WARTIME COOPERATION AMONG THE UNITED STATES, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, CHINA, AND THE NETHERLANDS AFTER DECEMBER 7; DECISION OF THE SOVIET UNION TO REMAIN NEUTRAL IN THE PACIFIC WAR

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Atcheson) of a Conversation With the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Hayter)

[WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1941.

Mr. Hayter telephoned Mr. Atcheson at three o'clock this afternoon and stated that his Embassy had just received an urgent telegram from the British Foreign Office inquiring whether the United States was now in a state of war. The British Foreign Office desired this information in connection with the Prime Minister's¹ recent declaration indicating that Britain would declare war within one hour after the United States became at war. After referring this inquiry to the Secretary's office, Mr. Atcheson telephoned to Mr. Hayter and stated that the Secretary had been informed of the inquiry and was on his way to the President and that we would get a reply to the British Embassy as soon as possible after the Secretary's return.

Mr. Hayter stated that the information was urgently necessary so that the British could "get going".

Memorandum by Mr. Joseph E. Davies, of Washington²

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE HAD WITH AMBASSADOR LITVINOV³ UPON HIS ARRIVAL DECEMBER 7, 1941

When Ambassador and Mrs. Litvinov were lunching with me alone, word came of the Japanese attack. Litvinov asked me how I felt about it. I replied that it was a terrible thing, but it was providential. It assured unity in this country. It also assured a united battle front of the non-aggressor great nations. It was now "all for one and one for all."

¹Winston Churchill.
²Copy transmitted to the Under Secretary of State (Welles) in covering letter dated December 8 from Mr. Davies, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union. In a telephone conversation on the evening of December 8 Mr. Davies told Mr. Welles that the original was being sent to President Roosevelt that evening. Mr. Welles on December 9 forwarded the copy to the Secretary of State.
³Maxim M. Litvinov, newly arrived Soviet Ambassador in the United States.
I asked him how he felt about it. He said that had the United States come into the war earlier it would have undoubtedly thwarted Hitler. He was not so sure that it was advantageous now. I gathered that what was in the back of his mind was that this development would prevent the delivery of vital war materials to Britain and Russia.

I asked him if that was what he thought would be the reaction of his government. He said that he could not say. He had been out of touch with his government for three or four weeks. He intimated that his government had been handling Japan gingerly, under the non-aggression pact, to avoid war on two fronts.

Madame Litvinov expressed great concern over Moscow. In reply to my question she said that if Moscow fell it would have a bad effect on the morale of the Soviet people. I did not press the discussion further.

The matter of air bases in Siberia and Kamchatka and the question of Soviet bombing of Japan from Vladivostok is vital. Hitler will decide it. If by his direction the Jap forces in Manchukuo attack Russia the problem becomes academic.

If on the other hand, Japan may have been able to prevail upon Hitler not to require such a pincer movement against the Soviets because of the bombing danger, then the problem will be vital. The question of policy will then arise as to whether it is better to try to get the Soviets to attack and aid us or not. We might win the battle, but hazard the war.

If the Soviet should be defeated by an attack on two fronts; or if they should lose heart, it might affect the ultimate issue.

The Soviets, if attacked by Japan and Germany, might be in a desperate plight, or think that they were. Particularly is this true if the Germans cut the Murmansk rail line of supply. Shipments by way of the Persian Gulf in the Caspian sea are also dubious. The limited rail facilities are accentuated because of lack of harbor equipment on the south shore of the Caspian.

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740.0011 Pacific War/890: Telegram

_The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State_

Tokyo, December 8, 1941—1 a. m.

[Received December 10—8:58 a. m.]

1906. Department’s 818, December 6, 9 p. m.,4 was received and decoded late this evening5 and I was able to see the Foreign Min-

4 Not printed; it transmitted President Roosevelt’s message to the Emperor of Japan, printed in _Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941_, vol. II, p. 784.

5 December 7.
ister* immediately thereafter at 12:15 a. m., when I requested an audience with the Emperor at the earliest possible moment in order to communicate the President's message directly. The Minister said that he would present my request to the throne and would communicate with me thereafter. I read to him and left with him a copy of the message.

GREW

740.0011 Pacific War/741 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 8, 1941—4 a. m.
[Received December 7—10:40 p. m.]

5929. Personal to the Secretary for the President. It was great to talk to you. The Prime Minister is calling Parliament to meet at 3 o'clock this afternoon. Would it be best for him to ask for a declaration of war at that time or simply describe what had taken place and say that we would ask for a declaration of war within an hour after we had declared war which he has pledged to do?

I am thinking of the difference in time and that you might want to address the joint session prior to a British declaration of war.

The Prime Minister wanted you to know that he sent the following private and secret message to de Valera:*

"Now is your chance. Now or never! A nation once again! I am very ready to meet you at any time."

If you also would like to send de Valera a message you might want me to deliver it. We are old friends and I understand he gives me some credit for persuading the government here to abandon conscription in Northern Ireland.

I hope people at home will relate the tactic pursued and the action taken by Japan to German instigation and collaboration under the tripartite pact.

I am back at the Embassy.

WINANT

740.0011 P. W./741 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1941—8 a. m.

5743. From the President. Your 5929, December 7 [8], 4 p. m. [a. m.] "I think it best on account of psychology here that formal

* Shigenori Togo.
* Eamon de Valera, Irish Prime Minister.
British declaration of war be withheld until after my speech at 12:30 Washington time. I am asking for declaration. Any time after that would be wholly satisfactory.

Delighted to know of message to de Valera. Roosevelt.”

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Memorandum by Mr. Theodore C. Achilles of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] December 8, 1941.

The British Embassy states that a telegram was despatched by the Foreign Office at 5:00 p.m. London time to the British Ambassador at Tokyo instructing him to deliver the following note to the Japanese Foreign Office:

“On the evening of December 7 His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom learned that Japanese forces without previous warning either in the form of a declaration of war or in the form of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war had attempted a landing on the coast of Malaya and bombed Singapore and Hong Kong.

“In view of these wanton acts of unprovoked aggression committed in flagrant violation of international law and particularly of Article 1 of the Third Hague Convention relative to the opening of hostilities to which both Japan and the United Kingdom are parties, I have the honor to inform the Imperial Japanese Government in the name of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom that a state of war exists between the two countries.”

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The Netherland Minister (Loudon) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1941.

My Dear Mr. Welles: Late yesterday afternoon I had the pleasure to inform you orally during our conversation that the Netherlands Government would declare itself at war with Japan.

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For text of President Roosevelt’s message to Congress on December 8, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii., p. 709.

For the declaration of a state of war with Japan, see ibid., p. 705.

British Prime Minister Churchill made his statement to the House of Commons at 3 p.m., London time (10 a.m., Washington time), December 8; for text, see United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 376, p. 1258.

Sir Robert L. Craigie.

This has since been confirmed by a telephone message which I received last night at 8:30 p.m. from H. M.'s Government in London and which reads as follows:

"The Netherlands Minister at Tokio has been instructed to inform the Japanese Government that whereas Japan has opened hostilities against two powers with which the Netherlands entertains most friendly relations, the Netherlands Government therefore considers herself also at war with Japan."

Believe me [etc.]

A. Loudon

740.0011 P. W./891: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, December 8, 1941—1 p.m.  
[Received December 10—6:23 a.m.]

1910. Embassy's 1906, December 8, 1 a.m.
1. The Foreign Minister at 7 o'clock this morning asked me to call on him at his official residence.
2. He handed me a 13-page Memorandum, dated today, which he said had been transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to present to you this morning (evening of December 7th, Washington time). He said that he had already been in touch with the Emperor who desired that the aforesaid Memorandum be regarded as his reply to the President's message.
3. The Foreign Minister thereupon made to me the following oral statement:

"His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the President. He has graciously let known his wishes to the Foreign Minister to convey the following to the President as a reply to the latter's message:

Some days ago, the President made inquiries regarding the circumstances of the augmentation of Japanese forces in French Indochina to which His Majesty has directed the Government to reply. Withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indochina constitutes one of the subject matters of the Japanese-American negotiations. His Majesty has commanded the Government to state its views to the American Government also on this question. It is, therefore, desired that the President will kindly refer to this reply.

Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact."

Grew

* See memorandum of December 2, 1941, ibid., p. 778.
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1941—3 p.m.

5749. For the Former Naval Person 36 from the President.

"The Senate passed the all-out declaration of war 82 to nothing, and the House has passed it 388 to 1. Today all of us are in the same boat with you and the people of the Empire and it is a ship which will not and cannot be sunk."

Hull

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 8, 1941—4 p.m.
[Received December 8—10:55 a.m.]

5936. For the President. Your 5743, December 8, 8 a.m. Although we were waiting for your message and it was decoded and communicated by telephone by me at once, the House had already been called to order and the Prime Minister was speaking when it was handed to him. He felt he could not change his address at that time. The Foreign Office had already acted. I am terribly sorry. I am cabling separately text of his address.

Winant

The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State

BATAVIA, December 8, 1941—5 p.m.
[Received December 8—4:52 p.m.]

225. At 6:30 this morning the Governor General in a broadcast to the Netherlands Indies referred to Japan’s attack on British and American territory even while negotiations were still going on in Washington, mentioned Japan’s aim to dominate this part of the world and then said, “The Netherlands Indies Government accepts this challenge and takes up arms against the Japanese Empire.”

All Japanese were rounded up and taken into custody within one hour after the official announcement that this country was at war with Japan.

All classes of the population are calm and there are no signs of fear or panic.

