

PHILIPPINES

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN EVACUATION OF PRESIDENT QUEZON; PROPOSAL FOR IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRALIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; ADHERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES TO DECLARATION BY UNITED NATIONS

*Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 12, 1941*¹

An exchange of telegrams between the President of the United States and the President of the Philippine Commonwealth follows:

“December 9, 1941.

“I have just arrived from Baguio the summer capital of the Philippines where I was when the war between the United States and Japan was declared. I have covered the country by automobile and I am happy to report that everywhere the people are loyal to America and determined to stand by her in testimony of their gratitude to you, to the Government of the United States and to the American people and because of their devotion to the cause of Democracy and freedom. I am proud therefore that the reiterated assurance I have given to you to the effect that you can count upon us was no empty word.

Manuel L. Quezon”

“December 11, 1941.

“Your renewed assurances of the devotion and loyalty of the Philippine people to the United States and to democracy are particularly appreciated in this grave hour. The hearts of all Americans are deeply touched by the fortitude and gallantry being shown by your people in this present ordeal. We are at one with you in our faith in the ultimate triumph of our common ideals.

Franklin D. Roosevelt”

740.0011 European War 1939/17502 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner in the Philippines (Sayre)
to the Secretary of State*

MANILA, December 15, 1941—6 p. m.

[Received December 15—7:30 a. m.]

628. Personal for [President] Roosevelt. Am gravely concerned over rumors circulating here. Filipinos risking lives and country on faith of America's word she will protect them. Under MacArthur's²

¹ Reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, December 13, 1941, p. 511.

² Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East.

leadership they making magnificent defense effort. America cannot afford to let them down. Whispers here United States withholding further aid and does not intend to try break Jap blockade. Existing forces woefully inadequate. Assume whispers untrue but if they become convincing there's critical danger of collapse entire structure and ensuing disaster. To avert this may I suggest, first, that you forthwith order available resources be sent succor Philippines; second, you publicly announce this fact, giving lie to rumors and preserving morale here. Immediate action necessary.

SAYRE

740.0011 European War 1939/17502: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Manila (Steintorf)

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1941—6 p. m.

430. Personal for Sayre from President.

"The President is directly in touch with the situation in the Far East. He wishes you to read the War Department's message sent today to MacArthur³ which is self-explanatory. For evident military reasons no public announcement of the nature suggested by you should be made at this time. General MacArthur can determine what might safely be said publicly. Roosevelt."

HULL

811B.00 General Conditions/35: Telegram

Mr. Cabot Coville⁴ to the Secretary of State

FORT MILLS,⁵ January 11, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received January 12—12:29 a. m.]

Telegram in lieu of periodic political report because no present despatch of mails.

Outbreak of war has of course altered and dominated political scene completely. Evidences of Quezon's American loyalty have been

³ Telegram No. 787, dispatched at 2:28 p. m., which in pertinent part was as follows: "Your messages of December 13th and 14th have been studied by the President. The strategic importance of the Philippines is fully recognized and there has been and will be no wavering in the determination to support you. The problem of supply is complicated by Naval losses in the Pacific but as recommended in yours of December 14th bomber and pursuit reinforcements are to be rushed to you." (740.0011PW/12-1541) For summaries of messages of December 13 and 14, see Department of the Army, *The Fall of the Philippines*, by Louis Morton (Washington, 1953), pp. 147, 151, 152.

⁴ Foreign Service Officer, on detail as Second Secretary in the Office of the High Commissioner in the Philippines.

⁵ On island of Corregidor, approximately 30 miles from Manila.

gratifying. The oral decision that, when it should be necessary to abandon Manila, the persons so mobilizing [*sic*] Government be retained within area in control of American forces was concurred in by Quezon and at Corregidor he and his highest associates have been in intimate constant touch with Sayre and MacArthur and have cooperated fully. Should Quezon be again in touch with Japanese, however, the probability of a deal is still not to be ignored.

Morale in islands of both Filipinos and Americans has been notably sustained by removal from occupied area of Quezon and other persons symbolizing and controlling Government. Psychological effect has been that desired and it is recommended constant effort be made to continue such removal policy if military developments make impossible holding area where those persons lie [*are?*] or may be. Continuity of Government and the sense that removal to other places of the personal symbols of Government is a matter of temporary expediency rather than giving in to the enemy is of primary importance in nourishing the attitude of Filipinos toward the United States.

Since the High Commissioner (at the same time as Quezon) brought part of staff to Fort Mills, Corregidor, much important work has been accomplished by his staff here particularly in measures in protection of American and Philippine currency and property rights all of large totals.⁶ The safe removal of at least one copy of the records involved, from Corregidor to the United States, by whatever means is urgently recommended. Transportation would appear not available in absence of decision by Washington. The most practicable means would appear to be by plane flying by night to Corregidor from Java possibly via Borneo, and returning the following night.

Organizing of a final stand on Bataan Peninsula is proceeding with hearty backing of both military and civilian officials at Corregidor though noticeable reluctance among many Filipino soldiers. Enemy carefully bring[ing] up large numbers for sustained drive. Our greatest need is planes especially attacks and pursuits.

We have no communication with Manila and I am not in position to report on political conditions there other than press and radio items already known to September.

COVILLE

⁶ For further information on this subject, see *Sixth Annual Report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1942* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 49 ff.

124.11B6/26

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)*⁷

[WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1942.

Subject: Reference my memorandum of January 18⁸ on the subject of possible removal of personnel and records from Corregidor.

The question of possible removal of certain high persons from Corregidor has been under consideration in high quarters in the administration for sometime past.

It is understood that, for various reasons, physical effort to make this removal has thus far not been made, and that the making now of such an effort is regarded in certain quarters as being impracticable.

Under date January 11, Foreign Service Officer Coville telegraphed from Fort Mills to the Department a "political report" in the course of which Coville stated that evidences of President Quezon's loyalty to the United States had been gratifying but that if Quezon were to come again "in touch with Japanese . . . the probability of a deal is still not to be ignored". Coville said further that morale in the Islands had been notably sustained by the removal from occupied areas of Quezon and other persons who symbolize and control "government". He said, "It is recommended" that if military developments make it impossible to hold the area where those persons now are or may be, constant effort be made to continue the policy of removal. This would be of primary importance in influencing the attitude toward the United States of the Filipinos. Coville also recommended removal from Corregidor to the United States of at least one copy of the records involved. He suggested that plane might fly by night to Corregidor from the Dutch East Indies. Transportation would require decision by Washington.

Copies of the above message, which was received on January 12, were at once sent by the Department of State to the War Department and the Navy Department.⁹

On January 16, Mr. Coville telegraphed from Fort Mills¹⁰ that in the absence of acknowledgment or reply to his telegram of January 11, he felt impelled "to make it explicitly plain" before there should take place "a general fiasco in the matter" that there existed there an immediate and clear need for removing papers and records and some other matters in his custody; that the armed forces on the spot were occupied in the field; that only from the Department of State could there come an initiative toward meeting the need which he pointed

⁷ Submitted to the Secretary of State on January 19.

⁸ Not printed.

⁹ Sent on January 15.

¹⁰ Telegram not printed.

out; and that in his opinion the one practicable solution would be to send flying boats of a type named from Port Darwin.

