FINLAND

RELATIONS BETWEEN FINLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE
ATTEMPTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO PREVENT FURTHER FIN-
NISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION
IN ASSOCIATION WITH GERMANY

701.60D11/205a

The Secretary of State to the Finnish Minister (Procopé)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable
the Minister of Finland and has the honor to request that whenever
a member of the Finnish Legation staff desires to go to a point outside
of Washington and its immediately contiguous suburbs, such as Alex-
andria, Bethesda, et cetera, the Finnish Legation make inquiry of the
Department of State as to the practicability of such a trip. When
making such an inquiry, information regarding places to be visited,
time and duration of visit, and methods of transportation to be used
should be furnished the Department. Similar inquiries should be
made in those instances in which Finnish Consular personnel in the
United States desire to proceed to points outside of their respective
Consular districts. Each inquiry will be answered in writing by the
Department.

It is understood that procedures similar to the foregoing have been
made applicable to the personnel of the American Legation in Helsinki
by the Finnish Government since June 1941.

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1942.

701.60D11/2114

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs
of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1942.

Mr. Solanko telephoned me this morning regarding the Depart-
ment’s note of today’s date which he had just received relating to
movements of Finnish officials in the United States. Mr. Solanko
said that he would like information regarding the exact meaning of

3 Hjalmar J. Procopé.
4 The Minister in Finland, H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, was advised of this action
in telegram No. 5, January 3, 1942 (124.60D/52).
5 Risto Solanko, Counselor of the Finnish Legation.
certain aspects of our note. He inquired whether "personnel of the Legation" applied to everybody connected with the Legation, including the Minister, chauffeurs, and families of officials. I said all persons who had been officially notified to the Department as being officials of the Finnish Legation came within the purview of the note and the restrictions set forth therein. He then inquired whether honorary consuls were included and I said that in my opinion they were, since the Legation had notified us of their official status and also that it did not make any difference whether they were Finnish citizens. He inquired then as to the meaning of "Consular district". I said that I did not know the exact boundaries of the various Finnish Consular districts in the United States but that I presumed this had been the subject of communications from the Finnish Legation in the past. He said that in that case the Finnish Consul General in New York could travel anywhere in the United States, since he had consular jurisdiction over the whole country. I said that if that were the case, the Legation would not have to make the inquiries mentioned in the note regarding his visits in the United States. (When we have had some experience with the procedure set forth in our note and how the Finnish Government will react to these restrictions, we might wish to consider amending the restrictions upon movements of Finnish Consular officers in the United States to make it necessary that inquiries be made regarding any visits which they may wish to make outside of the corporate limits of the cities in which their respective consular offices are situated.) Mr. Solanko then inquired whether inquiry would have to be made of the Department when his children desired to go to Glen Echo. I said that to give him a definitive answer I would have to give him a map but that I presumed that this would not be necessary in as much as there were no intervening suburbs. He replied that there were some intervening woods, to which I commented that I was sure that minor details of this character could always be worked out satisfactorily to all concerned.

Mr. Solanko then brought up the question of the First Secretary of the Finnish Legation, Mr. Mikkola, who was at the time in New York. He said that the Legation had endeavored to get in communication with Mr. Mikkola by telephone to order him to return to Washington immediately but so far had been unable to complete their call. I inquired when Mr. Mikkola was expected to return and upon learning that he was scheduled to be back in Washington on Monday, said that it would hardly be necessary for him to return any earlier; that in instances of such a character the Legation could assume our note was effective only in respect to future visits outside of Washington of Legation personnel. I took the opportunity then to inquire of Mr. Solanko as to the present whereabouts of Mr. Wrede, an Attaché

*An amusement park northwest of Washington, in Maryland.*
of the Legation, who, so far as I knew, has spent very few days in Washington since his arrival in the United States. Mr. Solanko said that the Legation had already gotten in touch with Mr. Wrede who was in New York and had instructed him to return to Washington immediately. I did not suggest that the Legation might countermand this instruction so as to permit Mr. Wrede to return at a later date as in the case of Mr. Mikkola.

Mr. Solanko inquired whether we are acquainted with the precise details of Finnish restrictions upon the movements of American consular and diplomatic personnel in Finland. I said that I was not but that from what I knew of those restrictions they were similar in effect to those communicated to the Finnish Legation in its note under reference. We did not discuss this matter further.

Mr. Solanko suggested that considerable delays might be encountered from time to time in submitting and receiving written communications regarding proposed visits of the Legation personnel. He inquired what Division of the Department would be handling these matters. In reply I remarked that the Department would make every effort to expedite replies to any inquiries which the Legation might make in regard to these matters, but that any delays encountered would be the result of the pressure of work at the time inquiry was made. I said that several Divisions in the Department had to be consulted on each inquiry received from the Legation but that if the Legation so desired, they could bring the inquiries to me and I would undertake to expedite consideration of the inquiries by the other Divisions.

Throughout the conversation Mr. Solanko confined his inquiries and comments almost entirely to facts. There was, however, a discernible note of surprise at the terms of our communication. In only one instance did he depart from what might be termed legitimate inquiry. He made one reference to "prison regulations" which I quickly corrected.

701.60D11/228

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Long)

[WASHINGTON,] January 8, 1942.

The Finnish Minister came in at his own request and said that he had communicated with his Government and had obtained an answer to the effect that no restriction was placed upon the movements of American diplomats in Helsinki which was not placed upon all other diplomats. In other words, there was a universal application of the restriction in Helsinki on the theory that Helsinki was a "war area". I pointed out to the Minister that it was hardly pertinent that they were confined to a war area because supposedly the whole
of Finland was a "war area". He replied that Helsinki was a special war area in that there were many war activities there and movements concerning the war which involved the safety of Finland. I mentioned the fact that they were allowing the diplomats to move around the city where there were these particular movements which the Minister mentioned.

The Minister said that he felt that we should relieve the restrictions placed upon him because many missions in Washington were allowed to move around the country at liberty and the American mission in Helsinki was not encumbered with any restrictions which were not applicable to all other members of the diplomatic corps. I told him we would communicate with him in due course.

\[\text{B[reckinridge] L[ong]}\]

740.0011 European War 1939/18303: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, January 8, 1942—noon.

[Received 5:51 p.m.]

15. Department's 214, October 17, 1941.\(^3\) The following summarizes our report on public opinion in Finland for the period December 21, 1941—January 4:

Public opinion toward the United States in this fortnight was conditioned by two factors: first, military reverses suffered by the United States in the Far East, and second, evidences of increasingly close cooperation between the United States, Great Britain and Finland's arch enemy the Soviet Union as exemplified by the conferences in Washington\(^9\) and Moscow.\(^10\) The public felt a rather savage satisfaction at the injuries inflicted upon the United States by Japan in East Asia tinged with ill-concealed alarm that the United States whose moral prestige was still higher than that of other nations in the Finnish mind should have become openly a comrade in arms with the loathed and feared U.S.S.R.

Official statements in the United States regarding the war received but scant treatment in the Finnish press and passed almost unnoticed.

The Finnish attitude toward Germany was one of increasing irritation at the presence of German troops who, it was felt, had not pulled

\(^3\) Not printed; in this telegram the Department asked to receive a bi-weekly analysis of public opinion in Finland (740.0011 European War 1939/15898a).

\(^9\) Meetings were held between British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and President Roosevelt and their advisers between December 22, 1941, and January 14, 1942. Correspondence on this First Washington Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of \textit{Foreign Relations}.

\(^10\) For correspondence regarding the visit of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, in Moscow toward the end of December 1941, see \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1941, vol. i, pp. 192–205.
their own weight in the war on the Finnish front but had merely shivered helplessly in the forests waiting for the Finns to win the campaign. At the same time it was recognized that Finland was wholly dependent on Germany for military supplies and to an increasing degree for food. German influence continued to be manifest, particularly in the increasingly dictatorial tone toward the Finnish press of the German Press Attaché Metzger and in such examples of Nazi editing as the suppression of certain points of the Pope’s Christmas Eve message which ran counter to Nazi doctrine.

Signs of increasing restiveness in the Social Democratic Party continue to be manifest. Most significant of these was the presentation of a memorial to the Prime Minister II on behalf of the Central Federation of Finnish Trade Unions on January 3 pointing out that a continuation of the war would lead to increased difficulties in all spheres and requesting amelioration of a number of conditions which were particularly onerous for the working class, particularly maldistribution of food. The very fact that such a petition could be addressed to the Government at this time was significant of how far the acid of war weariness had eaten into the social fabric in Finland. The schism between the Socialists and the powerful Conservative class in Finland seemed to be growing wider and some thought there might even be the possibility of an open break. Certainly the prospect of a volatile and widely spread socialist peace movement in Finland, the acclaimed North Star of the New Order, would cause no rejoicing in Berlin.

Reflecting the ground swell of popular discontent with the war were the exhortations at New Year’s time of the Field Marshal 12 and the speaker of the Diet 13 calling upon the home front to stand firm. Despite such exhortations there were evidences of an increasing impatience on the part of the common man with the aims of conquest proclaimed by the Field Marshal. The man in the street and the common soldier could not see why the army should hold distant Soviet Karelia when the men are needed at home.

It seemed probable that if Russia should continue to keep the Finnish front moderately active resistance here would eventually be worn down through inability of the people and the internal economy to stand the strain.

SCHOENFELD

11 Jukka (Johan) Wilhelm Rangell.
12 Karl Gustav, Baron Mannerheim, commander of the Finnish armies against the Soviet Union.
13 Väinö Hakkila.
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

Kuibyshev (Moscow), January 13, 1942—3 p. m. [Received 7:01 p. m.]

43. Inquired of Vyshinski last night with respect to rumors (reported to the Embassy by both the AP and UP representatives) to the effect that conversations are in progress between the Soviet and Finnish Governments.

Vyshinski replied that he had not heard of the matter.

Thurston

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs

Washington, January 16, 1942.

Mr. Toivola called on me this afternoon pursuant to my request made after consultation with Mr. Atherton.

I immediately handed to Mr. Toivola without comment Helsinki’s telegram no. 42 of January 15 (transmitted in plain language). After he had read the telegram, I said that I wanted to make it clear that we were not protesting against Finnish censorship of our Legation’s telephone conversations, but that I was bringing this matter to his attention because it, taken together with many recent instances of unjustified Finnish press attacks on the United States and the Administration in particular, was having an unfortunate and cumulative effect on all persons in this country who had knowledge of these developments. I said that we could afford to overlook these matters in so far as the damage which they did to our own interests was concerned but that I did not think that Finland could do so. After recalling to Mr. Toivola the often expressed opinion in Finland that Finland could depend upon Britain and particularly the United States not countenancing any measures at the peace table contrary to basic Finnish interests, I remarked that their sense of prudence should warn the Finnish Government and people not to go too far along the lines recently manifested, lest they put too great pressure upon the friends of Finland in the United States and Great Britain.

Toivola

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Fordie Relations, 1942, Volume II

740.0011 European War 1939/19467: Telegram

14 Andrey Yannaevich Vyshinsky, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
15 Henry Cassidy was Associated Press correspondent in the Soviet Union.
16 Henry Shapiro was United Press correspondent in the Soviet Union.
17 Urho Toivola, Counselor of the Finnish Legation.
18 Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.
19 Not printed.
readily agreed that the recent trend of events in Finland did carry with it the danger which I had mentioned and he said that he was going to send a personal telegram to Helsinki strongly urging that more careful consideration be given to measures of the character in question. He said that the Finnish press could not be strictly neutral in its comments, in as much [as] it could obviously never criticize Germany in any way because of Finland's complete dependence upon Germany at this time for foodstuffs. I said that I understood this but that to me it seemed unnecessary for the Finnish press to attack the United States and the President in the way they had been doing lately. I pointed out that an analysis of these attacks strongly suggested German inspiration and I intimated that I believed that the press attaché of the German Legation in Helsinki might be exerting pressure on the Finnish press and the Information Central along the lines he considered desirable. Mr. Toivola readily agreed that this was a reasonable conclusion.

As another instance of what I had in mind, I showed Mr. Toivola an intercept of a Tokyo radio broadcast allegedly quoting a statement of the Finnish Legation in Tokyo to the effect that recent rumors regarding a Soviet-Finnish peace were "nothing but Anglo-American machinations". I made it clear to Mr. Toivola that I was not convinced that the Finnish Legation had, in fact, made any such statement but that if it had done so, I thought it a mistake from the point of view of Finland's own interests, because, as he knew personally, this Government had had absolutely nothing to do with any of these recent rumors.

Mr. Toivola was obviously disturbed at all of these matters which I brought to his attention. Our conversation was entirely friendly and reasoning. He expressed appreciation for my bringing the matters to his attention.

The Finnish Minister (Procopé) to the Secretary of State 20

The Minister of Finland presents his compliments to His Excellency The Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to his note of January 5th, 1942 21 concerning certain restrictions, mentioned in the Secretary of State's note of January 3, 1942, as to the travels of members of the staff of the Finnish Legation and of Consular Officers of Finland.

In the aforesaid note of January 5th the Finnish Minister had submitted the question whether the restrictions mentioned in the Secretary

20 Handed to Assistant Secretary of State Long by the Minister on January 20.
21 Not printed.
of State’s aforesaid note are to apply to American citizens acting as honorary consuls or serving at the offices of the Legation or the Consulate General or who are in the service of any of the officers attached to the Legation or the Consulate.

Referring to the above mentioned and also to several verbal conversations which at different times he has had in the State Department, the Minister of Finland has the honor hereby to repeat what in the conversations he has brought to the knowledge of the Department, viz. that pending a reply to his aforesaid note of January 5th, the Legation of Finland, having brought the contents of the Secretary of State’s note to the attention of all Finnish citizens concerned, has not up to the present informed the American citizens referred to in the note of January 5th about the matter.

At the same time the Minister of Finland most respectfully reiterates the following facts brought forward in his aforementioned verbal conversations.

As far as there are restrictions in Finland as to travels of members of the diplomatic corps, they apply to all foreign diplomats in the country.

It is further to be noted that the Finnish capital Helsinki is in the war zone.

Finnish citizens who are serving as honorary consuls or at the offices of legations or consulates or who are in the service of officers attached to legations or consulates are not subject to other restrictions concerning their travels than Finnish citizens in general.

The restrictions mentioned in the Secretary of State’s note of January 3rd do not, as far as the Finnish Legation is informed, likewise apply to the personnel and the staff of other embassies, legations and consulates in general.

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1942.

760D.61/1620

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The British Minister at Stockholm 22 has learnt from his Soviet colleague 23 that she has informed the Finnish Government through unofficial Swedish channels that she would be prepared to enter into contact with them and has hinted that Finland might expect more favourable terms now than later. The Soviet Minister has expressed

22 Victor Alexander Louis Mallet.
23 Alexandra Mikhalkovna Kollontay.
a wish that these contacts should be kept strictly secret for the time being.  

WASHINGTON, 20 January, 1942.

Memorandum by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs to the Acting Chief of the Division (Atherton)

[WASHINGTON,] January 21, 1942.

Mr. Atherton: You will recall that yesterday Mr. Reed 25 of the British Embassy told Mr. Achilles 26 that the British Government believed it would be making it easier for Finland to make peace with the Soviet Union, if the British and American Governments should make it clear to the Finnish Government that we are not disposed to be lenient in our attitude toward the continuance of present Finnish policy. Mr. Reed said that at present British propaganda was following this line and in response to his inquiry you approved Mr. Achilles' informing Mr. Reed that our own attitude coincides with the British attitude in this matter.

To follow out the policy mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, you may wish to consider whether we should have the Minister at Helsinki deflate the present optimistic attitude taken by Witting 27 as reported in the Minister's telegram no. 58 of January 20. 28 I attach a draft of a telegram 29 to the Minister along these lines.

740.0011 European War 1939/188284: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1942—11 p. m.

28. Please make occasion to see Witting and state that you wish to convey to him the following as your views, based on information in your possession, because of his remarks of January 20 (your 58):

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25 In another aide-mémoire of February 4, 1942, the British Embassy reported that Mme. Kollontay had no further information on establishing contact with the Finns, and no serious approach on the part of the Finnish Government to the Allies was considered likely (760D.61/1621).
26 J. L. Reed, Second Secretary of the British Embassy.
27 Theodore C. Achilles of the Division of European Affairs.
28 Professor Rolf J. Witting, Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs.
29 Not printed; the Foreign Minister, on the grounds of reports received from Procopé, professed to believe in an increasingly friendly attitude toward Finland developing in Washington, which was being reflected generally in the American press.
30 Not printed, but see telegram No. 23, January 21, to the Minister in Finland, infra.
31 See footnote 28, above.
I. You are fearful of Procopé’s interpretation of the underlying temper of the American press and public towards Finland. The public remembers that Finland disregarded America’s timely advice as to cessation of hostilities with Soviet Russia.

II. Official opinion remains unchanged since my comments to the press of last November.31

III. Our estimate of British attitude toward Finland at present is that it is stiffening in accordance with policy of ever closer cooperation with the Soviet Union. Finnish Government should not overlook natural effects of British policy on our own in questions affecting our common effort against the forces of Axis aggression.

Hull

740.0011 European War 1939/18842: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, January 28, 1942—5 p.m.
[Received 9:12 p.m.]

66. Your 23, January 21. I called on Foreign Minister Witting this afternoon and after saying that I had been pondering his statements to me January 20 regarding reported basic attitude of American public and press towards Finland I expressed concern lest I had not made clear my view that his advices were not in accord with my own knowledge of those matters. Accordingly I said I had tried to formulate my views in a personal note addressed to him which I read and which embodied the three points of your telegram omitting mention of Procopé personally. I left the letter with him.

Witting said he presumed I had gained impression from his statements that he felt attitude towards Finland in United States was more favorable than it really is and I answered in affirmative. He then said that Procopé had qualified his report regarding more friendly American attitude by adding that he had not changed his own opinion regarding long range outlook as to which he was not optimistic. I expressed regret that I had not previously understood him to say so as in fact he did not. I said I was relieved to learn this since I should not wish Finnish Government to be under any misapprehension that we no longer stood by our position as stated by you or under your instructions last fall.

He then launched again into exposition of necessity for achieving Finnish strategic aims saying for first time to me they included

31 Concerning comments made by Secretary of State Cordell Hull in November 1941, see telegram No. 226, November 3, 1941, to the Minister in Finland, and memoranda by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles of November 13 and 18, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 88, 90, and 106, respectively; and footnote 77, ibid., p. 107.
control of Karelian and Onega Isthmuses because of development of Murmansk railroad area for aggression. I asked whether on assumption Finland should control Isthmian areas mentioned and Russians should develop Archangel-Vologda railroad area in same way Finland would then consider it necessary for same reasons of defense to move further east and cover new areas. Witting said Finland would not be able to do that. I then suggested that it seemed futile to build Finland’s security only on so-called strategic lines adding that Americans believed in necessity of basing security on sound political foundations. I said we were optimists as to that possibility and this pointed to the great issue of present war. Witting answered that if German and British statements regarding rights and sovereignty of small nations were compared they would be found substantially identical and there was little to choose between them. I asked whether he thought German action in Norway, Holland and Belgium among other smaller countries was to be compared with action of Britain and he said Germans merely got there first.

I asked whether the “realism” of which President Ryti \(^{32}\) had often spoken as characteristic of Finns and which was also mentioned in Finnish answer of November 11, last,\(^{33}\) to our representations \(^{34}\) was to be understood as describing above reported views. Witting said Finnish realism was based on age old experience with Russians and that each generation of Finnish leaders tried to preserve this nation for their own time. They had succeeded thus far against hopeless odds and could only go on trying.

During conversation Witting mentioned that according to Procopé views expressed “privately” in State Department circles included thought that small nations of Europe must be put under Anglo-Russian control after war and their sovereignty correspondingly limited, and as to Germany that her industrial equipment must be purged of any facilities for waging war.

Manifest tendency of my statements today in pursuance of your number 23 was by no means lost upon Witting whose response was grave in tone but it was also clear that he was at loss to know what Finland could do in present circumstances. I should say Witting realizes as indeed he has doubtless done for some time that his Government is increasingly the toy of forces beyond its control.

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\(^{32}\) Risto H. Ryti had become President of Finland on December 19, 1941, following the resignation of Kyösti Kallio.

\(^{33}\) See telegram No. 572, November 12, 1941, from the Minister in Finland, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. I, p. 91.

\(^{34}\) See telegrams No. 220 and No. 222, October 25 and 28, to the Minister in Finland, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 81 and 84, respectively.
The Secretary of State to the Finnish Minister (Procopé)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Finland and has the honor to inform the Minister in reply to the inquiry made in his note no. 20 dated January 5, 1942 36 that the inquiries described in the Secretary’s note of January 3, 1942 apply equally to personnel of the Finnish Legation and Finnish Consulates who are American citizens, since such personnel, because of their official capacities, are under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finland. The Minister would appear to be entirely justified in requiring such personnel of American citizenship to conform to the Secretary of State’s request of January 3, 1942 or, in the case of their refusal to do so, in severing their official connections with the Finnish Government.

This opportunity is taken to modify the Secretary’s request of January 3 to make it necessary for Finnish consular personnel in the United States to make inquiries of the character in question whenever they desire to depart from the city limits of the cities in which their respective consular offices are situated.

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1942.

740.0011 European War 1939/1940 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, January 30, 1942—11 a.m.
[Received 12:51 p.m.]

77. In conversation last night with former Foreign Minister Erkko he told me there was no doubt of the overwhelming majority of Finnish people for withdrawal from war. Question was how to secure this end and when. He thought the time was not yet and believed that it would depend upon right combination of external circumstances which might be presented at moment when it would be to distinct advantage of Russians to see Finland out of war and when Germans had success somewhere which would make them relatively indifferent to Finland’s withdrawal. It would be necessary to watch carefully for opportunity presented by some such combination of events and to seize it with skill and firmness.

He said prime consideration from Finnish standpoint remains assurance that Russians keep out of this country. If this were assured it might even be possible to face risk German displeasure perhaps involving outright attack on Finland but in this event question of supply

36 Not printed.
from overseas would be paramount and there would have to be some guarantee in that respect to save Finns from starvation.

Although Erkko did not say so I am convinced he also believes Finnish Government missed opportunity to reach settlement afforded by our intervention last year because he adverted to his own experience when Minister at Stockholm in establishing contact which led to Moscow peace, saying that contact was tenuous enough at first but became most definite with careful handling. I gathered he feels next opportunity must not be missed.

Erkko said that being in military service he cannot express his views openly, but that he can discuss such questions with a few people in authority including Prime Minister Rangell and does so.

He confided that from purely human standpoint friction between Finnish troops and Germans is growing and that there is increasing dissatisfaction in military circles with German incapacity on Finnish front. Indeed he intimated that Finns were inclined to question that capacity on rest of the front and asked how it was that Finns were able consistently to throw Russians back and Germans could not do so.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/1941a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) 38

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1942—5 p.m.

31. Following treacherous Japanese attack on December 7, and subsequent declarations of war on us by Germany and other Axis powers on December 11, 1941, we have been compelled to review in the light of those events the military and political situations in all other countries not signatory to the Declaration by United Nations 39 or at war with us. In the case of Finland we find that probably the most outstanding factor at this time is the use which German troops are

37 For correspondence on negotiation of this treaty signed March 12, 1940, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. 1, pp. 298–317; for translation of text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1940, p. 453.
38 In response to an inquiry by Assistant Secretary of State Adolph A. Berle, Jr., regarding the “objective” of this telegram, Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs, who drafted it, explained in an attached memorandum dated January 30, 1942:
“With possibility in mind we or British may find it necessary at some future time to make a landing at Petsamo or move through Northern Finland from Murmansik area against Germans in Northern Norway and Finland, Eu [Division of European Affairs] thinks it desirable to emphasize at this time for the record the use which German troops are making of Finnish territory.
“Another aim of the attached telegram is to reinforce the thought to the Finnish Government that by prolonging its close association with Germany it runs into unavoidable complications which neither it nor we desire.”
When the Acting Chief of the Division, Ray Atherton, initialled this memorandum, he added: “I cite also spirit of attached” telegram.
making of Finnish territory as bases of military operation, so far as we are aware, with the full consent of the Finnish Government.