Foote

36 Code name for Winston Churchill.
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

CHENGKING, December 8, 1941—6 p.m.  
[Received December 9—3:15 a.m.]

481. Chiang Kai-shek 18 summoned me this afternoon with Soviet Ambassador. 19 Foreign Minister 20 also present. British Ambassador 21 absent in Chengtu will be informed later. 22

Chiang made following statement and later asked that it be sent as from him to the President:

1. Despite sincere efforts by United States in recent conversations with Japan to settle by peaceful means various questions bearing on the Pacific, Japan has suddenly launched attack on United States and Britain. This latest act of international brigandage by Japan has even taken us by surprise. Fact that attack was made while Japan envoys were continuing talks in Washington shows plan of aggression premeditated.

2. Chinese Government now holds itself in full readiness to collaborate regardless of all further sacrifices in any concerted military plan which United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Holland and Soviet Russia may adopt against Japan and her Axis partners.

3. Chinese Government has decided to declare war against Japan as well as her partners, Germany and Italy.

4. In order make possible full concerted action, Chinese Government deems it imperative that every member of anti-aggression block should consider as common enemy every member of Axis group. We therefore suggest simultaneous declaration of war by United States against Germany and Italy and by Soviet Russia against Japan should be made.

5. For effective and successful prosecution of war, Chinese Government considers essential conclusion of a military alliance between Soviet, United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Holland and China with the unified command of allied moves under American leadership.

6. Chinese Government proposes an agreement be concluded between countries above-mentioned not to sign any separate peace.

GAUSS

18 President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Premier).
19 Alexander S. Pan'yushkin.
20 Quo Tai-chi.
21 Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr.
22 On December 9 Gen. John A. Magruder, head of American Military Mission to China, reported another meeting with Generalissimo Chiang, when the British Ambassador also was present, to discuss the situation and military plans.
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) 23

[WASHINGTON,] December 9, 1941.

Reference: Chungking's telegram no. 481, December 8, 1941, 6 p.m. From point of view of theory, these suggestions are eminently sound.

From point of view of practice, the suggestion made in paragraph five is probably impossible of serious consideration.

The suggestion made in paragraph six should in my opinion be given serious consideration immediately.

The suggestion made in paragraph four should likewise be given as to its purport serious consideration immediately.

S[TANLEY] K. H[ORNBECK]

The Australian Minister (Casey) to the Secretary of State

No. 266/41

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1941.

SIR: I have the honour to inform you that I have been advised by my Government that the Australian Chargé d’Affaires at Tokyo has been instructed to inform the Imperial Japanese Government that a state of war exists and has existed between His Majesty’s Government in the Commonwealth of Australia and the Imperial Japanese Government as from 5 o’clock in the afternoon of the 8th December, 1941.

I have [etc.]

R. G. CASEY

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] December 9, 1941.

Dr. T. V. Soong 24 called to see me this afternoon.

Dr. Soong asked if I would transmit to the President the following message from General Chiang Kai-Shek. The latter wished the President to know that China was prepared to declare war immediately upon Japan, Germany and Italy. The Generalissimo, however, said at the same time that this message was sent to Dr. Soong a message was sent urging the Russian Government to declare war upon Japan.

23 Noted by the Secretary of State.
24 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s personal representative in the United States.
simultaneously with the declaration of war by China. Chiang had informed Stalin 26 that, if Russia and China were both to declare war now upon Japan, Russia could do great damage at this critical moment to Japanese bases and communications. He was awaiting the reply from the Russian Government.

He wished the President further to know as an interesting sidelight that the Russian Military Attaché in Chungking had called yesterday upon the Generalissimo and had intimated that Russia would withhold for the time being a declaration of war upon Japan for fear that if Russia were now to declare war the United States would not be willing to concentrate its full war effort upon Japan and thus hold Japan in check while Russia was continuing its fight in the western front.

The Generalissimo therefore wished to know whether the President had any information regarding the Russian attitude and whether the President believed that the Chinese Government should withhold a declaration of war upon the Axis powers until the Russian attitude was clarified or whether it should go ahead immediately.

I told Dr. Soong that I would transmit this message to the President as soon as possible and inform him of any views which the President might wish to express.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 Pacific War/1302

Mr. Owen Lattimore 26 to Mr. Louchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt 27

CHUNGKING, December 9, 1941.

CURRIE: Generalissimo today telegraphed T. V. Soong, Hu Shih 28 [to] consult President and Soviet Ambassador urging prompt simultaneous Soviet-Chinese declaration [of] war on Japan following American declaration. Coordinated Chinese-Soviet land action essential because only Soviet can attack both by sea and air and thus [this?] (is) key to joint land, sea, air war by all democracies whereas if Soviet hesitates Japan can fight democracies piecemeal. Even without Soviet, China unhesitatingly prepared [to] follow American declaration, but if China declared war without waiting for Soviet afraid Soviet may delay longer. Foregoing message additional to formal diplomatic proposals [for] simultaneous American-Chinese declarations [of] war on Germany, Italy, and Soviet declaration on Japan, because Generalissimo anxious [to] use every approach to

26 Josif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Commissars (Premier) of the Soviet Union.
27 American Political Adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
28 Copy of telegram received in the Department December 13.
29 Chinese Ambassador in the United States.
Soviet, including Washington, in order [to] insure undelayed Soviet participation. Soviet Military Attaché hinted that [if] Soviet fights Japan America might not concentrate main effort in Pacific. Clear indication that American[s] will give priority to Pacific over Atlantic until Japan settled would undoubtedly bring Soviet in.

740.0011 Pacific War/1016c: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1941—6 p. m.

291. Please deliver to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek the following message from the President:

"Japan first treacherously attacked and then declared war upon the United States. The Congress has declared the existence of a state of war between the United States and Japan.

In the valiant struggle of resistance which China has carried on for four and a half years against the invading forces of a predatory neighbor, China has been made aware of this country’s sympathy in principle and in practice. China is now being joined in her resistance to aggression by a host of other nations that have been menaced by Japan and the movement of conquest in which Japan is a major participant.

The struggle cannot be easily or quickly brought to a successful end. It will demand of all who are entering it, as it has demanded and will demand of you and your courageous people, concentrated effort and intensive devotion to the common cause of vanquishing the enemy and thereafter establishing a just peace. I take pride in my country’s association with you and the great nation which you lead. I am wholly confident that the struggle in which we are engaged in common with other gallant nations will forge stronger the bonds of traditional friendships and will result inevitably in complete elimination of the lawless forces against which your effort, our effort, and the efforts of our associates are now individually and collectively directed."

Sent to Chungking.

Hull

740.0011 P. W./817: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, [December 9, 1941(?)]

[Received December 10—2:35 a. m.]

The following note was received yesterday:

"Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, December 8, 1941. Excellency, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that there has

29 In submitting the draft of this message to President Roosevelt on December 9, the Secretary of State wrote: "It is our opinion that you can send the attached to the Generalissimo and we suggest your doing so. You remember that Mr. Churchill did something similar yesterday and with some effect." President Roosevelt wrote in a notation: "O. K., F. D. R."
arisen a state of war between Your Excellency's country and Japan beginning today. I avail, et cetera. (Signed) Shigenori Togo, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

Grew

740.0011 Pacific War/1392

*Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to Dr. T. V. Soong* ²⁰

Please convey to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy my utmost indignation at the dastardly Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and my deepest sympathy for the losses sustained by the armed forces of the United States.

In the Far Eastern zone of hostilities I have already given orders for immediate operations to relieve Hongkong. We have also decided upon an attack on the Japanese in Indo-China, which will be launched as soon as a joint Far Eastern plan of campaign has been definitely agreed upon.

I summoned the British and American military attachés last night and conveyed to them China's unalterable decision to do its utmost and share the fortunes of the war with the two countries unflinchingly.

What is urgently needed now is the immediate creation of an Inter-Allied War Council, under the leadership of the United States, which should begin to function at once. Otherwise all our countries are in danger of being beaten in detail.

**Chungking, December 9, 1941.**

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740.0011 Pacific War/1086

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 10, 1941.

Reference, Mr. Welles' memorandum of conversation with Dr. T. V. Soong December 9.

Mr. Welles called me in last evening and, in my presence, telephoned to Dr. Soong.

My understanding of what Mr. Welles said to Dr. Soong was that he, Mr. Welles, had spoken with the President; that the President did not take at face value the views expressed by the Russian Military Attaché in Chungking to Chiang Kai-shek, as recorded; and that the President felt that the Chinese Government should go ahead with a declaration of war (upon the Axis powers).

S[TANLEY] K. H[ORNBECK]

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²⁰ Copies of telegram transmitted on December 11 by Dr. T. V. Soong to the Secretary of War (Stimson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Knox); copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Secretary of War, December 11.
740.0011 Pacific War/815: Telegraph

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1941—6 p.m.

293. Your 481, December 8, 6 p.m. Please inform Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as from the President that the President deeply appreciates the attitude of the Generalissimo and of the Chinese Government as expressed by General Chiang to you on December 8. State also that the suggestions made by General Chiang at that time are receiving prompt attention and careful study.  

Hull

740.0011 Pacific War/891: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1941.

824. Department received today your telegrams 1906 and 1910 of December 8, together with your undated telegram which contained Foreign Office note in regard to existence of state of war between the United States and Japan.

We hope that all goes well with you and your staff and other Americans in Japan. Department has notified families of Embassy staff that you are all safe and well.

Hull

740.0011 Pacific War/1291

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] December 10, 1941.

The Chinese Ambassador called this evening to see me at his request.