This telegram was received by the Department of State on January 17.

Officers of this Department at once took the matter up with coordinate officers of the War Department and the Navy Department. It appeared that copies of Coville's telegram of January 11 had not been brought in the War and Navy Departments to the attention of the highest officers; and that no recommendation had been made for action or for reply.

In this Department, officers of FE, PI and PA/H¹¹ collaborated in consideration of the matter, communication with Army and Navy, and drafting of a telegram to Coville. The subject matter and the draft were brought to the attention of Mr. Berle.¹² Mr. Berle communicated by telephone with the War Department and with the President.

On January 17 at 7:00 p. m. there went from this Department to Fort Mills a telegram to the High Commissioner and Coville.¹³ In this it was stated that Coville's suggestion in telegrams of January 11 and January 16 was "endorsed"; that the question of removing records was of course secondary in importance; and that this Department is informed that unless practical considerations prevent, which might of course prove to be the case, "action will be taken".

On the morning of Sunday, January 18, Mr. Berle informed the Secretary of State regarding the above recorded developments. A few minutes later the Secretary of State mentioned the subject to Mr. Hornbeck. Mr. Hornbeck, in the presence of Mr. Hackworth,¹⁴ gave the Secretary further details and offered comments bearing on political aspects of the question of removal or failure to remove President Quezon, General MacArthur, Mr. Sayre, and others. The Secretary called the President on the telephone and discussion of the matter ensued. It is understood that the President stated that he very much wished that the removal be effected but that the Army said that, from various angles, too great risk was involved. The Secretary of State and Mr. Hackworth and Mr. Hornbeck further discussed the problem. Question was raised whether removal might not be effected by submarine. The Secretary of State called the Chief of Naval Operations¹⁵ on the telephone and raised the question in general terms (not with special reference to submarine). It is understood that Admiral

¹¹ Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of Philippine Affairs, and Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck), respectively.

¹² Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

¹³ Not printed.

¹⁴ Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser.

¹⁵ Adm. Harold R. Stark.

Stark stated that the subject had not theretofore been brought to his attention in any way. Mr. Hornbeck suggested to the Secretary that the Secretary might find it advantageous to discuss the matter with the Secretary of War,¹⁶ in as much as Colonel Stimson has special knowledge of and special interest in the Philippines and in everything that relates to or is involved in the question of American policy, prestige, influence, and operations of the United States in the Far East—as well as in all angles of our war effort.

S[TANLEY] K. H[ORNBECK]

811B.001 Quezon, Manuel/1-1942

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1942.

About five o'clock on Saturday afternoon, at the request of Assistant Secretary of War McCloy,¹⁷ Colonel Tate¹⁸ came over to see me. He showed me the cablegrams exchanged between the War Department and General MacArthur nearly two weeks ago, at which time the possible evacuation of President Quezon had been discussed.¹⁹ MacArthur recommended against it very strongly, chiefly on the ground that it might impair the fighting strength and spirit of the Filipino troops. Nevertheless, Colonel Tate said, the War Department had raised the question again with General Marshall²⁰ and had prepared a brief cable to General MacArthur, resubmitting the situation.

On Sunday morning while I was with the Secretary, General Marshall telephoned. He said that after considering the matter he was unwilling to raise the question of evacuation of Quezon again with MacArthur. His reasons for this were substantially the same as those set out by MacArthur in reply to the previous inquiry on the same point. Briefly, he considered that the relationship of the American to the Filipino troops and the entire situation was such as to make it unwise to raise the question again.

He asked whether this was in accord with the President's directive. I told him that the President had left the estimation of chances and military problems entirely to him and presumably the War Department, and thought the President did not wish to try to control his judgment. The President had merely said that if chances were even or

¹⁶ Henry L. Stimson.

¹⁷ John J. McCloy.

¹⁸ Col. Ralph H. Tate, Executive Officer in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War.

¹⁹ See Department of the Army, *The Fall of the Philippines*, by Louis Morton (Washington, 1953), p. 239.

²⁰ Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

better, he was very anxious something should be done; if not, it could not be attempted.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

811B.001 Quezon, Manuel/1-2842 :Telegram

The Commanding General of United States Army Forces in the Far East (MacArthur) to the Adjutant General (Adams)

FORT MILLS, January 28, 1942.

1445. I have just received the following communication from President Quezon.

"I have been mortified by the radio broadcast from Tokyo asserting that a new government has been established in the Philippines, which government has pledged its conformity with Japan's new East Asia policy.

I know what the real sentiments of my people are and I am certain that their stand has not changed despite the military reverses of our forces. I am likewise convinced of the loyalty of the men who have accepted positions in the so-called new government.

I want you, therefore, to give publicity of [to] the following statement: "The determination of the Filipino people to continue fighting side by side with the United States until victory is won has in no way been weakened by the temporary reverses suffered by our arms. We are convinced that our sacrifices will be crowned with victory in the end and in that conviction we shall continue to resist the enemy with all our might.[']"

Japanese military forces are occupying sections of the Philippines comprising only one third of our territory. In the remaining areas constitutional government is still in operation under my authority.

I have no direct information concerning the veracity of the news broadcast from Tokyo that a commission composed of some well known Filipinos have been recently organized in Manila to take charge of certain functions of civil government. The organization of such a commission, if true, can have no political significance not only because it is charged merely with purely administrative functions but also because the acquiescence by its members to serve in the commission was evidently for the purpose of safeguarding the welfare of the civilian population and can, in no way, reflect the sentiments of the Filipino toward the enemy. Such sentiments are still those I have repeatedly pressed in the first: Loyalty to America and resolute resistance against the invasion of our territory and liberties.

At the same time I am going to open my mind and my heart to you without attempting to hide anything. We are before the bar of history and God only knows if this is the last time that my voice will be heard before going to my grave.

My loyalty and the loyalty of the Filipino people to America have been proven beyond question. Now we are fighting by her side under your command, despite overwhelming odds. But, it seems to me questionable whether any government has the right to demand loyalty

from its citizens beyond its willingness or ability to render actual protection.

This war is not of our making. Those that had dictated the policies of the United States could not have failed to see that this is the weakest point in American territory. From the beginning, they should have tried to build up our defenses. As soon as the prospects looked bad to me, I telegraphed President Roosevelt requesting him to include the Philippines in the American defense program. I was given no satisfactory answer.

When I tried to do something to accelerate our defense preparations, I was stopped from doing it.

Despite all this we never hesitated for a moment in our stand. We decided to fight by your side and we have done the best we could and we are still doing as much as could be expected from us under the circumstances. But how long are we going to be left alone? Has it already been decided in Washington that the Philippine front is of no importance as far as the final result of the war is concerned and that, therefore, no help can be expected here in the immediate future, or at least before our power of resistance is exhausted. If so, I want to know it, because I have my own responsibility to my countrymen whom, as President of the Commonwealth, I have led into a complete war effort. I am greatly concerned as well regarding the soldiers I have called to the colors and who are now manning the firing line. I want to decide in my own mind whether there is justification in allowing all these men to be killed, when for the final outcome of the war the shedding of their blood may be wholly unnecessary. It seems that Washington does not fully realize our situation nor the feelings which the apparent neglect of our safety and welfare have engendered in the hearts of the people here.

