III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE
(January 14-24, 1943)
7. PRE-CONFERENCE PAPERS

Editorial Note

This chapter presents, in chronological order, papers relating to the convening of the Casablanca Conference of January 1943. These papers begin with the correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill in November and December 1942 leading to the decision to hold a major Allied conference on the urgent strategic problems for 1943. Also included are those papers regarding the final arrangements for the selection of a meeting site, the determination of the composition of the delegations, and the attempt to define topics to be considered at the meeting. During November and December 1942, Roosevelt also corresponded with Stalin in an unsuccessful effort to make the Conference a tripartite meeting. These messages (Roosevelt’s of November 19, December 2, and December 8, and Stalin’s of November 27, December 5, and December 13) are not included here but are printed in Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. III, pp. 662–676, passim.

Urgent high-level strategic decisions regarding the conduct of the war in 1943 had been necessitated by the march of military events since the Second Washington Conference of June 1942. The successful Allied landings in Northwest Africa and the impending victory over Axis armies in the African desert decisively altered the American-British posture vis-à-vis the European continent. A re-examination of strategy was required, while the critical relationship between strategy and logistics necessitated a careful consideration of the problems of production, allocation, and shipping.

Narrative accounts of the military-logistical background of the Conference will be found in the appropriate volumes cited in the list of published sources, ante, p. xvii.

Although the Conference was intended to be predominantly a military meeting, a number of political questions came up for discussion and decision. The urgent question of leadership among French factions led to a broader consideration of French problems. The general background of these French problems will be found in Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. II, pp. 123–722. The diplomatic background of negotiations with the Soviet Union will be found ibid., vol. III, pp. 406–787.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] NOVEMBER 25, 1942.

From The President for The Former Naval Person personal and secret No. 222.

In reply to your 211. We of course have no intention of abandoning ROUNDP. No one can possibly know now whether or not we may have the opportunity to strike across the Channel in 1943 and if the opportunity comes we must obviously grasp it. However the determination as to the size of the force which we should have in BOLERO in 1943 is a matter which should require our joint strategic considerations. It is my present thought that we should build up as rapidly as present active operations permit a growing striking force in the U.K. to be used quickly in event of German collapse or a very large force later if Germany remains intact and assumes a defensive position.

The conclusions of The Combined Chiefs of Staff at the meeting last summer in London indicated that the mounting of TORCH necessarily postponed the assembling of the required forces in the United Kingdom. In view of our requirements for the initiation and maintenance of TORCH our studies indicated that we could not send forces and materiel to the United Kingdom at this time in excess of that stated by General Hartle. Until we have provided adequately

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1 Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels. This message was discussed during a meeting between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held in the White House on November 25, 1942. Regarding this matter, the Notes of the Meeting read as follows:

"The President then read a radiogram received from the Prime Minister which indicated the latter’s fear that the United States had abandoned plans for carrying out certain European operations. He also read a proposed reply to this message which had been prepared by General Marshall. The message from the Prime Minister indicated a desire to have a military conference held between representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia somewhere in the Middle East. In this connection, the President stated that such a conference should not be held until the North African situation had been stabilized with the complete occupation of Tunisia and a more secure situation with reference to Spain and Spanish Morocco." (Roosevelt Papers)

For other subjects discussed at this meeting, see the account in Sherwood, pp. 658-659.

2 For text of Churchill’s telegram 211, November 24, 1942, to Roosevelt, see Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 652-653.

3 For accounts of the mission of General Marshall, Admiral King, and Mr. Hopkins to London, July 18-24, 1942, see Matloff and Snell, chapter XII, and Harrison, pp. 28-32.

4 According to Churchill’s telegram 211, November 24 (see footnote 2 above), General Hartle had stated that a War Department directive had limited the build-up of United States forces in the United Kingdom to 427,000 men. For discussions of the factors bringing about a delay at this time in the build-up of United States forces and supplies in the United Kingdom for a cross-Channel attack (BOLERO), see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 480-487, and Matloff and Snell, pp. 322-327.
against the possible reactions from Spanish Morocco, and are clear as to the situation in Tunisia, North Africa must naturally take precedence. We are far more heavily engaged in the Southwest Pacific than I anticipated a few months ago. Nevertheless, we shall continue with Bolero as rapidly as our shipping and other resources permit. I believe that as soon as we have knocked the Germans out of Tunisia, and have secured the danger against any real threat from Spain, that we should proceed with a military strategical conference between Great Britain, Russia and The United States. I am hoping that our military position in Africa will be such that a conference might be held in a month or six weeks. Our own Combined Chiefs of Staff will, I believe, have a recommendation for us within a few days as to what the next steps should be, but I feel very strongly that we have got to sit down at the table with the Russians. My notion would be a conference in Cairo or Moscow: that each of us would be represented by a small group meeting very secretly; that the conclusions of the conference would of course be approved by the three of us. I would probably send Marshall to head up our group but I presume that all services should be represented. I think it would be wise to keep the numbers down to three from each of us.

I have given Oliver some private messages to you which I do not wish to put on the cables and he will be returning I believe next Monday. I hope that all of his problems will have been substantially resolved.

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5Roosevelt had already proposed to both Churchill and Stalin that tripartite staff talks be held in Moscow to consider future operations. Roosevelt’s telegram No. 211, November 14, 1942, to Churchill read as follows: “I think you and I have overlooked one very important step in relation to any operations springing from the eastern Mediterranean. I suggest that after we have considered our preliminary studies we should send a small British-American staff group, possibly limited to Army officers from each of us, to Moscow to discuss the procedure with Mr. Stalin and his staff. I realize that this may cause some delay but one week in Moscow should suffice and from every point of view it looks wise to have closer staff cooperation the nearer we get to the Black Sea and Russia.” (Roosevelt Papers) In his message to Stalin of November 19, 1942 (Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. III, p. 662), Roosevelt reported that the British and American military staffs were studying future military operations and added, “Before any further step is taken, both Churchill and I want to consult with you and your staff, because whatever we do next in the Mediterranean will have a definite bearing on your magnificent campaign and your proposed moves this coming winter.”


7November 30, 1942.
Will you let me know as soon as you can what you think of my proposal?

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt ¹

SECRET

LONDON, November 26, 1942.

URGENT

No. 214, November 26, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and secret (signed Prime). Your 222.²

Thank you so much about my 211.³ As I cabled you last night,⁴ we are in full agreement.

I entirely agree in principle that there should be a conference with the Russians, but I doubt very much whether a conference on general war policy, apart from some special point, between officers would be of much value. Certainly if a Russian delegation went to Cairo, which I deem unlikely, they would be so tied up that they would have to refer every point of substance back to Stalin at Moscow. If the conference were held in Moscow there would be less delay, but I trust that before British and United States missions went to Moscow they would have a joint and agreed view, to serve at least as a basis for discussion. I hope also that if General Marshall were sent by you he would not by-pass this country.

I think I can tell you in advance what the Soviet view will be. They will say to us both “How many German divisions will you be engaging in the summer of 1943? How many have you engaged in 1942?” They will certainly demand a strong second front in 1943 by the heavy invasion of the continent either from the west or from the south, or from both. This sort of argument, of which I had plenty in Moscow, requires to be met either by principals or by Naval and shipping authorities who would certainly have to be present. It would be very difficult to spare all our Chiefs for so long at this time.

Stalin talked to me in Moscow in the sense of being willing to come to meet you and me somewhere this winter, and he mentioned Iceland. I pointed out that England was no farther and more convenient. He neither accepted nor rejected the idea. At the same time, apart from

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated.
² Supra.
³ Not printed, but see footnote 2 to document printed supra.
⁴ In his telegram No. 213, November 25, 1942, to Roosevelt, not printed, Churchill reported that he had conferred with Major General Smith and had been reassured that there was no change in the general plan of BOREO and ROUNDUP (Roosevelt Papers).
the climate, there is a lot to be said for a new triple Atlantic conference in Iceland. Our ships might lie together in Halfjord and we would place a suitable ship at Stalin’s disposal wearing the Soviet flag pro tem. He talked with some zest of his desire to fly and of his confidence in the Russian machines. Only at a meeting between principals will real results be achieved. What about proposing it for January? By that time Africa should be cleared and the great battle in south Russia decided.

I may add that if ever I can persuade you to come to Iceland I shall never be satisfied unless you look in on this small place before returning.

\* Naval anchorage in Iceland.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

LONDON, December 2, 1942.

Number 216, December 2, 1942. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret.

1. I give below the text of telegrams exchanged between me and Premier Stalin.

2. Please note particularly the last sentence of Para 5 of Stalin’s message. The chances of Round-Up may be greatly improved by the present battles on the Russian Front.

3. It seems to me that the whole question ought to be re-examined in the light of the Russian victories. It would be unwise in my view for us to send separate delegations to Moscow without having decided what we are going to do about Round-Up, which is almost the sole thing they will want to know.

4. I hope therefore that you will allow General Marshall and Admiral King to come over here, if possible with Harry, at the earliest moment.

5. I still cherish the hope of an Iceland meeting after the ground has been fully explored.

6. Telegram to Premier Stalin dated 24 Nov. 1942 begins:

“1. It gave me the very greatest pleasure to receive your warm and heartfelt congratulations. I regard our trustful personal relations as most important to the discharge of our duties to the great masses whose lives are at stake.

2. Although the President is unable with great regret to lend me twelve American destroyers for which I asked, I have now succeeded in making arrangements to sail a convoy of over thirty ships from Iceland on December twenty-second. The Admiralty will concert

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\* Transmitted via War Department channels.

\* Harry L. Hopkins.
the operation with your officers as before. The Germans have moved
the bulk of their aircraft from the north of Norway to the south of
Europe as a result of "Torch". On the other hand the German sur-
face forces in Norway are still on guard. The Admiralty are pleased
so far with the progress of the Q.P. Convoy which has been helped
by bad weather and is now under the protection of our cruisers which
have been sent out to meet it.

3. I have communicated to President Roosevelt some preliminary
ideas about Turkey, and have found that he independently had formed
very similar views. It seems to me that we ought all of us to make
a new intense effort to have Turkey enter the war on our side in the
spring. For this purpose I should like United States to join in an
Anglo-Soviet guarantee of the territorial integrity and status of
Turkey. This would bring our three countries all into line, and the
Americans count for a lot with the Turks. Secondly, we are already
sending Turkey a considerable consignment of munitions including
two hundred tanks from the Middle East. During the winter by land
route, or coasting up the Levant, I shall keep on sending supplies of
munitions to Turkey together if permitted with experts in plain clothes
for training and maintenance purposes. Thirdly, I hope by the early
spring to assemble a considerable army in Syria drawn from our
Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Armies, so as to go to the help of Turkey if
either she were threatened or were willing to join us. It is evident
that your operations in the Caucasus or north of it may also exercise
a great influence. If we could get Turkey into the war we could not
only proceed with operations to open the shipping route to your left
flank on the Black Sea but we could also bomb heavily from Turkish
bases the Roumanian oil fields which are of such vital importance to
the Axis in view of your successful defence of the main oil supplies
of the Caucasus. The advantage of a move into Turkey is that it pro-
ceeds mainly by land and can be additional to offensive action in the
Central Mediterranean which will absorb our sea power and much
of our air power.

4. I have agreed to President Roosevelt's suggestion that we each
send in the near future, if agreeable to you, two high British officers
and two Americans to Moscow to plan this part of the war in 1943.
Pray let me know if you agree.

Roosevelt's telegram 210, November 11, 1942, to Churchill, contained the
following paragraph: "This brings up the additional steps that should be taken
when and if the south shore of the Mediterranean is cleared and under our
control. It is hoped that you with your Chiefs of Staff in London and I with the
Combined Staff here may make a survey of the possibilities including forward
movements directed against Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, Greece and other Balkan
areas and including the possibility of obtaining Turkish support for an attack
through the Black Sea against Germany's flank." (Roosevelt Papers) In his
reply (telegram 189, November 13, 1942) Churchill stated: "I shall spend all
this week end with my Chiefs of Staff reviewing the whole scene, which may be
more clear than now. ... Meanwhile let me say that nothing pleases me
more than to read what you say about trying to bring Turkey in. Our minds
have indeed moved together on this, as in so much else." (Roosevelt Papers)
Churchill's views on the steps to be taken with regard to Turkey as well as his
overall views on future strategy were set forth in a note he prepared for the
British Chiefs of Staff, dated November 18, 1942. Churchill sent the text of
his note in telegram 195, November 18, 1942, to Roosevelt. Substantial portions
of the note of November 18 are printed in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 654-655
and 697-698.
5. I hope you realise, Premier Stalin, that shipping is our limiting factor. In order to do "Torch" we have had to cut our Trans-Atlantic escorts so fine that the first half of November has been our worst month so far. We and the Americans have budgeted to lose at the rate of seven hundred thousand tons a month and still improve our margin. Over the year the average loss has not been quite so bad as that, but this first fortnight in November is worse. You who have so much land may find it hard to realise that we can only live and fight in proportion to our sea communications.

6. Do not be disturbed about the rogue Darlan.* We have thrown a large Anglo-American Army into French North Africa and are getting a very firm grip. Owing to the non-resistance of the French Army and now to its increasing support, we are perhaps fifteen days ahead of schedule. It is of the utmost consequence to get the Tunisian tip and the Naval Base of Bizerta at the earliest moment. The leading elements of our First Army will probably begin their attack immediately. Once established there with overpowering air, we can bring the war home to Mussolini and Fascist gang with an intensity not yet possible.

7. At the same time, by building up a strong Anglo-American Army and Air Force in Great Britain and making continuous preparations along our southeastern and southern coasts, we keep the Germans pinned in the Pas de Calais, etc., and are ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity. And all the time our bombers will be blasting Germany with ever increasing violence. Thus the halter will tighten upon the guilty doomed.

8. The glorious news of your offensive is streaming in. We are watching it with breathless attention. Every good wish.

Telegram from Premier Stalin dated 28 Nov 1942. Begins:

1. Many thanks for your message which I received on the 25 November. I fully share your view on the importance of developing our personal relations.

2. I am grateful to you for the measures you are taking to send a new big convoy to Archangel. I realise that in view of the considerable Naval Operations in the Mediterranean Sea this constitutes great difficulty for you.

3. I am in full agreement with you and President Roosevelt on the question of Turkey. It would be desirable to do everything possible to have Turkey enter the war on our side in the spring. This would be of great importance in order to accelerate the defeat of Hitler and his accomplices.

4. It seems to me that the Americans used Darlan not badly in order to facilitate the occupation of the Northern and Western Africa. The military diplomacy must be able to use for military purposes not only Darlan but 'Even the Devil himself and his grandma'. Maisky's footnote: This is a strong Russian proverb.

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* For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in political and economic conditions in French North Africa, November–December 1942, including Anglo-American negotiations with the French High Commissioner, Admiral Darlan, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. II, pp. 429 ff.

* On November 19, 1942, the Red Army opened the winter offensive on the Don River front which eventuated in the encirclement and capture of the Axis forces attacking Stalingrad.
5. I paid close attention to your communication that you and Americans do not relax preparation along your south-eastern and southern coasts in order to keep the Germans pinned in the Pas de Calais etc. and that you are ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity. I hope this does not mean that you changed your mind with regard to your promise given in Moscow to establish a second front in Western Europe in the spring of 1943.6

6. I am in full agreement with President Roosevelt's suggestion7 and your wish to arrange in Moscow conversations of the representatives of the three general staffs to prepare the respective military plans for 1943. We are ready to meet the British and American representatives whenever you wish.

7. In the Stalingrad operations we were so far successful partly because of snowfall and fog which hinder the activities of the German aviation.

8. We have intention to start in the next few days active operations on the central front in order to pin here the enemy forces and to prevent the transfer of any portion of them to the south.

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6 Churchill visited Moscow, August 12–16, 1942, and held several conversations with Stalin. During his first talk with Stalin on August 12, Churchill discussed the Anglo-American plans for a possible landing in France in 1943. For an account of this meeting, see Churchill, Hinge of Fate, Book Two, chapter 4. During Churchill's visit to Moscow, W. Averell Harriman was present as the personal representative of the President. For additional documentation regarding Churchill's talks with Stalin, including Harriman's reports thereon, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 616–625.

7 Reference presumably to Roosevelt's message of November 19, 1942, to Stalin, ibid., p. 662.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill1

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1942.

URGENT PRIORITY

From the President for the Former Naval Person. Personal and Secret. No. 224.

I have been giving a good deal of thought to our proposed joint conference with the Russians and I agree with you that the only satisfactory way of coming to the vital strategic conclusions the military situation requires, is for you and me to meet personally with Stalin. My thought would be that each of us would be accompanied by a very small staff made up of our top Army, Air and Naval Chiefs of Staff. I should bring Harry2 and Averell3 but no State Department representative although I believe we should arrive at tentative procedures to be adopted in event of a German collapse. I should

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1 Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.
2 Harry L. Hopkins.
3 W. Averell Harriman.
like to see the conference held about January 15th or soon thereafter. Tunis and Bizerte should have been cleared up and Rommel’s army liquidated before the conference. As to the place, Iceland or Alaska are impossible for me at this time of year and I believe equally so for Stalin. I should prefer a secure place south of Algiers or in or near Khartoum. I don’t like mosquitoes. I think the conference should be very secret and that the press should be excluded. I would question the advisability of Marshall and the others going to England prior to the conference because I do not want to give Stalin the impression that we are settling everything between ourselves before we meet him.

I think that you and I understand each other so well that prior conferences between us are unnecessary and when the time comes we can work things out from day to day. Our military people will also be in close cooperation at all times from now on.

I think that this conference may well result in knocking out Germany sooner than we anticipated. As you know Stalin has already agreed to a purely military conference to be held in Moscow and I have today sent him a message urging him to meet you and me. I believe he will accept.

I prefer a comfortable oasis to the raft at Tilsit. Roosevelt

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4 The proposal to hold military staff conversations on the future strategy in the Mediterranean had been raised by Roosevelt in a message of November 19, 1942, to Stalin, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. III, p. 662. In his reply to Roosevelt on November 27, 1942, Stalin said in part: “I now share your opinion that appropriate consultations between the Staffs of the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are desirable”, ibid., p. 663. In a message to Stalin on December 2, 1942, Roosevelt expressed the view that a meeting of military leaders alone would not be sufficient and that the reaching of early strategic decisions necessitated a meeting between Churchill, Stalin and himself together with top military commanders, preferably somewhere in Africa, ibid., pp. 665-666. Stalin, however, was unable to accept the proposal and in a message to Roosevelt on December 5, 1942, the Soviet leader explained that the intensity of the battles in progress with the Germans made it impossible to absent himself from his country for even a single day, ibid., p. 666.

5 The allusion is to the meeting of Napoleon I of France and Alexander I of Russia in July 1807 on a raft in the Nemen River at Tilsit (in East Prussia) where they concluded a peace settlement highly unfavorable to Prussia.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

LONDON, December 3, 1942.

Number 219, December 3, 1942. Former Naval Person to President personal and secret.

1 Transmitted via War Department channels.
1. Your 224. I am delighted at your proposal which is the only way of making a good plan for 1943. At present we have no plan for 1943 which is on the scale or up to the level of events. It is grand of you to come and I will meet you anywhere. I am telegraphing Stalin to reinforce your invitation.²

2. Meanwhile I deprecate sending our military representative to Moscow. It will only lead to a deadlock and queer the pitch. We still think that Marshall, King and Arnold should come here in advance, so that at least we have some definite plans as a basis for discussion when we all meet in January “somewhere in Africa”. Otherwise Stalin will greet us with the question “Have you then no plan for the second front in Europe you promised me for 1943?”

3. Khartoum is at your disposal and would be most satisfactory as regards weather, security and communications. I will report on accommodation tomorrow. We should be honoured to be the hosts. I am not informed, though quite ready to learn, about the Oasis south of Algiers. Marrakesh I can personally vouch for as regards accommodation, climate and, barring any extraordinary lapse, weather.

4. A supreme war conference, as this would be, ought to have the necessary staffs. For ourselves I should like to bring Eden from the War Cabinet with me and three Chiefs or Vice-Chiefs of the Staff, supported by a powerful secretariat, cypher staff, map room, etc., say about twenty-five.

5. As to timing, the sooner the better. Every day counts. We may reasonably expect that Tunis will be settled by the end of December and Tripolitania by the end of January. We ought not to be dependent on the actual working out of these operations. All prospect of attack in Europe in 1943 depends on early decision.

6. However everything hangs on whether “Barkis is willin”.

Prime

²For text of Churchill’s telegram of December 3, 1942, to Stalin, which was received by Stalin on December 4, 1942, see Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 665, and Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. 7, p. 81.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President’s Special Representative (Harriman) to President Roosevelt ¹

SECRET

LONDON, December 7, 1942.

Number LCR # 1. December 7, 1942.

Personal and For the Eyes of the President Only from Harriman. I have had three talks with the Prime Minister on the subject you

¹Transmitted via War Department channels.
asked me to discuss with him. I have been thoroughly beaten up but he finally understands that Anthony can not be viewed as a member of the War Cabinet divorced for the moment from the Foreign Office and he agrees to drop him out. He still wants one or two of the Joint Staff Secretariat like Colonel Jacob. He says he needs a couple of private secretaries to conduct his business and 24 hour shifts of cipher men some of whom can be provided locally. Also he wants his Map Room. He doesn’t want Oliver but is considering Leathers on account of the importance of his field in any plans. I explained to him emphatically your opposition to preliminary talks with Marshall in London. He is worried however about there being no agreement in advance between us on plans satisfactory to our friend and he has some ideas he wants to thrash out. He awaits an answer from you to his last cable of December third. In the last analysis I am quite sure he will accept your final wishes. I believe if you will instruct me, I can get him to conform with good grace and feeling. Specifically, am I right in assuming that you have no serious objection to his bringing a private secretary or two, Col Jacob, a cypher staff, and Leathers or someone else in the Field of Supply. How do you feel about the Map Room? I will get from him a complete list of whom he proposes and cable you. After he has received an answer from you to his cable, he says he will discuss his plans further with me. He understands I am cabling you along the lines of the above. Khartoum appears to answer your specifications and taking everything into consideration seems the most practical oasis.

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2 Harriman accompanied the Lyttelton Mission (see footnote 6 to Roosevelt’s message No. 222, November 25, 1942, to Churchill, ante, p. 488) to Washington in November 1942 and returned with the Mission to London at the end of the same month. In information given to the Historical Office on May 22, 1944, the then Under Secretary of State Harriman recalled the instructions given him by Roosevelt on the eve of his return to London. Roosevelt asked Harriman to discuss with Churchill the need for keeping the representation to the projected conference limited to the framework of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order to avoid the necessity of including the Secretary of State.

Anthony Eden.

3 Sir Oliver Lyttelton.

4 In information given to the Historical Office on May 22, 1944, Harriman stated that he received no further instructions from Roosevelt on this matter and assumed that the issue had been resolved in the subsequent correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

[PRIORITY]

[WASHINGTON,] December 8, 1942.

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and secret No. 220.

1 Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.
III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

Your No. 224: 2

The telegram you received from Moscow is essentially identical with the one sent to me. 3

For the sake of the record, I am sending another telegram 4 which follows in my next number, as I think we should continue to make every effort for the African meeting and put the responsibility for declining up to our friend.

I think it would be a mistake for our Staff people to discuss in Moscow any major moves planned for this coming summer. From the practical point of view they could not bind your Government or mine, nor could final plans be approved by you or me without careful study with our Staffs at home.

What would you think, therefore, of suggesting that Staff conversations between military officials from U.K., Russia, and America take place in Africa, either in Algiers, Khartoum, or some other suitable place. The results and recommendations of such a meeting would, of course, have to be taken up in all three Capitals before final approval.

ROOSEVELT

2 In his telegram 224, December 7, 1942, to Roosevelt, not printed, Churchill transmitted the text of Stalin’s message of December 6, 1942, and added: “Pray look especially at sentence beginning ‘I am waiting’. Stalin’s message to Churchill, the text of which is printed in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 655-656, and Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. i, p. 82, explained the Soviet leader’s inability to leave his country to attend a conference.

3 For text of Stalin’s message of December 5, 1942, to Roosevelt, declining the President’s invitation to attend a conference, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, p. 666.

4 In a message of December 8, 1942, to Stalin, Roosevelt expressed his disappointment at the Soviet leader’s inability to attend the proposed conference in January. As an alternative, Roosevelt suggested that the conference be scheduled for early March. For text of Roosevelt’s message, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, p. 675. Stalin replied to Roosevelt on December 14, 1942, and explained it was impossible for him to leave the Soviet Union even at the beginning of March. For text of Stalin’s message, see ibid., p. 675.

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill 1

[WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1942.

DEAR WINSTON:—I have not had an answer to my second invitation to our Uncle Joe 2 but, on the assumption that he will again decline,

1 The source text, which is unsigned, may actually be a draft of a letter sent somewhat later. Telegram 234, December 14, 1942, from the President to the Prime Minister reads as follows: “I am sending you a letter by courier in regard to our future plans. You should get it, weather permitting, in three or four days.” (Roosevelt Papers) The text of the letter printed here bears a covering note, unsigned, on White House stationery, dated December 13, 1942, and addressed to “Former Naval Person”, reading as follows: “My courier has already been delayed four days and will probably be delayed four more. Therefore, I am quoting to you the message which he carries. Please keep it very secret.” (Roosevelt Papers) The signed text of this letter printed in Churchill, pp. 667-669, is dated December 14, 1942. It varies from the text presented here in punctuation and complimentary close.

2 Regarding Roosevelt’s message of December 8, 1942, to Stalin and Stalin’s reply of December 14, see footnote 4 to Roosevelt’s December 8 message to Churchill, printed supra.
I think that in spite of it you and I should get together, as there are things which can be definitely determined only by you and me in conference with our Staff people. I am sure that both of us want to avoid the delays which attended the determination on Torch last July.

1. On the grounds of vile climate and icing on the wings, Iceland must be definitely out for both of us.

2. England must be out for me for political reasons.

3. There will be a commotion in this country if it is discovered that I have flown across any old seas. Therefore, Bermuda would be just as much out for me as Africa. However, on condition that I can get away in absolute secrecy and have my trip kept secret until I am back, I have just about made up my mind to go along with the African idea—on the theory that public opinion here will gasp but be satisfied when they hear about it after it is over.

4. One mitigating circumstance would be the knowledge that I had seen our military leaders in North and West Africa, and that is why I think it would be best if we could meet somewhere in that neighborhood instead of Khartoum. Incidentally, I could actually see some of our troops.

5. Incidentally also, it would do me personally an enormous amount of good to get out of the political atmosphere of Washington for a couple of weeks.

6. My thought is, therefore, that if the time suits your plans we could meet back of Algiers or back of Casablanca about January fifteenth. That would mean that I would leave about January eleventh, and pray for good weather. My route would be either from here to Trinidad and thence to Dakar and thence north—or from here to Natal, Brazil, and cross to Liberia or Freetown and north from there.

7. In view of Stalin’s absence, I think you and I need no foreign affairs people with us—for our work will be essentially military. Perhaps your three top men and my three top men could meet at the same place four or five days in advance of our arrival and have plans in fairly good tentative shape by the time we get there. I asked General Smith, who left here four or five days ago, to check up confidentially on some possible tourist oasis as far from any city or large population as possible. One of the dictionaries says “an oasis is never wholly dry”. Good old dictionary!

8. Here is an alternate plan in case Uncle Joe says he will meet us about March first:

I would suggest that your Staff people and mine should meet with the Russian Staff people somewhere in Africa, or even as far as Baghdad, and come to certain recommendations which would at least get the

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preliminaries of new moves started. The three of us could, when we meet, close up the loose ends and also take up some of the post-war matters.

With my warm regards,
As ever yours,

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

LONDON, December 12, 1942.

Number 230. Former Naval Person to President most secret and personal. The only question which the Russians will ask or the only one that matters will be "Are you going to make a Second Front in 1943 and when and with what forces?" I cannot answer this except jointly with you because the forces we British can dispose of are obviously insufficient. Therefore, we cannot reply to Stalin's question until our Staffs have explored the possibilities together and hence my strong wish that your friends should come here. If this is not agreeable I am willing to come to you. We are all here sure that a talk whether at Moscow or Khartoum among the three Staffs apart from the heads of governments would not be useful.

PRIME

1 Transmitted via War Department channels.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1942.

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and secret No. 242.

Following is the substance of letter 2 which courier has for you:

"In spite of Stalin's inability to meet with us I think we should plan a meeting at once with our respective military staffs. I should like to meet in Africa about January 15th. There is I believe a satisfactory and safe place just north of Casablanca. It might be wise for some of our military men to precede us by a few days to clear the ground. I should think if we could have four or five days together we could clear up all of our business.

"Will you let me know what you think of this."

Roosevelt

1 Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.
2 The reference is to Roosevelt's letter of December 11, 1942, ante, p. 498.
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt ¹

SECRET  

[LONDON,] December 21, 1942.

From the Former Naval Person to the President. Personal and Most Secret. Number 238.

Yes, certainly; the sooner the better. I am greatly relieved. It is the only thing to do. All arrangements here will be made on basis that it is a staff meeting only.

Suggested code name "SYMBOL".

¹Transmitted via Navy channels.

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt ¹

SECRET  

[WASHINGTON,] December 30, 1942.

Most Secret and Personal Number 248 from the Former Naval Person to the President.

I sent Brigadier Jacob to North Africa on Christmas Day to consult with Generals Eisenhower and Smith about arrangements for SYMBOL. Jacob has now telegraphed that they have found admirable accommodation and that General Smith who is in full agreement is telegraphing the results of their reconnaissance to you.²

2. I do not think we can do better than accept these proposals, and as time is short, I am going ahead on the assumption that you approve.

3. My intention is that HMS Bulolo, which is a specially fitted headquarters ship, should leave the UK on about 4th January with the more junior staff officers of my delegation, cypher staff, clerical staff, etc. Bulolo will be berthed in the harbour and serve as signal ship.

4. In your 242 you suggested that some of our military men should precede us by a few days to clear the ground. I entirely agree, and will arrange for British Chiefs of Staff to arrive by air at rendezvous on whatever day it may be possible for American Chiefs of Staff to reach there. Can you give me a date?

5. It would also be helpful if you could let me know as soon as possible your own programme and I will make my own arrangements accordingly.

¹Transmitted via Navy channels.

²The site agreed upon was Hotel Anfa and surrounding villas in Anfa, a suburb on the southern outskirts of Casablanca. For General Eisenhower's report of December 20 on the results of the reconnaissance and the selection of Anfa as well as the immediately preceding correspondence between Marshall and Eisenhower on the selection of a site, see Sherwood, pp. 603-605.
6. Many thanks about Macmillan. I agree to what you say about Eisenhower's final authority.

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*In his telegram 289, December 23, 1942, to Roosevelt (Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. II, p. 491), Churchill proposed the designation of Macmillan as British Political Representative at Eisenhower's headquarters. In his telegram 245, December 26, 1942, to Churchill (not printed), Roosevelt suggested that the arrival of Macmillan in North Africa be postponed until the situation was stabilized. In his telegram 347, December 29, 1942 (not printed), Roosevelt agreed to a proposal by Churchill to designate Macmillan "Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters", with the understanding that Eisenhower "will continue to have full veto power over all civil officials in the area of operations when in his (Eisenhower's) opinion such veto is advantageous to military operations or prospects." (Roosevelt Papers)\(^1\)

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

**President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill**

**SECRET**

**URGENT—PRIORITY**

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and secret No. 248.

Arrangements for Symbol satisfactory. Our Chiefs of Staff will arrive twelfth and I will follow two days later so that we could all meet together on fifteenth. I believe our staffs can cover the ground in a two day preliminary conference. The prospect pleases me.

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\(^1\) Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

**President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill**

**SECRET**

**URGENT—PRIORITY**

No. 249 personal and most secret from the President to the Former Naval Person.

Our censor plans to issue just before departure the following instructions to all papers, radio and wire communications systems:

"The President is going on another trip in the immediate future and for security reasons no comment should be made on his whereabouts or the purpose of the trip until a release is approved by this office."

I am particularly anxious that no confidential information be given to the press as to the place or time of Symbol. I wonder if your censor could give out substantially the same statement to your own press.

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\(^1\) Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.
regarding you as well as myself. I intend to clamp down the lid a few hours before I leave.

Roosevelt

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The President’s Special Representative (Harriman) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹

London, January 1, 1943.

Harriman to Hopkins, relating Symbol of which Harriman has been told by Prime Minister.

Please advise: 1. Whether the Boss still wants me to check membership British party in order to be sure that there are no ringers.² You will recall that this is what he asked me to do at luncheon my last day in Washington in connection with the then contemplated plans.

2. Whether I am still expected to come.² You can well understand my concern as to the manner in which our conclusions are to be presented to the Russians.

¹Transmitted via Navy Channels.
²Regarding Roosevelt’s instructions to Harriman to discuss with Churchill the matter of the composition of the delegations to the projected conference, see footnote 2 to Harriman’s telegram to Roosevelt, December 7, 1942, ante, p. 496.
³Roosevelt’s message 253 to Churchill, dated January 4, 1943, not printed, reads as follows: “I hope you can bring Averell with you and I have asked him to go to see you. He can be very helpful.” (Roosevelt Papers) In his message 254 to Roosevelt, dated January 5, 1943, Churchill replied: “Delighted to bring Averell.” (Roosevelt Papers)

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt ¹

SECRET

London, January 2, 1943.

From Former Naval Person to President, Number 251; Most Secret and Personal.

1. Your 249. We will conform to your wishes and are observing the strictest secrecy. It might be worth while later on, when our absence becomes noticeable, suggesting we are meeting secretly somewhere in the United States; or anyhow, that I have gone to America.

2. In Symbol I am “Air Commodore Frankland”. Suggest you also choose an alias and one for Harry.

3. Also suggest press correspondents be entirely excluded, but presume no objection to our official photographers going out in Bulolo (my headquarters ship), pictures being released and afterwards and simultaneously to both countries.

¹Transmitted via Navy channels.
IV. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

4. Your 250 also received. Many thanks for your good wishes. Are you going to see de Gaulle before Symbol, or wait till afterwards?

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2 In his telegram 250, January 1, 1943, to the Prime Minister, the President outlined his views regarding the political situation in French North Africa; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, p. 23.

3 Following the assassination of Admiral Darlan in Algiers on December 24, 1942, the projected visit to Washington of General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Fighting France movement and President of the French National Committee in London, was cancelled. In his message 245 to Prime Minister Churchill, dated December 26, 1942 (not printed), the President expressed himself on the visit as follows: "I think it would be best for de Gaulle to postpone visit here. This will give 'Symbol' a chance to clear situation first." (Roosevelt Papers) In replying to the President on December 27, the Prime Minister stressed the necessity to bring about a unification of the various French factions and the conviction that settlement of the North African situation could not be held up for the forthcoming conference (Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 644-645). For a discussion and documentation regarding the arrangements for de Gaulle visit and its subsequent cancellation, see de Gaulle, p. 70, and de Gaulle, Documents, pp. 95-116, passim. For documentation regarding relations between the United States and the Free French forces in 1942, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, pp. 502 ff.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

URGENT-PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] January 2, 1943.

Personal and secret for the Former Naval Person from the President No. 252. Your 251:
1. I heartily approve your Paragraph One.
2. The aliases from this end will be (a) Don Quixote and (b) Sancho Panza.
3. No press correspondents. I will bring one Navy Photographer and we can join in joint release.
4. I honestly think de Gaulle would feel happier if he postponed visit until after "Symbol". Also I would find great difficulty in giving him any time even if he were to leave at once.

ROOSEVELT

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1 Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

SECRET

PRIORITY

LONDON, January 3, 1943.

From the Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Most Secret and Personal Number 253.

Your 252.

1 Transmitted via Navy channels.
1. Your paragraph 1 will be done.
2. Your paragraph 2. How ever did you think of such an impenetrable disguise? In order to make it even harder for the enemy and to discourage irreverent guesswork propose Admiral Q. and Mr. P. (NB) We must mind our P’s and Q’s.
3. Should you bring Willkie with you suggest code word WINDMILL.
4. De Gaulle. I think it far better the visit should be postponed till Torch affairs are Symbolized.

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes of a Meeting at the White House

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1943.

PRESENT

The President
Admiral W. D. Leahy, U.S.N.
General G. C. Marshall, U.S.A.
Admiral E. J. King, U.S.N.
Lt. General H. H. Arnold, U.S.A.
Brig. General J. R. Deane, U.S.A.

The President first discussed the contemplated trip to North Africa indicating that he had had word that the British might be somewhat delayed. He said that he proposed to spend four or five days with Mr. Churchill and thereafter for at least two days he wished to visit troops, going as far east as Algiers. He is particularly anxious to keep on the move and not spend more than a few hours with the troops at any one place. He would like to have his sleeping accommodations and meals with our armed forces and indicated he would be perfectly satisfied with a tent. He said he did not want to go as far east as Bône.

General Marshall said that most of our troops were concentrated in the largest numbers in General Patton’s forces in the vicinity of Casablanca.

The President then said that on the way back he wanted to stop in Liberia, perhaps for a day, also in Natal, and either Dutch or British Guiana. He indicated that either on the way down or the way home he would like to stop at Trinidad, but that if he visited either of the Guianas on the return trip he would probably spend the night in Puerto Rico.

In response to a query from Admiral Leahy the President said he had no objection to visiting Dakar. He particularly stated that he did not wish to return to Casablanca once his part of the conference had

1 Meeting held on Thursday, January 7, 1943, at 3 p. m.
ended. He felt that he could go from Algiers or Oran directly to Liberia.

The President then asked General Marshall if he thought that he, General Marshall, should go to Moscow.

General Marshall said, "What would I be expected to accomplish there?"

The President replied that the visit would be particularly for the purpose of giving impetus to the Russian morale. He said that Mr. Stalin had been invited to confer with the President and the Prime Minister on two occasions but had been unable to do so. He said he thought that Mr. Stalin probably felt out of the picture as far as Great Britain and the United States were concerned and also that he has a feeling of loneliness. The President said he was going to speak to Mr. Churchill about the advisability of informing Mr. Stalin that the United Nations were to continue on until they reach Berlin, and that their only terms would be unconditional surrender. He also proposed to discuss with Mr. Churchill some political questions particularly with regard to disarmament after the war. He thought he would suggest that there be a meeting between Mr. Churchill, the Generalissimo, Mr. Stalin, and himself some time next summer, possibly in Nome. He informed General Marshall that if his discussions with Mr. Churchill along these lines were favorable, he, General Marshall, could be the emissary to inform Mr. Stalin of these results.

2 The concept of "unconditional surrender" had come under consideration within the United States Government as early as May 1942, and the President had been at least informally apprised of the support the policy had, apparently sometime prior to the Casablanca Conference. The Subcommittee on Security Problems of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, at its third meeting on May 6, 1942, began a consideration of armistice and unconditional surrender. According to the minutes of the Subcommittee, presided over by Mr. Norman H. Davis, quick agreement on the matter was reached: "The subcommittee agreed to begin its discussion of the armistice period with the assumption that unconditional surrender will be exacted of the principal defeated states. The view was expressed that it might prove desirable to negotiate an armistice with Italy in order to pull her out of the war, but that nothing short of unconditional surrender could be accepted in the case of Germany and Japan. The United States must insist, it was agreed, that there be no relaxation whatsoever in this stipulation. On the other hand, it was felt that a different set of terms of surrender would be required in the case of each major enemy in order to fit the peculiar conditions of each. The Army and Navy members of the subcommittee agreed to draw up for each of the Axis states a series of proposed terms of surrender." (IO Files). The Subcommittee reaffirmed its support of the unconditional surrender concept at its fourth meeting on May 20, 1942. The minutes of that meeting read in part as follows: "There was considerable discussion of whether an unconditional surrender, rather than an armistice, must be demanded of the principal enemy states. It was held that, while unconditional surrender would undoubtedly be preferable if the military situation permitted, study should also be given to possible conditions of an armistice and possible conditions of a negotiated peace." (IO Files) It appears that the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security Problems, Norman H. Davis, informally apprised the President of the Subcommittee's views on this matter: see Department of State publication No. 3580, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 127.
General Marshall said that after the conference was over he and General Arnold and General Somervell propose to go to Basra where they would separate, General Marshall going to Moscow, General Arnold going to Chungking, and General Somervell looking into the shipping and other logistical matters in the Iran–Iraq Area. After that he would return and pick up General Somervell and eventually they would leave from Ceylon and go to Australia, returning to the United States via the Pacific. General Arnold would return to the United States alone.

The President then asked who was to take the places of the Chiefs of Staff when they left.

General Marshall replied that in the War Department General McNarney would take over his duties and that General Styer would act for General Somervell. He felt that the immediate operational affairs could be taken care of very well inasmuch as General Hull, who will be at the conference, will be returning to the United States directly. He said, of course, all the plans were contingent on the results of the conference and the immineness of operations decided upon.

Admiral King then said that Admiral Horne would act as Chief of Naval Operations and Admiral Edwards as Chief of Staff would act for him in his office of Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet. He also informed the President he was taking Admiral Cooke with him.

The President then referred to a message which he had just received from Mr. Stalin in which he said that he wanted 100 airplanes but not crews.³

General Marshall and General Arnold pointed out that to send heavy bombers might immobilize these planes for six months while the Russians were learning to operate them and creating the necessary ground installations.

Admiral Leahy said that he understood the idea of sending planes at all was to placate Mr. Stalin and that he didn’t see why it made any particular difference whether they sent the planes with or without crews.

General Marshall replied that there was much more to the question than placating Mr. Stalin. Had we been able to send the planes as units of the Caucasus they would have been in a position to cover our operations in Iran and Iraq, to have given added protection to the Caucasus, and would have been available to have left Russia in support of some of our operations in case of emergency on short notice.

It then developed that Mr. Stalin’s reply was with regard to a proposal which had been sent to him that in the event of war between Rus-

³ For Stalin’s message to the President, dated January 5, 1943, see Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. ii, p. 48.
sia and Japan we would be prepared to send 100 heavy bombers to Russia within a period of about 72 days. The message also contained a proposal that the Bradley Mission be sent in order to make the necessary survey as to what facilities would be necessary in case these planes were sent. (A copy of Mr. Stalin’s reply will be sent to each of the Chiefs of Staff.)

General Arnold then suggested that we send 300 transport planes to Russia at the rate of twenty per month: ten from the United States and ten from the United Kingdom.

The President replied that he thought we should just send an answer to Mr. Stalin informing him that General Marshall will be coming to Moscow in the near future and will discuss the matter with him at that time. (Such a reply will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.)

Admiral Leahy then submitted a radiogram to the President which he proposed be sent to the Prime Minister giving a brief of the message that had been sent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek concerning proposed operations in Burma.

The President, in reading the message, said he didn’t think we should use the words “Burma Operations” but should make the title descriptive of what the operation proposed to do, that is, simply open the Burma Road. He said he did not see any necessity to take Rangoon.

General Marshall explained that the operation now being considered was a limited operation for the purpose of opening the Burma Road and was confined to the northern part of Burma.

Admiral Leahy suggested calling it “The Burma Road Operation,” to which all agreed.

The President again asked what would be the necessity of taking Rangoon.

General Marshall replied that Rangoon was included in the Anakim Operation and that it would be desirable to obtain the south-

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*The offer of one hundred bombers to the Soviet Union in event of an attack by Japan in the Far East was contained in a message from the President to Stalin, dated December 30, 1942, delivered to the Soviet Foreign Commissariat in note 1-26, January 1, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. III, p. 683.

*Major General Follett Bradley was sent to the Soviet Union by President Roosevelt in July 1942 to head a special air mission which was to arrange for the delivery via Alaska and Siberia of American war-aid aircraft for the Russian forces and was to arrange for American survey flights over the air-ferry route in Siberia. On October 6, 1942, Stalin gave American authorities permission to make surveys of Soviet air bases in the Caucasus and Eastern Siberia. General Bradley was ordered home for consultation late in October, and he left the Soviet Union in November 1942. For documentation regarding the Bradley Mission, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. III, pp. 607-622 and 720-726, passim; for an account of the Mission, see Matloff and Snell, pp. 339-346.

*In a message to Stalin, dated January 8, 1943 (Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. III, p. 616), the President restated his proposal and offered to send General Marshall to Moscow to help formulate plans.

*For text of Roosevelt’s message to Churchill as sent on January 7, see infra.
ern part of Burma because we could thereby increase the flow of freight over the Burma Road not only by having the port facilities at Rangoon but also through the use of the railroad which connects them. He pointed out that the limited operation now contemplated is over very difficult terrain and perpendicular to all of the parallel ridge lines. He said that as far as Akyab was concerned, the only purpose in attempting to capture that part was for the establishment of an airfield.

The President then opened the discussion relative to the coming conference in North Africa asking if all were agreed that we should meet the British united in advocating a cross-channel operation.

General Marshall replied that there was not a united front on that subject, particularly among our Planners. The Chiefs of Staff themselves regarded an operation in the north more favorably than one in the Mediterranean but the question was still an open one. He said that to him the issue was purely one of logistics; that he was perfectly willing to take some tactical hazards or risks but that he felt we have no right to take logistical hazards. He pointed out that the British were determined to start operations in the Mediterranean but that they are ready to consider Bolero operations for a later date. He said the British pressed the point that we must keep the Germans moving. They lay great stress on accomplishing the collapse of Italy which would result in Germany having to commit divisions not only to hold Italy but also to replace Italian divisions now in other occupied countries. The British also feel that Turkey would be much impressed by a success in the Mediterranean and that the communications in the Mediterranean would be improved.

General Marshall went on to say that Sicily was probably a more desirable objective but much more difficult because the Germans have been in Sicily longer, and that there were a great many more and much better airfields for them than in Sardinia. An operation against Sicily would be similar to an operation across the Channel, but that any operation in the Mediterranean would limit what could be sent to the United Kingdom.

General Marshall emphasized that his greatest worry about operations in the Mediterranean was the loss of tonnage which would be involved. Any such operation would have to be made under air attack from Italy, southern France, Corsica, possibly Greece, as well as under a concentrated submarine attack. Our Planners, have estimated that there would be about 20% loss in shipping: —10% in and 10% out. He also pointed out the danger of Spain becoming hostile, in which case we would have an enemy in possession of a defile on our line of communications. To point out the scarcity in shipping he stated that we were now about to undertake an operation in the Aleutians in which we could only make one combat loader available whereas
the success of the operation would be much more assured if we could have had two combat loaders. He said we may learn something from the British in the conference, of which we are not now aware, but he felt that the tonnage involved in the Mediterranean operation was the most important consideration. He said that he personally favors an operation against the Brest Peninsula. The losses there will be in troops, but he said that, to state it cruelly, we could replace troops whereas a heavy loss in shipping, which would result from the Brimstone Operation, might completely destroy any opportunity for successful operations against the enemy in the near future.

Admiral King said that the occupation of Sardinia would not be of great assistance in opening communications through the Mediterranean whereas the occupation of Sicily would have a very decisive and favorable effect on such communications. He felt that the question of communications through the Mediterranean was a more important consideration than the effect of our operations on Italy.

The President said that as far as Sardinia is concerned he felt that if we took it we could shout “Hooray” and then say “Where do we go from here?”

General Arnold said that he thought that Sardinia was a more difficult operation than Sicily from the air point of view because Sicily was not subject to attack from as many directions and also that it could be given fighter protection from the Tunisia Area more rapidly.

The President then asked General Marshall what he thought the losses would be in an operation against the Brest Peninsula.

General Marshall replied that there would of course be losses but that there were no narrow straits on our lines of communications, and we could operate with fighter protection from the United Kingdom.

The President had questioned the practicability of a landing on the Brest Peninsula to which General Marshall replied that he thought the landing could be effected but the difficulties would come later in fighting off attacks from German armored units. He also said that the question of supplying fighter aircraft for an operation in the north was much simpler than for operations in the Mediterranean because such aircraft could be flown from the United States via Great Britain.

The President then asked why the British opposed the Brest Peninsula Operation.

General Marshall said he thought they feared that the German strength would make such an operation impracticable.

Admiral Leahy then asked when such an operation could be undertaken, to which General Marshall replied the earliest date would be some time in August.
The President pointed out that at the conference the British will have a plan and stick to it.

General Marshall said that at one stage of the deliberations General Brooke favored an operation against Sardinia while the Prime Minister favored a SLEDGERHAMMER coupled with an effort to get Turkey into the war, but he thought they were now agreed on Sardinia and it would be difficult to arrive at an agreement.

He indicated that there was a very decided difference of opinion between the American and British point of view and there the question had resolved itself into one thing or the other with no alternatives in sight.

The President said that an operation in Turkey would involve more shipping than is available. The State Department's point of view is that Turkey will not enter the war until we can put sufficient forces in Syria, such as airplanes and tanks, to convince them that we can assure their success by simply moving across the border and joining them.

Admiral Leahy pointed out that it was essential to do something about Syria or the Germans would attack there.

General Marshall replied that the British 8th Army was planning on reinforcing British troops in Syria.

General Arnold said that one of General Eisenhower's greatest troubles at the present time was a lack of airfields, and that this would also hamper Operation BRIMSTONE.

General Marshall said that our Planners differed with the British on the effects that Operation BRIMSTONE would have with regard to Spain. The British feel that the successful capture of Sardinia would have a stabilizing effect on Spain and insure that they would not enter the war, whereas our Planners had exactly the opposite point of view, feeling that if we succeed in taking Sardinia Germany's logical move would be to occupy the Iberian Peninsula and cut our lines of communications.

Admiral Leahy said that if we captured the Brest Peninsula it would prevent an invasion of Spain.

General Marshall agreed but stated that the occupation of Spain might come before we were prepared to mount the operation against the Brest Peninsula.

Admiral King said he felt we should reach a decision in January to which the President agreed.

General Marshall said that when we were planning last July the possibilities of a Russian collapse were dominant in our thoughts and that we accepted the operation in North Africa realizing that it was extremely hazardous. He felt that the surprise attained in this operation had surprised us. He said that in no sense was it a normal opera-
tion, that everything about it was abnormal and perhaps that had been the reason for our gaining surprise.

The President indicated that if we undertake an operation against Sardinia the Germans would quickly become aware of it.

General Marshall then said that there was one point that General Eisenhower had presented which offered the only advantage for an operation against Sardinia that had impressed him. He said that he thought the operation should be mounted from outside the Mediterranean, at least one division coming from the United States and several from England. If this were done, the North African situation could remain unchanged, and there would be a good possibility of surprise since the Germans would not know whether plans contemplated an attack in the north or the south.

The President then asked if it wouldn't be possible for us to build up a large force in England and leave the actual decision in abeyance for a month or two.

General Marshall said that he thought perhaps the necessity for shipping landing craft would prevent this procedure.

Admiral King said that if the operation were mounted from England the landing craft would be sent there in any event.

Admiral King then suggested that perhaps the whole operation could be carried out from North Africa using the small type landing craft in which we could afford to take the attrition losses.

Admiral Leahy said he thought that the President's suggestion had considerable merit, that is, building up a large force in Europe and making plans for both an attack against the Brest Peninsula and an attack against Sardinia, but delaying the decision for a month or two; the decision to be based on the situation existing at that time.

The President pointed out that we now have 800,000 or 900,000 men in North Africa. He thought that 100,000 would be adequate for the protection of Syria, 200,000 would be necessary for the occupation of Algiers, Morocco, and Tunisia, once the Axis forces had been expelled.

The question then arose what to do with the additional 500,000 in North Africa and also the 500,000 that might be built up in the United Kingdom for an attack against either Brest or Cherbourg.

General Marshall pointed out that we were already training divisions for the Brimstone Operation in case a decision was made to mount it.

General Marshall said he would have a study prepared as to the limiting dates before which a decision must be made.

The President suggested that perhaps General Deane could meet him in Bathurst on the night of his arrival and explain what had taken place in the conference up to that time in order that he would not arrive at the conference ignorant of what had previously tran-
spired. He then indicated that perhaps it would be best to let him come right on to Casablanca, get a good night’s rest, and then go into the subject thoroughly. He said that he would leave the decision as to which course should be followed to the Chiefs of Staff to do as they thought best.

The President then took up the question of the areas of administrative responsibility in North Africa, in response to a recommendation which he had before him which had been submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He decided that the boundary between the areas of responsibility between the United States and the United Kingdom should be the eastern border of Tunisia.

[Here follows a discussion of certain domestic matters.]

The President then discussed the question of sovereignty in North Africa. He said that no sovereignty exists in North Africa. He said that French sovereignty is derived from the people of France, and since at the present time there is no government in France, it is impossible for the people to exercise this sovereignty and indicate the type of government that they desire. All that can be accomplished is a *de facto* civil control carried on by civilians who are capable of exercising such control.

He said that the sovereignty of France ceased in June of 1940 when President LeBrun disappeared. He felt that Marshal Pétain was really just a *de facto* dictator without legal functions and simply exercised control because he was a man whom the people would follow.

The President said that what must be made clear is that in North Africa we have military occupation. General Eisenhower has the right to say to anyone, “Can you run this Government? Okeh; I’ll give you a try at it, but I can recall you at any time.” The President said that when Admiral Darlan died, General Eisenhower should have said the same thing to General Giraud. He pointed out that instead of doing this General Giraud came to General Eisenhower and said that he had been chosen by a French Imperial Council. The President stated that there is no such thing as a French Imperial Council, and that General Eisenhower as Commander in Chief should have informed General Giraud that the United States does not recognize such a body. He felt that this matter should be discussed by the Chiefs of

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*The recommendation submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was in accordance with the proposal set forth in Hull’s letter of December 23, 1942, to Leahy, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 486. On January 23, 1943, Hull informed Ambassador Halifax of the President’s approval of the establishment of areas of responsibility in North Africa (855C.01/15).*

*Adm. Jean François Darlan, High Commissioner in French North Africa, was assassinated on December 24, 1942.*

*For the statement by the Secretary of State regarding the selection of General Giraud as High Commissioner to succeed Admiral Darlan, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 498.*
Staff with General Eisenhower and that the latter should be given a clear understanding with regard to it.

The President stated that the British are trying to organize a Government of France under de Gaulle. He said that he has perfect confidence in Mr. Churchill, but not in the British Foreign Office. He indicated that the United States has the whip hand and that he would tell Mr. Churchill that de Gaulle is a military officer, but that he can be given no authority regarding the sovereignty of France because the people of France have not had an opportunity to give such authority.

Admiral King then asked about the status of President LeBrun.

The President replied that Mr. LeBrun does represent the sovereignty of France since he is the duly elected President. He indicated that if Mr. LeBrun could resume his position as head of the French State and that it would then be possible for de Gaulle and Giraud to go to him for their orders, this type of government or sovereignty was one which we could recognize.

The President then discussed Comte de Paris. He told the Chiefs of Staff that they should inform General Eisenhower that the United States cannot recognize Comte de Paris in any way.

The President said that Mr. Murphy had given certain written pledges to Giraud to restore France and the colonial possessions of France after the war. He said that in doing this Mr. Murphy had exceeded his authority and that he as President was not prepared to make any promises. There are some of the colonial possessions which he was certain would not be returned to France, and he had grave doubts as to whether Indo-China should be. He thought that the Chiefs of Staff in their discussions in North Africa should make this plain to both Mr. Murphy and to General Eisenhower.

The meeting then adjourned.

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For texts of correspondence exchanged between Murphy and General Giraud in October and November 1942, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. II, pp. 412–422.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 7, 1943.

Personal and secret from the President for the Former Naval Person No. 254.

I should like to acquaint you with a message received by me from Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. Begin brief of Generalissimo's message:

Last spring the Prime Minister assured the members of the Pacific War Council that before the end of the next monsoon season, eight

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2 Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

3 The message from Chiang was a telegram dated December 28, 1942 (Roosevelt Papers).
battleships, three aircraft carriers and the usual complement of other vessels would be in the Indian Ocean to assist in the recapture of Burma. We have been counting on the support of this naval force, for without it the recapture of Burma will be impossible. General Stilwell upon returning from a conference in India informs me that Admiral Somerville stated the British Navy has at its disposal only a few destroyers and submarines for operations in the Bay of Bengal. Furthermore, two months ago General Wavell promised General Stilwell the British could make seven divisions available to assist in the recapture of Burma. Now I learn that only three divisions are to be employed in limited operations with the objective of capturing Akyab and occupying the line of the Chindwin River. You can rely on the Chinese force being concentrated and ready for action on time in accordance with plans already made. I am sure the American air help for the campaign will be present. However, it is impossible to undertake the offensive with my troops unless the British carry out their part of the undertaking. All the principal United Nations spokesmen have pledged that Burma will be recovered in 1943. I therefore earnestly ask that you urge our British Allies to provide the necessary naval, air and land forces to carry out their part. End of brief of Generalissimo’s message.

I understand that definite progress is being made not only in preparations of the Chinese troops in India for the Burma Road operation but also of the Chinese troops in Yunnan. Units are being reorganized and equipped. Some of the supply essentials are even being flown in. I feel that we must do something to ensure that the Chinese put their full weight into the operations which are due to start in March. Can you suggest any assurance which we can give Chiang Kai Shek which will have this effect?

Offensive action by the Chinese and the timeliness of a thrust into Burma this spring are all important. We also want to get started on our air offensive from China against Jap sea lanes (if not Japan itself), the moment sufficient and dependable communications over Burma warrant such action.

That we may forfeit neither the Chinese potential nor the lift to United Nations morale of early action in Burma, I would like to give the Generalissimo the necessary assurances to prevent the Chinese...
attack stalling. We might together go over the substance of my reply to the Generalissimo later.⁴

Dill has seen this message.

ROOSEVELT

⁴Roosevelt acknowledged Chiang’s message of December 28, 1942, in the following message to Chiang dated January 2, 1943, transmitted through Stilwell in Chungking as telegram AMMOSA No. 1942:

“The receipt is acknowledged of your message of December 28 in regard to the proposed Burma campaign.

“In view of the existing shortage in shipping and present difficulties in providing supplies and reinforcements at their great distance, it is my present thought that an opening of the Burma Road is more important at the present time to our war effort than an occupation of Southern Burma.

“It is my understanding that the light British naval vessels needed for operations in the Bay of Bengal are now being used to hunt Japanese ships in the vicinity of the Cape of Good Hope, a very necessary employment for them at the present time.

“I will definitely take up with the highest allied authorities at the earliest possible date the matter of opening the Burma Road without any avoidable delay.

“Please accept my warm personal regards and my wishes for great and final success in the New Year.” (Roosevelt Papers)

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON], January 9, 1943.

From the President to General Stilwell for delivery to Chiang Kai-Shek.

Your message to me dated January 9, 1943,² saying you are seriously considering abandoning Chinese participation in the proposed Burma operation.

In my message to you of January 2³ I told you that I would definitely take up with the highest Allied authorities at the earliest possible date the matter of opening the Burma Road without avoidable delay. Confidentially and for your personal information only, I expect to confer shortly with the Prime Minister in person. I urge you to delay final decision in the matter until you hear from me further. I hope to send you word in about a week.

ROOSEVELT

¹Transmitted via military channels.

²For text of the message of January 9, 1943, from Chiang to Roosevelt, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 259–260.

³Roosevelt’s message of January 2 to Chiang is given in footnote 4 to Roosevelt’s telegram 254, January 7, to Churchill, supra.
SECRET

LONDON, January 10, 1943.

Number 258, January 10, 1943. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret your 254.²

1. With regard to the Generalissimo’s allegations that we have broken faith with him on two important issues, I should like you to know, firstly about the fleet, that I gave no promise or assurance at the Pacific War Council, but merely stated what were then our intentions, since changed by events of which you are aware. Secondly, Field Marshal Wavell has given no undertaking to operate seven divisions for the recapture of Burma before the next monsoon. The position on these matters is as follows.

2. We had proposed to form the eastern fleet July first, 1942. Since then however all Somerville’s essential aircraft carriers have been drawn away. Victorious has been placed at your disposal. Illustrious must come home for refit. Formidable is busy with Torch but also overdue for refit. The destroyers have been cut to a minimum for the sake of Torch and the Russian convoys. Our shortage of destroyers is frightful. Therefore, although the battleships for the Eastern Fleet are, or will be all ready shortly, they are shorn of their indispensable ancillaries. The fleet in the Indian Ocean exercises a certain deterrent effect as the enemy do not know what it lacks. Also we hope to send Unicorn to join it pretty soon, but it will not be possible with this fleet to enter the Bay of Bengal until it has been reinforced with carriers, nor indeed is the fleet necessary for operations now being undertaken by Field Marshal Wavell before the monsoon.

3. I have been ardently pressing Field Marshal Wavell to take the offensive to the utmost but, as we have had to cut off his supplies of landing craft for the sake of Torch and future operations in the Torch area or elsewhere, he will not be able to manage anything more than operations Cannibal and Ravenous before the monsoon. I am quite sure that he has been most anxious to bring the greatest force to bear on land upon the enemy and to press forward, but it is absolutely no use Chiang or Stilwell saying that men can be maintained at particular points in these mountainous and rain sodden jungles when in effect we know that they cannot. There are plenty of troops in India but the difficulty is to supply them in the forward area under the prevailing conditions.

4. I hope therefore that any assurances to Chiang may wait till SYMBOL. In the meanwhile Field Marshal Wavell is keeping General

¹ Transmitted via military channels.
² Ante, p. 514.
Stilwell fully informed of the limitations which maintenance difficulties impose on his present operations. We had hoped that General Stilwell would have been able to make these problems clear to the Generalissimo.

Aiglers Consulate Files: 800.1 Giraud: Telegram

The President's Personal Representative (Murphy) to the Secretary of State ¹

SECRET

PRIORITY

[Algiers,] January 13, 1943.

No. 5385. Naf 102. General Smith, Macmillan and I called on General Giraud last evening and during the conversation informed him for his personal and secret information of Symbol indicating that we had been unable to advise him sooner due to his recent absence in French West Africa. He was delighted. Smith then brought out very clearly the Allied desire to cooperate with and assist Giraud in every way in his avowed purpose of prosecuting the war against the Axis describing the efforts made by the Allies to overcome the many obstacles in the way of supplying matériel to the French Forces which is the subject closest to Giraud’s heart. Smith emphasized the important part which public opinion plays in such matters both in Great Britain and in the United States and explained that it is primarily for that reason that we take occasion from time to time to discuss in a spirit of frankness certain political factors which unavoidably enter into the military situation. One of these he said is the arrest of a number of persons on December 30th which has aroused considerable interest in the Press abroad and that he had been conscious of a number of criticisms levelled against the local administration because of the mystery and secrecy which surrounded the proceedings.² Smith urged that the present occasion be seized to demonstrate the liberal tendency and the evident desire of Giraud’s administration to revert to the time honored French traditions of Freedom of the Press etc. Giraud insisted that no one would expect him to countenance assassination nor could they justly criticize the honest attempt which is being made to ascertain the guilt of persons involved in the assassination. We made it quite clear that there was no argument on the moral issue involved but that the point on which we insisted was simply a question of procedure and the avoidance of

¹ This message was transmitted via military channels with the following introductory information: “To AGWar for Hull for action and for information to Combined Chiefs of Staff, and USFor for British Chiefs of Staff. Signed Eisenhower from Murphy.”

unnecessary political complications. We felt that the French administration here would be well advised to release immediately all persons whose guilt is not established. Giraud said he agreed with this point of view and that he hoped action would be taken to release some of the persons involved. He could not say how many within two or three days. He also agreed that the trial of these persons would be postponed until after Syria and agreed as did General Bergeret in a preceding conversation that the name of Henri D’Astier De La Vigerie will not be published.

We also referred to the question of certain administrative changes including that of the Governor General of Algeria who we understand is to be replaced by Marcel Peyrouton. Giraud habitually shies when a foreigner discusses French internal politics and he refused to commit himself on this point saying that he would see. Notwithstanding the fact that Bergeret informed Murphy definitely on the preceding day that Peyrouton would be appointed Governor General immediately on his arrival here.

We also referred to the presence of the Comte De Paris in Algiers. Giraud said that he was sending word to the Comte De Paris last evening suggesting that his presence in Algiers is undesirable. We learned this morning that the Comte De Paris is exceedingly embarrassed over the way in which the situation has developed and that he plans to depart from Algiers at once and has announced his intention of joining the French armed forces. Probably the French Foreign Legion, as he did in 1939.

Macmillan brought up the matter of a civilian representative proceeding to London in behalf of the Giraud administration. Giraud was pleased that this would be acceptable and said that he nominated there and then Monsieur Pose, his Director of Finance and Economic Affairs. Macmillan promised to make the necessary arrangements with his Government and also proposed that Monsieur Pose contact some of the entourage of General de Gaulle.

Giraud went on to say that he felt fully confident of amicable and fruitful negotiations with de Gaulle who he said “after all served as a Colonel under my orders”. Giraud, however, took great exception to some of de Gaulle’s associates with whom he felt it would be impossible to get along. Macmillan interjected that this feeling was possibly reciprocated but that part of the discussion ended on the note that every effort be made to arrive at a reconciliation.

As in almost any recent discussion with Giraud, the question of the dollar-pound-franc rate of exchange came up. Giraud reproached Murphy with the statement that he always received from Murphy encouraging words but rarely obtained practical satisfaction stating that the injustice of the discriminatory rate of exchange applied to
this area as compared to the other French territories is so glaring as to be unbearable.

There were a number of references during the conversation to the question of military equipment for the French Forces. Smith repeatedly described the situation demonstrating the extraordinary effort which is being made by the Allies to render maximum assistance to the French. Giraud referred especially to the troops in French West Africa and the French merchant shipping which is being turned over to the Allied Shipping Pool insisting that some of that shipping be employed in the transport of equipment to North Africa for the French Forces. Smith assured him that everything possible was being done in that connection emphasizing the limitation of port facilities, railroad equipment and generally the unfavorable logistics which Giraud is prone to brush aside.
8. THE PRESIDENT’S LOG AT CASABLANCA, JANUARY 14–25, 1943

*Editorial Note*

The document referred to as the President’s Log is a booklet entitled “Log of the Trip of the President to the Casablanca Conference—9–31 January, 1943” consisting of the following parts: (1) foreword; (2) list of the President’s party; (3) summary of the President’s itinerary; (4) narrative of the President’s trip, amounting to 51 pages; and (5) photographs taken during the trip. Reproduced below is the narrative portion of the Log, exclusive of those passages having no bearing whatever on the proceedings of the Conference.

The account of the President’s trip to Casablanca, which comprises the first 11 pages of the narrative portion of the Log, is not reproduced. The President and his party departed by special train from Washington on the evening of January 9, 1943. Arriving in the Miami area early in the morning of January 11, the Presidential party immediately motored to the Pan-American Airways base at Miami where it boarded two chartered Boeing Clippers for the 10-hour flight to the Naval Air Station at Trinidad. The President, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, Rear Admiral McIntire and Captain McCrea flew in the first plane, and members of the Presidential staff flew in the second plane. After resting at the Naval Air Station for the night, the Presidential party took off early on the morning of January 12 for the 9½-hour flight to Belem, Brazil. Admiral Leahy was obliged because of illness to remain at Trinidad. While the Clippers were being refuelled at Belem, the President went ashore and was entertained at the South Atlantic Wing Station of the Air Transport Command. The Presidential party re-embarked at 7 p. m. for the 19-hour flight to Bathurst, Gambia, where the cruiser U.S.S. *Memphis* was waiting. Before boarding the *Memphis*, the President and some of his party made a brief inspection trip of some points of interest along the Bathurst waterfront. On the morning of January 14, after resting the night aboard the *Memphis*, the President went ashore and motored to Yundum Field outside Bathurst where he and his party boarded two C–54 transport aircraft for the 9½-hour flight to Medouina Airport outside Casablanca.
Log of the President's Trip

[Extracts]

Thursday 14 January

The President's plane landed at Medouina Airport, Casablanca, at 6:20 local time, where the President and the passengers in his plane were met by Mr. Michael Reilly of the White House Secret Service. The President proceeded by automobile to his villa adjoining the Anfa Hotel on the outskirts of the city. Here the American Army authorities had taken over a medium-sized modern hotel and 14 nearby villas. The entire area had been surrounded with barbed wire together with a heavy guard of troops, planes, and artillery. The hotel and the adjoining villas had been organized to provide temporary headquarters for the President, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and their respective staffs.

The President was installed in Villa No. 2, “Dar es Saada,” by 7:00 P. M., and a few minutes later Mr. Hopkins left for Villa No. 3, “Mirador,” to escort Prime Minister Churchill across to the President’s villa. The President and Mr. Churchill conferred for an hour and then went in to dinner.¹ In addition to Mr. Churchill, the following persons dined with the President:

General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal
Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten

Gen. George C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold
Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
Mr. Averell Harriman

After dinner, the President’s guests stayed late, renewing old acquaintances and “talking shop.” It was not until almost three hours after midnight that the President retired.²

Friday, 15 January

The day started with a long conference in the President’s bedroom. The following persons were present:

General Geo. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
Lt. General H. H. Arnold
Brig. General J. R. Deane
Mr. Harry Hopkins
Mr. Averell Harriman

¹ No record of the substance of this meeting has been found.
² See the editorial note, post, p. 557.
This conference had lasted from ten o'clock until 12:30. It was followed by a one-thirty luncheon in the President's villa. Mr. Churchill, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Hopkins, Commander Thompson, and Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt lunched with the President.

At 3:00 P.M. the Prime Minister and his personal aide, Commander Thompson, took their departure in company with Mr. Harriman.

At 3:55 P.M., Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S.A., Commander U.S. Armed Forces in North Africa, called on the President. Shortly after five o'clock, Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Special Representative of the President on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, North African Forces visited the President and remained for ten minutes, departing at 5:30 P.M.

Preparatory to a conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, scheduled for 5:30 P.M., the Prime Minister arrived at the President's villa and introduced to the President the following listed British officers:

- General H.R.L.G. Alexander, Commander Middle East Forces
- Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
- Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay
- Office of the Minister of Defense

From 5:30 until 7:00 P.M. the following listed persons conferred as a group with the President and Prime Minister Churchill in the President's villa:

- Field Marshal Sir John Dill
- General H.R.L.G. Alexander
- General Sir Alan F. Brooke
- Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
- Adm. of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound
- Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal
- Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay
- Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten
- Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob
- General George C. Marshall
- Admiral E. J. King
- Brig. Gen. John R. Deane

Following the departure of the above-listed conferees, Mr. Harriman and Lord Leathers called on the President and remained for half an hour, departing at 7:35 P.M.

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5 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes of this meeting, see post, p. 558.
6 See the editorial note, post, p. 563.
7 According to the accounts of this conversation in Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 136-138, and Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 78-79, the subjects discussed included the French North African political situation, the question of arming French military forces in North Africa, and the Allied military campaign in Tunisia.
8 No official record of this meeting has been found. Elliott Roosevelt did not attend, but overheard enough to be able to recall that the subject was French North African politics, including specifically the choice of Giraud as the chief administrator in the area (Elliott Roosevelt, p. 80).
9 For the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, see post, p. 573.
10 No record of the substance of this meeting has been found.
During the afternoon, Lieutenant Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., U.S.N.R., had been informed of his father’s arrival at Casablanca, and he accordingly took up quarters in “Dar es Saada,” thus making the household four persons—The President, Mr. Hopkins, Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Lieutenant Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. These four were joined at dinner in the President’s villa this evening by General Marshall, Lt. General Eisenhower, and Mr. Robert Murphy.

The President retired at 11:40.

Saturday, 16 January

During the morning, the President had a number of callers, and, for the sake of brevity, they are indicated as follows: 9

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<tr>
<th>Called</th>
<th>Departed</th>
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<tr>
<td>9:55</td>
<td>The Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:45</td>
<td>The Rt. Hon. H. Macmillan (British Resident in N. Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:50</td>
<td>Mr. Robert Murphy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>Lt. General Eisenhower</td>
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The President, Mr. Hopkins, Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Lt. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., were joined at luncheon today by Captain George Durno, Air Transport Command, who for many years before entering the Army, had covered the White House for the International News Service. 10 Following luncheon, Chief Photographer’s Mate, Black, took some moving pictures and a number of still photographs at the luncheon party.

From 5:00 until 7:00 P.M., the following listed persons conferred with the President: 11

- General George C. Marshall
- Admiral E. J. King
- Lt. General H. H. Arnold
- Lt. General B. B. Somervell
- Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr.
- Brigadier General A. W. Wedemeyer
- Brigadier General John R. Deane
- Mr. Averell Harriman

The evening dinner party was somewhat unusual. Five members of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAACS) had been invited to take dinner with the President, Mr. Hopkins, Lt. Col. Roosevelt,

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9 Regarding the calls made on Roosevelt on the morning of January 16, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 579.

10 No official record of the substance of the discussion at this luncheon has been found, but for a brief account, see Elliott Roosevelt, *pp. 85–86*.

11 See the minutes of Roosevelt’s meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *post*, p. 594.
Lt. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., and Captain George Durno of the Air Transport Command. Their names are listed below:

- Captain Louise Anderson  WAAC
- Captain Ruth Briggs       WAAC
- Captain Mattie Pinette    WAAC
- Captain Martha Rogers     WAAC
- Captain Alene Drezmal     WAAC

At 11:00 P. M., upon invitation of the President, the Prime Minister, General Alexander, Mr. Harriman, and Commander Thompson joined what was now an after-dinner party, departing at two o’clock the following morning.

No doubt, it may be safely said that not even by the wildest stretch of the imagination, could any of these Service ladies have foreseen that one evening, in a country far from their native land, they would be dining with the President of the United States, and later would be joined by the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

*Sunday, 17 January*

The first important caller of the day was M. General Charles A. Noguèes, Resident General at Rabat, who had been met by Captain McCrea upon arrival at Casablanca. The General was ushered into the President just at noon. General Noguès was accompanied by Major General G. S. Patton, Jr., Commanding General First Armored Corps, Brigadier General William H. Wilbur, First Armored Corps, and Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Special Representative of the President on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief North African Forces. Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt was also present during this conference. At 12:45 General Noguès, accompanied by General Patton and Brigadier General Wilbur, withdrew to the Prime Minister’s villa. (Note: Conference notes, made by Captain McCrea, recorded separately).\(^{12}\)

Following the departure of General Noguès, the Prime Minister called at the President’s villa at 1:30 and remained for luncheon with the President and Mr. Hopkins, taking his departure at 2:50 P. M.\(^{13}\)

At 3:30 P. M., Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, Commanding General Fifth Army, called on the President, to depart momentarily

\(^{12}\) For the record of this meeting, see post, p. 606.

\(^{13}\) No record of the substance of this meeting has been found.
at four o’clock. At 4:14 P. M. he returned, escorting General Henri Giraud, Commander of the French Armies in North Africa, who had an appointment to confer with the President. The President conferred with General Giraud from 4:20 until 5:30, General Clark, Minister Murphy, and Captain McCrea also being present during this meeting. (Note: Conference notes, made by Captain McCrea, recorded separately). 13

Upon the termination of the conference, General Giraud, General Clark, and Minister Murphy withdrew to the Prime Minister’s villa.

At eight o’clock in the evening, the Prime Minister, Lord Leathers, Admiral Cunningham, Admiral King, Lt. General Somervell, and Mr. Harriman dined with the President and his household. Following dinner, the main subject of the conversation was “shipping”, lasting until one o’clock in the morning when the President’s dinner guests took their leave. 16

Monday, 18 January

The President’s morning callers were Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, Commanding the Fifth Army, who arrived at 10:05 and departed at 11:10; Mr. Robert D. Murphy, who conferred with the President and Mr. Hopkins from 10:45 until 12:45; 17 and General George C. Marshall, who called at 12:45 and departed five minutes later.

The Prime Minister luncheoned with the President, Mr. Hopkins, and Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt at Dar es Saada at 1:15 P. M. and departed at 2:40. 18

The President left the grounds of his villa for the first time at 4:10 this afternoon.

[Here follows a description of the President’s inspection of the Third Battalion of the Thirtieth Infantry Regiment which was guarding the President’s camp.]

The President returned to his villa at 4:50, for the Combined Chiefs of Staff were scheduled to confer with him, starting at five o’clock.

The following American and British military representatives of their respective Army, Navy, and Air Forces, conferred with the

14 No official record of this meeting has been found. There is a brief account of what appears to be this conversation in Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950), pp. 131, 147-148. There is also a passing reference to the meeting in Elliott Roosevelt, p. 89.
15 For the record of this meeting, see post, p. 609.
16 See the editorial note, post, p. 612.
17 No official record of the President’s conversations with Hopkins, Murphy, and Clark have been found. According to the account in Elliott Roosevelt, p. 92, the subject under discussion was the planning of American policy on the setting up of an interim French government. Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 148, only mentions that he saw the President on this day.
18 See the editorial note, post, p. 626.
President, the Prime Minister, and Mr. Hopkins from 5:00 until 6:30 P.M.: 19

Field Marshal Sir John Dill General George C. Marshall
General Sir Alan F. Brooke Admiral E. J. King
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal Brig. Gen. John R. Deane
Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten
Brigadier E. T. C. Jacob

Shortly before seven o'clock, Mr. Hopkins had the pleasure of seeing his son, Sergeant Robert Hopkins, who had secured leave of absence from the Signal Corps company to which he was attached and which was then engaged in active operations at the front. Sergeant Hopkins went in to pay his respects to the President, and later his father took him to call on the Prime Minister.

Mr. Murphy called just before dinner, but stayed with the President only about five minutes, departing at 7:45. 20

Mr. Hopkins had accepted an invitation to dine with General Patton this evening, and so he was not present when the President, Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Lieutenant Franklin, Jr., sat down to dinner with their guests for the evening, Admiral McIntire, Captain McCrea, and a young Army Officer, Lieutenant Richard Ryan, a grandson of Thomas Fortune Ryan, and a friend of the family.

The President retired about eleven o'clock.

Tuesday, 19 January

As it was necessary for him to get back to his ship by ten o'clock, Lieutenant Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., U.S.N.R., departed the President's villa at 9:20 A.M. after breakfasting with his brother, Elliott, Mr. Hopkins, and Sergeant Robert Hopkins.

During the morning, Mr. Harriman and Mr. Robert Murphy were in conference with the President and Mr. Hopkins, 21 as was Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, who saw the President from 11:25 until 11:45. 22

The President held a second conference with General Henri Giraud, commencing at noon. Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Captain John L. McCrea, Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Captain A. Beaufre, Aide-de-camp to General Giraud, were also present. The conference touched on a number of points, the details of which are set forth in notes taken by Captain McCrea and which have been recorded separately. 23 At 12:40, the President and General Giraud

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19 For the record of this meeting, see post, p. 627.
20 No record of the substance of this conversation has been found.
21 Elliott Roosevelt, p. 95, gives a brief account of this conference but does not include Hopkins among the participants.
22 No record of the substance of this conversation has been found.
23 For the record of this meeting, see post, p. 644.
withdrew to the terrace where motion and still pictures were made of them. Later the President directed Mr. Hopkins, Captain McCrea, and Captain Beaufre to join the group and additional pictures were made. The General and his aide departed at 12:50.

The President, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Hopkins, Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt, and Sergeant Robert Hopkins lunched together today, following which General Patton called to take Mr. Hopkins and Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt downtown to shop and souvenir hunt and make an automobile tour of the waterfront and the business district of Casablanca.

During the afternoon, Lt. General H. H. Arnold called on the President. He was followed by Rear Admiral J. L. Hall, U.S.N., Commander Western Task Force Sea Frontier, who departed at 4:30 P.M.

At 5:30 P.M., the Prime Minister and his son, Randolph Churchill, a Captain in a Special Service Brigade (Commandos) paid a call on the President and chatted until 6:20, when they left to return to “Mirador.”

Mr. Hopkins and his son, Robert, together with Mr. Harriman left the villa about 7:30 to take dinner with the Prime Minister and his son, Randolph. At this time, the President, Captain McCrea, and Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt also left the villa to have dinner with Major General G. S. Patton, Jr., at “Villa Mas,” General Patton’s headquarters. Also dining with the President and General Patton this evening were Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., U.S.N., Major General Geoffrey Keyes, Deputy Commanding General, First Armored Corps, Brigadier General A. W. Wedemeyer, Brigadier General W. H. Wilbur, in charge of Special Activities in the area now occupied by the First Armored Corps, Brigadier General John E. Hull, and Colonel H. R. Gay.

The President returned to “Dar es Saada” at 11:15 P.M., and at 11:20 P.M. the Prime Minister came in to chat with the President, Mr. Hopkins, and Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt until 1:00 A.M. the next morning, when the Prime Minister returned to his villa.

The President retired about 1:30.

Wednesday, 20 January

Lt. General Somervell arrived at Villa Dar es Saada at eight o’clock this morning to breakfast with Mr. Hopkins, and departed one hour

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24 Photographs appear following p. 483.
25 No official records of the visits of Lieutenant General Arnold and Rear Admiral Hall have been found.
26 No official record of the substance of the discussion at this meeting has been found; for a brief account, see Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 96–97.
27 No official record of this dinner has been found; for a brief account, see Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 97–98.
28 No official record of this meeting has been found; for a brief account, see ibid., p. 99.
later. Major General Spaatz called at ten o'clock to keep an appointment with the President and departed at 11:30. Mr. Robert Murphy also spent an hour at the President's villa this morning conferring with the President and Mr. Hopkins.

At 11:35, General Marshall, Lt. General Arnold, Lt. General Somervell, and Admiral E. J. King arrived for a conference with the President, and following this conference they were photographed on the terrace with the President, together with Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harriman. After the photographs had been taken, the aforementioned Army and Navy officers departed, about 12:30.

Shortly after 1:00 P.M. the Prime Minister, Mr. Harriman, and Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan called to have lunch with the President, Mr. Hopkins, and Lt. Col. Elliot Roosevelt, and departed just before 3:00 P.M.

At 5:00 P.M., the Prime Minister returned in company with General Giraud, and the General's Civilian Aide, M. Poniatowski, and went into conference with the President, Mr. Hopkins, and Mr. Murphy until 5:55, when they took their departure.

At 7:45, the President left Villa Dar es Saada to dine as the guest of the Prime Minister at "Mirador." Also dining with the President and the Prime Minister this evening were:

General H. R. L. G. Alexander
Sir Charles Wilson
Mr. T. L. Rowan (Private Secretary to the P. M.)
Mr. J. M. Martin (Private Secretary to the P. M.)
Mr. Harry Hopkins
Mr. Averell Harriman
Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt
Commander Thompson (Aide to the Prime Minister)
Captain Randolph Churchill
Sergeant Robert Hopkins

The President returned to his villa about 11:15 P.M. and retired shortly thereafter.

Thursday, 21 January

The President arose early this morning, breakfasted, and left Casablanca by automobile at 9:20 for an inspection of the United States
Army forces stationed in the vicinity of Rabat, some 85 miles to the northeast. He was accompanied by Major General G. S. Patton, Jr., Commanding General First Armored Corps, Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Robert D. Murphy, and Rear Admiral Ross T. McIntire. Captain McCrea had gone on ahead to Rabat by automobile, accompanied by Brigadier General W. H. Wilbur, to deliver in person a letter \(^{37}\) from the President to the Sultan of Morocco \(^{38}\) inviting the Sultan and his entourage to take dinner with the President at Casablanca on 22 January. Captain McCrea joined the President's party upon arrival at a point about five miles north of Rabat, where the President was to begin his inspection.