The Ambassador left with me the texts of his Government's declarations of war upon Japan and upon Germany and Italy. These are attached herewith.  

The Ambassador also left with me a personal message addressed by the Generalissimo to the President.  

I told the Ambassador I would transmit this at once to the President, who I knew would be very deeply moved by this message. A copy of this message is likewise attached herewith.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

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21 In his telegram No. 492, December 13, 6 p.m., Ambassador Gauss reported to the Department that "Generalissimo has been informed". (740.0011 Pacific War/1045)

22 Dated December 9; for texts, see Department of State Bulletin, December 13, 1941, p. 506.

23 See ibid., p. 508.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1941.

The Ambassador of Soviet Russia called at my request. He stated that earlier today he had conferred with Harry Hopkins in regard to our policy of carrying out fully our Lease-Lend allocations to Russia for war purposes. He then said that he came in contact with the President during this visit to Hopkins and that they talked over the situation in regard to cooperation between the United States and Russia and other countries opposing Germany, Japan and Italy in the world war. Without going into detail concerning the conversation between himself and the President, he proceeded to say that he had received the final decision of his Government today and that it was not in a position to cooperate with us at present in the Japanese Far Eastern area; that his Government is fighting on a huge scale against Germany and that to take part with us in the Far East would mean a prompt attack by Japan, which would result in serious fighting on two fronts by Russia. In those circumstances his Government felt that it should obtain better and more secure control of the situation over Germany in Europe and the west. This was the substance of his contention, which was rather positively stated.

I replied that, of course, if his Government has its mind made up about the matter, there is not much more to be said at this time. I stated that during last January information that I considered absolutely reliable came to me to the effect that Hitler would attack Russia sometime around May of this year. I had requested Mr. Welles to convey that fact to the Soviet Government—a fact, however, that they did not accredit at the time. I added that I now have information I deem equally reliable to the effect that Japan, notwithstanding the terms of the Russo-Japanese neutrality agreement, is now under the strictest commitment to Germany to attack Russia and any other country fighting against Germany, whenever Hitler demands that Japan do so, and that this arrangement contemplated that Japan would first attack the United States and Germany and Italy would join, and that at a given time later—at any time demanded by Germany, in fact—Japan would carry out this agreement to attack Russia.


[Note: This memorandum is signed by the Secretary of State, who is a member of the Mainichi School, a Buddhist educational institution.]

[End of memorandum.]
The Ambassador seemed very much interested in this but still did not seriously attempt to discuss it, although indicating that he did not doubt the truth of it. I said that, of course, this is a world movement in its practical effects and that these international desperadoes, operating together in all mutually desirable respects, will not cease their movements of conquest voluntarily; that somebody must stop them; that they will not be stopped by merely slowing down one phase of this world movement and world combination of invaders; that, therefore, if this world movement and method of resisting and suppressing it is to be dealt with effectively, it must be considered as a whole and the fact must be realized that the movement of resistance must be carried on in each part of the world at the same time. He did not disagree with this.

I then said that if this Government could get two air bases, one on the Kamchatka Peninsula and one around Vladivostok, our heavy bombers could get over Japanese home naval bases and the home fleet, as well as over the cities. The Ambassador did not argue the former but suggested that bombing of cities did not necessarily settle the matter in view of experiences in Moscow, London and other cities.

I emphasized the extreme importance right now and each day hereafter of obtaining these two bases for the purpose of permitting our aircraft to operate over all portions of Japan from the air. I said that we could scarcely do so without them, and that, therefore, it is a matter of very great importance to the present resistance to Japan by us—that, in fact, there is no substitute for effective attacks just now when compared with the injury that we could and would inflict from the air.

The Ambassador then inquired whether Singapore could defend itself successfully in the present circumstances, to which I replied that forces from all of the other countries, from Australia across to Singapore and to the Philippines were unifying themselves and coming to the aid of Singapore and that probably they would be able to hold out successfully. The Ambassador inquired if they had a unified command over there, to which I replied that there was the fullest confidence among staff officers and others in each of the countries interested, which was the next thing to unified command but, of course, is not that in some respects.

I again brought up quite a number of circumstances and conditions illustrating the world nature of this movement of conquest and the extreme dangers of more and more cooperation between Japan and Germany, such as the possibility of the Japanese fleet going across the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf oil fields, to the mouth of the Canal, to the Cape of Good Hope, and, if Germany should be successful in her contemplated African invasion, Japan on the sea would meet her on the African Coast, extending up towards French Africa,
and that the effect of this on the whole British European situation would be terrific, with the result that Hitler and Japan would have a new lease on life, the effects of which would be terrible on all of us, including Russia. The Ambassador nodded his head and spoke in the affirmative but did not discuss these views.

Throughout the conversation I constantly came back to the point that if Russia should refrain from cooperation with us in the East while we continue to aid her, there will be a constant flow of criticism about why we are aiding Russia in a world movement involving all alike and Russia in turn is not cooperating with us in the Far East. I said I issued a statement today \(^\text{37}\) in an effort to allay some of this very kind of rising criticism and that it will become an increasingly serious matter for both governments.

After bringing this up several times, the Ambassador always agreeing, I finally remarked that it is highly important for some kind of formula to be worked out in regard to what each government is doing and should do and that at present I am unable to formulate a statement on this subject, which is a most difficult thing to do.

The Ambassador inquired if I had any suggestions or propositions to offer on this or in a general way. I replied that since he informed me that the President and he have gone over these phases I need not go into them now. I then added that, having just arrived here on Sunday, there has been no time before today for him to get settled and find out something about the general situation from his Government preliminary to a conversation between us touching such matters as cooperation in the war against the Tripartite group, and since his Government has made up its mind on the governing question, there is not much, as far as I can see, for me to take up with him just now. I then invited him to keep this question of cooperation in the East, as well as in the West, especially in mind and lend his cooperation to improve the situation in these respects because it will call for every possible attention as we go along hereafter.

C[ordell] H[ull]

740.0011 Pacific War/1663

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State* \(^\text{38}\)

[WASHINGTON,] December 12, 1941.

Mr. Secretary: We feel that the best and most feasible means of improving the general military situation in the Pacific area would be to take immediately steps along lines as follows:

\(^\text{37}\) Department of State Bulletin, December 13, 1941, p. 508.

\(^\text{38}\) Concluded in by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck).
1. To set up at Chungking a joint strategic board of American, British, Dutch and Chinese representatives, with an American as the presiding officer of the Strategic Board. This would follow out Chiang Kai-shek's suggestion.

2. To endeavor to persuade the Chinese Government to move forward immediately on a general "hit and run" offensive, the objective of which would be to cause the Japanese to mobilize in China large Japanese forces.

3. To conclude immediately with the Chinese, the Dutch, the British, and other governments which have declared war on Japan, an agreement of mutual assistance and cooperation in the war against Japan, and an agreement that no one of the governments concerned would make a separate peace with Japan. (For political reasons this latter proposal might have to be qualified in some respects.)

4. To enter into a similar agreement with various countries, including Russia, relating to the war against Germany and Italy.

5. To incorporate the American volunteer air corps now in Burma into the United States armed forces, subject to Chinese assent, and to have this air corps operate with the Chinese armed forces.

It is believed that the best chance of causing the Chinese to engage in a general offensive would be for the American Government immediately to take steps which would formally recognize China as a full-fledged associate and which would "give face" to the Chinese. With that end in view, Chungking has been suggested as the seat of the Strategic Board. As additional steps to further that objective, it is suggested that a political-strategic mission be sent from the United States immediately to Chungking, and that this Government ask the British, Dutch, Australian, and Canadian Governments to send similar missions. Other countries might also be represented.

We suggest that such a political-strategic mission be headed by an outstanding personage such as Mr. Willkie \(^{30}\) or Mr. McNutt.\(^{40}\) We suggest that the military member of the mission, who would be chairman of the Strategic Board, might be Major-General Joseph Stillwell \(^{41}\) (who might be made a Lieutenant-General or a full General for this purpose), who has had long experience in China. We suggest as a possible additional member of the Board Admiral Yarnell.\(^{42}\)

It is believed that if China would move forward on a general offensive which would contain in China Japanese armed forces now there, there would result a situation much more favorable to influencing the Soviet Union to participating in hostilities against Japan.

M[AXWELL] M. H[AMILTON]

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\(^{30}\) Wendell L. Willkie, Republican nominee for President in 1940.

\(^{40}\) Paul V. McNutt, Federal Security Administrator.

\(^{41}\) Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell had served as Military Attaché in China.

\(^{42}\) Adm. Harry E. Yarnell had served as Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.
Dr. T. V. Soong to the Under Secretary of State (Welles) 43

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1941.

DEAR MR. WELLES: In connection with our conversations last Tuesday,44 I am in receipt of a cable from General Chiang Kai-shek dated Chungking, December 10th, and reporting among other things, "the Chief Soviet Military Advisor expresses his personal opinion when I saw him again today that the Soviet declaration of war against Japan is merely a matter of time and of procedure. The Soviet, he indicates, will make an open declaration of war only after a general coordinated war plan has been arranged between the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet. This differs considerably with the attitude of scepticism and disappointment that he assumed two days ago. I cannot fathom whether the change in his attitude is due to new instructions received from his Government for communication to me."

Hoping that the above may be of interest,

Yours sincerely,

TSE VONG SOONG

43 Copy forwarded on December 12 by Mr. Welles to President Roosevelt.

44 December 9.

45 Viscount Halifax.

46 December 11.
this involves the question of discussing with Russia from time to
time the matter of her entrance into the war against Japan in the Far East.
I elaborated somewhat on these phases, as I had detailed them to the
Soviet Ambassador on Thursday. After discussing the questions
from all angles, it was agreed that after the preliminary meetings,
previously mentioned, to be held during this evening and tomorrow
morning, I might call him in for a discussion of what had happened
in each conference for the purpose of a preliminary recommendation
to the President. The Ambassador was very pleased with the whole
idea and said he would give it his attention and cooperate and collab-
orate fully with this Government.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 P.W./1244a

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
(Stalin) to the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan
(Chiang) 47

Your telegram only reached me yesterday. I am deeply appreci-
ative of your kind consideration. I am in perfect agreement with you
that the long heroic struggle China has put up against Japan, and
the present anti-Japanese front in the Pacific are part and parcel of
the general anti-Axis front. At the same time the anti-German front
assumes special significance in the anti-Axis front, because Germany
is the strongest partner of the Axis.

Soviet Russia today has the principal burden of the war against
Germany. And Soviet Russian victory over Germany constitutes a
great hope of the other members of the anti-Axis front, Great Britain,
the United States and China. It is my opinion that under the circum-
stances the Soviet today ought not to divert its strength to the Far
East, when it is beginning to attack the German armies, for by dis-
persing our strength the difficulties of the German armies will be
lessened. I beg you therefore not to insist that Soviet Russia at once
declare war against Japan.

Soviet Russia must fight Japan, for Japan will surely uncondition-
ally break the Neutrality Pact. We are preparing to meet that situ-
ation, but it takes time to prepare. Therefore I again implore you
not to take the lead in demanding that Soviet Russia at once declare
war against Japan.

[Moscow, December 12, 1941.]

47 Translation received in the Department of State from Dr. T. V. Soong,
apparently on December 16. Forwarded on December 17 by the Under Secretary
of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt, Mr. Welles having first read the message
to President Roosevelt on the telephone.
Memorandum by the Minister to Switzerland (Harrison),
Temporarily in the United States

[WASHINGTON,] December 13, 1941.

Upon the receipt of a confidential report to the effect that Ambassador Nomura 48 and the Naval Attaché of the Japanese Embassy 49 would commit hari kari and that this would be played up by Tokyo as murders, I called by direction upon the Swiss Minister 50 shortly after noon today and inquired whether he had as yet received instructions from his government to assume the protection of Japanese interests in this country. Mr. Bruggmann replied that while he had been instructed to assume the protection of Japanese interests in the Philippines and Samoa, he had as yet no instructions with regard to the continental United States. The Minister also stated that he had not as yet received word from his government of the consent of the Japanese Government to the protection of American interests by Switzerland in Japan although the Japanese radio had announced that the Japanese Government had given their consent.

The Minister indicated that although he had not received instructions to assume the protection of Japanese interests here he was quite prepared to handle any matters informally.

I then informed the Minister on behalf of Mr. Long 51 that the Department had received a report to the effect that Ambassador Nomura and the Japanese Naval Attaché intended to commit hari kari and that this would be called murder by Tokyo which might result in attacks on the American diplomatic personnel and in that event lead to unforetellable incidents. Mr. Long had asked me to tell the Minister that if he felt like doing so we would be very glad if he would call on Ambassador Nomura, inform him of this report and advise us of the result of his conversation.

Mr. Bruggmann stated that he would be happy to carry out Mr. Long's request and that he would report the results of his visit to the Japanese Ambassador as promptly as possible.

About four o'clock Mr. Bruggmann called upon Mr. Long and said that he had gone to the Japanese Embassy where he had been received by the Minister. 52 After a brief discussion about the protection of Japanese interests, regarding which the Minister was no better informed, Mr. Bruggmann asked if he might see Ambassador Nomura. The Ambassador then appeared and when it seemed that the Minister

48 Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura.
49 Capt. Ichiro Yokoyama.
50 Charles Bruggmann.
51 Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State.
52 Kaname Wakesugi.
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proposed to remain Mr. Bruggmann asked if he might see the Ambassador alone. The Minister then left.

Mr. Bruggmann explained to Mr. Long that he had had some difficulty in understanding the Japanese Ambassador as, perhaps for reasons of language, it was difficult to know whether he spoke in the past, present or future tense. However, after he had informed the Ambassador of the report which had reached the State Department, Mr. Nomura had made reply by explaining that he had done his best in an endeavor to maintain friendly relations between the United States and Japan and that his conscience was clear on this point but that, of course, the decision rested with the god Heroun (?).

Mr. Bruggmann then had endeavored to clear up this somewhat cryptic and possibly evasive reply. In reply the Ambassador had referred to the fact that in the last war the Japanese Minister to Russia and the Russian Minister to Japan had each returned to his own country.

Mr. Bruggmann had appealed to the humanitarian instincts of the Ambassador but had not been able to obtain any definite assurance from him that he would not commit hari kari. However, Mr. Bruggmann had received a somewhat quieting impression of his conversation and, after explaining the hesitation he had felt in presenting the matter to the Ambassador and his hope that he had done so with every appropriate discretion, Mr. Nomura had smiled and their parting had been friendly.

L[ELAND] H[ARRISON]

740.0011 Pacific War/1198

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 13, 1941.

The Chinese Ambassador called at his request. Having an idea about the matter he wished to discuss, I proceeded first to say that on yesterday I took up very earnestly with the President and Secretary Stimson the entire problem of unifying and coordinating into joint action, as fully as might be practicable, the forces of all of the opposition to Japan and her allies in the Far East, with special reference to the South Sea area. I said that every attention is now being given to that problem, which is complex and difficult in certain respects. I added that, of course, the situation in the whole South Sea area is dangerous and calls for treatment as an emergency to the fullest extent possible by each of our countries interested in defending our interests.

The Ambassador thanked me and stated that this was one of the questions about which he had come to inquire. I said that this
problem is now under earnest consideration and is receiving every attention.

I then stated that from the long-view standpoint, conference and collaboration are all-important at the earliest possible date with regard to joint action, et cetera, et cetera, and that we are giving this attention and shall be glad with respect to each phase to collaborate with the Government of China as we shall with respect to all other related questions of a like nature. These problems have special reference to the recent communication from the Generalissimo to the President and to General Magruder’s communication, received yesterday, commenting on and interpreting the former report.

I then referred to some of the main points contained in my recent talk with the Russian Ambassador on Thursday, which need not be repeated here. The Ambassador had no comment in a new or constructive way to make on this subject and no new or important information or suggestions to offer. He said he had not heard very recently from his Government on the Russian-Japanese situation.

He seemed very much pleased with what I said and with the assurances that we were giving attention to each important phase of the Generalissimo’s recent despatch. I said that we would be more than glad to work with his Government in every possible way in connection with the foregoing questions and problems, and that we did hope to see developed at the earliest date the best possible solution for both the temporary and immediate emergency and the long-view problems and conditions.

C[ordell] H[ull]

740.0011 Pacific War/1071a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston), at Kuibyshev

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1941—3 p. m.

1284. 1. The Military Attaché in London has informed us that he has learned from an excellent source that Sikorski 54 while in the Soviet Union has informed Stalin that he is of the opinion that the Soviet Union should not enter the war with Japan and that he does not believe that the Japanese unless forced so to do will attack the Soviet Union. The Military Attaché also reports that he has learned that Sir Stafford Cripps 55 agrees in this matter with Sikorski.

2. Any information which you may be able discreetly to obtain which might tend to confirm or refute this information would be helpful.

54 Latter not printed; see footnote 22, p. 736.
55 Gen. Władysław Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister.
56 British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
3. [Here follows report of conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, recorded in memorandum by the Secretary of State December 11, printed on page 742.]

Hull

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1941.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sending a draft which may assist you in framing a message to Chiang Kai-shek for such conference in Chungking as you suggested this morning.

Since leaving you I find that there is here already a military mission from Great Britain duly authorized to confer on just such matters as you are suggesting; also that there are fully qualified representatives of Australia, the Dutch East Indies, and China, who could confer with us here on just such matters as you suggested for Singapore. I suggest that such a preliminary conference might be held here instead of at Singapore.

So far as the Moscow conference is concerned, I do not feel that I am in possession of sufficient acquaintance with the addressee or familiarity with what you propose to discuss with him to make any attempt at such a draft by me of very much use to you.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

740.0011 Pacific War/1519

President Roosevelt to the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Chiang)

From the President to the Generalissimo: In my judgment it is of the highest importance that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for our common action against our common enemy. To this end I respectfully suggest that you call a joint military conference to take place in Chungking not later than December seventeenth to exchange information and to consider the military and naval action particularly in Eastern Asia which may most effectively be employed to accomplish the defeat of Japan and her allies.

I suggest that the conferees consist of representatives of China, Great Britain, the Dutch, United States and the U. S. S. R., and I am prepared to designate at once Major General George H. Brett as

58 Photostatic copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.
57 For text as sent, see infra.
59 Notation on original by President Roosevelt: "Sent via Army December 14, 4:30 p. m." Copy transmitted on same date to the Secretary of State.
60 Chief of the Air Corps, U. S. A.
representative of the United States assisted by Brigadier General John Magruder.

It is my thought that this conference arrive at a concrete preliminary plan and that this plan be communicated in the greatest confidence to me by Saturday, December twentieth.

It should also be communicated by the Russian, British and Dutch representatives in the utmost secrecy to their respective Governments.

While your preliminary conference is meeting in Chungking, I am asking the British to hold a military and naval conference in Singapore to include Chinese, American and Dutch officers and report operational plans as they see the situation in the Southern zone.

I am also asking Mr. Stalin to talk with Chinese, American and British representatives in Moscow and let me have his views from the Northern viewpoint.

These estimates and recommendations will give all of us equally a good picture of our joint problem.

I venture to hope that these preliminary conferences especially that in Chungking may lead to the establishment of a permanent organization to plan and direct our joint efforts.

I am working hard on continuing our contribution to your supplies and am trying to increase it.

I send you my very warm personal regards.

ROOSEVELT

President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union (Stalin)

From the President to Mr. Stalin: In my judgment it is of the utmost importance that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for common action not merely for the next few weeks but also for the permanent defeat of hitlerism. I very much wish that you and I could meet to talk this over personally. But because that is impossible at the moment I am seeking to initiate three preliminary moves which I hope will be preparatory to a more permanent joint planning.

First, I am suggesting to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that he call a conference immediately in Chungking consisting of Chinese, Soviet, British, Dutch and American representatives. This group would meet not later than December seventeenth and report to their respective Governments in the greatest confidence by Saturday, December twentieth. This would give us the preliminary picture of the joint problem from the angle of Chungking.

See infra.

Notation on original by President Roosevelt: “Given to Litvinov December 14, 4:30 p.m.” Copy transmitted on same date to the Secretary of State.

See supra.
Second, I am asking the British to assemble a military-naval conference in Singapore, reporting by Saturday the twentieth principally from the operational angle in the Southern zone.

Third, I would be very happy if you personally would talk with American, British and Chinese representatives in Moscow and let me have your suggestions as to the whole picture by Saturday the twentieth.

Fourth, I am during this coming week covering the same ground with British Missions here and will send you the general picture from this end.

I have had a good talk with Litvinov and I fully appreciate all of your immediate problems.

Again I want to tell you of the real enthusiasm throughout the United States for the progress your armies are making in the defense of your great nation.

I venture to hope that the preliminary conferences I have outlined for this coming week may lead to the establishment of a more permanent organization to plan our efforts.

Hopkins and I send our warm personal regards.

ROOSEVELT

740.0011 Pacific War/1519

*President Roosevelt to the British Ambassador (Halifax)*

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1941.

My Dear Halifax: Here is a message to General Chiang Kai-Shek and a similar message from me to Mr. Stalin. They are self-explanatory.

I hope you will ask London if they will go ahead with the holding of the Singapore conference and also instruct your people in Chungking and Moscow to take part in the proposed meetings as soon as they are held by Chiang Kai-Shek and Stalin. I assume, of course, that Australia and New Zealand will be represented in Singapore.

Always sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.0011 Pacific War/1058: Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State*

CHUNGKING, December 14, 1941—1 p. m.

[Received December 15—3:15 a.m.]

494. Official and press reaction and attitude here toward events of the past week have followed three principal lines (1, elation at our

*Ante, p. 751.

*Supra.*
entrance into war with Japan based upon expectation of our early victory despite reports of initial reverses; 2, insistence upon formalized ABCD common front and joint plan of action; and 3, an inordinate and unreasoned demand that Russia at once enter the war against Japan). There is evidence of an unfortunate tendency toward complacency as to the need for further Chinese military effort but the more liberal press is now suggesting early operations against the reduced Japanese forces in China.

Magruder has shown me his recent telegrams to the War Department reporting his conversations with Chiang on military matters. I assume contents of those messages have been made known to the Department.

I believe Chiang may be unintentionally misleading in his statements on the part that China may be counted upon to play in the struggle. His plans seem to me to have a touch of unreality derived from a somewhat grandiose or "ivory tower" conception of his and China's role. I do not believe that his military advisers entirely share his enthusiasm for all-out cooperative action. His proposal for a general headquarters in Chungking to plan and direct Far Eastern strategy is manifestly impracticable in the face of the actual situation but it would seem desirable to meet him to the extent of establishing some sort of joint military council at Chungking to exchange information and plans (carefully safeguarding vital plans, however) and tactfully to encourage and direct Chinese military operations against the Japanese in China.

The Chinese Army does not possess the aggressive spirit, training, equipment or supplies for any major military offensive or expedition, but it can, I believe, be used effectively to harass the Japanese forces throughout the country, attacking lines of communication and supply, isolating smaller units and in some measure in covering Chinese territory. Recovery of territory would have a beneficial effect upon Chinese morale and upon the economic situation.

Our problems in China it seems to me are (1) to keep the Chinese forces active against the Japanese in China, (2) to bolster and sustain Chinese morale and (3) to assist in arresting the trend toward economic chaos.

Point 1 should be the responsibility of the suggested Military Council. As to point 2, I suggested the urgent need of an information service with qualified personnel here to handle and disseminate it. As to point 3, it may become necessary for us to give financial aid in some form to support the Government credit and to encourage small-scale production of consumer goods.
Mr. Lauchlin Currie to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1941.

Re: Joint Defense of Burma.

In answer to my inquiry re. plans for joint defense of Burma, General Magruder replied on December 14 that joint plans were being prepared and that a Chinese regiment was en route by foot. He stated that due to the difficulties of terrain and the other operations of the Japanese it was not believed that there would be any ground movements or attacks on Burma.

On December 16 he stated that “The Generalissimo has been very vehement in his criticism of the British, owing to the fact that no joint plan has been brought out for the defense of Burma. He has condemned the apparent haphazard methods that are being used, also the fact that all reinforcements have been piecemeal. He pointed out that while the British are hesitating it is possible that Burma might be lost.”

A Military Intelligence Report from London stated that the Japanese had arrived at the Burmese border on Dec. 15th, on the route which I earlier indicated as the most likely one.

A cable received from Magruder today states that the British are now seriously concerned over Burma and have asked the Chinese for more troops. Chiang Kai-shek stated he would supply one corps.

There appears to be no way either here or there of securing the full measure of ABC coordination which our interests in that area so clearly demand. I have discussed with our Army people informally the possibility of our taking over a larger measure of responsibility for air operations in China, Burma and Singapore, under the command of a topflight air officer. I feel so strongly that our vital interests are being jeopardized by British ineptitude and weakness in that area.

Lauchlin Currie

740.0011 Pacific War/1280: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

Kuibyshev, December 17, 1941—noon.
[Received December 18—11:14 a.m.]

2070. Department’s 1284, December 13, 3 p.m.

1. It is not unlikely that Sikorski expressed sentiments similar to those reported from London during his visit to the Soviet Union (as

*Photostatic copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.)
it is probable that from the Polish viewpoint it is preferable that the Soviet war effort against Germany should not be diminished by additional activities in the East), but as he had returned to Moscow prior to the Japanese attack on us he presumably did not address his remarks to Stalin.

2. The British Ambassador called on me the day of the Japanese attack. In discussing the probable attitude of the Soviet Government he expressed the opinion that it might well be that of neutrality. His statements in this respect did not at the time convey to me the impression that he advocated such a policy. The Chinese Ambassador, however, with whom I carefully explored this subject last evening, stated explicitly that Cripps seemed to favor Soviet abstention from war with Japan. Upon Cripps' return from Moscow I shall endeavor definitely to ascertain his attitude in this respect.

3. The Chinese Ambassador has informed me that insofar as he is aware Stalin has not replied to Chiang Kai-shek's note of December 8 (a copy of which he understands was handed to Ambassador Gauss). He believes however from the general attitude of the Soviet officials with whom he has conversed that the Soviet Government will not be disposed to engage in hostilities with Japan at this time if they can be avoided.

4. With respect to Litvinov's exposition to the Secretary of the decisions arrived at by his Government I may say that, as the Department is aware, Soviet foreign policy is superlatively realistic. It may be taken for granted therefore that until the Soviet Government can be convinced of the advantages of entering the war against Japan no other considerations (such as the general wisdom of such action or the help that would thereby be rendered us and the British) will affect its decision. In this connection, it has been reported to me by persons having some association with Soviet citizens, and the same opinion was expressed to me last night by a Soviet official who may be presumed to know the present "party line", that the Soviet Government would be disposed to participate in the War of the Pacific only if Britain establishes a second front with Germany on the continent—the North African campaign being definitely regarded as a minor operation in no way capable of diminishing Germany's effective strength against the Soviet Union.

THURSTON

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67 Shao Li-tzu.
68 See telegram of December 12 from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union to the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan, p. 747.
69 Presumably similar to message to President Roosevelt contained in telegram No. 481, December 8, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, p. 736.
The Ambassador to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

London, December 17, 1941—7 p. m.
[Received December 17—1:35 p. m.]

Netherlands Series 62. Gerbrandy tells me Dutch and Australian forces have occupied Timor today despite remonstrances from local Portuguese authorities but things are now quiet there.

He adds that while they had sought to deal with Portuguese Government as decently as possible regarding this matter, they were determined that Timor should not become a menace. Evidence of the danger is the fact that recently two Japanese submarines were in the vicinity, one of which was sunk by Australian forces. It is their intention to hold Timor merely as trustees but they expect their action to lead to a violent outburst from the Portuguese Government.

[BIDDLE]

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to President Roosevelt

Washington, December 17, 1941.

My Dear Mr. President: A message has been received from Mr. Duff Cooper at Singapore on the subject of the proposed naval and military conference there, to the following effect:—

“I have now secured representation for Australia, New Zealand, United States and Netherlands and am arranging that conference shall start December 18th. If we were to await arrival of representative from Chungking there would be much delay and report by December 20th as requested by the President would certainly be impossible. Should representative from Chungking arrive in time we shall of course be delighted to receive him.”

Believe me [etc.]

Halifax

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

No. 243

Chungking, December 17, 1941.
[Received January 19, 1942.]

Sir: I have the honor to transmit a translation of a letter which I have received from the Headquarters (at Chungking) of a so-called Korean Volunteer Corps enclosing a letter to President Roosevelt, the

P. S. Gerbrandy, President of the Netherland Council of Ministers, London.

Photostatic copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.
officers and men of the American armed forces, and the citizens of the United States.\textsuperscript{72}

The letter itself is not of special note, and the part actually played by the Corps in the Sino-Japanese war is believed to have been inconsequential. As far as the Embassy has been able to learn, the organization itself is a small one, existing chiefly on paper, and supported and kept alive by the Chinese Government. With the United States at war with Japan, the American Government may, however, be interested in such organizations, whose potentialities should be greatly increased by the fact that unrest due to economic pressure will probably be first and most severely felt in Korea, and hence reflected among the very large numbers of Koreans now resident in Japanese-occupied China.\textsuperscript{73}

Respectfully yours,

C. E. GAUSS

740.0011 Pacific War/1673

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert B. Stewart of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] December 18, 1941.

Mr. Watt\textsuperscript{74} of the Australian Legation came in today to mention, among other things, Mr. Casey's\textsuperscript{75} call at the White House yesterday. The purpose of Mr. Casey's call, according to Mr. Watt, was to impress upon the President Australia's interest in the projected discussions in Moscow (Kuibishev), Chungking, Singapore and Washington to explore possible means of coordinating the war effort of all of the associated powers. Mr. Casey has received strong instructions (perhaps with a tinge of criticism) to keep in touch with the situation and see that Australia's interest is kept in mind. Mr. Casey expressed to the President the desire of his Government to be separately represented in any such discussions as may be held. The President appeared sympathetic but asked what about Canada, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa. If Australia were separately represented these Dominions might claim similar representation. Mr. Casey replied that he felt Australia's interest is greater and more immediate than that of the other Dominions. While failing to get a definite promise, Mr. Casey was apparently satisfied in having brought the matter to the President's attention.

In the course of the conversation between the President and Mr.

\textsuperscript{72} Neither printed.

\textsuperscript{73} The enclosures were not forwarded to President Roosevelt but were filed "without any action being taken in regard thereto", at the suggestion of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, which assumed that the Koreans concerned did not expect a reply from President Roosevelt and probably were "satisfied with the courteous reception" received at the Embassy in China.

\textsuperscript{74} Alan S. Watt, First Secretary of the Australian Legation in the United States.

\textsuperscript{75} Richard G. Casey, Australian Minister in the United States.
Casey, reference was made to the attitude of the Soviet Government in the present conflict, about which the President was not entirely happy. He said, however, that the Soviet attitude was "probably right" considering the whole picture.

Mr. Watt mentioned press reports from Australia indicating a growing bitterness about the Japanese successes in Malaya. Mr. Watt said that the Australians were willing to accept Crete and the losses incurred at that time but they are not willing to look upon Malaya and Singapore as another Crete. Mr. Watt felt that the situation in Malaya is now very sticky and thought that if the British have again failed to provide adequate equipment there is going to be real anger in Australia. Moreover, from the Australian point of view, Singapore is the last outpost of defense which in any appreciable degree protects Australia from direct attacks. The Australians could not contemplate the loss of this post except with deepest gloom.

811B.20/39 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, December 20, 1941—1 p. m.  
[Received December 20—12:46 p. m.]

For the United States High Commissioner: 76

"Chinese Foreign Office has informed Embassy of the Chinese Government’s desire that the Philippine authorities permit the organization in the Philippines of a Chinese volunteer corps to fight side by side with Americans and Filipinos. Foreign Office stresses beneficial psychological effect upon large population in the Islands and requests that you approach the Philippine Government." 77

Sent to Manila; repeated to Department.  

GAUSS

740.0011 European War 1939/17735 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

[Extract] 78

LONDON, December 21, 1941—10 p. m.  
[Received December 21—7:20 p. m.]

6166.

During the early phase of the discussion, Stalin told Eden he had a message from President Roosevelt asking that Russia be represented

76 Francis B. Sayre, at Manila.
77 Ambassador Gauss was instructed on December 27 to inform the Chinese Foreign Office that the offer was greatly appreciated and was receiving active consideration.
78 For other parts of this telegram, see vol. I, section III under "Activities of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe ...".
by an observer at a conference to be called at Chungking the following day. He further asked Eden if he knew anything about the object of the conference. Eden said that a similar message had reached the British Foreign Office and gave him the gist of the telegram forwarded by the British Government in reply to the President. Stalin then told him that the Soviet Government was prepared to attend any number of conferences if it would be helpful but that they could do nothing about the conference at Chungking as they had had no information about its subject matter.

I was told that Stalin had been informed about the conference to be held in Washington but this information did not appear in any of Eden’s cables which were shown to me. I personally believe it is important in the days immediately ahead to keep Stalin sufficiently informed through Litvinov to give him a sense of being included in war and peace plans. You of course will have information on this phase of the Washington negotiations that I am not acquainted with here.

WINANT

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt 79

WASHINGTON [undated].

I received your message on the 16th December. As there was no mention of the object of the suggested conferences in Chungking and Moscow, and that there was only one day left before their opening, I thought I might be able, in conversation with Mr. Eden, who has just arrived in Moscow, to elucidate the question of the objects of the conferences, and to find out whether they could be postponed for some time. It transpired, however, that Mr. Eden has no information on this point, either. In view of the above, I should be glad to receive from you the necessary details, to ensure that the participation of representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in these conferences should bring results. Allow me to thank you for the feelings you express with regard to the successes of the Soviet army. I wish you all success in your struggle against the aggression in the Pacific. I send you and Mr. Hopkins my warm personal greetings.

79 Transmitted by the Soviet Ambassador (Litvinov). Photostatic copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.
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740.0011 Pacific War/1941: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

VICHY, December 22, 1941—1 p. m.
[Received 9 p. m.]

1591. Ostrorog \(^*^\) read to us this morning portions of a telegram which the Foreign Office had received from Arsène-Henry \(^*^\) in Tokyo. According to Henry's information, two or three hours before the attack on Hawaii commenced, Ambassador Grew had been summoned to the Foreign Office and the Emperor's reply to President Roosevelt's message had been delivered to him. The message was apparently calm and reassuring in so far as Japanese-American relations were concerned and the American Embassy had expected no sudden aggression. It was only three hours later that they heard that Hawaii and the Philippines had been attacked.

Henry's telegram went on to say that it had not been possible for him to ascertain what group or groups were responsible for Japan's attack on the United States. There were indications however that "the attack might have been arranged by the military and naval groups who wished to have their war without the knowledge of the Japanese civil government". There were unconfirmed rumors that certain Japanese civil officials and members of the Diet had tendered their resignations.

Henry reported that while at first the members of the American and British Diplomatic Missions had been instructed to remain in their Embassies, surveillance had become increasingly severe and finally a cordon of Japanese police had been thrown around the buildings and no communication was permitted to be sent into or from our Embassy. Henry, who succeeded Grew as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, requested permission in his capacity as Dean to see Grew to take over the archives pertaining to this position. His request was refused by the Japanese. He has also according to the telegram "protested energetically" as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps over the manner in which American and British diplomats are being held and not permitted to communicate with anyone.

The telegram went on to say that the Japanese were arresting all foreigners in Japan and this had caused great anxiety among the small white population which still remains there. They fear that when Japan is bombed, there will be internal disorder and that all white persons may be massacred.

\(^*^\) Stanislas Ostrorog, French Foreign Office, at times acting head of its Far Eastern Section.

\(^*^\) Charles Arsène-Henry, French Ambassador in Japan.
Ostrorog promised to give us any further news of our diplomats in Tokyo which the Foreign Office may receive.

Leahy

740.0011 European War 1939/18712

The President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Chiang) to President Roosevelt 82

CHUNGKING, December 24, 1941.

MR. PRESIDENT: The Chinese Government and people wish to express their whole-hearted support of your proposed conference of American, British, Chinese and other representatives. We venture to offer the opinion that a Supreme Allied War Council should be established forthwith in Washington for the speedy formulation of comprehensive war plans. This will constitute a concrete step on the part of the nations of the democratic front to coordinate and concert their efforts against the aggressor nations of the Axis, and will be a most effective factor in bringing about the early destruction of our common enemy.

For this purpose I have designated Mr. T. V. Soong, newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the Chief Delegate of China to such Conference or Supreme War Council as you contemplate to set up in the immediate future, and request you to be good enough to notify him to participate in your deliberations on all questions relevant to the conduct of the war.

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] December 26, 1941.

Eu 83 has read with considerable interest the suggestion made by Mr. Culver B. Chamberlain 84 in his memorandum of December 23, 1941 85 that it might be possible for an American mission with headquarters in Soviet territory preferably at Vladivostok to carry on in Korea propaganda aimed at stirring up the Koreans against the Japanese and eventually at bringing about a breakdown in the Japanese control of that peninsula.

82 Translation of telegram received by the Secretary of State in a letter dated December 24 from the Chinese Ambassador; original transmitted to President Roosevelt at 5:40 p.m. on December 26.
83 Division of European Affairs.
84 Formerly in the American consular service in China, including Manchuria.
85 Not printed.
We are inclined to believe that it would be unwise to endeavor to establish a mission of the type suggested on Soviet territory. In the first place the Russians would be almost sure to reject such a scheme. They have thus far refused to permit British consular authorities to function in Vladivostok; they have not allowed us to appoint a naval observer in that city; they do not permit our consular staff to move about outside of Vladivostok and its suburbs; and they do not allow foreigners in general to travel in the Far East except along the line of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Soviet authorities would be sure to feel that a mission engaged in propaganda even though its activities may be carried on for the most part outside of Soviet territory would obtain in connection with its work information regarding the Soviet Union which is considered as secret. Not only would the Soviet authorities in all likelihood refuse the request but they would be inclined to view with still greater suspicion the various American missions which are already functioning in the Soviet Union or which are planning to proceed to the Soviet Union.

Until the Russians change their attitude with regard to all foreigners including even those fighting against Germany, it would be a mistake to propose using the Soviet Union as a base for any kind of political agitation. 88

740.0011 Pacific War/1824

President Roosevelt to the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Chiang) 87

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1941.

In order to insure immediate coordination and cooperation in our common effort against the enemy, there is being established a supreme commander for all British, Dutch and American forces in the Southwest Pacific theater.

The advisability of a similar command of activities of the United Powers in the Chinese theater appears evident. This theater we suggest should initially include such portion of Thailand and Indochina as may become accessible to troops of the United Powers. In agreement with the representatives of the British and Dutch Governments, I desire to suggest that you should undertake to exercise such command over all forces of the United Powers which are now, or may in the future be operating in the Chinese theater.

86 In a memorandum dated December 27, the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) wrote that on December 26 he informed Mr. Chamberlain orally that from what he knew of the Russian situation “the Russian angle in his project would have to be eliminated.”

87 Copy transmitted by President Roosevelt on December 30 to the Secretary of State “for your information.”
It is our thought that, in order to make such command effective, a joint planning staff should at once be organized consisting of representatives of the British, American and Chinese governments. If you consider it practicable, and Russia agrees, a Russian representative might be included. This staff would function under your supreme command.

The commander of the Southwest Pacific theater and the commander of the British forces in India would be directed to maintain the closest liaison with your headquarters. A mutual exchange of liaison officers between the three headquarters would be desirable.

Such arrangements would enable your counsel and influence to be given effect in the formulation of the general strategy for the conduct of the war in all theaters. Your views in this matter will be greatly appreciated by me.

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740.0011 Pacific War/1553

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1941.

MR. SECRETARY: The attached report\(^{59}\) of the F. B. I.\(^{60}\) relates to the activities of the Japanese Consulate in Hawaii and its complicity in the bombing of Pearl Harbor.

It will be noted that the F. B. I. wished to prosecute a number of the Japanese agents, first raising the question in the Summer of 1941. The Department of Justice consulted the State Department in July, 1941, and were advised that the State Department assented to the prosecution.

Prosecution of these agents never was carried out, owing to the objection of the War Department. The record is important because it makes clear the fact that the position of the Department was at all times plain.


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740.0011 Pacific War/1336

The Secretary of State to Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. JUSTICE: In your letter dated December 19,\(^{61}\) you request that I write to you, as Chairman of the Commission to Investigate...
igate the Facts and Circumstances connected with the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, stating whether I “conveyed to the Departments of War and Navy of the United States, in the period intervening between November 1 and December 7, 1941, warnings of the immediate danger of possible attack by the forces of the Japanese Empire”. You add that for your purposes it will be sufficient if I “will state briefly approximately the times when such warnings were given and, in outline and summary only, the purport of the warnings”.

I would say in reply that I have constantly kept myself as familiar as possible with all important developments and conditions arising in the relations of the United States with other countries. Recognizing the cooperative relationships which exist between the Department of State and the Departments of War and of the Navy, especially in times of danger to this country, I had during the year many conferences with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and at intervals conferences with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and officers of their staffs. Our conferences sought a full interchange of information and views relative to critical situations all over the world, including—of course—developments in the Pacific area.

These exchanges of information and views were in addition to those which took place at Cabinet meetings and at meetings during the fall of 1941 of the War Council, and in numerous other conversations. At these conferences I was given the benefit of the knowledge which representatives of the War and the Navy Departments possessed of military factors involved in the world situation and I in turn took up political factors in the world situation and other matters of which I had special knowledge.

In reply to your express inquiry, I recall that at the regular meeting of the Cabinet on November 7, 1941, I stated among other things that relations between Japan and the United States were extremely critical and that there was imminent possibility that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force in accordance with her many times announced purpose and policy. It thereupon became the consensus of opinion that some members of the Cabinet might well emphasize this critical situation in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. Accordingly, Secretary Knox, four days later on Armistice Day, delivered an address, in which he especially emphasized this imminent and dangerous situation. He expressed the following strong warning:

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Omissions in quotations indicated in the original.
... We are not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we are likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world—on the far side of the Pacific. Just what the morrow may hold for us in that quarter of the globe, no one may say with certainty. The only thing we can be sure of is that the Pacific, no less than the Atlantic, calls for instant readiness for defense. In the Pacific area, no less than in Europe, interests which are vital to our national security are seriously threatened."

On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles, carrying out this Cabinet suggestion in an address, used the following language of urgent warning:

"... today the United States finds itself in far greater peril than it did in 1917. The waves of world conquest are breaking high both in the East and in the West. They are threatening, more nearly each day that passes, to engulf our own shores."

"... In the Far East the same forces of conquest under a different guise are menacing the safety of all nations that border upon the Pacific."...

"... our people realize that at any moment war may be forced upon us, and if it is, the lives of all of us will have to be dedicated to preserving the freedom of the United States, and to safeguarding the independence of the American people, which are more dear to us than life itself."

It will thus be seen that knowledge of the gravity of the situation in the Pacific was not confined to me, but was shared by many high officers of the Government. I might add that throughout this period officials of the Departments of War and of the Navy manifested a spirit of wholehearted cooperation and indicated in statements made to me from time to time their keen concern regarding the seriousness and critical nature of the danger.

On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of the War Council, at which the highest officers of the Army and the Navy of course were present, I emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan: I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. At the conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various

*See Department of State Bulletin, November 15, 1941, p. 391.*
points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.\textsuperscript{93}

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

\textsuperscript{740.0011} Pacific War/1507: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV, January 1, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received January 1—9:26 a. m.]

1. Reference my telegram No. 2128, December 31.\textsuperscript{94} In view of the prominence given by Pravda to Zaslavski's article, and inasmuch [as] whatever the reason may have been for its publication, the one hypothesis which could be rejected with full confidence was that it merely represented the views of a casual writer, it was my considered opinion that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs should be apprised immediately of the reaction to it on the part of this Embassy. Accordingly I called on Lozovski\textsuperscript{95} last night and made the following verbatim statement to him:

"Under present circumstances, I am astonished that such an article, which is contemptuous and offensive in tone, should have been permitted to appear in a Soviet newspaper. I regard it as my duty to express my emphatic objection to the article and to protest against its publication."

Lozovski replied that inasmuch as the American newspapers carry every day articles which are offensive to the Soviet Union and its leader, against which neither the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs nor the Soviet Embassy in Washington has ever protested, he could not accept my protest. To this I rejoined that I regretted that he should adopt this attitude, which I would report to my Government, and that in so far as any articles which may have appeared in the American press are concerned, I need hardly point out to him the difference between the uncontrolled American press and the totally controlled Soviet press which furthermore is now subjected to the

\textsuperscript{93} In a memorandum dated January 17, 1942, Joseph W. Ballantine, Foreign Service Officer on special detail in the Department, wrote: "I delivered in person to Justice Roberts the copy of the attached blue [carbon copy] of a letter dated December 30, 1941. At the same time I showed him an alternative letter, the signed copy of which is attached [not printed], and explained to him that the Secretary had prepared this alternative letter containing additional material in case Justice Roberts felt that this would be helpful. Justice Roberts said that he preferred the shorter letter and that it contained just the material that the Commission desired."

\textsuperscript{94} Not printed; it quoted an article in Pravda entitled "Pétain Methods in the Philippines" by D. Zaslavski, who was very critical of the policy to declare Manila an open city (740.00116 Pacific War/6).

\textsuperscript{95} Solomon A. Lozovski, Soviet Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
additional censorship imposed by the war and that I must reiterate my protest.  

In the general conversation which followed I also remarked that it had been reported to me that Zaslavski's articles in the press represent the views of Narkomindel.  

Lozovski stated that this is incorrect. He also remarked that the article in question was not directed against the United States but against the theory of "The open city". I stated that anyone presuming to write an article of this character at this time could hardly be unaware of the fact that it is the United States Army under the command of General MacArthur that is entrusted with the defense of Manila and that I therefore regarded the article as derogatory to our armed forces. It has been suggested to me that the publication of this article may have been for the purpose of stimulating us to more decisive action in the Pacific, or that it may reflect the growing confidence or even smugness of the Soviet Government resulting from its current successes against the Germans. A third possibility may be that the article is designed to mollify Japan.

THURSTON

740.0011 Pacific War/1882: Telegram

The Military Air Attaché in the United Kingdom (Royce) to the War Department

LONDON, January 2, 1942—1:45 p.m.

1522. . . . The Chief of the Imperial General Staff has just received a personal message from General Wavell \(^1\) dated December 28th from Rangoon. It should be studied with reference to our cable I. B. No. 11, 12/31/41,\(^2\) and follows in substance:

On December 23rd Wavell conferred with Chiang Kai Shek throughout the day with Burma defense the chief subject.

Wavell sought China's consent to use Lease Lend materials, including aircraft repair tools and A. A. equipment, for defense in Burma and to return one or two squadrons of the American Volunteer Group to Rangoon. Chiang Kai Shek agreed in principle and referred these requests to a committee for study (Comment: Personnel of committee

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\(^{06}\) In telegram No. 3, January 2, 1942, 8 p. m., the Department cabled its full approval to Mr. Thurston for his action.

\(^{07}\) Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs.

\(^{08}\) In his telegram No. 59, January 19, 1942, 1 p. m., Mr. Thurston reported to the Department the substance of an article in the January 7th issue of Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), organ of the Defense Ministry. Mr. Thurston stated: "The tone of this article, as well as that of other recent Soviet press references to the war in the East, lead to the inference that they are to some degree at least designed to offset Zaslavski's article in Pravda of December 30." (740.0011 Pacific War/1707)

\(^{09}\) Received by the War Department on January 2, 9:24 a.m., and paraphrase transmitted to the Department of State; noted by the Secretary of State.

\(^1\) Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, British Commander in Chief, India.

\(^2\) Not found in Department files.
not indicated). No clearly defined orders were issued about Lend Lease or American airmen.

A cable was drafted to President Roosevelt after a discussion on the setting up of an inter-allied council at Chungking. This telegram included a proposal for the conduct of the Far Eastern war. Chiang Kai Shek's plan called for a defeat of Japan in 1942 as a first step to be followed by operations against the Germans and Italians.

If America would provide the air support needed, Chiang Kai Shek believed strongly that the Chinese could start an offensive by June or at least by October. General Wavell stated that in his opinion the Chinese can make not more than one additional major effort if America will furnish air support and equipment; further, that Chinese morale may be seriously impaired if their hopes for American aid are not realized.

Chinese assistance can be given most effectively by attacking Japanese lines of communication in China; hence, work should be initiated as soon as possible by Mission 204.

The message closed with the statement that Chiang Kai Shek is unwilling to dispatch additional American squadrons to Burma and even wishes one already there returned to China.

ROYCE

740.0011 Pacific War/1882 : Telegram
The American Military Mission in China to the War Department

CHUNGKING, January 5, 1942—9:10 p.m.

168. At present I am in doubt as to American plans and objectives in regard to Burma. Your radiograms of December 24 and 18 granting broad administrative powers did not give me much information in regard to the above. Presumably, directives are on the way but prior to arrival I should like to suggest some of the limitations of action as well as capabilities within the Burma area of operations.

Burma is very necessary as an air base and our only route into China in the event we find that we must go on the defensive and withdraw wholly or in part from the line Burma—Malaya—Philippine Islands. The above is true if an offensive is planned after much preparation. Before we can crush Japan we must first destroy the Nipponese forces in Indo-China and Siam and move to the north by air, water and on land. Burma must be utilized as an air base for support of military activities in the future as well as the present. Later it may be advisable to use Chinese bases, but now the distances are too great and there are no large scale operations to necessitate their use. A detailed

*Received by the War Department on January 7, 6:13 a.m., and paraphrase transmitted to the Department of State.
*Not found in Department files.
study of the uses of the Chinese air bases in the future is being made for General Marshall \* and Mr. Stimson.

The big job of the American Mission will be setting up AA \* defense, communications and facilities for the use of our air organizations in case we expect to assist the RAF in the defense of Burma. Air bases should be supplied beforehand and roads, etc., should be improved to southeastern China before we use Chinese bases for strategic bombing of, possibly preparatory to seizing, French Indo-China's important maritime cities. The above will necessitate the organization of routes from Burma in the usual military manner. This would appear to be an economic mission (garbled).

The general plan of tactical bases, zones of supply and communication should follow the scheme below in the event the above mission is planned:

1. To the extent it can be accomplished, the British should give us independent tactical and supply bases after they have organized the Burman theatre and set up the zones of communication. The British should be consulted without delay in regard to this matter.

2. Place the Burma road under U. S. military control under the Generalissimo's supreme authority in that area. This may be accomplished through negotiation with General Chiang. In no other way can we be sure that the road will be operated successfully. A U. S. regiment of engineers (provisional) with men specially trained for that sort of work and an AWM (Truck Maintenance?) organization to take care of all types of transportation will be essential. An American nucleus of officers and men will be needed even though Chinese labor will be available.

3. If we expect results, we must assist the Chinese in organizing the L. C. and enlarging the air bases and routes north and east of Kunming. These installations would be under Chinese command. Assuming that the above plans will meet with your approval I should initiate requisitions for equipment and personnel.

Guerrilla organizations, whether they are Chinese or foreign, will not be effective here. I believe the people in the U. S. do not appreciate the true military value of such units. Fervently I hope that you will not assist in any way irregular organizations or individuals who propose such independent action. Only regular units, supplied in the orthodox manner and supported from the air by units with normal bases and supplies will be successful in operations in this theatre. To turn China into a Spain will bring ill to this country as past political events have shown and the best opinion believe. Little success has crowned British efforts in organizing irregular units, and the Generalissimo would be quite humiliated if we should use so-called communist units. New and unorthodox schemes will add confusion.

\* Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. A.
\* Anti-aircraft.
The passive spirit and the weariness of war have China in their clutches, and the Army is not keeping an appreciable force of Japanese engaged. We cannot expect China to go on the offense until the united nations put a formidable force in the western Pacific. Chinese ground troops might attack Tongking effectively if foreign aircraft gave them strong support and after they were convinced of a victorious offence on the part of the allies. To retain sectors in China from which vulnerable Japanese land and sea positions may be attacked by foreign air forces is the best hope at present.

I feel that lend-lease supplies offer less than expected in direct military returns, for typically Chinese reasons. However, measured in political terms as the returns from war supplies and credits should be, they are war outlays of an indispensable nature. To improve China’s offensive power, our present plan of furnishing lend-lease war supplies, particularly howitzers, ammunition and small arms, is necessary.

If the Generalissimo’s regime should fall, all Asiatics, including the Chinese, will be attracted to the enemy. The maintenance of Chiang’s administration by tangible indications of material aid means that the Chinese people will be kept in a potential, perhaps even dynamic, resistance.

MAGRUDER

Memorandum by Mr. Max W. Schmidt of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs *

[WASHINGTON,] January 27, 1942.

In connection with the Japanese attack on the United States, the following dates and hours taken from translated transcripts of radio broadcasts from Tokyo, Japan, sent to the Department by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on January 16, 1942* (File no. 894.74/278) may be of interest.

Translation of radio broadcast from Station JZI, December 8, 1941 (Japan time) : *

"With our army and navy entering in a state of war with England and America at dawn of the 8th... *

"... the Imperial army and navy headquarters at 6 am on the 8th announced that our army and navy entered a state of war with

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* Initialed by the Chief of the Division (Hamilton); noted by the Secretary of State.
* Not printed.
* Omissions indicated in the original.
* Underlining added. [Footnote in the original. Underlined words are here printed in italics.]
England and America in the Western Pacific at dawn today, the 8th...

"... a Domei dispatch from Honolulu (sic) reported that our naval air force raided Honolulu at 7 am Hawaiian time, which is 3:05 am Japan time...

"... according to the announcement made by the headquarters of our fleet in China waters... our Commander-in-Chief" sent staff officers to the British and American gunboats at Shanghai "immediately after our country entered in a state of war at 5:40 am..." (presumably Shanghai time).

With regard to the American Marines stationed in north China, it is stated that "the disarming of the marines was carried out at 1 pm today" (December 8, 1941).

"... our Government at 7 am today (December 8, 1941) held an emergency session of the cabinet at the premier's residence...

"According to a Domei dispatch from Washington, Foreign Minister Togo reported by order Envoys Kurusu and Nomura to call on Secretary of State Hull at 1:00 P.M. on the 7th (Washington time), 3:30 A.M. of the 8th Japan time..." (This translation is undoubtedly garbled and probably should read that Foreign Minister Togo ordered Envoys Kurusu and Nomura, etc.)

"... At the same time (sic), Foreign Minister Togo invited American Ambassador to Japan, Grew, to his official residence at 7:30 A.M. today and handed him an official note similar to the one handed to Secretary of State Hull. Immediately afterwards at 7:45 A.M., he invited British Ambassador to Japan, Craigie and explained to him the text of this reply.

"Immediately after our loyal Army and Navy had entered a state of war with England and America at dawn today, it was decided to break off diplomatic relations with both countries and enter a state of war. Consequently, our government at 11:45 A.M. today (December 8, 1941, Japan time) declared war against England and America...

"At 8:30 A.M. today (December 8, 1941, Japan time), our government made the Foreign Ministry announce the results of the Japanese-American negotiation and the Japanese-American notes...

"At dawn today, December 8, (Japan time), the announcement of the Imperial Army and Navy headquarters to the effect that our Imperial Army and Navy will enter a state of war against American and British forces in the Western Pacific at dawn today was made public throughout our country through the radios and newspapers... Then with the issuing of the Imperial decree declaring war at 11:45 A.M. (December 8, 1941, Japan time), the nation's determination to march forward and support the emperor's will gushed forth...

"Japanese residents abroad, an Imperial decree declaring war against England and America was issued at 11:45 am, December 8, Japan time..."

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30 Marginal notation by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck): "Falt accomplis"
It may be noted that throughout the broadcasts on December 8 and 9 (according to the F. B. I. translation) the Japanese in general emphasized that the attacks made upon British and American bases throughout the Pacific area coincided with "dawn", of the day corresponding to December 8, 1941, Japan time, over those various bases. The hour of the issuance of the Imperial decree declaring war on the United States and Great Britain is repeatedly given as 11:45 A. M., December 8, 1941, Japan time.