Some [apparent garble], I telegraphed the President of the United States. . . .²¹ about this same matter. I did not receive even one word of acknowledgment. Is the sacrifice that I, members of my Government, and my whole family are making here, of no value at all?

In reference to the men who have accepted positions in the commission established by the Japanese, everyone of them wanted to come to Corregidor, but you told me that there was no place for them here. They are not Quislings. The Quislings are the men who betray their country to the enemy. These men did what they had been asked to do, under the protection of their Government. Today they are virtually prisoners of the enemy. I am sure they are only doing what they think is their duty. They are not traitors. They are the victims of the adverse fortunes of war and I am sure they had no choice. Besides, it is most probable that they accepted their positions in order to safeguard the welfare of the civilian population in the occupied areas. I think, under the circumstances, America should look upon their situation sympathetically and understandingly.

I am confident that you will understand my anxiety about the long awaited reinforcements and trust you will again urge Washington to insure their early arrival.

Sincerely yours,

Manuel Quezon."

²¹ Points appear in the original telegram.

His proclamation is being given the widest distribution that is possible from here both by printed circular and radio broadcast. It should be publicized by you throughout the world. The letter is of such a nature that it properly can be answered only by the President of the United States. I urge most earnestly that no effort be spared adequately to meet this situation. Please acknowledge receipt of this radio and inform me as to when reply can be expected.

MACARTHUR

*Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson) to President Roosevelt*²²

WASHINGTON, [January 30, 1942.]

Subject: Radiogram from General MacArthur quoting President Quezon.

General MacArthur points out that the nature of President Quezon's letter²³ is such that it can properly be answered only by the President of the United States. He requests information as to when reply can be expected.

That portion of Mr. Quezon's letter on which he asked distribution was sent immediately, through G-2,²⁴ to Colonel Donovan's²⁵ organization. A radiogram of acknowledgment has been dispatched to General MacArthur.

The following draft of a suggested reply is intended for dispatch by the President to General MacArthur for President Quezon:

"I have read with complete understanding your letter to General MacArthur. I realize the depth and sincerity of your sentiments with respect to your inescapable duties to your own people and I assure you that I would be the last to demand of you and them any sacrifice which I considered hopeless in the furtherance of the cause for which we are all striving. I want, however, to state with all possible emphasis that the magnificent resistance of the defenders of Bataan is contributing definitely toward assuring the completeness of our final victory in the Far East. The gaps existing in our offensive armaments are those that are to be expected when peace-loving countries such as the United States and the Philippines suddenly find themselves attacked by autocratic power which has spent years in preparation for armed conflict. Initial defeats, privations and suffering are the inevitable consequences to democracy in such circumstances. But I have pledged to the attainment of ultimate victory the full man power, finances and material resources of this country; and this pledge of

²² Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

²³ See *supra*.

²⁴ Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

²⁵ Col. William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information.

victory includes as an essential objective the restoration of peace and tranquillity in the Philippines and its return to the control of a Government of its own choosing. While I cannot now indicate the time at which succor and assistance can reach the Philippines, I do know that every ship at our disposal is bringing to the South West Pacific the forces that will ultimately smash the invader and free your country. Ships in that region have been loaded and dispatched to Manila with various supplies for the garrison. Already our forces, with those of our Allies, have inflicted severe losses upon enemy convoys and naval shipping and are definitely slowing his Southward advance. Our four engine bombers are daily reporting to General Wavell²⁶ from the trans-African route and more recently via the Pacific. Ten squadrons of pursuit and fighter planes have already been made available in that theater and a steady flow of such planes is crossing the Pacific. Our Navy is heavily engaged in escorting to the same region large troop convoys. Every day gained for building up our forces is of incalculable value and it is in the gaining of time that the defenders of Bataan are assisting us so effectively.

"I have no words in which to express to you my admiration and gratitude for the complete demonstration of loyalty, courage and readiness to sacrifice that your people, under your inspired leadership, have displayed. They are upholding the most magnificent traditions of free democracy.

"Those portions of your letter to General MacArthur on which you asked publicity are being broadcast to the world from Washington. Your words and your example will rally to renewed effort not only the people of your own country but all those that in every section of the globe are enlisted in the fight for democratic principles and freedom in government."²⁷

HENRY L. STIMSON

811B.001 Quezon, Manuel L./165 : Telegram

The Commanding General of United States Army Forces in the Far East (MacArthur) to the Chief of Staff (Marshall)

FORT MILLS, February 2, 1942.

187. In case of ultimate loss of Bataan and consequent siege of Corregidor the question arises as to the ultimate preservation of President Quezon and his family, Vice President Osmeña and the immediate members of the Commonwealth Cabinet. By that time the usefulness of his presence here due to the changed conditions will have been greatly dissipated. I have no means of evacuating him and his physical condition precludes use of air transportation. It is possible

²⁶ Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, British Commander of the American-British-Dutch-Australian Area, an Allied command including the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and Burma.

²⁷ Marginal notes: "OK Send FDR"; and "Col. Gailey states this case has been dispatched." Colonel Gailey was Executive Officer of the War Plans Division.

he could obtain [*sustain?*] a submarine trip. Can any plans be arranged from Washington for his possible evacuation thereto? Under the contingency I have described he wishes to take advantage of the previous suggestion that he be evacuated to the United States.

MACARTHUR

811B.001 Quezon, Manuel L./165

Memorandum by the Chief of Staff (Marshall) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) and the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1942.

The attached message ²⁸ has come in from General MacArthur during the night. It raises the issue we have been discussing and makes it possible to send the instructions you desire.

This can be done in the light of the fact that there will soon be another opportunity to make the evacuation. Apparently General MacArthur is at the moment unaware of this.

G. C. MARSHALL

811B.001 Quezon, Manuel L./164

Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs ²⁹

[WASHINGTON,] February 2, 1942.

It is understood that transportation for the evacuation from Corregidor in all probability can be provided by the Navy.

It is believed that evacuation of President Quezon and his family, Vice President Osmeña and the immediate members of the Commonwealth Cabinet should be brought about.

If a journey thus begun by those persons is to be continued with ultimate destination the United States, it would seem that the American Government forthwith make plans for receiving and taking care of the party. (This would probably require consultation with and collaboration with the Secretary of the Interior.³⁰)

Following up his memorandum of this morning, General Marshall has just now called me on the telephone and requested that we here make a preliminary draft of a telegram for expedition to General MacArthur ³¹ along the lines of a telegram which we had drafted and which we discussed with him on January 25 and 26.

²⁸ *Supra.*

²⁹ Presumably by the Chief of the Division (Hamilton). An attached chit by Mr. Hamilton states that he left the original with General Marshall on the afternoon of February 2.

³⁰ Harold L. Ickes.

³¹ Draft telegram prepared on February 2 by Mr. Hornbeck and left with General Marshall by Mr. Hamilton that afternoon. With only minor changes, it was transmitted the same evening; see p. 893.

811B.001 Quezon, Manuel L./165

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Chief of Staff (Marshall)

[WASHINGTON,] February 2, 1942.

Reference, your memorandum for Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton of February 2 and its enclosure.