We are unaware of any evidence that the Finnish Government has taken any action since Germany's declaration of war on us or even before that date, to clarify or justify its position with regard to the continued presence in Finland of German armed forces and use of Finnish territory as a base of operations by German forces. It must be recognized that the continued presence and activities of German armed forces on Finnish territory unopposed by the Finnish Government has a direct bearing on the status of Finland in the present war situation.

You are requested to bring this matter orally to the attention of the Finnish Government, leaving with it a memorandum of your oral presentation of our views.

Hull

740.0011 European War 1939/19204: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, February 3, 1942—7 p.m.
[Received 11:27 p.m.]

91. Finance Minister Pekkala called on me this afternoon as he said to inquire as to present state of relations between Finland and the United States which is matter of concern to many here. He said frankly he was not kept informed about foreign policy but whenever he had inquired recently either of Prime Minister Rangell or Minister Tanner, with special reference to United States, he had been told there were no new developments. I told the Minister that it was difficult for me to discuss these matters with him in present circumstances but that I felt Finland’s position could not be considered stationary and was necessarily affected by rapid developments of the war, this being particularly true since attack on United States by Japan. Hence, I said Finland’s position seemed to require clarification and time was of the essence.

Pekkala said he could assure me of two things: First, that great majority of Finnish people were sympathetic to cause of the democracies and, second, that conviction was steadily growing that Finland must make separate peace with Soviet Union. He did not know how long it would take for these facts to find expression in official action but he appreciated importance of time element. He expressed opinion that even Field Marshal Mannerheim and many in the Finnish Army shared these views and assured me they were also shared not only by

44 Väinö A. Tanner, Minister of Commerce and Industry until May 1942; then Minister of Finance.
Social Democratic Party leaders including Tanner and rank and file of that party but by numerically smaller political groups including Swedish Party and Progressives. When I inquired as to attitude of Agrarian Party his answer was they were still convinced that Russians must and could be crushed and in any case took little interest in foreign policy.

Pekkala said he never discussed anything with Foreign Minister Witting and intimated some lack of confidence in President Ryti but he asserted categorically that the two propositions above stated were absolutely in accordance with facts and that movement based on them was growing steadily.

I expect to see Foreign Minister Witting tomorrow to make representation directed in your 31, February 2. Meanwhile it is apparent from Pekkala’s visit and from other indications which Department will have noted in my recent telegrams that there is increasing uneasiness here both about relations with us and possibility of Finland withdrawing from the war.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/1942: Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSENIK, February 4, 1942—3 p.m.
[Received 8:55 p.m.]

94. Department’s telegram No. 31, February 2. I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs as directed today and left with him memorandum in confirmation of oral statements. He said he could not make considered comment at the Foreign Office and would have to examine memorandum most carefully.

He pointed out at once that Finland is now dependent on 93% of its imports on German good will, a remark which was doubtless prompted by the fact that German delegation for renewal of trade agreement negotiations has just arrived here and called on him immediately preceding my visit. He also said that Finland’s position with regard to German troops and use of Finnish facilities by Germans was similar to that of Iceland with regard to Allied troops and asked

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4 The Minister in Finland again pointed out in his telegram No. 98 of February 5, 1942, that public opinion toward the United States was largely uninformed owing to the suppression of American news coming from non-Axis sources. To overcome this deficiency, the Legation had recently commenced the distribution of a news bulletin to some 800 persons, who had accorded it an enthusiastic reception, while it also speedily ran afool of the German Legation. The Minister further declared that German officials at this same time were making determined efforts to prevent the showing of American motion picture films in Finland.

(740.0011 European War 1939/1942):

4 Foreign Minister Witting’s aide-mémoire in reply is contained in telegram No. 127, February 16, from the Minister in Finland, p. 39.
what Icelandic Government could do in event of German demand for evacuation of Allied troops from that Island. I said I saw little similarity between the two situations inasmuch as Finland was actively and voluntarily engaged in war.

Witting went on to say that even in the time of Russian domination of Finland \(^a\) there had often been periods when no "constructive" action could be taken by Finnish patriots and that Finland at the present time was "like a mouse in a trap" and similarly in a period when there was little to do but keep quiet.

It was evident that so far as Witting is concerned there was little disposition to try to shake off the German grip on this country if only on the theory that Finland could not risk starvation which he believes will ensue for Finns if Germans have any pretext for interrupting imports to this country.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/19350 : Telegram

_The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State_

STOCKHOLM, February 9, 1942—6 p. m.
[Received February 10—12:56 a. m.]

239. My 229, February 7, 1 p. m.; 211, February 5, 5 p. m.; 103, January 19, 7 p. m.; 38, January 9, 2 p. m.; \(^a\) and Department’s 31, February 2, 5 p. m. to Helsinki. From all information available here it seems clear that Finnish military situation is rapidly deteriorating. Should spring and summer arrive without a cessation of Russian-Finnish fighting and a Russian offensive take place ending in the complete military collapse of Finland there would arise possibilities of reaction in Sweden which in my view cannot be ignored. The further Russian forces penetrate into Finnish territory during such an offensive the harder would become the terms on which Finland might make peace and as the Russian forces got nearer the Swedish and Norwegian frontiers there would arise in this country a cry for assistance to Finland. Such assistance in those circumstances would suggest Swedish collaboration with the Germans and would play strongly into the hands of the small but potentially influential pro-German group in Sweden as well as appealing to those circles, including officers of the high command, who though not pro-German doubt possibility of an Allied victory. An appeal for Swedish assistance for Finland in this eventuality would also command popular support from among classes who have no sympathy for Germany. As a result this country might be faced with an internal political

\(^a\) Finland was a Duchy and Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire between 1809 and 1917.
\(^a\) None printed.
crisis of the first order, which could endanger present coalition government and might place in power a group whose policies would be dangerous to democratic cause.

Madam Kollontay, Soviet Minister, has expressed herself privately as being exceedingly concerned about possible effects on Sweden of a Russian victory and advance into Finnish territory. She believes that only hope for Russo-Finnish peace is for a simple cessation of fighting. My understanding is that she has brought her view to attention of her Government and is exploring possible ways in which it may be made effective.

JOHNSON

711.60D/55

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] February 12, 1942.

The Minister of Finland called to see me this morning at his request. The Minister began the conversation by asking what opinion I had with regard to relations between Finland and the United States at this moment.

I replied that, as he knew, I had been away for the better part of a month and since my return I had been so occupied with urgent problems that I had not had any opportunity to acquaint myself with recent developments regarding Finland.

The Minister went into a very long and exceedingly rambling conversation which always came back to the expression of his hope that relations between Finland and the United States would not deteriorate and that there would be nothing like a severance of relations between the two countries.

I again and again reiterated the same basic principle, namely, that in as much as the United States was now engaged in war it was impossible for it to consider maintaining normal or understanding relations with any country which was actively assisting the Axis powers.

The Minister insisted that his Government had officially stated to the United States that it would not participate in any way in the war between the United States and Germany.

I repeated that if Finland was actively engaged in assisting Germany in fighting Russia that obviously constituted active assistance on the part of Finland to the enemy of the United States.

I made it clear that because of our traditional friendship for the Finnish people we had so far undertaken a very patient and forbearing policy towards Finland, but that if Finland were now to embark upon major offensive operations against the Soviet Union, it would
inevitably give rise to a situation which I was sure the Minister and I would regard as regrettable.

The Minister endeavored, as usual, to get me to give him a detailed statement as to how far Finland could undertake military operations against the Soviet Union without being regarded as going beyond the bounds of what this country would stand. To this I consistently replied that the statements I had already made on this and previous occasions and the statements made to the Minister by the Secretary of State made perfectly clear beyond the shadow of any misapprehension the position of this Government in that regard.

The Minister likewise endeavored to get me to give him some information with regard to the conversations between Stalin and Mr. Eden. I said that I regretted that I was not in a position to give him any information on that point.

The Minister handed me a copy of the address made by the President of Finland at the opening of the present session of the Finnish Parliament which is attached herewith.47

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/19350: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1942—7 p.m.

85. As a means possibly of sounding out Swedish Government on matters mentioned in your 239, February 9 and of influencing it to urge Finnish Government not to participate in further offensives against the Soviet Union we suggest you press on such Swedish officials as you deem appropriate the following thoughts:

Ryti's recent speech and other information now available to us strongly suggest Finnish Government has decided to gamble everything on a final German victory and may now be considering collaboration with German forces in further offensives in Soviet territory. We take such a serious view of these developments we hope that in the interest of Finland and the rest of Scandinavia the Finnish Government might be persuaded not to take any action which would further complicate Finland's position with anti-Axis forces but to make every effort to come to a peaceful understanding with the Soviet Union at the earliest possible moment—or at least to arrange for the cessation of fighting.

Repeat to Helsinki.

Hull

46 Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, People's Commissar for Defence, etc.
47 Not printed.
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, February 14, 1942.
[Received February 15—3:45 a.m.]

122. New trade agreement between Germany and Finland was signed here yesterday following negotiations since February 3. Official statement published press today to effect that “negotiations conducted in spirit of brotherly and hearty cooperation inspired by common task offered opportunity for far reaching consideration all economic questions and resulted in complete agreement”. Statement adds “Within framework agreements reached we received assurance that on German side everything in their power being done in field both of public supply and industrial and financial economy so that Finland’s economic striking power in common struggle may be kept unbroken and strengthened and so that Finland on its side notwithstanding difficulties caused by war and demands created thereby shall deliver to Germany in highest possible quantity important products from its forestry resources and industry.” Also announced that special agreement simultaneously concluded regarding exchange goods between Finland and Norway.

German negotiator Schnurre quoted in press having said negotiations not only involved extension previous agreements regarding exchange goods and regulation of payments but intensification thereof. Said negotiations would be undertaken middle this year within framework agreement reached yesterday regarding details exchange of goods and that discussions covered all economic questions including raw materials and foreign trade. Finland would be provided with coal, iron, artificial wool, etc., in sufficient quantity. Added that as clearing procedure cannot be maintained to full extent further regulation of payments will be made later and that “Finland despite great difficulties has delivered great quantities forest products and other things to Germany” also that “agreement reached is specially advantageous to Finland and shows that talk of weakness of Finnish economy is without foundation”.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/19505 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, February 16, 1942.
[Received February 17—2:44 a.m.]

127. Minister Foreign Affairs this afternoon handed me following aide-mémoire in English language under today’s date.

48 Karl Schnurre, head of the Eastern European and Baltic Section of the Commercial Policy Division of the German Foreign Office.
"Aide-Mémoire. The arrival of German troops in Finland was originally based on a transit arrangement made in September 1940 and referring to transportation of German military personnel and matériel through Finland from Germany to northern Norway and back. Having received from the German Government an enquiry suggesting such an arrangement the Finnish Government gave their consent. The main reason why the Finnish Government took this attitude was the policy of the U. S. S. R. towards Finland after the conclusion of the peace in Moscow. The numerous demands on Finland put forward by the U. S. S. R. clearly indicated that the Soviet Government was not disposed to treat Finland as a sovereign state with which, in conformity with the peace treaty, it ought to have entertained friendly and normal relations. Immediately before the conclusion of the above mentioned arrangement with Germany, the Finnish Government had been forced to grant to the Soviet Government free passage of military transports on the railway between the frontier and the Hanko territory. It became obvious from the continued pressure and policy of extortion carried out by the Soviet Government that they were preparing for Finland the fate of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, a fate to which the Finnish nation will never submit without fighting. During the months following the conclusion of the arrangement with Germany it became evident that the Finnish Government had correctly appreciated the consequences of the German troop transports as a check on Soviet efforts to interfere in Finnish affairs as for the time being the crisis was postponed.

This is the background against which the presence of German troops in Finland ought to be seen and considered.

However, the developments in the world situation on which Finland had no influence, led before long to new tension and to open war. In June, 1941, the U. S. S. R. attacked Finland. Finland was thus involved in hostilities with the U. S. S. R. already at war with Germany. The presence of German troops in Finland now took on a new aspect. Their activities from Finnish territory against Soviet forces are a consequence of the struggle against the common enemy. These relations of co-belligerency were created by the military situation and without any political commitments.

Finland wages war against the U. S. S. R. for the purpose of safeguarding her existence and permanent security and does not want to become involved in the events referred to in the first paragraph of the American Minister's memorandum dated February 4, 1942.

Attaching the greatest importance to the continued maintenance of the friendly relations between Finland and the United States of

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60 The Minister in Finland summarized the provisions of this transit agreement of September 22, 1940, in his telegram No. 416, September 26, 1940, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. 1, p. 347.
61 Hangö, Hanko.
62 This convention of September 6, 1940, was reported by the Chargé in the Soviet Union in his telegram No. 1173 of September 15, 1940, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. 1, p. 343.
63 For correspondence on the forcible occupation of the Baltic States and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see ibid., pp. 357 ff.
64 This memorandum was given to the Foreign Minister of Finland by the American Minister at the time of carrying out the instructions sent by the Department in telegram No. 31 of February 2, p. 33, about which he had reported in telegram No. 94 of February 4, p. 35.
America the Finnish Government believes that to achieve their aim mentioned above cannot be against the aspirations of the American Government. Helsinki February 16, 1942.  

Repeated to Stockholm.

Schoenfeld

740.0011 European War 1939/19512: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, February 16, 1942—7 p.m.
[Received February 17—4:18 a.m.]

128. My 94, February 4, and 127 today. When Foreign Minister Witling this afternoon handed me his memorandum I [read] it in his presence and after doing so I had two inquiries to make. First, with reference to statement in third paragraph from end of memorandum to effect that U. S. S. R. attacked Finland last June, inquired whether Finnish Government considered there was no connection between presence of Germans in Finland at that time and alleged Soviet attack. His answer was that Finland considered attack in June 1941 part of same aggression which had begun in November 1939 and had continued even following Moscow peace. Secondly, I asked whether penultimate paragraph of his memorandum in light of official statements including President Ryti's latest speech that Finland was fighting for destruction of Bolshevism and would continue until common victory with Germany defined purpose of safeguarding Finnish existence and permanent security. Witling said destruction of Bolshevism was certainly Finnish war aim.

Witling then alluded to effort made by Finnish Government in summer of 1940 to secure agreement with Sweden for common defense and failure of that effort through Swedish timidity and later formal Soviet objection. He expressed view already expressed by Wasastjerna as previously reported that Soviet objection was very shortsighted for Finnish-Swedish agreement at that time would have made it possible for this country as well as Sweden to remain neutral.

Accumulation of Russian strength in Finnish area in summer of 1940 especially in tense crisis of August of that year had led directly to situation in which Finnish-German transit agreement in September was accepted here as great relief.

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54 Information about the consideration of plans for the formation of a northern defensive alliance, and the note of March 27, 1940, from the Soviet Union to the Interested Scandinavian countries warning against the creation of any such combination, is contained in telegrams No. 315 of March 20, 1940, and No. 339 of March 26, 1940, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and in telegrams No. 152 of March 28, 1940, and No. 164 of April 4, 1940, from the Minister in Sweden. Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. 1, pp. 315, 320, 323, and 325, respectively.

55 Jarl Axel Wasastjerna, the Finnish Minister in Sweden.
As early as November 1940 Witting again said Germans were aware of far-reaching Russian preparations including accumulation of men and materiel for attack not only on Germany, but incidentally on Finland which was confirmation of Finnish apprehensions in summer of 1940 when Finland knew Russians had every intention of attacking this country again.

I then turned to statement in penultimate paragraph of Witting’s memorandum to effect that Finland does not want to become involved in greater war and asked whether this signified that Finland had already attained her strategic aims and that continuance of hostilities against Russians was result only of Russian offensive tactics at the front. Witting said that in a democratic country like Finland where military and civil direction was in different hands it was not possible as in authoritarian states precisely to define strategic aims of military leadership. It was true, however, that for long time past activity on Finnish front was due to Soviet offensive tactics which incidentally had recently been very costly to Russians in Poventsa area where only some 60 prisoners had been taken in an operation which had cost Russians approximately 3,700 killed.

I intimated that what seemed to us to be of primary importance at this time was relation of Finnish military action to necessary passage of overseas supplies for Russia in our struggle against Germans. He asked how in practical terms Finland could control German action in this respect at a time when Finland was almost wholly dependent upon German good-will for imported supplies necessary to sustain life of Finnish people.

I asked whether this was not somewhat humiliating position for Finns to be in and whether they had given up all pretension of exercising their own free will. He countered by saying that free will of Finland was determined by its geographical position in precisely the same way as that of Sweden or of the United States which latter was protected by two oceans.

It seems perfectly clear that while Finns may still hope not to be forced to take aggressive action which will interfere with passage of our supplies for Russia they have very little confidence that this hope can be realized and are prepared if necessary to face consequences of enforced cooperation with Germany. I believe therefore it would be true to say Finns will not voluntarily take any action further to complicate their position with anti-Axis forces as suggested in your 85, February 13, to Stockholm, but that they rather expect that military necessity or events over which they have no control preclude possibility of their coming to peaceful understanding with U. S. S. R. at this time or even to arrange for cessation of fighting on Finnish front. I do not think it likely that Sweden can exert their influ-
ence successfully as desired by Department. The Finnish mind is made up.

Repeated to Stockholm.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/19533: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSEKII, February 17, 1942—1 p. m. [Received 7:29 p. m.]

129. Your 85, February 13, to Stockholm. I asked my Swedish colleague 56 today whether he thought it possible at present for Finns [to reach understanding?] with Russians for cessation of hostilities. He answered in negative pointing out that though there was considerable body of opinion among Social Democratic and Swedish parties in favor of some action to that end this body had no effective leadership and would go along with Government on ground of national unity. I also asked Westman whether he felt it was possible for him to exercise any influence in that direction and he likewise answered in negative saying he would not wish even to try to do so since if he should talk along those lines with Witting it was not unlikely latter would report it to Germans and thereby further increase German displeasure with Sweden. He said he believed Finns for present neither can nor desire to come to understanding with U. S. S. R., mentioning that during recent visit here of Swedish newspaper editors Witting had emphasized dependence of Finland on Germany for essential supplies and that at same time Finns had sought to impress Swedes with merits of their annexation policy by circulating to the editors copies of Professor Jaakkola’s 57 book entitled Finland’s Eastern Problem to which I referred in my telegram No. 718, December 29, last, 58 and which purports to make out case for extensive acquisitions of Soviet territory.

Westman said that while there had been some wavering and uncertainty here a few weeks ago, recent reverses of Allies had again strengthened Finnish confidence in German success against Russians, although there was still anxiety as to possible effect on Finland of German exhaustion next fall, when Russians might be in position to concentrate their strength against Finland. Field Marshal Mannerheim was, therefore, giving very anxious thought to military situation and was finding it hard to reach any decision.

Westman added that Finns had begun their war thinking it would be short, victorious and ignored by Britain but that in all three respects

56 Karl Ivan Westman.
57 Jalmari Jaakkola, professor of history at the university in Helsinki.
58 Not printed.
they had miscalculated. They had "gone into the air without a parachute." He was not able to express opinion as to whether Finns will themselves undertake further offensive operations against Russians in immediate future and seemed to feel, as I do, that this is still an open question.
Repeat to Stockholm.

SCHOENFELD

701.60D11/2239

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] February 18, 1942.

The Finnish Minister came in to see me at his request.

We first cleared up the question of permission for him to travel to New York and Providence, which had been granted yesterday. The Minister told me he had planned to go to Providence to spend a weekend with Mrs. Merriman but as there was not adequate time, he was limiting his trip to New York where he had to investigate an expenditure by the Finnish Consul General there.

He took advantage of the opportunity, as usual, to discuss the problem of Finnish-American relations. I told him that these had been made entirely clear to him by Mr. Welles and that there was not much now to say.

The Minister said that certain columnists had accused him of misleading his Government as to the friendship of the United States and Finland. Actually, he had not done that but had always leaned to the dark side of the picture.

He referred to a conversation he had with me at my house some months ago, in which I had told him that the ineluctable forces of military operation could produce only one result. Finland was fighting on the side of the Germans—and the rest of the world were lining up against the Germans.

I observed that I had nothing to add to the statement I had then made, namely, that the cardinal fact was that Germany was the enemy of the United States and of most of the civilized world, and that Germany's allies were necessarily lumped with Germany in the general jackpot.

I pointed out that I had told him then that the theory that there was a separate Finnish-Russian war, apart from the general war, was an impossible position to take. The Minister said he knew this was so and he had consistently so reported to his Government. He added that he saw no solution.

I said that I could again refer him to his conversation with Mr. Welles. The Minister observed that Mr. Welles had not proposed a
solution but had merely stated that if Finland’s policy continued as it was, relations with the United States would become more critical. The Minister had reported to his Government that would probably mean a breach of relations between the United States and Finland. I made no comment.

The Minister then said that he found it difficult to see how the Finns, even though they did not take part in the spring offensive, could follow the situation resulting from the existence of German troops on the ground. They were not in a position to fight both Russia and Germany.

I said that as to that, I was not well enough informed to discuss the matter.

A. A. B[erle], Jr.

740.0011 European War 1939/1940: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, February 24, 1942—2 p.m.
[Received 4:46 p.m.]

144. There has been no reference in Finnish press thus far to Stalin’s declaration yesterday "on anniversary of Red Army including his statement that recovery of Baltic States and Karelia is Soviet war aim."

Schoenfeld

740.0011 European War 1939/1941: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, February 25, 1942—2 p.m.
[Received 3:03 p.m.]

149. My telegram no. 147, today. It is now quite obvious that the Finnish Government is following a deliberate policy of suppressing or at least distorting all statements by President Roosevelt bearing on the war situation. This contrasts even with policy toward Great Britain as Churchill’s pronouncements are reported in the Finnish press in some detail. I am somewhat at a loss to know what we can do about this in view of manifest control over Finnish press exercised by Germans and should welcome the opinion of the Department as to any action that might be taken.

Schoenfeld

59 The Department received a report of Stalin’s speech in telegram No. 163 of February 24, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, vol. III, p. 416.
60 Not printed.
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, February 28, 1942—noon.
[Received 12:40 p.m.]

162. My telegram 64, January 22. Jubilation over increase in bread ration of approximately 20 percent for February owing to German promises of grain has been short lived. Ice conditions in the Baltic have caused suspension of maritime traffic with result that food ships for Finland are icebound at Stettin and other North German ports. Ministry of Supply has been forced to requisition one-half of wheat and all rye seed reserved for next autumn sowing in Southern and Central Finland as well as cereals reserved for consumption by farmers in August which are to be returned later. This is an emergency measure designed to tide over the country until grain ships arrive from Germany but it emphasizes the force of Witting’s repeated assertions to me that Finland is now dependent on Germany for essential food supplies.62

It is equally rejuvenating however that apart from effects upon Finnish policy of an eventual change in the military aspect of the general war, the United Nations have it in their power to influence Finnish policy whenever they can assure Finland of adequate food supplies.

SCHOENFELD

711.60D/58

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1942.

The Minister of Finland called to see me this morning at his request.