[Here follows the account of the President's inspection trip.]

The President reached his villa in Casablanca at 5:20 P. M. He had been gone eight hours on his tour of inspection, traveling approximately 200 miles by automobile.

Following the President's return to his villa at Casablanca, the Prime Minister called and remained with the President for an hour, departing at 7:25 P. M.\(^{39}\) Dinner was a comparatively small affair, Admiral McIntire and Captain McCrea dining with the President, Mr. Hopkins, Sergeant Robert Hopkins, and the President's son, Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt. The President said that he had enjoyed himself immensely during this day in the open. He retired shortly after 9:30 for his longest night's rest since arriving in North Africa.

**Friday, 22 January**

Mr. Hopkins was in conference with the Prime Minister from 9:45 until 11:55 A. M.,\(^{40}\) returning just before noon in order to be present when the President and the Prime Minister were photographed with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.\(^{41}\) Several photographs were taken on the terrace of the President's villa, and then the President bestowed the Congressional Medal of Honor on Brigadier General William H. Wilbur, U.S. Army, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action during the landing at Fedala on November 8, 1942. Under heavy fire, General Wilbur had succeeded in passing through the French lines in order to deliver certain important letters to French generals some 16 miles to the rear, and later, while returning to his own troops, had personally led a group of tanks which destroyed a French artillery unit observed to be effectively shelling our positions. The President made the presentation in the presence of the Prime

\(^{37}\) No copy of this letter has been found.

\(^{38}\) Sidi Mohammed ben Youssuf.

\(^{39}\) See the editorial note, *post*, p. 679.

\(^{40}\) For an account of this meeting, see Hopkins' notes regarding the proceedings of January 22, in Sherwood, pp. 687–690.

\(^{41}\) Photographs follow p. 485.
Minister, General Marshall, and General Patton, and upon the conclusion of the ceremony extended his personal congratulations to General Wilbur, as did the Prime Minister and Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.\textsuperscript{42}

The President and General Marshall lunched together at the President’s villa, no others being present. General Marshall departed at 2:30 P. M.\textsuperscript{43}

During the late afternoon, Mr. Harriman and Mr. Murphy conferred with the President, and Mr. Hopkins, separately and jointly.\textsuperscript{44}

The Sultan of Morocco had taken great pleasure in accepting the President’s dinner invitation which Captain McCrea had delivered at Rabat the day before. He arrived at the President’s villa at 7:40 together with his early ‘teen age son, the Heir Apparent,\textsuperscript{45} the Grand Vizier,\textsuperscript{46} and his Chief of Protocol.\textsuperscript{47}

The Sultan and his entourage were magnificently attired in white silk robes and came bearing several presents—a gold-mounted dagger for the President in a beautiful inlaid teakwood case, and two golden bracelets and a high golden tiara for Mrs. Roosevelt. The President presented the Sultan with a personally-inscribed photograph of himself, in a beautiful heavy silver frame, engraved at the top with the seal of the President of the United States.

No alcoholic beverages were served before, during, or after the dinner, and care had been taken that no pork or pork products were served since these items are forbidden to true Mohammedans.

The dinner list was composed of the following persons:

The President
The Sultan of Morocco (on the President’s right)
The Prime Minister of Great Britain (to his left)
General Charles A. Nogués, Resident General
The Grand Vizier to the Sultan
Major General Patton
Mr. Robert Murphy
The Crown Prince of Morocco

\textsuperscript{42}For Hopkins’ reflections in connection with this ceremony, see his notes regarding the proceedings of January 22, in Sherwood, p. 688.

\textsuperscript{43}No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. Although he did not participate in the luncheon, Elliott Roosevelt (pp. 108–109) recalls overhearing the portion of the conversation which touched on various aspects of the joint American-British strategic plans for 1943. In his notes regarding the proceedings of January 22 (Sherwood, p. 689), Hopkins states that he joined in at the very end of the Roosevelt–Marshall conversation which at that point was concerned with the Tunisian campaign and the problem of rearming the French.

\textsuperscript{44}No official records of the substance of these conferences have been found. Hopkins’ note regarding the proceedings of January 22 (Sherwood, p. 689) record that the discussion centered on the outcome of the de Gaulle–Giraud luncheon that day.

\textsuperscript{45}Moulay Hassan.

\textsuperscript{46}Mohammed el Mokhri.

\textsuperscript{47}Sidi Mammeri.
The Chief of Protocol
Mr. Hopkins
Captain McCrea
Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt

The Sultan and his party left at 10:10 P.M. and were followed shortly thereafter by the Prime Minister, General Noguès, and General Patton.48

General Charles de Gaulle had arrived in Casablanca from London at noon today, had luncheon with General Giraud,49 and at 6:30 P.M. had kept an appointment with Prime Minister Churchill.50 These two conferred until the latter had to depart for dinner with the President and the Sultan of Morocco. General de Gaulle talked with the President from 10:20 until 10:55 P.M. Information as to the substance of the conversation between the President and General de Gaulle is contained in notes recorded separately by Captain McCrea.51

Following the departure of General de Gaulle at 10:55, the Prime Minister and Mr. Macmillan, plus the latter's secretary, Mr. Mack, called on the President at 11:15 and conferred with him, Mr. Murphy, and Mr. Hopkins until 12:30 A.M.52

The President retired a half hour after the Prime Minister, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Macmillan, and Mr. Mack departed.

Saturday, 23 January

Mr. Hopkins had a number of callers during the morning, conferring at various times with Lt. General Arnold, Mr. Harriman, and Major General Patton.53

The Prime Minister lunched with the President, Mr. Hopkins, and Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt at 1:30 P.M. He departed at 2:45 P.M.54

Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan called during the afternoon at 3:50 and departed at 4:10, again calling at 4:30 and leaving at 5:15.55

The Prime Minister arrived at the President's villa at 4:45 to talk with the President prior to a final meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff scheduled for 5:30.56 The American and British military, naval, and air chiefs conferred with the President and the Prime Minister, in the dining room of the President's villa from 5:30 until 7:50 P.M.

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48 Regarding the dinner party, see the editorial note, post, p. 693. A photograph appears following p. 483.
49 This first de Gaulle-Giraud meeting appears to be the one described in de Gaulle, p. 83, and Giraud, pp. 101–103.
50 For accounts of Churchill's conversation with de Gaulle, see Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 681–682, and de Gaulle, pp. 86–87.
51 For McCrea's record of this meeting, see post, p. 694.
52 See the editorial note, post, p. 696.
53 No record of the substance of these meetings has been found.
54 See the editorial note, post, p. 704.
55 See the editorial note, post, p. 707.
This was the last large-scale meeting of the ten-day conference period fast drawing to a close.\textsuperscript{56}

There were no guests at dinner tonight. The President and Mr. Hopkins dined with their sons, Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt and Sergeant Robert Hopkins.

After dinner, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Mack called to see Mr. Hopkins,\textsuperscript{57} and at 10:30 the President sent for Chief Ship’s Clerk Terry to dictate some “background material” which the President planned to give to the correspondents who were to attend the press conference scheduled for 11:00 A. M. the following day.\textsuperscript{58}

When Mr. Terry returned shortly after midnight with the transcription of the President’s dictation, he found the Prime Minister and his son, Randolph, in conference with the President and Mr. Hopkins.\textsuperscript{57}

In the next two hours, the final draft of a cable to Mr. Stalin,\textsuperscript{59} reporting the highlights of the meeting, was agreed upon as was also the text of the joint communiqué\textsuperscript{60} to be issued next day to the press representatives for actual release to the press of the world the following Wednesday.

Mr. Murphy, Mr. Macmillan, and Mr. Mack left the President’s villa at 2:10 A. M., and the Prime Minister and his son took their departure at 2:30. The President retired a few minutes later.

\textit{Sunday, 24 January}

General Henri Giraud called at 11:05 and had an audience with the President until 11:40.\textsuperscript{61} Major General Charles de Gaulle had arrived while General Giraud was in conference with the President, and following General Giraud’s departure, went in to talk to the President, Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Murphy, and Mr. Macmillan.\textsuperscript{62}

While General de Gaulle was with the President, General Giraud returned, and a few minutes later the Prime Minister appeared.\textsuperscript{63}

These four, the President, the Prime Minister, General Giraud, and General de Gaulle then repaired to the lawn in the rear of the President’s villa where they posed for moving and still pictures. While the cameras “turned over”, the two generals shook hands.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{56} For record of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, see post, p. 707.
\textsuperscript{57} See the editorial note, post, p. 722.
\textsuperscript{58} For text of Roosevelt’s notes for his press conference, see post, p. 836.
\textsuperscript{59} For final text of the Joint message from the President and the Prime Minister to Stalin as sent on January 25, 1943, see post, p. 805.
\textsuperscript{60} For final text of the joint communiqué see post, p. 847.
\textsuperscript{61} See the editorial note, post, p. 723.
\textsuperscript{62} See the editorial note, post, p. 724.
\textsuperscript{63} See the editorial note, post, p. 725.
\textsuperscript{64} Photographs follow p. 488.
Then Generals Giraud and de Gaulle bade farewell to the President and the Prime Minister and withdrew.

A few minutes after twelve, the President, with the Prime Minister seated at his left, invited the assembled newspapermen to sit down on the lawn and make themselves comfortable for the discussion which was to follow. It was a beautiful day, brilliant with sunshine, and with these two great men seated before them, the assembled correspondents heard a complete description of the purpose of bringing the British and American Chiefs of Staff together here in North Africa, together with the heads of their respective governments, and a general description of what had been accomplished.

Both the President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed the decision that no effort would be spared until the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers had been accomplished. (The notes of this press conference have been recorded separately.)  When the discussion ended, the Prime Minister and the President asked the newspapermen to come up to shake hands, the President remarking that they should consider themselves an "elite group", inasmuch as the great number of correspondents habitually attending routine press conferences in Washington precludes any thought of shaking hands.

Following the press conference, the President received General Charles A. Noguês, Resident General at Rabat, who had hurried down to Casablanca to say "au revoir" to the President upon being informed by telephone at 10:30 that the President's departure was imminent.

At this time, the President also received Vice Admiral Michelier, the Commander-in-Chief of the French North African Fleet, who had called to pay his respects.

Heavy baggage, collected the night before, had been stowed in the planes and flown to Marrakech. The motorcade was waiting when the President departed from his villa at a few minutes past one o'clock in the afternoon, and at 1:25, the party was on its way to Marrakech, 150 miles almost due south of Casablanca, but well inland.

Besides his own immediate group, the President was accompanied by the Prime Minister, his son, Captain Randolph Churchill, Sir Charles Wilson, the Prime Minister's aide, Commander Thompson, and his two private secretaries, Mr. Rowan and Mr. Martin.

At three o'clock, the cars were halted at the roadside for a basket lunch packed by the British consisting of several kinds of sandwiches, hard boiled eggs, and mincemeat tarts.

At 5:45, the party arrived at Marrakech, a very old Berber and Arab town, going directly to a large villa now occupied by the U.S.

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67 For the transcript of the press conference of the President and the Prime Minister, see post, p. 726.
68 No record of the substance of this meeting has been found.
Vice Consul at Marrakech, Mr. Kenneth Pendar. This villa was placed at his disposal by the wife of the American millionaire, Moses Taylor. It was most beautiful, set in the midst of an olive grove. Its courtyards were filled with orange trees, flowers, and shrubs. There was a fountain or pool and inlaid marble floors all furnished in splendor befitting a Sultan.

The President and the Prime Minister, together with Admiral McIntire, Captain McCrea, and several others, ascended to the top of a 60-foot tower which crowned the villa, to view the sunset and the towering Atlas mountains, many miles away, as the bells tolled from Mosque towers summoning the faithful to evening prayer.

The President and the Prime Minister were dinner guests of Mr. Pendar this evening, as were the following:

- Sir Charles Wilson
- Mr. Averell Harriman
- Mr. Harry Hopkins
- Admiral McIntire
- Captain McCrea
- Mr. Martin
- Mr. Rowan
- Commander Thompson
- Colonel Beasley
- Captain Randolph Churchill
- Sergeant Robert Hopkins

Monday, 25 January

At the last minute, as the President and his party left for the airport at 7:45 this morning, the Prime Minister, deciding to accompany him, got into the President’s automobile in bathrobe and slippers. Marrakech was the place where the trail split. Au revoirs were said.

At eight o’clock, the planes took off toward Bathurst, 1400 miles to the southward, crossing the Atlas Mountains in flight. In another hour, the planes flew through a pass at 9,000 feet and emerged finally over the endless wastes of sand first seen when flying up on 14 January.

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*See the editorial note, post, p. 731.

**The remaining portion of the Log is concerned with the President’s return trip by airplane, ship, and train to Washington, January 25–30, 1943. In the course of his return trip, the President visited Liberia on January 27, where he met with President Edwin Barclay, and Brazil on January 28, where he met with President Getulio Vargas. For a report on the President’s visit to Liberia, see despatch 18, January 28, 1943, from Monrovia, Liberia, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, p. 656; for the report on the visit released by the White House to the press on January 28, 1943, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. vii, January 30, 1943, pp. 94–95. For documentation regarding the conference between President Roosevelt and President Vargas at Natal, Brazil, on January 28, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. v, pp. 653 ff.; for the report on the visit to Brazil released by the White House to the press on January 30, 1943, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. vii, January 30, 1943, p. 95.
9. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

THURSDAY, JANUARY 14, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 14, 1943,
10:30 A.M., ANFA CAMP

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Wedemeyer

UNITED KINGDOM
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane

J. C. S. Ffles

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

General Marshall outlined the broad problem facing the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the allocation of resources between the two major theaters of war—the Atlantic (which included for this purpose the Mediterranean) and the Pacific. He suggested as a concept on which to work that this broad allocation should consist of 70 percent in the Atlantic theater and 30 percent in the Pacific theater.

Admiral King said that according to his estimates we were at present engaging only 15 percent of our total resources against the Japanese in the Pacific theater, which for this purpose included the Indian Ocean and Burma. In his view this was not sufficient to prevent Japan consolidating herself and thereby presenting ultimately too difficult a problem. The Japanese were fighting a delaying action in the Solomon Islands and digging in along the whole line of the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. They were shipping back raw material into Japan as fast as they could. He felt that before the Combined Chiefs of Staff turned to the discussion of particular opera-

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3 C.O.S. 55th meeting. The meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were numbered consecutively from the establishment of that organization, which held its first meeting in Washington on January 23, 1942. The 55th meeting was the first held in connection with the Casablanca Conference.
tions they should first fix the general proportion of effort to be applied in the two main theaters.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that in fixing this balance of effort between the two theaters, it would be wise first to try and weigh up the enemy situation as both the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff saw it. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff would naturally know more of the situation in Japan than the British. He expressed the admiration of the British Chiefs of Staff on the magnificent work of the U. S. Forces during the last twelve months after the early disasters of the war against Japan. At one time it seemed as if nothing would stem the tide of the Japanese, but the position was now very different. The Japanese were definitely on a defensive basis and from intelligence received it appeared as if they were taking quite a different outlook on the war now from what they had been some months ago. They were worried about the situation of their European allies.

The security of the United States and the United Kingdom had always been basic factors in our strategy. The threat to the United Kingdom had been at one time serious, but as a result of our latest review of this danger it was felt that the forces in the United Kingdom could be reoriented from a defensive to an offensive basis. The greatest danger at the present time was to our communications. The shortage of shipping was a stranglehold on all offensive operations and unless we could effectively combat the U-boat menace, we might not be able to win the war.

Germany's situation was undoubtedly developing favorably from our point of view. She was staggering under the failure of her second offensive against Russia, and feeling must be growing in that country that it was impossible for her to defeat Russia. Her successes in 1942 against Russia had been very much smaller in scale than in 1941. She had failed in her main object of the 1942 campaign, the capture of the Caucasus oil. By failing to capture even the port of Tuapse, she had failed in securing the facilities to export such oil as she had captured at Grozny. Her northern flank was in danger as also were the troops in the Caucasus salient.

The Russian offensive had been well carried out and had now reached within fifty miles of Rostov. Germany had only two courses open to her, either to push back the Russians into Stalingrad, which would be almost impossible during the winter, or to shorten her line. The latter, therefore, was the more probable course; and that would involve reverting to the 1941 line. The psychological effect of this withdrawal would be very serious in Germany.

Germany was thus on the defensive both in Russia and in North Africa. In the operations which had led to the defeat of the Germans in North Africa after the British defeat at Tobruk very great assist-
ance had been given by the timely arrival of American Sherman tanks and S.P. guns.

Germany was already having trouble among her allies. The Rumanians had suffered severely in the Crimea but had been forced to carry on, although greatly weakened in strength. The Italian troops on the Russian front had also suffered heavy losses and the Hungarian forces, which had never had much stomach for the fight, were also in bad shape. Italy was becoming more and more shaky; and if she collapsed, Germany would not only have to bolster up Italy by sending troops into the country but would also have to replace the numerous German [Italian?] divisions in Yugoslavia and in Greece. Alternatively she would have to withdraw altogether from the Balkans and Italy, and leave it open to the Allies.

All indications showed that Germany's manpower was failing and that some cannibalization of her divisions would have to be carried out. The latest estimate was that she would lose ten divisions in this way during the first quarter of 1943. Lack of oil was another of Germany's major difficulties which would hit her particularly hard during the next six months.

Taking all these factors into account, it seemed at least possible that the precarious internal situation of Germany might make it possible to achieve a final victory in the European theater before the end of 1943. The immediate problem was how best to apply our available resources in order to take advantage of Germany's present situation.

The means we had at our disposal were broadly three in number. First there was Russia, which constituted the largest land power; her efficiency was rising and the work of moving Russian manufacturing plants to the eastward away from the German invasion had been very well carried out. Russia's oil situation was now more satisfactory than had seemed likely earlier in the year, but she was short of grain. In order to get the best value out of Russia, we must support her in every way we could. Our second main weapon was air bombardment, by U. S. and British forces. This we must exploit to the maximum. Our third means of striking at Germany was by amphibious operations which included invasion of the Continent. The possession of sea power enabled us to threaten the enemy at several points and thereby compel him to disperse his forces. Once committed to a point of entry, however, the enemy would be able to concentrate his forces against us, and it was therefore necessary to choose this point of entry with the greatest care at the place where the enemy was least able to concentrate large forces.

As a point of reentry to the Continent, France had great advantages. In the first place the sea-crossing was short, and we had better facilities for giving air support to our invasion. On the other hand the German defenses in this area were most strong and Germany's
power of concentrating against us was greatest. A recent study had shown that the East-West communications across the Continent enabled Germany to move seven divisions simultaneously from the Russian front to the West in about twelve to fourteen days. The North-South communications on the Continent were not nearly so good. Not more than one division at a time could be moved from the North to the Mediterranean front. The Italian railways were close to the coast and vulnerable to interruption from the sea, and in the Balkans there was only a single line of railway passing through Nish. From this point of view, therefore, the Southern front seemed to offer better prospects for amphibious operations.

Torch operations in North Africa had been an outstanding example of successful cooperation between U. S. and British forces, and the British Chiefs of Staff wished to express their admiration of the very able manner in which General Eisenhower had overcome the extremely difficult problems with which he had been faced. North Africa would provide a valuable base from which either to threaten Southern Europe or to undertake offensive operations. By this use we could compel the Germans to disperse their forces in order to reinforce threatened points. In this way we could probably give greater assistance to Russia than if we committed ourselves definitely to Northern France. Once we had captured Bizerte, we could pass merchant ship convoys through the Mediterranean. Their very passage would compel the Germans to fight in the air, since if they let them pass through unmolested the effect of their U-boat operations against our shipping would be largely nullified. These air battles against the German Air Force would be of the greatest importance. Already more than half the German Air Force was deployed on fronts other than the Russian.

In all Mediterranean operations Spain, of course, was a most important factor. There must be always some anxiety that Spain would close the door behind us, but all recent opinion tended to show that Spain was turning away from Germany and that it was at least highly improbable that she would ever grant free access to German forces. The more successes we had in the Mediterranean the more likely it was that this favorable tendency in Spain would continue. Spain knew that from the economic point of view she must depend primarily on the Allies. Against this there was, of course, the fear of Communism in Spain if the Allies were victorious and Russia overran Germany. Generally speaking, however, the feeling of the British Chiefs of Staff was that we had no cause for anxiety about Spain at the present time.

Another important factor in the Mediterranean was Turkey. That country no doubt would either try and keep out of the war altogether or at least join in on the side of the Allies only at the eleventh hour.
There were, however, reasons to hope that if well handled, Turkey might be brought in earlier. As an inducement we should have to give her equipment, technical personnel and instructors. It did not seem wise to press Turkey to undertake an advance into the Balkans but rather to hold her position and afford us bases from which to attack Germany, in particular the Rumanian oil. We might also obtain a free passage to the Black Sea as another means of striking at Germany.

Summing up prospects in the European Theater, Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that we should first expand the bomber offensive against the Axis to the maximum and that operations in the Mediterranean offered the best chance of compelling Germany to disperse her resources. With this end in view we should take as our immediate objective the knocking out of Italy. At the same time, we should try and bring in Turkey on our side. By this means we should give Germany no respite at all in 1943 and we should give the best aid to Russia, whom we must continue to supply with all the equipment which we could send. The difficulty, of course, was that many of these operations were mutually exclusive. For example, to send large supplies to Russia used up great quantities of available escort vessels. This naturally cut down our capacity to undertake amphibious operations. A balance would have to be struck between these various commitments, and we should have to face the necessity for accepting considerable losses in shipping, providing these paid a good dividend.

We must be in a position to take advantage of a crack in Germany in the late summer. There were already indications of considerable German withdrawals from France to the eastward. If Germany were compelled to withdraw considerable numbers of troops from France, the possibilities of an invasion across the Channel would be much greater. The estimate of the British Chiefs of Staff was that by August 1943 there would be available for cross-channel operations some 13 British and 9 U. S. divisions whether or not we undertook limited operations in the Mediterranean. Mediterranean operations, however, would produce other shortages, notably in Assault Shipping; and it might be difficult, if not impossible, to transfer landing craft from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom or to the Burma front in time.

In all amphibious operations the provision of landing craft was the critical factor. Not only had the crews to be provided but the naval crews to man them had to be trained and the land forces had to be trained to work from them. This training was a slow process. The British landing craft resources were being formed into two main forces, one earmarked for operations on the Continent and one for operations further afield, such as Burma. As regards operations
in Burma, a limited offensive was now being undertaken with the object of capturing Akyab, on which the 14th Indian Division was now closing. Operations in the North of Burma presented very difficult logistical problems owing to the absence of roads.

The complete conquest of Burma was a much bigger problem, and naval supremacy in the Bay of Bengal would be required for it. It would be necessary to undertake simultaneous offensives against Rangoon and Moulmein since Rangoon could not be taken if the Moulmein airfields were in the hands of the Japs. Rail communications between Thailand and Burma were being improved and it might be necessary to extend the occupation of Burma by going some distance into Thailand as well. For this major operation seven divisions were being prepared in India; and two African divisions, one from the East and one from the West, could be found, both composed of seasoned native troops well adapted to jungle fighting. If the Germans were compelled to abandon their Caucasus offensive, troops could also be found from Iraq and Persia. There appeared, therefore, no particular difficulty in finding the land divisions; the difficulty lay rather in the provision of the necessary naval forces. It must be realized, however, that once started operations for the recapture of Burma would develop into a full-scale campaign.

Sir Dudley Pound stated that in the Atlantic the greatest concerns to the Home Fleet were: first, to prevent a break-out of the German naval forces; and, second, to provide protection for convoys to North Russia.

At first, the Russian convoys did not present any great difficulty. Their early success gave everyone a false sense of security. German interference, however, has been increasing constantly, culminating with the concentration of their surface vessels on the coast of Norway; namely, the Tirpitz, Lutzow, Hipper, Scharnhorst, and Prinz Eugen, all of which have now been completely repaired. A force of 20 U-boats was maintained in northern waters, as well as considerable air force. The security of Russian convoys is affected chiefly by the hours of darkness and the ice limit. For the next three months, the ice limit will only permit utilizing a channel about 220 miles in width which can be kept under close air reconnaissance by the Germans. The passage occupies about twelve days, and vessels are under attack all but two of them.

For the last convoy of 16 ships there were 12 escort vessels of the corvette type and 4 destroyers. Two six-inch cruisers were employed to give cover against surface attack; the Commander of the convoy had placed the cruisers between the vessels being escorted and the operational base of the German surface vessels. However, the Hipper and Lutzow attacked from the other side and came into contact with the 4 British destroyers. Until joined by the two cruisers,
the destroyers prevented an attack on the convoy for some forty minutes and drove the enemy ships out of gun range of the convoy, although one of our destroyers and a minesweeper were sunk. As soon as the cruisers appeared, the *Hipper* and *Lutzow* withdrew. The Germans thus sacrificed a splendid opportunity to effect some serious damage on an inferior force.

It was first thought that the German Admiral commanding had made an error in judgment, but it was later learned that he had received orders from the German authorities ashore to expedite his withdrawal. This would seem to indicate that the Germans are following a policy of preventing their ships from receiving any damage. It can possibly be explained by their desire to keep them intact preliminary to a break-out into the Atlantic.

Sir Dudley Pound stated that before such a break-out into the Atlantic could be effected, the Germans must send out oilers which will enable them to refuel at sea, since he doubted if the Germans would again attempt to retire to Brest in view of their previous experience there.

During the months of long daylight, the danger of air attack precluded the use of cruisers with the Russian convoys; and their escorts consisted only of a powerful destroyer force. Convoys can then only be run every thirty-six to forty-two days. Twelve days are required for the journey, three days for refueling, twelve days for the return journey, and the remainder for boiler cleaning, etc. The Royal Navy does not have sufficient destroyers to operate two convoys simultaneously. If, therefore, it is necessary to send more than thirty ships to Russia every forty days, it will be necessary for the United States to furnish some assistance in escort vessels.

Sir Dudley Pound then stated that there was considerable traffic between Japan and Germany, Japan sending to Germany rubber and other raw materials obtained in the Far East in return for machinery and machine parts. It was important to stop this traffic at once. There are two places from which this can be best accomplished: first, in the Bay of Biscay by air and submarine action, and second, in the Atlantic narrows. For the latter a British task force was being built up on the east side and a U.S. task force was operating from the United States on the west side.

Sir Dudley Pound then discussed the situation in the Indian Ocean. It had at first been hoped to create a considerable Eastern Fleet, but this has been seriously reduced in size by Torch and other operations; and it now appears that its remaining carrier, the *Illustrious*, may be needed for future operations in the Mediterranean. If this is so, now would be an opportune time to withdraw it from the Indian Ocean for repairs and the installation of the most modern fighter direction devices. Without the protection of carrier aircraft, the Eastern Fleet
is unable to operate in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean against Japanese naval forces accompanied by aircraft carriers.

In the Mediterranean area, Admiral Cunningham has a force of three battleships and two aircraft carriers. One of the duties of this Task Force consists in containing three modern Italian battleships which are at present unlocated. In the Eastern Mediterranean, British naval forces had been heavily engaged in the supply of the 8th Army in the Eastern North African ports. What the future redistribution of the Mediterranean naval forces will be must be based on the future strategy to be adopted.

Sir Dudley Pound then discussed the German U-boat situation. At the present time the Germans have one hundred and ten submarines in the Atlantic in addition to those in the Mediterranean and off the coast of Norway. It is anticipated that new production will go to the Atlantic.

The Germans are apparently concentrating their submarines into large groups, each of which is responsible for a certain area. One of these has been located off the coast of Newfoundland, one in the Central Atlantic, and one off Southwest Ireland. It is possible that a convoy may at any time blunder into a pack of German submarines if our intelligence is at fault.

Recently there were two convoys from the United States, each attacked by a considerable number of German submarines, one convoy losing two vessels and the other losing none. This was accomplished by providing air coverage for the convoys with Liberator airplanes which resulted in keeping the U-boats down during the day. While they were down, the convoys were able to alter their course and, by nightfall, leave the submarines behind.

Sir Dudley Pound then described an experiment which had been made owing to shortage of escorts due to Torch, in sending cargo vessels bound for Freetown out with a trans-Atlantic convoy, the vessels bound for Freetown breaking off from the convoy at a suitable moment and proceeding to their destination independently. The experiment was unsuccessful and the loss amounted to ten percent. Seventeen out of forty-four ships were lost in one convoy. The British have, therefore, found it necessary to resume the Freetown convoys.

Sir Dudley Pound stated that escorts to convoys must be sufficiently large to deal with a heavy attack. He said our aim must be to get a long-range air protection and additional escort vessels. He added that it would be desirable to obtain more long-range aircraft protection to escorts from the United States.

Sir Dudley Pound indicated that we must make special efforts to provide adequate protection in the early part of 1943 in order that
we may be able to meet the great demands in the build-up of Bolero in the latter part of the year.

Sir Charles Portal then discussed the air situation. He stated that our experience so far has been that the German operations are definitely tied up with the adequacy of their air power. He felt that this will be as true with regard to the German defensive operations as it has been in their offensive operations.

The present state of the German air force is critical. The stamina of the airplane crews is decreasing; the crews lack interest and are less determined, and their training is deteriorating. One explanation for this is that training units and personnel are being used for combat purposes because of a shortage of aircraft. He felt that there is no depth behind the German front line of aircraft. The British Intelligence Service is of the opinion that if the United Nations can keep Germany fighting with aircraft, they will suffer losses from which they cannot recover.

He felt certain that they are incapable of conducting large scale operations on two fronts and that if they are kept fighting through the winter and spring they will have in the summer a shortage of from seven hundred to two thousand first-line aircraft below what will be necessary for all fronts.

He stated that German production for next year will be about twenty-three thousand aircraft; Italy will produce three or four thousand; and Japan will produce about seven thousand. On the other hand, the lowest estimates for the United Nations' aircraft production will be one hundred thousand combat airplanes or about four times that of the Axis powers.

Sir Charles Portal said that our greatest need is to force the Germans to extend the use of their aircraft to as many areas as possible and thus destroy and bleed them. The best ways to accomplish this are: (1) to engage them while they are in support of land operations (However this is only possible at present on the Russian front.); (2) to meet them while they are attempting to stop our amphibian operations; and (3) by directing operations directly at Germany.

He stated that one of the most pressing questions was how we should accomplish our air attack against Germany. The United Kingdom is the most advantageous base for such operations and one of the most important questions before the present conference is to decide on where the United States bombers are to be used.

He indicated that daylight attacks by United States bombers should be continued, as this has a serious effect on the German Air Force, on their industries, and on their morale. The question of whether to strike Italy from the United Kingdom or from North Africa is still
an open question; but before deciding to build up a strong bomber force in North Africa, it is desirable to be certain that this action is more advantageous than concentrating them in the United Kingdom.

General Marshall stated that insofar as the estimates presented by the British Chiefs of Staff concerning Germany, Russia, and the occupied countries are concerned, the United States Chiefs of Staff are in full accord.

He also expressed concurrence in the idea that the U-boat menace is the paramount issue and that everything must be done to combat it by directing our attacks against it from the place of manufacture of submarines to the places where they are used.

He stated that the Japs are digging in, in an effort to build up a defensive front from the Solomons, through New Guinea and Timor, particularly with their air forces.

He pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff are anxious to find some method whereby they can strike in the rear and against the flank of the Japanese defenses. In this connection, they feel that operations in Burma will serve to weaken the Japs’ defensive front and that therefore, they are most anxious to undertake Operation Ravenous.

They feel that a reverse in this operation would not be a calamity but that a success would bring advantages all out of proportion to the risks involved. It would have an effect not only in the South Pacific area but would enable us to furnish strong support to China. A successful Operation Ravenous would result in an eventual economy of tonnage by relieving the Japanese pressure in the Southwest Pacific.

General Marshall then stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff are concerned as to whether operations in the Mediterranean area would bring advantages commensurate with the risks involved. He said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are inclined to look favorably on an operation from the United Kingdom because of the strong air support that can be furnished from that base as well as the relative ease with which it can be supplied from the United States.

He repeated that our first concern must be the defeat of Germany’s submarine warfare.

Sir Charles Portal then said that the British Chiefs of Staff also felt that the defeat of the submarine menace must be given first priority in the use of air power, particularly in the protection of our line of communications.

For long range antisubmarine operations not only the provision of suitable aircraft had to be considered but also the bases from which they are to be used. The British are considering the advisability of
establishing an air base in Greenland for this purpose. They were
most grateful for the 21 Liberators provided by the U.S.A. for the
Bay of Biscay. There are three possible methods of attack on sub-
marines: (1) along the sea lanes; (2) against bases in the Bay of
Biscay; and (3) against factories in which submarines are built.
The British now propose making air attacks in sufficient force to
destroy the entire port in which the submarines are based rather than
confining their attacks to the submarine pens and surrounding instal-
lations. He pointed out that no one can be certain as to how much
damage can be done in the port towns themselves and that the method
proposed will be in the nature of an experiment, the results of which
will not be known for five or six months.

Admiral King then asked whether the possibility of concentrating
all air attacks on the building yards had been considered.

Sir Charles Portal replied that the building yards are not suffi-
ciently large to be certain of hitting them at night.

Admiral King said that he felt the most favorable targets against
the submarine menace were the yards at which they are assembled and
at their bases. He said that he had the personal impression that there
has not been a program undertaken there that has been consistently
followed. He felt that the attacks had been sporadic. He thought
that attacks should be aimed: first, against factories where compo-
nent parts are made; secondly, at yards where the submarines are
assembled; thirdly, at bases; and fourthly, at sea.

General Arnold said he felt we should attempt to find what com-
ponent part or parts of submarines constitute a bottleneck and then
strike at factories where they are made.

Sir Charles Portal stated that the greatest bottleneck was the
ball bearings, but pointed out that it would be tactically impossible
to destroy the factories.

General Arnold drew attention to the necessity for a decision as
to where airplanes are to be utilized before they leave the factory. This
is so because different theaters require different equipment on aircraft.

General Marshall stated that the United States is now in the
process of recasting its troop deployments. As an example, he indi-
cated that it had become possible to reduce the size of the Caribbean
garrison considerably. He stated that the United States is also con-
sidering reducing the size of the Iceland garrison and in that con-
nection he thought it would be desirable to have opinions of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff on the hazards that now face Iceland. The
purpose of this scaling down of forces wherever it can be accomplished
is for saving shipping.
MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 14, 1943, 2:30 P.M., ANFA CAMP

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane

J. C. S. Ffles

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

COMBINED STRATEGY

Sir Allen Brooke said that he would like to hear the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff regarding the situation in the Pacific.

Admiral King stated that of the nine fronts on which the United Nations are now engaged, four are in the Pacific. These include the Alaska-Aleutian area, the Hawaiian-Midway area, the South and Southwest Pacific areas, and the Burma-China area.

He said that when he took office as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet on December 30, 1941, he immediately sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet stating that his mission was, first, to hold the Hawaiian-Midway line and the communications with the Pacific coast; and, secondly, to hold the remainder of the line of communications to Australia and New Zealand.

The Navy had already established a refueling point at Bora Bora, which was sufficiently far to the rear to insure its being held. Marines had been sent to Samoa and there were also troops in the Fiji Islands. Steps had been taken to establish three strong points on the line of communications: Samoa, the Fiji Islands, and New Caledonia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had then established a base for the Navy in Auckland with an advanced base at Tongatabu. As time went on, the United States forces went into the New Hebrides to Efate and Esperitu Santos.

1 C.C.S. 56th meeting.
2 This despatch is quoted in Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1952), pp. 353–354.
3 Use of the island of Bora Bora in the French Society Island group as a U. S. Navy refueling point had been granted at the end of 1941 by the Free French forces which controlled the islands.
Meanwhile, there had been engagements with the Japanese near the Marshall Islands, the Island of Wake, and in the Coral Sea.

The Japanese had advanced as far south as Tulagi with the apparent intent of using it as a base from which to operate against our line of communications.

Admiral King said that had we been set at the time of Midway, we could have made great progress in an attack on the Solomon Islands. The operation was in preparation in July and took place on August 7th but we did not have sufficient force even at that time to exploit our success beyond the occupation of Tulagi and Guadalcanal. The Japanese reaction there was more violent and sustained than had been anticipated. Another reason why we could not proceed further with the Solomon operations was that Operation Torch had been decided upon and much of our available means had to be diverted to it.

Admiral King stated, however, that we have attempted to go on with the Solomon operations. The Japanese reaction was, at first, probably designed to "save face" but eventually that became a minor consideration. The Japanese have a long line of communications, and it soon became apparent that they were fighting a delaying action to cover the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines where the "treasures" are to be found.

He pointed out that we have had some success in the attrition of the Japanese forces but not as much as has been claimed. At present, the Tulagi area is pretty well stabilized and General MacArthur has driven the Japanese out of the Papuan Peninsula on New Guinea. The enemy is reinforcing Lae and Salamaua.

The main object of the operations has been the safety of the approaches to northeastern Australia, and the key to the situation is Rabaul.

The campaign in the Solomons was to be divided into three parts: (1) the capture of Tulagi, (2) securing the northeast coast of New Guinea, and (3) the capture of Rabaul. The process has been slow but the United States forces are going on with it. The immediate question is where to go when this campaign has been completed.

Admiral King stated that he felt the Philippines should be our objective rather than the Netherlands East Indies. The Philippines could be captured by a flank action whereas the capture of the Netherlands East Indies must of necessity be the result of a frontal attack. The most likely intermediate objective, once Rabaul is captured, is Truk and thence to the Marianas.

Prior to the war, every class at the Naval War College was required to play the game of the Pacific Islands involving the recapture of

*The Battle of Midway Island between American and Japanese air and sea forces, June 3–6, 1942, in which the Americans scored a decisive victory.
the Philippines. There are three ways in which the Philippines may be taken: first, the direct route which would constitute a frontal attack; second, the southern route which is outflanked by the enemy along much of its course; and third, the northern route through the Aleutians to the northern tip of the Island of Luzon. The northern route would include establishing a base in the northwestern Marshall Islands and then proceeding to Truk and the Marianas. The Marianas are the key of the situation because of their location on the Japanese line of communications. Any line of action decided upon requires considerable force, especially air strength. All of the necessary operations are amphibious.

Admiral King said that Mr. Stalin had been good enough to say that the Solomons operations have been of considerable assistance to Russia.⁵

He pointed out the importance to the Japanese of occupying the Maritime Provinces in order to secure the Japanese Islands. He felt that such action would be necessary and that the Japanese should attach more importance to them than holding the Netherlands East Indies.

Admiral King stated that the Japanese are now replenishing Japan with raw materials and also fortifying an inner defense ring along the line of the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. For these reasons, he believed that it was necessary for the United Nations to prevent the Japanese having time to consolidate their gains. He compared this situation with the present desire of the United Nations to avoid giving Germany a respite during the winter months.

Admiral King then said that the idea of utilizing 30 percent of the United Nations war effort against Japan was a concept rather than an arithmetical computation. He had caused studies to be made of how much of the total war effort is now being applied to Japan and found it to be approximately 15 percent. He said that this is not sufficient to do more than hold; it is not enough to permit maintaining pressure on the Japanese.

Admiral King stated that we are continuously exploring possibilities of an attack against Japan by the northern route and called attention to the fact that the United States forces had just captured Amchitka. All operations in the Pacific are limited by the amount of available shipping.

Admiral King pointed out that the Japanese route for a naval effort against Siberia is secure. He said that he had recently had a survey made of Paramushir Island, the northernmost of the Kurile Islands. This revealed that it would be unsatisfactory as a base for operating against Japan.

⁵ For text of the message of November 28, 1942, from Stalin to Roosevelt cited here, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, p. 664.
It would be desirable to have the cooperation of the Russians in this respect but there has been difficulty in obtaining any information from them. The best means of obtaining information so far has been by direct correspondence between the President and Mr. Stalin.

General Marshall then reviewed the deployment of the United States troops in all of the islands of the Pacific, giving the strength of each in ground and air troops and in aircraft. He pointed out the logistical difficulties of supplying these forces.

Admiral King then gave the disposition of the Marine forces which amount to approximately 60,000 men in the area from Midway to the South Pacific Islands.

General Marshall said that in the light of the logistical requirements in the Pacific, the United States' interest in undertaking an operation to open the Burma Road could be well understood. General Stillwell and Field Marshal Wavell would have to determine the logistical requirements of such an operation but, in any event, they would be minor in comparison to the requirements in the Operation Torch. Any success in the Operation RAVENOUS would have a tremendous effect in the Pacific chiefly by making it necessary for the Japanese to divert forces to the Burma operations, thus lessening the pressure in the South Pacific and the consequent demands on our available shipping.

General Marshall stated that the peace of mind of the United States Chiefs of Staff was greater now than it had been a year ago. The Japanese are now on the defensive and must be careful of a surprise move from us. However, he pointed out that we must still worry about the locations of the Japanese aircraft carriers because they constitute a constant threat against our line of communications and for raiding purposes against our west coast.

We must not allow the Japanese any pause. They fight with no idea of surrendering and they will continue to be aggressive until attrition has defeated them. To accomplish this, we must maintain the initiative and force them to meet us.

General Arnold then discussed the United States efforts to obtain information concerning Russia. He stated that when the Germans threatened to capture the Caucasus, the Russians began to be fearful that the supply of airplanes from the United States via the southern route would be eliminated. They, therefore, requested the United States to start delivery of airplanes from Alaska at once. The United States agreed to this, providing the Russians would demonstrate that there were sufficient facilities available to make possible the delivery of one hundred and fifty planes a month. The Russians did not have these facilities at the time but built them rapidly. At the present time, both the southern route and the Alaskan route are in use. In the coming year, the delivery to Russia amounts to four hun-
dred airplanes a month. These will be divided over the two routes. Bombers are flown to Basra but the flight is so long that the Russians refuse to accept the engines and this necessitates replacing them. The northern route will be used for this purpose as much as possible inasmuch as it eliminates fifty hours of flying time on the journey.

General Arnold then stated that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff were desirous of knowing what facilities were available in southern Siberia and Vladivostok in order to see if they could be of assistance to Russia in case Russia was attacked by the Japanese.

General Marshall stated that Mr. Stalin had finally given General Bradley permission to make a survey. General Bradley, however, considered that it would be better to present the Russians with a specific proposal. He returned to the United States, and it was decided to offer Russia one hundred heavy bombers seventy-two days after the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan. Mr. Stalin had rejected this offer and said he would like 100 aircraft at once for use against Germany.

General Marshall also stated that the Russians object to the presence of “gossipy” people from the United Nations and that they were afraid that the United Nations personnel could not put up with the conditions which are imposed on Russian troops.

Sir Charles Portal stated that the British had operated successfully with the Russian navy in the Murmansk area but that they had the same experiences with the Russian army as the U. S. had.

General Marshall then described the difficulties which the United States Chiefs of Staff had had concerning sending air units to the Caucasus. The Russians had stated definitely that they did not desire units but airplanes only. There had been some sentiment among the United States authorities to furnish sufficient airplanes for the purpose of placating Mr. Stalin. However, to do so, especially in the case of heavy bombers, would necessitate immobilizing these airplanes for as much as six months while the Russians were learning to operate them and establishing ground crews for their maintenance.

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*Regarding the Bradley Mission, see footnote 5, ante, p. 508.

The offer of one hundred bombers to the Soviet Union in event of an attack by Japan on the Soviet Far East was contained in a message from Roosevelt to Stalin, dated December 30, 1942, delivered to the Soviet Foreign Commissariat in note L-26, January 1, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. III, p. 683.


*Presumably the reference is to Stalin’s message of December 18, 1942, to the President, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. III, p. 677. For the President’s messages of October 9 and 12 and December 17, 1942, to Stalin regarding the assignment of Anglo-American air squadrons in the Caucasus under Soviet command, see ibid., pp. 731, 733, and 677, respectively.
General Marshall stated that in his opinion it was unwise to withhold this striking power against the enemy for so long a period.

Admiral King then asked the British Chiefs of Staff if they had the impression that the Russians were unwilling to help themselves. The Germans were successfully operating air forces out of the northern part of Norway and the Russians had apparently made no effort to stop them although they were well within range.

Sir Dudley Pound stated that the Russians do send destroyers out to meet convoys. They invariably state, however, that they have run out of fuel before completing their task and then leave the convoy for home at a rate of 28 knots, which is hardly consistent with a shortage of fuel. Their Air Force has not furnished much protection.

Sir Charles Portal stated that he felt the reason for this was that their air personnel is not properly trained. The Russians had made some attempts to strike at the German forces but had been unsuccessful.

General Marshall asked why the Russians were willing to risk whole divisions but not their naval forces.

Sir Dudley Pound replied that they are continental people who do not understand naval action. Their submarines have been the only effective units of their navy.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed with this statement and added that while they do not know what dangers are involved in escorting convoys, they are very free to offer silly advice as to how security should be attained.

General Marshall then described the development of troops of the United States, which was proceeding very well. He added that United States troops, both in this and the last war, appeared to "veteranize" quickly in the field. The young officers and non-commissioned officers had exhibited a remarkable facility for eliminating errors rapidly. We may expect their effectiveness to increase enormously in a short time.

He thought we were particularly fortunate in the deadly character of the Pacific fight, since our forces which have been engaged in the Pacific have become imbued with the idea that it is "kill or be killed"; and this attitude gives promise of tremendous power for future operations. The staffs are sound and the engineers are particularly effective. He recalled a remark that had been made in the War Department, when Field Marshal Wavell questioned the possibility of building a road which could support the Burma operations, to the effect that "Wavell does not know General Wheeler," the United States engineer in this theater.
Sir Alan Brooke inquired how far forward the U.S. Chiefs of Staff envisaged it would be necessary to go in order to prevent the Japanese from digging themselves in. He feared that if operations were too extended it would inevitably lead to an all-out war against Japan and it was certain that we had not sufficient resources to undertake this at the same time as a major effort against Germany. Would it be possible for the forces at present in the Pacific to hold the Japanese without incurring the additional drain on our resources which would result from pushing forward our present defensive positions?

General Marshall explained that it had been essential to act offensively in order to stop the Japanese advancing. For example, in New Guinea it had been necessary to push the Japanese back to prevent them capturing Port Moresby. In order to do this, every device for reinforcing the troops on the island had had to be employed. The same considerations applied in Guadalcanal. It had been essential to take offensive action to seize the island. Short of offensive action of this nature, the only way of stopping the Japanese was by complete exhaustion through attrition. It was very difficult to pause: the process of whittling away Japan had to be continuous.

Sir Charles Portal asked whether it was not possible to stand on a line and inflict heavy losses on the Japanese when they tried to break through it. From the very fact that the Japanese continued to attack, it was clear that they had already been pushed back further than they cared to go. We [He] also inquired whether the U.S. Chiefs of Staff thought it would be possible to gain a decision by air bombardment of Japan alone.

General Arnold pointed out that the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific were now operating from the tips of two narrow salients. The Japanese had greater width in their line and could therefore operate on a larger scale than the forces which we could bring to bear.

General Marshall said that in Papua it would be possible to gain additional airfields alongside our present position, but this was not the case in Guadalcanal where only a small strip of suitable territory was available. To broaden our base there, we should have to have New Britain and New Ireland. As regards air bombardment of Japan, the U.S. view was that Japanese industries were so vulnerable to the air that heavy attack would ultimately destroy her capacity to maintain her war effort.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that it should be possible to determine what it was that we had to prevent the Japanese from doing, and what forces we should require for the purpose. We should then see what forces remained for use elsewhere in the world.
Admiral King observed that unless some effort was made to assist Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese might pull out of the war. The 30 percent effort to which he had referred would, of course, include operations in Burma.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that operation Ravenous might be successful but when we had reached the objective we should still have to defend our line of communication against Japanese attack from the flank. It was calculated that the route would only suffice to maintain two Divisions, and this would leave little if any capacity for the supply air forces operating in China.

Admiral King pointed out that in addition to opening the supply route to China, Ravenous would gain the territory necessary to secure the air supply route from India to China.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that it would be well worth while taking a risk on Ravenous since it would not cut across the main effort against Germany, whereas Anakim would.

General Marshall pointed out that the Chinese only required about half the maintenance tonnage required by white troops. In any event, even a small residual tonnage for supplies to China would probably be far greater than could be transported by air. Twelve bombers in China under General Chennault had done wonderful work; and if he had even 50, the results they might achieve would be very great. For this reason the U.S. Chiefs of Staff thought that Ravenous was a gamble well worth while. It should also be remembered that any help given to China which would threaten Japan might have a most favorable effect on Stalin.

General Arnold said that General Chennault claimed he could drive the Japanese Air Force out of China if he had 175 aircraft. This might be an exaggerated claim, but there was no doubt additional air forces in China would have a very great effect. By December it was hoped to have 150 transports working from India to China, with a maximum delivery estimated at 10,000 tons per month.

Admiral King asked on whom would fall the principal burden of beating Japan once Germany had been knocked out.

Sir Alan Brooke said that once Germany was defeated, practically all the British naval forces would be released for the war against Japan. Forces destined for the recapture of Burma and Malaya were

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16 In a message to the President dated January 9, 1943, Chiang Kai-shek had stated that serious consideration was being given to the abandonment of Chinese participation in the proposed Allied operations in Burma; for text of Chiang's message, see Romano and Sunderland, pp. 259-260. For text of the President's reply, see ante, p. 516.
already forming in India. He did not think it wise, however, to embark on Operation ANAKIM unless we were quite prepared for a full-scale campaign.

Sir Charles Portal said that India had already been asked to provide airfields for double the number of air forces we were ever likely to have available before the defeat of Germany. These were intended for the campaign against Japan. He had no doubt that as soon as Germany was defeated the British Government would turn the whole of their resources against Japan.

General Marshall pointed out that to depend on sea operations alone against Japan was hazardous, owing to the rapidity with which the balance of sea power could change in the event of a reverse. For example, in the Midway battle the U.S. Forces had been able to get all their aircraft into the air before the Japanese attack developed. In consequence, the Japanese had lost four carriers as against one American. With a little ill-fortune the reverse might have taken place; and in that case, the whole of the west coast of America would have been open to Japanese carrier-borne attack. The Japanese territories were not nearly so vulnerable in this respect.

Admiral King said that the Japanese might well strike again at Midway. They were on interior lines, and it was easier for them to take the initiative against us. At the present time it looked as if their carriers were being prepared for another attack somewhere, perhaps on Midway or Samoa. It was essential, therefore, to maintain the initiative against the Japanese and not wait for them to come against us.

General Marshall explained the difficulties with which he had been faced in finding even the small forces required by General Stilwell to support RAVENOUS. Shipping could not be spared for them in the absence of some definite assurance from Chiang Kai-shek and agreement with Field Marshal Wavell on the operations to be undertaken. By the time these had been obtained much time had been lost and shipping had to be found by drawing it away from other commitments in the Pacific such as Alaska and Hawaii. General MacArthur was some 20,000 men short of his requirements, and provision of these reinforcements had had to be deferred. By the most rigid economy sufficient shipping had at last been found to move 6,000 men to General Stilwell. In order to cut down numbers to the minimum, units had been stripped to the bone of all personnel which were not absolutely essential. It was certainly fortunate that losses sustained in the Pacific from submarines had been so small.
ADMIRAL KING said he was puzzled to know why these losses had been so small and what the Japanese were keeping their submarines for.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that, in British experience, Japanese submarines were much less of a menace than the German. They were less efficiently operated, and quite small escorts were sufficient to drive them away. He pointed out that it was in a way to our advantage to allow the Japanese to dig in well in places which we did not mean to attack as this dispersed their forces. To recapture the Philippines before the defeat of Germany was impossible; and it was, therefore, all to the good if the Japanese locked up troops in these Islands. The quickest way of recapturing the Philippines would be to defeat Germany. It seemed to him that the correct strategy was to establish a line where we had better air facilities than the Japanese and then to allow them to wear out their air forces by attacking us on that line. Would it be of any advantage to go as far forward as Truk in the immediate future rather than just before the main attack on the Philippines? Even if we had Truk he questioned whether we could operate surface forces against the Japanese lines of communication at the present time.

ADMIRAL KING agreed that the recapture of the Philippines must probably await the defeat of Germany. On the other hand, he would be in favor of seizing Truk and going forward to the Marianas in order to dominate the Japanese sea routes to the eastward thus freeing our submarines for the more covered Japanese supply route to the westward. He felt it was necessary to soften up the Japanese before making our main effort and not simply to allow them to do what they wanted, while we held a static position. The 30 percent allocation of resources which he had suggested would certainly suffice for the recapture of Rabaul.

After some further discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:

Agreed to direct the Combined Staff Planners to report, on the basis that Germany is the primary enemy, what situation do we wish to establish in the Eastern Theater (i.e., the Pacific and Burma) in 1943, and what forces will be necessary to establish that situation.  

30 In pursuance of this decision, the United States Joint Staff Planners prepared a partial report, C.C.S. 153, January 17, 1943, post, p. 755. In a memorandum designated C.C.S. 153/1, January 17, 1943, post, p. 757, the British Joint Planning Staff commented upon the American report.
ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL CONVERSATION, JANUARY 14, 1943, ABOUT
7:00 P. M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No record of the substance of this conversation has been found. The meeting is mentioned in the Log, ante, p. 522.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, JANUARY 14, 1943, ABOUT
8:00 P. M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Vice Admiral Mountbatten

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of the discussion at this informal meeting appears to have been kept. The meeting is described in Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 66–71. Arnold, pp. 394–395, states that the immediate concern of the meeting was the desire by both Roosevelt and Churchill to make a visit to the front lines. According to Brooke's diary entry (Alanbrooke, p. 446), the matter of the political organization of French North Africa was discussed. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), p. 238, relates that the submarine war in the Atlantic was discussed at length. The reference to the meeting in Hopkins' notes (Sherwood, p. 674) indicates that the conduct of the war and the French situation were considered. According to the Log, ante, p. 522, the guests stayed late, and the President retired almost three hours after midnight.
III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1943

MEETING OF ROOSEVELT WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 15, 1943, 10 A. M., PRESIDENT’S VILLA

PRESENT

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Brigadier General Deane

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. VISIT OF GENERAL NOGUÈS AND THE SULTAN OF MOROCCO WITH THE PRESIDENT

The President asked as to the advisability of his seeing General Noguès and possibly the Sultan of Morocco. General Marshall and Admiral King both stated they felt that General Eisenhower was in a better position to advise the President on this subject and he would no doubt do so when he arrived at Anfa Camp. Admiral King, however, questioned whether or not General Noguès merited the honor of visiting the President of the United States.

2. THE PRESIDENT’S PROGRAM

General Marshall explained that it had at first been thought the President would stay here for about four or five days; then leave by motor for Rabat and Lyauty [Port Lyautey] where he would visit three divisions and interview certain selected officers and men; then proceed by air to Oran, observe the troops there and also visit a hospital. From Oran, it was planned that he should go to Marrakech, change planes at the airfield there and then return to the United States. He stated that in view of the fact that the conference would probably last about ten days, these plans would of necessity have to undergo some change. He said that it is not desirable for the President to visit Marrakech and he should refuse any invitation of the Prime Minister to do so.

General Marshall explained that Marrakech is inland, that its airfield is entirely open. No one knows how many Axis agents may be included in the civilian populations. He also said that it would be unwise to have the President of the United States in a city that contained about one and one-half French divisions which have recently been hostile to us and only one regiment of American troops.

1 According to the Log, ante, p. 522, this meeting lasted until 12:30 p. m.
General Marshall suggested that if the Prime Minister desired to visit Marrakech, he might do so with Mr. Hopkins and this would furnish good cover for the real location of the President.

It was decided that the President would remain here and that if there was any indication that his presence here had become known, he would immediately start on the inspection tour which had been previously planned to start at the conclusion of his stay in Africa, except that when he returned to the Marrakech airport, he would change planes and leave the Marrakech airport as though returning to the United States. Actually he would return to the Anfa Camp in time to be here to finish up such business as might be necessary in connection with the conference.

In discussing the protection available at Anfa Camp, General Arnold brought out the fact that there was a French squadron equipped with our P-40 airplanes and at the request of the President, he explained something of our program for equipping French air units.

3. The British Strategic Concept

General Marshall gave the President a brief summary of the British Chiefs of Staff concept regarding the prospects in the European theatre. They believed that we should first expand the bombing effort against the Axis and that operations in the Mediterranean offer the best chance of compelling Germany to disperse her air resources. He explained that the British are now in favor of an attack against Sicily rather than Sardinia and that this change of attitude was probably inspired by the Prime Minister.

At the same time, the United Nations should try to bring Turkey in on our side. Continued aid should be given to the Russians. A balance will have to be struck between these various commitments because they are mutually conflicting.

They also feel that we must be in a position to take advantage of any weakness developing in Germany by being prepared for operations across the English Channel.

General Marshall said that both Lord Mountbatten and General Clark agreed that there must be a long period of training before any attempt is made to land against determined resistance. General Clark had pointed out many of the mishaps that occurred in the landing in North Africa which would have been fatal had the resistance been more determined. General Clark was also apprehensive about our ability to maintain a surprise because of the necessity of locating landing craft along the northern coast of Africa prior to initiating operations. General Marshall stated that General Clark felt that while this presented some difficulties, they could be overcome.

General Marshall stated that the British are extremely fearful of any direct action against the continent until a decided crack in the
German efficiency and morale has become apparent. The British point out that the rail net in Europe would permit the movement of seven divisions a day from east to west which would enable them to reinforce their defenses of the northern coast of France rapidly. On the other hand, they can only move one division from north to south each day in order to reinforce their defense of southern Europe.

General Marshall said that General Clark had expressed the opinion that operations in the Mediterranean could be mounted more efficiently from North Africa. His reasons are that the lines of communication would be shorter there, that the troops in North Africa have had experience in landing operations, and that there will be an excess number of troops available for the operation once the Axis has been forced out of Tunisia, and finally that training will be more effective if undertaken in close contact with the enemy.

General Marshall stated that while the British wish to build up a strong force in the United Kingdom for possible operations against Germany in case a weakness develops, it must be understood that any operation in the Mediterranean will definitely retard Bolero.

Admiral King pointed out that the line of communication is the bottle neck in any operations in the Mediterranean.

Mr. Hopkins asked if the British Chiefs of Staff felt that the lines of communication are sufficient. General Marshall said that the two critical factors in the decision as to whether the operation is to be in the north or the south were: (1) the safety of the line of communications and (2) the fact that there will be an excess of veteran soldiers available in North Africa to mount an operation.

In discussing Turkey, General Marshall said that the British Eighth Army would be prepared to send a considerable force there or near there. The aim of the United Nations should be to have Turkey resist Axis aggression and at the same time permit and protect our use of their airfields.

The President said that the question of bringing Turkey into the war is one for the diplomats to settle. In conducting negotiations, he stated that he and the Prime Minister should be given information as to how much military support the United Nations should be prepared to offer Turkey in order to accomplish what is desired. He stated that he did not want to be in the position of over-promising anything to the Turkish government. (The Joint Staff Planners have been directed to investigate how much aid it would be necessary for us to furnish Turkey in order to enable them to provide effective resistance to an Axis invasion.)

It was agreed that regardless of whether Turkey came into the war on the side of the United Nations, we should assemble sufficient force to the east of the Turkish boundary to enable the United Nations to reinforce Turkey as soon as she did become involved in the war.
This can probably be accomplished by using part of the British Eighth Army.

4. Anti-Submarine Warfare

General Marshall then pointed out that both the American and the British Chiefs of Staff agreed that effective measures must be taken against the Axis submarines. He said that Admiral King had pointed out that the most effective targets would be at the places where the submarines are assembled. He agreed with the statement, which he attributed to Sir Charles Portal, that we must keep hammering on one link in the chain, whether it be the factories which manufacture component parts, the submarine assembly yards, submarine bases, or submarines along the sea lanes.

5. Operation Ravenous

General Marshall informed the President of the British attitude concerning the operation Ravenous.

Admiral King stated that he had the impression that the British were coming around to the idea that it would be a profitable gamble.

General Marshall explained that there were hazards, particularly from Japanese action against the southern flank, but that if the operation was successful it would secure favorable results far out of proportion to the risks involved. The most important benefit to be hoped for would be a decrease in the Japanese pressure in the southern Pacific by forcing the Japanese to divert their attention to the Burma theatre and even in the event of failure it would almost certainly result in a junction of the Chinese forces now in Burma with those from Yunnan and if a retirement became necessary, a trained Chinese army would withdraw into China.

General Marshall then spoke of the Generalissimo’s refusal to mount the operation. One reason given by the Generalissimo is the failure to secure British cooperation in assembling naval forces in the Bay of Bengal which he felt was a definite British commitment.

It was agreed that an effort should be made to obtain firm British support for the operation before requesting the President to discuss the matter further with the Generalissimo.

The President added that for psychological reasons he thought it would be advisable to double General Chennault’s force in China and also to bomb Japan proper. General Arnold replied that he agreed that it would be wise to increase General Chennault’s force and expressed great confidence in his ability to effectively operate against the Japanese. He stated, however, that the difficulty of supplying gasoline, spare parts, and other maintenance necessities prevented doing this at this time. He indicated that this was one of the most urgent reasons for opening the Burma road.
Mr. Hopkins asked General Marshall what he thought the prospects of success in Operation Ravenous were.

General Marshall replied that he thought they were better than fifty-fifty. He said the British presented all sorts of difficulties which must be overcome but that he personally did not feel any of them were insurmountable. The tactical operations involved would not be of long duration but it would be necessary to build an improved road rapidly before the rainy season set in. He felt that our engineers could do this but the British were inclined to doubt it. The British also feared the effects of Malaria but General Marshall pointed out that their malaria preventative methods did not approach the effectiveness of ours.

Admiral King stated that he thought it was most essential to undertake Operation Ravenous, particularly for its effect on the Japanese in the South Pacific. He stated that they are operating on interior lines and it was difficult to understand why they did not make some serious thrusts at Midway or other points on our line of communications.

6. Command Situation in Europe

General Marshall stated that he had learned that the Prime Minister was concerned over the effectiveness of our bombing operations in Europe. The utilization of our bombing force is tied up with the question of command. At the present time General Eisenhower controls the Air Force, both in North Africa and in England. We are cooperating with the British in selecting the bombing objectives but we are not subject to their orders. General Marshall said that he felt the time had come when we should establish a separate United Kingdom theatre. He stated that he had sent General Andrews to Cairo to give him some experience in an active theatre of operations and that he now proposed to put him in command of the American troops in the United Kingdom.

General Marshall stated that so far as operational direction of bombing, i.e. time and mission, our bombers in England should be subject to British command. So far as technique, etc. they should not be permitted to dictate our procedure.

7. Operations in Tunisia

General Marshall indicated that there may be a change in the British command in the operations in Tunisia. He said that Admiral Cunningham agreed that the command had not been well handled. Instances occurred in which trained United States combat teams loaned to the British were broken up, thus reducing their effectiveness. There had also been instances of the misuse of British parachute troops. This situation is now being corrected.
ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, JANUARY 15, 1943, 1:30 P.M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Commander Thompson

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. Only the names of the participants and the time are mentioned in the Log, ante, p. 523. The brief description by Elliott Roosevelt (p. 78) indicates that the French North African situation and the upcoming meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the Combined Chiefs of Staff were discussed. It may have been at this luncheon that the President showed the Prime Minister a copy of telegram No. 192, January 8, 1943, from London, which transmitted Matthews’ report on a conversation with Eden regarding French North African problems. The copy of this telegram in the Roosevelt Papers, the text of which is printed in Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. II, p. 33, bears the President’s handwritten marginal notation “I showed this to the P. M., Casablanca, Jan. 15, 1943. F.D.R.”

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 15, 1943, 2:30 P.M., ANFA CAMP

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Lieutenant General Eisenhower *
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Wedemeyer

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Captain Lambe, R.N.
Lieutenant General Ismay
Brigadier Stewart
Air Commodore Elliot

Secretariat

Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane

* C.C.S. 57th meeting.
* Present for item 2.
1. ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

Sir Dudley Pound said that the four points at which the U-boats could be attacked were the factories and building yards, the operating bases, the routes to their hunting grounds, and the hunting grounds themselves. He had sent for detailed information concerning the construction bottlenecks. As regards the operating bases, the British Government had agreed to intensify air attacks on French ports which were used as bases. The only question now at issue was that of giving some warning to the French inhabitants.

Attacks on the U-boats on passage to the hunting grounds had been successful for a time and considerable damage and delay had been inflicted on them as long as the U-boats did not know when the aircraft were detecting them with their A.S.V. equipment. This equipment was used in conjunction with the Leigh light at night. Now, however, U-boats were fitted with listening devices which detected the A.S.V. outside the range of the light. Ten-centimeter A.S.V. 's were now being introduced, but no doubt in time the Germans would find a counter to them. Nevertheless, if we were successful even in compelling them to remain submerged in darkness, it would have the effect of making them surface in daylight to recharge batteries.

For dealing with the submarines on the hunting grounds, the two requirements were first: as much air cover as possible, and second: adequate escorts. A rough rule of thumb for the number of escorts was to have three ships with every convoy plus one for every ten ships in the convoy. A convoy of forty ships would thus have seven escorts. In practice, however, we were never able to supply this number of escorts, and as a general rule we never had more than six with any convoy. When escorting vessels had to be withdrawn for operations, there was no pool from which to replace them. We had now new commitments in the Sierra Leone convoys which had had to be restarted, and the convoys bringing oil from the Dutch West Indies to the United Kingdom and to North Africa. As a minimum sixty-five more escort vessels were required in the Atlantic alone. Before any decisions were taken on our strategy for 1943, it seemed essential to weigh carefully the requirements in escort vessels for any operations to be undertaken. Once an operation was launched and escorts were

*Search light installed on anti-submarine aircraft to facilitate night search and spotting; devised in 1940 by Royal Air Force Squadron Leader H. de V. Leigh.
withdrawn from convoys, they could not be returned usually for four or five months, during which an acute shortage was felt. The only relief during such a period would be the intake from new construction.

Sir Charles Portal said that the air had proved the most effective weapon against the U-boat. The estimated German output of U-boats was twenty a month. He gave the following figures for attacks on U-boats during the last two months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U-Boats sunk by aircraft</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-Boats damaged</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-Boats sunk</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-Boats damaged by other means</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Air patrols over the U-boat routes to the hunting grounds were very costly in aircraft since it was calculated that there was only one sighting for 250 hours flying time. Nevertheless, even if a large number of U-boats were not actually destroyed by this means, aircraft patrols had a good effect in compelling U-boats to remain submerged and thereby reducing their time on the hunting grounds. A further method of attack on U-boats was the laying of mines from the air at the exits of the U-boat bases and construction yards.

General Arnold inquired whether it was not possible to use flying boats for anti-submarine work, both over the hunting grounds and on the routes to them. This would avoid the use of valuable long-range bombers.

Sir Charles Portal said that the long-range bomber was essential for work over the convoys, since flying boats, owing to their slow speed, took too long to reach them after a call for assistance. Moreover, the load of the flying boat in bombs and depth charges was less than that of the Liberator. In addition they were not processed for the 10 centimeter A.S.V. A considerable number of Catalinas were being used in spite of these disadvantages. It was estimated that the minimum requirements for the whole of the Atlantic and British Home Waters was between 120 and 135 long-range bombers. New devices were being developed to combat the German listening apparatus which detected the presence of A.S.V. aircraft.

Admiral King asked whether economy in long-range bombers could not be effected by using Catalinas for patrol work and reserving long-range bombers for emergency calls when convoys were actually attacked. The Catalina had a very long endurance and could be kept in the air for twenty-four hours if the crew was large enough to provide two watches. One advantage of the flying boat was that any sheltered water could be used for a base instead of airfields.

Sir Charles Portal said that Catalinas were being used to the maximum. A survey had been made of the West African coast and it was found that two depot ships for Catalinas would suffice on the
northern part, but this did not cover the requirements of the Indian Ocean or the South Atlantic.

Sir Dudley Pound said that anti-submarine aircraft were essential in the area north of Freetown. The requirements in long range bombers which had been stated were an absolute minimum, even allowing for the maximum use of flying boats.

Sir Charles Portal asked whether the aircraft in the Pacific, details of which had been given at a meeting on the previous day, were available for anti-submarine work as well as local defense of the Islands themselves.

Admiral King said that fortunately the Japanese had not yet made any great use of submarines in the Pacific, and it was, therefore, possible to work with only small escorts. If the Japanese submarines became more active, aircraft would have to be used against them. The total resources available, however, were insufficient for security everywhere. When Alaska was threatened, forces had to be sent up from all quarters. The acute shortage of escort vessels was of course fully recognized.

Sir Dudley Pound pointed out that where long range shore based aircraft could not be employed to cover the whole passage, as for example in the direct convoys from the Dutch West Indies to the United Kingdom, auxiliary aircraft carriers had to be used with the convoys themselves. On the northern route it was hoped to establish bases for long range aircraft in Newfoundland to join up with aircraft working from the United Kingdom.

General Arnold said that Greenland would be of little use for this purpose owing to the long hours of darkness and the very bad weather.

Admiral Cooke asked whether full use was being made of direction finding apparatus to pick up the short range inter-communication radio of U-boats working in packs. The Japanese had developed this technique to a high degree.

Sir Dudley Pound said that all destroyers and most corvettes, were fitted with the necessary apparatus for this purpose. This use was being developed to the maximum.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that it would be desirable to have an assessment made of the total resources required in escort vessels and aircraft to combat the submarine menace, in order that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should have a picture of what would be left over for offensive operations during the coming year.

The Committee

Agreed to direct the Combined Staff Planners to examine and report the minimum requirements of escorts (including aircraft car-
riers) and aircraft which should be devoted to the security of the sea communications of the United Nations during 1943.4

(GENERAL EISENHOWER entered the Meeting at this point.)

2. SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA

GENERAL EISENHOWER gave a résumé of the situation in North Africa at the present time. Operations in December had been held up by bad weather and mud which restricted the use of vehicles entirely to the roads. Since this check every effort had been made to build up for an attack in the North by increasing our air power, improving the communications to the front and re-equipping the 6th Armored Division with Sherman Tanks. By the end of December, however, it was clear that the weather conditions would compel postponement of any attack for a considerable time. Attention had then been directed to the possibility of an attack further to the south where ground conditions were better. For this purpose forces composed of the 1st U.S. Armored Division and two U.S. Regimental Combat teams with Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Tank Units were being concentrated. At first operations on the right flank had been looked upon primarily as a diversion, but it now seemed probable that it would be possible to advance on Sfax and hold it with infantry while withdrawing the 1st Armored Division as a mobile reserve further to the rear, where it could be maintained more easily. This mobile reserve would be available to deal with a threat either from the North or from Rommel's forces retiring from the direction of Tripoli. The plan was to launch the attack on Sfax on January 24th. Although the road to Gabes was better, the time factor made it necessary to go direct for Sfax. There seemed, however, every reason to hope that Sfax could be successfully taken.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out the need for careful coordination of the attack on Sfax with General Anderson's operations in the North and those of the 8th Army in the South. If weather conditions made it impossible for General Anderson to move forward, except on the roads, before March 15th there seemed to be a danger that the Germans would thin out in the North and defeat the Sfax forces in detail. It would take some time before the 8th Army could bring pressure to bear from the southward in support of this force, since even at the best General Montgomery did not expect to reach Tripoli before the

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4The conclusion of the Report by the Combined Staff Planners, C.C.S. 160, January 19, 1943, not printed, was as follows:

"On the basis of the tables included in the enclosures it will be seen that minimum acceptable requirements as to escort craft will be met approximately in August and September. We will not be in a position, however, to give fully adequate protection to ocean-going convoys to the extent of sinking attacking submarines at a rate even comparable to their production output before the end of the year." (J. C. S. Files)
middle of February; and before he could advance from there the port would have to be cleared in order to supply his forces with petrol for a further advance.

**General Eisenhower** agreed that it was improbable that any movement off the roads would be possible in the North before March 15th, though General Anderson had seven days' reserves built up which would be kept intact for an attack whenever conditions permitted. He hoped that General Montgomery would push on through Tripoli as fast as possible. By the end of January the 46th Division would be concentrated forward under General Anderson and the 18th Regimental Combat Team would be withdrawn into reserve. As long as the 1st U. S. Armored Division was kept for counterattack, he felt that he could deal with any threat to the Sfax force. He hoped, however, to be able to discuss the whole problem with General Alexander and to make any necessary adjustments in the plan on the latter's arrival.

**Sir Alan Brooke** pointed out that after two months of "an active defensive," the 78th Division would not be in very good condition for the attack in the North and suggested that it would be better to let a fresh division form the spearhead.

**General Eisenhower** said that he was faced with the dilemma of either allowing the troops in the North to deteriorate by remaining inactive in the mud or suffering some losses to them through keeping them more active. In his opinion the latter was the lesser of two evils. Also that active patrolling would reveal any thinning out of the Axis force in the North.

The latest intelligence reports place the Axis strength in North Africa at about 65,000. Every effort had been made to retard their buildup but the appalling conditions of the airfields and the bad weather had largely closed down air operations against them recently. At the present time it was calculated that the Axis were getting in about 750 men a day with the necessary supplies for them, in addition to a certain amount of supplies for Rommel.

The French forces in the middle of the front were playing a most important part since they were holding the line between the British in the North and the American forces in the South. Unless they held firm, a serious situation would develop. Moreover, he was completely dependent on them for the working of his long line of communication and the ports. These considerations necessitated careful handling of the French. The French units themselves were badly equipped and some of them were poorly trained. The French troops from Tunisia were somewhat unreliable since their families were now in the German area. In one battalion there had been 132 desertions. The French Generals Barré and Juin were cooperating excellently with General Anderson and General Fredendall. Unfortunately, General Juin was not being given very much scope by General Giraud. The latter might
be a good Division Commander but he had no political sense and no
idea of administration. He was dictatorial by nature and seemed to
suffer from megalomania. In addition he was very sensitive and al-
ways ready to take offense. He did not seem to be a big enough man to
carry the burden of civil government in any way. It had been far
easier to deal with Admiral Darlan.

Civil affairs, which included economic as well as political matters,
had of course, given a great deal of anxiety. There were many
agencies involved but the necessary organization to deal with all these
problems was being improved.

Rail communications forward were very limited in capacity at
present. East of Algiers the daily tonnage which could be carried
 amounted to about 2,200 tons but with additional rolling stock and
 locomotives which were being sent from the United States, it was
hoped to increase this to 4,400. From Casablanca to Oran the daily
 tonnage was only about 800. Port clearance was improving. At Oran
it averaged 5,000 tons a day. At Algiers the daily clearance was not
so great and initially it had been much reduced by the presence of
French ships lying at many of the berths. Losses of shipping had
been sustained by air attack at Bougie and Bône. Air defense of the
ports was being steadily improved. All available French antiaircraft
weapons had been brought into action and night fighters had been
sent from the United Kingdom. Radar had been installed to cover the
stretch from Bône to Algiers and some had also been provided at Oran
and Casablanca. Passive air defense measures in the ports were being
improved and assistance had been given by an expert sent from the
United Kingdom who had done very good work at Algiers. One
difficulty was that there was no rigid control over the French civil
population.

Sir Charles Portal said that the Radar cover between Bond
[Bône?] and Algiers was not yet effective below 10,000 feet. He had
made arrangements for additional equipment to be provided to make
good this deficiency. He inquired what air defense could be provided
for Sfax.

General Eisenhower said that there was good natural cover for
the troops in Sfax. One airfield there was practically complete and
there was another at Gabes. The improvement of airfields had been
one of the greatest problems. Approximately 2,000 tons of steel mat-
ting were required for a single runway and this quantity used up the
complete capacity of railroads in the forward areas for a whole day.
Every possible expedient had been tried to use local material but
broken stone merely sank into the mud. Once the weather improved
all these difficulties would vanish since there were large areas in the
forward zone which could be used as airfields with little or no prepara-
tion at all.
3. Strategy in the European Theater

Sir Alan Brooke outlined two broad policies which should be followed in the European Theater during 1943. The first was to close down in the Mediterranean as soon as the North African coast had been cleared and the sea route through the Mediterranean had been opened, and to devote every effort to building up in the United Kingdom for an invasion of the North of France at the earliest possible moment. The British Chiefs of Staff had examined the possibilities and calculated that 21 to 23 divisions could be made available for this purpose by September 15th. It had at first been thought that port and railway capacity would be the limiting factor on the build-up of American troops' expansion but it looked as if these difficulties could be overcome if the expansion of receiving depots for supplies were pushed ahead. As a basis of calculation, a monthly movement of 120 merchant vessels from the U.K. to the U.S.A. had been taken, the corresponding troop lift being 120,000. This would allow 9 to 12 U.S. divisions to be transported to the U.K. by September 1st. The number of troops which could be put into France was severely limited, however, by the availability of landing craft and of administrative facilities in France.

Three possible areas for invasion had been considered:

(a) The Calais-Boulogne area, which, although heavily defended, was within fighter cover of the United Kingdom;

(b) Cherbourg Peninsula, which could be seized by a comparatively small force;

(c) Brest Peninsula, which was a more worthwhile objective, would require a much larger force, say, at least 15 divisions to hold the 150 kilometers of front.

One of the objections to operations against the North of France was the excellent railway connections across Europe which would enable the Germans rapidly to reinforce the invaded area. Moreover, it would not be possible to begin the operation until the early autumn and no support would therefore be given to Russia throughout the summer. This last factor seemed to be the principal objection. A land invasion on a small scale would have little more than a local effect except for the air fighting which would inevitably ensue from it.

The other broad possibility was to maintain activity in the Mediterranean while building up the maximum air offensive against Germany from the U.K. and putting in as many troops as could be spared with a view to undertaking a comparatively small operation such as seizing Cherbourg Peninsula.

The Mediterranean offered many choices: Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, and the Dodecanese. Our amphibious power enabled us to threaten all these points simultaneously and thereby cause the Germans to
disperse their forces. Unless they were to risk the loss of these islands, they would be compelled to reinforce them as well as the coasts of Italy, Greece, and France. If Italy could be knocked out, Germany would be involved in large new commitments in an attempt to bolster her up and replacing Italian troops in the Balkans. Other German satellites might also fall out. The British Chiefs of Staff considered that our best policy would be to threaten Germany everywhere in the Mediterranean, to try to knock out Italy, and to bring in Turkey on our side. It was not, of course, certain that we could bring Turkey in but by a combination of inducements and pressure we might be successful. With Turkey as a base, we could attack the Rumanian oil fields and open up the Black Sea Route to Russia.

If this policy was adopted, we shall have to make a careful choice of our objective. The main choice seemed to lie between the capture of Sardinia and Corsica and the capture of Sicily. Sicily would be the bigger prize but would be a bigger undertaking and the operation could not be staged until late in the summer. The threat, however, would compel dispersion on Germany long before the operation itself was launched. As for Sardinia and Corsica, these increased the possibilities of air attack against Italy by providing bases for fighter escorted bombers. The operation might be combined with operations from the Middle East against the Dodecanese.

One of the great advantages of adopting the Mediterranean policy was that a larger force of heavy bombers could be built up in the United Kingdom for the attack on Germany than if we concentrated for an invasion of France. For the latter purpose, a much larger proportion of the lighter type of bomber and ground support planes would be needed and the number of heavy bombers would suffer accordingly.

Admiral King pointed out that the more troops that we concentrated in the Mediterranean, the more likely Germany was to move into Spain in order to cut our line of communications through the straits of Gibraltar. An invasion of Northern France such as the seizure of the Brest Peninsula would not nearly so likely precipitate such an event. He doubted whether the Spaniards could be relied upon to offer anything more than guerilla resistance to a German invasion.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff did not consider it was at all probable that Spain would permit free passage to the German forces. It was calculated that some 20 divisions would be necessary to occupy the country if the Spaniards resisted at all. This would be a very large commitment for Germany. In any event, we would be able to secure the south side of the Straits of Gibraltar by occupying Spanish Morocco and this would prevent the complete closure of the sea route. He did not think it would be possible for Germany to seize the Spanish airfields in the South by parachute
troops. The problem of supplying them by air would be extremely difficult.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that if the Spaniards allowed the Germans free passage we should declare war on Spain which was depending on us for many of the necessities of life. Even if the Germans did go in, we should be better able to afford aircraft for the protection of shipping through the Straits of Gibraltar than could the Germans for its attack. It would be much more advantageous for the Germans if we built up against France and left the Mediterranean alone. They would then be able to withdraw large numbers of air forces from the Mediterranean and reinforce the Russian Front, relying on the strong defenses of Northern France to resist an invasion. On the other hand if we kept the Mediterranean active, they would be compelled to keep large air forces there the whole time. This was of the greatest importance since Germany’s main shortages were air forces and oil.

Considerable discussion followed on the details and timings of operations against Sicily and Sardinia in which the following were the principal points made:

(a) If the capture of Sicily was mounted from the United Kingdom and the United States, it could be carried out early in August, but would require some 190 escort vessels. If it was mounted from North Africa some 65 escorts would be saved, but its launching would be delayed about one month. This delay was due to the time required for amphibious training in North Africa where facilities were extremely limited.

(b) The capture of Sardinia could be undertaken in about May, i.e., three months earlier than Sicily. Air cover for the Sardinia operation, however, would be more difficult owing to its greater distance from North Africa.

(c) The total coastline of Sicily was about 500 miles and it was anticipated that some 7 to 8 enemy divisions would be defending the island. This compared very favorably with the coastline of Northern France which was the same length, more strongly fortified and would be defended by 15 divisions.

(d) Part of the air cover for operations against Sicily could be provided from Malta from which about 300 fighters could be operated. Additional fighter protection could be given if Pantellaria was seized in a preliminary operation. The troops required for the operation amounted to some 9 divisions, 10 to 12 brigade groups being employed as assaulting troops.

(e) It was doubtful whether the whole operation against Sicily could be undertaken by troops already in the Mediterranean owing to the difficulties of training them in time in North Africa. Assembly and repair of landing craft was another bottleneck.

Sir Dudley Pound estimated that once the North African Coast had been cleared, even without having Sicily in our possession, it would be possible to run a convoy of thirty ships once every ten days through
the Mediterranean, in substitution for the present shipping to the Middle East, Persian Gulf and India, which moved via the Cape. This would effect a saving of some 225 ships. The average losses per month on the Cape route are at present about 15 ships. The estimated losses if the Mediterranean route were used should only be about 9 a month even allowing a higher percentage of loss. He understood, however, that the United States estimate was 18.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, JANUARY 15, 1943, 5:30 P. M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Eisenhower
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt
Lieutenant Roosevelt, U.S.N.R.