It occurs to Mr. Hamilton and me to ask: Ought not this matter now be taken up again with the President?

Presumably the question of making plans and issuing instructions would lie with you and Admiral King.³²

Mr. Hamilton and I are at your service and would be glad to come to you for conference should you so desire or to collaborate with you in any manner which may be helpful to you.

811B.001 Quezon, Manuel/2-242: Telegram

The Chief of Staff (Marshall) to the Commanding General of United States Army Forces in the Far East (MacArthur)

[WASHINGTON,] February 2, 1942.

Re your number 187, February 2nd: The President and his advisers feel that if and when military considerations no longer call for continued presence of President Quezon and other Philippine officials the evacuation of Quezon and family, of Osmeña and of other such officials will become desirable.

The question whether any of those persons and whether any other persons including Mr. Sayre and family, Mrs. MacArthur and son, and other Americans, shall at any time be evacuated will be for your decision in the light of the military situation, the feasibility and hazard of operation of evacuation and wishes of individuals concerned.

Opportunities for such evacuation should occur shortly with arrival of a submarine from the south carrying 3 inch AA ammunition to you and another from Hawaii also carrying 3 inch ammunition.

Steps will be taken to provide for reception of those evacuated at whatever places they may be taken while enroute to this country and upon their arrival in United States.³³ Acknowledge.

MARSHALL

³² Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet.

³³ On the night of February 20, President Quezon and his party left Corregidor en route to Australia and the United States. High Commissioner Sayre and party left 2 days later. General MacArthur and party left on March 12.

*The Commanding General of United States Army Forces in the Far East (MacArthur) to the Chief of Staff (Marshall)*³⁴

FORT MILLS, February 8, 1942.

2265. The following message has just been received by me from President Quezon for President Roosevelt.

"The situation of my country has become so desperate that I feel that positive action is demanded. Militarily it is evident that no help will reach us from the United States in time either to rescue the beleaguered garrison now fighting so gallantly or to prevent the complete overrunning of the entire Philippine Archipelago.

My people entered the war with the confidence that the United States would bring such assistance to us as would make it possible to sustain the conflict with some chance of success. All our soldiers in the field were animated by the belief that help would be forthcoming. This help has not and evidently will not be realized. Our people have suffered death, misery, devastation. After 2 months of war not the slightest assistance has been forthcoming from the United States. Aid and succour have been dispatched to other warring nations such as England, Ireland [*sic*], Australia, the N. E. I.³⁵ and perhaps others, but not only has nothing come here, but apparently no effort has been made to bring anything here. The American Fleet and the British Fleet, the two most powerful navies in the world, have apparently adopted an attitude which precludes any effort to reach these islands with assistance.

As a result, while enjoying security itself, the United States has in effect condemned the sixteen millions of Filipinos to practical destruction in order to effect a certain delay. You have promised redemption, but what we need is immediate assistance and protection. We are concerned with what is to transpire during the next few months and years as well as with our ultimate destiny. There is not the slightest doubt in our minds that victory will rest with the United States, but the question before us now is: Shall we further sacrifice our country and our people in a hopeless fight? I voice the unanimous opinion of my War Cabinet and I am sure the unanimous opinion of all Filipinos that under the circumstances we should take steps to preserve the Philippines and the Filipinos from further destruction.

Thanks to wise generalship two-thirds of my country is as yet untouched. We do not propose to do this by a betrayal of the United States. It appears to us that our mission is only to fight as a sacrifice force here as long as possible in order to help the defense of the Dutch and British in this area of the World. But you do not need to sacrifice the people of the Philippines to win this war. Members of your Government here repeatedly said that the action against Hitler would determine the outcome of the entire war.

I feel at this moment that our military resistance here can no longer hold the enemy when he sees fit to launch a serious attack. I feel that

³⁴ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

³⁵ Netherlands East Indies.

the elements of the situation here can be composed into a solution that will not reduce the delaying effect of our resistance here but which will save my country from further devastation as the battleground of two great powers.

I deem it my duty to propose my solution. The Government of the United States under the McDuffie-Tydings law³⁶ is committed to grant independence to the Philippines in 1946, and the same law authorized the President to open negotiations for the neutralization of the Philippines. On the other hand, the Japanese Government has publicly announced its willingness to grant the Philippines her independence. In view of the foregoing I propose the following:

That the United States immediately grant the Philippines complete and absolute independence;

That the Philippines be at once neutralized;

That all occupying troops, both American and Japanese, be withdrawn by mutual agreement with the Philippine Government within a reasonable length of time;

That neither country maintain bases in the Philippines;

That the Philippine Army be immediately disbanded, the only armed forces being maintained here to be a constabulary of modest size;

That immediately upon granting independence the trade relations of the Philippines with foreign countries be a matter to be determined entirely by the Philippines and the foreign countries concerned;

That American and Japanese civilians who so desire be withdrawn with their respective troops under mutual and proper safeguards. It is my proposal to make this suggestion publicly to you and to the Japanese authorities without delay and upon acceptance in general principle by those two countries that an immediate armistice be entered into here pending the withdrawal of their respective garrisons.

(signed) Manuel L. Quezon."

I took the liberty of presenting this message to High Commissioner Sayre for a general expression of his views. States as follows:

"If the premise of President Quezon is correct, that American help cannot or will not arrive here in time to be availing, I believe his proposal for *immediate* independence and neutralization of Philippines is the sound course to follow."

My estimate of the military situation here is as follows:

The troops have sustained practically 50% percent casualties from their original strength. Divisions are reduced to the size of regiments, regiments to battalions, battalions to companies. Some units have entirely disappeared. The men have been in constant action and are badly battleworn. They are desperately in need of rest and refitting. Their spirit is good but they are capable now of nothing but fighting in place on a fixed position. All our supplies are scant and the command has been on half rations for the past month.

³⁶ Approved March 24, 1934; 48 Stat. 456.

It is possible for the time being that the present enemy force might temporarily be held, but any addition to his present strength will insure the destruction of our Gonzale force. We have pulled through a number of menacing situations but there is no denying the fact that we are near done. Corregidor itself is extremely vulnerable. This type of fortress, built prior to the days of air power, when isolated is impossible of prolonged defense. Any heavy air bombardment or the location of siege guns on Bataan or even on the Cavite side, would definitely limit the life of the fortress. My water supply is extremely vulnerable and may go at any time. Every other vital installation can be readily taken out.

Since I have no air or sea protection you must be prepared at any time to figure on the complete destruction of this command. You must determine whether the (mission?) Misegon [*sic*] of delay would be better furthered by the temporizing plan of Quezon or by my continued battle effort. The temper of the Filipinos is one of almost violent resentment against the United States. Everyone of them expected help and when it has not been forthcoming they believe they have been betrayed in favor of others. It must be remembered they are hostile to Great Britain on account of the latter's colonial policy. In spite of my great prestige with them, I have had the utmost difficulty during the last few days in keeping them in line. If help does not arrive shortly nothing, in my opinion, can prevent their utter collapse and their complete absorption by the enemy. The Japanese made a powerful impression upon Philippine public imagination in promising independence.