The Minister said he wished to read to me the telegram he had sent to his Foreign Minister after his previous conversation with me. The Minister read to me what purported to be a copy of his telegram and what he read to me seemed to be an accurate account of the conversation held. In the text which he read to me, the Minister had emphasized the statement I had made to him that if the Finnish Government now undertook openly and actively to assist the German Government in an offensive attack upon the Soviet Union, the relations between our two countries would reach a very serious crisis.

61 Not printed.
62 The Germans were, of course, quite aware of this hold over Finland. In telegram No. 171 of March 4, 1942, Minister Schoenfeld repeated the remark made by a German official: "If Finns do not do as we wish, was machen sie?" (860D.8111/66)
I said that what the Minister had read to me seemed to be an accurate presentation of the views I had expressed to the Minister and that I could only reiterate today the same views and with even greater emphasis, if possible. I stated that as I had said before, the Government of the United States had learned to have a very high regard for the people of Finland since shortly after the termination of the last world war and that this Government had always believed that the democracy of Finland was a very useful and desirable element in the concert of nations. I said, however, that to speak very bluntly, I believed the Minister would agree that no matter what the termination of the present war might bring about, the existence of friendly and cordial and intimate relations between our two countries was of far greater value to Finland than to the United States. I said, therefore, it seemed to me from the long range standpoint that the Finnish Government would certainly desire to think very carefully before embarking upon any adventure or policies which would result in the elimination of that relationship with the United States.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

[WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1942.

The Finnish Minister called upon me at his own request. He stated that he had handed Mr. Welles a note on the subject of Finnish ships and he handed me a copy thereof which is attached.\textsuperscript{63} He stated that the Finnish ships had an engagement with the United States Maritime Commission through the Finnish Shipping Mission \textsuperscript{64} in New York to operate these ships on the Inter-American routes and that the British Government had given its permission for these vessels to return to United States ports. When Britain declared war on Finland, five of these ships were taken over by the British. The Minister claimed that we were responsible to Finland for the vessels because we had not forced the British to live up to their agreement to permit those vessels to return to American ports but had themselves appropriated them.

I told the Minister that his statement was correct except that it omitted to take note of the fact that the agreement with the United States and the undertaking of Great Britain was during a period when Great Britain and Finland were on a friendly basis. There was no war existing between the two. They had broken relations and

\textsuperscript{63} Not printed.

\textsuperscript{64} Finnish Shipowners Commission.
that was the occasion for the undertaking on the part of Great Britain to permit the ships to return to United States ports. However, the agreement did not contemplate that upon the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Finland that those ships would continue in the same relationship and receive the same treatment by Great Britain. The outbreak between England and Finland had changed the situation and had caused England to change its attitude toward ships of a power which had suddenly become an enemy power. I told the Minister that his claim, if any, would be against England and not against the United States and that the proper way for him to present his claim or to make any observations his Government might care to make on the subject of these vessels was through the intermediation of the Swedish Government as their protecting power with the British Government; that their protest or their claim should be made to Great Britain and not to the United States.

The Minister said that he was making this “for the record”; and that he did not expect any immediate action on the part of the United States.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1942.

The Finnish Minister came in to see me at his request.

He brought up again the question of restrictions on Finnish consuls who are by law required not to leave the city in which they work. He said he believed that some of the honorary consuls who were American citizens were not observing this; specifically, there was an honorary consul who worked in New York but lived in Long Island. He likewise asked about restrictions on his own movements, saying that he had to go to New York quite frequently in connection with the liquidation of the Finnish purchasing mission.

I said the matter was still under consideration and I would try to expedite a solution.68

He then, as usual, tried to draw me into a discussion of the general Finnish position. I avoided this, saying that I thought that the discussions had between himself and Mr. Welles had made the matter perfectly clear.

He renewed his insistence that they considered it a “Finnish War”, not to be connected with a World War. I confined myself to saying

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68 A notation dated March 12, 1942, to this portion of the memorandum reads: “Mr. Berle says to let Eu [Division of European Affairs] handle this; the Minister should not be able to shop around.”
that unhappily Finland had got herself into the position of fighting on the side of the Germans, with all that implied.

He asked whether he might personally go over the various possibilities in the situation. I inquired whether he was doing this by instruction of his Government and he said he was not. I said that I likewise had no authority to discuss those matters and that I feared that under all the circumstances, merely personal discussion could be of no useful result.

A. A. B[erle], Jr.

702.60D11/165

The Acting Secretary of State to the Finnish Minister (Procopé) 66

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: In view of the statement in your note of March 4, 1942 67 that Finnish citizens in American service in Finland are not subjected to other restrictions than other Finnish citizens, I am prepared to agree to withdraw the limitations imposed upon American citizens in Finnish employ in this country set forth in the Department's note of January 27, 1942.

I hope this will ease your situation.

I am [etc.]

Sumner Welles

740.0011 European War 1939/19999 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, March 8, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 3:55 p. m.]

181. Jarnefelt, 68 former Finnish Minister at Washington, visited me yesterday. He said he had opposed his Government's policy at time of outbreak of war with U. S. S. R. last summer and had thought it would be wise to await developments before committing Finland. He had disagreed also with view then held by President Ryti and other leaders here that Soviet regime would collapse in matter of weeks under German attack. Now, however, things had gone so far that it would be most difficult to turn back especially since Germans constantly betray concern about Finnish policy by repeated inquiry whether Finns intend to make separate peace.

Jarnefelt intimated Finnish policy might indeed change if German military position deteriorates seriously but in that event change in

66 This note was acknowledged with "very sincere gratitude" by the Minister on March 9, 1942.
67 Not printed; this was a personal letter from the Minister to Mr. Welles.
68 Eero Jarnefelt was the Finnish Minister in Washington, 1935–39.
policy might also involve revolution in this country which would sweep away many present leaders.

When in answer to his inquiry, I stated with conviction that Germany would be defeated by American action and that our war effort against Germany would not be deflected by necessity of waging war in Far East, Jarnefelt said it was realized both here and in Germany that this was American strategy. Result thereof he said would be to make northern theater, particularly Murmansk area, very important and might easily bring Finland into conflict with United States. I expressed agreement with this view.

Jarnefelt strongly deprecated local talk of so-called new strategic frontier saying that air power had made any such frontier meaningless for Finland. He spoke similarly of war slogan that Bolshevism must be destroyed saying Bolshevism was Russian internal affair resulting from conditions caused by First World War and that it had manifestly been succeeded by strong national resurgence on [in] Russia quite apart from fact that Finnish peasant and worker were not easily persuaded to accept alien political ideas.

He said, however, it is still quite impossible to obtain rational hearing for such views which are received with scorn and indignation. People here, he said, are divided as they were in 1918 between those on German side and those who look to West and new leadership of Finland; above mentioned would emerge from latter category. . . .

When I suggested that recent Finnish policy had appearance of gamble on German victory without alternative line of retreat Jarnefelt did not deny it. He seemed to accept my further suggestion that it appeared to be necessary for Finland to get back to strong moral position it held in eyes of world during war of 1939–40 and that to do so more would be required than official claim which was already wearing thin and almost abandoned that Finland is following independent line. To do this, however, Jarnefelt pointed out it was now extremely difficult considering position into which Finland’s relations with Germany had drifted.

. . . Though he wondered whether present war may not have produced vindictive spirit previously lacking among Russians towards Finns, he said his experience in Russia indicated that Russians felt no such hatred for Finns as latter feel for Russians. I gathered he feels there must be an accommodation with Russians on reasonable terms.

Whether our warnings and intimations official and unofficial in recent months have had effect on Finnish policy should appear more clearly in next few weeks. If Finns refrain from trying to interfere with northern supply route via Murmansk railroad by cutting line at Sorokka, for instance, this will be seen by time that [thaw? ] sets in since otherwise such operation must be postponed till summer.
Should they so refrain it will be due in great part to acceptance by Finnish Government and High Command of views like those expressed by Jarnefelt and to him yesterday. Meanwhile Brazilian Chargé d’Affaires \(^70\) tells me he has it on good authority that Finnish military have always concluded Sorokka is now too strong to be taken even by Finns. Latest Finnish communiqués continue to mention bombing of railroad south of that place.

SCHOENFELD

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711.60D/59: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, March 11, 1942.
[Received March 12—4: 18 a.m.]

199. Finnish Government’s annual report for 1941 submitted to Diet includes usual section behalf Ministry Foreign Affairs from following extract refers United States: “As appears from foregoing fact that Finland was drawn into war also had political effects on relations between Finland and United States. Number of measures very regrettable from Finland’s standpoint also took place on part United States Government in economic matters. However, friendly relations between the two countries continue in normal diplomatic forms although actual connections chiefly economic were interrupted in consequence of general war.”

SCHOENFELD

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740.0011 European War 1939/20856: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, March 16, 1942—3 p.m.
[Received March 16—2: 52 p.m.]

218. Former Estonian Minister Varma \(^71\) informed me today that Germans about a month ago brought pressure to bear on Finns to secure withdrawal of American Legation from Finland. Representations were made both to Finnish Minister at Berlin \(^72\) and to Foreign Office here. Representations were oral and informal and Finns answered that severance of relations with United States would cause unfortunate reaction among masses of Finnish people and hence was not considered for present.

Varma adds that Foreign Office officials now express regret Finnish Government did not take stronger line in opposing German pressure

\(^70\) P. C. de Souza Dantas.
\(^71\) Aleksander Varma.
\(^72\) Toivo Mikael Kivimäki.
for breaking off relations with Britain last summer. Gripenberg lately Finnish Minister at London has made his views on subject known here and both he and former Counselor of Finnish Legation at London have been frank in deprecating wisdom of Finnish policy in relation to Britain. This Varma says has had influence on Finnish Government’s attitude toward German pressure with reference to United States apart from accepted fact that public opinion here is definitely opposed to rupture with United States.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/20731: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, April 1, 1942—11 a.m.
[Received April 1—8:20 a.m.]

251. French Minister told me yesterday he has good reason to think Finns have decided to take no further offensive action against Russians at least for present and are resolved to resist continued German pressure to participate in spring offensive. He says Finns explain visit to [of] Marshal Von List to far north as German affair in which they are not concerned.

Now that Finns have recovered Suursaari Island in Gulf of Finland, as just announced, I believe French Minister’s impression may be quite correct.

He adds that feeling Finnish Government as among public is definitely that anything should be avoided which might further jeopardize maintenance of relations with United States. When he said Finnish Government is firmly following its “middle course” my comment was that policy of Government hardly leaves Finns much choice.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/21186: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

Washington, April 22, 1942—5 p.m.

296. We have been informed that early in March Soviet Minister in Stockholm raised with British Minister there question of effecting Finnish withdrawal from the war pointing out danger to Finland of cooperation with Germany after war turns against Axis and reper-

73 G. A. Gripenberg, Finnish Minister in the United Kingdom until the break in relations, August 1, 1941.
74 R. Seppälä.
75 Hubert Guérin.
76 The Department had received its information through an aide-mémoire of April 13, 1942, from the British Embassy (not printed).
cussions in Sweden from Finnish military collapse. British Government instructed Mallet and Ambassador at Kuibyshev to take no action on this matter which would give rise to Soviet suspicions that British Government is flirting with Finland at Soviet expense and that generally Finns and Russians should be left to find their own way to initiate a settlement. British appear to feel Finns would not be amenable to settlement until they can see probable outcome spring offensives.

We have been much interested in foregoing information which is passed on to you to put you in a better position to interpret any developments pertinent thereto coming to your attention. We feel British Foreign Office instructions mentioned are soundly conceived. Department has repeated this telegram to Kuibyshev. Please repeat to Helsinki as no. 61.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/21094: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1942—7 p.m.

63. Your 291, April 20, and related telegrams. We suggest you endeavor to see Ryti and say to him orally we are much concerned with persistent reports from many sources that Finnish troops may resume the offensive against Soviet territory; and that since we have already made our position in that general connection clear we can only re-emphasize at this time our more than ever confident belief that Germany will be completely defeated by the United Nations.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/21256: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, April 27, 1942—7 p.m.

[Received April 28—5:02 a.m.]

309. Upon his return to Helsinki from an absence President Ryti received me today and I spoke to him in sense of your 63, April 23. President expressed confidence that Russian resistance to Germans would be broken this year and countered any intimation of possible further Finnish offensive in Soviet territory by asserting that it was Russians who continued to attack Finnish positions. These attacks in recent past and still going on in some sectors at no time represented serious threat to Finnish positions and in general he gave impression that Finnish military situation remained satisfactory.

"Not printed."
He said he could not know outcome of war against Germany but he remained sure that if Germany were defeated and Russia victorious Bolshevism would sweep Europe, including Britain and even threaten internal stability in United States. President while disclaiming sympathy with Nazism considers Hitler pivot of balance between Nazi Party and German Army which balance might be destroyed by his elimination and deliver Germany to Bolshevism while in Britain and United States the lowering of standard of life, the casualties and other losses incident to war on its present scale would similarly prepare ground for proletarian upheavals at least akin to Bolshevism if in form different from its expression in Russia.

Ryti expressed doubt that we would be able to restore European position in Far East and said he expected the present would not be the last war between United States and Japan. Ryti said that if Finland and the other northern countries survived present war it would be necessary with Sweden and Norway to form the northern coalition which Finland sought to create in 1940 and which was accepted in principle by Swedes but failed for various reasons.  

In response to inquiry as to effect of continuance of war on Finland’s internal economy President was vague but expressed view that in Finland as well as in other belligerent countries including Britain and United States public debt being piled up would never be repaid.

So far as Finland’s relation with Russia and Germany was concerned the President said frankly that as a Finn he would prefer the danger attendant upon German domination of the continent to decapitation of the Finnish people which would follow Russian control of this country because the first danger could be met by passive resistance in which Finns were experienced whereas the second danger would mean destruction of nation. He said that during the peace negotiations at Moscow in March 1940 Molotov had frankly admitted to him that purpose of Soviet policy was creation of a new Soviet nationality and elimination of all traditional national groups in the Soviet Union.

My conversation with President which lasted more than 2 hours and covered pretty well entire range of world affairs was first I have had with him since November and I do not think he has changed in slightest his view of what Finnish policy should be. I would describe that policy as designed to make maximum use of Finland’s relation with Germany to prevent Russia from controlling this country but with no inclination specially to facilitate possible German plans for propagation of Nazi ideology here. Policy mentioned undoubtedly includes also hope that territorial gains already achieved can at least be held pending result of European War and perhaps extended if Rus-
sian power is forced back to line of Volga River which the President mentioned. He clings tenaciously to the claim that hostilities last June were initiated by Russians against Finland and said in response to my inquiry as to reason for such action on part of Russians that it was undoubtedly due to Soviet Government's knowledge of its own military power, which was unknown outside Russia, and to belief that relatively small number (about 30,000) of German troops then in this country could be destroyed and Finland taken over because of its supposed exhaustion as a result of Winter War.

So far as our relations with Finland are concerned, my view is that nothing we can do short of direct military action or a free offer to feed Finland will change Finnish policy. The President said as much when he pointed out that if Russia were on victorious side at end of war she would dispose of this country as she saw fit and we could do nothing about it. Britain, he said, was already committed to Russian domination of this country and President asserted that he knew this to be fact although he admitted that we were still governed in our view of status of Finland and of the small nations in Russian orbit by our interpretation of Atlantic Charter.79

Summing up—there has been no essential change in Ryti's view of general European situation. He still expects European War to end in relatively short time, say within a year with defeat of Russia or her withdrawal to Volga and a compromise peace between Germany and the Western powers. He seems still to count on German victory for salvation of Finland but said that he would make peace with Russia the moment he could get "security." I did not press for any definition of that term in view of your no. 61, April 22.80

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/12251 : Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 27, 1942—midnight.
[Received April 27—11:20 p.m.]

2202. The competent official of the Foreign Office mentioned that the various reports which circulate occasionally regarding the possibil-

79 For text of the Atlantic Charter, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367. The Minister in Finland commented in a later telegram, No. 320, April 29, 5 p.m., that the Finns still believed that "despite our displeasure at their collaboration with Germany," at the end of the general war our sympathy "will at least preserve their independence and lead us to contribute to reconstruction of the country. They are strengthened in this view by fact that, notwithstanding our warnings since last fall, they have been able to keep to their course and at the same time maintain official relations with us." (740.0011 European War 1939/21300)

80 See last paragraph of telegram No. 296, April 22, 5 p.m., to the Minister in Sweden, p. 52.
ity of Finland withdrawing from the Russian war apparently originate in the hopes of certain Social Democrats in Finland and gain currency abroad through Social Democratic circles in Sweden. In this official’s view such reports were exaggerated and premature to say the least and he still believed that Finland would in any event await an indication of the outcome of this summer’s eastern campaigns. According to this official, one of the chief holds which the Germans possess over Finland is the food supply. The Foreign Office had consequently considered suggesting to the Russians that, despite their present food stringency, they might explore the practicability of making food available to the Finns as a possible basis of discussion at some later stage. This suggestion had been telegraphed to the British Embassy at Kuibyshev which was left discretion whether it should be placed before the Russians at this time, particularly from the standpoint of whether the suggestion under the present circumstances might be interpreted by the Russians as part of an independent British initiative to make peace with the Finns, an impression which the Foreign Office wished to avoid. As yet no answer has been received from Kuibyshev.

The Foreign Office official referred with appreciation to the cooperation which the Department has extended to the British Embassy in Washington in the consideration and formulation of policy toward Finland.

MATTHEWS

701.0060/114

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1942.

Mr. Solanko came in to see me this afternoon. He inquired as to the reasons for an announcement he said had been made by the American Legation in Helsinki advising American citizens that the last opportunity for them to return to the United States would be provided when the Swedish steamship Gripsholm leaves Göteborg at the end of this month.82 The manner in which Mr. Solanko phrased his inquiry indicated clearly that he suspected some political implication in the announcement.

I told Mr. Solanko that I had not previously heard of any such announcement and could not therefore make any specific comments regarding the matter. It was my opinion, however, that the announcement was another in the series, and probably the last of such

82 The Gripsholm and Drottningholm were exchange ships used for repatriation of American officials and other American citizens from Europe in accordance with agreements with the German and Italian Governments. For correspondence on this subject, see vol. 1, pp. 285-377.
announcements, issued by American Consulates and Missions in Europe since August 1939. I went on to say that as difficulties in Europe for American citizens had increased and as facilities for their return to the United States became available, it was our policy to advise all American citizens who could do so to return to the United States.

Mr. Solanko inquired why no such announcement had been issued before the recent sailing of the *Drottningholm*. I replied that I presumed it was because of the shortness of time between the receipt of information that German authorities would permit Americans to sail on the ship and its departure.

In order not to ease his mind too much, I cautioned Mr. Solanko on his departure that what I had said in the foregoing connection was based upon supposition, and that other factors unknown to me might possibly be involved.

740.0011 European War 1939/21467a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1942—6 p.m.

196. According to a UP despatch date lined Stockholm, May 2,\(^3\) Soviet radio stations broadcasting on that date to the Finnish people promised Finland territorial gains if they would lay down their arms and conclude a separate peace.

In case an opportunity should present itself and unless you should perceive some objection to so doing, please inquire of the appropriate Soviet authorities (a) whether such Soviet broadcasts have been made to the Finnish people; (b) whether such broadcasts indicate that the Soviet Government has decided upon a definite policy with regard to Finland in case Finland should make a separate peace and (c) what this policy might be.

You may in your discretion point out that your inquiries are made with the purpose of ascertaining whether your Government might possibly be of some assistance in any efforts to induce Finland to make a separate peace.

The text of some of these broadcasts would be helpful.\(^4\)

Hull

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\(^3\) The United Press despatch was carried in the *Washington Post* for May 3, 1942.

\(^4\) Confirmation of such broadcasts from Moscow as were mentioned in the Finnish press was reported by the Minister in Finland in telegram No. 341, May 6, 1942. Here they were described as “offering Finland certain territorial compensations but stating that this country will have to pay war indemnity at very high figure.” (740.011 European War 1939/21446) The Finnish reception of these broadcasts was not encouraging.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Long)

[WASHINGTON,] May 6, 1942.

The Minister of Finland came in to request information as to the reason for which he had been denied the right to go to New York on the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th of this month. I treated the matter lightly and told the Minister that it was not necessary to go into explanations as to why the application had been denied; that he of course recognized the right of any government to deny such an application under the circumstances at present existing; that there was no personal reflection upon him and no intention to prevent him from attending to the business of his mission but that the Government had exercised its right to say that for these particular dates and at that particular place it was inconvenient for the Minister to proceed.

He asked if restrictions had been placed upon Minister Schoenfeld and whether he was allowed to proceed to his country home, about forty miles from Helsinki. I told the Finnish Minister I did not know whether he could proceed to his country home but for the last six months he certainly would not be making it a habit to proceed to his country home. I then stated that whereas our action has nothing to do with the theory of retaliation and should be entirely divorced from that thought, yet the fact remained that several officers of the United States in Finland had been denied the right to proceed to certain destinations and that one officer had been denied the right to visit with his family outside Helsinki. I stated I realized the conditions were different because Finland was actually the scene of warfare, but under the conditions existing here, the United States must insist that it had the right at any time to approve or deny such an application.

The Minister mentioned his summer plans and wanted to know if there would be any objection to his having his family, which would include a young child and a baby, take a place outside of Washington. He asked particularly if he might go to the seacoast. I said there would probably be no prohibition upon it but it might be difficult and embarrassing for him from time to time because there were regulations owing to the war in force along the seaboard. It would be more difficult for a foreigner, even if he were a Minister, than it would be for an American, and there would be plenty of difficulties for Americans. He seemed to agree that it would border upon the impractical.

There is no doubt in my mind that the Minister associated this denial with the possible immediate probability of his demission. I obtained from him the unmistakable impression—not from his words, however—that he felt this might be a part of a breach of relations.

B[reckinridge] L[ong]
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Kuibyshev (Moscow), May 10, 1942—4 p.m. [Received 5 p.m.]

379. Department’s 196, May 5, 6 p.m. In response to my inquiry concerning the reported Soviet broadcast, Vyshinski emphatically stated last evening that the Soviet Government had not broadcast any peace appeals to Finland and would not take the initiative in making peace overtures to the Finnish Government since Finland started the war.

Standley

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Ankara, May 20, 1942—9 p.m. [Received May 21—4:53 p.m.]

456. For President, Secretary and Under Secretary. Finnish Minister *66 called on me this morning and told me present Axis–Soviet front in Finland substantially follows Finnish–Soviet frontier of October 1939 on the Karelian Isthmus and along Svir River from Lake Ladoga to Lake Onega thence along west shore of Lake Onega to head of Lake thence along railroad to Nadvoitsk *67 thence north from 50 to 100 miles west of Murmansk railroad. He said total number German troops in all Finland at present time numbered about six divisions nearly all of which are operating or stationed north of Lake Onega. Line on Karelian Isthmus and along Svir River and Lake Onega is held by Finnish troops.

Minister said his Government desired a permanent frontier with Soviets which would be strategically defensible and line now held south of Nadvoitsk would constitute such a frontier. He expressed doubt a definite frontier could be established other than at a general peace conference but remarked present line was substantially frontier Finland would seek. He clearly indicated exact frontier was subject to negotiation provided lines agreed upon was strategically defensible.

After Minister had informed me of foregoing and had emphasized his desire for absolute secrecy particularly in respect of his disclosure of number of German troops now in Finland and their position I inquired of him as to whether his Government was prepared

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*65 This telegram was repeated to the Minister in Finland in Department’s telegram No. 109, May 23, 7 p.m., with a request for comment.

*66 Baron Aarno Armas Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen.

*67 Nadvoitsk.

428310—62—5
to make a separate peace with Soviet to which he replied that in his personal opinion it was but only on basis of a strategically defensible frontier.