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Tedder
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

THE SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA

General Eisenhower gave a review of the situation on his front. He explained that the Allied forces which landed in French North Africa were equipped to capture three ports. They were not a mobile army and had little strength for offensive operations. This arrangement had been necessary since the attitude of the French was an unknown quantity. General Anderson had advanced with great boldness and rapidity taking every kind of risk in an attempt to get into Tunis and Bizerte in the first rush. He had finally been stopped by dive bombing when he got into the open country near Tunis, and by wet weather which hampered movement off the roads. Every effort had then been made to reinforce the forward troops, units being moved from Oran and from Casablanca. It was hoped to launch an offensive on December 22nd to capture Tunis, making use of superior gun power. The weather had turned against us and it had proved necessary to call off the offensive. A means of carrying out opera-
tions in the drier country in the south had then been sought and an operation had now been planned for the capture of Sfax which would begin on January 24th. He had been waiting, however, for a chance of coordinating action with General Alexander, as it was important that the timing should fit in with the movements of the 8th Army.

General Eisenhower then gave details of how it was proposed to conduct the forthcoming operation and of the forces to be employed. It was intended to use the American First Armored Division (less one light battalion), a regimental combat team and additional units of artillery, and also to use the airfields in the Gafsa and Tebessa areas for supporting aircraft. The Germans had disposed their armor northeast of Pont du Fahs, and it would be necessary to guard against a counter stroke towards the rear of the forces attacking Sfax. It was hoped to put supplies into Sfax by sea from the eastward to ease the maintenance problem. It was hoped that this operation would be of real assistance to the 8th Army because the Germans were sending supplies by rail to Sfax whence they were sending small coasting vessels to Rommel. The Sfax force would be separated by 75 miles of rough country from the British 1st Army, in which there were two critical points: Pont du Fahs and Foudouk, which were held by the French. Apart from one regiment in Algiers, and part of a division in Oran, there was virtually nothing between the troops in the front line and Morocco. Troops in the latter place were too far away to move up over the long and difficult line of communications. The 1st Army had 7 to 10 days' supplies of all kinds, and so if an opening were offered by the Germans they could launch an attack. In the whole theater of war there were now about 320,000 troops. Supplies were ample in the Casablanca area, but again difficulty of transportation prevented much being moved forward.

General Eisenhower then gave a description of the various airfields being used by the Allied Air Forces, and of the difficulties of keeping them serviceable. He then referred to the political situation and pointed out that it was very closely related to the military situation in view of the very vulnerable nature of the line of communications for the guarding of which French troops were responsible. Returning to the air situation he said that Air Chief Marshal Tedder had twice visited Algiers and detailed plans had been worked out to insure the coordinated action of the Air Forces from the Middle East, Malta and French North Africa. Medium bombers based on Philippeville were now being used with effect against shipping.

General Alexander then gave an account of the operations of the 8th Army. He said that the El Alamein position was about 40 miles long and was occupied by the German 15th Panzer, 21st Panzer, 90th Light and 164th Infantry Divisions which were at full strength in men and equipment, and by 10 Italian Divisions. The position had
no open flank so the problem was one of punching a hole through which
the armor could be launched. The attack went in under a very heavy
barrage of 500 guns on October 24th. Infantry advanced through
deep minefields for 4,000 to 6,000 yards. For the next ten days there
was severe fighting designed to eat up the enemy’s reserves and pre-
pare the way for the final breakthrough. On November 4th, the
front was broken and the opportunity came for the fine American
Sherman tanks to pour through. In two weeks Tobruk was reached
and by the end of a month the army was at Agheila. They had the
satisfaction of advancing twice as fast as Rommel had been able to
move during our retreat. The Germans had not enough transport
to go round and so they had made certain that what there was was
used for the German units. Our casualties in twelve days were 16,000;
the enemy’s must have totalled between 60,000 and 70,000 and Rommel
must have lost nearly 5,000 vehicles. None of this would have been
possible had it not been for the air superiority gained by the Air
Forces who had throughout done magnificent work.

For the further advance beyond Agheila everything depended upon
the use of Benghazi. The harbor was left by the Germans in a ter-
rible mess. However by dint of fine work on the part of the Navy,
a flow of 3,000 tons per day was reached. A severe gale which again
breached the mole and sank several ships interrupted the flow, but it
was now back again to 2,000 tons per day. Sirte was useless but there
was a small place near Agheila where 400 tons per day had been
unloaded.

The plan of the operations which had now begun was an attack by
the 7th Armored Division, the New Zealand Division and the 51st
Highland Division who were carrying with them 10 days’ supplies
and 500 miles of petrol. It was hoped to reach Tripoli by January
26th.

The enemy’s fighting value was hard to assess but he was believed
to have at his disposal the following forces:

15th Panzer Division with 30 tanks
21st Panzer Division with about 27 tanks) 50 additional
tanks were be-
lieved to be
ready in Tunisia.
90th Light Division both weak in strength and short of
164th Division artiller.
About 9 Italian Divisions.

The total strength might be assessed at 50,000 Germans and 30,000
Italians, though only about 20,000 of the former were strictly fighting
troops. The enemy’s organization was much broken up and he was
very short of artillery. Furthermore, his army had retreated 1,000
miles, which must have had its effect on morale. Our superiority
rested in tanks and guns, of which we had ample. General LeClerc’s
advance through Fezzan had been a fine piece of work but would not exercise an influence on the present battle.

If we got to Tripoli according to plan the 8th Army would be quite immobilized until the port was open. This would take probably seven or ten days, though in the worst case it might take three months. It was hoped to work up to 3,000 tons a day and if this was achieved it would be possible to attack the Mareth Line towards the middle of March with 2 Armored and 4 Infantry Divisions. We were getting photographs of the Mareth Line, which was certainly a prepared position, though lacking in depth. It should be realized that the distances involved were very great. From Buerat to Tripoli was 248 miles and from Tripoli to Gabes was 220 miles. It would, of course, be possible, if the enemy’s resistance proved weak, to advance to the Mareth Line with very light forces somewhat earlier.

Discussion then turned upon the coordination of the operations of the 8th Army and of those of General Eisenhower’s command. General Eisenhower inquired what Rommel’s position would be if the 8th Army captured Tripoli and if he captured Sfax. Could the 8th Army keep Rommel engaged so that the forces at Sfax could neglect its right flank and turn all its attention towards the North?

General Alexander said that Rommel was living very much from hand to mouth for supplies and if he lost all his ports he would certainly be trapped; nevertheless, it would be necessary to give very careful study to the Sfax operation. It should be realized that if a force advanced on Sfax, Rommel would react like lightning and his plan would be the best possible. Great care would be necessary to insure that undue risks were not taken.

Sir Alan Brooke said that a great deal depended upon the timing of the Sfax operation. It might be unfortunate if the force arrived at Sfax just at the time that the 8th Army had reached Tripoli and were immobilized for lack of supplies.

It was generally agreed that the coordination of the action of the two armies was a matter of the highest importance and the present opportunity should be utilized to the full.

Discussion then turned on the strength required to hold the North African shore when it had been completely cleared of the enemy. General Alexander said that he had calculated that two divisions with a mobile reserve would be sufficient for Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. General Eisenhower said that he considered four divisions should be held to watch Spanish Morocco and that one infantry and one armored division would certainly be necessary in Algeria and Tunisia. There were at present six U.S. divisions in French North Africa and three more were set up in the original plan to come. If these were shipped there would be three U.S. divisions over and above defensive requirements. He thought it would be unwise to hand over
the defense of Tunisia too early to the French. The Prime Minister agreed. He said that it appeared that there would be some thirteen divisions in the whole North African theater available for future operations.

In reply to an inquiry Sir Arthur Tedder said that he was of the opinion that convoys could be passed through the Mediterranean when airfields had been established and when the Tunisian tip had been cleared. Sir Dudley Pound agreed. He reckoned that if thirty ships could be passed through every ten days the whole of the Cape traffic could be done away with and 225 ships would thus be released for other uses. It was hard to estimate the relative losses which might be incurred, but though the percentage of loss might be slightly higher through the Mediterranean the total would be less as fewer ships would be involved. The Mediterranean route would be more expensive in escorts, but there would be a saving in the time of voyages.

The Prime Minister said that the opening of the Mediterranean would have its effect on the attitude of Turkey; moreover, the British 10th Army, consisting of six divisions, which had been established in Persia with the object of meeting the threat through the Caucasus, was now available to encourage and support the Turks.

In discussion it was suggested that it might be worth while calculating what specialized units would be required to round out the Turkish Army. Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that up to the present the Turks had been supplied with technical material and arms, but although their Army consisted of first-rate material, as infantry, they tended to misuse technical equipment and allow it to deteriorate. He did not think their army would ever be fit to operate offensively outside Turkey. It might, however, serve to hold Turkey as a base from which our forces could operate.

Sir Arthur Tedder said that the Turks had a small air force to which we gave a limited number of aircraft; it would never be fit to fight. Our plan was to operate initially some twenty-five fighter and bomber squadrons from airfields in Turkey which had been prepared and stocked. Further airfields would be required if we were to operate offensively and plans were all drawn up for their preparation. It was intended to move antiaircraft defenses in with the squadrons.

Sir Arthur Tedder then gave an account of the part played by the Air Force in the recent victories in the Middle East. He emphasized that their task began during the British retreat from Gazala. Since that time the enemy air force had been beaten down and great efforts had been made to stop Rommel’s supplies. The action of an air force in operations of this kind was difficult to explain concisely, extending as it did over great areas and diverse tasks. The Middle East Air Forces had first struck at Rommel’s supplies and then at the supplies to Tunisia; for the latter purpose Malta had been rein-
forced to the utmost and aircraft had been transferred to Tunisia. The coordination of the Air Forces of the Middle East, Malta and Tunisia was a complicated problem and he was very glad to have the present opportunity of meeting General Eisenhower and discussing it.

General Eisenhower explained the difficulties under which the Air Forces in Tunisia were operating in support of the Army. There were only two airfields available for fighters and even these were 100 miles from the front line. The Germans, on the other hand, had two all weather airfields in Tunis. In the early stages U. S. units from the Western Zone had been moved up and placed under British command; Air Marshal Welch had disposed them in the Tebessa area. For the operation now contemplated the British fighter force would operate from Souk El Arba under Lawson and the U. S. fighters would operate in the South under General Crane. His own conception of the layout on this front was that the British Army Commander should control it all since there was no sound arrangement by which the front could be divided. The French, however, had refused to serve under British command. This had meant that he had had to establish a Command Post from which to direct operations. He hoped to overcome this kind of difficulty in the near future.

The Prime Minister inquired whether there was any danger of the Germans striking through General Anderson’s left flank rather in the manner adopted by the 8th Army at El Alamein. General Eisenhower said that the 1st Army had such superiority over the enemy in artillery that he did not think there was much fear of this. Though the enemy’s specialist and tank units were good, his infantry had not seemed to be up to the same standard.

In conclusion it was emphasized that events had reached a crucial stage in the North African Theater and that the events of the next two or three weeks would be of vital importance. The present was the time at which to consider what action should be taken when the North African shore had finally been cleared.

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ROOSEVELT-LEATHERS CONVERSATION, JANUARY 15, 1943, 7 P. M., PRESIDENT’S VILLA

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM
Lord Leathers

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this informal conversation was kept. The information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 523, and Elliott Roosevelt, p. 81. Neither of these sources indicates
the substance of the discussion, but the presence of Leathers, the
British Minister of War Transport, makes it likely that shipping
problems were considered.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 16, 1943

ROOSEVELT–CHURCHILL CONVERSATION, JANUARY 16, 1943, 9: 55 A. M.,
PRESIDENT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Murphy
Lieutenant General Eisenhower

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Macmillan

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this conversation has been
found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log,
ante, p. 524. French politics was the subject of the discussion, accord-
ing to the mention of the meeting in Elliott Roosevelt, p. 84. It was
probably at this meeting that Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to in-
vite de Gaulle and Giraud to join them at Casablanca. A British
day-to-day summary of communications with Giraud and de Gaulle,
not printed, records the following for January 16:

Air Commodore F’s invitation to de Gaulle despatched. Foreign
Secretary replied that he was seeing de Gaulle the following day
(January 17th). General Eisenhower, on return to Algiers, conveyed
similar invitation from Admiral Q. to General Giraud. General
Giraud’s reply, accepting, received late the same night. (Roosevelt
Papers)

In his telegram of January 16 to Hull, post, p. 810, Roosevelt in-
formed the Secretary of the invitations which had been sent to the two
French leaders. Murphy, p. 171, recalls that it was during the first
three days of the Conference that Churchill persuaded Roosevelt to
agree to a formula which would offer de Gaulle joint political
leadership with Giraud in North Africa.

In his account of the decision to send invitations to de Gaulle and
Giraud, Macmillan (pp. 244–246) does not mention this morning
conversation. Macmillan recalls first calling upon Roosevelt (who was
in bed) at 6 p. m. on January 15. Churchill and Eisenhower were
already present, and Murphy arrived soon after. There was a short

1 Present from 10:50 to 11:20.
2 Present from 11:00 to 11:15. This apparently was Eisenhower’s final par-
ticipation in the proceedings of the conference. According to Butcher, p. 243, he
departed by plane for Algiers about noon.
3 Present from 10:45 to 11:20.
discussion of conditions in North Africa. Macmillan further recalls that he joined Roosevelt, Churchill, and Murphy after dinner on January 15 for a discussion of possible invitations to de Gaulle and Giraud to come to Casablanca. Macmillan expressed fear that both generals would resent such a plan, but a decision was nevertheless made to despatch the invitations.

The text of Churchill’s message of invitation to de Gaulle, dated January 16, is printed in de Gaulle, Documents, p. 126, and it also appears in Macmillan, pp. 245–246. Regarding the delivery of the invitation to de Gaulle by Eden on January 17, see the cable from Eden to Churchill, January 17, post, p. 815.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 16, 1943, 10:30 A.M., ANFA CAMP

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Smart
Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay
Major General Kennedy
Air Vice Marshal Slessor

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. The North African Situation

Sir Alan Brooke gave an account of a conference between General Alexander and General Eisenhower regarding the coming operations in Tunisia and Libya. General Eisenhower had planned an offensive against Sfax to be launched on January 24th. The Plan presented...
some difficulties. The 1st Army cannot attack prior to March 15th. The British 8th Army expects to take Tripoli by January 24th. At that time they will be out of fuel for their vehicles and a certain amount of reorganizing will be necessary. It is probable that the 8th Army will not be able to attack Rommel's forces on the Mareth line prior to February 15th. Thus they will be too late to take advantage of the favorable situation created by General Eisenhower's attack on Sfax and consequently Rommel will be free for a period of time to operate against General Eisenhower's southern forces and perhaps force him to withdraw from Sfax. This might be coupled with a German attack from the north which would place General Eisenhower's southern forces in an extremely precarious position.

Sir Alan Brooke stated that it had been decided that the Sfax attack would be canceled. Instead, raids would be conducted against the German line of communications from Sfax but the bulk of General Eisenhower's forces consisting of the 1st Armored Division, reinforced, would be held in the vicinity of Tebessa prepared to assist General Alexander in his attack on Rommel's forces or to assist the 1st Army to the north. The Sfax attack might be accomplished later and, if so, it would be timed by agreement between General Alexander and General Eisenhower who will confer frequently.

2. The Strategic Concept for 1943 in the European Theater

General Marshall stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff were anxious to learn the British concept as to how Germany is to be defeated. It has been the conception of the United States Chiefs of Staff that Germany must be defeated by a powerful effort on the continent, carrying out the Bolero-Roundup plans. Aid to Russia is regarded as being of paramount importance in order to assist the Russian Army to absorb the strength of the German ground and air forces.

He said we must devise means to enable Russia to continue aggressively through 1943 by providing them with supplies. The amount of such supplies and the methods of delivering them must be determined upon. The German air and ground forces brought to bear against Russia must be reduced. Any method of accomplishing this other than on the Continent is a deviation from the basic plan. The question is then to what extent must the United Nations adhere to the general concept and to what extent do they undertake diversions for the purpose of assisting Russia, improving the tonnage situation, and maintaining momentum.

In commenting on the British presentation of their plans for the Mediterranean, General Marshall stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like to have further information on the following points:
(a) Were not the East-West communications in northern Europe, which the British consider capable of moving seven divisions every twelve days, subject to severe interference by heavy air attacks from England?

(b) If the Mediterranean operations were undertaken and there were a break in the German strength, might it occur so rapidly that full advantage could not be taken of it? It was, therefore, desired that the British Chiefs of Staff expand on what the tonnage savings from the Mediterranean operations might be in order to determine if they were worth the costs involved.

(c) What would be the effects of Mediterranean operations on the timing of the United Nations concentrations in England? In General Eisenhower’s opinion, it was unwise to count on further use of landing craft used in the initial landings for any other operation. A fifty or seventy-five percent loss should be anticipated. General Eisenhower also thought that operations on the Continent to establish a bridgehead would require more divisions than had originally been thought necessary.

(d) What were the relative merits of undertaking an operation against Sicily or Sardinia, particularly in regard to the effects on tonnage, and the development of forces in the United Kingdom?

(e) Was an operation against Sicily merely a means towards an end or an end in itself? Is it to be a part of an integrated plan to win the war or simply taking advantage of an opportunity?

General Marshall said the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed that every effort must be made to build up forces to support Turkey in order to be able to reinforce her for resistance against the Axis powers and to secure the use of her airfields for bombing operations by the United Nations.

He thought that if operations are to be undertaken in the Mediterranean, they should be financed by the troops now in North Africa. One of the strongest arguments for undertaking such an operation is that there will be an excess of troops in North Africa once Tunisia has been cleared of the Axis forces.

Admiral King stated that he thought it most important to determine how the war is to be conducted. The percentage of the war effort to be applied to Germany and to Japan must be determined as well as over-all plans for the defeat of each. He asked if Russia is to carry the burden as far as the ground forces are concerned; also, if the United Nations were to invade the Continent, and when. He said that since Europe is in the British area of strategic responsibility, he would like to hear their views on these questions. He thought it should be decided whether a planned step-by-step policy was to be pursued or whether we should rely on seizing opportunities.

General Arnold stated that he was interested to know whether an attack on Sicily was to be a means to an end or an end in itself and what relation such an attack would have to the whole strategic conception.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that, when planning for GYMNASIUM, we were attempting to undertake an operation “on a shoe string.” He said we then changed to the BOLERO-ROUNDUP concept and had to prepare for SLEDGEHAMMER because of the strong possibility of a Russian collapse last autumn. Troop concentrations had been started and production programs rearranged for BOLERO. This created difficult complications. The naval program was upset because of the necessity to undertake the construction of landing craft. It was then decided to undertake Operation TORCH in which great risks were involved but in which we have been abnormally fortunate.

GENERAL MARSHALL described the difficulties with which the United States Chiefs of Staff were faced over questions of priorities in production. It was essential to fix our strategic policy as carefully as possible in order to avoid production difficulties.

GENERAL MARSHALL thought it important that we now reorient ourselves and decide what the “main plot” is to be. Every diversion or side issue from the main plot acts as a “suction pump.” He stated that the operations against Sicily appeared to be advantageous because of the excess number of troops in North Africa brought about by the splendid efforts of the British 8th Army. However, before deciding to undertake such an operation, he thought it necessary to determine just what part it would play in the over-all strategic plan.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that on the Continent Russia is the only ally having large land forces in action. Any effort of the other allies must necessarily be so small as to be unimportant in the over-all picture. He felt that ground operations by the United States and the United Kingdom would not exert any great influence until there were definite signs that Germany was weakening.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that it was desirable to force the enemy to meet us in air combat. He asked Sir Alan Brooke to discuss the effects of air superiority of the United Nations on the operations of ground troops of the Continent. He felt that if a bridgehead were established and Germany did not attempt to meet our air superiority, the bridgehead could be expanded. On the other hand, if they did meet our air superiority, it would necessitate withdrawing large air forces from the Russian front.

He referred to a suggestion by Mr. Molotov that we send a ground force to the Continent sufficient to divert forty German divisions from the Russian front. He said that this was out of the question and

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* Molotov had made the suggestion in the course of a conference in Washington with the President and Hopkins on May 29, 1942, for the record of which see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, p. 570. General Marshall apparently first heard of Molotov's suggestion about the size of the Anglo-American landing force desired by the Soviet Union during a White House Conference on May 30, 1942, for the record of which see ibid., p. 575.
that our aim should be to weaken the German air power in the Russian theater rather than the ground forces.

Sir Alan Brooke stated that with limited ground forces, he did not believe that we could constitute sufficient threat in Northern France to the Germans to force them to withdraw much of their air power from the Russian front. The Germans have forty-four divisions in France, some of which have been moved south as a result of Operation Torch. However, the Germans still have sufficient strength to overwhelm us on the ground and perhaps hem us in with wire or concrete to such an extent that any expansion of the bridgehead would be extremely difficult. Moreover, we cannot undertake any operation in Northern France until very late in the summer of 1943. Since, therefore, we cannot go into the Continent in force until Germany weakens, we should try to make the Germans disperse their forces as much as possible. This can be accomplished by attacking the German allies, Italy in particular. This would result in a considerable shortage of German troops on the Russian front. An effort should be made to put Italy out of the war, largely by bombing attacks on the north from the United Kingdom and in the south from North Africa and Sicily.

Our policy should be to force Italy out of the war and bring Turkey in. If Italy were out of the war, Germany would be forced to occupy that country with a considerable number of divisions and also would be forced to replace Italian divisions in other Axis occupied countries such as Yugoslavia and Greece.

Preparations for an attack against Sicily would be known to the Germans and would necessitate the dispersing of their forces to meet any of the capabilities of our amphibious forces. They would have to be prepared to meet us in Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, Greece and the Dodecanese, and this would give great opportunity for deception plans. He felt that this would cause a much greater withdrawal of strength from the Russian front than any operations which we might undertake across the channel. The protection of the sea route alone would bring on a considerable air battle in the Mediterranean which will give relief to the Russian front. Airplanes which normally leave Russia during the winter months and participate in operations in the Mediterranean would be unable to return to the Russian front in the spring.

Sir Alan Brooke said that at the same time as operations against Sicily were being undertaken, there must be a continued build-up of the United Nations forces in the United Kingdom. These must be prepared to undertake the final action of the war as soon as Germany gives definite signs of weakness.

Sir Alan Brooke did not believe we could undertake any further operations in Italy from Sicily in 1943, unless Italy collapsed com-
pletely. We should be very careful of accepting any invitation to support an anti-Fascist insurrection. To do so might only immobilize a considerable force to no useful purpose.

Sir Alan Brooke did not feel that air operations against the German and French railway systems in the north would be particularly effective or do anything more than impose delay. There were so many alternative routes. On the other hand, operations against the north-south railway lines, particularly those in Italy, could be made effective because of the close proximity of the lines to the shore which makes them vulnerable to commando raids as well as to air action.

Sir Dudley Pound discussed the effects that taking Sardinia and Sicily would have on the passage of convoys. He said that securing either of these islands will not have as much effect as securing Tunisia. He anticipated that when Tunisia is gained, we shall be able to convoy thirty cargo ships through the Mediterranean every ten days which will result in the release of two hundred and twenty-five ships for other purposes. The route would not be safe for personnel ships or tankers. The capture of Sardinia would have little effect on the movements of shipping. On the other hand, the capture of Sicily would enable us to move troop convoys as well as cargo convoys through the Mediterranean with relative safety. The troop convoys, however, will, in the future, be limited almost entirely to replacement troops for the Middle East.

He stated that there will also be a saving in tankers because of the possibility of supplying the necessities for oil in the Mediterranean from Haifa rather than bringing oil from the United States.

Sir Alan Brooke recapitulated the comparative merits of an attack on Sardinia and Sicily as follows: The loss of Sicily would be a much heavier blow to Italy than Sardinia and would effectively secure the sea route through the Mediterranean. On the other hand, it was a much more ambitious operation and would have to be mounted later. Sardinia was a smaller undertaking, and could be mounted earlier. It would provide an excellent air base for attack on Industrial Italy, particularly if Corsica were taken as well.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that if Sicily had to be taken later in the year and if the Germans in consequence were able to reinforce it more strongly, it would be a much tougher nut to crack. On the other hand, once in possession of the Sicilian airfields we could make it very difficult indeed for the Axis to reinforce the island. The rail-ways along the Italian coasts in the two [toe?] were vulnerable to air attack and raiding; and there were narrow defiles leading from the port of Messina in the island itself.

Sir Charles Portal referred to the suggestion that we might be able to offset inferiority in land forces in Northern France by the greatly superior air forces which could be operated from the United
Kingdom. So far as the Brest Peninsula was concerned, no fighter support could be given from the United Kingdom, since it was out of range. The Cherbourg Peninsula was better from this point of view and offered some possibilities as a preliminary operation. Nevertheless, with the limited air facilities in the Peninsula we should probably find ourselves pinned down at the neck of the Peninsula by ground forces whose superiority we should be unable to offset by the use of air. We should certainly be opposed by strong German air forces there. Once we were committed in Northern France the Germans would quickly bring up their air forces from the Mediterranean, realizing that we could not undertake amphibious operations on a considerable scale both across the channel and in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, by threatening in the Mediterranean we should cause a far greater dispersion of German air forces.

Sir Charles Portal said that in his view it was impossible to map out a detailed plan for winning the war, but Germany’s position, if we knocked out Italy, would undoubtedly be most serious. Her ability to continue the fight depended on (a) the possession of the necessary resources and (b) the will to fight on. As regards resources, her main shortages at present were oil and air power. We had no exact knowledge of her oil position, but if she had not succeeded in gaining the Caucasus oil, and if her synthetic oil plants were attacked by precision bombing in daylight, there could be little doubt that her forces would rapidly become immobilized from lack of oil.

As regards her air forces, calculations had been made by the British Air Intelligence Staffs of German deficiencies under the following hypotheses:

Case A—Italy fighting and Germany continuing the offensive in Caucasus.
Case B—As for A, but Italy knocked out.
Case C—Italy fighting and Germany holding a shortened line in Russia by withdrawing to Rostov.
Case D—As for C, but Italy not fighting.

German deficiencies in June 1943 were calculated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Deficiencies in First Line Aircraft</th>
<th>Deficiencies in Divisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>2250</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Germany’s will to fight depended largely on her confidence in ultimate success. If we and the Russians began to score continual successes against Germany, which she could not defeat owing to her lack of means, she would begin to realize that the prospects were hopeless. She might be faced with the dilemma of withdrawing all her
troops from France and concentrating in the East against Russia. The way to defeat Germany, therefore, seemed to be to take every chance of attacking her oil supplies; to increase the air bombardment of Germany itself with its inevitable results on German morale, and on industrial capacity and its effect in producing heavy casualties in her population and great misery by the destruction of their dwellings. If we could achieve as well a series of successes, even though these might be comparatively small in extent, it seemed fairly certain that a point would be reached at which Germany would suddenly crack. No one, however, could say precisely when or how the collapse would come.

**Admiral King** said he understood the general concept of the British Chiefs of Staff was to make use of Russia’s geographical position and her reserves of manpower to make the main effort on land against Germany and to support Russia by diverting as many German forces as possible from the Eastern front. This raised the question as to whether we should not give Russia larger supplies of equipment.

Once the North African coast had been cleared it seemed that we should have a surplus of troops in North Africa and the Mediterranean whom we could not readily move elsewhere. It seemed therefore economical to use them in that area if possible. Sicily seemed undoubtedly to offer a greater dividend though its cost would be higher than Sardinia. The question was whether we could afford to delay so long before taking further offensive action against Germany and whether the Russians would be satisfied unless a “second front” was opened in France. The chief bottleneck seemed to be the provision of landing craft. Operations in Norway seemed to be worth examining though they would almost inevitably lead to a demand from Sweden for assistance and equipment.

As regards the Brest Peninsula, it was worth noting that once we were established there, U. S. troops could be moved in direct from America without the need for trans-shipment in the United Kingdom. The effect of capturing Brest on the U-boat war needed careful consideration.

**Sir Charles Portal** said that Brest was one of the four Biscay ports used by the Germans as U-boat bases, but he doubted whether the possession of the peninsula would greatly assist the proposed heavy bomber attacks on Lorient, La Pallice and Bordeaux. All these were within easy range of the United Kingdom and to operate against them from the Brest Peninsula would involve putting in additional facilities there. The airfields in the peninsula were likely to be fully employed in the air defense of the area and direct support of the army, leaving nothing to spare for fighter escorts for daylight bombing attacks on the Biscay ports.
The next point discussed was the effect of Mediterranean operations on BOLERO. SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the number of divisions which the British Chiefs of Staff calculated could be made available by September 15th for operations from the United Kingdom into Northern France were:

21–24 if the Mediterranean were closed down
16–18 if Mediterranean operations were undertaken

If the capture of Sicily were undertaken, the number of landing craft left available for operations in Northern France would be less. SIR DUDLEY POUND observed that all calculations of the number of divisions available for operations in Northern France were based on the date of September 15th. In his view this was too late since the weather was liable to break in the third week in September and it was essential to have a port by then. The first assault should not be later than August 15th.

GENERAL MARSHALL inquired whether considerable numbers of landing craft would not be required for the maintenance of Sicily after it was taken.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that once Sicily had been occupied the air defense of the ports should present no particular difficulty. We were able to put large ships into Malta which was very exposed to air attack. The number of enemy airfields in the toe of Italy was small, and fighters on the Sicilian airdromes should be able to deal with dive bombers.

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN then reviewed the British landing craft situation. Available landing craft were being allocated broadly as follows:

(a) A group in the United Kingdom of the smaller types of cross-channel craft sufficient to lift 4 brigade groups with their vehicles, or 7 brigade groups loaded for raids when very few motor vehicles would be taken.
(b) A group in the Western Mediterranean sufficient to lift 1 brigade group complete.
(c) A similar group in the Eastern Mediterranean.
(d) A group in India sufficient to train 1 brigade group, but not enough to lift the brigade group if it had to undertake actual operations.
(e) An overseas assault force, as a strategic reserve, sufficient to lift 6 brigade groups. The personnel would be carried in combat loaders but they could not all be put ashore in the first flight as the ships could not carry sufficient landing craft for the purpose.

Every attempt was being made to organize landing craft bases in the U. K. so as to give the maximum flexibility and thus allow for a change of plan. The switch over from ROUNDUP to TORCH had caused great difficulties owing to the fact that bases prepared for ROUNDUP
were in the South of England whereas Scottish bases had to be used for Torch.

Lord Louis Mountbatten observed that he was working on the assumption that any U.S. troops would be carried in landing craft manned by the U.S. In the Torch landings the majority of U.S. forces at Oran and Algiers had been landed in British manned craft. He emphasized the need for working out allocations of landing craft well ahead owing to the long time involved in training the necessary crews.

General Somervell said that the introduction of the L.S.T. and the L.C.I. necessitated considerable change in our ideas about landing craft; the former carried some 150 infantry as well as tanks, and the latter 250 infantry. He calculated that if all the available landing craft were concentrated in North Africa we should be able to lift a total of some 80,000 men by April. Allowing for the use of 105-foot and 50-foot craft as well, this lift would probably increase to about 90,000 in June. If this force of landing craft were used for a second and third ferrying flight, on a short sea crossing, their lift would probably be about 60,000 in the second flight and 45,000 in the third flight, allowing for inevitable casualties in craft. He considered the use of these landing craft, working to beaches, a sounder proposition than the risking of large ships under air attack. The latter should be reserved for the long ocean hauls.

To transfer landing craft from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for a subsequent operation later in the year presented considerable problems. It was certainly essential to have considerable numbers of landing craft in the United Kingdom well in advance for training purposes.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Joint Planners had calculated August as the earliest date for the attack on Sicily. If the whole operation were mounted from North Africa in order to save escorts, the date would be postponed until the end of August. His own view was that, even under the latter condition, the date might be advanced to July. Assuming that the attack be launched about July 20th, he expected that we might gain control of the Island within about six weeks.

General Marshall inquired when, on the above assumptions, there would be sufficient landing craft in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack in Germany.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that three months would have to be allowed from the time when the landing craft could be dispensed with to the time when they would be ready for action again in the United Kingdom. The large types of sea-going landing vessels presented no difficulty but small 50-foot craft were essential for the assault landing. Both the United States and British Planners were
agreed that it was not possible to use the large craft for the first flights. These small craft had to be collected from the site of operations, transported to Scotland, distributed for repair, reassembled and then again transported by ship to the South of England for a Continental operation.

There would be in England, however, at all times the assault force to which he had previously referred which could lift 4 Brigade Groups with their transport for an assault against heavy opposition. In addition, for the follow-up troops, a great number of landing barges and small coasting vessels were being prepared. The spearhead would not be affected at all by operations in the Mediterranean and would always be kept intact. Any landing craft recovered from the Mediterranean would therefore be in the nature of a bonus.

Admiral King said that the intended use of combat loaders for an assault on Sicily greatly disturbed him. He had hoped that it would be possible to use the larger types of landing craft instead. He feared that a large number of these valuable combat loaders would be lost in the operation.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that in the Husky plan all available L.S.T.’s and L.C.I.’s would be used, but in addition, 26 combat loaders were required for the assault troops. Of these, the British could provide half.

Admiral King pointed out that the two main factors in winning the war were manpower and munitions. In respect to military manpower, the British Commonwealth had presumably mobilized practically up to the limit. The United States at the present time had reached about 60% of their contemplated strength in military manpower though the position had not yet completely stabilized. His own guess at Russia’s position was that she had mobilized about 80% of available military manpower. China’s resources in manpower were still relatively untouched, and India likewise was scarcely tapped.

As regards munitions, the greatest potential lay in the United States. Next came Great Britain, but she could not supply the full needs of the British Commonwealth forces. Russia was more self-supporting than at first appeared likely but had to receive a considerable amount of assistance from the Allies. From the munitions point of view, China and India were liabilities since their available manpower enormously exceeded their industrial production.

In the European theater Russia was most advantageously placed for dealing with Germany in view of her geographical position and manpower; in the Pacific, China bore a similar relation to the Japanese. It should be our basic policy to provide the manpower resources of Russia and China with the necessary equipment to enable them to fight. With this in mind, the United States Chiefs of Staff set great store by Operation Ravenous. It seemed likely that one of
the major British contributions to the defeat of Japan would be to
complete the reconquest of Burma and the opening of the Burma
Road.

General Marshall observed that, with regard to Operation
Ravenous, Chiang Kai-shek had now withdrawn from his undertak-
ing to move in from Yunnan on the grounds that Field Marshal
Wavell could only provide very limited British forces and there would
be no British naval strength in the Bay of Bengal to cut the Japa-
nese reinforcements route to Rangoon. General Stilwell was cer-
tainly placed in a very difficult position at the present time.

Discussion then turned on the need for long-range planning in
order that production policy could be coordinated with strategy.

General Arnold pointed out that if operations in the Mediter-
ranean were undertaken, the seizure of Brest, in the British view,
would not be possible this year. Further, that even if Cherbourg or
Brest were taken, our forces would not be able to break out for a
further invasion of the Continent. It looked very much as if no
Continental operations on any scale were in prospect before the spring
of 1944. We should have to decide not only what we were going to
do in 1943 but also in 1944 since otherwise, owing to the time lag,
our priorities in production might be wrongly decided.

Sir Alan Brooke expressed the view that we should definitely
count on reentering the Continent in 1944 on a large scale.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that production plans could never
follow strategy precisely since the situation changed so frequently
in war. The best that could be hoped for was to take broad decisions
on major questions and these would always be in the nature of com-
promises. For example, when considering the possibility of reenter-
ing the Continent, it had been decided that we must treat it as a for-
tress and that heavy initial bombardment would be required to break
into it. It had therefore been decided to give very high priority to
the production of heavy bombers which would be used to soften up
Germany before the invasion of the Continent.

Further discussion then followed on the possibility of a German
break in 1943.

Sir John Dill felt that there was quite a possibility of beating
Germany this year. We should therefore strain every nerve to effect
this since the sooner we beat Germany the sooner we could turn on
Japan. We must not let Japan consolidate her position for too long.
Japan certainly could not be beaten this year, but Germany might.

Admiral King doubted whether Germany could be defeated before
1944. He felt that her defeat could only be effected by direct military

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5 Chiang Kai-shek had made known his intention to withdraw from the pro-
jected military operation into Burma in a message of January 8, 1943, to the
President, the text of which is printed in Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 259–260.
action rather than by a failure in her morale. Was it necessary, however, to accept that we could do nothing in Northern France before April 1944?

Sir Charles Portal said that this depended entirely on Germany’s power of resistance. If we concentrated everything we could on Germany this year, it was possible that we might cause her to crumble and thus be able to move into Germany with comparatively small forces. Until this condition had been produced, however, some 20 divisions would get us nowhere on the Continent. A factor which must not be forgotten was the terrific latent power of the oppressed people which could only come into play when the crumbling process started. At that moment, however, their efforts might contribute greatly to the final collapse. He did not see Germany fighting on and on, completely surrounded by the armed forces of the Allies. A point would come at which the whole structure of Germany and the Nazi Party would collapse, and this moment might well come during the current year. It was essential therefore to have ready a plan and some resources in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack. In order to produce the crack, however, we must keep up the maximum pressure on Germany by land operations; air bombardment alone was not sufficient.

In further discussion the importance of deciding the requirements and availability of escort vessels was emphasized. These appeared to be one of the principal limiting factors.

Admiral King said that there was no reserve of escort vessels but if Operation Husky were decided upon, the United States and British Navies would have to find the escort vessels somehow just as they had in the case of Torch.

After some further discussion,

The Committee:

Agreed to direct the Combined Staff Planners to reexamine the British plan for Husky in the light of the American and British resources of all kinds that can be made available for it, and to calculate the earliest date by which the Operation could be mounted.6

3. Supplies to Russia

Sir Dudley Pound recapitulated the factors governing PQ convoys to North Russia. With the present resources of the Home Fleet not more than one 30-ship convoy could be run every 40 to 42 days. Each convoy had to contain two oilers, leaving a net total of 28 cargo ships.

* The main features of the British plan for mounting operation Husky were set forth in the memorandum by the British Planning Staff, C.C.S. 161, January 30, 1943, not printed. The report by the British Joint Planning Staff, C.C.S. 161/1, January 21, 1943, not printed, concluded that the earliest safe date on which it would be possible to rely for the British assaults in Husky would be August 30, 1943, and it was considered not possible to advance the date unless operations in Tunisia were concluded considerably earlier than anticipated.
With more destroyers it would be possible to "double-end" the convoys, reducing cycle to 27 days instead of 40–42. For this purpose about 12 destroyers would be required from the U. S. Navy. He wished to emphasize, however, that if the Germans employed their surface ships boldly and kept up the same amount of air and U-boats as last year, it was within their power to stop the PQ convoys altogether.

General Somervell reviewed the general problem of supplying Russia. The northern route was at present the best since the turn-round was shortest. The turn-round on the Persian Gulf route was about five months. Some fifteen ships a month are now being used on this route but the flow was restricted by port and inland transportation deficiencies. Once the Mediterranean was opened some relief might be given by the use of Haifa and the overland route from there to Bagdad. For this purpose additional heavy trucks for the road haul would be needed. U. S. Technical troops were being dispatched to Persia to improve the trans-Persian transportation facilities, and it was hoped to increase these to about 10,000 tons per day. If this could be achieved, 40 ships a month instead of 15 could be sent into the Persian Gulf.

The sea route from Seattle to Vladivostok was also being used for non-military supplies and raw materials. Twelve ships manned by the Russians were now working this route, and it was hoped to add 10 ships a month in the future. The use of this route naturally depended on non-interference by the Japanese.

All these potential increases in shipping to Russia naturally would have to be found by cutting down elsewhere. If the opening of the Mediterranean saved some million and a half tons of shipping, this would provide a surplus for the purpose; but there appears to be no other sources. It should be possible for Great Britain and the United States to keep the pipeline full even if these potential increases were made. The maximum tonnage might be as high as 10 million tons per annum; the target for the current year was 4 million but it was doubtful if it would be reached. One million deadweight tons of supplies for Russia were awaiting shipment now in U. S. ports.

Sir Alan Brooke observed that one unsatisfactory feature of the whole business of supplying Russia was their refusal to put their cards on the table. It might well be that we were straining ourselves unduly and taking great risks when there was no real necessity to do so.

4. Employment of French Forces in North Africa

General Marshall asked for the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the employment of French divisions. The United States Chiefs of Staff felt that they can be effectively used and that their use will effect a considerable economy of force. The French divisions
regarded as being the best must be reequipped as soon as practical. This, however, has political complications which must be resolved.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that we should exploit the use of French troops in North Africa to the maximum, particularly for garrison work. We should have to provide them with a considerable quantity of antiaircraft weapons. Their usefulness would depend greatly on whether we could establish a satisfactory French government. Good leadership was required to rekindle in them the desire to fight. Too many of the French were only waiting for the end of the war.

General Marshall asked what the effect would be on Spain if French troops were stationed opposite the border of Spanish Morocco. There seemed no doubt that some very useful French divisions could be formed in North Africa.

Sir Alan Brooke thought that it would be wise to keep U. S. forces on the Spanish border as well as French troops. This would tend to allay Spanish suspicions of the French intentions and at the same time remove any temptation from the Spanish to cross the frontier if they thought the French troops of inferior quality.

MEETING OF ROOSEVELT WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
JANUARY 16, 1943, 5 P. M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

PRESENT

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Brigadier General Deane

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

Admiral King informed the President that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been attempting to obtain the British Chiefs of Staff's concept as to how the war should be won. He said that the British have definite ideas as to what the next operation should be but do not seem to have an overall plan for the conduct of the war.

General Marshall stated that the planners are making a study of what is required in the Pacific in order to maintain constant pressure.

1 According to the Log, ante, p. 524, this meeting lasted until 7 p. m.
on the Japanese and keep the initiative in that theatre. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been particularly concerned with the strategic concept for 1943. They have had discussions on the Burma operations and also whether an immediate operation should be planned for the Mediterranean or for the Continent or both. He stated that the planners had been instructed to estimate the earliest possible date that an operation against Sicily could be mounted in order that the Chiefs of Staff could determine what residue of force would be available for operations on the Continent and if such operations would be advisable this year.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the most critical factors in the coming operations are the availability of landing craft, the time necessary for amphibious training, and the availability of escort vessels. He stated that there will be excess troops available in North Africa when the Axis powers have been expelled from North Africa and that this is one of the chief reasons why Operation Husky appears to be attractive.

The British have estimated that the operations against Sicily cannot be mounted prior to August but feel that there is a possibility of moving this date up to some time in July.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the question being determined is whether we can undertake an operation against the continent together with Operation Husky or separately and at a later date. The British maintain a spearhead in the United Kingdom for an operation against the continent in the event of a crack in German morale. This includes enough landing craft to move four brigade groups and, additionally, the British are putting motors in approximately 1,000 barges which they will use, together with other small craft to bring in troops following the spearhead.

The President asked how many troops were in England at this time, to which GENERAL MARSHALL replied that there was one trained division and about 140,000 to 150,000 men. He said that by next summer we can have six to nine divisions in the United Kingdom, and the British will have thirteen.

GENERAL MARSHALL quoted Sir Charles Portal as saying a crack in Axis morale may come at any time because of the explosive elements existing in the populations of the occupied countries. Sir Charles Portal feels that if such an explosion comes, it will start in the interior of Germany but will finally reach the front line troops who will desire to return to their families. In this case, an occupation of the continent

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3 At the conclusion of their meeting on January 14, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a report on the situation to be established in the Pacific and Burma in 1943; see ante, p. 556. For the partial report by the United States Joint Staff Planners (C.O.S. 153, January 17, 1943) prepared in pursuance of the directive, see post, p. 755. For the comment by the British Joint Planning Staff on the American paper, see C.O.S. 153/1, January 17, 1943, post, p. 757.
would be comparatively simple.

General Marshall said that training for amphibious operations is the most critical factor which we have to face. The training must be of much higher quality than that given for Torch. He quoted General Eisenhower as saying that he believed that there must be an invasion on the continent but that it would require a minimum of 12 divisions, which is double previous estimates. General Eisenhower also feels that there is a need for more training. Other limiting factors to any proposed operation are the necessities of combating the submarine menace and for the delivery of supplies to Russia.

An operation against Sardinia can be accomplished about six weeks earlier than one against Sicily, but the results will have little effect in improving the shipping situation through the Mediterranean. The only positive result to be received from the capture of Sardinia would be the ability to bomb Italy and perhaps the southern coast of France.

General Arnold pointed out that there would be much better air coverage for Operation Husky than could be given to Operation Brimstone. The President asked where the Germans had the best defence.

General Marshall replied that their defence in Sicily was better than that in Sardinia and that by summer it might be expected that the Germans would have 6 to 8 divisions there. General Marshall said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were all agreed on the necessity of placing adequate troops in rear of Turkey to be prepared to reinforce her for a resistance to Axis invasion.

The President remarked that Turkey's entry into the war was a diplomatic question, to which General Marshall replied that he felt that the concentration should be made regardless of whether Turkey came into the war or not.

Admiral King said that in our endeavors to obtain a definite strategic concept from the British Chiefs of Staff it had become apparent that they intended using the geographic and manpower position of Russia to the maximum. This necessitates making every effort to maintain the flow of supplies to Russia and also to divert German air and ground troops from the Russian front. He added that the British make no mention of where or when a second front on the continent should be established. The President said that we now have a protocol with the Russians which involves a certain delivery of munitions to them and that this shall probably be continued on the same scale when the present protocol expires.\(^3\)

Admiral King stated that British convoys by the northern route are set up for 30 ships every 42 days. With an additional 12 destroyers this could be improved to a rate of 30 ships each 27 days. He stated that he did not believe we should base our plans too largely on a contemplated German crack-up. It now appeared that a real Round-Up operation is not feasible before April, 1944 because of British lack of enthusiasm.

General Marshall said that British would undertake an operation Sledgehammer if they saw signs of a break in German morale. This would be followed by a makeshift Round-Up operation. He said the British feel that they cannot gather the means for a real thrust against the continent in 1943, and that Admiral Pound states that no operation should be undertaken after August. It is apparent that British cooperation cannot be obtained unless there are indications of the Germans weakening.

Admiral King stated that if the operations on the Mediterranean and on the Russian front caused the Germans to withdraw their forces from France, the British would be willing to seize this opportunity to invade the continent.

General Marshall informed the President that the British were not interested in occupying Italy, inasmuch as this would add to our burdens without commensurate returns.

The President expressed his agreement with this view.

General Marshall stated that in his opinion we may be able to obtain a decision from the Combined Chiefs of Staff concerning the operations in the Pacific by January 17th and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had come to the conclusion that Operation Husky should be undertaken, but they had not yet informed the British to this effect.

The President stated that from the political point of view he thought it would be extremely wise to send more airplanes to China. He felt that they could be used to great advantage there and if periodic bombing raids over Japan could be undertaken they would have a tremendous morale effect on the Chinese people. General Arnold stated that he agreed with this view but wished to see for himself whether or not an increased air force in China could be supplied.

The President then stated that he thought it was desirable to set up additional transport planes to insure a supply of a larger air force in China.

General Marshall said that transport planes now allocated to China are sufficient and that we must be extremely careful about making additional allocations. He pointed out that, in addition to China, we would receive demands for transport planes from Russia. We would need a considerable number for the Operation Husky and also for General MacArthur's forces in the Pacific.
The President suggested the possibility of preparing two or three plans and making all preparations to carry them out, but leaving the decision as to the objective until a later date.

Admiral Cooke pointed out that if planes [plans?] were made for Operation Husky the objective could readily be changed to either the Dodecanese, Crete or Sardinia.

The President said he would like to have some flexibility to the plans in case it became apparent that Turkey might enter the war. In that case we could then adopt the objective which would fit in best with this development.

General Marshall stated he did not feel that the Operation Husky would interfere with Turkey’s entering into the war, but rather that a success in Sicily might be an added inducement to her to join with us.

The President then directed the discussion to Russia. He said that he had received information that the Russians did not desire any of our personnel and also indicated that they would not welcome General Bradley’s mission to make a survey of the available air facilities in Siberia.

He asked General Somervell about the supply situation to Russia.

General Somervell replied that the Persian port is capable of handling 15 ships per month. The road and rail facilities are capable of handling about 10,000 tons per day which are sufficient to handle the freight from 40 ships per month, and efforts are now being made to expand the port facilities to make this possible. He then went on to describe to the President several overland routes to Russia, all of which are limited by the availability of truck transportation.

The President asked what might happen if Turkey remained neutral but permitted our transporting munitions and bombs through her territory.

General Somervell replied that certain routes could be made available by this means, but if they were used it would be necessary to establish a truck assembly plant in that area. He added that he thought this should be done, and that all available routes into Russia should be used.

The President asked General Somervell if truck bodies could be manufactured in the Near East, to which General Somervell replied that lumber would have to [be?] obtained from India.

Mr. Harriman stated that until a truck assembly plant could be constructed, the one now at Cairo could be used.

Admiral King stated that the last convoy to Murmansk arrived without loss of any of its 16 cargo ships, but that one destroyer had
been sunk and another damaged. He stated that we could help Russia more if they would help us to do so.

The President asked if we were getting as much information from Southern Europe as are the British. General Marshall replied that he would have this investigated. (A message was sent to G-2, Allied Force Headquarters, asking for a report as to the amount of intelligence received out of Southern Europe by U.S. Intelligence Agencies and how our efforts in this regard compared with those of the British.)

General Marshall then informed the President that the British had agreed to transfer their Valentine tanks from the 6th Armored Division to the French as soon as the British had received our Sherman tanks. He also stated he thought it necessary to equip the best French divisions rapidly.

General Marshall then informed the President regarding a decision which had been made by General Eisenhower concerning the Tunisian operations. A drive towards Sfax which had been planned for January 24th has been called off. This was necessary because the British First Army on the north could not attack until March 15th and General Alexander could not attack Rommel's forces on the south until February 15th. It was decided that the attack against Sfax might be premature and expose them to an attack from the north by German Tunisian forces and from the south by Rommel. Instead, General Eisenhower is to hold his First Armored Division in the vicinity of Tebessa prepared to assist either Alexander's forces in the south or the First British Army in the north, and the attack against Sfax will be made by infantry units at a later date, to be coordinated by General Eisenhower and General Alexander.

The President then asked General Somervell about the general supply situation. General Somervell replied that the greatest shortages in North Africa were in road machinery and motor transporta-
tion. Both of these are now being sent to North Africa. The machinery is needed to improve the railroads and also for the construction and improvement of airfields. Efforts are also being made to bring in needed locomotives.

The President then asked about the civilian supply situation. General Somervell replied that it was being handled satisfactorily, except that valuable cargo space was being utilized by some of the civilian agencies in the United States in sending unnecessary and ridiculous items.

The President then informed the Chiefs of Staff that Admiral Robert in Martinique had received a message from Laval to sink his
ships immediately upon receiving evidence that the United States intended action against Martinique. Laval required Robert to give him an answer at once. Robert informed Laval within four hours that he would comply with his orders. This definitely eliminates the possibility of our obtaining the use of French shipping now in Martinique.

Admiral Cooke then informed the President that the British were becoming conscious of the fact that the United States was engaged in a war in the Pacific and described his discussions with the British Staff Planners who recognized the necessity for adequate means being provided to handle the Pacific situation. He stated, however, that he did not feel that the British Chiefs of Staff were as yet convinced of this necessity. The Chiefs of Staff feel that we should maintain the status quo and simply hold, whereas the planners recognize that a constant pressure must be kept on the Japanese and that every effort must be made to keep China in the war. The Planners admit the possibility of the Chinese dropping out of the war.

The President then discussed the proposed operations in Burma. General Marshall informed him that just as he felt that we had convinced the British that Operation RAVENOUS should be undertaken, the Generalissimo had declined to participate. The reason given by the Generalissimo is that the British refuse to place a naval force in the Bay of Bengal to interrupt the Japanese line of communications. The Generalissimo feels that a definite commitment to this effect had been made by the Prime Minister in a talk last year before the Pacific Council. General Marshall said that the Prime Minister probably had the ANAKIM operation in mind.

Admiral Cooke stated that the British have no intention of undertaking an operation to recapture Burma in the present dry season.

General Marshall pointed out that the Chinese, particularly General Hsiung, had been loud in their complaints about failures to assist them, and now that we offer them assistance, they refuse our help.


*For the text of Chiang's message of January 8, 1943, to Roosevelt, explaining his formal withdrawal from the proposed operations in Burma, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 259-260.

*Chiang's view of the commitment made by Churchill was set forth in a message of December 28, 1942, to Roosevelt, which is summarized in Roosevelt's telegram 254, January 7, 1943, to Churchill, ante, p. 514. See also footnote 3 to that document.
SUNDAY, JANUARY 17, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 17, 1943, 10:30 A.M., ANFA CAMP

PRESENT

**United States**

- General Marshall
- Admiral King
- Lieutenant General Arnold
- Lieutenant General Somervell
- Rear Admiral Cooke
- Brigadier General Wedemeyer
- Commander Libby

**United Kingdom**

- General Brooke
- Admiral of the Fleet Pound
- Air Chief Marshal Portal
- Field Marshal Dill
- Vice Admiral Mountbatten
- Lieutenant General Ismay
- Major General Kennedy
- Air Chief Marshal Slessor

**Secretariat**

- Brigadier Dykes
- Brigadier General Deane

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

1. **The Eastern Theater**

General Marshall proposed discussing a paper prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners regarding the forces needed in the Pacific Theater in 1943.²

The British Chiefs of Staff stated that they would like to have an opportunity to study the paper before discussing it in detail.

General Marshall pointed out that in their discussions with the British Planners, the United States Planners were told that the British did not feel that ANAKIM was possible of accomplishment during the dry season of 1943–1944. He said that the United States Chiefs of Staff are particularly concerned about the timing of this operation because of the seriousness of the situation regarding China.

Admiral King added that Operation ANAKIM was also of importance with regard to our strategy in defeating Japan.

Sir Alan Brooke said that there were two stumbling blocks to Operation ANAKIM in 1943. These are naval cover and the assemblage of landing craft in sufficient time to permit adequate training. He felt the land forces could be found but that it would be difficult to assemble the landing craft following Operation Husky.

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¹ C.C.S. 59th meeting.
SIR DUDLEY POUND said that in order to do Operation Torch, it had been necessary to withdraw a considerable force from the Eastern Fleet and that it was probable the same conditions would pertain in operations undertaken in other theaters in 1943.

ADMIRAL KING said that ANAKIM was at least ten months off. He added that to postpone the date would put us in a critical situation. It is absolutely essential that we utilize China's geographical position and their manpower and ANAKIM is a step in this direction.

ADMIRAL COOKE said that he felt the operation could be started in November or December of 1943 and the actual landings be made in January. He said that there would be considerable landing craft available from production between April of 1943 and January of 1944. Some of this additional landing craft will be available for Burma in October. Therefore, the requirements for landing craft could probably be met. As for the naval force, he considered that we would only need carriers, destroyers, and cruisers. He did not feel that battleships would be necessary if the Japanese were being contained by the United States Fleet in the Pacific. The real bottleneck is the availability of shipping.

ADMIRAL KING said that he definitely considered that Operation ANAKIM must be aimed at in 1943 and carried through if the situation permits.

SIR DUDLEY POUND considered in such an important operation that battleship cover would be necessary.

ADMIRAL KING again pointed out that the operation would not be undertaken for at least ten months. By this time the destroyer program should be well along, the submarine menace should be reduced, and the shipping situation much improved through increased production and the opening of the Mediterranean. To postpone the operation in 1943 would result in not undertaking it for almost two years.

GENERAL MARSHALL then informed the Chiefs of Staff of a message which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had sent to the President in which he regretted that Chinese troops would not be able to participate in Operation RAVENOUS, the reasons being that the British ground forces are inadequate and that the British will not agree to engage the Eastern Fleet in the Bay of Bengal to interrupt the Japanese line of communications.

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN stated that the British Chiefs of Staff agree that the Burma road must be opened and that the entire question is one of the availability of resources.

ADMIRAL KING said that the United States Chiefs of Staff recognize Germany is our prime enemy and that their strategy does not envisage a complete defeat of Japan before defeating Germany.

* For text of Chiang's message of January 8, 1943, to the President, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 259-260.
added, however, that every effort must be applied which will put us in a position of readiness from which we can operate against Japan after Germany has been defeated.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed to this unless the attainment of such positions of readiness would delay or jeopardize the defeat of Germany.

General Marshall said that he felt it was a question of creating more than positions of readiness as far as the Japanese are concerned. We must maintain the initiative against them by offensive moves on our part. The present operations in the South Pacific are tremendous expensive in merchant vessels, naval vessels, and escorts. The situation is also fraught with the possibility of a sudden reverse and the consequent loss of sea power. He said that he is most anxious to open the Burma Road, not so much for the morale effect on China as for the need to provide air support to China for operations against Japan and Japanese shipping. He said the expensive operations in which we are now engaged in the South Pacific react on everything else the United Nations attempt to do whether it be in the Mediterranean, the United Kingdom, or elsewhere. He discussed the situation in the Pacific as being so critical as to make it appear at one time that Operation Torch would have to be called off. He also stated that unless Operation Anakim could be undertaken, he felt that a situation might arise in the Pacific at any time that would necessitate the United States regretfully withdrawing from the commitments in the European theater.

General Marshall spoke of our commitments in the Pacific, of our responsibilities, with particular reference to the number of garrisons we have on small islands and the impossibility of letting any of them down. He insisted that the United States could not stand for another Bataan. He said that he is desirous of undertaking the Burma operation in order to reduce our hazards in the Pacific and thus undertake the campaign against Germany.

General Marshall spoke of other commitments in the Pacific that are serious but in which we have been willing to accept the hazards. In this connection he pointed to the Japanese operation in the Aleutians and the necessity of protecting the Hawaiian-Midway line of communications. In these instances he felt that, while we were vulnerable to Japanese attack, support from the United States could be furnished quickly because of the relatively short distances involved.

General Marshall informed the Chiefs of Staff that the President is desirous of giving additional air support to China. This will be done because of the psychological results to be achieved despite the fact that it is a tremendously expensive operation.

Admiral King pointed out that the demands in the Pacific are enormous and continuous. Many of the demands are made by Australia, a Dominion of the British Commonwealth. Australia is
in the area of the United States strategic responsibility and most of our 
efforts have been devoted to protecting its line of communications. 
He said, in this connection, that the political and military situations 
are interlocked and these factors must be considered together when 
deciding what operations are to be undertaken. He repeated that we 
must place ourselves in positions of readiness for the time when all the 
resources of the United Nations will be brought against Japan.

2. Iceland

General Marshall asked for the views of the British Chiefs of 
Staff on the size of the garrison which should be maintained in Iceland. 
At the present time there were some 40,000 United States’ ground 
troops in the island and two squadrons of fighter aircraft, together 
with a squadron of naval patrol craft. He was anxious to cut down 
these numbers.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the British garrison had been about 
22,000 men. In his view an invasion of Iceland by the Germans was 
quite out of the question. Taking into account the general attitude 
of the Germans and their unwillingness to risk their ships without 
heavy air cover in Northern waters, he did not think even a tip and run 
raid was at all likely. It was possible, of course, that they might 
change their policy, but the only object of a German attempt to seize 
the island would be to deny it to us as an air base. Our possession of 
it made our control of the Northern exit to the Atlantic more secure. 
It seemed much more likely that if the Germans wished to adopt a 
ore active policy, they would use their surface ships against our con-
voys rather than for a hazardous expedition against Iceland. These 
were his first thoughts and he would like to have a more considered 
opinion prepared for the United States Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral King was in general agreement with the views of Sir 
Dudley Pound. He pointed out that the German situation had greatly 
changed during the last six months.

The Committee:

Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would prepare for the 
information of the United States Chiefs of Staff a memorandum setting 
out their views on the defense of Iceland.*

3. Russian Air Assistance for P. Q. Convoys

Admiral King suggested that more should be done to induce the 
Russians to attack the German air forces in Northern Norway which 
were such a menace to the Murmansk convoys. The German air bases 
were out of range from the United Kingdom but the Russians could 
undoubtedly do something if they wished to. The Murmansk route

*The subject of Iceland was not taken up again during the Casablanca Conference.
was the most important of the four routes for Russian supplies, and he felt we ought to press the Russians to give us more assistance.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the British had pressed the Russians in 1942 to assist with escorts and with air attack. They did provide some assistance with escorts, but always found some reason for not sending their surface ships out as far as Bear Island where the danger was greatest. Whatever they might undertake to do, however, it would be quite unsafe to rely on their promises, and reduce the scale of our own protection.

As regards air, the British Mission had pressed the Russians hard for assistance, and the Prime Minister had also communicated with Mr. Stalin. In the end some Russian Army bombers had been sent North to attack the German airdromes. Such action, however, was only of very limited value. It would be no use asking them to attack the German ships since they were untrained in this work. Two British squadrons of Hampdens had been sent up to North Russia last year. At the beginning of the winter the British personnel had been withdrawn, and these were now manned by the Russians. Recently, however, when the Lutzow and Hipper came out, the Russians failed to take any action against them with these aircraft, although asked to do so.

Sir Charles Portal said that the Germans had some seven airfields between Bodo and Petsamo, all well defended. The Russians had three airfields in the Murmansk–Archangel area. Bombing of airfields was very unprofitable. For example, Malta had only three airfields within 100 miles of Sicily but a very large force of German bombers had been quite unable to prevent us using them. Whatever they did, the Russians would not be able to stop the German air reconnaissance. Medium bombers and long range fighters for their escorts would be required for the purpose; German fields were out of range of dive bombing attack.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the possibility of amphibious operations to capture the German airfields had been most exhaustively examined by the British Staffs, but they had not been found practicable. The effect of Torch, however, had been very great in causing withdrawals of German aircraft from Norway. Their present strength was only about 53 aircraft all told, whereas they had had up to 300 previously.

Sir Dudley Pound pointed out that one of the greatest difficulties was that the convoys were open to attack for about ten days. This enabled the Germans to reinforce their airfields in Northern Norway from elsewhere before the convoy was out of the danger zone.

* Presumably, the reference is to the Churchill message received by Stalin on September 7, 1942, printed in Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. 1, pp. 64–65.
ROOSEVELT-NOGUÉS CONVERSATION, JANUARY 17, 1943, NOON, PRESIDENT'S VILLA

Present

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Murphy
Major General Patton
Brigadier General Wilbur
Captain McCrea
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

FRANCE

General Noguès

Roosevelt Papers

McCrea Notes

CASABLANCA, JANUARY 17, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

At 1200 this date, the President received M. General Chas. A. Noguès, Resident General at Rabat. Also present were Major General G. S. Patton, Jr., Commanding General, 1st Armored Corps; Brigadier General William H. Wilbur, 1st Armored Corps; Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Special Representative of the President on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, North African Forces; Captain John L. McCrea, Naval Aide to the President, and Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, Air Corps Reserve.

The President greeted General Noguès with the remark that "I am very pleased to meet you, General, and I must say that you look exactly like your photograph." The General stated that all of Morocco was very proud to have the President here and that the President's presence in Morocco was a source of much surprise to the General.

The President stated that he did not speak very good French and so therefore thought that the conversation should be carried on with the aid of Brigadier General Wilbur, as interpreter. The conversation started out thus, but before long the President and General Noguès were conversing freely in French.

The President stated that he trusted that North Africa had seen the last of the Germans for some time, to which the General readily agreed. The President inquired as to the attitude of the Germans resident in North Africa during the period of the Armistice. General Noguès stated that at all times they were haughty and overbearing, and that everyone was glad to see them depart. He also stated that they were now being well cared for by the French in various concentration camps.

General Patton remarked that the fine cooperation existing between the French and ourselves was largely due to the splendid cooperation which General Noguès had given us. The President remarked that
he felt that the newspapers had been making much out of a situation which did not exist, namely, that there was confusion and misunderstanding between the French, the Americans and the British in North Africa, and that the period for "name calling is now over." General Noguès assured the President that everyone was most anxious to cooperate with the United States forces, looking towards the ultimate defeat of the enemy.

The President requested General Noguès' advice as to whether or not he, the President, should ask the Sultan of Morocco 2 to call on him. Specifically, the President asked if it would be in order for him to entertain the Sultan at lunch or dinner. To this, both General Noguès and General Patton replied that it would be a most gracious thing for the President to do, and that it would definitely cement relations between the Arabs and ourselves. It was then explained that amongst the Arabs no higher compliment can be paid than to invite one to break bread. General Noguès stated that it was equivalent to becoming one's blood brother or fighting a campaign with him. In other words, it cemented relations between the host and guest. The President stated that he would despatch an invitation to the Sultan which he trusted could be delivered in time for the Sultan to make preparations to come to Casablanca. At this point, General Patton stated that the letter should be delivered by no one less than a General officer, in company with General Noguès. The President stated that when the letter was ready to go, he would give it to his Naval Aide, as his personal representative, who would go in company with an Army general and General Noguès, and deliver the letter to the Sultan. 2

Discussion was had about the progress being made in repairing ships that were sunk in Casablanca harbor incident to the occupation. As to this, General Noguès could remark only generally, stating that he was not familiar with the details of such repairs. It was stated, however, by General Patton, that it would be most difficult to make repairs to these ships unless in some way they could be moved to American shipyards; that the conversion of the metric system plans to our units of measurement would be a job that would require at least a year's work. Conversation along this line was further pursued in connection with our field pieces and small arms. It was remarked by General Patton that much of our field piece ammunition was interchangeable with the French, but that the small arms situation was another matter. It would be much the easier, the General stated, to equip the French troops with small arms of our manufacture.

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2 Mohammed ben Youssef.
2 No copy of the President's letter to the Sultan has been found.
The matter of political prisoners was then discussed. General Noguès stated that for the most part the Jews had now been released from the concentration camps. It was also stated that the Jews, especially those in Algeria, had raised the point that they wish restored to them at once the right of suffrage. The President stated that the answer to that was very simple, namely, that there just weren't going to be any elections, so the Jews need not worry about the privilege of voting. Mr. Murphy remarked that the Jews in North Africa were very much disappointed that “the war for liberation” had not immediately resulted in their being given their complete freedom. The President stated that he felt the whole Jewish problem should be studied very carefully and that progress should be definitely planned. In other words, the number of Jews engaged in the practice of the professions (law, medicine, etc.) should be definitely limited to the percentage that the Jewish population in North Africa bears to the whole of the North African population. Such a plan would therefore permit the Jews to engage in the professions, at the same time would not permit them to overcrowd the professions, and would present an unanswerable argument that they were being given their full rights. To the foregoing, General Noguès agreed generally, stating at the same time that it would be a sad thing for the French to win the war merely to open the way for the Jews to control the professions and the business world of North Africa. The President stated that his plan would further eliminate the specific and understandable complaints which the Germans bore towards the Jews in Germany, namely, that while they represented a small part of the population, over fifty percent of the lawyers, doctors, school teachers, college professors, etc., in Germany, were Jews.

At 12:45 p.m., General Noguès, accompanied by General Patton and Brigadier General Wilbur, withdrew to proceed to the villa occupied by Prime Minister Churchill.

Note: Shortly after the above interview started, General Patton whispered to Captain McCrea that General Noguès was scheduled to see the Prime Minister at 12:15 p.m.; that he, General Patton, had been informed by the Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff, to this effect. General Patton asked whether or not he should make an announcement to the President at 12:15 about the scheduled conference with Mr. Churchill. To this, Captain McCrea replied that under no circumstances should he make such an announcement, and that the President would indicate when his conversation with General Noguès was at an end. About 12:30, General Patton again stated to Captain McCrea that he felt that he should indicate that the hour for the Prime Minister’s conference with General Noguès had passed, and that the party should proceed to the Prime Minister’s villa. Captain McCrea again told General Patton that under no circumstances should such
an announcement be made. Upon the conclusion of General Nogués’
conference with the President, Captain McCrea informed the Presi-
dent as to what had taken place between General Patton and him.

JOHN MCCREA

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON, JANUARY 17, 1943, 1:30 P. M.,
PRESIDENT’S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No record of the discussion at this luncheon has been found. The
information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 525, and
from Elliott Roosevelt, p. 89.

ROOSEVELT-GIRAUD CONVERSATION, JANUARY 17, 1943, 4:20 P. M.,
PRESIDENT’S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Murphy
Major General Clark
Captain McCrea

FRANCE
General Giraud

Roosevelt Papers

McCrea Notes

CASABLANCA, JANUARY 17, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT’S FILES

At 4:20 p.m., January 17, 1943, the President received General
Henri Giraud, Commander of the French Armies in North Africa.
Present also were Lieutenant General Wayne M. [Mark W.] Clark,
U. S. Army, Minister Robert D. Murphy and Captain John L. Mc-
Crea, U. S. Navy.

After pleasantries had been exchanged, the conversation got down
to specific cases. General Giraud early stated that there was only
one thing that mattered in all the activity of today and that was the
future of France. He stated that in his judgment, all personal am-
bitions should be subordinated to this thought and that he for one was most willing to do this. He stated that he believed there should be no discussions on a political level and that the civil administrations of French possessions and protectorates in Africa should remain as they are now established. Here followed a discussion of sovereignty, the President pointing out that sovereignty in the United States and in the nation of France rested in the people; this in distinction to sovereignty in Great Britain, which rests in the King. The President pointed out that as a legalistic and constitutional matter it was quite correct to say that there could be no change in the French civil set-up until such time as the people of France were able to exercise their inherent rights in this regard. The President stated that, for example, in his judgment M. Lebrun was still the President of France regardless of the fall of the French government and that he would remain the President of France until the French people had an opportunity to again exercise their political rights. To the foregoing, General Giraud agreed.

The President stated that the discussion could therefore be narrowed down to two items. First, the establishment of an army by the French to assist in throwing the enemy out of the French protectorates in Africa and out of the French home land, and second, a determination on the part of all concerned that there will be no political discussions until the country has been freed of the enemy. Enlarging on the first point, the President asked General Giraud if, in his judgment it would be possible for French North Africa to raise and support an Army of 400,000 men. To this, General Giraud replied in the negative, stating that while troops were available, equipment and white officers and white non-commissioned officers were not available. The President stated that he had been informed by General Noguès that many French officers and non-commissioned officers were surreptitiously leaving France and crossing the Pyrenees into Spain, and that the problem seemed to be to get them to North Africa. The President stated that Spain had set a very fine precedent in permitting the Roumanian King, Carol, and his mistress, Magda Lupescu, to “escape” into Portugal, from whence it was possible for them to proceed to the Western Hemisphere. In this regard, General Giraud remarked that Spain desperately needed phosphates from North Africa, and an agreement might be concluded whereby for every shipload of phosphates the Spaniards got, North Africa in return would receive a shipload of Army evacuees.

The President then remarked that he felt it would be a very splendid thing if Generals Giraud and de Gaulle could get together and handle the military situation for Africa, and together with a leading civilian, from a “Committee for the Liberation of France.” General Giraud met the suggestion with enthusiasm. He stated that he was very cer-
tain that he and General de Gaulle could work out some military arrangement. General Giraud asked if there were any objection to bringing Madagascar, Reunion, etc., into the African picture. The President stated that he felt that for the time being, all French territory outside the African continent should be excluded from the agreement. This, the President pointed out, would permit de Gaulle to continue in control of the territory over which he now exercises such control, it would permit Robert, as Vichy representative, to continue in control of the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, etc., etc. "It just occurs to me that by so doing, a number of untoward situations may be thus avoided." The President stated that with the inauguration of the "Committee for the Liberation of France," the French Imperial Council should be disbanded. General Giraud remarked that he was already satisfied with the manner in which M. Boisson was administering Dakar and General Noguès was administering Rabat, but that Algeria represented a different situation; that there was no one at the moment whom he thought capable of administering that area.

The President asked General Giraud as to the Jewish situation in Algeria. This was discussed at some length and the President set forth to General Giraud his views as he had done in this connection to General Noguès. General Giraud did not think the Jewish problem an insurmountable one.

General Giraud then asked that he be permitted to express to the President his great admiration for the Atlantic Charter, adding that he felt that pronouncement held great hope for all occupied countries and small countries throughout the world.

General Giraud spoke at length about the continental campaign to crush Germany for once and for all. He stated that in his judgment, on the conclusion of this war, Germany should be occupied. He said that this had also been his conviction at the end of the last war. The President stated that it was well known that both General Foch and General Pershing wanted to occupy Germany, but that this was denied for political considerations, and that the unwise of this policy had

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1 On December 17, 1942, the British Government and the French National Committee (de Gaullist) had concluded an agreement in London regarding the defense of the Island of Madagascar and its dependencies and the island of Reunion under the terms of which the representative of the French National Committee assumed authority over Madagascar and Reunion. On January 8, 1943, the Free French High Commissioner arrived in Madagascar and assumed control. For correspondence relative to American policy regarding the British occupation of Madagascar, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. II, pp. 687 ff.

2 For the record of the Roosevelt–Noguès conversation of January 17, see ante, p. 606.
long ago become apparent to all. General Giraud then dramatically stated that it would be observed that he wore no ribbons or decorations; that he had foresworn wearing them until he could march down Unter Den Linden at the head of the occupational forces of Germany.

At the President's suggestion, General Giraud then told in detail of his escape from Germany and his subsequent escape from France to North Africa. The details of the General's escape from Germany are fantastic and could hardly be conceived by a writer of fiction.

At 5:30 p.m., the interview terminated with much cordiality, and General Giraud, General Clark and Mr. Murphy withdrew to proceed to the villa occupied by the Prime Minister.  

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, JANUARY 17, 1943, 8:00 P.M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Harriman
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Somervell

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Leathers
Admiral Cunningham

Editorial Note

The information set forth above regarding the circumstances of the meeting has been derived from the Log (ante, p. 526) which indicates that the main subject of discussion was shipping. This is supported by Elliott Roosevelt (pp. 91–92), who appears to have dined with the group but not to have participated in the discussions that followed. Kennedy, Business of War, p. 284, suggests that the President and the Prime Minister may have discussed the deadlock in the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting regarding the strategy to be pursued in the Pacific in 1943. Churchill's message to the War Cabinet on January 18, 1943 (Hinge of Fate, pp. 676–677), reviewing the course of the conference up to that time, indicates that it was at this meeting that the Prime Minister broached the matter of designating Alexander as Eisenhower's Deputy.

At the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on the morning of January 18, 1943, Admiral King recounted as follows a portion of his conversation with the Prime Minister on the previous evening:
"Admiral King, recounting his conversation with the Prime Minister the previous evening, said that Mr. Churchill had committed himself to undertaking ANAKIM in 1943 and that he was agreeable to operation RAVENOUS, concerning which there still remains the question of Chinese cooperation. They had thoroughly discussed the submarine situation and Mr. Churchill appeared agreeable to giving highest priority to bombing the submarine bases, building yards, and assembly points, although he said the United States must help. The Prime Minister objected to our 'putting the cart before the horse' with respect to Pacific operations, and said we had refused to give the British accurate information as to our landing craft program and as to our dispositions in the Pacific. He appeared greatly concerned over our stand with respect to Pacific operations. With respect to the Burma operation, Admiral King had tried to explain to the Prime Minister his concept regarding the geographical position and manpower of China. The President was anxious to get additional airplanes to General Chennault, which could not be supplied unless the upper Burma Road is opened. Admiral King understands the purpose of RAVENOUS to be to open this upper Burma Road in order to improve communications to China. He feels that Chiang Kai-shek should be urged to move at once." (J.C.S. Files)

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**MONDAY, JANUARY 18, 1943**

**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 18, 1943, 10:30 A.M., ANFA CAMP**

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<td><strong>UNITED STATES</strong></td>
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<td>General Marshall</td>
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<td>Admiral King</td>
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<td>Lieutenant General Arnold</td>
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<td>Lieutenant General Somervell</td>
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<td>Rear Admiral Cooke</td>
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<th><strong>UNITED KINGDOM</strong></th>
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<td>General Brooke</td>
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<td>Admiral of the Fleet Pound</td>
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<td>Air Chief Marshal Portal</td>
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<td>Field Marshal Dill</td>
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<td>Admiral Cunningham ²</td>
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<td>Vice Admiral Mountbatten</td>
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<td>Air Vice Marshal Slessor</td>
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**Secretariat**

- Brigadier Dykes
- Brigadier General Deane

¹ C.C.S. 60th meeting.
² Present for item 6 only.
³ Present at part of the meeting.
⁴ Present at the second part of the meeting.
1. OPERATIONS IN BURMA
(C.C.S. 154)\(^5\)

At the request of General Marshall, Admiral Cooke discussed the landing craft situation in regard to Operation Anakim. He said the United States Planners had estimated the number of landing craft of types built by the United States which would be required for Operation Anakim would be available in November 1943. These requirements can be made available from United States production and they will be in addition to allocations of landing craft already made. There has been uncertainty as to what the production of landing craft would be because of the necessity of revising the whole production program in the United States.

Sir Alan Brooke asked if this number of landing craft would be available over and above those needed in all other operations under consideration, including Roundup.

Admiral Cooke replied that the landing craft which would be made available for Anakim would be from United States production that will be too late for other operations in 1943 which are being considered.

Lord Louis Mountbatten stated that the British will be unable to man additional landing craft beyond those for which they are asking.

Sir Alan Brooke then described the proposed Operation Anakim. The operation must start by the middle of December in order to clear up the communications to the north after the capture of Rangoon. To protect the flank it would be necessary to occupy Moulmein and the airports on the west coast of Thailand. It will be necessary to protect the east flank to prevent the Japanese from coming in from Thailand by routes that are capable of sustaining a maximum of five divisions, in order to insure that once in Burma, our forces remain there. Thereafter, it will also be necessary to maintain adequate air and naval cover to keep open the lines of communication to Rangoon.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that naval forces must be built up for the operation. As far as air power is concerned, 18 squadrons will be available and can be provided. The landing craft is the most ticklish question. Landing craft training establishments have now been provided for two brigade groups in the Mediterranean and one

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\(^5\) C.C.S. 154, January 17, 1943, a report by the British Joint Planning Staff entitled "Operations in Burma, 1943" is not printed, but the paragraph relative to landing craft availabilities is quoted in the following footnote.
in India. There is also a mobile overseas reserve but it will take three months to move this after it completes operations either in the Mediterranean or operations from the United Kingdom. He believed that the necessary shipping could be made available but that the two main bottlenecks were naval coverage and landing craft.

Admiral King stated that we can count on shipping some landing craft from the Southwest Pacific to Burma together with operating crews. These could probably be made available in Burma in November. While the operation was at least ten months off, he did not see why necessary naval coverage could not be assembled, either by having the United States relieve the British from naval missions elsewhere so that they could furnish the Burma coverage, or by supplying the deficiency from the United States naval units to participate in the Burma operation. He stated that he was willing to commit himself to assisting the British in these operations.

Admiral King stated that our use of landing craft in the Pacific would be in the Rabaul operations primarily. Operations beyond Rabaul would not require landing craft of the types needed for Rabaul. The Rabaul operations would be completed long before Anakim would be mounted. He added that even though we had gone beyond Rabaul in the Pacific, the operations could be curtailed or lessened in order to insure the success of Anakim in view of its importance.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the possibility of securing help from the Pacific altered the whole situation as far as the British were concerned and that with the assistance of the United States, he thought that the necessary landing craft could be assembled.

General Marshall then asked Sir Alan Brooke to discuss the relation between Operation Ravenous and Operation Anakim.

Sir Alan Brooke said that Operation Cannibal now being undertaken was for the purpose of securing the airport in Akyab. This is necessary in order to furnish air support for future operations. He described Akyab as a locality in no man's land lightly garrisoned by both sides.

He described Operation Ravenous as one to improve the line of communications preparatory to Operation Anakim, in order to drive in from the North at the same time as the offensive from the South. A British corps is to secure bridgeheads over the Chindwin River and improve the road between Imphal and Kalewa, to connect it with the Chindwin River for use as a supply line to the South. The Ramgarh force was to advance on Myitkyina from Ledo which will also enable us to build a road between these two points. This road will be of value in supplying our forces in Operation Anakim and also will be used as a connecting road to join with the main Burma road into China.
SIR ALAN BROOKE gave a résumé of the present conditions of roads in Burma which indicated that all are badly in need of improvement. He said that all of the component operations of RAVENOUS are independent of each other. The operation of the British 2nd Corps from Imphal is thus independent of the action taken by the Chinese Ramgarh and Yunnan forces. The improvement of the road from Ledo was only possible to the extent of the advance made by the Ramgarh force.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that ANAKIM is now definitely on the books, is being planned, and should be put to the front. With the assistance from the United States Navy in providing landing craft, the operation would be feasible.

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN then discussed again the question of landing craft with particular reference to paragraph 9(d) of C.C.S. 154. In reply to a question from GENERAL MARSHALL, he stated that the assault force in England would remain there as a permanent spearhead in case of a crack in German morale. The overseas assault force contains sufficient landing craft to undertake the operation in Burma by October 1st provided that they had not been used in operations elsewhere. If they had been so used, their use in Burma would be delayed for a period of three months following the termination of the operation in which they had been engaged. He added, however, that with the assistance promised by Admiral King from the South Pacific, he felt that sufficient landing craft could be assembled to mount ANAKIM.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that the amphibious operations in ANAKIM would have to be supported by aircraft based on carriers.

ADMIRAL KING said the main point was that we should plan to do ANAKIM in 1943.

THE COMMITTEE:

(a) Agreed that all plans and necessary preparations should be made for the purpose of mounting ANAKIM in 1943.

(b) Agreed that the actual mounting of Operation ANAKIM would be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the summer of 1943.

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Paragraph 9(d) of C.C.S. 154 reads as follows:

"(d) Assault Shipping and Landing Craft

1. If no major amphibious operations are carried out elsewhere in 1943, the assault shipping and landing craft could be found by the British by October 1, 1943.

2. If Operation BRIMSTONE is carried out not later than the end of June 1943, and no other amphibious operation takes place, the assault shipping and landing craft could be found by the British by December 1, 1943, in Indian waters. This would permit of an assault on Rangoon about December 30, 1943.

3. If HUSKY is carried out after June 1943—or any other operation, such as the Dodecanese, in addition to BRIMSTONE—it will not be possible to provide the assault shipping and landing craft for ANAKIM from British sources until about February 1944.

4. If Operation ANAKIM is carried out with British assault shipping and landing craft at any time during the winter 1943–44, it would seriously curtail the British share of any cross-channel operations in the early spring of 1944." (J.C.S. Files)
(preferably not later than July) in the light of the situation then existing.

(c) Took note that if ANAKIM is mounted in 1943, the United States will assist in making up deficiencies in the necessary landing craft and naval forces by diversion from the Pacific Theater, and in merchant shipping, if necessary.

2. The Situation To Be Created in the Eastern Theater (The Pacific and Burma) in 1943
(C.C.S. 153 and 153/1)

Sir Alan Brooke stated that the British Chiefs of Staff took exception to paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 153 in that it did not provide that Germany must be defeated before undertaking the defeat of the Japanese.

