first, that he personally was utterly disgusted with de Gaulle and, second, that the British were not aiding him as much as I seemed to think. I then suggested that there were numerous ways for the British to get away from their build-up of de Gaulle both rapid and gradual, if the latter course should prove necessary. I do not think that I made any special impression on the Prime Minister in this regard as he continued to urge that this Government should not support Giraud to the point of engaging in a quarrel with de Gaulle and the British. I, of course, maintained that this would be the inevitable outcome of the British policy in regard to de Gaulle.¹

¹For additional documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the disunity between Giraud and de Gaulle in French North Africa, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, pp. 23 ff.

ROOSEVELT–CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 13, 1943, 11 P. M.,
THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of the discussion at this evening meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the President’s Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers).
FRIDAY, MAY 14, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 14, 1943, 10:30 A. M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

Present

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Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

Without discussion, the COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF accepted the record and conclusions of the 83rd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. GLOBAL STRATEGY

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had examined the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff on the Global Strategy of the War. There were certain points in this paper with which they were not in entire agreement. They adhered to the views agreed to at Casablanca as set out in C.C.S. 155/1.

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1 C.C.S. 84th meeting.
2 Present for discussions of Burma operations only.
The British Chiefs of Staff had two main points of difference which he would like to mention. Firstly, paragraph 2b of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff paper referred to an extension of pressure against Japan. Such extension might well cause a vacuum into which forces would have to be poured and would thereby depart from the object set out in paragraph 2a of the same paper, i.e., to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe. Action in the Pacific must be coordinated with that in Europe and must not prejudice the defeat of Germany or the war would drag on indefinitely.

The second point of difference was in connection with paragraph 3 of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff paper, i.e., Roundup and its possibilities. The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the possibilities of Roundup were dependent on the success or failure of the Russians on the Eastern Front. Allied cross-Channel operations could only form a very small part of the whole continental land war, and our effort must be aimed therefore at supporting Russia and thereby creating a situation in which Roundup was possible.

The views of the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to Roundup might be summed up as follows:

It was their firm intention to carry out Roundup at the first moment when the conditions were such that the operations would contribute decisively to the defeat of Germany. These conditions might arise this year, but in any case, it was the firm belief of the British Chiefs of Staff that they would arise next year. They could be created only by the Russian Army. Our action, therefore, must consist of:

a. Continuing our increasing bombardment of Germany; and
b. Drawing off from the Russian Front as many forces as possible.

On the basis of this definition of Roundup the British Chiefs of Staff had put forward their views on operations in the Mediterranean.

Paragraph 5 of the U. S. paper pointed out how essential it was that Russia should be kept in the war. The British Chiefs of Staff looked on the matter differently and regarded it as essential not only that Russia should be kept in the war but that we should create a situation whereby Russian victories could be achieved.

Admiral Leahy said that he was unable to see that the U. S. conception of global strategy differed materially from that set out at Casablanca. The intention was now and was then to prepare for and launch cross-Channel operations. The African venture was undertaken in order to do something this year while preparing for cross-Channel operations. Little preparation for the latter had, in fact, been made, since all available U. S. resources had been sent to North Africa. The North African campaign was now completed. If we launched a new campaign in the Mediterranean, then we should con-
continue to use our resources in that area. This would again postpone help to Russia since we should not be able to concentrate forces in the U. K. and thus cause a withdrawal of German troops to western Europe. If new operations in the Mediterranean were the best way to bring the European war to a conclusion, then they must be undertaken; but if these operations would have the effect of prolonging the war, he saw great difficulties in committing U. S. resources to them.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, Sir Alan Brooke confirmed that, in the British view, Mediterranean operations would shorten the European war.

Admiral Leahy said that the U. S. Planners in reporting to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff had pointed out the necessity of shortening the war in the Pacific and thus preventing Japan from consolidating her gains.

Admiral Leahy then read out a paper† giving the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff on global strategy.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had prepared two papers—one on operations in the European Theater and one on operations from India for 1943–1944, which he would like to hand over to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff at the conclusion of the meeting.‡

Admiral Leahy drew attention to paragraph 11 of the British Chiefs of Staff paper contained in Annex "B" to C.C.S. 83rd Meeting with regard to a combined examination of the method by which the defeat of Japan was ultimately brought about. He thought it would be helpful if Field Marshal Wavell and General Stilwell were asked to give their views on this subject. An examination should be made of each plan and of what it would accomplish. He suggested that there should also be a combined examination as to how to bring about the ultimate defeat of Germany. He would like to have the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the Pacific campaign as a whole.

E[3]. Operations in Burma

Sir Alan Brooke said that after the Casablanca Conference, plans had been drawn up for operations from India. Field Marshal Wavell would outline the plan which had been decided on as being the best; but this plan did not, in his opinion, hold out great hopes. Even when Burma was cleared and the Burma Road opened, it would take from six to nine months to develop it to a capacity of 10,000 tons per month. Was Anakim the best plan? He believed that we should examine other lines of approach to the problem and whatever action was de-
cided on from India this should be coordinated as part of a complete plan for the defeat of Japan. One possibility was to seize the Kra Isthmus and to punch through to Bangkok, thereby cutting the main Japanese line of communications to Burma and obtaining bases from which to threaten Japanese oil traffic. There was no communication by rail with Bangkok from the west coast of the Kra Peninsula, and the roads were poor; but the principal difficulty was the lack of adequate port facilities on the Kra Isthmus.

Another alternative was to capture northern Sumatra and Penang. This operation again would give us air bases to cover the Japanese oil routes.

The third alternative would be to take the whole of Sumatra and then Java, the latter either from the east or west.

Only preliminary examination had been given to these plans. It was essential to decide whether one of these or operation ANAKIM held out the best hopes. The latter might prove to be the most valuable, but the very poor lines of communication through Assam must be remembered. The Brahmaputra River had to be crossed by train ferries since there was no bridge, and the only railways available were single track meter gauge. It was planned to use more shipping on the Brahmaputra when it could be returned from Iraq. Rather than undertake ANAKIM, it might be better to develop new airports and to increase the capacity of the air ferry service into China to the maximum.

Land operations would have to take place down the two roads from Imphal and Ledo at the end of which roads, when built, our forces would have to be maintained through the monsoon season, when no operations could take place. A thrust from the north would have to be accompanied by landings on the west coast designed to secure air fields. These landings would require carrier-based air support, and only relatively small forces could infiltrate over the mountains. To capture southern Burma an assault on Rangoon would be necessary. Owing to the delta and mangrove swamps, no landings on the coast were possible, so that a hazardous operation up the Irrawaddy was required. Even when Rangoon was captured, there would be a continuous threat on our eastern flank; and once committed in this area, we might be drawn on into further operations against Thailand and the consequent difficulties of maintaining ourselves.

If on examination operation ANAKIM proved to be the best answer, it must be done; but any action we took must be coordinated with United States thrusts from the east. In any event, the air route to China should be developed. It must be remembered, too, that suc-
cessful operations against Germany in Europe might well bring Russia to our assistance in the Far East.

Admiral Leahy pointed out that the object of the Burma Campaign was to assist China by opening the Burma Road. Alternative operations did not appear to afford immediate relief to China.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that unless the Burma Road was opened, no immediate relief to China would be given except by air. He considered that the moral effect of recapturing Burma would be great both in China and in India; and it was, therefore, desirable to do this operation if possible; but from the material point of view we must consider whether operations to open the Burma Road would produce sufficient result to warrant the scale of effort which would be necessary and the commitments which would arise. The actual supplies which the Road could take through to China were relatively small.

Admiral Leahy said that it was essential to do something for China. We must maintain the air route whose capacity was now relatively small and which would fall further during the monsoon season.

Sir Alan Brooke said that it was important to appreciate the fact that operations to recapture Burma would interfere with developing facilities for increasing the capacity of the air route.

Admiral King said that he understood that air fields in Assam were now being developed though slowly. As in Europe, where Russia's geographical and manpower position were regarded as vital to the defeat of Germany, so China's geographical position and manpower were vital to the defeat of Japan and must be used. A collapse of China would vastly prolong the war and vitally affect the whole situation vis-à-vis Japan.

Sir Alan Brooke said he fully appreciated this point. The value of Russian bases for use against Japan was also great.

Admiral King said that he was attracted toward the Bangkok operation, but it must be remembered that this was of no direct assistance to China. The Japanese attitude toward the Puppet Government in Nanking had changed, and the people in the occupied area were being offered supplies and facilities which were not available to Free China. Morale was weakening, and if China went out of the war, the task of the United Nations in defeating Japan would be terrific.

(At this point, Field Marshal Wavell, Admiral Somerville, and the Air Chief Marshal Peirse entered the meeting)

Admiral Leahy stated that the Chiefs of Staff had just been discussing the Burma situation. They would like very much to hear Field Marshal Wavell's idea on the best methods of procedure.
FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that, considering such operations, the first thing necessary to make clear was the administrative situation in India, which would of necessity be used as a base for operations in Burma. The communications in eastern India and Assam are very poor. One means of communication is the Brahmaputra River, but the value of the river ports is limited by the fact that the seasonal rise and fall is as much as 25 feet. On the other hand, the river constitutes a formidable barrier, as it is unbridged throughout its length and frequent changes of course make it difficult if not impossible to bridge. The result is that the bottleneck of transportation from India to Assam is the ferries which operate across this river. It has railroads on either side which are of meter gauge, single line, and in poor condition. A year ago this railroad carried only three or four trains a day, had no modern methods for operation, and few crossings. Improvements have made it possible to operate 14 pairs of trains a day up as far as Manipur Road. Beyond that point 12 pairs a day is the maximum capacity. Unless this rail route is double tracked, which would be a tremendous undertaking and would take from two to three years, the present volume of traffic cannot be increased. There is one stretch of the railroad north of the Brahmaputra which runs along the south of the Himalayas. This part of the road is frequently broken by floods. Last year it was out of action for five months during the monsoon season. The only other approach to Assam was through Bengal, which is a single-track route. There were no satisfactory road communications between India and Assam. Such as there were, were poor in the dry season and impossible during the wet season. This necessitated sending by rail all vehicles for use in Assam or Burma. Before the Japanese entered the war, one of the principal tasks for India was to establish a line of communications to Russia through Iraq. Therefore, most of the steamers from the Brahmaputra were sent into Iraq for this purpose. It is now difficult and a long haul to get them back, but an effort was being made. The ultimate result is that the amount of supplies which can be sent into northeast Assam is limited. The scope of the operations which can be conducted is in turn dependent upon this volume of supplies.

In referring to conditions in Assam and northern Burma, GENERAL WAVELL stated that it was one of the rainiest spots in the world. Recently over 22 inches of rain fell in a period of three weeks, in the dry season. During the wet season it rains continuously. There are few roads, and those which do exist are in poor condition. There is very little stone or other suitable building material which could be used for the purpose of constructing roads or airdromes, and such as there is usually has to be carried great distances. The entire country
is intensely malarial resulting in a high casualty rate. At present they are very short of engineering equipment such as bulldozers, rollers, etc., as well as qualified personnel to operate this machinery.

When the Japanese entered the war, there were approximately thirty air fields in India. Last year over 200 were constructed at a very great effort, which demanded practically all of the resources which could be made available in India. The original layout of these air fields had to be defensive and therefore further back than now required. There were only a limited number in the forward area including Assam. The conditions there are therefore unfavorable for offensive operations.

Work is going on on three or four projects, but each of these projects demands the same thing. There are two bases being constructed, also the road from Manipur to Imphal and on to Tamur. This was originally a one-way road as far as Imphal only. It has now been made two-way as far as Imphal; and work is in hand to extend it as a two-way, all-weather road as far as Tamu. Beyond Tamu and into Burma it is at present a fair-weather road only. This project is not completed. Malaria is intense in the area. The road to Imphal, over 200 miles, all requires fill. It would have to be doubled in some places in order to bear the traffic. When this road gets into Burma, it will still have another seventy miles to go to get into the Chindwin Valley, across a route which a year ago was nothing more than a mule track.

The other base is at Ledo from which it is intended to construct a road by the Hukaung Valley to Myitkyina. Here again a road needs to be constructed approximately 200 miles in length, for most of which there has formerly been not even a mule track, although a road alignment had been surveyed for part of the way.

General Wheeler had taken over the construction of this road and had at present gone about 50 miles. In the Hukaung Valley section the only way to get a road through was to stick to the hills; otherwise in the rainy season this section will be covered with water. Whether or not a road could be constructed to open the line of communication from India to China was open to doubt. However, General Stilwell, who has recently seen General Wheeler, could give a more accurate report. The moral effect on the Chinese would be good if such a project were undertaken, even though the carrying capacity might prove small.

They had tried to run two roads from Imphal into the Chindwin Valley. One is through, but the other is considered as being a much greater undertaking.
With regard to air fields, the original requirement had been three fields in the northeast corner of Assam. These were in use but not quite completed but had encountered various delays, particularly because of labor and equipment shortages. These air fields now are operating with runways complete. However, the standings are limited; and with the increase in the numbers of aircraft, the demands for standings are increasing proportionately. After the visit of Generals Arnold and Somervell, three more air fields had been requested. The sites had been selected. The target date for their completion was 1 October, but a great deal will depend on monsoons and the availability of labor. It was difficult to get native labor to work during the rainy season. It was proposed to use on these fields steel mats, which in turn mean an added burden on the railway—6,000 tons per runway.

He had had another administrative survey made just before leaving India; the conclusion reached was that the facilities were not available both to establish communications for the maintenance of the large force necessary to invade Burma successfully and to provide sufficient air fields for the support of China. He had left instructions to put the construction of the air fields on top priority.

The land route to Akyab was extremely difficult. The sea landing could have been successfully made, but he did not have the shipping, landing craft, and other essential equipment available. Therefore he tried the operation overland down the coast. The essence of this operation should have been speed in order to arrive at Akyab before the Japanese were able to reinforce. However, the conditions encountered proved extremely difficult and provided the time necessary for the Japanese to reinforce and eventually drive the British out. Operations on a small scale against Akyab could not have had any major effect. The original plan was to have been coordinated with a Chinese offensive beginning in March. He had not been told that the Chinese had abandoned their operation until well into February, when his arrangements were already under way. He had continued with the operation, but the Japanese had been able to move reinforcements from Upper Burma and use them against his force. While Akyab had not been captured, the Japanese had suffered heavily, and air operations against them had been effective.

Further north, it had been the intention that one brigade should advance from the Fourth Corps Area and penetrate deeply beyond the Chindwin Valley to cover work taking place on the road and to help Chinese operations. This brigade had been specially trained to

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live on the country and operate without communications. When he had learned that the Chinese did not intend to take any action, he had decided to send the brigade in to gain experience in this form of fighting. They crossed the Chindwin early in February and went through to the Irrawaddy, cut the railway in 75 places, and put it out of action for several months. The commander of the brigade then decided to try to operate against Japanese communications near Lashio. However, in crossing the Irrawaddy, he had lost many of his transport animals and some of the remainder had died of disease. After being in action with the Japanese, he decided to break up the brigade into small columns, as had been arranged, and up to date some 1,500 of the original 2,500 had gotten back. Of the remainder, some were still on their way back while some were making for China. Casualties amounted to some 18 percent. The brigade consisted of British, Burmese and Ghurka troops. The Burmese had been included to assist the command with their local knowledge, and some had been deliberately left behind for future use. As a result of the experience gained, it had been decided to train one or possibly more brigades for this type of fighting.

The operations on the Arakan coast had proved disappointing, and we had failed to capture Akyab. This failure, together with the possible loss of Maungdaw, had strategic disadvantages in that it gave the Japanese an advance base for air attack on India and denied us bases.

In view of the difficulties of warfare in Upper Burma, it would never be possible to complete the conquest by land alone and a seaborne invasion of Lower Burma was essential. Landings on the Arakan Coast down to Cape Negrais would be cut off from the mainland by the Arakan Hills, through which there was only one bad road to Prome. It was impossible to land in the delta of the Irrawaddy; and, though landing at Moulmein was possible, these forces would be separated from Rangoon by big rivers and a flank guard against Siam would be essential.

Operations down the Arakan coast were designed to obtain air bases to give air cover for successive landings and finally for assault on Rangoon, but the latter town could not thus be captured in one season.

When Generals Arnold and Somervell had arrived from Casablanca with the proposal that a plan to capture Burma in one campaigning season should be drawn up, it was decided that the object could only be achieved in one way.

An advance by land must be made in Upper Burma to contain Japanese forces. This must be followed by landings on the Arakan coast to provide bases for air cover for a direct assault on Rangoon
by going up the river. Forces from Assam and the Chinese from Yunnan would join up. The final assault up the Rangoon River was extremely difficult and hazardous. Though the river was not at present heavily defended, this could quickly be done if the Japanese learned of our intentions.

Certain conditions were essential if this plan was to be successful. Sufficient forces must be available, fully trained and fully equipped with all the necessary supplies and specialized equipment, and be ready to start operations at the beginning of the dry season during the first fortnight of November. Planning and Operational staffs were gotten together to prepare for the operation; and it was estimated that 180,000 tons of supplies a month, loading during March, April, May and June, were essential in order to mount the operation. In fact, in March and April only 70,000 and 65,000 tons respectively had been loaded. This was approximately half the normal maintenance requirements, and the operation was thus put back from two to three months.

The operations on the Arakan coast had proved that the Japanese were as good in defense as in attack and that our troops would require careful and lengthy training. Training in India was a difficult process due to the climate, and took longer than elsewhere. It was unlikely that the necessary shipping or naval forces would be available and therefore ANAKIM as originally planned was not possible of execution in full during the coming cold weather season. He was prepared to undertake the operation only if fully trained and equipped troops were available with the necessary amphibious transport assault and landing ships and specialized equipment. However much shipping was sent now it would not be in time for the forces to be ready in early November.

Admiral Leahy asked Field Marshal Wavell what he considered to be the best practicable action which could be taken to keep China in the war.

Field Marshal Wavell said that he fully realized the political importance of the recapture of Burma, both on China and on India. Even if operation ANAKIM was undertaken in full and was successful the Burma Road was unlikely to attain a capacity of 20,000 tons per month until June 1945. He believed the U. S. Air Force was now ferrying some 6,000 tons per month into China and hoped to work up to 10,000 tons per month. This was a greater capacity than the road would have for a long time and it might be possible to raise even this figure. He believed that the best way to help China was to increase the strength of General Chennault's forces and that this, together with an increase of air-borne supplies, would have more material re-
ults than operation Anakim. An unsuccessful operation into Burma would be almost worse than no operation at all. General Chennault's forces could bring pressure to bear both against Japanese air and their shipping and port facilities. These were their weak links. It was not easy to construct more air fields in Assam since the requirements of gasoline and of construction material, including steel tracks, were heavy. If large-scale operations into Burma were not undertaken, then it would be easier to construct the air fields required to increase the flow into China. Thus it would be feasible to increase General Chennault's forces which could then achieve bigger results.

Admiral Leahy thanked Field Marshal Wavell for his description of the position in Burma.

Admiral Leahy explained that it was essential that we should find some method of giving assistance to China so that we could take advantage of Chinese manpower and eventually have bases in China for direct attack against Japan proper. He asked General Stilwell for his views on this subject.

General Stilwell stated that in his opinion it was absolutely necessary that we give the Chinese assistance in the near future. Their economic situation is rapidly deteriorating and the morale of the people and the army is bad. At present there is a great need to build up ground forces to make the route safe to the bases in China we hope eventually to establish. He had been worried since last summer lest the Japanese should undertake operations for the purpose of seizing Kuning. If the Japanese could successfully accomplish this, even a recaptured Burma would be of no use to us, and China would be lost. He was firmly of the opinion that Yunnan Province must be held and at present saw no way to accomplish this except by the use of the Chinese Army. He felt that if a route for supplying China could be made safe, everything else would follow; and conversely, if the route were lost, all of China would be lost. Therefore, the fundamental necessity was to insure the retention of our present route and its terminals and to conduct offensive operations to improve the supply situation. He stated that other things which we might undertake against the Japanese from China, such as conducting air offensives against their shipping and ground installations, would hurt the Japanese to some extent, but could not be decisive. On the other hand, they might provoke violent and fatal reaction on the part of the Japanese. In referring to Field Marshal Wavell's statement with reference to 6,000 tons per month being moved into China by air, he stated that 3,400 tons per month was the greatest air load yet shipped over the hump, and that was under the most favorable conditions. He was of the opinion that this volume could not be materially increased
within the next six months. If all the tonnage of the air transport were devoted to air effort, that is, for use by the 14th Air Force, it would hearten the Chinese to some extent, but with the means available, nothing really effective could be done to help the Chinese. He believed that the 14th Air Force should continue on a defensive mission in order that the minimum essential equipment could be supplied the Chinese troops in Yunnan. There were now 32 divisions in Yunnan, and the goal set was to try to carry 10,000 tons of equipment for this force. That, together with what could be scraped together in China, would enable this force to be put in the field at least partly equipped by the fall. He was firmly of the opinion that the best way to help the Chinese situation was to reassure the Chinese that a main effort was being made to reopen the supply route from India. If this were not done, he believed the Chinese reaction would be very serious. There were certain pro-Japanese elements in China that were taking advantage of an increasing feeling in the minds of some Chinese that no material help could be made available. Unless this condition could be remedied promptly, the situation would become dangerous. Delay might make it impossible for us to seize the bases which we needed in south and east China.

Admiral Leahy asked General Stilwell what he meant by “something must be done.”

General Stilwell replied that we must open the road to China—undertake operation Anakim.

In reply to a question asked by Sir Alan Brooke as to when he considered it essential to have the road opened, General Stilwell replied, by January ’44, or as soon as possible. The limiting date is a year from now. China can not be expected to hold out for another year and a half, if for that long.

Admiral King suggested that General Stilwell meant that although the road might not actually be completed or in a condition to carry an appreciable volume of traffic, the psychological reaction on China in allaying their fears would keep them from cracking.

General Stilwell agreed.

Sir Alan Brooke asked whether or not it was correct that if we were to undertake operations to open the Burma Road, the cost would have to be borne by the air effort in China and if he recommended undertaking such operations at the expense of the air effort.

General Stilwell replied that the air effort could be supported with 3,000 tons a month. That amounted to only one train a day at most. The bases at Imphal and Ledo were pretty well stocked by now, and he did not see why any material reduction in the air effort should be caused. If 10,000 tons per month could be made available
to the Chinese Divisions in Yunnan, they would be in suitable state for use in the fall.

Field Marshal Wavell stated that he had never intended to convey that limited ground operations could not be carried out at the same time as full-scale air operations.

In answer to a question by Admiral Leahy as to whether or not limited operations would help the situation in China, General Stilwell stated that such operations would help materially. Any way in which the line of communications could be improved would provide appreciable assistance. It was his opinion that operations to clear Burma, north of a northeast and southwest line through Lashio, should be undertaken.

Field Marshal Wavell said that he gravely doubted the ability to maintain forces in that area during the rainy season unless they were able during the dry season, in addition to conducting the offensive, to build approximately 200 miles of road.

General Stilwell stated that he was fully aware of this condition and that the plans called for building the road.

Field Marshal Wavell pointed out the enormous effort involved and stated that it would utilize practically all of the engineering personnel and equipment. He stated that the basic objection to seizing northern Burma was that once occupied it could not be maintained, especially if we were to go as far as Mandalay. The Japanese have railroad, river, and road communications from Rangoon and can develop and support a much larger force. Also they would be operating out of a dry area, which extends to the north of Prome, where movement and operations are possible during the wet season. We, on the other hand, could reach only the northern edge of this dry area from which the Japanese would be operating and would be confronted with immense supply problems; in addition, we would have no air support unless air fields could be constructed in northern Burma. This would be a gigantic undertaking.

Air Marshal Peirse pointed out that the movement of supplies for the air force used in support of the ground operations in north Burma would be of such volume that it would cut down materially supplies by air to China.

Field Marshal Wavell said that part of the plan called for a pipeline to Imphal and Ledo to supply gasoline for the support of the operations. This would effect a great reduction in the load on rail, river and road and also on the amounting of trucking. However, at present there was only a limited amount of pipe available.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that a limited operation for the purpose of opening a road in northern Burma would require practically
the whole of the force involved to protect the road and in turn demand a greater volume of supplies over the road for the support and maintenance of troops. He believed that the only effective way of opening a supply route to China was to recapture the whole of Burma.

Admiral King pointed out that if the present air route could be shifted further to the south, where the mountains were not so high, each of the planes could carry a greater load and therefore materially increase the volume of supplies.

Admiral Leahy stated that, of course, we could expect the Japanese to attack the road, but would they have enough troops available to attack it in greater strength than we could support in the same area?

Admiral King, referring to a possible operation against Bangkok previously mentioned by Sir Alan Brooke, stated that he felt that such an operation would get at the root of the Japanese communications, and if undertaken, would cut their supply.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he believed that an operation against Bangkok would develop a vacuum, and that we should not launch such an operation until we were ready to carry it through to completion. He agreed with Admiral King that it was a vital spot in the center of the Japanese communications system.

General Marshall said that the whole problem of maintaining China in the war was one of logistic difficulties which must be linked to our capabilities of overcoming them. He would like Field Marshal Wavell to prepare his views on this so that the U. S. Planners, General Stilwell and General Somervell could examine them. The object of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff was to maintain China in the war since they assigned immense strategic importance to this in relation to the ultimate outcome of the war with Japan.

Admiral Leahy stated that all of this discussion on Burma had been very interesting. It was clearly indicated that we had a very difficult problem before us and that we must do something to improve the conditions in China. This resolved itself into a study of the logistic problems incident to her supply. He agreed with General Marshall that the best line of approach would be to study these logistic problems which should indicate a line of action to be followed.

4. Future Business

Sir Alan Brooke, in answer to a question by Admiral Leahy, suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff have one more meeting before directing the Planners to prepare an agenda.

Admiral Leahy agreed that after the discussion with the President and the Prime Minister that afternoon, the Combined Chiefs of Staff
would be better able to give the Planners instructions for the preparation of the agenda. It may well prove desirable to discuss the Oriental problem first. He suggested that the question of the agenda be taken as the first item at tomorrow's meeting.

Admiral Leahy expressed his appreciation to Field Marshal Wavell and General Stilwell for the information presented at the Conference.

**The Combined Chiefs of Staff:**

a. Approved the conclusions of the 83rd Meeting as recorded in the minutes.

b. Agreed:

(1) That, with reference to Conclusion a(5) of the 83rd Meeting, the Combined Planners would require general directions to enable them to prepare an agenda for the remaining Conferences.

(2) That these directions should be considered at the beginning of their next meeting.

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**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, MAY 14, 1943, 2 P.M., THE WHITE HOUSE**

**Present**

**UNITED STATES**

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Stilwell
Lieutenant General McNarney
Major General Chennault

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Prime Minister Churchill
Field Marshal Dill
Field Marshal Wavell
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral Somerville
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Ismay

**Secretariat**

Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

J.C.S. Files

**Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes**

The President said that this Conference had been called to talk about the local situation in the India-Burma-China Theater because that area presented problems which were extremely difficult. The United Nations were now on dead center with regard to operations in that area. The thought on the subject must be simplified. He said the problem should be divided into two main subdivisions: first, operations to be carried out forthwith and, second, operations to be carried out at the end of the present monsoon season. The two should not be confused. Preparations for operations in November and December
of 1943 must certainly start now, but preparations for operations to be carried out forthwith must be rushed.

The President indicated that China is now in a dangerous political condition. The United Nations could not let China go to pieces. It should be remembered, when discussing demands of the Generalissimo, that he was the head of the Army and of the State. It was imperative that the United Nations not be put in the position of being responsible in any way for the collapse of China. It was no longer possible to simply tell China to take what she was given. There must be active cooperation on the part of the United Nations. An attitude of It can't be done could not be tolerated because it was certain that something must be done. He said there would have to be a 1943 affirmative.

The Prime Minister said that there must be a 1943 and a 1944 affirmative.

The President then asked those present to express their convictions freely on the subject of China and asked the Prime Minister to present his views.

The Prime Minister said he felt that the President had put the case very clearly. He himself had once been keen on action of the ANAKIM type and two years ago had written a memorandum on the subject, a copy of which he had given to Admiral King at Casablanca, in which he had proposed an operation through Rangoon on Bangkok. A decision had been made at Casablanca that ANAKIM was to be mounted. Accordingly, Field Marshal Wavell had prepared a plan which was in his opinion the best method for accomplishing the recapture of Burma. The Prime Minister said he now gathered that Field Marshal Wavell considered the outlook for the accomplishment of this plan to be bleak, but he still held it feasible if and when the necessary material was provided.

The Prime Minister said that operations in Burma so far had not been effective. However, they had taught lessons. He said when he looked at Field Marshal Wavell's plan, in the light of results to date, he did not like the looks of it. He questioned the value of trying to retake Burma now, and asked if it could not be by-passed. If so, would not the construction and defense of air fields be sufficient to insure a flow of supplies into China? The question was how to construct these air fields quickly and to insure their protection. He said that, for himself, he had little inclination to go to swampy jungles in

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1 Chiang Kai-shek.
2 The Churchill memorandum described here has not been found. On the evening of January 17, 1943, in the course of the Casablanca Conference, Admiral King and Churchill did have a conversation during which the Prime Minister apparently expressed himself in favor of operations in the Burma area in 1943; see the editorial note, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, pp. 612–613.
which operations could be conducted for only five months of the year, country infested with malaria, where modern equipment could not be used. The idea of making four attacks from the sea, to say nothing of the advance up the Rangoon River to Rangoon, subject to attack from shore defenses of various kinds, did not present a favorable outlook. All of these factors, together with the long lines of communications, made the prospects for Anakim, as now planned, extremely gloomy, a view that was shared by his military advisers.

The Prime Minister indicated that he could not see how operations in the swamps of Burma would help the Chinese. The factor that had turned him against the plan, more than any other, was that only 20,000 tons could be transported over the Burma Road, and then only in early 1945, even though Anakim were completely successful. He questioned what would happen to the Chinese in the interval. He felt that the above considerations indicated that there should be a passionate development of air transport into China, and the build-up of air forces in China, as the objectives for 1943.

The Prime Minister then turned the discussion to 1944. He indicated an Asiatic Torch should be sought. A blow should be struck where it could be accomplished with complete surprise. It would, of necessity, have to be an operation which would attract enemy reaction and thus take the pressure off China and the South Pacific. He suggested the possibility of seizing the northern tip of Sumatra. It would be much better to baffle the enemy by surprise than to continue with the development of the obvious.

The President said that in the Torch operation the objective had been to drive the Axis forces out of Africa, or at least to form a junction between Generals Alexander and Montgomery in the East and General Eisenhower's forces in the West. Our objectives in China should be: first, to save China and keep it going and, second, to continue to increase the rate of attrition on Japan in ships and airplanes. He said that until now the United Nations have met with considerable success in their battle of attrition against Japan, but the pace would have to be stepped up. He then asked Field Marshal Wavell to express his views on the Burma and Anakim operation.

Field Marshal Wavell said that he had had the Burma campaign and Burma constantly in mind for two years. He considered it to be the most important pivot in the war against Japan. After war had been declared, it became impossible to defend Burma once the United Nations had lost control of the seas. He had been thinking of the reconquest of that country ever since. He said he was convinced that a reconquest could not be accomplished by land operations alone but must be combined with amphibious operations and naval action. He
had always realized the political effect that the loss of Burma had on China and also upon India. The moral effect on both countries was also of extreme importance.

Field Marshal Wavell said that the more he had planned for reconquest the more difficult it had become. Communications to northeast India, which must be a base for land operations, are extremely difficult. They are dependent upon a railroad which has small capacity and is often out of operation for long periods. Air fields must have metal or concrete surfaces. To illustrate the difficulties in communications, he said that his troops at Manipur had never been on full rations during the last monsoon period because of the effect of rain on the roads. Current operations have shown that the Japanese have good troops for defensive fighting, whereas the Indian forces, accustomed to the open plains, require intensive training for this type of warfare.

Field Marshal Wavell said that when he was asked to produce a plan to conquer Burma in the next dry season, he had had prepared what he thought was the best plan possible. Even so, it was a hazardous one and difficult of accomplishment. He felt it had a reasonable chance of success if his troops were fully trained and equipped. The plan required a considerable increase of supplies which had to be sent to the theater at once. It was necessary that 180,000 tons per month be sent to India. Actually, in March and April only 65,000 and 70,000 tons respectively had been shipped. He felt that therefore the operation could not start in November as originally planned. Unless the operation could start in November, it could not succeed in the coming dry season. It would be necessary to get land-based air cover on the Arakan coast first, then capture Rangoon, while, at the same time, conducting operations in the north with British and Chinese troops. The Chinese forces from the north and the British-Indian forces from the south would then attempt to form a junction. After that it would be necessary to repair the railroads and bring supplies in through Rangoon and ship them north in order to start repair of the Burma Road. His administrative experts had informed him that the road could not be fully opened to traffic until the middle of 1945.

The Field Marshal indicated that relief to China would therefore not be effective until 1945, but that the moral effect, on the other hand, would be considerable at once to both China and India. If success was assured, it would be worth hazarding the losses. He said, however, that an unsuccessful expedition would be much worse than none at all.
Field Marshal Wavell said that his Planners had been examining alternatives. He said that, in the long run, it was probable that more supplies could be sent into China by air alone in the next 18 months than would be the case if the air transport was required to use much of its capacity for operations leading to the construction of the Burma Road.

The possibility of using troops in the India Theater for some other operation was being examined. An effort was being made to determine the effect of creating a break or landing somewhere in the semi-circle from Burma through the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and Java. Possible objectives were Bangkok via the Kra Isthmus, northern Sumatra, and Malaya, or the Sunda Straits. Bangkok was considered to be impracticable because there was no adequate port or routes across the Kra Isthmus. Sunda Straits was an attractive objective because it threatens the Palembang oil fields. This, however, was not possible within the resources available. An operation which did appear to be promising was one which would seize three or four air fields in northern Sumatra and from there drive on into the Malayan Peninsula at Penang, where there were four or five additional air fields. The object of such an expedition would be to place large air forces in Sumatra and Malaya from where they could attack Bangkok, Singapore, the Palembang oil fields, and Japanese shipping. If it were possible to place strong air forces on northern Sumatra and protect them, a bad situation would be created for the Japanese and cause them considerable air losses. The expedition would probably require about the same forces as would be required by Anakim. It would have the advantage that the operation would not be dependent on the monsoon. It would be an expensive operation in aircraft because of the distance from air bases and it would also require considerable shipping. The proposed operation, if feasible, however, would cause considerable attrition to Japanese air power and shipping. The Japanese would have to react to the United Nations' operations and this would bring on air battles. Considerable further study would be required before an opinion could be given as to the possibility of the operation.

In reply to a question by the Prime Minister, the Field Marshal said the operation proposed could not take place until 1944.

The President pointed out that there were many naval problems involved in the capture of Rangoon. He questioned whether sufficient carriers could be made available.

Admiral Somerville said that the Rangoon operation was not attractive. Even to seize the air fields on the Arakan coast would require carriers standing off from one to three weeks, which was too long against Japanese land-based air attack. Seizure of Rangoon
was not feasible unless it could be covered to some extent by land-based aircraft from the Arakan coast.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound indicated that carriers could not be made available until they could be released from the Mediterranean.

Admiral Somerville said that the naval approach to Rangoon was narrow and could be easily defended. He doubted if the operation was feasible from the naval point of view.

Air Chief Marshal Peirse said that, from an airmen’s point of view, air development appeared to meet the requirements, which were

a. to defeat the enemy air forces;
b. to assure military aid to China; and
c. to bring support in the form of supplies at the earliest date.

One thing was essential and that was that we should have adequate air forces operating from India to neutralize Japanese air forces which might interfere with the air route. He pointed out that it had become clear that the development of land operations through Assam into China and development of the facilities required both for the Royal Air Force and the American Ferry Command were mutually antagonistic. He continued that, in his opinion, if all the effort was put into building up the air forces operating under General Chennault and the air transport into China, much more could be done than is at present planned. He felt that the tonnage over the air transport route to China could be considerably increased. He further considered that, for the defense of this air route, it was not necessary to reconquer Burmese territory, provided that Allied Air Forces were adequate for the neutralization of the enemy air forces.

Referring to Anakim, Air Chief Marshal Peirse said that he had never considered the plan to be sound since the sea-borne expedition and the landings could not be supported by land-based aircraft. The plan was based on the assumption that the enemy might have 300 to 350 aircraft and that of these, 100 might attack any landing operation. Clearly the defense which one or two carriers could oppose would be quite inadequate to a scale of attack of this order.

The President asked how many airports there were in the area from Assam to Chittagong.

Air Chief Marshal Peirse said that at the present moment he was operating 14 squadrons from forward airdromes between northeast Assam and Chittagong, exclusive of those used by the American Air Force.

The President asked if the runways were long enough for bombers.

Air Chief Marshal Peirse replied that there were six air fields with hard runways from which medium and heavy bombers could
operate. For the most part, heavy bombers operated from air fields further back. He said that the plan to capture Sumatra has considerable merit because it extends our air cover eastward and interferes with the Japanese shipping lanes. The radius of bomber aircraft operating from Malaya to northern Sumatra will extend far enough to meet that of bombers operating through southern China. He considered that air operations undertaken from Malaya in conjunction with offensive air operations undertaken from China would be bound to draw considerable enemy air forces into these areas to oppose them. Such air forces the enemy could ill spare.

General Stilwell said that the weight of opinion was apparently against him. To his mind China represented a base which the United Nations wanted. They wanted it both for its geographic position and for the use of Chinese manpower. He felt that ultimately the United Nations must meet the Japanese Army on the mainland of Asia. If China were allowed to fall now, it would be a long road back before the United Nations would be in a position to meet Japan on Chinese soil. He said that to keep China in the war it was essential to retain control of Yunnan.

General Stilwell said that he had been worried for a long time over the possibilities of a Japanese attack against Kunming, particularly one from the south. The Japanese have the forces available in Indo China to make such an attack. He said that if we are to hold Yunnan, ground forces must be trained to do it, and they must be Chinese forces.

General Stilwell said that there are now 32 divisions in training which will be available for the defense of Yunnan. At the present time they have a strength of about 8,100. However, it is planned to inactivate one out of each three divisions so as to bring the remainder to a total strength of 10,000 each. This will result in 22 divisions being available as soon as their equipment is received and the others will be brought up to strength later. He felt that if this force could be trained and equipped, it would be capable of defending Yunnan Province. Sufficient equipment would be available if 10,000 tons capacity were utilized for this purpose over the air transport route between now and September.

General Stilwell indicated that it was absolutely essential to open land communications to China. Even though the initial supplies were small, they would have a tremendous moral effect on China and munitions thus transported would be used to build up a second group of 30 divisions which had been promised by the Generalissimo. He said that under this program there would ultimately be a force capable of fighting the Japanese. If supplies for these
ground forces were not sent at once, it would be impossible to train and equip the Chinese Yunnan forces and the Chinese Army would disappear. He admitted that if all supplies were devoted to building up the Chinese Air Forces, it would have an effect on the Japanese shipping lanes, and it would be a shot in the arm to Chinese morale, but he felt that it would not lead to decisive results. He said as soon as the build-up of American forces begins to sting the Japanese too much, they will launch an attack from Indo China to capture the Kunming Area. If that proved to be the case, the eastern terminal of the air route would disappear and China would be out of the war. It was imperative, therefore, that Yunnan Province be defended and the only way this could be accomplished was by the build-up of Chinese Ground Forces.

The President said that he had never accepted such a low tonnage figure for the air route, that it must be divided up between Air and Ground equipment. Why should not sufficient be conveyed for both?

General Stilwell said that up to the present, 3,400 tons had been the maximum conveyed in any one month. Increased quantities were certainly possible on paper, but it must always be remembered that we were fighting the conditions of the country, the monsoon, and inadequate air fields, and there was always the danger that the Japanese would interfere with the route.

Field Marshal Wavell said that there was no great danger to the Assam air fields from land attack. The warning system was reasonably adequate, giving 13 minutes warning.

General Stilwell thought that the warning system required improvement. He thought that all possible steps had already been taken by Field Marshal Wavell to speed up the development of the air fields. Labor had already been switched from the Ledo Road.

In response to an inquiry by the President, General Stilwell said that his requirements for the Chinese Army in Yunnan were 2,000 tons a month in the next five months; and General Chennault said that he required 4,700 tons a month for four months, and after that 7,000 tons a month.

The President suggested that the immediate objective for the air route should therefore be 7,000 tons a month.

In further discussion, it was pointed out that the plan was already to achieve 10,000 tons per month by November, though something might be done to speed up matters so as to try to achieve 7,000 tons a month by July.

General Stilwell said that the only way of getting large quantities of material into China was by road. We might, by a great effort,
achieve 10,000 tons by air, but a land route would ultimately be essential.

The President said that it must be borne in mind that the Generalissimo was head of the State, as well as Commander in Chief. General Stillwell and General Chennault were thus in a sense under him when they were in his territory. It was difficult from the psychological point of view to tell the Generalissimo that we thought things should be done in some manner different from his ideas.

General Chennault agreed that it was necessary to listen to what the Generalissimo said. His own plan was first to use his air forces to protect the terminal base in Yunnan, and then to operate from another area farther east from which Japanese shipping could be attacked in the Hong Kong-Formosa area. He doubted whether the Japanese could advance across-country and capture Yunnan. They had never yet succeeded in such an operation. They had always advanced up rivers which they used for their line of communication, and the traffic on the rivers was thus open to air attack. The Generalissimo certainly feared an attack up the Yangtze, but quite a small force, say two Fighter squadrons and one Bomber squadron, would be enough to prevent such an advance.

The Prime Minister suggested that if all efforts now concentrating on the Ledo Road and on supporting the troops in Burma were concentrated on developing the air fields, the progress might be more rapid, and the higher tonnage might be achieved earlier.

Field Marshal Wavell said that a certain amount of resources might be saved from the Ledo Road, though it was in itself of some importance for improving the warning system. Air fields already had first priority.

General Marshall said that several steel mats for air fields were on their way, and General Wheeler’s demand for two or three more Engineer Battalions was under examination. It might be possible to supply these from the Middle East.

The President inquired what would be the effect on the Generalissimo if Operation Anaxim were not carried out.

General Stillwell said that the effect was unpredictable, but there was no doubt that the Generalissimo was relying on the operation.

General Chennault said that the Generalissimo always wanted definite commitments on dates and size of forces. He believed that if 7,000 tons a month were flown in the Generalissimo would be satisfied.

Field Marshal Dill pointed out that the Generalissimo knew about the plan for 10,000 tons a month, and was expecting this to be carried
out in addition to Anakim. A 7,000 ton project would thus not be anything new to him.

General Stilwell said that the Generalissimo felt that he had been himself concerned in the making of the Anakim plan, and was committed to it. He expected the operation to be carried out as planned. If it were not, he would feel deserted. Operations against Sumatra or Malaya would have no bearing on the opening of the Burma Road, and would thus greatly prolong the period during which no steps were being taken to reopen it. The Chinese were suspicious of the British, and it would be necessary for the British to prove to them that they were in earnest. The effect of the cancellation of Anakim would be very bad on the Chinese people, and the development of the air supply route would not be regarded as an adequate substitute.

The Prime Minister said that he was not prepared to undertake something foolish purely in order to placate the Chinese. He was not prepared to make war that way. He would do anything that was sensible to help the Chinese in exactly the same way as he would do anything that was sensible to help the Russians; but he did not see any particular value in carrying out costly operations to no purpose.

Admiral King said that the Burma Road was a symbol to the Chinese, and operations in Burma would make them feel that at any rate the reopening was on the way.

The President suggested that a possible alternative solution would be to make use of the forces designed for Anakim for an advance towards China, opening the Road as the advance progressed.

Field Marshall Wavell said that this possibility had been carefully studied. The question was how could a force advancing in this manner be sustained? The railhead in Assam was already overloaded. Beyond that there were 200 miles of hill road already completed. Then came 80 miles of partly made hill road to a point still west of the Chindwin River. After that point there was no all-weather road at all in Upper Burma north of Mandalay. The Japanese had built a dry-weather road towards the Chin hills, but it was separated from the end of our road by 120 miles. We should have to build 250 miles of all-weather road in 4/5 months—an engineering effort entirely beyond the capacity of the line of communication through Assam to support. Upper Burma was the most malarial country in the world, and if operations were continued there in the rainy season, 25% casualties per month must be expected. It might be better to go down to Mandalay, rather than to try to go due east, but after we got to Mandalay, we should then be trying to maintain our forces over 300 miles of road of which 150 miles were
not all-weather. We could not possibly meet the Japanese on even terms as they would have behind them the railway, the road, and the river. He did not think it would be possible to cut their line of communication decisively by air.

General Stilwell, in reply to a question by the President, said that he agreed with Field Marshal Wavell that an attack on Rangoon would be very hazardous. He thought it might be better to go in through Bassein.

Admiral Somerville observed that an attack on Bassein was open to the same objection, that for two or three weeks air support would have to be provided by carriers.

The Prime Minister, reverting to General Stilwell's statement about the attitude of the Chinese, said that he was sorry to hear that the Chinese were suspicious of the British. The British had asked nothing of the Chinese and were prepared to do anything that would really contribute to their safety. He was not prepared, however, to undertake months of unprofitable operations in order to remove the unfounded suspicions of the Chinese. The United States would realize that it was not a question of saving the expenditure of British blood. The British were perfectly prepared to fight in true brotherhood with their Allies.

General Stilwell explained that it was only because China was essential ultimately as a base that it was so necessary to undertake operations to open the way thereto.

The Prime Minister said that he was not at present convinced that this was so. However, he saw no reason openly to abandon the operation at present. He thought that moves in preparation should continue provided they did not hamper the development of the air route. Further study would be necessary before a decision could be taken on the actual operation to be carried out.

The President said that he thought the two objectives should be to get 7,000 tons a month by air into China by July; and, secondly, to open land communication with China. It was for the Military advisers to suggest the best way in which the latter objective could be carried out.

Admiral Leahy thought that the task for the staffs was to find out the most promising operation to open the way to China irrespective of any agreement actually to carry it out in the immediate future.

General Marshall urged that no suggestion be made to the Generalissimo that 7,000 tons per month was the target as this would appear to the latter as a reduction from the 10,000 tons per month which he knows to be the objective. He said that in the development
of Anaxim, RAVENOUS had been the first approach. Field Marshal Wavell had objected to RAVENOUS as being unsound for supply reasons, Sir Alan Brooke had objected because of the insecurity of the south flank, and the Generalissimo had objected because it was not coupled with naval action. Finally, Anaxim in its present form had been agreed upon by all. This was now considered to be impracticable. He said that the plan proposed by General Stilwell was new in many of its features and should be thoroughly explored.

SATURDAY, MAY 15, 1943
MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 15, 1943, 10:30 A. M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNarney
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Horne
Vice Admiral Willson
Major General Streett
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Smart
Commander Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Ismay
Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Porter
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Macleod

Secretariat
Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the conclusions of the 84th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes.

2. FUTURE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

Admiral Leahy said that the Committee had not yet directed the Planners to prepare an agenda for future work. He suggested that

1 C.G.S. 85th meeting.
2 Ante, p. 96.
the Combined Chiefs of Staff should first consider various courses of action open to achieve the defeat of the Axis in Europe and then similarly the defeat of Japan.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff held much the same views. He felt that Roundup should first be considered, and for this it would be desirable to have expositions of the U.S. conception of this operation and a study of conditions and feasibility; next, operations in the Mediterranean might be discussed based on the British Chiefs of Staff memorandum; and, lastly, the war with Japan, considering operations in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and their coordination.

When the scope and requirements of operations in the theaters had been defined, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would then proceed to examine the extent to which our demands for shipping resources could meet what was proposed. After that, the Committee would consider the global strategy in terms of concrete facts and deal with miscellaneous points such as the Portuguese islands and Ploesti.

Admiral King felt that the first step should be to set out agreed basic fundamentals: for instance, the vital importance of Atlantic and Pacific lines of communications, security of the citadel of Britain, and the fact that the full weight must be thrown first on the defeat of Germany. To this might be added others. Was China essential as a basis for the defeat of Japan? These fundamentals, when agreed, would constitute a point of departure and yardsticks by which our strategy could be judged. Many of these points had been contained in previous papers, but he felt it important that a fresh statement should be got out as early as possible.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed with Admiral King's views and suggested that the Planners should be instructed to prepare a document on those lines.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

a. That the Combined Staff Planners should prepare for consideration on Monday morning, 17 May:

(1) A statement of agreed essentials for the effective prosecution of the war, which would serve as a background for the formulation of future plans, e.g., security of essential sea communications; security of the citadel of Britain; etc.²

² In pursuance of these instructions, the Combined Staff Planners prepared and circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 16, 1943, a report designated C.C.S. 232, not printed. The report was discussed and agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 17, 1943, post, p. 93 subject to certain emendations. For text of the final version of the report, designated C.C.S. 232/1, May 18, 1943, see post, p. 231.
(2) A draft agenda for the remaining conferences in the light of the discussion which had taken place.4

3. OPERATIONS IN BURMA

Sir Alan Brooke said that at the White House the previous day 5 it had been agreed that the staffs should, in consultation with the U.S. and British commanders in the area, examine the best means of expanding the air route to China and of opening a land route from India.

Sir Charles Portal said that he considered it important that the commanders concerned should be consulted so that the orders the Combined Chiefs of Staff would give as a result of their deliberations would be related to practical possibilities.

Admiral Leahy suggested that it would be desirable that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should offer Dr. T. V. Soong and General Chu an opportunity to express the views of General Chiang Kai-shek at an early date.6

The Committee then discussed a draft directive to the Combined Planners with reference to a study of operations in Burma.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

a. That the Combined Staff Planners, in consultation as necessary with the British and U.S. Commanders in Chief, India and China Theaters, should examine and report on:

(1) The potentialities of the air route from Assam to China given complete priority for its development except for the minimum requirements of the forces defending the air field areas, and whether any further steps can now be taken to enable these potentialities to be realized.7

(2) The most promising operation, having regard to the various considerations brought to light in previous discussions, for the opening of a land route to China, and what resources and conditions are necessary for carrying it put without prejudicing the development of the air route.8

4 Pursuant to this directive, the Combined Staff Planners prepared a draft agenda which was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 16, 1943, as C.C.S. 233, not printed. At their meeting on May 17, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered and approved the draft agenda, subject to certain amendments; the revised agenda was subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 233/1, May 17, 1943, post, p. 229.
5 For record of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on May 14, 1943, see ante, p. 66.
6 Regarding Soong’s request to be allowed to participate in the Conference, see the letter of May 13, 1943, from Soong to Hopkins, post, p. 288.
7 C.C.S. 229, “Potentialities of Air Route From Assam to China”, circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 19, 1943, not printed. At their meeting on May 20, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed that C.C.S. 229 be withdrawn from the Agenda; see post, p. 142.
8 C.C.S. 231, “Operations in Burma To Open and Secure an Overland Route to China”, circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 19, 1943, not printed. At their meeting on May 20, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed that C.C.S. 231 be withdrawn from the Agenda; see post, p. 142.
b. That Dr. T. V. Soong and Major General Shih-ming Chu should be invited to appear at the meeting on Monday, 17 May, and express the views of the Generalissimo regarding operations in the Burma-China Theater. 9

4. OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

Sir Alan Brooke considered the possibilities of undertaking Roundup should be examined in relation to the results which would accrue from the shutting down of future operations in the Mediterranean. United States views on the possibilities of the Bolero build-up and their conception of the scope and results of cross-Channel operations would be of value. Similarly, operations in the Mediterranean should be examined with the British Chiefs of Staff paper as a basis for discussion.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the acceptance of General Eaker's plan for the build-up of Sickle as one of the fundamentals of our agreed strategy. 10

Sir Alan Brooke believed that at this stage Sickle should not be accepted as a fundamental since it might on further examination be found to tie our hands with regard to future plans.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement that Sickle should not at this stage be accepted as a fundamental, though it was obvious that the intensity of our air bombardment would have a material effect on any land operations, whether undertaken across the Channel or in the Mediterranean and should not therefore be reduced except after critical examination.

Sir Charles Portal said that the most important point was to decide whether the defeat of Germany would be brought nearer by immediate Mediterranean operations at some expense to Bolero, or, alternatively, by stopping operations in the Mediterranean in order to build up at the maximum rate for cross-Channel operations. The Planners should examine this problem with a view to a combined assessment of the effect on Germany of the two alternatives.

Sir Alan Brooke said that both the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff were agreed that Roundup must be undertaken as early as possible, but in the British view it was necessary, before Roundup could be successful, to create a suitable situation by diversion of German forces. The United States view was that the war could be won by cross-Channel operations in 1944, but he was not clear as to the exact plan by which decisive results would be achieved.

9 See post, p. 87.
10 A brief presentation of Eaker's plan for the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom is set forth in enclosure B to C.C.S. 217, May 14, 1943, post, p. 241.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that great faith was being pinned to the results of the bomber offensive. We must be ready to take advantage of these results. He was concerned lest any delay in building up forces in the United Kingdom would result in our not being ready when the moment presented itself. The British believed that operations in the Mediterranean would not materially slow up the Bolero movement. The exact results of the air attacks might be problematical, but the availability of tonnage to move troops could be calculated.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it was estimated that further operations in the Mediterranean would only result in some three to four fewer U.S. Divisions being available in the United Kingdom.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had last year considered the necessity of undertaking operation Sledgehammer to relieve pressure on the Russian Front, but the situation there was now very different. The landing of 25 divisions in France at that time might have been suicidal, but now there was the possibility of concentrating our vast air superiority in direct support of the land forces in the bridgehead, thereby materially altering the balance of force in our favor.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that our air power could be withdrawn from attacks on German industry and transferred to the direct aid of our land forces, but even if the area of ground operations could thereby be isolated, the penetration of these forces inland could not be assisted since the British Air Force was not yet fully on a mobile basis.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that certain U.S. fighter units in the U.K. were on a fully mobile basis. He stressed the psychological effect of a landing in France. He did not believe that the effect of overwhelming air superiority on the Continent had been appreciated, whereas great stress had been laid on its value in the Mediterranean.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in considering the results to be expected from air support of ground operations, it must be remembered that, in North Africa, though we had had air superiority since El Alamein, Rommel had been able to move his army back into Tunisia relatively intact. Similarly in Tunisia the enemy had been able to reinforce by some 100,000 men.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out the outstanding results achieved by the use of air power in Tunisia as soon as the weather had improved.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out with regard to air power that fighter cover was essential.

GENERAL McNARNEY agreed but said that he believed that a bridgehead in France would enable us to move forward the necessary fighter cover. Air power must be related to our ground power. For instance, it might well be that the correct application of air power might
halve the number of divisions required to overcome a given resistance. The seizure of the bridgehead would insure that the fighter line could be advanced and air power applied at the correct moment in support of ground operations.

Sir Charles Portal said that he entirely agreed in the abstract with General McNarney’s last statement but it was important that in considering the seizure of, say, the Brest Peninsula, the Planners should carefully work out the rate at which fighter cover could be developed in that area in order that the plan could be assessed on a sound tactical and logistic basis.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out the further limitations of port capacity in the bridgehead.

Admiral Leach agreed to the study suggested by Sir Charles Portal. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff had prepared a brief outline plan for ROUNDP which would be circulated for the information of the British Chiefs of Staff. He believed that the results expected from the air bombardment of Germany should be taken into consideration both in connection with cross-Channel and Mediterranean operations.

Sir Charles Portal said that one of the main features of the air plan outlined by General Eaker was not only its tremendous effect both on production and morale, but also, and perhaps most important, the elimination of the German fighter force. This would have an immense effect on any operations against Germany, whether across the Channel, in the Mediterranean, or on the Russian Front. He did not maintain that the utmost priority should continuously be accorded to Sickle, but it must be realized that its value was fundamental. The longer the destruction of the German fighter force was delayed, the longer would the ultimate defeat of Germany be delayed.

Admiral King said that operation ROUNDP must be carefully examined. While it had originally been believed that cross-Channel operations could be undertaken in 1943, April of 1944 now appeared to be the earliest possible date. This must be fixed as a firm date, or we should never come to grips with Germany by cross-Channel operations in 1944. He appreciated the value of operations in the Mediterranean, but they would, he believed, render cross-Channel operations in 1944 impossible.

Sir Alan Brooke said that only by Mediterranean operations to draw off and hold German forces could a situation be achieved in which a successful ROUNDP is possible. Otherwise at best only SLEDGEHAMMER could be undertaken and we should then be committed in France and pinned down to a bridgehead.

11 The plan under reference was circulated on May 15 as C.C.S. 215, May 13, 1943, “Invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom in 1943-1944”, post, p. 238.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that all were agreed that Roundup was essential and that a strategy should be adopted which would produce the earliest possible successful invasion of the Continent. The British believed that Mediterranean operations were first necessary, whereas the United States Chiefs of Staff believed in piling up forces in the United Kingdom to give more strength to the blow. The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the balance of force on the Continent would alter more rapidly in our favor if Mediterranean operations were undertaken.

ADMIRAL KING said that he did not believe it would be possible to build up sufficient forces in the United Kingdom if Mediterranean operations were undertaken, since these would cause a vacuum into which our forces would be sucked.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said it must be remembered that this vacuum would suck in not only Allied Forces, but also Axis Forces.

With regard to General Morgan's plans, GENERAL MARSHALL said that these, without forces to implement them, were of little value. He feared that unless we concentrated on the United Kingdom build-up, we should lack the necessary punch to undertake cross-Channel operations when the critical moment arose.

SIR ALAN BROOKE undertook to circulate a note giving an estimate of the shipping commitment to meet the economic situation that would arise in the event of an Italian collapse.\(^{12}\)

ADMIRAL KING drew attention to the dangers of tying down forces and equipment to await eventualities. If a definite date was not decided on for Roundup, valuable equipment, such as landing craft, which was urgently required in the Pacific, would be lying idle in England.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that this also applied to air-borne forces which were also essentially offensive and absorbed much air power which might well be used in active attack, but he believed that both with landing craft and air-borne troops their use was so essential to achieve success at the critical moment that their inactivity until this moment arrived must be accepted.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that he regarded Sledgehammer as a preliminary to Roundup. Even a bridgehead was valuable in that it

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\(^{12}\)The reference is presumably to C.C.S. 227, May 16, 1943, a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, entitled "Relief and Supplies for Occupied and Liberated Territories" (not printed). This memorandum, which was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 16, estimated the monthly food and fuel requirements for Italy, Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia to be provided from United Nations stocks and the number and type of ships needed to move such relief supplies.
would bring ground and air forces into active contact with the enemy, diverting German forces from the Russian Front and inducing attrition. When, during operation Torch, it had been obvious to the Germans that no cross-Channel operations were possible, they had sent part of their garrison from Western France to the Eastern Front at a critical moment.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the commitment of our forces to a bridgehead such as the Brest Peninsula would enable the enemy to concentrate rather than force him to disperse.

General Marshall said that on two previous occasions the forces which it had been believed would be available for cross-Channel operations had dwindled to very small numbers due to the demands of operations Torch and Husky, which had exceeded expectations. Unless Bolero build-up was now given priority over operations in the Mediterranean, similar results might be expected and no forces would be available to undertake the operation at the critical moment.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that it had always been agreed that the build-up in the United Kingdom should take place subject to the requirements of the agreed operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. These requirements had not greatly exceeded expectations but rather the availability of shipping had not proved so large as had been expected.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should prepare for consideration on Monday morning, 17 May, two papers as follows:

(1) A plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) by concentrating on the biggest possible invasion force in the U.K. as soon as possible. This paper to be prepared by the U.S. planners in consultation with the British.

(2) A plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) which accepts the elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary. This paper to be prepared by the British Planners in consultation with the U.S.

In the preparation of the above plans cognizance should be taken of the effects of a full-scale Sickle.

In submitting the above two papers, the Combined Staff Planners should make such recommendations as they feel able to on the respective plans.

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The paper prepared was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as C.C.S. 235, May 18, 1943, "Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe", post, p. 273.

The paper prepared was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as C.C.S. 234, May 17, 1943, "Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe (Elimination of Italy First)", post, p. 261.
5. Directive to Allied Authorities in the Far East

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the terms of a directive to the U.S. and British authorities in the Far East on the expansion of the capacity of the air route to China.

In the course of discussion, General Marshall outlined certain steps which General Wheeler, in cooperation with the British authorities concerned, was taking for the improvement of these facilities. He mentioned the difficulties with which General Stilwell was faced, and in this connection paid tribute to the outstanding success achieved by Sir John Dill on his visit to Chungking, in convincing the Chinese of British good will.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

That the following telegram should be despatched forthwith by the appropriate Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate Commanders in Chief: 16

"Give first priority to effort to prepare Assam air fields in order that not less than 7,000 tons per month may be transported to China by 1 July 1943.

"It is considered essential that facilities for the monthly transport of 10,000 tons should be provided at the earliest practicable date and not later than 1 September, and that adequate defensive measures for the air field area must be maintained."

6. The Azores

Admiral King, in stressing the urgency of action with regard to the Azores as a vital factor in the battle of the Atlantic, asked if any further developments had taken place.

7. General Ismay stated that the British Chiefs of Staff had prepared a paper on this subject which had been submitted to the Prime Minister and which he had invited them to discuss with the United States Chiefs of Staff. 17 This paper will be circulated. The military desirability of obtaining these islands was generally agreed. He believed that the Prime Minister and President were discussing means of achieving our object.

15 The reference is presumably to C.C.S. 227, May 16, 1943, "Relief and Supplies for Occupied and Liberated Territories"; see ante, p. 83, footnote 12.
16 The telegram was sent as No. 1371, May 15, 1943, from Marshall to Wheeler (J.C.S. Files). For an indication of parallel action by the British Chiefs of Staff, see item 2 of the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 17, post, p. 87.
17 The reference is to C.C.S. 226, post, p. 304.
I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed that the paper on the Portuguese Atlantic Islands, by the British Chiefs of Staff, which is now being circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, should be considered at the meeting on Monday, 17 May.

SUNDAY, MAY 16, 1943

Editorial Note

Roosevelt and Churchill spent the weekend of May 14–17, 1943, at Shangri La, the President’s mountain camp in Maryland. According to the Shangri La guest book, also present were Mrs. Roosevelt, Anna Roosevelt Boettiger, Thomas Rowan, Harry Hopkins, Commander Thompson, Rear Admiral Brown, Lord Beaverbrook, Brigadier General Smith, and General Marshall. No official record of any of the conversations held during this weekend have been found. Churchill (Hinge of Fate, pp. 795–798) gives an account of the holiday.

MONDAY, MAY 17, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 17, 1943, 10:30 A.M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

Present

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<th>UNITED STATES</th>
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<tr>
<td>Admiral Leahy</td>
<td>General Brooke</td>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
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<td>General Marshall</td>
<td>Admiral of the Fleet</td>
<td>Soong²</td>
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<td>Admiral King</td>
<td>Pound</td>
<td>Major General Chu³</td>
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<td>Lieutenant General McNarney</td>
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Secretariat

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¹ C.G.S. 86th meeting.
² Present for the discussion of China only.
1. VISIT TO ANNAPOLIS

ADMIRAL KING invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to visit Annapolis on Sunday, 23 May, leaving Washington at approximately 9 A.M.

2. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that with reference to Item 5 of the 85th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff, in telegraphing to the appropriate British authorities in the Far East, had thought it wise to add to the last sentence of the draft telegram the words “including air fields necessary for maintaining air superiority.”

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

(a) Approved the conclusions of the 85th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes.

(b) Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff, in telegraphing the British authorities in the Far East, had added to the last sentence of the draft telegram contained in the conclusion to Item 5 of C.C.S. 85th Meeting the words “including air fields necessary for maintaining air superiority.”

(At this point Dr. T. V. Soong and General Shih-ming Chu entered the meeting.)

3. SITUATION IN CHINA

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked Dr. Soong to give the Combined Chiefs of Staff the benefit of his views on the Chinese situation, with particular reference to Chinese needs and the opening of a land route to China.

Dr. Soong said that it must be remembered that China had been in a state of siege for five years. The Japanese had seized the Chinese coast, then Indo China and finally, with the occupation of Burma, the investment had been completed save for the air route. The resultant economic pressure, deterioration of morale and lack of supplies made the situation very grave. After Casablanca Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had been informed in a message from the President and Prime Minister, firstly, that the U.S. Air Force under General Chennault would be strengthened with a view not only to attacking the Japanese in China but also Japan itself, and secondly, that a combined all-out assault on Burma by naval, ground and air forces would

*Ante, p. 85.*
be undertaken at the conclusion of this year's monsoon.\(^4\) These assurances were naturally very welcome to the Generalissimo.

It was appreciated that the existing air route, with a capacity of only a few thousand tons per month, would not permit the implementation of a strong air offensive from China and, at the same time, the supply of the Chinese troops in Yunnan. The Generalissimo had therefore asked the President that for the next three months all supplies carried by the air route should be those for General Chennault's air force.\(^5\) The General had worked out a plan for attacking the Japanese air forces, their lines of communication, and most important of all, for providing air support for the Chinese ground forces. So far these forces had received no air support, and this was vitally important. The Japanese not only had better lines of communication but also better equipment, and were assisted by their air. Recent Japanese attacks in the neighborhood of Ichang had enabled them to capture territory on the south of the Yangtze. This provided them with an excellent line of communication via the Yangtze; and unless they were dislodged, it would enable them to attack Chang Sha and Chungking itself, since their logistic situation was far more favorable than that of the Chinese, whose lines of communication, now that the use of the Yangtze could be denied them by Japanese air power, were over most difficult mountainous country. Air power, and air power alone, would be of any value in the present situation, and it was for this reason that the Generalissimo asked that, for three months, supplies to General Chennault's air forces should take priority over everything else so that these could be used in support of the Chinese Army.

The situation was, frankly, very bad. General Chiang Kai-shek's military views had been guided over a period of years not only by United States and British advisers but by a series of outstanding German and Russian general officers. General Chiang Kai-shek was the

\(^4\) For text of the message of January 25, 1943, from Roosevelt and Churchill to Chiang, setting forth some of the results of the Casablanca Conference, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 807. This message did not explain American-British intentions with regard to the reconquest of Burma. The basic decisions of the Casablanca Conference with regard to future operations in Burma were included in the Final Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Roosevelt and Churchill, C.C.S. 170/2, January 23, 1943, ibid., p. 797. Beginning on February 1, 1943, a high-level mission composed of Arnold, Somervell, and Dill met in New Delhi with key British and American officers in the China–Burma area to prepare detailed proposals for Burma operations based on the Casablanca decisions. Arnold and Dill subsequently discussed these proposals with Chiang at Chungking on February 6 and 7, 1943. For accounts of the New Delhi conferences and the discussions in Chungking, see Romannus and Sunderland, pp. 272–275 and S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan, vol. ii: India’s Most Dangerous Hour (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1958), pp. 298–305.

\(^5\) For text of Chiang’s message to Roosevelt as transmitted in a note of April 29, 1943, from Soong to Hopkins, see Romannus and Sunderland, pp. 319–320. For Roosevelt’s response of May 4, 1943, to Chiang, see post, p. 258, footnote 2.
Supreme Commander in the Chinese Theater of War, and for this theater he was responsible. On him depended the safety of China. His military views, therefore, must, unless he were absolved of this responsibility, be given overriding consideration.

With regard to the first promise made by the President and Prime Minister, i.e., the strengthening of General Chennault’s air forces, the Generalissimo regarded this as all-important. Japan had changed her policy vis-à-vis China. She had now given the puppet government in Nanking many concessions, including the control of currency. She had restored factories in the occupied area. This new policy of conciliation was far harder for the national government to combat than her previous line of action and called for strong positive steps.

With regard to the second promise, i.e., that the United Nations would undertake a full-scale offensive in Burma towards the end of 1943 the official record of the meeting held in Calcutta between the British, American and Chinese representatives gave a clear picture of the situation.6

This discussion was regarded as one to ensure that the decisions reached at Casablanca and Chungking should be perfectly clear to all concerned. General Ho had outlined the action to be taken by the Chinese forces. All had agreed that the provision of naval forces was essential and that success would be impossible without them. The importance of air superiority had been emphasized and General Arnold had pointed out that, even if the Japanese Air Force were as strong as believed by the Chinese representatives, the British/American air force would be considerably stronger. The Chinese representatives had agreed to provide three extra air fields at the China end and additional facilities to match those provided by the British at the Indian end. Field Marshal Wavell had said he had not had time to work out details. He must consider the needs of his own troops in the area who were dependent on difficult lines of communication. The Generalissimo might be assured that he would do his utmost to meet his request. He was confident that it would be possible to carry up to the air fields as much as the ferry service could carry forward.

From all this it was clear that the Burma plan for 1943 was a definite U.S./British commitment and he must therefore ask for its fulfillment and would be interested to know further details of it.

As a background to this request the Chinese situation must be borne in mind. Inflation had taken place; there was economic distress; China had borne long years of war; and the Japanese were adopting

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the policy of *wheedling* rather than *terrorizing* the people. Throughout the Chinese Army and indeed the people, the plan to retake Burma in 1943 was an open secret. If not undertaken, they would believe themselves abandoned by the Allies and suspect that the latter did not intend to achieve the unconditional surrender of Japan by force of arms.