So far as the military angle is concerned, the problem presents itself as to whether the plan of President Quezon might offer the best possible solution of what is about to be a disastrous debacle. It would not affect the ultimate situation in the Philippines for that would be determined by the results in other theatres. If the Japanese Government rejects President Quezon's proposition it would psychologically strengthen our hold because of their Prime Minister's³⁷ public statement offering independence. If it accepts it, we lose no military advantage because we would still secure at least equal delay. Please instruct me.

MACARTHUR

³⁷ Gen. Hideki Tojo.

*The Chief of Staff (Marshall) to the Commanding General of United States Army Forces in the Far East (MacArthur)*³⁸

[WASHINGTON, February 9, 1942.]

[1029.] Please convey the following message from the President to President Quezon:

I have just received your message sent through General MacArthur.³⁹ From my message to you of January 30, 1942⁴⁰ you must realize that I am not lacking in understanding of or sympathy with the situation of yourself and the Commonwealth government today. The immediate crisis certainly seems desperate but such crises and their treatment must be judged by a more accurate measure than the anxieties and sufferings of the present, however acute. For over forty years the American government has been carrying out to the people of the Philippines a pledge to help them successfully, however long it might take, in their aspirations to become a self-governing and independent people with the individual freedom and economic strength which that lofty aim makes requisite. You yourself have participated in and are familiar with the many carefully planned steps by which that pledge of self-government has been carried out and also the steps by which the economic independence of the Islands is to be made effective. May I remind you now that in the loftiness of its aim and the fidelity with which it has been executed, this program of the United States towards another people has been unique in the history of the family of nations. In the McDuffie-Tydings Act of 1934, to which you refer, the Congress of the United States finally fixed the year 1946 as the date in which it was hoped that the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands established by that Act should finally reach the goal of its hopes for political and economic independence.

By a malign conspiracy of a few depraved but powerful nations this hope is now being frustrated and delayed. An organized attack upon individual freedom and governmental independence throughout the entire world, beginning in Europe, has now spread and been carried to the southwestern Pacific by Japan. The basic principles upon [*sic*] which have guided the US in its conduct towards the Philippines

³⁸ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

³⁹ See *supra*.

⁴⁰ See memorandum by the Secretary of War to President Roosevelt, p. 890.

have been violated in the rape of Poland, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Albania, Yugoslavia, Manchukuo, China, Indo-China, Thailand and finally the Philippines. You refer in your telegram to the announcement by the Prime Minister of Japan of Japan's willingness to grant to the Philippines her independence. I only have to refer you to the present condition of Korea, Manchukuo, North China, Indo-China, and all other countries which have fallen under the sway of the Japanese government, to point out the hollow duplicity of such an announcement.

The United States today is engaged with all its resources and in company with the governments of 26 other nations in an effort to defeat the aggression of Japan and its Axis partners. This effort will never be abandoned until the complete and thorough overthrow of the entire Axis system and the governments which maintain it. We are engaged now in laying the foundations in the southwest Pacific of a development in air, naval, and military power which shall become sufficient to meet and overthrow the widely extended and arrogant attempts of the Japanese.

By the terms of our pledge to the Philippines implicit in our 40 years of conduct towards your people and expressly recognized in the terms of the McDuffie-Tydings Act, we have undertaken to protect you to the uttermost of our power until the time of your ultimate independence had arrived. Our soldiers in the Philippines are now engaged in fulfilling that purpose. The honor of the United States is pledged to its fulfillment. We propose that it be carried out regardless of its cost. Those Americans who are fighting now will continue to fight until the bitter end.

So long as the flag of the United States flies on Filipino soil as a pledge of our duty to your people, it will be defended by our own men to the death. Whatever happens to the present American garrison we shall not relax our efforts until the forces which we are now marshaling outside the Philippine Islands return to the Philippines and drive the last remnant of the invaders from your soil.

*The Commanding General of United States Army Forces in the Far East (MacArthur) to the Chief of Staff (Marshall)*⁴¹

FORT MILLS, February 10, 1942.

3. The following communication is from President Quezon to President Roosevelt:

"The following is the letter I propose to address to you and to the Emperor of Japan if my recent proposal meets with your approval:

⁴¹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

Two great nations are now at war in the Western Pacific. The Commonwealth of the Philippines is still a possession of one of those nations, although through legislative processes it was about to attain complete independence which would have insured its neutrality in any conflict. The Philippines has therefore become a battleground between the warring powers and it is being visited with death, famine and destruction, despite the fact that occupation of the country will not influence in any way the final outcome of the war, nor have a bearing upon the conflicting principles over which the war is being waged.

Under the Tydings-McDuffie Law the United States has promised to recognize the independence of the Philippines in 1946 and the same law gave authority to the President of the United States to begin parleys for the neutralization of the Philippines. On the other hand, the Premier of the Imperial Government of Japan, addressing the Diet, stated that the Imperial Government of Japan was ready to offer the Filipino people independence with honor. On the strength of these commitments and impelled by a sincere desire to put an end to the sufferings and sacrifices of our people, and to safeguard their liberty and welfare, I propose the following program of action:

That the Government of the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan recognize the independence of the Philippines; that within a reasonable period of time both armies, American and Japanese, be withdrawn, previous arrangements having been negotiated with the Philippine Government; that neither nation maintain bases in the Philippines; that the Philippine Army be at once demobilized, the remaining force to be a Constabulary of moderate size; that at once upon the granting of freedom that trade agreement with other countries become solely a matter to be settled by the Philippines and the nation concerned; that American and Japanese noncombatants who so desire be evacuated with their own armies under reciprocal and appropriate stipulations.

It is my earnest hope that, moved by the highest considerations of justice and humanity, the two great powers which now exercise control over the Philippines will give their approval in general principle to my proposal. If this is done I further propose, in order to accomplish the details thereof, that an Armistice be declared in the Philippines and that I proceed to Manila at once for necessary consultations with the two governments concerned.

(signed) Manuel L. Quezon."

MACARTHUR

740.0011 Pacific War/1917

*The Assistant Chief of Staff (Gerow) to the Adjutant General
(Adams)*⁴²

[WASHINGTON,] February 11, 1942.

The Secretary of War directs that a secret message, as follows, be sent by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces in the Far East:

⁴² Copy received in the Department about February 16.

From the President to General MacArthur. Transmit the following message from me to President Quezon:

"Your message of February tenth evidently crossed mine to you of February ninth. Under our constitutional authority the President of the United States is not empowered to cede or alienate any territory to another nation. Furthermore, the United States has just bound itself in agreement with twenty-five other nations⁴³ to united action in dealing with the Axis Powers and has specifically engaged itself not to enter into any negotiations for a separate peace.

You have no authority to communicate with the Japanese Government without the express permission of the United States Government.

I will make no further comments regarding your last message dated February tenth pending your acknowledgement of mine to you of February ninth through General MacArthur.[""]

Franklin D. Roosevelt

L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General

*The Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in the Far East (MacArthur) to the Chief of Staff (Marshall)*⁴⁴

FORT MILLS, February 12, 1942.

262. The following message is from President Quezon:

"The President of the United States:

I wish to thank you for your prompt answer to the proposal which I submitted to you with the unanimous approval of my war cabinet. We fully appreciate the reasons upon which your decision is based and we are abiding by it.

(signed) Quezon."