I then inquired as to whether he had received specific instructions from his Government or from Ryti, Tanner, Erkko or perhaps Paasikivi to impart foregoing to me. Although he denied having received any suggestions from anyone I am inclined to view that he would not have approached me on this subject without instructions from his Government.

As Minister apparently expected a reply to his approach I assured him that I would report what he said to my Government.

From nature of Minister’s remarks I am reasonably satisfied that Finnish Government would welcome any steps Department might see fit to take with object of ascertaining terms on which Soviet Union would be prepared to make a separate peace with Finland.

STEINHARDT

740.00119 European War 1939/1015 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, May 26, 1942—3 p.m.
[Received May 26—2:16 p.m.]

434. Definition of Finnish front given by Finnish Minister at Ankara as set forth in your 109, May 29, seems approximately correct but as indicated in my 359, May 8, there are probably nine or more German divisions in this country. As suggested in my 417, May 22, Finns now are alone on Svir front and it seems probable that Finns alone hold Karelian Isthmus notwithstanding report in my 426, May 23.

“Strategically defensible frontier” mentioned by Finnish Minister at Ankara remains declared war aim of Finland. What such frontier might be when Finland finally stands alone against U. S. S. R. and in view of modern methods of war particularly air power is not easily defined. I think Finnish Minister was repeating sentiment expressed in my 309, April 27 when President Ryti said to me he would make peace any time he could be sure Finland could get “security”. It may be that Ryti directed his Minister at Ankara to sound Steinhardt because of latter’s participation in conversations preceding Moscow peace of March 1940 but I have no reason to think Finnish Government is prepared to make separate peace with U. S. S. R. at present.

88 Juho Kusti Paasikivi, Finnish Minister in the Soviet Union, April 1940 to May 1941.
89 See footnote 85, p. 59.
90 Not printed.
Finnish Minister at Ankara apparently ignored important question
what Germans might think of Finnish attempt to conclude separate
peace. Finns are bound by their relation of cobelligerency with Ger-
mans and are not likely to abandon it without obtaining compensatory
protection. This suggests that until tide of war definitely turns there
is little to convince Finns they should give up German support. Two
conditions seem necessary to such change in Finnish policy as hereto-
fore repeatedly reported namely change in military situation favor-
able to us and capacity to feed these starving people. On both points
perhaps as good a statement as any was made by Erkko some months
ago when he said to me in facetious manner that best solution might
be landing of overwhelming American force in north Finland to pro-
tect this country not only against Russians but Germans as well. At
present I do not think Finns can disengage themselves even if they
would.

In view of your 61, April 22, I shall not approach Foreign Minister
or President pending further instructions with regard to possible peace
feeler mentioned in your 109. It happens that on June 2 I expect to
have important members of Government and some former Cabinet
Ministers for a stag dinner and if Department has any suggestions on
this occasion I may be able to sound Witting or Tanner.

SCHOENFELD

740.00119 European War 1939/1017 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1942—8 p.m.

114. Following telegram has been sent to Steinhardt in connection
with subject matter of your 434, May 26.

"We are inclined to believe approach mentioned in your 456 was
unauthorized. Schoenfeld holds similar opinion. However, in order
that no real opportunity be lost to effect Finland's withdrawal from
the war, we think it desirable that you inform your Finnish colleague
in effect as follows:

"We are ready to be of assistance to his or the Soviet Government
in reaching a peaceful settlement of their differences, if requested to
do so. However, it is our understanding that the Soviet Government
now feels that any initiative for such a settlement must come from the
Finnish Government. Hence, before giving further consideration to
approaching the Soviet Government to ascertain its reaction to the
Minister's intimations, we feel it desirable to be informed categorically
whether his approach to you was under specific instructions from his

91 See last paragraph of telegram No. 296, April 22, 5 p.m., to the Minister in
Sweden, p. 52.
Government, and if so, to be given a clearer definition of the terms on which his Government would be willing to make a settlement. Repeated to Helsinki."

It is not suggested that you initiate any discussion of foregoing matter at time mentioned last paragraph your telegram under reference.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/21944 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, June 3, 1942—2 p.m. [Received June 3—11:41 a.m.]

459. In conversation last night with Paasikivi, formerly Finnish Minister at Moscow, who was always well regarded by Russians and is probably most moderate among Finnish leaders in his views on relations between Finland and the U.S.S.R., he indicated that he saw no solution for that problem except on basis of maintenance of German power as counterbalance to U.S.S.R. He insisted that Russian mentality was wholly alien to that of western Europe and that Stalin's policy represented combination of outright expansionist aims with internal development. He agreed with Witting and Tanner who were also present that only force could prevent Russian encroachment in northern Europe though at same time he admitted Russia was potentially self-sufficient and consequently irresistible in long run by purely military methods. He expected that exhaustion resulting from present war would keep Russians quiet for a time thereafter, but he was skeptical of Russian sincerity in accepting principles of Atlantic Charter and expressed grave doubt that Britain and United States could exercise any controlling influence over U.S.S.R. if war concludes favorably for United Nations.

It was evident from my talk with Paasikivi as well as with other Finnish leaders last night that they continue to count on German power as their only available resource against U.S.S.R. and that if this fails them they see no alternative to destruction of their national existence and Russian domination of entire European continent. Their panacea is reconciliation of western powers and Germany to form united front against Russians and they make no secret of their belief that this united front will also have to face the Japanese. In short, these Finns consider Russians incorrigible and our political idealism impracticable.

SCHOENFELD

92 Some discussion of the possibility of peace between Finland and the Soviet Union took place between President Roosevelt and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, during the latter's visit in Washington. See the third paragraph of the memorandum by Mr. Samuel H. Cross of the morning conversations on Monday, June 1, 1942, vol. III, p. 578.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] June 5, 1942.

The Minister of Finland called this afternoon to see me at his request.

The Minister was obviously perturbed by the declaration of war, unanimously approved by the Congress, upon Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. He referred to this and inquired whether any change of policy on the part of the United States towards Finland was contemplated. I told the Minister that the policy of this Government towards his country had been made very clear in conversations which he had had with Secretary Hull and myself. He said that he had learned of the visit to Washington recently of a "distinguished visitor," and asked whether there was any evidence that the Soviet Government was pressing the United States to change its policy towards Finland. I answered that the policy of the United States was determined by this Government, and was not formulated as a result of pressure from any other government. He said that, of course, recent Soviet negotiations with Great Britain had created profound disquiet in Finland, where the fact that these negotiations had taken place was generally known, and that if it were known that the United States had held similar conversations with Soviet officials of the highest rank, that would create far greater disquiet in his country.

I said that I had just learned of the visit of Hitler to Field Marshal Mannerheim in Finland, and that this visit could only be interpreted as meaning that Germany was demanding that Finland cooperate with Germany in some new offensive action against the Soviet Army, presumably towards Murmansk and Archangel in order to cut off the flow

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93 The substance of this conversation was sent to the Minister in Finland in telegram No. 122, June 8, 8 p.m.
94 On June 5, 1942. For correspondence regarding a state of war with these countries, see pp. 833 ff.
95 Negotiations on the occasion of the visit of V. M. Molotov in Washington (May 29–June 4, 1942) are described in vol. III, pp. 566–583, 585–587.
96 Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe, and Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter, signed at London on May 26, 1942; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. corr. p. 353; for draft of treaty and subsequent changes, see telegrams No. 2907, May 24, and No. 2922, May 26, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. III, pp. 558 and 564, respectively. For correspondence regarding the conversations leading to the conclusion of this treaty, see ibid., pp. 490–563, passim.
97 Adolf Hitler and party had been in Finland from soon after noon until about 6:30 p.m., on June 4, 1942, on the occasion of the 75th birthday of Field Marshal Mannerheim. Conversations between Government leaders were also reported to have taken place.
of British and American war materials to the Soviet Union through those ports. I said that, as Secretary Hull and I had both informed the Minister, if the Government of Finland were now to undertake to give open and direct assistance to Germany against the Soviet Union, such action would necessarily and immediately result in a complete change of policy on the part of the United States. I said: "It seems to me that your Government must, therefore, realize that whether or not the policy of the United States towards Finland changes depends on Finland herself."

The Minister spoke at some length of the desirability, from the standpoint of the United States, of having an intact and independent Finland as an island of order and of democracy in the chaos which would exist in Europe if Germany were defeated and the Soviet Union were to be the victor. I said that our feelings with regard to the Finnish people had been demonstrated in many practical ways upon repeated occasions, and that the United States most certainly desired to see a world of the future in which small countries could live at peace and in security. I said that the apparently increasing willingness of Finland to permit herself to be used by Germany, and apparently to be occupied more and more as the weeks passed by German troops, could only bring about a revulsion on the part of the American people towards the Finnish people, with consequences which I felt would be disastrous to the people of Finland. I said that the victory of Germany could only mean utter annihilation and ruin for every ideal for which the Finnish people have striven since 1918, and that I trusted no decision would now be made by the Government of Finland which would result in a change of policy by the Government of the United States toward the people of Finland.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/22163a : Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1942—5 p. m.

121. In reply to inquiries today from the press concerning Hitler's visit to Finland, I said:

"It is evident that the visit is a deliberate ruse on the part of the Germans to compromise Finland further in the eyes of the anti-Axis world and a cover for the desperate attempts of Hitler to induce Finland to make further contributions to Axis military campaigns. A reported statement yesterday of a Finnish spokesman in Helsinki may be interpreted to mean that Finland is balking at the German pressure."
"We are watching the situation most closely to see whether this visit of Hitler results in any greater degree of cooperation with Hitler against the United Nations." 88

Repeat to Stockholm as Dept's No. 492.

Hull

701.60D11/363

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

[Washington,] June 9, 1942.

The Minister of Finland requests for himself and for members of his staff permission for repeated and frequently contemporaneous visits out of Washington. If the engagements are carried out which are indicated by the requests for permission to visit New York, there are frequently a number of them together in New York.

In view of the present situation vis-à-vis Finland and Germany, it is my opinion that the Department should exercise a more strict control over the movements of the Minister of Finland. Through other sources we know that he has several contacts in New York which are not related to Finnish business. He may have other activities that we know not of. I think it would be entirely proper to limit the Minister to a maximum of four consecutive days in New York within each calendar month—in case he applies for permission to go.

The individual members of his staff should be more strictly limited and should be confined to Washington unless it appears that there is some unusual urgency or official importance to Finland connected with their visits. They should not be in New York at the same time with the Minister or with one another. Nor should it be arranged that one or the other of them would be there most of the time.

None of this has any relation to the Minister's visits to and from his summer home or to the visits of his designated secretariat to his summer home.

B[reckinridge] L[ong]

88The Minister in Finland reported in his telegram No. 485, June 10, 1942, that no reference whatever had been made to this statement in the Finnish press (740.0011 European War 1939/22164).
740.00119 European War 1939/1028: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1942—1 p.m.

123. Our 114, May 27. Following secret telegram from Ankara has been received: 99

"Finnish Minister called to see me this morning and read me substance of a telegram which he received yesterday from his Government. Minister explained that in his last telegram to his Government he had suggested if it desired to pursue the matter any further appropriate instructions be sent to Procopé.

"Finnish Government agreed with Minister's suggestion and instructed him to inform me to this effect. His Government then informed Minister in strict confidence on May 22 Procopé had telegraphed an unidentified person in Washington had suggested to him the conclusion of a separate peace with Soviet Union saying Soviet was disposed to make peace with Finland and he had reason to believe that State Department would lend its good offices if formally requested to do so by either Finland or Soviet Union but without such a request State Department would not be disposed to take any action. Telegram closes with following:

"'For this reason we have informed Procopé that according to our information Soviet Union is not disposed to discuss peace with Finland.'

"In response to my inquiry as to his opinion concerning source of Finnish Government's information that Soviet was not disposed to discuss peace with Finland at this time Minister replied he had little doubt it came from the Swedes.'

We have not been approached by Procopé in the foregoing connection.

Hull

862.24/695: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, June 10, 1942.

[Received June 10—11:25 p.m.]

482. Reference my 121 [122], February 14. According to communiqué in morning papers Finnish-German trade negotiations carried out in Berlin from May 29 to June 9 with purpose of complementing agreements concluded at Helsinki February last have "led to agreements intended to maintain and strengthen production capacity of Finnish war economy and to promote within fixed framework mutual goods exchange". Berlin correspondent Uusi Suomi reports consid-

99 Telegram No. 547 was sent by Ambassador Laurence A. Steinhardt from Ankara at 2 p.m., June 6, and was received at 6:43 p.m.
erable significance attached there to conclusion of new Finnish-German agreement details of which kept secret involving strengthening of Finland’s military power and war economy.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/22568 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, June 30, 1942—noon.
[Received June 30—10 a. m.]

533. Prime Minister Rangell who in absence of Witting is acting as Foreign Minister informed me in reply to inquiry this morning that Marshal Mannerheim’s visit to Germany reported in my 529 \(^1\) yesterday was one of courtesy only. He said emphatically that Hitler’s visit here June 4 and Mannerheim’s return visit had no military significance.

My conversation today with Prime Minister gave me impression that there has been no change in general attitude of Finnish Government which remains essentially defensive for the present but as indicated in my 320, April 29 \(^1\) possible collapse of Russian resistance to German attacks may well induce Finns to continue their advance eastward to the White Sea. As to possible German intentions in the North I elicited no information from Rangell.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/22878 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, July 14, 1942—1 p.m.
[Received 3:15 p.m.]

567. In conversation this morning with Minister for Foreign Affairs he reiterated intention of Finnish Government to keep its military forces substantially in their present positions and seemed increasingly confident that success now attending German arms against Russians would make this possible without excessive further sacrifice on part of Finns. He repeated his statement of last year that Finns might have to stand on their present lines “with possible minor modifications” as they did in the period between 1918 and 1921. He appeared hopeful that at least as between Germans and Russians “war

\(^1\) Not printed.
would be over soon". He admitted strain on Finnish domestic economy by reason of large scale mobilization of manpower but was optimistic as to crop prospects for this year.

Again as in my conversation June 30 with Prime Minister Rangell, Foreign Minister Witting volunteered no reference to possible German offensive action against Russians in northern area and confined himself to giving me impression of substantial stabilization of Finnish front.

SCHOENFELD

123 Gleeck, Lewis E./76: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1942—6 p.m.

142. Please address a first person note to the Foreign Ministry, as under instructions from your Government, in the following sense:

The request for provisional recognition of Gleeck is withdrawn. Furthermore, in view of the action taken by the Finnish Government with respect to your request for provisional recognition of Gleeck and in denying since July 17, 1941 to our consular officers in Finland the right of access to local officials, actions which are contrary to the entire spirit of our Treaty of Commerce and Consular Rights of February 18, 1934 with Finland, we feel that it is impossible to continue further American consular representation in Finland in the face of the attitude adopted by the Finnish Government. We have, accordingly, cancelled the consular commissions of McClintock and Von Hellens and are closing immediately the consular section of the Legation. We

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3 The Minister in Finland in telegram No. 578, July 17, 1942, summarized Finnish public opinion as “hoping that Russia would speedily be defeated, preferring not to face fact that such defeat would be triumph for totalitarian system and defeat for free peoples of world. Devout believers in miracles, they dreamed of qualified victory sufficient to eliminate Russia followed by compromise peace after which Finland would again be friend of all nations except Russia.” (740.0011 European War 1939/22944)

4 The Legation’s note was delivered on July 16, 1942.

5 The Minister in Finland had recounted in his telegram No. 564, July 13, noon, that provisional recognition of Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr., Third Secretary of Legation, also as a Vice Consul had been requested on June 22. In reply the Finnish Foreign Ministry stated on July 9 that it was preferable to postpone this request to some subsequent time, and referred to its circular note of July 17, 1941, regarding consular procedure in Finland. The Minister summarized that this circular note “merely refers to necessity in view of war time conditions that consular matters be handled entirely through Finnish Foreign Office rather than directly with local authorities and seems to have no reference to question of issuance of exequatur for accredited consular officers.” (128 Gleeck, Lewis E./72)

6 For text, signed at Washington, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 868, or 49 Stat. (pt. 2) 2659. For the negotiations concerning this treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. II, pp. 134 ff.

7 Robert M. McClintock, Second Secretary of Legation in Finland.

8 Lawrence W. von Hellens, Vice Consul at Helsinki.
request that the Finnish Government close all Finnish consular offices in the United States not later than August 1, 1942.9

(Separate instructions will be sent you with regard to closing the consular section of the Legation and to Von Hellens.)

After you have assured yourself that the Foreign Ministry has received your note, inform us thereof by triple priority cablegram upon receipt of which we shall authorize you to issue to the Finnish press the following statement which we shall release to the press here upon receipt of your cable:

Under the terms of Article XXIII of the Treaty of Commerce and Consular Rights of February 13, 1934 between Finland and the United States of America, American consular officers "may within their respective consular districts, address the authorities, national, state, provincial or municipal, for the purpose of protecting their countrymen in the enjoyment of their rights accruing by treaty or otherwise."

However, in a note dated July 17, 1941,10 the Finnish Foreign Ministry informed the American Legation in Helsinki that "in view of wartime conditions" consular matters should be handled entirely through the Finnish Foreign Ministry rather than directly with local authorities. This action of the Finnish Foreign Ministry had the direct effect of denying to American consular officers in Finland the specific treaty rights mentioned above.

Furthermore, the Finnish Foreign Ministry in a note dated July 9, 1942 informed the American Legation that with reference to the Foreign Ministry's note of July 17, 1941, it was preferable to postpone to a subsequent date the question of an exequatur for a career officer of the American Foreign Service whom the American Government had recently commissioned as a Vice Consul in Helsinki and for whom the American Legation had requested provisional recognition in accordance with established custom in such cases.

The American Legation, acting on instructions from its Government, informed the Finnish Foreign Ministry in a note dated . . . .11 that the request which the American Legation had made for the provisional recognition of the consular officer referred to above was withdrawn. The Legation further informed the Finnish Foreign Ministry that by the latter's action in regard to the withholding of recognition of the consular officer referred to and in denying American consular officers presently in Finland their treaty rights in connection with the representation of American interests in Finland the Finnish Government had undermined the basis upon which American consular representation was maintained in Finland. Accordingly, the Foreign Ministry was informed that the consular commissions of the American consular officers at present in Finland had been cancelled and the consular section of the American Legation in Helsinki was being closed immediately; and that this action had been taken by the American Government to put an end to the present untenable situation involved in

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9 A note of July 31, 1942, from the Finnish Legation in Washington declared that all Finnish Consulates in the United States had been closed (702.60D11/197).
10 See footnote 5, p. 68.
11 The date here inserted was July 16, 1942, in the text printed in Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1942, p. 632.
maintaining American consular representation in Finland in the face of the attitude adopted by the Finnish Government in the matter. The Finnish Government was requested by the American Legation to close all Finnish consular offices in the United States not later than August 1, 1942.

Hull

711.60D21/13

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[Washington,] July 16, 1942.

The Minister of Finland called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Minister asked if I had any views to express to him with regard to the present situation. I said that I wished to let the Minister know that today the American Legation in Helsinki had officially notified the Finnish Government that, in view of the terms of the Finnish Government's decree of July 17, 1941, and in view of the recent indication given by the Finnish Government that they did not wish to issue an exequatur to Mr. Gleek, a Foreign Service officer whom this Government had desired to appoint as a consular officer in the consular section of the American Legation in Helsinki, it appeared to be clear that the Finnish Government is not willing to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Commerce and Friendship between the two countries as it relates to consular officers, and wishes to make it, in practice, impossible for American Consuls to operate in Finland; that in view of these circumstances this Government withdrew its request for the issuance of an exequatur for Mr. Gleek and would close the consular establishment of the United States in Finland, and reciprocally requested that the Finnish Government close its consular establishments in the United States prior to August 1, next.

The Minister inquired what the reasons for this step might be. I explained to him that one of the basic reasons for this step is the violation by the Finnish Government of the treaty above-mentioned. The Minister inquired whether the action taken by his Government with regard to our consular officers had not also been taken with regard to the consular officers of other Governments, and that consequently the most-favored-nation treatment accorded to the United States by the treaty could not legitimately be regarded as having been violated. I stated that that was not the point at issue, but the violation of the stipulation whereunder the American Consuls stationed in Finland were entitled to do business directly with the local and municipal officials where they were stationed, and that the decree of June [July] 17, 1941, clearly violated this treaty provision.

The Minister thereupon drew out of his portfolio a copy of the pertinent Article and commenced discussing the language of that
Article. It is very clear in my mind that the Minister must have had advance notice of the action taken by this Government, since it is highly unlikely otherwise that he would have had this particular Article at hand ready to discuss.

The Minister inquired whether this step on the part of the Government of the United States implied an imminent severance of diplomatic relations, and whether it was intended as a means of bringing pressure to bear upon Finland to make a separate peace. I replied that the question of pressure did not involve the Government of the United States but rather the Government of Germany. I said that if the Government of Finland desired, as I assumed, to maintain relations with the Government of the United States, it would hardly have taken this action with regard to American consular officers except as a result of direct pressure from Germany, and that I deeply regretted that evidence that Finland was operating under German pressure tactics.

I said that in so far as this Government was concerned the step taken represented exactly what I had stated to him—nothing more, nothing less.

I added, however, that it must be apparent to him, as it was to me, that the relations between our two countries were unfortunately degenerating. The Minister insisted that since his last conversation with me in early June the Finns had undertaken no offensive action and had limited themselves strictly to defense. He stated very emphatically that this made it clear that his Government wished at every cost to maintain relations with the United States and to do nothing to jeopardize the friendship between the two countries. I said that I was glad to have this statement from him, but that he himself must realize that as the war progressed it became more and more evident every day to the people of the United States that the Germans were only enabled to make their attacks on Murmansk and the railway and the lines of supply from the Allied powers to Russia by way of Murmansk because they were enabled to operate upon Finnish territory, with the assistance and support of the Finnish military authorities, and consequently American public opinion would feel consistently more clearly that the people of Finland were giving vitally important aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States and were seriously threatening the Soviet Union, a nation joined with the United States in the common determination to defeat Hitlerism. It was perfectly clear, I stated, that a situation of this kind could not continue for very long without very serious results to the relations between Finland and the United States.

I went on to say that the Minister and I had discussed these issues many times before, and that I consequently deeply regretted the course which events seemed to be taking.
The Minister stated that he regretted very much the action which his Government had taken and that he could only assure me again that he had tried consistently to prevent his Government from taking one step more than was strictly necessary to defend Finnish territory against the Russians. He had strongly urged his Government to prevent any press attacks against the United States and to refrain from undertaking any action which could be construed as “pin pricks”. He now regretted the fact that he had sent his Government word with regard to the restrictions placed by this Government upon the movements of himself and of his Legation personnel.

The Minister then cited certain instances where he thought inconsistent treatment had been accorded his Legation personnel, and I said that I was very glad to look into these cases with a view to rectification where I thought rectification was demanded.

The Minister read to me various editorials from Finnish newspapers, all to the effect that Finland was not undertaking any offensive warfare. He said these editorials represented his own point of view.

Before he left, the Minister inquired what the situation would be of those Finnish consular officials in the Consulate General in New York when the Consulate General was closed. He wanted to know whether any of them could be assigned to his Legation as members of his staff, since otherwise he could not, with his present staff, cope with the amount of work that had to be done in connection with the representation of Finnish interests in this country. I said that any request which the Minister might make in this regard would be given very careful consideration.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

701.0066D/7: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, July 18, 1942—11 a.m.

[Received July 19—7:49 a.m.]