Prior to the Casablanca Conference other plans had been suggested for limited operations and General Stilwell, who had a profound knowledge of China, had in January proposed the launching of an offensive by Chinese troops in North Burma at the beginning of March, with the object of opening an all-land route to China. The Generalissimo, however, both then and now, was in disagreement with this plan believing it to be logistically impracticable since, while the Allied forces would be operating from very limited lines of communication from Ledo onwards, the Japanese would have the use both of the Irrawaddy River and the railroad. The Generalissimo felt that even if this plan achieved initial success, we should eventually be faced with the Japanese being able to maintain stronger forces at the ends of their good lines of communication than could we.

With regard to the state of preparedness of the Chinese troops, everything possible had been done to fulfill their commitment for a full-scale attack on Burma, and forces had been drawn from many parts of the area, some having marched 2,000 kilometers. The troops required for the full Burmese operation were now all available within one week's march of Kunming. The promised air fields in China had been built, and though painfully constructed by manual labor, the preparations at the Chinese end were further forward than those in India. General Chen Cheng, considered by General Stilwell as the ablest Chinese commander under the Generalissimo, had been placed in command of the Chinese forces in Yunnan. The general situation in China was bad. The Yangtze had been cut; Chang Sha, and Chungking which was of immense economic, moral and military importance, were threatened. The Chinese would do everything possible to meet their share of the operation. He hoped to be informed of the availability of the Allied forces. He asked only that the decisions taken at Casablanca with regard to the offensive in Burma be implemented.

*Admiral Leahy* thanked Dr. Soong for his most interesting talk on the situation in China. He asked how many Chinese troops would be available for the Burma operation.

Dr. Soong said that there would be 32 divisions, though these would not be at full strength and would amount to the equivalent of some 22
full-scale divisions, i.e., about 220,000 men. In addition, there were
the Chinese forces training at Ramgarh and further troops held in
readiness for holding operations to prevent the Japanese attacking
Kunming from the south.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, Dr. Soong said that
the operations near Ichang were being undertaken by the 5th and 6th
Armies. These forces were short of artillery since the Chinese had
received no additional guns except Polish artillery captured by the
Russians. In spite of the general lack of artillery, the Chinese ground
forces would be able to undertake their part in the proposed operations,
and their degree of readiness was evinced by the fact that in January
General Stilwell had been prepared to launch an offensive in March.

Admiral Leahy asked General Chu if he wished to add anything
to Dr. Soong’s statement.

General Chu stated that he had nothing to add at this time but
would be available later if the need should arise.

4. Portuguese Islands
(C.C.S. 226)\(^7\)

Admiral Leahy suggested that paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 226, with a
short preamble explaining the vital military needs for these islands as
aids to maintaining the security of our Atlantic communications,
should be used as a basis of a recommendation by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister.

Admiral Pound presented a chart showing the vital role which the
Portuguese Islands would play in maintaining the security of our
sea routes.

Admiral Leahy suggested alternatively that it might be wiser
to delay the approach to the Portuguese Government until such time
as sufficient forces were available in the U.K. to seize the Islands in
the event of Portuguese refusal. If necessary, a European front in
Portugal could be opened.

Admiral King suggested that since all were agreed on the strategic
importance of the Islands and since time was of the essence, the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff should make plans and agree, during the course
of the Conference, that the Islands must be seized by force if diplo-
matic action failed.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that this possibility should be examined
and a decision taken as to whether the operation was better under-
taken by U.S. or British forces and as to the strength of the forces
required. With regard to the opening of a second front in Portugal,

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\(^7\) Post, p. 304.
he saw certain advantages in this course, but it must be considered in relation to projected operations in the whole of the European Theater.

Admiral King then explained that his proposal had been that the possibility of seizing the Islands without diplomatic negotiations should be considered since this course might render it easier for the Portuguese to say that action had been taken against their will and therefore action in defense of Portugal itself might be avoided. The time factor was vital. More and more traffic would be routed through the Mediterranean. The Portuguese Islands were very important to the security of the U.S.-U.K. sea lane, but vital to the U.S.-Mediterranean route.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, Sir Dudley Pound said that he could see no advantage in postponing action with regard to the Islands. They were vitally important at all times of the year but more particularly so in the winter. The use of the southern route, with its better weather, was important and only escort carrier air protection could be given unless we held the Azores.

Discussion then took place on the strength and source of forces required in the light of possible resistance.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

a. Agreed to recommend to the President and the Prime Minister:

(1) That the acquisition of the Azores Islands should be accomplished as soon as possible and, in any event, early enough for them to be utilized by the United Nations during the winter of 1943–1944.

(2) That an effort should first be made to secure the use of these islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese Government.

b. Agreed:

(1) That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings, and the effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view.\(^\text{a}\)

(2) That as soon as these plans have been approved preparations should be made to implement them in case diplomatic efforts should fail.

c. Directed that the secretaries, in consultation with the Chief of the British Air Staff, should prepare for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff a draft letter for submission to the President

\(^{a}\)The wording of this paragraph is the version as amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 87th Meeting; see post, p. 99. The original language of the paragraph had not specifically assigned the preparation of the plan to the British Chiefs of Staff.
5. **Agreed Essentials in the Conduct of the War**

(C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 2 a (1))

(C.C.S. 232)

The Committee considered a report by the Combined Staff Planners. The British Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum suggesting certain amendments to the paper. In the course of discussion on paragraph 2 b of the paper, on the desirability of relating the extension of unremitting pressure against Japan to the agreement that the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe must be brought about at the earliest possible date, Admiral Leahy said that he believed that this British suggestion would not be acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff. The defeat of Japan was a matter of vital importance to the United States. A situation might arise in which an extension of effort against Japan, if necessary, even at the expense of the European Theater, would be essential to maintain the integrity of the United States and her interests in the Pacific.

Admiral King pointed out that the so-called adequate forces for the Pacific had always been a matter susceptible to differences of opinion. It must be remembered that while the Casablanca Conference dealt only with operations in 1943, the present deliberations aimed at deciding on the strategy to be adopted to bring the war as a whole to a successful conclusion. In his view, C.C.S. 155/1 did, in fact, visualize the extension of pressure against Japan.

Admiral Leahy said that operations in the Pacific had actually been extended since Casablanca and there was no doubt that adequate forces for further extension were available. The only shortage was of shipping. If an unfavorable situation arose in the Pacific, all would realize that whatever agreements were in existence, the United States would have to divert forces to meet this eventuality.

Sir Alan Brooke said that shipping alone prohibited an equal effort in the Pacific Theater. He was convinced that it was not possible to achieve the defeat of both Germany and Japan at the same

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9 In pursuance of this directive, the Secretaries prepared a draft memorandum, designated C.C.S. 226/1, May 17, 1943, which was considered and amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 18, 1943, post, p. 98. For final text of the memorandum, see C.C.S. 226/2, May 18, 1943, post, p. 307.

10 C.C.S. 232, May 16, 1943, not printed. For the amended version, showing items of agreement and disagreement, see C.C.S. 232/1, May 18, 1943, post, p. 231.

11 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff is not printed, but for the amendments proposed therein, see C.C.S. 232/1, May 18, 1943, post, p. 231.

time, and the maximum effort must be made against one or the other. There was no possibility of holding Germany while concentrating on Japan, and therefore it was essential that the defeat of Germany should first be accomplished. This would be the best method of ending the war as a whole at the earliest possible date.

With regard to paragraph 3 b, it was generally agreed that this paragraph should be recast in order to clarify its intention.

With regard to paragraph 3 d, General McNarney agreed on the importance of both the air offensive against the Axis Powers and of relieving pressure on the Russian Front, but considered that concentration of air effort was essential. The British proposals left the way open to a dispersal of air forces from Norway to Greece which, while it might take pressure from the Russians, would not be the best application of our air power.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: 14

a. Agreed to the following changes in C.C.S. 232:

1. In the third line of paragraph 3 delete the word "fixed" and substitute the word "first" therefor.
2. Delete the captions "Priority Group 1" and "Priority Group 2" immediately preceding paragraphs 3 a and 3 e, respectively.
3. Delete the words "in the Atlantic and Pacific" from paragraph 3 e.

b. Agreed that paragraph 2 b, 3 b, 3 d, and 3 f of C.C.S. 232 should be considered further.

c. Directed the secretaries to publish an amended version of C.C.S. 232 which will show the items of agreement and disagreement. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 232/1. 15)

6. Agenda for the Remainder of the Conference

(C.C.S. 233)

The Committee had before them a note by the Combined Staff Planners setting forward a tentative agenda for the remainder of the conference. 16

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14 The wording of these conclusions respecting C.C.S. 232 is the version approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 18; see post, p. 93. The original version stated that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had approved C.C.S. 232 subject to certain changes, including the deletion of paragraphs on which there had not been agreement, and that they had agreed to consider those paragraphs further should agreement be reached on the issues in question. (J.C.S. Files)

15 Post, p. 231.

16 C.C.S. 233, May 16, 1943, not printed; the agenda for the remainder of the conference, as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at this meeting, was subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 233/1, May 17, 1943, post, p. 229.
With regard to Item 6, Sir John Dill reminded the Committee of the importance of discussing the action being taken with regard to rearming Turkey in relation to our plans for the conduct of the war in Europe.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Agreed to the agenda for the remainder of the conference shown in C.C.S. 233, with the following exceptions:

(1) Delegate paragraph (1), discussion on Global Strategy.
(2) Delete reference to the report of the Kauffman-Mansfield Committee under the heading of U-boat Campaign in paragraph (4).
(3) Insert a new item immediately following paragraph (5) entitled "Turkish Situation, General Discussion."

(Revised agenda subsequently published as C.C.S. 233/1.)

b. Agreed that the papers being prepared by the U.S. and British Planners on "The Defeat of Germany" would, in order to save time, be circulated as C.C.S. papers without receiving prior approval of their respective Chiefs of Staff.

c. Agreed that if necessary the Combined Chiefs of Staff would meet in an afternoon conference on Friday, 21 May, to consider papers receiving their attention which have no special reference to the subject matter of the Trident Conference.

(At this point the following left the meeting:

General Somervell  Admiral Noble
Admiral Horne  Lt. General Macready
General Fairchild  Air Marshal Welsh
General Streett  Captain Lambe
Admiral Cooke  Brigadier Porter
General Wedemeyer  Air Commodore Elliot
Colonel Smart  Brigadier Macleod
Commander Freseman
Commander Long

7. Operation "Husky"

Sir Alan Brooke informed the Committee of certain information which pointed to the desirability of advancing the date of Operation Husky.

The Committee discussed the advisability of asking General Eisenhower to consider the mounting of an earlier operation against Huskyland but it was pointed out that General Eisenhower had already given his views on this matter and had received all the available information referred to above. It was generally agreed that any specific action to draw General Eisenhower’s attention to this information might suggest a lack of confidence in his judgment, which most certainly did not exist.

**The Combined Chiefs of Staff:**—

Agreed that they should take no action on this matter.

**8. Operation “Upkeep”**

Sir Charles Portal outlined Operation *Upkeep* and the results which it was hoped had been attained.\(^{18}\)

**The Combined Chiefs of Staff:**—

Took note with interest of this statement.

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\(^{18}\)The reference is to the bombing of the Möhne and Eder dams in West Germany by Royal Air Force aircraft on the night of May 16, 1943. The preparation and execution of this operation is described in Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945*, vol. ii: *Endeavor* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), chapter x, part 4.

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**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, MAY 17, 1943, 1 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE**

**Present**

**UNITED STATES**

President Roosevelt

Mr. Hopkins

Mr. Baruch

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Prime Minister Churchill

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**Editorial Note**

No official record of the substance of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from Bernard M. Baruch, *Baruch: The Public Years* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 300; from the memorandum of May 18, 1943, from Baruch to Watson, *post*, p. 312; and from the President’s Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers). Baruch’s memorandum to Watson indicates that the supply of magnesium was one of the questions raised during the luncheon. The possibility of settling refugees in North Africa also appears to have been discussed at this meeting; see Baruch’s undated memorandum on this subject, *post*, p. 344.
LEAHY-SOONG MEETING, MAY 17, 1943, AFTERNOON, LEAHY'S OFFICE

Present

UNITED STATES
Admiral Leahy

UNITED STATES
Admiral Leahy

UNITED STATES
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNarney
Lieutenant General Somervell
Lieutenant General Embick
Vice Admiral Horne
Major General Smith
Major General Streett
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Smart
Commander Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED STATES
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Porter
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Macleod

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

Admiral Leahy said that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff did not consider that the conclusion to Item 5 of the 86th Meeting of the Combined

1 C.C.S. 87th meeting.
Chiefs of Staff was correctly worded. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had not approved C.C.S. 232\(^2\) subject to the deletion of certain paragraphs, but rather had accepted certain paragraphs, had amended others, and agreed to reconsider those upon which there was disagreement.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 86th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, held on Monday, 17 May 1943, except that the conclusions under Item 5 were changed to read as follows:

"The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

a. Agreed to the following changes in C.C.S. 232:

(1) In the third line of paragraph 3 delete the word ‘fixed’ and substitute the word ‘first’ therefor.
(2) Delete the captions ‘Priority Group 1’ and ‘Priority Group 2’ immediately preceding paragraphs 3 a and 3 c respectively.
(3) Delete the words ‘in the Atlantic and Pacific’ from paragraph 3 c.

b. Agreed that paragraphs 2 b, 3 b, 3 d, and 3 f of C.C.S. 232 should be considered further.

c. Directed the Secretaries to publish an amended version of C.C.S. 232 which will show the items of agreement and disagreement. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 232/1.)"

2. PORTUGUESE ISLANDS

(C.C.S. 226/1)\(^3\)

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 6)\(^4\)

The Committee had before them a draft memorandum for the President and Prime Minister prepared by the Secretaries in collaboration with the British Chief of the Air Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he considered that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide who should be responsible for providing the necessary forces and preparing a plan for seizing the Islands should this be necessary. The Azores were in a British sphere of responsibility. There was available a British Royal Marine Division which could undertake the task though the availability of landing craft and shipping would have to be further considered. If the U.S. Chiefs of Staff accepted British responsibility for the planning of this operation and for the provision of the troops, then he suggested that conclusion

\(^2\) Not printed; for the amended version, showing items of agreement and disagreement, see C.C.S. 232/1, May 18, 1943, post, p. 231.

\(^3\) Not printed; for text of this paper as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see C.C.S. 226/2, May 18, 1943, post, p. 307.

\(^4\) Ante, p. 85.
b (1) of Item 4 of the 86th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be altered to read:

"That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings, and the effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view."

Admiral King suggested that in view of the British alliance with Portugal, it might, for diplomatic and psychological reasons, be better for U. S. troops to undertake the operation even though the Azores were in a British sphere of responsibility.

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff agreed that the British should undertake this commitment, but General McNARNEY pointed out in connection with the alternative conclusion suggested by Sir Alan Brooke that, since the Azores should be put to the earliest possible use, plans must be prepared to provide the necessary facilities in the Islands. He suggested therefore that the words "and use" should be inserted after the words "for the occupation" in the draft.

In discussing the draft memorandum to the President, it was generally agreed that the urgency of obtaining facilities in the Portuguese Islands should be stressed and that it should be made clear that the Combined Chiefs of Staff proposed that, while the diplomatic approach was being made, they should prepare forces for the prompt seizure of the Islands in the event of this approach failing.

**The Combined Chiefs of Staff:**

a. Agreed to amend the conclusion in paragraph b (1) of Item 4 of the Minutes of the 86th Meeting to read as follows:

"That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation and use of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings and effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view."

b. Approved the draft memorandum to the President and the Prime Minister, shown in C.C.S. 226/1, subject to the following changes:

1. Insert the words "earliest possible" before the word "use" at the beginning of line 3.
2. Change the first sentence of the second paragraph to read:

In submitting this recommendation the Combined Chiefs of Staff propose that while the diplomatic approach is being made, forces

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5 *ante*, p. 92.
6 Not printed; for the amended version circulated as C.C.S. 226/2, May 18, 1943, see *post*, p. 307.
should be prepared for the prompt seizure and use of the Azores if diplomacy fails.  

(Amended version, as prepared for the signature of Sir Alan Brooke and Admiral Leahy, subsequently published as C.C.S. 226/2.)

3. FUTURE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

With regard to future discussions on the essentials to the conduct of the war, Sir Alan Brooke said that he believed the Committee should consider and first agree on European and Pacific strategy, and it would then be found that global strategy and agreed essentials could more easily and quickly be set out.

Admiral Leahy said that he believed it was wise to agree on the essentials prior to considering theater strategies.

Admiral King said that he considered that it was necessary that the U. S. views on the existing points of difference with regard to the essentials should at least be stated as early as possible.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would wish to discuss C.C.S. 232/1 at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be held on Wednesday, 19 May 1943.

4. POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

(C.C.S. 185/3)

Admiral Leahy suggested that this matter was one of urgency and should receive the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as early as possible. It might be necessary to consult the Foreign Office and State Department. The views of the theater commander must, he felt, be given full weight.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to consider C.C.S. 185/3 at their meeting to be held on the following day.

5. DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

(C.C.S. 234)

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff prepared after consultation with the U. S. Joint Planners.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with the views set out in this paper.

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7 The reading of this sentence as it appeared in C.C.S. 226/1 is given in footnote 3 to C.C.S. 226/2, post, p. 307.
8 Post, p. 231.
9 See post, p. 326, footnote 1.
10 Post, p. 261.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the short time he had had to examine this paper he hesitated to bring out points of detail. The general impression he received was that in the early part of the paper it was pointed out that a cross-Channel operation in April 1944 would be impossible, not only on account of the shortage of landing craft, but also because the risks would be unacceptable. Later on, however, it appeared that if Mediterranean operations were undertaken in the interval, a target date for April 1944 should be agreed on for cross-Channel operations.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it was believed that April 1944 as a target date would not be possible of achievement unless Mediterranean operations were undertaken. These would influence the strength of the opposition and should create a situation permitting cross-Channel operations. Landing craft alone were not the bottleneck, and one of the difficulties was the provision of the necessary personnel to man them. The rate of build-up of German forces in western Europe would greatly exceed our own build-up on the Continent unless Mediterranean operations were first undertaken to divert or occupy German reinforcements. If these operations were undertaken, April 1944 might well be right for a target date, though the actual operation would be more likely to be possible of achievement in May or June. The knocking of Italy out of the war would be the greatest factor in using up Germany's reserves and enabling our own build-up to exceed the enemy's.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he appreciated that it was the British view that by continuing Sickle and by undertaking Mediterranean operations, a situation would be created permitting of a reasonable chance of successful cross-Channel operations in the spring of 1944. The point on which he was extremely doubtful was whether, if these Mediterranean operations were undertaken, sufficient forces would be available in the United Kingdom to exploit the situation which the Mediterranean operations might have created. It might well be that operations in the Mediterranean would of necessity exceed in magnitude those now visualized, and that therefore the forces available in the United Kingdom would be correspondingly diminished. Thus when the moment to strike across the Channel arrived, we should be unable to reap the benefits of the effect of Mediterranean operations and of the vast concentration of air forces, and our resources in the U. K. would permit of nothing more than an unopposed landing.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the cost of Mediterranean operations on the build-up in the United Kingdom was estimated to be no more than from three and a half to four divisions, and this he believed was a cheap price to pay for the immense advantages and consequent
diversion of German troops which knocking out Italy would insure. Italy might drop out of the war as a result of a successful Husky, but at any rate the elimination of Italy was, he believed, the best and only way of helping Russia this year. If we caused the Germans to disperse their forces and therefore to slow up their possible rate of build-up against cross-Channel operations, the loss of three and a half divisions would be more than counterbalanced. The Mediterranean operations visualized were not interdependent, and each or any of them could be undertaken separately as the situation developed. For instance, it might be desirable, though perhaps not essential, to go into western Greece with the object of rallying General Mihailovitch and the partisans. The cost value of each operation could be assessed at the appropriate time. Landings in Italy or in Sardinia were alternatives. If the situation on the Russian Front was bad and the Germans stronger in the Mediterranean, we might have to forego a direct attack on Italy and capture Sardinia and possibly Corsica instead. These latter would prove valuable air bases for increasing the air bombardment of Italy, as well as being stepping stones for an invasion of southern France. In any event, all calculations had been made on the basis of the Sickle build-up remaining unaffected.

General Marshall said that he would like further time to examine the figures given in the British paper. He feared that the cost had been assessed too low since the wish might have been the father to the thought. If the ends could be achieved as cheaply as was visualized in the British paper, then the plan was worthy of further consideration, but he feared that the momentum consequent on the launching of Mediterranean operations would be difficult to check.

Both Admiral Leahy and General Marshall said that they wished further time to consider the British paper before expressing definite opinions and to have available to them at the same time the United States paper with regard to cross-Channel operations.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Deferred action on this paper pending further study by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

6. Re-Arming of the French in North Africa

Admiral Leahy said that it was his personal opinion that in order to utilize the French forces to the maximum, they should be provided with equipment and instructed in its use as rapidly as possible. At present somewhat more than three divisions had been equipped, but the remainder of the existing 11 divisions were almost without modern equipment. Early action to supply these seemed wise in view of their potential value in the invasion of France.
SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed as to the importance of re-arming the French, but considered that it was a matter of timing and of the availability of shipping. French forces fighting in North Africa had shown themselves to be good soldiers. They would certainly prove useful in continental operations, but particularly as garrison troops in North Africa, Corsica and Sicily. It was important, however, not to use shipping to reequip the French at the expense of a build-up of Allied forces for important operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL reminded the Committee of the Presidential memorandum given to General Giraud, which the latter had in some ways misinterpreted.\(^\text{11}\) He asked General Smith to give his views on the reequipment of the French.

GENERAL SMITH said that Allied Force Headquarters had been guided by the ANFA decisions. 25,000 tons of shipping per month had been made available for reequipping the French forces and 35,000 tons a month for civilian supplies. A possible use for French troops was for the assault of Corsica, if this and an attack on Sardinia were undertaken simultaneously. For this operation there would be available two divisions, one of them trained in mountain warfare. No armored division would be fit for combat duty until September, and no other troops could be prepared for offensive fighting in 1943. Captured German and Italian equipment was being issued to accelerate the rate of reequipment and certain of this was found to be of French manufacture. It was hoped that the lines of communications and the majority of the anti-aircraft defenses in North Africa could be manned by the French at an early date. French troops used in the recent fighting had not been issued new equipment from America, but had had their existing equipment made up by allotments from the British and United States forces. In general, the French had fought excellently.

General Giraud used the equipment shipped to train and equip those divisions which were not actively engaged in operations. General Eisenhower’s policy was, in general, to equip as many French troops as possible for garrison and line of communication duties. French Divisions were being provided with equipment on a 50 to 60 percent basis for training. General Giraud, on the other hand, was naturally anxious to equip on an expeditionary force basis. He (General Smith) believed that in three to four months sufficient French Divisions would be available to undertake the defense of Morocco. Equipment was arriving at a rate sufficient to provide 50 percent of the equip-

\(^{11}\) Presumably, the reference is to the memorandum of January 24, 1943, by Giraud entitled “Résumé of the Agreements in Principle Resulting from the ANFA Conversations,” which was presented to Roosevelt on the last day of the Casablanca Conference; for the English text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 823.
ment for one division every convoy. Though this rate did not satisfy General Giraud, it was the maximum which, at present, could be achieved. He believed that though the French must be equipped as rapidly as possible, it would be unwise to sacrifice any tonnage required for our own forces for the benefit of the French since it was unwise to count on an adequate return in combat value in the near future. 25,000 tons per month was the maximum which could be found from the shipping resources allocated to General Eisenhower. Unless the Combined Shipping and Adjustment Board could provide additional tonnage, General Giraud’s requirements of 100,000 tons per month could not be met.

General Marshall pointed out that in the event of the U. S. Divisions being moved to the U. K., their equipment would be turned over to the French.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that in general the correct policy was initially to equip the French forces for a static role to enable them to relieve Allied forces for offensive operations. At a later stage the French could be equipped as an expeditionary force.

General Smith pointed out that in general this was being done but that General Giraud was not anxious that all his troops should be assigned to defensive roles. Coast and A.A. defenses were being taken over by the French.

Sir John Dill asked if the possibility had been considered of supplying captured material to the Turks, particularly that of French manufacture, since they already possessed ammunition of this type.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U. S. forces in the various theaters.

7. PLAN FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM
(C.C.S. 217)\textsuperscript{13}

Sir Charles Portal suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider giving their approval to General Eaker’s plan for the combined bomber offensive outlined in C.C.S. 217. He invited General Mc Narcney to explain the main points of this plan.

\textsuperscript{13} For an account of the development of the program for the rearmament of French forces in North Africa during the first half of 1943, see Vigneras, chapters II, III, and IV.

\textsuperscript{13} Post, p. 239.
GENERAL McNARNEY explained that a committee of Industrial and Engineering Experts with first-hand experience of Germany had thoroughly surveyed the German industrial organization with a view to selecting systems of targets which, if destroyed, would produce the maximum reduction of the German war potential. A plan based on this survey had then been worked out by General Eaker and had been shown to and agreed with by the Royal Air Force Staff in London. To implement the plan certain minimum forces were required. These were set out in paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 217. The most important feature of the plan was the reduction of the German fighter force which would be achieved not only by air fighting but by systematic precision bombing of air fields, aircraft manufacturing plants, and ball-bearing factories. Fifty percent of German ball-bearing manufacturing capacity was in two plants, one in Germany and one in Paris.

The plan was in four phases which were described in maps 1, 2, 3 and 4 and legends thereon, C.C.S. 217. The whole plan was based on 6 raids per month backed up by R.A.F. night bombing on the same objectives. The United States Planners had estimated that the necessary forces could be made available except for a minor deficiency in the first phase. One important point was, that, unless the plan was approved and put into immediate effect, the German fighter strength would expand. The Germans had switched over much of their productive capacity from bombers to fighters, and unless the German fighter potential was attacked at once, not only the task of the bombers in carrying out the plan would become more difficult but also German air strength would render all our operations against them more hazardous. The ground echelons required for this plan were estimated to amount to some 375,000 men by the first of April, 1944. He believed, however, that this figure might be exceeded and the total ground echelons for air forces in the U.K. might amount to some 400,000 to 425,000 men.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that General Eaker's plan had been based on all the information available to the Air Ministry. He (General Eaker) had worked out the plan himself and had then put it to the Air Ministry for consideration. In spite of the most critical examination by all available experts, the Air Ministry was convinced that, if given the resources asked for, General Eaker would achieve the results he claimed. He (Sir Charles Portal) was one hundred percent in favor of the plan. The figure of 6 raids per month had been based on weather statistics collected over a period of years, but it was hoped that by the use of special equipment (H2S) which General Eaker proposed to fit to his leading bombers, attacks through overcast or cloud could be made on targets the size of a city. Raids
undertaken under these conditions would be in addition to the 6 precision attacks per month in clear weather. He had no doubt that the result of a salvo of bombs falling from some one hundred unseen B-17’s in daylight would be tremendous. General Eaker hoped to use these methods beginning in the autumn. It must be remembered that when bombing from above the clouds, reaction from German fighters was to be expected, with resulting fighter attrition. A somewhat similar device to the H2S was already in use for night bombing but, since once discovered by the enemy it would have no further value to us, it was only employed in Mosquito aircraft used to lead in night attacks.

General McNarney suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should give their approval to the plan for the combined bomber offensive set out in C.C.S. 217 and agree to the provision of the necessary forces to implement it.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the plan for the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom which is set forth in C.C.S. 217.

8. Bombing of Ploesti

Referring to the plan for the attack on the refineries at Ploesti by heavy bombers operating from North Africa or the Middle East, General McNarney stressed the importance of timing in particular reference to the German commitment on the Russian Front. An early and successful attack on the refineries would, be felt, be the greatest single contribution which could be made to assist the Russians this year. If we waited to capture bases nearer the objective, the delay would detract from the decisive value of the operation. The ranges from Ploesti of possible bases now available were:

- Tobruk .................. 857 miles
- Aleppo .................. 835 miles
- Alexandria ............... 963 miles
- Cyprus .................. 785 miles
- Tripoli .................. 1,080 miles

From all these bases Ploesti was within range of B-24 D’s with a load of 6,000 pounds; B-24 C’s with 3,000 pounds and B-17 F’s. It was estimated that a total of 155 aircraft were required. More than sufficient were available in North Africa and the United Kingdom. An early decision to carry out the attack was necessary since not only was the weather best in June and early July, but also an attack at this time would interfere less with air preparations for Russia and possible subsequent operations. The exact defenses of Ploesti were not known but it was believed that only a few, if any, fighters were available and the main defense was provided by a balloon barrage, mainly to the
south. If bombers operated from Tobruk, it was estimated that they could pass northward out of radar range of Crete and might thus achieve surprise without interference from fighters. If the attack took place at dusk they could return in darkness.

The method of attack would probably be low level bombing with delay action bombs. If command of these forces were given to General Doolittle, who was available and in whom he had great confidence, he, General McNarney, was convinced that success would be achieved. Losses might be heavy, but would be more than offset by results. If the raid could be carried out prior to Husky, this example of overwhelming Allied air power would have profound effects, both on the Russian Front and Italian morale.

Sir Charles Portal said that he would be prepared to recommend the operation if he were certain that a large proportion of the attacking aircraft armed with 6,000 pound bombs would reach the objective before dusk, but he was doubtful if this could be achieved since the operation was essentially dependent on accurate weather forecasting.

General McNarney said that this point had been carefully considered and it was believed that in June or early July a forecast could be made of the weather at Ploesti and en route twenty-four hours ahead with 85 percent accuracy.

Sir Charles Portal said that if this accuracy of forecasting could be achieved, the operation should have good prospects of success. Its effect, however, on Husky and other operations must be borne in mind. He would like to ask the commanders in the theater for their views on the advisability of undertaking this operation in the light of the necessity for concentrating our air resources in support of operation Husky.

Sir Alan Brooke also stressed the disadvantage of the dispersal of air forces prior to operation Husky and the great results it was hoped to achieve by the concentration of our air power on Italy. If Italy could be knocked out, bases closer to the Ploesti objective could be obtained, enabling us to undertake sustained bombing of the refineries.

General McNarney pointed out that the attainment of these bases in Italy might be delayed for some six or seven months, and by then the weather would be far less favorable.

The Committee then discussed the availability of aircraft and the periods during which they would be diverted either from the United Kingdom or their tasks in the Mediterranean.

Sir Charles Portal said that if the operation succeeded, it would certainly have more effect than almost any other on softening up Germany for operations in 1944. There was, therefore, a case for careful examination of this project, even though it might reduce our air preparations prior to Husky.
GENERAL McNARNEY undertook immediately to arrange for the necessary special sights to be sent to North Africa together with personnel fully conversant with the plan who could discuss it with General Eisenhower, Air Marshal Tedder, and their staffs.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

a. Agreed that the United States Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Roumanian Oil Fields, and that the Commander in Chief of the North African Theater should be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. Took note that special bomb sights and instructor personnel needed for such an operation would be sent to the North African Theater by the United States Army Air Forces as soon as practicable.

9. Operation "Upkeep"

Admiral Leahy, on behalf of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff offered Sir Charles Portal congratulations on the success of the R.A.F. force in this operation.

Sir Charles Portal, in thanking Admiral Leahy, said that the success attributed to the operation in the newspapers was borne out by aerial photographs.

10. Meetings with the President and Prime Minister

Admiral Leahy informed the Committee that the President and Prime Minister wished to meet the Combined Chiefs of Staff at 6 P.M. tomorrow, Wednesday, 19 May, for a short discussion on the schedule for the future work of the Conference. The Prime Minister and President also wished to meet the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Friday, 21 May, and for final meetings on Monday and Tuesday, the 24th and 25th.

ROOSEVELT-SOONG CONVERSATION, MAY 18, 1943, 11:50 A.M.,
THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

United States
President Roosevelt

China
Foreign Minister Soong

Editorial Note

No record of this conversation was made by Roosevelt. Soong's report on the meeting is contained in his letter of May 18, 1943, to
Roosevelt, *post*, p. 296. The information set forth above respecting the place and time of the meeting is derived from the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers).

**ROOSEVELT PRESS CONFERENCE, MAY 18, 1943, 4:10 P. M., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE**

Roosevelt Papers

*Record of Presidential Press Conference No. 897*

[Excerpts]

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON, May 18, 1943.]

**MR. DONALDSON:** All in.

**THE PRESIDENT:** I don't think I have anything of any importance. I have just had—in the past hour—a very satisfactory conference with the Duke of Windsor. And as you probably know, we are bringing a large number—several thousand—of laborers from the Bahamas, and others from Jamaica, to help out the farm labor this summer and autumn. And I think it's progressing very well.¹

The talks of the Prime Minister are going along very satisfactorily. They are not finished yet.

I think that's about all.

Q. Is the Prime Minister going to be subjected to the tender mercies of a Press Conference, Mr. President?

**THE PRESIDENT:** Yes, I think so. He doesn't worry about it any more than I do. (laughter)

Q. Would Friday be a good guess, sir?

**THE PRESIDENT:** I don't know. I have no idea about it.

Q. Mr. President, has Prime Minister Mackenzie King (of Canada) joined the conferences yet?

**THE PRESIDENT:** No. He—I understand that he just got into town this afternoon, and he is coming to the White House in the morning, to spend the night.

¹ Only those portions of the press conference dealing with the TRIDENT Conference and related matters are printed here.

² No other record of the substance of Roosevelt's meeting with the Duke of Windsor has been found.
Q. Mr. President, I didn’t understand you a moment ago to say that the Prime Minister met the Duke of Windsor?

The President: No. I did.

Q. He did?

Q. The Prime Minister did not meet him.

The President: The Prime Minister—I don’t know, this is society column—(laughter)—the Prime Minister lunched up at the British Embassy. The Duke and Duchess were there, I think. And afterwards, the Prime Minister brought the Duke of Windsor down, and the Duke and I talked for about an hour; and we would be talking longer if I hadn’t noticed that it was four o’clock.

McNARNEY-SOONG MEETING, MAY 18, 1943, AFTERNOON

Present

UNITED STATES
Lieutenant General McNarney

CHINA
Foreign Minister Soong

Editorial Note

No official American record of this conversation has been found. Soong’s report of the meeting is contained in his letter of May 18, 1943, to Roosevelt, post, p. 297.

SMITH-BROOKE CONVERSATION, MAY 18, 1943, EVENING

Present

UNITED STATES
Major General Smith

UNITED KINGDOM
General Brooke

Editorial Note

No official record of this conversation has been found. According to the very brief mention in Alanbrooke, pp. 507–508, Smith anticipated that a solution to the problems regarding future strategy would be put forward which would limit operations in the European area for the benefit of the Pacific theater.
MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 19, 1943, 10:30 A.M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNarney
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Horne
Vice Admiral Willson
Major General Smith
Major General Streett
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Smart
Commander Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Holmes
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Porter
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Macleod

SECRETARIAT
Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

Admiral Leahy suggested that it might be preferable to eliminate the words “and in the light of the probable operation and employment of the French forces” in the conclusion to item 6 of the 87th Meeting.

The British Chiefs of Staff agreed with this view.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 87th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on Tuesday, 18 May 1943, subject to the deletion of the words “and in the light of the probable operation and employment of the French forces” at the end of the conclusion to item 6.

2. AGREED ESSENTIALS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR
(C.C.S. 87th Mtg., Item 3)

Admiral Leahy stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff wished to defer consideration of C.C.S. 232/1.

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1 C.C.S. 88th meeting.
2 Ante, p. 104.
3 Post, p. 231.
3. DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE
(C.C.S. 234 and 235)\textsuperscript{4}

Admiral Leahy asked for the comments of the British Chiefs of Staff on the United States Planners’ paper, C.C.S. 235.

Sir Alan Brooke said that it appeared from the two papers before the Committee that there were certain basic factors on which the U.S. and British Staffs were in agreement. On others there were differences of opinion which must be eliminated.

With regard to the target date for cross-Channel operations, April 1 had been selected for two reasons. This date coincided with the conclusion of the fourth phase of the bomber offensive, and it was the earliest practicable from the point of view of weather. He would like to suggest, however, that April 1 might be too early a date to select. At that time the Russian Front was likely to be static since it was the period of the thaw. The weather conditions in western Europe would not be as favorable on that date as later, say the end of May or early June, which would also coincide with the end of the thaw in Russia. If the first of May or the first of June was accepted as the target date, the build-up in the United Kingdom would also be further advanced.

Though in the United States paper the elimination of Italy was considered and accepted as a possibility, yet no appreciation was given as to the steps necessary to deal with this or to take advantage of it. We might be called upon by some political party other than the Fascists to enter Italy, or we might be confronted with complete collapse and a state of chaos. In either case we should be faced with a decision as to what action was necessary to take advantage of this situation, and the result such action would have on other operations. There were obvious advantages in going into Italy which could be used as a naval and an air base, but how far we should be drawn in was a matter for discussion. There were great advantages in obtaining the northern plains for use as an air base. German air defense was not organized on this sector, and its occupation would force the Germans to detach forces to protect the northern and western frontiers of Italy. We should also examine the possibility of limiting the extent of our occupation of Italy and examine the magnitude of the commitments and the action required to implement our plans.

The next point in the United States proposals was the period of inactivity on land for a period of some six to seven months after Husky. In paragraph 5 c it was pointed out that Germany intended to concentrate on the defeat of the Russian armed forces in 1943

\textsuperscript{4} Post, pp. 261 and 273, respectively.
and that Germany would either fail or succeed in Russia this summer. This year was the most critical time for Russia, and we must take all possible steps to assist her. It would, he felt, be most difficult to justify failure to use available forces for this purpose.

Without crippling Roundup in 1944, we could, he believed, with the forces now available in the Mediterranean achieve important results and provide the greatest measure of assistance to Russia in this critical period and at the same time create a situation favorable for cross-Channel operations in 1944.

It was difficult from paragraph 17 of the paper to visualize the shape of operations to defeat Germany, but it appeared that it was proposed to capture ports to enable a direct build-up from the United States. This concept, he believed, would present considerable difficulties since a study of this problem had shown that the sustenance of the forces used to cover these ports would absorb the larger part of their capacity. After the capture of a bridgehead, Cherbourg might be seized, but the provision of the necessary forces to cover this would be difficult unless the Germans were greatly weakened or unable to find reserves. For this reason active Russian operations were essential. If the Russians suffered defeats in 1943, the possibility of any landing was bad.

In conclusion, he felt that the first of May or the first of June was a better target date for Roundup since this would be the period when the summer fighting in Russia would be starting. By maintaining pressure with limited forces in the Mediterranean, German troops estimated at some 20 to 30 divisions would, by the elimination of Italy, be dispersed and tied down.

He would like to add one minor point. The United States’ build-up envisaged would, he believed, require at an early date additional S.O.S. troops, possibly even at the expense of Sickle, to prepare the depots to receive them. This was necessary since the manpower situation in England was very serious.

Admiral Leahy said that he understood the British proposal to be for Mediterranean operations and a magnified Sledgehammer. He was interested to know what effect the British proposals had on the Anakim operation since he believed some form of operation to help China to be essential.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British proposals for Mediterranean operations contemplated only a deduction of some 3½ to 4 divisions from the forces available for Roundup. Landing craft was a critical item, and the shortage would anyhow necessitate the assault going in on a relatively narrow front. In any event it was not proposed to move any forces from the Mediterranean for use in
ANAKIM since all the troops required were already in India, but any operations in Burma would be hampered by a shortage of shipping, naval covering forces, and landing craft. If it was decided only to open the Ledo Road to China, then, of course, naval operations could be dispensed with, but this operation would probably be at the expense of the capacity of the air route. Before discussing Burmese operations in detail, he felt it wise to await the report of the Combined Staff Planners.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he personally believed that the postponement of the target date for ROUNDUP to the first of May would be acceptable in view of its relation to Russian operations, and the extra time given for the build-up. He agreed also that the action required in the event of the collapse of Italy must be studied and preparations made to meet it.

He agreed with Sir Alan Brooke’s view on the importance of helping Russia in 1943, but he believed that it would take some time to mount any operation subsequent to Husky which itself might not be completed until September. We should, therefore, be helping Russia up until the end of the period of the German campaign.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that he considered that operations in the Mediterranean, with a consequent diversion of German forces, were important throughout the entire year.

GENERAL MARSHALL, commenting further on the British plan, believed that the calculated build-up through the ports was pessimistic. Experience had shown that estimated port capacities were likely, in practice, to be doubled.

In general he believed that the British plan magnified the results to be obtained by Mediterranean operations and minimized the forces which would have to be used and the logistic requirements. It was too sanguine with regard to the results of enemy reaction, and in this connection it must be remembered that in North Africa a relatively small German force had produced a serious factor of delay to our operations. A German decision to support Italy might make intended operations extremely difficult and time consuming.

GENERAL MARSHALL then turned to detailed comments of the British plan.\footnote{C.C.S. 234, May 17, 1943, post, p. 261.} Paragraph 2 \( a \) visualized it as essential for invasion that the initial assault must be on a sufficiently large scale to enable the rate of our build-up to compete with that of the enemy. In this connection a deteriorating German situation was visualized earlier in the paper. As he saw it, the first step was aimed, not at the immediate defeat of the German Army, but at the establishment of a bridgehead which would have results not only psychologically, but on the U-boat
campaign, and would provide air fields, giving better bases for operations against the enemy which in turn would result in the destruction of a growing percentage of the enemy's air fighting capacity. These were immediate and important results, and these, rather than an immediate advance to the Rhine, should be our first objective. He did not believe that the British paper gave sufficient weight to the devastating effect of our air bombardments with the resulting diminution not only of Germany's power but of her ability rapidly to build up forces in western Europe. The effects of the bombing offensive were becoming more and more apparent daily.

Paragraph 7 of the British paper, while showing the limitations imposed on cross-Channel operations by lack of landing craft, did not sufficiently stress the expenditure of these craft in Mediterranean operations. The limitations of landing craft production in the United States must be remembered. In addition, the need for these craft for operation ANAKIM was not brought out.

In paragraph 27 it was suggested that Ploiești could not be attacked except from bases in Italy. This matter had, of course, been discussed at the previous meeting when it had been agreed that an attack could be carried out from bases already in our hands.

In paragraph 35 he believed that the Italian people's will to deal with the Allies was overestimated. If Germany decided to support her to the full, serious delay might be imposed on our plans, our resources would be sucked into the Mediterranean, and we should find ourselves completely involved in operations in that theater to the exclusion of all else.

With regard to the proposal in paragraph 38, that, during the period of confusion after the collapse of Italy, we should secure a bridgehead at Durazzo, he believed that such an operation would so commit us that through shipping and landing craft limitations no other important operations would be possible.

The summary of commitments contained in paragraph 42 might be an accurate estimate but it was axiomatic that every commander invariably asked for more troops than were originally estimated as being necessary. We should, he believed, if Mediterranean operations were undertaken, find ourselves overwhelmed with demands for resources over and above our original estimates.

He had read the British estimate on the shipping requirements to sustain Italian economy in the event of her collapse. He believed that

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6 C.C.S. 227, May 16, 1943, memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff entitled "Relief and Supplies for Occupied and Liberated Territories", not printed, estimated the total shipping commitment for Italy at 10-12 store ships and about 8 tankers.
these were too optimistic and that some 32 to 40 sailings a month would be required. It must be remembered that there was a large Italian element in the United States who were politically powerful and who would not permit the undue curtailment of supplies to Italy.

He believed that the shipping requirement for the Bolero build-up was larger than had been estimated. Even if the personnel and cargo shipping required was available, the limitations of escorts would curtail the full Bolero build-up if operations in the Mediterranean continued. If operations in any magnitude were undertaken in the Mediterranean after Husky there would, in all probability, be no landing craft available to be returned to the United Kingdom for cross-Channel operations.

In general, he considered that the British paper throughout was over-pessimistic with regard to the possibilities of cross-Channel operations, particularly in so far as the results of our vast air power and its relation to ground operations. On the other hand, in considering Mediterranean operations, the British paper was very optimistic with regard to the forces required, the Axis reaction and the logistic problem.

Admiral King, with reference to the suggestion that the target date for Roundup should be postponed to the 1st May or 1st June, agreed that the weather would be better at a later date but considered that to achieve the maximum results in relation to the operations on the Eastern Front, it should take place before the thaw finished. The target date was seldom met, but he believed that it would be wise to plan the target date for 1 May which would be reasonable in all the circumstances.

(At this point all officers with the exception of the Combined Chiefs of Staff themselves, left the meeting.)

After a full discussion the Secretaries were recalled.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Informed the Secretaries of the lines on which draft resolutions were to be drawn up.
b. Instructed the Secretaries to prepare these draft resolutions for their consideration at a meeting to be held later that day.⁹

⁹ See post, p. 118.

CHURCHILL ADDRESS TO A JOINT MEETING OF THE HOUSES OF CONGRESS, MAY 19, 1943, NOON

Editorial Note

For text of Churchill’s address, see House Document No. 217, 78th Congress, 1st session, Congressional Record, vol. 89, pt. 4, p. 4619, or Churchill, War Speeches, vol. II, pp. 449–460. According to the account in Pickersgill, pp. 505–506, Prime Minister Mackenzie King accompanied Prime Minister Churchill’s party from the White House to the Capitol. The address was also heard by the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, then on a brief visit to Washington, who shared the Executive Box with Prime Minister Mackenzie King. Arrangements for Churchill’s party at the Capitol are briefly described in Grace Tully, F.D.R. My Boss (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1949), pp. 327–329.

Following his address, Churchill met with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. According to the brief account in The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, edited by Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., with the collaboration of Joe Alex Morris (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 50, Churchill was questioned by Senator Vandenberg regarding postwar Anglo-American cooperation and the hazards of wartime partnership with the U.S.S.R. Pickersgill, p. 506, indicates that Prime Minister Mackenzie King was also present at this meeting but that the questioning was directed to Churchill.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 19, 1943, 4: 30 P. M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNarney

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge

¹ C.C.S. 89th meeting.
1. **Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe**
   (C.C.S. 237)**

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 88th Meeting, Item 3)**

The Committee considered the draft resolutions contained in C.C.S. 237 and agreed to certain amendments which are incorporated below.

[Here follows text of C.C.S. 237/1, May 20, 1943, *post*, p. 281.]

(These resolutions to be subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 237/1.)

(At this point the Secretaries entered the meeting.)

2. **Operations from India**

In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, Admiral Leahy said that he understood the term **Anakim** to mean operations in Burma and not to cover other operations based on India against such places as Sumatra or the Malayan Peninsula. The Chinese believed that they had received a firm promise that the British and Americans would, towards the end of 1943, undertake operations in Burma aimed at opening a road to China. He personally now accepted that the original operations which included the capture of Rangoon were impracticable, but he believed nevertheless that an operation to open a land route to China must be undertaken. This might take the form of attacking in North Burma with a view to capturing Mandalay and opening a route through Ledo, at the same time seizing Akyab and Ramree Island.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, Sir Alan Brooke said that the Andaman Islands contained only one small air field and their capture, except as part of large scale operations, was not worth while.

3. **Provision of Transport Aircraft for Husky**

Sir Charles Portal said that despite the additional aircraft promised there was still a deficiency of 80 transports for the new Husky plan. He had discussed the subject with General Smith who was most anxious that every possible step should be taken to provide them. If trained crews were the bottleneck the Royal Air Force could pro-

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2 This paper, not printed, was prepared by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff along lines set forth by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after the "off the record" portion of their meeting on the morning of May 19, 1943; see ante, p. 116.

2 See ante, p. 112.
vvide them. He suggested that this matter might be further discussed at a future meeting, say Friday, of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

General McNarney said that crews were not the limiting factor. The additional 80 aircraft required could only be provided at the expense of the South Pacific. He believed that if the air-borne troops visualized were essential to the success of the plan, these could all be dropped by using the same aircraft for two drops. He fully appreciated the timing of these drops would not be perfect, but was convinced that by this means all the air-borne troops required could be put across.

General Marshall said that the theater commander must be and had been backed to the limit but in this case the limit had been reached and the aircraft required were not available.

General McNarney agreed.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, MAY 19, 1943, 6 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

United States

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNarney

United Kingdom

Prime Minister Churchill
Field Marshal Dill
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat

Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. Progress of Conference

The President inquired what progress had been achieved in the Conferences between the Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral Leahy said that he hoped that it would be possible to furnish the President and the Prime Minister with some tentative conclusions in time for the weekend. Anakim had only been dealt with in a very general way up to the present, but would be considered in more detail the following day.

The Prime Minister said that he was entirely in favor of carrying out whatever operations might be possible in Burma without trench-
ing too deeply on shipping and naval resources. Of course any troops who could be placed in contact with the enemy should not be allowed to stand idle.

General Brooke agreed.

The Prime Minister said that he very much hoped it would be possible in time to arrange for some British squadrons to take part in the operations in China. Sir Charles Portal agreed that it would be very desirable.

General McNarney said that logistical difficulties would prevent any employment of British squadrons in the near future.

The President drew attention to the importance of political and personal considerations in planning action in China.

2. The U-Boat War and the Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands

The President inquired whether in the opinion of the First Sea Lord the U-boat war was proceeding reasonably well.

Sir Dudley Pound said that results recently had been fairly satisfactory.

Sir Charles Portal said that the air operations against submarines were being extended and it was hoped to increase not only the total sinkings by this means but also the rate of sinkings per aircraft employed.

General Marshall inquired whether the President had yet considered the possibility of securing the use of the Azores.

The President said that he had been considering the matter and he thought that one method of procedure might be to ask President Vargas of Brazil to make a secret approach to the Portuguese Government. The President then read to the meeting a telegram drafted by the Secretary of State putting the matter to President Vargas.¹ He said that he had mentioned the idea to President Vargas when he had last seen him, and had suggested that if a token Brazilian force were sent to the Islands, the Portuguese might be enabled to transfer back to the mainland some of the good troops which they had serving in the Islands.² This might be an added inducement to the Portuguese to allow the United Nations to make use of bases in their Island territory.

In the discussion that followed the following were the main points made:

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were all agreed as to the great military advantages which would follow the occupation of the Azores and considered that no time should be lost in carrying it out.

¹ See post, p. 308.
² For documentation regarding the conference between Roosevelt and Vargas at Natal, Brazil, on January 28, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. v, pp. 553 ff.
b. Mr. Hopkins thought the chances of the Portuguese willingly conceding the use of bases in the Azores were extremely remote. He thought therefore that before any approach was made we should be quite sure in our minds that we were prepared to occupy the Islands by force if our request was refused.

c. Although on the face of it it might appear to be an action savoring somewhat of German or Japanese technique, the occupation by force of the Azores could hardly be condemned when it is remembered that Portugal, together with the other small nations depended for their very existence upon the victory of the United Nations, and that as long as the latter were debarred from making use of the Azores, their shipping was subjected to damaging attacks, against which a proper defense could not be provided. In the last war it had been found necessary to make a technical breach of neutrality by occupying the Piraeus, but the incident had eventually been settled to everyone's satisfaction. It should not be forgotten that it was on the margin of shipping that the Allies depended for their warmaking capacity.

d. Probably the best way of handling the matter would be to have ample force available off the Islands, and to inform the Portuguese Government that the Islands would be occupied the following morning and that resistance would be hopeless. Solid inducements would be offered, and if the Portuguese desired it, the Brazilians could ostensibly provide the occupying troops.

In conclusion, it was agreed that the Prime Minister should telegraph proposals on these lines to the British Government for their comments, and that in the meanwhile the Combined Chiefs of Staff should have a plan prepared for carrying out the operation as soon as possible. The plan should be ready for examination by the President and Prime Minister on Monday, 24 May.

The Prime Minister asked how the discussions regarding the Mediterranean and Bolero had been progressing.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had today reached an agreement which provided for a build-up in England of a sufficient force to secure a bridgehead on the Continent from which further offensive operations could be carried out. This was to involve approximately nine divisions in the assault and a build-up of twenty additional divisions. At the same time, the Chiefs of Staff had agreed that the Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of Husky as would be best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and contain the maximum number of German forces. These operations would, of course, be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Eisenhower was to be told that he might use for this purpose those forces available in the Mediterranean Theater except that four Ameri-

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*For Churchill's telegram of May 21, 1943, to Attlee and Eden, see post, p. 309.*
can divisions and three British divisions would be held in readiness from the first of November onward for withdrawal to take part in the operations from the United Kingdom. Sir Alan Brooke said it was also agreed that these decisions would be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in July or early in August in order that the situation might be reexamined in the light of the results of Husky and the situation then existing in Russia.

The President asked what the situation concerning the troops in Syria was at the present time.

Sir Alan Brooke informed the President that there were not many divisions available in Syria at this time. Most of them were being trained for Husky either in Syria or in Egypt. There were two Polish divisions now in Iraq.

The Prime Minister observed the Polish troops would be much improved if they could be actively engaged.

The President asked what use could be made of Yugoslav troops.

Sir Alan Brooke said that there was only a handful of these troops, about a battalion. He said the Greeks had also organized one brigade.

The Prime Minister said that he thought September of this year would be a good time to urge Turkey to permit the United Nations to use air bases in that country. He felt that the relations with Turkey would have been considerably strengthened by that time because of having supplied them with considerable munitions of war and that they might be receptive to such an approach.

In reply to a question from the President, Sir Charles Portal said that weather for flying conditions out of Turkey was not too reliable after the late summer.

The Prime Minister indicated that it would be desirable, of course, to obtain Turkey’s permission to use her air bases prior to September and thought it might be possible if Italy were to be eliminated from the war. In the latter case, we should get free access to Rhodes and the Dodecanese.

The President then indicated to General Marshall that he had sent him a message concerning General Eisenhower’s proposals that pre-Husky propaganda should contain a promise of peace with honor to Italy. The President and the Prime Minister both agreed that such a promise should not be made.

The Prime Minister indicated his pleasure that the Conference was progressing as well as it was and also that a cross-Channel operation had finally been agreed upon. He had always been in favor of such

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4 For Eisenhower’s message of May 17, 1943, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see post, p. 326.
an operation and had to submit to its delay in the past for reasons beyond control of the United Nations. He said that he thought Premier Stalin would be disappointed at not having an invasion of northern France in 1943 but was certain that Mr. Stalin would be gratified by the results from Husky and the further events that were to take place this year.

The President and The Prime Minister agreed that the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be held at 5:00 P. M. on Friday, 21 May.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-MACKENZIE KING CONVERSATION, MAY 19, 1943, EVENING, THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

United States
President Roosevelt

Canada
Prime Minister Mackenzie King

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No American record of this conversation has been found. According to Pickersgill, p. 510, from which the information set forth above has been derived, this conversation followed a dinner at the White House attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, Mackenzie King, and several other unnamed guests. During the conversation, peacemaking and postwar international organizations were discussed, and Roosevelt set forth his proposal for a Supreme Council of the United Nations.

ROOSEVELT-MACKENZIE KING CONVERSATION, MAY 19, 1943, EVENING, THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

United States
President Roosevelt

Canada
Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Editorial Note

No American record of this conversation has been found. According to the account in Pickersgill, p. 513, from which the information set forth above has been derived, Roosevelt told Mackenzie King that he had sent a message to Stalin asking for a bilateral meeting. Roosevelt was concerned about Churchill's possible reaction to the proposal. For text of Roosevelt's May 5, 1943, message to Stalin, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 3.
I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

THURSDAY, MAY 20, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 20, 1943, 10:30 A.M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNarney
Lieutenant General Stilwell
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Horne
Major General Streett
Major General Chennault
Major General Fairchild
Major General Smith
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Cabell
Commander Freeman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Field Marshal Wavell
Admiral Somerville
Air Chief Marshal Peirse
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Holmes
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Porter
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Macleod

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Dcane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETINGS

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:-

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 88th and

1 C.C.S. 90th meeting. Regarding this meeting and the 91st meeting (post, p. 142), the Stimson Diary for May 21, 1943, records the following observations:

"The minutes of the proceedings of yesterday by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were not so encouraging. They dealt with the serious situation in Burma and the possibilities of action there. The conclusions evidenced in their final resolution in the afternoon seem to me so inconclusive and unsatisfactory that I called in General Stilwell who had been there and got him to explain to me and to McCloy on the maps his own plans and the extent and method in which the British propositions fell short of what Stilwell thought were the requirements of the situation. Later in the afternoon I had a talk with Marshall over it and he gave me his difficulties. He agreed that the matter had been left in a very unsatisfactory situation. The President has gone over solid to the support of an air attack by Chennault as sufficient to secure China and to that end he is giving to Chennault the lion's share of the capacity of the Burma airline during the first approaching months. This will cut off the indispensable supply for the ground troops in Yunnan which Stilwell is laboring so hard to get. Marshall told me of his difficulties in getting Stilwell to report clearly and intelligently to the conference. I told him that in my interview with him this morning I found that, while he was shy, by proper questions I could get it all out and I wished very much that someone had been able and willing to do that yesterday in the conference but apparently Stilwell shut up like a clam and made therefore an unfavorable impression." (Stimson Papers)
89th Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on Wednesday, 19 May.²

2. POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
(C.C.S. 185/3)⁵

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that at the meeting at the White House on the previous day, the President and Prime Minister had signified their disagreement with certain points in General Eisenhower’s proposals put forward in NAF 221.⁴

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff recommended therefore that General Eisenhower should be informed that his proposals were not approved and that he should continue to base his propaganda policy on the previous directive.

SIR ALAN BROKE said that this matter had been referred to the Foreign Office and he would like to await their reply before giving any instructions to General Eisenhower. Until such instructions were issued General Eisenhower would, of course, continue to act on his previous directive.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—
Agreed to defer action on C.C.S. 185/3 pending the receipt of the views of the Foreign Office.

3. STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
(C.C.S. 220)⁶

SIR ALAN BROKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had examined this plan with great interest. The plan was, however, not in any great detail. The ways and means of achieving the various courses outlined had not been examined nor their possibilities assessed. He suggested that machinery should be set up at once to examine the proposals and to draw up a more detailed plan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY explained that C.C.S. 220 was not intended to be a detailed plan. He suggested that it might be accepted as a basis for study and elaboration.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was very important to examine carefully this great field of operations. He believed that a full appreciation should be prepared. The facts should be assembled, the objects set out, together with alternative courses of action to achieve these objects with full facts and arguments for and against each course. Only by starting from first principles could we decide on the most advantageous plan.

² See ante, pp. 111 and 118, respectively.
³ See post, p. 326, footnote 1.
⁴ Post, p. 326.
⁵ Post, p. 289.
Admiral Leahy said that he was in entire agreement with Sir Charles Portal’s views.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Accepted C.C.S. 220 as a basis for a combined study and elaboration for future plans.

b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate a study and prepare for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff an appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the defeat of Japan including an estimate of the forces required for its implementation.

4. Operations in Burma To Open and Secure an Overland Route to China

(C.C.S. 231)

Sir Alan Brooke said the British Chiefs of Staff believed there was great danger in extensive operations from Ledo and Imphal, which would be dependent on two very precarious roads, whereas the Japanese forces would be supplied by road, rail and river, and would be operating out of a relatively dry area. The maintenance of our forces at the ends of their lines of communication would be particularly difficult during the monsoon season. Even if a road to China were opened, he believed that the Japanese could bring stronger forces to bear than we could maintain to defend it. With regard to operations on the coast, he believed that the capture of Akyab and Ramree was feasible but we had not the resources or the necessary landing craft to undertake the two more southerly amphibious assaults. The danger, as he saw it, was that by aiming both to build up the air route to the maximum capacity and to undertake a land offensive, we should do neither very efficiently. The undertaking of land operations would limit the amount of supplies which could be taken up to the air bases. He believed that the right course was to expand the air route to the maximum in order to increase the strength of the air forces operating in China and to provide limited maintenance of the Chinese ground forces. Dr. T. V. Soong, in his memorandum, had emphasized the necessity for maintaining General Chennault’s force at the highest possible level.

Sir Alan Brooke believed that operations aimed at...
the capture of Mandalay were not possible of achievement and that instead we should concentrate on building up the air route and at the same time undertake limited operations from Ledo and Imphal in order to protect it, and capture Akyab and Ramree.

Field Marshal Wavell said he had only had a short time to examine the paper under discussion and was therefore not in a position to comment in detail. In general, however, he believed the possibilities outlined in the paper to be far too optimistic. He reminded the Committee of the administrative difficulties in connection with operations in Burma. The lines of communication were bad, heavy casualties had to be expected from malaria, trained lorry drivers were scarce, and, in general, the administrative difficulties invariably exceeded paper calculations of their magnitude. A margin of some 50 to 100 per cent had to be allowed on this account.

There were obviously great advantages to be derived from the capture of Mandalay and the control of Upper Burma to the northward of it. A land route would be open to China with consequent effect on Chinese morale, though it would be but an indifferent route and would carry but little for a long time. He was quite certain that even if Mandalay could be captured, it would be impossible, certainly during the monsoon season, to maintain there forces large enough to withstand the scale of attack which the Japanese, with their better lines of communication, could bring against them.

In planning, his personal tendency had always been to be optimistic, but after 18 months' experience in the area, he felt it only right to warn the Committee that he believed it unlikely to be feasible to maintain forces as far south as Mandalay. In his opinion, the correct and possible courses of action were: Firstly, to make every effort to increase the air ferry route to its maximum capacity and to build up our own air superiority over Burma. These two objects should be our first charge. Then if the required resources, engineering facilities, boats and vehicles were made available, it should be possible to make attacks by land into Upper Burma from Yunnan on Lashio, from Ledo on Myitkyina and Bhamo, and from Imphal into the Chindwin Valley whence touch would be gained to the eastward with the Chinese moving in from Yunnan. These three advances must keep step, and our first objective should be a line from a point where the Burma Road crossed the Burma-Chinese border, through Bhamo, Katha, Pinlebo, Kalewa, and thence to the west. To gain a line of that kind might well be possible, and it would give sufficient cover to the Myitkyina air fields and the route to Burma. If on achieving this line the Japanese

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C.C.S. 231, not printed.
were weakened, we should then consider the possibility of going further south, but any idea, at this stage, that the capture of and subsequent maintenance of our forces in Mandalay was possible was likely to be falsified. We must decide our future operations in the light of events.

With regard to coastal operations, he believed we should most certainly try to capture Ramree and Akyab, though this was a difficult proposition since it was now heavily defended. It was not, in his view, worthwhile to endeavor to capture Sandoway and Taungup since they would be difficult to maintain during the monsoon owing to sea conditions and would be cut off from the rest of Burma by the Arakan range. The paper suggested the use of the long-range penetration brigade on An and Mimbua. He would examine this, but he believed that a better use for this unit would be in Upper Burma to maintain contact between the Chinese and the British. The possibility of an attack on Rangoon through Bassein had been examined by his Planning Staff, but they had reported adversely on its practicability, since it entailed a long and difficult advance through thick jungle country interspersed with creeks. Another possibility was to proceed up the railroad from Bassein to Henzada, using trucks on the railway, but from that point there were 40 miles of difficult jungle before the good road north of Rangoon was met. It had been judged that a direct assault on Rangoon up the river was less hazardous and more likely to succeed than either of these two plans.

Air Chief Marshal Peirse said that he wished to emphasize that wherever operations in Burma were undertaken air superiority was essential, both to defend the air route and to assist in land operations. Additional air fields for the fighting air force would therefore be required. If land operations were undertaken stronger air forces would be required including transport aircraft to maintain ground forces, particularly during the monsoon season. This necessity would probably cause a diversion of transports from the air ferry route.

Admiral Leahy said that as he understood it, the British proposals consisted of a maximum concentration on the air route and limited ground operations, including the capture of Ramree and Akyab.

General Marshall said that he was impressed both with General Wavell’s comments on the magnitude of the logistic problem and Air Marshal Peirse’s on the air diversion resulting from land operations. In his view, however, a great increase in the air route alone without offensive ground operations would produce a strong Japanese reaction. He believed ground operations to be essential for their effect both on Chinese morale and on operations in the South and Southwest Pacific. If no aggressive action were undertaken in Burma the results on
Pacific operations would be most unfortunate. Similarly, if no aggressive action were taken in the Pacific it would have a serious effect on the Burmese operations.

Operations in New Guinea and Guadalcanal under somewhat similar conditions, with disease, monsoon and logistic difficulties had been successfully accomplished. Bombers had been used for supplies when transports had not been available.

He believed that lack of real aggressive action in Burma would be unfortunate for the South and Southwest Pacific and fatal to China. He did not believe that we should bank all on the attractive proposition of do everything by air. He realized that full-scale ground operations might limit supplies to China by air, but the Japanese must be threatened on the ground and this could only be achieved by hard fighting. Results on other theaters must be considered. Adequate shipping must be provided to build up the necessary resources. He was in no doubt as to the difficulties of the operations but equally he was in no doubt as to their vital importance.

Admiral Leahy said that he believed that without aggressive action by ground forces we should lose the air route. How far it was possible to go was a matter of some doubt but he believed that we should direct our attack on Mandalay in order to occupy the Japanese to the full, to save the air route and to insure Japanese withdrawals from other theaters. It must always be remembered that Japanese communications were open to sea and air attack. The two Governments were, he believed, decided that operations in North Burma must be undertaken.

Sir Charles Portal said that the main difference of opinion appeared to be as to whether or not limited land operations could succeed in insuring the safety of the air route. He believed that the maximum effect against the Japanese could be achieved by air superiority and the build-up of the air route into China, thus freeing our lines of communications and our air forces from the need to support and feed troops engaged in extensive ground operations. He firmly believed that we should put all our resources into the air and that the problem as a whole must be regarded as a military one, the object of which was to achieve the maximum effect on the Japanese.

General McNaurney said that he had always been surprised that the Japanese had not made more effort to cut the air supply route, particularly Myitkyina where it was very exposed to fighter attack. He believed that they would do this as soon as the air effort being built up in China was sufficient to cause them serious worry. To prevent the air line being cut, it was necessary to advance our fighter
bases as far as Myitkyina and the air warning line still further. Unless Mandalay and Lashio were captured, we should not have sufficiently far advanced bases for the air warning system to cover the fighters at Myitkyina. He did not believe that the necessity for supplying ground forces by air would necessarily limit the supplies taken into China. There were some 90 C-47's in India used for this purpose, and this number could possibly be increased. Further, heavy bombers could be used for this purpose.

Field Marshal Wavell pointed out that he was concerned not only with the problem of maintaining the supplies to our forces as far south as Mandalay, but also with the fact that the Japanese could bring and maintain stronger forces to bear at that point.

Sir Charles Portal, with regard to the vulnerability of the air route to China, said that he believed if adequate airfields were available in Assam, the Japanese fighters could be bombed out of their bases.

General Chennault said that he believed it to be practicable to defend the two terminals of the air route with the air forces now available, since these could prevent the Japanese from concentrating and maintaining heavy air forces within range of these terminals. The major attack which had occurred at the Chinese end was against Kunming on the 8th of May, when 40 fighters and 36 bombers had attacked. Out of these, 13 fighters and 2 bombers had been shot down, with 10 further probables. No confirmed attacks on transports had been made. Occasional fighter patrols were flown from both ends, with an overlap at the center. The Japanese could, in any event, only maintain sporadic attacks on the route, and the forces available to the 10th and 14th Air Forces could reach all the Japanese airfields within range of the route. If attacks developed, the route could be moved some 60 miles further north in the area of Myitkyina, which, though over higher mountains, would only increase the distance by 15 miles.

Sir Charles Portal said that General Chennault had expressed his own views exactly.

Sir Alan Brooke said he was in entire agreement that some sort of aggressive action was required and the forces available used, but, if operations were carried beyond a certain point, we should face a possible defeat with its consequent bad effects both on China and in the Pacific. An advance far to the south would put us at a severe logistic disadvantage with regard to the Japanese. In Assam we were relatively safe since the Japanese would have to operate over bad lines of communication to reach our own forces.
GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the Japanese now possessed an air barrier from Bougainville to Burma, along which they could rapidly effect concentrations in any area. The Japanese had not yet concentrated at the Burma end, but he believed that when powerful bombing from China was undertaken, the Japanese reaction against the air route would be strong, unless the Japanese air forces were tied down by active operations elsewhere.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said the Japanese must be prevented from attacking the air line to China. The maintenance of China was essential to successful operations against Japan, and therefore we must conduct operations toward Mandalay.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that General Wavell’s calculated requirements were some 180,000 tons per month. A large part of this, however, had no relation to the operations envisaged. There were 33 divisions in India, with a further 10½ overseas, but only 12 engaged in the operation. He believed there was no real justification for a tonnage greater than 90,000 per month for ANAKIM. 27,000 tons a month of the requirement was for civilian supplies.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL and SIR ALAN BROKE pointed out that India must be maintained and this could not be divorced from the operational requirement. India’s requirements had already been cut in order to make good the British import program. If the so-called civilian requirements were not met, India’s output of munitions could not be maintained.