MACARTHUR

811B.01/461 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner to the Philippines (Sayre) to the Secretary of State

FORT MILLS, February 12, 1942—1 a. m.

[Received February 13—7:30 p. m.]

45. For information [of] Interior, Treasury and other interested Departments. Central Government reportedly set up in Manila under Japanese auspices.

1. Council of State. According *Manila Tribune* January 25th, 30 prominent Filipino political leaders signed document January 23

⁴³ See Declaration by United Nations, January 1, 1942, p. 25.

⁴⁴ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

addressed to Japanese military commander ⁴⁵ constituting themselves provisional Council of State as follows:

"In response to the message of Your Excellency as Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese forces, on the 8th of January, 1942, through Honorable Jorge B. Vargas,⁴⁶ we have duly and respectfully taken note contents thereof and respectfully express our gratitude for Your Excellency's words of solicitude over the welfare of our people.

We beg to inform Your Excellency that, in compliance with your advice, and having in mind the great ideals, the freedom and the happiness of our country, we are ready to obey to the best of our ability and within the means at our disposal the orders issued by the Imperial Japanese forces for the maintenance peace and order and the promotion of the well being of our people under the Japanese military administration. Consequently, we have constituted ourselves into a Provisional Philippine Council of State and we are immediately proceeding to draft our articles of organization in line with Your Excellency[']s] advice."

Document signed by Jorge B. Vargas, Yulo, Paredes, Laurel, Aquino, Sison, Alunan, Recto, Bocobo, Guinto, Rodriguez, Baluyut, Qarabut [*Marabut?*], Aguinaldo,⁴⁷ Madrigal, Fernandez, De Las Alas, Quirino, Zulueta, Tan, Lavides, Avencena, Unson, Roces, Sabido, Arranz, Hernaez, Ozamiz, Navarro and Perez. Four persons requested to sign document failed to do so, namely, Jose Fabella, Alfonso Mendoza, Jose Veloso and Prospero Sanidad.

2. Executive Commission. According *Manila Tribune* January 28th, an Executive Commission was organized under Order No. 1 of Commander-in-Chief of Japanese expeditionary forces and members [in this?] Area [are] Vargas, Chairman; Aquino, Commissioner Interior; De Las Alas, Finance; Laurel, Justice; Alunan, Agriculture-Commerce; Recto, Education, Health, Public Welfare; Paredes, Public Works and Communications; Sison, Auditor General; Marabut, Executive Secretary to Commission. Yulo is reported as Chief Justice of Supreme Court.

3. Vargas in broadcast over KZRH Manila January 31st is reported to have said *inter alia*:

"In dealing occupied territory Japanese High Command has expressed deep desire follow benign and liberal policy predicated on willingness of people to cooperate with military administration in reestablishment peace and order and to that end has set up national civil administration intended among other things to temper rigors of martial law. Fact that High Command has seen fit that civil

⁴⁵ Gen. Masaharu Homma.

⁴⁶ Chairman of the Philippine Council of State.

⁴⁷ Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the Philippine insurrection against Spain in 1898 and against the United States, 1899-1901. From that time on he was retired to private life.

government be run by Filipinos under control of Japanese Army should be cause for gratification on part of our people. We cannot escape inexorable fact that fortunes of war have placed those of us in occupied territories outside protection of United States and at mercy of Japanese military. We must have trust in the justice and fairness of the Japanese people. The illustrious Premier, General Tojo of Japan in a special pronouncement promised us independence with honor. It is imperative therefore that we should refrain from committing acts which are detrimental or inimical to the interests of the Japanese forces."

4. Aguinaldo recently broadcast from Manila an appeal to General MacArthur to surrender saying in part Japan had promised Philippines independence with honor.

SAYRE

811B.001 Quezon, Manuel/172

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)

[WASHINGTON,] April 11, 1942.

DR. HORNBECK: The President has informed me that he thinks it highly desirable for President Quezon under present conditions to remain in Australia with his Government. He feels that in Australia the Philippine Government in exile will be able to undertake effectively the kind of propaganda and intelligence work which the Governments of Norway and the Netherlands, et cetera, are able to undertake in London because of geographical proximity.

Under these circumstances these communications⁴⁸ should not be sent.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

811B.01/470

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) and the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] April 14, 1942.

MR. WELLES: We wonder whether the President has taken into consideration certain facts, among which the following:

Except for the psychological value of having President Quezon remain in an area whence it may seem to the Filipinos that he can

⁴⁸ Proposed letter to President Roosevelt and proposed telegram to be sent by President Roosevelt to General MacArthur, neither sent; they reflected the Department's views that the presence in the United States of President Quezon, his family and Cabinet was desirable and recommended that, unless there were politico-military conditions that might cause General MacArthur and Mr. Quezon to feel it preferable for Mr. Quezon to remain in Australia, General MacArthur should make arrangements to have Mr. Quezon and his party brought to the United States.

easily—and perhaps soon—return to the Philippines, Australia appears less suited for the engaging in the type of propaganda which would be of help to our side in relations with the Philippines than is the United States. More than 1,000 miles from the Philippines, Australia has no system of communications with the Philippines, has no American press or Philippine press, and has more limited broadcasting facilities than this country.

President Quezon suffers from a tubercular condition of the lungs; reportedly he became so ill while on Corregidor that those around him were afraid that he might die before his escape; and, although he is understood to have improved somewhat since his arrival in Australia, the winter season in Australia, which is now approaching, may have serious consequences for a person in President Quezon's condition. Furthermore, it is doubtful that President Quezon can receive in Australia the expert medical care which would be available to him here. The death of President Quezon would mean the loss of perhaps the most important rallying point we have to keep the Filipino people loyal to the United States and reluctant to submit to Japanese rule. President Quezon has gained the affection of the Filipino masses and has caught their imagination as has no other Filipino leader.

President Quezon thrives in the midst of action and under more or less of limelight. Although it is true that President Quezon has friendly relations with General MacArthur and that it would be desirable to have President Quezon remain near him because of the fact that the Philippines lie within the sphere of General MacArthur's command, it is improbable that General MacArthur is going to have much time to concern himself with Philippine affairs or with President Quezon and his associates. In Australia, in view of the fact that there are no Filipinos there other than those who have gone there recently, President Quezon and his cabinet with the passage of time will feel pretty much strained, isolated, and impotent. This feeling will be an added unfavorable influence on President Quezon's health.

If a definite decision is made to keep President Quezon and his associates in Australia, should not thought be given to the possible appropriateness and possible other advantages, in the light of such a decision, of sending a high commissioner in the near future to be "near to" the Philippine Government?

740.0011 European War 1939/22706b

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In reply to the inquiry contained in your memorandum of April 17 with regard to the suggestion made to you

under date of April 16 by Adolf Berle⁴⁹ that the Philippine Government be invited to sign the United Nations Pact, I think the proposal is good in principle.

The doubt in my mind is, however, whether we could not advantageously take a step of this character in connection with a broader and more far-reaching policy. As you and I agreed some time ago, the Philippine people will have to be given their full independence upon the conclusion of the war. The step which Adolf proposes is equivalent to formal recognition by us at this time of the independent status of the Philippines.