General Marshall stated that, in his opinion, the British Chiefs of Staff wished to be certain that we keep the enemy engaged in the Mediterranean and that at the same time maintain a sufficient force in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack in the German strength either from the withdrawal of their forces in France or because of lowered morale. He inferred that the British Chiefs of Staff would prefer to maintain such a force in the United Kingdom dormant and awaiting an opportunity rather than have it utilized in a sustained attack elsewhere. The United States Chiefs of Staff know that they can use these forces offensively in the Pacific Theater. He felt that the question resolved itself into whether we would maintain a large force in the United Kingdom awaiting an opportunity or keep the force engaged in an active offensive in the Pacific.

General Marshall said that the number of troops used in the Pacific would not have much effect on the build-up of forces in the United Kingdom. The conflict arises chiefly in the use of landing craft and shipping. He said that to a large measure the shipping used in the Pacific is already committed and, therefore, could not be made available for a build-up of forces in the United Kingdom and the necessity of maintaining them. These forces are at the end of a long line of communications and the question arises as to whether we should let them remain there precariously or do something to improve their situation.

Sir Alan Brooke stated that we have reached a stage in the war where we must review the correctness of our basic strategic concept which calls for the defeat of Germany first. He was convinced that we cannot defeat Germany and Japan simultaneously. The British Chiefs of Staff have arrived at the conclusion that it will be better to concentrate on Germany. Because of the distances involved, the Brit-

7 Post, pp. 755 and 757.
ish Chiefs of Staff believe that the defeat of Japan first is impossible and that if we attempt to do so, we shall lose the war.

He said that having decided that it is necessary to defeat Germany first, the immediate question is whether to attempt to do so by an invasion of Northern France or to exploit our successes in North Africa. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that an all-out Mediterranean effort is best but that it must be "all-out."

He said the British Chiefs of Staff appreciate the position in the Pacific and that they will do everything they can to meet it but that they feel we must give first consideration to the defeat of Germany. This can be done by finishing Tunisia and then operating in the Mediterranean so as to draw the maximum number of German ground and air forces from the Russian front. In undertaking operations in the Mediterranean, assistance from the United States is necessary. He felt that if we do not maintain constant pressure on Germany, they will be given an opportunity to recover and thus prolong the war.

General Marshall said the United States Chiefs of Staff do not propose doing nothing in the Mediterranean or in France; they have no idea that we should not concentrate first on defeating Germany. The question that is to be decided is how this can best be accomplished. On the other hand, it is the view of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the war should be ended as quickly as possible, which cannot be accomplished if we neglect the Pacific theater entirely and leave the Japanese to consolidate their gains and unnecessarily strengthen their position.

General Marshall said that he advocated an attack on the Continent but that he was opposed to immobilizing a large force in the United Kingdom, awaiting an uncertain prospect, when they might be better engaged in offensive operations which are possible.

General Marshall stated that it was apparently agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to give Russia every possible assistance and to endeavor to bring Turkey into the war. His primary concern with the operations in the Pacific was to insure that our positions would be so strengthened as to provide us with the means for necessary operations rather than to continue conducting them on a "shoe string." He felt that this would ultimately reduce the necessity for tonnage in the Pacific and this was his chief reason for advocating operations in Burma.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff certainly did not want to keep forces tied up in Europe doing nothing. During the build-up period, however, the first forces to arrive from America could not be used actively against the enemy; a certain minimum concentration had to be effected before they could be employed. His point was that we should direct our resources to the defeat of Germany first. He
agreed as to the desirability of ANAKIM since it appeared that for this operation we could use forces available in the theater without detracting from the earliest possible defeat of Germany. This conception was focused in paragraph 2(e) of the British Joint Planning Staff’s paper (C.C.S. 153/1) in which it was stated that we agreed in principle with the U. S. strategy in the Pacific “provided always that its application does not prejudice the earliest possible defeat of Germany.”

Admiral King pointed out that this expression might be read as meaning that anything which was done in the Pacific interfered with the earliest possible defeat of Germany and that the Pacific theater should therefore remain totally inactive.

Sir Charles Portal said that this was certainly not the understanding of the British Chiefs of Staff who had always accepted that pressure should be maintained on Japan. They had, perhaps, misunderstood the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and thought that the point at issue was whether the main effort should be in the Pacific or in the United Kingdom. The British view was that for getting at Germany in the immediate future, the Mediterranean offered better prospects than Northern France. For this purpose they were advocating Mediterranean operations with amphibious forces while concentrating, so far as the United Kingdom was concerned, on building up a large heavy bomber force, which was the only form of force that could operate continuously against Germany.

General Marshall said that he was most anxious not to become committed to interminable operations in the Mediterranean. He wished Northern France to be the scene of the main effort against Germany—that had always been his conception.

Sir Charles Portal said that it was impossible to say exactly where we should stop in the Mediterranean since we hoped to knock Italy out altogether. This action would give the greatest support to Russia and might open the door to an invasion of France.

General Marshall pointed out that extended operations in the Mediterranean as well as the concentration of forces in England for the invasion of Northern France might well prevent us from undertaking operations in Burma; he was not at all in favor of this. Moreover, American forces at present in the Southwest Pacific were desperately short at present of their immediate requirements.

Admiral King said that we had on many occasions been close to a disaster in the Pacific. The real point at issue was to determine the balance between the effort to be put against Germany and against Japan, but we must have enough in the Pacific to maintain the initiative against the Japanese. The U. S. intentions were not to plan for anything beyond gaining positions in readiness for the final offensive against Japan. He felt very strongly, however, that the de-
etails of such operations must be left to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, who were strategically responsible for the Pacific theater. He did not feel this was a question for a decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff had not been consulted before the British undertook operations in Madagascar and French Somaliland—nor did they expect to be; but the same considerations applied to the details of operations in the Pacific.

In his view there would be plenty of forces in the theater for all necessary operations in the Mediterranean and it was now determined that such operations should be undertaken. The operations contemplated in the Pacific, however, would have no effect on what could be done in the Mediterranean or from the United Kingdom.

Sir Charles Portal said that the British Chiefs of Staff would be satisfied if they could be assured of this point. Their fear was that the result of extended operations in the Pacific might be an insufficient concentration in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack in Germany.

General Marshall pointed out that the whole concept of defeating Germany first had been jeopardized by the lack of resources in the Pacific. Heavy bombers set up to go to the United Kingdom had had to be diverted to the South Pacific to avoid disaster there. Fortunately disaster had been avoided; but if it had occurred, there would have been a huge diversion of U. S. effort to the Pacific theater. The U.S. had nearly been compelled to pull out of Torch and the decision to spare the necessary naval forces from the Pacific had been a most courageous one on the part of Admiral King. A hand-to-mouth policy of this nature was most uneconomical. He was anxious to get a secure position in the Pacific so that we knew where we were. The reconquest of Burma would be an enormous contribution to this and would effect ultimately a great economy of forces.

Discussion then turned on the operations proposed to secure the Pacific theater, which were set out in C.C.S. 153.

Sir Alan Brooke said that in the British view it would be sufficient to stop at Rabaul and Anakim and that to go on to Truk would take up too much force. There would inevitably be large shipping losses in the course of such operations, which would be a continuous drain on our resources.

Admiral King pointed out that the proposed operations would be carried out one after the other. After Rabaul had been captured, the same forces might be employed to go on to the Marshalls. Rabaul might be taken by May and Anakim could not start before November. During the intervening months, surely the troops in the theater should not be allowed to remain idle but should be employed to keep up pressure on the Japanese and maintain the initiative. Only by this means could we offset the advantage which the Japanese had in their
possession of interior lines. Operations into the Marshalls could be stopped at any point desired and were not an unlimited commitment which had to be seen through to the end. It might well be that Truk would, after all, be found impossible to capture this year.

**General Marshall** said that there seemed general agreement as to the need for the capture of Rabaul and the desirability of *Anakim*. Could it not be agreed that operations should be continued as far as Truk if it were possible with the forces available at that time? There should be no question of sacrificing *Anakim* for Truk.

**Sir Charles Portal** said he would not like to be committed to *Anakim*, even with forces released after the capture of Rabaul, without first reviewing whether some other operation more profitable to the war as a whole might not be desirable. For example, to take an extreme case, suppose after the capture of Rabaul a good opportunity arose, owing to a crack in Germany, of breaking into France. Should we refuse to take advantage of it because we were already committed to *Anakim*?

**General Marshall** felt that if such a situation arose we should certainly seize the opportunity. He agreed that a further meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff might be necessary in the summer to decide these questions.

**Sir Alan Brooke** proposed that at the present time we should limit our outlook in the Pacific to Rabaul, which should certainly be undertaken, and to preparations for *Anakim*, the decision to launch this being taken later. Similarly, any decision on Truk should be deferred.

**Admiral King** pointed out that the effect of this would be strictly to limit commitments in the Pacific, although the British Chiefs of Staff apparently contemplated an unlimited commitment in the European theater.

**General Marshall** agreed that a decision on *Anakim* and Truk could be left until later. He pointed out that C.C.S. 153 merely proposed a series of operations which might be carried out in 1943 with the means available.

**Admiral King** said that on logistic grounds alone it would be impossible to bring forces from the Pacific theater to the European theater. *Anakim* was not therefore an alternative to operations in the European theater.

**General Somervell** supported this view. He pointed out that, once Rabaul had been seized, ships would be required to maintain the garrison there and these could be employed to exploit success by minor operations against other islands.

As regards landing craft, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had committed themselves to supply a large proportion of the craft needed for
ANAKIM. Operations against the Pacific Islands required combat loaders and not the tank-landing ships and tank-landing craft which were needed elsewhere.

ADMIRAL Cooke said that a very large proportion of the U.S. shipping in the Pacific was needed for the maintenance of the Fleet, which was operating 7,000 miles from its home bases. This requirement would continue whether or not operations against Truk were undertaken. U.S. production of L.S.T.'s would shortly amount to about fifteen per month. These could not be ready in time for Mediterranean operations in the summer, but would be available for ANAKIM. As regards land forces, the figure of 250,000 put down in C.C.S. 153 included 150,000 men now in movement or set up to move, and another two divisions which he understood were already earmarked for operations in Burma this year from India. This left a total of only some 50,000 men additional for the whole Pacific theater.

SIR CHARLES Portal reiterated that it would be unwise to accept a definite commitment for ANAKIM now since a favorable situation might arise in Europe during the year which would make operations in the European theater more profitable than anything in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL King said that forces set out in C.C.S. 153 constituted the minimum necessary to maintain pressure on the Japanese. Although the forces in the Pacific were primarily for defensive purposes, many of them could be used simultaneously for minor offensives, such as air bombardment of Japanese bases. Favorable opportunities might then be seized for exploitation.

GENERAL Marshall suggested that paragraph 11(c) of C.C.S. 153 could be revised to read “seizure and occupation of Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands up to and including Truk with the resources available in the theater.”

(The meeting adjourned at this point.) 8

On the resumption of their meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft note setting out tentative agreements which appeared to have been reached in the preceding discussion. 9

After some further discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:

(a) Invited General Ismay and General Hull to redraft this note to include further points which had been raised.

(b) Instructed the Secretaries to circulate this draft for discussion at the next meeting. 10

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8 According to the account in Alanbrooke, pp. 449-450, the meeting adjourned at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

9 The draft note considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at this point is substantially identical with parts 5 (a) and 5 (b) of C.C.S. 155, post, p. 760. Accounts of the preparation and presentation of this draft note are to be found in Slessor, The Central Blue, pp. 445-447, and Alanbrooke, pp. 449-450.

10 C.C.S. 155, January 18, 1943, post, p. 760.
3. Escort Vessels

Sir Dudley Pound emphasized the need for the Combined Chiefs of Staff having before them a proper survey of the escort vessel position before taking any final decision on operations during the coming year. He recapitulated the British needs for additional escorts in the Atlantic and pointed out that considerable U.S. assistance would be required not only in the Atlantic but also for Husky if that operation were undertaken. When escorts were withdrawn for an operation such as Torch or Husky, they were absent from their normal duties for about four months. It took at least one month to collect them beforehand from the various convoys on which they were working and a similar period to redistribute them after the operation. Experience in Torch had shown that it was not possible to release them from the operation itself under about two months.

Admiral King said that with the U.S. and U.K. construction coming out during the next six months, the position should be easier by July, when Husky was to be launched. He thought it should be possible to find additional escorts for the Atlantic as well as those required for Husky. If the use of combat loaders for Husky could be cut to the minimum, escort requirements would be correspondingly reduced.

Sir Dudley Pound said that new construction in the U.K. was comparatively small during the first half of 1943 and would do little more than make good recent heavy losses.

Admiral Cooke said that the examination of the escort position by the British Joint Planning Staff was progressing well but it appeared that the total number of U.S. and British escort vessels would not be sufficient to provide any surplus after providing for normal convoy work. Any operations undertaken would therefore involve accepting increased losses in normal convoys. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would have to decide what losses would be acceptable.

The discussion then turned on the relation of P.Q. convoys to Mediterranean operations.

Sir Dudley Pound said that one problem was whether a 30-ship convoy every forty days would be considered sufficient for Russia or whether we should be pressed, as we had been in the past, to increase Russian deliveries. The worst three months were from February to the middle of May when daylight hours were increasing and the channel was restricted by ice. Later in the year the ice retreated and although the days were longer, the passage of convoys became less dangerous.

General Marshall felt that we should not again risk the same heavy losses which had been sustained on the Russian convoys in 1942. Such losses were likely to cripple our whole offensive effort against the enemy. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff
should include a reference to this effect in the note which was being
drafted. One alleviating factor was the improvement in the Persian
Gulf route which would offset reductions on the Murmansk route.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the Prime Minister had made it clear
to Mr. Stalin that we might have to call off P.Q. convoys if the scale
of German attack became too heavy. If warning was given of our
intention to stop the convoys, there was likely to be heavy pressure
to increase deliveries during the early part of the year, when, as he
had previously explained, conditions were most difficult. This meant
either increasing the size of the convoys or reducing the cycle. The
dangers which we were likely to face this year were much greater
than last year.

4. Potentialities of Polish Forces

Sir Alan Brooke, in answer to a question by General Marshall,
said that the Polish forces consisted (1) of a “secret” army inside
Poland and (2) of regular Polish troops outside the country. As re-
gards the first, there was a definite organization of determined men;
with leaders, though they were almost entirely unarmed. Their in-
telligence service had been good, but recently many of their agents
had been caught by the Germans and less information about German
forces was now coming out from Poland. General Sikorski claimed
that by the use of this organization he could do great damage on the
Polish railways to interrupt German communications at a critical
moment. There could be no doubt that this secret army would play a
valuable part in the final rising against Germany, particularly if
combined with similar action in adjacent Balkan countries. There
was always a danger of a premature rising, however.

The Polish forces outside Poland consisted of an armored division
and a parachute brigade with certain other units in the United King-
dom and 2 divisions and 2 brigade groups in the Middle East. General
Sikorski’s conception was to get some of these troops into Poland
to supplement the secret army. The difficulty was the method of
transport, on which General Sikorski was rather vague. He envisaged
the use of air transport and parachutes, but there were obvious limi-
tations in this.

General Marshall inquired whether any steps had been taken to
meet a request of General Sikorski for the bombing of an area in
Poland from which the Germans were clearing out all Polish inhabi-
tants under circumstances of great brutality.

Sir Charles Portal said the Poles had been informed that this
operation was impracticable, but steps would be taken to publicize the
presence of Polish air forces in the raids on Berlin which might be
considered partly as a reprisal on behalf of Poland.

\[\text{See Churchill’s message of July 17, 1942, to Stalin, } \textit{Hinge of Fate}, \text{ pp. 267–270.}\]
5. RAIDS ON BERLIN

Sir Charles Portal gave details of the recent raids on Berlin, and estimated that, making all allowance for the comparative sizes of London and Berlin and the time interval, the two raids on Berlin on successive nights had hit Berlin about twice as hard as London had been hit in the two heaviest raids of April and May 1941. The aggregate losses in the two Berlin raids amounted to 6 percent, the figure expected being 10 percent. The effect of the raids would be largely morale though there were important electrical works in the area attacked. They would be a great encouragement to the Russians as well as the Poles.

Sir Andrew Cunningham entered the meeting at this point.

6. NAVAL SITUATION IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Admiral Cunningham said that the Germans might threaten our shipping passing through the Straits of Gibraltar by U-boats and by aircraft and coast defense guns from Southern Spain. He considered the risk from U-boats was comparatively small. The Germans had never been able to maintain many U-boats in the Straits where currents made their operation difficult. The danger from aircraft would be no less than to coastal convoys along the east coast of England. Provided we had fighters established in the airfields of Spanish Morocco, we should be able to deal with this threat. Coast defense guns constituted the greatest danger, but only experience would show how bad this would be. The guns were supposed to have Radar range-finding apparatus but we had means of jamming this which would probably be effective. The guns would have to be neutralized by counter-battery from the southern shore and by air bombardment.

He thought that ships with a speed of 11 knots and upwards would get through the Straits without heavy losses even with the Germans in Southern Spain provided we held Spanish Morocco. Even without it, we should be able to get some convoys through by night. The Planning Staffs at Algiers had been examining the problem and their preliminary conclusions were that if we seized Majorca we should be able to prevent the Germans building up a large air strength in Southern Spain.

Sir Dudley Pound said that in spite of the German coast defense guns on the French shore of the Straits of Dover, we had not lost a ship from them. The range, however, was some 38,000 yards, whereas the distance across the Straits of Gibraltar was only about half that.

Sir Alan Brooke said that a plan had been prepared for seizing Southern Spain with a force of about six divisions. It would not be
possible, however, to do this at the same time as Husky. It must be remembered that even if the Spaniards offered no resistance at all it would take some time for the Germans to become fully established in Southern Spain.

Admiral Cunningham, referring to the possibility of capturing Sicily, said that he did not anticipate very heavy shipping losses in the operation but the actual assault of the beaches would be a very expensive operation. He did not consider that the possession of the island would very greatly add to the security of the sea route through the Mediterranean. If we were in Sicily, he would estimate this route as being 90 percent or more secure; without Sicily, it would be about 85 percent secure, once we held the whole of the North African coast.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that from the air point of view the possession of Sicily would make a very considerable difference. If the Germans were not in the island, it would be difficult for them to operate against our shipping at all; they would have to use bases in Sardinia and the mainland of Italy, which were a considerable distance from the Narrows.

Admiral Cunningham then described the naval situation in the Tunisia area. The Germans had made heavy attacks on Bône on three successive days damaging four merchant ships and a cruiser, but the defenses were now much improved and our cruisers were still operating from the port. We had at first sunk about one ship a day, but the Germans were getting far too many ships into Tunisia now. We should be able to inflict much greater damage on them as soon as we had fully organized our arrangements. Steps were now being taken to block the channel between the Italian minefields with our own mines.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, JANUARY 18, 1943, 1:15 P. M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 526, which also records that the meeting lasted until 2:40 p.m. The account of the luncheon by Elliott Roosevelt (pp. 92–93) indicates that de Gaulle’s continued absence from Casablanca was one of the subjects touched upon. It is likely that by the time of this meeting, the Presi-
dent had already been apprised of de Gaulle’s refusal to attend the Conference, as reported in Eden’s telegram of January 17 to Churchill, post., p. 814.

Macmillan (pp. 246–247) recalls several exchanges of messages between Eden and Churchill on January 16, 17, and 18, regarding Eden’s discussions with de Gaulle about the invitation to Casablanca. According to Macmillan’s account, de Gaulle’s rejection of the first invitation was discussed by Roosevelt, Churchill, Murphy, and himself at lunch and throughout the afternoon. According to Macmillan and Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1962), p. 217, Macmillan proposed at this time that the invitation to de Gaulle to come to Casablanca should come from Giraud, but it was decided instead that Churchill send another message to de Gaulle. For the text of Churchill’s second invitation to de Gaulle as originally sent from Casablanca, see Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 680–681; for text of the message as finally delivered to de Gaulle by Eden on January 19, see de Gaulle, Documents, pp. 127–128. There is no indication in the available records and accounts of Roosevelt’s role in the preparation of this second invitation. It may have been at this time, however, that Roosevelt cabled Eden: “I have got the bridegroom, where is the bride?” (The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, The Reckoning (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 421.)

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, JANUARY 18, 1943, 5:00 P. M., PRESIDENT’S VILLA

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay

SECRETARIAT
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

The President and the Prime Minister asked the Chiefs of Staff for a report of progress regarding the current conferences.
SIR ALAN BROOKE stated that after seven days of argument he felt that definite progress had been made. A document is now being prepared setting forth the general strategic policy for 1943. This will be gone over in detail at the C.C.S. meeting on the morning of January 19th.

SIR ALAN BROOKE summarized the document as follows:

1. A statement that the measures to be taken to combat the submarine menace are a first charge on the resources of the United Nations and provide security for all of our operations.
2. A statement that we shall concentrate on the defeat of Germany first which will be followed by the defeat of Japan.
3. Our efforts in defeating Germany will be concerned first with efforts to force them to withdraw ground and air forces from the Russian front. This will be accomplished by operations from North Africa by which Southern Europe, the Dodecanese Islands, Greece, Crete, Sardinia, and Sicily will all be threatened, thus forcing Germany to deploy her forces to meet each threat. The actual operation decided upon is the capture of Sicily.

At the same time, we shall go on with preparing forces and assembling landing craft in England for a thrust across the Channel in the event that the German strength in France decreases, either through withdrawal of her troops or because of an internal collapse.

4. Operations in the Pacific are to be continued to include the capture of Rabaul and Eastern New Guinea while plans are to be prepared to extend the operations to the Marshall Islands and the capture of Truk if the situation permits.

5. Plans and preparations to undertake Operation ANAKIM late in 1943 are to be instituted at once with the understanding that the United States will assist to make up deficiencies in landing craft and naval vessels needed for this operation. The operation is to be planned for December of 1943 with the view to capturing Burma and opening the Burma road prior to the monsoon season of 1944.

6. The maximum combined air offensive will be conducted against Germany from the United Kingdom. By this and every other available means, attempts will be made to undermine Germany’s morale.

7. Every effort will be made, political and otherwise, to induce Turkey to enter the war in order that we may establish air bases there for operations against Rumania.

8. Operation RAVENOUS will be undertaken for the purpose of establishing bridgeheads over the Chindwin River, and also to prepare roads and airfields in northern Burma which will facilitate the mounting of Operation ANAKIM toward the end of the year. In this connection, Operation CANNIBAL is now being undertaken with a view to securing air bases in the Akyab area.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that Chiang Kai-shek wishes to postpone his part of Operation RAVENOUS until there is more naval support in the Bay of Bengal. He added that this was strategically

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1 According to Alanbrooke, pp. 449-450, Marshall, who had been acting as chairman of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, had asked General Brooke to report on the results of the Conference meetings.
2 C.C.S. 155, January 18, 1943, post, p. 769.
sound as the Chinese operation would be more effective if coordinated as a part of Anakim. He said Ravenous requires no Naval support.

General Marshall then explained that while that part of the Chinese operation which was to consist of an advance from Yunnan could be advantageously postponed, the advance from Ramgarh could well be initiated as part of operation Ravenous in order to provide security for the construction of a road southward from Ledo. However, this will have to have the approval of the Generalissimo.

The Prime Minister then stated that he wished it made clear that if and when Hitler breaks down, all of the British resources and effort will be turned toward the defeat of Japan. He stated that not only are British interests involved, but her honor is engaged. If it were thought well for the effect on the people of the United States of America, the British Government would enter into a treaty or convention with the U. S. Government to this effect.

The President stated that a formal agreement regarding British efforts against Japan was entirely unnecessary. He said, however, that efforts should be made to obtain an engagement from Russia to concentrate on the defeat of Japan after Germany had been eliminated from the war. He thought that Russia would probably want to come in with the United Nations in that event, but he would like to have an expression from them as to whether they will come in and how.

Mr. Churchill then discussed operation Sledgehammer. He thought it should be given a “sharper point” and that plans should be made to undertake it, including the appointment of a Commander and the fixing of a target date. He had not been in favor of such an operation in 1942 but he felt that it was our duty to engage the enemy on as wide a front and as continuously as possible, and as the only way of stopping an operation with the full force of the British Metropolitan air forces and the U. S. air forces in Great Britain is to do a Sledgehammer, he thought we should do everything we could to make the operation possible this summer.

The President agreed with the Prime Minister and further suggested that we join together to build up forces in the United Kingdom. He said that it would be desirable to prepare a schedule of the build-up of forces by month in order that we would know what the potential effort might be at any time, and plans should be made for utilizing this potential at any time that there are signs of Germany’s deterioration.

The Prime Minister then discussed possible operations from the Mediterranean against the Dodecanese. He considered that these might be developed either as feints in order to conceal the location of the main effort against Sicily, or perhaps as a real attack. He had received a message from the three Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East informing him that plans to this effect were under way. He
desired that the final document prepared by the Chiefs of Staff covering the strategy for 1943 should include some mention of the Dodecanese.

The Prime Minister said that he felt that General Chennault's air force in China should be reinforced. He stated that General Wavell concurred in this view.

The President stated that the effects of help to China would be largely political. A small effort to send aid would have a tremendously favorable effect on Chinese morale. The Generalissimo has been disappointed with regard to the Burma operations. He has considerable difficulty in maintaining the loyalty of some of the Chinese provinces. Anything that we can do to help China and to hurt Japan will have a heartening effect on him.

The President stated that reinforcing our air power in China would also be a severe blow to Japan. He said that the Japanese people panic easily. This was especially true at the time of their earthquake. Mr. Grew, the United States Ambassador, in reporting this incident, stated that it was necessary for the Japanese broadcast to adopt every means possible to quiet the people.

The President considered that we should send from 200 to 250 planes to China. This should include heavy bombers which, because of the difficulties of supply, could be based in India. They could be used to operate in raids over Japan proper by refueling in China on their way to and from such missions.

He thought that the United Nations should commit themselves to this line of action and that whoever of the Chiefs of Staff was next to see the Generalissimo, should inform him to this effect.

The President then discussed operations in the Mediterranean. He said we had been extremely fortunate in Operation Torch. He was worried, however, about news concerning the operations against Sicily reaching Germany. To prevent this, he thought that we should give the operations in the Mediterranean some such name as "Underbelly" and continually think of them as being aimed at any one of a number of objectives, knowing secretly all the while, that they were to be toward Sicily.

Admiral King stated that the deception could be well achieved by the use of cover plans. He said that the document that is now in preparation and will be discussed on January 10th goes a long way toward establishing a policy of how we are to win the war. It has taken some days for the Chiefs of Staff to express themselves but in principle they are all agreed. He expressed the opinion that the document being prepared would be approved after a short discussion and with minor amendments. He said that he personally would like to have had it expanded to present a complete concept for concluding the war but that he was well pleased with it as it is.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that when the United States Chiefs of Staff came to the conference, they preferred to undertake Operation ROUNDUP in 1943. The decision, however, has been made to undertake Operation Husky because we will have in North Africa a large number of troops available and because it will effect an economy of tonnage which is the major consideration. It is estimated that possession of the north coast of Africa and Sicily will release approximately 225 vessels which will facilitate operations in Burma, the Middle East, and the Pacific. He felt that the capture of Sicily would do much to improve the air coverage for our shipping in the Mediterranean. This will add considerably to the safety of the passage. He said that Admiral Cunningham and other naval officers had indicated that the capture of Sicily would not be of great benefit in the protection of our convoys, Admiral Cunningham having stated that the possession of Sicily would only make us 5 percent more effective in the protection of convoys.

SIR CHARLES PORTER thought there had been a misunderstanding of Admiral Cunningham's views. He feels that without Sicily we will lose 15 ships out of 100, or be 85 percent effective. We will lose only 10 ships out of 100, 90 percent effective, with Sicily in our possession. The number of the ships lost is therefore 50 percent greater with Sicily in possession of the Axis.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the second consideration which brought about the decision to operate against Sicily was the possibility of eliminating Italy from the war and thus necessitating Germany's taking over the present commitments of the Italians.

GENERAL MARSHALL emphasized that ROUNDUP would be a difficult if not impossible operation to undertake once we have committed ourselves to Operation Husky. He said that the United Kingdom maintains a small spearhead of amphibious forces consisting of about 20,000 troops which are available at all times for an operation across the Channel. This force could be augmented by follow-up troops carried in small craft which might be available in England. Unless there is a complete crack in German morale, operations across the Channel will have to be extremely limited. It will be fully as difficult to assemble landing craft following Operation Husky and send them to England as it will be to assemble them after the capture of Rabaul and send them to Burma. Probably three months will be required to accomplish this in either case.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that sudden signs of deterioration of the Axis forces might take two forms; first, a collapse in the interior with the troops initially holding fast; and, second, by the withdrawal of troops from France. In the latter case, we should make every effort to cross the Channel and in doing so, utilize any means that are available. He said the greatest difficulty in setting up strength for
Roundup in addition to Operation Husky is the lack of escort vessels and landing craft.

General Marshall then discussed increasing the air force in China. The United States now has an agreement to increase the Chinese air force to the extent to which it can be supplied. The increase will be much more than the force is now. It is contemplated sending a group of heavy bombers which may be used to shuttle back and forth from China to India. There will be 25 to 30 additional medium bombers with the appropriate aircraft to furnish them fighter protection. He emphasized that while we are committed to the build-up of the Chinese air forces, it is a tremendously expensive operation. The air transport planes which must be utilized in their supply could be utilized with great effect elsewhere.

General Marshall said that in the agreements reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, effective measures had been adopted to improve the situation in the Pacific. He said he hoped these were sufficient to insure that we would not again be threatened by a series of crises, since sufficient forces would be made available to insure our maintaining pressure on Japan.

General Marshall said that as summer approaches, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet again to make the necessary readjustments in the decisions made now.

He then discussed the use of United States bombers in England. He thought that they should be under the operational direction of the British, who should prescribe the targets and the timing of attacks. Control of operational procedure and technique should remain under the United States Commanders. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will attempt to prescribe general priorities of bombing objectives.

General Marshall said we should coordinate and improve our methods in combating the submarine menace and that this also would be a subject of discussion during the conferences.

Another vital question before the Combined Chiefs of Staff is how to maintain the Russian forces at their maximum effort both by forcing a withdrawal of German pressure on their front and also by insuring the flow of munitions to them. It is questionable to what extent the United Nations can take the losses of tonnage incidental to escorting the northern convoys. It may be possible to decrease the intervals between convoys or add to the strength of their escorts. However, it is entirely within the power of Germany to administer such losses as to make it necessary to discontinue this route to Russia.

General Marshall said that he does not believe it necessary to take excessive punishment in running these convoys simply to keep Mr.

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*Presumably, the reference is to the renewed commitment by the United States to provide aircraft for the China theater; see Romanus and Sunderland, p. 224.
Stalin placated. In any event, he feels that it would be necessary to inform Mr. Stalin that the convoys would have to be discontinued during Operation Husky.

General Arnold said that the agreements tentatively arrived at would be very helpful from the air point of view. They will facilitate the allocation of aircraft and the development of procedure and technique.

The Prime Minister said that since we have surveyed the whole field of strategy, it will now be necessary for the Chiefs of Staff to go into ways and means by which the adopted strategy can be accomplished. They must determine where risks should be incurred and where the reduction of forces is necessary. This may take several days. It will involve the broad distribution of our resources. He agreed with General Marshall that another meeting should be held before summer and expressed his pleasure to the President of the United States, and to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, for arranging to attend this conference.

The President said that he particularly appreciated having Sir John Dill at the conferences since he would be the individual who would carry on the liaison between the Chiefs of Staff in London and the Chiefs of Staff in Washington between whom he constituted an indispensable link.

Sir Dudley Pound then said that we must go into ways and means of implementing our agreed decisions. Two problems involved are the security of the Atlantic convoys and the extent to which it will be necessary to decrease such security when Operation Husky is undertaken. He said that increased pressure against the submarine menace must be maintained by adequate coverage of our convoys and by striking at places where submarines are manufactured and assembled. If this is done, the situation may be considerably improved by the time operation Husky is undertaken. He agreed with General Marshall that it will be necessary during Operation Husky to discontinue the northern convoys.

The Prime Minister said that this would be an added reason for increasing the tonnage sent to Russia prior to Operation Husky.

Sir Dudley Pound replied that this could be done provided the United States would help in the escort problem.

The President then discussed the possibility of assembling a large number of river and lake craft available in the United States and sending them quietly to Europe in order to transport troops across the Channel in case Germany cracks.

Lord Mountbatten stated that five Great Lakes steamers had already been sent.

The President told Admiral King to survey the situation and see what could be done in this respect.
SIR JOHN DILL expressed his satisfaction over the progress of the present conferences.

The Prime Minister then discussed the situation in Turkey. He said that the British had some right to expect Turkey to enter the war when the Balkans were invaded, but in view of our own weakness to help Turkey they did not press it. Turkey will be in a weak position at the peace table following the war if she has not participated in it. It was possible to give them a guarantee for existing territory, and for their rights over passage through the Dardanelles. The United Nations should be prepared to provide Turkey with antiaircraft, flak, tanks and other mechanized vehicles and also be prepared to send some of this equipment manned with units, since Turkish troops do not handle machinery particularly well. He feels that Turkey might be influenced to enter the war by the successes of Russian troops on the north and those of the United States—United Kingdom troops on the south. At present they are angry with the Bulgarians and it would not be surprising if they did enter the war.

The Prime Minister said that since most of the troops which would be involved in reinforcing Turkey would be British, he asked that the British be allowed to play the Turkish hand, just as the United States is now handling the situation with reference to China. The British would keep the United States advised at all times as to the progress being made.

The President concurred in this view* and also said that if Roundup should be undertaken, he felt that it should be under British command.

The Prime Minister said that he thought the question of command in Roundup operation might be determined later, but he agreed that it would be advisable to designate a British commander at this time who could undertake the planning of the operation. In his view, the command of operation should as a general rule be held by an officer of the nation which furnishes the majority of the forces.

He said that in perhaps five weeks six divisions of the 8th Army would enter Tunisia, and it was understood that they would, of course, come under command of General Eisenhower. He thought, however, it would be advisable for General Alexander to be designated as the Deputy Commander of the Allied Forces.

The President and General Marshall both expressed agreement, and the latter said he thought it would be particularly desirable since there would be two British armies involved in the Tunisian front.

Admiral King suggested the possibility of unifying command prior to the 8th Army’s entry into Tunisia, feeling that there were many matters common to both the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the

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*For subsequent documentation regarding the clarification of this decision relative to the respective roles of the United States and United Kingdom Governments in relations with Turkey, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 1064 ff.
8th Army which should be coordinated. After discussion, it was agreed that date of appointment should be left for future decision.

General Marshall informed the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff of the great contribution that Admiral Cunningham had made to the success of Operation Torch. He wished to express the appreciation of the United States Chiefs of Staff not only for the skill that Admiral Cunningham had displayed, but also for his spirit of helpfulness and for his cooperation.

The Prime Minister thanked General Marshall and directed that General Marshall’s comments be included in the minutes in order that he could present them to the Cabinet.

After being informed that the agreements arrived at at the conference would be included in a paper, the Prime Minister suggested that one should be drawn up for presentation to Premier Stalin. He felt that the Soviet is entitled to know what we intend to do, but that it should be made clear that the paper expressed our intentions and did not constitute promises.5

The President brought up the subject of press releases concerning the current conferences. He said that a photograph should be made of the participants in the conference and be given out with a release date which might be set as the day that he and the Prime Minister departed.

The Prime Minister suggested that at the same time we release a statement to the effect that the United Nations are resolved to pursue the war to the bitter end, neither party relaxing in its efforts until the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan has been achieved. He said that before issuing such a statement, he would like to consult with his colleagues in London.6

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5 For the draft telegram from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin as prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see C.C.S. 165/2, January 22, 1943, post, p. 782. For the joint message to Stalin as ultimately sent, see post, p. 805.
6 In a telegram to the War Cabinet on January 20, 1943 (Hinge of Fate, pp. 683-685), Churchill reported on this meeting with Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In paragraph 6 of his telegram, Churchill asked the War Cabinet’s views regarding the inclusion in a proposed statement on the work of the Conference of a declaration of American and British intention to continue the war until the “unconditional surrender” of Germany and Japan. Churchill, who reported that Roosevelt was in favor of such a statement, suggested that reference to Italy ought to be omitted in order to hasten internal collapse in Italy. Replying to Churchill in a telegram dated January 21, 1943, Attlee and Eden stated that it was the unanimous view of the War Cabinet that Italy ought not to be excluded from the terms of such a declaration. For text of the last mentioned telegram, see Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 686. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 469, col. 2218, and Sherwood, p. 973. In Hinge of Fate, p. 686, Churchill stated that he did not remember that anything further was said to Roosevelt on this matter following receipt of the War Cabinet message. It was Churchill’s feeling that the absence of further action in this regard may have resulted from his opposition to applying unconditional surrender to Italy. The proposed statement referred to by Churchill in his January 20 telegram to the War Cabinet has not been identified, but an unrecorded and undated paper which is closely related to it is printed post, p. 853.

FIELD MARSHAL DILL then asked the President if there were any information concerning General de Gaulle.

The President replied that he had arranged to have General Giraud come here for a conference, but that so far the Prime Minister had been unable to effect such arrangements with General de Gaulle.

The Prime Minister said that General de Gaulle had refused, saying that if the President wished to see him, he would no doubt invite him to come to Washington. De Gaulle had said that he would not meet Giraud in an atmosphere dominated by the High Command of the United Nations. The Prime Minister said that he had sent an invitation to de Gaulle to come, and the invitation had been sent in the name of the President and himself. He indicated to General de Gaulle that if he refused the invitation, it would be necessary for him and the President to consider whether or not he was a leader who merited their support.

The President stated that General Giraud had informed him that there were sufficient French officers and noncommissioned officers in North Africa to enable the French to raise an army of 250,000 men. He thought General Giraud should be instructed to raise such an army, and that we should make every effort to provide him with equipment. He said that General Giraud was desirous of being relieved of some of his civilian responsibilities.

The Prime Minister said that he thought the political representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom should be at all times represented in whatever controlling machinery is set up, and that even General Eisenhower should present his demands to the French Government through civilian representatives, except in those cases where he wished to exercise his prerogatives as a military commander of an occupied country.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the French have a considerable number of French 75 mm. guns on hand together with ammunition. They were to receive the tanks from the British 6th Armored Division when this unit received its Sherman tanks from the United States. He said that there were also some antiaircraft weapons available which can be given to the French. General Marshall stated that he thought it necessary to give the French the best equipment obtaining, and that he proposed to do so from United States resources subject to shipping limitations. His idea was that if we are to equip the French, we must make good units of them.

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* See Eden's telegram of January 17 to Churchill regarding de Gaulle's refusal to come to Casablanca, post, p. 814.

* Regarding the consideration and despatch of this second invitation from Churchill to de Gaulle, see the editorial note, ante, p. 626.
The President thought it would be desirable to utilize some French units in Operation Husky even if only as a reserve.

The Prime Minister then expressed the hope that the United States would bring to North Africa the remaining three divisions which are scheduled to come here.

General Marshall replied that there had been no change in schedule yet, but that after the complete details for Operation Husky had been worked out, a determination could be made as to what divisions should be brought or what other changes might be made.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 19, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 19, 1943, 10:00 A.M., ANFA CAMP

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Hull
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Smart
Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay
Major General Kennedy
Air Vice Marshal Slessor

Secretariat

Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob
Lieutenant Colonel Grove

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943
(C.C.S. 155)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a draft memorandum prepared as a result of their meeting the previous day. Certain amendments were suggested and agreed.

THE COMMITTEE:

Approved the memorandum as amended.  

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1 C.C.S. 61st meeting.
2 C.C.S. 155, January 18, 1943, post, p. 760.
3 C.O.S. 155/1, January 19, 1943, post, p. 774.
2. **Suggested Procedure for Dealing With the Agenda of the Conference**
   (C.C.S. 155/1)\(^4\)

   The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a note, prepared by the Combined Staffs suggesting the procedure to be followed for dealing with the major questions on the agreed Agenda of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 140).\(^5\) Certain alterations were suggested to the tentative program of meetings set out in the annex to these minutes.

   **The Committee:**

   Approved the suggested procedure subject to the Annex being revised as agreed at their meeting.\(^6\)

3. **Strategic Responsibility and Command Set Up for Dakar French West Africa**

   **Admiral King** said that no question of land forces was involved in West Africa. Admiral Glassford had proposed that the West African Coast from Cape Bojador to the Western boundary of Sierra Leone should be placed under French naval command.\(^7\) The French naval forces should be responsible for such operations off shore as might be necessary in that area. He understood that M. Boisson and Admiral Collinet were both agreeable to this suggestion.

   The proposed arrangement would include the air cover for offshore operations. The difficulty would be the lack of equipment of the French air forces. He suggested that to overcome this difficulty we should set out to familiarize the French with modern aircraft. To do this it would be necessary to give them up to date equipment and adequate training and to include them, so far as possible, in actual operations. He said that the West African coast from Cape Bojador southwards was a British sphere, and his proposal was that the French in their area should work under Admiral Pegram. We should have to decide whether to deal with the French as full allies or whether it would be necessary to exercise some degree of control over them.

   **Sir Dudley Pound** said that he had formed the impression that Admiral Collinet was all out to help and that the arrangement which Admiral Glassford proposed was based on the assumption that the French would fully cooperate.

   **Sir Charles Portal** said that he was in general agreement with the suggestions put forward by Admiral King.

   It was essential that all coastal air operations in West Africa should be coordinated by the British Air Commander who would be working

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\(^5\) C.C.S. 140, January 8, 1943, Note by the Secretaries, *post*, p. 752.

\(^6\) For the annex to minutes of the meeting, see *post*, p. 641.

\(^7\) Glassford headed a mission to Dakar, French West Africa, at the end of 1942 to arrange for the Allied use of air and naval bases there; see Howe, p. 271.
in cooperation with the British Naval Commander. He was fully alive to the importance of giving the French airmen at Dakar some equipment to enable them immediately to take a share in air operations in the proposed French sub-area. For this purpose he proposed, subject to the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to allot them 2 Sunderland Flying Boats and 4 Hudson patrol bombers which, to begin with, would be operated by British crews with the more experienced French crews alongside them until they were fit to take over themselves.

He was less anxious about the reliability of the French than about their technical ability and training. So far, they had neither the equipment, training or experience of coastal air operations in modern war. He proposed, therefore, that the less experienced French air crews, together with the appropriate maintenance personnel, should be withdrawn to British training establishments, with the object of forming them, if they turned out to be any good and as soon as the equipment could be made available into two squadrons, one of Catalinas and one of Wellington patrol bombers. He agreed that the equipment of these coastal squadrons in West Africa should be a British responsibility, but pointed out that owing to present shortage of suitable aircraft and the necessity for adequate training of crews, the formation of the proposed two squadrons was not likely to be practicable in the immediate future.

General Arnold said that the United States concept was gradually to draw in French air force personnel as they became trained and equipped for operational work over a period of about a year. He agreed that in French West Africa this would be a British responsibility.

General Marshall said that he was in favor of proceeding with a definite program for reequipping the French forces. This would, of course, imply French acceptance of our organization and training methods, and would inevitably delay the progress of equipping our own forces. He thought, however, that we should do the thing wholeheartedly; and he was prepared, subject to General Eisenhower's views, to modify the United States program in order to equip French forces up to a strength of 250,000. All the equipment provided for the French would be at the expense of United States troops forming in America. He proposed to make use of French shipping to bring it over.

General Somervell said that General Giraud had agreed to turn over 160,000 tons of French shipping to the Allied pool. Out of this tonnage General Giraud proposed that 85,000 tons should be allocated to meet French civil requirements, leaving 75,000 tons for shipping equipment for the French forces. General Somervell calculated that this would enable them to be equipped at the rate of about
one division a month. No allowance was made in this program for the carriage of coal and oil which was at present being shipped by the British.

**The Committee:**

Agreed:

(a) That the West African Coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador (Rio de Oro) southward shall be an area under command of a British Naval Officer for naval operations and of a British Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval forces.

(b) That subject to (a), a sub-area extending from Cape Bojador to the western boundary of Sierra Leone and all forces operating therein shall be under French Command.

(c) That in the French sub-area the intention will be to enable French air units to take over air duties as rapidly as equipment and training permit.

4. **Publication of Results of the Conference**

**Sir Alan Brooke** drew the attention of the Committee to the decision which the President and the Prime Minister had made at their meeting the previous day that:

(a) The results of this conference should be communicated to Stalin in the form of a document setting out our intentions for 1943.\(^8\)

(b) A communiqué should be prepared for issue to the Press when the conference is finished.\(^9\)

**Sir Alan Brooke** suggested that a small subcommittee should be appointed to draft a suitable document for approval by the Committee at the end of the conference.

**The Committee:**

Agreed:

To appoint a subcommittee for this purpose consisting of:

**United States Representatives:**

- Brigadier General Hull
- Colonel Smart
- Commander Libby

**British Representatives:**

- Lt. General Ismay
- Major General Kennedy
- Air Vice Marshal Slessor

\(^8\) For draft of the telegram prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see post, p. 782.

\(^9\) For the draft communiqué, presumably prepared by Roosevelt and Churchill and their aides on the evening of January 23, 1943, see post, p. 842.
Tuesday, 19th:
Discussion of future procedure.
System of command in French West Africa.
Turkey and Axis oil.

Wednesday, 20th:
Organization of command and allocation of spheres of responsibility in the Mediterranean.
Assistance to Russia in relation to other commitments.
HUSKY.
Bomber Offensive from North Africa.

Thursday, 21st:
U Boat War.
Landing Craft.

Friday, 22nd:
Bomber Offensive from U. K.
BOLERO Build-up.
1943 Limited Operations from U. K.

Saturday, 23rd:
ANAKIM.
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

HOPKINS–HARRIMAN–PONIATOWSKI MEETING, JANUARY 19, 1943,
MORNING, PRESIDENT’S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman

FRANCE
Count Poniatowski

Hopkins Papers

Hopkins Notes

[Extracts]

CASABLANCA, January 19, 1943.

Had a call from Count Poniatowski, who is acting as General Giraud’s civilian aide, who wanted to see me, but I sent for Harri-
man because I had learned that at one time he had been Harriman's brother-in-law.

Had a long talk with Count Poniatowski and Harriman. I did not tell him that de Gaulle had refused to come, because the President thinks that is British business and that they should acquaint Giraud of this fact. The Count told me what they proposed to say to de Gaulle in case he came down. It boils down that they are going to tell him that Giraud is going to be the top dog and that they will be glad to play with de Gaulle all around the world in a secondary capacity. He also told me the things he wanted to take up with the President, which included the adequate arming of the French Army, adjustment of exchange rates, the organization of a new French layout with Giraud in charge and de Gaulle No. 2 man, and then some other vague business about French sovereignty. I told him that there would be no trouble with the President about the arming of the French Army and the exchange rates, although I couldn't say what those rates would be, and that I thought the President thought that Giraud should land on top, but as far as sovereignty is concerned, he is treading on very difficult ground because the President stuck by his position that sovereignty rested exclusively with the French people, and that he would recognize no one, not even Giraud, as representing France. I told Harriman to see the President and tell him what had gone on at this conference, and I went over to see Churchill.²

² For Hopkins' notes on his meeting with Churchill, see infra.

HOPKINS–CHURCHILL CONVERSATION, JANUARY 19, 1943, MORNING, PRIME MINISTER'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Hopkins Papers

Hopkins Notes

[Extracts¹]

CASABLANCA, January 19, 1943.

The Prime Minister told me he wanted to see me this morning. He had not yet heard from London about de Gaulle and seemed to be un-

¹ For other portions of these notes dealing with the Hopkins–Harriman–Poniatowski and Roosevelt–Giraud meetings, see supra and post, p. 646, respectively.
happy about the President’s decision to close up the conference with the Chiefs of Staff here on Wednesday afternoon.²

I found Churchill in bed and he told me that while the second raid on Berlin looked pretty good, the weather had been bad and he was not sure how much damage had been done.³ He told me that he was sure his forces attacking Tripolitania were much further along than they had anticipated and that that was very good. I asked him what was bothering him about winding up the business with the Chiefs of Staff on Wednesday and he told me that he didn’t have anything specific in mind, that he thought the Chiefs of Staff were going to work out a pretty good agreement. He did tell me, however, that he intended to fly to Cairo as soon as the President left and work out the new Middle East Command with General Wilson in charge, and that he wanted to meet the President of Turkey perhaps in Cyprus, and push him pretty hard on the business of getting Turkey into the war, and giving us some adequate air bases, and to attack Roumanian oil fields.⁴ He told me he intended to take the line that Turkey should not wait until the last minute, but that if they were recalcitrant he would not hesitate to tell the Turks that in the event of their remaining out, he could not undertake to control the Russians regarding the Dardanelles and that their position would be intolerable.

I arranged to have dinner with Harriman and Churchill tonight because the President and Elliott are dining with General Patton. The Prime Minister was anxious that the President not tell Giraud that de Gaulle had refused to show up, because he was hoping to get a message from de Gaulle any minute. He said he wanted to come to see the President around five or six o’clock tonight. I went back to the house and told the President that the Prime Minister did not want Giraud told.⁵

² In another portion of his notes, Hopkins records that during the course of the morning, prior to his meetings with Poniatowski and Churchill, he arranged with the President the schedule for the remainder of the week. The President agreed that the Conference should be completed at an early date, followed by a review of the troops on Thursday, January 21, a dinner with the Sultan on January 22, and departure no later than Saturday morning, January 23.
³ In messages to Stalin on January 17 and January 18, Churchill reported very briefly on two air raids against Berlin; for texts of the messages and Stalin’s reply of January 19, see Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. 1, pp. 85–86.
⁴ For Churchill’s description of his visit to Turkey following the conclusion of the Casablanca Conference, see Hinge of Fate, pp. 696 ff.
⁵ The Hopkins notes continue with a description of the Roosevelt–Giraud conversation; see post, p. 646.
ROOSEVELT-TEDDER MEETING, JANUARY 19, 1943, 11: 25 A. M.,
PRESIDENT'S VILLA

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Air Chief Marshal Tedder

Editorial Note

No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The
information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 527, which
also records that the meeting was terminated at 11:45 a. m. The
account in The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord
393, mentions General Alexander as also present. According to this
source, the conversation was confined to a few questions by Roosevelt
and a brief repetition by Tedder and Alexander of the reports they
had already made to the Conference.

ROOSEVELT-GIRAUD CONVERSATION, JANUARY 19, 1943, NOON,
PRESIDENT'S VILLA

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Murphy
Captain McCrea
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

FRANCE
General Giraud
Captain Beaufre

Roosevelt Papers

McCrea Notes

[CASABLANCA,] 19 January 1943.

The President received General Henri Giraud at 12:00 noon this
date. Present also were Mr. Harry Hopkins, Mr. Robert D. Murphy,
Captain John L. McCrea, Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and
Captain A. Beaufre, Aide-de-camp, to General Giraud.

The President stated to General Giraud that he had been giving con-
sideration to suggesting the formation of a “Committee for the Liber-
aton of France,” to consist of General Giraud, General de Gaulle, and
a civilian. The President stated that he recognized the choice of a
civilian would no doubt be a matter of some concern to both Generals
Giraud and de Gaulle. In this connection, he stated that there were no
doubt many Frenchmen who would be unacceptable to Generals Giraud
and de Gaulle, and that the important thing to do was to agree on some-
one of experience as a civil administrator, and unquestioned honesty.
The President stated that he did not wish to appear as suggesting anyone, but that he had heard much favorable comment about M. Roger Cambon and M. Boisson. General Giraud stated that M. Petryon [Peyroulon] too had much in his favor. The President stated that under the circumstances, of course, General Giraud would be the senior member of such a committee and that General de Gaulle might be designated as Chief of Staff, or Inspector-General, or some such convenient title. The civilian member of the committee would be the Aide for Civil Administration, and that it was expected this latter member would relieve General Giraud of many of the duties which he now performs in connection with the civil administration. The impression that I gathered was that the formation of such a committee would meet with the approval of General Giraud. "No distractions," said the General, "should be permitted to interfere with the conduct of the war."

In response to a question by the President, General Giraud stated that practically all the political prisoners in North Africa had now been set free. It was stated that many of these prisoners had been confined since the start of the war. He stated that the political prisoners remaining in confinement were so held because of other crimes with which they were charged.

The President asked General Giraud that if the value of the franc were re-pegged in North Africa giving a higher value to the franc, would anyone stand to make a fortune out of such a revaluation. Both General Giraud and Mr. Murphy then explained to the President that there were no large money operators in North Africa. It was stated that no doubt a few people would stand to benefit by such a revaluation, but not in an alarming amount. The President then asked if anyone in France with a considerable amount of francs would stand to benefit by such a re-pegging. Both General Giraud and Mr. Murphy then explained to the President that the French Colonial monetary system is entirely divorced from the Bank of France, and that a revaluation such as proposed by the President would affect only the colonial franc and not the franc of the Bank of France.

The President stated that he had met with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the evening of January 18 and that the subject of equipping the North African French Army had been given much consideration. The President stated that he was pleased to inform General Giraud that General Marshall was enthusiastic about the prospects of such an army and that he (General Marshall) had stated to the President that it was his intention to see that such an army was equipped with our latest and best material rather than from our surplus supplies of

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1 For the record of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on January 18, 1943, see ante, p. 627.
older material. General Giraud received this statement with much satisfaction and assured the President that a French army so equipped would give a good account of itself against the enemy.

General Giraud then raised the question of propaganda. He stated that propaganda was a well-recognized weapon, but that it had to be used with care. Specifically, he stated that propaganda intended for the French people must be directed by Frenchmen. He admitted that the United Nations had an interest in such propaganda and that it was only right that our interests be given consideration, but that in the final analysis, a Frenchman should pass on propaganda directed towards the French people. To this the President and Mr. Murphy agreed.

At 12:40 p.m., the President and General Giraud withdrew to the terrace where motion and still pictures were made. After a number of shots had thus been made, the President directed Mr. Hopkins, Captain McCrea, and Captain Beaufre to join the party, and additional pictures were made.2

At 12:50 p.m., General Giraud and his aide, Captain Beaufre, withdrew.

John L. McCrea
Captain, U. S. Navy

2Photographs follow p. 483.

Hopkins Papers

Hopkins Notes
[Extract 2]

Casablanca, January 19, 1943.

I attended the conference between the President, Giraud, Murphy, Captain McCrea, Elliott, and Giraud’s Military Aide, Captain Beaufre. The President laid out to Giraud in a masterful fashion, his concept of French resistance, emphasizing the fighting. McCrea has made complete minutes of this meeting. I gained a very favorable impression of Giraud. I know he is a Royalist and is probably a right-winger in all his economic views, but I have a feeling that he is willing to fight. He is about six feet, two inches and a man of about 63 or 64. He has the appearance of health and vigor. He spoke with a good deal of modesty, but with confidence. Had a feeling that he had made up his mind that he was going to do whatever the President

1For other portions of these notes dealing with the Hopkins-Harriman-Poniatowski and Hopkins-Churchill meetings, see ante, pp. 641 and 642.
2See supra.
wanted in Africa. Apart from fighting in the war, it is impossible to tell whether or not he has political ambitions. He did not give me that impression except when he stressed later, with great vigor, his determination to head the civil as well as the military areas in Africa.

Giraud speaks no English, but the President's French seemed to me to be better than usual, and Murphy, who did the interpreting, didn't have much to do. It was only when the President wanted to be perfectly sure that Giraud knew what he was saying on an important matter, that he had Murphy interpret. Giraud laid out his problem[s], which his aide had previously told me,⁵ and the President settled them all to Giraud's complete satisfaction, but on the sovereignty point he was adamant, and insisted that Giraud, at the moment, act only as a representative in North Africa, and that he not in any sense speak for France, and that the understanding about all other French possessions should be worked out only when de Gaulle arrived. The President and Giraud then went out on the back porch and a flock of Army photographers took pictures of them, and later of McCrea, Giraud's aide and me with the President and Giraud. On the whole I thought it was a very satisfactory conference and I am sure that Giraud and the President have mutual confidence in each other.

⁵ Regarding the Hopkins–Harriman–Poniatowski meeting, see ante, p. 641.

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 19, 1943, 4:00 P. M., ANFA CAMP

**Present**

**UNITED STATES**

General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Hull
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Smart
Commander Libby
Major Codman

**UNITED KINGDOM**

General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay
Major General Kennedy
Air Vice Marshal Slessor
Air Vice Marshal Ingles
Lieutenant Colonel Hirsch

**FRANCE**

General Giraud

**Secretariat**

Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

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¹ C.G.S. 62nd meeting.

² Present for Item 3.

³ Present for Item 1.
1. Axis Oil Position
(C.C.S. 158)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a note by the Assistant Chief of British Air Staff (Intelligence) summarizing the latest British views on the Axis oil position (C.C.S. 158).

Sir Charles Portal said that the British had fully realized the great strategical importance of oil targets in Germany, but for tactical reasons these were extremely difficult to attack. The most important targets were the synthetic oil plants and the Rumanian oil refineries. Unfortunately the latter, from bases at present available, were at extreme range of our bombers; and he felt that it would be a mistake to make light and sporadic attacks on Ploesti, which would do little harm and only result in an increase of the German air defenses. It would be better to wait until we had the Turkish air bases before starting our attacks. The synthetic oil plants were in the Ruhr and elsewhere, but they were very small targets which needed precision bombing to put out of action. Recent developments in radio navigation increased the chances of success on these targets, and great hopes were placed on the possibility of daylight precision bombing by the U. S. Air Forces. When a sufficient force had been built up in a few months' time, it might be possible to resume attacks on these targets more effectively, provided of course that this could be achieved without prejudice to the U-boat warfare.

General Arnold pointed out that the Ploesti fields—which were roughly equidistant from Sicily, Benghazi, Cairo, and Aleppo—were within range of the B-24 with a load of 4,000 pounds of bombs or under.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that one of the chief difficulties was getting the necessary meteorological information, without which long-distance attacks of this nature were unlikely to be successful. It was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain information from secret radio stations in the Balkans owing to the activities of the Gestapo.

Air Vice Marshal Inglis confirmed that in the British view the Rumanian oil supplies were vital to Germany. Her stocks were so low that she depended on Rumanian oil for about thirty-three percent of her total need.

General Somervell said that the latest American estimate was less optimistic about the shortage of oil in Germany than the British.

* Not printed.
It was believed that Germany would have a surplus of about 40,000,000 barrels at the end of 1943 instead of the 10,000,000 barrels which she had at the end of 1942, owing to the opening up of new sources in Hungary and elsewhere. It was, therefore, calculated that even if the whole of the Rumanian production were knocked out early in the year, she would still have enough for operations in 1944. There were two tetraethyl lead factories however, the destruction of which would hamstring the production of German aviation fuel.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that this latest American information should be immediately given to the British Intelligence Staffs with a view to the production of an agreed estimate.

General Marshall emphasized the importance of making great efforts against German oil if we could be sure that it formed a really critical target. U.S. aircraft in the Southwest Pacific were bombing targets at a greater distance from their base than Rumania from the present bases available. We might have to wait a long time before the Turkish bases could be used.

Sir Charles Portal said that we must be sure our bombing would be really effective. The value of attacks on German oil had to be balanced against the needs of Husky, for which we should try to cause the maximum loss to the German air forces in the Mediterranean during the coming months. Only by this means could we hope to obtain the necessary air superiority on which depended the success of the operation.

After some discussion,

The Committee:

(a) Took note that the Axis oil situation is so restricted that it is decidedly advantageous that bombing attacks on the sources of Axis oil—namely, the Rumanian oilfields and oil traffic via the Danube, and the synthetic and producer gas plants in Germany—be undertaken as soon as other commitments allow.

(b) Directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to submit as early as possible an agreed assessment of the Axis oil situation based on the latest information available from both British and U.S. sources.

2. Allied Plans Relating to Turkey

(C.C.S. 157)6

In discussing C.C.S. 157, Sir Alan Brooke said that the plans for inducing Turkey to enter the war on the side of the United Nations were largely political and that the military efforts were designed to further the political negotiations.

He said that Turkey is in need of specialized equipment and that it would be preferable to furnish operating units rather than the equipment alone. The Turkish people are not particularly adept in han-

6 Post, p. 784.
dling mechanized equipment, but they seem to have a strong desire to attempt it. As a result, we shall probably have to furnish the equipment with certain personnel to train Turkish troops in its use.

Sir Alan Brooke then presented the following draft resolution which he recommended be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

"The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognize that Turkey lies within a theater of British responsibility, and that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all matters connected with China are handled by the United States of America.

"In particular, the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignment Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The onward despatch to Turkey from the Middle East of such equipment will be a function of command of the British Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. They will not divert much equipment to other uses except for urgent operational reasons, and will report such diversions to the appropriate Munitions Assignment Board."

General Somervell stated that just prior to his departure from Washington, an agreement had been reached between the State Department and the British Joint Staff Mission as to methods by which munitions should be supplied to Turkey.7

Sir Alan Brooke said that this agreement was not acceptable in London. He pointed out that any agreements previously made were superseded by the agreement arrived at on January 18th between the Prime Minister and the President which provided that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all matters connected with China are handled by the United States.8

General Marshall stated that he desired more time to study the resolution referred to above and requested that action with regard to it be postponed until the meeting of January 20th. He said that there was some confusion in his mind as to just what was intended with regard to Turkey. The President had said that he had hoped to arrange for Turkey's permission for the passage of munitions en route

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6 The Combined Munitions Assignments Boards in Washington and London, operating under the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, controlled the assignment of military equipment for Anglo-American forces. For a discussion of the operations of the two assignment boards, see Leighton and Coakley, chapter X.

7 The American-British negotiations regarding military supply to Turkey are described in Leighton and Coakley, pp. 520–521. For documentation regarding the arrangements effected in March–June, 1942, aiming at the establishment of direct military lend-lease channels between the United States and Turkey, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 677 ff.; see also the memorandum entitled "Turkey" by George V. Allen of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, March 16, 1943, ibid., 1943, vol. iv, p. 1099.

8 Regarding the agreement on Turkey, see minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on January 18, ante, p. 634.
to Russia through Turkish territory. C.C.S. 157 indicates that certain arrangements have already been made regarding the supply of munitions to Russia. In addition, the decision has been reached to make certain troop concentrations available to assist Turkey in the event that she enters into the war on the side of the United Nations. He asked Sir Alan Brooke what he considered the probabilities with regard to Turkey would be.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British had an agreement to assist Turkey if she were attacked. The agreement includes furnishing Turkey 26 squadrons of pursuit aviation. In order that these squadrons might be able to operate quickly, certain necessary equipment had already been sent there. This had been a defensive agreement, but the intention is now to operate an offensive from Turkey. The present plan is that Turkey should merely hold the Axis forces beyond her frontier and thus secure air bases from which the United Nations could operate against Rumania.

He said it was hoped that we could induce Turkey to come into the war. This might be accomplished by political moves. Certain territorial promises might be made to Turkey at this time. For example, they might be promised the “Duck’s Bill”9 in Syria, control of the Dodecanese, certain parts of Bulgaria, and assurance that her communications in the Bosphorus will be unhampered. The more apparent a victory by the United Nations becomes, the more will Turkey desire to have a place at the peace table. This might be sufficient inducement for her to join the United Nations. In any event, our efforts with regard to Turkey will not be very costly, but they may provide an opportunity for appreciable gains.

General Marshall said that he had no doubt about the value of bringing Turkey into the war. He thought that if she could be induced to join us at the right moment, the results might play a determining part in the conclusion of the war. He asked Sir Alan Brooke what he thought Turkey’s reaction might be if we effected a large concentration in the rear of her borders.

Sir Alan Brooke said it would strengthen the United Nations in the eyes of Turkey and give tangible evidence that we are ready to assist her. He said that the capture of the Dodecanese by the United Nations would give Turkey a feeling of confidence in their power but that these islands could be much more easily captured by an operation from Turkey, once she had joined in with us. He added that there is no possibility of doing operation Husky and capturing the Dodecanese simultaneously.

Sir Charles Portal said that holding the Dodecanese would facilitate operations in Turkey by insuring the use of the port of Smyrna.

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9Bec de Canard, the northeast corner of Syria immediately adjacent to Turkey and Iraq.
THE COMMITTEE:

(a) Agreed to consider the proposed resolution on Turkey, quoted above, at the meeting on January 20th.

(b) Took note of the paper under consideration.

3. MEETING WITH GENERAL GIRAUD

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were much honored by the presence of General Giraud and were very pleased that it had been possible to arrange the meeting. He hoped that General Giraud would express his views, and in particular that he would indicate the present status of the French forces and the rapidity with which they could be built up.

GENERAL GIRAUD said that he was proud at being able to participate in the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The French army had now reentered the war and had not only the will to fight but also the experience and knowledge. As an example, he might mention a message which he had that morning received on the telephone from his Chief of Staff; this was to the effect that the Germans had yesterday attacked the junction of the British and French armies between Medjes el Bab and Pont du Fahs with 80 tanks supported by infantry. On the British front the attack had completely broken down and 10 tanks had been knocked out. On the French front an attack by 50 tanks had been made against a battalion locality. The battalion had held its ground all day, and it was not until the evening that certain advanced posts were evacuated by order of the battalion commander. He had not had any further news but he understood that the situation was in hand. The action showed the quality of the French troops. They had not been able to knock out any tanks as they had no antitank guns. They had, however, prevented the German infantry from supporting their tanks and had held their ground. Similar examples had occurred on the whole front during the last two months. Such troops were worthy of modern arms.

On the existing cadres, the French army could form three armored divisions and ten mobile infantry divisions. It would also be possible to raise the following air forces:

- 50 fighter squadrons with 500 aircraft.
- 30 light bomber squadrons with 300 aircraft.
- 200 transport aircraft.

Such a force was an indispensable accompaniment for a modern army. The French pilots had already given proof of what they could do. One squadron of the Groupe Lafayette, armed with 12 P-40 aircraft, had been fighting for the last six days; they had shot down five enemy aircraft for the loss of one. He was particularly anxious to receive: first,

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10 Giraud, pp. 94-97, gives his own account of his participation in this meeting, which he recalls, however, as beginning about 11 o'clock.
fighter aircraft in the supply of which he hoped the British would participate; and, subsequently, light bombers so that he could equip the pilots of whose quality he had intimate knowledge and who would quickly master the new equipment. He realized that there were considerable difficulties due to the shortage of shipping and the needs of the Allied forces. Some of the aircraft, however, could fly from America, and possibly the fighters might be flown in from aircraft carriers. He felt confident that the French army could make a great contribution to the European campaign if it were properly equipped. He estimated that the campaign in North Africa would be over in two months’ time; and in this campaign he included the capture of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, which he regarded as forming a direct prolongation of Africa and as bases for further action.

General Marshall said that he was very glad to have heard General Giraud’s views. Speaking on behalf of the U.S. Army, air and ground, he explained that he was going into the details of how quickly modern equipment could be provided for the French Army. He knew that the shipping question was under detailed consideration by Admiral King and French Naval officers. General Somervell, the Head of the Services of Supply, had already called on General Giraud to discuss these matters and had reported thereon to him. The question of priority of delivery of items and the method to be adopted in equipping French Units would be taken up with General Giraud. General Arnold had been conferring with French officers to see what could be done to provide air equipment. It was in the interests of the U.S.A. to bring the French forces to a high state of efficiency, and everything possible would be done to obviate the difficulties of distance. It was not a question of whether to equip the French Army, but rather of how to carry it out. Availability of equipment was not the limiting factor, but transport.

Sir Alan Brooke expressed, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, great pleasure at the report which General Giraud had given of the state of the French Army. With the more limited resources at the disposal of the British, they would do what they could to help in providing modern equipment. He fully realized the important part which the French forces would play in bringing the war to a successful conclusion.

Admiral King said that arrangements were well in hand for the rehabilitation in rotation of the French warships. Resources would

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11 No record of such discussions has been found.
12 No record either of Somervell’s discussions with Giraud or of Somervell’s report to Marshall has been found.
not permit of them being dealt with all at once. He welcomed the
officers and men of the French Navy who were now joining in the
struggle for victory.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the navies of the Allies were now fight-
ing in every ocean of the world and the U-boats were extending their
activities further and further afield. The combined British and
American naval forces were less than we should like to have to meet
this menace, and the help of the French naval forces would be most
welcome. From his experience at the beginning of the war, he knew
the value of French naval assistance, and he knew also that this help
would be of the same quality now as then.

Sir Charles Portal said that he had the clearest recollection from
two wars of the skill and high performance of the French air forces.
He, therefore, hoped that they could be equipped as soon as possible
to fight once more alongside the Allies. Within the limit of British
resources, which were considerably strained, everything would be
done to hasten the day of this collaboration.

General Arnold said that he had been trying for some time to
find the most effective use for the French pilots, who had proved their
ability to take over and operate skilfully American equipment. He
hoped that this study would soon be completed.

Sir John Dill said that he felt inspired by the presence of General
Giraud, knowing as he did how much General Giraud had suffered
for France. It was a matter of great pleasure, therefore, to have
the General back to lead France to victory.

General Giraud said that in the early days of the war he had worked
in the closest touch with the British Army. The cooperation between
all arms at that time, and particularly between the 1st French Army
and the Second Corps, of which Sir John Dill was the distinguished
Commander, had showed how close such contact could be. Now once
more cooperation had been resumed. In September 1940, when he was
in a German prison camp, he had told the German generals that they
had lost the war. Their attempt to invade Great Britain had failed,
and though he could not prophesy how long the war would last, Ger-
many could never win. Sooner or later the U.S. would come to the
help of Great Britain. The Germans had asked him to sign a paper
to say that he would not escape during the period of two hours each
day when the French generals were allowed outside. He had said
that he refused to sign any paper in German. They had asked him
whether he was planning to escape as he had done in 1915. He had
said, “Never mind what I am thinking. You are my jailers, I am
your prisoner. It is your duty to guard me; it is my duty to escape.
Let us see who can carry out his duty best. It took a year to get
away, but now I am here amongst you once more.”
The Combined Chiefs of Staff expressed with applause their warm approval of the statement made by General Giraud who then withdrew from the meeting.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL CONVERSATION, JANUARY 19, 1943, 11: 20 P. M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 528, which adds that the conversation lasted until 1 a.m., January 20. According to Elliott Roosevelt, p. 99, Churchill advanced the proposal that the French provisional regime might best be left exclusively to de Gaulle, but the President dismissed the subject "almost peremptorily".

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 20, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 20, 1943, 10:00 A.M., ANFA CAMP

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Hull
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Smart
Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lord Leathers
Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat

Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob
Lieutenant Colonel Grove

1 C.C.S. 63rd meeting.
2 Present for item I only.
III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. U. S. Aid to Russia
   (C.C.S. 162)²

General Marshall requested Lord Leathers to give his comments on C.C.S. 162.

Lord Leathers stated that the bulk of the munitions sent to Russia under the Protocol ⁴ are from the United States. He said that C.C.S. 162 does not constitute a paper with which he is in full agreement as is indicated in its heading. He cannot be certain of the basic figures presented because he does not know the backlog of munitions to Russia that are now in the United States. He did, however, concur in General Somervell’s conclusions of the paper.

Lord Leathers stated that an agreement had been arrived at between the United States and British authorities in Washington, including representatives of both Navies, that all calculations for the allocation of shipping in 1943 should be based on a loss rate of 1.9% per month, whereas General Somervell used a rate of 2.6% in his preparation of C.C.S. 162. He said that if the 1.9% figure works out correctly, more shipping will be available than is indicated in this paper.

Admiral King said he had no knowledge of such an agreement and thought that 1.9% was optimistic. This was the figure for December 1942 which was particularly favorable.

General Somervell agreed that if we are able to reduce the losses in shipping from 2.6% to 2% per month, an additional troop lift of 500,000 men to England would be possible in 1943. If it were further reduced to 1.9%, an additional 50,000 could be lifted.

General Marshall said that if we accept General Somervell’s loss rate, the question as to what can be sent to Russia must be reexamined. It must also be determined whether we should undertake such a program considering its effects on troop lift.

General Somervell added that he recognized that there should be an improvement in the loss rate in 1943 over that which was sustained in 1942 because of the more effective anti-submarine measures which are contemplated. He felt it safer, however, to plan on the continu-

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¹ C.C.S. 162, January 19, 1943, entitled “U.S. Aid to Russia”, and headed “Joint Memorandum agreed by Lord Leathers and Lieutenant General Somervell,” not printed. With the exceptions of the revisions of paragraphs 14 and 15 which were discussed and agreed upon at this meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the change in the heading to indicate that the memorandum had been prepared by Somervell, C.C.S. 162 is identical with C.C.S. 162/1, January 20, 1943, post, p. 778.

² Regarding the Second (Washington) Soviet Supply Protocol of October 6, 1942, see footnote 3 ante, p. 596.
ance of the 1942 rate until it could be effectively demonstrated that the losses would decrease. He said that it was reasonably certain that the loss rate would drop as low as 2.4% per month. In this case, all of the commitments under the Russian Protocol could be fulfilled. If the rate improves beyond 2.4%, an additional troop lift for Bolero will become available.

Lord Leathers stated that it is particularly important to establish an agreed estimated loss rate for planning purposes. This will insure that all those concerned with shipping problems will be speaking and thinking in the same terms when planning troop or cargo movements.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the figures in the paper apparently are based on the assumption that the northern route to Russia will be open throughout the year. He stated that this will not be the case, particularly during the period of Operation Husky. He further thought that the paper should include some statement indicating that commitments to Russia will only be fulfilled provided they will not entail prohibitive losses in shipping.

General Somervell said that stopping the northern convoys during the period of Operation Husky would eliminate 64 sailings for which the capacity was available on the Persian route. In reply to a question by Admiral King as to why the shipments to the Persian Gulf dropped off in June, General Somervell said that the commitments to Russia would not require the total capacity of all routes and that, therefore, a reduced rate had been applied to the Persian route which had the longest turnaround. This will provide a safety margin to take care of contingencies such as stopping the northern route during Operation Husky.

Lord Leathers pointed out that C.C.S. 162 applies only to aid from the United States. He said that the British can overtake their back-log of deliveries about the end of June; a relatively small number of British shipments is involved. Assuming a convoy every 27 days, there will be 11 or 12 ships in each, whereas if they were to be run every 40 days, each convoy must include 15 British ships.

General Somervell proposed an amendment to clarify paragraph 14 of C.C.S. 162. He then asked for a careful consideration of the conclusions contained in Paragraph 15 of the paper.

Lord Leathers suggested that in the last sentence the phrase “assigned to United States troop movements” be changed to “assigned to combined troop movements.”

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*A footnote in the source text at this point reads as follows: “Corrected version circulated as C.C.S. 162/1.”

Paragraph 14 of C.C.S. 162, January 19, reads as follows: “Supplement British assistance as previously agreed, up to 300,000 tons per month, cumulative. Even on this basis, with a reduction in sinkings, there may be some relief on this score.” For the amended paragraph 14, see C.C.S. 162/1, January 20, post, p. 780.
Sir Charles Portal asked if it would be possible to frame our commitment to Russia so as to make it clear that some curtailment in the delivery of munitions might be required because of operational necessities. He felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were taking a big step in making a firm commitment regarding the delivery of munitions to Russia at the expense of all operational requirements.

Lord Leathers stated that we have reserved the right in the past to curtail shipments of munitions to Russia but that Russia did not like to have such reservations made and always objected when an actual curtailment became necessary. A notable exception to this was that they agreed that the northern convoys be discontinued during Operation Torch.

General Somerville pointed out that the current Protocol which expires in June of 1943 does include such a resolution. The new Protocol will be framed by the State Department and the Foreign Office, but actually there will be ample opportunity for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to review it before the negotiations between governments are initiated. It will thus be possible to insure that a safety clause is included in the basic document.

The Committee:

(a) Agreed that a loss rate of not more than 2.4% per month could be relied on with sufficient certainty to warrant the Combined Chiefs of Staff giving their approval to the total shipping commitments set forth in Paragraph 6, Table II of C.C.S. 162, subject to the proviso that supplies to Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations' effort.

(b) Took note that the Persian Gulf route could make good the loss of 64 North Russian sailings if these had to be eliminated in the latter part of the year owing to other operations.

(c) Agreed to direct the Combined Military Transportation Committee to make an agreed estimate of the rate of United Nations' shipping losses in 1943 which can be used by all United Nations' Agencies for planning purposes.

(d) Agreed to amend paragraph 15 of C.C.S. 162 so as to delete the words "United States" in the last sentence and substitute the word "Combined" therefor.

(e) Agreed that, in the preparation of the next Protocol with Russia, a clause should be included to the effect that the commitments included in the Protocol may be reduced if shipping losses or the necessities of other operations render their fulfillment prohibitive.

*The Third (London) Soviet Supply Protocol was signed on October 19, 1943, by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada (for the first time), and the Soviet Union. For text, see Department of State, Soviet Supply Protocols, p. 51. For documentation regarding the continuation of wartime military assistance to the Soviet Union in 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. III, pp. 737 ff.*
2. BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY FOR TURKEY
(C.C.S. 62nd Meeting, Item 2)

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested the addition of the words "through the Combined Chiefs of Staff" after "Assignment Boards" in the first sentence of the second paragraph of the draft resolution proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff at their previous meeting.\(^7\)

BRIGADIER JACOB explained the procedure for the submission of Turkish bids to the Munitions Assignments Boards in London and Washington. Turkish requirements were, in the first instance, scrutinized and coordinated by a Committee in Ankara containing U.S., British and Turkish representatives. This Committee transmitted requirements to London. The London Munitions Assignments Board passed on to the Washington Board bids for all material which could not be supplied from the U.K. The bids were presented by the British representatives of the Washington Munitions Assignments Board. Difficulty was caused, however, by the fact that the Turkish Embassy in Washington was apt to approach the War Department simultaneously with requests for equipment and, as a result, duplication took place. The object of the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff was to canalize all Turkish demands for munitions through London where the majority of these demands were met. Turkey was only one of a large number of claimants for material, and the general principle followed was that all the small European nations dealt with the London Board in the first instance, whereas the South American Republics and China dealt with Washington. For example, any demands made by the Chinese in London were refused, and the Chinese were told to present them direct to Washington. He feared that if all bids had to be passed through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, they would be smothered in a mass of detail.

ADMIRAL KING said his only concern was to insure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had an opportunity to exercise control over the actions of the Munitions Assignments Boards in connection with Turkish bids.

The Committee:

(a) Agreed that Turkey lies within a theater of British responsibility, and that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all matters connected with China are handled by the United States of America.

(b) Agreed that, in particular, under the general direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The onward dispatch to Turkey from the Middle East of such equipment will be a function of command of the British

\(^7\) The text of the draft resolution is printed ante, p. 650.
Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. They will not divert such equipment to other uses except for urgent operational reasons, and will report such diversions to the appropriate Munitions Assignments Board.

3. THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM NORTH AFRICA
(C.C.S. 159)\(^8\)

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff setting out in order of time the proposed objectives for the bomber offensive from North Africa.

In discussion certain amendments were suggested and agreed.

The Committee:

Approved the British Chiefs of Staff memorandum as amended in the discussion.

4. COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
(C.C.S. 163)\(^9\)

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff giving their recommendations for the set-up of air command in the Mediterranean.

Sir Alan Brooke said that with the 8th Army approaching Tunisia the time was near when it would be necessary to place it under General Eisenhower's command. It was, therefore, proposed that General Alexander should come in as Deputy Commander-in-Chief under General Eisenhower with the primary task of commanding the group of armies on the Tunisian front. He would be accompanied by a small nucleus staff with the necessary signals. This proposal, if accepted, would leave General Eisenhower in supreme command over:

(a) The group of armies on the Tunisian front.
(b) The U.S. 5th Army in Morocco.
(c) French forces under General Juin.

He would still have, in addition, his political responsibilities in North Africa.

The position was slightly complicated by the fact that the 8th Army must still be supplied from the East. This could, however, be arranged and the organization in the Middle East was quite adequate for the task.

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\(^8\) C.C.S. 159, not printed, is identical with C.C.S. 159/1, January 20, 1943, post, p. 777, except for those changes indicated in the first footnote to C.C.S. 159/1.

\(^9\) Not printed. The main proposal of this British paper of January 20, 1943 (J.C.S. Files), was that there be appointed an Air Commander in Chief for the whole Mediterranean Theater, under whom would be the Commander of the Northwest African Air Forces (General Spaatz), an Air Officer Commander in Chief, Middle East (Air Chief Marshal Douglas), and an Air Officer Commanding, Malta. For a description of the system of air command as subsequently worked out, see Howe, pp. 354-355.
Sir Alan Brooke then pointed out that responsibility for planning Husky, or whatever operation in the Mediterranean might be decided upon, must soon be fixed. It would probably be thought that General Eisenhower was the appropriate man to assume this responsibility. If that were decided, he would have General Alexander available to take charge of the necessary work.

Sir Charles Portal said that intensive air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean were coming to an end, but that many of the bases, such as Malta, in that area as well as the very large maintenance organization which had been established there, would still be available. It was essential that the action of all operational air forces in the Mediterranean area should be coordinated by one Commander.

General Arnold said that certain minor changes in the proposed organization would almost certainly be necessary, but the general set-up was acceptable to him.

Sir Charles Portal agreed and said that such changes could most easily be made by the Air Commander-in-Chief once he had been appointed.

Admiral King asked what dividing line was proposed between the Middle East and Northwest African theaters.

Sir Alan Brooke replied that the British Chiefs of Staff when considering this matter had thought that a line from the Tunisia-Tripolitania frontier to Corfu would be most suitable.

Sir Dudley Pound then referred to the question of the naval command which would be necessary for Husky. His proposal was that Admiral Cunningham should become Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and that Admiral Harwood should adopt the title of Commander-in-Chief, Levant. The boundary might be the line Bardia-Zanti [Zante]. Thus Malta would come under Admiral Cunningham who would be responsible for coordinating all movements and matters which affect the Mediterranean as a whole. He would also be responsible for the distribution of forces between the Mediterranean and Levant Commands.

The Committee:

(a) Accepted the proposals contained in C.C.S. 163, subject to any minor changes which might be found necessary by the Air Commander-in-Chief after his appointment.¹⁰

(b) Took note with approval that it had been agreed that, at a time to be determined after the British 8th Army had crossed the Tunisian border, General Alexander should become Deputy Commander-in-

¹⁰The Final Report to the President and Prime Minister Summarizing Decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 170/2, January 23, 1943, post, p. 791, under item 3, C, 3, recorded the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the appointment of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder as Air Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean.
Chief to General Eisenhower, and that the British 8th Army should at the same time be transferred to the command of General Eisenhower, although it would continue to be based on the Middle East.

(c) Agreed that, subject to the concurrence of General Eisenhower, General Alexander's primary task would be to command the Allied forces on the Tunisian front with a small headquarters of his own, provided from the Middle East, and that after the conclusion of these operations he should take charge of Operation Husky.

(d) Took note of the proposals of the First Sea Lord as set out above for Naval command in the Mediterranean during Husky, i.e., Western and Eastern Commands under Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and Commander-in-Chief Levant, respectively, with Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean responsible for general coordination.

(e) Agreed that General Eisenhower should be informed of the above decisions.

ROOSEVELT–CHURCHILL LUNCHEON, JANUARY 20, 1943, 1:00 P. M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Harriman
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Macmillan

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of the conversation has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 529, which adds that the luncheon was concluded just before 3 p.m. Elliott Roosevelt (pp. 102–103) states that the conversation was concerned with the de Gaulle–Giraud problem and the question of bringing de Gaulle to the Conference.

An entry in Stimson's diary for February 3, 1943, which records the Secretary's first meeting with the President following the latter's return from Casablanca, relates a Presidential anecdote about an exchange with Churchill which probably occurred at this meeting: "He [Roosevelt] told me also how when de Gaulle held back from coming to the conference after two successive invitations by Churchill and Churchill had become proportionately indignant, he Roosevelt asked whether de Gaulle got any salary and who paid him. Churchill replied that he Churchill paid it. Then said the President 'I should suggest to him that salaries are paid for devoted and obedient service and, if he doesn't come, his salary would be cut off'. De Gaulle came the next day." (Stimson Papers)
MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 20, 1943, 2:30 P.M., ANFA CAMP

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Hull
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Smart
Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay
Major General Kennedy
Air Vice Marshal Slessor

Secretariat
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane
Lieutenant Colonel Grove

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. HUSKY
(C.C.S. 161)²

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke outlined the British proposals for undertaking this operation. He said that there were two broad alternatives for carrying out the British portion of the assault—either to mount the assaulting force in the U.K. and bring the follow-up from the Middle East, or to mount the major part of the operation from the Middle East. The former would enable us to start at an earlier date but, it involved a grave risk in passing the spearhead of the assault forces through the Sicilian narrows in mineable waters and under air attack. For this reason the British Chiefs of Staff considered that the second alternative should be adopted.

If the major portion of the assault was to be mounted from North Africa, it seemed that training would be the bottleneck.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that a Brigade required three weeks training before it was fit to take part in the assault. A Brigade which had had previous training could be "brushed up" in about ten days. In either case, a further two weeks' training was necessary for final rehearsals. Time could only be saved by arranging for two or more

¹ C.C.S. 64th meeting.
² C.C.S. 161, January 20, 1943, memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff entitled "Operation HUSKY", not printed.
Brigades to be trained simultaneously. It was not possible to reduce the training periods below the figures he had given.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that these training times could not be further reduced. He thought, however, that we could not accept the end of September as the earliest date for the operation. Various devices were being examined, such as the setting up of additional training establishments and making use of a wider range of ports in the Middle East; and it was hoped to bring forward this date to about the end of August. It was assumed that Tunisia would have been cleared by the end of April.

Admiral King asked what divisions were now with the 8th Army and whether any divisions were available in the Middle East which could start training at once.

Sir Alan Brooke said that, although there were some divisions not actively engaged in the present battle, they would all be required for operations after the capture of Tripoli.

Brigadier General Wedemeyer said that no difficulty was foreseen in finding the land forces required for the U.S. portion of the operation. It was assumed that the divisions required would be taken from Morocco and not from Tunisia. The Airborne Division would have to come from the U.S.A. Certain types of aircraft would also have to be brought over, but the majority were already available in North Africa. All could certainly be provided. He felt that some date at the end of July or the beginning of August should be possible.

Rear Admiral Cooke said that a great deal of research into the capacity of Northwest African ports and the provision of landing craft would be necessary. This was already in hand. On the question of timing, his view was about two months before a planning staff could be assembled and detailed plans could be produced. He agreed that it might be possible to start the operation in July.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that the operation must depend on when the British could be ready and when the Americans could be ready and the later date set as D-day. He suggested that these should be worked out separately. It might be found that the later date was too late to be acceptable. He thought that if Tunisia were cleared by the end of April, a further two months should be sufficient for the preparation of airfields in the Tunisian tip.

General Marshall referred to the transport by air of 20,000 Chinese to Ramgarh and asked whether time might not be saved by making use of air transport to carry personnel from Northwest Africa to the Middle East. He suggested that, rather than transport troops to the Middle East via the Cape, they might be shipped to North Africa, carry out their training there, and then be taken by air to the Middle East.
By that time the passage of the necessary landing craft should have been completed. He said that Sicily was our goal and that we ought not to be diverted from it by the apparent difficulties of the undertaking.

Admiral King agreed that, although for the assault the capacity of the Northwest-African ports might be barely sufficient, it should be possible to find room for training British as well as American formations in this area. He asked whether the Tunisian ports were being used for the assault.

Brigadier General Wedemeyer said that it was intended to make use of Bizerte, Tunis, and Sousse for the U.S. portion of the assault. For training he agreed that it might be possible to squeeze up further west and so leave some of these ports for training British formations if required.

Sir Alan Brooke said that every possible permutation must be examined and that we should aim at arriving at a starting date in July. Two points called for early decision—first, the set-up of an organization to plan the whole operation; and, second, the preparation of a cover plan which would need to be integrated between the U.S.A., U.K., Northwest Africa, and the Middle East and put into effect at an early date. He pointed out that the Germans would be forced to divert troops from the Russian front as soon as our preparations made it clear that an offensive was impending somewhere. The effect of the operation would, therefore, be felt long before the actual assault was launched.

The Committee:

(A) Directed the U.S. and British Planning Staffs to:

1. Examine all possible expedients for speeding up the preparations for Husky and to report on the earliest possible date by which the operation could be mounted.
2. Recommend how the organization for planning Husky should be set up.

2. Future Business

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that it might be possible to bring forward certain items on the Agenda so as to complete the conference as early as possible. After a short discussion,

The Committee:

Agreed on the following program:

**Thursday**

- U-boat War.
- Bomber Offensive from Great Britain.
- Anakim.
- Bolero (if time permits).

**Friday**

- Husky.
- Landing Craft.
- Limited Operations.
- S. W. Pacific.
ROOSEVELT-CURCHILL-GIRAUD CONVERSATION, JANUARY 20, 1943, 5 P. M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Murphy

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

FRANCE
General Giraud
Count Poniatowski

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 529, which adds that the meeting concluded at 5:55 p. m. According to the account of this meeting in Elliott Roosevelt, p. 103, the question under discussion was the establishment of unity between de Gaulle and Giraud. Giraud (pp. 98–99) gives an account of a meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill which may be a recollection of this conversation.

CHURCHILL-ROOSEVELT DINNER, JANUARY 20, 1943, 7:45–11:15 P. M., PRIME MINISTER'S VILLA

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt
Sergeant Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
General Alexander
Sir Charles Wilson
Mr. Rowan
Mr. Martin
Commander Thompson
Captain Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of the conversation at this dinner has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 529. According to Elliott Roosevelt, p. 103, no substantive business was discussed.

CHURCHILL-EAKER LUNCHEON MEETING, JANUARY 20, 1943

Present

UNITED STATES
Major General Eaker

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of this meeting has been found. Churchill (Hinge of Fate, pp. 678–679) describes his meeting with Eaker, date unspecified, during which the latter stated the case for the American daylight
bombardeo procedure and reviewed the preparations in England for the daylight bombing force. Churchill records that he was persuaded to support Eaker and his views. According to Eaker’s diary (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.), he arrived in Casablanca on January 16 and saw Churchill on January 20 for about half an hour. Arnold (pp. 393 and 395–397) recalls that he asked Eaker to come to Casablanca to help convince Churchill of the soundness of daylight bombing. Arnold adds that on January 19 he told Churchill that he would like him to talk with Generals Andrews, Spaatz, and Eaker, who were then in Casablanca, on the daylight bombing matter, and Churchill did so on the “same day”. Eaker’s visit is not mentioned in the Log or in the communiqué; Spaatz’s visit to Casablanca is mentioned in the Log, ante, p. 529, and in the communiqué, post, p. 847; Andrews’ visit to Casablanca is recorded in the communiqué, p. 847.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 21, 1943
MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 21, 1943, 10:00 A. M., ANFA CAMP

Present

UNITED STATES
Admiral King
General Marshall
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Smart
Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay
Major General Kennedy
Air Vice Marshal Slessor

Secretariat
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. THE U-BOAT WAR
(C.C.S. 160)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a report by the Combined Staff Planners on minimum escort requirements to maintain the sea communications of the United Nations (C.C.S. 160).

1 C.C.S. 65th meeting.
2 Not printed. Salient points of this paper are briefly summarized in Leighton and Coakley, pp. 588 and 675.
SIR DUDLEY POUND said that most of the points in the body of the paper had been touched on in the course of previous discussions, but he drew particular attention to paragraph 14 emphasizing the need for adequate air cover if the number of escorts was to be kept to a minimum Schedule V on the last page of the paper showed the large number of escorts required for this purpose. The table in Enclosure "C" showed the small numbers of escort vessels which would be coming out of production during the first half of 1943.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that the categories of aircraft in this Schedule were as follows:

V.L.R.—Aircraft with a range over 2,000 miles, such as Liberators, and specially prepared Halifaxes with a range of about 2,100 miles which were temporarily assigned to antisubmarine work.
L.R.—Aircraft with a range between 1,200 and 2,000 miles.
M.R.—Aircraft with a range between 600 and 1,200 miles.

He inquired whether it could be taken that the requirements of Section 2 in Schedule V (North Atlantic, East Coast U.S. and Canada) involved no commitments for the United Kingdom.

ADMIRAL KING said that he had not the exact figures, but he had no reason to doubt that this commitment would be fulfilled by the U.S. and Canada entirely. The Caribbean and the East Coast of South America were also, of course, entirely U. S. commitments. The full details of the U. S. figures were not available at the present time, but he suggested that the report should be accepted as a working basis.

ADMIRAL KING said that the report of the Combined Staff Planners on the U-boat war, which had been ordered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a recent meeting in Washington, should be ready very shortly. This would contain the full U. S. figures.

SIR DUDLEY POUND pointed out that in their agreed policy for the conduct of the war in 1943 (C.C.S. 155/1), the Combined Chiefs of Staff had said that the defeat of the U-boat must remain the first charge on the resources of the United Nations. Nevertheless, it had been decided that the Rabaul and HUSKY operations were to be carried out, and these would inevitably detract from the anti-submarine effort. He felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should clearly record their reasons for thus diverging from the anti-submarine effort as a first objective. He passed around draft conclusions on the Combined Staff Planners’ report, which he had discussed with Admiral King, but suggested that since the first two of these were bound up with the directive for the bomber offensive from the U.K., which was to be discussed next, these should be taken up after that item.

After an adjournment,

a Post, p. 774.
THE COMMITTEE:

(a) Took note of C.C.S. 160.

(b) Agreed that:

(1) Intensified bombing of U-boat operating bases should be carried out.

(2) Intensified bombing of U-boat constructional yards should be carried out.

(3) U.S. and British Naval Staffs should:

   a. Scrutinize the dispositions of all existing destroyers and escort craft;
   b. Allocate as much new construction, or vessels released by new construction, as possible to convoy protection. The above with a view to each nation providing, to the greatest extent possible, half of the present deficiency of sixty-five escorts for the protection of Atlantic convoys.

(4) U.S. and British Naval Staffs should provide auxiliary escort carriers for working with Atlantic convoys at the earliest practicable moment.

(5) Long distance shore-based air cover should be provided over the following convoy routes as a matter of urgency:

   a. North Atlantic convoys (U.S.-U.K.)—from both sides of the Atlantic,
   b. D.W.I. oil convoys from the West Indies and the U.K.
   c. Torch oil convoys from the West Indies and Gibraltar.
   d. U.K.-Freetown convoys from Northwest and West Africa.

(6) Greenland airdromes should be developed for use by L.R. or V.L.R. aircraft.

(7) Non-ocean-going escorts should be used for Husky to the maximum possible extent.

2. THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM
   (C.C.S. 166)*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft directive for the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom submitted by the British Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 166).

Sir Charles Portal, in answer to a question by General Marshall on the precise implications of paragraph 6,5 said that political considerations often override military expediency in the case of objectives in the occupied countries. The British Government, on representations from one of the exiled Governments, sometimes placed a political embargo on some excellent military target. In such cases decisions

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*Not printed. For text of the paper as revised and approved, see C.C.S. 166/1/D, post, p. 781.

5 Paragraph 6 of C.C.S. 166, January 20, 1943, reads as follows:

"In attacking objectives in occupied territories, you will conform to such instructions as may be issued from time to time by His Majesty's Government through the British Chiefs of Staff." (J.C.S. Files)
had often to be taken very quickly, and it would not be practicable to deal with the matter through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

General Marshall suggested, and the Committee agreed, that the words "for political reasons" should be inserted in paragraph 6 in order to make this clear.

In discussion it was also agreed that the word "synthetic" should be deleted from paragraph 2 (d).

Sir Charles Portal referred to the difficulty which always arose in such directives over the precise interpretation of placing the German submarine bases and construction yards first in order of priority. This might be held to preclude attacks on any other targets. At the present time the U. S. 8th Bomber Command had U-boat targets at the top of their list and attacked them on every possible occasion with good results. There had been, however, considerable criticism in the U. K. because they never attacked targets in Germany. If too literal an interpretation of the order of priority were taken and the entire weight of our bomber effort were placed on the German submarine bases, to the exclusion of targets in Germany, there would be very serious criticism indeed. His own view was that other targets besides the submarine bases and yards should not be excluded and that paragraph 2 of the paper required some redrafting to make it clear that there was no intention to concentrate on what were strategically defensive operations to the exclusion of the offensive.8

General Marshall said that he fully appreciated this difficulty.

Sir Dudley Pound pointed out that the acceptance of large-scale amphibious operations for 1943 must inevitably detract from the anti-submarine effort and every endeavor should, therefore, be made to offset this by a higher concentration of the air effort against U-boat targets. He believed that if we put the maximum effort onto the Biscay bases now, and destroyed all the facilities and accommodations in the towns, we should vitally affect German capacity to carry on the U-boat campaign. It was no good making sporadic attacks, the pressure had to be continued for a considerable period. If the Germans had gone on bombing Plymouth, Liverpool and Glasgow instead

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8 Paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 166 read as follows:

"Within that general concept, your primary objectives, subject to the exigencies of weather and of tactical feasibility, will for the present be in the order of priority set out below. This order of priority may be varied from time to time according to developments in the strategic situation. It is not to be taken to preclude attacks on Berlin when conditions are suitable for the attainment of specially valuable results unfavorable to the morale of the enemy or favorable to that of Russia.

(a) German submarine operations bases and construction yards.
(b) The German aircraft industry.
(c) Transportation.
(d) Synthetic oil plants.
(e) Other targets in enemy war industry." (J.C.S. Files)
of stopping when they did, we should have been placed in a very
difficult position indeed.

He could not see that there was any real difference between so-
called offensive and defensive bombing. Both were directed against
the power of the enemy to carry on the war.

Admiral King agreed that the bombing of the U-boat bases should
be sustained. His impression was that the bombing of anti-submarine
targets had so far been sporadic. For example, it appeared that
Berlin had had in two raids twice the weight of bombs dropped on
Lorient recently.

Sir Charles Portal agreed that it would be a sound move to destroy
completely the four Biscay bases if experience showed this was pos-
sible. Attacks would be continued on Lorient, but so far we had no
information of the result of the recent concentrated bombardments.
It had had a greater weight of bombs dropped on it than Plymouth.
In comparing this with the weight on Berlin, regard must be paid to
the comparative size of these two targets. Weight in relation to area
was much greater at Lorient than Berlin.

Sir Alan Brooke did not think that we could win by defeating the
U-boat alone. We should be careful, therefore, not to allot more effort
than was absolutely necessary for this purpose. The bombing of Ger-
many contributed directly to the destruction of German power, where-
as the bombing of U-boat targets was only an indirect contribution.

General Marshall recalled that in the bombing directive for the
Mediterranean the emphasis had been laid on preparations for Husky.
He asked what would be done from the United Kingdom to support an
invasion of Europe.

Sir Charles Portal said that this point was covered by paragraph 5
of the draft directive. Targets would be selected in accordance with
the plan of the Commander-in-Chief, so as to give the best possible
support to the operations of the Army. Whenever operations were
immediately in prospect, attacks on what might be called the long-term
targets, such as industry, had to give way to immediate operational
needs.

General Arnold said that no one was keener to go for targets in
Germany than the U. S. Air Commanders in the United Kingdom.
They had been directed on to U-boat targets by General Eisenhower
as a direct means of supporting Torch. About half the U. S. bomber
force in the U. K. had already been withdrawn from the United King-
dom to North Africa, but large increases in its strength were now in
prospect. We should soon be able to think in terms of hundreds of
bombers where we were now thinking in tens.

General Marshall said that the control of bomber operations by
the U. S. Air Forces in the United Kingdom would be in the hands
of the British. It would be a matter of command rather than of
agreement with the U. S. Commanders. It would be the responsibility of the U. S. Commanders to decide the technique and method to be employed.

After an adjournment,

The Committee:

Approved, subject to minor amendments, a revised draft directive prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff (circulated subsequently as C.C.S. 166/1/D).\

3. Draft Telegram to M. Stalin
(C.C.S. 165)\

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that paragraph 5 of the draft telegram prepared for the President and Prime Minister to send to Premier Stalin be amended by changing the first sentence to read, “We have taken the decision to launch wide scale amphibious operations at the earliest possible moment” and to amend the second sentence to read, “the preparations for these operations are now underway and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping in North African ports.”

These changes were acceptable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir John Dill suggested that in paragraph 5 the 5th sentence be terminated with the word “subjected” and that the remainder of the sentence be deleted.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that paragraph 8 should be strengthened in view of the much greater Allied bomber offensive which will be undertaken against Germany as the result of the increased bomber strength which is in view. The British will increase their heavy bomber strength from 600 to 1,000 and the United States’ increase will be from 200 to 900. This will enable the intensity of the bombing attack against Germany to be at least doubled, a fact that M. Stalin should be glad to learn.

Admiral King suggested that the last two sentences of paragraph 5 be deleted from that paragraph and amalgamated with the redraft of paragraph 8, suggested above by Sir Charles Portal.

It was agreed that the last two sentences of paragraph 5, paragraph 7, and a more positive statement of paragraph 8 be amalgamated into one paragraph.

The Committee:

Directed that representatives of the Combined Staffs be directed to revise the draft telegram to M. Stalin in the light of the discussion given above.

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7 Post, p. 781.
8 Not printed, but see document C.C.S. 165/2, January 22, 1943, post, p. 782.
4. Anakim
(C.C.S. 164)*

General Marshall suggested that in the remarks [paragraph 3, c] concerning the availability of air forces, the last two words, “Middle East,” be deleted, and the words, “Mediterranean area” be substituted therefor.

This change was agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke stated that he believed the target date of November 1943, given as an assumption in paragraph 2, was probably too early for actual accomplishment, but that it should do no harm to let it stand as a target date to be aimed at.

The Committee:

(a) Took note of C.C.S. 164 as amended and agreed:

(1) To approve November 15, 1943, as the provisional date for the Anakim assault.

(2) To approve the provisional schedule of forces laid out in paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 164, recognizing that the actual provision of naval forces, assault shipping, landing craft, and shipping must depend on the situation in the late summer of 1943.

(3) To confirm in July 1943 the decision to undertake or to postpone Operation Anakim.

5. Bolero Build-Up

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were informed that a paper on the subject, being prepared by the British Joint Planning Staff, was not ready for consideration.

General Marshall suggested that there be some general discussion regarding Bolero prior to receipt of the British paper. He stated that it had already been decided to keep plans for a cross-channel operation up to date on a month-by-month basis in order to be ready at any time to initiate such operations.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed with this statement.

General Marshall then said he wished to discuss the question of organization. He asked what is to be done in England and also how the plans regarding Bolero are to crystallize.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British can absorb American troops at the rate of 120,000 per month. In this connection, General Somervell said that the number to arrive would be somewhat less than 120,000 per month up to July but considerably more thereafter.

Sir Alan Brooke said that one of the greatest difficulties regarding the reception of American troops in England is the lack of sufficient receiving depots for equipment. It would be necessary to construct

*Not printed. This report by the British Joint Planning Staff (J.C.S. Files) sets forth the military, naval, air, and shipping resources required for Operation Anakim and the date and size of such forces as would be available from British resources.
additional depots. The British have stopped such construction because of the manpower situation and because they have only been committed to receive five additional American divisions, or a total of 427,000 troops. The construction which must be undertaken and the operating force required for new reception depots will require personnel from the United States. These should be included in the earliest possible troop convoys to the U.K.

An area has been reserved in southwestern England for the United States troops which will be next to the area reserved for British troops in southeastern England. These areas will face France. The area to be occupied by the United States troops is being cleared of British forces. Their accommodations, except for some which cannot be moved, such as schools, will be available to the American forces.

He said that the immediate necessity was the appointment of a Commanding General and staff. The British are now engaged in reorganizing their forces from defensive organizations, supplied from fixed bases, to offensive organizations which include their own mobile service elements. It is expected that 12 divisions will be so organized by July and 15 by October. The new offensive organizations will be divorced entirely from the defensive organizations of the British Isles. Each will be under a separate commander. The British offensive forces, together with those being built up by the United States, including air forces, should come under a supreme commander who should be appointed in the near future.

General Marshall stated that General Andrews is now going to England to replace General Hartle and undertake the same duties that General Eisenhower performed prior to Operation Torch. He will have the responsibility of receiving American divisions in England; and, as soon as these divisions are ready, General Andrews will turn them over to the Supreme Commander for assignment to the cross-channel task force. He assumed that although the British contemplated setting up a separate Home Defense force, the cross-channel task force would also have to be on an alert status and considered as available to participate in the defense of the British Isles.

Sir Alan Brooke said that there were two types of planning involved with regard to the cross-channel operations; one was for a limited offensive operation which might be expected in 1943, and the other was for the larger task of an all-out invasion of the Continent. In the latter case, the decision must be made as to the direction of the attack once the landing was effected. It must be decided whether such an attack would be aimed at Germany or at occupied France. Plans might well be made to meet both contingencies.

He said that plans must envisage making the maximum use of S.O.E. activities and that these activities must be carefully coordinated with
the military operations proposed. This has not always been done in the past.

Admiral King said he considered that the appointment of a supreme commander was urgent.

General Somervell said that he had understood Sir Alan Brooke to say that the British could absorb 120,000 troops per month without assistance from the United States. This is contrary to an opinion which General Somervell attributed to Lord Leathers, that assistance would be required from the United States if the flow of troops to England exceeded 70,000 per month. General Somervell said it would be necessary to determine at once which estimate is correct. He also said that he understood it would be necessary for the United States to furnish some locomotives and rolling stock to the British in order to assist in the increased traffic resulting from troop movements.

He pointed out that the speed of sending troops to the U. K. would depend largely upon the success attained in combating the submarine menace. He urged that the United Nations concentrate their efforts in this respect.

General Somervell said that the location of United States troops in England must be made with an eye to training facilities. The troops will need amphibious training for which few facilities are available in southern England. He concluded that, from a supply point of view, an early decision was necessary as to the size of the build-up of United States forces contemplated and the type of operations in which they would be engaged. These decisions are particularly necessary with respect to the allocation of tonnage.

Sir Alan Brooke said that any operation in 1943 will of necessity be limited since an all-out offensive across the Channel can hardly be undertaken until 1944. With regard to the rolling stock for the railroads, he pointed out that when an invasion of the Continent is undertaken, the Germans will make every effort to deny our use of their rolling stock. For this reason, the United Nations must be prepared to follow the initial assault with such equipment.

He stated that the British now send their troops from southern England to Scotland or Northern Ireland by brigade groups for amphibious training. He suggested the possibility of United States troops stopping off in Ireland or Scotland for such training on their way to the final assembling area in southwestern England. The greatest difficulty is in the training of armored units, and that as far as possible it would be better if the United States forces could have this training prior to their departure from the United States.

General Marshall said that this can easily be arranged. It must be remembered that the forces used in the Torch operation were hurriedly gathered together and that the training of the troops, prior to their departure from the United States, had been difficult. The build-
up for Bolero can be accomplished more deliberately and will enable the armored units to participate in major maneuvers and complete their target practice prior to departure. Units will be frozen three months prior to leaving the United States, and this will facilitate their training. He pointed out that firing ranges have been made available for use by units in staging areas en route to ports of debarkation.

In reply to a question from Lord Louis Mountbatten, he stated that insofar as possible, all units would have had amphibious training prior to their departure from the United States.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the British had set up an amphibious training establishment at Appledore on the Bristol Channel. The northern part of this training area has been turned over to the Americans for amphibious training. Flat beaches, changes of tides, and all means of possible defense are available to insure the thoroughness of the training. Another amphibious training establishment will be available in the Clyde area in two months and, in addition, one in northern Ireland which has been started by Admiral Bennett.

General Marshall said that he assumed that the American troops included in the assault waves of a cross-channel attack would have to be rehearsed in amphibious operations, but that the great bulk of American troops would not need such rehearsals.

Lord Louis Mountbatten then pointed out that it would be well to arrange to have American forces use landing craft manned by American crews, with which General Marshall agreed.

General Somervell stated that the movement of American forces to England must be considered in connection with the escort vessels available for convoys.

Admiral King agreed that the Bolero troop movements would constitute an additional requirement for escort vessels.

Sir Charles Portal said that air forces must be reorganized with Bolero in view. At present the R. A. F. operates from static bases. Mobile air units must be organized to support cross-channel operations. He suggested that American fighter aircraft should be under the operational direction of the British in the same manner as had already been decided for heavy bombardment aircraft.

Sir Charles Portal called attention to the fact that a decision must be made as to whether to utilize troop-lift capacity from the United States to Great Britain for ground troops or for the ground echelons of the air force. He also stated that a decision might be forced on the Combined Chiefs of Staff with regard to utilizing some of the shipping engaged in the delivery of munitions to Russia in the build-up of a Bolero force.

General Somervell said that a paper was being prepared, designed to show how many troops can be transported from the United States
to the U.K. The paper had to be based on a great many assumptions and the figures which it would contain could not be considered as a reliable estimate until certain decisions have been arrived at with reference to other operations, notably Husky. Assuming that Husky is mounted in August and that an attack will be mounted from England on August 15th, it would be possible to bring in approximately 400,000 troops to England by July 1st. This would give them six weeks to settle down in order to be available for an attack August 15th. The 400,000 troops mentioned included those now in England. Of the total number, approximately 172,000 would be air corps troops and there would be five to six ground divisions. He said that, assuming 150 ship voyages could be made available from British imports, the number could be raised from seven to nine divisions.

Sir Alan Brooke stated that these figures bore out his previous estimates that there would be from 18 to 21 divisions available in England in the latter part of the summer.

General Somervell said that if the attack from England were not to be mounted until September 15th, four additional divisions could be transported from the United States, three in American, and one in British shipping. The rate of four divisions per month could be maintained thereafter inasmuch as most of the overhead personnel would be included in the earlier shipments.

Sir Alan Brooke asked what rate of flow could be expected from America monthly, assuming an attack from England in September. Would one division per month be the maximum?

General Somervell replied that the figure would greatly exceed this as far as shipping was concerned. However, if the troops were to be transported to France, the number would be limited by the port facilities available. For this reason, any plans made should envisage the capture of sufficient port facilities.

Admiral King agreed that this should be given careful consideration in planning the operation.

General Marshall suggested that once the operation is initiated, it would probably be necessary to conduct separate operations to gain additional port facilities.

Sir Alan Brooke said he thought it would be easier to establish a bridgehead and widen it out by overland operations in order to capture the ports that would be necessary. He said that at least two or three ports would be required before any attempt could be made to advance further inland. He thought that the ports from Calais to Bordeaux were the most desirable. When the British were in France, they operated from Lorient to Calais and that even with these ports, it required a long period of time to build up nine divisions.

General Marshall said that after the direct crossing had been accomplished, he thought it would be desirable to find some method
of making a flank attack in order to shorten the operations. In this
connection, he had considered the possibilities of Holland and
Denmark.

**Sir Alan Brooke** said that before a sufficient force could be built up
for a direct attack, the Germans, because of their superior communi-
cations, could concentrate against our forces in superior numbers. This
will be true unless German divisions are forced to withdraw from
France because the Russian “steam roller” had started rolling.

**Sir Dudley Pound** said that Denmark did not offer good oppor-
tunities for hostile landings because of the difficulties of air coverage
and also because of the lack of ports on her western coast. Holland
is undesirable because of her canal system which favors the defense
in retarding forward movements.

**Sir Alan Brooke** said that it would be necessary to determine ac-
curately what flow of reinforcements from the United States could
be expected.

**General Somervell** stated that he would be prepared to present
such data within from 8 to 10 hours after a decision concerning Opera-
tion Husky had been made.

**Admiral King** then suggested that limited operations proposed
from England in 1943 be discussed.

The British Chiefs of Staff stated that they had a paper on this
subject in the process of preparation and would be prepared to discuss
it during the meeting of January 22nd.

**Sir Alan Brooke** brought up the question of what organizational
set-up for Bolero would be.

Both the United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed that they
had not discussed this matter among themselves and had not come to
a definite conclusion.

**General Marshall** said that there were two methods of organiza-
tion that might be followed: either a Deputy Commander or a Chief of
Staff could be set up with an appropriate staff; or a Commanding
General could be selected at once and organize his own staff. In either
case, the planning and training for these operations should be under-
taken at once and carried out on a month to month basis, ready at any
time to undertake a cross-channel operation if the opportunity was
presented.

**Sir Alan Brooke** stated that there was a combined staff in London
now which might be a nucleus around which the Bolero planning
organization could be built.

**Lord Louis Mountbatten** pointed out that any operations under-
taken this year would be very small.

**Sir Alan Brooke** considered that regardless of how small the opera-
tions might be, they should be tied in with the over all plan for the
all-out invasion of the Continent and designed to further those operations in some way.

The Committee:
Agreed that representatives of the Combined Staffs should prepare and submit recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to be ready not later than the afternoon of January 22 relative to the command, organization, planning and training set-up necessary for entry of Continental Europe from the U. K. in 1943 and 1944.

6. Report to the President and the Prime Minister

Without discussion,

The Committee:
Directed the Secretariat to prepare a draft report of decisions reached subsequent to the submission of C.C.S. 153/1.

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ROOSEVELT—CHURCHILL CONVERSATION, JANUARY 21, 1943,
6:25–7:25 P.M., PRESIDENT’S VILLA

Present

United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 530. According to Elliott Roosevelt (p. 107), Churchill arrived with news that de Gaulle had agreed to come to Casablanca. For the text of de Gaulle’s message of January 20, 1943, to Churchill, accepting the invitation to attend the Casablanca Conference, see de Gaulle, Documents, p. 128. De Gaulle arrived at Casablanca on January 22.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 22, 1943

HOPKINS—CHURCHILL CONVERSATION, JANUARY 22, 1943,
9:45–11:55 A.M., PRIME MINISTER’S VILLA

Present

United States United Kingdom
Mr. Hopkins Prime Minister Churchill
No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. According to Hopkins' informal notes on the proceedings of January 22 (Sherwood, pp. 687–690), Hopkins, at Roosevelt's request, informed Churchill that the press conference planned for noon of January 22 would be postponed. In the course of their discussion, Hopkins expressed dissatisfaction over the results of the Conference, and Churchill held forth the hope that de Gaulle's arrival at the Conference might permit some progress to be made.

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 22, 1943, 10:15 A.M., ANFA CAMP

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<tr>
<th>Present</th>
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<td>General Marshall</td>
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<td>Admiral King</td>
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<td>Lieutenant General Arnold</td>
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<td>Lieutenant General Somervell</td>
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<td>Rear Admiral Cooke</td>
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<td>Brigadier General Hull</td>
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Secretariat

| Brigadier Dykes |
| Brigadier General Deane |
| Brigadier General Jacob |
| Lieutenant Colonel Grove |

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. Draft of Telegram to Mr. Stalin
   (C.C.S. 165/1)

After several minor amendments had been agreed upon,
The Committee:
Directed that the draft telegram as amended be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister for their approval.

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1 C.C.S. 66th meeting.
2 Present for part of the meeting.
3 Present for Item 1.
4 Not printed, but see document C.C.S. 165/2, January 22, 1943, post, p. 782.
SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Planners had examined various permutations and combinations with reference to assembling and training the requisite forces for Operation Husky and concluded that it could be mounted by August 30th, with the possibility of putting the date forward to August 15th. The British Chiefs of Staff were in favor of Plan A described in C.C.S. 151/1, Enclosure "A", paragraph 5. He said that August 22nd would be the best date because of the favorable state of the moon. The date could be set still earlier if the Tunisian ports were made available to the British for loading.

The British will require 5 divisions in all for the operation. These would probably be the 5th, 56th, 78th for the first assault; one division in from U.K. for the Catania assault on D + 3; and the New Zealand division for the follow-up. It will be necessary to move the Overseas Assault Force from England to the eastern Mediterranean about March 15th. Once this had been accomplished, the British would be committed to Operation Husky to the exclusion of Brimstone.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that while the U.S. Planning Staff did not have complete data available at this time, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that as far as the United States forces are concerned, Operation Husky could be mounted by August 1st or earlier. He referred to a statement made in paragraph 4 of the outline plan (Enclosure "A" to C.C.S. 165/1 [161/1]) that if the British forces used the Algerian and Tunisian ports in order to be ready by August 1st, the American share of the assault might be delayed beyond August 31st. The United States Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that the British could utilize all the ports from Bizerte eastward and the United States forces could still be made ready by August 1st. The only use required by the American forces of Bizerte and ports to the eastward would be for refueling purposes. He stated that as far as landing craft is concerned, little difficulty would be encountered. The limiting factor would be the "degree of finished training" that would be necessary. One division to come from the United States is undergoing thorough amphibious training at this time. The remaining divisions to participate are now in North Africa. They have already participated in landing operations, and their further training presents no

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1 C.C.S. 161/1, January 21, 1943, was a Report by the British Joint Planning Staff entitled "Operation Husky", not printed. The Report set forth those proposals and recommendations requested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the conclusion of Item 1 of their 94th meeting (see minutes ante, p. 665).

2 Enclosure "A" of C.C.S. 161/1 set forth a plan for the mounting of Operation Husky. Paragraph 5 presented four alternatives for the provision of army forces for the initial assault. Plan A called for the use of the 5th and 56th divisions from the Persia-Iraq theater and the New Zealand division or the 78th division from Tunisia. (J.C.S. Files)
problem. The question of relieving these divisions which are now being held ready for any eventuality in Spanish Morocco will require careful planning.

**Sir Alan Brooke** said that the British Planners thought that it might be necessary for the British to have ports somewhat further west than Bizerte in order to meet a target date of August 1st.

**Admiral Cooke** said that the British could train at Bougie and do their loading in the Tunis area. He could see no reason why all the forces could not meet a target date of August 1st. He realized that the Germans might do considerable damage to the ports of Bizerte and Tunis, but he estimated that by blasting processes the ports could be cleared for use by the time the air forces were ready to operate.

**Sir Alan Brooke** pointed out that the British prognostications for the target date were based on an estimate that the Axis forces would be driven from Tunisia by April 30th. If this is accomplished sooner, the target date could be moved forward accordingly.

**Admiral Cooke** pointed out that there is still uncertainty regarding the character of the beaches in Sicily. They might not be suitable for the new types of landing craft, and this would involve a change of plans. He also indicated that Admiral Cunningham will be presented with some difficulties when landing craft and combat loaders are moved into the Mediterranean. It will be necessary to do this in time for them to be available for training. The American forces will require some of the new type LCA landing craft. These weigh 8 tons empty, 13 tons loaded, and carry 36 men. The davits on the U. S. combat loaders may have to be replaced or adjusted in order to be capable of handling such weight.

**Lord Louis Mountbatten** said the British are building 30 LCA type landing craft per month in England. The number needed by the American forces could either be sent to America from England or the blueprints could be sent to America and the craft could be constructed there. The design is comparatively simple, and he thought that they could easily be manufactured in the United States. If the craft were to be manufactured in England, it would be necessary for the United States to furnish the engines required. The shipping of some 60 LCA to the Mediterranean, however, would not be an easy problem.

**Sir Alan Brooke** said it was apparent that the whole plan might require some changes; there might be some unforeseen and insurmountable difficulties which would necessitate the postponing of the target date too long. He thought that, in this case, we should be prepared with an alternative.

**General Marshall** stated that he understood the only possible alternative was Operation BRIMSTONE and indicated that he would like to discuss frankly the desirability of undertaking that operation.
Sir Alan Brooke said that Operation Brimstone would afford a base for the bombing of the whole of Italy; it would be an easier operation to undertake; and it could be accomplished earlier. It does not assist in clearing the Mediterranean for shipping, and it would not be as great a blow to Italy. However, he felt it essential that consideration of Operation Brimstone, as a possibility, be not delayed so long as to leave us with no alternative for 1943 if it were found that Husky could not be accomplished.

General Marshall said it was the opinion of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff that while Operation Brimstone would produce an advantage as far as air attack against Italy is concerned, it would postpone Husky. Any operation in the Mediterranean would postpone the Bolero build-up. He considered Brimstone a minor operation which would result in many military restrictions. Either Husky or cross-channel operations will produce great results, whereas Brimstone merely gives an air advantage. At the same time, it jeopardizes the prospects of either Husky or cross-channel operations.

General Marshall pointed out that German resistance to Operation Brimstone could not be discounted. In estimating the capabilities of the United Nations, it must be assumed that the Germans are aware that Sardinia can be undertaken at an earlier date than Husky. They will undoubtedly make their dispositions accordingly. He added that the undertaking of Brimstone would destroy the cover for future operations unless the Germans conclude that we propose to by-pass Sicily entirely and attack southern France. He thought it hardly likely that the Germans would come to such a conclusion.

He said the United States Chiefs of Staff are more concerned with adding to the security of shipping through the Mediterranean and with the immediate effects of our operations on Germany's strength against the Russians than they are with eliminating Italy from the war. He thought that to undertake Operation Brimstone would be to seek the softest spot before turning to the harder spot and in so doing we might make the harder spot harder.

Admiral King pointed out that the airfields in Sardinia have a relatively small capacity and that they would have to be developed. While the position of Sardinia does bring northern Italy and southern France within range of our fighter aircraft, it is, by the same token, within range of Axis aircraft based in those areas.

General Arnold said that in order to get fighter protection from Sardinia we must capture Corsica.

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff are very much opposed to the Operation Brimstone.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he agreed with all of these arguments, and he felt that we must go all out for Sicily. At the same time, he
felt that there should be an alternative upon which we could fall back in case of absolute necessity.

Admiral King said that the ideal would be to attack Sicily at the same time the Germans were evacuating Tunis. The longer the attack against Sicily is delayed beyond that date, the stronger will be the defenses of Sicily. He thought it important, therefore, that every effort be made to reduce this lapse of time to the minimum.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that in his opinion the ideal would be to take Sardinia during the time that Tunis was being evacuated by the Axis forces. He felt that the Axis powers would then be giving little attention to the defenses of Sardinia. He thought that the earlier date upon which the Operation BRIMSTONE could be accomplished, the securing of air bases from which to attack northern Italy, and the possibility of conducting Commando raids all along the coast of Italy, combined to make Operation BRIMSTONE very attractive.

General Marshall asked Lord Louis Mountbatten if the training difficulties would be reduced if we were able to attack Sicily at the same time that Tunis was being evacuated by the Axis forces.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said he did not think so insomuch as the evacuation would have small effect on the fixed defenses of Sicily.

Sir Dudley Pound pointed out that if the operation were to be mounted before August 22nd, it should be moved forward to July 25th in order to take full advantage of the favorable stage of the moon.

Admiral King suggested that for purposes of surprise it might be well to mount the operation at a time other than when the moon was in its best stage.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that to avoid undue risk of aerial torpedo attack the periods of the full moon should be avoided and that the assault should be made only when there was moonlight during the early morning hours. There was a period of from 5 to 6 days in each month which would be suitable.

Admiral King said he thought that July 25th should be set as the target date for planning purposes and that the attack should only be postponed to August if July proved to be impossible.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that a clear statement should be made by the naval forces as to when their training can be completed. He prophesied that naval training will be the bottleneck.

Sir Charles Portal agreed with Admiral King that July should be set as the target date in order that we might strive for the best. He added that we should also be prepared for the worst. He pointed out that the critical time on the Russian front is in August and September. If the target date for HUSKY had to be postponed beyond September, it would be of little value. He considered that the collapse
of Italy would have the most favorable effect on the Russian front. Since this might be accomplished by Operation Brimstone, he thought that we should be prepared to undertake this operation if Husky had to be delayed too long. Brimstone in June would be better than Husky in September; but a decision to undertake Brimstone must be made by March 1st; otherwise the landing craft would be at the wrong end of the Mediterranean.

General Marshall said he thought there should be no looseness in our determination to undertake Operation Husky. He recounted the difficulties regarding the changes and delays in Bolero in 1942.

Sir Alan Brooke and Sir Charles Portal agreed with this view.

General Marshall said that we must be determined to do the hard thing and proceed to do it. He did not agree with Sir Charles Portal that the elimination of Italy from the war was the most important thing that could be done. To accept this premise might make it absolutely necessary to turn to Operation Brimstone in order that Italy could be eliminated in time. He felt that this should be avoided because Operation Brimstone would neutralize the efforts of the United Nations for 1943. He said that in Brimstone we should be advancing into a salient with limited air support where we might be shot at from three directions. The supply of Sardinia entails an increase in our line of communications and adds a threat to our limited shipping.

Sir Dudley Pound said that if Operation Brimstone is undertaken, Husky would have to be delayed until the period of bad weather in October or later.

Sir Alan Brooke said that Operation Brimstone would not be an easy operation. Fighter support would be inadequate, and it would be necessary to fight our way northward through the entire island. He believed that we should go bald-headed for Sicily. He felt that the capture of Sicily would have more effect on the war. He added, however, that if by March 1st it develops that Operation Husky cannot be mounted until too late, it was important for us to have an alternative to turn to in order that we do not remain idle for the entire year.

The discussion then turned on the Command and Staff organization which would be required for the operation.

Admiral Cooke said that the Combined Staff Planners felt strongly that one man should be made responsible for the whole of the arrangements; otherwise, it was very unlikely that the necessary preparations could be completed within the short time available. A special staff would be required for the purpose.

In the discussion this need was fully accepted, and it was recognized that the Chief of Staff must be carefully selected.
THE COMMITTEE:

(a) Resolved to attack Sicily in 1943 with the favorable July moon as the target date.

(b) Agreed to instruct General Eisenhower to report not later than March 1st: (1) whether any insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favorable July moon; and, (2) in that event, to confirm that the date will not be later than the favorable August moon.

(c) Agreed that the following should be the Command set-up for the operation:

(1) General Eisenhower to be in Supreme Command with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, responsible for the detailed planning and preparation and for the execution of the actual operation when launched.

(2) Admiral Cunningham to be the Naval Commander, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.

(3) Recommendations for the officers to be appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders to be submitted in due course by General Eisenhower.

(d) Agreed that General Eisenhower should be instructed to set up forthwith, after consultation with General Alexander, a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the operation.

(e) Instructed the Secretaries to draft for their approval the necessary directive to General Eisenhower conveying the above decisions.  


HOPKINS-HARRIMAN-MOUNTBATTEN LUNCHEON MEETING, JANUARY 22, 1943

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM

Vice Admiral Mountbatten

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. According to the Hopkins' notes on the proceedings of January 22 (Sherwood, pp. 687-690), Mountbatten explained his views in favor of an attack on Sardinia rather than Sicily and described current British experiments on special explosives and ships made of ice.
MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 22, 1943,
2:30 P. M., ANFA CAMP

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Hull
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Smart
Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM
General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay
Major General Kennedy
Air Vice Marshal Slessor

Secretariat
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob
Lieutenant Colonel Grove

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC THEATER IN 1943
(C.C.S. 168)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff which Admiral King explained with the aid of a map of the Pacific theater.

GENERAL ARNOLD, in reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, said that the theoretical radius of action of the B-29 and B-32 was 1,600 miles. This would be sufficient for the bombardment of Tokyo from the Nanchang area. The best bases for the bombardment of Japan were in the Maritime Province where there were known to be twenty-five airfields. No details, however, were available regarding their condition.

THE COMMITTEE:

Took note of the proposals of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff for the conduct of the war in the Pacific theater in 1943, as set out in C.C.S. 168.

2. PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ
(Previous reference C.C.S. 61st Meeting, Item 4)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note that the President and Prime Minister were themselves preparing the communiqué for issue

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1 C.C.S. 67th meeting.
2 For text of C.C.S. 168, January 22, 1943, memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff entitled "Conduct of the War in the Pacific Theater in 1943", see Morton, Appendix H, p. 627.
3 Ante, p. 640.
4 For text of the Communiqué by the President and the Prime Minister, issued to the press on January 26, 1943, see post, p. 847.
to the press at the conclusion of the Conference, and that it would not, therefore, be necessary for them to submit a draft.

3. Continental Operations in 1943
   (C.C.S. 167)\(^5\)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a report by the British Joint Planning Staff on Continental operations in 1943, C.C.S. 167.

Sir Alan Brooke said that paragraph 2 (c) was somewhat misleading in its present form since there could, in fact, be no half-way house between the limited operations described in (a) and (b) of the paragraph and return to the Continent in full. He proposed that subparagraph (c) should, therefore, be amended to read, “Return to the Continent to take advantage of German disintegration.”

The policy which the British Chiefs of Staff recommended was contained in paragraph 19 of the paper.

The provision of additional airborne forces from the U.S. would be essential since Husky would use up all British resources in this respect.

Lord Louis Mountbatten agreed and emphasized the need for airborne forces to turn the beach defenses. Without these and armored forces to follow up, the assault on the northern coast of France was, in his opinion, quite impracticable. He drew attention to the note at the end of paragraph 5 relating to armored landing craft.

The Committee:

Agreed to defer final acceptance of the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff pending further study.

4. Organization of Command, Control, Planning and Training for Cross-Channel Operations
   (C.C.S. 169)\(^6\)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a note by the Combined Staffs, C.C.S. 169.

Sir Alan Brooke thought that it would be premature to designate a Supreme Commander for large-scale operations on the Continent at present in view of the limited operations which could be carried out with available resources in 1943. A special staff was, however, necessary for cross-channel operations and should, he thought, be set up without delay.

General Marshall agreed that a Supreme Commander would make a top-heavy organization at present, but thought that it was desirable to put a special staff under a selected Chief of Staff of sufficient standing; such an officer would perhaps suffice for the command of limited operations during the summer. This special staff could work out their

\(^5\) Post, p. 785.
\(^6\) C.C.S. 169, January 22, 1943, post, p. 789.
plans on the basis of certain forces being available, even though they were not in actual control of the troops themselves.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the staff which was at present working on cross-channel operations belonged to various Commanders in the United Kingdom. It would be necessary to take them away from their present Commanders and set them up independently.

The Committee:

(a) Accepted the proposals contained in C.C.S. 169, except for the immediate appointment of a Supreme Commander.

(b) Agreed that a Supreme Commander will ultimately be necessary for the reentry to the Continent, but that he should not be appointed at the present time.

(c) Agreed that a British Chief of Staff, together with an independent U.S.-British staff should be appointed at once for the control, planning and training of cross-channel operations in 1943.

(d) Invited the British Chiefs of Staff to prepare for their approval a draft directive to govern the planning and conduct of cross-channel operations in 1943 in accordance with the decisions to be reached on C.C.S. 167.

(e) Agreed that the above directive should make provision for a return to the Continent with the forces that will be available for this purpose in the United Kingdom month by month.

5. Landing Craft

Lord Louis Mountbatten gave an account of the British experiences in building up an Assault Fleet. He described how the L.C.I. (L) had been produced and explained the dislocation which had been caused by Torch. For that operation it had been necessary to stop the entry and training of British crews so that U.S. combat teams could have the use of the training center at Inveraray. As a result, a situation had arisen in which the British were temporarily unable to man all the landing craft at their disposal. The position was now in hand, and there would be no difficulty in manning all the landing craft expected by next August.

He drew attention to the shortage of spare parts which had recently forced him to consider the cannibalization of 25% of the landing craft at his disposal. This position, according to Admiral Cooke, also was now improving; but he emphasized the very great importance of providing ample spares parallel with the production of craft.

He described the organization of the British Assault Fleets. Broadly speaking, there were local forces organized for operations in home waters, western and eastern Mediterranean, and India. Besides these local forces, there was an overseas Assault Force with a lift of 30,000 personnel, 3,300 vehicles and 200 tanks. The purpose of this Force was to reinforce the local Assault Fleet in whichever theater might be the center of active operations. This Force would
be ready to sail for the Mediterranean by March 15th, to take part in Husky.

He described three important lessons of amphibious operations which had so far emerged:

(a) For any amphibious campaign involving assaults on strongly defended coasts held by a determined enemy, it is essential that the landing ships and craft shall be organized well in advance into proper assault fleets. These must have a coherence and degree of permanence comparable to that of any first-line fighting formation. Discipline, training, and tactical flexibility are just as necessary for assault fleets as for naval, military and air combat formations. This was the overriding lesson of Dieppe.

(b) No combined operation can be carried out with reasonable hope of success without adequate beach reconnaissance beforehand. He had now organized specially trained beach reconnaissance parties which had already done most valuable work.

(c) Adequate fire support for the assault against a strongly defended coast was most essential. A scale of 100 guns (48 self-propelled in L.C.T. and 52 in the new gun craft to be known as L.C.G.) for each assault brigade had been recommended. He handed around drawings of a type of amphibious close support vessel which had been designed for this purpose. These special assault craft were primarily intended for Roundup, and none could be ready in time for Husky.

He then handed around a table* showing the estimated availability of British and American built landing ships and craft. Referring to this table, he pointed out that the main British deficiencies by next August would be in L.S.T. and L.C.I. (L). He urged most strongly that allocations to the British of both these types should be increased to make up these deficiencies. He confirmed that provisions had already been made for manning the full number of all types of craft which had been asked for by next August together with 50 percent spare crews.

General Somervell confirmed that, so far as could be foreseen, sufficient landing craft could be made available for both the U. S. and British portions of Husky as now planned.

Admiral King drew attention to the great diversity of types of British built ships and craft. He asked whether a greater degree of standardization would not be possible. In reply Lord Louis Mountbatten explained that different types had been developed independently by the two navies; improvements had been made as a result of experience. Some of those shown in the table were now out of date.

Admiral Cooke expressed the view that the production of landing craft would be at least as great as the ability of the U. S. and British Navies to man them. He explained the heavy demand for the Pacific where rate of wastage was high and maintenance facilities extremely limited. He confirmed the shortage of spare engines. Spares had

*Annex. [Footnote in the source text. Annex not printed.]
been used to fit up new hulls which had come out of production in large numbers.

He explained that the original split of L.S.T. for Roundup, as between U. S. and British, had been in the proportion of 125 to be manned by the U. S. and 75 by the British. Allocations now proposed by the U. S. Navy Department gave a higher proportion to the British, half of the 168 proposed for the European Theater going to the British and half to the U. S.; 117 of these craft would be allocated to the Pacific. He then raised the question of L.C.A., of which the U. S. had none at all. He understood that 96 of these craft were required for the British portion of Husky, and he thought that a similar number would be required for the U. S. portion as well.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the provision of these craft would need careful examination. It might be found best to send the drawings to America so that they could be built in U. S. yards.

The Committee:

(a) Agreed that the question should be reviewed by July 1, 1943, whether the number of L.S.T. (2) to be allocated to the British from the total U. S. production of 390 can be raised from the figure of 120 now proposed by the U. S. Navy Department to 150 which was the full British requirement.

(b) Took note that the U. S. Navy Department would investigate whether the follow-up order for 44 L.C.I. (L) can be restored and half of this production allocated to the British.

(c) Took note that the greatest needs of the British Combined Operations Naval Command were for:

1. L.C.M. (3), of which 646 had been asked for by the British by August 1, 1943, but the detailed allocation of which was not yet available.

2. Scripps-Ford conversion engines for L.C.A., of which a large additional number would be needed if L.C.A. were built in the United Kingdom for the U. S.

3. Spare parts, as a matter of great urgency, for landing craft in the United Kingdom, to be supplied in the first instance on the requisitions already submitted to the U. S. Navy Department by Comamphoreu.


(Previous reference: C.C.S. 45th Meeting, Item 1)

General Marshall said that the intention of the paper under consideration was to lay down general principles for the organization of command where U. S. and British forces were engaged in combined operations under a Supreme Commander. The systems of command

∗C.C.S. 75/3, October 24, 1942, post, p. 733.
employed by the two nations for their own forces differed fundamentally. He recalled that when Field Marshal Wavell had been suddenly called upon to form a combined headquarters at short notice in the Southwest Pacific he had had considerable difficulties in arranging satisfactorily the general organization of his command. Similar cases might occur in the future, and it would be of great assistance to have guiding principles agreed beforehand.

Discussion followed on the precise channels for the communication of orders which would be used in the organization shown in the diagram attached to the paper.

Admiral King said that in considering the chain of command shown in the diagram, it must be remembered that all Subordinate Commanders act as the agents of the Supreme Commander. The authority of Task Force Commanders was complete in respect of their own task forces. It would not be necessary, however, for the Naval Commander always to transmit orders affecting naval forces through the Supreme Commander, and the Task Force Commander to the naval component of the task force. He would be an officer of experience and discretion and would avoid issuing orders which would encroach upon the authority of Task Force Commanders. The channels were not rigid. Taking the example of Husky, he explained that the Air Commander with General Eisenhower would have two main functions apart from advising the Supreme Commander. He would arrange for the air bombardment required to soften the defenses of the island, and command the air forces allotted to this task. He would also answer calls for assistance from the task forces. There would be no objection to such calls being passed direct from the Air Commanders in the task forces to the Air Commander at the main headquarters.

The Committee:

Accepted the basic system of unified command in combined U. S.-British operations as set out in C.C.S. 75/3.

ROOSEVELT DINNER PARTY, JANUARY 22, 1943, 7:40 P. M.,
PRESIDENT’S VILLA

Present

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Murphy
Major General Patton
Captain McCrea
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

MOROCCO

Sultan Mohammed V
Grand Vizier Mohammed el Mokhri
Crown Prince Moulay Hassan
Si Manneri

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

FRANCE

General Noguès
No official record of the substance of the conversation at this dinner has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 531, which adds that the Sultan and his party left at 10:10 p.m. followed shortly thereafter by Churchill, Noguès, and Patton. Hopkins’ informal notes of the proceedings of January 22 (Sherwood, pp. 687–690) include a brief description of this dinner. McCrea’s copy of the President’s own sketch of the seating arrangement as corrected by McCrea is reproduced in Sherwood, p. 971. According to the account of the dinner by Elliott Roosevelt (pp. 109–112), the conversation ranged over the problems of Morocco’s post-war economic development, the possibilities of American participation in Moroccan development programs, and the colonial question as it applied to Morocco. Pendar (p. 145) recalls that the President later described the dinner to him and spoke of the distress of Noguès at not being able to hear the President’s conversation with the Sultan. According to Murphy, p. 173, the President expressed to the Sultan his sympathy with Morocco’s aspirations for independence and spoke of possible American-Moroccan economic cooperation after the war. At his press conference on the morning of February 2, 1943, following his return to Washington on January 31, the President added the following information regarding his meeting with the Sultan: “We had a grand visit from the Sultan of Morocco, his Grand Vizier, his Chief of Protocol, and the Crown Prince. And the Sultan said—I told him I hoped he would come to Washington and see us all; and he said he would, he was going to try to do it just as soon as the war was over.” (Roosevelt Papers)

MURPHY-DE GAULLE CONVERSATION, JANUARY 22, 1943, ABOUT 10 P.M., GENERAL DE GAULLE’S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Murphy

FRANCE

General de Gaulle

Editorial Note

No official record of this meeting, made at the time, has been found. The account of this meeting given by Murphy to the Historical Office is essentially the same as that appearing in Murphy, p. 174, and in a letter written by Murphy on May 2, 1951, and quoted in part by Arthur Layton Funk, Charles de Gaulle: The Crucial Years, 1943–1944 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), p. 74. Murphy
and de Gaulle conversed for half an hour prior to the latter's meeting with Roosevelt. Murphy attempted to explain Roosevelt's policy toward France and to convince de Gaulle of the necessity of his reaching an understanding with Giraud. After hearing Murphy's exposition, de Gaulle concluded the meeting by explaining that the French National Committee in London had not empowered him to make any "binding decisions" while attending the Conference (Murphy, p. 174).

ROOSEVELT-DE GAULLE CONVERSATION, JANUARY 22, 1943, 10:20-10:55 P.M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

FRANCE
General de Gaulle

Roosevelt Papers

McCrea Notes

SECRET
WASHINGTON, 4 February 1943.

The President met General de Gaulle with much cordiality and, after the exchange of pleasantries, proceeded to tell General de Gaulle the reason for his, the President's and the Prime Minister's visit to North Africa. The President stated that after the occupation of Morocco had become an accomplished fact, it seemed most necessary to him, late in 1942, that plans be made for the calendar year 1943. The President stated that it had originally been intended that Mr. Stalin attend the conference, but that due to the urgency of the Russian Campaign and the fact that Mr. Stalin occupied the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, he had been compelled to decline the invitation to be present. In brief, the President remarked

McCrea's record of the Roosevelt-de Gaulle conversation is accompanied by the following note: "The following brief summary of the conversation which took place between the President and General de Gaulle on the evening of 22 January 1943 at Casablanca would not be complete without stating that the following observations were made by me from a relatively poor point of vantage—a crack in a door slightly ajar. In view of the fact that General de Gaulle talked in so low a tone of voice as to be inaudible to me, I cannot supply any comments made by him." For de Gaulle's version of the conversation, see de Gaulle, pp. 87-89. For a brief description of the extraordinary security precautions in effect during this meeting, see the undated Hopkins memorandum in Sherwood, pp. 685-686. Hopkins, who was present only for the opening of the meeting and did not record any of the substance of the conversation, does recall that de Gaulle arrived "cold and austere" and was accompanied by an aide. In this same undated memorandum, Hopkins suggested that Murphy was always in attendance at Roosevelt-de Gaulle meetings at Casablanca. In information supplied to the Historical Office, however, Murphy stated that he did not attend this first Roosevelt-de Gaulle conversation inasmuch as the President had expressed a desire to speak to de Gaulle privately.
that the whole purpose of his meeting with Mr. Churchill was "to get on with the war," and supply an answer to the question, "Where do we go from here?"

The President proceeded to discuss the political situation in North Africa, stating that he recognized that there existed many points of view, almost as many as there were people involved, and that accordingly, there were some conflicting thoughts. The President added, however, that so far as he was able to determine, there were no substantial differences which could not be readily reconciled.

The President stated that he supposed that the collaboration on the part of General Eisenhower with Admiral Darlan had been the source of some wonderment to General de Gaulle. Continuing, the President stated that he had felt from the outset that the problem of North Africa should be regarded as a military one and that the political situation should be entirely incident to the military situation. General Eisenhower had found that Admiral Darlan was very willing to collaborate with the end in view of bringing as much pressure as possible to bear on the enemy at the earliest possible moment. To this end General Eisenhower expressed his willingness to collaborate to the utmost with Admiral Darlan. The President stated that he thoroughly approved of General Eisenhower's decision in this matter and that real progress was being made when the Admiral met his untimely death.

At this point General de Gaulle evidently made some remark to the President with reference to the sovereignty of French Morocco. The President continued, stating that the sovereignty of the occupied territory was not under consideration, that none of the contenders for power in North Africa had the right to say that he, and only he, represented the sovereignty of France. The President pointed out that the sovereignty of France, as in our country, rested with the people, but that unfortunately the people of France were not now in a position to exercise that sovereignty. It was, therefore, necessary for the military commander in the area to accept the political situation as he found it and to collaborate with those in authority in the country at the time that the occupation took place so long as those in authority chose to be of assistance to the military commander. The President stated that any other course of action would have been indefensible.

The President again alluded to the lack of power on the part of the French people at this time to assert their sovereignty. The President pointed out that it was, therefore, necessary to resort to the legal analogy of "trusteeship" and that it was his view that the Allied Nations fighting in French territory at the moment were fighting for the liberation of France and that they should hold the political situation in "trusteeship" for the French people. In other words, the President stated that France is in the position of a little child unable to look out
and fend for itself and that in such a case, a court would appoint a trustee to do the necessary. The President stated that he had been twice in consultation with General Giraud and that General Giraud was very definite on the one point that mattered; namely, "to get on with the war." The President further remarked that General Giraud recognized fully the conflicting political situation, but stated that he would, under no circumstances, let it divert him from the immediate and urgent task of freeing French territory of the enemy.

The President stated that following the Civil War in our home country, there was conflict of political thought and that while many mistakes were made, nevertheless, the people realized that personal pride and personal prejudices must often be subordinated for the good of the country as a whole, and the contending French leaders could well follow such a program. The only course of action that would save France, said the President, was for all of her loyal sons to unite to defeat the enemy, and that when the war was ended, victorious France could once again assert the political sovereignty which was hers over her homeland and her empire. At such a time all political considerations would be laid before the sovereign people themselves and that by the use of the democratic processes inherent throughout France and its empire, political differences would be resolved.

After about 20 minutes of conversation, General de Gaulle, with some show of cordiality withdrew.²

JOHN L. MOORE
Captain, U.S. Navy

² According to Murphy’s recollections as given to the Historical Office (023.1/12-2456), Roosevelt told Murphy after the meeting with de Gaulle that the conversation had been unsatisfactory and that he had found the General rigid and unresponsive to his urgent desire to get on with the war. Roosevelt thought that de Gaulle placed too great an emphasis on French national politics, forgetting the pressing need for a military victory as a condition precedent to any French political settlement.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL CONVERSATION, JANUARY 22, 1943, 11:15 P.M., PRESIDENT’S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Murphy

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Macmillan
Mr. Mack

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log,
PREVIOUSLY, p. 532, which adds that the meeting lasted until 12:30 a.m. Elliott Roosevelt (pp. 113–114) indicates that from what little he overheard of the meeting, the subject of discussion was the de Gaulle–Giraud controversy.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 23, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 23, 1943, 10:00 A.M., ANFA CAMP

PRESENT

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<tr>
<th>UNITED STATES</th>
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<td>General Marshall</td>
<td>General Brooke</td>
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<td>Admiral of the Fleet Pound</td>
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<td>Lieutenant General Arnoud</td>
<td>Air Chief Marshal Portal</td>
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<td>Lieutenant General Somervell</td>
<td>Field Marshal Dill</td>
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<td>Rear Admiral Cooke</td>
<td>Vice Admiral Mountbatten</td>
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Secretariat

| Brigadier Dykes |
| Brigadier General Deane |
| Brigadier Jacob |

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. BOLERO BUILD-UP
   (C.C.S. 172)

General Somervell said that his paper had been prepared in collaboration with Lord Leathers, and the figures of U.S. troops to arrive in the United Kingdom in 1943 were dependent on certain assistance being provided by the British. A figure of 50,000 men per division had been taken as a basis of calculation, but this was very high owing to the inclusion of a large overhead in the first half year. The figures would be reduced to about 40,000 in the latter part of the year. In this event, the total number of divisions might rise from fifteen to nineteen by the end of the year. Every means would be used of in-

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1 C.C.S. 68th meeting.
2 C.C.S. 172, January 22, 1943, note by Lieutenant General Somervell entitled “Shipping Capabilities for Bolero Build-Up”, not printed; for a summary of the salient points of this paper, see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 676–677.
creasing the number of troops shipped by additional loadings in personnel ships during the summer months and the fitting of more cargo ships for troop carrying.

The Committee:
Took note of paper C.C.S. 172.

2. Continental Operations in 1943
(C.C.S. 167)\textsuperscript{*}

(Previous reference C.C.S. 67th Meeting, Item 3)

General Marshall said that the proposals in the paper by the British Joint Planning Staff were acceptable to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff subject to the following comments:

It appeared that the availability of the British airborne division referred to in paragraph 4 was now doubtful in view of the demands of Husky. The dispatch of an American airborne division to the United Kingdom, possibly in June, was, therefore, being considered by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. The first airborne division which would be ready for overseas would be required for Husky. The chief difficulty lay in the provision of the necessary air transports, but these could be moved across to the U. K. more quickly than the personnel, who would have to go by sea.

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff considered it most desirable that any operation of the type mentioned in paragraph 2 (a) of the paper, e.g., against the Channel Islands, should be coordinated in time with Husky.

As regards the larger operation against the Cotentin Peninsula, for which the target date given in paragraph 19 (b) was August 1st, it must be made clear that the plan was only to be based on the U. S. resources available at that time in the United Kingdom. First priority was given to Husky, and the U. S. did not wish to accept any additional commitment for operation Hadrian beyond what was at present envisaged. It was highly improbable that any U. S. landing craft crews would be available for operations from the United Kingdom this summer.

Sir Alan Brooke said that, as a result of the decision on Husky, paragraph 4 was not now correct. There would only be 11 British divisions and a part of one British airborne division available.

The Committee:
Approved the proposals contained in C.C.S. 167 subject to the reservations of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff recorded above.

\textsuperscript{*} C.C.S. 167, January 22, 1943, post, p. 785.
3. Report to the President and Prime Minister
(C.C.S. 170)*

The Committee:

(a) Approved the draft submitted by the Secretaries, subject to
minor amendments agreed in the discussion, and the inclusion of a
paragraph on the Bolero build-up based on C.C.S. 172.

(b) Instructed the Secretaries to prepare and submit a final draft
forthwith.

4. Operation Husky—Directive to General Eisenhower
(C.C.S. 171)*

General Marshall proposed certain amendments to the text of the
draft directive, which were accepted.

The Committee:

Approved the directive as amended and instructed the Secretaries
to transmit it to General Eisenhower.

5. Landing Craft

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the Admiralty had been asked
to complete another 160 L.C.A. during the next four months to pro-
vide American requirements for Husky and training. He might have
to send British L.C.A. from Force J (the Channel Assault Force) for
the U. S. share of Husky, but it was essential that these should be re-
placed in time to enable cross-channel operations to be undertaken
this summer. All L.C.A. engines come from America; and he would,
therefore, require 400 Scripps-Ford conversion engines at the rate
of 100 a month for the next four months. Each craft had two en-
grines, and 25 percent spares were required. It was of great im-
portance that the Channel Assault Force should be kept in being, even
though temporarily short of L.C.A. to make up U. S. requirements.
Otherwise, there would be no force available for cross-channel oper-
ations. Once broken up, this force would be very difficult to re-
form again.

Admiral King said that no firm promise could be given that this
large number of engines would be provided from the U. S. where pro-

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* C.C.S. 170, January 22, 1943, note by the Secretaries entitled "Report to the President and Prime Minister", not printed. As revised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at this meeting, C.C.S. 170 was redesignated C.C.S. 170/1, January 23, not printed. C.C.S. 170/1 as revised in conformity with the wishes of the President and Prime Minister during their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on January 23 (post, p. 707) was redesignated 170/2, January 23, 1943, post, p. 791. Variations between C.C.S. 170/1 and 170/2 are indicated in footnotes to the latter paper.

* C.C.S. 171, January 22, 1943, not printed. As amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at this meeting, the paper was redesignated C.C.S. 171/1/D, and as further amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the 69th meeting on January 23, post, p. 719, the directive received its final designation of C.C.S. 171/2/D, January 23, 1943, for the text of which see post, p. 799.
duction resources were already strained. He undertook to see what could be done.

**The Committee:**

(a) Agreed that it was most desirable for the Channel Assault Force to be kept in being for cross-channel operations this summer.

(b) Took note that the U.S. would endeavor to provide the necessary engines for any L.C.A. hulls produced in Great Britain during the coming months.

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**MURPHY-GIRAUD CONVERSATION, JANUARY 23, 1943, CASABLANCA**

**Present**

United States

Mr. Murphy

France

General Giraud

Hopkins Papers

Memorandum by the President's Personal Representative (Murphy) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[CASABLANCA,] January 22 [23], 1943.

**Mr. Hopkins:**

**Dear Harry:** Giraud had a long talk with Catroux this morning after which he told me that he had found Catroux' attitude helpful and understanding. In essence Giraud told Catroux for the information of de Gaulle that what Giraud proposed is that Giraud remain Commander in Chief of all French armed forces as a member and titular head of a French War Committee. The Committee would include de Gaulle as a High Commissioner or Commissioner who would have the direction of affairs of the territories which he brings into the combination. The Committee would include a third person, possibly General George, as High Commissioner or Commissioner having supervision of North and West Africa. Catroux would be the Committee's Director of Foreign Affairs, and General Valin—who is also with de Gaulle, would be in charge of Propaganda. Other de Gaulle people would be included one way or another in the setup. Giraud, de Gaulle and George would make their headquarters at Algiers. The military character of the organization would be emphasized—its primary purpose waging the war against the Axis—stressing political calm now during the military operation, and the fact that the French people must be left the decision of the eventual form of French Government.

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1 The place of the meeting is not indicated, but presumably it was held at Giraud's villa.

2 The memorandum is dated January 22, but available evidence indicates that January 23 is the correct date of the conversation. The Giraud-Catroux conversation referred to in the first sentence undoubtedly took place on the morning of January 23. See Catroux, pp. 319-321, and Giraud, pp. 104-105.
Under the War Committee would be the Directory or Committee of Governors of the several territories. Under that eventually a consultative body of representative civilians from those territories to be called for example the Federal Council.

Giraud says that he looks at this matter as a matter of plain common sense—there cannot be two bosses in this area if we are to get on with the war. On the other hand he wants to play ball with de Gaulle and to respect his sensibilities. When de Gaulle assumes to talk for France and of conditions in France, Giraud points out that he has lived there much more recently than de Gaulle where Giraud was in touch with the under ground organizations. He feels that possibly de Gaulle may confuse his idea of his own popularity with the French people and the latter's hatred of the Germans.

General George is still in France and will probably be smuggled out.

Giraud is lunching with de Gaulle and will have a long tête-à-tête after lunch.³

Bob

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² For accounts of this de Gaulle–Giraud meeting on January 23, see de Gaulle, pp. 89–92 and Giraud, pp. 105–107. De Gaulle and Giraud had previously met on January 22; for accounts of that first meeting, see de Gaulle, p. 85, and Giraud, pp. 101–103.

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HOPKINS–EL MOKHRI CONVERSATION, JANUARY 23, 1943, CASABLANCA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Hopkins
Brigadier General Wilbur

Morocco

Grand Vizier el Mokhri
Si Mammeri

Hopkins Papers

Wilbur Notes ²

The Grand Vizier made it clear that the matters to be discussed must be made known only to the President and that no power other than the U.S. should know of the interview. Unless the above could be agreed upon it were better not to discuss anything.

Mr. Hopkins assured the G.V. that his desires would be completely respected and that matters to be discussed would be for the President’s ear only.

The G.V. stated that there were four questions to be presented to the President for his consideration.

¹ The place of the meeting is not indicated.
² The source text is handwritten. Wilbur served as interpreter at this meeting.
1st Question.

His Majesty the Sultan has heard of the conference between Gen. Giraud and Gen. de Gaulle now taking place. France itself is insecure and has turned first this way then that. Since Nov. 8 relations with the French have been troubled due to the existence of many factions. The Sultan has no complaint to make against Gen. Noguès. He is an able administrator and his relations with the Sultan, with the Sultan's government and with the people have been excellent. But since Nov. 8, when Gen. Noguès has proposed some line of action, almost immediately some de Gaullist or Vichy group has opposed it.

Due to all of the above the Sultan is worried. He has welcomed the arrival of U.S. troops with joy; but will the joy continue? What are the intentions of the U.S. in regard to Morocco? What relations are to be established with the U.S.? In order to determine his future policy the Sultan would like to know the permanent policy of the U.S. in regard to Morocco.

2nd Question.

The Jews have never been the predominant people in Morocco. In numbers and in influence they have always been definitely second. They have been well treated by the Moslems. When the German Armistice Commission arrived in Morocco they at first insisted that the Jews in Morocco should be treated the same as they are in Germany. This the Sultan steadfastly refused to do.

The existing situation has been the result of centuries of living together. The Moslems need the Jews and the Jews need the Moslems.

There is no Jewish question in Morocco and will be none if matters are left as they are now. Some Jews thought that the arrival of U.S. troops would mean the placing of Jews in positions of authority over the Moslems. This must not be.

3rd Question.

Morocco is greatly in need of supplies of certain foods, clothing, machines, etc. The prestige of the U.S. has been drawn into this question somewhat as there have been statements to the effect that needed goods would arrive. It is hoped that the very evident needs of Morocco can be supplied at an early date.

4th Question.

The Sultan is certain that the war will end in a victory for the U.S. This victory will be followed by a treaty of peace. When the time arrives to discuss the conditions of the peace it is the Sultan's intention to throw himself in the arms of Mr. Roosevelt. Provided Mr. Roosevelt will accept him and his country.

If Mr. Roosevelt accepts the Sultan proposes to hold a plebiscite of his people. The Sultan is certain that all his people both in French and Spanish Morocco will be in agreement and wish to place their future in Mr. Roosevelt's hands.
The Grand Vizier stated that this last subject was one concerning which he requested that absolute secrecy be maintained, that he desired that it be presented only to Mr. Roosevelt. Mr. Hopkins stated that it would be for Mr. Roosevelt’s ears alone.

Mr. Hopkins stated that he could make a general reply now as he is thoroughly familiar with Mr. Roosevelt’s views.

**General Reply.**

Mr. Roosevelt believes that this war is a life and death struggle. For the present all efforts must be devoted to beating Germany, Italy, and Japan.

We believe that we will succeed and that complete victory will be gained.

Indicated by plane production.

Gave figures.

The war will be pursued until Germany Italy and Japan agree to unconditional surrender.

The President is aware of the difficulties now confronting Morocco. He realizes the situation the Sultan was in when the German Armistice Commission attempted to force him to comply with their demands. The Sultan proved himself to be a man of character and force and the President honors him for it and knows him to be a great man.

In the past armies have come into countries and after peace was restored have remained under one pretext or another. The American army will not remain in Morocco.

Powerful countries have exploited smaller countries; wealth and resources have been siphoned out for the benefit of the powerful country. Mr. Hopkins wished the G.V. to assure the Sultan that it is not the intention of the U.S. to exploit Morocco. It is hoped that closer economic relations can be established as airplanes and improved sea transport will bring the two countries closer together.

The President feels that many peoples of the world have not had their rightful share of the good things of the world. He feels that they can and will have them after the victory has been gained.

The President feels that there is no reason to change the present government of Morocco and has no intention of forcing other changes on any people.

Casablanca was selected for the conference somewhat by chance. It should prove beneficial to Morocco for it has enabled the President to see Morocco and meet the Sultan. The President has been profoundly impressed, and his visit will be of great benefit for he has become a warm friend of the Sultan and his country.

Mr. Hopkins stated that he could not give a final answer to all the questions; that with reference to supplies for the civilian population, they will be sent but military needs must come first.
The President knows that the people of Morocco are concerned. They should not be unduly so. The final outcome can be awaited with certainty.

Mr. Hopkins thanked the Grand Vizier for his frankness and stated that he would give the President a full and exact report of the discussion.

W. H. WILBUR
Brig. Gen.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, JANUARY 23, 1943,
1:30-2:45 P. M., PRESIDENT’S VILLA

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of the conversation at this luncheon has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 532. According to the account by Elliott Roosevelt (p. 117), it was in the course of this luncheon that the phrase “unconditional surrender” was “born”. Elliott Roosevelt recalls that it was the President, rather than the Prime Minister, who first used the term. It was strongly approved by Hopkins and accepted by the Prime Minister. The President appeared to be especially impressed with the beneficial effect the phrase would have on the Russians.

It is probable that the original “unconditional surrender” discussion between the President and the Prime Minister which Elliott Roosevelt recalls as occurring on January 23 actually had taken place some days earlier. On January 18 the Prime Minister had already suggested the preparation of a statement to the press using the phrase “unconditional surrender”; see ante, p. 635. In speaking to the House of Commons on November 17, 1949, regarding the origin of the phrase (see footnote 6, ante, p. 635), Churchill recalled that the phrase was undoubtedly mentioned in informal talks that he had had with the President during the Conference, probably at meal times. The President had, of course, already informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 7, 1943, of his intention to speak to the Prime Minister about the unconditional surrender formula; see ante, p. 506.
No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. It appears to have followed the de Gaulle–Giraud meeting described in de Gaulle, pp. 89–92 and in Giraud, pp. 105–107. In information supplied to the Historical Office, Murphy recalls that this meeting was concerned with the effort to resolve the conflict between de Gaulle and Giraud. De Gaulle (p. 92) says that he informed Murphy that it had not been possible to reach an agreement with Giraud regarding the unity of French liberation forces. De Gaulle also states that Murphy informed him at this time that Roosevelt and Giraud “had just signed an agreement” providing for deliveries of weapons and supplies to Giraud’s forces in North Africa and the recognition of Giraud as military and civil commander in Africa. The two memoranda constituting the agreement with Giraud were not approved by Roosevelt, however, until the following morning; see telegram 124, February 1, 1943, from Murphy, post, p. 825.

WILBUR–DE GAULLE CONVERSATION, JANUARY 23, 1943, 4 P. M., DE GAULLE’S VILLA

Present

United States
Brigadier General Wilbur

France
General de Gaulle

Wilbur Notes

[CASABLANCA,] 23 January 1943.

I called on General de Gaulle at his villa this afternoon at four o’clock. As we were both in the same class at the École Supérieure de Guerre, we started on a friendly basis. He seemed inclined to unburden himself to me, and told me the entire situation.

He told me that before our arrival in Morocco, his forces were the only French Forces that had been fighting for the liberty of France; that they were the only elements that represented the true France; that without question the whole of the France that is willing to fight for its rights rested with people who were for him. He said that there had
grown up the mystery of the Marshal and the mystery of La France Combattante, that these had become almost two religions. He said that the real Marshal Pétain had died in 1925, and that the present Marshal was weak, was vain, and had the spirit and attitude of a grandfather.

He said that when Darlan came into power he represented the collaborationists. De Gaulle and his people could have no traffic with him. Darlan in his opinion had remained too long.

General Giraud did not in his present position, and could not in his present position represent the government of France because he held a position by virtue of the vote of Noguès, Boisson, and Chatel, all of whom were representatives of the Vichy Government.

He said that he had offered General Giraud the command of the troops, but that General Giraud in his present position could not represent the true France. His thesis was that General Giraud should join the France Combattante, rather than that the Gaullists should join the present government.

He said that it was perfectly possible that the United States might make the decision that he should be deprived of supplies and equipment and that under such circumstances England and the others would have to agree to the United States' decision and that he, de Gaulle, would have to fold up.

He said that even if General Giraud succeeded in reaching France at the present time, he would find that the people would rise against him and that communism would result. I told him that as a friend of France I deplored the present situation, that it was of great importance that the French compose their differences now before the invasion of the continent took place; that they must compose their differences before the peacetime was reached or that the French would find themselves in a very weak and poor position. I told him that I personally, and many Americans, were extremely sorry for the French that we felt that the French people must be under-going a very severe winter, that it was only by unity that we would reach them at the earliest possible date.

I stated that it seemed to me that General de Gaulle, who I knew had the real interest of France at heart, must be willing to withdraw from any position if no other way could be found to accomplish the union of those who wished to fight to liberate France. We discussed the situation of his adherents in Morocco. He is very anxious to have those individuals who wish to serve with his forces be permitted to join them. He asked for my address so that he could communicate with me further. I told him that many Gaullists had come to me with their stories. He asked me if any others came to see me, if I would tell them that I had seen him, that he had seen General Giraud, that
they had not been able to compose their differences, but that he was sending a liaison officer to join Giraud.

I emphasized the necessity for calm and order in Morocco—and suggested that his adherents not only should not cause trouble but should also do everything they could to help the American effort. He agreed to do that.

W. H. Wilbur
Brig. Gen.

INFORMAL AMERICAN-BRITISH CONVERSATIONS, JANUARY 23, 1943,
3:50—5:30 P. M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Murphy

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Macmillan

Editorial Note

No official records of the substance of these conversations have been found. The Log, ante, p. 532, from which the information set forth above has been derived, records that Murphy and Macmillan were present from 3:50 to 4:10 and again from 4:30 to 5:15, and that Churchill conferred with Roosevelt from 4:45 until their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff at 5:30 p.m. The Log does not, however, identify the participants in any particular conversation. Elliott Roosevelt (pp. 117—118) indicates that Roosevelt and Hopkins were at work preparing the draft of a communiqué. In information supplied to the Historical Office, Murphy recalls that the meetings were concerned with the efforts to resolve the conflict between the de Gaulle and Giraud groups.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, JANUARY 23, 1943, 5:30 P. M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob
SECRET

The President suggested discussing the report submitted to him and the Prime Minister in C.C.S. 170/1, paragraph by paragraph.¹

Both the President and the Prime Minister, before starting the discussion, said that they wished to congratulate the Chiefs of Staff on the character of the work which had been done during the conferences. The Prime Minister said it was the first instance he knew of when military leaders had remained together so long, free from political considerations, and had devoted their full thought to the strategic aspects of the war.

The President agreed to this and recalled an incident in the last war when Marshal Foch, Field Marshal Haig and General Pershing had had a similar conference which lasted but 5 hours.

1. SECURITY OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS

In discussing the security of sea communications, the Prime Minister indicated that he wished German submarines to be referred to as “U-Boats” rather than dignifying them by calling them “submarines.”

2. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA

A discussion regarding assistance to Russia in relation to other commitments then followed.

The President said that in March we will be faced with the necessity of arranging to extend the Russian Protocol.² He thought the last sentence in paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 170/1 which provides that “supply to Russia will not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations’ efforts” should stand and asked Mr. Hopkins for his view on the subject.

Mr. Hopkins said that the present Protocol has such a clause but that, of course, it cannot be exercised without raising violent objections from Premier Stalin.

The Prime Minister said that aid to Russia must be pushed, and no investment could pay a better military dividend. The United Nations cannot let Russia down. He said that the Chiefs of Staff had been considering whether or not 16 destroyers could be made available from

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¹ C.C.S. 170/1, January 23, 1943, not printed, as revised in conformity with the wishes of Roosevelt and Churchill, was redesignated C.C.S. 170/2, January 23, post, p. 791. Variations between C.C.S. 170/1 and C.C.S. 170/2 are indicated in footnotes to the latter document.
the United States in order to reduce the length of the convoy turn-around from 40 to 27 days.\footnote{The Hopkins Papers include a copy of a British memorandum dated January 19 from "D.P." (Dudley Pound?) to the Prime Minister, showing how effective the loan of 16 American destroyers would be. The memorandum bears the endorsement, in Churchill's handwriting, "I will show President."}

Admiral King said that the destroyers simply were not available. The escort vessel situation is so tight as to make it necessary to eliminate the Russian convoys starting about June 14th in order to take care of the needs of Operation Husky. He pointed out that there is already a shortage of 63 escorts to protect the convoys in the Atlantic service and that the Husky operation will make this shortage more acute.

Mr. Hopkins suggested the possibility of stopping the convoys entirely if we could give Russia something that she had not previously expected and suggested that this be airplanes.

The President asked what new escort construction would be available by June of 1943.

Admiral King replied that there would be 100 escort vessels completed but that, if the present loss rates continued, this number would represent only a small net gain.

Sir Dudley Pound said there is no substitute for destroyers in protecting convoys. At the present time we are utilizing 16 destroyers and 8 ships of other types with the convoys running on a 40-day cycle. If this were to be reduced to 27 days, it would be necessary to double this force in order to have two convoys in operation.

Mr. Hopkins asked whether the destroyers and escort vessels that are now with these convoys could not be released for use elsewhere if the convoys were eliminated entirely.

Sir Dudley Pound said the escort vessels would be released, except for the Home Fleet destroyers which must be kept available to watch for a break-out into the Atlantic of the German fleet.

Mr. Hopkins repeated that some consideration should be given by the Chiefs of Staff regarding the entire elimination of the Russian convoys via the northern route. He said that it might be possible to increase the delivery of munitions to Russia over the Persian route and via Alaska although the Russians object to handling some types of munitions over these routes. At the same time, we could increase the Protocol in certain types of munitions such as aircraft. If this were done, there would be a saving in the use of the 500,000 tons of shipping from the Russian convoys. The considerable losses of shipping connected with the northern convoys would be eliminated, as well as the cargoes which are lost when ships are sunk. He felt that the Chiefs of Staff have been inclined to consider aid to Russia as a political expedient and that actually the question should be viewed from the standpoint of military necessity.
The Prime Minister said it would be a great thing if we could continue the Russian convoys throughout the Husky Operation. He thought it better to continue them on a 40-day cycle rather than attempt the 27-day cycle prior to Husky and then stop the convoys while Husky was being undertaken. He said we have never made any promises that we would take supplies to Russia. We have merely committed ourselves to making munitions available to them at our ports.

General Somervell said that by July 1st we will be able to send 30 ships a month to the Persian Gulf ports, and this would offer good prospects for increasing the supply to Russia.

The President said that supplying Russia is a paying investment. Stopping the convoys in July and August would occur just at the time when the Russians would be engaged in their most severe fighting. He pointed out that it is difficult to say now just what the situation regarding shipping losses will be in July or August, or what the conditions will be along the route of the northern convoys. He said, for example, at the time of the last conference in June 1942, the United States was suffering great shipping losses along her eastern coast. This area has now been almost cleared of submarines, and the greatest losses are now occurring off the coast of South America.

Admiral King said that we are definitely committed to mounting Operation Husky and that everything must be done to insure its success, including the elimination of the Russian convoys if that be necessary.

General Marshall, in referring to Mr. Hopkins' opinion of the Chiefs of Staff's attitude towards aid to Russia, said that in the current conferences, it had been decided that the first charge against the United Nations was the defeat of the submarine menace and aid to Russia had to come next. He said that if we had to take the losses which had been suffered in the Murmansk convoys, they would hurt Russia as much as the U. S. and U. K. Such losses make it impossible for us to attack on other fronts and thus eliminate the possibility of forcing the Germans to withdraw ground and air troops from the Russian front. He said these losses last year came just at the time that we were laboring to build up Bolero. It must be made certain that we do not hazard the success of Operation Husky.

The Prime Minister agreed that if passage of convoys on the northern route were prohibitive in cost, they must be stopped. He thought it would be right to have in our minds the possibility of continuing convoys through the Husky period, but to make no promises to Stalin.

Sir Dudley Pound said this must be the case because if we were

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*The Second Washington Conference, June 19-25, 1942. For documentation on this Conference, see ante, pp. 419 ff.*
committed to continuing these convoys, the Royal Navy could not play its part in Operation HUSKY.

The Prime Minister said that the discussion should rest on the point that the discontinuance of these convoys will depend upon the losses that are suffered. He said we must tell Mr. Stalin the facts, that he must rely on a 40-day schedule. Also that we cannot promise the continuance of the convoys while Operation HUSKY is being undertaken. He said it should also be made clear to Mr. Stalin that the U. S. and U. K. are under no obligation to continue the convoys.

The President said that the draft message to Mr. Stalin would require some revision. It must be remembered that the Russian General Staff are making plans on the assumption that the munitions called for in the Protocol will be available. In justice to them, they should know just what is intended. He asked how a 2.4% per month loss rate would relate to the 700,000 tons loss of shipping per year.

Admiral King said he thought the loss rate of 2.4% would reduce the losses in shipping to less than 700,000 tons. He recalled the Prime Minister's having said before the House of Commons that if our losses could be reduced below 500,000 tons per year, the shipping situation would be satisfactory.

The President said that the shipping situation is bound to improve during the coming year as a result of nearly doubling the construction program and by reason of the more effective antisubmarine measures which are to be taken.

Admiral King agreed with this and said that the great losses on the eastern coast of the United States were possible in large measure because of a lack of effective means to combat the submarines. He said that great improvement has been made in this respect.

The Prime Minister suggested that it should be decided that if the shipping situation is better than we expect, we shall continue the 40-day convoy throughout Operation HUSKY, but that we should not commit ourselves either way. He said that, while it might be possible to continue the convoys, they must be stopped if the losses are too great.

Admiral King suggested that before deciding on discontinuing the convoys, the situation should be reviewed as of the first of May.

3. Operations in the Mediterranean

The discussion then turned to Operation HUSKY.

The Prime Minister said he wished to set the target date as the period of the favorable June moon rather than that of July.

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5 For text of the draft telegram from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin as prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see C.C.S. 165/2, January 22, 1943, post, p. 782. For text of the draft message as revised by Roosevelt and Churchill and their advisers, presumably on January 23, see post, p. 803. For final text of the message to Stalin, dated January 25, see post, p. 805.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the matter of training must be considered as well as other features in connection with the preparations for Operation Husky. He said that all training and preparations must be scheduled, and that if an impossible or improbable target date was set and then later changed to one that was practicable, all of the schedules would be out of adjustment. This might result in compromising ourselves with regard to every aspect of the operation. The subject of the target date had been quite exhaustively studied, and it is going to be difficult to mount Operation Husky with properly trained forces even in July.

The President asked if the fixing of the target date in July was made on the assumption that the Axis forces would be driven from Tunisia by the end of April. He asked what the effect would be if they were to be eliminated from Africa by the end of March.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that success in Tunisia at the end of March would improve the situation somewhat but was not the limiting factor. The limiting factor was on the naval side with respect to organizing crews and assembling landing craft. After this has been accomplished, the naval crews and landing craft must be made available for the training of the troops. He said that the situation in Tunisia might result in delaying Operation Husky but that an earlier success there would not help in moving the target date forward.

ADMIRAL KING said it was a question as to whether the assault on Sicily should be made by partially or fully trained forces.

The President suggested that the operation might be easier than Operation Torch in view of the better weather found in the Mediterranean.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the difficulty of the Husky Operation was not in the weather but the excellence that might be expected in the enemy’s defenses.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out some of the errors that had been made in the Torch operation through lack of adequate training. Some of the landing boats went to the wrong place. One Ranger unit had the mission of taking a shore battery and clearing a certain area. It actually landed 18 miles away from its objective.

The President said he thought this might have been the result of poor navigation rather than a lack of adequate training.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that while we do have divisions with amphibious training, we do not have the landing craft or crews. The craft must be built and the crews must be trained.

The Prime Minister agreed that General Marshall’s point that the target date for Husky did not depend on the Tunisian operations but rather on the necessity of training was a good one.

He said, however, that the British are to send their overseas assault force which has a capacity of 7 brigade groups to participate in Op-
eration Husky. He had been told that this could not leave England until March 14th and then must undergo some training in the eastern Mediterranean. He said he felt sure that the force could be sent earlier. In this connection, Lord Louis Mountbatten said that he had been informed that it could be sent by the end of February.

The Prime Minister said that this would be done. He then discussed the question of navigation. When operations of the importance of Husky are to be undertaken, no effort should be spared to obtain capable navigators. He suggested the possibility of combing the navy, particularly the “R” class battleships, with the purpose of setting up a special group of navigators.

Sir Dudley Pound said that skilled navigators could not be taken from the navy without serious effects and, in any event, they would have to be supplemented by inexperienced men and the training period could not therefore be shortened.

The Prime Minister said that he feared the gap of perhaps four months during the summer when no U. S. or British troops would be in contact with the Germans.

The President agreed and said that this gap might have a serious effect all over the world.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had examined the timing of the operation most carefully. September was the first date that had been put forward and this they had rejected. Further study had brought the date back to the end of August. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had then put on the same kind of pressure that the President and the Prime Minister were now applying, with the result that July had been tentatively fixed, though August remained a more likely date. He was in agreement with General Marshall that to try and fix too early a date would prejudice the preparations. It was impossible to shorten the loading period, and thus the only process off which time might be lopped was training. If this were curtailed, the result might be disastrous.

The Prime Minister thought that by intense efforts the loading might be accelerated. Similarly if landing craft now employed in maintaining the 8th Army could be recovered forthwith, training might start earlier. All these points must be rigorously examined before the July date could be accepted.

General Marshall pointed out that if the date were to be made earlier, it would have to be by a complete four weeks unless the added risks of moonlight were acceptable.

The President said that the present proposals were based on a large number of factors which might well prove correct, but which were estimates. Another estimate which must be taken into account was the state of morale in Italy, which recent reports showed to be deteriorating. If this process continued, the Germans might be faced
with an Italy in revolt, and it would then be essential for us to have our preparations far enough advanced to be able to act, not necessarily in Sicily but perhaps in Sardinia, or even in Italy. For this reason he would like to set the date of the operation in June, it being understood that it might have to be carried out in July if the enemy’s strength remained as at present.

General Marshall pointed out that to bring back the date at the expense of adequate preparation would not make it any easier to stage an improvised operation during the intervening months. The troops would have been moved into place quite early in the preparatory period, so that they would be standing ready if required.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed and pointed out that we should probably get some advance indication of an Italian collapse which would enable us to speed up the launching of a smaller force. It would be quite wrong to risk a costly failure by unduly curtailing the period of preparation.

The Prime Minister said that General Marshall was pleading for the integrity of the operation, and the arguments which he had employed were most convincing. Nevertheless, he was not himself yet convinced that the integrity of the operation could not be maintained with a June date. Some quicker methods might be found of moving troops into place.

General Marshall said that this also had been examined. He pointed out that the period after the fall of Tunis would not be one of inactivity, as a growing air bombardment of Italy would be launched. We ought to place ourselves in a position to do the hard operation against Sicily while being ready to improvise if the enemy weakened. The initial landing in Sicily was on a larger scale than had been envisaged for Operation Roundup.

The President inquired whether any easement could be secured if the Spanish situation cleared still further during the Spring.

General Marshall said that in any case the troops standing ready to move into Spanish Morocco would be simultaneously training for Sicily.

Admiral King said that one of the innumerable items which had to be considered in this operation was the provision of armored landing craft, which he and Lord Louis Mountbatten agreed were essential. None of these was at present available for the U.S. forces. He agreed that the ideal method of launching the operation would be to follow in on the heels of the Germans fleeing from Tunis. He was convinced, however, that the closest we could come to this ideal was
July. He would have liked June, but felt it impossible to promise such a date.

The President said that the important point was to retain a flexible mind in the matter so that advantage could be taken of every opportunity.

General Marshall said that he had felt embarrassed over the date of this operation remembering as he did the incentive which had existed for hastening Torch in view of the U. S. elections. In spite of that, it had not proved possible to advance the date.

The Prime Minister said there had been much admiration in England of the fact that the election had not been allowed to influence in the slightest the course of military events.

After some further discussion, it was agreed that:

(a) Operations for the Capture of Sicily:

The July date should stand subject to an instruction that in the next three weeks, without prejudice to the July date, there should be an intense effort made to try and achieve the favorable June moon as the date of the operation. If at the end of this three weeks, the June date could be fixed, General Eisenhower's instructions could be modified to conform.6

(b) Cover Plans:

The Prime Minister suggested that Norway should again play a part in the cover plans.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that it might be awkward for the Russian convoys if we gave the Germans cause for reinforcing Norway. He thought that much the best cover would be given by the active preparations going on all over the North African shore. These would not only disguise the objective, but would cause dispersion of enemy forces.

The President thought that the creation of General Giraud's French army might also play a part in making the enemy think that the southern coast of France was our objective.

(c) Command of the Mediterranean Theater:

The Prime Minister said that he thought the United States had been very generous and broad-minded in the command arrangements. He thought that the most natural method of procedure would be at the appropriate moment to announce that the 8th Army, on entering Tunisia, had passed under the command of General Eisenhower, and that General Alexander had been appointed as his deputy.

*For text of the instructions to Eisenhower, as amended in conformity with the decisions taken at this meeting, see C.C.S. 171/2/D, January 23, 1943, *post*, p. 799.
(d) The Bomber Offensive from North Africa:
The Prime Minister thought that it would be advisable to maintain the threat of bombardment against Rome, but that it should not actually be carried out without further consultation.
The President agreed.

4. OPERATIONS IN AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

(b) Bolero:
The Prime Minister thought that it was very disappointing that there would only be 4 U. S. divisions equipped in the U. K. by August 15th. He inquired whether by using the Queens, the number for September could not be achieved in August.

General Somervell said that the limiting factor in the first half of the year was cargo ships, and in the second half of the year it was personnel ships. To move more men over in the first half would only result in their arriving in England with no equipment, and thus their training would be interrupted. The Queens were all fully employed in various parts of the world.

General Marshall pointed out that the figures in the table were a minimum, and the 4 divisions shown for August 15th would probably be 19 rather than 15. Allowance had to be made in the early build-up for the Air Corps personnel.

The Prime Minister inquired whether the initial equipment of 8 tons per man, and the maintenance of 1.3 tons per man per month, could not be reduced; similarly, could not savings be made on reserves and on vehicles. For the type of operations which would be undertaken in France in 1942, a big advance was not likely. Fighting men for the beaches were the prime essential.

General Somervell said that the calculation of the rate of build up had been made on the basis of one ton per man per month. The other factors mentioned by the Prime Minister had also been taken into account, and everything would be done to reduce any unnecessary volume to be transported. He pointed out that there was a 45-day interval between the arrival of a division and its availability for operations; thus, the divisions which were shown as being available on August 15th would have sailed by July 1st. If the British could lend additional cargo shipping in the early part of the year, the flow of troops could be increased.

The Prime Minister said that it was in the early part of the year that the British shipping shortage would be most acute. He suggested

*Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth.*
that it should be recorded that the figures shown in the report were a minimum and that every effort would be made to increase them.

(c) Amphibious Operations in 1943 from the U.K.

The Prime Minister suggested that the word "vigorously" should be inserted before the word "exploiting" in subparagraph (2) of this section of the report. This was agreed to.

The President inquired whether an operation against the Brest Peninsula could not be staged instead of against Cherbourg. The advantages of the former were very much greater. He also inquired about the date proposed for the operations.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the date for the Channel Island operations had been chosen so as to fit in with Operation Husky. A difficulty had arisen in that the armored craft required by the Americans for Husky would have to come from the British Channel Assault Force. A telegram had been sent to the Admiralty asking that the output of these craft should be doubled so as to produce 160 more in the next four months. This might be done provided 400 additional Scripps Ford conversion engines were allocated to the U.K. from the U.S.A. He understood this point was under investigation.

The President inquired whether some Ford tank engines could not be produced and taken by air transport from the U.S.A. to the U.K. He understood that the engine was much the same.

General Somervell said that there was a difference in the engines, though the same facilities were required to produce both. He considered that the production possibilities.

The Prime Minister suggested that some reduction of tank engine output could be accepted if necessary.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the landing craft resources would only permit of an initial assault by 2 brigade groups with an immediate follow-up of one brigade group and some armor. This could only be increased with U.S. help.

Admiral King said that all available U.S. resources would be devoted to Operation Husky.

On the question of command the President inquired whether sufficient drive would be applied if only a Chief of Staff were appointed. He hoped there would not be a long delay before a Supreme Commander was selected.

General Marshall said he understood it was a question of the availability of the right man.
SIR ALAN BROOKE thought that the Chief of Staff, if a man with the right qualities were chosen, could do what was necessary in the early stages.

The PRIME MINISTER suggested that in any case an American Deputy to the Supreme Commander should be appointed.

SIR ALAN BROOKE and GENERAL MARSHALL agreed.

The PRESIDENT suggested that the last sentence of this section should be omitted. This was agreed to.\(^8\)

5. PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER

The PRESIDENT said that he was disturbed to find that this section contained no reference to operations in or from China. Operations in Burma, though desirable, would not have the direct effect upon the Chinese which was necessary to sustain and increase their war effort. Similarly, an island-to-island advance across the Pacific would take too long to reduce the Japanese power. Some other method of striking at Japan must be found. The opportunity was presented by Japan's shipping situation. She began the war with 6,000,000 tons. In the first year of the war 1,000,000 tons net had been sunk, leaving her with 5,000,000. When this was reduced to 4,000,000, Japan would be hard pressed to maintain her garrison in the chain of islands stretching all the way from Burma to New Guinea and would have to start pulling in her lines. The most effective weapon against shipping was the submarine, and the U.S. submarines were achieving notable results. There was another method of striking at the Japanese shipping, and that was by attacking the routes running close to the Asiatic shore from Korea down to Siam. This could be done by aircraft operating from China. He thought that 200 aircraft should be operating in China by April. They could spend most of their time in attacks on shipping, but occasionally they could make a special raid on Japan. There seemed to be two methods of achieving this object: either the planes could be based and maintained in China or else they could be based in India, moving to China each time for a mission, returning to their bases in India on completion. An indication of the shortage of Japanese shipping was the fact that they were buying up junkos to replace coastal steamers, so that they could employ these on their maintenance routes.

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\(^8\) The sentence that was omitted reads as follows: "The directive will also make provision for the planning of an invasion of the Continent in force in 1944." See footnote 22 to C.C.S. 170/2, January 23, 1943, post, p. 796.
GENERAL ARNOLD said that he was fully aware of the need for reinforcing the U.S. Air Force in China. One group of aircraft was just preparing to leave the U.S.A.; and he would examine, when he got to India, the best method of operating the aircraft. He hoped that effective operations would start before April. It should be remembered, however, that there were large demands for transport aircraft in other theaters, and these could not be neglected. Nevertheless, he hoped to have 135–150 transport planes operating on the India-China route by the end of the Fall.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the provision of transport planes for India competed with urgent requirements for Husky, and for cross-channel operations. Nevertheless, he felt it was vital to step up the effort in China, and this would be done.

The PRIME MINISTER expressed his agreement with the President’s proposals. He suggested that the document should now be reconsidered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and amendments arising out of the present discussion should be incorporated in a final edition. The document would then fittingly embody the results of a remarkable period of sustained work.

The PRESIDENT agreed with this proposal, and expressed his congratulations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the results which they had achieved.

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 23, 1943, 9:30 P. M., ANFA CAMP

Present

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brigadier General Hull
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Smart
Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Ismay

Secretariat

Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane

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1 G.C.S. 69th meeting. This is the last meeting held by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the Casablanca Conference.
III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

SECRET

1. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
   (C.C.S. 170/1)?

The Committee:
   (a) Agreed, after discussion, to a number of amendments to C.C.S.
       170/1.
   (b) Instructed the Secretaries to incorporate these amendments in
       a final report to be submitted to the President and Prime Minister.

2. OPERATION HUSKY—DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER
   (C.C.S. 171/1/D)?

The Committee:
   (a) Agreed to an amendment to the directive to General Eisenhower
       (C.C.S. 171/1/D) consequent upon the amendments agreed to in
       C.C.S. 170/2.
   (b) Directed the Secretaries to transmit the amended directive to
       General Eisenhower.

3. ASSAULT SHIPPING

Sir Alan Brooke read a note by Lord Leathers expressing concern
at the use of large passenger ships as assault shipping. (A copy of
this note is attached as an Annex 4 to these Minutes.)

Admiral King said that it was this consideration which had moved
him to suggest that the assault in Operation Husky should be carried
out as far as possible in the larger type of landing craft and not in
assault shipping.

The Committee:
   Took note:
   (a) Of the note by Lord Leathers.
   (b) That the British Chiefs of Staff would submit proposals for
       reducing to the minimum the use of large passenger ships as assault
       ships.

4. CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE

General Marshall, at the conclusion of the conference at Casa-
blanca, expressed his appreciation of the readiness of the British
Chiefs of Staff to understand the U. S. point of view and of the fine
spirit of cooperation which they had shown during the discussions.

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? C.C.S. 170/1, January 23, 1943, not printed, but see C.C.S. 170/2, January 23,
1943, post, p. 791.
? C.C.S. 171/1/D, not printed, but see C.C.S. 171/2/D, January 23, 1943, post,
p. 799.

4 Not printed.
He felt sure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would greatly profit by their contacts with their colleagues and the mutual understanding of each other's problems which had been insured. He paid a tribute to the work of the British 8th Army and expressed his admiration of their energetic prosecution of the operations in Tripolitania. He went on to thank Sir John Dill for accompanying the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the conference and for paying a visit to India to continue his valuable work as a link between the U.S. and British Staffs.  

Sir Alan Brooke thanked General Marshall for his words and said that he reciprocated most whole-heartedly General Marshall's expression of the great benefit which had accrued from the conference. Mutual appreciation of each other's problems was only possible through personal contacts. Sir John Dill was performing a great service as a link between the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff. A great step forward had been taken in agreeing upon a basic strategy for the future prosecution of the war. 

Sir Charles Portal said he was sure he was speaking on behalf of all the British Chiefs of Staff in expressing his appreciation of the

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6 General Marshall sent the following memorandum, dated February 20, 1943, to President Roosevelt regarding the work of Dill:

"Dill accompanied me to the Casablanca conference at my suggestion, approval being obtained from the British Chiefs of Staff. His presence there I believe was of vital importance and at one time practically prevented a complete stalemate regarding the differences between Admiral King and Sir Alan Brooke over the Pacific-European theater issue. Throughout the conference it was apparent that after each difficult meeting a great deal was done by Dill to translate the American point of view into terms understandable to the British, also the fact that in certain matters there could be no compromise. It was useless for them to further complicate the discussions.

"At my request Dill proceeded on to the East in company with General Arnold and General Somervell, who very much desired this arrangement. General Arnold reported to me that Dill's presence at New Delhi was the major factor in enabling us to reach an agreement with the British and to stimulate them to aggressive efforts towards mounting a Burma operation. To my surprise he further reported that Dill's presentation of the British factors to the Generalissimo at Chungking was very effective in bringing about a final apparent accord. I have gone into detail in this matter for the reason that I think some special notice should be taken of Dill's contribution to the Allied cause and also because I think that any special awards on his level are highly inadvisable at this time. Therefore I take the liberty of suggesting that you send him a note of appreciation. There is attached a rough draft of such a note, in case you feel disposed to do this." (Roosevelt Papers)

On the basis of Marshall's draft, Roosevelt sent the following letter to Dill, dated February 24, 1943: "General Marshall, and later, General Arnold and General Somervell, have told me of the important contribution you made to the British-American conference at Casablanca and especially to the Staff meetings in New Delhi and in Chungking. I want you to know that your impartial attitude and sound judgement in all matters pertaining to cooperation among the United Nations are very deeply appreciated by me. I am glad that things went so well and that you are safely back." The letter was signed: "Sincerely your old friend, Franklin D. Roosevelt." (Roosevelt Papers)

great hospitality which had been given by the U. S. Forces and of the excellent arrangements for the conference which had been made by General Patton and the troops under his command.

Sir John Dill thanked the Combined Chiefs of Staff and emphasized the great value of the frank discussions which had been held.

Admiral King said he fully agreed with Sir Alan Brooke as to the great value of the basic strategic plan which had been worked out at the conference. In his view this was the biggest step forward to the winning of the war. Much has already been done to fill the details of this plan and more would be done in the future, but the discussions which had been held had enabled a true meeting of minds to take place between the British and U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

General Arnold said that he fully associated himself with these views.

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ROOSEVELT–CHURCHILL MEETING, JANUARY 23, 1943, EVENING, PRESIDENT’S VILLA

Present

United States
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Murphy

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Macmillan
Mr. Mack
Captain Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 538, and Elliott Roosevelt, pp. 118–119. From these sources, it is not possible to determine whether all of the seven persons listed as present participated in any single conversation. According to the Log, Murphy, Macmillan, and Mack called after dinner to see Hopkins. Churchill and his son appeared later and joined in the task of preparing final texts of the joint message to Stalin and the joint communiqué. Elliott Roosevelt indicates that Murphy and Macmillan contributed to those parts of the communiqué which had to deal with the French political scene. Macmillan, p. 252, recalls that the discussion went on through the night of January 23–24 regarding the de Gaulle–Giraud question, and that he and Murphy finally drafted a “formula” which was approved by Roosevelt and Churchill. According to the Log, Murphy, Macmillan, Mack, Churchill, and his son, did not leave the President’s villa until after 2 a. m. on January 24.
For the draft of the message to Stalin apparently prepared during this meeting, see *post*, p. 803. For text of the communiqué approved by Roosevelt on January 24, see *post*, p. 842. For text of the “Suggested Statement” by de Gaulle and Giraud presumably prepared during this meeting, see *post*, p. 822.

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**SUNDAY, JANUARY 24, 1943**

**MURPHY–GIRAUD CONVERSATION, JANUARY 24, 1943, MORNING**

**Present**

United States

Mr. Murphy

France

General Giraud

**Editorial Note**

No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found, and the only reference to it appears in Hopkins’ notes of January 24, *post*, p. 839, wherein Hopkins remembers that Giraud expressed willingness to co-operate with de Gaulle but not to work under him.

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**HOPKINS–MACMILLAN CONVERSATION, JANUARY 24, 1943, MORNING, PRESIDENT’S VILLA**

**Present**

United States

Mr. Hopkins

Mr. Murphy

United Kingdom

Mr. Macmillan

**Editorial Note**

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found, and the only reference to it appears in Hopkins’ notes of January 24, *post*, p. 839. According to Hopkins, Macmillan brought news that de Gaulle insisted on the dominant role in the French movement. After conferring with Roosevelt, Hopkins informed Macmillan that it was up to Churchill to bring de Gaulle to a meeting with Giraud.

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**ROOSEVELT–GIRAUD CONVERSATION, JANUARY 24, 1943, 11:05 A. M., PRESIDENT’S VILLA**

**Present**

United States

President Roosevelt

France

General Giraud
No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 533. The conversation appears to have been given over in large measure to a discussion of two memoranda concerned with the political relationship between Giraud and the Anglo-American authorities and with the rearmament of French military forces in North Africa. The texts of these two memoranda, a description of Roosevelt's annotations thereto, and a brief discussion of some aspects of the conversation are contained in telegram 124, February 1, 1943, from Murphy in Algiers to the Department of State, post, p. 825. According to Elliott Roosevelt (p. 119), Giraud was reluctant to reach an accord with de Gaulle, but eventually agreed to do so. Giraud's willingness to cooperate with de Gaulle is also mentioned in Hopkins' account of the meeting recorded in his notes for January 24, post, p. 839. Another account of what appears to be this same conversation appears in Giraud, p. 112.

ROOSEVELT-DE GAULLE CONVERSATION, JANUARY 24, 1943, 11:40 A.M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Murphy
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. Macmillan

FRANCE
General de Gaulle

No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 533, Hopkins' notes of January 24, post, p. 839, and Elliott Roosevelt, p. 120. Macmillan, p. 253, recalls that about noon he called on de Gaulle and asked him to come to see Roosevelt at his villa. The brief accounts of the conversation by Macmillan, de Gaulle (p. 94), and Catroux (p. 322) agree that Roosevelt sought unsuccessfully to persuade de Gaulle to accept the text of a draft joint statement or communiqué regarding his meetings with Giraud. The draft joint statement printed post, p. 822, is presumably the one rejected by de Gaulle at this time.
ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING WITH DE GALULLE AND GIRAUD, JANUARY 24, 1943, ABOUT NOON, PRESIDENT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Murphy
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Macmillan

FRANCE
General de Gaulle
General Giraud

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the Log, ante, p. 533, and Hopkins' notes of January 24, post, p. 839. The brief accounts of the meeting by Elliott Roosevelt (p. 120), de Gaulle (pp. 94-95), Catroux (p. 322), Giraud (pp. 109-110), and Macmillan (p. 253) indicate that the principal subject of discussion was the joint statement to the press to be made by de Gaulle and Giraud. It appears to have been agreed that the two French leaders would prepare such a statement after Roosevelt and Churchill had left Casablanca. Macmillan (p. 254) recalls that the statement was prepared late on the afternoon of January 24; for the text, issued to the press on January 26, see de Gaulle, Documents, p. 94. After the conversation, the four leaders moved to the lawn at the rear of the President's villa for photographs; see ante, p. 483.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL PRESS CONFERENCE, JANUARY 24, 1943, 12:15 P. M., PRESIDENT'S VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

1 A parenthetical statement on the source text reads as follows:

"(this Press Conference was held jointly by the President and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain, on the lawn at the rear of the President's villa, which adjoined the Anfa Hotel, and which was part of the general term "Anfa Camp," comprising the Hotel surrounded by 15 villas, which in turn was surrounded by barbed wire and troops)

(the newspapermen—about 50 in number—sat cross-legged in front of the President and the Prime Minister, who were seated in chairs)"

A photograph of the press conference is printed following p. 483.
III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

Roosevelt Papers

Transcript of Press Conference

Casablanca, January 24, 1943.

The President: This meeting goes back to the successful landing operations last November, which as you all know were initiated as far back as a year ago, and put into definite shape shortly after the Prime Minister’s visit to Washington in June.

After the operations of last November, it became perfectly clear, with the successes, that the time had come for another review of the situation, and a planning for the next steps, especially steps to be taken in 1943. That is why we came here, and our respective staffs came with us, to discuss the practical steps to be taken by the United Nations for prosecution of the war. We have been here about a week.

I might add, too, that we began talking about this after the first of December, and at that time we invited Mr. (Josef) Stalin to join us at a convenient meeting place. Mr. Stalin very greatly desired to come, but he was precluded from leaving Russia because he was conducting the new Russian offensive against the Germans along the whole line. We must remember that he is Commander in Chief, and that he is responsible for the very wonderful detailed plan which has been brought to such a successful conclusion since the beginning of the offensive.

In spite of the fact that Mr. Stalin was unable to come, the results of the staff meeting have been communicated to him, so that we will continue to keep in very close touch with each other.

I think it can be said that the studies during the past week or ten days are unprecedented in history. Both the Prime Minister and I think back to the days of the first World War when conferences between the French and British and ourselves very rarely lasted more than a few hours or a couple of days. The Chiefs of Staffs have been in intimate touch; they have lived in the same hotel. Each man has become a definite personal friend of his opposite number on the other side.

Furthermore, these conferences have discussed, I think for the first time in history, the whole global picture. It isn’t just one front, just one ocean, or one continent—it is literally the whole world; and that is why the Prime Minister and I feel that the conference is unique in the fact that it has this global aspect.

The Combined Staffs, in these conferences and studies during the past week or ten days, have proceeded on the principle of pooling all

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2 This transcript was made by Warrant Officer Francis Terry. It is printed, with slight variations, in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1943, The Tide Turns (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950), pp. 37-45. Interpolations within parentheses occur in the source text. For Roosevelt’s notes for this press conference, see post, p. 836.
of the resources of the United Nations. And I think the second point is that they have re-affirmed the determination to maintain the initiative against the Axis Powers in every part of the world.

These plans covering the initiative and maintenance of the initiative during 1943 cover certain things, such as united operations conducted in different areas of the world. Secondly, the sending of all possible material aid to the Russian offensive, with the double object of cutting down the manpower of Germany and her satellites, and continuing the very great attrition of German munitions and materials of all kinds which are being destroyed every day in such large quantities by the Russian armies.

And, at the same time, the Staffs have agreed on giving all possible aid to the heroic struggle of China—remembering that China is in her sixth year of the war—with the objective, not only in China but in the whole of the Pacific area, of ending any Japanese attempt in the future to dominate the Far East.

Another point. I think we have all had it in our hearts and heads before, but I don’t think that it has ever been put down on paper by the Prime Minister and myself, and that is the determination that peace can come to the world only by the total elimination of German and Japanese war power.

Some of you Britishers know the old story—we had a General called U. S. Grant. His name was Ulysses Simpson Grant, but in my, and the Prime Minister’s, early days he was called “Unconditional Surrender” Grant. The elimination of German, Japanese and Italian war power means the unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and Japan. That means a reasonable assurance of future world peace. It does not mean the destruction of the population of Germany, Italy, or Japan, but it does mean the destruction of the philosophies in those countries which are based on conquest and the subjugation of other people.

(this meeting is called the “unconditional surrender” meeting)

While we have not had a meeting of all of the United Nations, I think that there is no question—in fact we both have great confidence that the same purposes and objectives are in the minds of all of the other United Nations—Russia, China, and all the others.

And so the actual meeting—the main work of the Committee—has been ended, except for a certain amount of resultant paper work—has come to a successful conclusion. I call it a meeting of the minds in regard to all military operations, and, thereafter, that the war is going to proceed against the Axis Powers according to schedule, with every indication that 1943 is going to be an even better year for the United Nations than 1942.
The Prime Minister: I agree with everything that the President has said, and I think it was a very happy decision to bring you gentlemen here to Casablanca to this agreeable spot, Anfa Camp, which has been the center—the scene—of much the most important and successful war conference which I have ever attended or witnessed. Nothing like it has occurred in my experience, which is a long while—the continuous work, hours and hours every day from morning until often after midnight, carried on by the Staffs of both sides, by all the principal officers of the two nations who are engaged in the direction of the war.

This work has proceeded with an intensity, and thoroughness, and comprehensiveness, the like of which I have never seen, and I firmly believe that you will find that results will come from this as this year unfolds. You will find results will come from it which will give our troops, and soldiers, and flyers the best possible chance to gather new victories from the enemy. Fortune turned a more or less somber face upon us at the close of last year, and we meet here today at this place—we have been meeting here—which in a way is the active center of the war direction. We wish indeed it was possible to have Premier Stalin, and the Generalissimo (Chiang Kai-shek), and others of the United Nations here, but geography is a stubborn thing; and the difficulties and the pre-occupations of the men engaged in fighting the enemy in other countries are also very clear obstacles to their free movement, and therefore we have had to meet here together.

Well, one thing I should like to say, and that is—I think I can say it with full confidence—nothing that may occur in this war will ever come between me and the President. He and I are in this as friends and partners, and we work together. We know that our easy, free conversation is one of the sinews of war—of the Allied Powers. It makes many things easy that would otherwise be difficult, and solutions can be reached when an agreement has stopped, which would otherwise be impossible, even with the utmost goodwill, of the vast war machinery which the English-speaking people are operating.

I think that the Press here have had rather a hard, provoking time, because it isn’t possible to have everything organized at once when you throw yourselves on a shore. Some of our earliest and brightest hopes have not yet been fulfilled, and you gentlemen have no doubt felt baffled in the work you want to do, and therefore a trial is imposed upon you. I beg you to rise to the level of that; namely, not to allow the minor annoyances of censoring, et cetera, make you exaggerate these details. To keep your sense of proportion is a patriotic duty.

Tremendous events have happened. This enterprise which the President has organized—and he knows I have been his active Lieutenant since the start—has altered the whole strategic aspect of the
war. It has forced the Germans to fight under the very greatest difficulties. And I think that it gives us in a very marked way the initiative. Once we have got that precious treasure into our hands, we must labor hard to keep it. Hitler said you never could tell what would happen, because he wasn't dealing with competent military experts but with military idiots and drunkards. He said he didn't know where he was, and that was a preliminary forecast of the explanation which he will no doubt offer to the Nazi Party for the complete manner in which he has been hoodwinked, fooled, and out-maneuvered by the great enterprise which was launched on these shores.

We are still in full battle, and heavy action will impend. Our forces grow. The Eighth Army has taken Tripoli, and we are following (Field Marshal Erwin) Rommel—the fugitive of Egypt and Libya—now wishing, no doubt, to represent himself as the deliverer of Tunisia. The Eighth Army have followed him a long way—15 hundred miles—from Alamein where I last saw them, now to Tripoli. And Rommel is still flying before them. But I can give you this assurance—everywhere that Mary went the lamb is sure to go.

I hope you gentlemen will find this talk to be of assistance to you in your work, and will be able to build up a good and encouraging story to our people all over the world. Give them the picture of unity, thoroughness, and integrity of the political chiefs. Give them that picture, and make them feel that there is some reason behind all that is being done. Even when there is some delay there is design and purposes, and as the President has said, the unconquerable will to pursue this quality, until we have procured the unconditional surrender of the criminal forces who plunged the world into storm and ruin.

The President: I think—the Prime Minister having spoken of the Eighth Army—that you should know that we have had a long talk with General (Harold R. L. G.) Alexander, Admiral (Sir Andrew) Cunningham, (Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur) Tedder. (Lieutenant) General (Dwight D.) Eisenhower has been here, as has (Major) General (Carl) Spaatz—(Lieutenant) General (Mark W.) Clark too. We have had a pretty good picture of the whole south shore of the Mediterranean, at first hand.

This afternoon there will be given to each of you a communiqué from the Prime Minister and myself, which is really the formal document stating the history of this conference, and the names of all the people who have taken part; nothing very much in it in addition to what we have talked about as background for you all.³

³ For text of the communiqué, see post, p. 847.
You will want to know about the presence of General (Henri Honore) Giraud, and General (Charles) de Gaulle. I think that all that should be said at this time is that the Prime Minister and I felt that here we were in French North Africa and it would be an opportune time for those two gentlemen to meet together—one Frenchman with another Frenchman. They have been in conference now for a couple of days, and we have emphasized one common purpose, and that is the liberation of France. They are at work on that. They are in accord on that, and we hope very much that as a result of getting to know each other better under these modern, new conditions, we will have French armies, and French navies, and French airmen who will take part with us in the ultimate liberation of France itself.

I haven’t got anything else that relates to the United Staffs conference, but—it is purely personal—but I might as well give it to you as background. I have had the opportunity, during these days, of visiting a very large number of American troops—went up the line the other day and saw combat teams and the bulk of several divisions. I talked with the officers, and with the men. I lunched with them in the field, and it was a darn good lunch. We had to move the band, because it was a very windy day, from leeward to windward, so we could hear the music.

From these reviews we went over to a fort—I don’t know whether you can use the name or not—that is up to (Brigadier) General (Robert A.) McClure. Actually, it was at the mouth of Port Lyautey where the very heavy fighting occurred and where a large number of Americans and Frenchmen were killed. Their bodies, most of them, lie in a joint cemetery—French and American. I placed a wreath where the American graves are, and another wreath where the French graves are.

I saw the equipment of these troops that are ready to go into action at any time; and I wish the people back home could see it, because those troops are equipped with the most modern weapons that we can turn out. They are adequately equipped in every way. And I found them not only in excellent health and high spirits, but also a very great efficiency on the part of officers and men, all the way from top to bottom. I am sure they are eager to fight again, and I think they will.

I’d like to say just a word about the bravery and the fine spirit of the French whom we fought—many of whom were killed. They fought with very heavy losses, as you know, but the moment the peace came and fighting stopped, the French Army and Navy, and the French and Moroccan civil population have given to us Americans wholehearted assistance in carrying out the common objective that brings us to these parts—to improve the conditions of living in these parts, which you know better than I do have been seriously hurt by the fact
that during the last two years so much of the output, especially the food output of French North Africa, has been sent to the support of the German Army. That time is ended, and we are going to do all we can for the population of these parts, to keep them going until they can bring in their own harvests during this coming summer.

Also, I had one very delightful party. I gave a dinner party for the Sultan of Morocco (Sidi Mohammed) and his son. We got on extremely well. He is greatly interested in the welfare of his people, and he and the Moroccan population are giving to us the same kind of support that the French population is.4

So I just want to repeat that on this trip I saw with my own eyes the actual conditions of our men who are in this part of North Africa. I think their families back home will be glad to know that we are doing all we can, not only in full support of them, but in keeping up the splendid morale with which they are working at the present time. I want to say to their families, through you people, that I am mighty proud of them.

This is not like a Press Conference in Washington. We have 200 to 250 that crowd into one rather small room, and it is almost impossible there to meet everyone personally. You are an elite group, and because it is not too big a group, the Prime Minister and I want to meet all of you.

One thing, before we stop talking—on the release date of this thing—sometimes I also am under orders. I have got to let General McClure decide the release date. There are certain reasons why it can’t be for a few days, but as I understand it, one of your problems is the bottle-neck at Gibraltar. I think you have enough background to write your stories and put them on the cables, and General McClure will decide what the actual release date will be. I told him that it should be just as soon as he possibly could.

4 Regarding Roosevelt’s dinner party, see the editorial note, ante, p. 593.

ROOSEVELT–CHURCHILL DINNER, JANUARY 24, 1943, 8 P. M., VILLA LA SAADIA, MARRAKECH

Present

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman
Rear Admiral McIntire
Captain McCrea
Colonel Beasley
Vice Consul Pendar
Sergeant Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Sir Charles Wilson
Commander Thompson
Mr. Martin
Mr. Rowan
Captain Churchill
III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of the discussion at this dinner has been found. The information set forth above has been derived from the Log, ante, p. 535, and from Kenneth Pendar, Adventure in Diplomacy: Our French Dilemma (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1945), pp. 149–152. According to Pendar’s account, the conversation ranged over a number of topics including Morocco, the Arab problem, the de Gaulle–Giraud controversy, and the rebuilding of France. No record has been found of the exchange of correspondence between Roosevelt and the Sultan of Morocco alluded to by Pendar.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, JANUARY 24, 1943, ABOUT MIDNIGHT, VILLA LA SAADIA, MARRAKECH

Present

United States
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Martin
Mr. Rowan

Editorial Note

No official record of the substance of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The brief accounts in Hopkins’ notes of January 24, post, p. 839, and in Pendar, Adventure in Diplomacy, p. 152, agree that the meeting was given over to the final revision of the joint messages from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin and Chiang. In information supplied to the Historical Office, Harriman recalls that the one significant piece of business during the Conference of which he had personal recollection related to this particular meeting: “In the course of that evening, Hopkins prepared, with some suggestions from me, drafts of joint messages from the President and Churchill which were to be sent to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, informing them of the substance of their talks at Casablanca. The President and Churchill made some changes in the text thus prepared and the messages were sent off.” Pendar’s account describes the unusual circumstances in which the revision of the documents was carried out. Hopkins’ account fixes the conclusion of the meeting at 2 a.m. on January 25, while Pendar recalls that the documents were not in final order until 3:30 a.m. For the final texts of the two messages, see post, pp. 805 and 807, respectively. It is also probable that at this meeting Roosevelt and Churchill concluded the drafting of their letter of January 25, 1943, to the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, post, p. 808.
10. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

A. MILITARY STRATEGY AND COMMAND

J. C. S. Files

Report by the Combined Staff Planners

SECRET
C.C.S. 75/3

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1942.

SYSTEM OF COMMAND FOR COMBINED U. S.-BRITISH OPERATIONS
(Previous reference: (a) C.C.S. 38th Meeting, Item 3)

1. The enclosure, prepared by the Combined Staff Planners in accordance with reference (a), is presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Annex "A", attached thereto, presents graphically the principles of unified command as contained in the report.

2. The U. S. Navy members of the Combined Staff Planners state that while this paper does not in its entirety accord with their views, it is believed that it presents the best agreement which can be reached at this time. The U. S. Navy members believe that the status of the assistants to Supreme Commander, because of the possible interpretation of their functions, may result in actually interposing an additional element in the chain of command which would limit the authority of the Supreme Commander.

Enclosure

SYSTEM OF UNIFIED COMMAND FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS

Definitions:

1. Unified command is the control, exercised by a designated commander, over a force integrated from combined and joint forces allocated to him for the accomplishment of a mission or task. This force will include all the means considered necessary for the mission's successful execution. Unified command vests in the designated commander, the responsibility and authority to control the operations of all arms and services composing his force, by the organization of task forces, assignment of missions, designation of objectives, and the exercise of such control as he deems necessary to insure the success of
his mission. Unified command does not authorize the commander exercising it, to control the administration and discipline of any forces of the United Nations composing his command, beyond those necessary for effective control.

2. The term “joint” refers to participation of forces from two or more of the arms (U.S.) or services (British) of one nation.

3. The term “combined” refers to the participation of forces of two or more of the United Nations.

**Supreme Commander:**

4. In cases where the governments concerned so decide, a Supreme Commander will be appointed for operations when forces of more than one of the United Nations are to be employed on a specific mission or task.

5. He will be appointed by agreement between the governments concerned at the earliest possible moment after the decision to undertake an operation has been made.

6. He will exercise unified command over all forces of the United Nations allocated to his operation.

7. He will be the recipient of all major directives pertaining to the arms and services of his force.

8. Out of the means allocated to him, he will organize task forces as necessary, designate their commanders, and assign the major tasks to be performed by each.

9. He will be assisted by a small composite staff which will include in principle a Chief of Staff, a Planning Division, an Operations Division, an Intelligence Division, a Logistical Division, and a Communications Center. Each nation involved and each of the several component arms or services of the force will be represented on the staff in order to insure an understanding of the capabilities, requirements, and limitations of each component.

**Land, Naval and Air Commanders:**

10. The officer appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the Senior Officer of each combined arm or service not specifically allocated to task forces by the Supreme Commander, will advise the Supreme Commander on the best use of his own combined arm or service.

11. These Commanders will carry out their duties at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander unless specifically ordered otherwise by him.

**Task Force Commanders:**

12. Task Force Commanders will organize their commands as may be necessary for the execution of the tasks assigned. Sub-Task Force Commanders will be designated as may be necessary for the execution of the subordinate tasks assigned. The principle of unified command will apply throughout.
13. The organization of task forces will be governed by the nature of the operations to be performed. The task forces will include all the elements—land, air and naval—necessary for the accomplishment of the task. The appointment of the Task Force Commanders, subordinate as well as major, will be governed by the nature of the task assigned, and the major arm or service involved in its performance, i.e., whether preponderantly land, air or naval.

**Integrity of National Units:**

14. Insofar as conditions will permit, task forces will be composed of units of the same nationality. When organizations of one nation serve under the command of an officer of another, the principle will be maintained that such organizations shall be kept intact and not scattered among other units.

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J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

C.C.S. 135

[WASHINGTON,] December 26, 1942.

BASIC STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR 1943

References: (a) ABC–1
(b) ABC–4/CS–1 (WW–1)
(c) C.C.S. 91
(d) C.C.S. 94
(e) C.C.S. 97/6

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1 According to C.C.S. 140, January 8, 1943, post, p. 752, the British Chiefs of Staff suggested that the first meeting of the forthcoming staff conference be devoted to a discussion of this memorandum and the two related memoranda by the British Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 135/1, January 2, 1943, and C.C.S. 135/2, January 3, 1943, infra. The issues considered in all three of these memoranda were taken up by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their initial conference meeting on January 14, 1943; see ante, p. 536.


4 C.C.S. 91, July 14, 1942, a paper by the Combined Staff Planners entitled “Strategic Policy and Deployment of U.S. and British Forces”, not printed. For a brief account of the origin and disposition of C.C.S. 91, see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 279-280.

5 C.C.S. 94, July 24, 1942, memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff entitled “Operations in 1942/1943”, not printed. For an account of the evolution of C.C.S. 94, see Matloff and Snell, pp. 279-282 and 295-297.

6 Not printed.

735-006-68——52
III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

MEMORANDUM BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed, in the light of current developments, references (a) to (e), inclusive, covering the evolution of United Nations strategy, for the purpose of determining what adjustments, if any, are necessary or desirable at this time, in the basic strategic concept.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

2. The present basic strategic concept of the United Nations, reduced to its simplest form, has been stated,

"To conduct the strategic offensive with maximum forces in the Atlantic-Western European theater at the earliest practicable date, and to maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters with appropriate forces."

In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this concept, while basically sound, should be restated with a view to setting forth more exactly the strategic concept as regards the Pacific theater. The following statement is proposed:

"Conduct a strategic offensive in the Atlantic-Western European theater directly against Germany, employing the maximum forces consistent with maintaining the accepted strategic concept in other theaters. Continue offensive and defensive operations in the Pacific and in Burma to break the Japanese hold on positions which threaten the security of our communications and positions. Maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters.

"It is well understood that the strategic concept contained herein is based on the strategic situation as it exists and can be foreseen at this time, and that it is subject to alteration in keeping with the changing situation."

3. It is recommended that the following (see paragraph 4) be approved as the strategic objectives of the United Nations in support of the basic strategic concept as stated above. In arriving at its recommendations the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken note:

(a) That Germany is our primary enemy;
(b) That Russia is exerting great pressure on Germany and is absorbing the major part of her war effort;
(c) That Russia's continuance as a major factor in the war is of cardinal importance;
(d) That timely and substantial support of Russia, directly by supplies and indirectly by offensive operations against Germany, must be a basic factor in our strategic policy.
(e) That until such time as major offensive operations can be undertaken against Japan, we must prevent her from consolidating and exploiting her conquests by rendering all practicable support to China and by inflicting irreplaceable losses on Japanese naval, shipping, and air resources.
(f) That a prerequisite to the successful accomplishment of the strategic concept for 1943 is an improvement in the present critical
shipping situation by intensified and more effective anti-submarine warfare.

4. Strategic objectives:

(a) Western Hemisphere and United Kingdom.
Maintain the security, the productive capacity, and the essential communications of the Western Hemisphere and of the British Isles.

(b) Western Europe.
Insure that the primary effort of the United Nations is directed against Germany rather than against her satellite states by:

(1) Conducting from bases in United Kingdom, Northern Africa, and as practicable from the Middle East, an integrated air offensive on the largest practicable scale against German production and resources, designed to achieve a progressive deterioration of her war effort.

(2) Building up as rapidly as possible adequate balanced forces in the United Kingdom in preparation for a land offensive against Germany in 1943.

(c) North Africa.
Expel the Axis forces from North Africa, and thereafter:

(1) Consolidate and hold that area with the forces adequate for its security, including the forces necessary to maintain our lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar against an Axis or Spanish effort;

(2) Exploit the success of the North African operations by establishing large scale air installations in North Africa and by conducting intensive air operations against Germany and against Italy with a view to destroying Italian resources and morale, and eliminating her from the war;

(3) Transfer any excess forces from North Africa to the U. K. for employment there as part of the build-up for the invasion of Western Europe in 1943.

(d) Russia.
Support Russia to the utmost, by supplying munitions, by rendering all practicable air assistance from the Middle East and by making the principal offensive effort of 1943 directly against Germany in Western Europe.

(e) Middle East.

(1) Maintain Turkey in a state of neutrality favorable to the United Nations until such time as she can, aided by supplies and minimum specialized forces, insure the integrity of her territory and make it available for our use.

(2) If Turkey can then be brought into the war, conduct offensive air operations from bases on her northern coast, in aid of Russia and against German controlled resources and transportation facilities in the Balkans.
(f) Pacific.

Conduct such offensive and defensive operations as are necessary to secure Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, and our lines of communications thereto, and to maintain the initiative in the Solomon-Bismarck-East New Guinea Area with a view to controlling that area as a base for further offensive operations and involving Japan in costly counter operations.

(g) Far East.

Conduct offensive operations in Burma with a view to reopening the supply routes to China, thereby encouraging China, and supplying her with munitions to continue her war effort and maintain, available to us, bases essential for eventual offensive operations against Japan proper.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

C.C.S. 135/1

JANUARY 2, 1943.

BASIC STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR 1943—THE EUROPEAN THEATER

1. We have considered the Memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their recommendations for a Basic Strategic Concept for 1943 as set out in C.C.S. 135. We had ourselves prepared a paper on somewhat similar lines setting out our conception of what should be the American-British strategy in 1943. This is being circulated separately as C.C.S. 135/2. On most issues we are in agreement with the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. The main point of difference between us is that we advocate a policy of following up “TORCH” vigorously, accompanied by as large a “Bolero” build-up as possible, while the U. S. Chiefs of Staff favor putting our main effort into “Round-Up” while adopting a holding policy in the Mediterranean, other than in the air. We therefore submit the following comments on the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with particular reference to strategy in the European theater.

2. In support of our arguments we have divided our examination into two parts:

(a) What is the largest Anglo-American Force that can be assembled in the United Kingdom by August 1943 for re-entering France, and what would be the effect of assembling this force on operations in other theaters.

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1 Regarding the disposition of this memorandum, see footnote 1, ante, p. 735.

2 Infra.
(b) What can we expect to achieve if we follow up “Torch” by offensive operations in the Mediterranean, and what forces can then be assembled in the United Kingdom for re-entering France.

Maximum “Bolero”.

3. If we go for the maximum “Bolero” we calculate that the strongest land force, which we can assemble in the United Kingdom in August for an attack upon Northern France, will be—British 13 Divisions, United States 12 Divisions (at the very most).

4. Of the above, 6 divisions (4 British and 2 United States) is the maximum which could be organized as assault forces with the shipping and landing craft which can be made available, assuming that the highest priority is given to combined operational manning, training and repair requirements—possibly at the expense of the fleet.

5. The assembly of the above forces would have the following effects:—

On the Axis.

(a) We should have to accept only a small increase in the scale of bomber offensive against Germany and Italy from now onwards. This would be due to giving a higher priority to the passage of United States soldiers across the Atlantic and to the need for bringing over a larger proportion of Army cooperation type United States aircraft, i.e., fighters and light bombers.

(b) The abandonment of “Brimstone” and “Husky” and any amphibious operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

On Turkey.

(c) There would be enough Divisions left over in the Mediterranean and Middle East area to support Turkey but these could not be used for offensive amphibious operations owing to lack of shipping and assault craft. Turkey could not fail to notice an easement of the pressure on Italy.

On China.

(d) We could not do “Anakim” in 1943 because all available landing craft would be wanted in the United Kingdom.

6. We emphasize that even if we accepted the above curtailment of our activities in other theaters, we should still be unable to stage an expedition on an adequate scale to overcome strong German resistance. The scale of “Round-Up” as originally planned was a total of 48 British and American Divisions. In the meanwhile the defenses on the French coast have been greatly strengthened. It is also to be noted that we cannot carry out even this reduced “Round-Up” until August. In other words Russia would get no relief for another 7 or 8 months and the Axis would have a similar period to recuperate.

The “Torch” Follow-Up.

7. If, on the other hand, we decide to exploit “Torch” during the spring of 1943 we consider that the effects would be as follows:—
On the Axis.

(a) We should have a good chance of knocking out Italy by a combination of amphibious operations (such as "Brimstone" and "Husky" and consequential assaults on the mainland of Italy), and an air offensive on the largest scale.

(b) We can ensure bringing the Axis air force to battle in the Mediterranean but, without surface operations, this cannot be guaranteed.

(c) We can greatly increase the number of Bombers arriving in the United Kingdom for offensive action against the Axis.

(d) German forces will be pinned in Northwest Europe by the build-up of the reduced "Bolero." (See paragraph 8 below.) Even though this build-up would be at a slower rate owing to other activities the enemy will not dare to relax their state of readiness to meet invasion.

On Turkey.

(e) We shall have some Divisions, air squadrons and aircraft to spare to help Turkey. Turkey is much more likely to come into the war on our side if she sees us putting Italy out as we should hope to do during 1943. With Turkey on our side we should be well placed for offensive operations against Crete and the Dodecanese, and possibly also the Balkans.

On China.

(f) We can probably do "Anakim" in the winter of 1943.

8. We calculate that if we adopt the above policy it would still be possible to assemble in the United Kingdom a force of some 21 British and United States Divisions by the late summer to take advantage of any opportunity which may occur for reentering France. To do this it would be necessary to decide by the first of May at the expense of further amphibious operations.

Relief to Russia.

9. Our Intelligence Staffs have made an assessment * which brings out the relief to Russia which an offensive Mediterranean policy might achieve. This shows that if we force Italy out of the war and the Germans try to maintain their line in Russia at its present length they will be some 54 divisions and 2,200 aircraft short of what they need on all fronts. This forecast is of course highly speculative but if the defection of Italy were to be followed by that of the other satellite nations the German deficiency would be still further increased.

10. Whether we adopt a maximum "Bolero" or concentrate on the "Torch" follow-up, we should be able to run a limited number of convoys to Russia.

The Axis Oil Situation.

11. The strongest argument against allowing Germany any respite in the near future is that during the next five months her oil situation

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*Has been despatched from London by air. As soon as it is received in Washington will be circulated as an annex to this paper. [Footnote in the source text.]
will be critical. Any measures therefore that force her to go on using up her oil stocks may have a profound effect on her ability to prosecute the war.

Conclusions.

12. To sum up we consider that our policy should be—

(a) To exploit “Torch” as vigorously as possible with a view to

(1) Knocking Italy out of the war.
(2) Bringing Turkey into the war, and
(3) Giving the Axis no respite for recuperation.

(b) Increased bombing of Germany.
(c) Maintenance of supplies to Russia.
(d) The build-up of “Bolero” on the greatest scale that the above operations permit in order that we may be ready to reenter the Continent with about 21 Divisions in August or September 1943, if the conditions are such that there is a good prospect of success. We believe that this policy will afford earlier and greater relief both direct and indirect to Russia than if we were to concentrate on “Bolero” to the exclusion of all other operations, observing that at the best we could not put a force of more than 25 Divisions on to the Continent in late summer of 1943.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

C.C.S. 135/2

JANUARY 3, 1943

AMERICAN-BRITISH STRATEGY IN 1943

1. Our combined resources have increased to the point where we have been able to wrest the initiative from Germany and Italy, and to pin down the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific. The days of plugging holes are over. We must now agree on a plan that will lead to victory, quickly and decisively.

2. The main factors bearing on the conduct on the war are:

(a) The fighting power of Germany is on the wane and her oil situation is at the moment critical. What she needs above all, is a period for recuperation.

(b) All that stands between Germany and the opportunity for recuperation with an abundant oil supply, is Russia. The Russian war effort is also the greatest single drain on the power and hope of Germany and must be sustained and assisted at all costs.

(c) The Japanese war effort is incapable of much expansion provided communications with Germany are kept severed.

(d) The offensive power of the United States is growing. The main problem is to decide how her armed forces can best be deployed against the enemy.

1 Regarding the disposition of this memorandum, see footnote 1, ante, p. 735.
(e) The war potential of the British Empire is not capable of much more overall expansion. The bulk of the British armed forces are already directed against Germany. As long as Germany is in the field, a considerable proportion of these forces must continue to be located in the United Kingdom and Home Waters.

(f) Shipping is vital—not only to maintain the British war effort but to deploy the forces of the United Nations against the enemy.

(g) Submarine warfare is now the only means whereby Germany could cripple our offensive action.

3. The resources of the United Nations are insufficient to defeat Germany and Japan simultaneously. We must therefore either concentrate on defeating Germany while holding Japan, or vice versa. The arguments may be summarized as follows:

(a) If Germany were allowed breathing space to recuperate, she might well become unbeatable. Provided we maintain limited pressure on Japan, she can never become unbeatable.

(b) By concentrating on Germany we uphold Russia. By concentrating on Japan we should cause little, if any, relief to the Russians. Moreover, for a given amount of shipping more United States forces can be deployed against Germany than against Japan.

(c) In order to defeat Japan, we should need to concentrate against her so large a naval force that the security of the United Kingdom and of Atlantic Sea communications would be seriously jeopardized.

(d) If we do not bring sufficient pressure to bear on Japan there is a risk of China dropping out of the fight. We must therefore continue to give China such support as will ensure that she will not give up the struggle.

(e) Important though China is as an ally against Japan, Russia is far more important as an ally against Germany. Moreover, after the defeat of Germany, Russia might be a decisive factor in the war against Japan, whereas China could never help us in the war against Germany.

4. It is clear from the above that we should persist in the strategic policy adopted at the first Washington Conference, namely, that we should bend all our efforts to the early and decisive defeat of Germany, diverting only the minimum force necessary to hold Japan.

**Holding Japan**

5. The operations in the Southwest Pacific during the last few months have forced the Japanese to make this area their principal theater of operations. These have directly relieved the threat to Australasia, India and the Indian Ocean, and have indirectly assisted Russia by staving off a Japanese attack on the Maritime provinces. The best way of holding Japan is to continue limited offensive operations on a scale sufficient to contain the bulk of the Japanese forces in

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*For documentation regarding the First Washington Conference, see ante, pp. 1 ff.*
the Pacific. It is necessary to define the broad action required to implement this strategy.

6. The only way of bringing material help to China is to open the Burma Road. The reconquest of Burma should therefore be undertaken as soon as resources permit.

**Defeat of Germany**

7. The occupation of Germany will ultimately be necessary. For the present, however, Northwest Europe may be likened to a powerful fortress which can be assaulted only after adequate preparation. To make a fruitless assault before the time is ripe would be disastrous for ourselves, of no assistance to Russia and devastating to the morale of occupied Europe. We cannot yet bring to bear sufficient forces to overcome the German garrison of France and the low countries, which can rapidly concentrate against us in superior strength and behind powerful coast defenses.

8. The alternatives which lie before us are:

(a) To devote our main effort towards building up in the United Kingdom a force of sufficient size to invade the Continent, or

(b) To devote our main effort towards undermining the foundations of German military power; simultaneously building up in the United Kingdom the maximum United States and British forces which our remaining resources allow in order to return to the Continent as soon as German powers of resistance have been sufficiently weakened. The effect of each of these courses of action is discussed in the following paragraphs.

**Invasion of the Continent**

9. If we go for the maximum "Bolero" with the intention of assaulting the Continent in 1943 we must be ready to strike by September. Thereafter weather conditions will progressively deteriorate. The strongest Anglo-American force which we could assemble in the United Kingdom by that date for an attack upon Northern France would be some 13 British and 9 United States divisions with perhaps a further 3 United States divisions collecting in the United Kingdom. 6 divisions are probably the maximum which could be organized as assault forces.

10. The assembly of the above forces would have the following effects:

**On the Axis**

(a) We should have to accept only a small increase in the scale of bomber offensive against Germany and Italy from now onwards. This would be due to giving a higher priority to the passage of United States soldiers across the Atlantic and to the need for bringing over larger proportion of army support types of United States aircraft.

(b) We should have to abandon all amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, thereby giving Germany the opportunity she so des-
perately needs for rest and recuperation, and Italy a chance to steady her morale.

On Russia

(c) We could run a limited number of convoys to North Russia.

(d) The Axis might well make advantage of the relaxation of pressure to transfer forces from the Mediterranean to Russia.

On Turkey

(e) There would be sufficient Allied Forces left over in the Mediterranean to support Turkey but these could not be used for offensive operations owing to lack of shipping and assault craft. The reduction of our offensive in the Mediterranean would make Turkey all the more reluctant to join in the war on our side.

On Spain

(f) Relaxation of Allied pressure in the Mediterranean would make Spain more inclined to yield to German pressure.

11. Even if we accepted the above curtailment of our activities in other theaters, we should probably find that the expedition which we had prepared was inadequate to overcome the scale of German resistance existing when the time came for the assault. The scale of "Roundup" as originally planned was a total of 48 British and United States divisions; since then the defenses of the French Coast and the German garrison in France have been increased to some 40 divisions. In short the adoption of this strategy would mean a relaxation of pressure on the Axis for 8 or 9 months with incalculable consequences to the Russian Front and at the end of the period no certainty that the assault on France could, in fact, be carried out. Or even if it were carried out, that it would draw out land forces from the Russian Front.

Attrition of Germany

12. Apart from operations to clear the enemy out of North Africa, our attrition of Germany has hitherto comprised bombing, blockade, raids and subversive action. All these methods strike at the enemy's industrial and economic system, submarine construction, sources of air power and, last but not least, at the morale of the German people—and all can be intensified.

13. The bomber offensive is susceptible of great development and holds out most promising prospects. For this purpose we should aim at an Anglo-American bomber force of 3,000 heavy and medium bombers in the United Kingdom by the end of 1945 (See Annex I).

14. Our success in North Africa opens up wide possibilities of offensive operations against the Southern flank of the Axis. In particular we may be able to detach Italy from the Axis and induce Turkey to join the Allies. If we force Italy out of the war and the Germans try to maintain their line in Russia at its present length, we estimate that they will be some 54 divisions and 2,200 aircraft short of what they need on all fronts. If the defection of Italy were followed
by that of other satellite powers, these deficiencies would be still larger. (See Annex 2)

15. While we follow this policy of bombing and amphibious operations in the Mediterranean our surplus resources can be devoted to the build-up of Anglo-American forces in the United Kingdom to take advantage of any deterioration in German military power. Any decision to re-enter the Continent would have to allow 3 months for the collection of landing craft and other preparations. We estimate that under favorable conditions a force of 12 British and 6 United States divisions could be made available in the United Kingdom by September with a further 3 United States divisions collecting in the United Kingdom. (See Annex 3)

16. The effects of devoting our main effort initially to this undermining of German military power will be:—

On the Axis

(a) We can substantially increase the weight of the bomber offensive.

(b) By amphibious operations in the Mediterranean aimed at bringing about the collapse of Italy we can give the maximum relief to Russia, wear out the German Air Force and ultimately threaten Axis economic resources in the Balkans.

(c) The build-up of forces in the United Kingdom, though below the maximum rate, would still be sufficient to pin down substantial German forces in Northwest Europe, and would permit us to take advantage in the autumn of a pronounced decline in German fighting power.

On Russia

(d) During the period of amphibious operations in the Mediterranean convoys to North Russia will be limited to the extent that the United States can provide escort vessels.

On Turkey

(e) We should have forces available in the Mediterranean which we could use to support Turkey. Turkey is more likely to come into the war on our side if we succeed in eliminating Italy—as we hope to do during 1943. With Turkey on our side we should be well placed for offensive action against the Balkans.

On Spain

(f) Germany will have no forces to spare to invade Spain. Spain is less likely to yield to German pressure if we keep the German forces fully extended by a vigorous offensive in the Mediterranean.

Conclusion

17. Our proposals for the conduct of the war throughout 1943 are these:

(a) The defeat of the U-boat menace to remain a first charge on our resources.

(b) The expansion of the Anglo-American bomber offensive against Germany and Italy.
(c) The exploitation of our position in the Mediterranean with a view to—

(1) knocking Italy out of the war,
(2) bringing Turkey into the war, and
(3) giving the Axis no respite for recuperation.

(d) The maintenance of supplies to Russia.

(e) Limited offensive operations in the Pacific on a scale sufficient only to contain the bulk of Japanese Forces in that area.

(f) Operations to reopen the Burma Road to be undertaken as soon as resources permit.

(g) Subject to the claims of the above, the greatest possible concentration of forces in the United Kingdom with a view to re-entry on to the Continent in August or September 1943 should conditions hold out a good prospect of success, or anyhow a “Sledgehammer” to wear down the enemy Air Forces.

Annex I

THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE

1. The aim of the bomber offensive is the progressive destruction and dislocation of the enemy’s war industrial and economic system, and the undermining of his morale to a point where his capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

2. In estimating the prospective results of the air offensive it is important not to be misled by the limited results attained in the past 2½ years. Bombing methods and technique have been passing through a phase of rapid development, new navigational aids and other ancillary equipment which should bring about a great advance in bombing accuracy are being introduced, the training of air crews has been improved, and better tactical methods, showing great promise, have been devised.3

3. As a result, the British Bomber Force will attain far higher standards of efficiency and accuracy in night bombing in the future than have been possible in the past. We have gained a lead over the German defenses, and we do not believe that they will be able to develop countermeasures sufficient to offset our advantage.

4. In spite of the progress made during recent months by the United States Bomber Command in the bombing of targets in occupied territory, it is still an open question whether regular penetration of the defenses of Germany by daylight will be practicable without prohibitive losses. While every effort should continue to be made to achieve success by day, it is important to arrange that, if the daylight bomb-

3 For a discussion of the strategic air offensive from September 1939 to December 1942, see Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939–1945 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), vol. i, pts. ii and iii.
ing of Germany proves impracticable, it will be possible to convert the United States Bomber Command from a primarily day to a primarily night force with the least possible delay and loss of efficiency.

5. The result attained with a given bombing effort does not vary directly with the scale of that effort, but tends to become progressively more fruitful as the effort increases. Moreover experience shows that, as the bombing effort mounts above a certain level the defenses become saturated and the aircraft casualty rate is reduced.

6. While the enemy’s attention is focussed on Russia, the Allies have the initiative in strategic bombing which is the chief method by which they can at present inflict direct damage on Germany and Germans. We must therefore exploit it to the full.

7. British heavy bombers are in steadily increasing production. In parallel, the build-up of United States heavy bombers in the United Kingdom will increase our combined strengths at little cost to shipping space, once the transfer of American ground personnel has been completed.

8. It is not claimed that the bomber offensive will at once shatter the enemy’s morale. It is claimed that it already has an appreciable and will have an increasing effect on the enemy’s distributive system and industrial potential—an effect which the German high command and German people will fear more and more.

9. We recommend that we should aim at operating a force of 3,000 British and United States heavy and medium bombers from the United Kingdom by the end of 1943. Without drawing on reserve stocks, this increase in the Allied bomber force in the United Kingdom will only involve an increase in petrol import requirements of about 350,000 tons in 1943—a very small proportion of total requirements.

Annex II

PLAN OF ACTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

1. Communications prevent our maintaining large forces in Southern Russia. It would be unwise to operate against Southern France except in conjunction with an offensive across the Channel, and difficult to operate in the Balkans unless either Italy goes out of the war or Turkey comes into it. To exploit our African successes, therefore, our plan of action will be:

(a) To bring about the collapse of Italy.
(b) To bring Turkey into the war.
(c) To seize any chance offered by (a) or (b) to operate in the Balkans.
Amphibious Operations.

2. Once North Africa is cleared, it will be necessary to seize one or other of the island bases—Sicily, Sardinia or Corsica—in order to increase the pressure on Italy. Since we cannot capture Corsica until we have Sardinia, the initial choice will lie between Sicily and Sardinia.

3. Plans for both these operations are already being prepared and should be pressed forward as a matter of urgency. We do not, however, feel able at this stage to express a definite opinion as to which of the two alternatives should be chosen.

The Bombing of Italy.

4. The bomber offensive which is at present being conducted by Bomber Command against Northern Italy is already creating panic and dislocation. As the situation in North Africa clears, complementary bombing offensives should be developed from the south, mainly against targets in Central and Southern Italy. The proposed plan is:

(a) The heavy bombers of Bomber Command based in the United Kingdom will usually operate against targets in Northern Italy when weather permits.

(b) The heavy and medium bomber squadrons at present in the Middle East will concentrate against targets in Southern Italy from bases in the Benghazì Area, using Malta as an advance base.

(c) The United States Bomber Groups in North Africa which will be available for the attack on targets in Italy may be supplemented by Wellington squadrons of Bomber Command detached periodically to North Africa to the extent which airfield capacity and maintenance facilities will allow. All important Italian towns will then have been brought within the range of effective attack.

Political Warfare Campaign.

5. We should as yet make no promises to the Italian people, but we should warn them of what is in store, concentrate blame for Italian sufferings upon Mussolini and the Fascist regime and continuously remind them that their salvation lies entirely in their own hands.

6. We should exploit to the full the existing internal and international dissensions in Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary, with a view to inducing these countries to recall their forces from Russia and occupied territories.

Raidson the Italian Coast and Coastal Shipping.

7. “Commando” raids and harassing attacks by sea and air against the Italian coast and shipping would produce military results out of proportion to the effort involved. Later, from bases in Sardinia, Corsica or Sicily, we should be able to carry out large and sustained raids against Italian ports and cities.
**Divisions in the Eastern Mediterranean.**

8. When we are in occupation of the whole North African Coast, we shall be well placed for developing threats and deception plans in any quarter—for example, simultaneously with operations in the Central Mediterranean, we could build up a large deception plan against Crete and the Dodecanese.

**Increased Subversive Activities in the Balkans, Corsica and Italy.**

9. We must give increased assistance to the insurgents in Yugoslavia and stimulate sabotage in Greece, since in both countries the garrisons are largely Italian. By sabotage in Italy and subversive activities in Corsica we shall add to the burden of the Italians.

**The Collapse and After.**

10. It is not beyond hope that the cumulative effect of the above measures, if pressed forward with vigor and determination, and especially if accompanied by assaults on the mainland, will result in the collapse of Italy, possibly at an early stage in our operations. The garrison of the Balkans is mainly Italian. Germany will be unable to undertake the two new commitments of garrisoning both the Balkans and an Italy in a state of collapse, without devastating results on the Russian Front. She must choose one or the other.

11. If the Italian collapse results in a request for an armistice, which will mean that Germany has decided to withdraw from Italy, we should welcome the proposal, provided that:

   (a) Italy lays down her arms everywhere.
   (b) She grants the limited facilities which we shall require in Sardinia, Sicily, the Dodecanese and in certain areas of Italy, for the further prosecution of the offensive against Germany, particularly in the Balkans.

12. We should not assume any obligation for the defense and full occupation of Italy since:

   (a) It would entail a considerable liability for internal security.
   (b) We should encounter insuperable difficulties in conducting operations against the Germans established in a strong, natural defensive position in the Alps, to which their communications would be short, easy and by land—in contrast to ours.

**Turkey**

13. Our motives in inducing Turkey to join us in the war would be:

   (a) To use Turkey as a base for air attacks on important objectives, such as the Roumanian oilfields and Black Sea communications.
   (b) To close the Dardanelles to the Axis and open them to the United Nations.
   (c) To force an increased dispersal of German Forces by using Turkey as a base for potential threats in the Balkans and South Russia.
III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

(d) To deny Turkish chrome to Germany. We should not want Turkey to embark on major land operations in the Balkans, with or without Allied help.

14. A prime factor influencing Turkey’s entry into the war will be her fear that by staying out she will be penalized at the Peace Conference in favor of the Russians. British and United States diplomatic action should be concerted to exploit this anxiety to the full in the hope of accelerating a Turkish decision to join the Allies. Turkey will not come into the war until she feels reasonably sure of her own security. She will become increasingly reassured as we develop our operations against Italy, as the Germans become more stretched on all fronts and as the Balkans become more restive. From the Turkish point of view a sufficient degree of security may be achieved considerably before the end of the war.

Staff Talks.

15. In the meantime the opening of semi-official staff talks is a practical step which we can take. Such talks are being initiated by His Majesty’s Ambassador and will be kept informal for the present. Although these will deal initially with Turkish dispositions and British air assistance under existing defensive plans, they should be extended as soon as possible to cover offensive operations based on Turkey, and the use of Turkey as a base for staging threats to the Axis. The transportation and port facilities which we should require, the provision of coal for the Turkish railways, and the provision of wheat for Turkey herself should also be considered.

Supply of Material and Financial Assistance.

16. We should adhere to our program of financial assistance and credits and continue to supply Turkey with materials and equipment, though these will not in themselves cause Turkey to abandon her neutrality. The extent of this supply must suffice at least to ensure the benevolent neutrality of Turkey so that she limits and obstructs her export of chrome to Germany. Beyond this, further supply should depend on the progress of the staff talks. Serious shortcomings in the Turkish clearance capacity will, in any case, limit the volume of materials and equipment which can be sent into the country.

Military Cooperation.

17. The details of Allied-Turkish military cooperation must be settled at the Staff Talks. The general form of this cooperation might be British naval control of Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Sea communications, while the Black Sea might be a Russian responsibility. We might provide air forces for defense of Istanbul and Ankara. On the army side we should be prepared to make full use of the potentially first-class infantry of which the Turkish Army is
mainly composed, and limit the provision of military forces to armored and specialist troops. We could thus form a balanced army for defense or offensive purposes.

**ACTION IN THE BALKANS AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF ITALY**

18. In the event of an Italian collapse, our further action in the Mediterranean will be influenced by Germany's concentration and distribution of her forces and by the attitude of Turkey. Action in the Balkans might result in the following benefits:

(a) We should obtain bases for air attack on Roumanian oilfields and refineries, and for fanning the already glowing embers of revolt in the Balkans.

(b) We should (a) be able to interrupt the Danube supply route to Germany, (ii) create a threat to the German southern lines of communication to South Russia, (iii) cut Axis sea communications between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

(c) The raw materials of the Balkans (particularly oil, chrome and copper) are vitally important to the Axis. The loss of chrome and copper, together with the cutting of Axis sea communications in the Aegean, on which the Axis supply of chrome from Turkey largely depends, would deprive Germany of almost all her sources of these indispensable products.

*Plan of Action.*

19. Our plan of action for developing our effort against the Balkans might be

(a) Intensification of subversive activity in the Balkans, and supply of arms and equipment to the Patriot forces in Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania, and

(b) When the time is ripe, the despatch of Allied land and air forces to act as a rallying point for offensive action of insurgent forces in this area.

**Annex III**

**CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS**

1. We intend to return to the Continent the moment the time is ripe.

2. Subject to the prior claims of the Mediterranean, and of the bomber offensive, therefore, our policy should be to assemble the maximum British and United States forces in the United Kingdom for invasion of the Continent in the event of a sudden crack in German military power.

3. For example, it is possible that continued pressure on the Russian Front, the bombing offensive from the United Kingdom and offensives in the Mediterranean might combine seriously to weaken Germany and to bring Italy to surrender during the summer. It might then be justifiable to forego further offensives in the Mediterranean and to concentrate rapidly for a Cross-Channel operation. If the
decision were taken at the end of May, we calculate that Allied shipping resources might allow us to have in the United Kingdom ready for an invasion of the Continent on the 15th of September some 12 British and Canadian divisions, 6 United States divisions, with a further 3 collecting in the United Kingdom. There would be enough air forces to support the operation. Out of these 18 divisions we estimate that we shall be able to launch an assault of about 5 divisions, 3 British and 2 United States.

4. In addition to providing the maximum possible force for our ultimate return to the Continent when Germany has been effectively weakened, the gradual build-up of forces in the United Kingdom will meanwhile play an important part in containing German forces in France and the Low Countries. The assault forces available should, moreover, allow this containing effect to be intensified by raids.

5. Our re-entry to the Continent during 1943 will be impracticable at less than three months’ notice, owing to the necessity of bringing home landing craft from the Mediterranean. Owing to the difficulty of carrying out Cross-Channel operations during the six months October to April this delay may be increased by anything up to nine months.

6. The deterioration of German power, when it does come, is likely to be rapid. If, therefore, in the summer of 1943 German strength is considered likely to fail during the forthcoming winter, it may be advantageous to secure a foothold on the Continent in the late Autumn—for example, in the Cherbourg Peninsula—in order that we may be ready to exploit any German weakening during the winter.

7. Our preparations for a re-entry onto the Continent to stay should, therefore, include plans for:

(a) Establishing a permanent foothold in Autumn 1943, and

(b) A re-entry of the Continent at any time with the maximum forces available, in the event of a pronounced deterioration in the fighting power of the German armed forces generally—this operation to be at three months’ notice.

J. C. S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

C.C.S. 140

[WASHINGTON,] January 8, 1943.

AGENDA FOR SYMBOL

It has been suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff that the first meeting should be devoted to a discussion of the papers by the United
States and British Chiefs of Staff on worldwide Anglo-American strategy (C.C.S. 135, C.C.S. 135/1 and C.C.S. 135/2).

The attached agenda, prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff, has been concurred in by the United States Chiefs of Staff, who have suggested certain additional items (underlined). The British Chiefs of Staff have been informed of these additional items suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

V. Dykes
J. R. Deane
Combined Secretariat

[Attachment]

Agenda Prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff as Revised by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, January 8, 1943.]

LIST “A”

PRIMARY QUESTIONS FOR DECISION

(1) Anglo-American world-wide strategy.
(2) European (including Mediterranean) Strategy.
(3) Pacific strategy.
(4) Indian Ocean (including Burma) strategy.
(5) Major Operations for 1943. (These will be governed by decisions reached on (1) above.)
   (i) Mediterranean
   (ii) Continental
   (iii) Pacific
   (iv) Indian Ocean.

LIST “B”

SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION RELEVANT TO, OR ARISING FROM, LIST “A”

(6) Mediterranean
   (A) North Africa
      (i) The Tunisia-Libya campaigns.
      (ii) Opening the Mediterranean.
      (iii) Allocation of spheres of responsibility in North Africa if the Axis have been ejected.
      (iv) Arising out of the above disposition of American and British Naval, Military and Air Forces in North Africa, together with questions of command of the same.

1 Anto, pp. 735, 738, and 741 respectively.
2 In a message to the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, dated January 9, 1943, not printed, the British Chiefs of Staff took note of the agenda set forth in this paper and agreed in principle (Department of Defense Files).
(B) Air Offensive from North Africa against
   (i) Italy
   (ii) Balkan Objectives
   (iii) Axis shipping

(C) Operation BRIMSTONE

(D) Operation HUSKY

(E) BRIMSTONE v HUSKY

(F) Turkey—Assistance to

(G) Russia—Assistance to

(H) Governments in Exile—Assistance to

(I) French Air Force
   (i) Strength and Composition
   (ii) Source of Aircraft and Equipment
   (iii) Training—Location and Facilities

(7) Pacific
   (A) Operations in S.W. Pacific
   (B) Security of communications
   (C) Assistance to Russia if Japan attacks Maritime Provinces
   (D) Assistance to China

(8) The United Kingdom theatre
   (A) Bolero build up in 1943 and also in 1944.
   (B) Bomber build up in 1943 and also in 1944.
   (C) Continental operations in 1943 and 1944.
   (D) System of command and planning for above.
   (E) Jupiter operation.

(9) Indian Ocean
   (A) RAVENOUS
   (B) ANAKIM
   (C) Command in Burma
   (D) Employment of Chinese Troops in Burma

(10) Landing Craft

(11) Shipping
   (A) Implications on strategy
   (B) Increased efficiency in use of

(12) Anti U-boat Warfare
   (A) Escort vessels
   (B) Airplanes

(13) Oil
   (A) Axis oil position
   (B) Oil stocks in all important areas of operations and production.

(14) Strategic Responsibility and Command set-up for Dakar-
     French West Africa area.
Report by the United States Joint Staff Planners

[CASABLANCA,] January 17, 1943.
C.C.S. 153 (Revised)

SITUATION TO BE CREATED IN THE EASTERN THEATER (NAMELY PACIFIC AND BURMA) IN 1943

Assumptions:

1. The Combined Planners assume that the ultimate objective of the basic global strategy is to bring the war to a successful conclusion at the earliest practicable date;
   that in gaining this objective efforts must be made toward the destruction of the economic and military power of all our adversaries at a rate exceeding their power of replacement;
   that Germany is recognized as the primary or most powerful and pressing enemy;
   and that the major portion of the forces of the United Nations are to be directed against Germany insofar as it is consistent with the overall objective of bringing the war to an early conclusion at the earliest possible date.

2. Tentative assumptions are made that the present situation as between Russia and Japan will continue, and that the Chinese will continue in the war if sufficient support is furnished by Great Britain and the United States in the way of supplies and equipment.

Situation To Be Created:

3. We consider that the accomplishment of the over-all objective, as well as the maintenance of the security of our position in the Pacific, requires that the Japanese be kept under continual pressure sufficient in power and extent to absorb the disposable Japanese military effort.

4. The United Nations' positions in the Pacific are extended over a line roughly 12,000 miles long—from the Bering Sea, through the Hawaiian Islands, Samoa, Fiji, New Guinea and Northwest Australia, to Singapore. The Japanese, strongly established, occupy interior lines which permit offensive action by their mobile forces against any of the Allied positions—unless these mobile forces are denied freedom of action.

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1 Circulated under a covering note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (not printed) which observed that this paper was a “partial report” prepared in pursuance of the directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (at their meeting on January 14, ante, p. 350) to the Combined Staff Planners “to report on the basis that Germany is the primary enemy, what situation do we wish to establish in the Eastern Theater (i.e., the Pacific and Burma) in 1943 and what forces will be necessary to establish this situation”. This paper was discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on January 18, 1943, ante, p. 617, following a postponement of such a discussion at the meeting of January 17, 1943, ante, p. 601.
5. The United Nations' positions have depth at certain points, as in Alaska, Hawaii, and New Caledonia, New Guinea. The positions between Hawaii and New Caledonia have little depth and are susceptible to successful enemy attack, if these attacking forces are free to move. Some of the United Nations' positions (i.e., on the larger islands) are capable of strong defensive establishments. Other positions such as the smaller islands, like Canton, cannot be strongly defended. Economy in defensive strength of the larger islands, and security of the smaller islands, require that we maintain the initiative by offensive action. This offensive action must be directed against Japanese objectives of sufficient importance to the Japanese as to cause Japanese counteraction; they must be sufficient in power to combat successfully this Japanese counteraction.

6. By this process we intend to prevent the Japanese the opportunity for consolidating (digging in), thus strengthening their positions, to an extent that would permit them to initiate offensive action at times and places of their choosing.

7. We consider that Japanese power in respect to shipping and aircraft has been getting progressively weaker; that our attacks against shipping, particularly by submarines, should be pushed to the maximum extent possible; and that our offensive action should be designed to effect a continuing decrease in Japanese naval and air power.

8. To maintain the security of our possessions in the Pacific and to contain in the Pacific area the Japanese Fleet, it is necessary to continue in that area the major portion of the United States Fleet. To give full implementation to this naval force, it is necessary that sufficient mobile ground forces, air forces, and shipping be available in that area to undertake continuing limited offensives against Japanese possessions. The character of these offensive actions envisaged for 1943 are set forth in subsequent paragraphs.

9. In planning these offensive operations in the Pacific, we take note that the ability of the United Nations to project military actions against the enemy in all areas is limited by shipping. In the Atlantic there is a further serious limitation caused by the lack of adequate numbers of escorts. Until the escort problem is improved, the amount of shipping which can be moved in the Atlantic is definitely limited. This same consideration of limitation of escort capacity does not at present apply to the Pacific, because of comparative absence of submarine menace in that area at this time.

10. The adverse situation in regard to the number of escorts available in comparison to the number of submarine packs operating in the Atlantic, and to the convoy needs in the Atlantic, will not begin to show relative improvement before October.
Operations:
11. The prospective operations to create and maintain the situation in 1943 set forth above are:

(a) Seizure and consolidation of United Nations forces in the Solomon Islands, Eastern New Guinea up to Lae Salamaua peninsula, New Britain-New Ireland (Rabaul) area.
(b) Seizure and occupation of Kiska-Agattu (Western Aleutians).
(c) Seizure and occupation of Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands, up to and including Truk. It is planned that these operations will be undertaken subsequent to Rabaul.
(d) Extension of occupation of New Guinea up to approximately the Dutch border. This will be an extension of the Truk campaign for the second part.
(e?) Burma campaign. Limited operations during present favorable weather conditions such as to permit improvement of communications from India to China, to be followed by more extended operations towards the end of the year with the objective of re-establishing the communications along the lower Burma Road. The objective of this campaign is to strengthen forces in China with the view to keeping China in the war, keeping pressure on the Japanese in this area, and to the establishment and operation of air strength on Japanese shipping in Chinese and Indo-China ports as well as on the flank of Japanese sea communications along the China coast.

12. The increase of forces in the Pacific-Burma area in 1943 for the operations listed above will depend largely on the strength of Japanese dispositions. They will be of this general order:

Ground Forces, including air personnel—250,000 troops
U. S. and U. K.—500 airplanes
Navy—The major portion of additions (by new construction) to the U. S. Fleet, while maintaining in the Atlantic present large ship strength and increasing destroyer and antisubmarine escort in the Atlantic.
Increase in strength of the British Eastern fleet sufficient to support operations against Burma.
Shipping 1,250,000 tons

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff

SECRET

[CASABLANCA,] January 17, 1943.
C. C.S. 153/1

SITUATION TO BE CREATED IN THE EASTERN THEATER (PACIFIC AND BURMA) IN 1943

1. We have been instructed by the British Chiefs of Staff to comment on the paper by the Joint U. S. Staff Planners on the situation

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1 This paper was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on January 18, 1943, ante, p. 617.
to be created in the Eastern Theater (Pacific and Burma) in 1943 (C.C.S. 153).\(^2\)

2. Our comments are as follows:

Assumptions:

(a) Paragraph 1:
We feel that this should be reworded as follows:

"The Combined Planners assume that the ultimate objective of the basic global strategy is to bring the war to a successful conclusion at the earliest practicable date. The quickest way of achieving this will be to concentrate on defeating Germany first and then to concentrate our combined resources against Japan. Meanwhile such pressure must be maintained in Japan as will prevent her from damaging interests vital to the Allies, and will hinder her from consolidating her conquests."

(b) Paragraph 2:
We concur.

Situation To Be Created:

(c) Paragraphs 3–10:
We agree in principle with this expression of the strategy required, provided always that its application does not prejudice the earliest possible defeat of Germany.

Operations:

(d) Paragraphs 11–12:
We suggest the following alternative:
The operations which are certainly required in 1943 to create and maintain the situation set forth above are:

(a) Seizure of, and consolidation of United Nations forces in the Solomons, Eastern New Guinea up to the Lae-Salamaua peninsula, New Britain-New Ireland (Rabaul) area.

(b) Burma—Limited operations during the present favorable weather period:

1. To recapture and establish air forces at Akyab (CANNIBAL).

2. To establish a bridgehead in the Chindwin Valley so that, when an attack on Rangoon is made, simultaneous pressure can be exerted on Mandalay (RAVENOUS).

3. To construct the Hukawng Valley road from Ledo to Myitkyina and Lungling.

\(^2\) Supra.
The additions to present forces in the Pacific theater required for these operations must depend upon the strength of Japanese dispositions but will be of the following general order:

Ground forces ........................................
Aircraft ..............................................
Navy ...................................................
Amphibious forces ..................................
Shipping ..............................................

No forces additional to those now present will be required in Burma.

12. With the successful completion of the operations outlined in the preceding paragraph, a new offensive will be necessary if we are to retain the initiative and thereby contain disposable Japanese strength.

Detailed plans for undertaking the following further operations, though not necessarily in the order given, should therefore be made; but, since the timing must depend upon the speed with which the earlier operations in the Rabaul—New Guinea area are concluded, a decision whether or not to launch these further operations should be taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff later in the year.

(a) The seizure and occupation of Kiska-Agattu (Western Aleutians).

(b) The seizure and occupation of the Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands up to and including Truk.

(c) Extension of occupation of New Guinea up to approximately the Dutch border. This will be an extension of the Truk campaign.

For these operations the additional forces required will be of the order of:

Ground forces ........................................
Aircraft ..............................................
Navy ...................................................
Amphibious forces ..................................
Shipping ..............................................

13. Detailed plans for operations to reopen the Burma Road (Anakim) during the winter of 1943–44 will also be made. It is not possible at this stage to say by when the forces required for this operation could be provided without detracting seriously from the defeat of Germany. Orders for the completion of full administrative preparations by October 1, 1943, have, however, already been given and planning is proceeding in India.

The forces additional to those now in the theater required for this operation must depend upon enemy strength and dispositions at the time but will be of the following order:

Ground forces ........................................
Aircraft ..............................................
Shipping ..............................................
Naval forces . . . . . . Covering forces as may be found necessary in the light of the naval situation at the time. As much as practicable would be found from British resources.
6-8 Escort Carriers
40 Destroyers or Escort Vessels

Amphibious forces . . . Assault shipping and landing craft sufficient to lift 4 Inf. Brigade Groups and 1 Armored Brigade.

Shipping . . . . . . . 60 MT ships
20 Personnel ships

14. It is certain that the provision of the naval and amphibious forces required for simultaneous Truk and Anakim operations cannot but react adversely on the early defeat of Germany. It may be possible to carry out one of these operations without such a violation of our agreed strategy. The decision as to the right course of action should be taken later in the light of the development of the war.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
secret
[CASABLANCA,] January 18, 1943.
C.C.S. 155

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943

In accordance with the conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 60th meeting, a draft memorandum setting out the tentative agreements already reached has been prepared and is circulated herewith for consideration at the next meeting.

V. Dykes
J. R. Deane
Combined Secretariat

Enclosure

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to submit the following recommendations for the conduct of the war in 1943.

1. Security:
The defeat of the U-boat must remain a first charge on the resources of the United Nations.

1 This draft memorandum was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their morning meeting on January 19, 1943, ante, p. 637. As amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, this memorandum was redesignated C.C.S. 155/1, January 19, 1943, which is printed post, p. 774.

2 Ante, p. 622.
2. Operations in the European Theater:

Operations in the European Theater will be conducted with the object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum forces that can be brought to bear upon her by the United Nations.

3. The five main lines of offensive action will be:

In the Mediterranean:

(a) The occupation of Sicily with the object of:

(1) Making the Mediterranean line of communications more secure.
(2) Diverting German pressure from the Russian front.
(3) Intensifying the pressure on Italy.

(b) To create a situation in which Turkey can be enlisted as an active ally.

In the U. K.:

(c) The heaviest possible bomber offensive against Germany.

(d) Such limited offensive operations as may be practicable with the forces available.

(e) The assembly of the strongest possible force (subject to (a) and (b) above and paragraph 5 below) to re-enter the continent as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent.

4. In order to insure that these operations and preparations are not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated to the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters.

5. Operations in the Pacific and Far East:

(a) Operations in these theaters shall continue with the forces allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against Japan by the United Nations as soon as Germany is defeated.

(b) These operations must be kept within such limits as will not, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, prejudice the capacity of the United Nations to take advantage of any favorable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

(c) Subject to the above reservation, plans and preparations shall be made for:

(1) The recapture of Burma (Anakim) beginning in 1943.
(2) Operations, after the capture of Rabaul, against the Marshalls and Carolines if time and resources allow without prejudice to Anakim.

6. Assistance to Russia:

The resistance of the Soviet forces must be sustained by the greatest volume of supplies that can be transported to Russia, without prohibitive cost in shipping.

*Regarding earlier drafts contributing to this section of the memorandum, see footnote 9, p. 622.*
III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

Note by the Combined Staff Planners

SECRET
C.C.S. 156

[CASABLANCA,] January 18, 1943.

SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH THE AGENDA
OF THE CONFERENCE

1. The next stage of the discussions should be to examine each of
the operations set out in the (C.C.S. 155) draft proposals for the
conduct of the war in 1943, with a view to determining:

(a) The resources of all kinds required for each.
(b) How they are to be made available.
(c) Target dates, where practicable.

2. U-Boat Warfare:
The naval and air forces required to defeat the U-boat are already
under examination by the Combined Staff Planners whose report
should form the agenda for an early meeting.

3. Mediterranean:
(a) Organization of Command, and establishment of spheres of
responsibility in the Mediterranean.
(b) HUSKY:
(Reference: Paragraph 3 (a), C.C.S. 155)
The resources required for HUSKY have been assessed by the British
Joint Planning Staff. A summary of this and of the outline plan will
be circulated for discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Agreement
should be reached as to the resources to be provided by U. S. and
U. K. respectively and on the arrangements for planning and command.
(c) Air offensive from North Africa against Italy, Balkan objectives,
and Axis shipping.

4. Turkey:
(Reference: Paragraph 3 (b), C.C.S. 155)
A draft paper by the British Joint Planning Staff on Allied Plans
relating to Turkey which has not yet been considered by the British
Chiefs of Staff will be circulated as a basis for discussion. British
Chiefs of Staff to circulate a note on the Axis oil position for discussion
in connection with this item.

5. The Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom:
(Reference: Paragraph 3 (c), C.C.S. 155)

1 In circulating this note the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff indicated that the note had been prepared at an informal meeting on January 18 of the Combined Staffs, who suggested that it be considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their next meeting. The note was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the morning of January 19, 1943, ante, p. 638.

2 Supra.
British Chiefs of Staff to indicate the present and projected build-up of the R.A.F. Bomber Command and the British conception of the general plan for its employment in 1943. Agreement should be reached on the program for the build-up of U.S. Bomber forces in the United Kingdom and on the general lines of employment of Allied Bomber forces from the U.K. against Germany.

6. **Limited Offensive Operations from the U.K.:**

(Reference: Paragraph 8(d), C.C.S. 155)

British Chiefs of Staff to circulate a paper outlining their conception of the limited offensive operations possible in 1943 under the terms of C.C.S. 155 and the resources available.

7. **Bolero Build-up:**

(Reference: Paragraph 3 (e), C.C.S. 155)

British Chiefs of Staff to circulate a paper showing the forces which in their view could be made available for a return to the Continent in 1943 under the terms of C.C.S. 155. Agreement should be reached on the general concept of the circumstances which would make such an operation feasible.

8. **Anakim.**

(Reference: Paragraph 5(c) (1), C.C.S. 155)

British Chiefs of Staff to circulate a paper giving the broad concept for operation Anakim, with an indication of the forces considered necessary. Agreement should be reached as to the resources to be provided by U.S. and U.K. respectively.

9. **Operations in the Southwest Pacific:**

(Reference: Paragraph 5 (c) (2), C.C.S. 155)

U.S. Chiefs of Staff to circulate a paper giving the broad concept for operations in the Southwest Pacific with indications of the forces involved.

10. **Assistance to Russia:**

(Reference: Paragraph 6, C.C.S. 155)

Agreement should be reached on the probable effect of the operations agreed at the conference upon supplies to Russia in 1943.

11. The following items which appear in the agreed Agenda of the conference have not been dealt with above:

(a) Strategic Responsibility and Command Set-up for Dakar-French West African Area required to be settled as early as possible. Admiral King to be invited to make proposals.

(b) Increased efficiency in the case of Shipping. Lord Leathers and General Somervell to be invited to discuss and make appropriate recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff

SECRET

[CASABLANCA,] January 18, 1943.
C.C.S. 157

ALLIED PLANS RELATING TO TURKEY

PART I

ENTRY OF TURKEY INTO THE WAR ON THE SIDE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1. The following extract from C.C.S. 135/2 has been taken as the basis for our further examination of the problem of inducing Turkey to join the Allies and of using that country for the development of offensive operations against the Axis.

“Our motives in inducing Turkey to join us in the war would be:

(a) To use Turkey as a base for air attacks on important objectives, such as the Rumanian oilfields and Black Sea communications.

(b) To close the Dardanelles to the Axis and open them to the United Nations.

(c) To force an increased dispersal of German forces by using Turkey as a base for potential threats in the Balkans and South Russia.

(d) To deny Turkish chrome to Germany.”

Inducements to Turkey:

2. The two main factors upon which Turkey’s entry into the war depend are:

(a) Her fear of Germany now;

(b) Her fear of Russia after the war.

In order to make Turkey enter actively into the war at an early date, we must convince her that (a) is unfounded, and at the same time exploit her fear of (b).

Fear of Germany:

3. Turkey’s anxieties under (a) will only be assuaged when she is satisfied either that the Allies have so stretched the Axis as to restrict the latter’s ability to hurt her, or that material provision of the Allies to defend her against Axis air or land attack is forthcoming in time. The former may result from a development of our existing strategy in the Mediterranean and from continued Russian successes. The latter is examined in Part II.

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1 This paper was discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their afternoon meeting, January 19, 1943; see ante, p. 649.

2 Ante, p. 741.

3 For additional documentation regarding the representations by the American and British Governments relative to the transit of the Straits by German vessels, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 805 ff., and ibid., 1943, vol. iv, pp. 1086 ff.

4 For additional documentation regarding the efforts of the American and British Governments to acquire Turkish chrome and to prevent its sale by Turkey to Germany, see ibid., 1942, vol. iv, pp. 742 ff., and ibid., 1943, vol. iv, pp. 1150 ff.
Fear of Russia:

4. With regard to (b), Turkey must now appreciate that her hopes of a weak Russia are not likely to be realized. Consequently, her best chance of post-war security lies in obtaining for herself a place and support at the Peace Conference. She is particularly afraid that Russia may spread her influence through Rumania and Bulgaria and confront her with the fact of being the power in control at Turkey's western door into Europe as well as at her back door into Asia. She also fears that Russia, having secured complete control of the Black Sea, will demand unrestricted rights of passage through the Dardanelles. She would look to the Allies, and especially to the British Empire, to support her in resisting exaggerated Russian claims in regard to passage of the Straits.

5. Whether it would be wise for His Majesty's Government to oppose Russian desires regarding passage of the Straits seems a matter for urgent consideration, for if we thwarted Russia in that respect we should probably be confronted with a claim for rights of transit through Persia to a port on the Persian Gulf. This, from our point of view, would be most undesirable.

6. British and American diplomacy should be directed to exploit Turkish fears of Russia. It should be made clear that public opinion will have little sympathy, when peace comes, for a country which remained aloof when we needed her aid.

Economic and Territorial Inducements:

7. Guarantees of continued financial and economic assistance, of which details are given in Enclosure "A",5 might be a useful weapon, particularly in view of the deterioration of the Turkish position.

8. There are certain territorial adjustments by which Turkey sets store. Firstly, she is determined to have complete control of the railway which at present runs out in Syrian territory at Aleppo. Secondly, she requires some material facilities in, and some guarantees for, the Turkish population of the Dodecanese Islands. Thirdly, she desires a rectification of her frontier with Bulgaria. We can see no strategical objection to their realization after the war provided we can retain certain rights to use the Aleppo-Mosul railway, but we must not lose sight of the fact that there is a strong French interest in this railway. We have also guaranteed the future integrity and independence of Syrian territory.

Greek interest would be directly affected by the realization of the second aim and it would be difficult for the Allies to encourage the appetite of an allied but still neutral country at the expense of a fighting ally.

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5 Not printed.
We doubt whether these three sops would materially affect Turkey’s decision on the main issue.

Summary of Diplomatic Policy:

9. We should exploit Turkish fears that she stands to lose if she remains out until the eleventh hour, making it clear through diplomatic channels that the extent of Allied support for Turkey at the Peace Conference will be conditioned by her entry into the war without delay.

PART II
INITIAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY

10. An undertaking to assist Turkey against Axis aggression has already been given. This includes a plan for establishing certain forces in Turkey (Sprawl Plan) and the provision of equipment and supplies to augment Turkish resources. A summary of these measures is given as Enclosures “B”, “C” and “D”,6 from which it will be seen that a substantial quantity of material together with some aircraft have already reached Turkey.

11. The roles of the force earmarked under the Sprawl Plan were:

(a) To gain and maintain air superiority.

(b) Assist Turkish land and air forces in the defense of Thrace and Western Anatolia.

(c) Provide support for Turkish forces against seaborne attack in the Izmir area.

(d) Assist in the defense of Ankara.

(e) Attack strategic objectives in Southeast Europe.

(f) Protect base ports.

Changed Conditions:

12. Existing plans assume that Turkey had already been attacked. The conditions under review are somewhat different. In the first place the threat we are now considering is potential rather than actual, although there is still a possibility that if the Germans believed that Turkey was about to enter the war they would try to overrun Thrace and at the same time bomb vital areas. In the second place Turkey is not compelled to fight but must be induced to come in of her own free will. As already stated, this she is unlikely to do unless she is satisfied that the general situation severely restricts German offensive potentialities in the Balkans.

The Air Threat:

13. The ability of the Axis to deliver a heavy air offensive against Turkish vital areas cannot be forecast. It is certain, however, that Turkey will require the provision of air and ground defenses. The

*Enclosures “B”, “C” and “D”, none printed, are entitled “Our Military Commitments to Turkey”, “R.A.F. and Army Stores Already Dumped Into Turkey”, and “Supply of Equipment”, respectively.
extent to which she will regard these as an inducement to fight will depend upon the rapidity with which they can be rendered effective. Should Turkey be prepared to take the plunge it would be to her advantage to augment her defenses with Allied help before she actually declares war. We can, however, undertake—provided ground equipment is installed and preparations made in Turkey beforehand—to have operational about 6 Fighter squadrons with limited antiaircraft defenses within three days of the Turkish invitation. To achieve this, approximately 100 transport aircraft would have to be made available.

The Threat Through Thrace:

14. The Turks at present intend, if attacked in Thrace, to hold a forward line near the frontier until a “scorched earth” policy has been effected, and then to withdraw to the Catalja and Bulair lines. These are sound defensive positions, and we see no object in persuading the Turks to establish a main position forward, as this would be weak in defense. If, on the other hand, the attack does not develop, the forward area will remain available for the subsequent concentration of our offensive forces. The Turks will have, in any case, to rely initially on their own resources, since communications prevent any substantial Allied military assistance reaching Thrace quickly.

Allied Military Policy:

15. The force which we should establish in Turkey, in the first place, should comprise the minimum defensive element to satisfy the Turks, and the maximum offensive element, within the limits of communications, to meet our own future requirements.

16. We consider that the following constitute a suitable defensive offer to the Turks:

Air:

26 squadrons. Of this force, 6 Fighter squadrons would constitute the immediate air defense contingent referred to in paragraph 13 above. The types of the remaining squadrons proposed in the Sprawl plan may require adjustment in the light of changed conditions, but since a total of 26 squadrons has been offered to Turkey and the arrangements for the installation of this force are in hand, we consider that the total figure of 26 squadrons should stand. Additional aircraft for use by the Turks can be supplied from resources in the Middle East if priority over other commitments is considered to justify such a course.

Land:

72 H.A.A. guns for defense of Istanbul, etc.
96 H.A.A. guns
215 Lt. A.A. guns for airfield defense.
4 Battalions for defense of the L. of C.
It is possible that the Turks will regard the provision of armored fighting vehicles as an added inducement. In view of the Turks’ inability to use or maintain armored fighting vehicles we should prefer to supply complete armored formations with our own personnel, and this we should be prepared to do.

**Naval:**

A striking force of submarines, M.T.B.’s and possibly destroyers.

17. The next step is to build up forces to undertake offensive operations and to secure air bases in Turkey. This is considered in Part III.

**PART III**

**DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFENSIVE**

18. Turkey will be of value to the Allies as an offensive base for air rather than land operations. Owing to the initial defensive needs of the Turks it will be impossible to include in the first air contingent a striking force adequate for a widespread heavy and sustained offensive. Since, however, trans-Anatolian communications will be stretched to the limit of their capacity, the first step must be to open up the Aegean sufficiently to make use of Turkish ports. For our use Smyrna is of primary importance.

19. Any land offensive we may wish to mount from Turkey must be based on Thrace, but the Turks themselves will be making great demands on the limited Thracian ports and communications for their own maintenance.

**Phase I—Opening the Aegean**

20. It is considered that the opening of the Aegean could be achieved by the capture of the Dodecanese. With air protection based on Turkey and the Dodecanese it should then be possible to pass sufficient shipping through to make full use of Turkish port capacities in spite of the Axis threat from Crete and Greece.

21. The capture of the Dodecanese is at present being studied by the Middle East [Command?]. We estimate that a force of some three divisions will be required, supported by 12 squadrons of aircraft operating from Southwest Anatolia. These squadrons will have to be included in the initial force sent to Turkey. Airfields in the coastal area opposite Rhodes will have to be constructed in advance and stocked with supplies so that operations can begin as early as possible. The subsequent garrisons might be found by our Balkan allies.

**Protection of Shipping:**

22. As soon as the Dodecanese have been captured it will be necessary to provide for the protection of our shipping through the Aegean. The estimated forces required for this purpose are given below.
Naval:
23. With Crete still in enemy hands, shipping must be routed as far east of that island as possible. It is not likely that the threat in the Aegean will exceed that of submarines, E-boats and aircraft. It is estimated that 8-knot convoys of 20 ships running every 14 days between Alexandria and Istanbul will meet requirements and would need an escort group of about 8 ships.

Air:
24. A regrouping of the squadrons already in Turkey should suffice both for protection of shipping and general defensive requirements. The necessary airfields exist but must be developed and supplied in advance.

Land:
25. No additional land forces will be required other than a few L. of C. battalions and anti-aircraft protection for the new ports and airfields brought into use, for which about 48 Heavy and 84 Light A.A. guns will be needed.

Phase II—Subsequent Operations

The Task of Offensive Forces:

Air:
26. Air forces operating from Turkey will be required for:
   (a) Attacks on Rumanian oil refineries and their communications. This is the primary task.
   (b) Attacks on Balkan chrome mines and communications generally, both of which are difficult targets.
   (c) Attacks against Axis shipping in the Black Sea and the Aegean.
   (d) Support of any Allied land operations.
   (e) Assistance to the Russians in the Ukraine.

   For these purposes a force of 15–20 Heavy Bomber squadrons will be required and could be maintained through Smyrna. Existing airfields in Northwest Turkey will require development.

Naval:
27. While the Black Sea should become a Russo-Turkish sphere of responsibility, British light naval forces will be required for the attack, in conjunction with the Turks, on Axis communications in the Aegean.

Land:
28. The object of a land offensive from Thrace would be to stretch Axis forces and to support Balkan patriots. The mounting of any offensive is dependent on the Turks holding an adequate bridgehead in Europe.

29. There are two alternative lines of advance from Thrace into the Balkans: North into Bulgaria; or West into Macedonia.
North Into Bulgaria:

30. The objectives for a northward drive would be Axis communications in the Danube Basin and the oilfields of Ploesti, which are so vital to Germany that she would defend them if necessary at the expense of other areas. The line of advance would be through a hostile country, where communications, which always strongly favor the enemy, are initially so bad as probably to prevent much progress being made. This course might contain some Axis forces, but would have little effect on the Balkans generally.

West Into Macedonia:

31. The objective for a westward drive would be Salonika. Once established there, further forces could be landed and arms for patriot forces of Greece, Albania, and Southern Yugoslavia imported. It should then be possible, in conjunction with the patriots, to sever Axis communications with Southern Greece and to gain control of the whole area.

32. This should result in the abandonment of Crete by the Axis. Alternatively, it might be desirable to capture Crete at an earlier stage to assist in operations on the Greek mainland. Such an operation would be best mounted in Africa, though some air support could be given from the Dodecanese and Southwest Anatolia.

33. The capture of Salonika from Thrace will, however, be a formidable and lengthy operation if the enemy puts up much resistance. Communications are bad, but not so greatly in the German's favor as those into Bulgaria. By supplementing road communications with coastwise shipping it should be possible to maintain 2½ divisions, but in winter conditions this would be very difficult. A further 2½ divisions could be maintained by rail as far forward as railhead, but the line is an easy one for the enemy to disrupt and repairs might take a very long time.

34. A further adverse factor is that while the line of advance itself is badly served with airfields, it is flanked by a limited number of indifferent airfields in enemy hands within S. E. fighter range. Therefore, airfields will have to be provided in Turkish Thrace before operations can start, and others constructed as the advance progresses. This will take time.

35. It is impossible to assess the chances of success of land operations through Macedonia without making a detailed study, and without a firmer forecast than is now possible of the Axis military position as it will then be. The prize is great but the prospects are poor.

1 Presumably "single engine."
SUMMARY

Course of Operations:

36. Offensive operations might take the following course:

(a) The capture of the Dodecanese and the establishment of naval and air forces for the protection of shipping to Istanbul, in order to open the Eastern Aegean.

(b) The assembly of air forces in Anatolia for offensive operations against the Balkans and sea communications.

(c) A possible land offensive from Thrace directed against Salonika.

(d) After reinforcement through Salonika, the severance of Axis communications with Southern Greece and assistance to guerrilla forces in Greece, Albania, and Southern Yugoslavia.

(e) The elimination of the Axis from Greece and Crete.

PART IV

SUMMARY OF FORCES REQUIRED

Air:

37. Immediate Air Defense

6 Squadrons
Balance of Defensive Requirements
20 Squadrons
Opening of the Aegean and Support of Land Offensive
12 Squadrons (additional to those above)
Bomber Offensive
15–20 Heavy Bomber Squadrons

Land:

38. Defensive Requirements

4 battalions for local defense
168 Heavy A.A. guns
215 Light A.A. guns For ports, airfields and vital areas.

Opening the Aegean
3 divisions
3 battalions for local defense
48 Heavy A.A. guns
84 Light A.A. guns For ports and airfields.

Operations in Greece
2½ to 5 divisions, including at least 1 Armored division With possible subsequent reinforcement of up to 4 divisions
(to include Crete)

Naval:

39. Forces as necessary to assist in the capture of the Dodecanese.
A striking force of destroyers, submarines, M.T.B.’s and M.G.B.’s
A commitment of about 8 escort vessels for shipping in the Aegean.

PART V
CONCLUSIONS

40. (a) We do not consider that Turkey will enter the war unless the general situation is such that she is satisfied that she can initially hold Thrace without Allied assistance and that immediate air defense is forthcoming.

(b) Turkey will be of value to the Allies as an offensive base for air rather than land operations.

Policy To Hasten Turkey’s Entry Into the War:

41. (a) Political:
We should make clear to Turkey that our good offices at the Peace Conference will depend upon her entry into the war without delay.

(b) Financial and Economic:
Turkey should be assured of the continuance of our present economic and financial assistance. This might be extended to the provisions of wheat and sugar in the near future, but our commitments elsewhere in the Middle East may prevent this.

(c) Military:
We should offer:

(1) An “immediate air defense” contingent for the protection of vital centers in Western Turkey (paragraph 16).
(2) The balance of forces up to the limit of trans-Anatolian communications (paragraph 16).
(3) Military equipment to bring all Turkish infantry formations in Thrace up to a satisfactory scale of weapons.
(4) Armored fighting vehicles only if these are considered necessary from the psychological point of view. We should prefer to send armored formations since the Turks cannot be relied upon to operate or maintain armored fighting vehicles efficiently.

Allied Military Policy:

42. (a) The provision of assistance to Turkey as in paragraph 41(c) above.

(b) Opening of the Aegean by the capture of the Dodecanese.

(c) Development of the air offensive from Turkey.

(d) If practicable, to open up and rearm the Balkans by an advance westwards from Thrace with limited forces directed on Salonika.

Preparatory Measures in Turkey:

43. (a) Airfield Development.

Certain airfield developments are already included in the Sprawl Plan. We should press for further development of air fields and supplies in the following areas:
(1) In the Istanbul and Ankara areas to operate fighters for the defense of those sites.

(2) In the Southwest of Turkey to assist our capture of the Dodecanese.

(3) In Anatolia and Armenia to operate bombers against Rumanian oil, Balkan communications, and in support of the Russian southern front.

We must insure that the air defense equipment, including A.A. guns, ammunition and R.D.F., necessary for the defense of at least those airfields which will be used by our initial air contingent, is ready in Turkey for immediate operation.

(b) Personnel:

We should send in to Turkey under cover the following personnel:

(1) Such specialists as are acceptable by the Turks to insure proper instruction in the maintenance and use of the Allied military equipment.

(2) Reconnaissance parties for preparing the layout of airfield defenses and for studying the administrative and transportation problems.

A number of Turkish-speaking liaison officers should be collected in the Middle East.

(c) Communications:

We should continue and, where necessary, augment supplies of locomotives, rolling stock and port facilities. The provision of coal dumps at strategic centers is important for the operation of communications.

RECOMMENDATIONS

44. We recommend that:

(a) The Foreign Office be invited to examine the possibilities of diplomatic action in the light of the suggestions contained in this paper. We particularly urge that a firm policy should be decided with regard to our post-war attitude on the Dardanelles question and other matters of a primary interest to the Turks.

(b) A copy of this paper should be sent to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, in reply to their telegram (C.C./166 dated December 29, 1942) and that they should be invited to comment on the proposals contained herein.

[Here follow enclosures “A” through “D”, not printed, entitled respectively: “Financial and Economic Assistance for Turkey”; “Our Military Commitments to Turkey”; “R.A.F. and Army Stores Already Dumped Into Turkey”; and “Supply of Equipment”.]

*Not printed.
III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

J. C. S. File

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CASABLANCA,] January 19, 1943.
C.C.S. 155/1

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to submit the following recommendations for the conduct of the war in 1943.

1. Security:
The defeat of the U-boat must remain a first charge on the resources of the United Nations.

2. Assistance to Russia:
The Soviet forces must be sustained by the greatest volume of supplies that can be transported to Russia without prohibitive cost in shipping.

3. Operations in the European Theater:
Operations in the European Theater will be conducted with the object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum forces that can be brought to bear upon her by the United Nations.

4. The main lines of offensive action will be:
In the Mediterranean:
(a) The occupation of Sicily with the object of:
(1) Making the Mediterranean line of communications more secure.
(2) Diverting German pressure from the Russian front.
(3) Intensifying the pressure on Italy.

(b) To create a situation in which Turkey can be enlisted as an active ally.
In the U.K.:
(c) The heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort.

(d) Such limited offensive operations as may be practicable with the amphibious forces available.

(e) The assembly of the strongest possible force (subject to (a) and (b) above and paragraph 6 below) in constant readiness to reenter the Continent as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent.

5. In order to insure that these operations and preparations are not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated to the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters.

\(^1\) Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their morning meeting on January 19, 1943, ante, p. 637. For draft text of this memorandum prior to revision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see C.C.S. 155, January 18, 1943, ante, p. 760.
6. Operations in the Pacific and Far East:

(a) Operations in these theaters shall continue with the forces allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against Japan by the United Nations as soon as Germany is defeated.

(b) These operations must be kept within such limits as will not, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, jeopardize the capacity of the United Nations to take advantage of any favorable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

(c) Subject to the above reservation, plans and preparations shall be made for:

1. The recapture of Burma (ANAKIM) beginning in 1943.
2. Operations, after the capture of Rabaul, against the Marshalls and Carolines if time and resources allow without prejudice to ANAKIM.

740.0011 PW/3080 1/2

The Australian Prime Minister (Curtin) to President Roosevelt

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Having learnt that Mr. Churchill and yourself are meeting in Washington, I presume that discussions of great strategical importance are proceeding and that decisions of far-reaching effect on global strategy may be reached.

2. The following information was recently communicated to me by the Commander in Chief, South West Pacific Area, on the outstanding lessons learnt from the New Guinea campaign and I consider them to be of such transcending importance that we are forthwith communicating them for your urgent consideration, together with my observations and recommendations thereon:—

General MacArthur's statement begins:

The outstanding military lesson of this operation was the continuously calculated application of the air power inherent in the poten-

1 A copy of this communication is included in the Roosevelt Papers. The source text is attached to the following memorandum of conversation by Welles, dated January 20, 1943:

"The Australian Minister called to see me this morning at his request. The Minister handed me two secret messages addressed by the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Curtin, to the President and to Mr. Churchill. Sir Owen Dixon asked that these messages be transmitted for him by this Government. I told him that I would be very glad to send them to the White House for immediate transmission."

In a letter of March 18, 1943, to Welles, not printed, Australian Chargé Watt explained that at the time these messages were sent from Australia, it was not known that Roosevelt and Churchill were at Casablanca; the messages were transmitted to Washington on the assumption that Churchill was in Washington (740.0011 PW/3196 1/2). In a communication dated March 18, 1943, not printed, Curtin reminded Roosevelt that he had not received a reply to this message, either from the President or from Churchill (740.0011 PW/3198 1/2).
tialities of every component of the air forces employed in the most intimate tactical and logistical union with ground troops. The effect of this modern instrumentality was sharply accentuated by the geographical limitations of this theatre. For months on end air transport with constant fighter coverage moved complete infantry regiments and artillery battalions across the almost impenetrable mountains and jungles of Papua and reaches of the sea; transported field hospital and other base installations to the front; supplied troops and evacuated casualties. For hundreds of miles bombers provided all round reconnaissance, protecting the coast from hostile naval intervention and blasted the way for infantry as it drove forward. A new form of campaign was tested which points the way to the ultimate defeat of the enemy in the Pacific. The offensive and defensive power of air and the adaptability, the range and capacity of transport in effective combination with ground forces, represents tactical and strategical elements of a broadened conception of warfare that will permit the application of offensive power in swift massive strokes rather than the dilatory and costly island to island advance that some have assumed to be necessary in a theatre where the enemy’s far flung strongholds are dispersed throughout a vast expanse of archipelagoes. Air forces and ground forces were welded together in Papua and with proper naval support their indissoluble union points the way to victory through new and broadened strategic and tactical conceptions.

*General MacArthur’s statement ends.*

3. I am convinced that this campaign has demonstrated the efficacy of certain principles of modern warfare—the results of which are so important and encouraging as to warrant a review of the present broad strategy of the United Nations and the allocation of additional operational and transport aircraft to the South West Pacific area to permit of the earliest possible extension of offensive action against the Japanese.

4. These operations have been an extraordinary demonstration of the manner in which air power, closely integrated with ground forces and under central direction of one commander, can enable effective blows to be struck at Japan’s sprawling holds on the archipelagoes in the Pacific. This technique is a substitute for a difficult amphibious operation of an island to island nature under earlier conceptions of warfare which would require vast resources in naval and merchant ships and entail opposed landings against strongly defended positions with costly losses in men. This closely co-ordinated use of land forces and air power will therefore conserve both manpower and shipping necessary to bring them and their equipment to this theatre of operations.

5. Whilst realizing the needs of other theatres I feel that if 1500 repeat 1500 additional operational and 500 additional transport aircraft can be made available to the South West Pacific Area as soon as possible in 1943, and if naval disposition can be made to give appropriate covering support, the blows that can be struck against Japan
are such that she can be driven from her island gains in the Pacific and forced to contract her lines. It is not improbable that a mortal blow might be dealt while she is still so extended and vulnerable. As you are aware Japan since the losses of Guadalcanal and Buna is concentrating her garrison strength on building up and holding an outer screen to her base at Rabaul which extends from Ambon to the Northern Solomon Islands.

6. The enemy is weakest in the air. He has been decisively outfought in this element in New Guinea and the Solomons. As the productive capacity of the United Nations now greatly exceeds that of the Axis powers, Japan cannot hope to gain air superiority if adequate allocations are made to the Pacific areas. This request for aircraft does not make any extensive demands on shipping resources, as most of the aircraft could be flown to the South West Pacific.

7. The naval support that the operations would call for does not entail any more risk than that which it is presumed Naval Headquarters of the United Nations are prepared to accept at the present time to meet the enemy under land-based air cover.

8. I am sure great credit would redound to Mr. Churchill and yourself by demonstrating that we lack nothing in comparison with our enemies and Russian allies in aggression, devising methods of warfare appropriate to the circumstances which confront us and with weapons that have been developed for hurt and discomfiture of the enemy. I am also confident that such a step will allay the growing anxiety that the Japanese are to be left indefinitely to their own devices with the consequence that the war in the Pacific even after the defeat of Germany will be of the most prolonged duration.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN CURTIN

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[CASABLANCA,] January 20, 1943.

C.C.S. 159/1

THE BomBER OFFENSIVE FROM NORTH AFRICA

1. The objects of the bomber offensive from North Africa will be, in order to [of?] time:

(a) The furtherance of operations for the eviction of all Axis forces from Africa.

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1 This paper is identical with C.C.S. 159, not printed, except for the deletion of the words, “The proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff are as follows,” at the head of the paper and the addition of the words, “including bombing required by cover plans,” following “Husky” at the close of paragraph 1(b). The memorandum was approved as amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the morning of January 20, 1943, ante, p. 860.
(b) When (a) has been achieved, infliction of the heaviest possible losses on the Axis Air and Naval forces in preparation for "Husky", including bombing required by cover plans.

(c) The direct furtherance of operation "Husky".

(d) The destruction of the oil refineries at Ploesti.

2. So far as is possible without prejudice to the achievement of objects (a), (b) and (c) above, bombing objectives will be chosen with a view to weakening the Italian will to continue the war.

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Commanding General, Services of Supply
(Somervell)

SECRET
[CASABLANCA,] January 20, 1943.
C.C.S. 162/1 ¹

U. S. AID TO RUSSIA

1. Existing U. S. estimates on the availability of shipping and the possibility of moving troops, naval forces, supplies and equipment during 1943 allow for the following U. S. sailings for Russian aid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) To North Russia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) To Persian Gulf</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) In Pacific</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Average from U. S. and Russian Pool)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shipments beyond June are estimated at the same rate.

2. Owing to limited capacity of Persian Gulf ports and the discontinuance of the North Atlantic route, U. S. commitments under the existing Protocol ² have been only about 50 percent of requirements for the last six months, necessitating the shipment of three-fourths of the year's total during the first half of the year 1943. This will require a total of 432 sailings from the U. S. to Russia prior to July

¹ With the exception of paragraphs 14 and 15, the revisions of which were discussed and agreed upon at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the morning of January 20 (ante, p. 656), this paper is identical with the earlier version, C.C.S. 162, January 19, 1943, not printed.

² Regarding the Second (Washington) Soviet Supply Protocol of October 6, 1942, see footnote 3, ante, p. 596.
1, 1943. If Protocol commitments after July 1 are at the same rate as for the year prior to that time, two-thirds this number, or 288 sailings, will be required.

3. As the route through the Pacific is subject to interruption by the Japanese at any moment and as arms and ammunition do not move via that route, it cannot be relied on for any great increase above the present sailings.

4. It is expected that the capacity of Persian Gulf ports can be expanded to handle a total of 26 ships per month by June 1943.

5. For the northern route on the basis of 12 British cargo ships and two tankers there would remain available 16 sailings from the U. S. every convoy. Owing to the restricted supply of escorts, it seems that the convoy interval will not be reduced below 42 days. With ice hazards and the menace of submarines and air attacks, it is hardly possible that total sailings will exceed this rate.

6. The total sailings for the year could therefore be on the following order:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NORTH RUSSIA</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSIAN ROUTE</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PACIFIC ROUTE</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sailings on this order would fail to meet Protocol requirements in July by 56 ships, but would permit meeting full commitments by the end of the calendar year.

7. It will be noted from Tables I and II that the following additional sailings would be required for such a program resulting in the necessity for the use of additional cargo ships for the period of a year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADDITIONAL SAILINGS REQUIRED</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. The effect of meeting the Russian Protocol on the movement of U. S. troops overseas and maintaining them thereafter would be on the following order:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>No. of troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Quarter</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Quarter</td>
<td>82,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Quarter</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Quarter</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>187,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. As requirements for other theaters are more or less fixed, the blow would fall on movements to the U. K. Some adjustment might be necessary in timing of Russian shipment to avoid interference with special requirements.

10. Additional tonnage above that assumed in existing estimates might be made available: (a) by reduction in the rate of submarine losses below the 2.6 percent assumed in these calculations; (b) by eliminating conversion of 100 EC 2's into transports; (c) by savings through the use of the Mediterranean route; (d) release of U. S. from obligation to replace British losses in like amount.

11. A reduction in rate of loss of United Nations shipping from 2.6 percent per month to only 2.0 percent per month would increase the troop carrying capacity in 1943 by 500,000 men. Even a third of this, or a reduction of the loss rate to 2.4 percent, would make these shipments to Russia possible, without lessening troop movements. With the measures projected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such an improvement is a possibility.

12. If conversion of EC 2's were stopped at the end of February, a gain in transport capacity of 153,000 would be possible. If losses are not reduced or no assistance from British sources for this purpose can be obtained, such a course would be desirable.

13. The British have already discounted the estimated gain in the Mediterranean by diverting this tonnage to British imports.

14. The U. S. is committed to replace losses in British tonnage in accordance with an agreement dated November 30, 1942. If there is a reduction in the number of sinkings the assistance required will be reduced. As a reduction is expected in some measure there will be a credit on this account.

15. It is concluded from the above that the possibility exists of meeting Russian Protocol deliveries on the present scale during 1943 without reducing tentative schedules, but that the possibility exists that movements to the U. K. may be reduced by as much as 100,000 men. The advantages of furnishing aid to Russia are such that this hazard should be accepted. Owing to the scarcity of shipping, there should
be a general agreement that all tonnage above minimum requirements
should be assigned to combined troop movements.

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J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff ¹

C.C.S. 166/1/D

THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

Directive to the appropriate British and U.S. Air Force Commanders,
to govern the operation of the British and U.S. Bomber Com-
mands in the United Kingdom (Approved by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff at their 65th Meeting on January 21, 1943)

1. Your primary object will be the progressive destruction and
dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system,
and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point
where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

2. Within that general concept, your primary objectives, subject to
the exigencies of weather and of tactical feasibility, will for the present
be in the following order of priority:

(a) German submarine construction yards.
(b) The German aircraft industry.
(c) Transportation.
(d) Oil plants.
(e) Other targets in enemy war industry.

The above order of priority may be varied from time to time according
to developments in the strategical situation. Moreover, other objec-
tives of great importance either from the political or military point
of view must be attacked. Examples of these are:

1) Submarine operating bases on the Biscay coast. If these can
be put out of action, a great step forward will have been taken in the
U-boat war which the C.C.S. have agreed to be a first charge on our
resources. Day and night attacks on these bases have been inaugu-
rated and should be continued so that an assessment of their effects
can be made as soon as possible. If it is found that successful results
can be achieved, these attacks should continue whenever conditions
are favorable for as long and as often as is necessary. These objectives
have not been included in the order of priority, which covers long-
term operations, particularly as the bases are not situated in Germany.

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¹This directive to the appropriate British and U.S. Air Force Commanders
was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on January 21,
1943 (see ante, p. 669). This was a revised and expanded version of C.C.S. 166,
January 20, 1943, which was a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff en-
titled "The Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom" suggesting that a draft
directive be issued by the C.C.S. to govern the bomber offensive. For the origi-
nal versions of paragraph 2 and paragraph 7 (paragraph 6 of the six-paragraph
C.C.S. 166), see footnote 6, ante, p. 670 and footnote 5, p. 669.
(2) Berlin, which should be attacked when conditions are suitable for the attainment of specially valuable results unfavorable to the morale of the enemy or favorable to that of Russia.

3. You may also be required, at the appropriate time, to attack objectives in Northern Italy in connection with amphibious operations in the Mediterranean theater.

4. There may be certain other objectives of great but fleeting importance for the attack of which all necessary plans and preparations should be made. Of these, an example would be the important units of the German Fleet in harbor or at sea.

5. You should take every opportunity to attack Germany by day, to destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on the German day fighter force, and to contain German fighter strength away from the Russian and Mediterranean theaters of war.

6. When the Allied armies reenter the Continent, you will afford them all possible support in the manner most effective.

7. In attacking objectives in occupied territories, you will conform to such instructions as may be issued from time to time for political reasons by His Majesty’s Government through the British Chiefs of Staff.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

C.C.S. 165/2

CASABLANCA, January 22, 1943

DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN TO PREMIER STALIN

1. We have been in conference with our Military Advisers for the past ten days, and we have decided the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in 1943. We think that you would wish to know our intentions at once.

1 At their meeting on the morning of January 19, the Combined Chiefs of Staff appointed a Subcommittee to prepare a draft telegram from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin setting forth American-British intentions for 1943; see item 4 of the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting, ante, p. 640. The first version of the draft telegram, designated C.C.S. 165, January 20, 1943, was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on January 21; see ante, p. 672. Changes suggested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were embodied by the Subcommittee in a revised version of the draft telegram designated C.C.S. 165/1, January 21, 1943. At their meeting on January 22, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered and slightly revised C.C.S. 165/1; see ante, p. 680. The paper printed here incorporates the additional changes made by the Combined Chiefs. Variations between C.C.S. 165, C.C.S. 165/1, and C.C.S. 165/2 are indicated in the following footnotes.

The paper printed here was revised still further by Roosevelt and Churchill and their advisers at meetings at Casablanca on January 23 and at Marrakech on January 24; for the subsequent revision and the text of the telegram as actually sent to Stalin, see post, pp. 803 and 806.
2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving early and decisive victory in the European Theater. At the same time, we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theaters such as your Maritime Provinces.

3. A constant consideration has been the necessity of diverting strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and of sending to Russia the maximum flow of supplies, consistent with equally urgent requirements in other theaters. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance by every available route, but it would be no more in your interest than ours to do so at a cost which would cripple our capacity to relieve pressure on you by continuing an intensified offensive effort on our part.

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up the naval and air installations to open:

(a) An effective passage through the Mediterranean for military traffic, and
(b) An intensive bombardment of important Axis installations in Southern Europe.

5. We have made the decision to launch large scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment.\(^2\) The preparation for these operations is now under way and \(^3\) will involve a considerable concentration of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping in Egyptian and \(^4\) North African ports. This concentration will certainly be known to our enemies, but they will not know where or when, or in what strength, we propose to strike. They will, therefore, be compelled to reinforce with both land and air forces the South of France, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete, and the Dodecanese.\(^5\)

\(^2\) In C.C.S. 165, this sentence read as follows: “It is our intention to undertake considerable amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment.”

\(^3\) The phrase “is now under way and” was not included in C.C.S. 165 but was included in C.C.S. 165/1.

\(^4\) The phrase “Egyptian and” was not included either in C.C.S. 165 or in C.C.S. 165/1.

\(^5\) In C.C.S. 165 this paragraph continued as follows:

“In particular, they will be compelled to spread their fighter defences over a very wide area in order to meet the continuous and ever-increasing bombardment to which they will be subjected as soon as we can release our bomber forces from the task of clearing North Africa. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half of German air force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that the operations which we are undertaking will compel further withdrawals from the Russian Front.”

Paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 165/1 contained the following additional sentence: “In particular, they will be compelled to spread their fighter defenses over a still wider area in order to meet the continuous and ever-increasing bombardment to which they will be subjected.”
6. These operations may result in the collapse of Italy. The defection of other German satellite states would probably follow. Germany would then be faced with the choice of shortening her eastern line by a major withdrawal on your front, or of accepting a shortage of some fifty divisions and 2,000 aircraft in her global requirements.

7. In Europe we shall increase the Allied Bomber offensive from the U.K. against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it should be more than double its present strength. Our experiences to date have shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo and weight of daylight and night attacks will lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength in Germany and occupied Western Europe. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our greatly intensified bombing offensive, together with the other operations which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air and other forces from the Russian front. 6

8. We shall also concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum American land and air forces that shipping will permit. 7 These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will be held in constant readiness to reenter the Continent of Europe as soon as this operation offers reasonable prospect of success.

9. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Rabaul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to reopen our channel of supply to China. We shall not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take advantage of any favorable oppor-

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6 In C.C.S. 165 the equivalent paragraph, paragraph 8, read as follows: “We shall, of course, continue and intensify the Allied bomber offensive from the United Kingdom against German.”

Paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 165/1 read as follows:

“In Europe we shall increase the Allied bomber offensive from the U.K. against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it will attain great destructive power. By the middle of the year, it should be more than double its present strength. Our experiences to date have shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo of daylight attacks will lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength in Germany and occupied Western Europe. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our greatly intensified bombing offensive, together with the other operations which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air from the Russian front.”

7 In C.C.S. 165 the first sentence of the equivalent paragraph, paragraph 7, read as follows: “Concurrently with amphibious operations from the North African shore, we shall concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum American land and air forces that shipping will permit.”
tunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

J. C. S. Files

Report by the British Joint Planning Staff

SECRET
C.C.S. 167

[Casablanca,] January 22, 1943.

CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS IN 1943

1. In view of the recommendations approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 155/1, for the “Conduct of the War in 1943,” we examine below the possibilities of cross-channel operations in 1943.

Object of Operations:

2. The objects of cross-channel operations in 1943 may be set down as:

(a) Raids with the primary object of provoking a major air battle and causing the enemy loss.

(b) Operations with the object of seizing and holding a bridgehead and, if the state of German morale and strength of her resources permit, of exploiting success.

(c) Operations on a larger scale to take advantage of German disintegration.

Assumption as to Date:

3. Where figures are quoted, we have assumed a target date of August 1st.

Resources:

4. The number of divisions available will be twelve British, including one airborne, and about four American.

5. Training of naval crews will be the limiting factor in the provision of landing craft for the initial assaults. It is estimated that, without U. S. assistance, the maximum lift which can be provided will be:

Initial assault force: Two brigade groups, with proportion of armor and commandos.

Total lift including initial assault force: Two infantry divisions and one armored group; and a proportion of armor can be mounted in the initial assault.

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1 This report was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the afternoon of January 22, 1943; see ante, p. 688.

2 Ante, p. 774.
Note: This is on the assumption that the British are not required to provide the U.S. with armored landing craft for Mediterranean operations.

6. There will by August 1943 be sufficient air forces, British and American, to support a limited cross-channel operation either against the Pas de Calais or the Cotentin Peninsula, provided operations in the Mediterranean have not drawn too heavily on our Fighter reserves. The decision to carry out such an operation would, however, entail a reorganization of part of the Metropolitan Air Force with a consequent brake on its expansion and operational effort.

Estimated Scale of German Resistance:

7. It may be assumed that the Germans will continue to develop their system of coast defenses, but it is fair to expect that the formations holding these defenses will be of poorer quality than at present.

8. The reserves which the Germans will be able to bring against us must depend entirely on the progress of operations elsewhere in Europe.

In the worst case, if they succeeded without heavy losses in stabilizing their Eastern front on the shortened line of R. Dnieper, and in checking our operations in the Mediterranean, they might rebuild their reserves in Northwest Europe to approximately the level of November 1942, i.e., 41 divisions.

It is possible, however, that they may be forced to make further substantial reductions in the number of their reserve formations in Northwest Europe, and that their capacity to reinforce Northwest France rapidly may be decreased.

9. It is improbable that the strength of the German Air Force on the Western Front will be less than it has been during the last six months, i.e., about 1,000 first line aircraft of all types. In the event of a clear threat of a large-scale landing by our forces in North France or in the Low Countries, the G.A.F. might be prepared to withdraw forces both from the Mediterranean and Russia to increase this strength to 1,500.

Possible Areas for Raids:

10. Raids of which the primary object is to provoke an air battle would best be conducted against the Pas de Calais, but the nature of the defenses would be extremely costly to the assault forces.

Possible Area for a Limited Bridgehead Operation:

11. The Cotentin Peninsula is the only possible objective for offensive operations of which the object is to remain on the Continent, as it is the only area with a short and easily defensible line within reasonable distance of the beaches, and one which, at the same time, permits reasonable air support.
Combined Commanders' Plan for Assault of the Cotentin Peninsula
(Operation Hadrian):

12. In November 1942 the Combined Commanders in London made a detailed study of the problems involved in an assault to seize and hold the Cotentin Peninsula, on the assumption that the Germans could bring up to 15 reserve divisions against the assaulting force during the first fourteen days. They concluded that the minimum requirements for success were:

(a) Initial assault to be made by 5 brigade groups.
(b) Assault to be supported by 10 parachute battalions and an airborne division, less one parachute brigade, for lifting which 847 transport aircraft would be required.
(c) The total force, including assault forces, to be approximately 8 divisions.
(d) The build-up of fighting troops to be substantially complete by evening of D + 1.

General Eisenhower did not himself see the plan, but his representatives collaborated in its preparation and fully concurred in the conclusion as to minimum requirements.

Practicability of Operation With Forces Set Out in Paragraph 5:

13. With the resources available in 1943, neither the size of the seaborne and airborne assault forces nor the rate of build up can approach the requirements of the Combined Commanders. It is clear, therefore, that no operation to seize and hold a footing in the Cotentin Peninsula has any prospect of success unless the German reserves have been very greatly reduced. Similar considerations would apply to a limited operation anywhere on the French coast.

14. There is, however, a good prospect that the German reserves will in fact be greatly reduced by August. It will, therefore, be necessary to make a detailed examination to determine:

(a) Whether with the small assault forces available, it is possible successfully to assault the Cotentin Peninsula.
(b) If such an assault is practicable, to what level German reserves in Northwest France must be reduced in order to give our forces a reasonable chance of holding the Peninsula.

15. It can, however, be said at once, without further examination, that:

(a) A minimum of four brigade groups in the initial assault will almost certainly be necessary.
(b) Shortage of seaborne assault troops will make provision of airborne troops the more necessary.
(c) To insure the success of the initial assault against the strong defenses of the French coast, and to reduce casualties among the assaulting troops, maximum allotment of support craft will be necessary.
(d) The limiting factor in the rate of subsequent build-up is availability of vehicle-carrying craft.
Possibility of Exploiting a Limited Operation:

16. In view of the limited capacity of the port of Cherbourg, operations to exploit success must be designed to secure additional port facilities so as to permit the maintenance of larger forces. Such operations might take the form of an advance by a mobile force, supported by seaborne and airborne assaults, either eastwards to capture the Seine ports or southwestwards to secure the Breton ports. In either instance, preliminary operations would be necessary to expand the bridgehead so as to obtain the use of the port of Caen and the group of airfields in that area.

17. The practicability of undertaking such subsequent operations will, however, depend entirely on the state of German morale and on the extent to which they are able to concentrate reserves to oppose our further advance. The rapidity with which such operations can be undertaken will in any case depend on the rate at which we are able to reconstruct the ports and to build up our own forces and reserves. Even if German opposition is negligible, progress will be slow on account of our limited resources in vehicle-carrying craft suitable for landing over beaches.

Operations on a Larger Scale To Take Advantage of German Disintegration:

18. The return to the Continent in the case of German disintegration will be primarily an administrative problem. The Combined Commanders in London should therefore be instructed to make the necessary plans.

Conclusions:

19. 
(a) Unless the Germans are forced to reduce their reserves and their beach defenses in Northwest Europe substantially, no limited operation to seize and hold a footing in France is practicable with the resources likely to be available in 1943.

(b) A detailed plan for an operation to seize and hold the Cotentin Peninsula should be made on the basis of resources likely to be available.

(c) An examination should be made to determine to what level German reserves in Northwest Europe must sink in order to give such an operation a reasonable chance of success.

(d) Preparations should be made to mount the operation by August 1st, but the decision to put this plan into execution should be deferred until a reasonably firm estimate of the German reserves on that date can be made.

(e) Outline plans should be made for further operations to exploit success in the event of a breakdown in German morale, e.g., to extend the bridgehead to include Caen and subsequently to secure either the North Seine or Breton group of ports.
(f) The Combined Commanders in London should be instructed to draw up plans for a return to the Continent in the case of German disintegration.

(g) U. S. Government will have to provide:

1. Assault shipping and landing craft, manned by U. S. crews, to carry at least two brigade groups as assault scales.
2. Such additional parachute battalions and transport aircraft as may be necessary.

(h) All possible steps should be taken to provide:

1. Support craft for the assault.
2. The maximum number of improvised craft for carriage of vehicles.

(Signed) C. E. LAMBE
          G. M. STEWART
          W. ELLIOT

J. C. S. Files

Note by the Combined Staff Planners

SECRET
C.C.S. 169

[CASABLANCA,] January 22, 1943.

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND, CONTROL, PLANNING AND TRAINING FOR OPERATIONS FOR A REENTRY TO THE CONTINENT ACROSS THE CHANNEL, BEGINNING IN 1943

1. Strategic Basis: The Combined Chiefs of Staff agree that there is no chance of our being able to stage a large scale invasion of the Continent against unbroken opposition during 1943. Their policy is, however, that we should:

(a) Undertake such limited operations as may be practicable with the forces available and
(b) Assemble the strongest possible force (subject to certain prior commitments in other theaters) in constant readiness to reenter the Continent as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent.

2. The organization should therefore provide for:

(a) Small scale amphibious operations, such as the progressive re-occupation of the Channel Islands.
(Note: Raids are already adequately taken care of by the existing organization.)
(b) The need to reenter the Continent with all available forces at the shortest possible notice in the event of a sudden and unexpected collapse of German resistance. The aim would be to seize critical political and military centers in Germany in the shortest possible time.

1 This paper was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the afternoon of January 22, 1943; see ante, p. 688.
(c) Operations to seize a bridgehead late in 1943, leading up to a rapid exploitation or
(d) An invasion in force in 1944.

3. Need for a Directive: The first thing that is essential, whatever organization is set up, is a clear directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff setting out the objects of the plans and the resources likely to be available. In this latter connection some inevitable difficulty arises from the fact that—except for the operation in paragraph 2 (a)—preparations for the other possible operations must be based, not on any given strength of forces available nor on any fixed estimate of enemy opposition to be encountered, but on the maximum forces that are likely to be available in the U. K. at any given time. Moreover, it is virtually impossible to fix a date, because that must depend entirely on the state of enemy resistance on the Continent.

All plans and preparations must therefore be extremely flexible.

4. Training: In order that training and preparation of the forces may not be unduly hampered by the maintenance of an unnecessarily high state of readiness, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should issue instructions on this point. In the first instance, the degree of notice might be fixed at three months. But planning for the operation described in paragraph 2 (b) above must be on the basis of immediate reentry into the Continent at the shortest possible notice with whatever resources are available at the time.

5. Principles of Command and Planning: It is suggested that 2 (a), small scale operations, such as the Channel Islands, should they be considered desirable either separately or as part of a larger operation, could adequately be dealt with by C.C.O.'s organization on the same lines as was the Dieppe raid.2

6. As regards the larger operations in 2 (b), (c), and (d), the governing principle should be that the responsibility for planning and training should rest with, or under the direction of, the Commanders who will have to carry out the plans, who will be the same Commanders for all three operations. These should be designated at once.

7. Supreme Command: This raises the question of a Supreme Commander. It is considered that when the operations in 2 (b) to (d) become reasonably imminent, a Supreme Commander must be appointed. He should have a small combined staff of British and American officers of all three services, and under him will be subordinate commanders, air, land and sea, corresponding to the organization just approved for the operations in the Mediterranean.

It is considered desirable that the Supreme Commander should be appointed at once. If this is not feasible, his Chief of Staff or Deputy

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2 For a brief account of the Canadian-British amphibious attack on the French coastal town of Dieppe on August 19, 1942, see Harrison, p. 55.
and a nucleus of the combined staff should be appointed immediately to give the necessary impetus and cohesion to planning.

8. The present "Round-Up" Planning Staff: For some months a special inter-Allied staff drawn from all three services has been in existence working together in one building in London, studying the problem and planning for a return to the Continent. In this way much specialized experience has been gained and planning has progressed far beyond the staff study stage. In particular, a great deal of administrative work has been done and measures—such as the acquisition and preparation of airfields—actually put in hand.

9. This special planning staff should be adapted to the new conditions and strengthened by the addition of American personnel. They should work, under the direction of the Supreme Commander (or his deputy until he is appointed), in conjunction with the nucleus of his combined staff in London.

Administrative planning will have to be done very largely by the normal administrative staffs in the Service Departments and in H.Q. E.T.O. U.S.A. These Headquarters should, however, appoint representatives to form, together with the Administrative Staff in Norfolk House, a joint administrative planning staff for the reentry to the Continent.

One of the first tasks of the Supreme Commander (or his deputy) should be to simplify the existing system of interdepartmental administrative planning which, at present, is unduly cumbersome.

J.C.S. Files

Final Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister

SECRET

C.C.S. 170/2

[CASABLANCA,] January 23, 1943.

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 155/1) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented their proposals for the Conduct of the War in 1943. These proposals were in broad outline, and we have subsequently examined them and reached certain conclusions on points of detail. We have also studied a number of matters closely related to these proposals. The present memorandum contains a summary of what has been accomplished.

1 The original draft of this paper prepared by the Combined Secretariat, designated C.C.S. 170, January 22, 1943, was reviewed and revised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and redesignated C.C.S. 170/1, January 23, 1943. C.C.S. 170/1, as reviewed and revised in conformity to the wishes of the President and the Prime Minister on January 23, 1943 (ante, p. 708), became the final document here printed as C.C.S. 170/2. Variations between C.C.S. 170/1 and C.C.S. 170/2 are indicated in footnotes.

2 Ante, p. 774.
1. Security of Sea Communications:

A close examination of the minimum escort requirements to maintain the sea communications of the United Nations has been completed (C.C.S. 160). In the course of this examination we have laid down certain scales of ocean-going escort vessels as the minimum acceptable. Our broad conclusion is that the minimum acceptable requirements of escort craft will not be met until about August or September 1943. We ought not to count on the destruction of U-boats at a rate in excess of the production rate before the end of the year. If it is desired to provide escorts for offensive operations, the acceptance of increased losses must be balanced against the importance of the operations in question. We have adopted certain resolutions on measures necessary to intensify the anti-U-boat war. C.C.S. 65th Meeting, Item 1.

2. Assistance to Russia in Relation to Other Commitments:

We have examined the extent of the shipments to Russia required to fulfill United States and British obligations throughout 1943 with a view to estimating the effect of these shipments on other commitments. Our conclusion is that, provided a shipping loss rate of not more than 2.4 percent per month can be relied on, it will be possible to meet full commitments by the end of the calendar year 1943; and we have approved a program of shipments on this basis subject to the proviso that supplies to Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations effort.

An essential point is that an agreed loss rate for 1943 shall be established so that all British and American calculations can be made on the same basis. We have accordingly directed the Combined Military Transportation Committee to make an agreed estimate.

We are agreed that in the preparation of the next Protocol with Russia (should this be necessary) to cover the period after July 1, 1943, a clause should be inserted to the effect that the commitments included in the Protocol may be reduced if the shipping losses or the necessities of other operations render their fulfilment prohibitive. (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 1, and C.C.S. 162)

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* C.C.S. 160, January 19, 1943, Report by the Combined Staff Planners entitled "Minimum Escort Requirements to Maintain the Sea Communications of the United Nations", not printed. Some salient points of this paper are briefly summarized in Leighton and Coakley, pp. 558 and 675.

* ante, p. 667.

* ante, p. 666.

* C.C.S. 162, January 19, 1943, a joint memorandum by Somervell and Leathers entitled "U.S. Aid to Russia", not printed. With the exception of the revisions of paragraphs 14 and 15, which were discussed and agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the morning of January 20, C.C.S. 162 is identical with C.C.S. 162/1, January 20, 1943, ante, p. 778.
3. Operations in the Mediterranean:

(a) Operations For The Capture of Sicily:

We have carefully examined possible operations in the Mediterranean theater and we have recorded the following conclusions: (C.C.S. 66th Meeting, Item 2, and C.C.S. 161/1).

1. To attack Sicily in 1943 with the favorable July moon as the target date.

2. To instruct General Eisenhower to report not later than March 1st: firstly, whether any insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favorable July moon; and, secondly, in that event to confirm that the date will not be later than the favorable August moon.

3. That the following should be the Command set-up for the operation:

   a. General Eisenhower to be in Supreme Command with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, charged with the detailed planning and preparation and with the execution of the actual operation when launched.

   b. Admiral Cunningham to be Naval Commander, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.

   c. Recommendations for the officers to be appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders to be submitted in due course by General Eisenhower.

4. That General Eisenhower should be instructed to set up forthwith, after consultation with General Alexander, a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the operation.

The necessary directive to General Eisenhower conveying the above decisions has been drafted.

(b) Cover Plans:

We intend to instruct the appropriate agencies in Washington and London and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa, to draw up a comprehensive cover plan for the Mediterranean. The possibility of carrying out feints or minor operations in the Eastern Mediterranean will be examined.

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7 Ante, p. 681.
8 C.C.S. 161/1, January 21, 1943, Report by the British Joint Planning Staff entitled "Operation Husky", not printed. Set forth those proposals and recommendations requested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the conclusion of item 1 of their meeting on the morning of January 20, ante, p. 665.
9 A footnote in the source text at this point reads as follows: "We have agreed that without prejudicing the July date for the operation, an intense effort will be made during the next three weeks to achieve by contrivance and ingenuity the favorable June moon period as the date for the operation. If at the end of the three weeks our efforts have proved successful, the instructions to General Eisenhower will be modified accordingly." This annotation was not included in the earlier version of the Report (C.C.S. 170/1), but it was included in this final version by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the evening of January 23 in conformity with the wishes of Roosevelt and Churchill expressed at their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff earlier on the same day.
(c) Command in the Mediterranean Theater:

We have agreed to the following Command arrangements in the Mediterranean: (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 4\(^{10}\) and C.C.S. 163\(^{11}\)).

(1) Sea:

For operation Husky the Naval Commander Force X will assume the title of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The present Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will be designated Commander-in-Chief, Levant. The boundary between the two Commands will be determined later.\(^{12}\) The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will, however, be responsible for naval matters which affect the Mediterranean as a whole.

(2) Land:

At a moment to be determined after the British 8th Army has crossed the Tunisian border, General Alexander will become Deputy Commander-in-Chief to General Eisenhower, the 8th Army at the same time being transferred to General Eisenhower’s command. Subject to the concurrence of General Eisenhower, General Alexander’s primary task will be to command the Allied forces on the Tunisian front with a small Headquarters of his own provided from the Middle East and after the conclusion of these operations to take charge of Operation Husky. The boundary between the North African and Middle East Commands will be the Tunisian-Tripolitania frontier.

(3) Air:

We have agreed that Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder shall be appointed Air Commander-in-Chief of the whole Mediterranean theater with his Headquarters at Algiers. Under him will be the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Northwest Africa (General Spaatz), and the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Middle East (Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas). We have defined the relationship and mutual responsibilities of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Forces in Northwest Africa, and we have laid down certain principles for the organization of the Mediterranean Air Command subject to any minor changes which the Air Commander-in-Chief may find necessary after his appointment.

(d) The Bomber Offensive from North Africa:

We have laid down the following as the objects of the bomber offensive from North Africa in order of time (C.C.S. 159/1\(^{13}\)):

1. The furtherance of operations for the eviction of all Axis Forces from Africa.
2. When (1) has been achieved, infliction of the heaviest possible losses on the Axis Air and Naval forces in preparation for Husky, including bombing required by cover plans.
3. The direct furtherance of Operation Husky.
4. The destruction of the oil refineries at Ploesti.

\(^{10}\) Ante, p. 660.

\(^{11}\) C.C.S. 163, January 20, 1943, Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff entitled “System of Air Command in the Mediterranean”, not printed.

\(^{12}\) In the earlier version of the Report (C.C.S. 170/1), this sentence read as follows: “The boundary between the two Commands will be drawn from Zante to Bardia.”

\(^{13}\) Ante, p. 777.
So far as is possible without prejudice to the achievement of objects (1), (2), and (3) above, bombing objectives will be chosen with a view to weakening the Italian will to continue the war.

4. Operations in and from the United Kingdom:

(a) The Operation of Air Forces from the United Kingdom:

We have agreed that the United States Heavy Bombardment Units in the United Kingdom shall operate under the strategical direction of the British Chief of the Air Staff. Under this general direction the United States Commanding General will decide upon the technique and method to be employed. (C.C.S. 65th Meeting, Item 2.16)

We have agreed upon a directive (C.C.S. 166/1/D)15 to be issued to the British Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command and to the Commanding General United States Air Forces in the United Kingdom.

(b) Bolero:

(C.C.S. 172 16 and C.C.S. 68th Meeting, Item 1 17)

A study has been made of the shipping capabilities for Bolero build-up in 1943.

With the data available at the conference and making a number of assumptions which are set out in full in C.C.S. 172, Enclosure “C”, we calculate that the U.S. Forces as shown in the following table will be available for Continental operations in the U. K. on the dates shown. The figures given in the last column include the build-up of the air contingent to 172,000. They may be regarded as the minimum, and every effort will be made to increase the number of trained and equipped divisions in the United Kingdom by August 15th.16

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<td>988,000</td>
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This is based on (1) the figures of 50,000 troops per division with supporting troops; (2) 45 days allowance between sailing date and availability date.

As the movement proceeds the over-all number of men per division will decrease and by the end of the year it may be down to 40,000 in which case the number of divisions available on December 31st may be

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15 Ante, p. 669.
16 Ante, p. 781.
17 C.C.S. 172, January 22, 1943, Note by Lieutenant General Somervell entitled “Shipping Capabilities for Bolero Build-up”, not printed; for a discussion and summary of the salient points of this paper, see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 676–677.
18 Ante, p. 697.
19 The final sentence of this paragraph had not been included in the earlier version of the Report (C.C.S. 170/1).
19 instead of 15. The number of divisions earlier in the year is unlikely to be increased.

(c) Amphibious Operations in 1943 from the United Kingdom: (C.C.S. 167 and C.C.S. 67th Meeting, Item 2.)

We have examined the problem of amphibious operations from the United Kingdom in 1943. There are three types of operation for which plans and preparations must now be made:

(1) Raids with the primary object of provoking air battles and causing enemy losses.
(2) Operations with the object of seizing and holding a bridge-head and, if the state of German morale and resources permit, of vigorously exploiting successes.
(3) A return to the Continent to take advantage of German disintegration.

Plans and preparations for (1) above will proceed as at present. An attack on the Channel Islands is an example of the type of operation which we have in mind.

We propose to prepare for an operation against the Cotentin Peninsula with resources which will be available, the target date being set at August 1, 1943. This operation comes under type (2) above.

We have agreed to establish forthwith a Combined Staff under a British Chief of Staff until such time as a British Supreme Commander, with an American Deputy Commander, is appointed. A directive to govern the planning is in course of preparation. We intend to include in this directive provision for a return to the Continent under (3) above with the forces which will be available for the purpose in the United Kingdom month by month.

9. [677] Pacific and Far East Theater:

(a) Operations in the Pacific Theater:

(C.C.S. 168 and C.C.S. 67th Meeting, Item 1.)

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30 *Ans*, p. 785.
31 *Ans*, p. 789. In the earlier version of the Report (C.C.S. 170/1) there was no reference at this point to C.C.S. 169.
32 *Ans*, p. 698.
33 This last paragraph under (c) (3) was revised at the final meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the evening of January 23. In the earlier version of the Report (C.C.S. 170/1) this paragraph read as follows:

“We have agreed to establish forthwith a Combined Staff under a British Chief of Staff until such time as a Supreme Commander is appointed. A directive to govern the planning is in course of preparation. We intend to include in this directive provision for a return to the Continent under (3) above with the forces which will be available for the purpose in the United Kingdom month by month. The directive will also make provision for the planning of an invasion of the Continent in force in 1944.” (J.C.S. Files)
34 For the text of C.C.S. 168, January 22, 1943, memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff entitled “Conduct of the War in the Pacific Theater in 1943”, see Morton, Appendix H, p. 627. At their meeting on the afternoon of January 22, 1943, *ante*, p. 687, the Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of the proposals set forth by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 168.
The following is an outline of the operations which it is intended to carry out in the Pacific in conformity with the provisions of our previous report (C.C.S. 155/1):

(1) Operations to make the Aleutians as secure as may be.
(2) An advance from Midway towards Truk-Guam as practicable and particularly in conjunction with the operations now in hand for the capture of Rabaul.
(3) An advance along the line Samoa-Jaluit.
(4) An advance on the Malay Barrier (as Timor) on a limited scale to counter enemy capabilities and divert his forces.
(5) It is not intended to advance from the Rabaul area towards the Truk-Guam line unless and until forces are in hand to enable the advance to be carried through and followed up.

(b) Support of China:

(1) Immediate Operations:
Subsequent to the operations now in progress which are aimed at the capture of Akyab, a limited advance from Assam will be carried out to gain bridgeheads for further operations; to improve the air transport route to China by enabling aircraft to fly at lower altitudes; and, if Chinese cooperation is available, to gain ground for additional airfields and to extend the air warning system.

(2) Operations In China:
In order to support the Chinese war effort, to provide means for intensifying attacks on Japanese shipping, and to strike at Japan herself when opportunity offers, it is intended to improve air transportation into China by supplying additional transport aircraft, and to build up the U.S. Air Forces now operating in China to the maximum extent that logistical limitations and other important claims will permit. We hope that more sustained operations with increased Air Forces may begin in the spring, and we regard this development as of great importance in the general scheme.

(3) Reconquest of Burma and Reopening of the Burma Road:
We have approved November 15, 1943, as the provisional date for the Anakim assault. It will be necessary to decide in July 1943 whether to undertake or to postpone the operation (C.C.S. 65th Meeting, Item 4).

We have prepared a provisional schedule of the forces required for the operation and have investigated the possibility of their provision. The land and air forces can be provided. The provision of naval...
forces, assault shipping, landing craft and shipping cannot be guaranteed so far in advance and must depend upon the situation existing in the late summer of 1943 (C.C.S. 164 27).

6. The Axis Oil Position:

We have had before us certain information from British sources on the Axis oil position (C.C.S. 158 28). It is believed that additional information available in Washington may modify the conclusions which have been drawn by the British. We have accordingly directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to submit as early as possible an agreed assessment of the Axis oil situation based on the latest information available from both British and United States sources. In the meanwhile, we have taken note that the Axis oil situation is so restricted that it is decidedly advantageous that bombing attacks on the sources of Axis oil, namely, the Rumanian oil fields and oil traffic via the Danube, and the synthetic and producer gas plants in Germany, be undertaken as soon as other commitments allow (C.C.S. 62nd Meeting, Item 1 29).

7. Naval and Air Command in West Africa:

We have agreed upon the following naval and air arrangements to cover the French West African Coast (C.C.S. 61st Meeting, Item 3 30):

(a) That the West African Coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador (Rio de Oro) southward shall be an area under command of a British Naval Officer for naval operations and of a British Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval forces.

(b) That subject to (a) a sub-area extending from Cape Bojador to the western boundary of Sierra Leone and all forces operating therein shall be under French Command.

(c) That in the French sub-area the intention will be to enable French air units to take over air duties as rapidly as equipment and training permit.

8. Turkey:

We have agreed upon the administrative measures necessary to give effect to the decision that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 2 31).

27 Not printed; Combined Chiefs of Staff consideration of this paper is recorded in Item 4 of the minutes of the meeting of January 21, 1943, ante, p. 673.
28 Not printed.
29 Ante, p. 648.
30 Ante, p. 638.
31 Ante, p. 659.
Directive to the Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa (Eisenhower)¹

SECRET
C.C.S. 171/2/D

[CASABLANCA,] January 23, 1943.

Operation Husky

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved that an attack against Sicily will be launched in 1943, with the target date as the period of the favorable July* moon (Code designation Husky).

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have further agreed that the following command setup shall be established for the operation:

(a) You are to be the Supreme Commander with General Alexander as Deputy Commander in Chief, charged with the detailed planning and preparation and with the execution of the actual operation when launched.

(b) Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham is to be the Naval Commander and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.

You will submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your recommendations for the officers to be appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders.

In consultation with General Alexander you will set up at once a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the operation, including cover plans.

The provision of the necessary forces and their training in time for the assault on the target date given above have been the subject of exhaustive study by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their staffs. A Memorandum setting out the various considerations and the outline plan for the operation which formed the basis of this study is attached for your information (C.C.S. 161/1).² Case A (vide C.C.S. 161/1,

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¹ As approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their final meeting on January 23, 1943, ante, p. 720. The earliest draft of this directive, C.C.S. 171 (not printed), was considered and amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the morning of January 23, 1943, ante, p. 699. The revised directive, C.C.S. 171/1/D, January 23, 1943 (not printed), is identical with the final version except for the footnote to the word "July" in the first paragraph which was added by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their final meeting on the evening of January 23.
² The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that without prejudicing the July date for the operation, an intense effort will be made during the next three weeks to achieve by contrivance and ingenuity the favorable June moon period as the date for the operation. If at the end of the three weeks their efforts have proved successful, your instructions will be modified accordingly. [Footnote in the source text.]

²Not printed.
Enclosure “A,” paragraph 5) was accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the provision of the British Ground Forces. The details of the additional forces which will be made available to you for the operation will be communicated separately by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff.

A copy of the Minutes of the 60th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held at Casablanca on January 22, 1943, which led to the above decisions, is attached for your information.

You are to report to them not later than March 1st whether any insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favorable July moon. In the event of there being such a delay you will confirm that the assault date will not be later than the favorable August moon.

The code designation to be communicated to you later will apply to all general preparations for Husky in the Mediterranean Theater, including training, cover plans and preliminary air operations. Specific operations will be given special code designations.

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Roosevelt Papers

*President Roosevelt to President İnönü of Turkey* ¹

**VERY SECRET**  
[CASABLANCA,] January 23, 1943.

**President İnönü:** The Prime Minister, who has been conferring with me, is going shortly to Cairo. He will in all probability wish to confer with you or with your Prime Minister at some convenient secret place. In case Prime Minister Churchill does seek a conference, I earnestly hope you or your Prime Minister will find it possible to meet him.²

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¹This message was sent by Churchill to the British Foreign Office with instructions to deliver it to the American Embassy at London, which in turn was to relay it to the American Ambassador at Ankara, who was to transmit the message to President İnönü as well as to concert with his British colleague concerning the meeting proposed in the message. Telegram 651, January 25, 1943, 8 p.m., from Chargé Matthews in London to the Secretary of State for the President reported that the President's message had been received from the British Foreign Office and had been transmitted to the American Embassy in Ankara for delivery to President İnönü (Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, p. 1058). The President's message was delivered to President İnönü on January 27.

²For additional documentation regarding the exchange of messages between President Roosevelt and the Turkish President regarding the conference between Prime Minister Churchill and President İnönü at Adana, Turkey, January 30 and 31, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 1058 ff.
Roosevelt Papers

Draft Letter From President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang

[CASABLANCA,] 23 January 1943.

My Dear Generalissimo: As you probably know, the Prime Minister and I have recently conferred in North Africa with our respective Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of determining the course of action that would most effectively facilitate the defeat of all our enemies. Global strategy was discussed in general, and specific theaters were studied in detail, with a view to determining the most advantageous allocation of resources. It was agreed that we should wage war with an ever increasing tempo against Japan. The United States will intensify her efforts to drive the Japanese from the South Pacific Islands and will relentlessly harass Japanese naval and air forces, shipping and land armies.

I am sending Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Commanding General of the U. S. Army Air Forces, to you as my personal emissary to explain more fully our contemplated plans for Burma and to examine the situation with reference to air operations in the India-Burma-China area.

We will intensify our efforts to improve the situation by augmentation of the flow of supplies, particularly for the support of larger air forces to operate in China.

Mrs. Roosevelt has informed me that Madame Chiang Kai Shek is making excellent progress in the restoration of health. We are looking forward with the greatest pleasure to her visit in our home at the White House. With the victorious conclusion of the War, we will hope to have the pleasure of a visit by you which will give us the opportunity to welcome you at the White House to accept the tribute of the citizens of the United States to your heroic leadership of the Chinese people.

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1 This draft was apparently revised when it was decided that Roosevelt and Churchill would send a joint telegram to Chiang. For the final text of Roosevelt's letter to Chiang, see infra. The joint telegram is printed post, p. 507.

2 The word "all" is inserted in Roosevelt's handwriting.

3 Madame Chiang arrived in New York on November 27, 1942, in order to undergo medical treatment in the United States; see Sherwood, pp. 644 and 660.

4 For information concerning the visit of Madame Chiang to the White House in February 1943, see Department of State Bulletin, February 20, 1943, p. 165.
Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang

Casablanca, January 23, 1943.

My Dear Generalissimo: This note will be given to you by Lieutenant General Henry H. Arnold, U.S. Army, the commander of our Air Force. I am sending him to you because I am determined to increase General Chennault's air force in order that you may carry the offensive to the Japanese at once. General Arnold will work out the ways and means with you and General Chennault.

General Arnold will also tell you about the plans to intensify our efforts to drive the Japanese out of the Southwest Pacific. As I wired you,² I have been meeting with the Prime Minister and our respective Chiefs of Staff to plan our offensive strategy against Japan and Germany during 1943. I want Arnold to talk all this over with you in the greatest detail because I think it would be best that I not put it on the cables.

Mrs. Roosevelt has seen Madame Chiang Kai-Shek several times and we are all hoping that she can come to see us very soon. Her health is improving rapidly.

I have great hopes for the war in 1943, and like you, I want to press it home on the Japanese with great vigor. I want to convey not only my warm regard for you personally, but my everlasting appreciation of the service which your armies are giving to our common cause.

Cordially yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

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¹ The text of this letter as printed in Arnold, p. 415, is dated January 23, 1943. It contains minor variations in punctuation and capitalization. Arnold, who left Casablanca on January 24, delivered the letter to Chiang at Chungking in early February.

² Apparently a reference to the joint message of January 25, 1943, from the President and the Prime Minister, post, p. 897.
Mr. H. HOPKINS.

You asked me to send you a reminder about Tube Alloys—disclosure of information to United Kingdom and Canada.²

J. M. MARTIN

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¹The letter-head is “10 Downing Street, Whitehall.”
²No official record has been found of any discussion at Casablanca of the atomic bomb project. In a telegram to Hopkins on February 16, 1943, Churchill, however, did remind Hopkins of a conversation they had had on the subject, presumably during the Casablanca Conference. Churchill’s message read as follows:

“Do you remember our conversation about that very secret matter we called “Tube Alloys” which you told me would be put right as soon as the President got home? I should be grateful for some news about this, as at present the American War Department is asking us to keep them informed of our experiments while refusing altogether any information about theirs.” (Hopkins Papers)

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Roosevelt Papers

Draft Telegram From President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin¹

SECRET

[CASABLANCA, January 23, 1943.]

DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN TO PREMIER STALIN

1. We have been in conference with our Military Advisers for the past ten days,² and we have decided the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in the first nine months of 1943. We think that you would wish to know our intentions at

¹This undated paper appears to be a revision of C.C.S. 165/2, January 22, 1943 (ante, p. 782), which was prepared by Roosevelt and Churchill and their advisers at their meeting on the evening of January 23, ante, p. 722. This paper was considered further at the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill and their advisers at Marrakech late on the evening of January 24, 1943, at which the final text of the message to Stalin was completed; see ante, p. 732. One of the three copies of this draft telegram found among the Roosevelt Papers bears a number of handwritten corrections and emendations by Harriman. These corrections are indicated in footnotes at the appropriate places. For the final version of the message to Stalin, see infra.
²In the corrected copy, the phrase “for the past ten days” is crossed-out.
once. We believe these operations, together with your powerful offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943. Every effort must be made to accomplish this purpose.

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving early and decisive victory in the European theatre. At the same time, we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theatres such as your Maritime Provinces.

3. A constant consideration has been the necessity of diverting strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and of sending to Russia the maximum flow of supplies. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance by every available route.

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up the naval and air installations to open:—

   (1) An effective passage through the Mediterranean for military traffic, and
   (2) An intensive bombardment of important Axis targets in Southern Europe.

5. We have made the decision to launch large scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment. The preparation for these operations is now under way and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping in Egyptian and North African ports. This concentration will certainly be known to our enemies, but they will not know where or when, or in what strength, we propose to strike. They will, therefore, be compelled to reinforce with both land and air forces the South of France, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese.

6. We shall concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum American land and air forces that shipping will permit. These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will prepare themselves to re-enter the Continent of Europe as soon as possible.

7. In Europe we shall increase the Allied Bomber offensive from the U.K. against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it should be more than double its present strength. Our experiences to date have

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3 In the corrected copy the phrase “A constant consideration has been the necessity of diverting” is in penciled brackets.

4 In the corrected copy the word “particularly” is crossed-out and replaced by the phrase “with the necessary”.

5 In the corrected copy the phrase “that shipping will permit” is crossed-out and replaced with the phrase “to the limit of our shipping resources.”

6 In the corrected copy the word “possible” at the end of this sentence is crossed-out and replaced with the phrase “it is practical.” The following additional sentence is written in at the end of this paragraph and then crossed-out: “The enemies will be compelled to strengthen their defenses in Northern France and the Low countries.”
shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo and weight of daylight and night attacks will lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength in Germany and occupied Western Europe. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our greatly intensified bombing offensive, together with the other operation which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air and other forces from the Russian Front.

8. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Rabaul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to reopen our channel of supply to China. We intend to increase our air force in China at once. We shall not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take advantage of every opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

*In the corrected copy the phrase “and diversified” is added at this point.*

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin*¹

**MOST SECRET**

[MARRAKECH,] January 25, 1943.

**President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin**

1. We have been in conference with our military advisers and have decided the operations which are to be undertaken by American

¹The text of this message appears to have been completed at the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill and their advisers at Marrakech late on the evening of January 24, 1943; see the editorial note, ante, p. 732. For the earlier draft of the message to Stalin, see supra. The text of the joint message as presented here was transmitted in a telegram from the Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary Eden. At the same time, the British Foreign Office was informed that Roosevelt and Churchill wished the British and American Ambassadors in Moscow personally and jointly to present the message to Stalin. The British Foreign Office was directed to transmit the text to the American Embassy in London and to concert delivery of the message to Stalin. According to telegram 60, January 27, 1943, from Moscow to the Department of State, not printed, Ambassador Standley and British Chargé Baggallay delivered the joint message to Stalin at an interview on the night of January 26-27, 1943; Stalin read the message but made no comment on it at the time (740.0011 EW/27635). For an account of the delivery of the message, see William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955), pp. 327-328. For text of the message as delivered to Stalin, see Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. i, p. 86, and vol. ii, p. 51. Stalin replied to the joint message in identical messages to Roosevelt and Churchill dated January 30, 1943; for texts, see *ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 52, and vol. i, p. 89.
and British forces in the first nine months of 1943. We wish to inform you of our intentions at once. We believe these operations, together with your powerful offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943. Every effort must be made to accomplish this purpose.

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving early and decisive victory in the European theatre. At the same time, we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theatres such as your Maritime Provinces.

3. Our main desire has been to divert strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and to send to Russia the maximum flow of supplies. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance by every available route.

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up the naval and air installations to open:

(1) An effective passage through the Mediterranean for military traffic; and
(2) An intensive bombardment of important Axis targets in Southern Europe.

5. We have made the decision to launch large-scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment. The preparation for these operations is now under way and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, including landing craft and shipping in Egyptian and North African ports. In addition we shall concentrate in the United Kingdom a strong American land and air force. These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will prepare themselves to re-enter the Continent of Europe as soon as practicable. These concentrations will certainly be known to our enemies, but they will not know where or when, or on what scale we propose to strike. They will therefore be compelled to divert both land and air forces to all the shores of France, the Low Countries, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese.

6. In Europe we shall increase the Allied Bomber offensive from the U.K. against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it should be more than double its present strength. Our experiences to date have shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We

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*In the text of the message delivered to Stalin, the concluding phrase of this sentence reads as follows: “in Egypt and the North Africa ports.” See Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. i, p. 87, and vol. ii, p. 51.

*In the text of the message delivered to Stalin, the concluding phrase of this sentence reads as follows: “Sicily and the Levant, and Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete, and the Dodecanese.” See ibid., vol. i, p. 87, and vol. ii, p. 52.
believe that an increased tempo and weight of daylight and night attacks will lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our intensified and diversified bombing offensive, together with the other operations which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air and other forces from the Russian front.

7. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Rabaul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit success in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to reopen our channel of supply to China. We intend to increase our air force in China at once. We shall not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take advantage of every opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

8. Our ruling purpose is to bring to bear upon Germany and Italy the maximum forces by land, sea and air which can be physically applied.

25. 1. 43

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang

MARRAKECH, January 25, 1943.

We have been meeting in North Africa with our Chiefs of Staff, to plan our offensives and strategy for 1943. The vital importance of aiding China has filled our minds. General Arnold, the Commander of the U.S. Air Force, is already on his way to see you. We have decided that Chennault should be reinforced at once in order that you may strike not only at vital shipping routes but at Japan herself. Arnold carries to you our best judgment as to Burma. He will also advise you about our expanding operations in the South West Pacific.

1 Handwritten notations at end of file copy: “O.K. F.D.R.” “I concur, W.S.C.” The text of this message appears to have been completed at the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill and their advisers at Marrakech late on the evening of January 24, 1943; see the editorial note, ante, p. 732. The text of the joint message as presented here was transmitted in a telegram to the British Foreign Office with directions that it be sent to the American and British Embassies in Chungking for personal and joint delivery by the Ambassadors to Chiang. The Foreign Office was also directed to inform the American Embassy in London that Roosevelt had asked that Ambassador Gauss also show the message to Arnold upon the latter’s arrival in Chungking. According to telegram 148, January 27, 1943, from Chungking to the Department, Foreign Relations, 1943, China, p. 2, Ambassador Gauss and British Ambassador Seymour delivered the message on the afternoon of January 27. Chiang made no comment on the message, merely asking the Ambassadors to convey his thanks to Roosevelt and Churchill, respectively.
and our developing offensive against Germany and Italy which will follow promptly after the destruction of the Axis forces in Tunisia.

We have great confidence in the 1943 offensives of the United Nations and want to assure you that we intend with your co-operation to keep the pressure on Japan at an ever increasing tempo.

25. 1. 43.

Roosevelt Papers

The President and the Prime Minister to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

[MARRAKECH,] January 25, 1943.

In cordially approving the Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff drawn up after thorough examination of the problems, the President and the Prime Minister wish to emphasise the following points which should be steadily pressed in all preparations:

1. The desirability of finding means of running the W.J. [JW?] Russian convoys even through the Husky period.

2. The urgency of sending the air reinforcements to General Chennault's force in China and of finding means to make them fully operative.

3. The importance of achieving the favourable June moon for Husky and the grave detriment to our interests which will be incurred by an apparent suspension of activity during the summer months.

4. The need to build up more quickly the United States striking force in the United Kingdom so as to be able to profit by favourable August weather for some form of SLEDGEBAMMER. For this purpose not only the scales of initial equipment and monthly maintenance should be searchingly re-examined but the priorities of material and manpower shipments from the United States to Great Britain should be adjusted to the tactical situation likely to be presented at the target date.

F.D.R.

25. 1. 43.

W.S.C.

¹There is no record of when or where this letter was prepared, although the date of the document would seem to indicate that it was finished at the meeting which Roosevelt and Churchill held on the evening of January 24, 1943, in Marrakech; see the editorial note, ante, p. 732.
B. FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President to the Secretary of State

[Casablanca,] January 16, 1943.

Newburg 28. I have arranged with Prime Minister to bring de Gaulle here Monday. Giraud coming tomorrow. I am sure I can bring British around to our way of thinking.

It looks to me as though we have got to get a civilian into this picture. Giraud apparently has no administrative ability and French Army here will not follow de Gaulle. No Frenchman readily available here. What would you think of Jean Monnet? He seems to have kept his skirts clear of all political entanglements during the past two years and I have a very favorable impression of him. I am most anxious that this query be kept absolutely secret as any leak would spoil everything. I think Morgenthau knows Monnet and trusts him.

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1 Transmitted via military channels.
2 The decision to send invitations to de Gaulle and Giraud to come to Casablanca was presumably made at the Roosevelt-Churchill conversation on the morning of January 16; see the editorial note, ante, p. 579.
3 In his account of a 10-minute interview with Roosevelt early in the morning of January 16, 1943, Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower (p. 242), recalls having been asked by the President about de Gaulle’s popularity among the French and having told Roosevelt that Giraud had the support of the French military.
4 According to information supplied to the Historical Office by Murphy in 1962, it was Hopkins who suggested to Roosevelt that Monnet be appointed as Giraud’s political adviser. After returning to Washington after the conference, Hopkins again urged the appointment, and on February 23, 1943, Monnet left the United States for a visit to North Africa to look into the problem of supply in Africa on behalf of the Combined Munitions Assignment Board. In connection with Monnet’s mission, President Roosevelt sent telegram SVC 1842, February 22, 1943, through military channels to Eisenhower and Murphy which read in part as follows: “About 3 weeks ago General Giraud asked Monnet to come to see him. When I learned of this, I encouraged the visit; first, because Monnet knows a great deal about the whole problem of supply throughout the world and can, as well as anyone I know, tell Giraud about how the whole business works throughout the world. I am sure also he can be helpful to Murphy and Macmillan as well as Giraud in understanding the whole North African situation as viewed from here. I have discussed all of these matters fully with him and he carries a personal letter from me to you. “You know that Monnet was the Allied Chairman of the Anglo-French Co-ordinating Committee until the fall of France. Since then he has been working with the British Supply Mission here in Washington and has been in close touch with all of our combined boards. He is thoroughly familiar with whole problem of military supply and has gone over the whole matter with Somervell . . . .” (Algiers Consulate Files: 824 Supplies for French Army)

For additional documentation regarding the Monnet Mission in French North Africa, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. 11, pp. 65–175, passim.
I hoped, as you know, to avoid political discussions here, but on arrival I find newspapers in London and at home have been making such a mountain out of a rather small hill that it would be bad for me to return without having settled the matter. All well. Affectionate regards.

[ROOSEVELT]

Roosevelt Papers

The Assistant Secretary, War Department General Staff (McCarthy) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹

[CASABLANCA,] January 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS:

General Marshall has asked that the President be informed of the following excerpt from a message received from Washington:

"State Department reports Le Brun, President of France, is now in Switzerland, according to their information. They are confirming this in message to Ambassador in Switzerland and will obtain further information on Le Brun."

McCarthy

¹The source text is handwritten.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President²

[WASHINGTON,] January 17, 1943.

From Hull to Alex (McCrea from Hammond).

Thank you for your message,² and needless to say my every wish is to contribute to the success of your deliberations.

In the French situation with which you are dealing and from the information immediately available to me I am not disposed to believe Jean Monnet is the right man. His banking affiliations over a period of years includes Lazard Frères, the Paris international banking group, which incidentally is so closely tied in with the de Gaulle organization in London, and likewise Monnet’s extended dealings over a period of time with Pleven, the acting adviser on foreign affairs of the Free French movement, would clearly create doubts in a great many French minds. Likewise the fact of his recent affiliations as a member of the British Purchasing Commission here.

Any Frenchman to be endorsed by ourselves and the British in the North African situation must be of such a quality that his outstanding integrity and his loyalty to all the best elements of France is the

¹Transmitted via military channels.
²Roosevelt's message of January 16 to Hull, ante, p. 809.
dominant note of his character. It would seem to me that Roger Cambon has the requisite qualifications. His name, which carries so much weight in North Africa because of his father's service there, his long years in London and his impartial approach to all groups important in the French picture today would seem especially to recommend him for consideration.

I am glad that all is well and send warmest regards.

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Roosevelt Papers

_The Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa (Eisenhower) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)_

SECRET

_[ALGIERS,] 17 January, 1943._

DEAR HARRY: I sent you a message today following a conference with Peyrouton, who just called at my office. He recited his past history to me, and one thing that struck me was that the day Laval returned to power, Peyrouton sent in his resignation as French Ambassador to Argentina. This may or may not be true but it could easily be checked. He seems to be a realist, and the general views he expressed were contained in the telegram I sent you.

I cannot tell you how valuable it was to me to have the chance to talk to the President and yourself and to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, particularly General Marshall. There is no doubt that great good will come out of your meeting there, and I often regret that you people who are occupying the top positions cannot get together with greater frequency.

I am enclosing with this letter a short note to the President, which I request that you pass on to him if you think it an appropriate one.

If you can possibly get up here, I assure you of a warm welcome and I will do all in my power to let you see everything that can be arranged within the time you may have.

With warm personal regard,

Cordially,

IKE EISENHOWER

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_This letter was addressed: "The Hon. Harry Hopkins, Somewhere in Africa"._
_1 No copy of this message has been found._
_2 Message from Eisenhower to Roosevelt, infra._

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Roosevelt Papers

_The Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa (Eisenhower) to the President_

SECRET

_[ALGIERS,] 17 January, 1943._

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: My recent visit to your Headquarters was, for me, an uplifting experience and one that I know will be reflected in
increased efficiency in my own operations. I cannot tell you how much I appreciated the kind words you had to say about our efforts in the past, and you may be confident that everyone here will continue to devote his full energies to success in the great crusade, the progress of which you are directing.

Please accept my sincerest wishes for your continued good health and my complete confidence that you will lead us to a great victory in the shortest possible time.

Respectfully,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Algiers Consulate Files: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa (Eisenhower) to the President’s Personal Representative (Murphy)

SECRET

URGENT

No. 5936. Paraphrase of AGWAR telegram 1049 14th January 1943 follows: On 13th January Mr. Lemaigre Dubreuil concluded his discussions in Washington and left for North Africa. In agreement with him, it was decided that the following summary of his observations to the Secretary and Under-Secretary of State would be sent to you as this would be the basis of the recommendation which he will make to General Giraud. It was pointed out by Dubreuil that it was not possible to meet the situations, to reply to propaganda criticisms that Africa was under “Occupation” by the U.S., to give concentration to the military situation until the fulfilment of certain conditions having to do with material and morale. In a large measure the solution of this depended on the U.S. In his opinion it was necessary in this connection to remember that the intervention of American Troops had been requested, prepared and assisted by the French who received assurance at that time in letters exchanged between General Giraud and Mr. Murphy that the required material would be supplied and that treatment of the French would be as an Ally in complete possession of sovereignty. Dubreuil said that there is a growing impression in North Africa that territory is being given the treatment not of allied but of occupied territory. He feels in order to meet this situation certain changes would be necessary in the Clark–Darlan Agreement especially the recognition as an Ally of French North Africa. He stated that the present rate of exchange which has been imposed was markedly increasing the cost of living and prices within

Footnote:
the country and that this should be taken into account and the rate
modified. He went on to say that U.S. had representation in North
Africa in Civil as well as military affairs but that North African Au-
thorities did not enjoy reciprocal treatment in this country. That at
the present time there exists in the U.S. a Military Mission. He feels
in this regard that unless General Giraud were granted some such
form of representation, a claim could be put forward by de Gaulle
that the latter was in a position of primacy with respect to political
and civil matters in that he could discuss such matter with the British
and U.S. Governments direct and, further, that he, de Gaulle, should
be regarded as the political leader of French resistance. The primary
concern of General Giraud is one of military necessity of bringing back
Frenchmen into active participation in the war. If supported in this
position and supplies and recognitions could be given to General
Giraud, the war could then be pursued with a maximum of effective-
ness. French preoccupation would be reassured and General Giraud
could establish himself as a leader of French military resistance. In
this way General de Gaulle’s political aspirations would be relegated
to a secondary place and the entire political situation would be
clarified.

Lemaigre Dubreuil proposed that in order that General Giraud’s
position be made perfectly clear that the latter might issue a declara-
tion which would have as its purpose clarifying his position and
showing that its character was non-political. Such declaration would
be so framed as to indicate clearly to General de Gaulle that the mili-
tary problem is the real one and the only one to be solved and that
political matters do not become paramount until such time as the
French people in France are liberated and in a position to determine
their own destiny. The declaration by Giraud would point out that
as no government exists now in France he was acting in the defense of
French interests as trustee until termination of hostilities, as the result
of this he would be free to carry on military operations without com-
plications of a political character.

A further suggestion was made that there should follow Giraud’s
declaration, a statement by the President who would confirm that it
was the opinion of the Government of the U.S. that no French Govern-
ment was in existence and that General Giraud is to be considered as
trustee for the defense of French interests and as an ally.

It was agreed that the text of such a declaration should be discussed
with you and with General Giraud. No further comment will be
undertaken on the proposal by the State Department until a report is
received from you.
Certain commitments have been obtained by the Béthouart Mission with respect to supplying matériel. These commitments will be communicated to you in another message.²


Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill ¹

[LONDON,] 17 January, 1943.

TELESCOPE No. 87. Following personal for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary:

I sent for General de Gaulle this morning. Sir A. Cadogan was also present. I told him I had a message for him from you, and exacted a promise of absolute secrecy. I said you had gone to North Africa for military conversations with important American personages. He said he had not heard of your departure though he had received report that principal American personages had been recognized at Accra.

I then gave him your message to read.² He read quietly until coming to reference to Bergeret which elicited angry exclamation. When he had finished, he expressed no pleasure. He had wanted to meet Giraud after Darlan’s assassination, but Giraud had not agreed. Time was not now opportune and he was reluctant to meet Giraud under auspices of allies who might press him to compromise. I urged advantage of meeting, both to the General himself, the cause of France and that of Allies.

You had obviously been at pains to arrange it. We stood loyally by our engagements to him, and a meeting, the sooner the better, was in the interests of all. General de Gaulle said our interests and his might not be the same. We had never understood that Fighting French movement was the real force in France today. There were only two alternatives—Fighting French and Vichy. Giraud, who tried to balance between them was not too popular at all. We made a mistake in going into North Africa without de Gaulle. We were in difficulties, and asked him to come and help. We contested all these statements and asked him whether he still wished to come to terms with Giraud. He said he would meet Giraud next week at Fort Lamy,

¹There is no indication of when the source text was passed to Roosevelt or Hopkins, but it was probably given to them before or at the Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting of January 18; see the editorial note, ante, p. 626.

²For text of Churchill’s message of January 16 to de Gaulle, see de Gaulle, Documents, p. 126.
alone, and he hoped you would press this on Giraud. Right course for latter was to rally the Fighting French. He could then become member of National Committee and be appointed to command forces.

General de Gaulle said he would be doing a disservice to France by compromising with Giraud and the Vichy men surrounding him, at the behest of Allies. I retorted that attitude of Giraud to Vichy was just one of the matters that could be discussed with him and we emphasized that our message proposed direct talks between the two generals. I could not believe he had refused to play his part. Moreover, this was an opportunity for him to explain his position to the President, which he had been contemplating. General de Gaulle said this was a different proposition. If the President wished to see him he could always summon him to America.

I said he should deeply regret a refusal by him to the Allies and cooperate with them for bringing the war to a victorious conclusion. He argued that if victory was won for Vichy elements, France would not have won much. Most he would offer was to reflect upon the matter and see me again this afternoon. At five o’clock he appeared with the following message to you:

*Message begins:* The message from you which was delivered to me today by Mr. Eden was somewhat unexpected. As you know, I have telegraphed several times to General Giraud since Christmas, urging him to meet me. Although the situation has moved since Christmas in the direction which now renders an understanding less easy, I would gladly meet General Giraud in French territory anywhere he likes as soon as he wishes, with all necessary secrecy. I am now sending him an offer to maintain direct liaison between us. I value most highly the sentiments which inspire your message and thank you very heartily for them. Allow me to say, however, that the atmosphere of an exalted Allied forum around the Giraud–de Gaulle conversations as well as the suddenness with which those conversations have been proposed to me, do not seem to me to be the best for an effective agreement. Simple and direct talks between the French leaders would, in my opinion, be the best design to bring about a useful arrangement. I should like to assure you once again that the French National Committee in no way dissociates the higher interests of France from that of the world and of the United Nations. It is for this reason that, in my view, a rapid and complete rehabilitation of the internal situation of North Africa is necessary under conditions consistent with the maximum war effort and the success of our plans. I am telegraphing again to General Giraud to repeat once more my proposal for an immediate meeting—a proposal to which I have so far received no precise reply from him. *Message ends.*

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5 For text of de Gaulle’s January 17 telegram to Giraud, see de Gaulle, *Documents*, p. 127. When Macmillan and Murphy delivered the message to Giraud on the afternoon of January 20, they apparently asked that the reply to de Gaulle be postponed.
I once more pointed out that your proposal provided for “simple and direct talks between French leaders.” He reverted to his fear of “pressure”. He still hoped for a meeting with Giraud on his conditions, but I held out no hope of this and said results of his decision must be most unfortunate. He was throwing away an opportunity of an arrangement with Giraud with full support of two principal allied leaders, which would have greatly helped our war effort. Nothing, however, would move him and I have no alternative but to forward his message.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

[Casablanca,] January 18, 1943.

Newburg 29. To Hull from Alex.

We delivered our bridegroom, General Giraud, who was most cooperative on the impending marriage, and I am sure was ready to go through with it on our terms. However, our friends could not produce the bride, the temperamental lady de Gaulle. She has got quite snooty about the whole idea and does not want to see either of us, and is showing no intention of getting into bed with Giraud. We are going to do the best we can under these circumstances and I think can bring something out of this that will be pretty good. Giraud gives me the impression of a man who wants to fight and has no great interest in civil affairs.

Do you think Leger could be usefully used over here? I agree with what you have said about Monnet. Also please let me know what you think of Roger Cambon, who is universally respected and through his father knows much about North Africa.

Our military studies and plans are going very well.

¹ Transmitted via military channels.

831.01/947: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*¹

TRIPLE PRIORITY

London, January 18, 1943—2 p.m.

460. General Catroux came to see me this morning at his request and said that Colonel Billotte and several other officers are leaving for

¹ This telegram was repeated to Algiers for Eisenhower and Murphy; it was received there on January 20, 3 p.m.
Algiers tonight (my telegram 415 January 16, 4 p. m. ²). He, Catroux, expects to be in Gibraltar Friday (barring delays caused by bad weather) and said that he would like to have a conversation either with General Giraud himself, whom he knows well personally, or with one of his officers. He said that he would be quite willing to go on to Algiers if his presence there would not cause embarrassment at this particular time to General Eisenhower or General Giraud. It will be more satisfactory, he feels, if he can have a preliminary conversation with General Giraud or one of his officers before the meeting between de Gaulle and Giraud, and I told him that I fully agreed. He said that he wanted to get a picture of Giraud's ideas, for he realizes the difficulties both for General Eisenhower and for General Giraud in the present situation. He said that he thinks that it is high time that there should be some agreement between various French elements fighting the Germans and he saw no real obstacle to reaching a common accord with General Giraud. No questions of internal French politics, he said, should be allowed to come up for consideration now, and such matters should be left for decision after the war.

However he does believe there must be some central administrative organization exercising "French Sovereignty" to conduct negotiations during the war period, rather than various groups operating independently and often at cross purposes.

He asked what Peyrouton's position is to be (and though he did not specifically so state, it was clear to me that like the other Fighting French, he does not like him). I replied that I did not know. I said that I understood Hoppenot was en route to North Africa and that I had a high personal regard for him. He agreed that Hoppenot is a good man. He asked if I had any information as to when de Gaulle would visit Washington and I said that I had none.

He also talked a little of his ideas of general strategy, stating that he had always favored some offensive from Syria up into the Balkans and that he thought the Turks might be willing when the time comes to cooperate either by coming in to the war or permitting troop passage. He feels, he said, that the delay in cleaning out Tunisia, which he attributed entirely to the rain and mud, had the unfortunate effect of retarding plans for the Spring, but he expects that the Axis will be driven from Tunis in a month and a half time. He does not think that Rommel will attempt to make much of a stand at Tripoli but will fall back to try to occupy the Mareth line in Tunisia. I made

² Not printed; it reported that de Gaulle had decided to postpone the departure of the military mission he was planning to send to Algiers pending the receipt of formal guarantees from American military authorities that (1) he would be permitted to use his own secret cipher for communications with Giraud, and (2) that Eisenhower would give blanket approval to any agreement reached between de Gaulle and Giraud, whatever the terms might be (851.01/946).
no comment on these observations as to strategy other than to agree that the unusually heavy rains in Tunis were an important element of bad luck.

While Catroux is ambitious and politically minded, he has a sense of the practical and I believe that a meeting between him and General Giraud would be useful.

Repeated to Algiers for General Eisenhower and Murphy.

MATTHEWS

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President¹


Utah 64. From Hammond to McCrea for Alex signed Hull.

As I indicated in my last message to you, we feel that Roger Cambon has all of the qualifications necessary although from what we are told by those who know him best, his own personal temperament and the retired life he has led during recent years and his unwillingness to assert himself would undoubtedly make him reluctant, if not unwilling, to accept the responsibilities you have in mind. Léger would, I know, be willing to serve in any capacity in which he could advance the interests of his own country provided he were given a sufficiently free hand under the Allied and French Military chiefs to be able to cope effectively with the problem of civil administration. He, of course, has had a far greater measure of administrative experience in the past than Cambon and he has supported our own policies with regard to France and in North Africa completely. A better solution might be to give Léger the position of civil administrator with Cambon as chief adviser. The two men are very close and such an arrangement would, I think, be satisfactory.

Am I correct in understanding that the arrangement you have in mind is that General Giraud as Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies will continue as the supreme French authority in North Africa subject to our own ultimate decisions and that the proposed administrator of civilian affairs, while nominally subordinate to General Giraud and cooperating with him, will, nevertheless, possess sufficient authority to enable him to initiate such measures for civil administrative reform as may be desirable, provided the steps he contemplates are satisfactory from the military standpoint to us and to General Giraud. I think it would be impossible to obtain the cooperation of either Léger or Cambon unless they obtain a prior clarification on this point.

¹Transmitted via military channels.
It is, in my opinion, vital that under this plan definite British approval to these nominations be obtained and that British specifically agree to all the clarifications of the immediately preceding paragraph. I assume it is only with such British approval that you will wish to approach the question of the attitude not only of General Giraud but very probably that of General de Gaulle as well.

Hopkins Papers

The Assistant Secretary, War Department General Staff (McCarthy) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹

[CASABLANCA,] January 19, 1943.

I believe you already have this information, but I pass it along to make sure.

"Harrison, our ambassador in Switzerland, states that LeBrun is now at this home at Chateau de Hixelle near Grenoble, which is southeast of Lyon. Indications are that his health is good, but he is under constant surveillance. He was in Switzerland early in November."

McCarthy

¹The source text is handwritten.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill²

[LONDON,] January 20, 1943.

Tel No: 162. Am doing my utmost. I am having a final interview with General de Gaulle in two hours and will telegraph immediately after it.² Text as modified by Cabinet and delivered to de Gaulle follows in my immediately following telegram.³

²Sent to Hopkins under cover of a note from Churchill's private secretary, Rowan, dated January 20, and reading as follows: "The Air Commodore has asked me to send this round immediately for the information of Admiral Q." (Hopkins Papers)

³According to an undated British memorandum summarizing the communications with de Gaulle and Giraud between January 16 and January 21, 1943, just before midnight on January 20, Churchill received a telegram from Eden stating that de Gaulle was leaving that night, weather permitting. De Gaulle's flight was postponed on January 21, due to the weather, and de Gaulle did not actually leave England until early on January 22 (Roosevelt Papers).

³Not found in American files. For text of the telegram from Churchill to de Gaulle as received by the latter, see de Gaulle, Documents, pp. 127–128. For the original text of Churchill's telegram to Eden of January 18 and presumably prior to its revision by the Cabinet, see Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 650–651.
The President to the Secretary of State

[Casablanca,] January 21, 1943.

NEWBURG 35. To Hammond from McCrea for Secretary Hull from Alex.

1. There is an urgent question of adjusting the dollar-pound-franc exchange rate which temporarily is now 75 francs for the dollar and 300 francs for the pound as a result of our provisional agreement of November 14, 1942, with the French North African authorities. The francs involved are notes issued by the Bank of Algeria, the Bank of Morocco and the Bank of French West Africa. Notes issued by the Bank of France are not in question as they do not circulate in North and West Africa.

2. Apart from economic and financial aspects of the problem, urgent military and political considerations demand our immediate attention. In other French territories under de Gaulle the rates of 43 for the dollar and 176 for the pound have been permitted to continue. Our French Allies in North Africa and West Africa, on whose military support we rely, resent this discriminatory treatment. They, of course, advance economic and financial reasons in support of and they recommend an adjustment of the rate to 50 francs for the dollar and 200 for the pound. Am informed by the Prime Minister that he will urge on the French National Committee an adjustment in other French territories to the rate of 50 francs for the dollar and 200 for the pound.

3. General Eisenhower considers it necessary for military and political reasons to authorize our French Allies at this time to announce an adjustment of the rate to the basis recommended by them. The Prime Minister agrees with this point of view and I have given my approval. This is most secret for Morgenthau.

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Hopkins Papers

The President’s Personal Representative (Murphy) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[Casablanca,] January 22, 1943.

HARRY—Giraud will have de Gaulle for lunch.

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1 The source text was transmitted via military channels. The White House staff sent a copy in paraphrase to Hull on January 22, 1943 (851R.5151/10).


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1 The source text is handwritten.

2 This first de Gaulle–Giraud meeting appears to be the one described in de Gaulle, p. 83, and Giraud, pp. 101–103.
After lunch both men will be shut in a room for private confab. After that I think the PM should receive de Gaulle\(^2\) and then the PM should lead him over to the President.

I think Giraud will be willing that the President be able to include in his public statement something to effect that all Vichy racial laws will be abolished in this area.

Bon

\(^2\) Churchill did receive de Gaulle on January 22. For accounts of the meeting, see de Gaulle, pp. 86-87, and Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, pp. 681-682.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*\(^1\)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 23, 1943.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY HULL

Treasury, War and State Departments are wholly in accord with revision upward for the franc for military and political reasons, the advisability of revising the exchange rates now in use for North and West Africa having been under consideration in Washington. It is felt, however, that you should be advised that the suggested adjustment to fifty francs to the dollar probably carries action somewhat too far, and, providing it would meet military and political circumstances, the rate of fifty-five or even sixty would be preferable, for this would lessen the possibility that economic and financial conditions would necessitate a future revision. It is not possible for us to judge whether it is too late to give additional consideration to the question of the rate.

If the French National Committee will adjust rate in territories under their direction to the rate which may be established now for French North Africa and French West Africa, we believe a most useful purpose will be served.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) As prepared in the Department of State for transmission to the President, this message was dated January 22 (851R.5151/10).

\(^2\) The Roosevelt Papers contain a telegram of January 21, 1943, from Eden for Macmillan, which reported that the British Treasury officials welcomed the news of the proposed revision in the dollar-pound-franc exchange rate. The British Treasury attached the greatest importance to the rate being made universal throughout the French Empire and assumed that the necessary arrangements would be made both with Giraud and de Gaulle.
Suggested Statement by General Giraud and General de Gaulle

General Giraud and General de Gaulle have been in friendly conference in North Africa for three days and have come to a complete understanding, which, without going into details which will be worked out progressively, represents a unity of purpose and objective which augurs well for the future course of the common effort of the war.

They have agreed that there is one simple, common purpose in which all Frenchmen everywhere can unite—the liberation of France. This means that every German soldier will be eliminated from the soil of France and the nation returned to the people of France.

This is essentially a military objective. In Africa it is possible for French officers to organize a thoroughly trained, fully equipped striking force, to be used against the joint enemy. Its strength could reasonably reach 250,000. Its equipment would of necessity come principally from the United States and the United Kingdom.

Always keeping the one great purpose in mind—the liberation of France—General Giraud and General de Gaulle, seeking the simplest form of organization, propose to organize a committee for the liberation of France, consisting of themselves and a third member, representing the civil administration of French North Africa, French Morocco, French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa and Djibouti.

The governors of all French territories or protectorates in Africa would carry out their administrative duties as formerly, subject only to final decisions of the Committee for the Liberation of France.

In this provisional set-up covering the whole of Africa, there is no inclusion at this time of other territories and other problems such as the French Fleet in Alexandria, the French fleet and islands in the West Indies, or in other parts of the world. It is hoped that this new organization, controlling as it will by far the greater part of French territories, both in area and population, will play an effective military part in the liberation of the mother country.

¹ This undated and unsigned document is accompanied by an additional page which is entitled “Suggested Insert” and reads as follows: “The National Committee, with headquarters in London, will continue until further arrangements are made to exercise its present supervision over territories now under their control in parts of the world other than Africa. The so-called French Imperial Council set-up in Algeria will be disbanded.”

In a letter of March 13, 1945, to the Historical Office, Murphy recalls that this draft joint statement, together with the “Suggested Insert”, were prepared by the American and British civilian advisers at the conference and that Roosevelt and Churchill gave them their personal attention. It is Murphy’s recollection that the statement was offered to de Gaulle and Giraud on January 24, 1943. Regarding the meetings of January 24 between Roosevelt, Churchill, de Gaulle, and Giraud, see the editorial notes, ante, pp. 723–725.
This committee of three offers leadership to all Frenchmen who are able to participate with it, but, pending the establishment of a government chosen by the French people themselves, in no sense sets itself up as the government, or the provisional government, or the prospective government of France.

The agreement has been entered into with full cordiality and mutual high purpose. It is an agreement made by Frenchmen, with Frenchmen.

It has the full and sympathetic support of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Department of Defense Files

Memorandum by the High Commissioner in French North and West Africa (Giraud)¹

SECRET

ANFA, January 24, 1943.

RESUMÉ OF THE AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE RESULTING FROM THE ANFA CONVERSATIONS

In the military field it has been agreed between the President of the United States and General Giraud that the French forces are to receive under priority the armament which is absolutely necessary for them to have, and that this matériel shall be made up of the most modern kind.

In the ulterior conversations with General Marshall and General Somervell it was specified that the total amount of this matériel should be enough for 3 armored divisions and 8 motorized divisions, plus first line aviation matériel consisting of 500 pursuit planes, 300 bombers and 200 transport planes, and that of these quantities there shall be delivered in the course of the next few weeks 400 trucks and the armament for 2 armored regiments, 3 reconnaissance battalions,

¹This is one of two memoranda presented to President Roosevelt by General Giraud on the morning of January 24, 1943; regarding the meeting, see the editorial note, ante, p. 724. English translations of both memoranda are contained in telegram 124, February 1, 1943, from Algiers, infra. The English translation printed here, together with a copy of the French original of this memorandum, was handed to General Marshall by Major General Béthouart in the course of a meeting in Washington on February 3, 1943. For the original French text, except for a portion of the second paragraph dealing with supply, see René Richard and Alain de Sérigny, L'Enigme d'Alger (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1947), pp. 251-232. For an account of the background of this memorandum and a commentary on the English translations, see Vigneras, Rearming the French, pp. 26-33. For documentation relative to the clarification of the agreement set forth in this memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. II, pp. 44-138, and Vigneras, pp. 38-44.

²A parenthetical sentence at the end of this memorandum indicates that the remarks in the margin are those of President Roosevelt.
III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

3 tank destroyer battalions and 3 motorized divisions and such aviation matériel as may be sent by air.

As concerns shipments it has been agreed with General Somervell that the supplying of French Africa would be assured by a monthly contingent of 65,000 tons (50,000 tons of wheat, 12,000 tons of sugar, 3,000 tons of fabrics) and that the transportation of the matériel would be effected before next summer. France is to furnish in the inter-allied pool a contingent of 165,000 ship tonnage, and the Allies are to supply the additional tonnage necessary for making the delivery within the period fixed. The aviation matériel is to be sent insofar as possible by air and the coal and petroleum are to be sent separately.\(^8\)

In the political field it has been agreed between the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great

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\(^8\) In a memorandum of February 4, 1943, to Assistant Secretary of War McCloy, not printed, Marshall reported on his meeting of February 3, 1943, with Béthouart and reviewed his knowledge of the Roosevelt-Giraud agreement in the following manner: "I told General Béthouart that the President had not advised me as to specific agreements with General Giraud other than the confirmation of what I had already assured General Giraud—that we would proceed with the greatest possible speed to equip his troops, and that the matter of cargo space, character of equipment as to priorities of shipment, etc., would be determined later." (Department of Defense Files)

In telegrams 1453, February 17, 1943, and 1628, February 18, 1943, from Algiers, General Eisenhower reported on the strong representations made by General Giraud on February 16 with respect to his understanding of the agreement reached at Casablanca. General Marshall's reply in telegram ZRE 2841, February 20, 1943, contained the following review of the President's understanding of the agreement worked out with General Giraud: "In the conversations which took place at Casablanca, no commitments were made by the President, by General Somervell or by me, as to how much equipment could be sent or when it would be sent. The paper entitled, 'Résumé of the Agreements in Principle Resulting from the Conversations at Anfa,' prepared by General Giraud and submitted to the President was approved in principle by the President. This was not intended as an agreement that the specific amount of matériel would be shipped, nor obviously that it would be shipped within a specific period. Clearly it was to be sent as fast as possible, considering the whole war effort .... Neither General Somervell nor I had made any detailed commitments as are directed in the paper submitted to the President. In our conversations with General Giraud, Somervell and I dealt only in general terms, in which we did specifically agree to reequip the French forces in North Africa as rapidly as could be managed. We had informed General Giraud that because of the shipping limitations, the program which he proposed would be impossible of attainment immediately, particularly in view of our commitments with Russia and China and of our requirements in the southwest Pacific. The President had no opportunity to see either General Somervell or me after his receipt of the paper in question from General Giraud. The President's agreement in principle, therefore, was based on General Giraud's statement of a detailed arrangement with General Somervell and me which had not been reached. Furthermore, the President considered that his agreement 'in principle' did not involve detailed commitments." (Department of Defense Files)
Yes  Britain and General Giraud that [it] is in the common interest that all Frenchmen fighting against Germany be united under the same authority, and that all facilities be given to General Giraud for realizing this union.

Along these lines it has been agreed by the President of the United States that the rate of exchange shall be brought back to 50 francs to the dollar to lessen the difference existing between the rate prevailing in the territories under the control of General de Gaulle, in the hope that in the other territories the rate will be lowered from 65 to 50.

It is likewise agreed that the necessary propaganda (for France and in the French language) should be conducted from African territory by the French authorities and that for this reason conferences should be held concerning the use of stations and short waves.

(The remarks in the margin are those of President Roosevelt)

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4 In the French original (see Richard and Sérigny, L'Enigme d’Alger, p. 222) and in the English translation transmitted in telegram 124, February 1, 1943, from Algiers, infra, this number reads “48”.

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740.0011 European War 1939/27641: Telegram

The President’s Personal Representative (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Algiers, February 1, 1943.

124. Secret for Atherton from Murphy. No other distribution.

A few minutes before his departure from Anfa the President had a short conversation with General Giraud during the course of which Giraud presented two memoranda dated January 24, 1943. The first memorandum reads as follows:

[“] 1. The intervention of the Anglo-American troops on the 8th of November on French territory in Africa, brought about at the demand of the French who, since 1940 have wanted to take up the fight against Germany, was the first act of liberation of an oppressed nation accomplished by the United Nations.

1 See the editorial note, ante, p. 724.

2 A copy in French of this memorandum was handed to General Marshall by Major General Béthouart, Chief of the French Military Mission in the United States, on February 3, 1943. This French copy, which is included among the files of the Department of the Army, is headed “Commandant en Chef en Afrique Française, Anfa, le 24 Janvier 1943” and bears the marginal handwritten notation “Text signed by Pres Roosevelt”. This same French text of the memorandum is printed in Giraud, pp. 353–354, and in Richard and Sérigny, L’Enigme d’Alger, pp. 232–233, with the additional heading “Protocole d’Anfa”. Lemaigne-Dubreuil, who appears to have been the drafter of the memorandum, gives an account of its preparation in Crusoe (Jacques Lemaigne-Dubreuil), Victoires d’une Victoire: Documents du Temps Présent (Paris: Les Editions de l’Ame Française, 1946), pp. 87–98. For documentation regarding the subsequent modification of this memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. II, pp. 48 ff.
2. The form of the relations between France and the Foreign powers temporarily occupying part of French territory, the post war consequences of the association of France and the United States in the fight against Germany the military, economic and financial aid given to France, have all been defined in letters * exchanged between the Consul, Mr. Murphy, in the name of President Roosevelt, and General Giraud, before the landing. They remain in force. However, the paragraph dealing with the military question and with the Inter Allied command is excepted.

3. Because of the fact that the French nation and the French people are the only ones who may fix their representation and designate their government, and because it is impossible for the French in other land [French motherland?] to pronounce freely her will, France no longer possesses a government.

In the interests of the French people, in order to safeguard France’s past, her present, and her future, the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain recognize in the Commander-in-Chief, with his headquarters in Algiers, the right and duty of preserving all French interests under the military, economic, financial, and moral plan. They bind themselves to aid him by all the means in their power until the day when, in complete freedom, the French people and the French nation shall be able to designate their regular government.

General Eisenhower and Minister Murphy will work out with the French Commander-in-Chief, with his headquarters as Algiers, the details of the present understanding. In so doing, they will be governed by the conversations exchanged in Washington between the twenty-eighth of December and the second [eleventh] of January, by the representative of General Giraud and the State Department, and the decisions which have been made by President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, and General Giraud in the interviews at Casablanca between the seventeenth and twenty-fourth of January 1943.”

The foregoing was endorsed “approved” by the President.

It is my understanding of the second paragraph of Article III from the conversations between the President and General Giraud that this phraseology relates to French interests in French Africa together with such interests outside of that area as have rallied or may adhere in the future to [the] General’s authority.

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3 For texts of the correspondence exchanged between General Giraud and Mr. Murphy in October and November 1942, see enclosures to despatch 76, March 22, 1943, from Murphy to the Secretary of State, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, p. 412.

4 I.e., General Giraud.

5 Regarding the conversations held in Washington between representatives of General Giraud and officers of the Department of State, see the memoranda of conversation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, dated December 27 and December 28, 1942, and January 9 and January 11, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, pp. 492 and 493, and ibid., 1943, vol. ii, pp. 36 and 38, respectively.

6 For the records of the President’s meetings with General Giraud on January 17 and 19, see ante, pp. 609 and 641; see also the editorial note regarding the meeting of January 24, ante, p. 724.
The second memorandum is entitled “résumé of the agreements in principle resulting from the conversations at Anfa.” First paragraph reads as follows:

“Under the military plan, it has been agreed between the President of the United States and General Giraud that the French forces will receive, by priority, the equipment which is indispensable to them and that this shall be made up of the most modern material.”

The President made a marginal notation okaying the foregoing paragraph. The second paragraph relates to conversations with General Marshall and General Somervell regarding the delivery of military matériel. I shall not quote this paragraph for reasons of military security.

The third paragraph reads as follows:

“In regard to transport, it has been agreed with General Somervell that the resupplying of French Africa would be assured by the monthly allocation of 65,000 tons (50,000 tons of wheat, 12,000 tons of sugar, and 3,000 tons of material) and that the shipment of this material would be made before next summer. France would furnish to the interallied pool a share of 165,000 tons of shipping and the Allies would furnish the remainder necessary for the delivery to be completed within the agreed time. The aviation material would be sent, as far as possible, by air.”

The President made a marginal notation regarding paragraphs two and three as follows:

“Okay in principle. Work out with Eisenhower and Somervell.”

Paragraph four reads as follows:

“Under the political plan, it was agreed between the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and General Giraud, that it was to their common interest for all the French fighting against Germany to be reunited under one authority, and that every facility would be given to General Giraud in order to bring about this union.”

The paragraph was okayed by the President. Paragraph five reads as follows:

“In connection with this, it has been agreed by the President of the United States that the exchange would be brought to fifty francs to the dollar in order to ameliorate the existing differences with the exchange rate given to the territories placed under the control of General de Gaulle (it being the strong hope that, in the latter territories, the rate will be lowered from forty-three to fifty francs to the dollar).”

The parenthetical reference is language inserted by the President.

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1 For text of an English translation of this memorandum handed to General Marshall by Major General Béthouart in the course of a meeting in Washington on February 3, 1943, see supra.
2 This paragraph in English translation is included in the document printed supra.
He made a marginal note to this paragraph "okay as amended". Paragraph six reads as follows:

"It has also been agreed that the necessary propaganda (for France in the French language) should be carried on from the African territory by the French authorities and that, for this reason, (conferences should be held regarding the use of the short wave radio stations)."

The President made a marginal notation to this paragraph "amend". In the conversation he agreed that in principle propaganda by radio from French North Africa in the French language for metropolitan France should be directed by the French authorities in consultation with Allied authorities. Allied authorities would conduct propaganda activity destined for other European countries. It was understood between the President and General Giraud that this entire subject is one for conversations between the French and Allied authorities looking to the most advantageous use of French North African radio facilities in the prosecution of the war.

These two memoranda were not discussed in advance with the British as there was no opportunity to do so, but I have provided copies of them to Macmillan. General Eisenhower of course is fully informed.

Giraud acted extremely well throughout the conference, making a favorable impression on both the President and the Prime Minister. I believe every one noted Giraud's obvious simplicity and sincerity of purpose to prosecute the war against the Axis—a consideration with him which overrides everything.

This telegram is addressed to you as I believe that the Secretary would wish to limit distribution.

Repeated to Matthews for his information only.²⁰

²⁰ Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, pp. 218-219, confirms that the two memoranda, which were communicated to Macmillan by Murphy on January 27, 1943, had not been seen by the Prime Minister, and that the President had not consulted him about them.

²⁰ Matthews replied to this message in telegram 45, February 3, 1943, from London to Algiers, for Murphy's eyes only, which reads in part as follows: "Hal Mack told me last evening (before I had read your 124 Feb 1 noon) that a telegram had been received from Macmillan giving the text of two memoranda you had given him. He said that you and Giraud had [drafted?] these memoranda, presented them to the President just a few minutes before his departure and after the Prime Minister had left, and obtained the President's hurried approval. The memoranda, Mack said, went much farther in recognizing Giraud as the protector of all French interests everywhere than the British had ever gone with de Gaulle and not only committed our govt but also the British govt." (Algiers Consulate Files: 710 Crt. Brit. U.S. Fr. North Africa) Telegram 153, February 6, 1943, from Murphy at Algiers, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, p. 48, reported that Churchill understood "how the two memoranda of points agreed at the Anfa Conference were approved by the President immediately prior to his departure from Anfa which left no opportunity for coordination with the Prime Minister." American and British representatives did subsequently prepare slightly modified versions of these memoranda; see ibid., pp. 48-53 passim.
Roosevelt Papers

Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹

[CASABLANCA,] undated.

I suggest that U.S. Chiefs of Staff should be informed that shipments on ground equipment and aircraft to the French should only be undertaken at a rate to be determined by Combined Chiefs of Staff which will not prejudice military operations agreed on at Casablanca.

¹Attached to this document is the following note by Hopkins dated April 10, 1943: "This is a memorandum Churchill handed me at Casablanca."

C. STATEMENT TO THE PRESS AND THE COMMUNIQUÉ

Hopkins Papers

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary, War Department General Staff (McCarthy) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[CASABLANCA,] January 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HOPKINS.

We received the following message last night from General Eisenhower:

"Yesterday Commander Butcher was told by Mr. Hopkins that the President probably would wish to see the war correspondents before he departs. As virtually all correspondents in this theatre headquarter at Algiers, it would be necessary to fly them to Casablanca. Suggest 15 representative U.S. and British correspondents to be chosen by General McClure. (General McClure handles public relations for General Eisenhower). Please advise whether correspondents desired. If so, when and whether the number is satisfactory."

Will you let me know what the President's wishes in this matter are so that I may inform General Eisenhower?¹

FRANK MCCARTHY
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

¹About 50 correspondents were brought to Casablanca to attend the joint press conference by Roosevelt and Churchill on January 24; for the record of that conference, see ante, p. 726.
III. THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

Roosevelt Papers

Draft Statement to the Press *1

[CASABLANCA, January 20?, 1943.]

Suggested Joint Statement by the President and the Prime Minister

The President and the Prime Minister met in northern Africa on January 14th. They were accompanied by or preceded by members of the Combined Staff.

Since then there have been daily conferences relating to the continuation and strengthening of the war effort.

The plans are progressing in every way, favorably.

They have received visits from Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan, Generals Eisenhower, Clark and Spaatz of the American Expeditionary Force in North Africa, and also from General Alexander and Air Marshal Tedder from the British Eighth Army operating in Tripoli.

The President was accompanied by Mr. Hopkins, and the meeting was joined by Mr. Averell Harriman and Lord Leathers of the British Shipping Administration, who came from London.

General Giraud spent several days with the American and British representatives.

General de Gaulle was invited to come from London, but declined. General Giraud will proceed with the organization of a French army

*1 The text of this draft statement, the final copy of which is undated, was cabled by the Prime Minister to the British Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary on January 20, 1943, at 10:08 p.m., along with the following explanatory message:

"1. The President has shown me the enclosed draft statement. I invite your comments upon it and will very likely propose some changes in it myself. It is essential that I hear from you tomorrow, 21st.

"2. We have been waiting all day for a further reply from de Gaulle or for some explanation by you. If de Gaulle does not come the President will make an arrangement very favourable for General Giraud which I shall not easily be able to resist. Giraud has made an excellent impression on everyone here, military and political alike.

"3. The President proposes to raise the rate of exchange from 75 francs to the dollar to 50 and he asks whether we will alter our rate in Madagascar and elsewhere in the reverse direction to have one unique rate of 50. On this point, I seek your advice." (Hopkins Papers)

As subsequently revised and enlarged, this draft statement eventuated as the final conference communiqué for the draft and the final text of the communiqué, see post, pp. 842 and 847. The preparation of such a statement was agreed upon at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on January 18, ante, p. 635. Regarding the preparation of a more detailed statement to the press which included a declaration on unconditional surrender, see footnote 1, post, p. 833.
of several hundred thousand men coming from Algeria, Morocco, French West Africa and Tunis; and it is hoped that this Army, formed to assist in the liberation of France itself, will be joined by other French who find themselves in a position to cooperate. The equipping of this French army will come largely from American and British sources. General Giraud will be in command of all French forces and the civil administrations in North and West Africa will be responsible to him in order to forward as greatly as possible the attainment of the single objective—the liberation of France.

This arrangement, pending the establishment of a government chosen by the French people themselves, in no sense sets itself up as the government, or the provisional government, or the prospective government of France.

The meetings held during the past week in North Africa make clear the only great purpose which can be considered at this time—the winning of the war against the Axis powers, and, with it, the liberation of France.

The President and the Prime Minister have now completed the work of planning and cooperation necessary at this time. The meetings have been wholly successful.

Hopkins Papers

Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹

SECRET

[Casablanca,] January 21, 1943.

Mr. Hopkins:

Can I take it that the provisional programme, on the assumption that the bride² arrives tomorrow morning, is as follows:—

Friday, 22nd.

Interviews with Giraud and de Gaulle, and their talks among themselves begin.

¹ This message, which is on the Prime Minister's 10 Downing Street letterhead, bears no signature but is obviously from Churchill.

² Reference here is to de Gaulle who did arrive at Casablanca on January 22. See Roosevelt's reference to de Gaulle in the January 18 telegram to Hull, ante, p. 816.
Luncheon.
Would it not be well to have both French chiefs to lunch either with
Admiral Q or here?
Afternoon at 5.0.
Report of the Chiefs of the Staff on the quantitative aspects of their
recent conversations on the Paper they wrote the other day. 3
Dinner. At the White House. (Dry, alas!); with the Sultan.
After dinner, recovery from the effects of the above. 4

Saturday, 23rd.
9.0 a.m. Press Conference. 5
10.0 a.m. Photographs. 9
Thereafter Admiral Q and I leave for airfield but really go to M., 7
where we arrive (pretty hungry) for lunch. The British Chiefs of
the Staff are all coming to M. 8

Sunday, 24th.
Polish off the wedding party and tidy up anything else left.

Monday, 25th.
Admiral Q departs. Where would he like to meet Lord Swinton, 9
Accra, Bathurst, Freetown? I can arrange anything but I should like
them to meet.

Will you kindly check the above and amplify it in any way so that
I can tell my people.

21.1.43.

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3 The Final Report to the President and Prime Minister by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff, the final text of which was designated C.C.S. 170/2, January 23,
1943, is printed ante, p. 791. For the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
with Roosevelt and Churchill on January 23, see ante, p. 707.
4 Regarding Roosevelt's January 22 dinner party for the Sultan, see the edi-
torial note, ante, p. 693.
5 The press conference was, in fact, scheduled for noon of January 22, but it
was postponed because of the failure to reach agreement on the statement to
be issued and in order to await the outcome of the meeting between de Gaulle
and Giraud. Regarding the postponement, see Hopkins' account in Sherwood,
p. 687. For the record of the press conference, eventually held on the morning
of January 24, see ante, p. 726.
6 Photographs follow p. 483.
7 i.e., Marrakech. The President and the Prime Minister did not travel to
Marrakech until January 24; see the Log, ante, p. 534.
8 Only General Brooke made the trip to Marrakech; see Alanbrooke, p. 459.
9 In the course of his return trip to the United States, the President conferred
briefly with Lord Swinton aboard the cruiser U.S.S. Memphis in the harbor at
Bathurst.
Draft Statement to the Press

[CASABLANCA, January 20–22? 1943.]

Soon after the successful landing operations in North Africa on November 8th, the President and the Prime Minister quickly agreed that the time had come for another review of the world war situation, and the practical discussion of steps to be taken by the United Nations for the further conduct of the war in the year 1943. This involved a meeting of the British-American combined staffs and if possible, another personal meeting between them. Such a meeting involved total geographical considerations and the President discussed with Mr. Stalin the possibilities of his attendance at a joint meeting somewhere in Africa. It became clear that while Mr. Stalin greatly desired to attend such a meeting, he was of necessity precluded from leaving Russia because of the new Russian offensive which even at that time had begun its eminently successful operation against the

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1 This uncaptioned and undated paper appears to have been prepared for use at the Roosevelt-Churchill press conference originally scheduled for noon of January 22. It is possibly the original draft of a statement intended to include the unconditional surrender formula as proposed by Churchill at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on January 18; see ante, p. 635, especially footnote 6. The source text bears a number of corrections and emendations by Roosevelt and Churchill which are indicated in footnotes at the appropriate places. The last two paragraphs of this draft constitute a separate page (page 4) of the typewritten source text. The first three typewritten pages of this draft were probably prepared after Churchill's message of January 20 to the British War Cabinet (Hinge of Fate, pp. 683–685) reporting the intention of the Conference to prepare a statement for the press which would include a declaration on "unconditional surrender." Churchill's handwritten insertion of the word "Italy" (see footnote 10, p. 635) was undoubtedly made after receipt of the War Cabinet's telegram on January 21, urging that Italy not be exempted from the unconditional surrender requirement (Hinge of Fate, p. 686). The other handwritten alterations were presumably made by Roosevelt and Churchill at the same time. The last two paragraphs of this draft (page 4 of the typewritten source text) were apparently added on January 22, after de Gaulle's arrival at Casablanca.

Hopkins' informal notes on the proceedings of January 22 indicate that difficulties had arisen in the preparation of this statement to the press:

"It was perfectly clear that there was no meeting of the minds as to the exact statement that should be released. In view of the fact that de Gaulle was just arriving, it seemed to me that the wisest thing to do was to postpone the Press Conference until we were ready to make a final statement. The President rather reluctantly agreed to this, but I told him that it was essential that we have a meeting of the minds with Churchill. The question of whether any reference to Stalin's having been invited must be decided, and a careful statement relative to the Southwest Pacific ought to be included, and if the de Gaulle thing might be in the bag in another 24 hours, a much better statement on that could be made." (Hopkins Papers)

The contents of this draft paper as amended by Roosevelt and Churchill and as subsequently revised still further were incorporated into Roosevelt's press conference notes, infra.

2 The phrase "further conduct" is crossed out and replaced by the word "prosecution" presumably in Roosevelt's writing.

3 The word "of" is crossed out and replaced by the phrase "he was conducting", possibly in Churchill's writing.
Germans, along the whole long line of the Russian-German front, from the north to the Caucasus.

The Russian Commander-in-Chief 4 was advised that the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister would nevertheless be held, and that he would be kept fully informed of the progress of planning for the year 1943. It is of course expected that as the operations of the year develop, the four major United Nations' military power will continue its excellent 5 cooperation in, and coordination of the world wide strategy which day by day is closing the net around the Axis powers.

As a result of preliminary conversations, the President and the Prime Minister met in an undisclosed point in North Africa about ten days ago, their Army, Navy and Air staffs having already begun studies of the world situation.

These studies, unprecedented in history in their completeness and in their total global aspect, have resulted in unanimous agreements marked by a spirit of complete understanding and cordiality, and have now been brought to a conclusion.

The combined staffs have been actuated in this by a spirit of pooling all of the resources of the United Nations and by the determination to maintain the initiative against the Axis powers in every part of the world.

Complete plans are agreed on to meet every eventuality which may face the United Nations during the year 1943. These plans cover—

(a) United operations conducted by American and British forces in their areas of hostilities,

(b) All possible material aid to the magnificent Russian offensive against Germany and a continuation of Russian destruction of the manpower of Germany, Roumania, Italy and Hungary now opposing Russia on the eastern front, 6 together with the continued destruction of German munitions and material of all kinds.

It envisions also 7 all possible aid 8 to the heroic struggle of China now in its 6th year, with the objective of ending 9 for all time Japanese domination of the Far East.

The President and the Prime Minister, after a complete survey of the world war situation, are more than ever determined that peace can

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4 The phrase “Commander-in-Chief” is crossed out and replaced by the phrase “war leader”, possibly in Churchill’s writing.
5 The word “excellent” is crossed out and replaced by the word “thorough”, in Roosevelt’s writing.
6 The phrase “now opposing Russia on the eastern front” is crossed out, presumably by Churchill.
7 The opening phrase “It envisions also” is crossed out, and the word “All” is capitalized, presumably by Churchill.
8 After the word “aid” the phrase “will be given” is inserted in Churchill’s writing.
9 The phrase “the objective of ending” is altered to read “the resolve to end”, in Churchill’s writing.
come to the world only by a total elimination of German and Japanese war power. This involves the simple formula of placing the objective of this war in terms of an unconditional surrender by Germany and Japan. Unconditional surrender by them means a reasonable assurance of world peace, for generations. Unconditional surrender means not the destruction of the German populace, nor of the Japanese populace, but does mean the destruction of a philosophy in Germany and Japan which is based on the conquest of other peoples.

The President and the Prime Minister are confident that this is equally the purpose of Russia, China and all members of the United Nations.

In view of the fact that the conference was held in North Africa and in view of the world wide desire that France be liberated from the Nazi yoke, the President and the Prime Minister, on arrival, took steps to bring all Frenchmen in every part of the world outside of occupied France, into a unity, with one simple objective—the raising of French Army, Navy and Air forces to cooperate with the United Nations in the liberation of France.

They therefore invited General Giraud and General de Gaulle to meet in North Africa, in order that they might discuss ways and means toward this simple objective, and if they desired to consult with the President and the Prime Minister toward the common end. General Giraud, the High Commissioner of French North Africa and French West Africa, arrived at the place of meeting within two days.

It is worth noting that General Giraud, as High Commissioner, represents the supreme French command in Algiers, Tunis, the French Protectorate of the Sultanate of Morocco, and West Africa, which includes Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey and French Guinea. These territories include by far the greater part of the French overseas territory, both in area and in population. In the category of population, these territories include not only the greater majority of the native population, but also the greater majority of the French population which lives outside of France proper.

After negotiations in London which lasted six days longer, General de Gaulle agreed to come to North Africa to meet with General Giraud. He arrived on Friday morning, January 22nd. (At this point the Prime Minister will set forth the situation resulting from General de Gaulle’s visit).

The meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the combined staffs has come to a complete and successful meeting of the minds in regard to all military operations, and the war against the Axis powers will proceed according to schedule with every indication of a continuation of successes for the United Nations during 1943.

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10 The word “Italy” is inserted after the word “Germany”, in Churchill’s writing.
11 “But does mean” is revised by Churchill to read “but it does mean”.
12 The words “and subjugation” inserted following the word “conquest”, in Churchill’s writing.
13 “Cooperate” crossed out and replaced by “march”, in Churchill’s writing.
14 “Sultanate” is changed in an unknown hand to read “Sultante”.
President Roosevelt's Press Conference Notes

[Casablanca, January 22–23, 1943.]

[Part A]

NOTES FOR F.D.R.

Soon after the successful landing operations in North Africa on November 8th, the President and the Prime Minister quickly agreed that the time had come for another review of the world war situation, and the practical discussion of steps to be taken by the United Nations for the prosecution of the war. This involved a meeting of the British-American combined staffs and if possible, another personal meeting. Such a meeting involved total geographical considerations and the President discussed with Mr. Stalin the possibilities of his attendance at a joint meeting somewhere in Africa. It became clear that while Mr. Stalin greatly desired to attend such a meeting, he was of necessity precluded from leaving Russia because he was conducting the new Russian offensive which even at that time had begun its eminently successful operation against the Germans, along the whole long line of the Russian-German front, from the Baltic to the Caucasus.

The Russian war leader was advised that the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister would nevertheless be held, and that he would be kept fully informed of the progress of planning for the year 1943. It is of course expected that as the operations of the year develop, the four major United Nations' military powers will continue their excellent cooperation in, and coordination of the world

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2 Photographs of the Roosevelt–Churchill press conference of January 24, 1943, such as that following p. 488, show Roosevelt holding a document, presumably the notes printed here. These notes, which appear to have been prepared in the course of several days, are printed here in two parts. Part A bears a notation at the top of the first page in Roosevelt's handwriting: "Notes for my press conf. —Dictated by my [sic] Jan. 29". Part A is in fact a revision of the draft Joint statement by the President and the Prime Minister printed supra and incorporates most of the handwritten corrections and emendations indicated in that previous paper. Part A itself contains marginal notations, in an unidentified handwriting, which are indicated in footnotes at the appropriate places. Part B, which is also undated, bears the notation in Roosevelt's handwriting: "Notes for my press conference statement FDR Casablanca." According to the Log ante, p. 538, during the evening of January 23, Roosevelt dictated "background material" for the press conference scheduled for the following day. The substance of these notes and the handwritten annotations thereto were included in Roosevelt's statements as recorded in the transcript of the press conference, ante, p. 726.

2 A marginal note at this point reads: "definitely asked to come."
3 A marginal note reads: "as Commander in Chief of the Russian armies."
4 A marginal note reads: "Expression of admiration for the quality of his leadership."
wide strategy which day by day is closing the net around the Axis powers.\(^5\)

As a result of preliminary conversations, the President and the Prime Minister met at an undisclosed point in North Africa about ten days ago, their Army, Navy and Air staffs having already begun studies of the world situation.

These studies, unprecedented in history in their completeness and in their total global aspect, have resulted in unanimous agreements marked by a spirit of complete understanding and cordiality, and have now been brought to a conclusion.\(^6\)

The combined staffs have been actuated in this by the pooling all of the resources of the United Nations and by the determination to maintain the initiative against the Axis powers in every part of the world.

War plans have been agreed on to strike the enemy during the whole of 1943. These plans cover:

(a) United operations conducted in their areas of hostilities.
(b) All possible material aid to the Russian offensive against Germany, which is so greatly cutting down the manpower of Germany and her satellites Roumania, Italy and Hungary now opposing Russia on the eastern front, together with the continued destruction of German munitions and material of all kinds.
(c) All possible aid will be given to the heroic struggle of China now in its 6th year, with the resolve to end for all time Japanese domination of the Far East.

The President and the Prime Minister, after a complete survey of the world war situation, are more than ever determined that peace can come to the world only by a total elimination of German and Japanese war power. This involves the simple formula of placing the objective of this war in terms of an unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy and Japan. Unconditional surrender by them means a reasonable assurance of world peace, for generations. Unconditional surrender means not the destruction of the German populace, nor of the Italian or Japanese populace, but does mean the destruction of a philosophy in Germany, Italy and Japan which is based on the conquest and subjugation of other peoples.

The President and the Prime Minister are confident that this is equally the purpose of Russia, of China, and of all other members of the United Nations.

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\(^5\) The first part of this sentence is crossed out, and a marginal note reads: “with Russia and with China in the offensive vs. Japan.”

\(^6\) A marginal note at the end of the sentence reads: “Stayed in same hotel with adjoining rooms etc.”

\(^7\) Before being corrected by Roosevelt, the first part of the sentence read: “The combined staffs have been actuated in this by a spirit of pooling.”
The meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the combined staffs has come to a complete and successful meeting of the minds in regard to all military operations, and the war against the Axis powers will proceed according to schedule with every indication of a continuation of successes for the United Nations during 1943.

In view of the fact that the conference was held in North Africa and in view of the world wide desire that France be liberated from the Nazi yoke, the President and the Prime Minister, on arrival, took steps to bring Frenchmen in every part of the world outside of occupied France, into a unity, with one simple objective—the raising of French Army, Navy and Air forces to march with the United Nations to the liberation of France.

They therefore invited General Giraud and General de Gaulle to meet in North Africa, in order that they might discuss ways and means toward this simple objective, and if they desire to consult with the President and the Prime Minister toward the common end. General Giraud, the High Commissioner of French North Africa and French West Africa, arrived at the place of meeting within two days.

General Giraud, as High Commissioner, represents the supreme French command in Algiers, Tunis, the French Protectorate of the Sultanate of Morocco, and West Africa, which includes Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey and French Guinea. These territories include by far the greater part of the French overseas territory, both in area and in population. In the category of population, these territories include not only the greater majority of the native population, but also the greater majority of the French population which lives outside of France proper.

After negotiations in London which lasted six days longer, General de Gaulle agreed to come to North Africa to meet with General Giraud. He arrived on Friday morning, January 22nd. (At this point the Prime Minister will set forth the situation resulting from General de Gaulle’s visit):

[Part B]

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

While in North Africa, I have visited and inspected a number of American Army ground and air units, and in addition have talked with a number of commanders of Naval areas.

A few days ago I visited and inspected several American divisions which had taken part in the landing operations on the night of November 7-8. I found them in excellent health, high spirits and high efficiency—eager to fight again. And they will.
I had the opportunity of visiting localities where the actual landing operations, followed by severe land fighting, had taken place. I went to a cemetery containing the graves of American soldiers and the graves of French soldiers killed in the first few days before the fighting ceased.

May I say here, that the French garrisons, obeying orders to resist any landing, fought with extreme bravery and with heavy losses, but the moment peace was reestablished, the French Army and Navy and the French civil authorities have given whole hearted assistance to the American forces in carrying out the common objective of peace in these areas, of the establishment of French armies to do battle in the common cause, and to improve the conditions of living in a civil population which had been subjected to grave hardships during the past two years by the demands upon them for food and other supplies by a Nazi machine which thought of itself and itself alone.

I have also had the privilege of meeting and cooperating with the Sultan of Morocco, who, as the sovereign of Morocco, is rightly interested in the welfare of his people. It is gratifying to know that at no time has he given aid or comfort to the Axis.

The American forces in North Africa maintain at the highest point their morale and fighting qualities. They seek further victories. They are ready to go. I am proud of them.

Hopkins Papers

*Notes by the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

**Casablanca, January 24, 1943.**

Up at seven to get the communiqué—the telegram to Stalin—and one to the Generalissimo in final shape. Robert came in to breakfast and Averell—and then Bob Murphy who had just been to see Giraud. Giraud was quite willing to co-operate with de Gaulle but was unwilling to work under him. Bob told me that Macmillan of the British thinks that de Gaulle is going to be difficult and insist on being top dog. Macmillan came in in a moment and told us that de Gaulle’s proposition to Giraud is that “he (de Gaulle) is to be Clemenceau and Giraud Foch”. I told them the President would not stand for that but might agree to a joint leadership of the two of them—with Giraud running Africa and de Gaulle the rest of the show.

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1 The source text is handwritten. For a facsimile of one page, see Sherwood, p. 629.
2 For text of the final version of the joint message from the President and the Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin, January 25, 1943, see *post*, p. 805.
3 For text of the final version of the joint message from the President and the Prime Minister to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, January 25, 1943, see *post*, p. 807.
I left them in my room and went to see the President to tell him the news. He was none too happy about it but I urged him not to disavow de Gaulle even tho he was acting badly. Believing as I did and still do that Giraud and de Gaulle want to work together I urged the President to be conciliatory and not beat de Gaulle too hard. If there is any beating to be done let Churchill do it because the whole Free French movement is financed by them. I told the Pres. I thot we could get an agreement on a joint statement issued by de Gaulle and Giraud—and a picture of the two of them. Bob and I then told Macmillan that Churchill had to bring de Gaulle around.

Churchill had amended the communiqué* and General Jacobs [sic] brot it around—and I revised it some more—I got a final draft at 11.15 which the President approved with slight modifications in language.

Giraud arrived at 11.30—de Gaulle was with Churchill by this time. Giraud wanted a confirmation on supplying his army but the President referred him to Eisenhower. The conference went well. Giraud will play ball with de Gaulle. Giraud goes out, de Gaulle and his staff come in. De Gaulle calm and confident—I liked him—but no joint communiqué* and Giraud must be under him. The President expressed his disappointment in pretty forceful terms and made an urgent plea to de Gaulle to come to terms with Giraud to win the war and liberate France. The Secret Service called me out to tell me Churchill was outside. He was talking to Giraud, saying good bye to him. Churchill walked in and I went after Giraud believing that if the four of them could get into a room together we could get an agreement. This was nearly 12 o’clock and the press conference was to be at that hour. The President was surprised at seeing Giraud but took it in his stride. De Gaulle was a little bewildered. Churchill grunted. But the President went to work on them with Churchill backing him up vigorously. De Gaulle finally agreed to a joint statement and before he could catch his breath, the President suggested a photograph. By this time the garden was full of camera men and war correspondents who had been flown down the day before.

I don’t know who was the most surprised—the photographers or de Gaulle when the four of them walked out—or rather the three of them because the President was carried to his chair. I confess they were a pretty solemn group—the cameras ground out the pictures. The

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*For the final text of the Communiqué of the Casablanca Conference as released to the press on January 26, 1943, see post, p. 847.

*Regarding the Roosevelt-Giraud conversation under reference here and the subsequent Roosevelt-de Gaulle and Roosevelt-Churchill-de Gaulle-Giraud conversations on the morning of January 24, see the editorial notes, ante, pp. 724 and 725. For accounts of the Church-de Gaulle conversation on the morning of January 24, see de Gaulle, p. 91, and Catroux, p. 322.

*For text of a suggested statement by General Giraud and General de Gaulle, probably prepared on January 24, 1943, see ante, p. 822.
President suggested de Gaulle and Giraud shake hands. They stood up and obliged—some of the camera men missed it and they did it again. The two Frenchmen and their staffs left and Churchill and the President were left sitting together in the warm African sun—thousands of miles from home to talk to the correspondents of war and the waging of war. It would be flashed around the world the moment a release date was fixed.

The President gave a background statement—not for quotation—he chose his words very carefully and talked from notes. The only important addition to the communiqué was the President’s statement that he and Churchill were determined to accept nothing less than unconditional surrender of Germany, Japan and Italy. The President talked for about fifteen minutes. He told them of his visit to our troops and later agreed to be quoted on that. Churchill supplemented this with a masterly review of the military situation. He emphasized his personal friendship for the President and said the two of them were going to see the war through together. They have had no disagreements.

I talked after the conference to a number of newspaper[men] I had met in Washington, London and Moscow. The fact that Churchill and Roosevelt were in Africa was a complete surprise.

At 1:15 we drove to Marrakesh—picnic lunch on the way everyone tired but relaxed. As the British had fixed up the lunch we had plenty of wine and Scotch. We were put up at the villa of the late Moses Taylor—very pleasant—our host was a young archaeologist named Pendar (Louise rented his flat in Paris)—he was one of our secret agents in N. Africa prior to the Landing.

Averell, Randolph, Robert and I went to visit a big fair—story tellers—dancers—snake charmers—and 15,000 natives. Very colorful. The great trading market was near—but nothing much to sell—tho thousands were milling thru.

Dinner was good—army style—the company aglow—much banter—Churchill at his best. The President tired.

After dinner we agreed on the drafts to Stalin—Averell and I had re-written it. I made a draft for the Generalissimo—they agreed and both dispatches were put on the cables. At 2 A. M. we retired leaving a call for seven.

Robert roomed with me—he is flying to Algiers with Averell early in the morning.

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1 The photograph referred to here is among those reproduced following p. 483.
2 January 26 was fixed as the release date.
3 Kenneth W. Pendar was American Vice Consul in Algiers. Prior to the American landings in North Africa on November 8, 1942, Pendar had been Vice Consul in Casablanca. His exploits in Morocco are related in his book Adventures in Diplomacy (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1945).
The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have been in conference near Casablanca since January 14. They were accompanied by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the two countries, namely, for the United States:

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S.A. Army,
Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy,
Lieut.-General H.A. Arnold, Commanding U.S. Army Air Forces

and for Great Britain:

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord,
General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff

These were assisted by:

Lieut.-General B. B. Somervell, Commanding General Services of Supply U.S. Army

Roosevelt and Churchill and their advisers worked very late on the evening of January 23 preparing the message to Stalin and a communiqué for the press; see the editorial note, ante, p. 722. According to Hopkins' Notes of January 24, supra, revision of the communiqué continued during the morning of January 24, and a final draft reached Hopkins at 11:15 a.m. "which the President approved with slight modification." For the final text of the communiqué, see infra.
Field Marshal Sir John Dill,
Head of the British Joint Staff
Mission in Washington,

Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten,
Chief of Combined
Operations,

Lieut.-General Sir Hastings Ismay,
Chief Staff Officer to
the Minister of Defence,

together with a number of Staff Officers from both
countries.

They have received visits from Mr. Murphy
and Mr. Macmillan; from General Eisenhower, the
Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Force in North
Africa; from Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew
Cunningham, Naval Commander Allied Expeditionary
Force in North Africa; from General Spaatz, air
Commander Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa;
from General Clark, U.S. Army and also, from Middle
East Headquarters, from General Sir Harold Alexander,
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder and Lieut.-General

The President was accompanied by
Mr. Harry Hopkins and was joined by Mr. Averell
Harriman. With the Prime Minister was Lord Leathers,
Minister of War Transport.

For ten days the Combined Staffs have been in constant session meeting two or three times a day, and recording progress at intervals to the President and the Prime Minister. The entire field of the war was surveyed theatre by theatre throughout the world and all resources were marshalled for the more intense prosecution of the war by sea, land and air. Nothing like this prolonged discussion between two Allies speaking the same language has ever taken place before. Complete agreement was reached between the leaders of the two countries and their respective Staffs upon the war plans and enterprises to be undertaken during the campaign of 1943 against Germany, Italy and Japan with a view to drawing the utmost advantage from the markedly favourable turn of events at the close of 1942.

Premier Stalin was cordially invited to meet the President and the Prime Minister, in which case the meeting would have been held very much farther to the East. He was, however, unable to leave Russia at this time on account of the great offensive which he himself is conducting at the present time.
The President and the Prime Minister realised to the full the enormous weight of the war which Russia is successfully bearing along her whole land front, and their prime object has been to draw as much of the weight as possible off the Russian Armies by engaging the enemy as heavily as possible at the best selected points.

Premier Stalin has been fully informed of the military proposals.

The President and the Prime Minister have been in communication with Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. They have apprised him of the measures which they are prepared to undertake to assist him in China's magnificent and unrelaxing struggle for the common cause.

The occasion of the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister made it opportune to invite General Giraud, to confer with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to arrange for a meeting between him and General de Gaulle. The two Generals have been in close consultation.

The President and the Prime Minister and the
Combined Staffs having completed their plans for the offensive campaigns of 1943, have now separated in order to put them into active and concerted execution.

24.1.43.
The Communiqué

[CASABLANCA], 24 January 1943.

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have been in conference near Casablanca since January 14. They were accompanied by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the two countries, namely, for the United States:

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Navy
Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Commanding U. S. Army Air Forces

and for Great Britain:

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord,
General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

These were assisted by:

Lieut. General B. B. Somervell, Commanding General, Services of Supply, U. S. Army,
Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington,
Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations,
Lieut. General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief Staff Officer to the Minister of Defence,
together with a number of Staff Officers from both countries.

They have received visits from Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan; from General Eisenhower, the Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa; from Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, Naval Commander Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa; from General Spaatz, Air Commander Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa; from General Clark, U. S. Army and from Middle East Headquarters, from General Sir Harold Alexander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder and Lieut-General F. M. Andrews, U. S. Army.

The President was accompanied by Mr. Harry Hopkins and was
joined by Mr. Averell Harriman. With the Prime Minister was Lord Leathers, the British Minister of War Transport.

For ten days the Combined Staffs have been in constant session meeting two or three times a day, and recording progress at intervals to the President and the Prime Minister. The entire field of the war was surveyed theatre by theatre throughout the world and all resources were marshalled for the more intense prosecution of the war by sea, land and air. Nothing like this prolonged discussion between two Allies has ever taken place before. Complete agreement was reached between the leaders of the two countries and their respective Staffs upon the war plans and enterprises to be undertaken during the campaign of 1943 against Germany, Italy and Japan with a view to drawing the utmost advantage from the markedly favourable turn of events at the close of 1942.

Premier Stalin was cordially invited to meet the President and the Prime Minister, in which case the meeting would have been held very much farther to the East. He was, however, unable to leave Russia at this time on account of the great offensive which he himself, as Commander-in-Chief is directing.

The President and the Prime Minister realized to the full the enormous weight of the war which Russia is successfully bearing along her whole land front, and their prime object has been to draw as much of the weight as possible off the Russian armies by engaging the enemy as heavily as possible at the best selected points.

Premier Stalin has been fully informed of the military proposals.

The President and the Prime Minister have been in communication with Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. They have apprised him of the measures which they are undertaking to assist him in China's magnificent and unrelaxing struggle for the common cause.

The occasion of the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister made it opportune to invite General Giraud to confer with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to arrange for a meeting between him and General de Gaulle. The two Generals have been in close consultation.

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"In the text released to the press, this sentence reads as follows: "The President was accompanied by Harry Hopkins (Chairman of the British-American Munitions Assignments Board) and was joined by W. Averell Harriman (United States Defense Expiider in England)."

"The word "however" was not included in the text released to the press.

"The phrase "to the full" reads "up to the full" in the text released to the press.

"At this point, the text released to the press contains the following insertion: "(General Henri Honoré Giraud, High Commissioner of French Africa)."

"At this point, the text released to the press contains the following insertion: "(General Charles de Gaulle, Fighting French Commander)."
The President and the Prime Minister and the Combined Staffs having completed their plans for the offensive campaigns of 1943, have now separated in order to put them into active and concerted execution.

24. 1. 43

*The word “the” at this point reads “their” in the text released to the press.