585. Considerable comment has been rendered in the Diplomatic Corps on the pointed omission of the Finnish Government to extend invitations to members of this Legation and to the Brazilian Chargé d’Affaires to a reception for the Diplomatic Corps given on June 29 last on the occasion of the 60th birthday of the Speaker of the Diet Mr. Hakkila. Speaker ranks next to the President of the Republic in precedence here. He did however make cordial acknowledgement of the receipt of cards from me and officers of the Legation.

I have refrained from reporting this incident earlier as it was suggested in diplomatic circles that possibly Finns intended to give a later reception to which the Brazilian and American Legations might be invited together with neutral diplomats as was the case last year when
President and Mrs. Ryti received the Diplomatic Corps in two separate functions. Under the circumstances since this possibility has not materialized it would appear that the Hakkila reception and pointed omission of this and the Brazilian Legations from list of guests was another pinprick of possible political significance.

SCHOENFELD

124.60D/69: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, July 18, 1942—1 p.m.
[Received July 19—8:55 a.m.]

589. Swiss Minister informed me this morning that Finnish official circles are obsessed by thought that American Legation is center of extensive espionage activity in Finland. He said that during conversation recently with German Minister Von Blücher latter told him quite openly that this was the case and that departure of American Legation might be expected shortly would be correspondingly welcome from Germans point of view. Egger said this feeling of German Minister had undoubtedly been constantly imparted to Witting with whom Von Blücher is on terms of intimate friendship and must thus have spread through higher ranges of Finnish Government. Egger added that particular anxiety was felt here as to possible espionage activities of Mrs. McClintock who he said is described as “the beautiful Creole” and whose visits to Stockholm from time to time have been subject of anxious comment in this relation. Mrs. McClintock’s trips to Stockholm have of course been innocuous and have been undertaken either with her child during periods of air activity here or with her husband on courier trips. Finnish credulity in this matter is measure of characteristic provincialism.

SCHOENFELD

125.0060D/54: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, July 21, 1942.
[Received July 22—4:45 a.m.]

596. Following is text of note in English language dated July 20 received from Minister for Foreign Affairs.

“I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency’s note No. 798 of 16th instant in which Your Excellency has brought

12 Karl Egger.
13 Further such reports came in telegrams No. 827, September 21, 3 p. m., and No. 1007, October 21, 7 p. m., from the Minister in Finland (124.60D/82, 86).
14 Not printed; but see Department’s instruction in telegram No. 142, July 15, 6 p. m., p. 68.
to my knowledge the decision of the American Government to break off consular relations between the United States and Finland.

This decision has been received with surprise by the Finnish Government, as they could not assume that the regulations communicated in the circular note, July 17, 1941, and which consequently have been in force for a year, would, without the usual exchange of views through the diplomatic channels lead to such an abrupt action on the part of the American Government.

Regretting the above decision, which does not correspond with the aspirations of the Finnish Government in the various spheres of the relations between the United States and Finland, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency, that the Finnish Minister in Washington has received the necessary instructions regarding the closing of the Finnish Consulates in the United States and the taking over of their affairs, from the first of August next.

The Finnish interests in USA are, as is known to Your Excellency, in view of the existing circumstances, considerably wider than those of which the American consular officers in Finland have been in charge. The disadvantage caused by the rupture to the United States, having no separate Consulates in Finland, is much less than to Finland, the numerous Consulates of which have been in charge of the multiple affairs of a large settlement spread over a wide area in the United States. The closing of the Consulate General in New York causes special disadvantage to Finland, since it is the main center of the economic life of the United States and in the center of a large Finnish colony. Thus, from the point of view of Finland and her economic interests, the Consulate General was of first rate importance.

The Finnish Government hope that the American Government will show a benevolent attitude towards the arrangements which will be necessary when the Legation in Washington takes over all the Finnish interests in the United States."

SCHOENFELD

711.60D/82

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) 15

[WASHINGTON,] July 22, 1942.

The Minister of Sweden 16 called to see me this afternoon at his request.

The Minister said that his Government was deeply disturbed by the action of the Government of the United States in withdrawing its consuls from Finnish territory and in requesting the withdrawal of Finnish consuls from United States territory, not because of the intrinsic action taken, but because of the belief of the Swedish Govern-

15 The substance of this conversation was telegraphed on July 25 to the Minister in Sweden as No. 618 and to the Minister in Finland as No. 148.
16 W. Boström.
ment that this step was merely a forerunner of the severance of diplomatic relations and a possible declaration of war against Finland.

I explained to the Minister the situation as it had developed during the past year and the technical grounds upon which our recent action had been based. I made it plain that this Government had informed the Finnish Government that the continued and increasing use of Finnish territory by German forces was inevitably creating an increasingly critical situation in the relations between our two countries and that this Government had repeatedly informed the Finnish Government that should the Finnish Government itself undertake anything in the nature of offensive action against the Soviet Union, the present relationship between Finland and the United States could not possibly be maintained. I said that this Government had further made it clear that the continuation of relations between the two countries depended very largely upon Finland herself and that it was with deep regret that this Government had seen recent evidences which led it to believe that the Government of Finland was operating increasingly under German pressure and upon German instigation.

I said that the Minister knew very well the importance to the United States of insuring the safe arrival in Soviet ports of matériel which the United States was making available to the Soviet Government and that the use of Finnish territory by the Germans in order to attempt to prevent the safe arrival of such supplies was creating more and more opposition on the part of American public opinion towards a continuation of apparently normal relations between Finland and the United States. I said that while it was the desire of this Government to maintain its traditional and close friendship with the people of Finland, the attitude and policy of the present Finnish Government was unquestionably making this more and more difficult.

The Minister specifically asked whether the closing of the consulates was to be interpreted as a forerunner of the severance of diplomatic relations. I replied that no decision on that question had been reached by this Government and that consequently the Swedish Government need not draw that conclusion from the recent action taken by the United States. I added, however, that I would not be frank with him if I did not emphasize the fact that I believed the situation was deteriorating and that it might not be possible, if Finland continued to permit the exercise by Germany of increasing influence both military and political within Finland, to continue the relationship which had existed up to now.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, July 22, 1942.
[Received July 23—1:20 a.m.]

598. Following memorandum has been received from Foreign Office with card of Foreign Minister:

"The Minister of the United States of America, having communicated that the members of his Legation have met with difficulties from the side of the Finnish authorities when they wished to go outside Helsinki, it seems appropriate to state as follows:

The settling of some requests of the Legation for its members to proceed to forbidden localities has lately been influenced by an information from Minister Procopé that all of his and his collaborator's corresponding demands have been declined [by the American authorities. Even his demand for a permission to go with his wife to a dinner party in the vicinity of Washington had been declined.] 17

Before, e.g., during the last 2 months, only one of the requests from the Legation has not been agreed. It was question of a sailing trip within an area which ought to be considered war zone. During these 2 months the members of the Legation have received 31 permissions. The requests from the American Legation constituted, indeed 45 per cent on all the demands addressed to the Ministry by the Diplomatic Corps during this period.

However, even after the Ministry having received Minister Procopé's communication and after Minister Schoenfeld's discussion with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the matter, several permits have been granted to members of the American Legation under the presumption, of course, that the treatment of similar questions in Washington be only temporary.

It may be added that several members of the Legation have been seen without permits in places where, according to the note circulaire of August 28, 1940, it is allowed to go only with a special permission. Helsinki July 18, 1942."

SCHOENFELD

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, July 28, 1942—noon.
[Received 5:10 p.m.]

624. I am prompted by your 148, July 25, 18 to point out again that Finnish Government has been for sometime aware of imminence of crisis in relations with us. Arrival here July 24 of Finnish Minister at Stockholm presumably for consultation suggests that your latest intimation through Swedish Minister at Washington is now known here. Following as it does long and consistent series of similar appeals,

17 Wording in brackets added on basis of certified copy of memorandum supplied by the Finnish Foreign Office, transmitted to the Department by the Embassy in Finland in despatch No. 775 of May 26, 1959 (023.1/5-2659).
18 See footnote 15, p. 74.
warnings and intimations this latest expression is doubtless well understood.

It is evident that Finnish Government has braced itself to meet final deterioration in relations with us though it may still come as shock to public here. This fact was shown by uniformity of controlled press comment attending recent break in consular relations and its political significance. Comment was based on premise that present hostilities are due solely to Soviet aggression against Finland which premise underlies same order of ideas as prevailed during Winter War and rationalizes policy adopted in June last year or earlier.

Men who managed Finnish policy at time of transit agreement with Germans in September 1940 are still in control and have followed with characteristic tenacity line then entered upon.

Regardless of its original motivation, or wisdom of Soviet contribution to its adoption prior to June 1941, Finnish policy has clearly taken little or no account of changed circumstances since then. In past year Finnish leaders have said openly that issues of general war do not concern them and even that the war involves no moral issues. Nevertheless, I know that many of these leaders understand issues quite well. They merely choose to ignore them in shrewd hope that Finland may profit by German success against USSR while avoiding consequences of attendant subordination of this country to Reich for the latter’s purposes in the general war. In doing this they choose also, to ignore effects upon American interests of their subordination to Germany. On other hand, I have no doubt they have measured with complete deliberation the risks attendant on our disapproval of their course and even on our hostility. If and when crisis comes, these leaders, like many of the Finnish public, may sincerely regret it but they have persuaded themselves that they have no alternative to course they are following and are prepared to accept the consequences.

Meanwhile they hope devoutly for cessation of German-Russian hostilities, if not for formal peace, and present development of military situation in Russia has gone far to confirm this hope. In these circumstances it seems improbable that further warnings or appeals to Finland on our part will be more effective than hitherto.

SCHOENFELD

800.20260D/3: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, August 3, 1942—4 p.m.
[Received August 3—1:15 p.m.]

639. My 638, today. Upon receipt of Finnish circular note August 1, we suspended distribution of our daily news bulletin pending

19 Not printed; it transmitted a translation of Finnish circular note of July 30, received by the Legation August 1 regarding prior authorization of Finnish authorities for circulation of foreign political propaganda (800.20260D/2).
opportunity for informal discussion with Foreign Office. We also suspended distribution of Finnish edition of Flying Fortress pamphlet which had been mailed at daily rate of 200.

Gleek today called on Chief of Press Section of Foreign Office 21 to discuss circular note and was told orally that notwithstanding terms of note order was intended to apply only to books, pamphlets and other more substantial pieces of propaganda. Numelin said specifically that our news bulletin was not affected and that he like other members of Foreign Office was anxious to see its continued distribution. Gleek handed Numelin copy of Flying Fortress pamphlet which he promised to submit to censor.

Numelin repeated usual expressions of solicitude that diplomatic relations with us be continued and alluded to severe German pressure on Finland citing as example forthcoming visit of German press delegation including Dr. Schmidt of German Foreign Office 22 arranged at instigation of local German Press Attaché. 23 Numelin mentioned also that Germans were not pleased by his membership on editorial board of periodical Le Nord devoted to non-political subjects concerning Scandinavian countries.

SCHOENFELD

125.0086D/61: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, August 5, 1942—2 p.m.
[Received 3:55 p.m.]

645. Secretary General of Foreign Office 24 said yesterday to member of Legation staff who is old friend of his that our recent action in breaking consular relations with Finland was strongly reminiscent of methods used by Soviet diplomacy in dealing with this country and he seemed to be correspondingly resentful. Matter is of interest in that Pakaslahti probably reflected his chief’s feeling on the subject.

On other hand Turkish Minister 25 told me today that Witting had recently said to him emphatically that Finnish Government is most anxious to avoid any difficulties with United States. I gathered, however, that Witting may also have intimated to my Turkish colleague that our action was thought to be due to Soviet pressure upon us.

SCHOENFELD

21 R. Numelin.
22 Paul Schmidt, Director of the Press Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1939–45.
23 H. Metzger.
24 Aaro Pakaslahti.
25 Agah Aksel, Turkish Minister to Sweden and Finland.
740.00112 European War 1839/6413 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSEIKI, August 20, 1942—noon.
[Received 2:49 p.m.]

692. Source 26 mentioned in my 691 today 27 confirmed our impressions that Finnish-German trade negotiations just concluded extended German-Finnish grain agreement for another year from September 1 on same terms, namely, 230,000 tons of grain during 12 months’ period. This source added that concurrently with commercial negotiations a General of German Army supply service had been in Helsinki and had signed an agreement with Finnish Army supply corps calling for unspecified amount of foodstuffs to be sent for use of Finnish Army. Similar agreements this source said had recently been reached with Hungary and Denmark undoubtedly under German inspiration.

SCHOENFELD

124.60D/78 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSEIKI, August 31, 1942—noon.
[Received August 31—8:17 a.m.]

734. Former Estonian Minister Varma told me last night in confidence that this Legation and especially our Military Attaché are now kept under regular surveillance by Finnish authorities including stationing of official photographer in nearby houses to record all visitors.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1839/23901 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSEIKI, August 31, 1942—2 p.m.
[Received 5:23 p.m.]

735. A Finn who in peace time is largest importer of steel and who is now in special military service and in close touch with leading military opinion last night told me Finns earnestly hope there will be no break with us but that if there should be such break direct results would be that Finnish forces will undoubtedly extend their operations eastward and will lend Germans support necessary for latter to move eastward on northern front. Thus far, he said, Finns have refrained from moving beyond strategic line required to protect their old fron-

26 A Finnish Army supply officer.
27 Not printed.
tiers largely out of consideration for us and Germans have been unable
to extend their lines only because of Finnish unwillingness to cooperate
in such operations. This Finnish attitude, however, would change
promptly in event of rupture with us.

My informant displayed characteristic self-confidence of Finns and
their amazingly egocentric outlook when he said they have absolutely
no sense of obligation for any German assistance which they realized
had been given only for German purposes and was as nothing com-
pared to assistance they had given Germans. Finns would never for-
get German betrayal of Finland to Russians in 1939 but now held long
Finnish front to German advantage as well as their own. Finns would
not permit German interference here either in political or economic
matters and in case of German victory in Europe they were confident
Finland would continue to command German respect and to enjoy
special position recognized by Germans. Finns had no fears on this
score the more so as Germans who had been inclined to patronize them
in early stages of present war now “talked very small” and know that
Finnish “sisu” is irreducible.

My informant’s statements though quite unofficial are worthy of
note because they undoubtedly reflect views in highest Finnish circles.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/24015: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

HELLENS, September 3, 1942—noon.

[Received 9:50 p.m.]

750. Following summarizes our report on public opinion August
16—September 1.

1. Finnish opinion toward United States. Despite fact that so far
as Finnish press and radio were concerned, battle for Solomon
Islands was seen through spectacles fitted in Japan and using Ger-
man lenses, most people in Finland sensed that all was not going
Japan’s way. Entry of Brazil into war on side of United Nations
was interpreted here as result of American pressure and was not
connected in any way in Finnish minds with possible good reasons
Brazil itself might have had. As for continuance of normal Finnish-
American relations, Finns welcomed views expressed in article of

28 A word expressing the quality of stubborn determination of character which
made possible the accomplishment of great deeds in time of stress.
29 Attacks by United States Marines began on August 12, 1942, to consolidate
positions, and the Navy Department announced on August 25, 1942, considerable
Japanese losses in a naval engagement.
30 August 22, 1942. For correspondence regarding the cooperation of the United
States and Brazil on defense measures, see vol. v, pp. 632 ff.
Anne O'Hare McCormick in *New York Times* of June 8 which emphasized that American foreign policy toward Finland was not dictated from Moscow. Nevertheless Finns felt that we would be subject to continued Russian pressure to force break with Finland and that should Russia win war we could not intercede effectively on behalf of Finland. Obverse of usual thesis that Finns have refrained from further advances against Russians for fear of break with United States was expressed by Finn who said that if we should break relations there would be nothing to restrain such advance. You may be interested to know that on July 31 there were just over 400,000 licensed radio sets in Finland although this statistic to United States still seems largely of potential importance since Finnish and Swedish language broadcasts from United States are simply not picked up in Finland. We still have not changed our view that until American radio propaganda can find a base of operations nearer to Scandinavia than Boston, much of its wordage in Scandinavian and Finnish languages will be lost on empty air.

6. Anniversaries. Many disparate anniversaries were celebrated in Finland during past 10 days including that as [of] recapture of Enso and Viborg, third anniversary of Russo-German non-aggression pact 31 and third anniversary of outbreak of Great War. When Hitler himself in his exhortation to German people to hold through fourth war winter suggested that he also did not know when his war would end Finns began to wonder. Something seemed a little too neat in dream that Germans would knock out Russians and in turn be knocked out themselves leaving Finland to emerge unscathed, its trade debt cancelled, its markets in demand, its eastern boundary secure and its normal position—as always—unassailable.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/245660: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1942—7 p.m.

191. You should seek an interview if possible with President Ryti, otherwise with Witting, and state orally that under instructions you wish to point out that the American Government is greatly concerned at increasing indications of German pressure on Finland for participation of Finnish armed forces in fresh military operations. The tolerance which the American Government has shown heretofore in

the numerous instances of provocation of it by the Finnish Government reflects the residue of the good-will for Finland which existed in the United States at the time Finland began its co-belligerence with our enemies. In the face, however, of a step by the Finnish Government which the United States could only consider as clearly affecting its own vital interests and in no wise promoting any legitimate Finnish interest for the future, our existing relations with Finland precarious as they already are would have to be reconsidered.

In the recent past there were indications from Finnish sources that the military objectives in view did not extend beyond those areas already encompassed. A public declaration to that effect or any other statement which would clarify Finland’s intentions would necessarily do much to strengthen our present day-to-day relationships with the Finnish Government which hang by such a slender thread.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/24515: Telegram

_The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State_

Helsinki, September 25, 1942—8 p.m.

[Received 8:25 p.m.]

866. President Ryti received me at 4 o’clock this afternoon when I spoke to him in sense your 191, September 24, and handed him memorandum closely paraphrasing your instruction. President at once said with vehemence that Finland’s policy remained absolutely unchanged in its fight for its existence which United States was apparently willing to see destroyed by Russians.

He denied that any German pressure had been exercised or was now being used on Finland but refrained from saying that Finland would not participate in new military operations. He was struck most unfavorably by reference to provocation on part of Finnish Government and asserted that if any provocation or any pressure was being exerted it came from United States and not from Finland.

President repeated official theme of purely defensive character of present hostilities with USSR outlining again events preceding Finland’s armed resistance in June last year. When I said that Hitler’s announcement of attack on Soviet Union apparently preceded Russian acts of hostility on Finland and that at that time Hitler had referred to Finland as Germany’s ally which implied prior understanding President said Finland could no more accept responsibility for Hitler’s statement at that time than it accepted responsibility for equally mistaken statements made by other foreign statesmen including President Roosevelt regarding Finnish situation.

President calmed down after his first intense reaction and repeated what he had said before as to total disregard by great powers of justice
for small nations when latter stood in their path which had made him absolutely cynical regarding policy of great powers including United States.

President cited as example of such injustice on our part our action in taking over Finnish ships without compensation and he reverted to British blockade policy against Finland in June 1940 as illustration.

Finland was determined he said to follow its present policy at any cost and neither we nor anyone else could alter it because Finland knew Russians and we did not as our existence was not at stake and existence of Finnish people as physical entirety [entity?] is in jeopardy. Bolshevik power must be destroyed and President was thankful that German action against Russians was helping to preserve Finland. He was confident United States and Britain could not rely on Bolshevik leaders who deserved absolutely no faith. American people were being misled by propaganda regarding Finland as well as other matters and indeed people in big countries were more susceptible to propaganda than those in small countries like Finland where pace of life made it possible for people to think for themselves.

When I asked President whether he thought Finnish Government would make public statement as I had suggested under your instruction President expressed opinion that as there had been no change in situation no further statement seemed necessary at this time.

When I intimated regret at conclusion of conversation that my message may not have been pleasing President said facetiously that if any further messages I had to convey were no less pleasing he would be thankful. Saying that his personal esteem for me had not been lessened and would not be by any future events President gave me impression that further initiatives on our part would not surprise him.

Department will gather from foregoing that adamant Finnish conviction of rightness of its course is fully represented by President Ryti. When I asked him whether Marshal Mannerheim shared his views he answered in affirmative and said Finnish leaders were unanimous.

SCHOENFELD

749.0011 European War 1939/24528 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, September 28, 1942—7 p.m.
[Received September 28—5:04 p.m.]

880. I have just received with Foreign Minister Witting’s card the following memorandum in English dated today.

“In a conversation with the President of the Republic on the 25th instant the American Minister suggested that a statement should be
made from the Finnish side which would serve to clarify the intentions of Finland.

The same day, just before this conversation took place, the Prime Minister of Finland made in the Parliament a statement which, as far as it concerns foreign policy, seems to correspond with the desire thus expressed on behalf of the United States of America. This part of Prime Minister’s statement is enclosed herewith.

The Finnish Government can, however, not at all understand the mentioning of the “numerous instances of provocation of the American Government by the Finnish Government”. This, or that there should be any reason for the allegation, that Finland is being subjected to foreign pressure, must be definitely rejected. It should also be remembered that when the acts of aggression of the Soviet Union against Finland took place in 1941, the United States of America were not at war with any power, nor an ally of the USSR, but gave in many ways assistance to Finland.”

Enclosed with foregoing memorandum also in English is an “extract from Mr. Rangell’s speech September 25, 1942” reading as follows:

“The clearly defined line of our foreign policy is determined by our defensive struggle. A logical consequence of the nature of our struggle is the fact, that no changes have occurred in the attitude underlying our foreign policy since the day, 15 months ago, when the Soviet Union, by her acts of aggression, forced us to continue the war into which she had drawn us through her aggression in the autumn of 1939. Finland is fighting her war against the Soviet Union side by side with Germany, to which we are linked by brotherhood in arms.

The unambiguous attitude, which we have adopted, with the purpose of securing the safety of our country, has been in so many different connections explained to the Governments of the foreign powers, that there should be no reason for various interpretations. I had on November 29, last year, the honor to define this attitude in a communication given by the Government to the Parliament. This was unanimously accepted by the Parliament and remains unaltered in force as a definition of our foreign policy. However, certain circles abroad have, for some reason, wished to draw arbitrary conclusions about the attitude of the Finnish Government. Quite recently one has wished to interpret a statement, which was made by one of our envoys to the press of the country where he is stationed, in a manner quite different from the real attitude of the Finnish Government, although the statement was based on the Government’s communication just mentioned.

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82 The Department had informed Minister Schoenfeld in telegram No. 102 of September 24, 8 p.m., that the Minister of Finland had given three hand-outs, issued without instruction from the Foreign Office, to press representatives in Washington on September 19, 1942. One of these, on the political and military situations in Finland, which had apparently been misinterpreted, had declared that Finland “wants to cease fighting as soon as the threat to her existence has been averted and guarantees have been obtained for her lasting security.” The Department had considered that this statement consisted in general “of a rehash” of remarks already made in the past by Finnish spokesmen. (740.0011 European War 1939/2440) Procopé was himself much exercised by the misinterpretation of his press hand-outs and he made extended explanations and descriptions of the circumstances to Mr. L. Randolph Higgs, of the Division of European Affairs, on September 22, 1942, and to Under Secretary of State Welles on September 23 and again on September 28.
The changes in the attitude to Finland of certain foreign powers, which occurred after the first phase of our defensive war, apparent from the interpretations I have just referred to, and of which the declaration of war by Great Britain in December 1941 was the most conspicuous example, have not induced us to adopt a different line of foreign policy than the one which according to the unanimous conviction of our people, has been dictated by our country’s vital interests.

SCHOENFELD

121.5460D/88

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1942.

I was called into Mr. Atherton’s office this afternoon to participate in a conversation already under way between him and the Finnish Minister. Mr. Atherton remarked that the Minister had raised the question of actions of the Finnish Government against the personnel of our Legation in Helsinki and that he had told the Minister about the refusal of Marshal Mannerheim to receive Colonel Huthsteiner, our Military Attaché in Helsinki, before the latter’s departure from Finland for the United States, and about the pressure being brought to bear on Finns to sever their association and other connections with our Legation personnel in Helsinki. Mr. Atherton asked me whether I had any other information along those lines to give the Minister.

I said that I could add a few details to the matter relating to the departure of our Military Attaché and recited the refusal of the Field Marshal to receive Colonel Huthsteiner after the latter had been given to understand before departing for his tour of the front that he would be so received. I said that it was our understanding that the Marshal was stated to have taken the position that he would no longer receive “neutral Attachés,” but that we were unable to understand this report in view of another report that the Swedish Military Attaché who was likewise being transferred from Finland had been received by the Marshal.

I then told to the Minister what I had previously stated to him: that is, that I saw little purpose in our trying to debate the pros and cons of various actions of this kind, since it would take up too much time and really do nothing to solve the basic difficulties which were the

34 The British declaration of war on Finland came on December 7, 1941; see telegram No. 256, December 5, 1941, to the Minister in Finland, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 114.
35 After the refusal of permission to make a farewell call, at the direction of the Minister in Finland the Military Attaché wrote a letter on September 29, 1942, to Baron Mannerheim calling attention to this refusal.
36 G. Baron Stedingk.
cause of these incidents. The Minister objected that one of the purposes in his being here was to smooth out such difficulties.

At this point the Secretary called for Mr. Atherton to come to his office and I was left alone with the Minister.

The Minister then stated that he could not agree with me entirely as to the basic attitude of the Finnish Government toward the United States at this time. He described that attitude as friendly and as indicating a strong desire on the part of all Finns to maintain relations with the United States. I replied that I could agree with him to the extent that there probably was wide-spread desire in Finland to maintain relations with the United States. I said that it was my personal opinion, however, that the considerations involved in maintaining relations with the United States were secondary in the mind of the Finnish Government to those involved in its policy toward the Soviet Union and toward Germany. I went on to say I felt that if the Finnish Government thought it necessary to achieve the aims involved in its policy toward the Soviet Union and toward Germany, it would readily forego the considerations of advantage to it involved in maintaining relations with us. The Minister said that he could agree with this view with the modification that friendly feelings toward the United States were stronger than I seemed to feel.

The Minister said that he wanted to illustrate the latter point. He then opened his brief case and pulled out a document which he said was a draft of a Christmas message which he intended to send to Finnish language newspapers in the United States this year in accordance with his usual custom. He said that as a matter of courtesy he would like to give me a copy of that message. I interrupted him to say that I would want to make it clear in accepting the copy that such acceptance did not imply either approval or disapproval of his message. He said that of course he understood, and that he would never submit voluntarily to censorship of such statements and that he was only giving me a copy of the message as a courtesy.

He then reverted to his previous statement about Finnish friendship for the United States and said he wanted to read me a passage in his message. The passage which he read me was to the effect that outside of the Scandinavian countries Finland had a greater friendship for the United States than any other country. I asked him how he thought such a statement would be received in Helsinki at the present time. He was much taken aback by this question and said he hadn't thought of it. He folded his paper and dropped the subject.

The conversation lasted for a few minutes longer along lines previously taken and much discussed between him and the Department on a number of other occasions.
As he got up to leave, I reminded him that he had not left with me the copy of his message mentioned above which I said I thought he had forgotten about. He replied that he would not give me that copy, but would send me a “clean copy.” (It was obvious that he intended to revise his “message” in the light of my remarks, an action which clearly demonstrates how “free” Finland is at this time of “foreign pressures.”)

740.00119 European War 1939/1160 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, September 29, 1942—noon.
[Received September 29—8:38 a. m.]

883. Local correspondent of Berlingske Tidende of Copenhagen has informed Colonel Woldike 57 that at press conference September 27 Foreign Office spokesman stated that Finland, having recovered its lost provinces and formally reincorporated them, its absolute minimum peace aim must be preservation of 1939 frontier.

This statement was banned by censors when foreign correspondents attempted to telegraph it abroad.

The second point made by Foreign Office spokesman was that there was no written agreement between Finland and Germany. He said that basis of Finnish-German relationships remained as set forth in two speeches (1) Hitler’s proclamation to German people on the morning of June 22, 1941, 58 and (2) President Ryti’s speech of June 25 [26] last year. 59 This statement was passed by censorship. This statement may also be noted in light of President Ryti’s statement to me reported in my 866, September 25, regarding Hitler’s reference to Finland as an ally in the war against Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Same source states that foreign correspondents here, and their wives, have been invited by Finnish press officials on conducted tour of Lapland this coming weekend. He suggested that Finnish Government is desirous of having foreign journalists absent from Helsinki should important news break at that time.

Schoenfeld

57 Lt. Col. Aage Woldike, Military Attaché in Finland.
58 See telegram No. 2488 of June 22, 1941, from the Chargé in Germany, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. 1, p. 152. For text, see Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik, July 1941, pp. 545–551.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1942.

The Minister of Finland called to see me today. The Minister asked what my impressions might be of the interview which Mr. Schoenfeld had recently had with the President of Finland and with regard to the aide-mémoire which the President had sent him after the interview. I said that the most accurate answer I could give the Minister was that I had no reactions. I said that the conversation and the document in question seemed to me to leave the situation exactly as it had been before.

The Minister inquired whether Mr. Schoenfeld had been instructed to seek the interview because of information received by this Government that a new and intensified German offensive against the Soviet through Finland was probable. I said that this Government had no information in that regard and that the instructions sent to Mr. Schoenfeld had been sent in accordance with the policy which we had hitherto followed with regard to the Government of Finland, namely, of informing the Government of Finland with complete frankness of the attitude of this Government and of the course which this Government would be forced to follow in the event of any change for the worse in the situation which the Minister and I had often previously discussed.

At the conclusion of the interview, the Minister presented to me Baron Wrede, now attached to the Legation.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

711.60D/96: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSEINKI, October 7, 1942—11 a.m.
[Received 2:37 p.m.]

928. I had confidential conversation yesterday at his request with former Finance Minister Pekkala. He was desirous of learning what had passed recently between American and Finnish Governments and said Foreign Affairs Committee of Diet of which he is member has vouchsafed no information. Intimating resentment of this secretive-ness he said Diet was entitled to be kept better informed. He asserted that he still disapproved Finnish Government's course in foreign policy as he had at time of his resignation from Cabinet. Mass of Finnish people were on side of democracies and convinced Germans would not win war. They were conscious of necessity for accommoda- tion with Russians with whom Finland must continue to live. Such views however could not be openly voiced though he had made no
secret of his position and it was significant that Finnish masses were so little influenced by intense and pervasive Axis propaganda.

I sounded Pekkala as to popular attitude in event American armament should become more noticeable on Finnish front in hands of Russians as was to be expected. He said this would cause no significant increase in anti-American feeling among Finns and would be understood as inevitable.

Though Pekkala represents presently uninfluential body of opinion in Social Democratic Party his group at least shares in even greater degree manifest desire of Government and probable majority of Finns to preserve relations with United States notwithstanding fact that former has gambled on German victory.

SCHOENFELD

711.60D/95: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1942—9 p.m.

201. Your 914, October 5, 10 a.m., and 929, Oct[ober] 7, noon. Department knows of no basis for any impression that Finnish-American relations have eased, unless it is based on some unwarranted assumption telegraphed by Procopé. The situation remains as before: on a day to day basis.

WELLES

711.60D/107: Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSEINKI, October 21, 1942—11 a.m.
[Received 12:31 p.m.]

999. We learn that Foreign Minister Witting in next [last meeting of?] Foreign Affairs Committee reprimanded Salmiala \(^{41}\) of quasi-fascist party when latter advocated break with us saying Finland does not know how long war will last and that as small country Finland must be careful not to lose contact with powerful nation which is of great importance to her interests.

It seems Witting is becoming more conscious that his own course has been too pro-German and that he has been warned by group of men including Erkko of need of following more closely President Ryti’s personal policy which goes about as far as is considered safe.

SCHOENFELD

\(^{40}\) Neither printed.

\(^{41}\) Prof. B. A. Salmiala, a leader of the Patriotic National Movement.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1942.

The Minister asked me if I could make any statement to him with regard to the relations between Finland and the United States which would relieve his mind in view of his approaching confinement to the hospital. I said that there were no developments since I had previously talked with the Minister and that the situation still remained on a 24-hour basis.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Standley), Temporarily in the United States

[WASHINGTON,] October 28, 1942.

Admiral Standley: You are requested to discuss orally with the Soviet Government, upon your return to your post, this Government’s Finnish policy with a view to placing before the Soviet Government the considerations upon which that policy is based and to obtaining, to such an extent as may be feasible, an expression of the Soviet Government’s concurrence in the general practicability of such policy.

This Government’s estimate of the situation in Finland, based upon reports over the past year from the Legation in Helsinki and upon conversations with other competent observers who have recently come from Finland after several years stay in the area, is as follows:

1. German forces now in Finland seem unwilling to attempt fresh advances into Soviet territory north of Leningrad unless they are aided by Finnish armed forces.
2. Neither the people nor the Government of Finland desire to mount fresh military offensives against the Soviet Union.
3. There is reason to believe that German pressure on Finland to furnish further military aid is heavy and increasing. It is still open to question whether such pressure will be decisive.
4. Given the foregoing situation it is the present policy of the American Government to exert counter pressure on the Finnish Government. Under present circumstances it is the opinion of all American observers in Finland that the Finnish people and certain officials of the Finnish Government place great value on maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States and that the maintenance of

42 Hjalmar J. Procopé, Minister of Finland.
43 William H. Standley, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, had arrived in Washington for consultations; he returned to the Soviet Union in January 1943.
such relations acts as a strong brake on successful German pressure for increased aid from Finland. These observers feel that, conversely, if we should break relations with Finland under existing conditions the last political weapon in the hands of the United Nations to counteract German pressure on Finland would be destroyed and increased Finnish military aid to Germany, perhaps of the decisive character referred to above, would soon result. It is also felt by these observers that instead of creating disunity among the Finnish people the immediate effect of a severance of relations with Finland on the part of the United States would be to increase the influence and power over the people on the part of the pro-German elements in Finland, a development almost certain to lead to more extended Finnish military collaboration with Germany against the Soviet Union. Accordingly it is the opinion of the American Government that there is a definite military advantage to the Soviet Union obtained in the maintenance of Finnish-American relations under present circumstances. (The maintenance of American relations with Finland in no way precludes, under present circumstances, military action by any member of the United Nations against Finnish territory.)

In presenting these considerations to the Soviet Government please endeavor to obtain to such an extent as may appear feasible, its views on the Finnish situation. If possible, it is desirable to obtain its specific approval of this Government’s policy in this matter.

103.9166/1004: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, October 28, 1942—3 p.m.
[Received 7:46 p.m.]

1039. The following may likewise be of interest to Office of War Information.

When I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning to inquire as to reasons why Finnish authorities had refused to approve for publication proofs of proposed weekly bulletin prepared by Press Section of our Legation at Stockholm in Finnish language with illustrations regarding American war effort Witting said it was policy of Finnish Government to keep such propaganda at minimum. When I pointed out that virulent Axis propaganda including entire book attacking United States was abundant here he said it was less abundant than it would be if Axis were allowed free hand and that though line of demarcation between what might be published and what might not could not be easily defined and we might differ as to where it should be drawn such line nevertheless existed. He confirmed refusal of authorities to permit us to publish proposed weekly on American war effort.

He called my attention to item in our news bulletin for October 24, as prepared by Legation at Stockholm quoting American commentator to effect that Finland had refused peace offer. He complained that
this statement appearing under masthead of this Legation which he said was not in accordance with facts should have been circulated here by us. I pointed out that statement was not made by Legation but he nevertheless objected.

Incidents herein reported illustrate practical impossibility of presenting in print either American war scene or American political standpoint in Finland as well as fact that discrimination in favor of Axis propaganda not only exists but cannot be eliminated under present conditions.48

Department and Office of War Information may wish to consider whether daily bulletin of Finnish Information Center, New York, should be suppressed although thus far our daily news bulletin in English continues to be distributed here to selected list of some 500 addressees with occasional suppression by the Finnish authorities.

SCHOENFELD

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860D.4061 Motion Pictures/76: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, via STOCKHOLM, November 5, 1942—3 p.m.

[Received November 6—8:20 a.m.]

1068. We have been trying since February 4 (see my 93 that date to Department, 15 to you 49) to obtain raw film for Finland which as subsequent telegrams over these 9 months have indicated has become chief obstacle to continuing distribution of American motion pictures in this country. Our most recent appeal for prompt action (my 1004, October 21 to Department 50) has so far gone unanswered. It is certain that our fight will now be lost and American films will be banned in this country after December 31 51 unless immediate support is forthcoming in way of providing raw film for Finland. Please act.

SCHOENFELD

48 Mr. Higgs of the Division of European Affairs discussed the substance of this telegram with Mr. Toivola, the Counselor of the Finnish Legation, on October 30, and remarked that "the position taken by the Foreign Minister in regard to this matter indicated rather clearly that the Finnish Government did not intend to permit us to make our position in the war clear to the Finnish people." The Counselor personally regretted that "his government had found it necessary to take that action." (103.9166/2071)

49 Not printed; the telegram sent to Stockholm was numbered 15.

50 Not printed.

51 Efforts were being pushed by Germany to compel suppression of American films in Finland. Certain of the Finnish film agencies (Adams Films, Suomi Film) abetted these German attempts, and the decision had been reached that there would be no importation of American films after December 31, 1942, and no showings in theaters after March 31, 1943.
Helsinki via Stockholm, November 7, 1942—8 p.m.

[Received November 8—9:50 a.m.]

1074. Many thanks for your prompt and timely cooperation in sending first shipment of 10,000 feet of positive raw film by pouch yesterday. We understand from letter from Eastman Kodak people in Stockholm to their representative here that in all 40,000 feet of positive film will presently be shipped to Finland through you.

We learn this morning that Finnish Government through Commercial Section of Foreign Office is actively collaborating in our efforts to bring this film in quietly by pouch. Finnish Government instructed Krogius, its Commercial Attaché in Stockholm, to suggest to Swedish Government that this would be best means of handling shipment for reasons which are obvious to you. In this evidence of willingness cooperation on part of Foreign Office we find great encouragement in our view that—provided we have raw film on which to print American pictures—it will be possible even after end of year to insure distribution of them in spite of German opposition. Raw film is duty free here, only charges payable are internal excise taxes, and hence use of our pouch creates no complication.

Department will be interested to know that at meeting early this week of Finnish Film Chamber majority of theater owners and film distributors in Finland passed vote of confidence in directorship of Chamber and resolution condemning boycotting of any foreign film on grounds of its country of origin. It is typical of Finnish censorship that publication of these resolutions in Finnish press was forbidden.

As matter of practical procedure Legation is keeping all raw film in its own custody and will release only to representatives of American film companies who can show that they have immediate need for raw film in order to distribute new American feature pictures. Eastman Kodak agent is thus relieved of possible opprobrium resulting from competition among various distributors here and will confine his activity to commercial aspects of question.

Although arrival of raw film at this moment has literally and in nick of time saved day for American film in this country we do not cease to urge need for shipment at earliest possible opportunity of complete requirements of raw film needed for Finland. We learn from Dr. Hiitonen, Secretary of Finnish Film Chamber, that Germans are

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82 As far back as on September 23, 1942, in telegram No. 848, the Minister had complained that the firm commitment of the American Government since the preceding May to supply limited amounts of raw film sufficient to meet legitimate needs of the Finnish film industry had remained only a promise on paper, as no supplies of film had yet been received (860D.4061 Motion Pictures/73).
considerably embarrassed by their own inability to send raw film to Finland and that in a large theater here which has two Hungarian features in stock is unable to show them because of lack of film on which to print copies. If we can bring in sufficient raw film to supply pro-American producers of motion pictures here we may very well be able to break back of pro-German Finnish film union.

SCHOENFELD

711.60D/112a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1942—5 p. m.

225. We see no objection to your actively circulating among such persons as you think appropriate, the statements that we consider Witting and his Ministry so pro-German that we expect nothing but a continuous worsening of relations with Finland as long as he remains in office and that it is out of the question to expect any rapprochement with the United States until he is replaced by a person in whom we can have some confidence.

HULL

711.60D/113 : Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, November 18, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received November 18—3:28 p. m.]

1120. I am reminded by your 225, November 16, of pressure successfully exerted by Axis in fall of 1938 for withdrawal of Holsti 53 as Finnish Foreign Minister. Although conditions in Witting’s case may not be the same, any activity on my part along lines indicated in your instruction seems expedient only if it proves successful. My intervention might have effect of checking growing weakness of Witting’s position among influential elements here on grounds of resisting foreign pressure. In that case my relations with him would be impaired below their present point of usefulness if they are not already seriously so because of his probable knowledge that I have no confidence in him.

Reference in your telegram to possibility of rapprochement with us if Witting is removed seems to imply that he and his Ministry are considered main obstacle to such possibility. This supposition I am afraid exaggerates their real importance in present political picture here which continues to be overshadowed by President Ryti himself and in all essentials reflects his personal direction of affairs.

53 Rudolf Holsti, who became permanent Finnish delegate at the League of Nations.
Consequently if and when I start circulating statements suggested in your 225, I can expect to be confronted with at least two questions, firstly, as to qualifications of possible successor to Witting and secondly, as to practical basis for possible rapprochement with us. To answer such queries it may seem advisable to you that I should have further instructions before acting on your 225.

SCHOENFELD

860D.00/979 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Greene)

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1942—9 p. m.

1015. We approve your discussing the matter in question with persons mentioned in your 3266, November 18, as well as Erkko should you see him during visit mentioned in Helsinki's no. 1119 November 18.

For your information in foregoing connection and for repetition to Helsinki as our no. 229:

"Your 1120, November 18.
"We had intended that you should convey the impression of something less direct than 'foreign pressure' in carrying out our 225, November 16. Hence we desired merely to make known in an informal way to such Finns as might be concerned over the course of relations with us that, if the Finnish Government has any real desire to improve relations with us, the continuation of Witting in office is one of the effective bars thereto.

"Referring last sentence your first paragraph we suggest you keep your contacts with Witting to absolute minimum anyway.

"We have not overlooked points made in your second paragraph.

"Answers to questions suggested in your last paragraph are: (1) We do not wish to suggest what the successor's qualifications should be; but they should be obvious to any Finn desirous of improving relations with us; (2) We are open to Finnish suggestions as to the positive and practical basis for rapprochement but have no intention of making any move ourselves except possibly in the negative manner indicated in our 225."

HULL

**Not printed; the Chargé had suggested that he might discuss the Department's attitude toward the Foreign Minister of Finland with Jarl Axel Wasastjerna, the Minister of Finland in Sweden, and with S. J. Söderblom, the Chief of the Political Affairs Section of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (8000.00/979).**

**Not printed. Eljas Erkko had told Minister Schoenfeld of his intention to visit 4 or 5 days in Stockholm. He had not mentioned the purpose of his trip, but it was thought possible that he might get in touch with the Swedish General Staff, or perhaps with the Russians. (740.0011 European War 1939/25788)**
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, November 24, 1942—1 p.m.
[Received November 25—1:40 a.m.]

1146. Member of Finnish Diet yesterday confirmed to me that recent enactment of law providing for presidential election next February by electors of 1937 for term of only 2 years from March 1st was intended to record resentment felt by Diet against President Ryti’s arbitrary methods of administration especially in matters of foreign policy regarding which Diet was kept uninformed. This lack of information about foreign policy however placed Diet in position of independence to make its influence felt in future and relieved it of direct responsibility for mistakes made.

My informant mentioned incidentally that according to information available understanding with Germans for joint action against USSR in 1941 contemplated Finnish offensive action 8 days after start of German offensive though this became unnecessary by reason of fact that Russian offensive against Finland started at once and enabled Finnish Government to claim with color of truth that it had taken no aggressive action.

Informant added that Foreign Minister Witting was most “hated” man in administration so far as Diet is concerned by reason not so much of his partiality for Germans as his secretiveness vis-à-vis Diet Foreign Affairs Committee. I gave my informant intimation along lines of your 225 ⁵⁶ and have no doubt intimation will go further. Informant said what was needed to precipitate decision of Finnish Diet to assist [assert?] itself for change in course of Finnish policy was unmistakable sign of our military strength and probable victory regarding which informant is personally convinced but bulk of Diet members are not as yet though recent military developments have already encouraged many sympathizers with democratic cause to express themselves more openly. It was chiefly because of Finnish dependence on German good will for essential supplies that continued restraint seemed necessary.

Schoenfeld

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki via Stockholm, November 24, 1942—6 p.m.
[Received 8:29 p.m.]

1150. We learn from excellent source that annual production capacity of refinery at Petsamo Nickel Mine is estimated at 5000 tons of

⁵⁶ November 16, 5 p. m., p. 94.
metal,\textsuperscript{57} although as suggested in my 1106, November 16,\textsuperscript{58} apparently plant is not yet in operation.\textsuperscript{59}

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**Schoenfeld**

860D.00/987: Telegram

*The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

**Helsinki, November 25, 1942—noon.**

[Received 4:44 p.m.]

1154. Well-informed former diplomat in close personal relations with leading Social Democrats as well as intellectuals here told me last night that Social Democratic elements are increasingly determined to bring about removal of Witting and Pakaslahti from Foreign Office and that principal difficulty seems to be to find suitable successor to Witting. Among possible candidates who are spoken of are Kekkonen, Minister of Education,\textsuperscript{60} Procopé, Minister at Washington, Voionmaa,\textsuperscript{61} Minister at Bern, and Erkko, former Foreign Minister. Of these only one who has political significance here is Kekkonen, member of Agrarian Party who is considered sound and steady man and who is not unfavorably regarded by Germans but is reported pro-Ally on larger issues of war. Erkko is considered lacking in political authority and is not personally popular. Voionmaa, though intelligent, exercises no political influence and is considered as lacking force. Procopé likewise has little standing here among political elements and his appointment might be regarded as too obvious a bid for American support.

Informant said there was increasing realization of necessity of *rapprochement* with Sweden upon which any favorable development of Finland's complicated political position is thought largely to depend. Hence consideration was also being given to possibility of finding Swedish party representative to take Foreign Office.

I carefully refrained from expressing any views on possible candidates mentioned but spoke emphatically along lines of your 225,

\textsuperscript{57} The Minister had reported in telegram No. 611 of July 24, 1942, that the Petsamo Nickel Mine was working at full capacity; that Germany obtained practically all of the nickel concentrate, but that "strangely enough Germans through deficient refining process were not getting as much out of this concentrate as we might." (860D.24/211)

\textsuperscript{58} Not printed.

\textsuperscript{59} The British Commercial Counselor in Stockholm (Mitcheson) had told the Secretary of the American Legation in Finland (McClintock) that although the refinery was constructed it was not yet functioning. While much of the construction material was being shipped through Sweden, he had arranged for "certain of the bits and pieces" to be "lost" in transit. Although these had been replaced, "someone had contrived to provide wrong lining for electrolytic tanks and in consequence plant is still incapacitated." (860D.6359 International Nickel Co./48, 44)

\textsuperscript{60} Urho Kekkonen was a former Minister of Interior. Antti Kukkonen was Minister of Education at this time.

\textsuperscript{61} Tapio Voionmaa.
November 16, regarding Witting. As anticipated in my 1120, No-
vember 18, endeavor was made to sound me as to basis for rappro-
che-ment with us to which I answered that this was matter for future and
not [now] immediate problem was to have a Foreign Minister here
in whom we could have some degree of confidence.12

I expect substance of last night's conversation will not be long in
reaching Social Democratic leaders.

SCHOENFELD

740.00119 European War 1939/1939: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, November 26, 1942—4 p. m.
[Received 7:46 p. m.]

1163. Informant referred to in my 1162, today13 says that about
month ago Molotov hinted to Swedish representatives that U. S. S. R.
might be inclined to discuss cessation of hostilities with Finland and
inquired whether Sweden would act as intermediary. Informant says
these efforts were fruitless at that time owing to Finnish obstinacy.
I have no confirmation of this report from any other source.

SCHOENFELD

711.30D/139

Memorandum by the First Secretary of Legation in Finland
(McClintock)14

[Extracts]

HELSINKI, November 30, 1942.

This Legation, as most Legations the world over, is not informed
as to the directives of American policy toward Finland. It infers
from the record of the past year, however, that American policy
toward Finland is much the same as stated by the Secretary of State
toward Vichy France. The Legation is not aware whether the Ameri-
can Government has reached an understanding with the Soviet Gov-
ernment as to Finland. The Legation is not aware whether indeed
the Soviet Government presently wishes peace with Finland or

12 A day later the Minister told in telegram No. 1159 of a recent interview
with President Rytö, who had spoken "in most friendly terms both of Britain
and United States emphasizing determination of Finnish Government at all costs
to preserve relations with the United States." (860D.00/388)
13 Not printed.
14 Transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Finland in his despatch
No. 2484, November 30, 1942; received December 29.
whether the Kremlin now believes it is good policy to continue the war with Finland to crush this country before the final peace treaty is written and thus to claim that there is no Finnish problem for the conference.

As for the Atlantic Charter, most Finns at present share the profound cynicism of President Ryti as to that document or any other declaration of principles by the Great Powers.

The Legation does feel, however, that with growing German military weakness the Finns indeed might reach a separate peace with Russia if they could be assured of economic support, largely in the form of food. Given first some sort of peace with Russia, which they would more quickly accept after assurance of guarantees by the western democracies, and given the promise of being fed by the United Nations, the Finns conceivably might turn against their German co-belligerents and lock them in a mighty motte in the Far North, where their superior knowledge of forest warfare would stand them in deadly stead. The landing of British or American troops—but most definitely not Russian troops—in Northern Norway or Finland might be a signal for Finnish co-belligerency with the United Nations against their former co-belligerent.

What seems certain at this writing is that American diplomatic pressure has at least resulted in the negative success of staying a further Finnish advance against Russia and of impeding a German military thrust in the Far North. This was perhaps no mean success, and it was achieved because political relations between Finland and the United States were maintained. Should diplomatic relations be broken the door would be closed in the face of the Finns and their last hope would be the dwindling hope of German victory.

The answer is largely out of Finnish hands. The “separate war” would imply the possibility of a separate peace. Finland, even if Russia were willing to conclude a separate peace, is powerless to do so. Finland’s partner is Germany, and Finland is not a free agent. A factor which has given the diplomatic correspondence of the last eleven months an unreal quality is Finnish insistence that Finland is a sovereign state with American willingness to accept this theoretical concept and thus to charge Finland with responsibility for its acts. Finland must indeed be held responsible for preparing and sharing in Hitler’s plans for an attack on Russia. To this extent Finland was and is still responsible for the consequences of this cooperation. But to pretend that Finland can cease cooperating with Germany at the

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65 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.
66 Elsewhere expressed as “pocket”.

FINLAND
present time, or stop fighting, is to assume that Germany does not have Finland in a state of quasi-occupation. At the peace conference Finland would have been better off as a fully occupied country than to appear, as Mr. Churchill said, in the same dock with the guilty and defeated Nazis.

One thing is certain and that is that if the United Nations win this war Finnish policy must change if there is to be a Finland. Perception of this fact is growing in this country and people are awakening to the realization that Finland will find security against Russia not in any particular chain of lakes and rivers but in a political basis whereby a small country can live beside a big one. Presumably such a basis would be found in the promises of the Atlantic Charter. If a way could be discovered to show the Finns that the Atlantic Charter means what it says, much progress could be made toward reaching that strategical frontier of the mind which the Finns have yet to win.

As for our own interest in getting Finland out of the fight, this country is a candidate with Italy and the Balkan satellites of the Axis for detachment from Germany. Already American diplomacy has succeeded in limiting the Finnish war effort. This has been a negative accomplishment. The positive deed is yet to come, to deprive Hitler of Finnish support entirely. To accomplish this objective positive means will have to be used, not merely the negative means of threats and re-statement of disapproval. The Finns under admonition merely dig in their heels and grit their teeth. However, like a mule, they will move toward a carrot held in front of their nose. In other words, we must be prepared to feed them. We must be able to offer them some framework for political security or else they will feel their present sacrifices have been in vain. The Finns would probably settle now for the return of their 1939 frontiers, if they had some guarantee from the United States and Great Britain that those frontiers would be respected by the Soviet Union. If we can offer food and guarantees there will be an earnest effort to end Finnish co-belligerency with Germany.

R[OBERT] M[CLINTOCK]

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, December 1, 1942—4 p. m.
[Received 5:47 p. m.]

1181. Reliable information reaches me with reference to my 1173, November 28 67 that Social Democratic Party leadership has in fact

67 Not printed.
decided for present not to agitate question of Cabinet reorganization or of positive change in foreign policy chiefly for fear of possible German reaction taking form of withholding supplies to Finland but possibly involving even more active measures.

I have no doubt fears of this kind are important factor in calculations not only of Social Democrats but of other political elements here who are seeking way out of impasse. Attendant sense of frustration seems for present to have led to determination merely to avoid any positive action in matters of foreign policy as well as on military front. It seems to be confirmed however that effort is being made unofficially to strengthen contact with Swedes as only possible bulwark in confusing cross currents now flowing. It seems also to be agreed that east Karelia annexation plans which were so prominent last year in Finnish Government’s mind have been reluctantly but substantially abandoned.  

SCHOENFELD

740.00119 European War 1939/1942: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, December 3, 1942—3 p.m.

[Received 6:13 p.m.]

1187. Helsinki is excited about two rumors of impending peace both involving the same protagonist but diametrically different. One story is that Paasikivi is in London seeking to arrange a separate peace. The other story is that he is in Berlin with Von Blücher, the German Minister here, on the same errand.

Paasikivi has accepted my invitation to dine with me tomorrow night and I doubt if he will send regrets at the last minute. The rumors are an indication of how anxiously people here speculate on the possibility of getting out of their “separate war”.

SCHOENFELD

58 In summarizing Finnish public opinion as it seemed to be at the end of November 1942, the Minister explained in telegram No. 1192, December 5, 10 a.m., that “As for effect of America’s increasing might on outcome of war and where Finland would stand at its end Finns began to rationalize their increasing fear they had backed wrong horse, struck up argument of German invincibility and insisted Finland was not concerned in what was happening in more distant theaters of war.” The Minister reported further that “At moment most people seem to have adopted defeatist argument that Finland has no choice and must grimly hold to its present policy. Believers in ultimate German victory by which Finland will profit are still majority but dwindling and those who are actively thinking how to get Finland on winning side are still minority. Leaven is there, however, and ferment is growing.” (890D.00/999)
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higges of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1942.

Mr. Boheman \(^{69}\) dropped in late this afternoon to say goodbye before his departure for New York to-night. I was reading at the time Stockholm's telegram no. 3341 \([3441]\) of December 3,\(^{70}\) a white of which is attached,\(^{71}\) reporting Swedish press comment on Finland.

I showed this telegram to Mr. Boheman and asked him whether he thought it represented the true Swedish opinion on this matter, particularly the statement,

"If Finland were again face Russia alone, it would be Sweden's duty interest aid Finland greater extent than hitherto."

Mr. Boheman after commenting that the Svenska Dagbladet had always taken a very strong stand in support of Finland, said that under no circumstances which he could now foresee would Sweden give armed assistance to Finland against Russia. I replied that that had been my understanding but that in all of our conversations with the Finns, they showed great confidence that if Germany should be defeated and Finland were faced with the threat of imminent invasion by the Soviet Union, Sweden would give Finland full military support against Russia. I went on to say that if the situation was indeed as he described it, I thought it unfortunate that the Finns were allowed by the Swedes to continue under this misapprehension; as they might, if clearly informed of the Swedish position find it necessary to pursue a different policy. Mr. Boheman agreed fully that this should be done and said that he would discuss the matter with the Swedish cabinet upon his return to Stockholm, especially as regards the Swedish press and their misleading statements.

Mr. Boheman \ldots\) said that rudimentary caution should have prevented the Finns from making any claim to Soviet Karelia when they did. He thought Finland should have announced that it intended only to regain its 1939 frontiers and to stop there. He said that such an announcement would have maintained Finland's moral position in the eyes of world opinion and would not have prevented Finland from taking a "little Russian territory" later if indeed Russia were completely smashed by the Germans. I recalled to him that the Secre-

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\(^{69}\) Erik Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Ministry.

\(^{70}\) Not printed.

\(^{71}\) A circulation copy on white paper of a telegram received in the Department; not attached to file copy of this memorandum.
tary, as had been made public by the Department, had urged in the strongest terms upon Minister Procépé that Finland declare that it intended only to regain its lost territory and stop there, but without avail.

Mr. Boheman said that it had been practically impossible for the Swedish Government to give the Finnish Government any advice about keeping its collaboration with the Germans to a minimum and making peace with the Soviet Union. He said that any such intimations were immediately reported by Finnish Foreign Minister Witting to the Germans who "took the matter up with the Swedish Government." Mr. Boheman said that as long as Mr. Witting remained Foreign Minister, it was practically impossible for the Swedish Government to offer any suggestions along these lines to Finland.

I gave Mr. Boheman our views on Witting and told him that we had already authorized our Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to pass them on to Mr. Soderbolen [Söderblom] in the Swedish Foreign Office.

Mr. Boheman gave me the impression of being completely in sympathy with our policy toward Finland. He said that he would be very glad to give Mr. Herschel Johnson,²² from time to time, any views which the Swedish Government might have on Finland and he would be happy if we would transmit our views on the subject to him through Mr. Johnson whenever we thought appropriate. I thanked him for his offer of cooperation and said that we undoubtedly would avail ourselves of it whenever it seemed feasible to do so.

800D.00/998 : Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenhof) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, December 5, 1942—1 p. m.
[Received 7:07 p. m.]

1194. I had occasion last night to speak to Paasikivi, Erkko and Swedish Minister ⁷³ along lines of your 225, November 16. Latter two had, of course, been previously informed as indicated in Stockholm’s telegram 3332, November 23.⁷⁴ Paasikivi, however, did not intimate he had previous advice. He immediately showed that supply question, in respect of which he said Finland was so dependent on Germany, was uppermost in his mind. Both Paasikivi and Erkko

⁷² The American Minister in Sweden.
⁷³ Hans Gustaf, Baron Beck-Frits, had been appointed Swedish Minister to Finland on September 14, 1942.
⁷⁴ Not printed.
made great point of fact that Finland had refrained and continued to refrain from move on Sorokka which they said could easily fall to Finnish arms and former said plainly that this restraint reflecting unwillingness of Finns to interfere with Murmansk railroad as well as their refusal to cooperate with Germans in operations against Leningrad were all to be interpreted as gesture vis-à-vis United States. I said supply question like many other problems could no doubt be advantageously discussed on Finnish initiative in due course but that immediate problem was to have in Finnish Foreign Office a point of contact meriting our confidence.

Paasikivi inquired as to standing of Procopé who is his protégé. I evaded discussion by returning to issue of Witting’s position. He asked if I had discussed Witting with President Ryti. I answered that I am, of course, entirely at President’s disposal should he wish to see me on this or any other topic. Paasikivi thanked me for frankly speaking about these matters. He gave me impression that he would lose no time in discussing them presumably with President and others intimating he would wish to talk with me again, later.

Erkko told me that on his return from Stockholm he had discussion at their request with Prime Minister Rangell, Finance Minister Tanner, and War Minister Walden and that unlike their attitude before these three men, especially Rangell, now saw necessity for reconsideration of Finland’s entire position. Erkko felt matters were beginning to “move.” He expected to have another talk with three mentioned and said he would wish to see me thereafter. While in Stockholm on his recent visit which was private and made on his own initiative Erkko said Swedish Foreign Minister had indicated plainly that Witting was not considered in Sweden to be adequate.

Erkko told me Germans had recently indicated their concern here regarding change in tone of Finnish press on such matters as democratic institutions of Finland, nonacceptance of so-called new order, and Nordic solidarity on all of which more pronounced position was being taken by Finnish papers.

Swedish Minister seemed to be informed of our attitude towards Witting but was characteristically cautious in his comment. He gave me to understand incidentally that idea mentioned in my 1169, November 27, regarding transfer of German and other refugees from Finland to Sweden was not looked upon with favor and would hardly have Swedish cooperation.

SCHOENFELD

\(^{77}\) Christian Günther.

\(^{78}\) Not printed.
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, December 7, 1942—4 p.m.
[Received 4:55 p.m.]

1200. My 1199 today. Ryti’s speech suggests that he has gone the whole way with Germans. His sole reference to Nordic solidarity is in historical review introducing his main argument and no reference is made as had been rumored to support of democracy except that he mentions Finland’s Nordic institutions. He did not refer to rapprochement with United States or Britain.

He twice used word “geo-politics”, almost said Japan would win its war for East Asia and hailed a strong Germany as principal bulwark of Europe against Soviet aggression. Except for veiled reference to Japanese victory he made no allusion to anything outside Europe and a reading of speech would not even suggest that United States was in the war. His reference to Finland as only state surviving among those created following First World War speciously pointed to Soviet absorption of Baltic States and Bessarabia completely ignoring German destruction of both old and new states in this war.

His address seems to indicate that Ryti has burned his bridges behind him and gambled everything on German victory. He maintains doctrine that his policy is “not only the sole way but the right way” to assured future for Finland and gives no hope of cessation of hostilities and much less peace.

Witting and Rangell were only persons to receive Grand Cross Order of White Rose in honors awarded yesterday.

SCHOENFELD

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, December 7, 1942—6 p.m.
[Received December 8—8:35 a.m.]

1202. Source mentioned in my 1201 today said he thought Witting would be held in office as long as Finland’s relationship of cobelligerency with Germany continued. He admitted that there would be slight chance of rapprochement with us so long as Foreign Office

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79 Not printed.
80 A radio address to the Finnish nation on December 6, 1942, commemorating the 25th anniversary of Finland’s Independence.
82 For correspondence regarding the activities of the Soviet Union in the Balkans and the seizure of Bessarabia, see ibid., pp. 444 ff.
83 The source of information was described as a “well informed member of Social Democratic Party” of Finland.
remained under Witting and Pakaslahti. . . . He added that former prohibition on Foreign Office officials seeing members of this Legation had recently been lifted. We reminded him that it took two to make a party and that Foreign Office officials were not being invited by us except rarely. Our friend said “the Finns have had more good luck than good ideas in matters of foreign policy”. He seemed to think there was now neither good luck nor good ideas.

SCHOENFELD

880D.00/1005: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, December 8, 1942—10 a.m.
[Received 10:11 p.m.]

1206. In light of Ryti’s speech as summarized in my 1199, yesterday, 65 I desire to draw Department’s attention to conclusions in latest of series of memoranda on Finnish war covering last year of Finnish-American relations which went forward by courier day before President spoke. This study was transmitted under cover of my despatch 2484, November 30. 66

Our conclusions are as follows:
1. There has been no basic change in Finnish policy whatever.
2. The Finns are impressed by deeds not words. Breaking of consular relations by United States moved them more profoundly than any of our representations expressing menace and displeasure.
3. Major result of American policy during year was negative achievement of restraining further Finnish advances, particularly against Sorokka and possibly further Finnish military cooperation with Germany, at least so far as active operations were concerned.
4. The Legation is not informed as to directives of American policy toward Finland but infers that it is similar to that maintained toward Vichy. Legation is unaware if USSR wishes separate peace with Finland or if USSR plans to eliminate Finland before end of war.
5. The Finns uniformly share Ryti’s cynical conviction that Atlantic Charter does not mean what it says.
6. With growing German weakness and signs that Germany will not win war, there is some possibility that if Finns can be assured of supplies and peace with Russia with guarantees from United States and Britain, they might conceivably turn against Germans in Finnish territory. Landing of British and American troops in far north after these conditions had been met might be signal for such action, but most definitely Russian troops should not cooperate.

65 Not printed, but see the Minister’s telegram No. 1200, p. 105.
66 Despatch not printed; for extracts of the study referred to, see memorandum by the First Secretary of Legation in Finland, November 30, p. 98.
7. Finland's possibly fatal mistake has been to cling stubbornly to its static policy in a dynamic situation. Finnish dogma of the "separate war" is a purely artificial concept proved not by argument but by blind repetition to reconcile Finland's desire not to be in the World War with the fact that it is. The Finns have wished to enjoy all the advantages of co-belligerency with Germany and none of the liabilities. Finland will be held responsible for sharing in Hitler's plans for attack on Russia but in its state of quasi-occupation is not free by itself to get out of its "separate war" even if it wanted to.

8. It is certain that if United Nations win this war and integrity of Finland is to be maintained, Finnish policy will have to change. Signs of a desire for such a change are beginning to be evident.

9. American interest would be served by getting Finland out of the fight to deprive Hitler of Finnish support entirely. To do this, however, more than negative means are required. Positive means include first of all food, guarantees, peace.

It is now seen from Ryti's speech that there is still a long road to travel before the Finns can be got out of the "motti" in which they have been trapped by bullheadedness, bad policy and Nazi guile.

SCHOFIELD

123 Sch 62/456 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld)

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1942—9 p. m.

235. In view of your 1200, December 7, you are instructed to return home for consultation at your earliest convenience under authorization already issued you.\(^7\)

We suggest you do not seek interviews with Ryti or Witting before leaving, and that you answer any inquiry as to whether you will return to Finland by saying your instructions are that you return home for consultation and that your return home has no reference to the forthcoming holidays.

CORDELL HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/26449 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Kuibyshev (Moscow), December 11, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received December 12—1:15 p. m.]

1084. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Reference my telegrams 1059, December 7, 5 p. m.\(^8\) and 1082, December 11, 7 p. m.\(^9\)

\(^7\) By telegram No. 220, November 6, 1942, the Department had directed Schoenfeld to report for consultation, without specifying a date (123 Sch 62/458).

\(^8\) Not printed.

1. If the Department perceives no objection I should like, during my impending conversation with Molotov early next week, and in case his attitude makes it possible for me to do so, to ask him whether in the opinion of the Soviet Government the time has come when something might be done in the direction of prevailing upon Finland to break away from Germany and to make peace with the Soviet Union. For some time the Swedish Minister here, who, as has been reported, is considered since very friendly to the Allies, has been insisting that now is the time to exert every effort to extricate Finland from its present position.

2. The Czechoslovak Minister, who it will be recalled is very close to the Soviet authorities, called on me today, and after discussing other matters also referred to the Finnish situation. He said that he had the feeling that the Russians might be more interested now than they have been in the past in effecting a settlement with Finland. His idea, which is similar to that of the Swedish Minister, is that the Russians might now feel themselves to be in a sufficiently strong position to permit overtures to be made to Finland without the impression being created that such overtures reflected weakness on their part.

3. The Swedish Minister is inclined to believe that if the Finns could receive assurances through the United States or some other channels that the Russians might be willing to negotiate on the basis of the Moscow agreement, altered to permit Hango and perhaps Viborg to remain in Finnish hands, accompanied by explanations that if Finland refuses to negotiate it might eventually expect Soviet occupation, they would be sorely tempted to reconsider their position. The Swedish Minister feels that success with regard to Finland could not fail to make a powerful impression on Sweden and would considerably strengthen the influence of those Swedish groups who desire Sweden to come out openly on the Allied side.

4. If I should mention the matter to Molotov I would, of course, confine my remarks to questions of an exploratory nature.

5. Please send reply direct to Moscow.

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HENDERSON

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123 Sch 62/470: Telegram

**The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State**

**HELSINKI, December 14, 1942—8 p. m.**

[Received December 15—4:10 a. m.]

1230. At request of President Ryti I called on him this afternoon and had 2 hours or more of conversation with him besides half an hour spent in his company and that [of] Madame Ryti for coffee.

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⁹⁰ For the Charge's report on his conversation with Molotov, see his telegram No. 537, December 15, 9 p. m., vol. II, p. 434.

⁹¹ Per Vilhelm Gustaf Assarsson.

⁹² Zdenek Flerlinger.
Ryti said he had learned of my forthcoming departure for consultation and desired me to say to you and to the President on his behalf that Finnish democracy which dates from fourteenth century in recorded history was analogous only to that of Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland in Europe and that none of these peoples had ever been serfs. Finland stood for same ideals of political and social freedom as United States and had no intention of deviating in slightest from them. He again made point that Finland had no political commitments to Germans and remained free to make its own decisions though he alluded to question of essential supplies.

President told me for first time from any authorized source that so far from taking negative and defeatist (my words) attitude toward problems of world war he fully intended as soon as in his judgment opportunity offered to take positive measures implying that these measures would be designed to terminate conflict with U. S. S. R. by saying that decision in March 1940 to go personally to Moscow for peace negotiations was taken by himself alone and against much opposition. I told President this was most important statement and that I had long felt something should be done to remove impression that Finnish policy was merely negative and static in presence of tremendous issues now at stake in world. His statement was made very cautiously and he made considerable point of fact that decision as to time for action though steadily kept in mind must be his own.

I had opportunity to tell President I had been greatly disappointed in his speech December 6 which struck me as having been made by scholarly and deeply thoughtful man such as I knew him to be as if in complete “vacuum” since it seemed entirely to ignore large moral issues involved in our past [part?] in world war except for allusion by implication to possible Japanese victory. His response was that careful examination of speech which he hoped would be made by us and particularly by you should make it plain that he had been principally concerned with security of small nations including Finland and their equal rights with great powers. Finnish spokesman, however, as representative of small nation could not undertake to discuss in specific language many other issues of war and in any case Russian danger for Finland and for Europe remained uppermost in his mind throughout that speech.

2. Also referred to attendance of Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and other Government representatives at Japanese Legation reception December 8 to celebrate anniversary of Pearl Harbor 99 saying this had made particularly bad impression on us. He gave no adequate explanation and obviously could not.

99 A reception had been held at the Japanese Legation in celebration of the first anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Prime Minister Rangell, and other Finnish Governmental officials, had attended. Here they viewed with seeming approval a Japanese film of this attack, and there had been reports that some of these officials had publicly congratulated the Japanese on the attack.
President brought up question of my personal status and that of this Legation in recent months which afforded me opportunity to tell him, mentioning isolation and intimidation of our friends, that speaking to him as man to man and fully cognizant as I was of delicacy of subject, it was fact that impenetrable barrier had developed in intercourse with Foreign Office and that relations between ourselves and Finnish Government could not improve until confidence was re-established between Legation and Foreign Office. President said he was most grateful for opportunity to discuss this question frankly. He said condition was due to fact that in Finland's short independent history Foreign Office was probably weakest point in administrative organization. Thanks to Marshal Mannerheim, respectable army had been built up, but it had not yet been possible to create diplomatic organization adequate to national needs. I gained impression President was fully inclined at the moment to take drastic action to change incumbency of Foreign Ministry but he may well have to reflect that this matter which must also be considered in light of effect of possible action on Nazi cobblergent.

Rytö alluded to his vehemence and rather intemperate attitude during his conversation with me last September 25 and told me his reaction had been due to use of words "provocation" in memorandum I then handed him. He apologized in effect for his attitude at that time and intimated desire for some specification of use of that term. I did not follow his lead beyond saying that if my Government should undertake to set out facts on which use of term was based list would be impressive.

Rytö reiterated his expressions of confidence and esteem for me and said he hoped I would soon return.4

Clear impression left on my mind by today's conversation and especially by Rytö's reference to intention not to remain passive is that my forthcoming departure is well understood as political gesture on our part and that it will have effect on policy here.

SCHOENFELD

740.0011 European War 1939/26449: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1942—10 p.m.

411. The matter mentioned in your 1084, December 11 will be discussed with Admiral Standley who plans to leave for Moscow end of this week.

HULL

"The Chargé in Finland informed the Department by telegram No. 1267 on December 24, 1942, that "Rumor is now current here that Mr. Schoenfeld will not return until Witting has resigned." (123 Sch 62/474)
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, December 15, 1942.
[Received December 15—9:16 p.m.]

1234. Press today publishes following:

“Finland, Germany have decided prolong trade agreement between the two states till end 1943. Similarly agreement has been reached as in earlier years regarding organization of Finnish-German trade during first quarter on temporary basis. Final negotiations regarding trade exchange 1943 will take place in Helsinki during February next.”

SCHOENFELD

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, December 16, 1942—1 p.m.
[Received 5:22 p.m.]

1238. At his request I called on Foreign Minister Witting this morning. His attitude was much unusual [as usual?] and not personally lacking in friendliness. He repeated standing theme so often previously reported regarding Finnish policy including statement that it remained unchanged and free of any political obligation to Germans though preponderantly influenced by dependence on Germany and German controlled Europe for 94 percent of essential imports. To my suggestion that such passive policy in fast movement of powerful forces now involved in war was highly dangerous to Finland his answer was that life itself is dangerous and that physical self-preservation was first requirement of small people who could not hope to influence events in larger field.

He asked me to explain when I reached Washington “facts” regarding Finland which he gave me credit for understanding. I intimated regret that he and I had found it difficult to understand each other to which his answer was that he understood our point of view very well. To my inquiry whether there would be any desire to take a more active line Witting said he could not speak for future saying this possibility would depend on events over which Finland had no control. Witting did not rise to my suggestion that if Finland had

53 The treaty of commerce between Finland and Germany signed at Berlin on March 24, 1934 (League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxlii, p. 343, or Finland, Treaty Series, 1934, No. 13), was extended by a law issued at Helsinki on November 6, 1942, approving certain provisions of the protocol which had been signed at Berlin on December 31, 1941 (Finland, Treaty Series, 1942, No. 3), and by a decree, bringing into effect this protocol, issued at Helsinki on November 13, 1942. The protocol of extension became effective on November 27, 1942. For the text of the Finnish law and decree, see Finland, Treaty Series, 1942, Nos. 10–20.
any problems to discuss with us they might be sympathetically con-
sidered if brought to our attention and contented himself substantially
with line above indicated.

Unlike President Ryti, Witting did not express any desire regarding
my possible return to Helsinki. Nor did he suggest any interest in
interpretation of fact that I have been ordered home for consultation.

SCHOENFELD

711.60D/187a

Memorandum for Admiral Standley

I. Our Policy Toward Finland

(a) Immediate Considerations

This Government's estimate of the present situation in Finland,
which is based upon reports over the past year from the American
Legation in Helsinki and upon conversations with other competent
observers who have recently come from Finland after several years
stay in the area, is as follows:

1. German forces now in Finland seem unwilling to attempt fresh
advances into Soviet territory north of Leningrad unless they are
aided by Finnish armed forces.

2. Neither the Government nor the people of Finland desire to
mount fresh military offensives against the Soviet Union.

3. There is reason to believe that German pressure on Finland to
furnish further military aid has been heavy in recent months.

4. Given the foregoing situation it has been the short term aim of
the American Government to exert pressure on the Finnish Govern-
ment as a counter to the German pressure.

It is the opinion of all American observers in Finland that the
Finnish people and certain officials of the Finnish Government place
great value on maintaining diplomatic relations with the United
States, and that the maintenance of such relations acts as a strong
deterrent to any Finnish inclination to increase substantially aid to
Germany. These observers feel that, conversely if we should break
relations with Finland under existing conditions, the last political
weapon in the hands of the United Nations with which to counteract
German pressure on Finland would be destroyed, and increased Fin-
nish military aid to Germany, perhaps of a decisive character along
the northern front, would probably result. It is also felt by these
observers that, instead of creating disunity among the Finnish people,

* Handed to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, William H. Standley, while
in Washington on December 18, 1942, by Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the
Division of European Affairs,
the immediate effect of a severance of relations with Finland on the part of the United States would be to increase the influence and power over the Finnish people of the pro-German elements in Finland, a development almost certain to lead to more extensive Finnish military collaboration with Germany against the Soviet Union.

5. Accordingly, it is the opinion of the American Government that in the absence of any practical possibility of opening substantial military operations in the area, there has been and continues to be a definite military advantage to the Soviet Union in the maintenance of Finnish-American relations under present circumstances. (It should be pointed out in this connection that the maintenance of American relations with Finland in no way precludes, under present circumstances, military action against Finnish territory by any member state of the United Nations.)

(b) General Considerations

It is the view of the American Government that it is in the interest of the United Nations generally and of the Soviet Union in particular that Finland be gotten out of its "co-belligerency" with Germany. Aside from the obvious military advantages to the Soviet Union, the psychological effect of a Finnish withdrawal from the hostilities would be very great on:

1. Sweden, where present nervousness over the fate of its eastern neighbor distracts Sweden from complete opposition to German encroachments.

2. Rumania, where, should it be demonstrated that Finland was able to withdraw from the war on equitable terms, the opposition to continuing military operations against the Soviet Union would, it is believed, substantially increase.

3. The United States, where a substantial Scandinavian population remains skeptical of the sincerity of the Atlantic Charter because of fear that the Soviet Union intends to occupy and annex Finland.

4. The Axis countries, where it is reasonable to assume the dis-sidence of Finland would have a strongly adverse effect on morale.

II. Procedure

(a) It is suggested that you explain to high Soviet officials as soon as practicable, the immediate considerations involved in American policy toward Finland. In doing so, it would be advantageous, for the record, to obtain the Soviet Government's specific approval of the policy which the American Government has followed so far in regard to Finland.

(b) If, on receiving the explanations of the immediate considerations involved in the American policy toward Finland, the Soviet
Government should show an inclination to discuss its own attitude toward Finland, you might find it feasible also to go into the question of general considerations in American policy toward Finland; but, if the Soviet Government should show no inclination to discuss Finnish matters further with you, it might be best not to pursue the matter for the time being.

The Department inclines to the opinion that the Finnish Government would not be receptive at this time to the character of peace terms which it is thought the Soviet Government might feel disposed to offer. * Hence, it would seem undesirable in any event for this Government to press the matter of a peace offer from the Soviet Government until the situation in Finland appears more propitious, which may be expected when the results of the North African campaign and the Soviet winter offensive are apparent to the Finnish Government.

123 Sch 62/472: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

Helsinki, December 19, 1942—10 a.m.

[Received 11:50 a.m.]

1249. Headlines in today’s papers emphasize two aspects of Minister Schoenfeld’s departure, first that he will return soon and second that his trip to United States is “without significance”. First headline is based on his alleged statement to Social Demokraten in Stockholm on the 17th and second seems to have been a directive from censorship here. Since headlines in Finland today are not slogans of news but of what Government wishes people to think this slant on Minister’s departure is significant.

Should Department wish to suggest any other interpretation of Mr. Schoenfeld’s return to Washington we feel that possibly American Finnish language transcription via British Broadcasting Corporation next Thursday and daily news bulletin prepared by Press Section of our Legation at Stockholm might be used.

*Note. In a conversation on December 14, President Ryti of Finland informed the American Minister that so far from taking a negative and defeatist attitude toward problems of the world war, he fully intended, as soon as in his judgment opportunity offered, to take positive measures, implying that these measures would be designed to terminate the conflict with U. S. S. R. The Department is inclined to believe that President Ryti expects the Soviet Union in due course to become much weaker militarily, and that he intends to wait for such a development before taking “positive measures”. However, if the military situation of Germany in relation to the Soviet Union deteriorates as we expect, he may be moved to take “positive measures” for consideration contrary to those he now expects. [Footnote in the original. The conversation with President Ryti on December 14, 1942, was reported in the Minister’s telegram No. 1230 of the same date, p. 108.]
Even in informed circles wishful thought is being expressed that Mr. Schoenfeld, who "understands Finland" will present Finnish case in Washington in best light and that following this "explanation" there will be an improvement in Finnish-American relations.

We shall continue to say that we do not know when the Minister will return and that significance of his trip must be inferred not from headlines but from facts of Finland's position in the war.

McClintock

811.20260D/6: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

Washington, December 23, 1942—8 p.m.

240. In a note dated today 97 to the Finnish Chargé d'Affaires 98 reference is made to a conversation on October 28 between Foreign Minister Witting and Minister Schoenfeld. The note continues:

"The American Minister inquired as to reasons why Finnish authorities had refused to approve for publication in Finland proofs of a proposed weekly bulletin with illustrations regarding the American war effort prepared by the Press Section of the American Legation in Stockholm. Professor Witting stated that it was the policy of the Finnish Government to keep such propaganda at a minimum. The American Minister pointed out to him that virulent Axis propaganda including an entire book attacking the United States was abundant in Finland.

The attitude taken by Professor Witting illustrated the practical impossibility of presenting in print in Finland the American war scene or the American political standpoints. It also points to the fact that discrimination in favor of Axis propaganda not only exists but cannot be eliminated under present conditions.

It had been the hope of the Department that the attitude of the Finnish Government in regard to this matter would be reversed. This, however, has not proved to be the case. Accordingly instructions are being issued by Mr. Hull to the American Legation in Helsinki to cease immediately the distribution of information of all types to the Finnish public.

In view of the foregoing, the Chargé d'Affaires is requested to have stopped immediately upon receipt of this note any further activities of the Finnish Information Center in New York and of the Finnish Legation's personnel in the field of releases, pamphlets, public addresses, books, et cetera. Hereafter the Finnish Legation is requested to make or release no statements for public consumption in the United States except such oral statements as may be required to reply to specific inquiries from American press representatives. Instructions

97 The note when finally despatched was dated December 26, 1942.
98 Torsten Oskar Vahervuori.
being issued to the American Legation in Helsinki require that that
Legation follow a similar practice in Finland.”

Please repeat to Stockholm for its guidance.

HULL

860D.00/1025 : Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, December 24, 1942—11 a. m.
[Received 12:04 p. m.]

3666. Foreign Minister Günther having expressed a desire to talk
with Minister Schoenfeld I presented latter yesterday afternoon.
Foreign Minister referred to a newspaper comment on attack in Fin-
nish Diet against Finnish Foreign Minister Witting 99 and said that
he really felt foreign policy of Finland did not rest with M. Witting.
He mentioned fact that Russian Government had let it be known that
it did not favor any members of present Finnish Government includ-
ing President Ryti and Minister Tanner.

In discussing possibilities of a Finnish peace, Foreign Minister men-
tioned existing Finnish fear that peace at a time when Russia is in
ascendancy would leave latter country in a stronger relative position
in United Nations effort than at a later date when it might be expected
that Britain and America would supply a more decisive blow against
Germany. From that point of view it did not seem to be to Finns’ ad-
vantage to seek peace at present. From another point of view, Günther
thought there is an advantage to Finland which Finns recognize in an
earlier peace in that at a later stage in war if United Nations desire aid
of Russia against Japan there exists a fear that Russia might demand
more of Finland than would be case if a peace had already been estab-
lished. Günther said Finns are well aware that moment for peace
effort must be very carefully chosen also because success of Finland in
securing peace with Russia would be considered by Germans as breach
in solidarity of states associated with them and might lead to general
stampede out of Axis camp which Germans would use every effort to
prevent including forceful measures against Finland.

Repeated to Helsinki. 1

Greene

99 The Chargé in Finland reported also in telegram No. 1261, December 23, 1942,
that two days previously some members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
Finnish Diet had extensively criticized Witting for his conduct of foreign affairs,
and particularly for keeping this committee uninformed of developments in viola-
tion of constitutional provisions (article 48). (860D.00/1023)

1 This telegram was further repeated by the Department on December 31, 1942,
to the Embassy in the Soviet Union at Kuibyshev.
The Chargé in Finland (McCintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, December 24, 1942—noon.
[Received 4:34 p.m.]

1268. We have confirmation from reliable source* of report in my 1255, December 22,* that Kivimaki* has urged necessity of Finland maintaining an alternative line. It is alleged he has gone even farther and categorically informed his Government that Germany cannot win war. Kivimaki is supposed to have urged immediate consideration of ways and means to abandon sinking German ship before Finns go down with it. He seems to have laid particular stress on cultivating Sweden to this end.

McCintock

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McCintock)

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1942—6 p.m.

248. Your 1223, December 14; 1235, December 15; and 1239, December 17.* American press and radio featuring story that Prime Minister and other high Finnish officials attended reception December 8th at Japanese Legation in Helsinki celebrating the attack on Pearl Harbor. Reports cite fact pictures shown of burning American warships and that Rangell and others toasted Japan with shouts of “banzai”.

Story broken unofficially by OWI* with material released virtually same as that broadcast shortwave in Finnish and Danish languages by Schenectady station on December 17th. Source of information not given.

Finnish Legation issued statement this morning to following effect: it had received official Finnish version that film of Pearl Harbor attack was shown at tea party at Japanese Legation; that guests knew nothing beforehand of planned program; denies knowledge of alleged congratulations addressed by Rangell and others to Japanese Minister;* and concludes that there is no reason, from Finnish point of view, why invitations to social events should be declined when arranged by foreign legations in Finnish capital. (Repeat to Stockholm).

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*The Chargé described the informant as being an “exceptionally well informed” neutral Press Attaché.
*Not printed.
*Tolvo Mikael Kivimäki, Finnish Minister in Germany.
*None printed.
*Office of War Information.
*Tadashi Sakaya.
Please report fully on extent of reproduction of story in Finnish press and radio and popular reaction to publication of story in United States.

HULL

860 D. 00/1029 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSEINII, December 28, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 9:03 p.m.]

1275. Chief of Protocol 8 last night informed me that although annual New Year reception would not be held at President's Palace on January 1, it was expected that President's book would be signed by diplomatic representatives and that "pF9" cards would be sent to Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

In view of Japanese tea party on December 8, I am not disposed to send cards to Rangell or Witting unless instructed to do so by you.10

McClintock

711.60 D/132

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1942.

Being unable to arrange an appointment with Mr. Atherton this afternoon, Mr. Vahervuo, Finnish Chargé d'Affaires came in to see me.

Mr. Vahervuo read me the attached aide-mémoire.11 After he had finished I inquired of him if his phrase in paragraph no. 2 of the aide-mémoire "member of the Finnish Government" was to be interpreted as it was in Finland, or in other words that the phrase referred only to members of the Finnish cabinet and did not include other Finnish officials. He replied in the affirmative and indicated on my pressing the point that he had information to the effect that a Finnish official had in fact congratulated the Japanese Minister on the occasion. He endeavored to pass the incident off, however, by saying that inexperienced minor officials occasionally phrased their remarks in such a way as to convey meanings which they had not meant to.

I then inquired of Mr. Vahervuo whether, in view of the point made in his aide-mémoire that the Finnish officials had not been aware

8 R. Hakkarainen.
9 Pro forma.
10 No indication has been found in Department files of instructions sent in this matter.
11 Not printed; this aide-mémoire was concerned with the happenings at the celebration at the Japanese Legation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
of the character of the celebration at the Japanese Embassy [Legation], any of them had left the Legation when they did become aware that the Japanese were celebrating the attack on Pearl Harbor. Mr. Vahervuori replied that he had no information to that effect, but that he assumed that no one had left under those circumstances since it was contrary to Finnish character to create "demonstrations". I commented that, for whatever reason, Finnish officials had gotten themselves into a position where they had created a demonstration against us by not leaving the party, I said that it seemed to me that under the circumstances they were faced with the choice of "demonstrating" either against us or the Japanese and that they had chosen the former.

Mr. Vahervuori then stated that he had the impression that the Office of War Information "had it in for Finland". I replied that I was unaware of any such situation. Mr. Vahervuori referred to the handling of the story under discussion and to recent newspaper accounts of the renewal of the Finnish-German Trade Agreement, and the headlines carried by the American press indicating a definite Finnish subservience to Germany. I said that with respect to the "Pearl Harbor" story, I could not comment on the validity of Constantine Brown's information in his article breaking this story, as I had not discussed the matter before or after the publication of the article with Mr. Brown. I said, however, that it seemed to me on the basis of the information that I had in regard to the event in question and on the basis of the information just conveyed to me by Mr. Vahervuori that the sense, at least, of Mr. Brown's article was more or less accurate in that it reported that a function had been held at the Japanese Legation in Helsinki on the occasion of the Anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, that high Finnish officials had attended the function, and that the Japanese Minister had been congratulated by at least one of those officials.

Mr. Vahervuori then said that the Legation had received the previous night the Department's note regarding the closing of the Finnish Information Center in New York and in general regarding the dissemination of Finnish propaganda in the United States and American propaganda in Finland. Since it was obviously in his mind, I told him that this move was in no way connected with the "Pearl Harbor" incident and that the move had been decided upon before that story

12The article by Constantine Brown entitled "Finn Premier Reported Toasting Japs at Dec. 7 'Victory Party'" appeared in the Washington Evening Star for December 23, 1942, p. 1, col. 5. An Office of War Information radio broadcast to Finland about this incident had been made on December 17, and the text of it was printed in the Evening Star on December 24, 1942, p. 2, col. 2.
13See telegram No. 240, December 23, 8 p. m., to the Chargé in Finland, and footnote 97, p. 115.
appeared in the press and that the move would have been put into effect earlier had not Mr. Berle been unexpectedly delayed in returning to Washington.

Mr. Vahervuori then brought up certain details of the execution of the Department's note in regard to this matter. (1) He inquired whether it was the Department's desire that the Finnish Information Center in New York be definitely closed and I replied in the affirmative. (2) He then inquired what action the Legation could take in replying to the number of letters it was receiving in regard to the "Pearl Harbor story"; to which I commented that the Legation seemed already to have issued a statement to the press on the subject. I said that the Legation might answer these letters by referring to the Legation's statement to the press and agreed with his suggestion that it might not be inappropriate also to refer the inquiries for further information to the Office of War Information. (3) Mr. Vahervuori then stated that the Legation received a rather large number of inquiries from schools, students, et cetera for basic information in regard to Finland and that it had been the habit of the Legation to reply to these inquiries by enclosing pertinent documents, booklets, et cetera. I said that it seemed to be the clear intention of the Department that the dissemination of pamphlets, booklets, et cetera would cease, hence I thought that in replying to inquiries of this type the Legation should confine itself to furnishing an appropriate bibliography on the subject in question. I assured him that the Department had no real desire to oppose adequate and pertinent replies to legitimate inquiries of this character but pointed out the difficulty in drawing a line between inquiries of this character and others; and hence that no printed documents of any kind should be disseminated by the Legation.

Mr. Vahervuori then jokingly inquired what new "blow" we had in store for Finland. I replied that I knew of none; but that we should be prepared for surprises so long as Professor Witting remained in office as Foreign Minister. Mr. Vahervuori interrupted to inquire whether the Department was opposed to Professor Witting on personal grounds and whether there had been any personal difficulties between Professor Witting and Minister Schoenfeld. I replied in the negative to both questions and continued by saying that any references to Professor Witting as Foreign Minister referred to his policies. I said that it was no concern of this Government whether Professor Witting remained in office or not, but that we did realize on the basis of past experience that Professor Witting's personal policy was so closely identified with collaboration with our enemies that he might promote other measures in the field of collaboration with our enemies.
that would require action on our part. I said that as long as he remained in office, we had to anticipate under these circumstances a further deterioration in Finnish-American relations but that I could not forecast how this would come about since we had no idea, at this time, what new move Professor Witting would make.

860D.00/1033: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, December 29, 1942—6 p.m.
[Received 9:47 p.m.]

1237. Department’s 248, December 24, and my 1274, December 28.\(^{14}\)
Chief of Political Section of Foreign Office asked me to call this afternoon. He said that he had just received our news bulletin 293, December 21, with paragraph entitled “Americans resent Finnish attitude toward Pearl Harbor attack.” I am sending text of this paragraph in clear.

Ivalo said he had been instructed to raise this matter with me apparently with a view to protesting its appearance in our bulletin. I told him that in the words of President Roosevelt,\(^{15}\) Pearl Harbor was a deed which would live in the annals of infamy and that no recent incident had more aroused American popular indignation so far as Finland was concerned. Ivalo then more or less summarized statement of Finnish Legation of December 24 making point that Finnish officials could not well decline invitations from foreign legations, that Finland had maintained equally friendly relations both with Washington and Tokyo and that Rangell had not congratulated Japanese Minister on Pearl Harbor although he and others had used the usual “phrases de courtoisie”, as Ivalo put it. He said Witting did not stay to see film. His own impression on going to Japanese Legation had been that this was merely a Japanese national holiday.

I remarked that people in his own Protocol Section knew very well what the Japanese national holiday was and that it was even printed in Foreign Office’s own diplomatic list. I said that certainly any American seeing an invitation from Japanese Legation dated December 8 which, in Tokyo time was date of Pearl Harbor attack, could not fail to connect such invitation with Pearl Harbor. Finns were indeed free to accept such invitations as they wished and to offer such congratulations as occurred to them but to an American “Pearl Harbor” was fighting words and Americans, in fact, were angry at this gaff. Ivalo remarked that perhaps the Japanese Minister had made a gaff.

\(^{14}\) Latter not printed.
\(^{15}\) Message of the President to the Congress on December 8, 1941, Department of State Bulletin, December 13, 1941, p. 474.
I replied that I was glad to have his explanations and hoped that he would understand in light of my explanations how American people felt about this Japanese tea party.

Ivalo made point he has referred to in previous conversations of Finland's complete neutrality in Pacific war. He even went so far as to assert that 80 percent of news in Finnish papers concerning Pacific war was of American origin. I said I could not at all accept this statement as Legation had made very careful study of this point and on contrary, I had definite impression that any Japanese victory appeared on front page in big black type and any American victory on back page in very small type. This pointed indeed to Department's decision on whole problem of providing Finland with accurate information of American war effort.

I informed Ivalo that at all events he would no longer be troubled with news bulletins of American Legation as they had been stopped. He said he had received several telegrams from Finnish Legation in Washington on this subject but had not seen text of your note of December 23 18 and professed to be puzzled as to exact situation. I informed him in sense of your 240 and offered to send him text of your note which I am doing this afternoon. Ivalo also said he had not known that Finnish Legation had issued communiqué to press in terms of your 243 and I volunteered to give him paraphrase.

In closing interview, Ivalo said he hoped that we would show motion pictures and said without doubt Mr. Rangell would accept.

McCLINTOCK

740.0011 European War 1939/26838 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, December 31, 1942—2 p.m.
[Received December 31—9:51 a.m.]

1301. Officer cited my 1300 today 17 expressed great indignation last night at what he termed stupidity of Witting which resulted in suppression of our and Finnish Legation's propaganda activities. He said he hoped there would soon be a new Foreign Minister in Helsinki and intimated he thought there would be.

McCLINTOCK

18 See telegram No. 240, December 23, 8 p.m., to the Chargé in Finland, p. 115.
17 Not printed.