As I said to you in my letter of April 13⁵⁰ with regard to Dr. Soong's memorandum⁵¹ concerning the independence of Korea, I hope that the opportunity may be presented when the United States can join with the other nations directly interested in the Pacific regions in announcing their common determination to restore their liberties to all of the peoples whose territory has been invaded by Japan and to recognize the right to full independence of the Philippines and Korea and perhaps, if conditions seem to make it wise, Indochina. As I said in that letter, the reaching of an agreement for the dominion status or independence of India would have offered an admirable springboard for a declaration of this kind. It may be, however, that some other favorable opportunity will be presented before long for a broad announcement of this kind which would really imply that the United Nations were joined together in a war for liberation, namely, a war to end imperialism.

If you approve of a policy of that kind, I would suggest holding the question of the Philippines in reserve until the broader policy can be announced. If, on the other hand, it seems expedient to strengthen Philippine morale before that time comes by having them sign the United Nations Pact, that step could, of course, be taken at any time.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

811B.001 Quezon, Manuel/168

The Chief of Staff (Marshall) to the Acting Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1942.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The President has approved the plans for the return of Mr. Quezon as outlined in the attached paper. However, he directed that you be contacted reference same.

⁴⁹ Neither memorandum printed.

⁵⁰ *Ante*, p. 870.

⁵¹ *Ante*, p. 868; T. V. Soong was Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Your concurrence is requested.⁵²

For the Chief of Staff:
 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of Staff (Eisenhower)*⁵³

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

The Chief of Staff directs that the following message be sent by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy to The President, Hyde Park, New York: WDWPD:⁵⁴

The following secret radiogram has just been received from General MacArthur:

"In view of changed military conditions in the Philippines President Quezon now desires to accept the invitation previously extended to him to remove the seat of his Government to Washington. I therefore plan to send him and his party secretly to the United States on the SS *Coolidge* scheduled to leave Melbourne April 21st. I have directed that his transportation be without expense to him and that during the voyage he will be regarded as under the auspices of our Government. Due to his presence aboard, the ship is being convoyed to limit of jurisdiction of this area. Request that necessary orders be issued to insure convoy for remainder of voyage. This is considered essential not only for his actual protection but because of the political repercussions which might follow if every safety precaution were not taken. Request advice of action."

The invitation to which General MacArthur refers was communicated to him on December 31, 1941, in the following language:

"Philippine Commissioner here⁵⁵ and Secretary Stimson in consultation with the President feel that evacuation of Manuel Quezon from Luzon to United States where he could carry on as head of Philippine Government in exile and as the symbol of the redemption of the Islands is highly desirable if it can be accomplished."

We desire to answer General MacArthur's cablegram today because of the early sailing date specified.

Admiral King states that the Naval escort requested by General

⁵² An attached undated chit by Mr. Welles states that concurrence was given. President Quezon, four members of his family, Vice President Osmeña, and an entourage of 13 sailed from Australia on April 21 and arrived at San Francisco on May 8.

⁵³ Memorandum signed by Lt. Col. G. Ordway, Jr., Assistant Executive of the Operations Division.

⁵⁴ War Department, War Plans Division.

⁵⁵ Joaquin M. Elizalde, Resident Commissioner of the Philippines.

MacArthur can be provided. I am delaying reply to General MacArthur pending your confirmation of plan.

McNarney ⁵⁶

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Major General

740.0011 European War 1939/22706b

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1942.

I enclose memorandum from Berle ⁵⁷ and Welles ⁵⁸ in regard to asking the Philippine Commonwealth to become a signer of the United Nations Pact. Frankly, I hesitate to do this at this time. I spoke to Tom Connally ⁵⁹ about it and he agrees with me.

I am, of course, a firm believer in carrying through our promise of independence to the Philippines, but I do not think we should modify the present law by a step which might be considered to hold out a promise to them for immediate independence if, for example, the war were to terminate early in 1943. There might be a period of repair and adjustment for two or three years for which the United States should be responsible.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

P.S. Please return enclosures for my files. ⁶⁰

740.0011 European War 1939/22164b

Memorandum by Mr. Carlton Savage, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long), to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1942.

MR. SECRETARY: In accordance with instructions I have given consideration [to] the question of adherence by the Commonwealth of the Philippines to the Declaration by United Nations. I have discussed the question with Mr. Sayre,⁶¹ Mr. Hackworth, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Davis ⁶² of PI.

The Declaration provides that it may be adhered to by other "nations" which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism. If the Execu-

⁵⁶ Maj. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff.

⁵⁷ Not printed.

⁵⁸ Dated April 17, p. 903.

⁵⁹ Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

⁶⁰ Enclosures were returned by the Secretary with a covering memorandum of July 2.

⁶¹ Mr. Sayre had returned to Washington by way of Australia.

⁶² John K. Davis, Chief of the Office of Philippine Affairs.

tive should invite the Philippines to adhere to the Declaration this act might be construed by some as a recognition of the independence of the Philippines and thereby create an awkward situation as Congress has provided for independence in 1946.

On the other hand it can be argued that India, which may be considered no more a nation than the Philippines, is one of the original signatories of the Declaration. Furthermore, there is no doubt that there would be a worthwhile moral effect from accepting the Philippines as a member of the United Nations. The Commonwealth has proved that it is willing to fight for freedom.

If it should be decided that the Philippines are to adhere to the Declaration by United Nations it would seem prudent to consult beforehand with the British, Chinese, and Soviet Governments. The attached draft instruction⁶³ has been prepared for this purpose.

CARLTON SAVAGE

740.0011 European War 1939/22164b: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)*⁶⁴

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1942—1 p. m.

506. Please inform the Foreign Office confidentially that the Commonwealth of the Philippines has indicated a desire to adhere to Declaration by United Nations; that we find no objection; that in the absence of any objection from the Chinese, British, or Soviet Governments, such adherence will be formally accepted at a White House ceremony on June 14.⁶⁵

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/6-1042

The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Quezon) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1942.

Mr. SECRETARY: The people of the Philippines are wholeheartedly devoted to liberty and fully subscribe to the principles set forth in that great document known as the Atlantic Charter which was proclaimed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941.⁶⁶

⁶³ See telegram No. 506, June 10, 1 p. m., to the Ambassador in China, *infra*.

⁶⁴ Repeated as No. 2631 to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom and as No. 287 to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union; message was sent with the approval of President Roosevelt.

⁶⁵ No objection was made by the three Governments.

⁶⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

We have been battling since December 7, 1941 to preserve our country from the menace of Japanese aggression. Although a large part of our territory is overrun by Japanese military forces, our soldiers are still actively engaged in meeting and harassing the foe wherever possible. We do not intend to be cowed by the armed might of Japan. We shall continue the struggle with every means in our power.

We desire to associate ourselves with those nations which are fighting for the preservation of life and liberty against the forces of barbarism that seek world domination. Accordingly, the Commonwealth of the Philippines hereby formally adheres to the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942.

I am [etc.]

MANUEL L. QUEZON

740.0011 European War 1939/22706a

The Secretary of State to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Quezon)

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your communication of June 10, 1942 stating that the people of the Philippines are wholeheartedly devoted to liberty and fully subscribe to the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter; that they desire to associate themselves with the nations which are fighting for the preservation of life and liberty against the forces of barbarism that seek world domination; and that accordingly the Commonwealth of the Philippines formally adheres to the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942.