With the aid of a map, GENERAL SOMERVELL then outlined the amounts which he believed could be supplied over the various routes.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that he believed that the industrial capacity of India could be maintained without the figure of 180,000 tons per month being met. Many of the requirements would not bear examination in detail and some could be cut in half. For instance, the Indian requirement of 4,000 amphibious or special vehicles appeared excessive. It was greater than the number available to the entire United States Army.

He believed that the river route to Ledo had not been expanded to its maximum capacity. He outlined his views on the logistic possibilities of the routes to Mandalay and Lashio. The Japanese had only some four or five divisions in Burma and he saw no reason why stronger forces could not be maintained on the Mandalay line against them.

SIR ALAN BROKE said that he could not agree with this estimate. The Japanese had excellent lines of communication available to them. It was not wise to decide on operations which were not feasible. These operations had to be carried out by the British. He believed that
the maximum possible land operations should be undertaken but it must be appreciated that these would encroach upon the air route tonnage. An advance to a line through Bhamo and Kalewa was as far as the Commander in Chief considered possible.

In reply to a question, General Stilwell said that if they moved at all, he believed that the Chinese forces could get as far as Mandalay. He could see no object in stopping operations on the edge of the good road network. If the British forces could be supplied at Katha and Kalewa, the two rivers would permit their supply at Mandalay. The Chinese had been promised a major effort in Burma. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would probably make any action by his forces conditional on the recapture of the whole of Burma.

Admiral Leahy suggested that the Chiefs of Staff should project the campaign towards the seizure of Mandalay, and proceed as far as possible with this object in view. The Japanese might stop us, but he believed it to be a wasted effort to limit the objective to Kalewa.

Field Marshal Wavell said that he was prepared to go as far as he could while maintaining a force equal to the Japanese. If the Japanese proved weaker than was expected, or, if he found he could maintain a stronger force than he believed, he was naturally prepared to advance further, but he believed it useless to accept a liability until he was certain he could carry it out. Any operations he undertook were dependent on the action taken by the Chinese forces since, if they did not advance, his eastern flank would be exposed. The Chinese and British must keep in step.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Agreed to postpone further discussion on this matter until a later meeting to be held in closed session at 3:30 p.m. the same day.

5. Potentialities of the Air Route from Assam to Burma

[China] (C.C.S. 229) ¹⁰

Admiral Leahy said that all reference to the expansion of the air route to more than 10,000 tons should be deleted from the paper. The possibilities of any increase above 10,000 tons was problematical.

In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal as regards the limiting factor to the expansion of the air route, General McNaurney said that the Planners’ estimate had been based solely on the availability of aircraft from factories and not in relation to other demands for them. It would be dangerous to put forward a figure of 20,000 tons based on the premise that no other commitments existed for these aircraft. Fur-

¹⁰“Potentialities of Air Route from Assam to China”, May 19, 1943, not printed.
ther, an examination had shown that to increase the air route to 20,000 tons would mean getting some 50,000 tons per month into Assam which would require a large number of additional transports. The total requirements were higher than could be met by the end of December.

Sir Charles Portal said that although there might be a limit to the aircraft, he considered it wise for the terminals to be developed on the basis of a load of 20,000 tons/month. The development of the air route terminals would take far longer than the provision of additional transport aircraft. It might be possible for the British to provide certain of these.

Admiral King said that it appeared to be the suggestion that the Generalissimo should be offered 20,000 tons a month by air as an alternative to the opening of the Burma Road. His fear was that the increased bomber effort from China, resulting from the increased capacity of the air route, would force the Japanese to take strong action and the terminal points would be attacked. Even if the bases in Assam were secure those in Kunming were open to attack. The retention of China as a base for the defeat of Japan was as essential as the continuance of Russia in the war as a factor in the defeat of Germany.

General McNarney said that he saw no objection to expanding the facilities for the air route to 20,000 tons. The present limiting factor was hard standings rather than air fields.

Sir Charles Portal agreed that the date for the achievement of 20,000 tons might be optimistic, but believed that it should be laid down as the ultimate objective.

Admiral King pointed out that the President had laid down, and the Prime Minister concurred in, a figure of 10,000 tons a month for the air route being achieved by November. Anything we could do above this figure would provide a cushion which could be used for the support of ground operations against Mandalay. Though the opening of the Burma Road was a symbol to China, it might be possible to convince them that an air route would achieve the same results.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to consider C.C.S. 229 further at 3:30 p.m. that afternoon in closed session.

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11 Concrete parking areas for aircraft located along the edges of taxi-strips of airfields.
12 According to Soong’s report on the President’s decisions on supplies to China, Roosevelt ordered that the 10,000 tons per month goal be reached by September; see post, p. 297. There is no record indicating when Churchill concurred in the decision.
III. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

MEETING OF THE PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL, MAY 20, 1943, 12:05 P. M.,
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister
Churchill
Ambassador Halifax

CANADA
Prime Minister
Mackenzie King
Minister McCarthy

CHINA
Foreign Minister Soong

AUSTRALIA
Minister for External
Affairs Evatt

NEW ZEALAND
First Secretary of
Legation Cox (representing
Minister Nash)

NETHERLANDS
Ambassador Loudon

PHILIPPINES
President Quezon

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum by the President’s Naval Aide (Brown)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1943.

The thirty-first meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at
12:05 o’clock p. m., Thursday, May 20, 1943, in the Cabinet Room of
the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, D.C.

Present:

[The list is printed above.]

The President informed the Council that he considers the Prime
Minister’s address to the Congress to be the clearest and best exposition
of global war that has ever been given. There appeared to be
general agreement with this statement.

President Roosevelt then, with the aid of a chart, gave a brief ex-
planation of the operations now in progress for the capture of the
Island of Attu—the westernmost of the Aleutians. He described
the physical difficulties that had to be overcome and laid special stress
on the almost continuous bad weather that has prevailed during the
month of the year when the best weather of the year is to be expected
in the Bering Sea area. The commencement of the attack had to be
delayed several days because of fog and gales; fog and occasional

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1 Regarding the origin of the Pacific War Council, see the editorial note relating
to the 12th meeting, June 25, 1942, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Wash-

2 For the exchange of telegrams regarding Roosevelt’s invitation to Mackenzie
King to attend the meeting of the Pacific War Council, see post, pp. 333–334.

3 See ante, p. 117.

4 The United States 7th Division landed on Attu on May 11, 1943; the Japa-
nese garrison was defeated and rounded up by the end of the month.
gales have kept up ever since; we have rarely been able to use either aerial or gun support; the physical difficulty of moving through the tundra is great; snow has impaired progress in the high spots; more men have been hospitalized with frozen feet than from enemy bullets; but nevertheless we have progressed and have now squeezed the defending forces into the high land surrounding Chicagof Harbor where they are making a final stand. The President stated that so much misinformation has been written and expressed about the significance of the capture of Attu Island that he thought members of the Council should have in mind that the capture of Attu and the establishment of an air field there will not open the way to bombing the Japanese homeland even though we have moved appreciably nearer our final objective. The reason Attu will not facilitate bombing of Japan is due to the tremendously uncertain weather which is such that, even if we launched attacking squadrons, the chances of their return would be very slim. The occupation of Attu will secure and tend to neutralize the value of enemy bases at Kiska. This should enable us, in time, to push the Japanese out of the Aleutians. When, and if, Russia should join in the war against Japan, our position in Attu will help very much to take full advantage of Siberian bases. The Honorable Mackenzie King stated that the Japanese occupation of the Aleutians had been a matter of grave concern to Canada and that Canada welcomes and applauds every measure to evict the Japanese from the Aleutian Area.

President Roosevelt stated that he had not any further information to give the Council except that throughout the world we are assiduously continuing our pressure on our enemies and weakening his [their] position by daily attrition of his land, sea and air forces. In the case of Japan, the combined submarine and air action is steadily reducing the Japanese merchant marine to the point where the maintenance of her outlying stations will become more and more difficult. He wished to inform Dr. Soong that the Prime Minister plans to lend material help in revitalizing the air forces in China and that British air squadrons are to be added to the American and Chinese air forces in order that we may create in China a united Allied force that may learn by experience to work together effectively.

Dr. Soong stated that this prospect of additional aid would be highly valued by China.

President Roosevelt stated that, of course, everyone realized the principal difficulty of building up a powerful air force in China is in providing sufficient petrol; but that General Chennault, who is now here, feels perfectly confident that sufficient petrol can be brought in by air and that if we will give him sufficient planes he can accomplish
two very positive things:—(a) He can break up any extensive Japanese land offensive that aims at the demolition of Chinese air fields; (b) Within a year he can destroy 500,000 tons of Japanese shipping by constantly raiding their sea lanes and their river boat supplies. Dr. Soong stated that the people of China are very much heartened by the Prime Minister's speech to Congress yesterday and that they, too, are very hopeful that the difficulties of maintaining a strong air force in China will be solved. However, he wishes to state with all earnestness that it is the opinion of his government and of all the Chinese that it is essential that we must continue the offensive in Burma for the purpose of restoring the Burma Road, as it is through the Burma Road alone that sufficient supplies can be brought into China to enable that country to drive out her invaders. Dr. Soong stated that he felt sure everyone would agree that air force alone can not win the war and that we must provide a land route to equip Chinese armies. To do this we must carry out the promises made at Casablanca and send a combined naval and land expedition to recapture Burma.5

The Prime Minister said that (while we will continue our offensive in Burma when the weather permits) it is his understanding that the Burma Road has been so damaged by the Chinese and Japanese that it could not possibly be restored to a point where it would be of any value in bringing in supplies until the year 1945.

Dr. Soong stated that, although it had been badly damaged, the Japanese are repairing their part of the road and the Chinese are repairing the part they still control, so that the road could be restored to useful condition very soon after we gain physical control.

Dr. Evatt, the Australian Minister of State for External Affairs, stated that he thought perhaps all of the members of the Council failed to realize what extremely heavy casualties are involved in tropical warfare. He stated that in New Guinea the combined Australian and American forces have suffered nearly 45,000 casualties up to February and that of the 50,000 Australians who had fought in New Guinea, over 7,000 have been lost in [action?] killed or missing, but that malaria had run the combined casualties up to above 40,000. President Roosevelt agreed that in the New Guinea campaign the casualties had amounted to nearly fifty percent of the forces involved, and that this was, of course, a terribly high mortality rate; but that, on the other hand, we must remember that the Japanese losses had been very much greater than ours and that he thought, in general, the

5 Regarding the Casablanca Conference decisions with regard to future operations in Burma, see ante, p. 88, footnote 4.
proportion was nearly three to one. It was agreed by the President and Dr. Evatt that the bad cases of malaria should not be sent back into malaria countries, but it was also agreed that patients who have recovered could be used very effectively for garrisoning important non-malarial stations and thereby release other men to fight who had not been exposed to malaria.

The President asked Prime Minister Churchill whether he had anything to say to the Council.

The Prime Minister said that he welcomed the opportunity to inform the Council of several problems that he had very much in mind. He then delivered a very able brief statement of his theory of the general strategy that should be followed by the Allies now that we have gained the initiative and while we are building up an overpowering superiority in all weapons. In brief, the Prime Minister stated that we must recognize that we are limited in what we can do by the number of ships we have available to carry men and supplies to the chosen theatres of war and that, therefore, our purpose must be to force the enemy to fight in areas that are advantageous to us and disadvantageous to him. Tunisia was selected as a fine example of what the Prime Minister considers sound strategy. The enemy was compelled to lengthen his lines of communications; to overstrain his line of supply and to eventual collapse, because of his inability to maintain and reinforce his armies.

The Prime Minister expressed the opinion that an extensive campaign in Burma, instead of putting the enemy at a disadvantage, would place all of these burdens on our forces, because the rainy season would give us only six months to gain our objective; the heat of the jungle would decimate our forces, as had been demonstrated by our fighting in New Guinea; and that the problems of supply for our troops would be tremendous. The Prime Minister stated that he noted a comment of an American Senator that the British had two million men in India who were apparently unable to drive a few thousand Japanese out of Burma. The Prime Minister stated that such a declaration completely ignored the practical problems of logistics; that the forest and swamps of Burma are such that only a limited number of men can work and fight in any given area, and that, therefore, it becomes a question of quality rather than quantity—when we put troops into Burma they must be experienced fighters who can overcome difficulties and defeat superior numbers of the enemy; and it is for that reason that the Prime Minister has offered British air squadrons to fight in China as the most effective assistance that Great Britain can contribute at this
time. The Prime Minister stated that this is in support of the view that President Roosevelt has held and enforced for the past several months. Mr. Churchill said that he wished to go on record as believing that President Roosevelt has a penetrating insight into the sound strategy of the present world war and that his instinct for lending immediate air support to China is wholly sound.

The Prime Minister also stated that, as a result of recent conferences, he was pleased to be able to announce for himself and for President Roosevelt that at least 450 planes would be added to the Australian Air Force for the prosecution of the war in that area. He stated that everyone knows that the Australian fliers are among the best in the world and that the planes would be provided for the Australians to man in order that they might take a more active part in the defense of their homeland.

The Prime Minister said there was only one other subject that he wished to touch on and that was that a disturbing rumor had reached him that China is massing troops on the borders of Tibet, and that he hoped that it was in error, both because the borders of Tibet had been secure for so many years and, also, because it would mean diverting forces away from the true enemy—Japan—and that he would regret to see the Chinese take offensive action against a neutral.

Dr. Soong stated emphatically that there was no truth whatsoever to the rumor, either that troops were being massed on the border or that China had any present intention of attacking Tibet. He stated, however, that Tibet is not a separate nation; that it is a part of China and that eventually China may have to take necessary action to maintain her sovereignty, but that they have no intentions of taking such action at the present time. Dr. Soong went on with considerable heat to state that he can not accept the Prime Minister's statement about the impossibility of undertaking a campaign in Burma. He stated that his people are greatly cheered by Allied successes in Tunisia and that it has demonstrated to the people of China that the Allies are able to defend their own. He stated that in his country the question is often asked, "How can the Englishmen, who were so feeble in their conduct of the war in Malaya, fight such magnificent battles as they have fought in Africa?" Dr. Soong said that his answer is that the Briton is always a good soldier when properly led

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6 For a letter from Evatt to Roosevelt on this subject, see post, p. 280.
7 Regarding Churchill's concern over Chinese policy toward Tibet, see Churchill's informal note of May 21 to Hopkins and the attached telegram from the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington, post, pp. 285 and 286.
and that perhaps the difficulty in Burma rested with the leadership. The Prime Minister interrupted to say that he hoped that no country would feel that it was their privilege to select the generals for the armies of their allies and that he believed that the leadership in Burma left little to be desired.

Dr. Soong stated with great earnestness that China expects and hopes that the United States and Great Britain will live up to their commitments.

The Prime Minister stated emphatically that he denied that any commitments had ever been made.

Some discussion continued, during which Dr. Soong held that the military discussions at Casablanca and later at Calcutta and Chungking\(^8\) were definite commitments; whereas, Mr. Churchill held that the Allied governments had never made any pledges to recapture Burma but that they had lent their full support to military studies which necessarily had to be modified from time to time as conditions changed. He stated that he had not seen the plans of attack until February. Dr. Soong said he did not understand how that could be so. The Prime Minister stated that it would be of no help to an ally to do anything foolish and that it would be a very foolish thing to consider pushing troops into Burma at the present time.

President Roosevelt intervened to state that he thought perhaps we were talking at cross purposes and about different things and that if Dr. Soong had gotten the impression that we had abandoned all thought of a Burma campaign that he was entirely wrong; we do expect to prosecute that campaign as soon as conditions will permit, but in the meantime our present need is to provide something that will benefit China at once and that there is a general agreement that air power can do this more effectively than any other way. He repeated that there was no change in intention and that the general policy remains the same, whereas the tactics of the situation had to be modified since the studies were initiated at Casablanca.

President Quezon stated that when an authority like Mr. Churchill informed him that an actual invasion and restoration of Burma was not practical at this time, he fully accepts that statement. He is, therefore, glad to support the request for additional aircraft for the Western Pacific as the best step that can be taken now to bring about the eventual defeat of Japan.

Dr. Evatt asked to be informed of the Japanese troop strength in China at present. He said that he had been given to understand that

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\(^8\) Regarding the Casablanca, Calcutta, and Chungking discussions with regard to future Burma operations, see ante, pp. 88 and 89, footnotes 4 and 6, respectively.
the Japanese had been withdrawing troops from China for some time and that, therefore, it would appear that the threat to China is not as great now as it has been at times in the past. Dr. Soong stated emphatically that he believes Japan will try to finish China this summer and that rather than removing troops from China they have merely replaced some of their troops that have been there for some time and are using China as a training ground for inexperienced troops.

The Prime Minister stated that Russia is, of course, the real answer to bringing about the coup de grâce of Japan, but because of the tremendous burden Russia is already bearing, neither the Prime Minister nor the President had ever requested Russia to join in the war against Japan as she is already doing her full share. When Germany is defeated, however, it is the Prime Minister’s personal opinion (he gave it only as a personal opinion without any suggestion that he had received any assurances) the Russians will be glad to join in the final defeat of Japan, as Russia disapproves of Japan’s treachery and her menace to stability as much as any other country.

Dr. Soong stated with considerable feeling and emotion that he must impress on the Council that the situation of China is indeed desperate and that she requires help by land as well as by air. He stated that the recovery of the Burma Road is not only a material necessity; that its recovery is necessary for the psychology of the Chinese people; that they regard it a symbol of the armed support of their allies.

Dr. Evatt stated that Australia also feels that she is seriously threatened and that the Japanese must be pressed on all fronts in order to prevent them from again assuming the initiative.

President Roosevelt reminded the Council that one of our most serious problems has been the German submarines in the North Atlantic. He stated that measures taken recently to increase our offensive action against enemy submarines, both by surface craft and by aircraft, encourage us to hope that our shipping situation will improve rapidly and that we may then develop more ambitious plans of action. However, he pointed out that the Japanese submarines have had marked success against our shipping in the South Pacific during the past month and that this requires more planes and more escort vessels to keep existing lines of communication open.

Mr. Churchill stated that he wished to make it perfectly clear that the British Empire would do everything humanly possible to support China but that he is convinced that the only effective aid we can give
to China this summer is an increase of her air power and that this measure will be pressed with every possible atom of our energy. He hopes that Dr. Soong will not send a report home that will be too discouraging to his people. We must all try to maintain the morale of all of our allies.

Dr. Soong said that he greatly appreciated the Prime Minister's assurances; that he had the highest respect for Mr. Churchill's great ability as a strategist and an authority on war and that he begged the Prime Minister to devote his great talent to the relief of the people of "Tortured China", to whom he had referred in his speech the day before. Dr. Soong repeated that the people of China are indeed a tortured people after four years of war and that the results of the failure to help them in time could not be predicted.

Mr. Evatt stated that before the Council adjourned he wished to express his sincere thanks to the soldiers, sailors and airmen of Holland who have continued to render outstanding services in the war against Japan.

At the suggestion of President Roosevelt, the Council then adjourned to have a photograph of the group taken by news photographers.

WILSON BROWN
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-MACKENZIE KING LUNCHEON MEETING,
MAY 20, 1943, 1 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

CANADA
Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Editorial Note

No official American record of the substance of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers). According to Pickersgill, pp. 511-513, the post-luncheon conversation (at which Hopkins was not present) was given over to a consideration of postwar international organizations. Roosevelt also took the opportunity to suggest the raising of the Canadian Legation in Washington to Embassy rank.
MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 20, 1943, 3: 30 P. M.,  
BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney

UNITED KINGDOM  
General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier Redman  
Brigadier General Deane

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

The combined chiefs of staff met in closed session and resolved on:  

a. The concentration of available resources as first priority within the Assam-Burma Theater on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to—

(1) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
(2) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China;
(3) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

b. Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

c. The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations.

d. The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

The combined chiefs of staff also directed that C.C.S. 229, C.C.S. 231, and C.C.S. 238 be withdrawn from the agenda.

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1 C.C.S. 91st meeting.
2 For Stimson’s impressions of these resolutions, see ante, p. 124, footnote 1.
3 None printed; these papers were entitled as follows: C.C.S. 229, “Potentialities of Air Route from Assam to China,” C.C.S. 231, “Operations in Burma To Open and Secure an Overland Route to China,” and C.C.S. 238, “Operations in Burma 1942–44.”
HULL-MACKENZIE KING DINNER MEETING, MAY 20, 1943

Present

United States  
Secretary Hull

Canada  
Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Editorial Note

No record of the substance of this discussion has been found; see the memorandum prepared by Hickerson and dated May 20, 1943, for the use of the Secretary in connection with the conversation anticipated at this meeting, post, p. 334.

FRIDAY, MAY 21, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 21, 1943, 10:30 A.M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

Present

United States  
Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney  
Commander Long

United Kingdom  
General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
Admiral Noble  
Lieutenant General Macready  
Air Marshal Welsh  
Field Marshal Wavell  
Admiral Somerville  
Air Chief Marshal Peirse  
Captain Lambe  
Brigadier Porter  
Air Commodore Elliot

Secretariat

Brigadier Redman  
Brigadier General Deane  
Commander Coleridge  
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 90TH AND 91ST MEETINGS

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Approved the conclusions of the Minutes of the 90th Meeting
subject to substituting the words “an outline plan” for the words “a plan” in paragraph b, Item 3.4

b. Approved the conclusions of the 91st Meeting.5

2. SELECTION OF CODE NAMES

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed that for purposes of the Trident Conference only, the word ROUNDHAMMER should be used to designate cross-Channel operations.

b. Directed the Secretaries to obtain recommendations from appropriate military security agencies in the U.S. and U.K. regarding code names for all operations agreed upon in the Trident Conferences.

3. MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR TURKEY

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that at the Anfa Conference (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting), it was agreed that Turkey lay within a theater of British responsibility and that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British.6 It was also agreed that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. He pointed out that no decision has been recorded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the priority to be accorded to the supply of equipment for Turkey as compared with other commitments and no instructions have yet been issued by the American Chiefs of Staff to their representatives on the various Assignments Committees in Washington as to the attitude to be adopted towards British bids for equipment on behalf of Turkey. As a result, there had been some inclination to treat Turkish requirements as unimportant.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in C.C.S. 206, dated 30 April, the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff informed the American Chiefs of Staff of the British view with regard to the provision of equipment for Turkey, and enclosed a list of the proposed supplies.7 This list has recently been somewhat increased.

GENERAL MARSHALL questioned what was included in the words “important commitments” in the conclusion proposed by the British. He said the proposal was acceptable to him with the understanding that requirements for training of U.S. forces and the rearrangement of French forces were considered as “important commitments.”

4 _Ante_, p. 126.
5 _Ante_, p. 142.
7 C.C.S. 206, April 30, 1943, proposed that the policy with regard to military supplies for Turkey be referred to the Combined Munitions Assignments Board with the advice from the Combined Chiefs of Staff that requests for Turkey were to be met “insofar as other important commitments allow.” (J.C.S. Files)
THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note of the action already taken or proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to the provision of military supplies for Turkey.

b. Agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of the equipment as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least possible delay.

(At this point the following entered the meeting):

Field Marshal Dill  
Admiral Somerville

General Ismay  
Air Chief Marshal Peirse

Admiral Noble  
Captain Lambe

Admiral Macready  
Brigadier Porter

Air Marshal Welsh  
Air Commodore Elliot

Field Marshal Wavell  
Commander Long)


Admiral King first related C.C.S. 239⁴ to C.C.S. 168⁵ and C.C.S. 155/1,⁶ and then gave a statement of the proposed strategy in the Pacific.

Admiral King stated that the remarks he would make would give a general outline of the situation in the Pacific and the scope of the operations visualized in the paper which had been submitted for consideration (C.C.S. 239).

During the past 30 or 40 years, since acquisition of the Philippines, the United States had been studying the possible courses of action which might have to be undertaken in the Pacific. A great number of studies prepared at the Naval War College had been premised on the necessity for supporting or recovering the Philippines. Briefly, there were three routes, one straight through from the Hawaiian Islands, the others detouring to the north or south of that line. The increase in the capabilities of aircraft had necessitated a revision of some of the previous plans. In any case, decisive action against the Japanese Fleet and the seizure of the Marianas Islands were of primary importance.

On December 30, 1941, when he took office as Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, there were numerous plans in existence for operations in the Pacific. He had, however, immediately sent a dispatch to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet stating that his mission was first to hold the Hawaiian–Midway line and the com-

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⁴ Not printed; for the amended version of this paper, circulated as C.C.S. 239/1, May 23, 1943, see post, p. 302.
⁵ For text of C.C.S. 168, January 22, 1943, see Morton, Appendix H, p. 627.
munications with the Pacific Coast, and, secondly, to hold the remainder of the line of communications to Australia and New Zealand. Prior to the fall of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, plans for the employment of naval forces presumed fueling in that area; however, with their loss, it was essential to establish safe bases elsewhere. One of the most urgent uses of naval forces during the early stages of the war in the Pacific had been in the support of the lines of communication from Hawaii to Australia. The U.S. Navy had, therefore, established refueling points in Bora Bora, in the Fijis and in New Caledonia. Ground forces had been sent for the protection of these bases. Operations during the recent months had rendered these lines of communication to Australia relatively safe, except in the case of Samoa, which was still exposed to some possibility of attack.

All operations in the Pacific should be directed toward severing the Japanese lines of communication and the recapture of the Philippines. The Philippines could be captured by a flank action, whereas the capture of the Netherlands East Indies must of necessity be the result of a frontal attack. The intermediate objectives should be Rabaul, Truk and thence to the Marianas. Regardless of which route might be taken, the Marianas are the key to the situation because of their location on the Japanese lines of communication.

In referring to the situation in the Aleutians, he stated that the United States had bided its time in undertaking the operation against Attu. He considered that there was little danger to Alaska or the western part of the North American continent unless the Japanese should succeed in reaching Kodiak Island. This probability, in his opinion, was remote. An effort on our part to reach Japan by way of the northern route and the Kurile Islands would be beset with difficulties because of the rugged nature of the latter. According to reports received from our submarines, the Japanese were now actively engaged in fortifying the Kurile Islands.

The ultimate defeat of Japan would be accomplished by blockade, bombing, and assault. Of these measures, attacks on warships and shipping along enemy lines of communication were inherent in all offensive operations. It has been our purpose to work toward positions of readiness from which Japan can be attacked. Allied offensive measures comprise continued and intensified attacks on enemy ships and shipping, in cutting or threatening to cut enemy lines of communication between Japan and Japanese holdings and in attack on enemy sea, air, and ground forces, thereby obliging them to fight to retain

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31 King's despatch of December 30, 1941, to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, is described in King, pp. 353-354.
their holdings and retain their lines of communication. The scope and intensity of the Allied war effort in the Pacific must insure that the means at hand are actively employed to the best advantage.

The general capabilities of the Allied effort comprise:

a. Keep Japan from further expansion and from consolidating and exploiting her current holdings.
b. Maintain the vital Midway-Hawaii line (key to the Pacific).
c. Secure the lines of communication to Australia and New Zealand.
d. Block the enemy approaches to Australia from the northward by way of Rabaul and from the northwest by way of the Malay barrier.
e. Attain positions which menace enemy lines of communication with the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and the South China Sea.
f. Open the line of communications with China by way of Burma.
g. Make ready to support Russia in case of war with Japan.
h. Continue to intensify attrition of enemy strength by land, air, and sea (including submarine) action.

In referring to Japan’s potentialities for offensive action, he listed as possibilities:

b. Alaska by way of the Aleutians.
c. Midway-Hawaii line (key to the Pacific).
d. The Hawaii-Samoan-Fiji-New Caledonia line which covers the line of communication to Australia and New Zealand.
e. Australia and New Zealand—by way of the Bismarck Archipelago and/or the Solomons.
f. Australia by way of Malay barrier.
g. India—by way of Burma.
h. China.

He summed up his comments on Japan’s potentialities and their probable courses of action with the general statements:

a. That there was an impending threat to the Maritime Provinces; why action had not been precipitated only the Japanese could answer.
b. That the developing situation may dictate that the Japanese undertake completion of the conquest of China.
c. That it was unlikely that the Japanese would undertake major operations against Alaska.
d. That, since the decrease in the scale of activity in the Solomon[s] area, Japan had not given any definite indication of where she would strike next. Her reserve potentialities were certainly great enough to permit offensive action. It was, therefore, necessary that the United Nations be alert to anticipate the direction of this attack.

He stated that it was necessary to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan, particularly by intensifying action to cut her lines of communication and to attain positions of readiness from which
a full-scale offensive could be launched as soon as the full resources of the United Nations could be made available. The yardstick which must be used in measuring any operation undertaken in the Pacific was:

a. Would it further threaten or cut Japanese lines of communication;
b. Would it contribute to the attainment of positions of readiness from which a full-scale offensive could be launched against Japan.

It was with these objects in mind that the conclusions reached in C.C.S. 239 have been set out; namely, offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943–44 have the following objectives:

a. Conduct of air operations in and from China.
b. Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China.
c. Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
d. Seizure of the Marshalls and Caroline Islands.
e. Seizure of the Solomons–Bismarck Archipelago and Japanese held New Guinea.

To these should be added: “Intensification of operations against Japanese lines of communication.”

Admiral King, in response to several questions, explained briefly the methods used by the Japanese in employing their submarines and the results which had been attained by the United States submarines operating against Japanese shipping.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved C.C.S. 239 subject to the following amendments:
Deletion of the word “retain” on pages 1 and 2;
Deletion of subparagraph 2b (6) on page 2 and substitution for it of:

“(6) Intensification of Operations Against Enemy Lines of Communication
“All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific.”

Addition of subparagraph 3a (6) as follows:

“(6) Intensification of Operations Against Enemy Lines of Communication.”

(At this point the following withdrew from the meeting:
Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell Captain C. E. Lambe, RN
Admiral Sir James Somerville Brigadier W. Porter
Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse Air Commodore W. Elliot)
5. Report to President and Prime Minister

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Directed the Secretaries to prepare a report to the President and Prime Minister on the results of the Conference thus far.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{12}\) The report prepared in response to this directive is C.C.S. 242, May 21, 1943, post, p. 346.


Roosevelt Papers

Record of Presidential Press Conference No. 898

[Extracts]\(^1\)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON, May 21, 1943.]

Q. Mr. President, you have had a number of recent conferences with Dr. (T. V.) Soong. Is there anything you can tell us about that?

The President: I don’t think so. There isn’t any particular news, one way or another.

Q. I wondered if there was anything special you had up between you?

The President: No. I suppose the—the principal thing relates to getting war materials of all kinds into China.

Q. Did you say more material?

The President: War materials—and medical things—things of that kind. That is going along pretty well.

Q. Mr. President, is there anything you can tell us about the visit of Prime Minister Mackenzie King (of Canada) here?

The President: I don’t think so. He is just—just down here on the same—same thing that everybody else is here—furtherance of the war. I am seeing him again this morning.\(^2\)

Q. Mr. President, back to Dr. Soong, we have noticed that he has been in here, particularly since Prime Minister Churchill arrived. Could you say if your talks with the Prime Minister concerned something about China?

\(^1\) Only those portions of the press conference record dealing with the Trident Conference and related matters have been printed. The parenthetical insertions appear in the source text and were presumably supplied by the White House Press Office.

\(^2\) No official record of the substance of Roosevelt’s meeting with Mackenzie King has been found; see the editorial note post, p. 151.
The President: Oh, sure. We talked about China. It isn’t the only place we have been talking about.

Q. Mr. President, when you referred to the majority of our forces, you were speaking then of a majority of these forces which are outside the continental United States?

The President: Yes, yes.

Mr. Godwin: (aside) How about it?

Q. Mr. President, any sort of progress report you can give us on your talks with the Prime Minister (Churchill)?

The President: Well, I suppose the best way to put it is this: that, so far, most of the work has been done by the Combined Staffs. And they have been at it, and we expect to get some preliminary recommendations from the Combined Staffs—you might call them tentative recommendations—probably in tonight’s meeting. Then those will be gone over—and I might say the Combined Staffs have been getting along extremely well—and then over the weekend we will be going over them, and take up the preliminary recommendations next week and iron out any kinks that are in them and make them final.

Q. Mr. President, has any consideration been given to the political future of Italy?

Mr. Godwin: (aside) What?

The President: Unconditional surrender. I think that—

Q. (interposing) Thank you, Mr. President.

The President: (continuing)—speaks for itself.

Q. Thank you.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. Godwin: Italy?

The President: What?

Mr. Godwin: Italy?

The President: Italy.

Mr. Godwin: He asked about Italy?

The President: Unconditional surrender.

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LEAHY–SOONG MEETING, MAY 21, 1943

Present

United States
Admiral Leahy

China
Foreign Minister Soong

Editorial Note

No official record of this meeting has been found. According to the very brief account in Leahy, p. 160, Soong spoke of Burma and made a
"categorical statement" that Chinese forces would not undertake a campaign in Burma unless an attack were launched on Rangoon. The President’s Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers) lists an appointment at noon on this date between Roosevelt and Soong, but no other record of such a meeting has been found. It appears likely that Leahy handled Roosevelt’s scheduled appointment with Soong.

ROOSEVELT-MACKENZIE KING MEETING, MAY 21, 1943, 12:30 P.M., THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

CANADA
Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Editorial Note

Roosevelt made no record of this conversation. The information set forth above is derived from the President’s Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers). According to the account in Pickersgill, pp. 513–514, this was a farewell meeting between the President and the Prime Minister. Matters discussed included Roosevelt’s letter of May 5, 1943, to Stalin asking the Soviet leader for an informal meeting, and Roosevelt’s proposal for a summer trip to Canada. For the text of the letter from Roosevelt to Stalin, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 3. On May 24, 1943, following his return to Ottawa, Prime Minister Mackenzie King sent a message of thanks to the President; see post, p. 335.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, MAY 21, 1943, 1 P.M., THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No record of the substance of this discussion has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the President’s Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers).
MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, MAY 21, 1943, 5 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

United States
President Roosevelt
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNarney

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Churchill
Field Marshal Dill
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

INTERIM REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

The Meeting had before them a draft of agreed decisions prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and submitted to the President and the Prime Minister (C.C.S. 242). The draft was considered paragraph by paragraph.

1. AZORES ISLANDS

The Prime Minister reiterated the view which he had expressed at the previous meeting that nothing would be gained by a diplomatic approach to the Portuguese Government which was not backed up immediately by force. In his opinion, the Portuguese should be presented with the fact of an imminent occupation with only sufficient time in which to send a message to order that there should be no resistance. He therefore suggested that if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in agreement, it would be better to omit from this paragraph of the agreed decisions the following words: "(b) That an effort should first be made to secure the use of these Islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese" and also in the last sentence of the paragraph the words "in case diplomatic efforts should fail."

Admiral Leahy said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would certainly agree to the omission of these words which had only been

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1 Post, p. 346.
2 See ante, p. 121.
3 The language quoted here is from section 1, subparagraph b and from the last sentence of section 1, C.C.S. 242, May 21, 1943, post, p. 347.
inserted because it was understood that it was the wish of the Governments to proceed in this manner.

The Prime Minister thought that the question of the diplomatic approach should be left to the President and himself and he hoped shortly to have the views of the British Government on the subject. At the same time it would be necessary to have on record a statement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff showing the reasons why it was of such importance to occupy the Islands without delay. This could be achieved by expanding paragraph 1 (a).

It was agreed that in their final report the Combined Chiefs of Staff should expand their recommendation in the manner suggested by the Prime Minister and should omit the words quoted above.4

2. THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

General McNarney gave the meeting a short account of the process which had been gone through in building up the plan for the combined bomber offensive.5 In view of the expansion of the German fighter forces, it had been found necessary to include in the plan attacks on the manufacturing plants. According to a conservative estimate based on experience, it was hoped to reduce the German fighter strength down to 500 as against the 3,000 to which it would otherwise rise in the middle of 1944. 25% of the bomber effort would go on submarine targets. About 425,000 ground personnel would be required to implement the plan.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that this figure included the ground personnel for Roundhammer.

The Prime Minister asked whether the figure could not be reduced. He recalled that when he had asked Monsieur Maisky why the Russians had refused the 20 squadrons for the Caucasus, the latter had pointed to the large number of ground personnel who would have to accompany the aircraft and the complication this would cause to the Russian communications.6 Every man brought to the U.K. on the ground staff of the Air Force would exclude a soldier. He earnestly hoped there could be a reduction.

General Marshall said that he had appointed a special group under an experienced and capable officer whose duty it was to survey the establishments of the Army and of the Air Corps. General

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4 In the subsequent revision of the draft report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the decisions regarding the Azores were included under part iv, section 1, paragraph a; see C.C.S. 242/2, May 23, 1943, post, p. 353.

5 Regarding the plan for the combined offensive from the United Kingdom, see C.C.S. 217, May 14, 1943, post, p. 239.

6 For the exchange of messages between Roosevelt and Stalin in October and December 1942 regarding the proposed assignment of Anglo-American air squadrons in the Caucasus under Soviet command, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 677, 731, and 733.
Arnold had already made an arbitrary cut in the numbers of ground personnel for the United Kingdom and it was hoped that a further reduction might be secured, though the figure was already lower than that set by General Arnold.

The Prime Minister said that he attached the greatest importance to this combined plan. There had not yet been an opportunity for the American scheme of daylight bombing to be applied in full, and he had been from time to time critical of the account of the few occasions when the bombers could go out and the comparatively small loads thus delivered on Germany; but he could see in the future, when several raids could be made in one day, most deadly results would be produced. He therefore welcomed the plan and hoped that it could be developed to the full.

General Marshall observed that in the latest raid which the U. S. B-17's had carried out from England three separate forces had been employed on three different objectives. One had had 6% casualties, and the other[s] had had nil. The over-all loss had been 3½%. This was as [an] indication of what might be achieved in the future. He assured the Prime Minister that he was just as anxious as he was to reduce the number of ground personnel to be transported to the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister thanked General Marshall for this assurance.

The President drew attention to the value of occasional raids, say 5% of the effort, on the smaller towns where factories were known to exist. It would greatly depress the Germans if they felt that even the smaller towns could not escape.

General agreement was expressed with this view.

3. DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

The President inquired whether the forces listed in paragraph 3 (a) would be sufficient to hold the Brest Peninsula.

Sir Alan Brooke said that they should be sufficient to enable this area to be held and extended. The latter would be most necessary in order to secure more ports for the build-up.

The Prime Minister inquired what would be the build-up after that shown in this paragraph. Could not something be added to indicate the subsequent rate?

General Marshall said that he would very much like to include something to show the subsequent build-up. It would be purely a matter of shipping and this was being examined. The probable rate would be three to four divisions per month.

In response to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, it was pointed out that the “Air Forces provided on a temporary basis for Husky” consisted of certain British and American air reinforcements which had
been specially lent to the Mediterranean Theater from the United Kingdom for a short period immediately around the Husky date.

The Prime Minister suggested that it would be desirable to include a statement to show what Army forces would be available in the Mediterranean Theater for use after Husky. He did not think it would be right to leave North Africa entirely in the hands of the French, some of whom should certainly move forward in the general advance.

The President said that no French Division was shown as taking part in the first attack on the Continent: he thought that politically it might be very desirable that one should be included. He agreed that a statement of forces which would be available in the Mediterranean Area should be drawn up. For example, it would be well to know what would be available to send into, say Salonika, if the Germans withdrew from the Balkans. One would also want to know what could be done supposing Italy collapsed immediately after Husky.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that this matter had been considered, and a survey of the troops in the Mediterranean Area, and of the various garrisons required, had been drawn up.

After further discussion it was agreed that the final report should include a statement of the troops which would be available in the Mediterranean Area after Husky, excluding the American and British Divisions earmarked for the United Kingdom.

It was also agreed that the words “Italy and” should be inserted before the word “Russia” at the end of paragraph 3 (c).

The Prime Minister drew attention to the need for a new code word to cover post-Husky operations in general.

Admiral Leahy said that the security staffs had already been instructed to propose code words for a number of different operations and final suggestions would be put forward by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. Burma-China Theater

The President read the Combined Chiefs of Staff’s decision concerning the Burma-China Theater. At the conclusion, he questioned the statement given in paragraph 4 d with regard to interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma. He wished to know if it implied an operation against Rangoon.
ADMIRAL KING replied that it did not, that actually it envisaged submarine operations against Japanese communications in the Bay of Bengal and the approaches to all the ports of Burma.

THE PRIME MINISTER then stated that he was in agreement with paragraph 4 of the Chiefs of Staff’s report on the proposed Burma operations, but was unhappy that it did not include any mention of offensive action against Kra, Sumatra, or Penang.

SIR ALAN BROOKES informed the Prime Minister that the whole conception for the defeat of Japan was now the subject of study by the Combined Staff Planners and all of the operations which the Prime Minister had referred to would be considered in this study; the present report included only the operations proposed for Burma.

THE PRESIDENT was concerned about the failure to mention Rangoon in the decision. He thought the Chinese would be much happier if some mention of Rangoon was included and thought it would be wise to do so if only for political reasons.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that paragraph 4 c might be amended to read: “The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations with possible exploitation toward Rangoon.” After some discussion it was agreed that the words “toward Rangoon” should be deleted from the amendment suggested by the Prime Minister in order that it would not be interpreted as a promise by the Chinese.9

THE PRIME MINISTER informed Admiral King that as soon as the Italian Fleet had been neutralized the First Sea Lord intended to send six or seven battleships, with necessary auxiliaries, from the Indian Ocean to operate in coordination with the United States Fleet in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING felt that mounting operations against Sumatra, Kra, or Penang, would depend upon the availability of shipping. He doubted if they could be mounted in conjunction with the operations planned in the report under consideration. He pointed out that the shortage of shipping also limited the use of troops from India in the Burma Theater. He said, however, that he felt some such operation as an attack on Sumatra or the Kra Peninsula was eventually indispensable to induce the Japanese to split their naval forces. If this could be accomplished, an augmented Indian Ocean Fleet, operating in coordination with the U. S. Pacific Fleet, might inflict severe damage on the enemy.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Chiefs of Staff had shown in their report that they had considered all of the operations that are

9 In the subsequent revision of the draft report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 242/2, May 23, 1943, the paragraph under reference, as revised, became part IV, section 3, paragraph 4, subsection (3), post, p. 356.
essential. He felt that subsidiary plans should also be worked out in order to be prepared to take advantage of opportunities that might present themselves.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound said that the program under discussion would probably take all of the resources available. As a matter of fact the Planners were now investigating to see whether or not the operations envisaged could actually be carried out with the resources available.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the relating of resources to the operations would occur on Saturday and Sunday and the results would be included in the final report to be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister on Monday.\(^{10}\)

5. Operations in the Pacific 1943-44

The President, after reading paragraph 5, concerning operations in the Pacific, commented that it included no sub-paragraph concerning air coverage for U.S. convoys, or regarding patrolling for enemy submarines.

Admiral King said that aircraft were being sent to the Pacific for this purpose as rapidly as possible but there are not sufficient numbers available to give the complete cover everywhere. He pointed out that other operations, particularly Husky, absorb many aircraft of the types necessary for this work.

The President said that while everything possible was being done in this regard nothing was said concerning it in the report.

Admiral King pointed out that the submarine situation in the Pacific was difficult to explain. He could not understand why the Japanese had not attacked our West Coast. He felt that they had great potentialities which they were not using, and indicated that he was concerned constantly over the possibility of a Japanese submarine effort carried out in accordance with a well conceived plan.

Admiral Leahy said he thought the President had made a good point and suggested adding paragraph 5 b (7) which would make provision for the protection of the U.S. lines of communications.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the question of security to lines of communications would be covered in a paper that was being prepared on global strategy.

The Prime Minister thought perhaps it would be better to leave the question of protection of the lines of communications out of the report under consideration as most of the decisions recorded were conceptions of the offensive. Defensive measures, therefore, might more properly be included in the global strategy paper. He asked

\(^{10}\) May 24; see C.C.S. 242/3, “Report to the President and Prime Minister,” post, p. 359.
Sir Dudley Pound how many submarines had been sunk in the last four days, to which the Admiral of the Fleet replied that the United Nations had been maintaining an average of about one per day.

6. RE-ARMING OF THE FRENCH IN NORTH AFRICA

After the President had read a paragraph on this subject, the Prime Minister asked for further information. He pointed out that large quantities of captured material had been taken from the Germans and suggested that investigation be made to determine whether it would be worthwhile to start manufacturing a limited amount of ammunition of German calibers.

General Marshall informed the Prime Minister that General Smith, the Chief of Staff at Allied Force Headquarters, had informed him that a rapid survey was being made to determine what captured material could be used for equipping the French forces.

The Prime Minister then asked Admiral King if ammunition was being manufactured for use on the Richelieu. When Admiral King replied in the affirmative, the Prime Minister suggested that something of similar nature might be accomplished with regard to manufacturing ammunition for captured German weapons.

General Marshall said he would have General Somervell make an immediate investigation of the possibilities in this connection.

The Prime Minister then asked how many French Divisions were to be armed.

General Marshall replied that it was proposed to rearm a maximum of eleven. At the present time three and a half divisions have been reequipped, including two and a half infantry divisions and one armored division.

The President asked if use was being made of French pilots.

General Marshall replied that the British have provided airplanes for one French squadron, and the United States has equipped another.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that the British were also supplying the French with airplanes for patrolling purposes off the coast of West Africa. However, apart from the one squadron which they had already given the French toward the build-up of a French Air Force, the entire project was in the hands of the United States.

7. BOMBING OF PLOESTI

After reading a paragraph on this subject, the President asked how far the Ploesti oil fields were from North Africa.

General McNarney replied that Ploesti was 895 miles from Tobruk and 875 miles from Aleppo.
The Prime Minister asked when it was envisaged conducting the proposed operation.

General McNarney said that it should be accomplished either in June or early July because of the excellent weather conditions which obtain in those months, and also because a blow struck then would coincide with the summer campaign in Russia. He said it would require two B-24 groups to be taken from the United Kingdom for a period of about four weeks, that is, two weeks prior to mounting the operation and two weeks after it had been completed. Additionally, one B-24 group on its way to the United Kingdom would be diverted to this operation and thus be about two weeks late in its arrival in Great Britain. He said that officers with special sights for low level bombing which would be required for the attack on Ploesti were now on their way to England and North Africa to give instructions in the use of these sights. Those going to North Africa were to present the plan to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, who was then to submit his comments to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Charles Portal said that there were two considerations which were of paramount importance in deciding whether the proposed bombing of Ploesti should be undertaken. The first was whether or not aircraft should be diverted from pre-Husky preparation. The British Chiefs of Staff were doubtful if this should be done. The second consideration was that unless the operation was fully successful, it would make subsequent operations from more suitable bases, which might later become available, more difficult. This could be attributed to the additional defenses that the enemy would install. He added, however, that since the prize was so great and because of weather conditions, the subject should be thoroughly explored before a decision was made.

General Marshall said that if there was a fair degree of success, an attack against Ploesti would be a staggering blow to the enemy, probably the greatest single blow that could be struck.

The President pointed out that even if the operation were not successful, it would result in diverting considerable German anti-aircraft equipment from the Russian Front.

The Prime Minister then asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider the subject report in the light of the discussion that had taken place, with a view to making appropriate amendments.

Sir Alan Brooke informed the Prime Minister that the report submitted included only those decisions which had been agreed upon thus far. They were still to be related with the resources that are available. When this was done, the items which had been considered would be incorporated in a final report, which would be submitted on Monday.
The President called attention to a news report concerning the German evacuation of Norway and suggested that the staffs might consider what action should be taken in the event such report proved true.

The President and The Prime Minister both expressed their gratification regarding the work accomplished by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and regarding the decisions which had been reached.

The Prime Minister said that what appealed to him most was the spirit of the offensive that permeated the paper, and the provisions which it made for the full utilization of our troops and resources.

SATURDAY, MAY 22, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 22, 1943, 10:30 A.M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

Present

UNITED STATES
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNarney
Lieutenant General Embick
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Horne
Rear Admiral Cooke
Major General Streight
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Cabell
Commander Freesman
Commander Long
Major Wildman

UNITED KINGDOM
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Lieutenant General Ismay
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Porter
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Macleod

Secretariat
Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 92ND MEETING

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 92nd Meeting held on Friday, 21 May.¹

¹C.C.S. 93rd meeting.
²Ante, p. 143.
2. Anti-U-Boat Warfare
(C.C.S. 241 and 241/1)*

Admiral Leahy said that the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, after examining the British paper (C.C.S. 241), were contained in C.C.S. 241/1.

Admiral Pound, in discussing the British proposals, emphasized the importance of the support groups and of their flexibility. He believed that the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, since they were continually examining the situation, were in the best position to advise on the transfer of the support groups north or south of 40° North. They could, of course, only make recommendations and the final decisions for such transfers would rest with Admiral King and himself.

Admiral King said that he accepted the importance of the principle of flexibility, but he did not believe the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board should be charged with the responsibility for recommending transfer of support groups, nor that the Admiralty and Navy Department should await such recommendations before taking action.

Admiral Leahy said that he believed that the Admiralty and Navy Department, rather than the Survey Board, were in the best position to review the situation and decide on the necessary allocation of means. He considered the duties of the Survey Board were to study and make recommendations with regard to facilities and methods of attack.

Admiral Pound said that it had been suggested that unified control over the whole of the North Atlantic should be instituted by the appointment of a supreme commander. This was, however, in his view, impracticable since no one commander could have sufficiently detailed knowledge of all the areas concerned. The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, on the other hand, since it could continually travel and thus cover the whole area, should have an intimate knowledge of conditions throughout, and would be in a better position to assess the requirements of all areas and recommend the transfer of forces. He believed this to be an important part of their functions, but, of course their recommendations would not tie either Admiral King or himself, with whom the final decision would rest. While the Admiralty and Admiral King's headquarters each had an intimate knowledge of the requirements and conditions on their own side of the Atlantic, neither was in a position to assess completely

* Neither printed. C.C.S. 241 was a paper from the British Chiefs of Staff suggesting lines of discussion on the question of anti-U-boat warfare. C.C.S. 241/1 set forth the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff after examining the British paper.
the situation on the other’s side. The whole picture, however, was available to the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board.

Admiral King said that he could not agree with Admiral Pound’s views. The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board had done, and would continue to do, most useful work but they were in no better position than the First Sea Lord and himself to assess the transfer of forces. He was apprehensive that, if the responsibility for recommending transfers was placed on the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, the Admiralty and Navy Department would feel tied down by their recommendations, and no action to transfer would be taken without such recommendations. The function of the Board was to survey conditions and not to exercise the function of command as regards the allocation of forces. The Survey Board was not an executive agency. As he saw it, the British proposal tended to delegate executive responsibility to the Board.

Admiral Pound said that this was not the intention. It would not be necessary for the executive authorities to await recommendations from the Board before taking action to transfer forces.

Admiral King pointed out with regard to V.L.R. aircraft that the arguments put forward in the British paper were misleading since the 26,000 hours flown in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers in February were largely done by short-range aircraft and those of the civilian air patrols. Only 4,500 hours had been flown by L.R. and V.L.R. aircraft. Further, he was in general opposed to a mixed command which was envisaged in the British paper.

Sir Charles Portal said that he appreciated that only 4,500 of the 26,000 hours flown in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers in February had been flown by V.L.R. or L.R. aircraft. Even on the figure of 4,500 there was, however, still a case for the transfer of aircraft from this area to the Bay. He would be interested to know in which areas it was proposed to relieve British aircraft in order that these could then operate in the Bay. He appreciated the advantages derived from the maintenance of homogeneous forces, but a firm decision to insist on this would be disappointing since it would cut across the principle of flexibility. A committee was now drawing up a simple standard procedure for the operation of A/S aircraft which should increase the efficiency of mixed forces and thus improve flexibility. There were disadvantages in mixed commands but he did not feel that too much importance should be attached to these.

Admiral King said that he agreed that homogeneous forces were not essential, but mixed forces, in his opinion, should be avoided as much as possible.

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4 i.e., Bay of Biscay.
ADMIRAL POUND explained that after a review of the advantages of an increased air effort over the Bay of Biscay, all possible British aircraft had been transferred to this duty. Squadrons had been removed from the East Coast and the North of Scotland. No further aircraft could be provided except at the expense of Bomber Command, a diversion from which, he believed, was not justifiable.

ADMIRAL KING said that it was essential to maintain a certain irreducible minimum of A/S air forces on the East Coast of America, even though their proportion of sightings was lower than that in other areas. The locality of submarine activity could be more rapidly transferred than could aircraft. Certain U.S. PBM's were not yet operational but drastic measures were being taken to render them effective. When this had been done, they could be used to release aircraft for the Bay. He was fully in agreement with the principle that the Bay provided an excellent hunting ground for anti-submarine operations.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then suggested certain amendments to paragraph 4 of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff paper (C.C.S. 241/1).

ADMIRAL POUND explained that the British proposals with regard to the Bay offensive should not be taken to mean that action would only be effective if the full number of 72 aircraft were provided. Every aircraft would be of great value.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:
Deferred action on these papers until the next meeting.

3. POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES (C.C.S. 185/3)

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that this was largely a political matter. The views of the Prime Minister had not yet been received.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the President had expressed the following views. We certainly could not tell the Italians that if they ceased hostilities they would have peace with honor: we could not get away from unconditional surrender: all we could tell them was that they would be treated by the United States and the British with humanity and with the intention that the Italian people should be reconstituted into a nation in accordance with the principles of self-determination: this latter would, of course, not include any form of Fascism or dictatorship.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that on receipt of this message from the President, he had prepared a draft telegram to General Eisenhower based on the President's views and instructing General Eisen-

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5 See post, p. 326, footnote 1.
hower to adhere to his original directive with regard to propaganda. He would like to send this message to the President for his approval.  

General Ismay explained that this matter had also been put in very similar terms to the Prime Minister whose decision was awaited.

Sir Charles Portal explained that the Foreign Office considered that, if too soft a line were taken now, its effects would wear off before operation Husky and even further promises would then be required.

General Marshall suggested that he should send the President the draft reply to General Eisenhower with a notation that it had not as yet received the concurrence of the British Chiefs of Staff nor of the Prime Minister.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to defer action on this paper pending reference to the Prime Minister and the President by General Ismay and General Marshall respectively.

4. Sonic Warfare
(C.C.S. 240)7

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that it was important that this form of warfare should be designated by a code name.

Admiral King said he believed that it might be found necessary that sonic warfare should be used for the first time in operation Husky.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Approved the recommendations contained in this paper.

b. Directed the secretaries to request the security authorities to recommend a code name to cover this type of warfare.

5. Movement of the “Queens”

Admiral Pound said that from his experience on the trip over, he was convinced that the Queens 8 should not be allowed to pass through the submarine area except in dark periods. This would entail the cycle for the Queens being opened out to 28 days. The loss in troop lift which this would entail had been estimated at 15,000 for the third quarter of the year and 31,000 for the fourth quarter, making a total of 46,000 for the remainder of the year. If one of these ships were torpedoed, the resulting loss to our troop lift would far exceed 46,000.

In reply to a question by General Marshall as to the extra degree of safety which could be expected from his proposal, Admiral Pound said that, when considering the possibilities of the Prime Minister travelling in one of these ships, he had taken the view that, while

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7 For the draft telegram to Eisenhower, see the enclosure to C.C.S. 185/4, May 22, 1943, post, p. 330.
9 i.e., the Queen Elizabeth and the Queen Mary, being used as trans-Atlantic troop transports.
it was a fair risk during a dark period of the moon, he would have strongly advised against it being undertaken during a light period. Similar considerations applied to the movement of 15,000 troops. In an emergency, he believed that one of these ships could be used in a light period, but only as a very special case. Boats were available for only 3,000 of the 15,000 passengers carried. Owing to the congestion on board and the fact that there might be no vessels capable of rescuing the personnel within several hundred miles, the loss of life, if a Queen were sunk, would be appalling.

The United States Chiefs of Staff stated that they would like to examine the implications of the British proposal.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would present a paper recommending a change in the cycle of military transport vessels of the Queen type with a view to lessening the risk of passage.

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STILWELL-CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 22, 1943, FORENOON

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Lieutenant General Stilwell

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Department of the Army Files

The Commanding General, United States Forces, China, Burma, India (Stilwell) to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

The Prime Minister listened sympathetically Saturday, while I presented the case.

He asked if I thought the British had been dilatory and lacked energy. I said “yes.” He thought so too.

He asked if the decisions reached were satisfactory, barring the allotment of tonnage by air, which would starve the Yunnan force. I said “no,” because there was no definite objective assigned, because the offensive was not all-out against all of Burma, and because the advance was conditional on being kept “in step.” I said that a really

1 Regarding this meeting, which probably took place at the British Embassy, the Stimson Diary for May 22, 1943, records the following observations: “Stilwell was going to see him [Churchill] this morning for a short talk and I coached Stilwell on how to act with him so as to get some punch into his remarks and not be afraid of him and, as it happens, it worked like a charm because when I met the Prime Minister he told me he liked Stilwell very much in what he had said to him in the morning.” (Stimson Papers)
aggressive commander could operate under the plan, but that as written there were too many loop-holes for one who did not mean business.

He said he meant business and wanted to put into action every man he possibly could. In this case, he said the only way to give China any help within two or three months was by air. He realized the necessity of keeping China in the war and the value of the China base.

He asked if I accepted the estimate that the Burma Road could not be built before the middle of 1945. I told him “no,” and that it should be operating by the middle of 1944.

In connection with Chinese policy, I told him that I thought CKS was trying to substitute American air power for Chinese ground troops. Last summer during the operations in Chekiang, I heard from a fairly reliable source that Ho Ying Chin, who would not have done it without the Generalissimo’s acquiescence, had told the Chekiang Commander to take it easy and withdraw as the Japs advanced, adding that the allies could now see to defeating Japan, and that the Chinese could coast. I could never definitely trace these remarks, but that was what the Chinese did, and Ku Chu Tung, the commander, is still there, although I tried to get him relieved and the Generalissimo indicated that he was going to remove him. In my opinion, the Generalissimo will continue on this line, asking for more and more U.S. aviation, and letting the ground forces, except for certain units under his direct control, deteriorate beyond redemption by neglect, and that if it went any further, our progress in Yunnan would be lost, and that it would be practically impossible to re-establish it later.

He reiterated that he wanted to help in every way possible, and would try and see me again on this subject.

JOSEPH W. STILWELL
Lieut. General, U.S. Army

AMERICAN-BRITISH LUNCHEON MEETING, MAY 22, 1943, 1:15 P. M., BRITISH EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Vice President Wallace
Secretary of War Stimson
Secretary of the Interior Ickes
Senator Connally
Under Secretary of State Welles

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Ambassador Halifax
The Prime Minister met the following at luncheon at the Embassy on May 22nd, 1943:—

The Vice President (Mr. Wallace), the Secretary of War (Mr. Stimson), the Secretary of the Interior (Mr. Ickes), the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate (Senator Connally) and the Under-Secretary of State (Mr. Sumner Welles).

World and Regional Councils

In the course of a general talk about the structure of a post-war settlement, Mr. Churchill said that the first preoccupation must be to prevent further aggression in the future by Germany or Japan. To this end he contemplated an association of the United States, Great Britain and Russia. If, as he understood, the United States wished to include China in an association with the other three, he was perfectly willing that this should be done; but however great the importance of China, she was not comparable to the others. On these Powers would rest the real responsibility for peace. They together with certain other Powers should form a Supreme World Council.

Subordinate to this World Council there should be three Regional Councils, one for Europe, one for the American Hemisphere and one for the Pacific.

Europe

Mr. Churchill thought that after the war Europe might consist of some twelve states or confederations who would form the Regional
European Council. It was important to recreate a strong France, whatever we might think about French deserts or the probable difficulty of achieving our purpose. For the prospect of having no strong country on the map between England and Russia was not attractive. Moreover the Prime Minister could not easily foresee the United States being able to keep large numbers of men indefinitely on guard in Europe. If such an experiment were tried he could not believe it would last for more than one Presidential election. Great Britain could not do so either. No doubt it would be necessary, and he thought it would be possible, that the United States should be associated in the same way in the policing of Europe, in which Great Britain would obviously also have to take part; but France also must assist.

Then there would be Spain and Italy. He also hoped that in South Eastern Europe there might be several confederations; a Danubian federation based on Vienna and doing something to fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Bavaria might join this group. Then there should be a Balkan federation.

He would like to see Prussia divided from the rest of Germany, forty million Prussians being a manageable European unit. Many people wished to carry the process of division further and divide Prussia itself into component parts, but on this question the Prime Minister reserved judgment. Poland and Czechoslovakia he hoped would stand together in friendly relations with Russia. This left the Scandinavian countries, and Turkey, which last might or might not be willing with Greece to play some part in the Balkan system.

Mr. Wallace asked about Belgium and Holland suggesting that they might join France. Mr. Churchill said that was a possibility, or alternatively they might form a group of the Low Countries with Denmark. Mr. Wallace asked whether the Prime Minister contemplated the possibility of Switzerland joining with France, but the Prime Minister was disposed to regard Switzerland as a special case.

In his view each of the dozen or so of the European countries should appoint a representative to the European Regional Council thus creating a form of United States of Europe. He thought Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas on this subject had much to recommend them.

*The American Hemisphere*

Similarly there might be a Regional Council for the Americas of which the Prime Minister thought Canada would naturally be a member and would represent the British Commonwealth.
The Pacific

There should be a Regional Council for the Pacific in which he supposed that Russia would participate. He thought it was quite possible that when the pressure on her western frontiers had been relieved Russia would turn her attention to the Far East.

Relation of the Regional Councils to the Supreme World Council

The Regional Councils should be subordinate in the Prime Minister’s view to the World Council. The members of the World Council should sit on the Regional Councils in which they were directly interested and he hoped that in addition to being represented on the American Regional Council and the Pacific Regional Council, the United States would also be represented on the European Regional Council. However this might be, the last word would remain with the Supreme World Council, since any issues that the Regional Councils were unable to settle would automatically be of interest to the World Council and bring the World Council in.

Mr. Wallace thought that the other countries would not agree that the World Council should consist of the four major Powers alone. Mr. Churchill agreed and expressed the view that to the four Powers should be added others by election in rotation from the Regional Councils. The central idea of the structure was that of a three-legged stool—the World Council resting on three Regional Councils. But he attached great importance to the regional principle. It was only the countries whose interests were directly affected by a dispute who could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure a settlement. If countries remote from a dispute were among those called upon in the first instance to achieve a settlement the result was likely to be merely vapid and academic discussion.

Mr. Wallace asked what in practice would be the procedure if, for example, there were a dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Mr. Churchill said that such a dispute would fall to be dealt with in the first place by the American Regional Council but always under the general overriding authority of the World Council. In the instance chosen the interests of countries outside the American Hemisphere would hardly be affected; but plainly a dispute which threatened the peace of the world might very well not be susceptible to being treated only on a regional basis and the Supreme World Council would quickly be brought in.

Neutrality

Mr. Churchill was asked whether the association of nations which he contemplated would be confined to the United Nations, or include
the neutrals. He said that in his view there was advantage in trying
to induce those nations at present neutral to join the United Nations
before the end of the war. He thought we ought to use all possible
persuasion and pressure to secure this when it could be done with
safety to the nation concerned. An example was Turkey. His policy
was to help Turkey to build up her own forces to the point where,
at the right moment she could and would effectively intervene. When
the United Nations brought the guilty nations to the bar of justice,
he could see little but an ineffective and inglorious role for Mr. de
Valera and others who might remain neutral to the end.

The Lessons of the League of Nations

Mr. Churchill maintained that we had much to learn from the
experience of the League of Nations. It was wrong to say that the
League had failed. It was rather the member States who had failed
the League. Senator Connally agreed and pointed to the achieve-
ments of the League in the years immediately after 1919. Mr. Stimson
also agreed and thought that if the original guarantee to France
had not fallen through subsequent French policy and also the history
of the League would have been very different.

National and International Forces

Mr. Churchill said that force would clearly be required to see that
peace was preserved. He suggested that there should be an agree-
ment between the United Nations as to the minimum and maximum
armed forces which each would maintain. The forces of each country
might be divided into two contingents, the one to form the national
forces of that country, and the other to form its contingent to an
international police force at the disposal of the Regional Councils
under the direction of the Supreme World Council. Thus if one
country out of twelve in Europe threatened the peace, eleven contin-
gents would be ready to deal with that country if necessary. The
personnel of the international contingent provided by each country
would be bound, if it were so decided by the World Council, to under-
take operations against any country other than their own. Mr.
Wallace said that bases would be required for these contingents. Mr.
Churchill agreed. In this connection he said that he would place a
total prohibition for an indefinite time upon the practice in the
enemy countries, and certainly in Germany, of the art of flying.
There should be international air lines, for example, operating in
and through Prussia which would give the Prussians as good a service
at as cheap rates as obtained elsewhere, but they should neither be
allowed to fly themselves nor to build aircraft.
Fraternal Association Between Great Britain and the United States

Mr. Churchill said that there was something else in his mind which was complementary to the ideas he had just expressed. The proposals for a world security organization did not exclude special friendships devoid of sinister purpose against others. He could see small hope for the world unless the United States and the British Commonwealth worked together in what he would call fraternal association. He believed that this could take a form which would confer on each advantages without sacrifice. He would like the citizens of each without losing their present nationality to be able to come and settle and trade with freedom and equal rights in the territories of the other. There might be a common passport or a special form of passport or visa. There might even be some common form of citizenship, under which citizens of the United States and of the British Commonwealth might enjoy voting privileges after residential qualification and be eligible for public office in the territories of the other, subject of course to the laws and institutions there prevailing.

Then there were bases. He had himself welcomed the Destroyer-Bases deal not for the sake of the destroyers, useful as these were, but because he felt it was to the advantage of both countries that the United States should have the use of such bases in British territory as she might find necessary to her own defence, for a strong United States was a vital interest of the British Commonwealth and vice versa. He looked forward therefore to an extension of the practice of common use [use] of bases for the common defence of common interests. Take the Pacific where there were countless islands possessed by enemy powers. There were also British islands and harbours. If he had anything to do with the direction of public affairs after the war, he would certainly advocate that the United States had the use of those that they might require for bases.

American Opinion. Importance of Concluding an Agreement During the War

All the American guests present said that they had been thinking on more or less the lines propounded by the Prime Minister, and thought that it was not impossible that American opinion would accept them or something like them. The Ambassador asked Mr. Welles whether he thought that the establishment of a Regional Council for Europe would have the effect of leading United States opinion to disinterest itself in European affairs. Mr. Welles was not afraid of this, having regard to the overriding responsibility of the Supreme World
Council and the relation between it and the Regional Councils. Mr. Stimson said most emphatically that in his opinion there would be a tendency to relax after hostilities ceased, and a reluctance to embark upon new international experience. He believed that it would be much easier to secure American agreement during the war; indeed that it was a case of during the war or never. The others were disposed to agree, and all felt that the best approach to future cooperation was to present such plans for the future as a continuation of the cooperation now in force, and to do so while the war was still proceeding.

The Prime Minister made two other suggestions both of which carried the warm assent of those present. First, that after the war we should continue the practice of Combined Staff conversations, and second, that we should by constant contact, take whatever steps were necessary to ensure that the main lines of our foreign policy ran closely together.

Mr. Wallace said to the Ambassador as he left that it was the most encouraging conversation in which he had taken part for the last two years.

Mr. Churchill on all occasions stated that he was expressing only personal views.

STIMSON–CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 22, 1943, 3 P. M., BRITISH EMBASSY

Present

United States
Secretary of War Stimson

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of this conversation has been found. The Stimson Diary, May 22, 1943, records the course of the meeting in the following manner:

"Then after the round table conference was over about three o'clock I had a half hour more alone with the Prime Minister and I took up with him the Burma problem. I gave him my views on that, talking very frankly, and he answered me frankly. He told me he was thoroughly dissatisfied with the way his commanders there had acted; he was going to change them all and put in some new punch to it. I said that was the only way in which the thing could be made to work. I brought out the resolutions which he hadn't seen yet and he asked me to prepare a map showing the place where the new airfields were to be built to strengthen the Burma air route and what work the difficulties required. I told him I would do so."
For the text of the letter of May 22, 1943, to Churchill which Stimson prepared as a result of this conversation, see post, p. 301.

Stimson’s preparations for his meeting with Churchill are described in the Stimson Diary for May 22, 1943, as follows:

“I at last got a chance to put in my oar and do my stick of work for the cause covered by these conferences today and I have an idea that I accomplished something. My reading of the minutes has shown pretty well what the situation is. The European situation is covered fairly well, but the Burma situation, as shown by the resolution adopted yesterday, is in very poor shape and that of course is vitally important on account of China. So this morning I spent time on that. I talked with Jack McCloy who had dined with the Prime Minister and had heard him say that he wanted to talk with me. I had in General Stilwell and went over the situation in Burma, getting his ideas as clearly as I could of what was necessary to make the resolutions which had been adopted have a little life in them. The thing had been pretty well gummed up. A step backward has even been taken in giving all of the capacity of the Burma air route to Chennault as against Stilwell. Therefore the only help that we can see in sight is to increase the capacity of the road and that depends upon getting more steam into the British commanders out there. So Stilwell and McCloy and I went over our maps in my room and we called in Colonel Timberman who had just been out there for the Operations Division of the General Staff and I got myself pretty well primed up by the time of the approach for my going to lunch at the Embassy where I was for the first time to get a whack at the Prime Minister.” (Stimson Papers)

HULL-HALIFAX CONVERSATION, MAY 22, 1943, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Secretary Hull

UNITED KINGDOM
Ambassador Halifax

740.0011 EW/29737

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1943.

The British Ambassador called at his request. He inquired if I had seen Mr. Churchill and I proceeded to give him the substance of what was said between Churchill and myself:

1 In addition to the topics covered in this memorandum, Hull and Halifax apparently also discussed the possibility of establishing a camp in North Africa for refugees from Spain. See Halifax’s telegram of May 22 to Eden, post, p. 342, footnote 3.

2 For the record of the Hull-Churchill meeting of May 13, 1943, see the Secretary of State’s memorandum of conversation of the same date, ante, p. 49.
I said that I had brought up our trade agreements program and our entire commercial and related policies, such as monetary exchange and others. It is not necessary here to repeat any of these statements in detail.

I then took up Russia and said that Great Britain and the United States must by persistent effort talk Mr. Stalin out of his shell, so to speak, that is, out of his aloofness, secretiveness and suspicion. I elaborated on what I had said on previous occasions with respect to each of these points, including the vital step of calling off all communistic activities in other countries under the direction of the Third Internationale at Moscow.\(^3\)

Mr. Churchill had expressed the view that Russia would aid us in defeating Japan after Germany is defeated. I stated that I hoped she would, but added that this illustrates her secretive attitude compared with that of Great Britain and the United States; that Russia has not, so far as I knew, intimated even in a confidential way what she may have in mind in this connection.

The Ambassador said that the President requested him to talk to me about de Gaulle. I thereupon related substantially what I had said during my recent conversation with the Prime Minister,\(^4\) which need not be repeated here.

\[^{3}\text{Regarding Hull's views on the necessity for the dissolution of the Third International, see the memorandum of his conversation with Beneš, May 18, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, p. 529. For documentation regarding the announcement in Moscow on May 22, 1943, of the decision to dissolve the International and Hull's reaction to that decision, see ibid., pp. 531-536.}\]

\[^{4}\text{See ante, p. 50.}\]

CHURCHILL MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, MAY 22, 1943, BRITISH EMBASSY

Editorial Note

No official record of this meeting has been found. According to the account of the meeting in The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, p. 50, Halifax had invited some 15 Senators and 15 Representatives to the British Embassy for the meeting. The same meeting is probably referred to in Earl of Halifax, Fullness of Days (London: Collins, 1957), p. 273, where Halifax recalls a meeting which took place at 6 p.m. and was marked by a speech by Churchill.
MEETINGS OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH SHIPPING EXPERTS, MAY 22, 1943, BEGINNING AT 4 P.M.¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Deputy War Shipping Administrator
Douglas
Mr. Bissell
Lieutenant General Somervell
Major General Gross
Colonel Stokes

UNITED KINGDOM

Minister of War Transport Leathers
Mr. Maclay
Major General Holmes
Brigadier Williams
Mr. Harvey

War Shipping Administration Files

Douglas Notes ²

Lord Leathers, Mr. Maclay, Brig. [Major] General Holmes, Brig. General Williams, Mr. Harvey joined the meeting, which, therefore became Combined, at 4:00.

Considerable discussion was had on the subject of the U. K. port capacity, with the American military insisting in effect that it was illogical for Lord Leathers to insist that more than 150 ships could not be accommodated on U. S. Army account in the ports while more than that number could be accommodated on account of the U.K. import program. It seemed to be clear that the Army was trying to use port capacity to restrict the U.K. import program. LWD ³ observed that the matter might well be resolved by advancing the volume of the U.K. import program into the summer months of 1943 when the U.S. Army program was at its lowest tide, thus making available places during the winter months in the U.K. ports for ships carrying U.S. Army cargo.

India was then discussed. Brigadier Williams very tenaciously but pleasantly inquired as to whether or not there had been duplications in the American statement of requirements of the items carried in the

¹ This appears to be the same meeting, or series of meetings, described in Behrens, p. 371 as having covered the better part of May 22 and the early morning hours of May 23, 1943. This American-British meeting was preceded by a 2-hour meeting of the American conference. Not all the persons listed above were present for the entire series of meetings.

² The source text is a carbon copy of a five-page document labelled “Diary” and obviously prepared by Douglas. The whole document, which included notes of the American meeting of May 22, the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting of 11 a.m., May 23, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting of 2 p.m., May 23, 1943, is included in the Lewis W. Douglas File, folder—Allocations General.

³ Lewis W. Douglas.
British statement.⁴ He pointed out that the British had reduced their
deficit by 155 and had brought their shipping position into a complete
balance. Most of the shrinkages had been made on the military side,
and he thought our military, too, might do some shrinking.

The Italian requirement was discussed, and, interestingly enough,
Lord Leathers took very much the same position that the WSA at the
Joint meeting had expressed.⁵

Paragraph 47 of the C.C.S. paper,⁶ the part regarding the Army
statement was brought up by General Somervell. Maclay finally got
the point of it and indicated that the British would have to disagree to
the language of the paragraph as Somervell interpreted it.

The meeting then adjourned. The WSA and the British retired to
prepare a consolidated statement and the Army retired to revise their
statement of requirements.

Several modifications were telephoned subsequently to Mr. Schnei
der. India was reduced, etc. About 2:30 Sunday morning Colonel
Stokes and General Gross came over with their finished statement.
Shortly thereafter Mr. Bissell’s estimate of availables was completed
for the year 1943. When matched together the deficit of 155 was
shown on the American side and no deficit on the British side. Gen-
eral Somervell, who arrived about 4:00 a.m. suggested that the Brit-
ish pick up half of the deficit. Brigadier Williams and Maclay very
categorically stated that they had already eliminated their deficit of
155 and had brought their shipping position into equilibrium, and that
they positively would not and could not shrink any further. General
Somervell then remarked to me that he thought it could be picked up
on his side. He indicated that very substantial shrinkages had taken
place in the Army requirements but that it would be possible to reduce
further the requirements. He made specific reference to Alaska, but
qualified that Kiska had not yet been taken; that, moreover, there were
no ships in the Alaskan service which were suitable to overseas voyages.

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⁴ Neither the American nor the British statements of shipping requirements
referred to here have been printed. The shipping deficits foreseen in these
statements are discussed in Behrens, pp. 368–371 and 382–383.
⁵ At the meeting of the American conference at 2 p.m., officials of the War Ship-
ping Administration had taken the position that 40 sailings per month to lib-
erated countries, particularly Italy, as had been advocated by the military
experts, were too many.
⁶ The reference is presumably to paragraph 47 of C.C.S. 234, May 17, 1943,
post, p. 270.
I pointed out to him that there were something like 20 to 22 Liberty ships and that they, of course, were exactly what we needed in the long ocean trips. At any rate, he made it very clear to me and to others that this deficit of 155 could be managed by reductions in the military requirements. He concurred that the deficit of 155 would be eliminated in practice.

The requirements for the first nine months of 1944 on the British side, including the U.K. import program and the usual Lend-Lease aid had been discussed and reduced very substantially below the original figure, hastily calculated, if indeed calculated at all, by the British.

Statements were prepared, one by Lord Leathers and LWD, one by the military, and at about 6:30 a.m. the meeting broke up with everyone well satisfied.7

7 For text of the memorandum by Douglas and Leathers, dated May 23, 1943, see post, p. 313.

SUNDAY, MAY 23, 1943

PHILLIPS-CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 23, 1943, FORENOON, BRITISH EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Phillips

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found, but William Phillips gives an account of the conversation in his volume of memoirs Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952), pp. 389–390. According to this account, Roosevelt asked Phillips to see Churchill and give him his frank impressions of conditions in India. Churchill apparently took strong exception to Phillips’ proposal that Indian leaders be given a measure of authority to deal with domestic affairs. Phillips also relates that he immediately reported upon his private talk with Churchill to Roosevelt during a luncheon conversation with the President.
MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 23, 1943, 2 P. M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McAnarney
Lieutenant General Embick
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Horne
Rear Admiral Cooke
Major General Streett
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Cabell
Commander Freseman
Commander Long
Mr. Douglas

UNITED KINGDOM
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Minister of War Transport Leathers
Lord Cherwell
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Holmes
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Porter
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Macleod

SECRETARIAT
Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 93RD MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 93rd Meeting held on Saturday, the 22nd May.

2. ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE
(C.C.S. 241 and 241/1)

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 93rd Meeting, Item 2.

Admiral Leahy suggested that C.C.S. 241 and 241/1 should each

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1 C.C.S. 94th meeting.
2 Present for Items 1–6.
3 Ante, p. 160.
4 Neither printed. C.C.S. 241 was a paper from the British Chiefs of Staff suggesting lines of discussion on the question of anti-U-boat warfare. C.C.S. 241/1 set forth the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff after examining the British paper.
5 Ante, p. 161.
be altered in certain respects and then noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Charles Portal suggested a minor amendment to paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 241/1.

Admiral Leahy read out a draft conclusion with reference to the work of the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Took note of C.C.S. 241 and deleted the phrase "and that the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board should be responsible for recommending any such transfer" at the end of the last paragraph of page 1. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 241/3.⁶)

b. Took note of C.C.S. 241/1 and directed that the words "relieve British planes in certain areas" should be deleted and the words "provide planes" substituted. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 241/4.⁷)

c. Agreed that in view of the fact that the directive under which the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board operates requires them to report on any aspect of the Allied Anti-Submarine Organization in which they consider the Allied resources are not being used to the best advantage, it is not considered necessary that the Board should have any special responsibility laid on them in the case quoted in C.C.S. 241.

3. Movements of the "Queens"
(C.C.S. 246)⁸

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 93rd Meeting, Item 5.⁹

Without discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Accepted the proposals for the future movement of the Queens as set out in paragraph 6 of C.C.S. 246.

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⁸ C.C.S. 246, May 23, 1943, memorandum by British Chiefs of Staff, not printed, reviewed the current danger posed by German submarines to the Queens in their trans-Atlantic passages and the desirability to arrange for these passages to be made under the most favorable conditions. The memorandum concluded: "Taking the above factors into consideration, it is considered that these ships should be run on the 28 day cycle and that the consequent loss in lift should be accepted."
(J. C. S. Files)
⁹ Ante, p. 164.
4. **Policy for Coming Operations Regarding Propaganda and Subversive Activities**
(C.C.S. 185/4)  

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 93rd Meeting, Item 3.  

**General Ismay informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Prime Minister had agreed to the draft telegram to General Eisenhower, contained in C.C.S. 185/4.**

**The Combined Chiefs of Staff:**

a. Took note that the President and Prime Minister had decided that the policy set forth in C.C.S. 185/2/D should be adhered to.

b. Agreed to send the message contained in C.C.S. 185/4 to General Eisenhower.

5. **Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Conduct of the War in 1943-1944**
(C.C.S. 244)  

**The Committee** had before them C.C.S. 244 together with an addendum and corrigendum to it containing Annex VII, and a summary of conclusions and a corrigendum to Annex II.

Certain amendments to the paper were suggested and accepted.

**Lord Leathers** said that Annex VII represented the agreed views of himself, Mr. Lewis Douglas and General Somervell and was a submission of the shipping position for the period under discussion. He and his colleagues believed the deficiencies were relatively small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect would not be unmanageable. The requirements set out in the paper had, in most cases, been cut as far as was possible. The deficiency was only a small percentage of the total. This small percentage of deficiency when taking into consideration the various assumptions, including losses, building rates, etc., was so small that it could be spread and absorbed and gave, in his opinion, no grounds for anxiety.

**Lord Leathers** then suggested a minor amendment to the note following paragraph 3 of Annex VII, Part I.

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10 Post, p. 330.
11 Ante, p. 163.
12 For text of the paper under reference, see footnote 2 to Eisenhower’s telegram of May 17 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, post, p. 326.
13 C.C.S. 244, May 23, 1943, not printed. For text of the revised version of this paper, C.C.S. 244/1, May 25, 1943, which incorporated the amendments agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the course of this meeting, see post, p. 293. Neither annex ii, a review of land force availabilities, nor annex vii, a review of shipping availabilities, is printed.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that the reduced troop lift due to the proposed opening out of the cycle of movement for the Queens had been taken into account—the bottleneck was dry cargo and not personnel shipping.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, Lord Leathers explained that shortly after the Casablanca Conference the loss rate had been carefully examined and agreed rates accepted. These were 2.39 percent per month for the first half of the year and 1.9 percent per month for the second half. The present paper had been based on these calculations, though in fact the loss rate so far this year had worked out at slightly less than 1.9 percent. An agreed and accurate loss rate was a most important factor in all calculations dealing with shipping requirements and availability. He agreed with Admiral King that the loss rate should be subjected to frequent review.

Mr. Douglas said that he agreed with Lord Leathers that the deficit with regard to dry cargo shipping was not unmanageable.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, General Somervell said that he agreed with Lord Leathers and Mr. Douglas that shipping was available for the undertakings set out in C.C.S. 244, subject to the slight deficit which he considered could be absorbed by spreading it over the entire period.\textsuperscript{14}

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt sure the Combined Chiefs of Staff would wish to express appreciation of the excellent work accomplished in so short a time by the Combined Staff Planners and shipping experts, both civil and military. All present agreed.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved C.C.S. 244, as amended in Annex “B” to these Minutes,\textsuperscript{*} except that paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Summary of Conclusions should be taken note of as recommendations only.

6. Despatch of U. S. Service and Engineer Troops to the United Kingdom

Sir Alan Brooke read out a brief memorandum\textsuperscript{†} on the importance of the early despatch of certain service and engineer troops to the United Kingdom. This movement would not interfere with the scheduled Sickel build-up but was essential due to the shortage of manpower in England.

\textsuperscript{14} For the memorandum by Douglas and Leathers regarding dry cargo shipping availabilities and requirements, dated May 23, 1943, see post, p. 313.

\textsuperscript{*} Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 244/1. [Footnote in the source text. This paper, post, p. 233, incorporated the amendments to C.C.S. 244 which were agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during this meeting.]

\textsuperscript{†} Annex “A” to these minutes. [Footnote in the source text. Annex “A” not printed.]
General Somervell said that he entirely agreed with Sir Alan Brooke's view that the early arrival of S.O.S. and engineer troops was essential to prepare for the arrival of the fighting forces.

General Marshall said that the present plan already provided for the movement of 40,000 men per division which included a large proportion of service units. The required priority could be arranged for early sailing of necessary service elements.

Sir Charles Portal said that he was prepared to accept this movement provided that it was not at the expense of Sickle, the priority of which must not be disturbed.

Admiral King said that the picture as a whole must be considered. It might prove necessary for the Sickle movement to be modified slightly in the light of these requirements.

Lord Leathers pointed out the necessity for port battalions for discharging the ships at the landing points.

Both General McNarney and Sir Charles Portal pointed out that Sickle was an essential prelude to and an integral part of cross-Channel operations as a whole and that the ground operations could not be undertaken without it.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed that the necessary service troops for the build-up of the Bolero force will be given priorities in sailings as necessary to service the build-up of the combat troops without prejudice to Sickle.

(At this point Lord Leathers, Lord Cherwell, and Mr. Douglas left the meeting.)

7. Operation "Brisk"

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 87th Meeting, Item 2.\(^{25}\)

The Committee had before them a draft report by the British Planning Staff. (J.P.(T) 17 (Final)).\(^{26}\)

In the course of discussion it was pointed out that the Prime Minister and President had made it clear that the decision with regard to diplomatic action should rest with them, and had asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff to prepare a statement of the military reasons necessitating the occupation of the Portuguese Islands, a military plan to effect their capture and to give a target date on which this operation could be undertaken.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed certain alternative

\(^{25}\) *Ante*, p. 98.

\(^{26}\) Not printed.
proposals for obtaining the use of these Islands at an earlier date than that indicated in the plan.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Took note that the British Staff Planners were preparing a statement for inclusion in the final report to the President and Prime Minister, which would set forth the urgent military reasons for this operation.\(^7\)

8. Third Soviet Protocol

(C.C.S. 243)\(^8\)

Without discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed that this matter should be considered after the conclusion of the Trident Conferences.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) For the statement regarding the advantages to be gained from the use of the Azores, included as the annex to C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, “Final Report to the President and Prime Minister”, see post, p. 371.


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ROOSEVELT–CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 23, 1943, EVENING,
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

Roosevelt made no record of the discussion at this meeting. On May 24, 1943, Presidential Assistant Secretary Early announced that Churchill had returned to the White House the previous evening after having spent the weekend as guest of the British Embassy. According to the Early announcement, Roosevelt and Churchill conferred together until 2:30 in the morning. It is likely that at this meeting, Roosevelt and Churchill took up the Memorandum Prepared by the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, May 22, 1943, post, p. 338.
I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

MONDAY, MAY 24, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 24, 1943, 11:30
A.M., ROOM 240, COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNarney
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Horne
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Major General Streett
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Cabell
Commander Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Holmes
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Porter
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Macleod

SECRETARIAT
Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 94TH MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the 94th meeting except that the conclusion under Item 6 was changed to read as follows:

"Agreed that the necessary service troops for the build-up of the Bolero force will be given priorities in sailings as necessary to service the build-up of the combat troops, without prejudice to Sickle."¹

2. DRAFT REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

(C.C.S. 242/2)²

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered C.C.S. 242/2 paragraph by paragraph and agreed to certain amendments.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the British proposal relating to the extension of pressure in the Pacific for the earliest defeat of the Axis was, in his opinion, unacceptable since, should the situation in the Pacific become dangerous to U. S. interests or to U. S. itself, it

¹ C.C.S. 95th meeting.
² See ante, p. 182.
³ Post, p. 351.
would be necessary to supplement U.S. forces in this theater even at the expense of the early defeat of Germany.

Sir Charles Portal said that the British proposal was not intended to restrict operations in the Pacific but rather to insure that any surplus forces which might become available could be concentrated on the early defeat of Germany, thus bringing the war as a whole to an end more rapidly.

General Marshall said that with regard to air forces, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed to put into the United Kingdom the maximum number of groups which could be maintained there. If, therefore, there was a surplus of air forces he believed that they should be sent to the Southwest Pacific which at present was operating on a shoestring and where great results could be achieved by relatively small additions to the forces in that area.

The U.S. Air Staff were more than anxious to implement the Sickle plan since they believed that air superiority properly applied would produce devastating results. They were reluctant, therefore, to divert forces elsewhere at the expense of Sickle. On the other hand, in the Pacific the Japanese with their good interior lines of communication could more rapidly concentrate their air forces and it was essential, therefore, to have a numerical as well as a combat ascendancy. No major concentration of Japanese forces had yet taken place in the Pacific; but if this should occur, our own forces might find themselves in a most difficult situation from which they would have to be retrieved. Public opinion in the United States would not permit the acceptance of major reverses in the Pacific. If, therefore, there was any surplus of forces above those required to undertake agreed operations, he believed that they should be sent to the Southwest Pacific to exploit and improve our position in that area.

Sir Charles Portal said that he entirely agreed that any surplus forces, which might exist, should be sent to the Pacific, either for agreed operations or to defend the United States; but what he had meant to imply was that if operations in the Pacific were going well, it would be wiser, in order to eliminate Germany from the war, to send any surplus there might be either to the United Kingdom or to the Mediterranean.

The Committee then accepted the addition of certain words to paragraph II b suggested by Sir Dudley Pound [Sir Charles Portal].

In discussing the subparagraph of paragraph III dealing with the concentration of maximum resources in a selected area, Sir Charles

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4 According to King, p. 441, Portal's amendment reads as follows: "The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken."
PORTAL said that the words “in a selected area” might prove restrictive, since, as regards air forces, a saturation point might be reached in the United Kingdom. He believed that if additional forces were available they should attack the citadel of Europe from bases on all sides.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that it had already been agreed that the air offensive in Europe should be intensified without restricting the bases from which the forces should operate. He believed that all the decisions of the Conference must be reviewed at the next meeting or earlier if necessary, since, should Russia fall or make peace with Germany, it would be impossible to accomplish Roundhammer. It might therefore be necessary to reorient our strategy with a view to undertaking the defeat of Japan prior to that of Germany.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed as to the necessity of reviewing at the next conference all the decisions now taken, since it was vital to exploit any opportunities which arose. The position in southern Europe might well be such that we should take advantage of it.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that paragraph VII b dealing with the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be amended to make it clear that the decisions reached at the present conference should be examined in the light of the situation then existing.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested certain amendments to the Annex aimed at strengthening the case, on military grounds, for obtaining the Islands.

In discussing the amendment to paragraph III i of the Annex, which pointed out that the Islands provided the most direct all-weather air supply routes to Europe, Africa and the Far East, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he would like it to be agreed that the requirements of anti-U-boat warfare must take first priority.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed to the draft report to the President and Prime Minister as amended in C.C.S. 242/3.

b. Agreed that with reference to Section IV, paragraph 3 a (5), no additional administrative or logistic commitments would be entered into without the prior approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

c. Agreed that the security control agencies of the U.S. and U.K. should arrange for the necessary machinery for the production of deception policy and the coordination of cover plans for operations in the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters (Including Burma).

d. Agreed, with regard to paragraph 3 i of the Annex to C.C.S. 242/2, that when the use of the Azores is obtained, first priority must be given to the needs of anti-submarine warfare.

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For text of C.C.S. 242/3, see post, p. 359.
(C.C.S. 247)\(^6\)

Without discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed that consideration of this matter should be deferred until after the Trident Conference.\(^7\)

4. Provision of New L.S.I. (L)'s
(C.C.S. 248)\(^8\)

Sir Dudley Pound asked that the following amendments should be made to this paper:

Paragraph 5 b (1), first sentence, to read: "the allocation for use by the British services of as many Jay ships as are suitable for conversion to L.S.I. (L)'s."

The final sentence of paragraph 5 b (2) to read: "and then after conversion temporarily allocated to British control."

Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like further time to consider this paper.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

\(\text{a. That certain amendments should be made to C.C.S. 248 as incorporated in C.C.S. 248/1.}\)\(^9\)

\(\text{b. That action on this paper should be deferred.}\)

5. Requirements To Expand the Capacity of the Air Route to China

General Marshall presented a memorandum setting out certain requirements to enable the capacity of the air route to China to be expanded.\(^10\)

Sir Charles Portal said that in view of the fact that a directive setting out the priority to be accorded to the expansion of the air route had already been sent to the U.S. and British authorities concerned

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\(^8\) C.C.S. 248, May 23, 1943, memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, not printed, recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be asked to authorize the allocation for use by the British of certain ships suitable for conversion to large landing ships (J.C.S. Files).

\(^9\) C.C.S. 248/1, not printed.

\(^10\) Not found.
in India and China, these requirements should also be transmitted to the authorities concerned.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:}

Agreed that the suggestion at \textit{a} above \textsuperscript{12} should be implemented by the U.S. and British Air Staffs in direct collaboration.

\textsuperscript{11} For a summary of the Marshall directive of May 22, 1943, see Romanus and Sunderland, p. 342.

\textsuperscript{12} An \textit{a} appears in the source text alongside the latter part of the immediately preceding paragraph.

\textbf{ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, MAY 24, 1943, 1 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE}

\textbf{PRESENT}

\textbf{UNITED STATES}

President Roosevelt
Vice President Wallace
Mr. Hopkins

\textbf{UNITED KINGDOM}

Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Cherwell

\textit{Editorial Note}

No official record of the substance of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the President’s Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers). The following letter of May 30, 1943, from Cherwell to Hopkins indicates the general nature of the discussion:

“I was so sorry not to see you again on Tuesday [May 25] to make my adieux, especially as I wanted to thank you for all you had done to make my stay pleasant and profitable.

I understand that the matter we discussed was concluded satisfactorily and I am sure that this is largely due to your efforts. I am very glad, as it is certainly to everyone’s advantage that the old conditions should be restored.

It was a great pleasure to have an opportunity of talking to the President and Vice-President on Post-war topics and I was delighted to find how closely I agreed with their line of thought. For arranging this once again, I am sure I must thank you.

I trust you will forgive this hasty typed note; it will at any rate save you the trouble of trying to decipher my handwriting.” (Hopkins Papers)

The presence of Wallace, who was a member of the top American policy-making group on atomic energy, and Cherwell, who was intimately connected with the British atomic energy program, indicates that the atomic bomb project may also have been raised at this luncheon meeting. The Hopkins–Bush–Cherwell discussion on May 25 of the question of resuming the exchange of information on the
atomic bomb project (see Bush's memorandum of conversation, post, p. 209) was held after Churchill formally raised the matter, perhaps at this meeting.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, MAY 24, 1943, 4:45 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNarney

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Field Marshal Dill
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
(C.C.S. 242/3)¹

The President indicated his satisfaction and that of the Prime Minister with regard to the unanimity of opinion and the satisfactory decisions that had been arrived at by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was particularly grateful that so much had been accomplished in such a short time. He said the Prime Minister recalled that in the last war decisions were made with undue speed. There was no organized group which corresponded to our Combined Chiefs of Staff which was able to provide continuity in the strategic direction of the war.

The Prime Minister said that "today we meet in the presence of a new fact"; namely, what might prove to be decisive progress in the anti-U-boat war. There were indications that there might be as many as 30 sinkings in May. If this continued, a striking change would come over the scene.

The President then read the draft report contained in C.C.S. 242/3. There was complete agreement on all items until he came to paragraphs 6 and 7 under Section III. These were amended slightly.

¹ Post, p. 359.
SECTION III, PARAGRAPH 9—REARMAMENT OF FRENCH FORCES

With regard to paragraph 9 under Section III, Admiral King pointed out that the original paper provided only for the equipment of French Army Forces in North Africa. At his suggestion the paragraph was changed to apply to French Forces in Africa.

The Prime Minister said that Admiral Godefroy had received an order from Vichy to scuttle his ships in Alexandria. He had replied that he had definitely thrown in his lot with General Giraud's forces. As a result of this action the British Government would probably lift the ban on Godefroy's squadron. It was now Admiral Godefroy's desire that his heavy ships would proceed around the Cape, call at Dakar, and then proceed to the United States for refitting.

SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 1a—OPERATION TO SEIZE THE AZORES

The Prime Minister said that the political considerations involved in the seizure of the Azores must be considered. There was a possibility that the Islands might be secured without the necessity of utilizing a force as strong as 9 battalions. He suggested that a smaller force might approach the Azores in June. From 7 to 10 hours before its arrival, the Portuguese Government might be approached diplomatically and told that the force was en route. If they were received without opposition, the Portuguese Government would be reimbursed by whatever figure might be set. He thought the chances were possibly 3 to 1 that the Portuguese Government would submit.

The Prime Minister said that he personally favored an expedition in sufficient force to take the Islands. His government, however, had not as yet authorized him to approve such action. The British cabinet members felt that the matter should be further discussed on his return.²

General Marshall said that if a smaller force could be assembled in June which would act as a threat to back up a diplomatic approach, he would favor such action. He thought the present success in the anti-submarine warfare made it even more imperative that the use of the Islands be obtained as soon as possible.

Admiral King pointed out that if President Salazar refused to give his assent and the smaller force failed to attack, the Allied Forces would be in a bad position. They would have the humiliation of withdrawing; the Germans would know of the diplomatic approach and, as a result, would stiffen the resistance of the Islands.

The President said that he had never liked the idea of being put in a position of permitting President Salazar to call our bluff. He was

² The views of the British War Cabinet on this matter are set forth in the telegram of May 21, 1943, from Eden and Attlee to Churchill, post, p. 312, and the telegram of May 24, 1943, from Eden and Attlee, quoted in Eden, p. 455.
inclined to favor the approach with sufficient force to take the Islands in the event that President Salazar refused to permit a peaceful occupation.

General McNarney suggested the possibility of reinforcing the bluff by timing it with the sailing of a Husky convoy from the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister said that the earlier operation would have a good prospect of success as the Portuguese would have no way of knowing how strong the force was with which they were threatened.

General Ismay said that a plan was being examined to see if something less than a full-scale operation could be mounted.

The Prime Minister said that he was content to leave paragraph 1a of Section IV as it was written, and that he would discuss the matter with his government upon his return to England and let the President know the outcome of these discussions. He suggested the addition of the following sentences to the end of the paragraph: “The possibility of an earlier move will receive further study. The political decision involved will be settled in the meanwhile by the two governments.”

The President suggested that in his discussions with the Cabinet the Prime Minister might bear in mind the alternative of an approach to the Portuguese Government by the U.S.A. and Brazil. In any case, the idea that Brazil might provide the occupying force would be a strong factor in influencing the Portuguese Government to submit.

Section IV, Paragraph 2b—Cross-Channel Operations

The President then read paragraph 2 of Section IV regarding the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom and the cross-Channel operations. He asked if the decision as written in paragraph 2b precluded the use of French Divisions in the assault to be made on the Continent.

The Prime Minister suggested that the use of French Forces might be covered if the last subparagraph of paragraph 2b could be changed to read “that the follow-up divisions might come from the United States or elsewhere.”

The President said, however, that he was considering the advisability of having a French Division as either one of the 9 assault divisions, or, at least, as one of the first 20 build-up divisions. He thought that politically it was of great importance to have the French represented in the first attempt to reconquer French soil.

General Marshall asked if there was any possibility of this decision being communicated to the French.

The Prime Minister replied that he thought that would be extremely dangerous. General Giraud and General de Gaulle were soon
to have another meeting. He felt that this meeting might result in violent disputes. General Giraud had become stronger because of the Tunisian victories while de Gaulle would think, of course, that he was about to regain control. The important thing was not to let these two French generals create discord between the United States and the British. He did not feel reassured regarding the outcome of the Giraud-de Gaulle conference. He thought it extremely important not to inform the French of our decisions when there was the prospect of a split.³

The President said he thought it was entirely satisfactory to leave any mention of the utilization of French Forces in the assault on the Continent out of the paper which was under consideration provided it was recorded in the minutes of the present meeting and if it was understood by the Staffs that serious consideration should be given to the participation of some French Forces early in the operation.

Admiral King pointed out that the decision regarding cross-Channel operations, as set forth in paragraph 2 b of Section IV, failed to make any mention of the month by month planning that was being undertaken by General Morgan in London for the purpose of insuring readiness on the part of such forces as were available in the United Kingdom in the event of the German crackup.⁴

The President agreed that it would be a good idea to put agreed decisions concerning month by month planning in the report. He pointed out that it was impossible to tell when a break in the German resistance might take place. In the last war the first element of the German Forces to crack was the submarine crews. He felt that at the rate they were now losing submarines, that is, one a day, the crews would be unable to stick it. German submarine losses in 1918 were not as great as those they are now experiencing and yet they had induced a break in the German morale. Recently airplanes have entered two theaters of operations with definite objectives. These had failed to reach their objective by 10 or 20 miles, but it is known that the reports they rendered when they returned to their bases stated that the objectives had been reached. He thought that this

³Discussions between de Gaulle and Giraud began at Algiers on May 31, 1943, and resulted in the agreement of June 3, 1943, providing for the unification of the French liberation movement and the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. For documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the dissunity between Giraud and de Gaulle in French North Africa and the steps leading to the recognition by the United States of the administrative authority of the French Committee of National Liberation, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. 11, pp. 23 ff., and post, pp. 320 ff.

⁴The planning done by General Morgan’s staff during the first half of 1943 for the occupation of the Continent in case of a German collapse is described in Harrison, pp. 70–82.
was indicative of a bad state of morale and efficiency in the German Air Force. These conditions were bound to spread. As soon as the German ground forces learned that they did not have adequate air protection and that the U-boat campaign had failed, the news would spread rapidly and a serious break in morale might come unexpectedly. For these reasons it was essential that the Allies be prepared to take advantage of such conditions whenever they might occur. The President also said that there had been rumors of a German evacuation of Norway. He thought that plans should be under preparation to take advantage of such a contingency.

The Prime Minister suggested that a subparagraph be put into the paper at the end of paragraph 2 b of Section IV which would read as follows: “Meanwhile preparations will be continuously kept up to date in order to take advantage of a collapse of the enemy in France, or, alternatively, for the occupation of Norway in the event of a German withdrawal.”

In reply to a question by the President, Sir Charles Portal said that for bombing operations, air bases in Norway would not be of great assistance. It would be more economical to utilize those in England than it would be to build new ones in Norway, especially since Norway would not greatly extend the bombing range. He added, however, that it would have a very beneficial effect if fighters could be based on air fields in southern Norway.

The Prime Minister pointed out that if Norway could be occupied, it would reopen our communications with Russia. This fact, in itself, would make it imperative that immediate advantage be taken of the situation.

The Prime Minister said that the United States authorities would be kept informed of studies being made by General Morgan’s Staff in this regard.

SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 20—OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN TO ELIMINATE ITALY FROM THE WAR

The Prime Minister inquired whether the Poles were included in the forces detailed in this paragraph as available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean.

Sir Alan Brooke confirmed that these were included in the 19 British or Allied Divisions.

The Prime Minister said that he hoped that it was not the intention of this paragraph to commit us to carrying out particular operations. For example, he would be very much opposed to any idea of an operation to capture Sardinia as a sequel to Husky. This would be an eccentric operation, which would have no influence on the secur-
ing of the great prize open to us if we could take the *toe* and *heel* of Italy, and gain touch with the insurgents of the Balkan countries.

Admiral King pointed out that it was stated in the paragraph that each specific operation would be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke said that General Eisenhower would not be able to tell which operation he could do after Husky until the situation had declared itself. The idea, therefore, was to plan several operations and to decide, at the meeting to be held after Husky had been launched, which of them to carry out.

The President said that it was certainly difficult to foretell what the conditions would be. For example, it might be that a movement in Sardinia to separate from Mussolini’s regime might gain way, and consequently comparatively small forces could gain possession of the island. Or again, as one report suggested, the Germans might decide to withdraw their forces behind the Po, in which case entry into southern Italy would be easy. It might be better to widen the instructions to General Eisenhower, and to tell him to prepare operations against all parts of southern Europe.

General Marshall said that General Eisenhower would prepare a number of different operations, and which of them was adopted would be determined when we saw how Husky went. General Eisenhower had already put in summaries of plans against the *heel* and *toe* of Italy, and against Sardinia, and had expressed a preference for Sardinia. Air Chief Marshal Tedder had dissented from this conclusion, mainly on account of the difficulties of staging an attack on Sardinia with adequate air support.\(^5\)

Sir Charles Portal said that Air Chief Marshal Tedder had also thought that the value of northern Italy as a base from which to bomb Germany had been underrated.

The Prime Minister said that the prime factor which should be kept in mind was the position in the Balkans, where 34 Axis Divisions were held in play by rebels, who would become much more active if we could gain touch with them through Durazzo, or any other suitable point. Of course, if Italy went out of the war, then the Italian Divisions would have to withdraw, and Germany would either have to fill the gap, or retire to the Danube. The effect on Turkey would be very important. None of these effects could possibly accrue from an operation against Sardinia.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that General Eisenhower would be instructed to prepare those operations which were best calculated to

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eliminate Italy. It was the elimination of Italy which would place these prizes within our grasp, and the right operation to bring this about would depend upon the situation after Husky. Moreover, much would depend upon events on the Russian Front. It might be that the presence of large numbers of Germans in the toe and heel would make a direct assault on this unprofitable—in which case Sardinia would be a better choice.

The Prime Minister did not agree that Sardinia could be an acceptable alternative. Operations in the general direction of the Balkans opened up very wide prospects, whereas the capture of Sardinia would merely place in our possession a desirable island. There was nothing in the paper which would indicate to General Eisenhower that we held a view on this matter. The politico-strategic aspect would not be present in his mind.

The President said he did not feel ready to make up his mind on this matter. Certainly there were greater advantages in going to places other than Sardinia, but he did not think we were ready yet to say where.

Discussion then took place on the exact meaning of the word to mount an operation.

Sir Alan Brooke said that to mount an operation meant to draw up the plans, to allocate the forces, and to give them the necessary special training. Husky, for example, had been mounted during Vulcan. It was quite possible to mount more than one operation at a time, as considerable changes could always be made, and, indeed, had been made quite recently in the Husky plan.

The Prime Minister thought that the word mount meant the fixing on a particular operation for execution to the exclusion of others. He did not think more than one operation at a time could be mounted with the same resources.

After some further discussion, The Prime Minister suggested that he should take further time to consider this paragraph, and said that he would propose certain amendments for consideration.

SECTION IV. PARAGRAPH 2d—THE BOMBSING OF PLOEȘTI

The Prime Minister said that he hoped the bombing of Ploesti would not be carried out if it meant a considerable inroad into the preparatory aerial bombardment for Husky.

General McNarney said that the bombers which would be taken from the North African Theater to bomb Ploesti would only be away for four or five days. It was the units which would come from the United Kingdom which would be absent for a longer period.
GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the type of aircraft to be used was the B-24, which was not of such value for the Husky preparatory bombardment as the B-17. He thought that if Ploesti could be seriously damaged, it would be a blow of tremendous importance in support of operations on the Russian Front. The decision depended upon the comments and recommendations of the Commander in Chief, North African Theater.

SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 36—OPERATIONS IN THE BURMA–CHINA THEATER

THE PRESIDENT asked Mr. Hopkins what he thought the Generalissimo's reactions would be to these proposals.

Mr. Hopkins replied that he did not think that the Generalissimo should be told of the decisions reached in the Conference. He predicted that if he were told, he would not agree with them, although secretly he would not be unhappy about them. He would resent more than anything else not having been consulted. Mr. Hopkins suggested that Mr. Soong be told tomorrow that Anakim is to go on.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he thought the Chinese would have to be told a little more about the operations than was proposed by Mr. Hopkins. The Chinese were constantly pressing to see him concerning the decisions that were made, and he felt it wise to tell them everything except the details concerning the capture of Akyab and Ramree Islands.

THE PRESIDENT said in this regard they simply should be told that an occupation of a base on the Burma Coast by amphibious operations was included in the decision but that the details would have to be worked out after further consideration.

THE PRIME MINISTER proposed that the Chinese should be informed as follows:

"Further study of Anakim has led to the following plan:

1. A large scale build-up of air combat forces and a rapid build-up of the air transport route to China.

2. A vigorous offensive in the northern part of Burma with the purpose of opening the Burma Road and regaining contact with China.

3. Amphibious operations against the coast of Burma with the view to controlling communications in the Bay of Bengal."

THE PRIME MINISTER however, indicated that he would prepare a written suggestion as to what should be told to the Chinese.6

SECTION VI, PARAGRAPH 1—EQUIPMENT FOR TURKEY

THE PRIME MINISTER said he wished it definitely understood that the Turks would be informed regarding the origin of any equipment that

6 For text of the draft statement considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see post, p. 377.
was given to them from United States production. He felt that the same rule should apply to equipment given to Russia.

General Marshall said that in discussing the paragraph regarding equipment for Turkey, the United States Chiefs of Staff had been concerned more with the availability of the equipment and its effects on our training than they were with who received the credit for giving it to the Turks.

The Prime Minister said he understood the situation perfectly.

The President went on to consider the remainder of the paper which was agreed to in all its details by both him and the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister then said that he would like to give further consideration to the paper. He proposed to submit a suggestion regarding the post-Husky operations in the Mediterranean and also a proposal regarding the information that was to be given to the Chinese concerning the Burma decisions. He suggested, therefore, that the meeting adjourn at this time to meet again at 1130 on Tuesday morning, 25 May 1943.

This was agreed to.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 24, 1943, EVENING,
THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

United States

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman

United Kingdom

Prime Minister Churchill
Lieutenant General Ismay

Editorial Note

None of the American participants made a record of the discussion at this meeting. The information set forth above is derived from the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers). Harriman's memorandum to Churchill, post, p. 314, indicates that such matters as tank production were considered. Ismay's presence at this meeting suggests that the British proposal for the establishment of a refugee camp in North Africa may also have been discussed. Ismay, who was responsible for keeping Churchill apprised of the American-British negotiations on this issue, urged the Prime Minister on May 24 (see Ismay's memorandum, post, p. 342) to "go into action" with Roosevelt on this question.

At this meeting, but quite possibly after their advisers had departed.
Churchill requested of Roosevelt that Marshall be allowed to accompany the Prime Minister’s party on a visit to Algiers following the conclusion of the Conference in Washington. The Stimson Diary for May 25, 1943 relates the following information regarding the Churchill request:

“Before luncheon I learned that last night in a solitary debate between the President and the Prime Minister over some one of the points in which they both differed and differed vigorously, the Prime Minister . . . fought to the end and finally said, ‘Well, I will give up my part of this if you will let me have George Marshall to go for a trip to Africa’; and the President traded on the spot, took the point, and let Marshall go. Marshall told me of it and said he rather hated to be traded like a piece of baggage. I think I know pretty well what the Prime Minister has in prospect. He is going to take Marshall along with him in order to work on him to yield on some of the points that Marshall has held out in regard to the Prime Minister’s desired excursions in the eastern Mediterranean; but to think of picking out the strongest man there is in America, and Marshall is surely that today, the one on whom the fate of the war depends, and then to deprive him in a gamble of a much needed opportunity to recoup his strength by about three days’ rest and send him off on a difficult and rather dangerous trip across the Atlantic Ocean where he is not needed except for Churchill’s purposes is I think going pretty far. But nobody has any say and Marshall is going to pack up his bag tonight and start on his hard trip tomorrow morning on about twelve hours’ notice.” (Stimson Papers)

TUESDAY, MAY 25, 1943
HOPKINS–CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 25, 1943, FORENOON, THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the account in Alanbrooke (p. 514) which indicates that Hopkins persuaded Churchill to give up his attempt to obtain a radical revision of the Final Report and to settle, instead, for some minor changes. Churchill (Hinge of Fate, p. 810) recalls having been warned by Hopkins of the futility of pressing his recommendations regarding post-Husky operations.
MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 25, 1943,
10:30 A.M., ROOM 240, COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNaurney
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Horne
Major General Fairchild
Rear Admiral Cooke
Major General Streett
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Cabell
Commander Freseman
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Holmes
Captain Lambe
Brigadier Jacob
Brigadier Porter
Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Macleod

SECRETARIAT
Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 95TH MEETING

ADMIRAL KING suggested an amendment to Conclusion c of Item 2. THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the Conclusions of the 95th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes, but with the substitution of the word "Pacific" for "Indian" in Conclusion c of Item 2 and the addition of the words "(including Burma)" after the words "Far Eastern Theaters."

2. FINAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

(C.C.S. 242/4 and 242/5)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them C.C.S. 242/4, together with certain amendments suggested by the Prime Minister (C.C.S. 242/5).

1 C.C.S. 96th meeting.
2 Ante, p. 184.
3 C.C.S. 242/3, May 24, 1943, post, p. 359, as considered and revised during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on May 24 (ante, p. 189), was circulated as C.C.S. 242/4, not printed. C.C.S. 242/5, May 25, 1943, is printed post, p. 363. C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, post, p. 364, the approved version of the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, incorporated the amendments suggested by Churchill as well as the revisions of C.C.S. 242/4 made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the course of this meeting.
Certain other minor amendments were suggested and approved.  

**The Combined Chiefs of Staff:**—

Approved the final report to the President and Prime Minister, as modified by C.C.S. 242/5 and as amended in the course of discussion.

3. **Implementation of Decisions Reached at the Trident Conference**

(C.C.S. 250)  

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners covering suggested directives and instructions to General Eisenhower and General Morgan, prepared in the light of the decisions reached at the Trident Conference.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested an amendment to paragraph 1 c of the Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered certain amendments to the draft directives contained in Enclosures "A" and "B."

General Marshall presented a proposal that an additional statement be added at the end of paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 250 to the effect that shipping available for Post-Husky Mediterranean operations would amount to 15 combat loaders and 90 cargo ships.

Sir Charles Portal indicated that he thought that before the British Chiefs of Staff could agree to specify an exact number of ships the matter would have to be explored further.

Admiral King suggested adding the statement at the end of paragraph one: "Further instructions will be issued as to the availability of combat loaders and cargo ships."

Admiral King's proposal was agreed to.

Admiral Leahy suggested that the recommendations in the covering Memorandum to the Combined Staff Planners, as amended, be approved, but that the final directives be prepared by the Secretariat in the light of the discussion and of the latest decisions.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Approved the covering memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners as amended in the course of discussion.  

b. Approved the draft directive to General Eisenhower (Enclosure "A") and the draft supplementary directive to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate) (Enclosure "B"), subject to the incorporation therein by the Secretaries of the agreed decisions that had been arrived at subsequent to the preparation of these draft directives.  

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4 C.C.S. 250, May 24, 1943, memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners, not printed. For the final version of the memorandum as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see C.C.S. 250/1, post, p. 284.  

5 Post, p. 284.  

6 Post, pp. 284 and 286.
4. Suggested Statement To Be Made to the Chinese
(Unnumbered C.C.S. Memorandum dated 25 May 1943)\textsuperscript{7}

General Marshall said that since he had a meeting with the Chinese Representatives at 3 p.m. that afternoon he would like guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the form in which the decisions of the Conference should be conveyed to the Chinese.\textsuperscript{8} He urged that the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with reference to Burma be presented as proposals since it would be improper to imply a decision had been made regarding the use of the Generalissimo’s forces.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that the formal transmission of the decisions to the Chinese should be made by the President and Prime Minister to the Generalissimo.

Certain amendments to the draft contained in the memorandum under discussion were then inserted in order to conform to this conception.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved with minor amendments, the suggested statement to be made to the Chinese.\textsuperscript{*}

5. Proposals for Improving Combined Planning
(C.C.S. 251)\textsuperscript{9}

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners containing certain proposals for improving Combined Planning.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested an amendment to paragraph 2 a of the Memorandum designed to make it clear that the war against Japan should be considered as a whole.

Admiral Leahy suggested that paragraph 2 b should be eliminated since, in his view, the function of the Combined Staff Planners was to advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff on plans prepared by theater commanders and not to personally assist theater commanders. He felt that the presence of the Combined Staff Planners at theater headquarters might interfere with the function of theater commanders and their staffs.

Admiral Cooke and Captain Lambe explained that this paragraph had been inserted since it was believed that the Combined Staff Plan-

\textsuperscript{7} Post, p. 377.
\textsuperscript{8} No record has been found of Marshall’s meeting with the Chinese representatives. See the editorial note, post, p. 208.
\textsuperscript{9} Subsequently published as Annex to the White House Minutes, 25 May 1943.
\textsuperscript{*}Footnote in the source text. See post, p. 204.
\textsuperscript{9} Not printed.
ners could, if they visited General Eisenhower’s headquarters, prove useful by imparting information and data as regards resources which would assist him in drawing up his plans and, at the same time, themselves learn at an early stage of the possible plans and requirements.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the proposals put forward by the Combined Staff Planners, subject to certain amendments which have been incorporated in C.C.S. 251/1.20

6. Conclusion of the Conference

Sir Alan Brooke said that, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, he would like to express most heartfelt thanks for the kindness, both official and unofficial, which the British Chiefs of Staff had received during their visit. They had been met in a spirit of cooperation which had proved most helpful. The fundamental value of the exchange of views between the Chiefs of Staff of the two Nations had been proved by the fact that they had agreed to hold the next Conference at an early date. Short periods between meetings were, he felt, essential. If the lapse of time between successive meetings was too long, the views of each nation were more likely to become divergent.

Sir Alan Brooke paid tribute to the Combined Staff Planners who had worked at great pressure and whose high standard of work had gone far to assist the Combined Chiefs of Staff in reaching rapid decisions.

With regard to the results of the Conference, agreement had been reached on all vital points and through the process of reaching agreement, each side had achieved a clearer appreciation of the outlook and conception of the other. Finally, the Conference had strengthened those ties of friendship between the two Staffs, which was so essential to true cooperation in the war.

Admiral Leahy, on behalf of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, said that they too had an equal appreciation of the value of this conference and looked forward with assurance to equally successful results from future conferences. Frequent meetings were, in his opinion, essential. It had been a great pleasure to him to assist, for the first time, in personal consultation with the British Chiefs of Staff. This Conference had enabled the Chiefs of Staff to clarify the outlook for the immediate future and subsequent conferences would enable them to deal as successfully with future problems.

20 Not printed.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General McNarney

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Field Marshal Dill
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Ismay

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. EMPLOYMENT OF THE POLES

The Prime Minister said that he had had a strong appeal from General Sikorski for the employment of the Polish troops in battle in the near future. He hoped that these good troops could be made use of.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the Polish troops in the United Kingdom, which amounted to one armored division and one brigade, had been included in the forces earmarked for RoundHammer; and the two Polish Divisions and certain minor formations now in Iraq had been included in the 19 British and Allied Divisions available for further operations in the Mediterranean.¹

2. FINAL REPORT BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER (C.C.S. 242/4); AND AMENDMENTS THERETO SUGGESTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER (C.C.S. 242/5)²

The Combined Chiefs of Staff reported that they were in entire agreement with the amendments proposed by the Prime Minister and would incorporate these in the final edition of the report.

¹ For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in the evacuation of Polish troops and civilians from the Soviet Union to Iran in the spring of 1942, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. III, pp. 100–185, passim.
² C.C.S. 242/3, May 24, 1943, post, p. 359, as considered and revised during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on May 24 (ante, p. 189), was circulated as C.C.S. 242/4, not printed. C.C.S. 242/5, May 25, 1943, is printed post, p. 363. C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, post, p. 364, the approved version of the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, incorporated the amendments suggested by Churchill as well as the revisions of C.C.S. 242/4 made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during their meeting on the morning of May 25 (supra).
The Prime Minister suggested that it would be necessary to give a version of the report to the Russians. This version could be drawn up in suitable form for handing to the Russians through the normal official channels. This would obviate the necessity for an explanatory telegram from the President and himself. The message could simply be sent saying that a full report would be reaching them through the American and British representatives in Moscow.

The President and the Prime Minister:

a. Gave final approval to the report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as amended in accordance with the Prime Minister’s suggestions.

b. Instructed the Secretaries to prepare for their approval a version of the report suitable for communication to the Russians through the normal official channels.3

3. Communication of Certain Decisions to the Chinese

The conference had before them a suggested phraseology to be employed in communicating to the Chinese the decisions regarding operations in the Burma-China Theater, which had been suggested by the Prime Minister. (Shown in the Annex to these Minutes.)4

General Marshall said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had certain minor modifications to propose (which he read to the President and the Prime Minister), apart from which they were in entire agreement with the Prime Minister’s suggestion.

After further discussion, it was agreed:

That the President and General Marshall should make use of the form of words contained in the Annex to these minutes in conversation with Dr. Soong and General Chu respectively, and should hand them copies of the document for their retention.5

4. Official Statement for the Press

The President said that it would be necessary to consider the terms of a statement to be given to the Press at a suitable moment after the Prime Minister had left Washington.

Mr. Harry Hopkins said that he had drafted a statement, and he proceeded to read his draft to the Conference.6

General agreement was expressed with the terms of the draft, and Mr. Hopkins was asked to prepare it in final form for issue.7

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1 For the draft report for transmission to Stalin, prepared by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see post, p. 379.

2 Text of the proposed communication to the Chinese authorities is printed post, p. 378. For the original text of the proposed communication to the Chinese, prior to revision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see O.C.S. unnumbered memorandum, May 25, 1943, post, p. 377.

3 Regarding the Roosevelt-Soong and Marshall-Chu meetings, see the editorial notes post, p. 208.

4 For text of the draft statement referred to here, see post, p. 373.

5 For revised draft statement, see post, p. 374.
5. Visit of General Stilwell and General Chennault to the United Kingdom

The Prime Minister said that it would be of very great value if General Stilwell and General Chennault, with their unrivaled knowledge of the Burma-China Theater, could return to their posts via London. He understood that the route through London was actually three days shorter than the route across the Southern Atlantic; and since Field Marshal Wavell and Admiral Somerville would also be going to London, the visit of the two generals would serve to give a great impetus to the work necessary to enable the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for operations in the Burma-China Theater to be implemented.

General Marshall said that he was entirely agreeable to this suggestion and would issue the necessary orders.⁸

6. Post-Husky Operations

The President said that the Prime Minister would shortly have an opportunity of talking to the Commanders in Chief in North Africa on post-Husky policy, and had suggested that it would be of great value if General Marshall could accompany him.⁹ He (the President) had accordingly spoken to General Marshall,¹⁰ and asked whether he could defer his visit to the Southwest Pacific in order to fall in with the Prime Minister’s request. General Marshall had said that he was perfectly willing to do this.

The Prime Minister explained that he would feel awkward in discussing these matters with General Eisenhower without the presence of a United States representative on the highest level. If decisions were taken, it might subsequently be thought that he had exerted undue influence. It was accordingly a source of great gratification to him to hear that General Marshall would accompany him; and he was sure that it would now be possible to arrange everything satisfactorily.

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⁸ According to the account in Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 227, Churchill had earlier invited Chennault to return with him to England for a visit, but Chennault’s anxiety over the operations in China had forced him to decline the invitation. On his return trip to China, Stilwell did stop at London, where he conferred with British officials regarding future operations in the China-Burma area. Stilwell’s undated summary of the events of the Conference in Washington are printed in Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948), pp. 204-206.

⁹ Churchill’s request that Marshall accompany him to North Africa was made during the meeting with Roosevelt on the evening of May 24; see the editorial note, ante, p. 198.

¹⁰ According to the President’s Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers), Marshall met with Roosevelt at 11:20 a.m., just prior to this meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill.
in Algiers, and for a report to be sent back to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.21

7. Code Names for Future Operations

Admiral Leahy said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommended the adoption of certain code names, a list of which he handed to the President.

In discussion, certain modifications to the list were agreed upon.

The final list as approved has been given to those immediately concerned.22

8. The Plough Scheme

General Marshall read to the Conference a report which he had received upon the state of training and readiness for action of the force which had been specially set aside and trained for the Plough scheme. It was the firm opinion of all the United States and British officers concerned in the matter that this force, which numbered some 2,500 men, should be given battle experience as soon as possible. The force, which had been given amphibious training in addition to the special training for the Plough scheme, had been worked up to a high pitch of readiness, and provided it were not uselessly dissipated, it would greatly benefit by coming into action. It could be reassembled for its proper role before the winter. There were a number of possible places where the force might be utilized, such as the Aleutians, or post-Husky operations, or for commando raids from the U.K. or even in the Azores. It was perhaps a pity that they had not been employed in the operations against Attu, but an opportunity might occur for using them in another operation in that area.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that the value of the force would be greatly increased by early participation in battle.

General McNaurney said that the improved type of vehicle for use by the force would be ready about the middle of October.

The Prime Minister said that this force had been designed for a particular type of warfare and it would be a great pity to dissipate it if there were a chance of its real role coming to the fore. Nevertheless, he thought that it would be quite easy to create an opportunity for its employment if it was sent to the United Kingdom. It might be possible, for example, to repeat a raid on the coast of Norway of the type of the raid on the Lofoten Islands.

The President suggested that it would be necessary also to consider the utilization of the Norwegian battalion now in the United States.


22 C.C.S. 240, not printed.
The Prime Minister agreed. He suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should consider this matter immediately and make specific proposals to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

This suggestion was agreed to.

9. Consultations With the Russians

The President asked whether any steps had been taken to concert measures with the Russians in case of an attack by Japan on Russia.

General Marshall said that an attempt had been made to discuss this eventuality with the Russians, and General Bradley had been sent to Moscow for the purpose. After three months’ negotiation, it had been agreed that he should survey the air fields in Siberia, but the Russians had then reversed the decision and the whole proposal had fallen to the ground.13

The President said that the Russians naturally did not wish to permit any act which might compromise them in the eyes of the Japanese. Nevertheless, it would be a pity if the occasion arose and no plans had been made. It might be desirable, for example, to send forces to help the Russians to hold Kamchatka.

The Prime Minister agreed, but thought the Russians would be unlikely to be forthcoming. He suggested that one way of making progress would be to say to the Russians that we would be prepared to send them so many squadrons of aircraft so many days after the outbreak of the war with Japan. We could tell the Russians that they could count on this reinforcement in making their plans. This might lead them on to discussion.

General McNarney said that this proposal had in fact been made, but the only Russian response had been to suggest that the aircraft should be given to them so that they could fly them themselves.

Admiral King said that a running study was in existence of the possibilities presented by a Russo-Japanese war, and this had been reviewed three months previously. Little, however, could be done without additional data.

The Conference took note of the above discussion.

10. Adjournment of the Conference

The Trident Conference then adjourned, the Prime Minister expressing his gratitude for the warm welcome which he had received and his appreciation of the work which had been accomplished.14

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14 After the conclusion of the meeting, a luncheon was held at the White House for the participants in the Conference and for other high-ranking officials. The guest list is given in Sherwood, pp. 729–730.
ROOSEVELT-SOONG MEETING, MAY 25, 1943, 2:45 P. M.,
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

CHINA
Foreign Minister Soong

Editorial Note

Roosevelt made no record of the discussion at this meeting. The information set forth above is derived from the President’s Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers). At this meeting, Roosevelt presumably transmitted to Soong the report to the Chinese authorities on the results of the Conference. The text of the proposed communication to the Chinese, which is printed post, p. 378, was agreed upon by Roosevelt and Churchill at their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the morning of May 25, ante, p. 204. Chiang’s message of May 29, 1943, to Roosevelt, replying to the communication transmitted to Soong, is printed post, p. 385.

MARSHALL-CHU CONVERSATION, MAY 25, 1943, [3 P. M. ?]

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
General Marshall

CHINA
Major General Chu

Editorial Note

No records have been found which would confirm the holding of this conversation. The scheduling of the meeting, the purpose of which was the transmission to the Chinese authorities of a report on the Conference, is referred to in Marshall’s remarks during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the morning of May 25, ante, p. 201, as well as in the conclusion to item 3 of the record of the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the morning of May 25, ante, p. 204. A memorandum of May 24, 1943, from Deane to Marshall, not printed, indicates that Chu planned to call on Marshall at 9 a.m. on May 25 (J.C.S. Files). There is no evidence that such a meeting was held, and it appears probable that the meeting scheduled for 9 a.m. was postponed to 3 p.m. The text of the proposed communication to the Chinese authorities is printed post, p. 378.
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 25, 1943.

Mr. Hopkins called me on the telephone and told me that the Prime Minister had formally raised the question of interchange on S-1, and asked me to confer with Lord Cherwell in his office to see if there could be a meeting of minds.

I met Mr. Hopkins and Lord Cherwell at 3:30. Lord Cherwell asked that I state why we had altered our policy in regard to interchange on this subject. In reply, I traced the entire subject from the standpoint of its organization, beginning with the Briggs Committee and going through the NDRC handling, the taking over by the military, the existence of the Military Committee, and the Policy Group consisting of the Vice President and others. I then outlined the way in which the present policy had been adopted by these groups, making it clear that a new policy was needed at the time that the matter went into production in the hands of the Army, inasmuch as OSRD previously had had to do only with the scientific angles. I then outlined the principle which was adopted and outlined its application. I then asked Lord Cherwell whether they disagreed with the principle itself or with the way in which it was being applied. He stated that he disagreed with the principle itself.

We then had a considerable discussion in which I outlined that this was a principle that was applied generally. I also made it clear that the reason for the restriction of information to those who could use it in this war was for security purposes. I made it clear that this

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1 Roosevelt apparently first learned of the substance of this meeting from Bush on June 24, 1943. For an account of the President’s reaction to the report on the meeting, see post, p. 631. Also in connection with this meeting, see Cherwell's letter of May 30, 1943, to Hopkins, which is quoted in the editorial note to the Roosevelt–Churchill luncheon meeting of May 24, 1943, ante, p. 188.

2 The committees referred to in this sentence were those United States bodies established at various times from 1939 onward to deal with the atomic bomb project. For a narrative account of the organizational development of the project, see Hewlett and Anderson, chapters 2 and 3.
was being applied impartially and that there were groups such as the Naval Research Laboratory which wished much more information but were not being given it because they could not utilize it in this war.

Incidentally, in discussing the reasons for a restricted policy, namely security, I told Lord Cherwell that, if we were to furnish the manufacturing information freely at all points to the British, we could not then very well refuse to pass similar information from one American company to another, that we had at the present time each company confided to its proper field, that no information was being passed beyond that necessary for each company to operate properly therein, and that we would feel that it was undesirable from a security standpoint to pass the information around more freely than this in American companies. He stated that of course if we furnished the manufacturing information it would be to the British Government, and I stated that of course I would assume that the British Government would immediately have to work with some company such as I.C.I. in order to utilize the information effectively, which he did not contest.

On my insistence that, under the present plans, the British could not use for the purposes of this war the information on the manufacturing process, Lord Cherwell agreed that this was true as far as the present plans go. He also said, however, that, unless this manufacturing information was furnished to the British, they might feel impelled to alter the plans and go into manufacturing themselves, to the disadvantage of the balance of the war effort. I pressed him on the question as to whether they would expect in this way to attain results useful in this war, and he did not insist that they could. The matter finally came down to the point where he admitted rather freely that the real reason they wished this information at this time was so that after the war they could then at that time go into manufacture and produce the weapon for themselves, so that they would depend upon us during this war for the weapon but would be prepared after this war to put themselves in a position to do the job promptly themselves. He disclaimed the commercial aspects. He felt that it would be five or ten years before the matter came into use commercially, and that if commercial usage was indicated after study the British could readily go into that aspect of the subject. It was quite clear, and Mr. Hopkins reiterated it and emphasized it, that the reason the British wish the information was so that in the period immediately after this war they would be able to develop the weapon for themselves very promptly and not after a considerable interval.

The matter having gotten very definitely boiled down to this one point, I took the point of view, in which Mr. Hopkins joined me, that delivery of information to the British for after-the-war military rea-
sons was a subject which needed to be approached quite on its own merits, and that this question is tied up with the large problem of international relations on this whole subject from a long-term viewpoint. Lord Cherwell stated that there was a connection, because unless the British could now be assured that they would have this information for the above purpose they might have to divert some of their war effort in order to get it. He stated that he did not wish to say that they would do this, that it was up to the Prime Minister, but that they might feel that they were constrained to do so in order that their position immediately after the war might be properly secure. He made it clear, of course, that he did not mean secure as against the United States, but rather as against some other country which might have it far developed at that time. Mr. Hopkins said some things about one administration not being able to commit a succeeding one, except where the matter was incorporated in a treaty.

In conclusion, Mr. Hopkins stated that he now had the point very definitely in mind for the first time, and that he understood now exactly what was the point at issue. He evidently intends to talk to the President about it, although he did not say so. I asked him whether he wished me at this time, in view of the new angle of the matter, to discuss it in any way with Mr. Wallace or Mr. Stimson. He stated that there was nothing further that he wished me to do, that he did not think that I should take the matter up with either of those men at the present time, and I said to him that I would sit tight and do nothing unless and until I heard from him further on the matter.

V. Bush

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE, MAY 25, 1943, 4:03 P. M., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE

Roosevelt Papers

*Record of the Joint Press Conference by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON, MAY 25, 1943.]

THE PRESIDENT: (to the Prime Minister) If you don't mind, I will make these three little announcements first.

¹Presidential Press Conference No. 899. The parenthetical insertions appear in the source text and were presumably supplied by the White House Press Office. For full text of this press conference, see Rosenman, pp. 214-224. Another version of Churchill's remarks during this conference is printed in Churchill, War Speeches, vol. II, pp. 461-463, where it is noted that some 150 press representatives were present.
The Prime Minister: Yes.
(a long wait here as newspapermen continue to file in)

Mr. Donaldson: All in.

The President: I think, if our old-time friend will pardon me for about five minutes or less, I will give you one or two things that really ought to be said.

[Here follow statements by the President regarding certain domestic matters.]

And at this point I think I had better go off the record, and turn the meeting over to my distinguished colleague.

We are awfully glad to have Mr. Churchill back here. I don’t have—I don’t have to tell him that. All he has to do is to read the papers, and look into the faces of any American. He is very welcome.

I don’t think we have very much to tell you, except that we are making exceedingly good progress, and taking up—a matter which I spoke of the other day, the total war—the global war, which considering the—the size of our problems, these discussions have been done in practically record time.

And so I am going to turn the meeting over to Mr. Churchill, and I—I think that he will be willing to answer almost—with stress on the almost—any question. (laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, in Australia there is a very great fear as to the Japanese threat in that area. What is your feeling about the matter?

The Prime Minister: The threat is certainly, in our opinion, less serious than it was when I saw you last in this room (December 23, 1941).

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what can you tell us generally about the plans for the future, probably beginning with Europe?

The Prime Minister: A very expansive topic,—(laughter)—

Q. (interjecting) Yes, sir.

Q. (aside) Expansive?

The Prime Minister: (continuing)—and one which leads very early to difficult country; but our plans for the future are to wage this war until unconditional surrender is procured from all those who have molested us, and—and this applies equally to Asia and to Europe. It used to apply to—quite recently—to Africa.

The President: I think that word “molestation,” or “molesting” is one of the best examples of your habitual understatement that I know. (laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, could you say anything about how well satisfied you are with the way things are going on the fighting fronts?

The Prime Minister: I am very much more satisfied than I was
when I was here last (June 18, 1942). (laughter) It was within
this—this—not in this room—that the President handed me the tele-
gram of the surrender of Tobruk. And as I have mentioned to him,
I don’t think there was anybody—any Englishman in the United States
so unhappy, as I was that day, since Burgoyne surrendered at
Saratoga. (loud laughter)

But the situation is very different now. The—the plans which were
made then in June, and before June, and the movements of troops
which were set in motion before June last, enabled us to alter the
balance of the affairs in Africa entirely. And we opened our offensive
in Alamein on the 23rd of October. The United States and British
descent upon North Africa began on the eighth of November, and
since then we have already had a very great measure of—of success,
culminating in decisive victory of proportions equal to any of the
great victories that have been—that have been won: complete obliteration
of the enemy.

And too, while this has been going on, our Russian Ally who this
time last year was subject to very—well, who in June last year was
subject to the beginning of a very heavy and possibly deadly offensive
by the Germans, and it seemed that they might well lose the Caucasus,
has gained another series of successes, culminating in Stalingrad.
And Hitler has been struck with two—two immense blows, tre-
 mendous shattering blows: in Tunisia, and at Stalingrad. And from
every point of view we must regard the last ten or eleven months as
examples of highly successful war—a perfectly indisputable turning
of the tide.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, on this question of Russia. After you spoke
to Congress, Senator (Albert B.) Chandler (Democrat of Kentucky),
who is from my State, issued a statement saying that while you had
promised Great Britain would stay to fight Japan to the end, you could
not promise Russia would. Of course, there are reasons for this, but
do you care to say anything? In your opinion of Russia’s self-interest,
would it lead her to fight Japan after the European war?

The Prime Minister: Oh well, it’s one of those oversights that I
haven’t been placed in the position to give directions to Russia, as
he mentions. (laughter)

And I have this feeling, that those people have been doing such a
tremendous job facing this enormous mass—they have done what no-
body else was in a position to do: torn a large part of the guts out of
the German army. And they have suffered very grievous losses. They
are battling with, as I said to the Congress, 190 German divi-
sions—not up to strength, of course—and 28 satellite divisions from the

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*See the editorial note, ante, p. 117.*
different countries that Hitler gathered around him in his attack on Russia. They are bearing all that weight, and I certainly have not felt that I ought to suggest to my government asking more of them.

But their strength may grow as time goes on. They must know that Japan has watched them with a purely opportunist eye. But it isn't for me at all to make any suggestions to them at all.

They have been grand Allies; and of course they have shown it in heroic fashion. They have struck blows that no one else could strike, and they have endured losses that no one power has ever been capable of enduring, and continuing an effective and even a growing factor in the field.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what do you think of the dissolution of the Comintern? ²

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I like it—(laughter)—I like it.

Q. To get back to Russia, sir, are you confident that the Russians will be able to hold out this year, as they have in past years?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I certainly think that they have a much better prospect of holding out this year than they had the previous time. Indeed, I must express my full confidence that they will hurl back any attack which is made upon them.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, in the light of developments since your speech to Congress, would you care to make any general statement concerning the experiment of bombing Germany into submission?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I haven't had very much time to go on with the experiment since I spoke to Congress. (laughter)

We have had the heaviest raid we have ever had, the—the raid on Dortmund (Germany), where 2 thousand tons were cast down upon them with, I believe, highly satisfactory results.

And also, it has been an extremely good week for the United States air forces in Great Britain—in the United Kingdom. They—they made, I think, four heavy daylight attacks, which are judged to be extremely successful. Precision bombing in the daylight, of course, in proportion to the weight of bombs dropped, produces a more decisive effect—more than the night bombing, because it goes to more specific targets precise and accurate.

THE PRESIDENT: You know, I think that's something that hasn't been brought out, and that is that the night bombing over Europe carries more weight of explosives; but of course being night-time the precision of the actual bombing can't be so great as the day bombing, which carries less explosives but with more precision because it's daylight. On the whole, the combination of the two, day and night, is achieving a more and more satisfactory result.

² See ante, p. 174, footnote 3.
The Prime Minister: It's like running a twenty-four hour service. (laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, have you any comment to make upon relations between General (Henri Honoré) Giraud and General (Charles) de Gaulle?

The Prime Minister: Well, I have—I am very glad to see that apparently it's improved, and that there is to be a meeting, judging only from what I read in the—in the organs which you gentlemen sustain—(laughter)—and serve.

But certainly it is—it will be very satisfactory if all this backchat comes to an end, and Frenchmen who are fighting to relieve and liberate their country get together and look forward to the future instead of backward on the past, and think of the great duty they owe to France rather than to any factional interest.

Mr. Godwin: Mr. Prime Minister, the last time you spoke to us you used a term that I have remembered, because you said that you were not going to rely on an internal collapse of Germany, rather would you rely on an external knockout, at that time. Well, since then you have worked on Germany and the Occupied countries a good deal, and there are constantly recurring evidences that the German people may be getting close to "had enough." We still are working for this knockout, but have you any further light on that for us—on the internal collapse?

The Prime Minister: I stand pat on the knockout. (laughter) But, of course, any windfall will be gratefully accepted. (more laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, some quarters interpret your remarks to Congress on bombing to mean that other methods, which you said should not be excluded, should be postponed until the termination of the experiment.

The Prime Minister: Oh, No. That would be a most—a most distorted deduction to draw. I said—I said there is no reason why the experiment should not be continued, provided other methods are not excluded—I mean other simultaneous methods, or current methods, are not excluded.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, whenever you and the President confer, the rumor always goes around that you are about to pick an Allied commander in the European theatre. Could you tell us whether you have done that?

The Prime Minister: Done what?

Q. Picked an Allied commander for the European theatre?

The Prime Minister: Well, we have—we have an Allied commander in the theatre that is at present in force in Northwest Africa.
Q. I was thinking of the next one, sir? (laughter)

The Prime Minister: No step of that kind has been taken at the present moment, because the great preparations that are going forward—

Q. (interposing) Mr. Prime Minister, back to Australia—

The Prime Minister: (continuing)—haven't got to the point where the executive commander has to be chosen.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister,—

Miss May Craig: (interposing) Mr. Prime Minister, this may be an oversight, or you might not have been informed of this either, but I am curious to know what you think is going on in Hitler's mind now? (much laughter)

The Prime Minister: I have very little doubt that if he could have the past back he would probably play his hand a little differently. I think he would have hesitated long, before he rejected all the repeated peace efforts that were made by Great Britain, which even brought the name of our government into disrepute, so far did we go on the path of trying to placate and appease.

But he then got out of the period where he was restoring his country to its place among the countries of Europe. He had achieved that, but that wasn't what he was after at all. Appetite unbridled, ambition unmeasured—all the world! There was no end to the appetite of this—of this wicked man. I should say he repents now that he did not curb his passion before he brought such a great portion of the world against him and his country.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, do you think it's a sound assumption that he still has a mind? (laughter)

The Prime Minister: Do I think what?

Q. Do you think it's a sound assumption that he still has a mind?

The Prime Minister: I have no reason to suppose that he isn't in control of his faculties, and of the resources of his country. But, of course, I haven't the same facilities of acquainting myself with what is going on there, as I fortunately have on what is going on in the United States. (laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, do you care to say anything about Mussolini, and Italy? Is there any hint or news that you can bring us on that?

The Prime Minister: You know as much as I do about that. I think they are a softer proposition than Germany—

Q. (interposing) What kind of proposition?

The President: (interjecting) softer.

The Prime Minister: Softer—but I wouldn't count on anything but the force of arms. It may be aided at any time by a change of
heart on the part of the enemy's country—countries, a weakening of morale.

Italy—nobody proposes to take the native soil of Italy away from the Italian people. They will have their life. They will have their life in the new Europe. They have sinned—erred—by allowing themselves to be led by the nose by a very elaborate tyranny which was imposed upon them so that it gripped every part of their life. The one-party totalitarian system, plus the secret police applied over a number of years is capable of completely obliterating the sense of personal liberty.

And thus they were led by intriguing leaders—who thought they had got the chance of five thousand years in aggrandizing themselves by the misfortunes of their neighbors who had not offended them in any way—into this terrible plight in which they find themselves.

I think they would be very well advised to dismiss those leaders, and—and throw themselves upon the—upon the justice of those they have so grievously offended. We—we should not stain our names before posterity by cruel and inhuman acts. We have our own reputation to consider. But after all it really is a matter for them to settle among themselves, and settle with their leaders.

All we can do is to apply those physical stimuli—(laughter)—which in default of moral sanctions are—are sometimes capable of inducing a better state of mind in recalcitrant individuals and recalcitrant nations. (more laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there has been a lot of interest in the experts from India you brought with you. Would you care to comment about the situation in India, or China?

The Prime Minister: Well, I am very anxious to increase the intensity of the war effort against Japan, and therefore brought these commanders-in-chief in order that they could meet with the United States officers, and particularly with those who have been serving with such effect in China, like General (Claire) Chennault and General (Joseph W.) Stilwell, and the high officers here, because it is evident that the war in that theatre must be prosecuted with the very greatest vigor, and on the best lines. And we have been talking a great deal about that, and thinking a great deal, and have arrived at conclusions which I believe are sound—are good.

When I was here—when I saw you last in—in December 1941, or January 1942—I forget which it was—when I did, of course, this question of priority—which was first and which was second of the two great theatres and antagonists—assumed a much more sharp form than at the present time. Our resources have greatly expanded. If
the war continues on both fronts the war will be waged with equal force as our resources grow. Instead of being consecutive our efforts will be concurrent, and that great degree of effort will be capable of being applied at the same time in both directions. They have been already applied.

The forces that we have are becoming very respectable in munitions, and in men trained to war of all kinds; but as I pointed out to Congress, the problem is one of application, and that problem of application is limited by distance, and the U-boat war, the amount of shipping, the character of the communications, the vast distances of the ocean. Our forces are growing and gathering their ambition, but to apply it is a matter of time, and it is exceedingly difficult to apply.

But we follow out this principle, that all soldiers must be engaged, and ships and airplanes must be engaged on the widest possible fronts, the broadest possible superfcies, and maintain the fighting with the utmost intensity, because we are the stronger animal; we are the stronger combination; we are shaking the life out of the enemy; and as we are able to continue, we will not give him a moment's respite.

This is particularly true of the air, where they are already beginning to fail to keep up at all to the necessary strength on the various fronts. Neither Japan nor Germany is able to maintain equality with Britain, the United States and Russia on all the fronts.

Still less are they able to do so in the field of production. Immense plurality—the superiority of production—is on our side. And although it takes a certain number of months after planes are made before they come into action—perhaps a good many months, having regard to all the distances to be covered, and to the large ground staffs that have to be transported—but in spite of that, at the end of certain periods, the great superiority in numbers of our manufacture and of our trading is bound to have effect, which so far as the air war is concerned will be decisive.

Whether the ending of the air war—the deciding of the air war will entail a similar ending of the other forms of warfare has yet to be seen. But the air was the weapon these people chose to subjugate the world.

Q. (interjecting) That's right.

The Prime Minister: (continuing) This was the weapon they struck at Pearl Harbor with. This was the weapon with which they boasted—the Germans boasted they would terrorize all the countries of the world. And it is an example of poetic justice that this should be the weapon in which they should find themselves most out-matched and first out-matched in the ensuing struggle.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, have you anything to say about the submarine side of the situation?

The Prime Minister: I am very much encouraged by all that has happened there since the turn of the year. Really, it has been—it has been very encouraging. The—the output from the United States’ shipyards is prodigious and has fulfilled all hopes, hopes which, when the—the plans were first made and published, seemed to be excessive. But they have been made good. The movement of supplies across the ocean has been on an increasing scale. The surplus of—of new building over sinkings over the last six months has been substantial, especially in the later months; and the killings of U—boats have improved and reached a very high pitch—never better than in the last month.

Mr. Godwin: What was that word, sir?

The President: (interjecting) Killings.

The Prime Minister: Killings—

Mr. Godwin: (interjecting) Yes.

The Prime Minister: (continuing)—of U—boats. I mean the killings of U—boats by our forces.

Mr. Godwin: (interjecting) Yes.

The Prime Minister: (continuing) That is due, of course, to the increasing numbers of U—boats,—

Mr. Godwin: (interjecting) Yes.

The Prime Minister: (continuing)—but it is also due to the improved methods, and some wonderful things—wonderful things that have been thought of on both sides of the Atlantic. And, of course, we interchange everything immediately. Anything we have we share and bring into action. A lot of clever people are thinking a lot about these things.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there is—there is a great deal more confidence in the Allied commanders in the field than there was a year ago. Would you care to comment on that?

The Prime Minister: Well, they have had a chance to come into action on reasonable terms. Indeed, on advantageous terms, because we—we were struck with superior forces at the right spot. We—as your Confederated general (Nathan Bedford Forrest, a Cavalry commander in the Civil War) used to say, “We got there firstest with the mostest.” (laughter)

Mr. Godwin: (aside) That’s right.

The Prime Minister: (continuing) And also, because our troops have—since I was here last—been equipped with all the best weapons. You have only got to turn the industry of the United States and Britain over from peace to war. It undoubtedly takes a couple of
years or more to get it running, but when it does run it gives you a
flow of weapons which certainly neither Germany nor Japan possibly
can beat us.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, would you undertake to make a prediction
on the progress of the war for the rest of this year? I have in mind
your—this statement you and the President made at Casablanca, on
new and heavier blows against all of the Axis members in 1943?

The Prime Minister: Well, I think—I think that seems to be a
very sound prediction, and couched in terms which are unexceptionable
from the point of view of military security. (laughter)

Q. Thank you very much, sir.

Q. Thank you.

The Prime Minister: Thank you very much.

(the newspapermen started to leave rather slowly, and the Prime
Minister climbed onto his chair and gave the "V" for Victory sign
with his fingers, which was accompanied by much applause)

The President: May I say one word, please? Don’t get the idea
that the conferences are concluded. They are not. They are con-
tinuing. (laughter)

The Prime Minister: We have a lot of ground to cover.

The President: Yes.

Q. Thank you.

Q. Thank you.

ROOSEVELT–CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 25, 1943, EVENING,
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of this meeting has been found. The information
set forth above is derived from Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 811, where
it is recalled that the meeting was given over to a prolonged considera-
tion of several drafts of a message to Stalin on the results of the con-
ference. Finally, at 2 a.m., it was agreed that Churchill would take
the draft message with him and work on it during his flight to New-
foundland en route to Africa. Also according to Churchill’s account,
Marshall appeared at the meeting and was persuaded to accompany
Churchill on his flight and help prepare the draft message to Stalin.
For the draft message to Stalin dated May 25, as annotated by Roose-
velt, see post, p. 379. For the message to Stalin subsequently prepared by Marshall en route by air to Algiers, see post, p. 383.

It appears likely that it was also at this meeting that Roosevelt and Churchill agreed on the resumption of the exchange of information between the United States and the United Kingdom on the atomic bomb project. Cherwell's letter on May 30, 1943, to Hopkins (quoted in the editorial note, ante, p. 188) indicates that a decision on this matter was not forthcoming until after the Hopkins–Bush–Cherwell meeting on the afternoon of May 25. According to the account in Gowing, p. 164, Churchill, who had taken with him to the Conference a dossier of papers on the possibility of an independent British atomic energy program, received messages from London during the Conference regarding the increased urgency of restored American-British collaboration in this field. Sometime "towards the end of May", this account continues, Churchill sent reassuring messages to London that he had had an "entirely satisfactory" conversation with Roosevelt about Tube Alloys, and that Roosevelt had agreed to the resumption of the exchange of information on the project. References were also made to this Roosevelt-Churchill conversation on atomic energy in a number of post-Conference communications. In his message No. 374, June 10, 1943, to Hopkins (post, p. 630), Churchill wrote as follows:

"As you will remember, the President agreed that the exchange of information on Tube Alloys should be resumed and that the enterprise should be considered a joint one to which both countries would contribute their best endeavors. I understood that his ruling would be based upon the fact that this weapon may be developed in time for the present war and that it thus falls within the general agreement covering the inter-change of research and invention secrets."

In a letter of July 20, 1943, to Bush (post, p. 633), Roosevelt wrote:

"While the Prime Minister was here we discussed the whole question of exchange of information regarding Tube Alloys, including the building project.

"While I am mindful of the vital necessity for security in regard to this, I feel that our understanding with the British encompasses the complete exchange of all information."

For an account of American-British relations in this period in connection with the atomic bomb project, see Hewlett and Anderson, chapter 8.

At this meeting Roosevelt and Churchill also apparently sought to perfect a draft joint statement or final conference communiqué. For the texts of the drafts under consideration, see post, pp. 374, 375. For the text of the brief statement by Roosevelt, given to the press on May 27, 1943, but probably agreed upon at this meeting, see post, p. 377.
3. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

A. GLOBAL STRATEGY

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

GLOBAL STRATEGY OF THE WAR

1. It would appear that the first steps in an approach to our problem should cover the broad field of global strategy. Our two principal enemies, widely separated and constituting threats to our home theaters that differ in imminence and gravity, present problems that are inextricably interrelated. We are compelled, therefore, to view the problem as a whole, and in that light to test all proposals.

2. The United States concept of the global strategy of the war, reduced to its simplest terms, is to win the war as decisively and speedily as possible. We have stated this more formally, as follows:

a. In cooperation with Russia and the lesser Allies, to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with our Allies, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan in the Pacific and from China.

c. Thereafter, in cooperation with the other Pacific Powers and if possible with Russia, to combine the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to force the unconditional surrender of Japan.

3. The United States accepts the strategic concept that the war will be won most speedily by first defeating Germany, and thereafter by completing the defeat of Japan.

From our standpoint the concept of defeating Germany first involves making a determined attack against Germany on the Continent at the earliest practicable date; and we consider that all proposed operations in Europe should be judged primarily on the basis of the contribution to that end. Similarly, we believe that all proposed operations now or later in the Pacific should be judged primarily on the basis of their contribution to defeating Japan in the shortest practicable time.

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1 Read by Leahy in the course of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 13; see ante, p. 35. This memorandum comprised annex A to the minutes of that meeting.
It is the opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff that a cross-Channel invasion of Europe is necessary to an early conclusion of the war with Germany, and that an early opening of communications with China is necessary in order to keep China in the war and to bring to a successful conclusion the war with Japan.

4. We recognize that we have before us a difficult problem in how best to employ our resources in support of these concepts. Any major course of action against one enemy has a direct effect upon the timing, scope, and objective of action against the other. The global concept must, therefore, be kept constantly in mind.

5. We believe that keeping Russia and China actively in the war effort is essential to our successful conclusion of the war in any reasonable time.

6. We are confident that this Conference will find common ground upon which to reach sound solutions for this basic global problem, and the more specific problems which will appear in connection therewith.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943-44

1. We have asked for this meeting because we think the time has come to carry a stage further the combined plans agreed upon at Casablanca. We have no intention of suggesting any departure from the principles underlying the decisions taken at that Conference (see C.C.S. 155/1 and 170/2'). We feel, however, that their application requires review and development in the light of the progress of the war in the last four months, the detailed studies which have been carried out, and the experience which has been gained.

OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

2. The decisions reached at Casablanca (see C.C.S. 155/1, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5) were as follows:—

"Operations in the European Theater will be conducted with the object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum forces that can be brought to bear upon her by the United Nations.

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1 Read by Brooke in the course of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 13; see ante, p. 36. This memorandum comprised annex B to the minutes of that meeting.
2 For texts of C.C.S. 155/1, January 19, 1943, memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff entitled "Conduct of the War in 1943," and C.C.S. 170/2, January 28, 1943, Final Report to the President and Prime Minister Summarizing Decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, pp. 774 and 791.
The main lines of offensive action will be:—

In the Mediterranean

(a) The occupation of Sicily with the object of:—

(i) Making the Mediterranean line of communication more secure.

(ii) Diverting German pressure from the Russian Front.

(iii) Intensifying the pressure on Italy.

(b) To create a situation in which Turkey can be enlisted as an active Ally.

In the United Kingdom

(c) The heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort.

(d) Such limited offensive operations as may be practicable with the amphibious forces available.

(e) The assembly of the strongest possible force (subject to (a) and (b) above and paragraph 6 below (Operations in the Pacific and Far East)) in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent.

In order to insure that these operations and preparations are not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated to the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters."

3. So far as amphibious operations from the United Kingdom are concerned, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have since approved a directive to General Morgan to prepare plans, among other things, for a "full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible." So far as operations in the Mediterranean were concerned, the Casablanca Conference did not look beyond the capture of Sicily. It is therefore now for consideration what action should be taken in the European Theater between the capture of Sicily and the mounting of the full scale offensive in 1944—a period of anything up to nine or ten months—for the furtherance of the objects agreed at Casablanca which have just been referred to.

4. It seems to us unthinkable that we should be inactive during these critical months when Russia is engaging about 185 German divisions.* This is just the time when we ought to be exerting all the pressure that we can. It would be fatal to give Germany so long a breathing space in the west, and thus possibly enable her to avert collapse.

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*For an account of the discussions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in early 1943 leading to the directive of April 28, 1943, on the preparation of plans for the cross-Channel invasion of the continent, see Harrison, pp. 45-49.

**This does not include 14 G.A.F. divisions on the Eastern front. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. In our view, the main task which lies before us this year in the European Theater is the elimination of Italy. If we could achieve this, it is our opinion that we should have gone a very long way towards defeating Germany. The break-up of the Axis would inevitably have a most serious effect on the psychological and material strength of Germany. The effects would be:—

(a) The withdrawal of some 35 Italian Divisions from Greece, Yugoslavia, and southern France. Germany would either have to let go of one or more of these countries, with all that this implies in loss of raw materials and prestige, and in the extension of the range of the Allied bomber offensive, or alternatively she would have to substitute German for Italian troops at substantial cost to the Russian Front.

(b) The elimination of the Italian Navy would enable us to transfer very considerable naval forces from the Mediterranean to the Pacific or to the Indian Ocean, whichever is thought preferable. If we were able to take over the Italian Fleet, the naval position would be still more favorable.

(c) We should be able to mount a threat through Sardinia and Corsica against the south of France in the spring of 1944, which would greatly increase the chances of success of cross-Channel operations from the United Kingdom.

(d) The collapse of Italy would have a big effect on Turkey, and hasten her readiness to make common cause with the Allies.

6. It is of course possible that we might eliminate Italy after the fall of Sicily by air action alone. We think, however, that it would be most unwise to bank on this or to transfer any substantial part of our bomber force from the United Kingdom. We therefore consider it essential that we should follow up a successful Husky by amphibious operations against either the Italian islands or the mainland, backed up, if possible, by operations in other parts of the Mediterranean. Only in this way can we reap the full benefit of our victories in Africa and in Husky, and employ the powerful and experienced Anglo-American forces gathered in the Mediterranean Theater and their assault craft. We have considered various alternatives, and have formed provisional views as to which should be undertaken. We will explain these in detail later on.

7. The provision of the shipping required to deliver a second amphibious blow in the Mediterranean this year will of course have repercussions elsewhere and will affect Bolero. But even if Italy collapses as a result of the first blow (Husky), we shall still need considerable shipping in the Mediterranean to exploit this success by installing air bases on the Italian Mainland and Islands, by increasing supplies to the Balkan resistance groups, and by speeding up our aid to Turkey. In either case some delay is likely to be caused to the build-up of Bolero, but we believe that this disadvantage will be greatly outweighed by the fact that successful Mediterranean operations, and
still more the elimination of Italy, will ease the task confronting an army landing in Europe from the United Kingdom.

8. We do not believe that there is any method of giving effectual help to the Russian Front throughout this year other than a continuance of Mediterranean operations, and the intensification of our bomber offensive. It was decided at Casablanca that the heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort should be a feature of the campaign of 1943. Nothing has occurred in the interval to alter the wisdom of this decision, and we think that Sickle should continue to have a high priority.

PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER

9. At Casablanca it was agreed that certain operations should take place in the Pacific Theater (see C.C.S. 170/2 paragraph 5(a)), and that subject to certain reservations, plans and preparations should be made for the recapture of Burma to take place in the winter of 1943–44. The 15th November was approved as the provisional date for the Anakim assault. We do not know whether the experience of the last four months, and the studies which have been made by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff have caused them to consider or modify the program for Pacific operations which was drawn up. We should like to hear their views on this. As to Anakim, the position is that after Casablanca, the Commander in Chief, India, was at once invited to frame the best possible plan, and to state his requirements. We are prepared to explain this plan and its implications in detail if the U.S. Chiefs of Staff so desire. We think the plan represents the best that can be made having regard to the resources which will be available. But it is necessary to say straight away that we are of the opinion that the full operation should not be attempted in the winter of 1943–44. Our main reasons are:—

(a) The magnitude of the assault and the scope of the operations to which it would be the prelude, are such that we do not feel able to undertake them at a critical period in the war with Germany, on whom we cannot afford to relax the pressure.

(b) We are very doubtful of the feasibility of the operation at the present time. For any reasonable prospect of success it would demand a sufficiency of forces specially trained and equipped, and backed up by ample reserves of men and material. These conditions cannot be fulfilled in the coming winter.

(c) Until long-term plans for the ultimate defeat of Japan have been decided upon, it cannot be assumed that the re-conquest of Burma, however desirable the political effect, especially on China and India, is indispensable from the military point of view.

(d) Operation Anakim, even if successful in 1943–44, would not be likely to reopen the Burma Road until the middle of 1945.

10. Although we cannot do Anakim this year, we recommend that everything possible should be done, with the resources available to
keep up the pressure on Japan from the west and to support China. We have various alternatives to propose, and would welcome discussion of any suggestions which the U.S. Chiefs of Staff may desire to put forward.

11. The results of our examination of ANAKIM make us feel that we should together examine more closely the method by which the defeat of Japan is ultimately to be brought about. This is essential so that all preliminary operations can be arranged to fit into the ultimate design, and so that Commanders in Chief in the Far East Theater and Indian Ocean may have a firm basis on which to frame their long-term plans and preparations. This will insure that the right sort of equipment of all kinds will be available in the necessary quantities when the time comes.

SHIPPING

12. It is clear that the availability of shipping will be one of the main governing factors as to what can and what cannot be done in 1943 and also in 1944. We suggest, however, that before going into details on shipping, we should clear our minds on the strategical issues, and decide, on merits, on the course of action at which we should aim. Thereafter we should examine the extent to which the shipping available will enable us to fulfill our program. We think it essential that the shipping question should be examined in detail, and settled before the Conference breaks up.

WASHINGTON, 12 May, 1943.

J. C. S. Flies

Study by the United States Joint Staff Planners

SECRET

Enclosure to C.C.S. 219

[WASHINGTON,] 14 May 1943.

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943–1944

1. UNITED NATIONS OVERALL OBJECTIVE

The overall objective of the United Nations, in conjunction with Russia and other Allies, is to bring the war against Germany, Japan, and Italy to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible date.

2. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

a. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

1 This paper was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 14, 1943, under cover of the following memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff: "The enclosed study was prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners and meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff. It is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." It was read by Leahy during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 14; see ante, p. 54.
b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced.

c. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to force the unconditional surrender of Japan. If, however, conditions develop which indicate that the war as a whole can be brought more quickly to a successful conclusion by the earlier mounting of a major offensive against Japan, the strategical concept set forth herein may be reversed.

3. OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN-AFRICAN AREAS

a. Secure the lines of communications in the Atlantic by defeating the U-boat and removing other threats to these sea communications.

b. European Area

(1) Conduct a full-scale assault from the United Kingdom against the Continent in the spring of 1944.

(2) Conduct a vigorous air offensive with a view to reducing Germany’s war potential and to making feasible a cross-Channel operation and exploitation from lodgments on the Continent in the spring of 1944.

(3) Build up appropriate forces in the United Kingdom for tasks (1) and (2).

(4) Prepare for and return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

c. African Area

(1) Accomplish HUSKY.

(2) After the completion of HUSKY, or in the event that HUSKY is cancelled, conduct limited offensive operations in the Mediterranean Area. These operations will be designed:

(a) To destroy Italian war potential by continuing air attacks from Mediterranean bases;

(b) To continue support to Russia by the diversion of Axis forces and materials;

(c) To force dispersion of Axis forces in order to facilitate a cross-Channel operation; and

(d) To maintain the security of our positions and communications in the Mediterranean Area.

The strength of the forces to be employed in the Mediterranean will be so limited as not to prejudice the success of a cross-Channel operation in 1944. U. S. ground and naval forces will not be employed in the Mediterranean east of Sicily.
4. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST

a. Conduct operations to maintain lines of communication in the Pacific, particularly to Australia; to maintain pressure on Japan, retain the initiative, force attrition, contain the Japanese Fleet in the Pacific, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against Japan; and to keep China in the war.

b. For these purposes, U.S. Naval forces will be increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the Atlantic. With due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the European Axis, air and ground forces will be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of U.S. Naval forces.

c. Offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943–1944 will have the following objectives:

(1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.
(2) Seizure of Burma.
(3) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
(4) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
(5) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.

5. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE COMBATANT FRENCH

a. Sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia without militating against the attainment of the overall objectives.

b. Sustain China by continuing to furnish munitions to the greatest extent practicable.

c. Continue to furnish munitions to the combatant French in Northwest Africa on the scale previously agreed upon.

J.C.S. Files

Proposals by the Combined Staff Planners

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 17, 1943.

C.C.S. 233/1

TRIDENT CONFERENCE
TENTATIVE PROGRAM OF WORK

1. We submit the following tentative program of work. It is based on the assumption that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will have a full

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1 At their meeting on May 15, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a draft agenda for the remainder of the Conference in the light of the discussion which had taken place; see item 2 of the record of that meeting, ante, p. 79. At their meeting on May 17, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered and approved the draft agenda prepared by the Combined Staff Planners (C.C.S. 233, May 16, 1943, not printed), subject to certain changes incorporated in the revised version printed here. See item 6 of the 86th meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, ante, p. 94.
discussion on the “statement of agreed essentials” on Monday, 17 May. Thereafter, the program should be broadly as set out below.

**Tuesday 18th**

1. *The Defeat of Germany*
   a. A United States paper on the bomber offensive against Germany.²
   
   b. Plan for the defeat of Germany by concentrating on the biggest possible invasion force in the United Kingdom as soon as possible.

   and

   Paper under preparation by U.S. Planners in consultation with the British.³

   c. Plan for the defeat of Germany accepting the elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary.
   
   Paper under preparation by the British Planners in consultation with the U.S.⁴

**Wednesday 19th**

d. The possibility of an air offensive against Ploesti.

   Paper under preparation by the Combined Staff Planners.⁵

**Thursday 20th**

2. *The Defeat of Japan*
   a. A paper showing proposals for operations in the Pacific is under preparation by the United States Staffs.⁶

   b. The potentialities of the air route from Assam to China.

   Paper under preparation by the Combined Staff Planners.⁷

   c. Study of the most promising operation for opening a land route to China.

   Paper under preparation by the Combined Staff Planners.⁸

**Friday 21st**

3. *The U-Boat Campaign (Discussion)*

4. *Rearming of French Forces in North Africa*

5. *Turkish Situation (General Discussion)*

6. *Miscellaneous Items Arising During the Week*

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² C.C.S. 217, May 14, 1943, post, p. 239.
³ The paper under reference was circulated as C.C.S. 235, May 18, 1943, post, p. 273.
⁴ The paper under reference was circulated as C.C.S. 234, May 17, 1943, post, p. 261.
⁵ No combined paper on this subject was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. For the early planning for the air attack of August 1, 1943, against Ploesti, see Dugan and Stewart, Ploesti, pp. 36–39.
⁶ See C.C.S. 229/1, May 23, 1943, post, p. 302.
⁷ The paper under reference, C.C.S. 229, May 19, 1943, is not printed.
⁸ The paper under reference, C.C.S. 231, May 19, 1943, is not printed.
Saturday 22nd

7. Relation of Resources to Agreed Strategy With Particular Reference to Shipping and Landing Craft

Although these problems will be considered in the discussion on all the various plans for the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan, it will not be possible to collate a paper on the subject until all these various plans have been discussed. Once Items 2 and 3 have been cleared out of the way, the Combined Staff Planners will have to prepare a paper on this subject relating resources to agreed strategy.

Sunday 23rd

8. Global Strategy: Final Consideration

Monday 24th

9. Final Report to the President and the Prime Minister

This report is visualized as including agreed statements on global strategy, and on existing and projected undertakings arranged if possible in order of priority.

J. C. S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

WASHINGtON, 18 May 1943.

C.C.S. 232/1

AGREED ESSENTIALS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

Reference: a. C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 2 a (1)

Of the following items, all except those in the split columns have been agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Those in the split columns have not so far been agreed upon but are subject to further consideration.

1. OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The overall objective of the United Nations is:

In conjunction with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

2. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

a. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about at the

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1 This paper is an amended version of C.C.S. 222, May 16, 1943, not printed, and was prepared at the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to show the items of agreement and disagreement. For the discussion of C.C.S. 232 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 17, 1943, see ante, p. 93; see also the record of the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting of May 18, 1943, ante, p. 98. At their meeting on May 19, the Combined Chiefs of Staff deferred further consideration of C.C.S. 232/1; see ante, p. 111. The final decisions with regard to this paper are contained in C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, “Final Report to the President and Prime Minister”, post, p. 364.
earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

Proposed by C.P.S.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced.

Amendment Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff

Alter to read:
“To maintain, and so far as is consistent with a above, to extend . . . .”

c. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

3. ESTABLISHED UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF THE OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

a. Maintain the security and warming capacity of the Western Hemisphere and British Isles.

Proposed by C.P.S.

Amendment Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff

Omit.

b. Support and maintain the warming capacity of our forces in all areas to which committed.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

Proposed by C.P.S.

Amendments Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff

Re-letter as c and amend to read:
“Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.”

Add new paragraph:
“d. Take all necessary and practicable measures to draw land and air forces from the Russian front.”
e. Sustain the Soviet Forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia without militating against the attainment of the overall objectives.

*Proposed by C.P.S.*

f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide China with a volume of supplies sufficient to keep China actively in the war against Japan.

*Amendment Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff*

Amend to read:

"f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to keep China actively in the war against Japan."

H. Redman
J. R. Deane
Combined Secretariat

J. C. S. Files

Report by the Combined Staff Planners

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 25 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 244/1

IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR, 1943–1944: AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF CRITICAL STRATEGY

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. We have examined the available means of the United Nations with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the policy agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. A summary of this policy, which has been taken as the basis of our investigation, is attached as Annex I.

3. Our conclusions are set out below.

*Ground Forces (Annex II)*

4. All the ground forces required can be made available.

*Naval Forces (Annex III)*

5. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture Akyab and Ramree, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated,

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1 Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: "The attached revision of C.C.S. 244 incorporates the amendments agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 94th Meeting and certain changes requested by the Combined Staff Planners for purposes of necessary editing and clarification." C.C.S. 244, May 22, 1943. Is not printed. For the minutes of the 94th meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see ante, p. 180.

2 Not printed.
some diversion of U.S. naval forces may be required (see Annex III, paras. 7 to 10). Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.

Air Forces (Annex IV)³

6. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.

7. For Operation ROUNDHAMMER there will be sufficient air forces in the U.K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of which needs further investigation (see Appendix “A” to Annex IV). In the absence of any detailed plan for ROUNDHAMMER, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements of gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study by the ROUNDHAMMER planners.

8. For operations in Burma it will be seen there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater. (See Annex IV, Appendix “C”).

9. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in Assam, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into China, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft (Annex V)⁴

10. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U.S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available.

11. The allocations set out in Appendix “B” to Annex V are recommended.

12. Further recommendations are:

(a) If production permits 6 naval pontoon causeways or treadway bridges should be supplied to the Indian Ocean Area, to arrive simultaneously with the L.S.T. from the U.S., and 56 should be supplied for ROUNDHAMMER.

(b) There is need for one floating dock capable of docking an L.S.T. in the Indian Ocean Area.

Supply of Critical Items (Annex VI)³

13. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. A provisional estimate is, however; set out in Annex VI. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, these deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend

³ Not printed.
⁴ See Conkley and Leighton, pp. 72, 75.
that the possibilities of providing these items, and particularly the steel should be further examined.

Shipping (Annex VII)\(^5\)

14. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate (C.C.S. 174),\(^6\) personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943/1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.\(^6\)

Oil

15. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters but we feel that the whole question of stocks and of tankers will require urgent examination in the light of decisions taken at the Trident Conference.

Annex I

Basis of Investigation

The following operations and undertakings have been used as a basis for this investigation. They are not arranged in order of priority.

I. Use of the Azores Islands

Preparation and earmarking of the necessary British forces for the occupation of the Azores.

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\(^5\) See Conkley and Leighton, pp. 77, 85.

\(^6\) See paragraph 6 of annex II. [Footnote in the source text. Neither annex II nor C.C.S. 174 is printed. The “agreed estimate” referred to here was as follows:

(a) For non-tankers permanently in use for the fighting services—

0.91 percent per month for the whole of 1943 (to be adjusted for planned operational hazards).

(b) For other non-tanker shipping:

2.39 percent per month for the first half of 1943.

1.91 percent per month for the second half of 1943.

This “agreed estimate” was subject to revision on July 1, 1943.]

\(^7\) See the “Combined Statement Covering Dry Cargo Shipping Availabilities and Requirements,” May 23, 1945, by Douglas and Leathers, post, p. 313.
II. OPERATIONS IN NORTHEASTERN EUROPE

(1) Combined air offensive from the United Kingdom.

(2) Cross-Channel operations.

To be launched from the United Kingdom with a target date of 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944.

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft)

2 Infantry Divisions—Follow-up

2 Air-borne Divisions

Total: 9 Divisions in the assault

Build-up: Available for movement into lodgment area—20 Divisions.

III. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(1) Bombing of Ploesti by U.S. Army Air Forces from bases in North Africa.

(2) Continuing directed operations against Sicily.

(3) Such operations in exploitation of Husky as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British Divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for Husky will not be considered available.

IV. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC—Far East Theater

(1) Operations in Burma

(a) The concentration of available resources as first priority within the Assam—Burma theater on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to—

(i) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma.

(ii) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China.

(iii) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.
(b) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

c) The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations, with possible exploitations.

d) The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

(2) Conduct air operations in and from China.

(3) Continue the directed operations in the Solomons-Bismarck-New Guinea Area.

(4) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago and Japanese-held New Guinea.

(5) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.

(6) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communications.

(7) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.

V. OTHER UNDERTAKINGS

(1) Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and British Isles.

(2) Support and maintain the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

(3) Maintain vital overseas lines of communications, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

(4) Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide China with a volume of supplies to keep China actively in the war against Japan.

(5) To sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia without militating against the attainment of the over-all objectives.

(6) To provide for the fulfillment of British undertakings to Turkey with due regard to other important commitments.

(7) To provide for the maintenance of prisoners of war.

(8) To provide for the economic support of countries occupied by the United Nations.

(9) To rearm and reequip French forces in North Africa as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as secondary commitment to the requirements of British and United States forces in the various theaters.
B. STRATEGY IN EUROPE

J.C.S. Files

Study by the United States Joint Staff Planners

SECRET

Enclosure to C.C.S. 215

[Washington], 13 May 1943.

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943–1944

1. A detailed examination of the merits and possibilities of the defeat of the European Axis by a bomber offensive and air-ground invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom has been made by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

2. It is estimated that Germany has 32 divisions in France and the low countries. Seven of these divisions are highly mobile and could be moved to oppose an invasion effort. These forces could be increased in time to a grand total of 60 divisions. She also has about 1254 planes in the area (747 fighters) which could be increased to 1766 (1158 fighters) by stripping all areas except the Mediterranean and Eastern Front. In addition to a coastal defense zone varying from 5 to 15 miles in depth, she has four defensive belts which must be reduced or neutralized before the West Wall is reached.

3. The projected bomber offensive against Germany may be expected to reduce her ability to wage war as to create favorable conditions for a reentry to the Continent unless Germany is able to develop timely and effective countermeasures.

4. By maximum utilization of shipping and United Kingdom port facilities for the movement of United States forces, and by placing increased emphasis on the conversion of British defensive divisions into offensive units, it is estimated that 36 United Nations Divisions can be made available for cross-Channel operations by 1 April 1944.

5. Whether the available shipping is used to move forces from the United States or the Mediterranean, the total number of divisions available in the United Kingdom will be the same. However, the addition of battle seasoned troops from the Mediterranean will provide an added insurance for the success of the initial assault.

6. The two most promising areas for assault operations, the Caen and Cotentin Peninsula sectors, will afford port facilities for a build-

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3 At the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 15, 1943, Leahy stated that this paper would be circulated for the information of the British Chiefs of Staff; see ante, p. 82. Although dated May 13, this paper was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 15 under cover of the following memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff: "The enclosed study [was] prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners and meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff. It is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." Final action on the subject dealt with in this paper was taken in C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, "Final Report to the President and Prime Minister," post, p. 304.
up in 12 months of about 1,000,000 men. By extending this bridgehead to include the Seine River and the ports of Le Havre and Rouen, the build-up in 12 months would be about 4,000,000 men, or about 100 divisions.

7. It should be noted that consideration of cross-Channel operations in this study has been confined to the initial movement. Landing craft for this purpose as compared with the requirements of C.C.S. 105/2 may be met, but at the expense of some operations in other theaters. The build-up immediately thereafter and the requirements in APA’s, AKA’s, AP’s, AK’s, etc., have not been examined.

8. It is recommended that:

a. The combined bomber offensive be given first priority in build-up and its execution be facilitated.

b. As the combined bomber offensive progresses, its effects should be continuously examined and integrated with other factors, the results of these examinations to be used in determining the date for cross-Channel operations.

c. A balanced invasion force be built up in the United Kingdom as rapidly as possible for the purpose of an early invasion in the event of a collapse of Germany (Sledgehammer).

d. No operations be undertaken in the Mediterranean which will interfere with the build-up of maximum forces in the United Kingdom for Sledgehammer as well as for Roundup.

e. Production of landing craft be increased to the maximum without undue interference with the construction of other essential war materials.

f. The target date of 1 April 1944 be accepted for operations from the United Kingdom. The target date coincides with the completion of the fourth phase of the bomber offensive and is subject to revision in the light of the results obtained.

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Plan Submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

WASHINGTON,] 14 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 217

PLAN FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. Problem: To provide a plan to accomplish, by a combined U.S.-British air offensive, the "progressive destruction and dislocation of

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This plan was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 15, 1943 under cover of the following note by the Secretaries: "The attached plan for a combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff, and is submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

The plan was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 15, ante, p. 80, and was approved by them at their meeting on May 18, ante, p. 104. The plan was also discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 21, ante, p. 153.
the Germany Military, industrial, and economic system, and the under-
mining of the morale of the German people to a point where their
capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened;” as directed by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca.

2. Under the direction of the Commanding General, European
Theater of Operations, a plan to accomplish the above objective in
early 1944 has been prepared. The complete plan is on file with the
Secretary, U. S. Chiefs of Staff. A brief presentation of the plan
is contained in Enclosure “B”.

3. Representatives of the R.A.F. collaborated in the preparation of
this plan which has been approved by the British Air Ministry (See
Enclosure “A”).

4. The plan establishes requirements for U. S. aircraft in the United
Kingdom as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Heavy Bombers</th>
<th>Medium Bombers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By 30 June 1943</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By 30 September 1943</td>
<td>1192</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By 31 December 1943</td>
<td>1746</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By 31 March 1944</td>
<td>2702</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The Present U. S. Army Air Forces expansion program provides
the air units and aircraft necessary to implement the above program,
after provision has been made for meeting all present and planned
undertakings in other theaters with reasonable balance in estimated
aircraft production for unforeseen contingencies that may arise.

6. It is recommended:

That the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the “Plan for Combined
Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom,” presented in Enclosure
“B” and direct its implementation to the maximum extent practicable,
consistent with meeting aircraft production objectives, with the avail-
ability of combined shipping, and with proper relationship to strategic
objectives given in Item 5, Minutes, Combined Chiefs of Staff, 76th
Meeting.3

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3 The quoted portion is from paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 166/1/D, January 21, 1943,
the directive on the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom agreed upon by
the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Casablanca Conference. See Foreign Rela-
3 Under agenda item 5 of its 76th meeting, March 19, 1943, the Combined Chiefs
of Staff agreed that if a special board were established to study the Allied ship-
ing situation, it should be furnished with broad strategic guidance in the form
of a priority for military operations. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved
the following order of priority to be followed in the allocation of dry cargo
shipping: (1) HUSKY, (2) SICKLE and the South Pacific, (3) ANATIM, (4)
BOLERO. As a concurrent item the Combined Chiefs approved a statement regard-

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Enclosure “A”

The Chief of the British Air Staff (Portal) to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces (Arnold)

LONDON, 15th April, 1943.

My Dear Arnold, As you know, the Eighth Air Force has been engaged with the Air Staff in drawing up a detailed plan for the purpose of discharging the responsibilities laid upon our combined bomber forces at the Casablanca Conference.

The plan is now complete. It is based on our combined resources in the matter of intelligence and operational data including the very valuable report of your Operations Analysts and has been drawn up in close consultation with the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

I have carefully examined the plan and discussed it in all its aspects with the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force. I take this opportunity of saying that I believe it to be entirely sound and that it has my full support.

The plan includes an estimate of the rate at which the strength of the Eighth Air Force must be developed in order to achieve the planned effect. I believe this rate of build-up and the time factor generally to be of primary importance. The German Fighter strength is increasing rapidly and every week’s delay will make the task more difficult to accomplish. We cannot afford to miss the good bombing weather which will soon be due. We cannot exploit to the full the great potentialities of the daylight bombing technique if the requisite numbers are not available.

For all these reasons I earnestly hope that every effort will be made to achieve and if possible to exceed the programme.

The plan has been carefully examined by the Commander in Chief, Bomber Command, and he too is convinced of its soundness and importance.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

C. Portal

Enclosure “B”

Plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom

THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. The Mission

a. The mission of the U. S. and British bomber forces, as prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca, is as follows:

To conduct a joint U. S.-British air offensive to accomplish the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, in-
dustrial, and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. This is constructed as meaning so weakened as to permit initiation of final combined operations on the Continent.

2. The Principal Objectives

a. A thorough study of those elements of the German Military, industrial, and economic system which appeared to be profitable as bombing objectives was made by a group of Operations Analysts consisting of eminent U. S. experts. The report of the Operations Analysts concludes that:

The destruction and continued neutralization of some sixty (60) targets would gravely impair and might paralyze the western Axis war effort. There are several combinations of targets from among the industries studied which might achieve this result.

b. Examination of this report shows complete agreement by U. S. and British experts. From the systems proposed by the Operations Analysts, six systems, comprising seventy-six (76) precision targets have been selected. These targets are located within the tactical radius of action of the two air forces, and their destruction is directed against the three major elements of the German Military machine: its submarine fleet, its air force, and its ground forces, and certain industries vital to their support.

c. The six systems are:

- Submarine construction yards and bases.
- German aircraft industry.
- Ball bearings.
- Oil.
- Synthetic rubber and tires.
- Military transport vehicles.

Concentration of effort against these systems will have the following effect. The percentage of destruction is as indicated by the Operations Analysts.

(1) Submarine Construction Yards and Bases
Destruction of the submarine building yards selected will reduce present submarine construction by eighty-nine percent (89%). Attack of submarine bases will affect the submarine effort at sea. If it is found that successful results can be achieved, these attacks should continue whenever conditions are favorable for as long and as often as is necessary.

(2) German Aircraft Industry
Depletion of the German Air Force will fatally weaken German capacity to resist our air and surface operations. Complete domination of the air is essential for our ultimate decisive effort. Destruc-
tion of forty-three percent (43%) of the German fighter capacity and sixty-five percent (65%) of the German bomber capacity is provided for in this plan, and will produce the effect required.

3. Ball Bearings

The critical condition of the ball bearing industry in Germany is startling. The concentration of that industry renders it outstandingly vulnerable to air attack. Seventy-six percent (76%) of the ball bearing production can be eliminated by destruction of the targets selected. This will have immediate and critical repercussions on the production of tanks, airplanes, artillery, diesel engines—in fact, upon nearly all the special weapons of modern war.

4. Oil

The quantities of petroleum and synthetic oil products now available to the German is barely adequate to supply the life blood which is vital to the German war machine. The oil situation is made more critical by failure of the Germans to secure and retain the Russian supplies. If the Ploesti refineries, which process thirty-five percent (35%) of current refined oil products available to the Axis are destroyed, and the synthetic oil plants in Germany which process an additional thirteen percent (13%) are also destroyed, the resulting disruption will have a disastrous effect upon the supply of finished oil products available to the Axis.

5. Synthetic Rubber and tires

These products are vital to all phases of German Military strength on land and in the air. Provision is made for destruction of fifty percent (50%) of the synthetic rubber capacity and nearly all of the tire production. This destruction will have a crippling effect.

6. Military Transport Vehicles

Seven (7) plants produce a large proportion of the military transport and armored vehicles. The precise proportion in [is] unknown. Loss of these plants will strike directly at the German Military strength. The cumulative effect of the destruction of the targets comprising the systems just listed will fatally weaken the capacity of the German people for armed resistance.

4. The selection of these objectives is confirmed by the fact that the systems about which the Germans are most sensitive and about which they have concentrated their defenses such as balloons, camouflage, anti-aircraft, searchlights, decoys, and smoke are:

- Aircraft factories.
- Submarine construction yards.
- Ball bearings.
- Oil.

3. Intermediate Objective

a. The Germans, recognizing the vulnerability of their vital industries, are rapidly increasing the strength of their fighter defenses. The German fighter strength in western Europe is being augmented. If the growth of the German fighter strength is not arrested quickly,
it may become literally impossible to carry out the destruction planned
and thus to create the conditions necessary for ultimate decisive
action by our combined forces on the Continent.

b. Hence the successful prosecution of the air offensive against
the principal objectives is dependent upon a prior (or simultaneous)
offensive against the German fighter strength.

c. To carry out the Eighth Air Force’s part of this combined
bomber offensive it will be necessary to attack precision targets deep
in German territory in daylight. The principal obstacle to this is
the growing strength of the German Air Force. The growth of
this fighter force has become so pronounced as to warrant a brief
review of this development (Chart A.4).

d. The upper curve shows what has been happening to the German
Air Force in the past nine months. The bomber strength has been
sharply reduced from 1760 bombers to 1450 in operational units.
The fighters, on the other hand, increased from 1690 to 1710. They
suffered a reduction in strength doubtless caused by the intense oper-
tations in Russia and the Mediterranean as well as in the Western Front,
but those losses have been made good at the expense of the bombers.
That same trend is reflected in the lower curve, which shows produc-
tion was maintained fairly constantly for about five months and then
increased so that fighter production has risen from 720 to 810 per
month. Over a longer period of time, from the entrance of the
U. S. into the war until the present time, the trend has been even
more pronounced. German fighter strength has increased by forty-
four percent (44%) in that period in spite of the heavy losses. This
chart shows the margin of production over average monthly wastage
in German fighters. Of course, the monthly wastage has not been
constant over the past seven months, as shown on the chart,5 but the
average for that period has been fairly accurately determined at
655 fighters per month. The production rate as of last February
showed 810 fighters per month. The average increase in produc-
tion over the six month period depicted indicates a monthly surplus
of production over average wastage of 108 airplanes. If this trend
simply continues in its present ratio, it is well within the capacity
of the Germans to produce enough fighter airplanes over and above
wastage to provide a strength of 3,000 fighters by this time next
year. (See Chart D.4). This is, of course, a capability and not
necessarily a German intention, although current German develop-
ment points very strongly in that direction. The increase in fighter
strength is not reflected in this curve covering the past eight months;

4 Not printed.
5 Chart B; not printed.
however, during that period the Germans diverted a great many fighter type airplanes into fighter bombers and fighter reconnaissance airplanes. The wastage rate was very high in those units and that probably accounts for the temporary decline in German fighter strength; however, in the last three months it has shown a sharp uprise.

e. The disposition of German fighters is also significant. (See Chart C 6). The top lines shows the number of fighters on the Western Front. Since we entered the war, that strength has nearly doubled. It has risen from 420 to 830. This, in spite of the heavy drains on the Russian and Mediterranean Fronts. When we entered the war only thirty-six percent (36%) of German fighters were concentrated on the Western Front; today, fifty percent (50%) of all fighters available to the German Air Force are concentrated in opposition to our principal bombing effort from the United Kingdom. The German fighter force is taking a toll of our forces both by day and by night, not only in terms of combat losses but more especially in terms of reduced tactical effectiveness. If the German fighters are materially increased in number it is quite conceivable that they could make our daylight bombing unprofitable and perhaps our night bombing too. On the other hand, if the German fighter force is partially neutralized our effectiveness will be vastly improved.

f. For this reason German fighter strength must be considered as an Intermediate objective second to none in priority.


a. The combined efforts of the entire U. S. and British bomber forces can produce the results required to achieve the mission prescribed for this theater. Fortunately the capabilities of the two forces are entirely complementary.

b. The tremendous and ever increasing striking power of the R.A.F. bombing is designed to so destroy German material facilities as to undermine the willingness and ability of the German worker to continue the war. Because of this, there is great flexibility in the ability of the R.A.F. to direct its material destruction against those objectives which are closely related to the U. S. bombing effort which is directed toward the destruction of specific essential industrial targets. It is considered that the most effective results from strategic bombing will be obtained by directing the combined day and night effort of the U. S. and British bomber forces to all-out attacks against targets which are mutually complementary in undermining a limited number of selected objective systems. All-out attacks imply precision bombing of related targets by day and night where tactical conditions permit, and

* Not printed.
area bombing by night against the cities associated with these targets. The timing of the related day and night attacks will be determined by tactical considerations.

c. This plan does not attempt to prescribe the major effort of the R.A.F. Bomber Command. It simply recognizes the fact that when precision targets are bombed by the Eighth Air Force in daylight, the effort should be complemented and completed by R.A.F. bombing attacks against the surrounding industrial area at night. Fortunately the industrial areas to be attacked are in most cases identical with the industrial areas which the British Bomber Command has selected for mass destruction anyway. They include Hamburg, Bremen, Hanover, Berlin, Leipzig, Wilhelmshaven, Bremershire [Bremerhaven?], Cologne, Stuttgart, and many other principal cities. They also, of course, include smaller towns whose principal significance is coupled with the precision targets prescribed for the Eighth Air Force.

5. General Plan of Operations

a. It would be highly desirable to initiate precision bombing attacks against German fighter assembly and engine factories immediately. However, our present force of day bombers is too small to make the deeper penetrations necessary to reach the majority of these factories. Considering the number of German fighters which can be concentrated laterally to meet our bombers on penetration, and again on withdrawal, it is felt that 300 heavy bombers is the minimum operating force necessary to make deep penetrations.

b. The general tactical plan of operations with this minimum force involves the following general conception. A holding attack intending to attract German fighters to a particular area and prevent their massing against the main attacking force. For this purpose 50 heavy bombers with fighter escort are required. Second, a main striking force to penetrate through the fighter defenses and carry out the destruction of targets in Germany and return. Two hundred bombers is considered the minimum requirement to provide self-protection and at the same time carry out worthwhile destruction. Third, the covering force to attack still another area and attract fighters in order to divert them from the main force on withdrawal. Again, 50 bombers with fighter escort is the minimum force to carry out such a function.

c. In order to establish a yardstick to be used in the determination of the number of bombers required to destroy the objectives desired, the following procedure was employed:

Twelve successful missions were conducted in January, February, and March. Approximately 100 bombers were dispatched on each. It was found that sufficient bombs fell within a circle of 1000 foot radius centered about the aiming point to cause the desired destruction.
For each prospective target the number of 1000 foot radius circles necessary to cover it has been calculated. The yardstick as determined by experience is therefore: the number of 1000 foot radius circles of destruction, each requiring 100 bombers.

d. The plan of operations is divided into four phases. (See Maps 1, 2, 3, & 47). The depth of penetration, the number of targets available, and the capacity of the bombing forces increases successively with each phase.

e. Seventy-six precision targets have been selected for Eighth Air Force bombing operations. Having selected these 76 targets the questions arise: Can they be effectively destroyed, and if so, how many bombers will be required? As to the first question, operational experience answers yes.

6. Effectiveness of Eighth Air Force

a. The operations of the U.S. Army Air Force in daylight bombing of defended objectives in German occupied Europe have been sufficient to establish a criterion of precision daylight bombing effectiveness; the operations of the R.A.F. Bomber Command leave no room for doubt of the ability of that force to devastate industrial areas.

b. The daylight operations of the Eighth Air Force from 3 January 1943 to 6 April 1943 definitely establish the fact that it is possible to conduct precision pattern bombing operations against selected precision targets from altitudes of 20,000 feet to 30,000 feet in the face of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter defenses.

c. Of 20 missions dispatched by the U.S. Eighth Air Force in that period, 12 have been highly effective. These 12 daylight missions have been directed against a variety of targets, including:

Submarine bases.
Locomotive shops.
Power houses.
Marshalling yards.
Shipbuilding yards.
Motor vehicle and armament works.
Airplane engine factories.

The average number of aircraft dispatched against these targets has been eighty-six. The destructive effect has, in every case, been highly

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7 The maps referred to are not reproduced here. They indicated the location and type of precision bombing targets to be attacked by the United States Army Air Forces in the four phases of the Combined Bomber Offensive and the towns related to these precision objectives which would be appropriate targets for the complementary effort of the Royal Air Force. Legends or charts accompanying each map identified the precision bombing targets for each phase and listed them in accordance with the six systems described in paragraph 2c above. The dates of the phases were as follows: Phase I, April–July 1943; Phase II, July–September 1943; Phase III, September–December 1943; Phase IV, December 1943–April 1944.
satisfactory. From this experience it may be definitely accepted that 100 bombers dispatched on each successful mission will provide entirely satisfactory destructive effect of that part of the target area within 1000 feet of the aiming point; and that two-thirds of the missions dispatched each month will be successful to this extent.

7. Forces Required

   a. Heavy Bombers

   (1) In computing the force required, a yardstick of 100 bombers dispatched per target area of 1000 feet about each aiming point has been accepted as a reasonable product of actual experience to date. Each target has been evaluated in terms of these Target Units, or the number of 1000 foot radius circles in which this destructive effect must be produced.

   (2) Experience in the European Theater to date indicates that at least 800 airplanes must be in the theater to dispatch 300 bombers on operations. Hence, until the level of U. S. bomber strength in this theater reaches approximately 800, it will not be feasible to sustain a precision bombing offensive against the German fighter factories. It is estimated that we will be able to accommodate and train a force of this capacity by July of this year. In the interim every effort should be made to reduce the German fighter force by attack of those fighter factories which can be reached, and by combat under favorable conditions. The repair depots and airdromes are included for the purpose of giving commanders the necessary tactical latitude. Concurrently, operations can be conducted against submarine installations within reach and against other targets contributing directly to the principal objectives which are within covering range of our own fighters, or which do not require deep penetration. Some operations will have to be conducted to provide the necessary training for the incoming forces; such operations must be conducted against objectives within the listed categories.

   (3) During the next phase, from July to October, in which it is estimated that we will be able to penetrate to a limit of 400 miles, a determined effort must be made to break down the German fighter strength by every means at our disposal, concentrating primarily upon fighter aircraft factories. During this time interim an additional increment of 258 bombers is required so that the strength in the theater by October should be approximately 1192. This would provide a striking force of 450 bombers at the end of this period. The average striking force during this period would be 400.

   (4) During the third phase, the German fighter force must be kept depleted, and the other sources of German strength must also
be undermined. During this phase our bombing offensive forces must be adequate to perform all their major tasks.

(5) From October to January an additional increment of 554 bombers is required, bringing the total to 1746. This should provide an operational striking force of 655 bombers at the end of that time. The average striking force during this period will be 550 bombers.

(6) During the last phase—early 1944—the entire force should be used to sustain the effect already produced and to pave the way for a combined operation on the Continent. This will require a force of 2702 heavy bombers.

(7) It will be observed that the charts of the actual location of the targets to be attacked in each phase show the joint bombing effort of each phase. It will be noted that in the first phase (see Map 1), operations are limited to relatively shallow penetration. They include submarine bases along the coast, submarine construction yards, and the Focke Wulf airplane factory at Bremen. Actually, of course, these operations have all been undertaken with the small forces available and in the case of the submarine yards at Vegesack and the Focke Wulf plant at Bremen, a long step has already been taken toward completion of the plan. There are two other systems of operations calling for deep penetrations shown in this phase. One of them calls for an attack against oil installations in the Ruhr. This operation is entirely contingent upon an earlier attack from the Mediterranean Area against the oil refineries at Ploesti in Rumania. Such an attack is under consideration now and if it is carried out we will be forced to operate against the Ruhr refineries in order to exploit the advantage achieved in Rumania. The other attack calls for a very deep penetration at Schweinfurt. This operation might be undertaken as a surprise attack in view of the tremendous advantages accrued from a successful destruction of these plants; however, it would be most unwise to attempt it until we are perfectly sure we have enough force to destroy the objective in a single operation. Any attempt to repeat such an attack will meet with very bitter opposition. In the second phase (see Map 2), the plan calls for a concentration of effort against the German fighter assembly and fighter aircraft factories as well as attacks against airdromes and repair facilities. It is anticipated that approximately 75% of the striking force will be applied to this end during this phase. The other 25% is directed against submarine construction yards. In the third phase (see Map 3), an all-out attack against all the principal objectives is provided as well as repeat operations to continue neutralization of installations which have been destroyed and which can be repaired. During the fourth phase (see Map 4), these operations are continued and allowances
made for concentration of attacks against installations more directly associated with a cross-Channel operation such as rail transportation, arsenals, Military installations, etc.

(8) The determination of the number of aircraft required in each phase has been based strictly upon past experience. As to rate of operations, the Eighth Air Force has averaged six per month over the past six months. In the past three months, it has actually carried out twelve highly successful operations out of a total of 20. This plan is based on a total of 12 successful operations in each three month phase and recognizes the probability that the other six will for one reason or another be less satisfactory. Experience has shown that about \( \frac{3}{5} \) of the total number of airplanes in the theater can be dispatched on operational missions at any one time. This makes allowances for the airplanes in depot reserve, those in depot repair, and those being ferried and modified. There is every reason to believe that our forces will be more effective in the future than these figures indicate. In order to be as realistic as possible, however, the plan has been based in each case upon actual past experience.

(9) Charts appended to Maps 1, 2, 3, and 4 tabulate all the targets for contemplated destruction by the U. S. and British bomber forces to carry out the mission. The precision targets for attacks by the U. S. Bomber Command are shown as small symbols. The cities and towns in or near those precision targets and which constitute the complementary targets of the R.A.F. are shown as in circles. The German fighters are at present deployed in four main concentrations positioned well forward toward the coast. In general, the day fighters are in four lots of approximately 100 each in the general areas of northwest coastal Germany, Holland and Belgium, the Channel coast of France and western France in the vicinity of the submarine pens. These fighters are capable of concentrating laterally from bases at least 200 miles away so that forces of 300 fighters might be employed against our main efforts if we penetrated directly toward the Ruhr without distracting or diverting part of them.

(10) Chart D is illustrative of the effect of this plan of operations upon the intermediate objective, German fighter strength. This chart must be considered as pictorial rather than precise. The top line shows the increase in German fighter strength. That is a German capability if they choose to follow it. If German production is not interrupted and if German wastage is not increased it is possible for Germany to have in operation 3,000 fighters by next April. The broken line shows the effect of our operations upon that German fighter strength. In the first phase we do not expect to accomplish a great deal because our forces will not have been built up to decisive
proportions. In the second phase, our attacks against German fighter factory and engine factories and the increased attrition should cause the levelling off of the German fighter strength. In the third phase the full effect of the attacks against German fighter production should make themselves felt so that German fighter strength should fall off rapidly in this phase. In the fourth phase that German fighter strength should decline at a precipitant rate. This second line has been computed in the following manner. The decrease in German fighter strength is the result of two factors. One is the attacks against German fighter factories, the other the accelerated rate of combat wastage caused by our increased bomber forces. This wastage rate has been computed in an extremely conservative manner. It is realized that past claims of enemy aircraft shot down may seem high, although our evaluation of them is very careful; nevertheless, in order to avoid any charge of unwarranted optimism combat claims have been arbitrarily divided by four, the resulting decrease in German fighter strength dependent upon expected combat wastage is at a rate only one quarter as great as our present combat claims. Even under these very conservative assumptions it is apparent that the German fighter strength will have passed its limit by the end of the second phase and its powers of resistance should decline very rapidly thereafter.

b. Medium Bombers

It will be noted that no U. S. medium bombardment aircraft have been specifically included in the computation of force required above. That does not mean that medium bombardment is not necessary to implement this plan. Supplementary attacks against all strategic targets within range of medium bombers are anticipated as necessary adjuncts to the heavy bomber attacks. In addition, medium bombardment is required in order to conduct repeated attacks against German fighter airdromes, to aid the passage of the heavy bombers until the attacks against the German aircraft industry make themselves felt. Medium bombardment will be necessary to support combined operations in early 1944. The crews must be operationally trained in this theater by that date.

c. Fighters

At all times there is a need for an extensive U. S. fighter force both to protect the bombers and to assist in the reduction of the German fighter strength. Prior to the initiation of operations on the Continent, this fighter strength must be at a maximum, and must be fully trained for operations in this theater.
Note: This plan deals entirely with the requirements for the strategic bombing force, except for its use in the 4th phase on missions which will render most effective support to surface operations on the Continent, which may begin in early 1944. In order to supplement this force in providing the close support required for the surface operations, steps must be taken early to create and train a tactical force in this theater. This force must include light bomber, reconnaissance fighter, and troop carrier elements.

8. Conclusions

a. Recapitulation of U. S. Bomber Forces Required

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heavy</th>
<th>Medium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Phase</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Phase</td>
<td>1192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Phase</td>
<td>1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Phase</td>
<td>2702</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

200 Bombers required by 30 June 1943
400 Bombers required by 30 September 1943
600 Bombers required by 31 December 1943
800 Bombers required by 31 March 1944

b. If the forces required as set forth above are made available on the dates indicated, it will be possible to carry out the mission prescribed in the Casablanca Conference. If those forces are not made available, then that mission is not attainable by mid-1944.

c. Depletion of the German fighter strength must be accomplished first. Failure to neutralize that force will jeopardize the prosecution of the war toward a favorable decision in this theater.

d. The following bombing objectives should be destroyed under the provisions of the general directive issued at the Casablanca Conference:

1. Intermediate Objectives:
   German fighter strength.

2. Primary Objectives:
   German submarine yards and bases.
   The remainder of the German aircraft industry.
   Ball bearings.
   Oil (Contingent upon attacks against Ploesti from the Mediterranean).

3. Secondary objectives in order of priority:
   Synthetic rubber and tires.
   Military motor transport vehicles.

e. The following statement of principle, expressed by the Operations Analysts, is concurred in:

In view of the ability of adequate and properly utilized air power to impair the industrial source of the enemy’s Military strength, only

* A successful initial attack on the key element of either of those systems would demand the immediate concentration of effort on the remaining elements of that system to exploit the initial success. [Footnote in the source text.]
the most vital considerations should be permitted to delay or divert
the application of an adequate air striking force to this task.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters
(Smith)\(^1\)

SECRET
C.C.S. 223

[Algiers,] 14 May 1943.

OPERATIONS AFTER HUSKY

The attached paper (Enclosure “A”) prepared by the Operations
Division, Allied Force Headquarters, represents the views of General
Eisenhower and Admiral Cunningham with respect to operations after
HUSKY. It is not concurred in by Air Chief Marshal Tedder whose
comments are attached (Enclosure “B”). It is requested that both
papers be submitted for the information of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff as representative of the opinion of the Commander in Chief,
Allied Force, from the local viewpoint only.

Enclosure “A”

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Allied Force Headquarters (Rooks)
to the Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters (Smith)

SECRET

[Algiers,] 7 May 1943.

Subject: Operations after HUSKY

1. After Operation HUSKY there are two immediate possibilities:
a. To continue operations against the Italian mainland by action
against:
   (1) The Reggio–Sangiovanni area (Operation Buttress)
   (2) The Crotone area (Operation Goblet)
   (3) The Heel of Italy (Operation Musket)

These operations would be preparatory to an advance into Italy
in the direction of Naples.
b. To occupy Sardinia and Corsica as a preparatory measure to
such further operations as may be decided upon.

\(^1\) This memorandum was circulated on May 14, 1943 for the information
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The views of Eisenhower and Tedder regarding
operations to be undertaken after HUSKY, which are set forth in the enclosures
to this memorandum, were considered in the course of the meeting of Roosevelt
and Churchill with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 24, 1943, ante, p. 194.
2. Object

To discuss the relative merits of the two courses of action referred to above.

3. Operations Buttress, Goblet and Musket

a. The advantages of this course of action are:

(1) Operations on the Italian mainland even though confined to one area might be sufficient to compel Italy to ask for terms.

(2) Operation Buttress and possibly Goblet might be undertaken so as to coincide with the final stages of Operation Husky thus taking direct advantage of the disorganization and confusion which may occur as a result of a rapid success in Husky.

(3) The fact that operations were carried into the mainland of Europe would have considerable political value.

(4) Bases would be obtained from which operations in the Balkans could be supported if this strategy is decided upon.

b. The disadvantages are:

(1) The operations themselves will require considerable forces. Should Italy not ask for terms as a result, we may be committed to a major campaign on the Italian mainland possibly involving all the forces available in the Mediterranean.

(2) Should Germany be in a position strongly to reinforce Italy and should she so decide, we might be involved in a campaign against superior German forces in country in which superiority in numbers would have full weight.

(3) Both during and after the operations a considerable garrison commitment will be involved, since we shall be operating in enemy as opposed to occupied territory.

(4) We shall be responsible for the administration and supply of such areas of the mainland as we occupy. This will constitute a heavy shipping and economic commitment.

(5) Even if it is decided to limit the area of operations to the Toe and Heel of Italy, considerable forces will be required to defend these areas unless Italy has gone out of the war.

c. It is estimated that some 4–5 divisions would be required for Operations Buttress and Goblet. For Operation Musket it is estimated that 4–5 divisions would be required initially. The force in this area would probably have to be built up to a total of approximately 10 divisions (including two Armored divisions) if further operations are to be undertaken on the mainland.

The above requirements would be to some extent counterbalanced by the reduction which it would be possible to make in the garrison of Husky. It is clear, however, that operations on the mainland are likely to involve all the resources which we can make available.
4. Operations Brimstone and Firebrand

a. The advantages of this course of action are:

1. It will place the whole of Italy within easy bombing range. This fact alone might be sufficient to induce Italy to ask for terms.
2. A threat of invasion will exist over the entire length of the west coast of Italy. This is likely to cause the Italians to withdraw troops from the Balkans and will cause the maximum dispersion of Axis troops on the mainland.
3. It will constitute a threat to southern France and thereby tend to retain German troops in that area.
4. It renders our sea communications in the western Mediterranean secure and reduces the air threat to North Africa thus freeing air and AA resources.
5. The operational commitment is limited and the subsequent garrison requirement will be small. Operation Firebrand can be undertaken by French forces.

b. The disadvantages are:

1. If the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica does not induce Italy to ask for terms, we should still be faced with the necessity for conducting operations on the mainland in order to achieve that end.
2. We shall not be taking advantage of the disorganization which may be caused on the mainland by the success of Husky.
3. We shall not reap the political advantages which will accrue from the opening of a campaign on the mainland of Europe.

It is estimated that Operation Brimstone will require about 5 Inf Divs and one Armd Div; the garrison commitment is unlikely to be greater than 2 Inf Divs. On the other hand, it must be remembered that if this course is adopted it may be necessary to retain the maximum garrison in Husky.

5. Summary

The position may therefore be summarized as follows:

a. Operations Buttress, Goblet and Musket require considerable forces and once we have embarked upon this course we are committed. Unless Italian morale is already weakening, we may be involved in a major campaign the duration and requirements of which is not possible to foresee.

b. Operations Brimstone and Firebrand can be carried out with comparatively limited forces and after these operations we shall still retain full liberty of action to strike in whatever direction may seem advisable. If Italian morale is weakening after Husky, the threat of heavy bombing which these operations will produce may be sufficient to induce Italy to ask for terms.

c. The decision between these two courses of action must depend to a great extent upon the state of Italian morale after Husky. It will not be easy to assess this accurately and it is therefore considered that the course of action which does not definitely commit us to the mainland is preferable.
6. Conclusion

It is concluded that the next operations after Husky should be Brimstone and Firebrand in preference to Buttress, Goblet and Musket.

Lowell W. Rooks
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Enclosure "B"

The Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Air Command (Tedder) to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)

Most secret

[Algiers,] 8 May 1943.
Ref: ACMT/S. 515.

Mediterranean Strategy

I have just seen a paper prepared by G.3. section for the Chief of Staff. This paper has not been considered by the J.P.S. Previous editions of the paper (P/68) have been considered by the J.P.S. and I have instructed my representative to emphasize certain factors. This final paper does not, in my opinion, give these factors due weight. I cannot, therefore, agree with it or with its conclusions. The main points on which I am in disagreement are the following:

1. Firstly, the difficulties of the capture of Sardinia are completely glossed over. In my opinion, owing to the distance from air bases the capture of Sardinia would be a more difficult problem than Husky.

2. The alleged advantage that "It placed the whole of the Italian mainland within easy bombing range" is true, but misleading. The whole Italian mainland is already within easy bombing range from Tunisia and Sicily. The value of additional bases in Sardinia is more than balanced by the additional maintenance and supply involved.

3. The value of Sardinia is, in my opinion, almost entirely a defensive one, in that it would reduce the commitment for the protection of shipping passing along the North African coast.

4. I do not agree that the capture of Sardinia would free considerable A.A. resources in North Africa, since North African bases are within reasonable operation range of enemy bases in Italy.

5. As regards Italy itself, the paper does point out that the establishment of air bases in central Italy would bring within range of our heavy bombers the main Axis industrial centers in southern Germany, etc., also the Roumanian oil fields. This is true, but the main advantage of using Italy as a base is omitted. The main value of such an air base is that heavy bomber attacks on the majority of the most
vital centers in Germany, and other Axis countries pass through routes
which completely evade the great belt of fighter and A.A. defenses
which Germany has set up along the whole North and North Western
approaches. These defenses are exacting an increasing toll on our
bomber offensive. It would be quite impossible from every point of
view for the enemy to create a similar organization covering the
Southern approach, and bomber offensive directed from the South,
especially when coordinated with that of U.K. would have enormously
increased material and moral effects.

6. I must emphasize, therefore, that in my opinion the conclusions
to paper No. P/69 are unsound insofar as they fail to pay due weight
to the air aspect which I am sure you will agree has already proved
itself to be one of the vital factors.

A. W. TEDDER
Air Chief Marshal
Air Commander in Chief

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

C.C.S. 224

Operations in the European Theater Between "Husky" and
"Roundup"

1. The object of this paper is to indicate the action we recommend
in the period which will elapse between the completion of Husky,
which we assume will be about the middle of August, and the invasion
of France.

2. In the Mediterranean Theater, Germany will be occupying a long
and vulnerable front with poor north and south and even worse lateral
communications. In this area large hostile populations are being,
with difficulty, held down mainly by Italian troops. On the other
hand, we shall be firmly established on the whole North African shore
and will have developed a superior combination and structure of sea
and air power. We shall have mastered an important stepping-stone
to Europe, and we shall have large and experienced forces standing
ready for fresh enterprises. We cannot afford to keep those forces out
of action for a period of nine or ten months before we can launch an

1 This memorandum, which was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on
May 14, 1943, apparently was prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff during
their trans-Atlantic voyage aboard the Queen Mary en route to the Conference.
offensive from the United Kingdom into northern France. During this time, the battles on the Russian Front will be raging, and Germany will require all the forces that she can muster against the Russians. The first essential, therefore, will be to make certain that there will be no diminution of the threat to Germany’s Southern Front, the vulnerability of which is proved by the tenacity with which she has clung regardless of cost to Tunisia. So long as she is faced by our formidable Mediterranean forces, she cannot be certain where the next blow will fall, and must lock up resources she can ill afford to spare in unsuitable localities for the prosecution of the war.

3. It will not be sufficient to exercise a threat across the Mediterranean. The attack on Italy must be carried out relentlessly to insure her elimination from the war. We believe that this, more than any other single event, would hasten the early defeat of Germany. Through the fall of Italy, Germany must be forced to divert large forces from the Russian Front to Yugoslavia, Greece and France, thus relieving the pressure on Russia. The way would thus be paved for the defeat of Germany on the Russian Front, and thus for a successful return to the Continent from the United Kingdom in 1944. We think these events, coupled with a great increase in the air bombardment of Germany possibly from Northern Italy as well as from the United Kingdom, may well bring about her collapse.

4. We have examined very carefully the various operations which we might carry out after Husky in the Mediterranean, with the object of eliminating Italy. The alternatives are:

a. Operations against the Mainland of Italy
   These would take the form of the capture during or immediately after Husky of a bridgehead on the toe of Italy, to be followed by the seizing of Cotrone and further assault on the heel as a prelude to an advance on Bari and Naples. These operations present many difficulties and their practicability must depend on the situation prevailing in Russia and its repercussions on German assistance to Italy. Success must contribute materially to the disintegration of Italy and provide useful bases for further action against the Balkans.

b. The Capture of Sardinia
   Much will depend on the extent to which this island is reinforced after Husky, particularly by the Germans. If strongly defended, the operation would be comparable to Husky. On the other hand we should enjoy the benefit of the experience gained in a successful Husky and be able to apply this to good effect against Sardinia. After Sardinia we should capture Corsica, which should not present undue difficulties.

The capture of the island would assist us to increase the intensity of our air attack against Italy, would threaten the south of France and increase the security of our sea communications in the Mediterranean.
5. Further alternatives, not so directly connected with the elimination of Italy, have also been examined. Of these the most promising are:

a. An Assault on Greece from the West
The capture of the Athens Area and the establishment of a front in Greece would enable us to increase the pressure on Germany, interrupt sea communications to Crete and the islands in the Aegean and would give us air fields from which the Roumanian oil fields could be attacked. In view, however, of the strength of the German garrison, the difficulty of providing fighter cover, and the lack of ports in the Gulf of Corinth this operation does not appear a practicable one at the present time.

b. Operations against the Dodecanese
These operations have been fully examined in the Middle East. In our view, they cannot be carried out simultaneously with amphibious operations in the Central Mediterranean. The use of air fields in Turkey would greatly simplify the air problem. We consider that the right time to carry out these operations is simultaneously with the entry of Turkey into the war. This contingency is considered later in this paper.

6. Our conclusion, after prolonged study of these alternatives, is that we ought to undertake those which not only contribute most directly to the elimination of Italy, but which also relate themselves naturally to operations from the United Kingdom in 1944. Our proposal, therefore, is as follows:

a. That preparations should be made forthwith for the establishment of a bridgehead on the toe of Italy, during or immediately after Husky.

b. That alternative plans should be made by General Eisenhower for operations against the heel of Italy, and for the capture of Sardinia. A decision on which of these two operations should actually be undertaken should be made when we see how matters stand at the conclusion of Husky. If as a result of Russian successes and the consequent lack of German reinforcements for Italy and the weakening or withdrawal of German air forces, Italy is on the point of collapse, then we should enter the heel so as to administer the coup de grâce, and prepare for exploitation across the Adriatic. If, on the other hand, Germany diverts large force to Italy—an event which in itself would relieve the pressure on the Russian Front—we could go for Sardinia and Corsica. The seizure of these islands would not only increase the pressure on northern Italy early next year, but would provide stepping-stones from which to threaten and perhaps invade the south of France, and thus ease the cross-Channel operation. At the same time it would add to the security of our communications through the Mediterranean.

7. It is quite possible, of course, that Italy may collapse before any of the operations discussed above have been carried out. The moral
and material effects of her crushing defeats in Africa, the fall of Huskyland, and the effects of our air attack on Italy herself, may prove decisive. If this proves to be so, then we shall have reached at an early stage the favorable position in the Mediterranean at which we are aiming, and which, if properly exploited, should insure the earliest possible defeat of Germany. We must act quickly in the confusion before the Germans have time to regroup their forces. This would be the moment to bring pressure to bear on Turkey, either to permit the use of Turkish bases by our forces, or to enter the war on our side. Provided the Russians are doing well, there is no other time when a Turkish entry would be so opportune or so likely.

8. If, therefore, Italy collapses after Husky, our immediate action should be:

a. To occupy southern Italy, taking over air bases and at least one port in the heel, an air field at Reggio or Cotrone, and the air fields in the Rome–Naples Area.

b. To establish a bridgehead in the Durazzo area, and introduce supplies and long-range penetration groups to rally and support the guerillas.

c. To seize the Dodecanese, and if possible move into Turkey and attack Ploesti.

d. To occupy Corsica and the key points in Sardinia, and to complete the occupation of Sicily.

e. To land forces in central Italy to prevent German infiltration from the north.

9. The further exploitation of the situation must depend upon the progress of events and the German reaction. More than one possible theater of operations would be available. We do not believe that Germany can hold both northern Italy and the Balkans without risking a collapse on the Russian Front. Even if she decides to abandon Italy, and hold the Balkans, her task will be by no means easy, especially if Turkey comes into the war. We would carry out our plans for going to the support of Turkey in the first place with air and specialized units, and we should be prepared to exploit any weakening of the German positon in the Balkans.

10. A further promising line of action would be to direct forces towards southern France from Corsica and northern Italy. Such a movement would fit in well with a simultaneous operation into northern France from the United Kingdom.

11. These projects should, we think, be further examined and we should like to hear the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

12. Our final conclusion is that the Mediterranean offers us opportunities for action in the coming autumn and winter, which may be decisive, and at the least will do far more to prepare the way for a
successful cross-Channel operation in 1944 than we should achieve by attempting to transfer back to the United Kingdom any of the forces now in the Mediterranean Theater. If we take these opportunities, we shall have every chance of breaking the Axis and of bringing the war with Germany to a successful conclusion in 1944.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 17 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 234

BRITISH PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

OBJECT

The decisive defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe as early as practicable.

SECTION I—INVASION OF N.W. EUROPE

1. A necessary prerequisite to a re-entry on the Continent across the Channel is the initial softening of German war potential by the intensified combined bomber offensive, the naval blockade and the Russian offensive on the Eastern Front. Since this re-entry will ultimately be necessary, no plan for the defeat of Germany can be drawn up without first examining the essential features of the operation.

2. The essentials for invasion are as follows:—

a. A high degree of air superiority must be achieved during the assault and build-up.

b. Air fields must be captured at an early date.

c. The Coast defences must be sufficiently reduced by the employment of all available means, both before and during the assault.

d. The initial assault must be on a sufficiently large scale and our rate of build-up must compete with that of the enemy.

e. The beach capacity must be sufficient to allow of the subsequent maintenance of the force landed in the first seven days. Sufficient ports must be captured and available for use early.

f. Weather conditions must be suitable.

1 Circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 17, 1943, under cover of the following note by the Secretaries: “The attached memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff, prepared after consultation with the U. S. Joint Planners, contains a plan for the defeat of Germany, showing the course of operations and their feasibility[,] accepting the elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary.” This memorandum was prepared pursuant to a directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 15, 1943; see ante, p. 84. The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered this memorandum together with a companion American memorandum, C.C.S. 235, infra, at their meeting on May 18 and their morning meeting on May 19; see ante, pp. 100 and 112. The consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of these papers resulted in their agreement upon certain resolutions incorporated in C.C.S. 237/1, May 20, 1943, post, p. 281.
3. There are two main factors in this problem. These are:

a. The size of force which can be employed in the assault, which in general is limited by the assault shipping and landing craft available.

b. The relative rate of build-up of our own force, compared to that of the enemy, which can be achieved after the initial assault.

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft Requirements

4. Any assault is likely to meet not less than three divisions in the coastal zone reinforced by up to four divisions after 24 hours. The scale of assault cannot therefore be less than 10 divisions.

The assault shipping and landing craft required for an operation involving a force of this nature, run into large figures owing to the necessity for seven of these divisions being afloat simultaneously.

The scale of craft has been worked out in great detail by the British Planners in conjunction with the Roundup Combined Planners. The number of craft required to cross the Channel is higher than in other parts of the world on account of the need for a quicker rate of build-up and of the higher degree of resistance expected.

5. Of the total force of 10 Divisions, the British can provide 2 assault and 3 immediate follow-up divisions provided that the Americans allot the following assault shipping and craft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Craft</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L.S.T.2</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.S.E.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.C.I. (L)</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.C.T.5 or 6</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.C.M.3</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain maintenance equipment</td>
<td>All required in U.K. by 1st February, 1944.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above figures are based on the assumption that operations after Husky will take place in the Mediterranean, resulting in additional casualties to landing craft and ships.

6. The American contribution in the assault will amount to two assault divisions and three follow-up divisions. The two assault divisions which must be assault trained before arrival in U.K. must be carried in American assault shipping and American manned craft. The three follow-up divisions will be carried in the first turn-round of the ships and craft employed in the British and American assaults.

7. We understand that it is very doubtful if the total requirements could be found by 1 February 1944—to permit an assault date of 1 April 1944. This would mean either a reduction in the scale of the assault or a rate of build-up too slow to be acceptable.
Rate of Build-Up for Invasion

8. The most favourable area for build-up is that of the North Seine ports—Dieppe to Rouen, in which we estimate that there would be by D plus 7 ten Divisions ashore. Allowing for the build-up of reserves and for ports being put into working order, we estimate that by D plus 90—twenty Divisions would be ashore, and by D plus 125—twenty-five Divisions would be ashore. Thereafter additional ports would have to be used for the maintenance of a force of more than twenty-five Divisions.

9. The maximum maintenance capacity of the ports in the Cotentin peninsula is ten Divisions by D plus 90. Any build-up in this area can only be accomplished if additional ports outside the peninsula are captured.

Enemy Strength

10. The estimated German strength in France and the Low Countries in 1944 is 35 Divisions, of which at least four would be available as a mobile reserve. In addition there are some 100,000 static internal security defence troops. Reinforcing divisions would have to come from Germany or the Eastern Front. Up to ten under-strength divisions might conceivably be available in Germany, but would almost certainly not be available if Turkey were already in the war. Advance units of these might arrive four days after the decision to reinforce and might arrive thereafter in France (but not necessarily in the threatened area) at the rate of six divisions a week. The arrival of reinforcements from Russia must depend on the situation on that front. None could in any case arrive in less than 14 days, after which any available could come at the rate of 2 divisions a week. The defection of Italy would, however, have already reduced the German strength in Russia. Assuming, therefore, that the initial assault is faced by four divisions, our forces would, in the worst case, be faced by eighteen German divisions within the first fortnight, after which mobile reinforcements could only come at the expense of the Russian Front.

11. These rates of reinforcement might be considerably reduced by successful Allied air action, but the extent of this reduction would depend on a number of factors and cannot be assessed until the outline plan is firm.

12. Over and above the fixed defences the minimum Axis garrison which might be in France and the Low Countries, short of a complete withdrawal, is estimated at twenty-two divisions of which three would be in mobile reserve.

13. It is clear that unless Russian action or Allied action elsewhere reduces the enemy potential in France from the figures in paragraph
10 to something approaching those given in paragraph 12, we are
unlikely to be able to retain a foothold in France until our rate of build-
up gives us superiority over the enemy.

14. Another most important factor, though it cannot be defined as
one that is limiting, is the achievement of a high degree of air superi-
ority during the assault and build-up. The Combined Intelligence
Staffs have agreed:

a. If the exploitation of Husky is abandoned, the opposition to
cross-Channel operations at 1 May 1944 will be 105 squadrons or 950
combat planes in France and the Low Countries. These might be re-
forced immediately by some 10 squadrons, say 100 planes. Within a
week 50 additional squadrons, 450 planes, would be concentrated in
the area, giving a total, without losses, of 165 squadrons or 1,485 planes.
Further reinforcements would depend on Germany’s will to strip the
Russian Front.

b. If Italy is out of the war the early opposition to cross-Channel
operations will also be 105 squadrons or 950 combat planes. But the
enemy’s ability to reinforce this force, will be negligible unless he is
prepared to strip the Russian Front.

**Deductions**

15. To ignore the limitations of a cross-Channel operation outlined
above would be to invite the danger of entering on a build-up race in
which we could probably never obtain the necessary margin of su-
periority for success. If, however, the German strength in France
can be reduced to the required extent—and we feel confident that it
can—without too serious an effect on the availability of our forces in
the U.K., successful invasion should be possible with the forces out-
lined above in the spring or summer of 1944.

16. The Mediterranean commitment which would result from a col-
lapse of Italy would cause a reduction from some 1,480 to 950 aircraft
in the potential ability of Germany to resist our cross-Channel opera-
tions. Only some unknown and incalculable weakness on the part of
Russia could ease this situation for Germany.

**Method of Defeating Germany**

17. After Husky we must intensify, with every means at our dis-
posal, the process of weakening Germany sufficiently to ensure a suc-
cessful invasion across the Channel in 1944. To the effect of the in-
tensified bomber offensive, the naval blockade and the Russian war,
we must therefore add continued pressure by our combined forces fur-
ther to stretch the enemy without respite, and if possible win new bases
from which to hit him.

**Potentialities of the Mediterranean Theatre**

18. We have in the Mediterranean powerful and seasoned forces,
whose attack is now gaining its full impetus, destroying the enemy
and forcing him to give ground. This momentum must be sustained till we have reaped the great advantages in weakening Germany which it promises. Not to do so would be to cast away an unrivalled opportunity of inflicting on Germany a mortal injury and, instead, to give her a chance to parry the final blow and delay her defeat for at least another year.

19. This final blow can only be struck across the Channel; it cannot be delivered from the Mediterranean—but the peculiar nature of the cross-Channel operation sets limits to the weight of this blow.

We therefore strongly hold the belief that to make this blow possible every opportunity must be taken between now and its delivery to exhaust and weaken Germany.

Deception

20. Moreover, apart from weakening the Germans, it is an essential part of this preparation to deceive them as to our intentions. To discontinue operations in the Mediterranean and concentrate our forces in the United Kingdom in a series of moves which could not be concealed, would be to invite them to take appropriate measures to meet what would become an obvious threat.

Immediate Effects of an Italian Collapse

21. After a successful Husky the greatest aid we could give to Russia, and thereby inflict greatest injury which could be done to Germany, would be to tear Italy from the Axis.

22. Seven Italian divisions in France and Corsica, and 32 in the Balkans and the Aegean would lay down their arms and Germany would have to find at least fifteen divisions to replace them or so weaken her hold on the Balkans that she would be in danger of losing control in this vital area—a prospect which she could not tolerate. The loss of some 1,400 Italian aircraft, and the approach of the war towards the southern boundaries of the Reich would cost the extended Luftwaffe at least 450 fighters, half of which would have to be found by improvisation. The enemy’s total air commitments would reduce his ability to reinforce the Western Front to negligible proportions unless he were prepared to strip the Russian Front. The Italian fleet, though admittedly no great menace, contains valuable British heavy units which would be immediately released to engage the Japanese.

23. Apart, therefore, from the moral and political effects of the collapse of Italy, this calamity would immediately prove for Germany a military disaster of the first magnitude.

Subsequent Effects

24. In the West, the occupation of key points in Sardinia and the restoration of Corsica to France would create a threat to southern
France which the Germans could not ignore. The Germans would either have to occupy and fight for northern Italy, which they might well be unable to do, or yield air bases which could place 500 bombers within range of a large number of important German targets—notably aircraft factories and oil plants—which cannot be attacked from England, North Africa or Sicily. The safe areas to which the population of western Germany are being evacuated would come under constant threat of air attack, with serious effect on morale. The German air defences would be split and the effectiveness of the air offensive greatly increased. Moreover, the threat of invasion to southern France would be increased, together with the potentialities of diversionary action to coincide with our invasion across the Channel.

25. In Russia the German forces on land and in the air would have to be reduced below the strength that was already inadequate during the winters of 1941/42 and 1942/43.

26. In the East, the Germans would have great difficulty in controlling the Balkans. Sustained at comparatively little cost to the Allies, and supported by air action, up to 300,000 guerillas could harass the enemy’s vulnerable communications, denying him important economic resources in Yugoslavia and Greece, facing him with seriously increasing recalcitrance and throttling his garrisons in Greece to such an extent that it is difficult to see how they could be maintained.

27. Added to this, Ploesti itself would, for the first time, be brought within range of effective air attack, from Italy; great—possibly vital—damage could be done, and the German air defence commitments would once more be increased. The Roumanians are, moreover, unlikely to show much firmness under air bombardment and only a small proportion of the 38,000 operatives are thought to be Germans.

28. In the Aegean, the Dodecanese would be weakened and might well be taken, and the way opened for Turkey to enter the lists. This event would be a further heavy blow. Its political effect would be immense, Ploesti would be threatened, together with the eastern Balkan and Black Sea communications, and Germany would be faced with a land front in Thrace which she could only attack if she were to find 7 to 8 more divisions and allot proportionate air squadrons from her already attenuated air forces. We are committed to support Turkey if she is attacked with 48 squadrons and two armoured divisions. These forces must, therefore, be held ready in the Mediterranean against this possibility.

Deduction

29. Collectively, all these strategic prizes might even be decisive. This policy, together with the effects of the Eastern Front and the
weighty air offensive, is bound to produce powerful results. The results in our opinion will create a situation which will make the difference between success or failure of a re-entry into northwest Europe in 1944.

SECTION II—SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Collapse of Italy

30. The Tunisian disaster has been a severe shock to the Italians. While Husky is being mounted, southern Italy will be bombed, and virtually blockaded at sea. Success in Husky will be a further blow to Italian morale. Whether Italy will collapse at once will depend to a great extent on the degree of support which she receives from Germany and on events on the Eastern Front.

31. If Husky does not bring about a collapse, Italy can be subjected to a heavy scale of air attack. From August onwards, the bomber force from the United Kingdom could develop a scale of attack on the industrial areas concentrated in the North which would create conditions in which the supply and maintenance of the Italian armed forces would become precarious. Concurrently an even heavier attack could be directed from North Africa and Sicily against the South. The combined effects of these attacks might well bring about the collapse of Italy.

32. It is, however, so important to knock Italy out quickly that we cannot rely on air attack alone. We, therefore, consider that limited combined operations should be developed to support the air offensive, maintain the momentum of the onslaught and tip the scales in our favor, as this can be done at reasonable cost and with the resources present on the spot.

33. In the Central Mediterranean, we have the choice of two lines of advance, one northeastwards into the Toe and Heel of Italy to threaten, if necessary, the Rome-Naples area, the other northwestwards to Sardinia and Corsica. An Aegean advance by the Dodecanese would not have an immediate or speedy effect on the collapse of Italy. Operations against the Mainland are more continuous than an attack on Sardinia and are more likely to collapse Italy this autumn. The capture of Sardinia would cost the equivalent of seven divisions. The capture of the Heel of Italy would involve a total of nine divisions. In either case we should employ the bulk of our resources in present Allied air forces in the Mediterranean. The selection of the course to be pursued must await Husky and will turn on such factors as the general air and land situation at the time, German reinforcement, if any, of the objectives, and the morale of the Army and people of Italy.
34. We feel that either of these operations following rapidly upon a successful Husky and in conditions of rising air bombardment would tip the scale in our favor.

**Situation After an Italian Collapse**

35. The general war weariness and dissatisfaction of all sections of the Italian people will dispose them towards dealing with the Allies. Owing to the heavy commitment imposed by an Italian default, Germany will be forced to cut her unessential commitments and dispose her available forces so as to hold the areas which she considers essential to her security. These are, we consider:

a. The Maritime Alps between France and Italy which she will hold with some two or three divisions.

b. The area east of the River Adige towards the Yugoslav frontier held with some two or three divisions.

36. The fear of air attack on south Germany from airdromes in the Milan and Turin areas, might force the enemy to fight a delaying action on the line Ravenna–Pisa. In this case five low category divisions would be required for internal security in north Italy, twelve divisions for a determined stand on the line Ravenna–Pisa or four divisions for a token stand to delay our progress northward. The provision of these forces would leave the Balkans disastrously weak.

**Operations After an Italian Collapse**

37. After an Italian collapse we must take full advantage of the situation, to give the maximum further aid to Russia and to facilitate cross-Channel operations in 1944.

38. During the period of confusion we should secure a bridgehead at Durazzo. This would cost four assault brigades and two infantry divisions with one mixed division in reserve in Italy, and might be accomplished with little opposition. We should thus put in a total force of three divisions. This force would activate the guerillas, and we could support it with up to 500 bombers and 300 transport aircraft from the mainland.

39. On an Italian collapse, we should forestall the Germans in the Dodecanese and bring pressure on Turkey to enter the war, and so make available to us the benefits we have already noted, and in particular the use of air bases from which to bomb Ploesti.

40. Should the Germans decide to remain on the Ravenna–Pisa line, three divisions would be required in the Rome–Naples area to stop German infiltration to the southward. An enemy withdrawal from the Milan–Turin area would leave the air fields open to occupation by us, if we wished to do so. A force of six divisions would
be required to secure the air fields against an estimated scale of German attack of 4–6 divisions, but only minor forces would then be required in the Rome–Naples area.

**Garrison Commitments**

41. We should occupy the Cagliari and Alghero areas of Sardinia and Corsica and occupy, or remain in occupation of, the Trapani, Messina and possibly the Catania areas of Sicily. This commitment would amount to about 15 battalions and 3 brigades.

**Summary of Commitments**

42. Our proposals for meeting these commitments and our commitments in North Africa are detailed in Appendix "A". After they have been met, we estimate that we shall have available in reserve, or for further operations such as an attack on the south of France:

- 5 American Divisions
- 4–7 British Divisions
- 1 French Division

In any event our total commitment on the Italian mainland in the event of a collapse will not exceed 9 divisions.

43. The economic commitment which may have to be shouldered is described in C.C.S. 227. This problem will have to be faced in the event of an Italian collapse, whether or not we carry out any further operations in the Mediterranean after Husky.

**SECTION III—EFFECT OF MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY ON THE BUILD-UP OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM**

**Assault Ships and Craft**

44. Allowing for casualties at the agreed rate, any of the above courses of action can be carried out with the assault shipping and landing craft (British and American combined) allocated to the Mediterranean Theatre for Husky, together with one or two minor reinforcements of certain specialized British types.

45. Operations in the Mediterranean subsequent to Husky would only reduce the amount of assault shipping and landing craft for

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2 Not printed. This appendix set forth an estimate of Allied ground force commitments in the Mediterranean area after the elimination of Italy from the war. Of a total of 5 American, 23 British, and 4 French divisions available, 1½ British divisions would be in Sicily and the Toe and Heel of Italy, 1 British division would be assigned to the enforcement of the armistice, 3–6 British divisions would be in Central Italy, 1 American division in Sardinia, 1 French division in Corsica, 4½ British, 2 American, and 2 French divisions in North Africa and the Levant, 1 British division in the Dodecanese, 3 British divisions in the Durazzo bridgehead, and 2 British divisions for the commitment for Turkey. The remaining 5 American, 4–7 British, and 1 French divisions would be available in the Mediterranean as reserve and for other employment.

3 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, May 16, 1943, "Relief and Supplies for Occupied and Liberated Territories", not printed.
cross-Channel operations in 1944, by the equivalent of 10% of the total personnel and 6% of the total number of vehicles to be landed. The reduction in personnel lift is not serious as the numbers could be ferried from ship to shore.

Thus, in terms of assault shipping and craft, it is evident that the continuance of Mediterranean operations after Husky has comparatively little effect on cross-Channel operations in 1944.

Bolero Build-Up

46. After allowing for a Sickle movement of 380,000 men as well as for the necessary R.N., R.A.F. and Canadian troop movements by 1st April, 1944, the number of U.S. divisions which will be in the U.K. by this date will be:

   a. Assuming no further Mediterranean operation after Husky    20

   b. Assuming a continuance of Mediterranean operation after Husky    14½

Of the above divisions under a, two will be in process of disembarkation and two will be linking up with their equipment; but under b, owing to the slower rate of movement to the United Kingdom, only one will be in process of disembarkation and one linking up with its equipment. The total number of U.S. divisions which will, therefore, be available for operations from the U.K. on 1st April 1944, under the two above hypotheses will be:

   a. 16 divisions

   b. 12½ divisions

47. In this connection, the two examinations of the cargo shipping position just completed by the British and United States Committees on Shipping Availability reveal an apparent deficiency against total requirements, other than post-Husky, of 336 sailings for the rest of the year.

Losses have so far been less than the agreed rate taken as the basis of the calculations. In view of this and the economies that could be effected by the Combined Loading of British imports and U.S. Army supplies in the North Atlantic, this deficiency may be largely eliminated and all calculations in the above paragraph are based on the realization of this hope. It may even happen that the reduction in the programmed Bolero movement shown above due to the additional requirement of some 90 ships for post-Husky operations, may not be fully necessary.
British Forces Available in the U.K.

48. The British forces available in the U.K. for cross-Channel operations by 1st April 1944 amount to 10–14 divisions dependent on whether cannibalization proves necessary or not.

Return of Land Forces From the Mediterranean

49. The size of the cross-Channel assault, as we have already shown, is limited by the number of landing craft that will be available. It would be possible to bring two additional British divisions ex North Africa to U.K. in the first quarter of 1944 without materially affecting the Bolero program as planned for that quarter.

50. It will be seen from Appendix "A" that after the elimination of Italy there will be some ten divisions (British and American) in the Mediterranean available for other employment. Even if we halted in the Mediterranean after Husky, there will be no object in bringing these forces back to U.K. except that they are battle experienced troops, since the availability of landing craft and maintenance limitations will preclude their use in Roundup.

Deduction

51. Thus, if we continue operations in the Mediterranean after Husky, there can be available in the United Kingdom by 1st April 1944 for cross-Channel operations some 22½–26½ divisions, United States and British. These figures could be increased by a further two divisions if it is decided to bring two British divisions back from North Africa (see paragraph 49 above). Even if no post-Husky operations are carried out, the total number of divisions available in the United Kingdom would only be increased by 3½.

Air Forces

52. There are sufficient air forces in the Mediterranean to implement the strategy recommended. Allowing for the bombing of Italy and necessary air striking forces, defensive fighter commitments and air forces for Turkey, we could possibly return to United Kingdom, if offensive amphibious operations in the Mediterranean stopped after Husky, up to the following strength of air forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th></th>
<th>British</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sqns.</td>
<td>A/c</td>
<td>Sqns.</td>
<td>A/c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter/Recc</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Bomber</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.R.U.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

332–558—70—24
53. It is at present impossible to say to what extent this would actually increase the air forces available in U.K. in April, 1944, since only a proportion of these units could actually be reconstituted in the line. Additional strength would, however, be given to existing formations by additional reserves of aircraft and personnel.

54. If amphibious operations were continued in the Mediterranean after Husky, the air forces stated in paragraph 52 would have to remain until offensive operations were concluded. There should then still be time to bring back a proportion before April, 1944, but there would be no fighter squadrons to spare, and extra transport aircraft would have to be retained. The retention of fighter squadrons in the Mediterranean would, in addition to the considerations stated in paragraph 53, probably not have a restricting effect on fighter reserves for cross-Channel operations.

SECTION IV—CONCLUSIONS

55. To concentrate our efforts after the completion of Husky solely upon Roundup is to forego the initiative to the enemy for some months, to adopt a defensive attitude on land and to allow Germany to concentrate for the defense of France and the Low Countries against our invasion.

56. Our plan for the defeat of Germany is therefore:

a. To eliminate Italy by:

(1) Air action and one of the following alternatives:

Either

(2) During or immediately after Husky, a landing in the Reggio area and thereafter continuing operations as soon as possible on the mainland by landing first at Cotrone and then in the Heel.

We estimate that the approximate timings of those operations might be mid-August, 1st September, and mid-October.

Or

(3) During or immediately after Husky a landing in the Reggio area and thereafter continuing operations as soon as possible by a landing in Sardinia followed by one in Corsica.

We estimate that the approximate timing of these operations might be mid-August, mid-October, and mid-November, respectively.

b. To invade northwest Europe with the target date of April 1944.

C. E. Lambe
W. Porter
W. Elliot

WASHINGTON, 17th May 1943.
Memorandum by the United States Joint Staff Planners

SECRET

Enclosure to C.C.S. 235

[WASHINGTON,] 18 May 1943.

DEFEAT OF GERMANY FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

PROBLEM

1. To present a plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) by concentrating on the biggest possible invasion force in the United Kingdom as soon as possible.

ASSUMPTIONS, 1943-44

2. a. Russia remains an effective Ally in the war and is containing the bulk of the German forces. She is at peace with Japan.

b. No amphibious operations will be undertaken in the Mediterranean area subsequent to HUSKY.

c. HUSKY starts on the date at present planned and all organized opposition in the island ceases by 31 August. Landing craft can be released by 15 August for movement to other areas for further operations by 15 August.

d. SICKLE continues at full scale as planned.

e. Air operations in the Mediterranean area will be limited to the protection of shipping and the bombing of Italy and other remunerative Axis targets.

f. Spain remains neutral.

g. Turkey is either neutral or an active Ally.

OBJECTIVE

3. The decisive defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe as early as practicable.

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1 Circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of the following note by the Secretaries: "The attached memorandum by the U.S. Joint Staff Planners, prepared after consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, contains a plan for the defeat of Germany showing the course of operations and their feasibility by concentrating the biggest possible invasion force in the U.K. as soon as possible." This memorandum was prepared pursuant to a directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 15, 1943; see ante, p. 84. The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered this memorandum together with a companion British memorandum, C.C.S. 234, supra, at their morning meeting on May 19; see ante, p. 112. The consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of these papers resulted in their agreement upon certain resolutions incorporated into C.C.S. 237/1, May 20, 1943, post, p. 281.
4. To attain this objective we believe that the courses of action outlined below are essential:

a. Sickle, and the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom.
b. Bolero, in order to achieve the primary objective, Roundup, in the spring of 1944.
c. Keep Russia in the war.
d. Mediterranean air operations after Husky must not prejudice Sickle, the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom, Bolero, and Roundup.

5. A sound strategic concept for the defeat of Germany at the earliest possible date can only be developed after careful analysis of existing and anticipated conditions in the entire European-Mediterranean area in 1943-44. Our strategic concept is firmly based on such an assessment, and accepts the following premises:

a. Defeat of the Western Axis by means of an invasion from the Mediterranean is unsound strategically and logistically.
b. The United Kingdom is an unparalleled base from which to create conditions for a successful landing on the Continent and to launch the decisive invasion of the Fortress of Europe.
c. Germany intends to concentrate on the defeat of the Russian armed forces in 1943. Only a major threat from another direction will divert Germany from this purpose, as she is fully conscious that failure on the Russian Front means her ultimate defeat by the United Nations. The minor operations in the Mediterranean which could be conducted after Husky, within the limited capabilities of the United Nations, even if they resulted in the defection or collapse of Italy, would be of lesser importance to Germany than the defeat of Russia. The United States and British forces are incapable of interfering seriously, by Military action other than air, with Axis operations against Russia in 1943. Germany will either fail or succeed in Russia this summer.
d. We believe that Russia will continue to require the major part of the Axis effort in 1944. The heavy pressure on the Axis by the Russian armies, together with the devastating results of an overwhelming and uninterrupted bomber offensive from the United Kingdom, Africa, and Sicily, will create a situation favorable for Roundup in April 1944.
e. We further believe: that the elimination of Italy is not a prerequisite for the creation of conditions favorable for Roundup; that the elimination of Italy may possibly be brought about without need of further amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, by a successful Husky and an intensified bomber offensive against Italy—in fact Italian defection might precede Husky; that if, after Husky, Italy has not surrendered or collapsed, the advantages to be gained in eliminating Italy by conducting further amphibious operations are not
worth the cost in forces, shipping, amphibious equipment, and time; that secondary operations after Husky to eliminate Italy will have a drastic effect in forces, shipping, amphibious equipment, and time on our main effort—Sickle, the bomber offensive, Bolero, and Roundup.

f. Experience in Torch and in preparation for Husky has shown that once an operation, even though admittedly secondary, is directed, the desire to insure its success leads to increasing demands for greater and greater forces. Such would undoubtedly be the case with secondary operations in the Mediterranean after Husky, especially if directed against Italy. The additional forces can only be provided at the direct expense of Sickle, Bolero, and Roundup.

AXIS CAPABILITIES IN THE SPRING OF 1944

(Reference C.I.C. 24, 16 May 1943)\(^2\)

General

6. Germany will be increasingly war weary and will be faced with an economy inadequate to a prolonged war, resulting, among other things, in the armed forces beginning to experience shortages in supply. The presence of Russia on the East and the Allied threat on the West will prevent the hoped for remanning of industry by men released from the armed forces. Her total number of divisions will remain approximately static, but they will be under strength. Our build-up in the United Kingdom will offer for the first time a positive threat of a war on a second front. While this build-up is being effected, the bomber offensive will be carrying the striking power of the United Nations to the Germans and creating conditions favorable for a successful invasion.

Ground Forces

7. In the spring of 1944, German ground forces may be estimated at about 280 combat divisions, which could be distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Front (including Finland)</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeastern Europe</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France and Low Countries</td>
<td>32 (1/3 refitting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (Strategic reserve)</td>
<td>27 (1/3 refitting)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. An attack against the European coast would be met by coastal divisions varying, with the area attacked, from 2-3 to 3-5. The mobile reserves of 2 to 4 divisions could begin to arrive after 24 hours, but the movement of these divisions can reasonably be expected to be delayed by aerial action.

\(^2\)Not printed.
9. The strategic reserve in Germany will total a maximum of 18 understrength divisions. Units could begin to arrive in 4 days and the total could be in France, but not in the areas of operations, in 3½ weeks. If this movement were not undertaken prior to our attack, it would require 5 weeks to complete the move to France. If units could be spared from the Eastern Front, the first division would arrive in 14 days and 2 each week thereafter. Continued air attack on these units while enroute will materially reduce their combat effectiveness.

Air Forces

10. The number of airplanes is difficult to determine, but after planes have been allocated to the Russian Front, it is estimated that there will be 2050 planes available for all other areas.

11. It is estimated that on 1 May 1944 there will be 950 combat airplanes in France and the Low Countries. These might be reinforced immediately by 100 additional planes. Within a week, 450 planes probably could be concentrated in the area giving a total of 1500 planes, assuming no losses. Further reinforcements would depend on Germany's will to strip the Russian Front, but in any event the absolute number of German planes is of relatively minor importance due to the United Nations' preponderance (8 to 1) of air power, in the United Kingdom.

Naval Forces

12. An invasion would probably be opposed at sea by 70 E-boats, 17 destroyers, 30 torpedo boats, and a large but indeterminate number of submarines.

Summary

13. A cross-Channel assault would be faced, initially, with from 2 to 5 coastal defense divisions which might be reinforced by 2 to 4 mobile divisions after a minimum of 24 hours. A minimum delay of from 3 to 5 weeks can be expected before the 18 understrength divisions in Germany could be moved to France. Additional time would be required to move them to the combat zone.

14. Our overwhelming air superiority (8 to 1) could seriously delay, or even prevent, the arrival of reserves, if not eliminate them entirely from early arrival in combat. This applies equally to the mobile reserves in France as well as to the 18 understrength divisions in Germany. Therefore, 3 to 4 coastal divisions must be defeated initially and a build-up effected to face a reinforcement of 2 to 4 divisions which may arrive in a depleted and disorganized condition, as a result of our air attacks. After 30 to 60 days, Germany might be in a position to face us with a maximum of 15-20 understrength
divisions. At this time their air strength would be negligible unless they chose to strip other areas including the Russian Front.

CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

Target Date
15. Because 1 April 1944 coincides with the completion of the 4th phase of the Allied bomber offensive against Germany, and is the earliest date on which the weather becomes favorable for a cross-Channel operation, it should be accepted for planning purposes as the date on which we must be prepared to re-enter the Continent. The continued examination of the results of the bomber offensive and the integration of its effects with other factors, including events on the Russian Front and in the Mediterranean, will enable the United Nations to decide by November, 1943, if a change in the proposed target date should be necessary.

General Concept
16. The Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander for cross-Channel operations has been directed to study and prepare plans for invasion at any time with whatever forces may be available. This planning is proceeding, but has not yet progressed to a full study of Roundup. Lacking complete examination of this problem, only the broader aspects of a plan can be presented. Detailed examination may therefore result in some modifications to the plan presented herewith.

17. In general, it is proposed that an operation be conducted to secure a lodgment in the north of France. It is estimated that ten divisions will be required for the initial cross-Channel movement, and that sufficient amphibious assault craft will be available to float those required in the initial assault provided those now in the Mediterranean are moved to the United Kingdom on the completion of Husky, and that no other major amphibious operations in the Mediterranean are undertaken. Thereafter, a build-up of forces [should?] be accomplished at the maximum rate consistent with available port capacities together with an exploitation of the lodgment to secure additional ports and air bases. When a sufficient build-up of forces and the organization of logistical establishments have been accomplished, and when the effect of the air offensive has been reflected in decreased German resistance, the advance to the heart of the German citadel can be accomplished.

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For an account of the planning in the first half of 1943 for a cross-Channel invasion of the continent, see Harrison, chapter II.
Air Forces

18. The U.S.A.A.F. program and the R.A.F. projected order of battle for April, 1944, is indicated below. The U.S.A.A.F. must be given first priority on shipping if the bomber offensive program is to be accomplished.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.A.A.F.</th>
<th>R.A.F.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Bombers</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Bombers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light and Dive Bombers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomber Recon.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Fighter</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Fighter</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter Recon.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Support (Fighters)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Support (Bombers)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo Recon.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air/Sea Rescue</td>
<td>8½</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>112½</td>
<td>7302</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ground Forces

19. If commitments to other theaters remain at the 1943 level there will be available in the United States, through 1944, more divisions than can be shipped to the United Kingdom. After Husky, 6 additional U. S. divisions in the Mediterranean will be available for use elsewhere.

20. The British will have 10 offensive divisions available in the United Kingdom by October, 1943. This may be increased to 14 divisions by 1 April 1944. After Husky, 11 additional British divisions in the Mediterranean will be available for use elsewhere.

Build-up in the United Kingdom

21. The build-up in the United Kingdom for a cross-Channel operation can be obtained by the movement of forces from the United States only, or by moving troops from the United States and transferring surplus U. S. and British formations from North Africa. The two methods of build-up are indicated below (priority on shipping has been given to the air force units and provides for completion of U.S.A.A.F. build-up by May, 1944). These figures are based on British estimates of the numbers that can be processed through U. K.
ports rather than on a larger number which can actually be moved by available shipping.

**Build-up (divs.) From the United States Only (See Appendix “A”)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Oct 1943</th>
<th>1 Jan 1944</th>
<th>1 Apr 1944</th>
<th>1 Jul 1944</th>
<th>1 Oct 1944</th>
<th>1 Jan 1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14*</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. It is reasonable to assume that operations have secured continental ports through which troops and cargo may pass, and that the flow through U. K. ports has been increased, thus permitting the following build-up:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Jul 1944</th>
<th>1 Oct 1944</th>
<th>1 Jan 1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total divisions</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Build-up (divs.) From the United States and North Africa (See Appendix “A”)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Oct 1943</th>
<th>1 Jan 1944</th>
<th>1 Apr 1944</th>
<th>1 Jul 1944</th>
<th>1 Oct 1944</th>
<th>1 Jan 1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures are based on what the British have indicated can be processed through U. K. ports and not on the availability of shipping. The latter would permit a material increase in the build-up indicated were it not for the limitations imposed by the port capacities of the United Kingdom.

24. The second method of build-up, from the United States and North Africa, is presented because of the desirability of using battle seasoned units for the initial cross-Channel operations. Units can be found in the Mediterranean that are not only composed of veterans, but that have also participated in large-scale amphibious operations.

**Amphibious Assault Craft**

25. Appendix “B” lists the amphibious assault craft which will be available after Husky, and also after each of two major amphibious operations subsequent to Husky, if such operations are conducted.4

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4Not printed.

*These 4 additional British divisions are dependent on the present program of conversion of defensive divisions to an offensive type. [Footnote in the source text.]
Garrisons in the Mediterranean

26. Proposed garrisons in the Mediterranean are contained in Appendix "C." 5

EFFECT OF OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO HUSKY ON ROUNDUP AND SICKLE
Ground Forces

27. If major operations, other than by air, are undertaken in the Mediterranean after the successful completion of Husky, no ground forces may be released for Bolero until after the collapse of Italy.

28. Such operations may interfere seriously with Roundup if shipping available for Bolero has to be diverted to reinforce and support the forces engaged in the Mediterranean.

29. The time required to gain the objective of the Mediterranean operations—the collapse of Italy—is indefinite. Success cannot be expected before 1 January 1944. After that date sufficient time remains to move two divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom before the target date selected for Roundup, but there can be no assurance that shipping will be available. Roundup would probably be deprived, therefore, of battle-experienced troops.

30. Little would be gained in the build-up following Roundup by moving any other available forces from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom over the movement of similar numbers from the United States.

Air Forces

31. After providing for an air offensive against Italy, convoy projection, and defense, about 900 combat aircraft and 250 transports will be available and could be moved to the United Kingdom following the completion of Husky. However, if further advances are undertaken, all aircraft employed at the time of Husky will remain in the Mediterranean until offensive operations are completed. All of the fighters (550), most of which are first line, and 250 transports, sufficient to lift two parachute regiments simultaneously, would be retained in the Mediterranean for garrison and supply of additionally occupied areas. Only light bombers and special purpose airplanes (about 350) could be released for transfer to the United Kingdom.

Amphibious Assault Craft (see Appendix "B")

32. If no operations are conducted subsequent to Husky, the number of amphibious assault craft available for Roundup will total 4,657 of all types.

33. After one major amphibious operation subsequent to Husky, the total will be reduced to 3,540, or 76 percent of the maximum.

5 Not printed.
34. A second major amphibious operation subsequent to Husky will reduce the total to 2,461 or 53 percent of the total.

35. If the second operation is not undertaken until the middle of November 1943, the amphibious assault craft remaining cannot arrive in the United Kingdom until about 1 March 1944.

36. It is probable that the amphibious assault craft available after Husky will not meet fully the maximum vehicle requirements of a large scale Roundup. It is apparent, therefore, that any lesser number would be entirely inadequate.

CONCLUSIONS

37. After Husky, the main effort of the United Nations should be concentrated on executing Sickle, the bomber offensive, Bolero, and Roundup.

38. The planning date for Roundup should be 1 April 1944.

39. The launching of a Roundup operation about 1 April 1944 is considered entirely feasible, and the movement of United States and British resources to the United Kingdom, therefore, should be executed.

40. Operations in the Mediterranean subsequent to Husky should be limited to the air offensive, because any other operations would use resources vital to Roundup and present the risk of a limitless commitment of United Nations resources to the Mediterranean vacuum, thus needlessly prolonging the war.

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J.C.S. Files

Resolutions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff¹

SECRET
C.C.S. 237/1

[Washington,] 20 May 1943.

EUROPEAN OPERATIONS

Reference: C.C.S. 89th Meeting, Item 1

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Resolved:

a. That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date

¹ The first version of this paper, C.C.S. 237, not printed, was prepared by the Secretaries along lines set forth by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after the “off the record” portion of their meeting on the morning of May 19, 1943 (ante, p. 110). At their meeting on the afternoon of May 19, 1943 (ante, p. 118), the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed upon certain amendments to C.C.S. 237 which are included in this final approved version of the resolutions. These resolutions were also included in the “Final Report to the President and Prime Minister,” C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, post, p. 364.
1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944:

**Assault:**
- 5 Infantry Divisions (Simultaneously loaded in landing craft)
- 2 Infantry Divisions—Follow-up
- 2 Airborne Divisions

**Total:** 9 Divisions in the Assault

**Build-up:**
- 20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment area

**Total:** 29 Divisions

b. That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of Husky as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Each specific operation will be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for Husky will not be considered available.

c. The above resolution shall be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in July or early in August, the date to be decided later, in order that the situation may be examined in the light of the result of Husky and the situation in Russia.

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**Hopkins Papers**

**Prime Minister Churchill’s Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)**

WASHINGTON, [May 24, 1943.]

**Mr. Hopkins,**

The Prime Minister wishes you to see the attached minute. 2\(a\) of Flag ‘Z’ is set out in the attached extract\(^3\) from our papers. If this does not make the matter clear, I can show you the file.

**T. L. ROWAN**

24.5.43

\(^3\) Enclosure 2 to this document.
LORD HALIFAX.

GENERAL ISMAY.

1. I might talk 2(a) of Flag 'Z' over with General Eisenhower when we meet, but in principle his wishes should be met about his own organization.

2. He should certainly communicate with the Combined General Staffs, and all official communications should pass by this channel.

3. Incidents may however arise which will be immediately published by the Press, on which it may be necessary to take rapid political decisions on the highest level. Therefore it would be wise for Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan to be kept in touch with what is passing and to report, as they now do, direct to the Heads of Governments. Neither I nor I expect the President wishes to be involved in the regular routine. But political questions of the highest importance may arise on which we must be constantly informed by our two representatives on the spot, and the good relations prevailing between them and General Eisenhower should render this process smooth and easy.

4. The more Italian functionaries we have to replace by military officers, the greater will be our difficulties. It certainly seems desirable to take all we can get in the way of trustworthy help for running the country, except where malignant Fascists are concerned. It is probable that the local Italian officials will fall over each other in their desire to serve once the fighting is over. It would be a great mistake for us to establish an Anglo-American military bureaucracy if we can get the Italians to do the work.

5. I am not aware who is dealing with this subject on the American side. I should think the matter could be quite easily settled round a table today or tomorrow by the four or five people involved, and could then be submitted to the President for his approval. I do not wish to address the President on the subject until it is reduced to some particular, precise point of difference.

W[inston] S. C[hurchill]
24.5.43

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*This paper has the following typed endorsement: “Mr. Hopkins to See.”*
I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Hayter)

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1943.

EXTRACT FROM A PAPER BY MR. HAYTER OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY, ON ADMINISTRATION OF HUSKYLAND

2. (a) They (His Majesty's Government) do not see the need for the proposed appointment of a Deputy Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, and would prefer a small political section with an American Chief and a British Assistant Chief. On this point the United States Government, while not acquiescing, have said that the organization is principally a matter for General Eisenhower. The latter's Chief of Staff, General Bedell Smith, is now in Washington and is believed to share the views of His Majesty's Government on this point.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 25 May 1943.
Attachment to C.C.S. 250/1

IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS REACHED AT THE TRIDENT CONFERENCE

1. In order that there may be no delay in action to implement the decisions arrived at the Trident Conference, the Combined Staff Planners recommend as follows:

a. That a directive be issued to General Eisenhower for operations after Husky (Enclosure A).

b. That a supplementary directive be issued to General Morgan (Enclosure B).

c. That General Morgan should be instructed to give, as soon as possible, a preliminary estimate of the requirements for operation Roundhammer in transport aircraft and gliders.

2. In view of the urgency of completing the Roundhammer plan, we suggest that further consideration should be given to the early appointment of the Supreme Commander.

Enclosure A

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

a. That forces and equipment shall be established in the United

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1 Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: "The attached memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners is in the form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 90th Meeting." For the record of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff under reference, held on May 25, 1943, see ante, p. 200.
Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft)
         2 Infantry Divisions—Follow-up
         2 Air-borne Divisions

Total 9 Divisions in the Assault

Build-up: 20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment area

Total 29 Divisions

The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

b. That the Allied Commander in Chief North Africa will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of Husky as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for Husky will not be considered available. It is estimated that the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean Area subsequent to Husky. These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the United Kingdom and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to Turkey. It
is further estimated that there will be available after Husky a total of 3,648 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives. Further instructions will be issued as to the availability of combat loaders and cargo ships.

2. You are directed to submit proposals with appropriate recommendations for operations in the Mediterranean Area, to be carried out concurrently with or subsequent to a successful Husky. All considerations related to your proposed operations must be [in] consonance with the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreements quoted in paragraph 1 above. Proposals will be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 1 July 1943.

3. Landing Craft. In view of necessity for starting preparations in the United Kingdom at once for cross-Channel operations referred to in paragraph 1 a above, it may be necessary after Husky to withdraw from the Mediterranean and Levant:

a. The crews of all landing craft that may be lost in Husky.

b. Maintenance and base staffs, with repair equipment and spare gear surplus to those required for the upkeep of landing ships and craft then remaining.

The landing craft available for operations in the Mediterranean after Husky are based on an estimate of 50 per cent loss in that operation. If the losses are less than this, surplus crews and craft may have to be returned to the U. K. This does not necessarily apply to special ships.

Enclosure B

Draft Supplementary Directive to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate)

Amphibious Operations From the U. K.

1. Under the terms of your present directive you have been instructed to prepare plans for:

a. An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy in the West and keeping alive the expectation of large-scale cross-Channel operations in 1943. This would include at least one amphibious feint with the

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2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive of April 26, 1943, is described in Sir Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1950), pp. 54, 55, and 57. For an account of the genesis of the directive, see Harrison, pp. 46–49.
object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and the U.S. 8th Air Force.

b. A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

c. A full-scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.

2. In amplification of paragraph c above the Combined Chiefs of Staff have now resolved that forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944, to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out.

3. You will, therefore, plan an operation based on the presence of the following ground forces available for use in the U.K. on 1 May 1944:

**Assault:**
- 5 Infantry Divisions simultaneously loaded in landing craft.
- 2 Infantry Divisions—follow up.
- 2 Air-borne Divisions.

**Total:** 9 Divisions in the assault.

**Build-up:**
- 20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment area.

**Total:** 29 Divisions.

A detailed statement of the forces which it is estimated will be available for this operation will be provided separately, and the possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

4. The expansion of logistical facilities in the U.K. will be undertaken immediately. You should plan for the development and seizure of Continental ports, after the initial assault, in order that the build-up forces may be augmented, and follow-up shipments may be made from the United States, or elsewhere, of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to you. In addition, you will prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to Norway in the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent.

5. Your outline plan for this operation should be prepared and submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as early as possible and not later than 1 August 1943.
C. STRATEGY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, Much as I dislike to impose on your time at this moment, I am very anxious about the decision on the Generalissimo’s request to devote the entire India-China air transport capacity in the next three months to air supplies. All the complicated factors in the China theatre call for immediate remedial action. It is the considered judgement of the Generalissimo as the responsible commander of the theatre that this can only be achieved by an immediate air offensive, both to strike at the enemy air force and shipping, and to support the Chinese ground forces.

With the limited air freight capacity at present available, no halfway measures are possible. May I add my own personal plea that the Generalissimo’s views will prevail, as I am convinced that the facts will support no other conclusion.

I hope you will understand the deep anxiety which leads me to send you these few words.

Very sincerely yours,

TSE VUN SOONG

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1 The source text is in Soong's handwriting.

2 Chiang’s request had been contained in a memo to Roosevelt transmitted in a note of April 29, 1943, from Soong to Hopkins; for the text, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 319-320. According to the same source (p. 326), Roosevelt had sent a letter to Chiang on May 4, 1943, pointing out the disadvantages of diverting the total tonnage of the ferry line to serve only the needs of the air offensive. For an account of the discussions in Washington during the first few days of May 1943 regarding Chiang’s request, see ibid., pp. 320-326.

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The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1943.

DEAR HARRY: At the Casablanca conference when Far Eastern matters were discussed, China was not consulted as there were no representatives present. Only after decisions were made, were they communicated to the Chinese Government.

At the present interallied conferences, when the war against Japan is discussed, I trust I may be called in to participate so that the Gen-

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1 Regarding the manner in which the Casablanca Conference decisions on Far Eastern matters were communicated to the Chinese Government, see ante, p. 88, footnote 4.
eralissimo may be continuously consulted. I shall appreciate it if you could do anything to ensure it.

Yours sincerely,

Tse Vun Soong

3 Telegram 717, May 15, 1943, from Chungking, Foreign Relations, 1943, China, p. 56, reported the request by Chiang that Madame Chiang and Soong should serve as the Chinese representatives in any consultations made necessary on Chinese questions raised in the course of the discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill.

At the proposal of Leahy, the Combined Chiefs, at their meeting on May 15, 1943, agreed to invite Soong and Chu to express the views of Chiang regarding operations in the Burma-China theater; see ante, p. 80. For the record of Soong's presentation at the May 17 meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see ante, p. 87.

Roosevelt Papers

The Australian Minister for External Affairs (Evatt) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, May 13th, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, In relation to the alternative plan for expanding the Royal Australian Air Force—now under your consideration—I have the honour to inform you that, in duty bound, I raised the matter in the course of my discussions yesterday with the Prime Minister.

In view of the supreme responsibility vested jointly in yourself and the Prime Minister in connection with such matters, I am expecting that in due course the plan will be considered by you both.

Yours sincerely,

H V Evatt

1 At the meeting of the Pacific War Council on May 20, Churchill announced that he and Roosevelt had reached agreement on the matter of allocating additional aircraft to Australia; see ante, p. 138.

J. C. S. Files

Plan Prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners

SECRET

Attachment to C.C.S. 220

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1943.

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

1. A brief discussion of a strategic plan for the defeat of Japan is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The plan is based on the following overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war.

1 Circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 19, 1943, under cover of a memorandum by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff reading as follows: "The attached strategic plan, prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners, meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff and is submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration." This plan was discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the morning of May 20, 1943, and it was accepted as a basis for a combined study and elaboration for future plans; see ante, p. 126.
a. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced.

c. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to force the unconditional surrender of Japan. If, however, conditions develop which indicate that the war as a whole can be brought more quickly to a successful conclusion by the earlier mounting of a major offensive against Japan, the strategical concept set forth herein may be reversed.

3. In view of the long period covered and the inevitable changes in conditions that cannot be foreseen, it is not practicable to divide the plan into definitely coordinated phases. With this reservation in regard to timing and coordination, the plan is expressed as follows:

**Phase I**

a. **Continue and Augment Existing Undertakings in and From China.**
   Chinese Forces assisted by U.S. Forces.

b. **Recapture Burma.**
   British Forces assisted by U.S. and Chinese Forces.

c. **Open a Line of Communications to the Celebes Sea.**
   United States Forces.

**Phase II**

a. **Operations To Open the Strait of Malacca and To Compel Wide Dispersion of Enemy Forces.**
   British Forces.

b. **Recapture the Philippines.**
   United States Forces.

c. **Prepare To Capture Hong Kong.**
   Chinese Forces.

**Phase III**

a. **Continue Operations To Open the Strait of Malacca and To Compel Wide Dispersion of Enemy Forces.**
   British Forces.

b. **Secure Control of the Northern Part of the South China Sea, and Assist in the Capture of Hong Kong.**
   United States Forces.

c. **Capture Hong Kong.**
   Chinese Forces.

**Phase IV**

Establish **Air Bases in Japanese Occupied China From Which To Launch an Overwhelming Bombing Offensive Against Japan.**
   Chinese Forces, assisted by British and U.S. Forces.
Phase V

Conduct an Overwhelming Air Offensive Against Japan.
U. S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces.

Phase VI

In invade Japan.
U. S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces.

Enclosure "A"

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

4.2 Objective of the Plan
The United Nations war objective is the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers. The accomplishment of this objective may require the invasion of Japan.

5. Most Probable Japanese Courses of Action
Japan’s most probable courses of action are to direct her major effort toward securing and exploiting the territory she controls, and eliminating China from the war.

6. The Invasion of Japan
Since the invasion of Japan is a vast undertaking, it should not be attempted until Japanese power and will to resist have been so reduced that favorable conditions for invasion obtain. Under these conditions the invasion of Japan is considered feasible.

It is probable that the reduction of Japan’s power and will to resist may only be accomplished by a sustained, systematic, and large-scale air offensive against Japan itself.

7. An Overwhelming Air Offensive Against Japan
An air offensive on the required scale can only be conducted from bases in China.

8. Recapture Burma
The attainment of bases in China for the air offensive against Japan is dependent on the continuation of China in the war, and on the establishment of adequate supply routes, not only to maintain China, but also to maintain United Nations forces which are to operate in and from China. The recapture of Burma is a prerequisite to the attainment of adequate bases in China. The capacity of the Burma Road supplemented by the air route from India is inadequate to support the air and ground forces required to implement an air offensive on the required scale. The seizure of a port in China to augment the supply routes through Burma is essential.

—Enclosure “A” begins with paragraph 4.
9. The Seizure of a Port in China

Hong Kong is the most suitable port which may be seized initially. Its seizure requires an offensive from the interior of China by forces supported through Burma, and, probably by supplementary amphibious operations. Control of the South China Sea by the United Nations will be necessary to prevent Japan from successfully opposing these measures.

10. A Line of Communications to Hong Kong

The most feasible sea route from the United States to Hong Kong is through the Celebes and Sulu Seas; that from the United Kingdom is through the Strait of Malacca. The establishment of these routes will require the neutralization of Japanese bases in the northern East Indies, the Philippines, Formosa, and on the Asiatic mainland south of Hong Kong. Control of these areas will prevent Japan from supporting her forces in the Netherlands East Indies and will deny her the economic advantages she receives from that area. Operations to open a line of communications to Hong Kong and to control the South China Sea are considered feasible.

11. A Line of Communications From Hawaii to the Celebes Sea

This line of communications to the Celebes Sea will be established by advancing in the Central and Southwest Pacific areas with a view to shortening the sea route, providing for its security, and denying to the enemy bases and means by which he may interfere with the line of communications.

12. A Line of Communications Through the Strait of Malacca

Although the supply of forces in China will come mainly from the United States, operations to open the Strait of Malacca, after the reconquest of Burma, are a vital part of the plan. The enemy must be continuously compelled to disperse his forces throughout the Pacific and Asiatic areas thus exposing them to attrition on an additional front in Southeastern Asia. This area is one of British strategic responsibility, and is a suitable and feasible undertaking for British Commonwealth Forces.

13. Control of the Seas

Since control of the seas in the western Pacific by the United Nations may force the unconditional surrender of Japan before invasion and even before Japan is subjected to an intensive air offensive, every means to gain this control will be undertaken by the United States. The establishment of the line of communications to the Celebes Sea will be used as the vehicle to gain this end. The selection of intermediate objectives which will compel the enemy to expose his naval forces will be the greatest single factor in determining the enemy positions to be seized.
Attrition of enemy shipping, air, and naval resources will be a continuing objective. Raids on Japanese lines of communication, and carrier-based air raids on Japanese positions extending to Japan itself, will be implemented as our naval strength increases.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff ¹

SECRET

C.C.S. 225

[WASHINGTON,] 14 May 1943.

OPERATIONS FROM INDIA, 1943–44

1. At the Casablanca Conference the following were agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President and the Prime Minister, to cover operations from India into Burma and China during 1943–44 (C.C.S. 170/2, Section V (b)).²

(a) Operations aimed at the capture of Akyab before May, 1943 (CANNIBAL).

(b) A limited forward advance from Assam before May, 1943, to gain bridgeheads for further operations; to improve the air route to China; and possibly to gain additional airfields.

(c) The improvement of the air transportation services into China with the object of enabling a larger air striking force to be maintained.

(d) A provisional date of 15 November 1943, and a schedule of forces required for launching an assault on Burma (ANAKIM). This date to be subject to the availability of the necessary forces and to be reviewed in July, 1943.

2. Since the Casablanca Conference, the following developments have taken place:

(a) The advance on Akyab has not succeeded, and the capture of this place before the monsoon must now be ruled out.

(b) The forward advance from Assam has not been undertaken because of administrative difficulties and the inability of the Chinese to advance from Yunnan during the spring.

(c) Some increase has been made in the air transport available for the China route, but it has been established that the full development of the air route and the full requirements of land operations towards Central Burma cannot both be provided by the engineering and transportation resources available.

(d) The ANAKIM plan has been prepared in outline and has been examined by the British Chiefs of Staff with the Commanders in Chief.

¹ This memorandum was handed to the United States Chiefs of Staff by the British Chiefs of Staff at the conclusion of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 14, 1943; see item 2 of the record of that meeting, ante, p. 54.

² The paper under reference is the “Final Report to the President and the Prime Minister”; see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 797.
3. In the light of all the above developments, and of the competing claims of all theaters of war for the available resources and shipping, we consider it essential that the review of Anakim, previously arranged for July, should take place now.

4. The British Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the full Anakim operation should not be attempted in the winter of 1943–44. Their main reasons are:

(a) The re-conquest of Burma involves a large-scale combined operation, followed by extended operations in very difficult country. These operations must be brought to a conclusion in a limited period of time, otherwise the onset of the monsoon will find us in a position of great difficulty. Even when Burma is once more in our hands, the operation is by no means finished. The Japanese have a good reinforcement route from Siam and we should become involved in ever extending operations in that country and in the Malay Peninsula. Operation Anakim is thus a very heavy commitment which we do not feel we can undertake at a time when the war with Germany is approaching its climax and when we cannot afford to relax the pressure for an instant.

(b) We are very doubtful of the feasibility of the operation if undertaken this year. Burma is a country whose topography is far more suited to Japanese tactics and equipment than to our own. The assault on Rangoon involves a difficult combined operation which depends for its success or [only] failure by the Japanese to fortify the river approach. For there to be any reasonable prospect of success, we must have a sufficiency of forces especially trained and equipped, and backed up by ample reserves of men and material. These conditions cannot be fulfilled in the coming winter.

(c) Until long-term plans for the ultimate defeat of Japan have been decided upon, it cannot be assumed that the re-conquest of Burma, however desirable the political effect, especially on China and India, is indispensable from the military point of view.

(d) Operation Anakim, even if successful in 1943–44, would not be likely to reopen the Burma Road until the middle of 1945.

5. We do nevertheless fully recognize that the objects which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had in mind at Casablanca still hold good, namely:

(a) Increase in the air effort against Japanese sea communications.
(b) Pressure on the Japanese forces in the Burma–China Theater.
(c) Help to China.

We should do everything we can to achieve these objects and we must also bear in mind the effect on India of inaction and failure to remove the air threat to Bengal.

6. The following are some suggestions which we would like to discuss with the United States Chiefs of Staff, together with any which they themselves may desire to propose:

(a) The concentration of available resources on building up and
increasing the capacity of the air route to China, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:

(i) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
(ii) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China with the object of striking at Japanese ports and shipping;
(iii) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

(b) Limited land operations in Assam with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, and covering the air route to China. These operations would, however, be limited to a scale which would not prejudice the development of the air facilities by excessive demands on engineer and transportation resources.

(c) The capture of Akyab. This would contribute to the main object of developing an air offensive, as it is possible from this air base to attack Japanese air fields and communications in Central Burma; while an attack on this island would bring on an air battle which would help to stretch the Japanese. Its capture would also provide a base from which we could increase our control of the Bay of Bengal, and from which coastal operations southwards could be covered.

(d) The capture of Ramree Island. The possession of this island is of assistance to the position, gives a good advance base for light naval forces, and, by threatening a landing at Taungup, from which there is a possible route inland to Prome, is likely to contain Japanese Air Forces.

7. The ways and means of providing the resources for these operations require examination, but we think they are likely to be within our power.

8. Whether or not Anakim should be undertaken at a later date must, we suggest, depend upon whether the reconquest of Burma is found to be essential to the ultimate defeat of Japan. We have already suggested to the United States Chiefs of Staff that steps should be taken forthwith to set up the machinery for evolving the plan for bringing about the defeat of Japan after Germany has sued for peace. Early and effective British participation must depend largely upon long-term preparations in India and Ceylon, which will be the bases for British operations. These preparations can only be made effectively in the light of an agreed plan.

Department of Defense Files

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I recommend that you approve the allocation of tonnage on the India-China Air Transport Route as follows:

May and June 1943

500 tons per month for Ground Force requirements
All remaining available tonnage for Air Force requirements
July–August–September–October 1943

As first priority, 4700 tons per month for Air Force requirements
As second priority, 2250 tons per month for Ground Force requirements
with the proviso that Ground Force requirements will be shipped concurrently with Air Force requirements as long as a daily average tonnage of 157 tons for the Air Forces is maintained.

Dr. Soong concurs and has agreed to recommend this allocation to the Generalissimo.
The above agreement should provide 10,000 tons for Stilwell by November 1st, 1943.

[G. C. Marshall]
Chief of Staff

Hopkins Papers

The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1943.

DEAR HARRY: On the basis of my conversation with the President this morning,¹ I am sending a draft of my telegram to the Generalissimo for the President’s approval, as it is important that there be no misunderstanding in so vital a matter.

I shall be grateful if you could lay it before the President as soon as possible, and give me his reply.

Yours sincerely,

T. V. [Soong]

[Enclosure]

The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to President Roosevelt

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Following our conversation today I wish to submit for your approval the following draft report to the Generalissimo on the decisions you have reached:

²I saw the President today, who told me he fully understands and is concerned over the military and economic crisis confronting you and is anxious the airforce be immediately strengthened to support you. He has accordingly made the following decisions:

¹Starting July 1, 1943, the first 4700 tons of supplies per month flown into China over the India–China route shall be for General Chennault’s Air Force; after this priority is fully satisfied, the next

¹No other record of the Roosevelt–Soong conversation has been found.
²The text of this message was read by Marshall to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the morning of May 19, 1943.
2000 tons per month shall be for other purposes including ground forces; thereafter the next 300 tons per month shall also be for the Air Force.

"2. President has ordered that starting September 1, the original goal of 10,000 tons per month shall be reached and even stepped up.

"3. I asked the President for all the tonnage for the remainder of May and June 1943 on both Air Transport Command and CNAC planes for air force supplies for the 14th Air Force. The President replied that certain small exceptions might be needed for ground forces and asked me to work this problem out with the Deputy Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

"I saw the Deputy [Chief] of Staff this afternoon and we came to the following conclusions. Ground forces will have 500 tons each month in May and June, and all the rest goes to airforce. From July onward Chennault will have absolute priority of 4700 tons monthly, and the balance, whatever it may be, goes to Stilwell until he has received in all 10,000 tons.

"4. General Wheeler has been ordered to take an engineering detachment from the road project and use it to rush to completion the Assamese airports now being constructed and repaired.

"5. The President told me that it is the position of the United States that there is a firm commitment for the ANAKIM project this fall and that he has advised the British that he expects them to carry out their part of this commitment. Definite and detailed plans for this project will, I trust, be communicated to me for presentation to you before the conclusion of the conferences now going on with the President and the Prime Minister, so that you may make your own observations."³

Yours sincerely,

Tse Vun Soong

³ Numbered paragraph 5 of the signed original copy of this draft letter, as it appears in the Hopkins Papers, is crossed out and covered over by the following insert:

"5. The President told me that it is the position of the United States that ANAKIM will be undertaken this fall in conjunction with the British. Definite plans for this project are now being considered from the viewpoint of the allotment of tonnage and special equipment, preliminary to detailed plans for each phase of the operation, which will be communicated to me for your consideration as they are prepared.”

The word “fall” in the first sentence is crossed out and replaced by the word “winter” in Roosevelt’s writing. What appears to be Roosevelt’s handwritten “OK” appears in the margin of the insert. This insert appears to be the same one prepared by Marshall and referred to in his memorandum of May 19, 1943, to Hopkins, infra.

Hopkins Papers

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1943.

Dear Harry: I am returning the papers that you sent me from Dr. Soong.¹

His outline of the tonnage agreements lacks certain small provisos,

¹ Supra.
but I do not think it is necessary to propose a modification of his statements.

As to paragraph 5, I am attaching a proposed substitute.² The fact is, we have not yet taken up the detailed consideration of Anakim, though we have heard Dr. Soong on the subject as well as Wavell, Stilwell and Chennault. I assume that nothing must be said at this time that in any way conveys the idea that Anakim is definitely to be modified; as a matter of fact we have not reached a final decision in this matter. Therefore the suggested paragraph.

There is a further complication in this matter, which involves the question of landing craft and the fact that we have not yet reached an agreement regarding the Mediterranean and a modified Roundup. These matters of course affect the landing craft situation, and the Mediterranean decision will have a direct bearing on the question of the availability of a British fleet in the Indian Ocean next November.

Faithfully yours,

[G. C. MARSHALL]

²This apparently is a reference to the revised paragraph 5 of Soong’s draft letter of May 18 to Roosevelt, supra. For text of the revised paragraph, see footnote 3 to that letter.

Hopkins Papers

The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong)

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1943.

DEAR DR. SOONG: Apropos of your note of May 18th,¹ the only amendment I have to suggest relates to paragraph 5 of your proposed wire to the Generalissimo. I think the following wording would more appropriately indicate the President’s purposes:

“5. The President told me that it is the position of the United States that Anakim will be undertaken this winter in conjunction with the British. Definite plans for this project are now being considered from the viewpoint of the allotment of tonnage and special equipment, preliminary to detailed plans for each phase of the operation, which will be communicated to me for your consideration as they are prepared.”

Very cordially yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

¹Ante, p. 296.

Hopkins Papers

Prime Minister Churchill to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, [MAY 21, 1943.]

MR. HOPKINS. I should be glad if you could show this to the Presi-
dent. I think the Chinese ought to be told to lay off this aggressive policy while they themselves are so dependent on the help of others.¹

W[inston] S [Churchill]
21.5.43

[Enclosure—Telegram]

The British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington

[LONDON,] 7 May, 1943.

My telegram No. 301 Saving of 1942 (of 15th August : Tibet).²

Chinese insistence on treating Tibet as a vassal state and the determination of the Tibetans to safeguard their independence have continued to prevent the establishment of a pack supply route and have hampered recent attempts on our part to arrange matters on a commercial basis through Tibetan merchants without raising political issues.

2. In early March the Tibetan Government held up all goods transiting the country from India and destined for the Chinese Government pending a settlement of the transport problem in accordance with their earlier stipulations, i.e. no warlike stores to be carried, no Chinese supervisors on the route, and a tripartite agreement including the Government of India guaranteeing observance of these conditions. Government of India continued to urge on Tibetan Government, who have now agreed, that civil supplies for China should be permitted to pass provided the Chinese Government refrained from sending inspectors or communication experts to Tibet.

3. Meanwhile it would seem that Chiang Kai-shek became exasperated at what he regarded as Tibetan intransigence and decided to adopt a threatening attitude. Reports have been received from various sources that he has ordered the concentration of Chinese forces at widely separated points near the Tibetan border allegedly for the reassertion of Chinese influence in Tibet, although they may also be connected with manoeuvres for strengthening Central Government’s influence in Western Szechuan.

¹ Regarding Churchill’s concern over Chinese policy toward Tibet, see his remarks during the meeting of the Pacific War Council, May 20, ante, p. 138.

² For text of a telegram of August 15, 1942, from the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington, transmitted to the Department of State on August 27, 1942, on the subject of the establishment of a supply route to China through Tibet and the British attitude toward the status of Tibet, see Foreign Relations, 1942, China, p. 630.
4. An American officer\(^3\) recently returned from Sining has stated that he was informed by the Secretary of the Chinese Governor of the Ching Hai province that the latter had received orders from Chiang Kai-shek to prepare for an attack by the Tibetans. The Governor was alleged to have sent 10,000 troops to the border and there was also a story that the Japanese were sending munitions to the Tibetans who were preparing airfields for the Japanese.\(^4\)

5. The Tibetan Government have also complained to our representative in Lhasa of warlike preparations by the Chinese and have appealed to His Majesty’s Government for assistance. Our obligations to the Tibetan Government require that we give them diplomatic support against any Chinese military aggression (see my telegram No. 3884 of 1942). His Majesty’s Ambassador at Chungking has therefore been instructed to inform the Chinese Government that we have been approached by the Tibetan Government regarding the alleged Chinese military movements and to ask for a confirmation of our assumption that these reports are without foundation. If the Chinese Government admit the military preparations and justify them on the ground that the Tibetans are preparing to attack or are permitting Japanese activities in their territory, Sir H. Seymour is to express incredulity and to undertake to obtain assurances from the Tibetan Government on the subject. He is to ask that pending their receipt Chinese troop movements be stopped. His Majesty’s Ambassador has been directed not to link his communication with the transport question but to deal with the latter separately if the Chinese raise it.

6. In the meantime His Majesty’s Representative at Lhasa is being instructed to ask the Tibetan Government for a denial of aggressive intentions and an assurance that they will allow no Japanese activity in their territory.

7. Please explain the situation to the United States Government and request their support in deterring the Chinese Government from aggressive action against Tibet, if this is indeed contemplated. Apart from other obvious reasons it would have the most serious results on Sino-British relations since, in view of our commitments to the Tibetans, it would be intolerable for India to be used as a source or channel of war supplies to China for an attack on Tibet.

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\(^3\)Apparent reference to Lt. S. H. Hitch, Assistant Naval Attaché in China.

\(^4\)The information contained in this telegram also reached the Department of State through the British Embassy and prompted an exchange of telegrams between the Department and the Chargé in China. See telegrams 633, May 18, 1943, to Chungking and 777, May 25, 1943, from Chungking, *Foreign Relations, 1943*, China, pp. 632-633. For additional documentation regarding the efforts to establish a supply route to China through Tibet and the attitude of the United States toward the status of Tibet, see *ibid.*, pp. 620 ff.
The Secretary of War (Stimson) to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1943.

My dear Prime Minister: I send you herewith the map which you requested, showing the four airfields to be completed in the neighborhood of Ledo in Assam.

The names of the sites are shown in large type as follows: Chabua, Mohanbari, Sookerating and Jorhat. These four fields have been selected by men of our General Staff and Air Corps who have recently personally visited the spot, and the sites have been checked up with and approved by General Stilwell. These fields have been chosen after a careful examination of all those in that locality and these officers estimate that, if first priorities are given on the shipment of cement, gravel, asphalt and equipment for the completion of these airfields, and an intense effort is concentrated upon these four fields, they may be ready by July first.

They also estimate that, if this is accomplished, our people will be able by intense effort to increase materially the capacity of the air route to Kuning during July possibly up to a capacity of seven thousand tons per month. They also think that it is possible but not probable that, if three additional fields are made available, they will be able to raise this capacity up to ten thousand tons in September. Success will depend upon the keenest concentrated effort in bringing in the fields and in the subsequent management of the route.

According to the following concluding portion of the Stimson Diary for May 22, 1943, preparation of this letter began immediately after Stimson's conversation with Churchill on May 22 (see the editorial note, ante, p. 172):

“When I got through with him [Churchill] and had left him, I got back to Woodley and got hold of Timberman and got the necessary facts and after dinner I dictated a letter to the Prime Minister and got a map from the General Staff and had that all ready for the next morning.”

The Stimson Diary entry for Sunday, May 23, 1943, gives the following account of the further preparation and dispatch of the letter:

“On Sunday morning I sent for Wright, gave him the letter which Miss Neary had written out for me last night and the map, and sent them down to be checked off by the people in the Operations Division (Timberman) and then I went off for a horseback ride. When I got back from my horseback ride to the Meadowbrook Stable I found waiting there for me Wright and Timberman with my letter checked up and rewritten and I signed it there and sent it down to the Prime Minister by Wright who delivered it to the Embassy in person. The whole day was an example of a concrete boost being given on a key point in a snarl which the whole conferences had been unable to resolve during the last week. I hope it will be effective. I telephoned Marshall about it and he was delighted with what I had done, particularly with my coaching of Stilwell and securing finally the approval of the Prime Minister to Stilwell.” (Stimson Papers)

No map found with source text. For a map of Air Transport Command airfields in Assam, including the airfields referred to in the following paragraph, see Map No. 7, “Transportation System, 1942–1943”, inside the back cover of Romains and Sunderland.
The Brahmaputra River is reported to me as now high, thus making difficult the obtaining of gravel from its bed. I am told that during the course of the monsoon it will tend to rise higher. If so, this means that the gravel will have to be obtained from quarries and this would necessitate its being hauled to the fields by overtaxed railway and highway routes.

But the possibility of General Stilwell's receiving enough equipment under his allotment to arm and equip the divisions which are to defend Kunming, as well as those which are to be in readiness to enter the Burma campaign from Yunnan, depends upon this enlargement of the capacity of the route at the times estimated. This indicates the importance of speed in the project.

Faithfully yours, 

HENRY L. STIMSON
J. C. S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 23 May 1943.
C.C.S. 239/1

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

Reference: a. C.C.S. 220 ¹
b. C.C.S. 92nd Mtg., Item 4 ²

1. The enclosed report by the United States Joint Staff Planners, in the form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 92nd Meeting, is circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. The operations set forth in this paper are in support of the overall "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan" as set forth in C.C.S. 220, already noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This plan for 1943-1944 operations is based on the premises:

a. That China must be retained as a base for operations against Japan.

b. That Japanese lines of communication must be subjected to continuous attack.

c. That Japanese Military forces must be subjected to continuous and increasing pressure to prevent consolidation and to effect attrition on Japanese Military power.

d. That positions must be secured in readiness for full-scale operations when such operations can be undertaken.

H. REDMAN
J. R. DEANE
Combined Secretariat

¹ Ante, p. 289.
² See ante, p. 145.
Report by the United States Joint Staff Planners

Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44

1. An analysis has been made of possible United Nations courses of action in the Pacific-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944 to conform to the objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 219. The analysis is contained in Enclosure "A". 5

2. The courses of action examined and conclusions reached are as follows:

a. Far Eastern Theater
   (1) Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China
   Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan
   and to keeping China in the war.
   (2) Air Operations in and from China
   Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential.

b. Pacific Theater
   (1) Operations in the Solomons and Bismarck Archipelago
   Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressure on Japan,
   and the defense of Australia.
   (2) Operations in New Guinea
   The capture of New Guinea will facilitate the opening of a line of
   communications to the Celebes Sea and contribute to the defense of
   Australia.
   (3) Operations in eastern Netherlands East Indies
   Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should
   be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture
   of New Guinea.
   (4) Operations in the Marshall Islands
   Shortens line of communications to Southwest Pacific and Celebes
   Sea.
   (5) Operations in the Caroline Islands
   Necessary to gain control of Central Pacific, thereby facilitating
   establishment of line of communications to Celebes Sea. Will enable
   United Nations forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.
   (6) Intensification of Operations against Enemy Lines of Communication.

All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific.

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5 The conclusions set forth in this report were later included in the "Report to the President and Prime Minister," C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, post, p. 364.
4 Ante, p. 227.
5 Not printed.
3. Conclusions:
   a. Offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-1944 should have the following objectives:
      (1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.
      (2) Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China.
      (3) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
      (4) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
      (5) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.
      (6) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.
   b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and amphibious craft.

D. BASES IN THE AZORES

J.C.S. Files

Report by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

S.S. "QUEEN MARY," 7 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 226

USE OF PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS

1. Experience has shown that so long as we can keep even a single aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, the operation of U-boats is greatly hampered. In order to obtain maximum air protection at the present time it is necessary for our convoys to follow a route which not only suffers from the disadvantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time we have to forego a considerable measure of air protection. If we had both a northerly and southerly route which had equal air protection it would be a great advantage and consequently facilities in the Portuguese Atlantic Islands would be of outstanding value in shortening the war by convincing the enemy he has lost the Battle of the Atlantic.

2. The facilities which we particularly require are as follows:
   a. Facilities in the Azores on Terceira and San Miguel Islands for operating V.L.R. and L.R. aircraft;

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1 This report was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of the following memorandum of May 15, 1943, from the British Chiefs of Staff: "The enclosure is a report prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff Committee which is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." For the record of the discussion of this report and the decisions reached thereon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 17, 1943, see ante, p. 91.
b. Unrestricted fuelling facilities for naval escorts at either San Miguel or Fayal;
c. Facilities in the Cape Verde Islands for operating G.R. aircraft. These, though desirable, are not comparable in importance to a above.

3. The benefits which would accrue from these facilities may be summarised as follows:—

a. They would give us a much extended air cover for all convoys plying between—
   
   (1) U.S.A. or West Indies and the Mediterranean;
   (2) West Indies and the U.K.;
   (3) South America and the U.K.;
   (4) U.K. and the Mediterranean;
   (5) U.K. and West Africa, and the Cape and Eastwards.

b. The increased areas under air cover would give us much greater scope for evasive routing, e.g., when U-boat were concentrating in northern waters, North Atlantic convoys could be routed via the Azores instead of always having to follow the Iceland (C) route.

c. Without the Azores we shall always be moving on the outside of the circle while the enemy operates inside it. Air forces there would be centrally placed to cover all varieties of the U-boat campaign against the North Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres.

d. We should be able to increase our carrying capacity owing to the possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of the Atlantic.

e. We could increase our harassing action against U-boats not only when on passage to and from the Biscay bases, but also while resting, refuelling and recharging their batteries in mid-ocean where hitherto they have been practically immune from interference by aircraft. New detection and attacking devices, which are expected to come into service this spring, would enhance the effect of such action.

f. Unrestricted fuelling facilities in the Islands would enable us to make better use of our inadequate numbers of surface escorts.

g. Blockade running between Germany and Japan would be rendered so hazardous as not to be worth the risk.

h. German warships and raiders would have greater difficulty in evading detection after breaking out into the Atlantic.

i. The islands would prove useful staging points on the air supply routes from U.S.A. to the Mediterranean theatres of operations.

4. We shall clearly have to pay a price and undertake new commitments in order to induce Portugal to give us the facilities in question. The extent of the price and the character of those commitments will depend upon our, and still more important the Portuguese, estimate of the way in which the Axis is likely to react to the transaction. Although we cannot be certain of it, strong reasons can be advanced for thinking that Germany will not, in fact, attack the Iberian Peninsula.
It would, however, be clearly wrong to discount such an attack altogether, and we have, therefore, examined its possibilities. If we assume the worst case, i.e., that the Axis powers would at once make war upon Portugal and attack her metropolitan [and?] overseas territory by all the means at their disposal, the commitments which Portugal would require us to undertake in the face of this possibility would probably include:

a. The defence of Portugal against land and air attack;
b. The protection of Portuguese shipping; and
c. Assistance in the local defence of Portuguese ports.

5. Of the above, only a calls for detailed consideration. The Portuguese Army is practically negligible and could not, of itself, offer any appreciable resistance. We have made a Staff study of the maximum scale of attack which could be built up against Portugal, with Spain's acquiescence (which is doubtful), without regard to the possible availability of enemy forces. This works out at 2 divisions ten days after crossing the Spanish frontier, rising to 8 divisions after seven weeks. It is certain that the Germans could concentrate forces overland in Portugal more quickly than we could by sea. To fulfil a guarantee to go to the assistance of Portugal against such a scale of attack we should have to earmark and prepare now between 9 and 11 divisions and some 20 squadrons of aircraft, and hold these forces in readiness together with their shipping. This course could only be followed at the expense of Husky and other future operations in the Mediterranean. Even if this could be done, there would be no certainty that we could protect more than a portion of Portuguese territory.

In the event of the Germans moving into the Iberian Peninsula, our interests would be to cover the Straits of Gibraltar, not to protect Portugal, and this again would be an undertaking we could not hope to fulfil except at the expense of other Mediterranean operations.

If we take the risk of provoking a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, even if we consider such an invasion unlikely, we must do so with our eyes open to what the consequences may be. In fact, we may well find that we shall be left without a footing in the Peninsula, except at Gibraltar itself.

6. A base in the Azores would be of particular value during the winter, when the weather in the north frequently interferes with flying. From this aspect therefore, it is desirable to make our approach to the Portuguese sufficiently early to allow the base to be in full working order by the autumn. A particularly favourable moment to open negotiations is now when victory in Tunis is in sight. The Portuguese
are less likely to make high demands for protection and the Spaniards are more likely to resist German pressure.

7. Having regard to the fact that we consider Germany is unlikely to invade the Iberian Peninsula, and the tremendous benefits we would gain from the use of the Islands, which are set out in paragraph 3, we feel the risk is acceptable. We therefore recommend that the War Cabinet should authorise an approach to the Portuguese Government now, but no guarantee should be given, and every endeavour should be made to persuade the Portuguese that no threat exists.

A. F. BROOKE
DUDLEY POUND
C. PORTAL

J. C. S. Files

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill\(^1\)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 18 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 226/2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER:

Subject: Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed as to the tremendous benefits which the United Nations would gain from the earliest possible\(^2\) use of the Azores Islands. They recommend that the Portuguese Government should be approached at once on this subject, but that no guarantee should be given and that every endeavor should be made to persuade the Portuguese that no threat exists. They consider that Germany is unlikely to invade the Iberian Peninsula if the Azores Islands are so used, and that the risk is acceptable.

In submitting this recommendation the Combined Chiefs of Staff propose that while the diplomatic approach is being made forces should be prepared for the prompt seizure and use of the Azores if diplomacy fails.\(^3\) Plans are therefore being prepared and will be submitted.

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\(^1\) Circulated in the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of the following note by the Secretaries: “The enclosure is a memorandum for the President and the Prime Minister which has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” This memorandum is a revision of an early version, C.C.S. 226/1, May 17, 1943 (not printed), which was considered and amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 18, 1943; see ante, p. 98. The revisions made in C.C.S. 226/1 are indicated in the two following footnotes. The memorandum was signed by Leahy and delivered to Roosevelt and Churchill on May 19.

\(^2\) The words “earliest possible” did not appear in C.C.S. 226/1.

\(^3\) In C.C.S. 226/1, this sentence reads as follows: “In submitting this recommendation the Combined Chiefs of Staff suggest that any diplomatic approach should be backed by readiness for forcible occupation if diplomacy fails.” (J.C.S. Files)
showing the earliest date for their execution and how, if at all, they will affect operations now in view.

A. F. Brooke
General
Chief of the Imperial
Staff

William D. Leahy
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

Roosevelt Papers

Draft Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)¹

Secret

WASHINGTON, MAY 19, 1943.

Secret from the Secretary for the Ambassador.

Please communicate orally and in the utmost secrecy the following message from the President to President Vargas:

You will remember that when I had the opportunity of meeting with you at Natal last winter and of talking over with you the problems with which our two countries are confronted, we agreed upon the necessity of taking every precaution to see that certain islands of the Atlantic should not become a source of grave danger to the defense of the interests of the Western Hemisphere.²

As you know, this Government has stated officially and publicly to the governments of both Spain and Portugal that it harbored no aggressive intentions against the sovereignty or territorial integrity of any other country. The policy of the United States today, like the policy of Brazil, is based upon the inalienable right of self-defense which we recognize as the rightful policy of other sovereign nations.

Since the time of our meeting I have become increasingly anxious because of the constantly expanding acts on the part of the German Government to extend the theater of operations of its submarines and particularly because of the efforts which the Germans are making to establish bases either openly or secretly on islands which by their very situation in the Atlantic threaten the shipping routes and, consequently, the security of the Western Hemisphere. As far back as 1941 I pointed out the dangers to our hemisphere which would result if certain of these Atlantic islands were to come under the control or occupation of forces which solely pursue a policy of world conquest.

Information is now at hand which indicates that the German Government has actually under contemplation the establishment of U-boat

¹Transmitted to the President under cover of a memorandum by the Secretary of State dated May 19, 1943, and reading as follows: “In accordance with our personal conversation I herewith enclose a draft of the proposed message from you to President Vargas. Please advise me as to whether you approve its sending. CH” The memorandum bears the handwritten marginal notation: “Not sent”. This is presumably the draft telegram read by the President to the Third Plenary Meeting, May 19, 1943, ante, p. 129.
²For documentation regarding the conference between President Roosevelt and President Vargas of Brazil at Natal on January 29, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. v, pp. 653 ff.
bases and U-boat supply stations in the Azores without any previous warning to the Government of Portugal. We may at any time be faced with a fait accompli.

Your own deep interest in this question and your own offer of helpful cooperation in the solution of this problem should the need therefor arise leads me now to ask whether you would be disposed to consider a secret approach on your part to the Government of Portugal in order to ascertain whether the Portuguese Government would be willing for the period of the war either to lease these islands to the Government of Brazil or to authorize the Government of Brazil together with the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain to establish such air bases and security controls in the Azores as would protect them not only from aggression by the Axis powers, but which would likewise prevent the use of the harbors and local resources of the islands by enemy submarines now preying on United Nations shipping.

Should you be willing to consider such an approach to the Portuguese Government I would of course be glad to have you restate the assurances I have offered in the name of this Government regarding the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Portuguese territories as set forth in my message to General Carmona in November 1942. I would assume that the terms of the British-Portuguese alliance would need no reaffirmation.

Because of the special ties which unite Brazil and Portugal, I feel as I have already said to you that any confidential and friendly approach which you would be willing to make in this matter to the Portuguese Government would be exceptionally helpful.

I shall be most grateful if you will let me have your views with regard to this question and inform me whether you would consider it possible for you now to take the initiative in this matter on behalf of the three Governments, Brazil, Great Britain and the United States, which are primarily concerned in maintaining the security of the Atlantic.

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Footnote:

3 For text of the message from President Roosevelt to the President of Portugal, General Antonio Oscar de Fragoso Carmona, in connection with the Allied invasion of French North Africa, which was released to the press on November 8, 1942, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. xx, November 14, 1942, p. 965.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to the British Deputy Prime Minister (Attlee) and the British Foreign Secretary (Eden) ¹

SECRET IMMEDIATE

PENCIL No. 159. Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

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¹ Presumably, this is the message which Churchill, during his conference with Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 19, promised to send to the British Government; see ante, p. 121.
1. I cannot feel that the proposed request to the Portuguese Government will lead to any useful result. As indicated in my Pencil No. 18, I do not think there is a chance of procuring Portuguese agreement. They might submit under protest, but they could not agree.

Proceeding as is proposed will only incur a rebuff. The Portuguese will make a virtue of their refusal to Germany, and measures will be taken to increase the resisting power of the Islands. The only way in my opinion is to confront them the night before with the fact that occupation is about to take place, and to warn them of the dangers of bloodshed, leaving them time to stop it. Then there is a good chance of none occurring.

2. We have now received a formal statement from the Combined Chiefs of Staff which stresses the extreme importance of our acquiring the use of these islands at the earliest moment. The gist of this will follow.

In conference Admirals King and Pound have spoken with the utmost emphasis of the advantages to be gained and the losses to be avoided. My estimate that 1,000,000 tons of shipping and several thousand lives might be saved was regarded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a serious underestimate. In short, military necessity is established in the most solid manner.

3. The President had drafted a telegram to President Vargas of Brazil, hoping that he might use his good offices with the Portuguese to persuade them to come over quietly, but this method is open to the same fatal objections as attach to our appeal to them to remember the old alliance. After discussion with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and myself the President recognized this.

4. The Chiefs of Staff have been directed to prepare a plan for immediate action, i.e., within the next three or four weeks, and this should be ready by Monday. I wish to be in a position to inform the President that in principle His Majesty's Government are willing to act provided that the United States is similarly committed.

5. I have read the assurances given to Salazar on the eve of Torch and do not consider they constitute any additional barrier to action since they are related to the operation Torch and its consequences whereas the present need arises from a wholly different cause.

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2 Attlee and Eden had telegraphed to Churchill a proposal that the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of 1373 be invoked in the effort to secure military facilities for the United Kingdom in the Azores; see Eden, p. 454.

3 The reference is presumably to Churchill's telegram of May 10, 1943, to the British War Cabinet; for discussion of telegram, see ibid., p. 453.

4 See C.C.S. 226/2, May 15, 1943, ante, p. 307.

5 For text of the draft message from Roosevelt to Vargas, see supra.

6 May 24, 1943.
6. I cannot see that there is any moral substance in the legalistic point involved in overriding the neutrality of Portugal in respect of these islands which are of no peace-time consequence but have now acquired vital war significance. The fate of all these small nations depends entirely upon our victory. Both the German and the Japanese have openly violated all neutralities. Timor is the latest example. Are we not putting the good cause to an undue disadvantage if in these circumstances we are not to take the steps which are necessary for the future law and freedom of the world? It is a painful responsibility to condemn so many great ships of the British and American flag to destruction and so many of our merchant seamen to drowning because our inhibitions prevent us from taking the action which would save them. I do not fear, nor does the President, any adverse reaction in our own countries though, of course, Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo will be inexpressibly shocked. I beg you to look up what we did in Greece in 1916. We went to war in 1914 because of the violated neutrality of little Belgium and a vast volume of rhetoric and argument was presented on that theme. However by 1916 the struggle had become so severe that the allies had no hesitation in violating the neutrality of Greece and landing at the Pyreus [Piraeus] by force of arms, and installing a Government favourable to their interests. I have not the records with me, but I cannot recall the slightest protest that was made by any of those who wished to see us win. In this case the issue is far more precisely pointed because the rate of new buildings over sinkings is the measure of our power to wage war and so to bring this pouring out of blood and money to a timely end.

7. Accordingly I ask to be empowered to state in your name on Monday next that if the President agrees to share the responsibility we will authorize the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make and execute a plan to take these islands at the earliest possible moment. As it is most undesirable that their names should be mentioned again I have agreed with the President that the code name for the operation shall be LIFEBELT.

8. We should, of course, offer the Portuguese several million pounds for the lease of the islands during the war and promise them their return at the end, plus all the improvements we shall have made to the air-transport facilities. It might also be desirable to associate Brazil with the occupation. This can be discussed later.

Japanese forces landed on the island of Timor, in the areas both of Dutch and Portuguese sovereignty, in February 1942. The events incident to this attack are set forth in Woodward, pp. 376–377.
Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The British Deputy Prime Minister (Attlee) and the British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

[London,] 21 May, 1943.

Alcove No. 334. For the Prime Minister from Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

Your pencil 159.

1. We very much hope that you will not press the War Cabinet to give the decision you asked for by Monday.

2. At a full discussion this afternoon the War Cabinet felt very strong objection to the course proposed on grounds of principle. Moreover, the only disadvantage of the Diplomatic approach is that it would give some warning. We think that this cannot be rated very high from the military point of view and is outweighed by the objection of principle the course proposed.

3. We also feel very doubtful whether action in the next few weeks is:

(a) Practicable without impairment of other vital operations, e.g., HUSKY or the Battle of the Atlantic, or

(b) Presents any great advantage over the same course of action taken a few weeks or months later.

4. We therefore ask that a decision should be postponed until the matter can be discussed with you after your return.

5. Meanwhile, the military authorities are pushing ahead on all preparatory work which can be carried out without prejudice to other operations.

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1 The views set forth in this telegram appear to be the basis for the statements made by Churchill during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on May 24, 1943, regarding the attitude of the British Cabinet on the matter of the Azores Islands; for the record of that meeting, see ante, p. 190. The source text, designated as copy No. 15, was apparently passed to Roosevelt during the Conference.

A subsequent exchange of messages between Churchill and the British War Cabinet on this same subject during the last days of the Conference is discussed in Eden, pp. 454-455.

2 Supra.

E. SUPPLIES AND SHIPPING

Hopkins Papers

President Roosevelt's Adviser (Baruch) to the President's Military Aide (Watson)

[Washington,] May 18, 1943.

My Dear General: Herewith, are two reports on Magnesium con-

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2 Only one report was found attached to the source text.
cerning which the President and the Prime Minister asked me about yesterday at luncheon.²

I am enclosing one other duplicate, in case the President wishes to give it to the Prime Minister.

Sincerely,

BERNARD M. BARUCH

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by President Roosevelt's Adviser (Baruch)

[WASHINGTON, May 17 (?), 1943.]

MEMORANDUM ON MAGNESIUM:

Unless there are demands for lend-lease and for our Armed Forces, which were not ordered up to the afternoon of May 17, 1943, supply has overtaken demand.

All bins have been filled. Two months advanced shipment have been made to China and Russia.

A stock pile is now accumulating here at the rate of 7,500,000 lbs. per month.

All listed demands up to Dec. 31, 1943, will be met by production and a stock pile of 50,000,000 will be accumulated by Dec. 31, 1943.

There need be no anxiety over this metal unless much larger demands are contemplated than have been placed. If—there are any such future requirements, it should be immediately presented to the Magnesium unit of the W.P.B.

B. M. BARUCH

² No official record of the luncheon under reference has been found.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Deputy War Shipping Administrator (Douglas) and the British Minister of War Transport (Leathers)¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 23 May 1943.

COMBINED STATEMENT COVERING DRY CARGO SHIPPING AVAILABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

This statement commenting on the schedules of cargo shipping is divided into two parts. The first summarizes the estimates of requirements for dry cargo ships and the ships available for loading during the period 1 June 1943 to 1 January 1944; the second summa-

¹ This memorandum was subsequently included as an appendix to annex vii to C.C.S. 244/1, May 27, 1943, ante, p. 223. For the Douglas notes of the American-British meeting of May 22–23, 1943, at which this memorandum was prepared, see ante, p. 175.
rizes the estimated requirements and availables for the period 1 January 1944 through September 1944.

The Statement is divided in this manner because the method of determining the estimates during the last half of 1943 is quite different from the method employed for the nine months period in 1944. The first period, being closer to hand, is less liable to error than the second. Moreover, there are certain important still undetermined factors such, for example, as the ship construction program, that render estimates for the nine months period of 1944 subject to a more considerable variation.

1 JUNE 1943–1 JANUARY 1944

Based upon the statement of estimated requirements and available dry cargo ships in paragraph 3, there appears to be a deficiency of 155 U.S. controlled ships available for loading during the period in question. This deficit, if properly spread, is not unmanageable.

1 JANUARY 1944–1 OCTOBER 1944

There are at the moment so many undetermined factors in the estimates of requirements and availables for this period that further review of the position is necessary. It does not now, however, appear to present insurmountable difficulties.

LEWIS W. DOUGLAS

LEATHERS

Hopkins Papers

The President's Personal Representative (Harriman) to Prime Minister Churchill

MOST SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.

Personal Memorandum for the Prime Minister:

In accordance with your request of last night \(^1\) I am listing below the salient reasons why I urge that you increase your tank demands on us, reducing proportionally United Kingdom production. I realize that you are fully familiar with the subject and therefore I am not setting forth the details.

1) The United States faces a substantial overproduction of Sherman tanks, even after a deep cut in the program made last autumn in order partially to meet the prior demands of the shipbuilding and

\(^1\) Harriman had attended the meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill on the evening of May 24; see the editorial note, ante, p. 197.
escort vessel building program. Splendid production facilities have been created which have been highly advertised as a great war achievement of the Administration and of American industry. Should this production be now further substantially cut thousands of men will be thrown out of work and these facilities if only partially used will be a target for criticism instead of a monument of achievement. Politically it will be difficult for the President to explain and it will give ammunition to the ever vigilant critics of the conduct of the war.

2) You personally and members of your Government share the responsibility for the establishment of the very high tank production objective. The President, against the advice of some of his advisors, set the target at the figure recommended by Lord Beaverbrook in January of last year. As late as last November Lytton presented requests for about 17,000 Sherman tanks and when we said that these could not be met by some 4,000 he urged that tank production be expanded to take care of this additional requirement. Fortunately, as things have turned out, this request was resisted by our army.

3) As the Russians are now no longer requesting shipment of tanks, we find ourselves with surplus production which is sufficient to meet your demands made in November. These 4,000 Shermans were therefore offered to you. In the meantime, however, your army estimates have been reduced and we have been advised that you cannot now use the additional tanks offered.

4) The present U.K. production program has also been reduced—to 7,000 tanks per year of the medium and heavy type. For certain tactical reasons your army consider that they would like to have this production of Churchill and Cromwell type tanks. In addition, as a matter of high policy, the substantial abandonment of the art of producing tanks is not considered in the British national interest.

5) I accept without qualification the national need for the continuation of the art of producing tanks in the United Kingdom. What is the proper minimum is of course a matter of opinion. After weighing all of the factors, however, I strongly urge that your tank production in the U.K. be reduced by 2,000 to 4,000 tanks, and that you increase your requests on us by a similar number for the following reasons:

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2 For documentation regarding the discussions during the First Washington Conference (ARCADIA), December 1941–January 1942, of the problems of tank production and allocation, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, pp. 328 ff., and the editorial note on the meeting between Roosevelt and Beaverbrook on the afternoon of December 26, 1941, ibid., p. 39.

3 For an account of the discussions regarding tank production during Lyttelton’s visit to Washington in November 1942, see Leighton and Coakley, p. 290.
A) You have made from time to time important requests on the United States for your war requirements. These have been accepted in many cases at great inconvenience to our own program. In the friendly and intimate spirit in which our relationships have developed in the conduct of the war it seems only appropriate for you to consider sympathetically an earnest request made by us even at some inconvenience or sacrifice. Your decision in this matter will be accepted in good faith but if it is adverse it cannot help but have some influence in dealing with future requests.

B) Labor required for the production of tanks in England is urgently needed in other directions, notably locomotive construction, locomotive maintenance, construction equipment, etc. We have urgently asked that you increase your allocations of labor for these purposes as we are not equipped to deal with our combined demands for these items.

C) I do not pretend to be able to judge the tactical advantages of the tanks that you propose building. We do know, however, that the Sherman is a good tank, thoroughly tried in battle, whereas the Cromwell series is still to be blooded. A fact not known in England when I left is that the production of our T–20 series has been agreed upon to start early next year and be in full swing by the early spring. The design of this tank was undertaken about a year after the Cromwell was conceived and gives promise of tactical advantages in advance of any other machine with which we are familiar, including those produced in Germany.

D) I have consulted Lord Leathers and Mr. Douglas on the shipping aspect and they agree that this additional number of tanks can be lifted.

I have discussed this matter at great length with Weeks and Lyttelton before coming to America. I believe that unless you take a strong position Lyttelton's attitude will continue to be negative. May I suggest if you cable that you emphasize the political situation you have found to exist here and our plans to commence production of the T–20 series early next year.4

AVERELL

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4 In telegram 4920, July 27, 1943, from London (not printed), Harriman reported to Hopkins as follows:

"British tank production program for 1944 has been given exhaustive study since the Prime Minister's return and is now finally settled by the War Cabinet. The Prime Minister advises me that British production has been further reduced which will make possible requisitions on United States in 1944 for [one] thousand medium tanks additional to the two thousand agreed to while the Prime Minister was in Washington. This means total requests on United States production in 1944 of 8500 medium tanks.

"I believe the President will be interested particularly as the Prime Minister has personally been the motivating force in the reaching of the decision in the desire to cooperate with our production problems." (841.24/1965)
Prime Minister Churchill to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) and the President’s Personal Representative (Harriman)\(^1\)

SECRET

[En Route by Air to Algiers, May 26, 1943.]

Pencil No. 406. Prime Minister to Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harriman. Most secret.

I suggest the remodelling of the last paragraph to bring it into line with our somewhat different procedure.

Please also see General Marshall’s suggested amendment.

W[insto]n S. C[Hurchill]

26.5.43

[Enclosure]

Recommendations Regarding Shipping, Prepared by Prime Minister Churchill

[En Route by Air to Algiers, May 26, 1943.]

Present estimates of shipping facilities indicate that there will be up to the middle of 1944 no surplus for any additional military operation that may become necessary.

Searching and continued examination on a combined basis of civilian requirements has set free a very large tonnage of shipping for military purposes.

As the major portion of our combined shipping resources is employed on military work, notable gain for additional operations might be made by subjecting military overseas supply requirements of both countries to an immediate scrutiny, conducted by appropriate officers of our two armies.

The President requests the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, through his nominee, to conduct (in Washington) this scrutiny, in consultation with the Chairman of the Munitions Assignments Board.\(^2\)

The Prime Minister will institute a similar enquiry in London by means of a Cabinet Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of Production, with the Secretaries of State for War and Air, the Minister of War Transport and the Paymaster-

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\(^1\) This message and the enclosed paper on recommendations regarding shipping were apparently flown to Washington from Botwood, Newfoundland, where the Prime Minister’s aircraft stopped for refueling en route to Algiers.

\(^2\) A marginal note in Churchill’s handwriting indicates that this sentence was subject to the “amendment suggested by Gen. Marshall.” Marshall’s interlinear alterations made the sentence read: “The President requests the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, through their nominee, to conduct (in Washington) this scrutiny, in consultation with the Chairman of the Munitions Assignments Board.”
General (Lord Cherwell) as members. The reports will be inter-
changed between the two countries, and will be submitted to the Presi-
dent and the Prime Minister jointly and severally.

\[WINSTON\] \[S\] \[C\[URCHILL\]]
26 v

Hopkins Papers

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

\[WASHINGTON,\] May 28, 1943.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:—When you were with us during the
latter part of December, 1941, and the first few days of 1942, after we
had become active participants in the war, plans for a division of
responsibilities between your country and mine became generally fixed
in certain understandings. In matters of production as well as in
other matters, we agreed that mutual advantages were to be gained
by concentrating, in so far as it was practical, our energies on doing
those things which each of us was best qualified to do.

Here in this country in abundance were the natural resources of
critical materials. Here there had been developed the welding tech-
nique which enables us to construct a standard merchant ship with a
speed unequalled in the history of merchant shipping. Here there
was waiting cargo to be moved in ships to your Island and to other
theatres. If your country was to have carried out its contemplated
ship construction program, it would have been necessary to move large
tonnages of the raw materials that we have here across the Atlantic
to your mills and yards, and then in the form of a finished ship to send
them back to our ports for the cargo that was waiting to be carried.

Obviously, this would have entailed a waste of materials and time.
It was only natural for us then to decide that this country was to be
the predominant cargo shipbuilding area for us both, while your coun-

\[1\] The source text is marked “copy”, bears no letterhead, and is signed “Pres.
Roosevelt” in an unidentifiable handwriting. There appears to be no doubt,
however, that this is a true copy of the signed original.

Churchill’s message No. 301, June 6, 1943, to Roosevelt, read as follows:

“Have just received your letter of May 28th about ships. Let me thank you
from the bottom of my heart for this broadminded, just and comprehending
treatment of this problem. Let me know whether you would care to have the
letter published. If so, I would write a suitable acknowledgement and would
also like to refer to the matter when I speak to the House of Commons on Tues-
day. However, naturally, it is entirely for you to say and I do not press for
publication unless you think it would be advantageous to our partnership.”
(Roosevelt Papers)

In his message No. 279 to Churchill, June 7, 1943, Roosevelt replied as follows:

“I think it not advisable at this time to release my letter for publication and
on the whole think it unwise to refer to the matter in your speech to the House
on Tuesday.” (Roosevelt Papers)
try was to devote its facilities and resources principally to the construction of combat vessels.

You, in your country, reduced your merchant shipbuilding program and directed your resources more particularly to other fields in which you were more favorably situated, while we became the merchant shipbuilder for the two of us and have built, and are continuing to build, a vast tonnage of cargo vessels.

Our merchant fleet has become larger and will continue to grow at a rapid rate. To man its ever increasing number of vessels will, we foresee, present difficulties of no mean proportion. On your side, the British Merchant fleet has been steadily dwindling. Depending upon the way in which the calculation is made, it has shrunk somewhere between six to nine million deadweight tons since the war began, and you have in your pool as a consequence about 10,000 trained seamen and licensed personnel. Clearly it would be extravagant were this body of experienced men of the sea not to be used as promptly as possible. To fail to use them would result in a wastage of manpower on your side, a wastage of manpower on our side, and what is of equal importance, a wastage of shipping facilities. We cannot afford this waste.

In order that the general understanding that we reached during the early days of our engagement together in this war may be more perfectly carried out and in order, as a practical matter, to avoid the prodigal use of manpower and shipping that would result from pursuing any other course, I am directing the WSA, under appropriate bareboat arrangements, to transfer to your flag for temporary wartime duty during each of the suggested next ten months a minimum of fifteen. I have furthermore suggested to them that this be increased to twenty.

We have, as you know, been allocating to the British services on a voyage-to-voyage basis large numbers of American controlled ships. What I am now suggesting to you and what I am directing the WSA to carry out will be in the nature of a substitution, to the extent of the tonnage transferred, for the American tonnage that has been usually employed in your war program. The details of the arrangements we can properly leave to the national shipping authorities for settlement through the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board whose function it is to concert the employment of all merchant vessels and will, in accordance with its usual practice, do so in connection with these particular ships. 

Always sincerely,

[FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT]

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2 For a brief account of the implementation of the arrangement for the transfer of ships to the British, see Behrens, p. 375.
MEMORANDUM FOR W.S.C.

I am sorry, but it seems to me the conduct of the Bride continues to be more and more aggravated. His course and attitude is well nigh intolerable.

The war in North Africa has terminated successfully without any material aid from de Gaulle and the civil situation with all its dangers seems to be working out well.

I think that Macmillan concurs in this.

However, de Gaulle is without question taking his vicious propaganda staff down to Algiers to stir up strife between the various elements including the Arabs and Jews. He is expanding his present group of agitators who are working up counter demonstrations and even riots.

Unfortunately, too many people are catching on to the fact that these disturbances are being financed in whole or in part by British Government funds.

De Gaulle may be an honest fellow but he has the Messianic complex. Further he has the idea that the people of France itself are strongly behind him personally.

This I doubt. I think that the people of France are behind the Free French Movement; that they do not know de Gaulle and that their loyalty is to the fine objectives of the movement when it was started and to the larger phase of it which looks to the restoration of France. If they only knew what you and I know about de Gaulle himself, they would continue to be for the movement but not for its present leader in London.

That is why I become more and more disturbed by the continued machinations of de Gaulle.

In my judgment, there should be a reorganization of the French National Committee, removing some of the people we know to be

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1 This draft memorandum was transmitted to Hull under cover of the following initialed memorandum by Roosevelt: “I enclose copy of memorandum I thought of taking up with the Prime Minister.” No official record has been found as to whether Roosevelt did take up this memorandum with Churchill.

2 In connection with the efforts at the Casablanca Conference to reconcile the factions in the French liberation movement, Roosevelt had referred to de Gaulle as the “Bride” and Giraud as the “Eridegroom”; see Roosevelt’s telegram of January 18, 1943, to Hull, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 816.
impossible such as Philippe [André Philip?], and include in it some of the strong men like Monnet and others from Giraud’s North African Administration, and possibly one or two others from Madagascar, etc.

Furthermore, I am inclined to think that when we get into France itself we will have to regard it as a military occupation run by British and American generals.

In such a case, they will be able to use 90% of the Mayors of Arrondissements, many of the subordinate officials of the cities and departments. But the top line, or national administration must be kept in the hands of the British or American Commander-in-Chief. I think that this may be necessary for six months or even a year after we get into France, thus giving time to build up for an election and a new form of government. The old form simply will not work.

I enclose extracts from some of the reports I recently have received from North Africa relating to de Gaulle.3

"De Gaulle’s dictatorial speech in London on May fourth, Catroux intimated, made it clear that Catroux’s role as negotiator has been ended, because de Gaulle is conducting his own negotiations by public speeches.

"De Gaulle in messages to Catroux, and in an almost childish manner, kept saying that he would come to North Africa when he pleased and to whatever place he chose.

"De Gaulle charged Giraud of welching on his original invitation to come to the City of Algiers. Catroux agreed that Giraud had never invited him to come straight to Algiers. Catroux seemed wholly disgusted and felt that de Gaulle’s speech was an open confession that he was seeking personal power.

"Monnet thought the speech sounded like pages out of Mein Kampf.

"Macmillan felt that de Gaulle’s speech dodged every question of principle involved.

"In de Gaulle’s telegram to Catroux on May third, there were derogatory references to the United States, saying in effect that it was the power against which the French must join forces."

All in all, I think you and I should thrash out this disagreeable problem and establish a common policy.

I think we might talk over the formation of an entirely new French Committee subject in its membership to the approval of you and me.

I do not think it should act in any way as a provisional government, but could be called advisory in its functions.

Giraud should be made the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army and Navy and would, of course, sit on the Advisory National

3 The following quoted paragraphs appear to be paraphrased excerpts from telegram 805, May 6, 1943, from Algiers, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, p. 108.
Committee. I think he has shown fine qualities since we saw him in Casablanca.

I do not know what to do with de Gaulle. Possibly you would like to make him Governor of Madagascar?

F[ranklin] D. R[oosevelt]

P.S. I hear the rumor that Leclerc forces in Tunisia have been permitted to recruit from the neighboring forces of Giraud because Leclerc offered more pay and better rations and clothing than Giraud’s men got.¹ I do not know if this is true. The same source reports that the de Gaulle mission in Algiers seems to have abundant funds and has put together an active and effective propaganda.

F.D.R.

¹ Regarding the differences between Leclerc and the French military forces under Giraud, see Howe, pp. 669–671.

Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of State to the President²

[WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to your memorandum of May 8 for W.S.C., I am in complete agreement that the issue presented in the French situation has come to a head and we must take a definite position that will determine the future of this controversy which, although outwardly between two French factions, may, if permitted to continue, involve both the British and American Governments in difficulties. I say this because the issue at stake is not only the success of our future military operations, but the very future of France itself. I am in complete agreement that either Allied or United Nations military must at the

¹ The Department of State’s file copy of this memorandum bears the following handwritten notation by James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations: “Original handed to the President by the Secretary May 10, 1943.” (851.01/2138) According to Hull, vol. II, p. 1218, the President, after reading this memorandum, readily agreed with the Secretary’s various points and said he would take them up with Prime Minister Churchill. No American records have been found of the discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill on this subject. In Hinge of Fate, p. 501, Churchill does record, however, that during the time of the Conference, “Not a day passed that the President did not mention the subject [of de Gaulle] to me.” According to the account in Eden, pp. 447–449, Churchill was subjected to “repeated American denunciation” of de Gaulle during the early part of the Conference. Finally, on May 21, 1943, Churchill telegraphed to the British War Cabinet the suggestion that urgent consideration be given to the possibility of withdrawing support from de Gaulle. Eden recalls that after the War Cabinet had counseled against taking such action, Churchill agreed to await the results of negotiations among the French leaders. Churchill telegraphed the War Cabinet on May 24, 1943, that he would tell Roosevelt that the problem would be considered again after he returned to London.

For additional documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the disunity between Giraud and de Gaulle, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. II, pp. 23 ff.
conclusion of hostilities be on hand in France to prevent anarchy and remain just so long as the French people in Metropolitan France, unhindered and unthreatened, need to formulate machinery to carry on a French Government.

It is very evident that the French National Committee is basing its whole policy on the idea that when France is liberated from the Germans, organized elements under de Gaulle may be in control. At the moment, this policy is leading the de Gaullists to attack all French and other elements not with them. To obtain this control, de Gaulle has permitted to come under his umbrella all the most radical elements in France. Under their statement of April 1, the Communists in France, probably the most highly organized political group there today, have announced their insistence that de Gaulle be their leader. The British Government has given its full weight, both financial and official, to the de Gaulle movement so that the active propaganda which has been carried on in this country and in North Africa against any or all elements believed to be insistent upon the free and untrammeled will of the French people to determine their own future has had more weight than would have been otherwise possible. Today, however, we face a situation where de Gaulle's active political propaganda directed from London immediately threatens the military success against the Axis powers to which we have dedicated our every effort. It cannot but be realized from your message of congratulation for the Allied victory in North Africa that the real French contribution was given by the French forces under General Giraud, while throughout the period of the battle de Gaulle, through his political agitation directed from London, caused nothing but disturbance and concern to our military commanders.

The remedy for this situation is in our hands today but, if not used, may not be tomorrow. We must reach agreement with the British on the fundamental question as to the future of France and the manner in which the free expression of the French will as to their Government may be obtained. Once this is determined neither de Gaulle nor Giraud personally is an issue. If we cannot reach agreement with the British on this fundamental point, then the one thing left is candidly to state in your forthcoming conversation that since General Giraud is fully cooperating and contributing to the military purposes we have in view and his military aid in North Africa is an essential in our war effort, we intend to support him in every way as military head of the French Allied forces whose collaboration is not only essential to the British and Americans, but to the cause of the United Nations as well.

*For text of Roosevelt's message of May 9, 1943, to Giraud, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. xiv, May 15, 1943, p. 427.*
Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of State to the President

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I herewith send you despatch 906 from Algiers,\(^1\) in particular, and also 3412 from London,\(^2\) regarding the de Gaulle-French situation. You will notice that despatch 906 quotes General Catroux directly and personally with regard to the inside of the present de Gaulle situation. I feel that you and Prime Minister Churchill are becoming more and more equally interested in disposing of this increasingly troublesome, serious, and not to say, dangerous problem.

I am also sending you Algiers 902 of May 17 containing Giraud’s last proposal to de Gaulle.\(^2\) I call your special attention to the marked paragraph in Section Two urging the importance of you and Mr. Churchill now reaching an agreement regarding this entire matter.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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\(^2\) Telegram 3412, May 17, 1943, from London, not printed. In this telegram, Ambassador Winant reported on a conversation with former French Senator Heuri Queille, who had recently been brought from France by General de Gaulle’s “British facilities”. Queille spoke at some length about the growing spirit of resistance in France, the gratitude of the French people to President Roosevelt and the Anglo-American liberation of North Africa, and the “mystique” of de Gaulle. Queille’s principal plea was the importance of unity among the two factions of the French liberation movement, and he urged that the United States Government do what it could to bring about this union (851.00/3088).

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G. POLISH-SOVIET DISPUTE

Hopkins Papers

Prime Minister Churchill’s Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, [May 22, 1943.]

Mr. Hopkins,

The Prime Minister has received a letter from Dr. Evatt about the representation of Polish interests in the U.S.S.R., and would be glad if you would bring it to the attention of the President.

I accordingly enclose a copy.

T. L. ROWAN
22.5.43
[Enclosure]

The Australian Minister for External Affairs (Evatt) to Prime Minister Churchill

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1943.

Dear Prime Minister, Our Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow visited M. Molotov with the British Ambassador and presented formal notification of Australia’s willingness to take over the representation of Polish interests in the U.S.S.R. M. Molotov expressed his agreement. It was understood that no publication of the new arrangement would be made until a later stage when a formal reply will be received.

The message handed to M. Molotov stated that “the proposal of Australia is made solely with the desire to promote the common interests of the United Nations and is animated by a warm admiration for the peoples of Soviet Russia and Poland alike.”

Would you be kind enough to inform the President of the informal acceptance of Australia’s offer which, as you know, was made with the cordial approval of the President.

Yours sincerely,

H. V. EVATT

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1 During April, May, and June, 1943, Evatt was in Washington on a special wartime mission.
2 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.
3 Evatt sent a letter similar to this one to the Secretary of State on May 21, 1943. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. III, p. 422. For additional documentation regarding the assumption by the Australian Government of the representation of Polish interests in the Soviet Union, see ibid., pp. 418–422, passim.

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Editorial Note

The question of a joint American-British approach to the Soviet Government with regard to the evacuation from the Soviet Union of certain categories of Polish citizens appears to have been discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at some time in the course of the Conference. According to the memorandum of conversation by Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs, dated June 2, 1943 (Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. III, p. 424), an officer of the British Embassy in Washington informed the Department of State that Churchill, at the suggestion of the British Foreign Office, had taken up with Roosevelt the question of American support of the British position with respect to the evacuation of Poles from the Soviet Union and that Roosevelt and Hopkins had agreed to send appropriate instructions to the American Embassy in Moscow. Those American instructions are set forth in telegram 427, June 12, 1943, to Moscow, ibid., p. 428. No official record of any Roosevelt–Churchill discussion on this subject has been found.
H. POLICY OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

J.C.S. Files: Telegraph

The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff ¹

SECRET

ALGIERS, May 17, 1943.

NAP 221. To AGWar for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Brigadier Husky. To USFor for the British Chiefs of Staff.

I wish to draw your urgent attention to importance of psychological warfare for the Husky operation. Having regard to risks we are accepting, I consider it essential every effort should be made in advance to weaken resistance of enemy. All our information goes to show that Italian Troops will fight bravely in defense of their own territory. In consequence, cost to us of the operation may depend very largely on the extent to which we can undermine their morale beforehand.

In my opinion policy of psychological warfare for Husky laid down in your telegram number FORTUNE 111 of April 16th ² is not sufficient.

¹ This telegram was circulated by the Secretaries to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as document C.C.S. 185/3, May 18, 1943, entitled “Policy for Coming Operations Regarding Propaganda and Subversive Activities.” The telegram was discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill during their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 19, 1943; for the record of that meeting, see ante, p. 122. The telegram first came before the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 18, 1943, but the Combined Chiefs deferred discussion until their meeting on May 20, 1943; for the records of the meetings under reference, see ante, pp. 100 and 125. For the reply of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower, see C.C.S. 185/4, May 22, 1943, post, p. 330.

² In C.C.S. 185/2/D, April 26, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with the concurrence of the Department of State and the British Foreign Office, had approved a statement of policy upon which plans for psychological warfare including propaganda were to be developed with regard to Operation Husky. The text of this directive was cabled to Eisenhower in Algiers in telegram FORTUNE 111 (PAN 117), April 16, 1943. The text of the directive, which was entitled “Policy for Coming Operations Regarding Propaganda and Subversive Activities,” was as follows:

“It is important to distinguish between the policy to be pursued up to the moment of the invasion of Italy and the policy to be pursued after that period. In the first period a firm line should be followed, without any promises, and should emphasize the following four points as the basis of combined British-American propaganda:

“1. We should lose no opportunity to point out the hopelessness of Italy’s present position in the war to the Italian people.

“2. The war against Italy should be pursued by attacking by land and sea and air upon all possible occasions and with all possible force.

“3. By all possible means passive resistance and sabotage of the Italian war effort should be encouraged.

“4. Appeals to premature revolt or ridicule of the Italian armed forces or the Italian people should be avoided.

“Immediately before invasion takes place, and for the period succeeding the assault, this line should be modified to the extent of holding out some ray of hope to the Italians about their future, the Allies being presented in the guise not of conquerors but of liberators. The following point should then be added:

“5. We should hold out assurances that Italy will survive as a nation after the defeat of the Fascist Government, without making any specific territorial commitments.” (J.C.S. Files)
for this purpose and will not succeed in making any substantial contribution to the operation. The reasons on which I base this opinion are:

A. Intimidation of the Italians by threats, as directed in points 1 and 2, will not itself achieve our object. Unless we can offer them a way out from the war, they will see no alternative other than to rally round their leaders. This is exactly what we wish to avoid.

B. The encouragement of passive resistance and sabotage of the Italian war effort, recommended in point 3, is unlikely to produce results which will be of any real assistance to Husky.

C. The assurances about Italy's future to be given under point 5 are not sufficiently explicit to be convincing, while the withholding of such assurance until immediately before the invasion takes place deprived them of any value for the operation. In view of the time required, even under the best conditions for propaganda to take effect, and of the measures taken by the enemy to prevent us reaching our audience, we shall need all the interval between now and D-day to put our message across and if we postpone it until the eve of the operation, it will be entirely lost in the heat of the battle.

I therefore strongly recommend that the statement of policy be amended as follows:

Point 5. During the period before invasion takes place, we should constantly emphasize to the Italians:

A. That the choice between a continuation and a cessation of hostilities rests with them.

B. That a cessation of hostilities on their part will be accepted by the Allies as evidence of good judgment, entitling them eventually to a "Peace with Honor."

C. That the policy of the Allied Governments pledges full nationhood for Italy after the defeat of the Axis and the removal of the Fascist Government and assures full benefits as provided in the Atlantic Charter.\(^3\)

D. That in consequence Italy has every interest in ceasing hostilities and that the only obstacle to honorable peace is the policy of the Fascist Government.

Our propaganda would be much strengthened if an Official Allied statement on the above lines were issued as soon as possible. Basing itself on such a statement, our propaganda could develop between now and D-day an effective campaign in which the advantages of surrendering would be balanced against the consequences of resisting, and in which blame for continuing a hopeless and unpopular war could be placed squarely on the Fascist Government.

The above recommendations are in line with those sent to you by CinC Mideast in their telegram number CC/227 of April 26th in

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\(^3\) Released by Roosevelt and Churchill, August 14, 1941. For text see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603; Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 508-509.
which I entirely concur. Action AGWar, information USFor and Mideast.

740.0011 European War 1939/30394

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Acting Chief of the
Division of European Affairs (Atherton)

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1943.

Eu—Mr. ATHERTON: I suggest that this letter be re-drafted in the
second paragraph rather along the lines of the statement made by Mr.
Churchill this afternoon in executive session with the Senate and
House Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees. His whole
emphasis—quite properly in my judgment—was that the Italian
people themselves had not wanted the war which had been forced upon
them by the Fascist regime and that the United Nations should have
no desire after the end of the war in seeing the Italian people deprived
of their position as one of the family of European nations. In my
judgment, however, a statement of this character, made for propa-
ganda purposes, should initially be made either by the President or by
Mr. Churchill or by both. It may perhaps be expedient to outline this
suggestion in this letter.

SUMNER WELLES

1 The draft letter under reference was the one from Hull to Leahy which had
been prepared on May 18 and was subsequently sent without alteration on May
22, 1943; see post, p. 329.

2 Regarding Churchill’s luncheon meeting with members of Congress, see the
editorial note, ante, p. 117.

740.0011 European War 1939/30395

The Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to
the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] May 20, 1943.

I quite agree with your suggestions concerning the tenor of our
propaganda to Italy at this time and the desirability of statements by
the President and the British Prime Minister. We will be glad to
draft a suggested text if you consider that would be useful.

With respect to the present communication to the Joint Chiefs
we are merely requesting that one of several basic points, which was
approved by the President and agreed to by the British Government
and the Combined Chiefs of Staff after considerable correspondence,

1 Welles’ handwritten endorsement above this paragraph in the source text
reads: “Please do so—SW”. For text of the message from Roosevelt and
Churchill to the people of Italy, July 16, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol.
ii, p. 330; Rosenman, p. 305.
be released from a limitation which we consider unnecessary and even dangerous to our national security. Until that condition is removed and appropriate directives received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff our propaganda agencies do not feel themselves free to give the emphasis to Italian propaganda suggested in your memorandum. The policy, in line with the suggestions made by you, has, as I have said, been agreed upon. The present question is really an administrative one. Consequently, I hope you will agree that the attached draft to Admiral Leahy can go forward.

RAY ATHERTON

\[Supra.\]

740.0011 European War 1939/30305a

The Secretary of State to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)\(^1\)

[WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1943.

My Dear Admiral Leahy: I refer to Mr. Berle's letter of March 17, 1943 to General Deane enclosing a copy of an aide-mémoire of even date from the British Embassy concurring in certain proposals of policy with respect to Italy. A copy of the British aide-mémoire is enclosed for your reference. These proposals were subsequently accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with some modification of point five.\(^2\)

The British Government requested that no use be made of point five until certain conditions were imminent or had been fulfilled. This was agreed to by the Department at that time and apparently accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I now feel that the fifth point, as modified by the Chiefs of Staff, should be freed from the conditions specified in the British note of March 17. It is my opinion that the moment is opportune to hold out to the Italian people some hope or assurance that their country will survive as a nation after the defeat of the Fascist Government. This, of course, could and should be done without making any specific territorial commitments. I feel that if such assurances are considered effective propaganda under certain given circumstances, that they are also effective under present condi-

\(^{1}\) Welles' initials on the source text indicate his approval of this letter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff circulated the letter for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 25, 1943, but the proposals it set forth were not taken up by the Combined Chiefs of Staff until after the TRIDENT Conference.

\(^{2}\) The letter of March 17, 1943, from Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., to General Deane is not printed. For text of the aide-mémoire of March 17, 1943, from the British Embassy to the Department of State, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, p. 324. For text of the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive on the policy for propaganda in Operation HUSKY, see footnote 2 to telegram NAV 221, May 17, 1943, from Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, ante, p. 326.
tions. Furthermore, it appears to me that a question of security is involved which makes it undesirable to associate a specific piece of propaganda with a possible major military operation.

If the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in my views, perhaps they would secure the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 May 1943.
C.C.S. 185/4

POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

The enclosure is a proposed reply to the request of General Eisenhower contained in C.C.S. 185/3. It has the approval of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the President.

H. REDMAN
J. R. DEANE
Combined Secretariat

Enclosure

Draft Telegram From the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

PROPOSED TELEGRAM TO GENERAL EISENHOWER

The President has expressed the following views on psychological warfare for Husky. The Prime Minister concurs: Reference your telegram of 17 May on the subject.¹

¹ See ante, p. 326, footnote 1.
² During the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on May 10, 1943 (ante, p. 122), the President stated that he had sent a message to Marshall regarding Eisenhower’s proposals on pre-Husky propaganda. Marshall explained to the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 22, 1943 (ante, p. 162) that he had prepared this draft telegram to Eisenhower on the basis of Roosevelt’s views. At their meeting on May 23, 1943 (ante, p. 180), the Combined Chiefs of Staff were informed by Ismay that Churchill had agreed to this draft telegram, the text of which was then sent by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower in Algiers as telegram FAN 127, May 24, 1943. At a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 8, 1943, Marshall stated that “the original proposal from General Eisenhower’s headquarters, which had included the phrase ‘peace with honor’, had been sent without the personal knowledge of General Eisenhower.” (J.C.S. Files) Cf. Eisenhower Papers, pp. 1161–1162.
³ Ante, p. 326.
"Most certainly we cannot tell the Italians that if they cease hostilities they will have a peace with honor. We cannot get away from unconditional surrender. All we can tell them is that they will be treated by us and the British with humanity and with the intention that the Italian people be reconstituted into a nation in accordance with the principles of self-determination. This latter would, of course, not include any form of Fascism or dictatorship."

Accordingly, the existing approved statement of policy, transmitted in our Fortune 111 of April 16,4 will be adhered to in your planning for psychological warfare.

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4 See footnote 2 to Eisenhower’s telegram of May 17 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, ante, p. 326.

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**Editorial Note**

Aside from the brief references to surrender policy in connection with pre-Husky propaganda, no record has been found of any consideration by Roosevelt and Churchill of the policy of unconditional surrender. An exchange of telegrams between the American Embassy in London and the Department of State immediately following the conference, however, indicates that this policy was reaffirmed in the course of the Washington meetings. In his telegram 3594, May 25, 1943, not printed, Ambassador John G. Winant reported having been informed the previous day by an official of the British Foreign Office that the British regarded favorably the preliminary report of the Foreign Ministers of the exiled governments in London on draft armistice terms for the Axis countries. Winant further reported that the British would shortly have their own armistice terms in sufficiently tangible form to communicate them to the United States Government. The following reply to Winant, which was prepared at the White House and initialed by Roosevelt, was sent as telegram 3367, May 27, 1943, to London: “Personal for the Ambassador to take up with Mr. Eden. The President is greatly concerned by report in your 3594, May 25th, relating to your talk with Ronald. The President and the Prime Minister were in complete agreement that our joint present position is that there shall be no armistice but that the policy of unconditional surrender be the sole criterion at this time. Therefore, the President is disturbed at any discussion of armistices in any place.” (740.00119 EW/1478)
I. VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER MACKENZIE KING

033.4211 King, W. L. Mackenzie/70

The Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

S—MR. SECRETARY I was told in confidence by a member of the Canadian Legation late yesterday afternoon that the circumstances in connection with Mr. King’s announcement that he would come to Washington next week were as follows:

Almost immediately after the announcement that Mr. Churchill was here, Mr. Mackenzie King learned that the Opposition was preparing to question him in the House of Commons as to what part, if any, Canada would play in the conversations. He thereupon telegraphed urgently to Mr. Churchill expressing the hope that Mr. Churchill would be able to visit Ottawa to confer with him. Mr. Churchill replied (I gather that the Canadian Legation did some prodding to expedite a reply) to the effect that he would not be able to visit Ottawa but that he had discussed Mr. King’s telegram with the President and that he and the President would be glad if Mr. King could come to Washington next week to confer with them.

You will note that the invitation to Mr. King was extended by Mr. Churchill in the name of the President and himself. 1 It seems to me that it would be desirable for you to send a message or alternatively for you to get the President’s approval of a message in his own name to Mr. King along the lines of the enclosed alternative drafts. 2 My own preference is for the telegram signed by you.

J[ohn] D. H[ickerson]

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1 According to Pickersgill, p. 502, Prime Minister Mackenzie King received a telegram from Churchill on May 12, 1943, suggesting the visit to Washington.

2 The draft message from Hull read as follows:

"The President and I are delighted that you can come to Washington next week and we are looking forward with real pleasure to seeing you and talking to you. Cordial regards."

The draft message from Roosevelt embodied substantially the same language. For text of the message as actually sent by Roosevelt, see post, p. 333.
Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, [May 14, 1943.]

Mr. Hopkins.

You asked me to remind you to speak to Mr. Mackenzie King about his visit to the White House—see telegram attached.

T. L. R[owan]
14.5.43

[Enclosure—Telegram]

Prime Minister Churchill to Prime Minister Mackenzie King

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1943.

Prime Minister to Mr. Mackenzie King. Personal and Secret.

I understand that the President is going to invite you to dine and sleep here on Wednesday night,¹ and we are arranging a Pacific Council for Thursday ² and a meeting of the British Empire Delegations in the afternoon.³ I shall of course be available to see you on Tuesday.

W[inston] S. C[hurchill]
14.5.43

¹ May 19.
² For the record of the Pacific War Council meeting on May 20, see ante, p. 134.
³ For an account of the meeting of Commonwealth delegations, held at the White House on May 20, see Pickersgill, pp. 503-504.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Mackenzie King ¹

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1943.

I am delighted that you could accept my invitation to come to Washington next week and I am looking forward with real anticipation to seeing you and talking to you.² I hope you can get here Wednesday

¹ The Department's copy of this message is filed under 033.4211 King, W. L. Mackenzie/68a.
² No record has been found of previous correspondence between Roosevelt and Mackenzie King on the subject of the visit to Washington.
afternoon and come straight to White House. We will have Pacific War Council meeting Thursday at noon.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Mackenzie King to President Roosevelt*

**OTTAWA, MAY 14, 1943.**

Greatly pleased to receive your telegram expressing hope that I may be able to be in Washington Wednesday afternoon and to come direct to White House.1 I thank you warmly for this invitation which I am more than pleased to accept. I am much looking forward to the opportunity of seeing and talking with you again. I also much welcome the opportunity of being present at the Pacific War Council meeting Thursday at noon. Kindest regards.

Mackenzie King

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1 At his press conference on May 18, 1943, Roosevelt told reporters that Mackenzie King had arrived in Washington that afternoon and would come to the White House the following day to spend the night.

711.42/255

*The Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State*

**WASHINGTON, MAY 20, 1943.**

**MEMORANDUM**

S—Mr. Secretary You will be seeing Mr. Mackenzie King at dinner tonight.1 This brief memorandum on our relations with Canada may be of interest to you in connection with your conversation with Mr. King.

Our relations with Canada are excellent. The only cloud on the horizon is that the extent of our War Department expenditures and activities in western Canada has been so great in connection with the war effort that some people in Canada have privately expressed apprehension. In other words some people feel that we may have a vested interest there and be reluctant to leave when the war is over. That is of course nonsense but not all Canadians realize it. I don’t think this is particularly serious. We have done everything we can to dispel any apprehensions on that point.

The only other thing about our relations with Canada which troubles me is the fact that in spite of the President’s close personal rela-

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1 No record of such a meeting has been found.
tions with Mr. Mackenzie King and your own personal friendship and close relations with him, and in spite of the traditionally close and direct relations between our two Governments, Canada continues to receive what information she gets about high policy discussions between the White House and London from London rather than direct from Washington.

Mr. Norman Robertson, the Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, whom you met during the Trade Agreement negotiations in 1938, is here with Mr. King. He told me at lunch today that the Prime Minister might discuss with you the advisability of appointing an American Minister to Canada at an early date.²

There is attached a brief telegram from our Legation in Ottawa summarizing the general political situation in Canada.a

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

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² The post of American Minister to Canada had been vacant since the death of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, January 24, 1943. The subject of raising the Canadian Legation to Embassy rank was discussed at the Roosevelt–Churchill–Mackenzie King conversation after luncheon on May 20, 1943; see the editorial note, ante, p. 141.

a Telegram 28, May 17, 1943, from Ottawa, not printed.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Mackenzie King to President Roosevelt

OTTAWA, MAY 24, 1943.

On my return to Ottawa may I express anew my warm appreciation of my recent visit to the White House and of all your kindness throughout the entire period of my stay in Washington. The conversations with Winston and yourself,² the visit to the Capitol,² the meeting of the Pacific Relations Council,³ and other conferences all related to the most important of the world’s events combined to give the occasion the most far reaching significance. I cannot be too grateful for all it has meant to me personally and for what the opportunities it afforded will always mean to the government and people of Canada.

Kindest personal regards.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

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¹ Regarding the Roosevelt–Churchill–Mackenzie King conversations of May 19, the Roosevelt–Churchill–Mackenzie King conversation of May 20, and the Roosevelt–Mackenzie King conversation of May 21, see the editorial notes, ante, pp. 123, 141, and 151.

² Mackenzie King attended the joint session of the houses of Congress on May 19 at which Churchill made his address. He also attended the Congressional luncheon and the meeting with the members of the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees which followed. See Pickersgill, pp. 605–606.

³ For the record of the meeting of the Pacific War Council, see ante, p. 134.
J. EMERGENCY MEASURES FOR REFUGEES

Editorial Note

For related documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. I, index entries under “Refugees From Europe and the Middle East, governmental efforts for relief of”, and especially (for the immediate background of the discussions of the Trident Conference) Hull’s memorandum of May 7, 1943, and Roosevelt’s reply of May 14, ibid., pp. 176–179.

The Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I recently had occasion to direct your attention to the refugee situation in connection with the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference which proposed a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee to carry on the work.

As my mind approaches the subject matter to be discussed and the questions to be decided by the Committee which it is now proposed to start in London and to continue in Washington, certain doubts assert themselves.

A meeting of that character would attract world-wide attention. It could not be allowed to fail. Unless the American and British Governments were determined in advance as to the purposes which they would pursue and as to the extent to which they would commit

1 The source text is endorsed “CH OK FDR” in Roosevelt’s handwriting. It was returned to Hull from the White House under cover of the following memorandum, dated June 11, 1943, from Roosevelt: “Will you bring this up to date? I have heard nothing from Winston Churchill who said he would let me know and has done nothing further. I think it is just as well to send this as is. If you approve, go ahead. F.D.R.” No record of any discussion between Roosevelt and Churchill regarding this paper or any other phase of the refugee problem has been found. Such a discussion was referred to in the memorandum of conversation by Assistant Secretary of State Long, dated June 4, 1943, the memorandum of conversation by Hull, dated June 17, 1943, the memorandum of conversation by Welles, dated June 24, 1943, the memorandum from Long to Hull, dated June 29, 1943, and the telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated June 30, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. I, pp. 309, 313, 319, and 321, respectively. These references indicate some discrepancy of views as to what Roosevelt and Churchill had actually discussed. In this connection, a memorandum of June 15, 1943, from R. Borden Reams of the Division of European Affairs to Long, not printed, reads in part as follows: “Mr. Hayter called today to state that a reply had been received from Mr. Churchill stating that he had not discussed the Intergovernmental Committee with the President. He had talked to the President about a refugee camp in North Africa.” (840.48 Refugees/4034½)

themselves on financial accounts, the Conference could not come to any satisfactory conclusions.

Attached is a telegram directed to London which was prepared after the receipt of your recent memorandum on this matter. The Department has been in telegraphic correspondence with the British Foreign Office and has discussed the matter on several occasions with Mr. Law, Parliamentary Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, now in the United States. Before proceeding further with it the thought occurs to me that its extreme importance from the psychological point of view would probably justify consultation by you with Mr. Churchill.

1. Expressed concretely, refugees who may need attention and protection are found in the following places in the following approximate number:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>4,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>13,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 73,050

2. It is impractical to estimate accurately the cost of transfer by vessel and maintenance of the individual on a yearly basis, but considering the short haul to some part of Africa, a figure of $2,000 per capita per annum is considered not unreasonable. The moving of all these 73,000 on that basis would cost $150,000,000. The estimate should include repatriation at the end of the war.

3. The determination is to be made whether it would be possible to limit the Intergovernmental Committee's participation in the plan for the succor and transit of the refugees to a place of temporary refuge where Governor Lehman's relief organization could take up the relief activities during their temporary residence, provided there is legal authority under existing legislation to permit it and provided further that the British join on equal terms.

If you could present this matter to the consideration of Mr. Churchill and arrive at some common decision with him as to what extent our respective Governments could be committed at the suggested Intergovernmental Committee meeting it would seem to be justifiable to proceed with that meeting, with the assurance of achieving some

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success. Lacking an understanding of the attitudes of our respective Governments it would seem that the Conference could not accomplish a very useful purpose.

Those persons who have escaped from German control or who may escape in the future can be forwarded to places of temporary refuge till the successful ending of the war will assure them the right to return to their homes.

I am attaching a telegram which I would propose to send to London in case it is justified by the conclusions you will reach with the Prime Minister.4

Respectfully,  

Correll Hull

4 The draft telegram has not been found. For final text see telegram 3879, June 25, 1943, to London, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. 1, p. 190.

Lot 60 D 224

Memorandum Prepared by the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy 2

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1943.

LIMITS OF LAND SETTLEMENT IN LIBYA

[The first four numbered sections of the memorandum consist of a ten-page survey of the geography of Libya, arranged under the following headings: I. The Land, A. Areas for European Settlement, (1) Tripolitania, (2) Cyrenaica; II. Italian Improvements, A. Dry-Farming, B. Subterranean Waters; III. Population, A. Number of Italian Colonists; IV. Italian Colonization, A. Size of Colonists’ Holdings, B. Land Tenure, C. Factors in Italian Colonization.]

2 Attached to the source text is a handwritten chit by Harley Notter, dated August 3, 1943, which reads: “This is that missing document that was prepared on secret instrucrs while Churchill was here.” Notter’s handwritten marginal notation on the first page of the source text reads as follows: “Sent to Pres. Roosevelt 8 p.m. May 22 by Dr. Bowman.” In a memorandum of May 24, 1943, to Leo Pasvolsky (printed in Notter, p. 514), Isaiah Bowman, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, described the preparation and delivery of this memorandum. According to this account, Bowman met privately with Roosevelt at the White House on May 18, 1943, at the latter’s request, and discussed the question of Libya. Roosevelt asked Bowman to prepare a memorandum on the subject for his personal use in connection with a conversation with Churchill scheduled for May 23. The memorandum, which was prepared by specialists on the Research Staff of the Department of State, was delivered to the White House late on May 22, 1943.

Included among the Roosevelt Papers is the following memorandum of May 21, 1943, from Roosevelt to Churchill: “I have started to get a brief report on Libya and Tripoli and we will have it by Sunday.” It is likely that this memorandum was taken up by Roosevelt and Churchill at their meeting on the evening of Sunday, May 23, 1943; see the editorial note, ante, p. 188
V. POSSIBILITIES OF FUTURE LAND SETTLEMENT

Limits to future land settlement may be set by the technical aspects—the amounts of arable land available, the supply of water and the degree to which the land is already settled. The possibilities of settlement are also subject to political considerations.

Although no precise figures exist on the quantity of land available, an insight into the situation may be gained from Italian experience. In 1922 the Italian Government began to acquire land for settlement by dispossessing the Arab occupiers and by 1938 had acquired 875,000 acres. In view of the official objective, the Government probably selected the land best suited for agricultural settlement. Yet this amount was not entirely available for cultivation, including as it did, large areas of rocky land, sand dunes, ravines and eroded soil in addition to areas fit only for grazing, as in the coastal plains of Cyrenaica. It is not surprising, therefore, that of the 875,000 acres acquired by the Italian Government, only 200,000 acres had been developed by 1937 and an additional 160,000 acres by 1938, a total of 360,000 acres. On this area, including the large concessions, were settled from 1921 to 1938 only 30,000 Italian agriculturists. Settlement of an additional 20,000 persons was proposed by the Italian Government in 1939–40 for which the sum of 450,000,000 lire, or $22,500,000, was budgeted. None of these persons were settled in Libya.

It has been suggested, on the basis of the Italian figures, that the best land has already been used for settlement. All the Italian settlers were placed in areas having 10 or more inches of rain. It seems certain that additional numbers of settlers, whether from Italy or from Central Europe, would find the land increasingly marginal for profitable exploitation.

It may be suggested also that, considering the population pressure in Italy, the nationalistic fervor of Fascism and the prestige factors involved, more Italians would have settled in Libya had land and water been available in sufficient quantities and quality. Italians did migrate to Libya but they found their places in the cities and not on the land.

In Libya, however, it is not so much a question of land, poor and scanty as it is, but rather a question of available water. It is also this factor which has limited Italian settlement and which must continue to limit large scale settlement.

From the evidence available it would seem that a large increase of cultivable area and of the agricultural population by use of surface water is impossible. Further increase by use of high-level wells must also be ruled out as these are already inadequate for present demands. Further drilling may endanger the present flow. This is a problem to be scientifically explored on the spot.
Increase of land through irrigation by artesian wells cannot be pronounced feasible on the basis of present information. The water table is not the only problem. There is also a question of the salinity of water, already necessitating the irrigation of crops only once every three years in areas where artesian wells are being used.

Some increase of agricultural land can be expected by the use of water pumped and brought in by aqueducts. The Italian authorities estimated that a total of 40,000 settlers or about 30,000 additional persons could be settled on Akhdar, with a provision of about 25 gallons of water per day per person, when the aqueduct is completed. An additional 1,500 or 2,000 persons were also expected to be settled on Jebel Nefusa in Tripolitania when the aqueduct and the canals on this mountain were completed. Some additional agricultural settlement may be made by the use of dry farming but it seems apparent that the Italians have pushed beyond the profitable limits, given the current yields and the competition of other areas as measured by market prices.

Additional land for settlement is also restricted by the fact that land both agricultural and pastoral, other than state domain, is becoming increasingly overpopulated in Libya. Approximately 625,000 of the 875,000 acres incorporated by the Italians into state domain was taken from the Arabs whose early resentment was manifested in rebellion. In the expropriation of 1937–38 clashes were reported between the Italian government and pastoral Arabs, who have remained sullen and restive at the loss of their lands. This attitude has continued notwithstanding the digging of new wells and the creation of new Arab agricultural settlements on marginal land.

Should additional land be acquired for agricultural settlements, particularly for settlers to whom the Arabs are hostile, the present competition between pastoral Arabs for grazing land for increasing herds and flocks and agriculturists for cultivable land, is likely to break into open conflict. The basic struggle between the economy of the Arabs and of European Jews now existing in Palestine would thus be carried into Libya.

Under these conditions it may be suggested that between 32,000 and 35,000 additional settlers or a total of about 60,000 to 65,000 could be settled on land in Libya. To settle even this number, consideration of other conditions seem essential. Among these are:

(1) The placing of the entire holdings of the Italian settlers at the disposal of new settlers by expropriation or purchase.
(2) The repairing and reconstruction of the buildings and public utilities on the present settlements, where they have been damaged by war and by pillaging Arabs;
(3) Completion of aqueducts and canals;
(4) The clearance of land and construction of new buildings for the new settlers. It may be noted that it required 32,000 laborers seven months to prepare the land and buildings for settlement of 1,800 families in 1938;

(5) Provision of essential funds for these operations and for the maintenance of the settlers until they are self-supporting. In the case of Italian settlers, the Italian government expected to subsidize them for at least five years after settlement and in the case of settlers growing olives—which was the majority—to subsidize such settlers for 15 years;

(6) Settlement of political difficulties with the local Arab and Moslem population and with the Arab and Moslem world, not only in relation to the new settlers but also in relation to the place and prestige of the powers and International Organization among the Arabs and Moslems.

VI. ARAB AND MOSLEM OPPOSITION

The settlement of Libya by Jewish refugees would undoubtedly meet hostile opposition from local Arabs and from the Arab and Moslem world in general.

A. Opposition of Libyan Arabs

The Libyan Arabs would reject any settlement which would threaten their grazing land and facilitate the infiltration of European Jews into the cities. For political reasons also the settlement and the International Organization responsible for it, would be met with hostility, particularly by the Senussi.

The Senussi, who form the most powerful of the north African Arab brotherhoods, are already evincing increasing strength. The London Times has already written of their incipient nationalism, to which their recent employment as auxiliary troops by the British may have contributed. Mr. Eden, speaking in the House of Commons, on January 8, 1943 [1942], stated the determination of the British Government that the Senussi should not fall again under Italian domination. It would seem probable that settlement of refugees could be made without use of force only if the acquiescence of the local Arabs is obtained through some form of negotiation.

B. Opposition of Other Arab and Moslem Countries

The settlement of Jews in Libya would undoubtedly lead to protests throughout the Arab and Moslem world. Part of the Arab hostility to Jewish immigration into Palestine has been occasioned by fear that Jews desired to acquire domination of other Arab countries. The establishment of Jews in Libya with the aid of the United Nations would presumably be regarded by Arabs as an indication that those ambitions had received the support of the responsible United Nations,

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which already are believed by most Arabs to desire the creation of the feared Jewish State in Palestine.

Egypt as a neighboring Arab state which has officially voiced its desire to further Arab interests and in which unofficial interest has been manifested in the extension of its frontier into Libya, would apparently not view with sympathy Jewish settlement in Libya. It has already opposed further Jewish immigration in Palestine.

Iraq, which officially and unofficially has shown its interest in Pan-Arabism and its opposition to Zionism might also be expected to oppose Jewish immigration into Libya unless the number of settlers were set at a definite limit and unless the settlement as a whole were related to a solution of the Palestine question in accordance with moderate Arab wishes.

The securing of acquiescence of Arabs and Moslems would undoubtedly involve negotiations with Arab leaders in Libya, notably in the Senussi, and in countries from Iraq to Morocco. In such negotiation, the solution of the Palestine question, the limitation of the number of settlers to be introduced into Libya, guarantees for Arab land holders, and provisions for capital expenditure on behalf of the Arabs would be among the conditions which the Arabs might raise if their settlement in Libya is to be won.

[Here follow five pages of tables and bibliography.]

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Hopkins Papers

Prime Minister Churchill's Chief of Staff (Ismay) to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 24 May, 1943.

PRIME MINISTER.

CAMP IN NORTH AFRICA FOR REFUGEES FROM SPAIN

With reference to your Minute on my note at Flag A. The present position is shown in Lord Halifax's telegram to the Foreign Office at Flag B.  

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3 It cannot be ascertained when this document was passed to Roosevelt or Hopkins, but the available evidence indicates that this was done at the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on the evening of May 24 when the subject of refugees probably came up for discussion; see the editorial note, ante, p. 197.

2 "Flag A" marked Churchill's handwritten note at the end of Ismay's minute of May 21, 1943, to Churchill; see footnote 8 to Ismay's minute, below.

4 "Flag B" marked a telegram of May 22, 1943, from Halifax to Eden which was attached to this minute. Halifax's telegram reads as follows:

"I reminded Mr. Hull today about the camp in North Africa for refugees from Spain. The present position is that the State Department have told us orally that agreement in principle will shortly be reached for the creation of a camp. But we have had no confirmation of this, and the United States Chiefs of Staff are still on record as opposing it. The question is now in the hands of the President. Mr. Hull promised to try and push it forward."

Hull's memorandum of his conversation with Halifax on May 22, 1943, printed ante, p. 178, makes no mention of this particular subject.
I submit that you should now go into action with the President on this matter.

H. L. ISMAY

[Attachment 1]

Prime Minister Churchill's Chief of Staff (Ismay) to Prime Minister Churchill

MOST SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1943.

PRIME MINISTER.

CAMP IN NORTH AFRICA FOR REFUGEES FROM SPAIN
(See ALCOVE 305 attached) (Flag 'A')

At the International Refugees Conference recently held in Bermuda, the British Delegates suggested the setting up of a small refugee camp in North Africa to which refugees in Spain, who had escaped from France, could be moved. The proposal was that these refugees should be moved on to some more distant place of refuge when shipping was available. The reasons underlying these proposals are set out in ALCOVE 305.

The U.S. Delegation to the Refugee Conference felt themselves unable to agree without the approval of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This was sought through the State Department.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff, however, recommended that the British proposals should not be accepted for the following military reasons:

(a) shortage of personnel shipping;
(b) shortage of cargo shipping;
(c) additional burden placed on the shoulders of the theatre commander;
(d) possibility of Arab resentment to the influx of Jews which might cause disorder.

The Joint Staff Mission took the matter up with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and pointed out how important it was that the only effective channel of escape for refugees of all nationalities from occupied Europe should not be blocked, since if it were, admission of further refugees would be prevented by the Spanish Government; the Allies would be deprived of useful personnel and public opinion throughout the world would believe that the Allies were making no serious effort to deal with the refugee problem. It was argued further that the establishment of a refugee camp in North Africa, far from the Allied lines of communication and under proper supervision, would be no embarrassment to the theatre commander.

1 Printed as attachment 3, post, p. 345.
2 The British proposal referred to here is described in telegram 127, April 21, 1943, from Hamilton, Bermuda, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. 1, p. 158.
3 The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were set forth in Leahy's letter of April 26, 1943, to Hull, ibid., p. 296.
It was also pointed out that if these refugees remained in Spain, the Spanish Government would be under continual pressure by the German Government to return them and that the shipping of relatively small numbers from Spain to North Africa would not be difficult.

The Joint Staff Mission suggested that, in view of the above arguments, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should inform the State Department and Foreign Office that they saw no objection, on military grounds, to the setting up of an internment camp in North Africa, at a spot to be selected in consultation with the theatre commander.

Later the U.S. Chiefs of Staff informed the Joint Staff Mission that they adhered to their view that it was militarily undesirable to set up a refugee camp in North Africa for the reasons they had already stated.\footnote{7}

The Embassy then took the matter up with the State Department and the latter are understood to have suggested to the President that he should override the objections of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This they believe he will do.

The Ambassador was proposing to ask Mr. Hull tomorrow morning how the matter stood. You may wish to await the results of this interview before approaching the President.\footnote{8}

H. L. ISMAIY

[Attachment 2]

Memorandum by President Roosevelt's Adviser (Baruch)\footnote{9}

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

SETTLEMENT IN NORTHERN AFRICA: RE REFUGEES: \footnote{10}

The President's suggestion to look up Italian plans for settlement might bring immediate practical results.\footnote{11}

Inquiry to be made as to titles of land, soil and possibilities of compounding water for power irrigation.

If titles are found to be in the Italian Government, matters will be simplified. It will also be satisfactory, if the Italians took over the land from the inhabitants.

\footnote{1}{See the letter of May 7, 1943, from Leahy to Hull, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 299.}
\footnote{2}{Churchill wrote the following note at the end of this minute and connected it with a line to the word "President" in the final paragraph: "Yes. I will intervene if necessary." W.S.C. 22.V"}
\footnote{3}{There is no indication as to when and by what means this memorandum was transmitted to Churchill. A copy of this memorandum is included also in the Roosevelt Papers.}
\footnote{4}{The words "Re refugees" are written in Baruch's hand in the source text.}
\footnote{5}{Roosevelt's suggestion referred to here probably was made at the luncheon with Churchill on May 17, 1943, at which Baruch was present; see the editorial note, ante, p. 96.}
I am wondering if the doors of all countries cannot be opened to a few of the refugees. Each one taking a few, would soon take care of many.

The present position of the United States and Britain and the United Nations victories would make the opening up of that possibility greater now than at any other time. They might be persuaded in order to show their adherence to the four freedoms.

B M BARUCH

[Attachment 3—Telegram]

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

ALCOVE No. 305. Following for the Prime Minister from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Personal.

I am dismayed and depressed by the refusal of the United States Chiefs of Staff to agree to our recommendation that a small camp should be established in North Africa into which to draft refugees from Spain. This suggestion has long been pressed forward by us, on the most urgent representations from H.M. Ambassador in Madrid, and has, I understand, the energetic support of the State Department. It is our main hope of getting refugees out of Spain and so not only satisfying British and American Public opinion, but also keeping open the escape routes from France into Spain which are essential to our military and intelligence services.

2. This is the only remaining way of getting our pilots and other prisoners out of France. The reasons given by the Chiefs of Staff for rejecting this suggestion are not very convincing, and should I think be overridden by the higher considerations mentioned. The numbers involved are not large and agreement to open a camp even for 1,000 would ease the situation. It is difficult to believe that this would put any particular strain on shipping, while as for administration it could be undertaken by Governor Lehman's organisation or we, as was suggested at the Bermuda Conference, would be willing to run the camp with our own officials. As for last objection, namely resentment on the part of the Arabs this could surely be eliminated by putting the camp in a place sufficiently remote from important Arab centres.

3. The refugees, even while they are in Spain, have to be fed and maintained to a considerable extent from American and British sources, and removal to North Africa, which appears to us essential if we are not to have a serious risk of the Spaniards closing their frontier tight, is we think the most economical suggestion from the point of

Sir Samuel Hoare.
view of both shipping and supplies. It must inevitably become known in due course that failure to get the "Hard Core" of refugees in Spain removed to the nearest and most convenient alternative destination is due to American military objections which will hardly be accepted as plausible. In that case I foresee extremely serious Parliamentary criticism.

4. If you see no objection I should be most grateful if you could put all this personally to the President—it is our last hope of carrying through a modest suggestion to which we attach great political and military importance.13

13 The source text bears the following notation in Churchill's handwriting: "Gen Ismay—Please report on this before I see the President. WSC-20. V"

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Editorial Note

In the weeks following the Trident Conference further discussions took place on refugee questions, and on July 9, 1943, Roosevelt informed Hull that he had approved and sent to Churchill a message prepared by the Department of State on the subject. This message proposed the transfer of some five or six thousand refugees from Spain to French North Africa and then to places of "more permanent settlement for the duration" of the war, with their continued care thereafter to be under the auspices and jurisdiction of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. Churchill agreed to this proposal on July 10. See Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. I, pp. 322–324. For subsequent developments, see ibid., pp. 324 ff.

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K. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Hopkins Papers

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

C.C.S. 242

Draft of Agreed Decisions

The attached paper sets out the agreed decisions that have been reached so far by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the present

1 This paper was prepared by the Secretaries in pursuance of a directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff made at their meeting on May 21; see ante, p. 146. The paper was considered paragraph by paragraph in the course of the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 21; see ante, p. 152. As then revised, the paper was redesignated C.C.S. 242/1, May 23, 1943 (not printed). A revision of C.C.S. 242/1 was prepared by the Secretaries in the light of the most recent decisions and was designated C.C.S. 242/2, May 23, 1943; that revision is printed infra.
conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These decisions still need to be related to the resources available and particularly to the availability of shipping and landing craft. This is being done and a final report will be submitted to you on Monday, 24 May 1943.²

[Attachment]

Draft Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

[Draft of Agreed Decisions]

1. AZORES ISLANDS

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have already submitted to the President and the Prime Minister the following recommendations:³

a. That the acquisition of the Azores Islands should be accomplished as soon as possible and, in any event, early enough for them to be utilized by the United Nations during the winter of 1943–1944.

b. That an effort should first be made to secure the use of these islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese Government.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed:

a. That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation and use of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings and the effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view.

b. That as soon as these plans have been approved preparations should be made to implement them in case diplomatic efforts should fail.

2. THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U.S.-British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.⁴

²See C.C.S. 242/3, May 24, 1943, post, p. 359.
³The recommendations and agreements regarding the Azores were formulated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meetings on May 15 and 17; see ante, pp. 85 and 91.
⁴Regarding the plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom, see C.C.S. 217, May 14, 1943, ante, p. 239.
The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and April 1, 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

3. DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:—

a. That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944:

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (Simultaneously loaded in landing craft)
         2 Infantry Divisions—Follow-up
         2 Airborne Divisions

Total 9 Divisions in the Assault

Build-up: 20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment area

Total 29 Divisions

b. That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of Husky as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Each specific operation will be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for Husky will not be considered available.

c. The above resolution shall be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in July or early in August, the date to be decided later, in order that the situation may be examined in the light of the result of Husky and the situation in Russia.

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5 This resolution was formulated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the afternoon of May 19; see ante, p. 118.
4. BURMA–CHINA THEATER

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:—

a. The concentration of available resources as first priority within the Assam–Burma Theater on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early Fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to—

(1) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
(2) Maintaining increased American air forces in China;
(3) Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.

b. Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

c. The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations.

d. The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

5. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC—1943–44

The courses of action examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the conclusions reached by them are as follows:—

a. Far Eastern Theater.

(1) Operations in Burma To Augment Supplies to China.
Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan and to keeping China in the war.

(2) Air Operations in and From China.
Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential.

b. Pacific Theater.

(1) Operations in the Solomons and Bismarck Archipelago.
Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressure on Japan, and the defense of Australia.

(2) Operations in New Guinea.
The capture of New Guinea will facilitate the opening of a line of communications to the Celebes Sea and contribute to the defense of Australia.

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6 These resolutions were formulated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their closed session on the afternoon of May 20; see ante, p. 142.
7 These conclusions are those set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the enclosure to C.C.S. 239/1, May 23, 1943, ante, p. 303, as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 21; see ante, p. 148.
(3) Operations in Eastern Netherlands East Indies.
Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture of New Guinea.

Shortens line of communications to Southwest Pacific and Celebes Sea.

(5) Operations in the Caroline Islands.
Necessary to gain control of central Pacific, thereby facilitating establishment of line of communications to Celebes Sea. Will enable United Nations forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

(6) Intensification of Operations Against Enemy Lines of Communication.
All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific.

Conclusions:

a. Offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943–1944 should have the following objectives:

(1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.
(2) Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China.
(3) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
(4) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
(5) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.
(6) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and amphibious craft.

6. RE-ARMING OF THE FRENCH IN NORTH AFRICA

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the re-arming and re-equipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and United States forces in the various theaters.

7. BOMBING OF PLOESTI

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the United States Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to pre-
sent to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Roumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa or Syria. Further, that the Commander in Chief of the North African Theater should be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

J. C. S. Files

Draft Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

C.C.S. 242/2

WASHINGTON,] 23 May 1943.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE FINAL AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

I. OVERALL OBJECTIVE

In conjunction with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

II. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

a. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

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1 This draft report was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: "The attached draft is a revision of C.C.S. 242/1. It has been prepared by the Combined Secretariat in the light of the most recent decisions taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." For the earlier version of this report, see C.C.S. 242, May 21, 1943, supra. This draft report was considered and revised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 24, 1943 (ante, p. 184). For the text as revised, see C.C.S. 242/3, May 24, 1943, infra.

2 Supra.
Proposed by C.P.S.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced.

c. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

a. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

Proposed by C.P.S.

b. Support and maintain the war making capacity of our forces in all areas (to which committed).

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

Proposed by C.P.S.

d. Intensify the air offensive from the United Kingdom and concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

Amendment Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff

Alter to read:
“To maintain, and so far as is consistent with a above, to extend . . .”

Omit

Proposed by C.P.S.

Reletter as c and amend to read:
“Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.”

Add new paragraph:
“d. Take all necessary and practicable measures to draw land and air forces from the Russian Front.”
Note: The basic undertakings noted under d (proposed by C.P.S.) and c and d (proposed by British Chiefs of Staff) are now included under “Specific Operations,” and should be omitted here.

e. Sustain the Soviet Forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia without militating against the attainment of the overall objectives.

Proposed by C.P.S.  
Amendment Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff

f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide China with a volume of supplies sufficient to keep China actively in the war against Japan.

Amend to read: “f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to keep China actively in the war against Japan.”

g. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI a.)

h. To prepare the French Army in North Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis powers. (See also Section VI b.)

IV. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR 1943-44 IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interests should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.

1. The U-Boat War

a. Operation To Seize the Azores Islands.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the success of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex, and that the preparation of the plan for the capture of the Azores Islands is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that in the first place the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at present the earliest date for

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3 Not printed as such, but its text can be reconstructed from the annex to C.O.S. 242/6, post, p. 372, and from footnotes 5 and 7 thereto.
the arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the middle of August.

b. Other Anti-U-Boat Measures.

All possible measures for strengthening the air forces engaged in the Bay Offensive and for increasing the number of VLR aircraft engaged in convoy protection have been examined and such steps as are possible are being taken.

c. Flexibility of Forces.

The necessity for flexibility in the utilization of both air and sea forces has been agreed, and steps to improve matters in this respect are being constantly studied and implemented.

2. Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe

a. Combined Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U. S.–British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

b. Cross-Channel Operations.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944:

**Assault:**
- 5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).
- 2 Infantry Divisions—Follow-up.
- 2 Airborne Divisions.

**Total 9 Divisions in the Assault.**

**Build-up:**
- 20 Divisions available for movement into lodgement area.

**Total 29 Divisions**

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom and the seizure and development of Continental ports will be undertaken
in order that the initial assault and build-up forces may be augmented subsequent to 1 May 1944 by shipment from the United States of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

c. Operations in the Mediterranean To Eliminate Italy From the War.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That the Allied Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of Husky as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Each specific operation will be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander-in-Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for Husky will not be considered available. It is estimated that 19 British and allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean Area subsequent to Husky. These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the United Kingdom and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to Turkey. It is further estimated that there will be available after Husky a total of 3,622 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 1,986 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives.

d. Bombing of Ploesti.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U. S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa and Syria. Further, they have agreed that the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, should be

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* The British commitment of two armoured divisions was part of the planned military support which the British were to provide in the event of Turkey entering the war. The whole plan, which was known by the name HARDHOO and which the British and Turks discussed in detail in mid-April 1943 in Ankara, is described in John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. v: August 1943–September 1944 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), p. 90, in the series History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series.
asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.

3. Operations for the Defeat of Japan

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required for its implementation.


The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:

(1) The concentration of available resources, as first priority within the Assam-Burma Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:

(a) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
(b) Maintaining increased American air forces in China; and
(c) Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.

(2) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma road.

(3) The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations, with possible exploitation.

(4) The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

(5) The continuance of administrative preparations in India for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of Anakim. (This has not yet been agreed.)


Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake have the following objects:

(1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.
(2) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
(3) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
(4) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese-held New Guinea.
(5) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

V. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT—1943–44

We have examined our resources with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the above operations and our conclusions are as follows:
Ground Forces.
1. All the ground forces required can be made available.

Naval Forces.
2. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture Akyab and Ramree, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated some diversion of U.S. naval forces may be required. Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.

Air Forces.
3. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.

4. For Cross-Channel operations there will be sufficient air forces in the U.K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of which needs further investigation. In the absence of any detailed plan for Cross-Channel operations, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements of gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study, which we are initiating.

5. For operations in Burma there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater.

6. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in Assam, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into China, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft.
7. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U.S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available. We have agreed upon the necessary allocations.

Supply of Critical Items.
8. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend that the possibilities of providing the necessary items, and particularly steel, should be further examined.

Shipping.
9. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate, personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United
Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943/1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.

Oil.

10. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters but we feel that the whole question of stocks and of tankers will require urgent examination in the light of decisions taken at the Trident Conference.

VI. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

1. Equipment for Turkey.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the Anfa Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignment[s] Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of the equipment as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least possible delay.


The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U.S. forces in the various theaters. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored.

VII. OTHER CONFERENCES

a. Decisions of the Casablanca conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.

b. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the situation in the light of the results of Husky and the situation in Italy and Russia.

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*Regarding the agreement referred to here, see item 2 of the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, January 20, 1943, 10 a.m., Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 659.*
Draft Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

C.C.S. 242/3

[WASHINGTON,] 24 May 1943.

TRIDENT: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE FINAL AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

I. OVERALL OBJECTIVE

In conjunction with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

II. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

1. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

3. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first

1 This draft report, which is a revision of the earlier draft, C.C.S. 242/2, May 23, 1943, supra, was reviewed and amended by Roosevelt and Churchill during their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 24, 1943; for the record of that meeting, see ante, p. 180. As revised during that meeting, the draft report was circulated as C.C.S. 242/4, May 24, 1943, not printed. For the final version of the Report, see C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, post, p. 304.
charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

4. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to keep Russia actively in the War.

7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to keep China actively in the war as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

8. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI 1.)

9. To prepare the French Army in North Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers. (See also Section VI 2.)

IV. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR 1943–44 IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interest should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. The U-Boat War

a. Operation To Seize the Azores Islands.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex. The preparation of the plan for the capture of the Azores Islands is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that in the first place the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor re-

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2 This annex is identical to the annex to C.C.S. 242/6, post, p. 371.
garding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at present
the earliest date for the arrival of the force in the Azores will be
about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, and sea
facilities of the Azores will be available to all United Nations forces.

b. Other Anti-U-Boat Measures.

[This subsection is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S.
242/2, ante, p. 354.]

c. Flexibility of Forces.

[This subsection is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S.
242/2, ante, p. 354.]

2. Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe

a. Combined Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom.

[This subsection is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S.
242/2, ante, p. 354.]

b. Cross-Channel Operations.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That forces and equipment shall be established in the United King-
dom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1
May 1944 to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further
offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will
be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and avail-
able for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944, in addition to the
air forces then available.

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in land-
ing craft).
               2 Infantry Divisions—Follow-up.
               2 Air borne Divisions.

Total 9 Divisions in the Assault.

Build-up: 20 Divisions available for movement into lodgement
           area.

Total 29 Divisions.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will
be undertaken immediately, and the seizure and development of Con-
tinental ports will be expedited in order that the initial assault and
build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the
United States of additional divisions and supporting units at the
rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

c. Operations in the Mediterranean To Eliminate Italy From the
War.

[This entire subsection is identical with the same subsection in
C.C.S. 242/2, ante, p. 355.]
d. Bombing of Ploesti.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U.S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa. Further, they have agreed that the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, will be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.


We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required.


The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:

[Subsection (1) of this section is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S. 242/2, ante, p. 356.]

(2) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations at the end of the 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma road.

[Subsections (3) and (4) of this section are identical with the same subsections in C.C.S. 242/2, ante, p. 356.]

(5) The continuance of administrative preparations in India for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of ANAKIM.


[This entire section is identical with the same section in C.C.S. 242/2, ante, p. 356.]

V. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 1943-44

[With the exception of the last section, section 10 on Oil, this entire part is identical with the same part in C.C.S. 242/2, ante, p. 356.]

Oil

10. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters, but the whole question of stocks and of tankers must receive urgent examination in the light of the decisions taken at the TRIDENT Conference.
VI. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

1. Equipment for Turkey.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the ANFA Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of such equipment as may be agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least practicable delay.


The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U. S. forces. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored.

VII. OTHER CONFERENCES

1. Decisions of the Casablanca conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the decisions reached at this conference in the light of the situation existing at the time.

J. C. S. Flees

Memorandum by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

C.C.S. 242/5

WASHINGTON,] 25 May 1943.

FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Following are changes in C.C.S. 242/4 which have been suggested by the Prime Minister:

1. At the bottom of page 4, add the following sentence:

"The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date."

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1 At their meeting on May 25, 1943 (ante, p. 199), the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the amendments set forth in this memorandum. For the final version of the "Final Report to the President and Prime Minister", see C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, infra.

2 As approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and incorporated into the final version of the Report, C.C.S. 242/6, this sentence appears in section 2b, immediately following the projected listing of divisions present and available for cross-Channel operations, post, p. 367.
2. At the end of the first paragraph on page 5, add the following subparagraph:

"The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to General Morgan. In addition, General Morgan will prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to Norway in the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent." 3

3. Subparagraph c on page 5, after the words "The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved" substitute the following:

"That the Allied Commander-in-Chief North Africa will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of Husky as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff." 4

H. REDMAN
J. R. DEANE
Combined Secretariat

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3 As approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and incorporated into the final version of the Report, C.C.S. 242/6, this paragraph appears as the final paragraph in section 2b, post, p. 367.
4 As approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and incorporated into the final version of the Report, C.C.S. 242/6, this section appears at the beginning of section 2c, post, p. 368.

J.C.S. Files
Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill 1

SECRET
Enclosure to C.C.S. 242/6

[WASHINGTON,] 25 May 1943.

TRIDENT: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE FINAL AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242) 2 the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present

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1 This report was circulated as an enclosure to the following memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff: "The Enclosure is the final report on the results of the Trident Conference as approved by the President and the Prime Minister on 25 May 1943." This text includes the changes to C.C.S. 242/3, ante, p. 359, made by Roosevelt and Churchill and incorporated in C.C.S. 242/4, not printed, as well as those further modifications to C.C.S. 242/4 contained in C.C.S. 242/5, supra, and the amendments agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 25, 1943, the record of which is printed ante, p. 199. Roosevelt and Churchill gave their final approval to this report during their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 25, 1943; for the record of that meeting, see ante, p. 203.
2 Ante, p. 346.
Conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

I. OVERALL OBJECTIVE

In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers.

II. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

1. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

3. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

4. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in
order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

8. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI 1.)

9. To prepare the French Forces in Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis powers. (See also Section VI 2.)

IV. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR 1943–44 IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interests should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. The U-boat War

a. Operation To Seize the Azores Islands

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex. The preparation of the plan for the capture of the Azores Islands is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that in the first place the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at present the earliest date for the arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, and sea facilities of the Azores will be available to all United Nations forces.

The possibility of an earlier move on the Azores will receive further study. Meanwhile, the political decision involved will be settled by the two Governments.

b. Other Anti-U-boat Measures

All possible measures for strengthening the air forces engaged in the Bay of Biscay Offensive and for increasing the number of VLR aircraft engaged in convoy protection have been examined and such steps as are practicable are being taken.

c. Flexibility of Forces

The necessity for flexibility in the utilization of both air and sea forces has been agreed, and steps to improve matters in this respect are being constantly studied and implemented.
2. Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe

a. Combined Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U. S.–British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

b. Cross-Channel Operations

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).

2 Infantry Divisions—Follow-up.

2 Air-borne Divisions.

Total 9 Divisions in the Assault.

Build-up: 20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment area.

Total 29 Divisions.

The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault, the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to General Morgan. In addition, General Morgan will prepare and submit to

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*For a discussion of the directive of April 23, 1943, to Morgan, see Harrison, pp. 49–49.
the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to Norway in the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent.\footnote{See the supplementary directive to Morgan, enclosure B to C.C.S. 250/1, May 25, 1943, War, p. 286.}

c. Operations in the Mediterranean To Eliminate Italy From the War

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of Husky as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the War and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for Husky will not be considered available. It is estimated that the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean area subsequent to Husky. These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the United Kingdom and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to Turkey. It is further estimated that there will be available after Husky a total of 3,648 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives.

d. Bombing of Ploesti

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U. S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa. Further, they have agreed that the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, will be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.

3. Operations for the Defeat of Japan

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an ap-
preciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required.

a. Operations in the Burma–China Theater

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:

(1) The concentration of available resources, as first priority within the Assam–Burma Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:

(a) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
(b) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China; and
(c) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

(2) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations at the end of the 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

(3) The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations, with possible exploitation.

(4) The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

(5) The continuance of administrative preparations in India for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of ANAKIM.

b. Operations in the Pacific

Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake have the following objects:

(1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.
(2) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
(3) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
(4) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.
(5) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

V. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 1943–44

We have examined our resources with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the above operations and our conclusions are as follows:

Ground Forces

1. All the ground forces required can be made available.
Naval Forces

2. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture Akyab and Ramree, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated some diversion of U. S. Naval forces may be required. Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.

Air Forces

3. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.

4. For cross-Channel operations there will be sufficient air forces in the U. K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of which needs further investigation. In the absence of any detailed plan for cross-Channel operations, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements in gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study, which we are initiating.

5. For operations in Burma there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater.

6. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in Assam, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into China, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft

7. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U. S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available. We have agreed upon the necessary allocations.

Supply of Critical Items

8. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend that the possibilities of providing the necessary items, and particularly steel, should be further examined.

Shipping

9. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate, personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected
operations for 1943/1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.

Oil

10. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters, but the whole question of stocks and of tankers must receive urgent examination in the light of the decisions taken at the Trident Conference.

VI. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

1. Equipment for Turkey

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the ANFA Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of such equipment as may be agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least practicable delay.

2. Re-Arming of the French in North Africa

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U.S. forces. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored.

VII. OTHER CONFERENCES

1. Decisions of the Casablanca Conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the decisions reached at this Conference in the light of the situation existing at the time.

Annex

ADVANTAGES TO BE GAINED BY THE USE OF THE AZORES

1. Experience has shown that so long as we can keep even a single aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, the operation of U-boats is greatly hampered. In order to obtain maximum air protection at the present time it is necessary for the U.S.-U.K. convoys to follow a northerly route which not only suffers from the dis-
advantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time, we lose shore-based air protection over a large part of the passage.

There is the further peril of U-boat concentrations against the U. S.-Mediterranean convoys. We regard the immediate occupation of the Azores as imperative to conserve lives and shipping and, above all, to shorten the War.  

2. The facilities which we particularly require are as follows:

a. Facilities in the Azores on Terceira for operating V.L.R. aircraft;

b. Unrestricted fueling facilities for naval escorts at either San Miguel or Fayal.

3. The benefits which would accrue from these facilities may be summarized as follows:

a. They would give us a much extended air cover for all convoys plying between:

(1) U.S.A. or West Indies and the Mediterranean;
(2) West Indies and the U.K.;
(3) South America and the U.K.;
(4) U.K. and the Mediterranean;
(5) U.K. and West Africa, and the Cape and Eastwards.

b. The increased areas under air cover would give us much greater scope for evasive routing, e.g., when U-boats were concentrated in northern waters, North Atlantic convoys could be routed via the Azores instead of always having to follow the Iceland (C) route. (See diagram.  

c. Without the Azores we shall always be moving on the outside of the circle while the enemy operates inside it. Air forces there would be centrally placed to cover all varieties of the U-boat campaign against the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters.

d. We should be able to increase our carrying capacity owing to the possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of the Atlantic.

e. We could increase our harassing action against U-boats not only when on passage to and from the Biscay bases, but also while resting,
refueling and recharging their batteries in mid-ocean where hitherto they have been practically immune from interference by aircraft. New detection and attacking devices, which are expected to come into service this spring, would enhance the effect of such action.

f. Unrestricted fueling facilities in the Islands would enable us to make better use of our inadequate numbers of surface escorts.

g. Blockade running between Germany and Japan would be rendered so hazardous as not to be worth the risk.

h. German warships and raiders would have greater difficulty in evading detection after breaking out into the Atlantic.

i. The Islands would provide more direct all-weather air supply routes from U. S. A. to Europe, Africa, and the Far East.7

7 In the annex to C.C.S. 242/2 (see ante, p. 333) subparagraph i reads as follows: "The Islands would prove useful staging points on the air supply routes from the U.S.A. to the Mediterranean theaters of operations."

L. PROPOSED COMMUNIQUÉ

Hopkins Papers

Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill1

[WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.]

There has been a complete meeting of minds on

A. The war in the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia
B. The war in China—southern Asia
C. War in the Near East
D. War in all parts of the Mediterranean
E. War in the Atlantic N.—South

All related to each other in regard to transportation.

After successful completion of N. African campaign one phase of the Casablanca plans was completed and the next phase was initiated.

The need of a further staff conference was therefore clear in order to take up further steps. And the C. C. of S. has agreed on further steps in the overall planning.

It is important to state that these further steps included every theatre of the war.

This phase of the conduct of war affairs [is?] in a more satisfactory condition than when the C. C. of S. met in Casablanca.

1 This draft statement is in Hopkins' handwriting on White House stationery. It appears to be the statement prepared by Hopkins and read by him during the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 25, 1943, ante, p. 204.
This integrated with anti submarine campaign which is showing greater success last month.

The Pres, the Prime Minister and the staffs also discussed in greater detail the temporary civil–military organization to be put into effect when and as Nazi, Fascist or Jap occupied territories are freed.

Hopkins Papers

Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

[WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.]

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

The complete destruction of the Nazi Afrika Korps and their Italian allies in North Africa completed one phase of the military decisions made at Casablanca. Progress on other operations, determined at that time, are [sic] proceeding satisfactorily. Aggressive warfare, however, requires a constant implementation of strategy, based upon military events. Further operations, in addition to those determined upon at Casablanca, must be set afoot. Therefore, the President and the Prime Minister decided to meet again with their Chiefs of Staff.

They have agreed on further steps to be taken in the overall planning of a global war. It is important to state that the operations which have been agreed to include every theater of war all over the world.

There has been a complete meeting of minds on—

(a) The war in the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia
(b) The war in China and Southern Asia
(c) The war in the Near East
(d) The war in all parts of the Mediterranean
(e) The war in the North and South Atlantic
(f) The war in Europe

All of these plans are related to each other in regard to shipping, air support and the command of the seas by our navies.

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1 This draft joint statement, which bears neither date nor indication of authorship, appears to be the revision of the earlier draft printed supra. In the course of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on the morning of May 25, it had been agreed that Hopkins should prepare such a revision; see ante, p. 204. The source text covers two typewritten pages. There are two identical copies of page 2, each of which bears a number of amendments in the handwriting of Roosevelt and Churchill. These amendments are indicated in footnotes. Roosevelt and Churchill presumably worked at revising this statement during their meeting on the evening of May 25; see the editorial note, ante, p. 221.

2 The word "Tentative" in Hopkins' handwriting appears above the title of the document.
The state of the war at this time is in a far more satisfactory condition than when the Chiefs of Staff met with the President and the Prime Minister in Casablanca. The unrelenting anti U-boat campaign is prospering, with the result that there are far more merchant ships available than had been anticipated.\(^3\)

The vast production of war materials assures the United Nations of weapons with which to destroy the enemy.

The President and the Prime Minister also discussed\(^4\) with the Chiefs of Staff the\(^5\) temporary civil and military organizations to be put in effect\(^6\) when and as Nazi, Fascist or Japanese occupied territories are freed.

A complete report of the conference has been sent to Stalin and the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.\(^7\)

\(^3\) The word “Air” in the President’s handwriting appears in the margin at the beginning of this paragraph. The following sentence, in the Prime Minister’s handwriting, appears at the end of this paragraph: “The weight & intensity of the air offensive grows continually.”

\(^4\) The word “discussed” is crossed out and replaced with the word “examined” in the Prime Minister’s handwriting.

\(^5\) Following the word “the” the phrase “form of” in the Prime Minister’s handwriting is inserted.

\(^6\) The phrase “put in effect” is crossed out and replaced by the phrase “set up” in the Prime Minister’s handwriting.

\(^7\) This paragraph is crossed out and the phrase “See amendment” in the President’s handwriting appears in the margin. The paragraph is revised, in the Prime Minister’s handwriting, to read: “A complete report of the conclusions of the conference is being sent to Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.” The introductory phrase “A complete report of the” is crossed out and replaced by the phrase “The fullest possible” in Hopkins’ handwriting, which is also crossed out.

Hopkins Papers

**Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill\(^1\)**

**WASHINGTON, [May 25, 1943.]**

**JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER**

The complete destruction of the Nazi *Afrika Korps* and their Italian allies in North Africa completed one phase of the military

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\(^1\) This joint statement, which is typed on White House stationery, bears the following marginal notation in Roosevelt’s handwriting: “Not sent FDR—Evening of May 25 FDR and W.S.C.” The Hopkins Papers also contain a nearly identical version, bearing a number of amendments and additions in Churchill’s handwriting. All of those alterations are reflected in this version of the statement. Roosevelt and Churchill presumably considered this statement during their meeting on the evening of May 25, 1943; see the editorial note, ante, p. 221.
decisions made at Casablanca. Progress on other operations, determined at that time, is proceeding satisfactorily.

Aggressive warfare, however, requires a constant implementation of strategy, based upon military events. Further operations, in addition to those determined upon at Casablanca, must be set afoot. Therefore the President and the Prime Minister decided to meet again with their Chiefs of Staff.

They have agreed on further steps to be taken in the overall planning of a global war. The operations which have been approved include every theatre of war all over the world.

There has been a complete meeting of minds on:

(a) The war in the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia.
(b) The war in China and Southern Asia.
(c) The situation in the Middle East.
(d) The war in the Mediterranean.
(e) The war at sea in the North and South Atlantic.
(f) The war in Western Europe.
(g) The war in Eastern Europe—the Russian-German front.²

Action in all these theatres is inter-related in regard to shipping, air power and the command of the seas by our navies.

The war at this time stands far better than when the President, the Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff met at Casablanca.

Our unrelenting anti-U-boat campaign is prospering, with the result that there are far more merchant ships available than had been anticipated. The triumphs of the Russian Army have inflicted shattering blows upon the German forces. Heroic China still stands firm. The weight and intensity of the Allied air offensive grows continually.

The vast production of munitions assures to the United Nations the weapons with which to destroy the enemy.

However the Combined Chiefs of Staff remain convinced that all plans must be based on a complete military victory without counting on any possibility of the enemy’s internal collapse.

The President and the Prime Minister also examined with the Chiefs of Staff the forms of temporary civil and military organizations to be set up when the Nazi, Fascist or Japanese occupied territories are freed.

The fullest possible contacts have been maintained with Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, to whom the final reports have been submitted.

²This line is crossed out in the source text.
Statement by President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.]

STATEMENT FROM THE PRESIDENT

The recent conference of the Combined Staffs in Washington has ended in complete agreement on future operations in all theatres of the war.

(To be given out in Washington on arrival of Prime Minister in Torch.)

There are no indications of the circumstances in which this statement was prepared, but the fact that it was used as a substitute for the much longer draft joint statement, supra, suggests that it was prepared by Roosevelt and Churchill during their meeting on the evening of May 25, 1943; see the editorial note, ante, p. 221. The statement was given to the press by the White House on the afternoon of May 27, 1943, as reported in Roosevelt’s message No. 270 to Churchill, infra.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, May 27, 1943.]

276. We were all very happy to hear this afternoon that you have safely completed the second leg of the trip. I have given the one sentence announcement of the end of the conferences to the Press. I miss you much. It was a highly successful meeting in every way and proved that it was well timed and necessary.

This message was sent by Roosevelt to Eisenhower, in telegram Freedom 8961, May 27, 1943, 4 p.m., for delivery to Churchill.

For the statement by Roosevelt, see supra.

M. REPORTS ON THE CONFERENCE TO STALIN AND CHIANG

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[C.C.S. Unnumbered Memorandum

WASHINGTON,] 25 May 1943.

SUGGESTED STATEMENT TO BE MADE TO THE CHINESE

Following is a suggested statement to be made to the Chinese authorities with regard to decisions reached at the TRIDENT Conferences.

The authorship of the suggested statement contained in this memorandum is not indicated, but in the course of the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 24, 1943 (ante, p. 196), the Prime Minister had indicated that he would prepare such a written statement. This memorandum was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the morning of May 25, 1943; for the record of that meeting, see ante, p. 201.
"It has been decided to pursue the operations in the Anakim theater which were discussed at the Calcutta Conference with certain modifications. The following are the decisions:—

First, the concentration of available resources as supreme priority within the Assam–Burma area on the building up and increasing of the Air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons monthly by early Fall, and the development of Air facilities in Assam with a view to:

a. Intensifying Air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
b. Maintaining increased American Air forces in China; and
c. Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.

Secondly, vigorous and aggressive land and Air operations will be begun at the end of 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing and engaging as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the Air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma road.

Thirdly, amphibious operations against the Burmese coast with the purpose of cutting Japanese communications between the coast and their northern front.

Fourthly, the interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

For the above purposes all possible measures will be taken to secure the Naval Command of the Bay of Bengal by an adequate force. No limits, except those imposed by time and circumstances, will be placed on the above operations, which have for their object the relief of the siege of China."

H. Redman
J. R. Deane
Combined Secretariat

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.]

PROPOSALS TO BE MADE TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

The following are the proposals which will be made to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with regard to operations in the Anakim Theater:

First, the concentration of available resources as supreme priority within the Assam–Burma area on the building up and increasing of

1 This paper, which appears to be a revision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the memorandum printed supra, was discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the morning of May 25; see ante, p. 204. At that meeting, it was agreed that Roosevelt and Marshall should make use of the wording of this paper in their conversations with Chinese authorities to whom copies of the document might be handed for retention. Regarding Roosevelt’s meeting with Soong and Marshall’s conversation with Chu on the afternoon of May 25, see the editorial notes, ante, p. 208.
the Air Route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons monthly by early fall, and the development of Air facilities in Assam with a view to:

a. Intensifying Air operations against Japanese in Burma;
b. Maintaining increased American Air forces in China; and

c. Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

Secondly, vigorous and aggressive land and Air operations will be begun at the end of 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing and engaging as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the Air Route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

Thirdly, amphibious operations against the Burmese coast with the purpose of interrupting Japanese communications between the coast and their northern front.

Fourthly, the interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

For the above purposes all possible measures will be taken to secure the Naval Command of the Bay of Bengal by an adequate force. No limits, except those imposed by time and circumstances, will be placed on the above operations, which have for their object the relief of the siege of China.

Hopkins Papers

Draft Message From President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.]

Draft of Message From the President and the Prime Minister to Premier Stalin

Upon the conclusion of the conferences which we have been holding in Washington with our combined military staffs, we think it proper that the following comprehensive report concerning our decisions should be sent to you.

1 This draft message, prepared by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, was transmitted to Roosevelt under cover of the following memorandum from Deane, dated May 25, 1943:

"Attached hereto is a draft report prepared by the Secretariat for submission to Mr. Stalin.

"A questionable part may be the paragraph on U-boat warfare (par. 4 a) which might be taken as a promise to deliver more supplies to Russia. On the other hand it presents a hopeful outlook. I therefore left it in the draft but call your attention to it.

"An identical draft has been sent to the Prime Minister."

The changes written in by Roosevelt on this draft message are indicated in footnotes. Roosevelt and Churchill worked at revising this message during their meeting on the evening of May 25, 1943; see the editorial note, ante, p. 220.

2 The word "decisions" was crossed out and replaced by the word "plans".
Throughout our conferences full recognition was given to the most important part which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is playing in the defeat of the European Axis Powers. Nearly all of the decisions enumerated below were made only after they had been measured against the yardstick of their aid to your country’s war effort. Briefly, our decisions may be summarized as follows:

1. OVERALL OBJECTIVE

In conjunction with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

2. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

a. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

c. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

3. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

a. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

b. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

c. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

d. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

e. To prepare the French Forces in Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

4. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR 1943-44 IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

a. Certain detailed operations were decided upon to combat the U-boat menace. These operations, we feel certain, will enable us to

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*The phrase “against the yardstick of their aid” was crossed out and replaced by the phrase “in relation”.

*The phrase “in Africa” was crossed out.

*The phrase “In execution of overall strategic concept” was crossed out.
increase our capacity to transport troops and supplies to active theaters and to our allies.

b. Combined Bomber Offensive.

We have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U.S.-British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

c. Cross-Channel Operations.

We have resolved:

That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting a large scale operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. French forces from North Africa may be represented in the initial assault or in the immediate build-up.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States and elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the fastest possible rate.

Meanwhile preparations will be continuously kept up to date to take advantage of a collapse in France or, alternatively, for the occupation of Norway in case of a German withdrawal.

d. Operations in the Mediterranean.

We have resolved to conduct such operations in exploitation of the forthcoming operation, of which you are aware, as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Alternative plans are to be prepared at once. Specific operations will be determined upon in the light of the situation developing from the coming operations. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for these operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and

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6 The words “United States” were spelled out.
7 The “m” in military was reduced to lower case.
8 The word “aircraft” was inserted after the word “fighter”.
9 The phrase “will be undertaken immediately” was crossed out and replaced with the phrase “has long been in progress”.
three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom.  

e. Operations for the Defeat of Japan.

Our plans also provide for extensive operations against Japan in the Far Eastern and Pacific Theaters. While these operations will, of necessity, have repercussions on our efforts in the European Theater, they are within the scope of the overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war as set forth above.

5. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS

After full and careful examination we have found that the above operations utilize our resources to the full. It has been our earnest desire to make the utmost use of our resources wherever they can be brought to bear upon the enemy and we believe that our object has been fulfilled in the statement of operations as set out above.

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This paragraph was extensively revised to read as follows: "We have resolved to exploit the forthcoming (Husky) operation, of which you are aware, as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Specific operations are to be determined upon in the light of the developing situation. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for these purposes all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in the main attack from the United Kingdom."

This heading was revised to read "The defeat of Japan".

This paragraph was revised to read as follows:

“Our plans also provide for waging war against Japan in the Far Eastern and Pacific Theaters. These operations will, of necessity, have repercussions on our efforts in the European Theater.”

The revisions of this paragraph seem to be incomplete and tentative. The word "operations" was crossed out and replaced by the word "undertakings". The following words are indicated as a possible substitution for the second sentence: "It is our earnest desire to engage the enemy to the utmost. We believe this object will be obtained by our proposed actions".

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Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

[EN ROUTE BY AIR TO ALGIERS, MAY 26, 1943.]

PENCIL NO. 400. Present Aerial Person to President Roosevelt. Most Secret.

General Marshall has himself prepared the following version of the approved decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be sent to Rus-
sia. C.I.G.S. and I agree with every word of it, and strongly hope that it can be sent to Stalin as the statement by the Chief of the United States Staff, concurred in by the C.I.G.S., and that it has our (President and Prime Minister’s) joint approval. If you agree, will you kindly implement without further reference to me.

Winston S. Churchill
26. 5. 43

[Enclosure]

Draft Message From President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin.

SECRET

1. In general, the overall strategy agreed upon is based upon the following decisions:

(a) To give first priority to the control of the submarine menace and the security of our overseas lines of communication.

(b) Next in priority to employ every practicable means to support Russia.

(c) To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies.

(d) To maintain an unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of continually reducing her Military power.

(e) To undertake such measures as may be practicable to maintain China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

(f) To prepare the French forces in Africa for active participation in the assaults on Axis Europe.

2. With reference to (a) above regarding submarines, the immediate results of the recent deployment of long-range aircraft with new

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2 General Sir Alan Brooke.

3 A memorandum of May 28, 1943, to the President by Lt. Col. Chester Hammond, Assistant to the President’s Military Aide, Maj. Gen. Edwin M. Watson, indicates that this draft message and the covering letter from Churchill were received in the White House Map Room on May 28, 1943. The memorandum transmits the suggestion by Rear Adm. Wilson Brown, the President’s Naval Aide, that the President might discuss with General Marshall the advisability of sending the message to Stalin by official courier in order to avoid the dangerous risk of sending it to Moscow by any of the existing codes (Hopkins Papers).

With the exception of the changes indicated in the following footnote and certain minor typographical alterations, this text is identical with the message ultimately sent to Stalin on June 2, 1943; see the telegram from Roosevelt to Stalin, June 2, post, p. 927.

4 In the text of this communication as ultimately transmitted to Stalin, subparagraphs (a) and (b) were combined to read as follows:

"(a) To give first priority to the control of the submarine menace, the security of our overseas lines of communication, and to employ every practicable means to support Russia."

Sub-paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (f) were accordingly relettered (b), (c), (d), and (e), respectively, in the communication transmitted to Stalin.
equipment and special attack groups of naval vessels give great encouragement, better than one enemy submarine a day having been destroyed since May 1. If such a rate of destruction can be maintained it will greatly conserve, therefore increase, available shipping and will exert a powerful influence on the morale of the German submarine armada.

With reference to the support of Russia, agreement was reached as follows:

(a) To intensify the present air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe. This for the purpose of smashing German industry, destroying German fighter aircraft and breaking the morale of the German people. The rapid development of this air offensive is indicated by the events of the past three weeks in France, Germany and Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, and by the growth of the United States’ heavy bomber force in England from some 350 planes in March to approximately 700 today with a schedule calling for 900 June 30, 1,150 September 30 and 2,500 April 1. The British bomber force will be constantly increasing.

(b) In the Mediterranean the decision was taken to eliminate Italy from the war as quickly as possible. General Eisenhower has been directed to prepare to launch offensives immediately following the successful completion of Husky the assault on Sicily, for the purpose of precipitating the collapse of Italy and thus facilitating our air offensive against Eastern and Southern Germany as well as continuing the attrition of German fighter aircraft and developing a heavy threat against German control in the Balkans. General Eisenhower may use for the Mediterranean operations all those forces now available in that area except for three British and four American Divisions which are to participate in the concentration in England, next to be referred to.

(c) It was decided that the resumption of the concentration of ground forces in England could now be undertaken with Africa securely in our hands and that while plans are being continuously kept up to date by a joint U.S.-British Staff in England to take instant advantage of a sudden weakness in France or Norway, the concentration of forces and landing equipment in the British Isles should proceed at a rate to permit a full-scale invasion of the Continent to be launched at the peak of the great air offensive in the Spring of 1944. Incidentally, the unavoidable absorption of large landing-craft in the Mediterranean, the South-West Pacific and the Aleutian Islands has been our most serious limiting factor regarding operations out of England.

3. We have found that the undertakings listed utilize our full resources. We believe that these operations will heavily engage the enemy in the air and will force a dispersion of his troops on the ground to meet both actual attacks and heavy threats of attack which can
readily be converted into successful operations whenever signs of Axis weakness become apparent.

G. C. M[ARSHALL]
26. 5. 43

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt

SECRET

CHUNGKING, May 29, 1943.

I am in receipt of your telegram of May 25 and wish to express my deep appreciation of the measures you have taken to strengthen the United States Air Force in China, and to increase the capacity of air transport to China.

In regard to ANAKIM I feel assured that you already possess a comprehensive and well-prepared plan of strategy, and that you are resolutely determined on pressing it forward to victory. I feel particularly grateful for the patience and courage with which you have resolved the many difficulties arising on all sides so that ANAKIM can go through. I venture to make a few supplementary observations which I have asked Dr. T. V. Soong to submit to you for your consideration.¹

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

¹This message appears to have been handed to Hopkins by Foreign Minister Soong.

²No telegram direct from Roosevelt to Chiang has been found. Chiang's reference is presumably to the message that Roosevelt gave Soong on the afternoon of May 25, 1943; see the editorial note, ante, p. 208.

³Infra.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

Generalissimo Chiang to the Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) in Washington

SECRET

CHUNGKING, May 29, 1943.

Please submit orally to the President the following points for his consideration:

(1) Has Great Britain committed herself to engage her navy in giving effective support for joint action in the Andaman Sea and is she determined to retake Rangoon?

(2) Is the United States providing the same naval strength for ANAKIM as that indicated by General Arnold in Chungking, and is

¹This message appears to have been delivered by Soong to Hopkins at the same time that he delivered Chiang's telegram of May 29 to Roosevelt, supra. There is no record of Soong's oral presentation of the substance of this telegram to Roosevelt. Between May 28 and June 1, Roosevelt was at Hyde Park.
Great Britain sending an equal or greater number of naval units? Now, that the North African campaign has come to a successful conclusion, is it possible to increase the strength of the naval participation for ANAKIM in order to accelerate the capture of Rangoon?

(3) Is the U. S. Army participating in the campaign, and if so, how many divisions will be engaged?

(4) While I do not doubt that Great Britain will be able to fulfill her commitments in regard to the plan decided upon by the President with Mr. Churchill, it seems to me that it is necessary for the President to exercise his influence continually in order to prevent delay in the execution of the plan.

(5) To carry out ANAKIM it is absolutely essential to synchronize the movements of the army attacking in the north with amphibious operations against Southern Burma so that both could take place at the same time. Otherwise, if the two operations were not coordinated in their movements or either of them should take independent action, they would be exposed to being defeated in detail by the enemy. It is earnestly hoped that the President would pay special attention to this point in regard to what the British propose to do.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The President to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

For General Marshall from the President. Urgent and secret. Despatch for Stalin approved with following amendment: strike out under b following words, “n priority”; and include a and b as one priority. In order to protect security suggest you wire Stalin telling him you are sending courier by air to deliver message to him in Moscow or his agent at some convenient place. You may state that your message has my approval as well as Churchill’s.

ROOSEVELT

1 Presumably transmitted via military channels to Marshall, then at Algiers.
2 In Roosevelt’s handwritten draft of this telegram, the quoted phrase appears as “next in priority”.
3 In Roosevelt’s handwritten draft of this telegram, the word “appropriate” is used rather than “convenient”.
4 The procedure recommended in this telegram for informing Stalin of the results of the conference in Washington was superseded by the procedure set forth in Roosevelt’s telegram of June 2, 1943, to Stalin, infra. Roosevelt explained the change in the following telegram of June 2, 1943, to Marshall:

“Please inform Prime Minister Churchill that the message containing decisions of Combined Chiefs of Staff has been sent to Stalin together with suggested covering note of transmittal in code through the American Ambassador in Moscow but with reluctance because of the ever present danger of the code’s being broken.” (Roosevelt Papers)
President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 2, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Personal and most secret from the President to Premier Stalin.

I am sending you through Ambassador Standley the recently approved decisions of our Combined Chiefs of Staff. These decisions have the joint approval of both Mr. Churchill and myself. In view of their extremely secret nature I am asking Ambassador Standley to deliver them to you personally.2

Roosevelt

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1 Transmitted via the United States Naval Attaché in Moscow.
2 Roosevelt's communication to Stalin, which was sent by telegram to the United States Naval Attaché in Moscow, is not printed here. The text was identical with the draft prepared by Marshall and printed ante, p. 383, with the exception of the change indicated in footnote 4 to that draft and certain minor typographical alterations. For a description of the manner in which the communication from Roosevelt to Stalin was received by Ambassador Standley in Moscow on June 4 and was delivered to Stalin in his Kremlin air raid shelter during an air raid alert, see William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955), p. 429. For text of Stalin's reply to Roosevelt's message, sent on June 11, 1943, see Stalin's Correspondence, vol. II, p. 70.
PLATE 1
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Washington, May 14, 1943.
Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt at Shangri La during the weekend of May 14-17, 1943.
Meeting of the Pacific War Council at the White House, Washington, May 20, 1943. Left to right: Chargé Cox (New Zealand), Foreign Minister Soong (China), Ambassador Halifax (United Kingdom), Minister for External Affairs Evatt (Australia), Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Minister McCarthy (Canada), Ambassador Loudon (Netherlands), President Quezon (Philippines).
PLATE 4

Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt on the White House grounds, Washington, May 24, 1943.
Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the White House grounds, Washington, May 24, 1943. 

Plate 6

Prime Ministers Mackenzie King and Churchill, President Roosevelt, and the Earl of Athlone (Governor General of Canada) on the terrace at the Citadel, Quebec, August 18, 1943.
Plate 7

President Roosevelt, Prime Ministers Mackenzie King and Churchill, the Earl and Countess of Athlone, and a group of British advisors on the terrace at the Citadel, Quebec, August 18, 1943. Seated, left to right: Foreign Secretary Eden, President Roosevelt, Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone, Prime Minister Churchill. Standing, left to right: The Earl of Athlone, Governor General of Canada, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Minister of Information Bracken.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the terrace at the Citadel, Quebec, August 18, 1943. Standing, left to right: General Arnold, Air Chief Marshal Portal, General Brooke, Admiral King, Field Marshal Dill, General Marshall, Admiral of the Fleet Pound, Admiral Leahy.
Secretary of State Hull and Prime Minister Mackenzie King on the station platform following Mr. Hull's arrival at Quebec, August 20, 1943. Standing behind Mr. Hull is Adviser on Political Relations James Clement Dunn.
Prime Minister Churchill, Minister of Information Bracken, and Mr. Harry Hopkins (Special Assistant to President Roosevelt) at the Citadel, Quebec, August 22, 1943.
The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff with their aides at the Château Frontenac, Quebec, August 23, 1943. Seated, left to right: General Marshall, General Arnold, Brigadier General Deane, Admiral King, Admiral Leahy. Standing, left to right: Vice Admiral Willson, Lieutenant General Somervell, Rear Admiral Cooke, Rear Admiral Badger, Lieutenant General Handy, Brigadier General Wedemeyer, Commander Freseman, Major General Fairchild, Brigadier General Kuter.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Château Frontenac, Quebec, August 23, 1943. *Left to right:* Vice Admiral Mountbatten, Admiral of the Fleet Pound, General Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Portal, Field Marshal Dill, Lieutenant General Ismay, Brigadier Redman (partly hidden), Commander Coleridge, Brigadier General Deane, General Arnold, General Marshall, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, Captain Royal.