The entire freedom-loving world admires the great courage and valor shown by the people of the Philippines during the past six months as they have gallantly fought to preserve their country from Japanese aggression. On behalf of this Government, as depository for the Declaration by United Nations, I take pleasure in welcoming into this group the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

Please accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

124.11B/50½

*The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Quezon) to the Secretary of the Interior (Ickes)*⁶⁷

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1942.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Referring to our conversation regarding the appointment of a new High Commissioner of the United States in the Philippines.

⁶⁷ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by President Roosevelt on June 24, with the instruction: "Please talk this over with the Secretary of the Interior."

In the first place, I think I should state frankly that I am in favor of your idea that no new appointment of a High Commissioner should be made. By the very nature of the position there is no reason for appointing one now since under the law, the High Commissioner is primarily the representative of the President of the United States in the Philippines. In view of the fact that the Government of the Commonwealth is now in exile in Washington where the President has his office, a representative of the President seems out of place.

Furthermore, the Philippine affairs as they relate to the Government of the United States are transacted in Washington, either through the Department of the Interior, when they are of purely domestic concern, or through the Department of State when, in some way, they relate to foreign affairs. The intervention, therefore, of the United States High Commissioner is not only unnecessary but it would mean more delay in the transaction of business between the Government of the Commonwealth and the Government of the United States.

I have some suggestions in mind which I intend to submit for the consideration of the President and if it should merit his approval it will automatically do away with the position of the United States High Commissioner. My suggestion, however, contemplates radical and fundamental changes, and will require careful study and deliberation. Hence, I must defer the submission of my proposals to a later date.

For the present this is what I consider to be the best solution of the problem we have at hand. Instead of abolishing the position of High Commissioner or not appointing a new one, just have the President designate one of your Assistants as Acting High Commissioner. In this way, we give the Japanese no occasion for saying that you have done away with the office for lack of interest in the Philippines, and at the same time your Department will be dealing directly with the Government of the Commonwealth.

If you desire to discuss with me this matter further and can see me next Monday,⁶⁸ I shall be available.

Very sincerely,

MANUEL QUEZON

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*⁶⁹

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1942.

In regard to this High Commissionership to the Philippines matter, I had a talk yesterday with President Quezon. He suggested to me that in view of the fact that the High Commissioner is supposed to

⁶⁸ June 22.

⁶⁹ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

represent the Government of the United States in the Philippines, that this situation is no longer in existence, and that Quezon himself is now at the seat of the Government of the United States, the need for a High Commissioner at this moment seems unnecessary. In other words, Quezon can consult with you and me and the Interior Department in person at any time he wants—and we with him.

In view of the fact that Sayre has resigned and his resignation has been accepted ⁷⁰ I am inclined to agree with Quezon that it is wholly unnecessary just now to fill the place.

What do you think of leaving it vacant for the time being?

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

124.11B/504

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1942.

Referring to your memorandum of July 23 in regard to the High Commissionership to the Philippines:

Having deemed it desirable to discuss this matter with the Secretary of the Interior, I find that Mr. Ickes and I are in agreement as follows:

If the post of High Commissioner is left vacant, various difficulties, some administrative and some political, are likely to arise.

However, under the circumstances, probably the most practical thing to do is to leave the post vacant for the time being. We would suggest that, to anyone who may make inquiry regarding the vacancy, including President Quezon himself, it be made clear that the matter of making an appointment is merely held in suspense and is not intended to effect a disappearance of the position.⁷¹

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 Pacific War/3025

*The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Quezon)
to President Roosevelt* ⁷²

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Although some time ago the White House announced that "insofar as notice of December 7 by the President is

⁷⁰ Mr. Sayre's resignation was dated March 23. It was accepted by President Roosevelt on June 30.

⁷¹ By Executive Order No. 9245, September 16, 1942, President Roosevelt transferred to the Secretary of the Interior the functions of United States High Commissioner to the Philippines.

⁷² Copy transmitted to the Department by President Roosevelt on December 7 for preparation of reply.

concerned, he feels that it should be observed as a day of silence in remembrance of a great infamy", I do not think that I am contravening your wishes by writing you this letter and by reminding you that on December 9, 1941 (which was December 8 in Washington) I sent you the following telegram :

[Here follows text of telegram printed on page 882.]

One year has passed. The Battle of the Philippines has confirmed the statement contained in that telegram. More than 20,000 Filipino soldiers gave their lives in the war against Japan. Many thousands more have been wounded or are missing, and no less than 60,000 are now suffering the moral and physical tortures of imprisonment. Recent radio broadcasts from Japanese transmitters show that the armed forces of Japan in the Philippines have been engaged in attacking Filipino fighters who refuse to surrender. These countrymen of mine remain active in the hills of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. They do not accept defeat, and they are determined to show Japan that the spirit of resistance has not been crushed. You understand, Mr. President, my grief over the invasion of my country and the occupation by the enemy with the consequent suffering that my people must bear every day.

But on this occasion, one year after the wholly unprovoked attack on the Philippines by the Japanese forces, I see that the United Nations have taken the offensive. The future looks brighter. And I hope that I am justified in feeling that the deliverance of my people will be not too long delayed.

I also want to say on this occasion that the Japanese attack on the Philippines was not an unmixed evil. It has sealed the friendship of Americans and Filipinos with blood. And it has thereby proved that our spiritual ties, forged through the last forty years cannot be broken. In our misfortune the Filipino people and I find further consolation in the evidences you have given—and with you, your Government and your people—that everything will be done by the United States to insure that the Philippines which will come out of this war will be a prosperous, happy and free Philippines.

With assurances of my devotion, I am

Very sincerely yours,

MANUEL L. QUEZON

740.0011 Pacific War/3025

*President Roosevelt to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth
(Quezon)*⁷³

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Your letter of December 5, 1942 is most gratifying. It is good to recall your inspiring telegram of December

⁷³ Draft transmitted to President Roosevelt by the Secretary of State on December 11; letter sent by President Roosevelt on December 12.

9, 1941. The assurance contained in that message has indeed been fulfilled—immeasurably so. I have never for a moment doubted that the courage, faith and determination of the Filipino people would carry them through their present period of adversity. The uncomplaining manner in which your people have endured the physical suffering and mental anguish resulting from acts of the enemy has been an inspiring example to the people of the United States.

I share with you, I scarcely need say, the grief you feel over the invasion of the Islands and the consequent suffering which your people are undergoing. That grief is widespread in this country and springs not alone from the several decades of friendship and understanding that have subsisted between the two peoples, but from the admiration which we feel for the unflinching stand which the Filipino people have taken in the ranks of all the freedom-loving peoples who are resolved to bring about the defeat of the unholy union of selfish nations bent on destroying democratic forms of government. Today we of the United Nations are striking at the enemy with ever stronger blows. The Japanese will be driven from the Philippines and the Filipino people will have their freedom restored and their independence established. The many thousands of Filipino soldiers who have given their lives for the cause of freedom and the many other thousands who have been wounded or are missing will not have made the sacrifice in vain.

With assurances of my highest esteem, I am

Very sincerely yours,

[FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT]