I. THE FIRST WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

(December 22, 1941–January 14, 1942)
1. PRE-CONFERENCE PAPERS

Editorial Note

This chapter presents in chronological order papers showing the arrangements made for the Washington Conference of December 1941-January 1942 (code-named Arcadia), together with papers of a substantive nature which were prepared in anticipation of that conference or which show the status, on the eve of the conference, of certain subjects that came up for discussion at the conference.

Some documentation pertinent to the immediate background of the First Washington Conference has already been published. Within a week after the entry of the United States into the war, there began negotiations looking toward the coordination of the Allied war effort particularly in the immediately threatened area of Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Some of these negotiations and exchanges of view were undertaken, at least on the part of Roosevelt, with the forthcoming Washington Conference in mind. This applies particularly to the “preliminary conferences” of Allied representatives that Roosevelt requested should be held at Moscow, Chungking, and Singapore prior to December 20. Documentation on these activities will be found in Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. IV, pp. 736-760. No conference was held at Moscow; see Stalin’s reply of December 17 to Roosevelt, ibid., p. 760; also printed, in slightly different translation, in Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. II, p. 18. For narrative accounts of the conferences at Singapore and Chungking, see Matloff and Snell, pp. 85-87; Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 50-57; and Morton, pp. 154 ff. With regard to the conference at Chungking, see also post, p. 271.

During the same period the Department of State was developing plans for a multilateral declaration of Allied unity (the Declaration by United Nations) and for a Supreme War Council. This work was pushed with all possible speed in order that the plans would be ready when Prime Minister Churchill arrived. Documentation on these interrelated topics prior to the opening of the Washington Conference will be found in Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. I, pp. 1-12. A few of these preconference documents which were referred to in the Washington Conference discussions have been included in this chapter, along with several additional papers not previously printed.

General background on the evolution of political subjects discussed at the First Washington Conference will be found in a number of
Foreign Relations volumes for the year 1941. In this connection special mention might be made of the following:

Volume I—The Atlantic Conference, p. 341; developments of significance concerning Soviet relations with other countries, p. 597; assistance from the United States for the Soviet Union after its invasion by Germany, p. 768.

Volume II—France, particularly the sections on French North Africa, p. 206, and the seizure of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon by Free French forces, p. 540; the agreement for sending American troops to Iceland, p. 776; the arrangements for sending American forces to Surinam, p. 811; the question of Portugal and the Portuguese islands in the Atlantic, p. 836; concern over the maintenance of Spanish neutrality, p. 880.

Volume III—Discussions regarding Ireland’s neutrality policy, p. 215.

Volume VI—Cooperation between the United States and Brazil on certain measures for hemisphere defense, p. 490.

For background on the military situation and the production and allocation problems considered at the Conference, see the appropriate volumes cited ante in the list of published sources.


740.0011 Pacific War/854E: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1941.

For the Former Naval Person from the President.

The Senate passed the all-out declaration of war eighty-two to nothing, and the House has passed it three hundred and eighty-eight to one. Today all of us are in the same boat with you and the people of the Empire and it is a ship which will not and cannot be sunk.

1 Sent as telegram 5749 over Hull’s signature to the Embassy at London.
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

[LONDON, December 9, 1941.]

EDITORIAL NOTE. No copy of this telegram has been found in American files. The text as printed in Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 609, is as follows:

"Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. 9 Dec. 41. I am grateful for your telegram of December 8. Now that we are, as you say, 'in the same boat,' would it not be wise for us to have another conference? We could review the whole war plan in the light of reality and new facts, as well as the problems of production and distribution. I feel that all these matters, some of which are causing me concern, can best be settled on the highest executive level. It would also be a very great pleasure to me to meet you again, and the sooner the better.

2. I could, if desired, start from here in a day or two, and come by warship to Baltimore or Annapolis. Voyage would take about eight days, and I would arrange to stay a week, so that everything important could be settled between us. I would bring Pound, Portal, Dill, and Beaverbrook, with necessary staffs.

3. Please let me know at earliest what you feel about this."

Hopkins Papers

The Administrator of Lend-Lease (Stettinius) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Diversion of Equipment Produced in the United States and Other Strategy Questions.

1. About $13,000,000,000 has already been appropriated for Lend-Lease purposes. Another $1,500,000,000 will probably be appropriated within the next few days. If we take into account the munitions, ships, etc. which can be transferred under the billion-3, the Maritime Commission Act, and the one-half billion of transfers that can be made under the pending bill, it will be a grand total of $17,900,000,000 available for Lend-Lease transfers.

2. Who is going to decide who can use what equipment best? This applies not only to guns and tanks and planes, but also to machine

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1 The "billion-3" presumably refers to the drawing account of $1,300,000,000 which the Division of Defense Aid Reports had at its disposal from appropriations prior to the passage of the Lend-Lease Act on March 11, 1941. See Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), p. 93.
tools, iron and steel and other raw materials. It also applies to non-
Lend-Lease material which has been ordered in this country by for-
eign governments with their own funds. The central thing is that
we should get the stuff of our production—Lend-Lease as well as non-
Lend-Lease material—into the hands of the people who can use them
most effectively.

3. It may be that the United Kingdom has reached pretty well the
saturation point on machine tools, in the light of the available person-
nel which they have. Raw materials are in large part complementary
to machine tools. In the light of the present critical situation, it
might be wise, for example, to send principally finished articles,
rather than machine tools to countries such as the United Kingdom.
The same might be true of things like toluol and TNT to a certain
extent.

4. These questions of high military, naval and political strategy
are now arising with greatest speed. There is still a strong pull to
decide them in a makeshift way at too low a level.

5. There is a pressing need, and the public will doubtless want—a
tough, hard-hitting strategy outfit to devote full time to this job.
Such a strategy group should probably be small and have a high
calibre staff of military, naval and civilian experts. I should think
that such a strategy group should have the power to:

a) Formulate the major policy on strategy, with the President's
approval where necessary or desirable.
b) Advise the President on strategic questions.
c) Pass on strategic questions arising in other departments or
agencies.
d) Do all of those other things necessary or desirable in an adequate
handling of the problems of military and naval strategy.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

740.0011 P.W./900 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State and the President

TRIPLE PRIORITY

LONDON, December 10, 1941.

5974. Personal and most secret to the Secretary for the President.
The Prime Minister, as you will have seen in the press, announced to
the Parliament at 11 o'clock this morning the loss of the Prince of
Wales and the Repulse. I was with him last night and saw him im-
mediately following the announcement and have been constantly with
him over the last few days. It seemed best to me that certain infor-
mation should go from him direct to you rather than through the
Embassy. I hope you and the Secretary approve. He feels that
information from the Pacific calls for reconsideration of planning as you already know. Discouragements seem only to give him new courage and add to his determination.

Your speech to the Congress was carried on the BBC. It gave people great confidence here. I listened to your talk to the Nation last night. There was serious interference but it was repeated this morning, again at noon on the NBC [BBC]. People here assume that we are in the total war together. News from the Middle East and Russia is good.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/17293: Telegram
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

TRIPLE PRIORITY

LONDON, December 10, 1941.

Personal and secret from the Former Naval Person for the President.

We do not think there is any serious danger about return journey. There is, however, great danger in our not having a full discussion on the highest level about the extreme gravity of the naval position as well as upon all the production and allocation issues involved. I am quite ready to meet you at Bermuda or to fly from Bermuda to Washington. I feel it would be disastrous to wait for another month before we settled common action in face of new adverse situation particularly in Pacific. I had hoped to start tomorrow night, but will postpone my sailing till I have received rendezvous from you. I never felt so sure about the final victory, but only concerted action will achieve it. Kindest regards.

1 Sent as telegram 5976 over Winant's signature to the Secretary of State.
2 There was apparently a telegram (no copy of which has been found) from Roosevelt to Churchill on December 9 in which Roosevelt expressed fears about Churchill's safety on the return journey to the British Isles. See Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 609.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

PERSONAL

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1941.

SECRET

For Former Naval Person from the President.

Delighted to have you here at White House. Impossible for me to leave country during intensive mobilization and clarification naval action in Pacific.

1 Sent via United States Navy channels.
I know you will bear in mind that the production and allocation problems can and will be worked out with complete understanding and accord. We shall have to use allotted planes for about three weeks but hope to resume schedule of shipments to you and Russia by January first. Practically all other lend-lease articles are continuing to be shipped. Details of production and allocation can be handled at long range.

Naval situation and other matters of strategy require discussion. My one reservation is great person[al] risk to you—believe this should be given most careful consideration for the Empire needs you at the helm and we need you there too.

The news is bad but it will be better.

Warm regards

ROOSEVELT

740.0011 European War/173325: Telegram
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

TRIPLE PRIORITY

LONDON, December 11, 1941.

To the President from the Former Naval Person.

I see reports that Admiral Leahy is to leave Vichy. Am most anxious to discuss with you offering Vichy blessings or cursings on the morrow of a victory in Libya. Trust your link with Pétain will not be broken meanwhile. We have no other worthwhile connection.

Footnote:
1 Sent as telegram 6002 over Winant's signature to the Secretary of State.

740.0011 EW 1939/174664: Telegram
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

TRIPLE PRIORITY

LONDON, December 12, 1941.

Most secret and personal from the Prime Minister to the President.

1. We feel it necessary to divert Eighteenth Division now rounding the Cape in your transports to Bombay to reinforce army we are forming against Japanese invasion of Burma and Malay. I hope you will allow your ships to take them there instead of to Suez. Route is both shorter and safer.

2. Our previous telegrams. Thank you so much. Hope rendezvous will be about 21st. I am enormously relieved at turn world events have taken.

Footnotes:
1 Sent as telegram 6012 over Winant's signature to the Secretary of State.
2 The convoy was rerouted as requested; see Churchill's remark at the meeting of December 23, post, p. 74.
Minutes of Meeting XVII of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, December 12, 1941

[Excerpt]

PRESENT

BOARD MEMBERS, ALTERNATES, AND STAFF

Vice President Henry A. Wallace, Chairman of the Economic Defense Board, who presided as chairman of the meeting
Mr. William S. Knudsen, Director General of the Office of Production Management
Mr. Sidney Hillman, Associate Director General of the Office of Production Management
Mr. Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, acting for the Secretary of War
Mr. Ralph Bard, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, acting for the Secretary of the Navy
Mr. Leon Henderson, Administrator of the Office of Price Administration
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President Supervising the Defense Aid Program
Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Executive Director of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board
Mr. John Lord O'Brien, General Counsel
Mr. Herbert Emmerich, Secretary

BY INVITATION

Mr. Isador Lubin, Economic Adviser to the President
Mr. M. G. de Chazeau, Consultant, Division of Civilian Supply, Office of Production Management
Mr. W. L. Batt, Director, Division of Materials, Office of Production Management (For discussion of items 1 through 7)
Mr. Floyd B. Odlin, Director, Division of Contract Distribution, Office of Production Management (For discussion of item 5)
Mr. Howard O. Sykes, Chief, Commodity, Stockpile and Shipping Imports Branch, Division of Materials, Office of Production Management (For discussion of items 1 through 4)
Mr. William Y. Elliott, Deputy Chief, Commodity, Stockpile and Shipping Imports Branch, Division of Materials, Office of Production Management (For discussion of items 1 through 4)
Mr. J. H. Eisenhart, Jr., Assistant Director of Transportation, Office of Price Administration
Mr. Hamilton K. Smith, Executive Secretary to Small Businessmen's Advisory Committee, Division of Contract Distribution, Office of Production Management (For discussion of item 5)

1. THE FIRST WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Mr. Emerson Ross, Chief, Statistics Section, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Office of Production Management (For discussion of Item 5)

Col. G. S. Brady, Chief, Import Section, Division of Civilian Supply, Office of Production Management

Col. J. W. Greene, Assistant Chief, Import Section, Division of Civilian Supply, Office of Production Management

2. International Control of Raw Materials

The Executive Director and Mr. Elliott pointed out the need at the present time for joint agreements with the British and other foreign governments regarding international control of raw materials. Upon motion duly made, it was agreed without objection that:

"The Executive Director shall confer with Mr. W. L. Batt, Director, Division of Materials, Office of Production Management; Mr. Milo Perkins, Executive Director, Economic Defense Board; Mr. Jesse H. Jones, Federal Loan Administrator; and Mr. W. L. Clayton, Deputy Federal Loan Administrator, Federal Loan Agency; the Department of State, and such others as may be interested in the formulation of a plan, for the holding of a joint conference of high ranking officials of the United States Government, the British Government, and such other governments as may be invited, for the purpose of discussing the international control of raw materials during the emergency."

Harriman Papers: Telegram

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 13, 1941.

From Hopkins to Beaverbrook

The following matter is thought to be of the greatest importance; the need of a talk between our own emissaries and proper English officials is felt by us, the discussion to take place here and to deal with production and allotment of the world's raw materials still capable of being obtained in our own two nations and from the resources of our friends. Certain critical items such as steel should be included in this parley. The finished production or distribution of munitions, which should be talked about on other levels would not be the concern of

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1 Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels. Since the original text of the message could not be found in the Hopkins Papers, the editors obtained this copy from Harriman. The source text is a copy of the message as transmitted in paraphrase from Harriman to Beaverbrook's office on December 14. From a notation on the file it appears that the message was forwarded to Beaverbrook, who had left London on December 12 for embarkation on H.M.S. Duke of York at the Clyde. See Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 625-626.
this conference. If you think this a good idea will you please think of whom you would like to represent your Ministry.

Roosevelt Papers

The Coordinator of Information (Donovan) to the President

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1941.

My Dear Mr. President: I submit the following for your consideration:

Assuming that it is only a question of time when the French Fleet will be turned over to the Germans, and with this turning over,

(1) that the Germans would be strengthened not only in the Mediterranean but in the Atlantic, and

(2) there would be a greater weakening of both ourselves and the British in the Pacific,

then should there be considered now the possibility—adhering to the principle of surprise attack—of having combined action of British and American forces against such elements of the French Fleet as would constitute advantageous targets?

There may be political, military and naval arguments against this, but I suggest its consideration only because there will be few opportunities in the coming months for offensive action by us, and such offensive action is necessary both from a morale and strategic standpoint.

Of course, if the assumption made is false, no consideration is merited.

Respectfully, 

DONOVAN

Hull Papers

Draft Joint Declaration

[WASHINGTON,] December 14, 1941.

Draft of Joint Declaration by the United States, Great Britain, China, the Netherlands, and Other Governments

The Government of the United States of America, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Union of South Africa, New Zealand, China and the Netherlands,

\footnote{This draft, prepared at Hull's request by Maxwell M. Hamilton, is the first version of what became the Declaration by United Nations; see Hull, vol. II, pp. 1114-1115. Although there is no explicit indication that this draft was sent to the President, it appears that it was one of two drafts submitted by Roosevelt to Churchill shortly after the conference began and telegraphed by the Prime Minister to London for consideration by the War Cabinet. The evidence of this appears in the telegram of December 25 from Attlee to Churchill, post, p. 364.}
Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,²

Being convinced that complete and world-wide victory of all of them is essential to defend and preserve life, liberty, independence as well as the righteous possibilities of human freedom and justice not only in their own lands but everywhere, and that the struggle in which they are now engaged is a common defense of human decencies everywhere against savage and brutal force seeking to subjugate the world, Declare:

(1) Each government pledges itself to employ its full resources against the Axis forces of conquest and to continue such employment until these forces have been finally defeated;

(2) Each government pledges itself to the other governments associated in this declaration to effect full coordination of military effort and use of resources against the common enemies;

(3) Each government pledges itself to continue war against, and not to make a separate peace with, the common enemies or any of them.

Other governments desirous of associating themselves in this declaration are hereby privileged to adhere to this declaration.

²For text, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1603.

Hull Papers

The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

MR. SECRETARY: It would seem that the problem of unifying the war effort necessitates three pieces of machinery.

I. A supreme political council.

This would be the equivalent of the Council of Three at the Versailles Peace Conference ¹ and ideally would be composed of the President, Mr. Winston Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. All of these are full allies in the sense that all are fighting Japan, Italy and Germany.

Since these three men cannot, of course, leave their own countries, each would have to appoint an alternate agent to speak for him to a very large degree, but of course subject to consultation.

¹For the so-called Council of Three (Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau), see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. v, p. vi, footnote 1.
To provide participation for the U.S.S.R. (which is only fighting Germany and Italy and is not at war with Japan), it would seem wise to divide the operations of the supreme political council into two sections, the Pacific theatre and the Atlantic-European theatre. In practice this would be little more than a device to hold meetings in respect of the Atlantic-European theatre, to which an alternate for Stalin might be invited.

This follows the practice evolved at Paris in which the five principal allies, namely, Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy and Japan, met to determine political policy; but because of the lack of interest of Japan in certain matters and of Italy in certain other matters, they appeared only as occasional members.

II. A supreme war council.

The purpose of a supreme war council, as described by Mr. Lloyd George and by Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, is to create “a staff superior to the Commanders-in-Chief and the Chiefs of Staff of each individual army.”

Such a council would consist of a soldier designated by the principal warring governments, namely, the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., China, and possibly Holland.

Again, for purposes of handling the Russian situation, and for purposes of economical work, it would seem that this council should be divided into three sections, namely: an Atlantic and European-continental section; a Middle East section; and a Pacific and Asiatic section. Conceivably, the Atlantic and Middle East sections might be combined into one, merely having then a section for the Eastern theatre and a section for the Western theatre.

The reason for dividing into sections would be that to each of these sections there might be added soldiers appointed by countries who were not directly concerned in the whole picture. For instance, it would be impossible to conceive strategy in the European continental picture without taking the Russians into account. The Russians would therefore presumably have to join in the work of this section.

I should suggest that in the Eastern section there be included besides Great Britain and the United States, Russia and Canada.

In the Pacific-Asiatic theatre, I suggest that there be included the following: Great Britain, the United States, China, Holland, Australia (whose representation should include New Zealand).

The Middle East sector, if it were determined to have one, could include the United States, Great Britain, the Union of South Africa, and (possibly) the Free French and the Belgians, if the Belgian Congo is drawn in.
Joint sessions might be had of the three sections.

Members of the supreme military council should act as military advisers to the representatives of their respective countries on the supreme political council.

The functions of the supreme war council should be to act as “an agency for the adoption and maintenance of a general policy for the allies in the prosecution of the war, consistent with the total resources available and the most effective distribution of those resources among the various theatres of operations.”

III. A supreme economic council.

This should have jurisdiction over supplies, relief, finance, increase of production, and similar allied questions.

Attached hereto are some sighting shots at drafts.

A. A. B., Jr.

[Attachment 1]

DRAFT

SCHEME OF ORGANIZATION OF A SUPREME POLICY COUNCIL

(1) With a view to the better coordination of military and naval action against their common enemies, a Supreme Policy Council is created, composed of the Chief of State and a member of the government of each of the great powers engaged in war against Germany, Italy and Japan. In matters having to do with continental Europe and territories adjacent to the Black Sea, there shall be included the Chief of State and a member of the government of any great power at war with Germany or Italy, but not at war with Japan.

(2) The Supreme Policy Council has for its mission to watch over the general conduct of the war.

(3) The general war plans drawn up by the competent military authorities are submitted to the Supreme Policy Council which, under the authority of the governments, insures their concordance.

The Supreme Policy Council will not discuss military operations in the field, but will reach decisions as to: (a) questions of policy affecting the military situation; (b) distribution of available manpower, equipment, supplies and shipping, among the various theatres of operations; (c) the character that military operations should assume, in view of the forces available, in each theatre of operations.
(4) The Supreme Policy Council may create two or more sections, each section corresponding to a theatre of war, and may provide for the representation in each section of the powers actively engaged in war against a common enemy in such theatre.

(5) The Supreme Policy Council shall be charged with effecting unified command in respect of theatres of war which it shall designate. The Supreme Political Council meets normally at . . . . . .

[Attachment 2]

DRAFT

SCHEME OF ORGANIZATION OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

(1) With a view to the better coordination of military action against their common enemies, a Supreme War Council is created, composed of a permanent military or naval representative of the great powers actively engaged in warfare against Germany, Italy and Japan. The decisions of the Council shall follow the lines of policy determined by the Supreme Policy Council.

(2) The general staffs and military and naval commands of the armed forces of each power charged with the conduct of military operations remain responsible to their respective governments.

(3) The general war plans drawn up by the competent military authorities are submitted to the Supreme War Council. When approved by the Supreme Policy Council, the Supreme War Council shall be responsible for making them effective.

(4) The members of the Supreme War Council receive from the government and competent military and naval authorities of their country all the proposals, information and documents relating to the conduct of the war. They shall watch day by day the situation of the armed forces and the means of all kinds of which the allied armed forces and the enemy armed forces dispose.

(5) The Supreme War Council may recommend the determination of theatres of war, and may nominate to the Supreme Policy Council a Commander-in-Chief of the forces in any theatre so designated. In respect of any theatre so designated, a military or naval representative of other Powers engaged in active war against any of the common enemies may be added to the Council in deciding upon military policy and operations in that theatre.

(6) The Supreme War Council meets normally at . . . . . .
Defense Files

The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Staff, British Joint Staff Mission

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1941.

Subject: ABC-1; modification of.

1. In view of the changed situation in the Pacific Area, the Chief of Naval Operations has made certain changes in the disposition of United States naval forces, and the tasks assigned the U.S. Pacific Fleet, that will require modification in ABC-1.

2. The tasks now assigned the Pacific Fleet are as follows:

(a) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;
(b) Support the Army in the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier in category of Defense “D”;
(c) Defend Samoa, Midway, Johnston Island and Palmyra Island, category of Defense “D”;
(d) Defend Wake, category of defense “C”;
(e) Raid enemy sea communications and positions;
(f) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;
(g) Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area east of the 180th meridian, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;
(h) Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces and the Canadian local defense forces;
(i) Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require;
(j) Route shipping of Associated Powers within the fleet control zones.

3. United States naval forces in the Atlantic Ocean have been directed to proceed for assignment as follows:

3 BB — U.S. Pacific Fleet
1 CV — “ “ “ “
9 DD — “ “ “ “
86 VPB — “ “ “ “
12 OSS — Fifteenth Naval District.

1 The letter was addressed to the Chief Staff Officer of the British Naval Staff and was signed by L. R. McDowell, Commander, USN, as Secretary for Collaboration.

4. Until the present situation in the Pacific Ocean becomes more favorable, the Pacific Fleet can not undertake the following tasks of ABC-1:

(a) Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East area by diverting enemy strength from the Malay barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls;
(b) Support British Naval Forces in the area south of the Equator, as far west as longitude 155° east;
(c) Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area.

5. The reduction in United States naval forces in the Atlantic Ocean and the present requirements for escorts in the Western Atlantic Area will delay the furnishing of units, for the following purposes:

(a) United Kingdom and British Home Waters
   1. Northwest Escort Force.
   2. Submarines.
(b) North Atlantic Area
   1. Submarines.
   2. United States Gibraltan Force.

Hull Papers

Mr. Savage to the Secretary of State 1

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1941.

Mr. Secretary: In view of the experience of the United States and the Allies during the first World War, and in view of the circumstances of the present war, there is set out below a suggested outline for a Supreme War Council designed to provide for the most effective use of available human and material resources in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers.

Supreme War Council
   Military Council
   Naval Council
   Aviation Council
   Shipping Council
   Economic Council
   Food Committee
   Munitions Committee
   Raw Materials Committee
   Petroleum Committee

1 Savage was technically Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long but at this time he was working directly with Secretary Hull in developing plans for the Joint Declaration and a Supreme War Council. A copy of this memorandum was sent to Roosevelt on December 22; see post, p. 58.
Some of the principal problems in connection with the establishment and operation of a Supreme War Council and subordinate bodies are listed below with a suggested solution.

1. **Representation:** The Supreme War Council and subordinate bodies would be composed of representatives of the United States, British Empire, Soviet Union, China, and possibly the Netherlands. The Soviet Union, in view of its neutrality agreement with Japan, would be announced as participating only in discussions of problems relating to the conduct of the war against Germany and Italy; however, in actual practice it would probably work out that most of the problems would relate directly or indirectly to this aspect of the war. Representation on the Supreme War Council and subordinate bodies would be limited to four or five powers because an organization composed of representatives of all the nations arrayed against Germany would be too large to be effective.

2. **Decisions:** The decisions of the Supreme War Council and the various subordinate bodies would be unanimous.

3. **Seat of Council:** The circumstances of this war would seem to make it desirable that the Supreme War Council and subordinate bodies be located at Washington.

4. **Unity of Command:** There would be no general unity of command of the armed forces throughout the world which are pitted against the Axis powers, except in so far as the Supreme Council itself would constitute a unity of command. However, the Supreme War Council, with the approval of the represented governments, might decide on unity of command in certain theatres of war as for example in the Far East or in the Near East.

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**Carlton Savage**

Hopkins Papers

*The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1941.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

A matter of very urgent importance is our coming to an understanding with the British, and possibly the Dutch, relative to the allocation of various raw materials under our control.

This came up the other day at the S.P.A.B. meeting and everybody agreed that such a conference should be held.¹

There are so many Departments that are concerned with this that I think you are going to have to notify the participants.

¹ *Ance*, p. 10.
Batt knows more about it than anyone else and I think has a primary interest in it because he is in charge of the materials section of OPM. I therefore suggest that he act as chairman of the group.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

Hopkins Papers

The President to the Director of Materials, Office of Production Management (Batt)

[WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1941.

DEAR BILL: I am anxious that we get into a conference at an early date with the British, and possibly the Dutch, relative to the raw materials of the world which are either under our control or are under the control of our friends. It is essential that we make the best and most effective joint use of these materials.

I think the conference should also deal with such critical items as steel. I do not wish it to include munitions of war or other manufactured products. Any political implications that arise out of the conference will naturally be referred to the proper Departments of the Government.

I have in mind a working conference to explore at once how the raw materials of the world can best be brought to bear on the defeat of Hitler.

I have asked Lord Beaverbrook, whose Ministry is responsible for this in England, to designate appropriate representatives to discuss this matter with our Government.

I am asking Jim Forrestal, Bob Patterson, Don Nelson, Ed Stettinius, Will Clayton, and Milo Perkins to serve on this conference. I wish you would take the initiative in getting this group together to make preliminary plans prior to the conference.

I wish for the present that this proposed conference be kept confidential.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

730.0011 E.W. 1939/17786a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1941, 10 p.m.

856. Strictly confidential for the Minister.

In view of information which has reached the Department from various sources during the past few days, it is believed that there may be some possibility that the Germans intend in the immediate future operations involving Spain. The Department desires you if possible
to have a conversation with Dr. Salazar as promptly as possible, or, if that is not immediately possible, a conversation with responsible officials of the Foreign Office in order that you may obtain the views of the Portuguese Government with regard to the accuracy of these reports. The fullest information possible will, of course, be most valuable to the Department. You will bear in mind in that connection the contents of the President's personal letter of last summer to Dr. Salazar, with the contents of which you are familiar.

Please report by telegram as soon as possible.

Hull

*For text, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. II, p. 851.

Roosevelt Papers

The President to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 18, 1941.

Dear Cordell: I am anxious that we get into a conference at an early date with the British, and possibly the Dutch, relative to the raw materials of the world which are either under our control or are under the control of our friends. It is essential that we make the best and most effective joint use of these materials.

I think the conference should also deal with such critical items as steel. I do not wish it to include munitions of war or other manufactured products. Any political implications that arise out of the conference will naturally be referred to the proper Departments of the Government.

I wish you could assign Mr. Thomas K. Finletter, Chief of your Division of Defense Materials, to be a member of the group. The names of the other members are as follows: Mr. James Forrestal, Mr. Robert Patterson, Mr. William Batt, Mr. Donald Nelson, Mr. E. R. Stettinius, Mr. W. L. Clayton and Mr. Milo Perkins. I have asked Mr. Batt to take the initiative.

I wish for the present that this proposed conference be kept confidential.

Sincerely yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, December 18, 1941.

Dear Mr. President: I have your letter of December eighteenth relative to the important question of a meeting with the British and the Dutch concerning raw materials.
In accord with your request I am glad to assign Mr. Thomas K. Finletter as a member of the group and have advised him accordingly.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

Roosevelt Papers

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1941.

Dear Mr. President, I have just received a message from the Prime Minister asking me to thank you for your most kind invitation to stay at the White House, which he is delighted to accept. He proposes that his party at the White House should consist of only himself, his personal assistant Commander Thompson, his secretary Mr. Martin, his valet, and his two detectives. Accommodation for the remainder of the Prime Minister's party is being obtained at the Mayflower Hotel, where Lord Beaverbrook's party and Mr. Harriman are also to stay.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

Halifax

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

[ABOARD THE H.M.S. "DUKE OF YORK,"

December 16–20, 1941.]¹

Brigadier Hollis.

C.O.S. Committee.

PART I—THE ATLANTIC FRONT

1. The procedure outlined in your Minute to me of yesterday ² is most desirable. There should be two or three meetings on successive days of the three or four principal persons on each side, presided over by the President. At these meetings the whole scope of the war can be discussed, and particular points as they arise can be referred to sub-Committees for implementing in detail. It is, however, necessary that while we are on board here we should make up our minds on the policy we wish to pursue and the chief proposals we should make to the United States' representatives. I do not attempt to deal with

¹ The four parts of this memorandum are dated respectively December 16, 17, 18, and 20. Part IV is a revision of Part II and is printed in Churchill, The Grand Alliance (pp. 652–655), as Part II. Churchill (ibid., pp. 645–646) explains the genesis of the memorandum and indicates (ibid., p. 664) that he gave a copy of it to Roosevelt on December 23.

² Not found in American files.
the question of allocation of supplies in these notes, but only with the war policy of 1942 and 1943.

2. Hitler’s failure and losses in Russia are the prime fact in the war at this time. We cannot tell how great the disaster to the German Army and Nazi regime will be. This regime has hitherto lived upon easily and cheaply won successes. Instead of what was imagined to be a swift and easy victory, it has now to face the shock of a Winter of slaughter and expenditure of fuel and equipment on the largest scale.

Neither Great Britain nor the United States have any part to play in this event except to make sure that we send, without fail and punctually, the supplies we have promised. In this way alone shall we hold our influence over Stalin and be able to weave the mighty Russian effort into the general texture of the war.

3. In a lesser degree the impending victory of General Auchinleck in Cyrenaica is an injury to the German Powers. We may expect the total destruction of the enemy force in Libya to be apparent before the end of the year. This not only inflicts a heavy blow upon the Germans and Italians, but it frees our forces in the Nile Valley from the major threat of invasion from the west under which they have long dwelt. Naturally, General Auchinleck will press on as fast as possible with the operation called ACROMAT, which should give him possession of Tripoli and if so bring his armoured vanguard to the French frontier of Tunis. He may be able to supply a forecast before we separate at Washington.

4. The German losses and defeat in Russia and their extirpation from Libya may, of course, impel them to a supreme effort in the Spring to break the ring that is closing on them by a south-eastward thrust either through the Caucasus or through Anatolia, or both. However, we should not assume that necessarily they will have the war energy for this task. The Russian armies recuperated by the Winter will lie heavy upon them from Leningrad to the Crimea. They may easily be forced to evacuate the Crimea. There is no reason at this time to suppose that the Russian Navy will not command the Black Sea. Nor should it be assumed that the present life-strength of Germany is such as to make an attack upon Turkey and march through Anatolia a business to be undertaken in present circumstances by the Nazi regime. The Turks have 50 Divisions; their fighting quality and the physical obstacles of their country are well-known. Although Turkey has played for safety throughout, the Russian command of the Black Sea and the British successes in the Levant and along the North Africa shore, together with the proved weakness of the Italian Fleet, would justify every effort on our part to bring Turkey into line, and are certainly sufficient to encourage her to resist
a German inroad. While it would be imprudent to regard the danger of a German south-west thrust against the Persian, Iraq, Syrian front as removed, it certainly now seems much less likely and imminent than heretofore.

5. We ought, therefore, to try hard to win over French North Africa and now is the moment to use every inducement and form of pressure at our disposal upon the Government of Vichy and the French authorities in North Africa. The German set-back in Russia, the British successes in Libya, the moral and military collapse of Italy; above all, the Declarations of War exchanged between Germany and the United States, must strongly affect the mind of France and the French Empire. Now is the time to offer to Vichy and to French North Africa a blessing or cursing. A blessing will consist in a promise by the United States and Great Britain to re-establish France as a Great Power with her territories undiminished (except for the changes in Syria and certain adjustments which may be necessary on the frontier of Spanish Morocco.) It should carry with it an offer of active aid by British and United States Expeditionary Forces, both from the Atlantic seaboard of Morocco and at convenient landing points in Algeria and Tunis as well as from General Auchinleck’s forces advancing from the East. Ample supplies for the French and the loyal Moors should be made available. Vichy should be asked to send their fleet from Toulon to Oran and Bizerta, and to bring France into the war again as a principal.

This would mean that the Germans would take over the whole of France and rule it as occupied territory. It does not seem that the conditions in the occupied and the hitherto unoccupied zones are widely different. Whatever happens European France will inevitably be subjected to a complete blockade. There is, of course, always the chance that the Germans, tied up in Russia, may not care to take over occupied France even though French North Africa is at war with them.

6. If we can obtain even the connivance of Vichy to French North Africa coming over to our side we must be ready to send considerable forces as soon as possible. Apart from anything which General Auchinleck can bring in from the East, should he be successful in Tripolitania, we hold ready in Britain (Operation Gymnast) about 55,000 men comprising two Divisions and an armoured unit, together with the shipping. These forces could enter French North Africa by invitation on the twenty-third day after the order to embark them was given. Leading elements and air forces from Malta could reach Bizerta at very short notice. It is desired that the United States should at the same time promise to bring in, via Casablanca and other African Atlantic ports, not less than 150,000 men during the next six
months. It is essential that some American elements, say 25,000 men, should go at the earliest moment after French agreement, either Vichy or North African, had been obtained.

7. It is also asked that the United States will send the equivalent of three Divisions and one Armoured Division into Northern Ireland. These Divisions could, if necessary, complete their training in Northern Ireland. The presence of American forces there would become known to the enemy, and they could be led to magnify their actual numbers. The presence of United States' troops in the British Isles would be a powerful additional deterrent against an attempt at invasion by Germany. It would enable us to nourish the campaign in French North Africa by two more Divisions and one complete Armoured Division. If forces of this order could be added to the French Army already in North Africa with proper air support, the Germans would have to make a very difficult and costly campaign across uncommanded waters to subdue North Africa. The North-west African theatre is one most favourable for Anglo-American operations, our approaches being direct and convenient across the Atlantic, while the enemy's passage of the Mediterranean would be severely obstructed as is happening in their Libyan enterprise.

8. It may be mentioned here that we greatly desire American Bomber Squadrons to come into action from the British Isles against Germany. Our own bomber programme has fallen short of our hopes. It is formidable and is increasing, but its full development has been delayed. It must be remembered that we place great hopes of affecting German production and German morale by ever more severe and more accurate bombing of their cities and harbours{.开发区}}{.开发区} and that this, combined with their Russian defeats, may produce important effects upon the will-to-fight of the German people, and with consequential internal reactions upon the German Government. The arrival in the United Kingdom of, say, 20 American Bomber Squadrons or a token force of 6 for a start would emphasise and accelerate this process, and would be the most direct and effective reply to the Declaration of War by Germany upon the United States. Arrangements will be made in Great Britain to increase this process and develop the Anglo-American bombing of Germany without any top limit from now on till the end of the war.

9. We must, however, reckon with a refusal by Vichy to act as we desire, and on the contrary they may rouse French North Africa to active resistance. They may help German troops to enter North Africa; the Germans may force their way or be granted passage through Spain; the French Fleet at Toulon may pass under German control, and France and the French Empire may be made by Vichy to collaborate actively with Germany against us, although it is not
likely that this would go through effectively. The overwhelming majority of the French are ranged with Great Britain and now still more with the United States. It is by no means certain that Admiral Darlan can deliver the Toulon Fleet over intact to Germany. It is most improbable that French soldiers and sailors would fight effectively against the United States and Great Britain. Nevertheless, we must not exclude the possibility of a half-hearted association of the defeatist elements in France and North Africa with Germany. In this case our task in North Africa will become much harder.

A Campaign must be fought in 1942 to gain possession of, or conquer, the whole of the North African shore including the Atlantic ports of Morocco. Dakar and other French West African Ports must be captured before the end of the year. Whereas, however, entry into French North Africa is urgent to prevent German penetration, a period of 8 or 9 months' preparation may well be afforded for the mastering of Dakar and the West African establishments. Plans should be set on foot forthwith. If sufficient time and preparation are allowed and the proper apparatus provided, these latter operations present no insuperable difficulty.

10. Our relationship with General de Gaulle and the Free French Movement will require to be reviewed. Hitherto the United States have entered into no undertakings similar to those comprised in my correspondence with him. Through no particular fault of his own he has not been of any important help to us. Indeed, his Movement has created new antagonisms in French minds. Any action which the United States may now feel able to take in regard to him should have the effect inter alia of re-defining our obligations to him and France so as to make those obligations more closely dependent upon the effective effort by him and the French nation to rehabilitate themselves. If Vichy were to act as we desire about French North Africa, the United States and Great Britain must labour to bring about a reconciliation between the Free French (de Gaullists) and those other Frenchmen who will have taken up arms once more against Germany. If, on the other hand, Vichy assists in collaboration with Germany and we have to fight our way into French North and West Africa, then the de Gaullists' Movement will be of value and must be aided and used to the full.

11. We cannot tell what will happen in Spain. It seems probable that the Spaniards will not give the Germans a free passage through Spain to attack Gibraltar and invade North Africa. There may be infiltration, but the formal demand for the passage of an Army would be resisted. If so, the Winter would be the worst time for the Germans to attempt to force their way through Spain. Moreover, Hitler with

*See Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 508.
nearly all Europe to hold down by armed force in the face of defeat and semi-starvation, may well be chary of taking over unoccupied France and involving himself in bitter guerilla warfare with the morose, fierce, hungry people of the Iberian Peninsula. Everything possible must be done by Britain and the United States to strengthen their will to resist. The present policy of limited supplies should be pursued. Hope should be held out of an improvement of the Spanish/Moroccan frontier at the expense of France, who must be made to understand that her rehabilitation following an Anglo-American victory will be an overwhelming reward which she has yet to deserve.

The value of Gibraltar Harbour and base to us is so great that no attempts should be made upon the Atlantic Islands until either the Peninsula is invaded or the Spaniards give passage to the Germans.

12. To sum up, the war in the West in 1942 comprises, as its main offensive effort, the occupation and control by Great Britain and the United States of the whole of the North and West African Possessions of France, and the further control by Britain of the whole North African shore from Tunis to Egypt, thus giving, if the Naval situation allows, free passage through the Mediterranean to the Levant and the Suez Canal. These great objectives can only be achieved if British and American naval and air superiority in the Atlantic is maintained, if supply lines continue uninterrupted, and if the British Isles are effectively safeguarded against invasion.

PART II—THE PACIFIC FRONT

1. The heavy losses inflicted by Japan upon the United States and British Forces in the Pacific theatre have given the Japanese, for the time being, superiority in these vast waters. There are at present few points in the East Indies to which they cannot transport a superior land force. By insulting the western seaboard of Canada and the United States, or the shores of Australia, with attacks of individual cruisers or seaborne aircraft they may seek to cause alarm and the dispersion of our forces. However, on account of the great number of objectives open to them—far more than they can possibly devour simultaneously—they must be expected, if they act wisely, to concentrate upon securing their military position in the East Indies. On this principle they would do their utmost to capture Manilla while making their longer advance overland towards Singapore. At the same time they would strike at Burma and the Burma Road, thus isolating China. No relief is possible for Hong Kong. The Japanese must be expected to establish themselves on both sides of the Straits of Malacca and in the Straits of Sunda, to take a number of islands in the Malaysian Archipelago, and to endeavour to occupy various parts of the Dutch East Indies.
The above, if stubbornly resisted, will involve the employment of very large numbers of Japanese troops, and their supply and maintenance will strain Japanese sea transport.

We should ask the United States’ authorities what is their view about a Japanese attempt to take and occupy Hawaii by an expedition. With the knowledge at present available to us it seems it would be an ill-judged and therefore unlikely enterprise.

2. We do not know what estimate of time the United States authorities place upon the resistance of Manila and other key points in the Philippines. We expect, however, that Singapore island and fortress will stand an attack for at least six months, although meanwhile the naval base will not be useable by either side. A large Japanese army with its siege train and ample supplies of ammunition and engineering stores will be required for their attack upon Singapore. Considerable Japanese forces also will be needed for the attack on Burma and the Burma Road. The line of communications between the Malay Archipelago and Japan is nearly 2,000 miles in length and dangerously vulnerable. The Japanese armies landed in the Malay Peninsula, or in Indo-China, Siam and Burma, will soon constitute immense commitments which would be immediately imperilled by the recovery by the United States of major sea-control in the Pacific. This process should be aided by Great Britain. In the meanwhile an attack upon Japanese sea communications by United States and Dutch submarines and other vessels constitutes a grievous danger to the enemy.

3. How then is the superiority of Anglo-American sea-power to be regained? The two new 45,000 ton Japanese battleships are dominating factors, and it is not seen how a superior line of battle can be drawn out against Japan in the Pacific theatre for some time. It may well be that this will not be achieved until the two new American 16" gun battleships join the Pacific Fleet. The date of May has been mentioned, but it is not known to us whether this is the date of commissioning of these ships or of their being fully worked up. It would seem unjustifiably hazardous to fight a general fleet action until these two ships at least have joined the United States’ Pacific Fleet. Diversions and enterprises by United States aircraft carriers escorted by fast cruisers against the exposed cities of Japan constitute a form of interim offensive action which will presumably be earnestly studied.

4. The British naval contribution to the war against Japan has been crippled by the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. We have to base on Scapa Flow the five Capital ships, viz: King George V; Duke of York; Rodney; Nelson (ready at the end of March) and Renown, together with one modern aircraft carrier Victorious. We contemplate basing on Gibraltar (while it is available) the Malaya
and a second modern aircraft carrier, probably *Formidable*. These forces should be sufficient to assure the ultimate control of the Atlantic in the event of a sortie by the *Tirpitz* (probably the most powerful vessel afloat) supported by *Scheer* and also by the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Prinz Eugen* if at any time they can be repaired at Brest. We hope by frequent air-bombing to keep these last three ships out of action. We therefore concur with the United States' Naval Authorities in their transference of all American Capital ships from the Atlantic to Hawaii or elsewhere in the Pacific. We ask, however, that as many U.S. destroyers as possible shall be left to guard the vital supply line between America and the British Isles.

5. In the meanwhile we propose to organize in the Indian Ocean a force of three armoured carriers, *via*: *Indomitable*, *Illustrious* and *Hermes*, together with suitable cruiser escort. At a later stage *Furious* will be available. This force, based on Trincomalee and ranging as far as Port Darwin, should be formed and in action from the end of February. The four “R” Class battleships, *Ramillies*, *Revenge*, *Royal Sovereign* and *Resolution* will be available as they arrive upon the scene for convoy or other duties between the Cape, Australia and Egypt. It is thought by the Admiralty that the three aircraft carriers working in combination may exercise a very powerful deterrent effect upon the movement of Japanese heavy ships into the Indian Ocean or in the waters between Australia and South Africa, and may to some extent repair the loss of battleship strength. We presume the United States will make their numerous and powerful aircraft carriers play a similar part in the northern Pacific. We are ready to concert action with the United States' fleet, and we should welcome the study of the combined use of all important units in the Pacific for any major offensive operation which may be deemed practicable. It would be only in the last resort that we should withdraw the *Queen Elizabeth* and *Valiant* from the Mediterranean. If adequate air forces were available on the Egyptian and Libyan shores this would not necessarily expose North East Africa to German overseas invasion. The withdrawal of these two battleships from the Eastern Mediterranean would, however, make the victualling of Malta far more difficult, and would exercise a disastrous effect upon Turkey, whose confidence it is so important to maintain. Only if Australia were to be threatened with imminent invasion on a large scale could we contemplate such a step. We therefore propose that *Warspite*, when repaired in February, should join Admiral Cunningham’s fleet at Alexandria. It may, however, be observed that in supreme emergency, or for a great occasion, these three fast modernized ships united to the three aircraft carriers aforesaid, and with the “R” Class battleships, constitute a respectable force.
6. This is the best we can do until the completion and working-up of the Anson and the Howe. The original dates for these were May and September 1942, plus two months working-up in each case. Since the Japanese Declaration of War extreme priority has been given to these vessels and 24-hour shifts are being worked upon them. It is hoped that the Howe may be advanced from September, perhaps to July. Unless some serious losses have been suffered in the interval, as is always possible, or unless the two Italian "Littorio" battleships have been taken over effectively and manned by the Germans, these two ships or alternatively the 16" gun Rodney & Nelson might be considered available to reinforce the Allied fleets in the Pacific either themselves or by setting free their two consorts. If they were added to the two new United States 16"-gun battleships they should give a good margin of superiority even if in the judgment of the United States Naval Authorities that has not been achieved earlier. We may therefore look to the Autumn of 1942 as the period when we shall have recovered superior naval control of the Pacific. From that moment all the Japanese overseas expeditions will be in jeopardy, and offensive operations on the largest scale may be set on foot either against their country, their Possessions or their new conquests. These again should be the subject of immediate planning.

The questions which remain open are how much injury we shall have to suffer in the interval; how strongly the Japanese will fortify themselves in their new positions, and whether the Philippines and Singapore can hold out so long. It is of first importance for us to abridge this waiting period by every conceivable means.

**Part III—1943**

If the operations outlined in Parts I and II should prosper during 1942 the situation at the beginning of 1943 might be as follows:

(a) United States and Great Britain would have recovered effective naval superiority in the Pacific, and all Japanese overseas commitments would be endangered both from the assailing of their communications and from British and American expeditions sent to recover places lost;

(b) The British Isles would remain intact and more strongly prepared against invasion than ever before;

(c) The whole West and North African shores from Dakar to the Suez Canal, and the Levant to the Turkish frontier, would be in Anglo-American hands.

Turkey, though not necessarily at war, would be definitely incorporated in the American-British-Russian front. The Russian position would be strongly established and the supplies of British and American material as promised would have in part compensated for the loss of Russian munition-making capacity. It might be that a
footing would already have been established in Sicily and Italy, with reactions inside Italy which might be highly favourable.

2. But all this would fall short of bringing the war to an end. The war cannot be ended by driving Japan back to her own bounds and defeating her overseas forces. The war can only be ended through the defeat in Europe of the German Armies, or through internal convulsions in Germany produced by the unfavourable course of the war, economic privations and the Allied bombing offensive. As the strength of the United States, Great Britain and Russia develops and begins to be realised by the Germans an internal collapse is always possible, but we must not count upon this. Our plans must proceed upon the assumption that the resistance of the German Army and Air Force will continue at its present level and that their U-boat warfare will be conducted by increasingly numerous flotillas.

3. We have, therefore, to prepare for the liberation of the captive countries of Western and Southern Europe by the landing at suitable points, successively or simultaneously, of British and American armies strong enough to enable the conquered populations to revolt. By themselves they will never be able to revolt owing to the ruthless counter-measures that will be employed; but if adequate and suitably equipped forces were landed in several of the following countries, namely, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the French Channel coasts and the French Atlantic coasts, as well as Italy and possibly the Balkans, the German garrisons would prove insufficient to cope both with the strength of the liberating forces and the fury of the revolting peoples. It is impossible for the Germans while we retain the sea-power necessary to choose the place or places of attack, to have sufficient troops in each of these countries for effective resistance. In particular, they cannot move their armour about laterally from North to South or West to East: either they must divide it between the various conquered countries—in which case it will become hopelessly dispersed—or they must hold it back in a central position in Germany, in which case it will not arrive until large and important lodgments have been made by us from overseas.

4. We must face here the usual clash between short-term and long-term projects. War is a constant struggle and must be waged from day to day. It is only with some difficulty and within limits that provisions can be made for the future. Experience shows that forecasts are usually falsified and preparations always in arrear. Nevertheless, there must be a design and theme for bringing the war to a victorious end in a reasonable period. All the more is this necessary when under modern conditions no large-scale offensive operation can be launched without the preparation of elaborate technical apparatus.
5. We should therefore face now the problems not only of driving Japan back to her homelands and regaining undisputed mastery in the Pacific, but also of liberating conquered Europe by the landing during the Summer of 1943 of United States and British armies on their shores. Plans should be prepared for the landing in all of the countries mentioned above. The actual choice of which three or four to pick should be deferred as long as possible so as to profit by the turn of events and make sure of secrecy.

6. In principle, the landings should be made by armoured and mechanized forces capable of disembarking not at ports but on beaches, either by landing-craft or from ocean-going ships specially adapted. The potential front of attack is thus made so wide that the German forces holding down these different countries cannot be strong enough at all points. An amphibious outfit must be prepared to enable these large-scale disembarkations to be made swiftly and surely. The vanguards of the various British and American expeditions should be marshalled by the Spring of 1943 in Iceland, the British Isles and, if possible, in French Morocco and Egypt. The main body would come direct across the ocean.

7. It need not be assumed that great numbers of men are required. If the incursion of the armoured formations is successful, the uprising of the local population for whom weapons must be brought will supply the corpus of the liberating offensive. Forty Armoured Divisions, or their equivalent in tank Brigades, at 15,000 men apiece, of which Great Britain would try to produce nearly half, would amount to 600,000 men. Behind this armour, another million men of all arms would suffice to wrest enormous territories from Hitler's domination; but these campaigns once started will require nourishing on a lavish scale. Our industries and trading establishments should, by the end of 1942, be running on a sufficient scale.

8. Apart from the command of the sea, without which nothing is possible, the essential to all these operations is superior air power, and for landing purposes a large development of carrier-borne aircraft will be necessary. This, however, is needed anyhow for the war in 1942. In order to wear down the enemy and hamper his counter preparations, the bombing offensive of Germany from England and of Italy from Malta and, if possible, from Tripoli and Tunis, must reach the highest possible scale of intensity. Considering that the British first-line air strength is already slightly superior to that of Germany; that the Russian Air Force has already established a superiority on a large part of the Russian front and may be considered to be three-fifths the first-line strength of Germany, and that the United States' resources and future developments are additional, there is no reason why a decisive mastery of the air should not be
established even before the Summer of 1943, and meanwhile heavy and continuous punishment inflicted upon Germany. Having regard to the fact that the bombing offensive is necessarily a matter of degree and that the targets cannot be moved away, it would be right to assign priority to the fighter and torpedo-carrying aircraft required for the numerous carriers and improvised carriers which are available or must be brought into existence.

9. If we set these tasks before us now, being careful that they do not trench too much upon current necessities, we might hope, even if no German collapse occurs beforehand, to win the war at the end of 1943 or 1944. There might be advantage in declaring now our intention of sending armies of liberation into Europe in 1943. This would give hope to the subjugated peoples and prevent any truck between them and the German invaders. The setting and keeping in movement along our courses of the minds of so many scores of millions of men is in itself a potent atmospheric influence.

[Part] IV—Notes on the Pacific

1. The Japanese have Naval superiority which enables them to transport troops to almost any desired point, possess themselves of it and establish it for an air naval fuelling base. The Allies will not have for some time the power to fight a general fleet engagement. Their power of convoying troops depends upon the size of the seas, which reduces the chance of interception. We can arrive by surprise from out of the wide seas at some place which we hold. Even without superior sea-power we may descend by surprise here and there. But we could not carry on a sustained operation across the seas. We must expect, therefore, to be deprived one by one of our Possessions and strong-points in the Pacific, and that the enemy will establish himself fairly easily in one after the other, mopping up the local garrisons.

2. In this interim period our duty is one of stubborn resistance at each point attacked, and to slip supplies and reinforcements through as opportunity offers, taking all necessary risks. If our forces resist stubbornly and we reinforce them as much as possible, the enemy will be forced to make ever larger overseas commitments far from home: his shipping resources will be strained and his communications will provide vulnerable targets upon which all available naval and air forces, United States, British and Dutch—especially submarines—should concentrate their effort. It is of the utmost importance that the enemy should not acquire large gains cheaply; that he should be compelled to nourish all his conquests and kept extended, and kept burning up his resources.
3. The resources of Japan are a wasting factor. The country has been long overstrained by its wasteful war in China. They were at their maximum strength on the day of the Pearl Harbour attack. If it is true, as Stalin asserts, that they have, in addition to their own Air Force, 1,500 German airplanes (and he would have opportunities of knowing how they got there), they have now no means of replacing wastage other than by their small home production of 200/400 per month. Our policy should be to make them maintain the largest possible number of troops in their conquests overseas and to keep them as busy as possible so as to enforce well-filled lines of communications and a high rate of aircraft consumption. If we idle and leave them at ease they will be able to extend their conquests cheaply and easily; work with a minimum of overseas forces; make the largest gains and the smallest commitments and thus inflict upon us an enormous amount of damage. It is therefore right and necessary to fight them at every point where we have a fair chance so as to keep them burning and extended.

4. But we must steadily aim at regaining superiority at sea at the earliest moment. This can be gained in two ways: first, by the strengthening of our Capital ships. The two new Japanese battleships built free from Treaty limitations must be considered a formidable factor, influencing the whole Pacific theatre. It is understood that two new American battleships will be fit for action by May. Of course, all undertakings in war must be subject to the action of the enemy, accidents and misfortune, but if our battleship strength should not be further reduced, nor any new unforeseen stress arise, we should hope to place the Nelson and the Rodney at the side of these two new American battleships, making four 16"-gun modern vessels of major strength. Behind such a squadron the older reconstructed battleships of the United States should be available in numbers sufficient to enable a fleet action, under favourable circumstances, to be contemplated at any time after the month of May. The recovery of our Naval superiority in the Pacific, even if not brought to a trial of strength, would reassure the whole western seaboard of the American Continent and thus prevent a needless dissipation on a gigantic defensive effort of forces which have offensive parts to play. We must therefore set before ourselves, as a main strategic object, the forming of a definitely superior battle-fleet in the Pacific and we must aim at May as the date when this will be achieved.

5. Not only then, but in the interval, the warfare of sea-plane carriers should be developed to the greatest possible extent. We are ourselves forming a squadron of three aircraft carriers, suitably attended, to act in the waters between South Africa, India and Australia. The United States have already seven regular carriers com-
pared to Japan's ten, but those of the United States are larger. To this force of regular warship aircraft carriers we must add a very large development of improvised carriers, both large and small. In this way alone can we increase our seapower rapidly. Even if the carriers can only fly a dozen machines they may play their part in combination with other carriers. We ought to develop a floating air establishment sufficient to enable us to acquire and maintain for considerable periods local air superiority over shore-based aircraft, and sufficient to cover the landing of troops in order to attack the enemy's new conquests. Unless or until this local air superiority is definitely acquired even a somewhat superior fleet on our side would fight at a serious disadvantage. We cannot get more battleships than those now in sight for the year 1942, but we can and must get more aircraft carriers. It takes five years to build a battleship, but it is possible to improvise a carrier in six months. Here then is a field for invention and ingenuity similar to that which called forth the extraordinary fleets & flotillas which fought on the Mississippi in the Civil War. It must be accepted that the priority given to sea-borne aircraft of a suitable type will involve a retardation in the full-scale bombing offensive against Germany which we have contemplated as a major method of waging war. This, however, is a matter of time and of degree. We cannot in 1942 hope to reach the levels of bomb discharge in Germany which we had prescribed for that year, but we shall surpass them in 1943. Our joint programme may be late, but it will all come along. And meanwhile, the German cities and other targets will not disappear. While every effort must be made to speed up the rate of bomb discharge upon Germany until the great scales prescribed for 1943 and 1944 are reached, nevertheless we may be forced by other needs to face a retardation in our schedules. The more important will it be therefore that in this interval a force, be it only symbolic, of United States' bombing squadrons should operate from the British Isles against the German cities and seaports.

6. Once the Allies have regained battle-fleet superiority in the Pacific and have created a seaborne air-power sufficient to secure local supremacy for certain periods, it will be possible either to attack the Japanese in their overseas conquest by military expeditions or to attack them in their homeland. It may well be the latter will be found the better. We must imagine the Japanese Air Force as being steadily and rapidly reduced and having no adequate power of replenishment. The approach to the shores of Japan near enough for our sea-borne air power to ravage their cities should be freed from its present prohibitive cost and danger. Nothing will more rapidly relieve the Japanese attacks in the East Indian theatre. Under the protection of the superior battle-fleet and the sea-borne air power aforesaid, it should
be possible to acquire or regain various island bases enabling a definite approach to be made to the homeland of Japan. The burning of Japanese cities by incendiary bombs will bring home in a most effective way to the people of Japan the dangers of the course to which they have committed themselves, and nothing is more likely to cramp the reinforcing of their overseas adventures.

7. The establishment of air bases in China or Russia from which attacks can be made upon the Japanese cities is in everyone’s mind. It is most desirable that Russia should enter the war against Japan, thus enabling her own and Allied aircraft to bomb all the main cities in Japan from a convenient distance. This would also make available a force of about seventy Russian submarines to harass the Japanese lines of communications with their overseas commitments, especially at the point of departure from Japan. However, this is not a point upon which we can press the Russians unduly at the present time. They have withstood and are withstanding the giant assault of the German Army. They have achieved undreamed of success. If their resistance to the German Armies were to break down, or even if their pressure upon them were to be relaxed, all the problems of the Caucasus, Syria, Palestine and Persia would resume the menacing shape they have only lately lost, entailing immense diversions of force upon Great Britain, and offering no satisfactory assurance of success. The influence of the German losses and defeats against Russia upon the German people must be very depressing, and if this is prolonged it may provoke stresses within the German regime of the utmost hopeful consequence. M. Stalin has indicated that perhaps in the Spring he may be able to act against Japan. If he does not feel able or willing to do so now, it would be a mistake to press him unduly. Russia has more than rowed her weight in the boat, and she alone must judge when to take on more burden. The question of whether air bases in Russia could be acquired without entailing war between Japan and Russia is worth-while studying. It would certainly not be in Japan’s interest any more than that of Russia to open up this new front of war. It might mean that an attitude of non-belligerency might be adopted by Russia at a period before she would be willing to come into the war. Such an attitude of non-belligerency might permit aircraft, based on China, to re-fuel in Siberia before and after bombing Japan.

8. The danger of the Japanese using their numerous cruisers to raid all shipping between Australia and the Middle East, and even to assail our convoys round the Cape, will require to be met by the

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*A similar indication was given by Litvinov to Hopkins on January 6, 1942; see the memorandum of conversation, post, p. 171. See also Stalin’s letter to Chiang of December 12, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 747.*
provision of battleship escort. We propose to use the four “R” Class battleships for this purpose if we need to. It is to be hoped that United States will also be ready to help in convoying work against cruiser attacks in the Pacific.

9. Lastly, there is the question of whether we should ask the United States to base her battle-fleet on Singapore, or perhaps make such a movement conditional on our adding our two battleships from the Atlantic. I am very doubtful about this. When we see what happened to the Prince of Wales and the Repulse in these narrow waters, soon to be infested with aircraft based at many points, we cannot feel that they would offer an inviting prospect to the United States. It would be represented as a purely British conception. One is not sure of the work they could do when they got there, and whether they would not suffer unduly heavy losses. It would redouble the anxieties and waste of force upon the defences of the Pacific seaboard of America. It would put out of the way all chances of a seaborne offensive against the homelands of Japan. It is inconceivable that the United States’ authorities would agree to it at any time which can at present be foreseen.

10. We cannot tell what will happen in the Philippines, and whether or for how long United States troops will be able to defend themselves. The defence or recapture of the Philippines cannot be judged upon theoretical principles. Wars of the present scale are largely wars of attrition and a wise choice of a particular battlefield is not necessarily the only criterion. The Philippines will undoubtedly appear to the United States as an American battle-ground which they are in honour bound to fight for. The Japanese will have to expend war-power and aircraft in this conflict, and even if it does not proceed in the best chosen theatre the process of exhaustion and wearing down of the weaker country by the stronger is of very great advantage and relief to us in the Pacific sphere.

11. For these reasons it would not be wise to press the Americans to move their main fleet to Singapore.

12. Nor need we fear that this war in the Pacific will, after the first shock is over, absorb an unduly large proportion of United States’ forces. The numbers of troops that we should wish them to use in Europe in 1942 will not be so large as to be prevented by their Pacific operations, limited as these must be. What will harm us is for a vast United States’ Army of ten millions to be created which, for at least two years while it was training would absorb all the available supplies and stand idle defending the American Continent. The best way of preventing the creation of such a situation and obtaining the proper use of the large forces and ample supplies of munitions which will
presently be forthcoming, is to enable the Americans to regain their Naval power in the Pacific and not to discourage them from the precise secondary overseas operations which they may perhaps contemplate.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

MOST SECRET

IMMEDIATE

[ABOARD THE H.M.S. "DUKE OF YORK",
December 18, 1941.]

1. It is hoped to reach agreement to following main points during conference.

(i) Fundamental basis of joint strategy.
(ii) Interpretation of (i) into terms of immediate Military measures, including re-distribution of forces.
(iii) Allocation of joint forces to harmonise with (i).
(iv) Long term programme based on (i), including forces to be raised and equipped required for victory.
(v) Set up joint machinery for implementing (ii) (iii) and (iv).

2. Under the direction of Prime Minister Chiefs of Staff are preparing short general review as a basis for discussion under paragraph 1 (i) above, to be followed by paper on (ii), (iii) and (iv).

3. Chiefs of Staff are giving much thought to machinery for post conference joint collaborations.

The message was transmitted by the British Embassy to the White House with the notation: "Following message has been received from H.M.S. Duke of York, 18, 21, 41." Copies were promptly sent to members of the Joint Board for their consideration; see post, p. 50.

Editorial Note on a Meeting at the White House, December 18, 1941

No official record of the discussion at this meeting has been found. Stimson, in his diary for December 18, writes of the meeting as follows:

"At three o'clock the President held a conference at the White House which I with General Marshall and Knox with Admiral Stark and Admiral King attended. Harry Hopkins was also there; also the new commander of the fleet, Nimitz. The President then told this conference exactly the nature of the conference which is coming next Monday and who will be there, and he said that he desired us to attend it as his advisers. A paper was produced containing suggested agenda which had been drawn up by the British. I had not seen it before as it had just come to the War Department as we were starting out. The President asked us to get ready with our agenda and to discuss the British agenda. In the Department we have been at work on that already for several days and Marshall told the President so. The
General Staff has been working hard in getting together its views as to the world strategy necessary to meet the present situation. It seemed to me that this was a matter that I must get into with all my mind and strength, and so when I got back to the Department I called a preliminary conference with Lovett, McCloy, and Bundy and showed them the British agenda and divided up among them certain of the things to be investigated."

740.0011 E.W. 1939/17668: Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, December 18, 1941.

758. Strictly confidential for the Secretary.

Department’s No. 856, December 17, 10 p.m. Sampayo, Secretary General of Foreign Office whom I saw this afternoon, informed that Portuguese Government had received no information from Germany, France or Spain regarding movement of German troops or others which would alter in any way the situation in Spain. He emphasized moreover that during the past week Ambassador Franco, brother of the General, had been in Madrid and that he had seen Salazar upon his return when he had informed him in accordance with terms of the treaty between the two countries that there had been no change in Spain nor was any contemplated.

To my inquiry regarding present Portuguese policy he stated emphatically that there had been no alteration in any way in Salazar’s policy of strict neutrality and that it was his fervent hope that Portugal could maintain it.

He made both these assurances with very evident sincerity and from my knowledge of him I do not think he would attempt to deceive me. Among the people generally there continue to circulate disquieting rumors regarding Spain, some of which have reached the international press. My British and Dutch colleagues state that they have been informed that the tension is less in Madrid and they feel that if Germany has attempted any pressure Franco has been successful.

FISH

740.0011 E.W. 1939/17668

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the President

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In connection with our conversation on the telephone of the day before yesterday, I am bringing immediately to your attention a copy of a telegram from our Legation in Lisbon

1 Supra.
sent in reply to the urgent inquiry I addressed to the Minister after speaking to you.

I fully discussed the whole situation with the British Ambassador last night. Lord Halifax felt—and I agree with him, as does Secretary Hull—that a further personal message from you to Dr. Salazar should be held in abeyance as a last resort. We all feel that because of the great value of such a message, it should not be sent by you unless we believe that a German occupation of Spain and a consequent possible entrance by the Germans into Portugal is actually imminent.

Lord Halifax further told me that just prior to the occupation of Timor, the British Government had satisfied themselves once again of the determination of the Portuguese Government to remain faithful to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. As a result of these conversations a plan has been drawn up for joint action from the moment the Portuguese Government decides to abandon their neutrality.

The information I have just mentioned is contained in a telegram sent to Lord Halifax under date of December 16 by the British Foreign Office and I am transmitting the entire text of this telegram since I believe you will wish to read it as soon as possible.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

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740.0011 (European War 1939)/12-1941

Draft Joint Declaration

[WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1941, 6 p. m.

JOINT DECLARATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CHINA, GREAT BRITAIN, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND OTHER SIGNATORY GOVERNMENTS

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty and independence, and to preserve human freedom and justice not only in their own lands but everywhere, and that the struggle in which they are now engaged is a

1 This draft was prepared in the Department of State and taken to the White House by Berle at 6 p. m. on December 19. For text of a draft taken to the White House by Hull earlier the same afternoon, and for related memoranda, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. i, pp. 1-12.
common defense against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate
the world, Declare:

(1) Each signatory Government pledges itself to employ its full
resources against the Government or Governments which signed the
Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940, with which it is or may be
at war, and to continue such employment until that Government or
those Governments have been finally defeated;

(2) Each signatory Government pledges itself to cooperate with
the others to the entire extent of its capacity to effect full coordination
of military effort and use of resources against the common enemies or
any of them.

740.0011 European War 1939/12–1941

Draft Agreement

[WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1941, 6 p. m.¹

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT: SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

I

1. With a view to the more effective prosecution of warfare against
Germany, Italy and Japan, a Supreme War Council is created com-
posed of H.R.M. Prime Minister in the United Kingdom, the Presi-
dent of the United States of America, the President of the Executive
Yuan and Generalissimo of the Armies of the National Government
of the Republic of China, and the President of the Soviet of Peoples
Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in respect of
warfare against those countries with which the Soviet Union is at
war. They may designate a member of their government with full
d power to represent them.

2. The Chiefs of State or of government above named pledge them-
selves not to cease hostilities against or conclude a separate armistice
with the common enemies or any of them, except by common agree-
ment.

3. The function of the Supreme War Council is to supervise and
coordinate the general conduct of the war and to provide for its
successful prosecution.

4. The Supreme War Council may determine theatres of war and
may provide for representation of any other government actively
engaged in war against a common enemy in such theatres.

5. The Council will be responsible for coordinating distribution of
available resources of all categories between various theatres of war.

¹This draft was prepared in the Department of State and taken to the
White House by Berle at 6 p. m. on December 19. For the text of a draft
taken to the White House by Hull earlier the same afternoon, and for related
memoranda, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 1–6.
6. The Supreme War Council shall be charged with effecting unified command in any theatre of war determined by it.

II

1. The Supreme War Council will create a Staff responsible to it and consisting of representatives of the armed forces of each of the members of the Council, who may be the highest ranking officers of the different branches of the respective armed forces.

2. The Staff may draw up general war plans, and shall review general war plans drawn up by the competent authorities of each country. It shall follow the execution by each country of the part allotted to it in any general operation or undertaking, but shall not exercise any of the powers of the commanders-in-chief in the field. It shall perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by the Council.

3. The members of the Staff shall receive from the government and the competent authorities of their respective countries all proposals, information and documents relating to the conduct of the war. They shall watch, day by day, the situation of the armed forces and the means of all kinds of which the armed forces and the enemy armed forces dispose.

4. By direction of the Supreme War Council, the Staff may designate a Staff Division to serve in respect of any theatre of war and may provide for representation of the armed forces of any other power engaged in active war against any of the common enemies in such theatre.

5. The general staffs and military, naval and air commands of the armed forces of each power charged with the conduct of military operations remain responsible to their respective governments, subject to the creation of any unified command which may be agreed upon.

6. The Staff shall sit continuously and shall establish headquarters for itself or for any Staff Division at such place or places, or in any region, as may be approved by the Supreme War Council.

851.00/2580: Telegram

The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State

Bern, December 20, 1941.

399. Source Legation's 257, November 20, attributes following to French Ambassador just back from several days sojourn in Vichy,

1 Not printed; it reported on the basis of reliable French Embassy sources the current status of Franco-German negotiations (851.00/2470).
where he had numerous conferences with Pétain and meeting with Darlan.

Pétain confirmed his initiative for St. Florentin meeting following Paris press accusations about his lukewarmness for collaboration, and complaints from occupied zone that he was not doing anything to alleviate difficulties there. His request for meeting with Hitler had been refused on ground that latter was too busy; instead Goering was offered and accepted by Pétain. Prior to departure for meeting Pétain had drawn up memorandum, reiterating the point of honor involved in his respect for the armistice provisions relating to French Africa and the fleet; further, containing complaints of the French in the occupied zone, a request for substantial diminution of the occupation costs now out of all proportion to the small occupying force, and numerous other French griefs.

The atmosphere of the encounter was cold. The memorandum was read in toto to Goering who told Pétain that it was not for vanquished Vichy to put demands, but to receive them. Pétain persisted, citing cooperation French industry, and Goering finally agreed that the occupation costs were indeed out of proportion; but he returned the document to Darlan, declaring that he could not possibly carry it to Hitler, who would only fly into a rage upon reading it and make matters worse by insisting upon further demonstrations to the French that they had really been beaten. Goering then proceeded to make counter demands, of which two were classed as urgent, namely use of North Africa, especially quick reinforcements to Rommel from “local resources” and use of French merchant marine. The third demand was for unequivocal French adhesion to “New Europe”, security to Germany for which would be immediate French accession to the first two demands. The public avowal could come later as could compliance with the fourth demand, French naval convey of transports. At the end of the interview Goering suggested that Vichy initiate settlement negotiations with Rome which was the reason [for] Darlan’s trip to Turin, where he found an embarrassed Ciano, and from which nothing developed.

Pétain left Goering with the distinct impression that the Germans then counted upon Rommel to be able to hold out, in much the same position that he then was, for about two months and that they consequently would not precipitate matters, but would allow the French time to come around to agreement with Goering’s third and fourth demands. An early positive answer, however, was expected to the first two. Because Rommel was not holding out as the Germans had

*For a record of the conversation between Pétain and Goering at Florentin-Vergigny on December 1, 1941, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. xiii, p. 914.
anticipated, Pétain felt, at the time of his subsequent conferences with his Bern Ambassador, that a series of ultimata could probably be shortly expected. At meeting with the Ambassador on December 15th Pétain suddenly stated a lengthy and pathetic jeremiad of his relations with Darlan and Puech, complaining that both were deliberately deceiving him and constantly exceeding their authority. Pétain said he had no confidence in Darlan and, with regard to Puech and his group of industrialists, exclaimed: "Can they be really Frenchmen?" Pétain asked the Ambassador to draw out Darlan at their coming meeting and then report back to him. Pétain termed Darlan "totally hallucinated" and said that, were it left to Darlan, Vichy would break immediately with the United States.

On December 13th Ambassador called on Darlan and had a depressing experience. Darlan told him that he had seen his reports, that the Swiss news was false and that Germany was not beaten; that he hated the English and Americans; that Germany was the only great power in Europe and that France deserved to be subordinate to Germany in saving Europe from disaster; that Germany could have peace with Russia any time it wanted; that the Japanese had 7000 men prepared for suicide in destroying the Anglo-Saxon fleets, and that consequently the United States despite its expanding industrial might was "washed up"; that Rommel was toying with the English in Libya, that Germany would ask for transit across North Africa and that Vichy would grant it; and finally that he, Darlan, knew that the United States would soon tire of the war and withdraw, leaving Germany to organize Europe, whereupon 5 years later "Europe" would embark on a "yellow peril" crusade against Russia, China and Japan. When the Ambassador suggested that there would be heavy internal resistance to such subservience by Vichy to Germany, Darlan admitted it and added that were he to venture on the street without his guards he would quite probably one day be cut to pieces by his enemies.

The Ambassador found very strong and potentially effective opposition to the Darlan-Puech Government (the position of which is anything but solid); that the army hates the navy; that because Pétain had refused to permit Dentz to succeed to Huntziger's position Darlan was refusing to name anyone at all, thereby infuriating the army all the more; that the internal French situation is very tense and that something is very definitely in preparation in unoccupied France and French Africa in the way of effective resistance to a capitulation by Darlan to German demands with respect to French Africa; and that Darlan had often lied to Leahy.

Rochat asked the Ambassador to send all reports of confidential information to him personally for transmission to Pétain, since every-
thing of that sort directed officially to the Ministry was passed on by Darlan to the Germans and not to Pétain.

Cipher text by pouch to Vichy.

HUDDLE

Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1941.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have dictated the enclosed brief memorandum of my views as to the basic questions which will come before the approaching conference. I hope they may be of some assistance to you in guiding the discussions. The strategic views therein expressed have the approval of Marshall, Arnold and Gerow.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

[Enclosure]

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC TOPICS AND THEIR ATTENDANT PROBLEMS

I

THE NORTH ATLANTIC

Our joint war plans have recognized the North Atlantic as our principal theatre of operations should America become involved in the war. Therefore it should now be given primary consideration and carefully reviewed in order to see whether our position there is safe. Its safety must underlie all our other efforts in the war.

1 A notation in Stimson's diary for December 20 reads as follows:

"Immediately upon my arrival at the office I dictated the revised version of my memorandum to the President, giving a suggested analysis of the basic topics for the coming conference and of the various problems which were connected with them. In the next room General Marshall, together with Generals Arnold, Gerow, and Eisenhower, were engaged in stating the views of the General Staff on the same subject. When they had finished they came in and went over their paper with me, and as soon as my paper was written out by Miss Neary I went over it with them. They approved of it substantially intact, making a number of minor suggestions. A copy of mine as thus approved is attached to this daily record. Immediately after it was finished I sent a copy to the President and another one to Hopkins as a suggested guide for the coming conference."
I suggest the following topics:

A. The safety of the British Isles
   1. Have the beach defenses been improved?
   2. What is the condition of the mobile forces defending the Isles?
   3. Should America land any major forces other than air forces in the British Isles?

   Should not American forces take over the defense of Ireland, releasing the present British forces in North Ireland?
   It is assumed that air forces are to go into the Isles.

B. The situation of Iceland and Greenland
   1. The possibility of the reenforcement of the American garrison in the light of further calls upon American shipping by any of the possible expeditions mentioned below.

C. American Navy in the North Atlantic
   1. Is it sufficient in size in view of the following possibilities:
      a. A violent renewal of submarine activity which is quite possible during the long winter nights.
      b. The demand for naval support for an American expeditionary force either to the Cape Verdes and Dakar, the Azores and Natal.
      c. Possible losses to the British naval forces in the Mediterranean or the Atlantic.

   2. Should the Atlantic fleet be depleted under any circumstances in order to strengthen the Pacific fleet?

II

American Efforts in Other Theatres of the War—Their Importance and Their Order of Priority

This seems to me the most difficult and important problem of the conference. American efforts are now being either made or suggested in at least four different possible theatres of operation. They may be called for in others. They are being made or suggested in the following areas:

   a. In the southwestern Pacific theatre.
   b. In the western African theatre including the Cape Verdes and Azores.
   c. In the Syria and Iran theatre.
   d. In the Egypt and Libya theatre.

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2 For the negotiations earlier in 1941 regarding the sending of American troops to Greenland and Iceland, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. II, pp. 35 ff. and 776 ff., respectively.
3 The words "or French North Africa" were added at this point in what appears to be Roosevelt's handwriting.
They might be forced on us in Natal where the situation at the present moment is perilous, threatening our air communication with the Far East.  

I have arranged them in what I consider their present apparent order of priority although I am supporting it suggestively rather than dogmatically:

1. The Southwestern Pacific
   a. This is of first importance because it has been forced upon us by a new combatant power which is challenging our entire position in the Pacific and our troops are already fighting desperately to carry out our legal and moral obligation to protect the Philippines.
   b. It is also of vital importance:
      (1) To assist the British in defending Singapore, the fall of which would be an almost vital blow to the British Empire as well as to our own future commercial interests in the Pacific.
      (2) To protect the Netherland East Indies and their sources of oil from falling into the hands of the Japanese and thus aiding Japan in her contest for the control of the Pacific against us.
      (3) For protecting the great dominions of Australia and New Zealand from domination by Japan.
      (4) To encourage and keep China fighting—who has and is still carrying the main effort of holding Japan in check.
      (5) To encourage Russia in staying in the war against the Axis powers.

2. The West African theatre
   This theatre is vital to us in two respects:
   a. To protect our line of communications and supplies, both air and sea, with the British activities in Egypt; with the supply of Russia through the Persian Gulf; with the activities in the Far Eastern theatre through Australia and Singapore on the south and through China on the north.
   b. It is vital as a means of preventing Germany from reaching Dakar from which she would both block the trade route around Cape Horn and also threaten the South American continent.

These two reasons seem to me more vital to the interests of this country than anything we can do in the areas of the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The method of our operations in this West African area, in which I include operations against the Cape Verdes and the Azores, are directly a question for our military advisers. Personally I regard any expedition to the Azores as strategically less important than a strong effort against the Cape Verdes and Dakar.

*For the "perilous" situation in Brazil, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. vi, pp. 490 ff., section entitled "Cooperation Between the United States and Brazil on Certain Measures for Hemisphere Defense". See also Conn and Fairchild, pp. 296-312.*
3. The area of Syria and Iran

I think this area is strategically, and in view of the ultimate winning of the war, more important than the Egyptian area because it furnishes our safest route for help to Russia. Thus far our activities consist solely in the improvement of the base and the furnishing of supplies. There is no prospect apparent to me of combat efforts.

4. The Egyptian area

While this area is of immense importance psychologically to the British Empire and perhaps strategically as a possible though unfavorable front for an attack on Hitler in Europe, it seems to me of the least important to us as a combat area. We should of course continue our supplies to the British. In my opinion we should not divert armed forces to that area which could by any possibility be necessary for use in the Far Eastern area, in Ireland, or in the West African area.

III

The essential problems of America in the areas which I have described in the foregoing portions of this memorandum can be in summary described as follows:

First: The preservation of our communications across the North Atlantic with our fortress in the British Isles 5 covering the British fleet.

Second: The protection of our communications with the Near and Far East by air via Brazil and Africa and by water around the Cape of Good Hope.

Third: The building up as rapidly as possible of air and sea communications in the Pacific with Australia.

Underlying all of these objectives is the immediate necessity of protecting the vital naval and air industrial establishments on the west and east coasts of the United States.

H. L. S.

5 The copy of this memorandum in the Stimson papers bears the marginal notation at this point: "Quoted to W. S. C[hurchill]."

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President’s Personal Representative (Bullitt) to the President 1

SECRET

CAIRO, December 20, 1941.

Following strictly confidential for the President from Bullitt. The British are handling the situation here better than was indicated by the reports received in Washington before my departure. I believe

1 Sent via Navy channels. Bullitt had been sent to North Africa and the Middle East in November 1941 as the Personal Representative of the President with the rank of Ambassador.
that Lyttelton, Auchinleck and the rest are doing as good a job as can be expected with the inadequate means at their disposal against a determined enemy led by a soldier of genius Rommel. Rommel has again escaped an excellent trap set for him but there are at this moment not more than 30 German tanks in condition to fight. In addition Rommel has approximately 30 Italian tanks and a number of armoured vehicles and approximately 60,000 infantry. Rommel's forces are all on this side of Benghazi except one Italian division in Tripoli which is reported to be low in health and morale. If the British can get to Benghazi, as they expect, they hope to be able to push on to Tripoli and the Tunisian frontier, but it is 1450 miles by the only road from the British base in Cairo to the frontier of Tunisia. Twenty-seven different languages and dialects are used by the soldiers of Auchinleck's army and a brigade of Free French from Syria is about to be added.

As you are aware, but few persons in Washington realize, the fighting in this area is being carried on by comparatively tiny fighting forces. Therefore a slight increase or diminution in the force here makes the difference between defeat and victory. In view of the vital importance of North Africa for an ultimate attack on Italy and Germany, and in view of the importance of having a British Army on the Eastern border of Tunisia rather than a German Army, and in view of the fact that the enemy is now on the run I believe that: (1) It would be folly to withdraw forces of any kind from this area now. (2) That the forces now here should be strengthened in any way that will not reduce forces which are vitally needed at other points. It is essential that the established program for deliveries here of aircraft, aircraft equipment, .30 and .50 ammunition, 250-lb bombs and 500-lb bombs and motor transport should be maintained and that there should be no diversion to other areas. It is vital that the program for delivery of Kitty Hawks, P-40's, Boston A-20's and Baltimore Martin bombers should be maintained. It is also important that the projects which were started by General Brett should be carried through. In view of serious German attempts to reinforce this theatre of war notably by the transfer of the entire 2nd German Air Corps from the Moscow front to Italy and flights of planes of this air corps to Libya, it is my belief that the success of the British plans to push on to the frontier of Tunisia depends on the prompt improvement of British transport and communications. The British are shockingly short of competent truck-drivers. Their system of telegraph and telephone communication has been stretched to the breaking point. As an example, when I attended with Lyttelton and Auchinleck a meeting of all the staffs yesterday for the exchange of info, no news had come for 24 hours from the fighting front. Lyttelton, Auchinleck, and Air
Marshal Tedder have all proposed to me in writing that we should take over with our own army units under command of Gen. Maxwell certain portion of the transportation burden as well as the installation, maintenance and operation of a system of telephone and telegraph communications. I am sending in American equivalents the written requests presented to me by the Brit[ish] yesterday by a separate message through Gen. Maxwell to the War Dept. I hope that you will be able to send at least the truck drivers immediately. Cooperation between the British and Gen. Maxwell is excellent and he concurs in my opinion that the British are doing as good a job as the inadequate means and the immense terrain will permit.

Please show this message to Marshall, Stimson, and Hopkins.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram
The President's Personal Representative (Bullitt) to the President

SECRET

CAIRO, December 21, 1941.

Following for the President from Bullitt Strictly confidential:—

The British both on the west coast of Africa where I conferred with General Giffard and his staff and in Cairo believe that they have absolute information with regard to the following points. (1) there are only two German divisions on the Spanish frontier of the Pyrenees. (2) all British information indicates that there are no German aircraft in either Morocco, Algiers, Tunis or the Dakar region. Moreover there are no German submarines based at Dakar or on the Portuguese possessions on the west coast of Africa. General Giffard stated that he had a careful investigation made of the entire coast and (enemy ships?) operating in the South Atlantic are refueled by supply ships and not from shore bases. (3) The British here believe that the weather and the concentration of Turkish troops in Thrace will cause the Germans to put off any possible attack against Turkey until the early spring.

The British Air Marshal in Cairo Tedder desired me to call to your attention that the German failure to get through to the oil wells of the Caucasus has made the oil wells of the Ploesti region in Rumania vital to Germany. He believes that three squadrons of Liberators based in Cairo could destroy this oil field in an attack to be sustained over a period of two months. I told the Air Marshal and General Auchinleck that we were extremely short of Liberators and that I felt almost certain that we should have none to spare for this purpose. He was never-the-less most insistent that I should

1 Sent via Navy channels. Received in Washington on December 23.
present this possibility to you as the vital link in the whole strategic picture.

The British Air Force operating in Libya is still stronger than the German. This is due to shortage on the German side of aviation gasoline and maintenance facilities. The Germans and Italians are making most determined efforts to get through gasoline and oil and tanks as well as airplanes to Libya. If they should succeed in delivering a few large cargoes the entire picture in this area would change at once. Speed is therefore essential. Lyttelton has informed me that Auchinleck is to be given command not only over North Africa Palestine and Syria but also over Iraq and Iran. Wavell is to command in India and Burma. General Wheeler’s Mission in Iraq and Iran will therefore in the near future be operating in an area commanded not from Delhi but from Cairo.

Bullitt

Defense Files

Papers by the Joint Board

SECRET

J. B. No. 325, Serial 729

PAPER A

TENTATIVE U.S. VIEWS ON SUBJECTS OF BRITISH MEMORANDUM, Dec. 18

(i) The broad strategic objective of the Associated Powers is the defeat of Germany and her Allies. While initially maintaining the strategic defensive, conduct local offensives in appropriate theatres. Ultimately conduct an all-out offensive (1) against Germany and her European Allies, (2) against Japan. Since a successful air offensive must precede any other form of decisive offensive action, the early development of the required air forces, their logistic support and the ground forces necessary to secure their bases must be assured. The first consideration to each of the Associated Powers, Russia, the British

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1 The date does not appear on the papers themselves but appears on a covering “Memorandum for Record” which reads as follows:

“The two attached papers, A and B, were taken under consideration by the Joint Board, at the called meeting on Dec. 21, 1941, at which time the Board approved them. The papers constitute the approved view by the Joint Board on general strategy, and served as the basis for presentation by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations of the War and Navy Departments’ recommendations to the President on December 21, 1941. W. P. Scobey, Colonel, General Staff, Secretary.”

For the preparation of these papers, see Cline, pp. 88-89.

2 Ante, p. 37.
Commonwealth, China and the United States, is its own national security. The common purpose demands maintenance of essential communications, especially sea communications via the North Atlantic and air communications via the trans-African Far East route.

(ii) The British Commonwealth is operating offensively against the Axis in the Middle East and with air power in Germany. The United States lacks defensive equipment against air raids on exposed critical production and naval facilities—the only type of attack that is presently indicated against our mainland. Russia is devoting her entire resources to the destruction of the German army, thereby compelling large-scale diversions of German manpower and materiel from other fronts. China is near complete isolation and needs military materiel. She is conducting limited offensives to assist in defense of Malaysia. The maintenance of adequate air and sea communications and the safety of China demand the defense of the Singapore—Philippine—Dutch Indies area. It follows that Malaysia is a theater of present urgent importance.

The following immediate military measures should be undertaken by:

**China:** Defend China, assist in defense of Burma, and provide facilities for air operations against Japanese homeland.

**Russia:** Continue offensive operations against Germany.

**British Commonwealth:**

- In cooperation with United States maintain sea communications in Atlantic and to Middle and Far East.
- Strengthen Singapore, Burma and Dutch East Indies to secure those areas and reduce the threat to China.
- Assist the United States in providing land and air equipment to Russia and China.
- Defend present occupied areas and acquire additional areas that might further the ultimate objective.

**United States:**

- Cooperate with British Commonwealth in maintaining sea and air communications, and in establishing any additional bases necessary to this purpose.
- Reinforce Philippines, Dutch East Indies and Australia to further the security of China and Southwest Pacific.
- Supply Russia, China and the British Commonwealth with such ground and air equipment as can be made available.
- Establish air and antiaircraft defenses to protect coastal military production and naval and shipping installations in the United States.
- Equip and dispose forces necessary to secure outposts and vital sources of supply in the Western Hemisphere.
- Strengthen naval power in Central Pacific including strong reinforcement of Hawaiian garrison.
- Attain maximum scale in all military, air, shipping and naval production.

**All Associated Powers:** Initiate preparations immediately to raise and equip forces and provide shipping for later large scale offensive operations.
(iii) Allocation of Joint Forces to harmonize with (i). Only the British Commonwealth and the United States possess troops sufficiently free of enemy pressure or threat to permit of redistribution. Only such forces of the British Commonwealth and the United States are subject to redistribution as are not actively engaged with the enemy or required for immediate security tasks heretofore indicated for these Governments.

The following dispositions should be immediately initiated:

The United States to reinforce the Philippine Islands and Dutch East Indies with ground and air forces with particular emphasis on aviation. The principal operating bases to be established in Australia.

The British Commonwealth to reinforce with land and air elements the forces in Singapore, Dutch East Indies and Burma.

Further detailed allocations cannot be indicated until missions enumerated herein are jointly agreed upon, and operations necessary to their accomplishment have been jointly planned.

(iv) In joint conference make necessary adjustments in the Victory Program* to initiate the production of equipment and the creation of military forces contemplated in that program.

(v) Create a Supreme Allied War Council to study joint problems and to recommend to the Associated Powers applicable policies, plans, programs and allocations.

Create at once a Military Joint Planning Committee and a Joint Supply Committee to propose the plans and take the actions necessary to implement approved recommendations of the Supreme War Council.

PAPER B—DRAFT

BROAD MILITARY DECISIONS

In General:

1. Hold where necessary while building up strength. Undertake land, sea and air offensives against Germany and sea and air offensives against Japan, as soon as possible.

Pacific Area.

1. Operate the Pacific Fleet and coastal frontier forces in the Central Pacific, for the protection of sea communications, and in offensive raids for the reduction of Japanese naval strength.

2. Hawaii—Build up air and troop strength as rapidly as possible not only in Oahu but in at least three other large islands of the group so that we may have a defended area rather than a single defended position.

* For a description of the Victory Program for production of war materials, see Matloff and Snell, pp. 128 ff.
3. *Wake and Midway*—Continue to support.
4. *Palmynra, Christmas and Johnston*—support and build up.
5. *Samoa*—Reenforce.
6. Prepare amphibious and expeditionary forces for overseas efforts.
7. Induce Chile to protect shipping along her coasts.

**Far East Area.**

1. Support the defense of the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand, building up bases as necessary.
2. Endeavor to obtain Russian assistance in the Far East in any way practicable and with particular reference to the early establishment in Siberia of air forces for operations against Japan.
3. British hold India, and if possible Burma, and Malaya.
4. Dutch hold the Netherlands East Indies.
5. British protect communications from the Cape of Good Hope and the Middle East to India, Malaysia and Australia.
6. Increase support to China.

**Middle East Area.**

1. Continue support of Russia and British in material.
2. Support British effort in North Africa with material and eventually with air units—with a view to the extension of the occupation westward over all North Africa.

**Atlantic Area.**

2. Induce Brazil and Argentina to protect shipping along their coasts.

**Domestic Measures.**

Speed up (not to alter existing priorities):
1. Naval shipbuilding, in particular coastal frontiers forces to operate against submarines, mines, and raiders.
2. Aircraft and antiaircraft production.
4. Recruiting and training of Navy and Army forces.
5. Manufacture of critical items of munitions.

Reduce:
1. Civilian consumption of materials required by armed forces.
2. Travel by civilians, ashore and at sea.
Memorandum to the President:

It seems to me that, in considering the Azores, there must also be considered the mainland of Africa, even though a thousand miles away. Accordingly, early in September I requested that our research group, together with our Army and Navy officers who were here, make an examination of North Africa. That study is prepared. It consists of 177 pages, and I do not wish to inflict it on you. However, the thesis is that the military and political advantages of occupying Northwest Africa seem to outweigh the probable and even maximum costs to Germany, and the study embodies the following:

1. The German Occupation of Northwest Africa—Objectives and Costs.
2. Chronology of events and significant rumors dealing with Western Mediterranean problems.
3. German “Eurafrican” Objectives as developed in Geopolitical Theory.
4. The Problem of Vichy.
5. The German Political and Economic Problem in Iberia.
6. Germany’s Economic Stake in French North and West Africa.

I am attaching the summary and conclusion. If these would make you wish to look at the complete study, I will send it to you.

Summary and Conclusion

I. Objectives.

The positive military advantages to Germany of occupying Northwest Africa are considerable: First, in connection with the Mediterranean campaign; second with respect to the South Atlantic counter-blockade; third, and less urgently, with respect to long run exploitation of areas bordering on the South Atlantic.

Equally, if not more important, would be the negative advantage of denying access to an important European flank and Mediterranean rear position.

Economically, the advantage of occupation are at best slight in the short run, problematical in the long run. The maximum increment to occupied Europe of Northwest African supplies cannot be regarded as a significant factor in the German decision. Occupation would however, have the important negative advantage to Germany of preserving a considerable leak in the Allied blockade.

Politically, occupation would remove the last remaining important bargaining levers of France and Spain. There would be, for them,
no real alternatives to full collaboration. Further, occupation might be the basis for a significant strengthening of the morale of Italy.

Negatively, occupation would serve to insulate the politically vulnerable peoples of Southern Europe from Allied influence.

II. Costs.

Military advice is to the effect that an action by Germany against Northwest Africa would take the form of a pincer movement through Spain and Tripoli. It is most unlikely that the Germans will move through Spain without Spanish collaboration or acquiescence. The force mobilized by the Germans would be of a size capable of overcoming full French resistance in Northwest Africa, whether or not that resistance is, in fact, expected. On these assumptions it is calculated that occupation would require roughly 9-14 divisions and sufficient planes to achieve air superiority. The transport, landing and subsequent supply of the required force, against the air and naval resistance available to the British and French in this theater would be a difficult but not insurmountable problem for Germany; this assumes Spanish collaboration or acquiescence and the maintenance of the existing supply facilities from Italian and Greek ports across the central Mediterranean.

The net political and economic costs of a campaign against Northwest Africa will vary considerably, depending upon the decision taken by Vichy with respect to collaboration. Other costs would include the loss of entrepôt supplies through Spain, Portugal, and the Canaries; the probable necessity of economic and territorial compensation to Spain and Spanish Morocco; the danger of exposing German troops to typhus; the burden of occupying French Morocco, Tunis and Algeria; and the cost of furnishing the goods not supplied by the country.

In addition, Germany must reckon with probable Allied occupation of Azores and Cape Verde Islands; probable strengthening effect on American morale and unity, caused by German bases at Casablanca and in Canaries.

III. Final Conclusion.

The military and political advantages of occupying Northwest Africa seem to outweigh the probable and even the maximum costs to Germany.

IV. Timing.

Available evidence on the probable timing of a German move is not adequate for sure prediction. The best guess, however, seems to be that they are making preparations for that move. With that in mind, I have a guerrilla project I would like to submit.
No official record of the discussion at this meeting has been found. Arnold’s notes on the meeting (which are in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress) are closely reflected in the account published in Arnold, pp. 274-276. Stimson, in his diary for December 21, notes that the meeting lasted from 2:30 to 5:30 p.m. and that those present were: President Roosevelt, Mr. Hopkins, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral King, and Lieutenant General Arnold. The account of the meeting in Stimson’s diary reads as follows:

“At the conference today in the White House Marshall presented the Army paper and the President went over that with us all, discussing the various points. Much of it was contained in the paper that I had sent him the day before; but, when he had finished the Army paper, he then went over mine which covered certain points which they had not covered. The conference was very useful and clarifying, one of the best war conferences we have had. There was great harmony on practically all of the problems. We discussed the following topics:

1. Methods to improve the safety of the British Isles including both the beach defenses and the mobile forces.
2. The problem of Eire and the use of American forces in North Ireland to release the British divisions now there.
3. The completion of unity of command of the Iceland garrison.
5. The requisite size of the American Navy in the North Atlantic.
6. The establishment of lines of communication across the Pacific.
7. Problems of the southwestern Pacific theatre and its defense on the part of the various nations involved there whose interests are now being attacked by the Japanese.
8. The methods of reinforcement of the forces now there.
9. The problem of protecting our communications across Africa and through the South Atlantic including the problems of Dakar and the various islands lying west of Africa.
10. The scope of American activities in the Syria and Iran theatre as well as in the Egyptian and Libyan theatres.
11. The creation of a supreme allied war council to study problems and make recommendations to the associated powers on policies, plans, programs and allocations.
12. The creation of a military joint planning committee and a joint supply committee to propose plans and actions necessary to implement the approved decisions of the supreme war council.

“I showed the President the cable which had come from MacArthur calling attention to the fact that the Japanese were enjoying apparently complete freedom of naval action in the sea route through the Islands and discussed it with him and with Admiral King. King said that he would take it up with Stark and they would discuss it with Marshall.”
Memorandum by Secretary Stimson

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, December 21, 1941.]  

MEMORANDUM OF DECISIONS AT WHITE HOUSE SUNDAY, 
DECEMBER 21, 1941

ICELAND

Complete American garrison.
King considers American occupation vital to his problem of protecting the northeastern passage for convoys.

BRITISH ISLES

Call attention of British to condition of defenses.
Strengthen mobile defense by landing at least two divisions in North Ireland and relieving the British divisions there for use in the defense of England and Scotland.
The President reported the failure of all efforts to get the cooperation of de Valera.
No further depletion of Atlantic fleet.

FAR EASTERN SITUATION

British to furnish reinforcements from India and to guard the Indian Ocean as far as Africa.
U.S. to establish base on Australia and to secure communications with that across the Pacific.
China to be asked to defend herself, protect Burma, and provide facilities for air attacks on Japan.
U.S. Asiatic fleet to be strengthened if possible and to be used more vigorously in patrolling southwestern Pacific.
Russia not to be pressed for action in Siberia but to be invited to join in declaration of ABCD countries with that reservation.

OTHER SECONDARY AREAS

West Africa considered foremost.
Azores subordinated.
Verdes to be studied.
Northwestern coast to be studied.

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1 The paper is undated but was attached to the entry in Stimson’s diary for December 21, 1941. At this point in his diary Stimson added the following in longhand: “For purposes of precaution I have not recorded the decisions made in the above matters which we discussed but they are far-reaching.” A further notation by his secretary indicates that the record of decisions (which had been kept in Stimson’s safe) was attached to the diary in April 1946.
Iran placed ahead of Egypt.
No troops to either except air force in Egypt.
Supplies to be continued to both.
Supreme War Council to be established in Washington.
Ditto Joint Planning Committee and Joint Supply Committee.

740.0011 EW 1939/17717: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

TRIPLE PRIORITY

London, December 21, 1941.

6165. Personal and most secret to the Secretary for Harry Hopkins.
Our friend asked me if the house was large enough to permit him to have with him a secretary and his valet. I told him this would not be difficult. The others will be quartered at the Embassy. Security here asked if a detective could be assigned to him. I told them they would not have to worry about that being done. He does not expect to leave the District of Columbia.

Dill is accompanying him and he plans to leave him there as his army contact man. I do not believe you could get a better. Brooke replaced him because Dill was worn out with day work [sic] and night.

WINANT

—2Arnold, p. 274, cites Roosevelt as saying on December 21 that Churchill’s party, in addition to the British Chiefs of Staff, would number about eighty-two officers and clerks.

Hull Papers

The Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Supplementing my suggestions regarding a Supreme War Council, I give you this additional outline of organizations that might function under it:

Military Council
Naval Council
Aviation Council
Shipping Council
Economic Council
Food Committee
Munitions Committee
Raw Materials Committee
Petroleum Committee

—2See the draft agreement for a Supreme War Council, ante, p. 15.
These auxiliary organizations were contemplated by the provisions in draft of the Supreme War Council wherein it was given responsibility for "coordinating distribution of available resources of all categories between various theatres of war".²

C. H.

²A notation on the source text states that Hull enclosed with this memorandum a copy of Savage's memorandum of December 17, ante, p. 17.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt³

MOST SECRET [ABOARD THE H.M.S. "DUKE OF YORK",
December 22, 1941.]

Following for President from "Rejoined" Naval Person.
Impossible to reach mouth of Potomac before 6.30 p. m. E.S.T.
which would be too late for plan you have so kindly made for us.³
Can anchor Hampton Roads Gate 4.15 p. m. E.S.T.
I should like to come on by aircraft to Washington Airfield reaching
you in time for dinner.³
If weather prevents this could I have a train to Washington from
whatever is most convenient starting point in the vicinity of Hampton
Roads?
Please on no account come out to meet me either way. Looking
forward so much to seeing you at the White House.

WINSTON

³Sent to Halifax and delivered by the British Embassy to the White House.
³No copy has been found of a telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill containing
"the plan", but Churchill (The Grand Alliance, p. 662) says that it "had been
intended that we should steam up the Potomac and motor to the White House."
³Arrangements were made for Churchill and his party to fly from Hampton
Roads to Washington, arriving on the evening of December 22.

Editorial Note on a Telephone Conversation Between President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King, December 22, 1941,
Early Evening

No official record of the conversation has been found. As recorded
in Mackenzie King's diary (Pickersgill, vol. I, pp. 317–318), Roosevelt
and Mackenzie King exchanged greetings and then spoke as follows:
Roosevelt: "You probably know about a certain person who is on his
way. He will be arriving in about two hours' time. I will want you
here while he is here. I will be having a talk with him tonight, and will
let you know just as soon as I can, the exact time to come down... We
will be having an important discussion here. It will be to work out a
long-range policy and also a short-range policy as regards the war. It will require very careful thought, and then will probably occasion much discussion. There will have to be a Supreme Council, and I am determined it shall have its headquarters in Washington.' The President followed this remark by saying there will possibly be quite a time over this. I did not say yes or no to what was said in this connection, but asked if I had not better bring one of my Ministers with me, and mentioned Ralston. The President said that will be all right, and then asked if he had to do with naval affairs. I said: 'No, that MacDonald was Minister of Naval Affairs.' The President then said: 'Better have him come also.' The President then said he thought things were going pretty well. I asked him how he was himself and he said he was feeling very well. . . .'

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White House Press Release

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

DECEMBER 22, 1941.

There is, of course, one primary objective in the conversations to be held during the next few days between the President and the British Prime Minister and the respective staffs of the two countries. That purpose is the defeat of Hitlerism throughout the world.

It should be remembered that many other nations are engaged today in this common task. Therefore, the present conferences in Washington should be regarded as preliminary to further conferences which will officially include Russia, China, the Netherlands and the Dominions. It is expected that there will thus be evolved an over-all unity in the conduct of the war. Other nations will be asked to participate to the best of their ability in the over-all objective.

It is probable that no further announcements will be made until the end of the present conferences, but it may be assumed that the other interested nations will be kept in close touch with this preliminary planning.

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1 Published in Department of State Bulletin, vol. v, December 27, 1941, p. 573.
2 Earlier on December 22 the White House had released a brief statement to the press, indicating that Churchill had arrived in Washington to discuss "all questions relevant to the concerted war effort." See Department of State Bulletin, vol. v, December 27, 1941, p. 573. On December 23 the White House released to the press a statement indicating that Prime Minister Churchill's first official engagement after being received by the President was to meet with the representatives in Washington of the British Dominions. See ibid., p. 573. Roosevelt issued a general statement on the progress of the conference on the evening of December 27. See ibid., p. 578.
2. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

Editorial Note

Since Churchill occupied guest quarters in the White House during the First Washington Conference, there took place many informal and unscheduled conversations between him and Roosevelt and/or Hopkins. In this connection Churchill has written (The Grand Alliance, p. 662): "The outstanding feature [of the Conference] was of course my contacts with the President. We saw each other for several hours every day, and lunched always together, with Harry Hopkins as a third. We talked of nothing but business, and reached a great measure of agreement on many points, both large and small."

No American minutes or memoranda of conversation were made on any of these informal White House talks, except the final dinner meeting on January 14, 1942, post, p. 208. For most of these Roosevelt-Churchill conversations there is not even a specific indication of when they took place. With respect to the luncheon and dinner meetings, there is a brief undated memorandum in the Hopkins Papers listing fourteen days during the conference on which Hopkins either lunched or dined (eleven times each) with the President and the Prime Minister, but there is no indication of the subjects discussed on any of these occasions.

The time and the nature of some of these informal White House conversations, however, are reflected in certain conference papers or in authoritative memoir material. Where this has been found to be the case, the editors have treated the identified conversation as a conference meeting, adducing in an editorial note such evidence as has come to light of the substance of the discussion.

From various sources it appears that Roosevelt and Churchill informally discussed certain subjects that are not reflected anywhere in the records of the conference. Among these subjects are the following:

2. The possibility of making a "sacrifice landing" or opening a "second front" by United States and British forces on the continent of Europe in the summer of 1942 in case the Russian front appeared to be in serious danger. See the letter from Mountbatten to Roosevelt, cited post, p. 423. See also Forrest Davis, "The January Promise", in The Saturday Evening Post, February 20, 1943, where it was stated that Roosevelt and Churchill told Litvinov in January 1942 that American and British forces would land in strength in Western Europe in 1942 if there seemed to be danger of imminent Soviet collapse. In a telephone conversation on July 7, 1958, Mr. Davis informed the Historical Office that his article had been based on a conversation with Roosevelt and had been cleared by the White House. No other evidence of this assurance to Litvinov has been found, and it was not mentioned in the discussions with Molotov in Washington in May–June 1942 (Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. III, pp. 566–594).


5. Article VII of the draft Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. This article, which involved the question of "Empire preferences" on certain tariff rates, was raised by Hull with Churchill at dinner on January 12, 1942; see the editorial note, post, p. 195. Hull, in a memorandum dated December 30, urged Roosevelt to raise the question with Churchill (841.24/1154a), and the President did so. The evidence for this appears in a report by Acheson of a conversation which he had with Roosevelt on January 29, 1942, in which the following statement appears:

"The President said that on several occasions during Mr. Churchill's visit the President had brought up for discussion the Lease-Lend arrangements, but that Mr. Churchill had stated that economic relations were out of his field and had shown a strong inclination to postpone these discussions or to have them routed through other officials. In view of the pressure of other matters the President had not insisted upon these discussions because he believed that the matters would in any event be referred to London." (841.24/1224).


6. The subject of sending relief supplies to the Greek people was proposed by Hull to Roosevelt on December 31, 1941, for discussion with Churchill (ibid., vol. II, p. 727), but it is not known whether Roosevelt did in fact take up this subject with the Prime Minister during the conference.
7. The question of raising the Netherlands and Norwegian Legations at Washington and London to the rank of embassies. In an instruction for Welles on December 29, 1941, Roosevelt asked for the views of the Department of State on this proposal and concluded:

"Let me know as soon as possible, as I want to talk it over with Mr. Churchill as soon as he gets back [from Ottawa]." (124.56/108/2).

Welles took up the matter that same evening with Halifax, who agreed to request a reply from his Government before Churchill returned from Ottawa on January 1. No record has been found of further discussion of the matter during the First Washington Conference, but on April 11 Roosevelt asked Welles to pursue the matter further, and in May the legations involved were raised to embassies (124.56/-109, 109/2, 109/3). See Department of State Bulletin, vol. VI, May 9 and 16, 1942, pp. 402, 438.

8. The question of cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in atomic-energy research. Although no record has been found of any discussion of this question during the First Washington Conference, a letter of February 27, 1943, from Churchill to Hopkins includes the following sentence with regard to Roosevelt's letter of October 11, 1941, to Churchill proposing cooperation in atomic research: "In December 1941 the Prime Minister replied 'I need not assure you of our readiness to collaborate with the US administration in this matter'." Nothing has been found in American files to show in what form or on what date this reply was conveyed to the President.

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MONDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1941

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, DECEMBER 22, 1941, EVENING, THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Secretary Hull
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Welles

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Halifax
Lord Beaverbrook

Editorial Note

No American record of the conversation at this meeting has been found. A brief reference by Roosevelt to the subjects discussed appears post, p. 69. The information respecting the time and place of the meeting and the participants is taken from Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 664, where there is printed Churchill's telegraphic report of the meeting to the British War Cabinet. The Prime Min-
ister noted that the President "had not of course at this time read the papers I had written on board ship, which I could not give him till the next day" but that he had "evidently thought much about my letter of October 20", the major portion of which is printed *ibid.*, pp. 544–548. In view of the importance of the discussion and the absence of other direct accounts of this meeting, the Churchill report to London is reproduced at this point:

"The President and I discussed the North African situation last night [December 22]. Mr. Hull, Mr. Welles, Mr. Hopkins, Lord Beaverbrook, and Lord Halifax also took part in the discussion.

"2. There was general agreement that if Hitler was held in Russia he must try something else, and that the most probable line was Spain and Portugal en route to North Africa. Our success in Libya and the prospect of joining hands with French North African territory was another reason to make Hitler want, if he could, to get hold of Morocco as quickly as possible. At the same time reports did not seem to suggest threat was imminent, perhaps because Hitler had enough on hand at the moment.

"3. There was general agreement that it was vital to forestall the Germans in Northwest Africa and the Atlantic islands. In addition to all the other reasons, the two French battleships, Jean Bart and Richelieu, were a real prize for whoever got them. Accordingly, the discussion was not whether, but how.

"4. Various suggestions were made:

(a) The United States Government might speak in very serious and resolute terms to Vichy, saying that this was final chance for them to reconsider their positions and come out on the side that was pledged to restoration of France. As a symbol of this Pétain might be invited to send Weygand to represent him at an Allied conference in Washington.

(b) An approach might be made to Weygand in the light of a North African situation fundamentally changed by British advance and by United States entering into war and their willingness to send a force to North Africa.

"5. It was suggested, on the other hand, that the effect of such procedure might be to extract smooth promises from Pétain and Weygand, the Germans meanwhile being advised of our intentions, and that, accordingly, if these approaches were to be made, it would be desirable to have all plans made for going into North Africa, with or without invitation. I emphasised immense psychological effect likely to be produced both in France and among French troops in North Africa by association of United States with the undertaking. Mr. Hull suggested that it might well be that a leader would emerge in North Africa as events developed.

"The President said that he was anxious that American land forces should give their support as quickly as possible wherever they could be most helpful, and favoured the idea of a plan to move into North Africa being prepared for either event, i.e., with or without invitation.

"6. It was agreed to remit the study of the project to Staffs on assumption that it was vital to forestall the Germans in that area and that the Libyan campaign had, as it was expected to do, achieved com-
plete success. It was recognised that the question of shipping was plainly a most important factor.

"7. I gave an account of the progress of fighting in Libya, by which the President and other Americans were clearly much impressed and cheered.

"8. In the course of conversation the President mentioned that he would propose at forthcoming conference that United States should relieve our troops in Northern Ireland, and spoke of sending three or four divisions there. I warmly welcomed this, and said I hoped that one of the divisions would be an armoured division. It was not thought that this need conflict with preparations for a United States force for North Africa."

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MEETING OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARNOLD AND AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PORTAL, DECEMBER 22, 1941, EVENING ¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Lieutenant General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

Air Chief Marshal Portal

Arnold Papers

Air Marshal Harris

Notes by Lieutenant General Arnold

SECRET

DECEMBER 22, 1941.

Subjects under discussion consisted mainly of the future employment of British troops and air forces, and the possible use of air force units of the United States.

Portal stated positively that the British could not afford to see Singapore pass by the board. I stated that we could not afford to see the Philippines pass by the board. I stated that we must build up our air strength in the Philippines, Australia and the Dutch East Indies as rapidly as possible; that a service of supply was being established in Australia to be commanded by General Brett; and that we would cram into Australia such airplanes, combat crews and other air force personnel as is possible to get there by air, by boat, or any other way until we had built up for General MacArthur a total of 80 heavy bombers and about 160 to 200 operating pursuit craft. I told Portal that I believed with this we could regain superiority of the air in that theater.

Portal stated that in his opinion the Japanese only had a total of 3,600 airplanes, combat types, and the production capacity was but 300 a month.

¹The meeting took place in Washington but the exact location is not specified.
He asked what we were going to do with reference to attacking Japan. I told him of our plans relative to operations from Eastern China. I further stated that I hoped that we would soon get permission to operate from bases in Vladivostok. He expressed doubt as to our getting operation bases in the vicinity of Vladivostok for a period of several months. He advanced the theory that we should have our aircraft carriers steal up rapidly to the vicinity of Japan and make the same sort of attacks on Japan that the Japs made on Honolulu. He stated that the carriers would not be taking any more risks than the British carriers took in Taranto or the Japanese carriers against Hawaii because the carriers are fast and the ocean is big. He further stated that he believed such attacks would cause the Japanese fleet to be returned to Japan waters.

Portal outlined the tremendous advantages to be gained if it were possible for the British to gain the control of the whole North African shore of the Mediterranean. At the present time, to supply Near East requires shipping to travel 12,000 miles, whereas if they could reopen the Mediterranean, the distance would be 3,000 miles and thereby the same shipping used would be about three times as effective. He believed that the French would grant permission to use French Morocco if properly approached and that would enable the United States and Great Britain to operate air bases along the entire coast of North Africa and thus control all shipping going through the Mediterranean.

Portal was in full accord with operations to take over the Cape Verde Islands and Dakar being given first priority over operations to take the Azores.

He felt that the Germans would probably make an all-out effort in the Atlantic soon, using submarines and probably surface craft.

He looked forward to the time when U.S. bombers could be stationed in England to help out their bombing effort. He also made the statement that he had passed his peak of fighters in that his fighter personnel was not as strong as it was some time back, therefore he had reached a saturation point insofar as fighter craft was concerned in England. He then stated that the bomber command in England had not as yet reached its full strength as he had more pilots than bombing planes. He also brought out the fact that the U.S. planes must be provided for all fighter units in North Africa.

Portal stated that the Russians had surprised everyone in their ability to not only take punishment but in their ability to face extreme hardships.

He stated that since the Germans had invested Leningrad, that 100 pursuit planes had been flown from the factories in Leningrad.

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2 Arnold's optimism was shared by Roosevelt; see post, p. 128, footnote 2.
to the Russian Army. He stated further that in his opinion the Russians are producing about 1,500 combat planes a month and that what defeated the Germans was the Russians’ ability to bring in reserve[s] to maintain their strength, while the Germans did not have such reserve. The Russians finally had superiority in the air over the entire front.

Portal stated further that with the British production of about 2,500 planes a month and the U.S. building up to a production of about 3,000 per month and with Russia’s 1,500, giving a total production of about 7,000, we need not fear about air superiority since the maximum the Axis can produce is:

- Germany 2,500,
- Italy 300,
- Japan 300, or a total of 8,100 a month.

Portal agreed that the mission of the Allied Councils’ conference should be: First, prepare a sound strategic plan; Second, discussion of the forces necessary to carry it out; Third, discussion of available forces and facilities; and Fourth, allocation of equipment, facilities, or what-have-you, in order to carry out the plan.

In other words, Portal agreed in general to the general plan that we have been discussing here in the War Department for some time. The question of Canadian training for R.A.F. pilots was brought up and all seemed to be in accord that these Canadian flying schools should be brought down to Southern United States where better weather and all-around flying conditions can be obtained.

*See the papers by the Joint Board, ante, p. 50.

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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1941

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, DECEMBER 23, 1941, FORENOON, THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

**UNITED STATES**

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Matthews

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

No contemporary record of this meeting has been found. In connection with the review in the Department of State of the manuscript of William L. Langer’s *Our Vichy Gamble* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), H. Freeman Matthews prepared a lengthy memorandum
of comment, one passage of which contains his recollection of this
meeting at the White House, as follows:

Matthews Files
SECRET
WASHINGTON, January 17, 1945.

... I was called down from Tarrytown, New York, where I was
finishing a few days leave before proceeding to London, on December
23 and sent right over to the White House. The President and
Churchill were in conference alone and we were later joined by Secre-
tary Hull. They told me of their plan to set up "Gymnast" and of
their hope of inducing Weygand to join the Allies. I told them
frankly that I was convinced that Weygand would not act inde-
pendently of Pétain and further that he would immediately inform
the Marshal of our approach to him. I added that in view of the
German contacts in the Marshal's entourage, they would almost im-
mediately learn of our plans. Churchill replied with much confidence
that he did not care whether they learned of them or not—a statement
I found it difficult to understand in view of the rapidity with which
the Germans could probably have moved in North Africa. After
some discussion, however, the President and the Prime Minister de-
cided that Weygand's prestige was such in North Africa and his
support would mean so much to our proposed expedition that they
would take the risk and send him the message. The latter made clear
that we would go ahead with our North African expedition whether
Weygand went along with us or not; hence, his refusal to cooperate
would not prevent France's becoming once more involved in the war—
something that Pétain and, to a certain extent, Weygand were anxious
to avoid. ... 3

1 In response to an inquiry by the editors, Matthews stated that Hull was
not actually present for this discussion but arrived at the end of the meeting,
apparently to see the President on another matter. Matthews recalled that
Hopkins was present for the discussion, and that Hopkins had shared his doubts
about Weygand's willingness to act independently of Pétain. (Matthews to the
Historical Office, January 15 and February 20, 1962, 640.00/1-1562 and 2-2062).

2 The message under reference is the secret oral message, post, p. 234. Roosevelt
also sent Weygand a written communication, dated December 27 and couched
in terms of a New Year's greeting (post, p. 244).

3 In amplification of this memorandum Matthews informed the editors that
the discussion also covered the procedure for transmitting the secret message
to Weygand. Roosevelt and Churchill had in mind that Matthews would take
the message to Leahy who would pass it on to Weygand. Matthews pointed out
that the suspicions of the German Secret State Police (Gestapo) would be aroused
if he were to return to Vichy on his way to his new assignment at London or
if Leahy went to see Weygand on the Riviera. Roosevelt and Churchill accepted
Matthews' suggestion that the message be transmitted by way of Leverich at
Lisbon and MacArthur at Vichy (Matthews to the Historical Office, January 15,
1962, 640.001/1-1562). For further information on the method of transmittal,
see the editorial note, post, p. 234.
MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL WITH THEIR MILITARY ADVISERS, DECEMBER 23, 1941, 4:45 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Secretary Stimson
Secretary Knox
Mr. Hopkins
General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Major General Watson
Captain Beardall

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Beaverbrook
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Brigadier Hollis

Defense Files

Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)

SECRET

December 23, 1941.

NOTES OF MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER PRESIDING

The President opened the conference with the statement that last night he had discussed general questions with the Prime Minister covering the initial situation, the present status, and relations with the Vichy Government and with Portugal; that no Army and Navy details were considered.

He stated that the draft of a declaration had been prepared covering our joint "intentions", and covering the point that no one power would make peace without an agreement with the associate powers.¹

I have a note regarding his statement as to the North Atlantic ferretying problem and the protection of the British Isles.

He stated:

(1) That they jointly felt, he and Mr. Churchill, that the presence of a small number of American bombers in England would have an important effect on the French people and on Germany.

(2) That they agreed that the next thing is to have three American divisions take over the defenses in the North Atlantic.

(3) That a mixed command in Iceland was a disadvantage, and that he thought they should be regulated.

¹The time of the meeting and the list of those present is taken from the Stimson diary and from Arnold's memorandum, infra; not all of the names of persons present appear on both lists.

²Two drafts of the joint declaration will be found ante, pp. 11 and 39.
He stated that he and the Prime Minister discussed the relative importance of the Azores versus the Verde Islands.

He stated that they were agreed that it would be a mistake to send American troops into the Near East at this time.

He stated that they thought it was important to keep a flying route open across Africa, referring to the Brazilian situation and to the threat from Dakar.

Southwestern Pacific.

He stated that England would hold Singapore; the United States would build up in Australia towards operations to the north including, of course, the Philippines.

China.

He stated that we were endeavoring to effect arrangements to utilize Chinese territory for air operations against Japan.

Russia.

He felt that no attack on Japan was now indicated, and would not be probable before March or April unless Japan would attack Russia.

West and North Africa.

Diplomatic representatives in Switzerland reported that Germans were planning attack December 27, through Spain. Other sources of information did not indicate this.

He discussed the importance of Dakar, with reference to the deficiencies in shipping, the lack of antiaircraft ammunition and planes.

He stated that the transports now being used by British troops (approaching Bombay) were to be used for whatever purpose was most important at the time, British or American. He stated that he is not in favor of converting these transports into airplane carriers.

He mentioned several questions that had been raised: (1) Are we to put PBY naval planes in Ireland? (2) Can we induce South Ireland to make naval bases available? (3) How soon can the commercial airlines take over the transportation to Foynes?

He stated that there appeared no reason for transferring to the British flag, North American flag ships for Atlantic runs under the Lend-Lease. Admiral Stark requested more opportunity to consider this in relation to the scarcity of trained crews.

He stated that the general question of supply and additions to munition production were to be considered in one or two days by Lord Beaverbrook, Mr. Knudsen, and others. (General Moore was not mentioned but I will request that he be included in this conference).

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3 Such a report had been sent from the American Minister at Bern in a triple-priority telegram number 418, December 22, 1941, not printed (740.0011 European War 1939/17772).

4 See ante, pp. 38, 49.
As an example of increases, he mentioned the doubling of plane production. He specifically mentioned planes, tanks, antiaircraft matériel and ammunition. He thought the overall estimate should carry up into 1944.

The British Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, made the following statements:

He voiced his appreciation of Mr. Stimson’s statement and he said the summation of that statement is that the preservation of the North Atlantic communications with the British Isles, etc., fully justified their trip over here, if nothing else. He referred to their appreciation of our present situation and their desire to help us in the Pacific. He said that he expected his staff people to be informed on the situation. He was much impressed by our attitude in this immediate crisis, of planning ahead in years instead of weeks.

He stated that they were short in manpower.

He expressed complete agreement with the proposition to replace the three British divisions in Ireland with American divisions; he thought we should hold our more highly-trained divisions for other tasks as there was not immediate likelihood of these divisions in Ireland being actively employed, and they could continue training. He thought their presence would have an excellent effect in many directions, and he was highly pleased with our willingness at this particular time to go ahead with that relief. (He was told that the limitation was tonnage and antiaircraft). He and Lord Beaverbrook stated that they could furnish us the antiaircraft. The tonnage issue was not elaborated on.

He desires us to take over Iceland, merely leaving available the use of airfields and shipping facilities sufficient for them to protect the northwest approaches.

North Africa.

He stated that he had the feeling that matters in that region were coming to a head quickly. There was a ferment in the French minds over the United States entry into the war, and the reverse in Russia. Supposing the British push beyond Cyrenaica to the frontier of Tunis in a month or six weeks—the situation would be pregnant. How will the Germans get into North Africa? Maybe that is the moment when the French home or African people will not accede to the German demands. That is then the moment for us, the British and the Americans.

He stated that the British have 55,000 men with transports ready for shipment for such a purpose and that they could be in Africa in twenty-three days; that two or three air squadrons from Malta could proceed to Bizerte. He offered for consideration the proposition that

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* The Stimson memorandum under reference is printed ante, p. 44.
at the same time United States forces, assuming French agreement, should proceed to land on the Moroccan coast by invitation. He referred to possible terms of approach to the French, the promise of supplies, the assurance that future France would be protected at the peace table, and conversely, a statement that she be ignored entirely in the peace settlement.

The President interjected at this time, commenting on an expedition against Agadir and Casa Blanca. Mr. Churchill commented that Spain should not be irritated if possible to avoid. Mr. Churchill continued—for such a purpose, assuming the invitation from the French, possibly the American expedition should move first, but the British are ready to go into it abreast, or to follow as might be deemed advisable in relation to French reaction. He repeated that their expedition was ready.

He asked that the foregoing be studied, to which the President agreed.6

The President commented at this time on the use of colonial troops against Dakar.

The President stated that he considered it very important to morale, to give this country a feeling that they are in the war, to give the Germans the reverse effect, to have American troops somewhere in active fighting across the Atlantic.

Mr. Churchill stated his agreement that it was not wise to send our troops into the Middle East, and it was better for the Indian Army and Australian troops. He made no reference to possible use of air units.

He desired that we consider the question of landing troops in Norway in 1943.

The President spoke of the dangers in Brazil.

The Secretary of War spoke of the importance of timing in relation to movements into Ireland and those projected for the Mediterranean, with relation to its effect on the French people. He thought that our movement into Ireland would have a very definite effect on the French mind, which would facilitate arrangements for a movement into Tunis and Morocco by the British and French.

Mr. Churchill stated that the issue in the Mediterranean might arise at any moment.

There was a brief discussion in regard to the time for putting an expedition in Ireland.

_Pacific._

Mr. Churchill desired that his staff officers be given the full view of the situation as to the Philippines, Hawaii, and the West Coast.

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The President interjected to comment about the decentralization of aircraft plants.

Mr. Churchill offered the services of Lord Beaverbrook to indicate a method for moving them without interfering seriously with production.

Mr. Churchill then continued: He stated their feeling that Hawaii need not be a fleet base; that it could be approached from so many directions that it should be supplied. It appears that it could be defended.

He stated that he felt in this emergency that we have the greatest needs. We should have the supplies at the moment. This had reference to later statements regarding British naval assistance in the Pacific.

He stated that he understood two new battleships would be ready in May. Admiral King said sometime in March. Admiral Stark commented there would be three and possibly four more battleships this year.

Mr. Churchill continued: “We will do our best to look out for the Atlantic so far as battleships are concerned.” He commented on the conditions of certain of their battleships—the King George [V]—and another one which I missed; the Renown, very good; the Nelson recently had been torpedoed but would be ready for action in February; and the Rodney. He spoke of the Anson being ready for service in May and another one later.

He referred again that they might be able to aid us in some way in restoring superiority in the Pacific. He stated that they would particularly like our destroyers in the Atlantic for convoy duty, that the distribution of battleships was open.

Syria and Persia.

Mr. Churchill stated that he thought possibly in the spring Hitler might feint at Russia and then thrust out in the Southeast. He felt that probably we would be able to hold the Nile Valley; that they now felt more secure because of improved conditions. Storms may come again. He felt it would be a tremendous disaster to give up the Canal—Turkey would go, Africa would be overrun. He was not asking us to do anything in that region except furnish supplies and build up bases. They were making no request for us in the Near East. They hope to have four armored divisions, the first, second, seventh and one other available there.

To sum up, he stated the question of Iceland, and of Ireland and French North Africa, the holding of forces available for operations against small islands; he spoke of an expedition against Dakar on

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1 For a clearer rendition of Churchill’s thought on this subject, see the notes by Arnold, post, p. 79.
the basis of in and out, leaving other troops to hold the place. (I assume this was on a basis of some agreement with the French).

In referring to the Far East, he spoke of possible retirement toward Jehor (Johore, fighting there. Singapore to hold out. It ought to be a matter of six months before Japanese can close in. The Burma Province has been reinforced since a fortnight ago. The 17th Indian Division, a very good division, is en route to Burma, Wavell in command, having released Iran and Iraq to Auchinleck. The 18th Division now in convoy on American ships is routed for Bombay and Ceylon. It might be possible for the Australians to move their troops closer to that theater than Australia and by transfers from the Near East. There was comment by the staff that this would take considerable tonnage. They would do their best to keep the Burma Road open. The Indian Army now has twelve divisions.

Mr. Churchill, with Lord Beaverbrook, brought up the question in relation to Ireland, that they had 25-pounders available with ammunition that we might use, and other guns that we might use. They could not help us with rifles.

G. C. M.

Arnold Papers

Memorandum by Lieutenant General Arnold

SECRET

CONFERENCE IN WHITE HOUSE TUESDAY AFTERNOON, 4:45 P. M.
DECEMBER 23, 1941

THE PRESIDENT

The President opened the conference by stating that he had discussed with Mr. Churchill the probabilities and possibilities from future actions by Vichy and probably by Portugal. Just what conclusions were reached during this discussion was not made clear.

The President further stated that Churchill and he had agreed that there must be an agreement between all nations; that hereafter there would be no peace without the concurrence of all until we had complete victory; that they were taking the necessary steps to insure this; and that there must be maintained trans-Atlantic air and ship lines.

The President said that he had agreed that we would start operating Heavy Bombers as soon as possible from England; that Churchill was in agreement on this—that the total number need not necessarily be large but the morale value of this action would be extremely high.

(Note: Later in the evening Portal asked me the number we could send and I told him we would not send less than one Group because the Group was the smallest unit that was self-sustained and self-contained. Portal asked when I could get them over and I told him in March.)
Ireland. The President said he had agreed with Churchill on the defense of Ireland; that we should relieve three British Divisions with American troops; that we would take over the whole of North Ireland from the British.

(Query: What air component goes with these troops and when must it be ready?)

(Note: General Marshall asked me about pursuit protection. I told him that I believed we could send two Pursuit Groups over there within the next couple of months.)

Iceland. The President stated that he had talked over the subject of Iceland with the Prime Minister and that there must be unity of command there; that he agreed there was an extensive shipping problem but that the shipping problem would probably be less if United States troops are there instead of the British, mainly because practically all British supplies come from New York to England and then to Iceland, whereas if American troops were there they would just go from New York to Iceland. He further stated that if the British withdrew their Army and Air, probably they would leave a Navy Base there which would operate with the American Forces.

(Query: What additional Air Units will be required for Iceland and when?)

Greenland. The President stated that so far as Greenland was concerned, it would require a very small number of troops—they would be mainly Weather and Radio troops and men working on the aviation fields. He did not say that we would need many fighting troops in Greenland. Everybody concurred with that.

Central Atlantic. The next step taken up was the Naval support for the Central Atlantic area. In this the President discussed the Azores, the West Coast of Africa, and the Cape Verdes Islands. He stated positively that the United States believed that the Verdes Islands were first priority as far as we were concerned, mainly due to the necessity of our maintaining the air route over the South Atlantic.

South West Pacific. The next subject taken up was the South West Pacific in which was discussed China, the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, and the Philippines. The President stated that the Prime Minister agreed with him that we must be prepared to hold Singapore and the Dutch East Indies even if we lost the Philippines, and then we must base in Australia, always with the endeavor to push to the north to regain lost territory; and that we must provide for the safety of New Zealand and Australia.

China. It was agreed between the President and the Prime Minister that we must keep the Chinese fighting; he was inclined to agree with the Chief of the Army Air Forces that we must complete or establish air bases over there from which to operate air transports.
He asked about the present status of those bases and was given the substance of a report recently received from General Brett. The President was also told that we must get air transports in there at once. He was further informed that General Brett's cablegram said that there were bombs, oil, and gasoline available but air transportation was required to get them in and that steps would be taken to provide these air transports.

Russia. It was brought out that the Russians have been taking troops from East Siberia and sending them to the western front, and that we need not expect Russia being of any material aid against Japan until March or April.

North and West Africa. It was the President's opinion that if Germany goes into North Africa we must get there first. On the other hand we can't take any action that might cause Vichy to turn the fleet over to the Germans. He did not believe that there were any preparations being made by the Germans now for any immediate attack on Spain, Portugal, Gibraltar, or Morocco. He has received reports from a source that sometimes is reliable and sometimes not, that the Germans are going to move into Portugal on December 27th. He said take it or leave it, that he didn't know whether to accept it or not, that sometimes this authority is right and sometimes wrong.

Expeditionary Air Force. The President said that we must prepare an expeditionary air force and have it available at all times. The force must be trained so as to have the troops ready for action regardless of the theatre. He realizes that ships are scarce so that we can't do more than one task at a time. He also realizes that anti-aircraft guns and planes are short but we must go on and have this expeditionary force ready.

(Query: Find out from War Plans what the expeditionary force is, and where and when it must be at some particular time.)

Transports. The President then took up the Secretary of War's prepared paper and the first subject discussed was transports. He said that transports should be used for whatever movements the Allied Council consider most important. Regardless of whether British or American, all transports would be used for that purpose. He said that he did not think this was any time to convert transports into aircraft carriers. This referred to the Navy transforming the West Point, Manhattan, and the Washington into aircraft carriers. The President said this matter should be held in abeyance until action could be taken. The President insisted that we build up at once air and sea communications across the Pacific—that that was of primary importance.

Planes for North Ireland. The next question that came up was the use of PBYs or some other type of plane in North Ireland. The President asked Churchill what he thought about this and it was
agreed that the use of any planes in North Ireland should be based upon our needs elsewhere and decision reached accordingly.

**South Ireland.** The subject of South Ireland was discussed and the President said that he believed if we put the whole 69th Regiment in South Ireland we could probably get them to do some fighting and not so much talking. At the present time it looked bad to him but he thought something might be done reference South Ireland entering the war and that we might eventually get them swinging into action along with the rest of us.

The Navy are to start airlines at once to Foynes, using commercial aircraft. This is a Navy proposition and will be handled by them.

**Warships to the British.** The next question taken up was the transfer of warships to the British. The President said he cannot see any advantage to be gained by transferring our warships to the British right now. Admiral Stark stated that there was a shortage of trained personnel in our Navy and it might be necessary to transfer some of our present ships to the British. It was finally decided that Stark and Pound would talk the matter over and pool their resources.

**Supply.** The supply end was then brought up and it was decided that a Supply Conference would start at once, with Beaverbrook, Knudsen, and some of our other people. I told General Marshall that it was very important that General Moore attend these conferences in spite of hell and high water.

**Objective—1944.** The President then stated that it looked now as if we should project everything into 1944. This was based upon the fact that if we started an idea for production now it will be 1944 before we can get the planes, tanks and ammunition in quantity, so that should be our objective insofar as all new facilities are concerned.

**President’s Message to Congress.** The President stated that he was going to send a message to Congress early in January and he wants to put in it such requirements as the Army and Navy may have.

(QUERY: Will the Air Forces be ready by the end of this month to have a paragraph to put in the President’s message about the Victory Parade [Program?] and our requirements? We must have that processed through the Secretary of War before the end of December.)

**Prime Minister Churchill**

Upon completion of the President’s remarks, Churchill was given the floor and said that in general he was in accord with everything the President said; that he appreciated more than he could say the aid that has come so far from the United States.

He emphasized the necessity for sending 3 American Divisions and one Armored Division to North Ireland as soon as possible, as it would replace British Divisions which could be used other places.

Churchill further stated that he thought we ought to take over
Iceland because it would provide us with ways and means for winter training in case we might have to operate in Norway or some other cold climate.

(Query: We should determine as soon as possible the size of air force required for both the Iceland and Ireland contingents.)

Churchill then went on to talk about North Africa and French Morocco; the attitude of the French; that the Vichy problem was coming to a head very soon; that he believed that when the matter did come to a head, the British should push right into Tripoli; that he hoped that the British forces operating against the Germans and Italians in Liberia at this time would reach the gates of Tunis in about a month; that the effect of this victory by the British would have a very decided influence on the morale of the Germans; that this, coupled with the U.S. entry into the war, must have a decided deteriorating effect on the Germans and it should serve to boost up the morale of the French so as to make them want to regain their lost prestige and put up a fight for their rights, etc.

The U.S. must be ready with a task force to enter Morocco; that this entry will probably be upon invitation; that if the invitation was not forthcoming, the value of this occupation was so great it might be necessary to proceed by force; that the ways and means of carrying out this campaign on the Northern Coast of Africa should be discussed by the Working Committees as an operation to be carried out during 1942.

The President gave his O.K. to the remarks made by Churchill.

At this point the President asked Churchill whether or not it might be possible to have French troops who were favorable to the British and American principles operate against Dakar from the rear. This subject was not discussed further, however.

Churchill reiterated the principle that the American Armies must get into this war as soon as possible, and not only get into the war but we must take the offensive against the Germans and against the Japanese to bolster up not only the people of the U.S. but also the other nations fighting on the side of Great Britain and the United States. We should get them into Ireland, get them into Iceland, and get them into Australia with men available for any Task Force to use where they are required, but the United States troops must get into action at the earliest possible moment.

Churchill again brought out the question of our possible occupation of Norway by U.S. troops. The President brought out the point that we also had a problem down at Natal that we could not ignore.

Churchill accentuated the necessity for U.S. bombers to be sent to England at the earliest possible moment to bomb German forces, German industries, and French ports used by German raiders—land, sea, and air.
At this point the President asked General Marshall: "What time can you set for such a movement of troops?" General Marshall replied "It is all a question of tonnage. We have the troops now. Some equipment is short but right this minute I have in mind the troops which should go. The Divisions have been trained and in the training have been given rather rough treatment to make them good soldiers, but we have the Divisions which could be sent into these places. We are short on antiaircraft artillery, however." Churchill then asked Beaverbrook, "Have we not the antiaircraft artillery?" and Beaverbrook said "We can provide the antiaircraft artillery."

Note: At this point Portal and Dill apparently were taken by surprise at Beaverbrook’s remark for they seemed to start and raise their eye brows a bit.

The President then asked "How about pursuit planes?" And I replied that we had plenty of pursuit planes we could send with those Task Forces.

Churchill then took up the question of our West Coast, Alaska, Hawaii, and the possible utilization of troops for the defense of those places, the necessity for dispersing the industries rather than have them all in one spot like they are in Los Angeles, how they had to do that in England in order to continue maximum production and provide against interruptions due to bombings and what-have-you. He said that Beaverbrook had done that in England quite successfully and Beaverbrook should take it up with Knudsen.

Churchill made the statement in connection with Hawaii that he could not see why there should be any trouble in supplying Hawaii. We would not need a battle fleet to keep the sea lanes open to Hawaii but the battle fleet should be clear to move in any part of the Pacific, that there was apparently no clear view on this subject and the matter should be talked over by the Staff.

Churchill further stated, or indicated that the British would, or indicated that they should take over the Atlantic with their Fleet so that the U.S. Navy could regain unquestioned supremacy in the Pacific.

Churchill further stated that in all probability Syria would be the next theatre of operations; that it was there the Spring campaign would be carried out.

The next subject he discussed was the Nile Valley. He stated that the British had to hold the Nile Valley and he was much more confident now of being able to hold it than ever before on account of the success of the Russians against the Germans and the British successes in North Africa.

He further stated that they were asking for continuation of supplies, building up of bases and building up of schools in England.

He further stated that the policy in Malaya was to retreat as long as they could, but when they got down to Singapore, to hold until the
last. At this point, I asked whether or not there was any policy with reference to keeping the Burma Road open. Churchill stated that they would fight to keep it open, that Indian troops would be used if necessary; that Wavell was being reinforced and they would do everything to keep the Burma Road open.

After some discussion on various subjects, the President then said we would meet again within a few days.

DINNER PARTY OF THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH MILITARY LEADERS, DECEMBER 23, 1941, 7:30 P. M., THE CARLTON HOTEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Secretary of War Stimson
Secretary of the Navy Knox
Under Secretary of War Patterson
Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal
Assistant Secretary of War McClay
Assistant Secretary of War Lovett
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Bard
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gates
General Marshall
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Lieutenant General McNair
Major General Moore
Rear Admiral Towers
Rear Admiral Turner
Brigadier General Gerow
Brigadier General Spaatz
Captain Wilkinson
Captain Ramsey
Captain Beatty
Major Harrison

UNITED KINGDOM

Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Little
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Wemyss
Air Marshal Harris
Major General Macready
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier Hollis
Air Commodore Dickson
Captain Lambe
Captain Macdonald-Buchanan
Paymaster Captain Brockman
Colonel Jacob
Group Captain Sharp
Commander Currie

Editorial Note

The information given above regarding the time and place of the meeting and the guest list is taken from the Stimson diary. The dinner, which was given by Stimson and Knox, was not an official meeting and there is no indication that any substantive decisions were made. The following excerpt from the Stimson diary indicates the nature of the discussion:

"I presided, gave a toast to the King which was responded to by Sir Dudley Pound by a toast to the President. Then at the close of the meal I made a little talk of welcome to them. I recalled my recollection of 1917 when America had just declared war and a British mission for a similar purpose had crossed the ocean and came to us; how Mr. Choate and I at that time had welcomed the situation as the fulfillment of our life's dreams of British cooperation; how now twenty-four years afterwards the same situation was presenting itself, the same hope and ideal lay before us, and this time we must not fail, but must win both the war and the peace. They all seemed to appre-
ciate the talk and practically all the British members spoke to me about it afterwards.

"After dinner we sat around informally in the adjoining room and chatted over our problems. There was a very hearty spirit of cooperation and good will evidenced on all sides and not a single note, so far as I could see, intervened to mar the earnest spirit of harmony and endeavor which pervaded everybody."

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**DINNER MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, DECEMBER 23, 1941, EVENING, THE WHITE HOUSE**

**Present**

**United States**

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins

**United Kingdom**

Prime Minister Churchill

**Editorial Note**

No record of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The fact that there was an evening discussion on December 23 between Roosevelt and Churchill appears from the first paragraph of the minutes of the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on December 24, 1941. According to this reference (*post*, p. 82), Roosevelt and Churchill discussed the military subjects that were further explored by the Chiefs of Staff the following morning. An undated memorandum in the Hopkins Papers, listing the functions that Hopkins attended during the First Washington Conference, indicates that Hopkins had dinner on the evening of December 23 with Roosevelt and Churchill.

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**WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1941**

**MEETING OF SECRETARY STIMSON AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, DECEMBER 24, 1941, MORNING, THE WHITE HOUSE**

**Present**

**United States**

Secretary Stimson  
Brigadier General Eisenhower

**United Kingdom**

Prime Minister Churchill

**Editorial Note**

No official record of this discussion has been found. The Stimson diary for December 24 contains the following paragraph:

"I received word this morning that Churchill was anxious for a talk with me on the subject of the Philippines, so I spent the first part

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1 For Churchill's remarks from the White House balcony on Christmas eve, see Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 669.
of the morning preparing for that besides attending to my other administrative work. I then went over to the White House with General Eisenhower of the War Plans Division to back me up in case I was asked questions that I couldn’t answer, and had a talk with Churchill upstairs in the main White House. He had fixed up a map room in a room near his bedroom and our talk took place in that. He was still in deshabille, wearing a sort of zipper pajama suit and slippers. I had brought maps of the Philippines and explained the location of the different troops on both sides, the course of the campaign, and its probable outcome in a retreat on Corregidor. Eisenhower then retired and I had a further talk with him about other matters in the various parts of the terrain. He explained to me particularly his views on the West African problem.

**MEETING OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 24, 1941, 10:30 A.M., FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING**

**Present**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
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<tr>
<td>General Marshall</td>
<td>Admiral of the Fleet Pound</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admiral Stark</td>
<td>Field Marshal Dill</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admiral King</td>
<td>Air Chief Marshal Portal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General Arnold</td>
<td>Admiral Little</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rear Admiral Sexton</td>
<td>Lieutenant General Wemyss</td>
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<td>Rear Admiral Horne</td>
<td>Air Marshal Harris</td>
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<td>Rear Admiral Towers</td>
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<td>Rear Admiral Turner</td>
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<td>Major General Holcomb</td>
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<td>Brigadier General Gerow</td>
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**Secretariat**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captain McCrea</td>
<td>Brigadier Hollis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Robinett</td>
<td>Colonel Jacob</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Sexton</td>
<td>Commander Coleridge</td>
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Defense Files

**United States Minutes**

**December 24, 1941.**

**SECRET**

**JCCSs-1**

The substance of the conference consisted of informal discussions of various points which had been brought up at a conference the previous evening at the White House, at which the President and Mr. Winston Churchill had been present.

1. **DEFENSE OF THE BRITISH ISLES**

**Admiral Stark** opened the discussion with the remark that he believed it apparent to all that the British Isles was the fortress which must be protected at all cost, and that in this there was no serious difference of opinion. He remarked that he was wondering as to the effectiveness of the United Kingdom defenses as regards invasion
from the Continent, remarking that at least two Marine Corps observers, after an inspection of the Island defenses, had come to the conclusion that they left much to be desired. Admiral Stark stated that the comments of these officers would be transmitted to the British for such use as they might care to make of them.

Marshal Dill remarked that the defenses were constantly being improved.

Admiral Pound welcomed Admiral Stark’s proposal.

2. Heavy Bombers

Admiral Stark made the point that in the future, heavy bombers sent to Great Britain would be manned by American crews; that some would be sent as units.

Air Chief Marshal Portal remarked that this had not been the original agreement. General Arnold stated that the R.A.F. was not to be deprived of any heavy bombers previously agreed to, but that units would be sent in addition. Details to be worked out later.

General Marshall remarked that Mr. Churchill had mentioned that the presence of American bombers, even in small numbers, in England would have an important influence on the French and the Germans.

3. Relief of British Troops in Northern Ireland and Iceland

The Prime Minister had requested that three British divisions in Northern Ireland be relieved at the earliest practicable date.

Marshal Dill remarked that it was his understanding that the relieving force was to consist of three divisions plus one armored division. General Marshall agreed. Admiral Pound asked at what time the troops in Ireland could be relieved. General Marshall replied that the troops are available now; the question is the availability of tonnage.

Admiral Pound asked with whom he could get in touch on the tonnage matter, and was told that his representatives should see Colonel Gross of the G–4 Division, War Department General Staff.

Admiral Stark stated that the United States was ready to take over the defense of Iceland, following which, however, base facilities would still be available to Great Britain. He also stated that the Marines in Iceland are an important element of the United States amphibious force, and that it was desired that they be relieved prior to beginning the relief of the British troops there.

Marshal Dill remarked that this would have to be worked out, and asked when the relief of the British could be accomplished. General Gerow replied that it could be completed by March, 1942.

Admiral Stark added that the whole question of relief was largely a matter of shipping, and added that United States production is
behind in antiaircraft weapons, and that the British might be able to help out.

The Conference agreed that the program for these reliefs should be studied by the Joint Committee.

4. GREENLAND

Admiral Stark brought up the question of Greenland and asked General Arnold the status of air fields there. General Arnold stated that the United States now has a small force in Greenland; that two fields are projected; one field is ready now, but in the fog belt; another field, farther to the north, will be ready very soon. He stated that Greenland will be used essentially as a staging area between the United States and Europe. He added that he could furnish more details later.

5. ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND ESCORTS

Admiral Stark stated that these would continue, in collaboration with the British; that the Prime Minister had mentioned the possibility of getting additional United States destroyers. Admiral Stark continued, "We just don't have any destroyers to spare, and in fact have far fewer than we require for our own needs." The construction program, he stated, was farthest behind in destroyers, battleships, and patrol vessels. He said that the situation along American seacoasts, with regard to the need for corvettes and other small patrol craft, is critical. In fact, it is desired that the British lend to the United States any available vessels suitable for coastal patrol work.

Admiral Pound then suggested that the whole question of general Naval dispositions of the two Navies be discussed.

6. PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH ISLANDS IN THE ATLANTIC

Admiral Stark asked Admiral Pound what importance he attached to the Azores. Admiral Pound stated that the British attached tremendous importance to these Islands, particularly if Gibraltar should become untenable. He said, "We need the Azores very much; they have great importance from every point of view." Admiral Pound went on to say that the Canaries also are important; that they might be invited to go in there.

Admiral Stark then asked what importance the British attach to the Cape Verde Islands. Admiral Pound replied that it was only a question of denying them to the enemy, rather than their actual use by the British. Admiral King then remarked that United States interest in the Cape Verde Islands is strategic, because of their locations between Dakar and Brazil. He went on to say that "we can not do all these things"; the British should take the responsibility for the Azores, and the United States for the Cape Verde Islands.
Admiral Stark suggested that further study be given to this question, to which Admiral Pound agreed.

7. Occupation of Africa

Admiral Stark said that he felt it undesirable for the United States to consider sending troops to Egypt or Libya. If the British can continue there and clean up, it would automatically protect Dakar, and at the same time Iran and Iraq would be of no great concern. So far as West Africa is concerned, the United States should fall in line with British action.

General Marshall read notes taken from a memorandum made at the White House conference yesterday, to the effect that if the British should reach Tunis there was the possibility of a French invitation to occupy North Africa.¹

Marshal Dill pointed out that the British had available to move on 23 days’ notice an expeditionary force of 55,000 men which could be reinforced from Malta; that the Prime Minister had thought that if this occasion arose, it would be desirable for United States forces to land in Morocco, possibly to precede the British.

General Marshall said that at the present time a Corps Commander is planning an expedition to Africa which would include an amphibious corps. That this would be a task force, ready for any action that might present itself; and that if an opportunity existed to occupy North Africa without difficulty, the United States should take advantage of it. That United States troops for this purpose are available, but that there is a shortage in antiaircraft guns, .50 caliber ammunition and 37 mm. ammunition for both antiaircraft and anti-tank guns; also a shortage of planes. However, if the initial move could be made without fighting, the United States has already organized a sufficient number of squadrons to take care of the operation; that time is of greatest importance, and that while the American force could not complete its movement within 23 days, it could within approximately 30 days at the earliest, contingent on the availability of tonnage.

Admiral King asked as to the possibility of furnishing an American token force, such as a regiment.

General Marshall said that a token force as part of the British forces would be feasible, but that he could not put a lone regiment on the coast of Africa. The question was asked as to whether the Marines now in Iceland could be ready for this move. General Holcomb agreed that they could be.

The Conference agreed that this question should be studied by the Joint Planning Committee.

¹ Ante, p. 78.
8. Brazil

Admiral King said that the political situation in Brazil made the United States Marine-Naval position of a “touch and go” nature; that the Germans are well organized in Brazil and have followers among important members of the Government.

General Marshall said that after prolonged negotiations, the United States has been able to place only a small number of unarmed Marines in Brazil.

9. The Curacao-Aruba Area

Admiral Stark brought up the question of the critical situation in the Curacao-Aruba area with respect to Allied oil supply, pointing out that 95% of the oil used on the eastern coast comes from that area; and that one-half of the Lend-Lease oil for Britain comes from that area. He stated that the troops on these Islands should be placed on the strictest alert; that time was of the greatest importance; and suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff do everything they could with their own authorities in London to expedite American entry into these Islands, particularly aviation units.

Admiral Pound agreed to take the matter up that afternoon.

10. Pacific Area

Admiral Stark listed the joint aims in the Pacific, as follows:

Protection of the Burma Road
Aid to China
Aid to the Netherlands East Indies
To hold Singapore
To hold the Philippine Islands
Use of Australia as a base.

Admiral Stark then reviewed the Naval situation in the Far East as pertains to the Asiatic Fleet. General Marshall reviewed the arrangements which had been made to get planes to the Philippines, not only from Australia, but by convoys; also by flying by way of the eastern route. General Marshall stated that the critical feature of assistance to the Philippines from Australia was the existence of fields in Borneo; and that the present issue is to elaborate our plans for building up bases in Australia.

Admiral Pound then reviewed what ships the British Navy has around Singapore.

The question was asked Marshal Dill as to his opinion of the situation at Singapore, to which he replied that, with reinforcements, the British would be able to hold Johore State.

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*See Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. vi, pp. 490 ff. See also Conn and Fairchild, pp. 303–311.

* For negotiations on sending American military forces to Curacao and Aruba, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 49 ff.
11. Bombardment of Japan

Admiral Stark asked as to the situation in China for air fields to be used as bases for bombing attacks against Japan.

General Arnold stated that General Brett had written for air transport planes for use in reconnaissance work and for supply. He stated that no bombing operations should be undertaken against Japan unless they are strong enough to create substantial damage; that the minimum number of bombers should be 50; that unsustained attacks would only tend to solidify the Japanese people.

12. Russian Situation

It was stated that it is not practicable at this time for Russia to begin operations in the Far East, as it might jeopardize her efforts in the west, and that Stalin should not be urged. The Prime Minister had quoted Stalin as saying that Russia was not ready to enter the war in the Far East now, but perhaps would be able so do in the spring.¹

13. Spain and Portugal

Admiral Stark brought up the question of German intentions in the Iberian Peninsula, and expressed fear of German action through that area. He asked Admiral Pound for his views, who replied that British Joint Intelligence reports no signs of concentration of German troops in the south of France. Admiral Stark remarked that, nevertheless, everyone should be on guard. He then asked Marshal Dill as to the significance of the change in the German high command. Marshal Dill stated that it probably concerned a difference of opinion on future operations.²

14. Airplane Carriers

Admiral Stark said that the United States situation with respect to airplane carriers was very bad, and that while the Navy was making plans to convert passenger ships and tankers into airplane carriers, in view of possible troop transport requirements, he had agreed to discuss proposed conversions with General Marshall. Admiral Stark stated that with respect to flying boats for the British, the situation was such that the United States could not furnish any.

15. P.B.Y.'s for the British

The conversation then was directed to the supply of heavy bombers and P.B.Y.'s for the British. Admiral Towers remarked that our

² The reference is presumably to the retirement of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch and the assumption by Hitler on December 19, 1941, of the High Command of the Army. See United States Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, Fuehrer Directives and Other Top-Level Directives of the German Armed Forces, 1939–1941 (Washington: 1948, processed), pp. 238–239; see also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 4, p. 4949.
present production of P.B.Y’s was 46 per month, and that this was being stepped up to 150 of all types. Admiral King pointed out that the bottleneck was really one of personnel rather than anything else. Admiral Stark remarked that all possible help has been given the British in the matter of aircraft. Rear Admiral Towers pointed out that the four-engine bomber program can not but interfere with the Naval aircraft progress for at least the next eight months. To emphasize his statement, he remarked that some American Naval aircraft factories, because of the four-engine bomber program, can only obtain material enough for an eight-hour, five-day week.

16. BRITISH CREWS FOR AMERICAN SHIPS

Admiral Stark said that available personnel for American merchant ships is so limited that he would like the British to consider the possibility of having British crews man American ships. Admiral Pound said the matter was questionable and that it should be discussed with Admiral Little.

17. GUNS FOR MERCHANT SHIPS

The question of guns for American ships was brought up. The United States Navy has furnished the British with 400 guns for arming merchant vessels. Admiral Stark inquired if any of these could be returned, as there was a shortage.

Admiral Pound stated that he would have the matter examined and do the best he could to meet the American requirements, which were to be made known to him.

18. NAVAL DISPOSITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC

Admiral Stark proposed that the British take over capital ship responsibility in the Atlantic, and listed fleet elements that would be required in that ocean.*

19. PRIORITIES IN EXPEDITIONS

General Marshall brought up the question of priorities in expeditions, and asked Marshal Dill if he had set up any such priorities. Marshal Dill said that the priorities were in the following order:

Africa
Iceland
North Ireland.

General Marshall then asked if the French do not invite an occupation, what disposition will be made of the expeditionary force of 55,000.

Marshal Dill said that if the Germans go through Spain, the British hope to take the Canaries, whether invited or not.

* See the proposed modification of ABC-1, ante, p. 16.
GENERAL MARSHALL then asked how many troops would be required, and MARSHAL DILL replied only a small force of a few battalions. The British do not want any more than that down there. The question was then asked, if the British take the offensive and occupy the Canary Islands, what cooperation would be expected of the United States. Admiral Pound, by nodded consent, indicated that the United States should take action in the Cape Verde Islands.

20. WEST AFRICA

GENERAL MARSHALL brought up the question of what was to be done at Freetown and Bathurst. This question was not settled.

Admiral Pound then asked about Dakar. Admiral Turner stated that the United States is getting up a plan for its occupation.

Admiral Stark asked Marshal Dill if he agreed that Dakar could be taken by direct attack. Marshal Dill stated that it could be done.

21. BRITISH CHIEF OF STAFF MEMORANDUM

Admiral Pound then read a memorandum signed by the British Chiefs of Staff, which was amended in minor points. (See Annex 1 for Revised Version). During the discussion, the following points were brought out:

Marshal Dill was asked what is the maximum estimated need in United States troops for an offensive against Germany. The answer was 15 to 17 divisions in 1942, or early 1943, including armored divisions. Admiral Turner then stated that 45 divisions was the maximum which could be transported and supplied by available shipping in sight.

Admiral King pointed out that the most mischievous naval operations which the Germans could make at this time would be a mass surface and submarine attack on convoy routes in the Atlantic. Admiral Stark then stated that a most important target for the bombing operations against Germany should be shipyards where submarines and airplane carriers are being built. Air Chief Marshal Portal agreed.

Admiral Pound was given a copy of the American Naval building program. He stated to General Marshall that the United States Army should look into the matter of putting a force into North Africa if the British do, under either of the following conditions:

a. If invited by the French.

b. If Germany makes a move through the Iberian Peninsula.

In either case the attack should be a surprise.

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2 Not printed. According to a statement prepared by the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board (post, p. 339), the program included 112 major combat ships and 600 minor naval craft to be completed in 1942. For the production actually achieved in 1941 and 1942, see Civilian Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 541.
22. BRITISH ESTIMATE OF ATTACK ON WEST COAST OF NORTH AMERICA

In response to a request from Admiral Stark, Admiral Pound read to the Conference a note which had been prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff on the probable scale of attack on the West Coast of North America.

In view of the short time which the United States Chiefs of Staff had had to study the British Chiefs of Staff memorandum, further discussion on it was deferred. (See Annex 2)⁹

The meeting adjourned at 1:30 p.m., with instructions given that the Planning Committee would meet in the afternoon and that the Chiefs of Staff Conference would reconvene at 10:30 a.m., December 25th.¹⁰

⁹ The memorandum under reference is the memorandum of December 24, entitled “Probable Maximum Scale of Enemy Attack on West Coast of North America”, post, p. 265.
¹⁰ The Chiefs of Staff met at 4 p.m. on December 25, at which time a report was made on the work of the Planning Committee; see post, p. 91.

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MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, DECEMBER 24, 1941, 6 P.M., THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Secretary Knox

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Brigadier Hollis

Editorial Note

No American record of the discussion at this meeting has been found. For a memorandum by Hollis summarizing the discussion, see post, p. 267.

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THURSDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1941

MEETING OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 25, 1941, 4 P.M., FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

Present

UNITED STATES
General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Horne
Rear Admiral Towers
Rear Admiral Turner
Brigadier General Eisenhower

UNITED KINGDOM
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Air Chief Marshal Portal

Secretariat
Captain McCrea
Lieutenant Colonel Robinett
Major Sexton

Colonel Jacob
Defense Files

United States Minutes

SECRET
JCCSs-2

DECEMBER 25, 1941.

1. PROGRAM OF PLANNING

REAR ADMIRAL TURNER said that the Planning Committee had been working on two projects which were nearly completed:

a. Outline plan proposed for peaceful occupation of North Africa.¹

b. Program of priorities in the Atlantic.²

It was anticipated that they would be ready for presentation shortly.

2. DISPOSITION OF THE “MOUNT VERNON”

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had been given to understand that it was desired to alter the destination of the Mount Vernon.

ADMIRAL STARK stated that orders had been issued for the Mount Vernon to proceed to Singapore or any other place the British Admiralty desired, but stated that these instructions did not involve escort being furnished for the Mount Vernon by the United States. ADMIRAL POUND indicated that the British had no intention of asking the United States to furnish escort, and stated that he regarded such escort as being a responsibility of the Royal Navy.

3. DIVERSION OF REINFORCEMENTS

GENERAL MARSHALL discussed the possible diversion of reinforcements to the Philippines. He stated that up to the present moment, he had had no opportunity to consult with Admiral Stark on the matter, but he had been called on to submit a list of troop and equipment departures and anticipation of arrivals in Australia. He read this data, a copy of which was furnished to the British Chiefs of Staff, (See Annex 1).³ He also stated that General Brett had been ordered to proceed immediately to Australia and place himself under the direction of General MacArthur, and to forward his recommendations as to the situation in the Philippine Islands. He stated that the question of his (General Brett’s) continued subordination to General MacArthur would be determined later.

¹ ABC-4/2, post, p. 240.
² ABC-4/1, post, p. 246.
³ The paper under reference was a copy of the memorandum of December 25 from Marshall to Roosevelt, post, p. 269. Presumably the request for such data had come from the President. For an urgent appeal on December 23 from the Australian Government to Roosevelt and Churchill, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. v, pp. 390-391. The Prime Minister’s reply is printed in Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 668; for the President’s reply, see post, p. 302.
AIR CHIEF MARSHAL Portal mentioned that the Australian representatives in Washington had stated that unless ten million gallons of 100-octane gasoline could be forwarded to Australia immediately, the planes there would shortly be immobilized. GENERAL ARNOLD said that this is no problem so long as we can keep contact with Sumatra, as Sumatra furnishes this gasoline. AIR CHIEF MARSHAL Portal said that it was his understanding that the Sumatra gasoline was not satisfactory and that American-produced gasoline was involved.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the only difficulty involved in the Sumatra gasoline was the aromatics in it, which affected adversely the self-sealing tanks. This difficulty had been anticipated and extra tanks for replacements were being forwarded to Australia. The new tanks would not be so affected by aromatics.

With reference to the diversion of reinforcements intended for the Philippine Islands, GENERAL MARSHALL said, "We do not have enough information at this time from General MacArthur to make a decision on this matter. However, we must not stand idle while waiting to know what he proposes. Until we know what the local situation is, we cannot cut off reinforcements from him. We will know in 24 hours whether or not it is a fast withdrawal and where it goes, and whether or not pursuit planes can get to him."

AIR MARSHAL Portal asked if General MacArthur has any instructions relative to the disposal of airplanes if he can not operate in the Philippine Islands. GENERAL ARNOLD replied that the bombers are already operating from Australia. He further stated that it must be assumed that the man on the ground will do the right thing. He said that General MacArthur has a good air officer who can be counted on to dispose properly of the remaining pursuit planes.

AIR MARSHAL Portal asked if General MacArthur would send his pursuit [planes] to Singapore. He added further that it was difficult for any man on the spot to make a decision relative to the disposal of his own means; that the decision should be made here by the responsible group.

4. UNIFIED COMMAND

GENERAL MARSHALL then brought up the question of command. He said, "I express these as my personal views and not those as a result of consultation with the Navy or with my own War Plans Division. As a result of what I saw in France and from following our own experience, I feel very strongly that the most important consideration is the question of unity of command. The matters being settled here
are mere details which will continuously reoccur unless settled in a broader way. With differences between groups and between services, the situation is impossible unless we operate on a frank and direct basis. I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater—air, ground, and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation. Human frailties are such that there would be emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we make a plan for unified command now, it will solve nine-tenths of our troubles.

"There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not achieve this. We never think alike—there are the opinions of those on this side of the table and of the people on the other side; but as for myself, I am willing to go the limit to accomplish this. We must decide on a line of action here and not expect it to be done out there. I favor one man being in control, but operating under a controlled directive from here. We had to come to this in the first World War, but it was not until 1918 that it was accomplished and much valuable time, blood, and treasure had been needlessly sacrificed. If we could decide on a unified command now, it would be a great advance over what was accomplished during the World War."

Air Marshal Portal said that the experience in London has been that the highest authority is the only one that can decide as to the allocation of forces; and when the allocation is decided upon, the directive has been formulated, and the forces allotted, everything else moves smoothly. If allocations are controlled from Washington, there should be no difficulty.

General Marshall said that the British and Americans are in complete agreement as to allocations; what he was speaking of was operations in the field.

5. Disposition of Forces Destined for the Far East

Air Marshal Portal said that the disposition of our forces must be planned first. This can be considered a Staff study, without commitments, based on ultimate dispositions under the following two conditions:

a. The Philippine Islands holding.

b. In case the Philippine Islands can not hold.

\[4\] The reference is to the unified command under Marshal Foch on the Western Front in 1918. The Department of State had also mentioned the advantages of unified command in its proposals for a Supreme War Council; see ante, pp. 12, 17, and 40.
Admiral King said that he felt this study should probably have first priority.

Admiral Pound inquired as to whether or not a study could be made of this entire problem, stating that it was of such an urgent nature that other things should be set aside, and inquired as to the proper directive. The consensus was that this should be done, and the senior members of the Planning Committee were called in and so informed.

Admiral Stark requested Rear Admiral Turner to give his opinion as to the question of allocations of aircraft reinforcements now going to the Far East. Rear Admiral Turner replied that responsibility should be given to General MacArthur if he is in a position to accept it where the planes are to be delivered; otherwise to General Brett.

There followed a discussion as to the proper directive, and several preliminary directives were drafted by various members of the Chiefs of Staff group.

As the American officers were due at the White House for a meeting, the conference adjourned at 5:20 p.m.

After the main conference adjourned, Admiral Pound called into consultation Colonel Jacob, Commander Coleridge, and Colonel Robinett, and discussed the various phases of proposed directives. A directive for submission to the senior members of the Planning Committee was drawn up and submitted to Rear Admiral Turner, who at the time was presiding at another meeting in the Federal Reserve Building. It was understood that Rear Admiral Turner and Brigadier General Gerow were not to accept the directive unless it was entirely agreeable to them, and Brigadier General Gerow was so informed by Colonel Robinett.

The pertinent portions of the directive are reflected in the papers produced by the Joint Planning Committee: ABC-4/1 (post, p. 238); ABC-4/2 (post, p. 240); and ABC-4/3 (post, p. 280).

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WITH HIS MILITARY ADVISERS, DECEMBER 25, 1941, 5:30 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

Present
President Roosevelt
Secretary Stimson
Secretary Knox
Mr. Hopkins
General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
No official record of this discussion has been found. The Stimson diary for December 25 contains the following paragraphs relating to this meeting:

"Generals Arnold, Eisenhower, and Marshall came in to see me and brought me a rather astonishing memorandum which they had received from the White House concerning a meeting between Churchill and the President and recorded by one of Churchill's assistants. It reported the President as proposing to discuss the turning over to the British of our proposed reinforcements for MacArthur. This astonishing paper made me extremely angry and, as I went home for lunch and thought it over again, my anger grew until I finally called up Hopkins, told him of the paper and of my anger at it, and I said if that was persisted in, the President would have to take my resignation; that I thought it was very improper to discuss such matters while the fighting was going on and to do it with another nation. He was naturally surprised and shocked by what I said and very soon called me back telling me that he had recited what I had said to the President in the presence of Churchill and they had denied that any such propositions had been actually made. I then read to him extracts from the paper which I had brought with me from the War Department and he said that they certainly bore out my view.

"Shortly afterwards I received notice over the telephone that the President was calling a meeting for 5:30 of his military and naval advisers. At 5:30 I went to the White House and found there Marshall, Arnold, Knox, Admirals King and Stark, and Harry Hopkins. The President then went over with us the reports up to date of the various matters and we discussed various things which were happening and the ways and means of carrying out the campaign in the Far East. Incidentally and as if by aside, he flung out the remark that a paper had been going around which was nonsense and which entirely misrepresented a conference between him and Churchill. I made no reply of course as he had given up, if he had ever entertained, the idea of discussing the surrender of MacArthur's reinforcements.

"This incident shows the danger of talking too freely in international matters of such keen importance without the President carefully having his military and naval advisers present. This paper, which was a record made by one of Churchill's assistants, would have raised any amount of trouble for the President if it had gotten into the hands of an unfriendly press. I think he felt that he had pretty nearly burned his fingers and had called this subsequent meeting to make up for it. Hopkins told me at the time I talked with him over the telephone that he had told the President that he should be more careful about the formality of his discussions with Churchill."

1 Reference is to the memorandum by Hollis, post, p. 207.
I. THE FIRST WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1941

MEETING OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 26, 1941, 3 P. M., FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

United States

General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Sexton
Rear Admiral Horne
Rear Admiral Towers
Rear Admiral Turner
Major General Holcomb
Brigadier General Gerow

United Kingdom

Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral Little
Lieutenant General Wemyss
Air Marshal Harris

Secretariat

Captain McCrea
Lieutenant Colonel Robinett
Major Sexton

Brigadier Hollis
Colonel Jacob
Commander Coleridge

Defense Files

United States Minutes

December 26, 1941.

JCCSs-3

1. Priorities for U.S. and U.K. Overseas Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean—(ABC-4/1)¹

Admiral Stark read the proposed plan and there followed a general discussion.

Admiral Turner said that the Joint Planning Committee recognized the importance of the North African project (operation GYMNST), but were not at this stage prepared to make recommendations on the relative priority of this and the other projects mentioned in paragraph 1(b) of their Report. The limitations on shipping and naval escort forces made it impossible to carry out the North African plan, and simultaneously relieve the British forces in Ireland and Iceland. If the North African project were carried out as envisaged, each power would produce the requisite amount of shipping for its own forces, but would have none extra available to lend to the other power. In addition, shipping required for the British part of GYMNST would seriously interfere with British reinforcements to the Middle East.

¹This paper, a copy of which was attached as Annex 1 to these minutes, is printed, post, p. 238.
The British delegation considered two possible moments at which the North African project would have to be put into effect as rapidly as possible; either (a) when British forces, moving from the eastward, had occupied Tripoli, or (b) when Marshal Pétain resigned, as had been thought possible. The second occasion now seemed unlikely to occur, though the first remained; and it was felt that the Chiefs of Staff should obtain a decision from the President and the Prime Minister as to whether or not it had been decided to make a political approach to the French authorities in order to obtain an invitation to enter French North Africa. The British forces for Gymnast were ready but their removal from the United Kingdom would leave the defense of the British Isles weak unless the United States took over the Iceland and Ireland commitments. Nevertheless, the British view was that the North African project would have to go forward if an invitation were received.

It was generally agreed that, for the purposes of paragraph 3 of the Joint Planning Committee’s Report, the major operations in the Atlantic area, only one of which could be carried out at one time, could be stated to be:

Northwest Africa.
West Africa.
Northeast Brazil and the Cape Verde Islands.
Northern Ireland and Iceland.

The occupation of the Canaries (by invitation), the Azores, and of Aruba and Curaçao, fell into the category of minor operations. Further consideration would have to be given to the status of the Madagascar operation.

It appeared that the British Chiefs of Staff understood that this report (see Annex 1), was accepted. However, the understanding of the United States Chiefs of Staff was that it was accepted in principle but should be restudied and resubmitted for further consideration.

2. NORTHWEST AFRICA PROJECT

The British delegation was of the opinion that it would take German forces six weeks to prepare to invade Spain, and, without Spanish
cooperation, a further six weeks to become firmly established in the South of Spain. It was pointed out that this estimate was based on the best information available to the British, and took account of the fact that the Germans at the present time had no forces readily available to undertake the operation. It was realized that with Spanish help the date of arrival in South Spain could be considerably accelerated.

Admiral Turner explained that the Joint Planning Committee felt that only Casablanca should be used, in the first instance, as the minor ports were difficult to protect from submarine attack and effective anti-air protection could only be given to one port. He pointed out that the size of the North African expedition as envisaged by the Joint Planning Committee was greatly in excess of anything previously considered, and the implications on shipping were therefore enormous. Was this increase in size essential—particularly with regard to air? The British view was that the German Air Force was already stretched almost to its limit. It was decided that consideration of the size of the forces required should be deferred.

It was also pointed out that one reason why large forces had to be envisaged was that the French authorities would in all probability only issue the invitation if the bait were, in their opinion, adequate. It was suggested that the French air force in North Africa might, in the early stages, prove of some value in spite of its known lack of spares, but General Arnold said that from a recent conversation he had had with a French officer who had recently left North Africa, he understood that only 40 of the French aircraft were capable of taking the air.

The U.S.-British Chiefs of Staff gave general approval to the Report, Annex 2, subject to certain amendments, and subject to further consideration of the strength of the forces required for the expedition.

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a The report under reference is ABC-4/2, post, p. 240.

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND LORD BEAVERBROOK, DECEMBER 26, 1941, 3:30 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

United States
President Roosevelt
Vice President Wallace
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Knudsen
Mr. Batt

United Kingdom
Lord Beaverbrook
No American record of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the President’s appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers), from an undated memorandum in the Hopkins Papers, listing certain functions attended by Hopkins during the First Washington Conference, and from the other sources mentioned below. The appointment calendar indicates that other persons (“et al.”) were also present. Since the meeting was referred to as a gathering of the “Supply Group”, the other persons present were probably among those listed as present at the similar meeting on December 29 (*post*, p. 135).

From a reference in Beaverbrook’s letter of December 27 to Roosevelt (*post*, p. 328), it appears that the discussion covered the production of certain items of military equipment and that Beaverbrook argued for far higher production goals for tanks, anti-tank guns, aircraft, and anti-aircraft guns. See also Roosevelt’s reference on December 27 (*post*, p. 110) to a meeting with Beaverbrook on aircraft production, and Beaverbrook’s reference on December 29 (*post*, p. 335) to “Mr. Knudsen’s suggestion” at a meeting in the Cabinet Room on December 26.

In response to an inquiry from the editors about this meeting, Mr. Batt replied by letter as follows:

“I remember the first formal meeting ... It was in the Cabinet Room and although we had some inkling of what Beaverbrook was going to ask for in the way of major items such as planes, tanks, ordnance, and ships, this was the opportunity which the President provided for him to assemble this list of requirements.

“We took some hours, as I remember, listening to his what seemed shocking requirements; obviously nothing could be done there and the President suggested that Wallace ... provide an office and work with those of us who had to decide what the answer to Beaverbrook should be.

“As to how much time we could have, the President suggested that he would address the Congress on a certain day not too far away—perhaps a week—and he would like us, that is Nelson particularly and those of us who were associated with him, to have our position firmly developed and ready for inclusion in his Message to Congress. If there were any minutes of that meeting, I don’t think I ever saw any and since we were never as meticulous in the observance of such formalities as the British, I doubt very much if there were any minutes. We all made our own notes and went to work on whatever part of the job seemed logical for us.” (Batt to Historical Office, May 15, 1963, PR 10)
MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER
CHURCHILL WITH THEIR MILITARY ADVISERS, DECEMBER 26, 1941,
4:30 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Secretary Stimson
Secretary Knox
Mr. Hopkins
General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Sexton
Rear Admiral Turner
Brigadier General Gerow
Major Sexton

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Beaverbrook
Admiral Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Air Chief Marshal Portal

Defense Files

Minutes by Major Sexton

SECRET

Subject: Tonnage.

At the President’s suggestion, Field Marshal Dill briefly reviewed
the proposition of sending troops to North Africa, stating that the
matter was in the hypothetical stage and depended on an invitation;
that studies were being made of the forces required; and that the
biggest problem is the matter of tonnage.

The President asked, if the above operation is undertaken, con-
sidering the shortage of tonnage, would the present convoys going to
Great Britain be impaired.

General Marshall replied that it was his understanding that they
would not; that both the British and Americans were in substantial
agreement on the general plan; that details were being worked out
by a Joint Planning Committee; but that the tonnage situation was
such that we could not proceed with the North African Expedition
and at the same time effect the relief of British units in Iceland and
Ireland. One question was how large a force was necessary to appeal
to the French in such a way that the occupation would be expedited;
and that was a political matter for the President and the Prime Min-
ister to decide. At any rate, the shipping should be collected and
made ready for contingent use.

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1 Stimson, in his diary for December 26, characterized the meeting as follows:
"This was a sort of interim conference to see how the Chiefs of Staff had been
going on in their conferences and everything seems to be going pretty well." In
addition to the minutes and notes on this meeting presented herein, brief
notes made by Arnold may be found in the Arnold Papers in the Library of
Congress.

2 See ABC–4/2, post, p. 240.
The President stated that the time for the movement was not ripe at present, but that it might become so at any moment, or it might possibly be three months away. That consideration should be given to the collecting of transports for the movement of troops to Northern Ireland, and then, if necessary, this tonnage could be diverted for the North African movement. General Marshall stated that that would be feasible.

Mr. Churchill stated that he placed tremendous importance on the Ireland and Iceland reliefs, the French African Expedition, and also the situation in the Far East. He approved all of them, but the question was, how could they be fitted in. The relief of Northern Ireland could be fitted in at any time. He recalled that in the World War two million men were shipped to France in a comparatively short time—and he asked what has become of the ships used. He stated that he was reluctant to take No for an answer because of shipping, and asked why there was a bottleneck in shipping; he suggested that if we try harder, the shipping can be obtained; he said that he would be frightfully unhappy if he had to adjust between expeditions; that he thought there was no possibility of an invasion of Great Britain before April.

The President pointed out that with regard to additional shipping, we also become involved with State Department matters; for instance, we now have three large ships plying back and forth between North and South America. These ships are the only access from South America to the United States, and their use for troop transportation has not been contemplated because of the "Good Will" feature. However, if it came to the point, we could probably utilize those ships plus three other Grace Line boats.

Admiral Turner pointed out that large ships could not go into certain Irish ports or Casablanca. Mr. Churchill stated that as far as Ireland is concerned, they could go into Clyde, and the troops could then be moved across.

The President then stated that if it would mean delaying the movement of troops to Ireland, Admiral Turner should take up with the State Department the matter of turning over the South American ships. Mr. Churchill stated that during the World War two million troops were moved in five months, and this present plan called only for the movement of a quarter of a million men in three months, and he did not feel that it was too great a problem to be solved.

The Secretary of War stated that he understood the movement of troops to Ireland was merely a passage, and that they would not require complete combat equipment, etc.

Lord Beaverbrook stated that the British are turning out ten ships of the cargo class each month, and that five armed merchant ships
are now being converted to cruisers; that this might be stopped. There was also the possibility, he said, of utilizing some of the large ships, such as the Queen Mary or even the Queen Elizabeth.

Mr. Churchill stated that one solution might be to use a large battleship to carry troops. Ten thousand men could be transported in a vessel moving at a speed of 25 knots. The only danger was that there would be a large number of eggs in one basket, and it would be difficult to provide adequate protection for the battleship during part of its trip.

The President stated that he thought we might be able to dig up more ships some way, and directed that Admiral Land and Captain Vickery of the Maritime Commission be consulted.

Mr. Churchill stated that if the North African Expedition were undertaken, it would have to be carried through; the Ireland Expedition could be interrupted at any time without difficulty.

The President stated that the matter should be explored of sending small groups of men, possibly 50 to a boat, on the convoys which are continuously going back and forth between the United States and Britain, carrying food and raw materials. He stated that on a 40-ship convoy, 2,000 men could be carried; that with two convoys a week, 4,000 men could be moved each week.

Mr. Churchill asked General Marshall if he had looked into the matter of artillery, and General Marshall said it was intended to send several key men who would be introduced to the British materiel. These cadres would be followed by personnel who would take over the materiel in place.

Mr. Churchill asked if the matter of rationing had been looked into. General Marshall stated that this matter was under study but as yet he had had no report. He stated that it is feasible to standardize in some things, but not in all, since the Americans were strongly antagonistic to “plum and apple” and not enthusiastic over British tea. Our World War experience in these respects was both amusing and disturbing.

Mr. Churchill stated that he was very anxious to get the American troops into North Ireland.

Subject: The Far East.

The President asked General Marshall if everything was being done to get troops and planes to the Far East. General Marshall replied that everything possible is being done; there has been some delay in the movement of the Kitty Hawk, but that planes and personnel are available to be moved as fast as ships can take them.

The President then asked if the matter of unity of command had been solved. He stated that this would seem to be most desirable, since there are four forces involved in the Far East.
GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he had brought up the matter yesterday, but that it had not been discussed today.

THE PRESIDENT stated that this matter should be considered; that he did not think we were getting the most out of the forces in the Far East.

MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that in some cases the troops are separated by a thousand miles, and that it is necessary for the person on the spot to play his own hand; that the matter of disposition of forces should be taken care of in Washington—that this is the place for the clearing and disposing house; that a commanding officer could not be a true commander if part of his command were a thousand miles away.3

THE PRESIDENT observed that the reports we are getting from the Far East are very sketchy. He stated that his idea was for the commander to have his headquarters in a plane and go from place to place.

MR. CHURCHILL stated that he would like to take this matter up with the President, and said that the British were very happy at the United States attitude that the Number 1 enemy is Germany.

THE PRESIDENT then asked if the Dutch had a good man in command of their forces. MARSHAL DILL stated that there had been a change recently, but that he understood the new man was good.

MR. CHURCHILL observed that unity of command is all right where there is a continuous line of battle, such as existed in France in the World War, but that the situation in the Far East is not the same; he felt that command could be best exercised from Washington.

THE PRESIDENT stated that we are not getting good information from the Far East, and asked if the Naval Commanders were working together. ADMIRAL KING stated that each was working in a certain sphere of action arranged previously by agreement, the Dutch and British generally in the Singapore area and the United States forces farther to the East.

MR. CHURCHILL stated that he thought Admiral Phillips had worked out an agreement prior to his death.4

ADMIRAL POUND observed that Admiral Leighton [Layton?] had stated that since the outbreak of war, cooperation between Naval forces had weakened and that he thought it could be improved.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY observed that, in his opinion, Mr. Churchill’s argument that a scattered condition of command is an argument against unity of command, is wrong; that, in fact, this scattered condition is an argument for it.

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3 For a note passed by Beaverbrook to Hopkins at this point in the discussion, see post, p. 273.
4 For the arrangements worked out by Vice Admiral Phillips, Admiral Hart, and General MacArthur just prior to the outbreak of war in the Pacific, see Matloff and Shell, pp. 70-72.
THE PRESIDENT pointed out that in case the Japanese should invade Borneo, for instance, Dutch and United States elements working together might be able to attain success, where individually it would be impossible.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY observed that he believed there should be one commander there, working under a directive from Washington. THE PRESIDENT then stated that the matter was one well worth study, and he directed that a study of it be made. 5

At 5:30 p.m. the conference adjourned, with the President stating that he would like to have it meet again tomorrow at the same time. 6

W.T.S.

6 See the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, December 27, 1941, post, p. 273.

5 The Chiefs of Staff met at 3 p.m. on December 27, but it does not appear that they met with the President and the Prime Minister that afternoon.

Defense Files

Notes by Brigadier General Gerow 1

SECRET

British and American representatives were present. The results of the recent meetings of the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff were stated to the President and Mr. Churchill by Generals Marshall and Dill.

In substance, Chiefs of Staff had agreed on allotment of areas of operation to British and to the U.S. There was considerable discussion of the relative importance of immediate action with regard to Iceland, North Ireland and North Africa.

The President stated that the time was not yet ripe for the North Africa venture. He suggested that we go ahead and collect all available vessels, proceed with the Iceland or the north Ireland movement and interrupt it, if necessary, in order to carry out the North African operation. Mr. Churchill stated that he was very desirous of getting our troops into north Ireland at the earliest possible date. He would also like to see the relief of Iceland completed. He appreciated the fact that all these operations would have to be coordinated.

He discussed at length with regard to shipping. He stated he could not understand why, when the U.S. was able to move 2,000,000 men to Europe in World War I, that we couldn't move approximately the same number now. He stated that we should count on using the shipping that is now enroute with British troops to the Middle East

1 The notes by Gerow give the starting time of the meeting as 3:30 p.m. but the President's appointment calendar agrees with the Sexton minutes in indicating 4:30. For citations to pertinent documents, see the minutes by Major Sexton, supra.
and Far East. An invasion of England was not expected before the middle of April.

The President discussed the political aspects of our shipping to South America. He would like to keep it going if possible. However, he stated that these ships could be diverted for troop movements in an emergency. The President seemed to be willing to give us carte-blanche to collect the necessary shipping for any of the three operations.

Admiral Pound said that he had just received a report from London stating what reinforcements were required for the Far East. He stated that a decision must be made as between the North African venture and sending reinforcements to the Far East.

Lord Beaverbrook discussed at length the shipping situation, with particular reference to the diversion of merchant cruisers to troop carriers or vice versa.

The President asked the possibilities of transporting a small number of troops (about 50) on freighters now moving between U.S. and the United Kingdom. He desired that this possibility be explored.

Mr. Churchill asked if any decisions had been made as to whether or not the U.S. troops that go to north Ireland would use British armament and food. General Marshall explained some of the difficulties involved but thought they all could be solved, with perhaps the single exception of food.

Mr. Churchill was particularly anxious that we send a detachment into north Ireland as soon as possible.

The President wanted to know if the Far East was being taken care of. General Marshall told him it was, to the limit of our resources and shipping.

The President was asked if “unity of command” in the Far East Theater had been settled. “Unity of command” was discussed at length by the President, Mr. Churchill, Admiral King and Secretary Knox. Mr. Churchill was opposed to “unity of command”. He said the situation in the Far East was not similar to the one on the Western Front during World War I. The Far East operating areas were widely separated and difficult of access. It would be very difficult for one single commander to control the whole theater. In his opinion, the control of the theater should be vested in Washington. Mr. Churchill and the President are to discuss this question.

The President seemed to be much concerned over the limited amount of information he was receiving with regard to all powers in the Far East.

Mr. Knox strongly supported “unity of command”. So did the President. Admiral King was lukewarm.

The President directed that the Chiefs of Staff go ahead and study the whole question.
There will be another meeting tomorrow (Dec. 27, 1941) at 4:30 p. m. The Secretary of War and Chief of Staff are to see the President at 10 a. m.

L. T. G.

MEETING OF SECRETARY HULL AND PRIME MINISTER MACKENZIE KING, DECEMBER 26, 1941, AFTERNOON, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Secretary Hull

CANADA
Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Editorial Note

No United States record of the conversation has been found. The information set forth above with respect to the meeting and the participants is derived from Pickersgill, pp. 320–321, which reproduces excerpts from Mackenzie King’s diary notes on the conversation. From Mackenzie King’s notes it appears that the principal subject of conversation was the problem of St. Pierre and Miquelon. According to this source, Hull indicated that the South American republics would feel that the United States Government was not sincere in preventing the forcible transfer of territories in the Western Hemisphere if the Free French were allowed to retain St. Pierre and Miquelon. Hull proposed that a commission of experts be appointed to supervise the operation of the radio station on St. Pierre and that Churchill might induce the Free French to withdraw and thus restore the status quo ante. Mackenzie King noted in his diary:

“I told him it would not do to have the Governor restored, as he was pro-Axis, and his wife a German. I also mentioned that while we had nothing to do with the matter, Canadian feeling was relieved and pleased with the de Gaulle accomplishment. There was a feeling against me for keeping the French Minister in Ottawa, as leaning too much towards Vichy. We would have to be careful to see that whatever was done would not appear that we were sacrificing the Free French. I said to Mr. Hull I would try to get Mr. Churchill to view the matter in this way. Mr. Hull and I then went over to the White House, where we joined the President and Mr. Churchill in the Oval Room at tea. . .”

For background on the seizure by Free French forces of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, see the memorandum of December 26 (post, p. 383) and Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. II, p. 540.
MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, AND PRIME MINISTER MACKENZIE KING, DECEMBER 26, 1941, LATE AFTERNOON, THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

United States
President Roosevelt
Secretary Hull

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Churchill

Canada
Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Editorial Note

No United States record of this meeting has been found. The information set forth above regarding the meeting is derived from Mackenzie King’s diary as reproduced in Pickersgill, pp. 321–322. The principal subject of discussion was the question of St. Pierre and Miquelon, concerning which Mackenzie King wrote as follows:

“. . . Both the President and Churchill went over the ground and the situation in Africa and the need to get this incident closed up so as to avoid its developing into a serious question. The President suggested that Canada might appoint a Commission of some kind to look after the supervision of wireless transmission; a representative from Vichy, one from the Free French, and one from Canada; that the Governor might be restored, and the Free French forces withdrawn. Churchill said there must be some compromise settlement and inclined to agree with the President. Churchill admitted that, at one stage, he agreed to de Gaulle taking action but had later taken an opposite stand, as the United States did not wish it. He said he was prepared to take de Gaulle by the back of the neck and tell him he had gone too far and bring him to his senses. He had on more than one occasion behaved in a troublesome way.

“I said to the President it would not do to have the Governor brought back, as he was pro-Axis, and his wife a German. Also, that I thought Mr. Hull had a better idea, which was to let de Gaulle feel that, while he had been precipitate, he had cleared up a certain situation thereby making it possible to have the whole supervision of radio messages properly arranged for. . . . Mr. Hull said he thought he and I were 98 per cent agreed on what should be done. Mr. Roosevelt said he thought it would be best for Mr. Hull and me to work out a suggested arrangement and then it could be considered tomorrow.”

DINNER MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, DECEMBER 26, 1941, EVENING, THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

United States
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Churchill
Editorial Note

No American record of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the list of luncheons and dinners attended by Hopkins during the first Washington Conference (Hopkins Papers).

From Roosevelt's reference to the conversation (post, p. 109) it appears that the principal subject was unity of military command. Churchill seems to have favored the organization of a central group at Washington to direct military forces in the Far East, while Roosevelt was more inclined toward the appointment of a commander in the area, mentioning Wavell as a possibility.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1941
MEETING OF PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL AND GENERAL MARSHALL, DECEMBER 27, 1941, FORENOON, THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

UNITED STATES
General Marshall

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No American record of this conversation has been found. According to Sherwood (p. 457), Hopkins arranged for Marshall to speak to Churchill privately about unity of command, as a result of Beaverbrook's note (post, p. 273) passed to Hopkins during the discussion on the afternoon of December 26 (ante, p. 103). The exact time of the Marshall-Churchill conversation is not indicated, but it apparently took place early in the morning and certainly before the meeting of the United States Chiefs of Staff at 11:30 a.m., since at that time Marshall mentioned the meeting. His remarks on that occasion were reported in the minutes (Defense Files) as follows:

"General Marshall stated that he had talked to Mr. Churchill on this matter. Mr. Churchill's reactions were that he saw the necessity for unified command between the ground and the air but was not convinced about the Navy, that his major consideration appeared to be the defense of Singapore and that he had a great fear of wasting power on the Philippine Islands or Borneo."

The conversation is also mentioned in The Stilwell Papers (pp. 18-19) and in Churchill's telegram to Attlee, the Lord Privy Seal, (Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 674). It should be noted that this telegram, although dated December 28, was undoubtedly dictated late in the afternoon of December 27.
The first subject brought up was the question of unity of command in the Far East.

The Secretary of War outlined to the President the necessity for unity of command, calling attention to the fact that if we were to beat the Japanese who have one man commanding all elements of the Japanese military power, we must build up a base sufficiently far back to be unmolested, and we can't do this if our elements are taken piece by piece and utilized at Singapore or Burma Road or at some other place.

The President agreed in principle 100% and cited incidents himself to indicate unity of command is essential.

He then told about his talk last night with Prime Minister Churchill where Churchill proposed that we have a Central Governing Body in Washington, who would direct the activities of the military forces in the Far East.²

General Marshall, the Secretary of War and General Arnold all stated that this would not work. Time passes too rapidly. It was called to the President's attention that in order to get the maximum value of his air power in the Far East, the man in the area had to make decisions to use it where it would do the most good. Targets are mostly surprise airplane raids and the Air Forces have to be concentrated for that particular time. Twenty-four hours would be too late.

It was also called to the President's attention that as it stands now the Japanese are using all their mobile forces within the interior, where they have Malaya on one side and the Philippines on the other, so that they can throw their maximum air power on one side or the other. Therefore, we must meet them at one place or the other if we are to prevent them from making a successful raid.

The President agreed with that and said that he thought he could get the British Navy to go with us.

The President also stated that Churchill was a little bit surprised when he suggested to him that the man in command might be Wavell.

² See the editorial note, ante, p. 108.
The President stated that in his opinion it should be an American because he believed that an American would be accepted more readily by the Australians and the Dutch than any Britisher. He suggested MacArthur. I assured the President that it would be possible to get MacArthur out of the Philippines if he desires to do it. The President then asked "who was second in command." At this moment, however, all agreed that in all probability we should start out with Wavell with the understanding that he would be replaced later on.

General Marshall told the President that Churchill was dead set against any unity of command[,] based primarily on the old theory that the Navy is Queen of the Sea and the first arm of British national defense.

General Marshall stated that without complete unity of command out there in the Far East it would be worse than none at all; that we still have too many bosses and would never be able to apply the maximum of power where it was most needed. The President agreed with this.

That subject was finally dismissed with unanimity of opinion that if we are to be successful, unity of command must be secured. General Marshall wrote a proposed directive to the man who would be put in command, which was agreed to in principle by all present.

General Marshall and General Arnold started to leave. The President called General Arnold back to tell him about a meeting with Lord Beaverbrook covering aircraft production. Beaverbrook told him that with a nation of 40,000,000 people, where all raw materials have to be imported, the production of aircraft is greater than that of the United States where the major part of raw materials are available and the population is three times as great. The President asked General Arnold what he thought about it. General Arnold assured the President that we could increase production of aircraft in the United States as soon as we had the will to do, and until we did have the will to do we could never reach British production. General Arnold cited, for example, the Boeing factories which were set up for 37 B-17's, actually produced 50, and expected to reach 75 in January. The President seemed to be greatly pleased about that.

One of the thoughts brought out which was accepted by all was that we must build up as soon as possible a base in the Far East from which we can gradually work northward, step by step, meeting the Japanese on better than even terms at each step, until ultimately sooner or later we drive the Japanese back from all of their present conquests. I

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2 Stimson noted in his diary for December 27 that the President asked him to tell Knox about the plan for unity of command, that he did so, and that Knox was fully in accord.

3 The draft instruction, as slightly revised, is ABC-4 C/S USA, post, p. 273.

4 The meeting under reference may have been the one held in the White House at 3:30 p.m. on December 26 (ante, p. 98).
assured the President that with all the airplanes we were sending in there if they were allowed to concentrate in Australia first and then go to the Dutch East Indies we could meet them on equal terms. The President said “in equal numbers?” And I said “no, not in equal numbers, but we will have power over them.” The President then asked “when will you be able to do this?” And General Arnold replied “the movement should be completed with all planes there sometime in February, and by the first of March we should have everything ready to move.”

We finally withdrew with the understanding that we return at 4:30 this afternoon.5

5 No record of such a meeting at 4:30 p.m. has been found.

MEETING OF SECRETARY HULL AND PRIME MINISTER MACKENZIE KING, DECEMBER 27, 1941, FORENOON, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Participants

UNITED STATES
Secretary Hull

CANADA
Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Editorial Note

No United States record of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above regarding the meeting is derived from Pickersgill, pp. 322–323, which reproduces excerpts from Mackenzie King’s diary notes on the discussion. Mackenzie King’s account indicates that Hull felt that Roosevelt and Churchill had not understood his attitude on St. Pierre–Miquelon as expressed in the discussion the previous afternoon. Hull asked Mackenzie King what he thought should be done about the problem. Mackenzie King’s diary recorded the remainder of this discussion as follows:

“I said I thought something on the lines of what had been understood between the President, Mr. Churchill, and ourselves. He then said he thought he had better send for the French Minister, Henry-Haye, and propose to him an arrangement to have the wireless supervised by Canada and by perhaps someone associated with their [U.S.] Consul. He spoke about a Commission. I said to him I did not think ‘Commission’ was the right term; all that was needed were technical experts who would be protected in their duties. He said they had a Consul at St. Pierre; that they might attach an expert to the Consul. I said I thought it would be all to the good to have Americans and Canadians do the supervision of the wireless. He then said that perhaps later they could get another Governor. He was rather for reinstating the present Governor. I said to him at once I thought that would be impossible.
“At that point, the press were waiting for a talk with him. He asked me if I would like to go with him. I said: ‘No,’ I would wait. When he came back, I said I had been thinking over the Governor part and felt the last state would be worse than the first, if he were allowed to remain. That he, Mr. Hull, must recall that 90 per cent of the vote had been for Free France, and that the Governor had said some word of defiance to the people when he went aboard Muselier’s ship; that if he returned as Governor, there would probably be civil strife between him and the people. . . He asked me if I thought Mr. Churchill would back him up in having de Gaulle withdraw. I said that I was sure he would. He had made that quite clear yesterday, but that it would have to be accompanied by some action such as the removal of the Governor allowing the people to control affairs themselves. I was almost an hour with Mr. Hull.”

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LUNCHEON MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, AND AMBASSADOR LITVINOV, DECEMBER 27, 1941, 1 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

SOVIET UNION

Mr. Litvinov

Editorial Note

No official record of the conversation at this meeting has been found. It appears that the principal subject of discussion was the proposed joint declaration of Allied unity. Roosevelt apparently emphasized the desirability of inserting in this document a reference to religious freedom, as suggested in the memorandum prepared by Hopkins earlier on the same day, (post, p. 368). According to Sherwood (p. 449) Litvinov thought that the Soviet Government would object to this although it might accept the phrase “freedom of conscience”. In the memorandum which Roosevelt sent to Hull on the afternoon of the same day the President indicated that he thought Litvinov could be induced to accept “religious freedom”; see post, p. 369.

At the Cabinet meeting on January 2, 1942, Roosevelt emphasized the importance of the preamble in the joint declaration. The note on this discussion in Stimson’s diary concludes as follows:

“He [Roosevelt] told of his successful struggle to get the consent of Russia to the insertion of the words about religious freedom. The words at first stood ‘freedom of religion’. Litvinov objected to that but when Roosevelt turned it around to ‘religious freedom’ he consented.”
MEETING OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 27, 1941, 3 P. M., FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Sexton
Rear Admiral Horne
Rear Admiral Towers
Rear Admiral Turner
Major General Holcomb
Brigadier General Gerow

UNITED KINGDOM

Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral Little
Lieutenant General Wemyss
Air Marshal Harris
Brigadier Dykes
Air Commodore Dickson
Captain Lambe

SECRETARIAT

Captain McCrea
Lieutenant Colonel Robinett
Major Sexton
Brigadier Hollis
Colonel Jacob
Commander Coleridge

Defense Files

United States Minutes

SECRET

JCCSs–4

1. ABC 4/1—Priorities for United States—United Kingdom Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean

Admiral Stark presented a revised draft of ABC 4/1 to the Conference.

Admiral Pound said that he understood the Report of the Joint Planning Committee had already been approved, and that he could not understand why a new draft was being submitted.

Rear Admiral Turner explained the changes. He said that copies of the changes had been furnished the British Section, but that apparently they had not been able to see them before the meeting.

Admiral Stark said that there were few changes. The greater part of the paper had been previously agreed to.

After some further discussion, it was agreed that the paper should be referred to the Joint Planning Committee for reconsideration by both sections and then resubmitted to the Chiefs of Staff at the next meeting.

2. ABC 4/2—Plan for Expedition to Northwest Africa

Admiral Stark brought up ABC 4/2, copies of which were distributed.

1 The revised draft of ABC–4/1, as resubmitted on December 29, is printed post, p. 246.
2 Post, p. 240.
Air Marshal Portal said that, with reference to the airplane allocations under this operation, he was horrified at the large number of planes contemplated; he thought it would be a mistake to send such a large number of planes to a theater of operations where they might not be utilized. He pointed out that in allocating planes, the large strategy must be the primary consideration, rather than local requirements; that in the matter of Greece it was realized that there was an insufficient number of troops and planes, yet those available were allocated despite the expectation that this force would be knocked down. Although this happened, the strategic importance of this operation was great because it delayed the attack on Russia for two months. He urged that in making allocations, the figures be viewed in the spirit of economy, that is, the minimum number that it would be safe to have.

General Arnold said that he had also objected to the large number of planes allocated, and thought the paper should be again referred to the Joint Planning Committee for further consideration.

General Marshall agreed that the paper should be referred back to the Planning Committee. He pointed out, however, that this operation might result in the first contact between American and German troops. Success should not be jeopardized by failure to provide adequate means. A failure in this first venture would have an extremely adverse effect on the morale of the American people. In summing up, he said that this first operation, although in some respects a minor one, could not be treated in a routine manner.

It was agreed that the paper would be referred back to the Joint Planning Committee for reconsideration, in the light of the discussion which had taken place, and revised draft submitted to the Chiefs of Staff at the next meeting.

3. American-British Strategy

Admiral Stark brought up WW/1, Joint American-British Strategy, which had been discussed previously.

Rear Admiral Turner said that the original British memorandum had not been fully agreed to.

Admiral Pound said that the papers had been agreed to as the basis for our joint strategy, subject to some amendments which had been agreed to and to the inclusion of a revised paragraph on air routes as proposed by General Arnold.

Admiral Stark agreed with Admiral Pound.

It was agreed that the paper would be referred back to the Joint Planning Committee and a revised draft incorporating the agreed

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*On the postponement of the German attack on Russia, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. XII, document No. 217, p. 372.

amendments and the revised paragraph on routes should be submitted to the Chiefs of Staff at the next meeting.

4. **Program of Work of the Joint Planning Committee**

**Rear Admiral Turner** listed the various papers now in the hands of the Joint Planning Committee as follows:

a. WW/1—Grand Strategy.
b. ABC-4/2—Expedition to Northwest Africa.
c. Diversion of Reinforcements in the Far East.\(^5\)

It was suggested that a definite statement of priorities should be presented to the Chiefs of Staff at the next meeting. In the meantime, the Joint Planning Committee was to concentrate on the directive concerning the disposal of reinforcements en route to the Far East.

5. **Unity of Command**

**Admiral Stark** asked Admiral Pound if he cared to discuss the matter of unity of command for the Far East as proposed by General Marshall.

**Admiral Pound** stated that he would like to get it clear in his mind what the United States means by unity of command, particularly how Naval matters would be dealt with.

**General Marshall** said that it would be impossible to choose anyone for supreme command who would have full technical knowledge of all services. He felt, however, that the matter of appointing a supreme commander would be bound up in the assumption that a man of good judgment would be selected; otherwise the whole project would be a failure. He felt that a man with good judgment and unity of command has a distinct advantage over a man with brilliant judgment who must rely on cooperation.

The whole matter, he said, rests on the consideration as to whether a directive could be drawn which would leave the Supreme Commander with enough power to improve the situation and still not give him power to destroy national interests or to exploit one theater without due consideration to another.

He then read a suggested form of letter, (see Annex 1,\(^6\)) copies of which were distributed, of instructions to the Supreme Commander, which he stated was purely a form and a basis for further discussion concerning the Far Eastern area. Similar directives might be possible for other areas.

In urging the adoption of unity of command in the Far East, **General Marshall** said that the Associated Powers are opposed in that area by an enemy who has unity of command in its highest sense; that

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\(^5\) This paper is printed post, p. 280, as the report of the Joint Planning Committee, dated December 28.

\(^6\) ABC-4 C/S USA, post, p. 273.
in light of the present conditions out there, any action whatsoever along this line would be an improvement. The situation in this respect could not be made worse than it exists at present.

Admiral Pound asked, on the assumption that four countries were involved, and a Supreme Commander were chosen for instance, from Power X, who would be on his Staff?

General Marshall replied that, personally, he envisaged a small staff, one representative from each Government possibly, who would act as a sort of liaison officer with local forces. The commander would possess two mobile elements—one, sea-going vessels and the other, bombardment aviation. He said that at the present time the situation in the Far East is tragic; that General Brereton, who was the air officer in the Philippines, had left the Philippines with heavy bombers and had been able to establish some contact with local commanders in Borneo and had ended up in Surabaya, Java. The information from General Brereton has been the most heartening from the Far East in the past few days.

General Dill observed, with regard to General Marshall’s draft, that the restrictions on the commander were too great; that the proposition formed a good basis to work on, but the restrictions would make it very difficult for the Commander-in-Chief to exercise command.

General Marshall agreed that the restrictions were great, but stated that if the Supreme Commander ended up with no more authority that to tell Washington what he wanted, such a situation was better than nothing, and an improvement over the present situation.

Air Chief Marshal Portal commended the paper for its realism; he observed that it separated a commander’s resources in air defense and air offense, which indicated some of the problems of such a proposition. He stated that the primary consideration should be what is sound from a military point of view; that what might be gained by the military aspect of unified command might be lost by the necessity of political considerations. He asked if it would not be possible to give the commander a free hand, and to have all the political questions resolved, say, in Washington, or, as an alternative suggestion, by a representative in the area, rather along the lines adopted by the British in the Middle East.

General Marshall said that political questions could be settled in Washington. He agreed that his paper had been drawn on realistic lines. He thought Air Marshal Portal was talking more in terms of idealism; that what he desired to do was to start something.

Admiral Stark pointed out that under the provisions of the draft directive, troops of one nation could not be moved out of its own possessions without approval of the home government. He felt that the restrictions were heavy, but realistic; and that it was better to have
restrictions first and then remove them, than to fail in establishing the principle.

Air Marshal Portal pointed out that if the Supreme Commander desired to move the air forces of one of the elements of the command, he should know the capabilities of these forces, and that could only be accomplished by having a suitable liaison element.

Admiral King thought that it would be impossible to get the idea of a single Commander-in-Chief accepted by the governments concerned unless the limitations were imposed. He suggested that the Chiefs of Staff Conference prepare an outline plan for presentation to the Prime Minister and the President.

Admiral Pound stated that he realized the urgency of coming to a decision in the matter, whatever it might be; and asked, on the assumption that unified command was recommended, how would the many details be worked out? He pointed out that there are a large number of details involved. He thought that it would be difficult to keep the staff of the Commander-in-Chief small for he would have to have representatives of the services of each nation to advise him. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed as to the urgency of getting to a conclusion on the question immediately.

During the discussion it was suggested that the broad outline be prepared and the details worked out later.

6. Utilization of the U.S. Transports Now Being Used in the Indian Ocean

Admiral Pound said that it might prove advantageous to the general scheme for reinforcing the Far East if these transports, when they had delivered the 18th British Division at its destination, could be used for carrying additional reinforcements from the Middle East to the Far East. He asked whether such a proposal would be approved by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral Stark said that these ships would be available for use as seemed best in the joint cause.

Admiral Pound said that he did not ask for an immediate decision in the matter, but thought it best to draw attention to the possibility that such a request might be made.

The Conference adjourned at 4:30 p. m.

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MEETINGS OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL WITH THE CHIEFS OF VARIOUS DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, DECEMBER 27, 1941, AFTERNOON, THE WHITE HOUSE

Editorial Note

At Roosevelt's request the Chiefs of Mission of various Allied and friendly countries called at the White House on the afternoon of De-
November 27. According to the President's appointment calendar in the Roosevelt Papers, the Chiefs of Mission came in different groups and were received in the Red Room. The first group, which came at noon, included representatives of the Latin American Republics; the Chinese Ambassador, Hu Shih, and the newly-appointed Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, T. V. Soong, came at 12:30 p.m.; Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Halifax, and representatives of the other British Dominions came at 2 p.m.; and the Chiefs of Mission of other governments at war with the Axis Powers came at 3:30 p.m. No United States record of the discussions at these meetings has been found, but a memorandum by Dr. Don Francisco Castillo Nájera, Ambassador of Mexico, which was described as the only written record of the first session, was made available in its Spanish original text to the Department of State and was circulated in that form early in 1942 to United States diplomatic officers in the other American Republics. An English translation (infra) has been made for the present volume. At one or more of the sessions Roosevelt apparently announced that a draft declaration of Allied unity was nearing completion and that all countries at war with the Axis powers would soon have an opportunity to subscribe to it. In a telegram to Attlee, Churchill stated: "Today for five hours President and I received representatives of all other Allied or friendly Powers and British Dominions, and made heartening statements to them" (Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 674). See also the reference to the meeting by the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) in Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. I, p. 20.

740.0011 European War, 1939/19539

Memorandum by the Mexican Ambassador (Castillo Nájera)

[WASHINGTON. December 27, 1941.]

[Translation]

President Roosevelt, Vice President Wallace, and Prime Minister Churchill Receive the Latin American Chiefs of Mission, December 27, 1941

Between nine and ten o'clock this morning the Latin American Chiefs of Mission were invited to a conference with President Roosevelt. They were notified that the meeting would be short, that it would be held in the Red Room of the White House, and that it would begin at twelve o'clock sharp.

Most of the representatives assembled in the vestibule of the White House and at the appointed hour were conducted into the Red Room. The absence of the Ambassadors of Brazil, Colombia, and Panama was noted. The suddenness of the invitation did not give the first
two, who were away from the capital, time to attend, and the Panamanian Ambassador presented his excuses because of illness.

In the Red Room were President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Lord Halifax, Ambassador of Great Britain. The latter was standing, while the President remained seated in the corner of a sofa and at his left side, in a large armchair drawn near, was Prime Minister Churchill.

The President introduced the diplomats by order of precedence, and Mr. Churchill, who had risen to his feet, exchanged a few words with each. As the introductions were ending, Vice President Wallace entered the room. The President paid him a compliment, stating that he was the only Vice President among all those who had ever held the office who spoke Spanish. He then added that Mr. Wallace was going to visit the countries of Latin America, where he would be able to speak to the people in their native languages, although, said President Roosevelt, the Vice President was not very sure that he had a good command of Portuguese. The Vice President remained standing, while Mr. Churchill again took his seat.

Next, President Roosevelt recalled that he had frequently had occasion in recent times to talk with some of the visitors; he mentioned the Dean and Ambassadors of Argentina and Mexico; hence, the President added, he would like some other representative, especially someone from Central America, to sit down beside him and share the sofa with him. He emphasized the invitation with an expressive gesture, but no one moved from the semicircle that had formed in front of him and Mr. Churchill.

The President, still speaking of Central America, expressed his gratification at the attitude of the republics of that region. Those countries, and a number of others, he said, had declared war on the totalitarian powers; the remaining countries had not gone to that extreme, having agreed to assume "an actively sympathetic neutrality," action, the President stated, which was appreciated and for which the Government of the United States expressed its gratitude.

Without interruption the President made a very brief summary of the known facts which had caused his country to take on the role of "active belligerent"; in a joking tone he said that "We are all in the same boat, just as we are all in this room." He affirmed his faith in the triumph of the democracies and made some trenchant comments on the news issued by the Japanese Government to deceive his country. The President knew that the official reports from Tokyo were saying that the Pacific was completely dominated by Japanese naval forces; the Japanese Government's audacity even went as far as the announcement that maritime shipping would very shortly be resumed between Japan and South America and trade would be established on an intensive and continuing basis. The President concluded that part of his remarks with these words: "It is possible that that trade
will never come to pass; right now I can assert that no Japanese ship will dare to approach the coasts of South America, and if any is foolhardy enough to do so, it will not return to its base.”

Mr. Roosevelt emphasized that the democracies would win the final victory, and in the balance of the future, as an organization for peace after the defeat of Hitlerism, he stated that the democracies, acting together—Great Britain, the United States, the British Dominions, and Latin America, as well as the European countries that might join in the civilizing task—would establish an international system that would guarantee the peaceful existence of all nations of the world, giving them opportunities for their development and progress, free of the fear of the calamities of war; but, cautioned the President, “to arrive at that stage, it is imperative to destroy Hitlerism in Germany and the world, and to disarm that country and keep it unarmed, so that at least one or two generations may enjoy the advantages of civilization free of threats, giving themselves over to scientific and other generous endeavors that will bring all mankind closer to the ideals of perfection.” The President revealed that he had discussed all that he had been saying with Mr. Churchill, who shared the ideas expressed and supported the same objectives as those advocated by the United States.

“Europe should follow our example, and thus all the countries of the Old World would enjoy a happy life, based on mutual respect, without discrimination between large and small nations,” said the President in an earnest tone of conviction. He then sketched the conditions that had existed in past times among the “nations of this Hemisphere.” Fortunately, Mr. Roosevelt noted with obvious pleasure, “the favorable transformation that began eight years ago is plain to be seen; in the establishment of the Good Neighbor Policy, the New Deal has demonstrated the sincere desires for fraternal relationships that inspire us.”

“In August 1933 a revolutionary movement developed in Cuba. I summoned the representatives of Latin America to a meeting in this same place; some of you attended that meeting (the President indicated the Ambassador of Peru and the Minister of Honduras, who nodded their assent) and you will remember that I stated then that although the United States had the right to intervene and to land troops, I was not going to operate as had my predecessors, because I considered that the matter was a national problem and it was up to the Cubans to resolve it. If some naval units were sent to Cuban ports, it was for the purpose of taking on citizens of this country who wanted to be repatriated; nobody wanted that and after three or four days the ships returned to United States waters.

“Thus, by means of this clearly evident act, proof was given of the Good Neighbor Policy, which has continued to be the rule in our inter-
American relations and the beneficial fruits of which we find valuable in this present conflict."

Mr. Roosevelt concluded by reaffirming that the forces of Hitler would fail in their attempt to impose on the world a system repugnant to human dignity; "coming generations will enjoy the conquests that the present generation ensures to them."

The President, who had taken fourteen minutes for his remarks, asked Mr. Churchill whether he wished to make any comments. Mr. Churchill reemphasized what had been said by President Roosevelt about the triumph of the democracies and supported his words with references to naval strength. The Atlantic, he said, was under the control of the British Navy; the production of ships and air facilities had this year given Britain even greater superiority than it had been acknowledged to have at the beginning of the war. He explained that the losses suffered by Germany made it impossible for that nation to undertake naval operations of any consequence. As for the submarine campaign, Mr. Churchill stated that it was daily becoming less dangerous to shipping between Europe and America; the British sea and air forces already had the means to punish the submarines that ventured into the high seas. The rate of production was increasing day by day in both British and American shipyards, while in Germany and Italy it had dropped by one-fifth, compared to what it had been a year ago. It would take a year and a half to make the repairs and replacements for the losses suffered by the two European Axis powers; as already indicated, Great Britain and the United States were producing at a very high rate and the assurance could be given that the Atlantic sea lanes would continue indefinitely to be a sure means of communication between the two continents. The United States could transfer its naval forces to the Pacific without the least fear because—and this bore repeating—the British Navy was more than able to guarantee control of the Atlantic.

Mr. Churchill was of the opinion that in the Mediterranean the Italian fleet was superior in the number of large units; it had three cruisers of the "Littorio" type, as well as destroyers and submarines; but judging by what had been shown thus far, that superiority had not managed to make itself felt; the tactical, strategic, and moral performance of the seamen did not balance with the apparent preponderance of strength. Great Britain was not worried over this situation and had not planned to divert units from other maritime sectors to reinforce those in the Mediterranean. It could be asserted, concluded Mr. Churchill, that Great Britain and the United States were the masters of the seas.

Vice President Wallace asked what role Mr. Churchill conceded to the French Navy. The Prime Minister replied that as it would be recalled, a great part of that Navy had been destroyed by the
British; two remaining ships, the Jean Bart and another of the same type, had been considerably damaged and were in French Morocco; it would take many months to repair them; but regardless of the physical or material problem, it could be considered that the crews of the French ships would refuse to serve on behalf of Germany; this would oblige Hitler's Naval Command to remove officers and men, and it was well known that only after extended training was it possible to handle the ships of a foreign nation; every fleet had its own special characteristic details that made handling difficult for those who had not been trained on the ships themselves. Mr. Churchill was sure that Admiral Darlan would not dare to order the remains of the French Squadron to cooperate with Germany because he knew beforehand that his orders would be disobeyed. The Prime Minister recalled the fact that French naval units anchored in Far Eastern waters had entered into an agreement with Dutch East Indies authorities and remained neutral at bases there.

Mr. Churchill concluded his remarks by expressing his faith in the triumph of the democracies and the reign of justice and peace. His statement, including the Vice President's question and his reply, lasted ten minutes.

President Roosevelt then spoke again. It was necessary, he said, to concern ourselves not only with the problems of the war but also with the problems of economic cooperation, both of which would be dealt with at the forthcoming conference of Foreign Ministers.¹ Military cooperation—which naturally included naval and air cooperation as well—was taking shape, although there was no coordination at the Hemisphere level. In brief, the United States would increase the production of arms and munitions of all kinds; within four or five months it would be in a position to provide the other American republics with the material needed for effective defense of the Hemisphere. Stores of munitions would be deposited in appropriate places and arms and equipment would be provided to the countries that most needed them, according to their situation and the degree of risk involved. For example, on the Atlantic it was natural that thought should be given to Brazil, which was short of air strength, as well as defensive elements; the President mentioned Brazil because, on account of its proximity to the West African coast, its extensive coast line, and its lack of fortifications, it was a vulnerable zone, regarded by Hitler's strategists as the least difficult prize to seize, as a toe hold where a landing would ensure a base for future operations. Therefore, it was urgent to equip Brazil. Various parts of the Pacific coast (the President did not specify any in particular) also had to be considered, although in much lesser measure than the Brazilian coast.

Vice President Wallace asked whether any thought had been given to the establishment of a Continental Defense Council, and if so, whether any program for coordinating joint action had been worked out.

The President replied that the advisability of setting up such a body had been approached in a general manner only. However, he added, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs who were going to meet in Rio de Janeiro would undoubtedly take up that extremely important question. President Roosevelt said that he did not know whether the subject was included in the agenda of the conference; but in any event, he repeated, the Foreign Ministers would discuss it, even if it was not on the agenda of the Meeting of Consultation. The program which the Government of the United States had set for itself to ensure the defense of the Hemisphere included the production of all kinds of materials, for distribution as deemed advisable throughout all the countries of the Americas; and that program had not failed to take into account the details of military, naval, and air requirements, as well as supplies of raw materials needed for war industries and food for the people. The Latin American representatives would receive the pertinent information in due course as the program was developed. “In the future you and we shall have to establish more frequent and more intimate contact; we shall notify you with what agencies or officials you are to get in touch,” said the President. He declared that never again would the mistake be made of allowing any nation to become a danger to the community. “That mistake, committed in the past, is the reason why many men who are still alive have suffered, in varying proportions, the consequences of the two great conflagrations of this century. That shall not be repeated. Not only the countries now engaged in actual struggle against Hitlerism, but four-fifths of all mankind reject totalitarian methods and anxiously desire the victory of freedom and justice.”

Returning to Mr. Wallace’s question, the President again mentioned the Rio conference, at which the action of the Hemisphere would probably be determined. “Perhaps a declaration of war is not necessary. Unfortunately, we have witnessed a number of wars without a declaration.” The President concluded by repeating that in the future there would be more frequent contacts between the Chiefs of Mission of Latin America and United States authorities; the course of events made this necessary; the measures required to triumph over tyranny and reestablish peace demanded it. These final remarks lasted nine minutes.

As we took our leave, the President and Mr. Churchill exchanged courtesies with the visitors.

The entire interview, from the time of entering the Red Room to the time of departure, lasted thirty-eight minutes. It should be noted
that at twelve o’clock, the time set for the meeting, we were already in the presence of the Chief Executive.

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, DECEMBER 27, 1941, 6 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Secretary Hull

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Halifax

Editorial Note

No official record of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The information set forth above regarding the time of the meeting and the participants is derived from the President’s appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers) and from Hull, vol. II, p. 1121. Concerning the discussion Hull says:

“During the conference it was apparent that Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill were not yet in agreement that a Supreme War Council should be set up. Most of our discussion was devoted to this subject. We therefore agreed to adopt the new draft of the Joint Declaration, standing alone, leaving the Supreme War Council draft for further discussion.”

The “new draft of the Joint Declaration” was the draft prepared in the Department of State on December 27; see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. I, p. 14. This draft was amended in several respects by Roosevelt at this meeting in the White House and was approved, as amended, by Churchill. The text of the amended draft is given in telegram 6081 of December 28 from Halifax to Eden, post, p. 370.

The “Supreme War Council draft” to which Hull refers was the draft of December 19, 6 p.m., ante, p. 40. For the further consideration of this draft, see the meeting in the Department of State on December 29, post, p. 132.

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND AMBASSADOR LITVINOV, DECEMBER 27, 1941, EVENING, THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

SOVIET UNION
Ambassador Litvinov

Editorial Note

No official record of this meeting has been found. Hull (vol. II, pp. 1121-1122) says: “Following the meeting [with Churchill] the President called in Soviet Ambassador Litvinov and handed him a copy [of the Joint Declaration] to be sent immediately to his Govern-
ment for comment.” See also the statement by Hull in his memorandum of conversation of December 29, 1941, in Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. I, p. 18. The text of the draft as given to Litvinov is in telegram 6081 of December 28 from Halifax to Eden, post, p. 370.

DINNER MEETING OF SECRETARY HULL AND PRIME MINISTER MACKENZIE KING, DECEMBER 27, 1941, EVENING, HULL’S APARTMENT

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Secretary Hull
Mrs. Hull

CANADA
Prime Minister Mackenzie King

851A.00/50

Memorandum by Secretary Hull

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1941.

The Prime Minister of Canada called and I repeated to him my conversation with the French Ambassador about the plan for the settlement of the controversy growing out of the seizure of the St. Pierre and Miquelon islands by the Free French. I said that if and when I received a satisfactory reply from the French I would then take it up with the Canadians and the British. He seemed more or less acquiescent, without expressly saying so, in the proposed terms of the French.

C. H.

1The information regarding the time and place of this meeting is derived from Pickersgill, pp. 322–324, which presents excerpts from Mackenzie King’s diary notes on the conversation.

2For Hull’s conversation with the French Ambassador, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. II, pp. 559–561.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1941

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WITH HIS MILITARY ADVISERS, DECEMBER 28, 1941, 11:45 A. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

President Roosevelt
Secretary of War Stimson
Secretary of the Navy Knox
Mr. Hopkins
Assistant Secretary of War McCloy
General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Turner
Brigadier General Gerow
Major Sexton
SECRET

Subject: Current War Situation.

The President suggested that General Marshall give an estimate of the situation after three weeks of war.

General Marshall stated that, with respect to the Far East, General MacArthur apparently was not falling back as rapidly as was indicated in his first message; that General MacArthur was in a most difficult situation as far as air forces were concerned; that the heavy bombers had been evacuated from Luzon and that he estimated that the only planes left in Luzon were being used for observation purposes, although they may be of fighter types; that out of the original thirty-five B-17's in the Philippines, eleven were at Surabaya; that General Brereton was with these planes and had established whatever fighter planes were now in Australia, they would be so disposed as to protect the fields where the B-17's would be based; that a comparatively limited amount of information had been received from the Philippines; and that it would probably be two or three days before the situation would be clarified as to whether or not General MacArthur's withdrawal would be rapid or would be prolonged.

The President asked if we had received any estimates of Japanese losses.

General Marshall replied that we had not; nor had we received an estimate of American losses; that, under the circumstances, he did not desire to harass General MacArthur with these details.

The President asked if there was a possibility of operating from Mindanao.

General Marshall replied that the Japanese had landed troops at Davao, but that General MacArthur hoped to hold fields in Mindanao, which could be used for operations against Luzon, and desired air and naval attacks on Japanese Davao preparations.

General Arnold stated that when we were able to get heavy bombers operating out of Borneo, we would be able to cover the Philippine Islands and Saigon; that eighteen B-17's are leaving the United States for the Far Eastern area tomorrow night.

General Marshall added that another serious matter for consideration was the situation at Rangoon; that it was important to hold this point because it was on our line of communications to the Far East, and that Air Chief Marshal Portal had told General Arnold that the British were sending three squadrons of Hurricane fighters into that area.
The President asked if we should establish a committee in China.\textsuperscript{1} General Marshall replied that he thought we should.

The President observed that it was primarily an air problem, and he wondered if General Magruder could handle it.

General Marshall replied that we have the 22d Pursuit Group there, which was out of the American voluntary group. General Marshall then added that the \textit{Ludington} was back at Los Angeles.

The President asked if it was possible to send the \textit{Ludington} to Australia.

General Marshall stated that it was too slow; that the \textit{Polk} should get into Australia on the 8th; that another transport was leaving today; that the Navy had advised the Army that they could escort one convoy per month for Australia, but freight vessels would have to go unconvoyed; that with respect to the Hawaiian theater, the air force had been increased to two hundred pursuit ships and forty-three B-17's; that General Emmons had asked for more troops as garrison for the Hawaiian Islands, and that these were being sent; that on our West Coast we have the antiaircraft defense set up as well as it is possible to do it. He added that when the Western Defense Command had been set up and placed under GHQ, there had been a tendency on the part of GHQ to move everything on the East Coast to the Western theater, and this condition had been remedied by setting up an Eastern Defense Command, which tended to balance this tendency on the part of GHQ; that every effort is being made to get winterized planes into Alaska, and that they will be there in a very short time; that General DeWitt believed that we should have stronger air forces in Alaska, but that it was simply a question of how to distribute our limited means; that at the beginning of the war we had established strong forces on the West Coast and guarding industry, and that it now became a question of gradually reducing them as far as practicable in order to prevent immobilization of large forces and serious interruptions of training.

The President asked what studies were being made with the Russians concerning operating bombers on the Kamchatka Peninsula, and operations in the Far East.

General Marshall replied that at the present time no studies were being made, because the Russians had no representatives here; that one Russian General here was primarily concerned with lend-lease; and that outside of settling with the Russians on the number of planes, tanks, etc., to be turned over to them, nothing more has been done.

\textsuperscript{1} In a memorandum of December 12 to Hull, Hamilton had proposed "that a political-strategic mission be sent from the United States immediately to Chungking"; see \textit{Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv}, p. 745.
The President stated that he thought that in four or five days the
Russians would agree to conversations on possible combined opera-
tions.²

Subject: Unity of Command.

The President stated that Mr. Churchill had agreed to the principle
of unity of command in the Far East, and that he was about to send
a radio to London to obtain approval of the Privy Council; that the
general thought was that the Far Eastern theater would include
Malaya, Burma, the Philippine Islands, Australia, and supply lines
north of Australia; that Mr. Churchill had agreed, after a struggle,
to include sea, land, and air in unity of command; that the supreme
commander should have a small headquarters, and the headquarters
would be mobile. Mr. Churchill had agreed that the commander
(General Wavell) should not stay in Singapore; that the British
and Dutch naval forces would be under an American Admiral; and
that the British naval commander would be directed to conform with
the plans and policies of the supreme commander.

General Marshall stated that this did not permit unity of command
with regard to the naval forces, and urged that, as written, this not
be accepted—that there should be no misunderstanding on this matter.

It was generally agreed that, as written, the telegram³ provided
for cooperation with respect to naval forces.

Admiral Stark pointed out that a communication had been received
from Australia urging unity of command.⁴

General Marshall strongly urged that the statement, “that the naval
forces be directed to conform with the policies of the supreme com-
mander,” be amended to read “will operate under the direction of the
supreme commander.”

At the President’s suggestion, General Marshall and Mr. Harry
Hopkins retired to another room and redrafted Mr. Churchill’s tele-
gram in accordance with General Marshall’s recommendations.⁵

During their absence, the President directed that arrangements
be made to go ahead with the proposition of establishing a committee
at Chungking in order to help the morale of Chiang Kai-Shek.

²Roosevelt’s optimism was apparently shared by Arnold (see ante, p. 66),
but the reason for the President’s reference to “four or five days” is obscure.
Litvinov had firmly stated to Hull on December 11, 1941, that the Soviet Union
could not at that stage engage in any conversations about cooperation in the
war against Japan. See Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 742. Roosevelt may
have been hopeful that conversations might be opened as a result of his decision
to resume full-scale shipment of lend-lease items to the Soviet Union. See ibid.,
1941, vol. i, p. 866; see also Matloff and Snell, p. 143, and ante, p. 87.
³The telegram under reference is Churchill’s draft of December 28, post, p. 277.
The revisions made by Hopkins and Marshall are shown in the text.
The Secretary of War observed that he had the idea that something of this nature had already been set up, but that he would set up a working committee.

The President asked who was to be designated as the American representative with Wavell.

General Arnold replied that it was contemplated having General Brett assigned as his air officer.

The President asked if Admiral Glassford would send someone also, and Admiral Stark replied that they planned to send Admiral Purnell.

Subject: Naval Operations.

The President stated that he had a report from the Dutch which quoted Admiral Hart as saying that he had instructions from Washington which precluded any joint action in the Far East. Also, the President asked, if it had been necessary to withdraw the task force which had been sent to Wake, why had this force ever been sent?

Admiral Stark replied that Admiral Pye had been sent to support Wake.

The President then asked again if it was felt necessary to send them at all, why should they have been withdrawn; and said that, except for the Midway task force, the operations had used a lot of oil and had accomplished nothing.

The President further stated that it had been his observation that a large number of the Japanese task forces scattered throughout the Far Eastern area were small; that they generally consisted of one or two cruisers, a few destroyers, and possibly two or three transports; that he thought a study should be made concerning the possibility of a sweep through the Pacific with the idea of catching some of these small forces; that the American forces should be slightly larger, possibly three or four cruisers and nine or ten destroyers; that the sweeping force should be fast enough to escape if it encountered superior strength; that he felt that it is necessary for the Navy to take some offensive action.

Admiral Stark replied that the Navy had forces operating on the line—Johnston, Christmas, Palmyra—and had hoped to meet some of the Japanese expeditions, but had failed.

The President remarked that the Japanese were getting awfully close to home.

It was pointed out that the United States had submarines operating in Midway and Wake area, and also three task forces in Japanese waters.

Admiral Stark stated that standing directions had been issued to raid Japanese forces whenever possible; that the area to the southwest had to be kept open; that, had the Japanese immediately followed

* Not printed.
up their Hawaiian raid, the defense of Hawaii would have been jeopardized. However, with the present air strength in Hawaii, it is believed possible to permit the naval forces to leave.

Admiral King stated that a list of priority missions with regard to the Pacific fleet had been drawn up—that first priority was holding the Hawaii-Midway line; second, that second priority was reinforcing and holding the line, Hawaii and Samoa; that all other projects must give way to this; and that in withdrawing the expedition from Wake, Admiral Pye was undoubtedly taking the broad viewpoint.

The President finally added that we need some kind of a contact with the Japanese navy, with our raiding forces having a slightly superior strength.

At this point General Marshall returned to the conference.

The President asked General Marshall if anything had been done with regard to moving small groups of men to England on current convoys.

General Marshall replied that the matter was being worked on; that it involved many difficulties; that he had a man en route to Halifax to see what could be done. He felt that something could certainly be worked out in the matter.

The President stated that he wanted to say something publicly this week about American troops in the British Isles.\(^6\)

General Marshall replied that the Commanding Officers for the Ireland, African, and Brazilian task forces were in Washington at the present time, working out detailed plans.

The President stated that the African expedition is a guess operation; that he had received an interesting telegram from Mr. Bullitt mentioning that there were some French ships in the harbor at Alexandria, and that it might be possible for the Americans to take these ships over without opposition, where the British could not.\(^7\)

General Marshall stated that, with regard to the African expedition, three alternatives were being studied—(1) the expedition to Casablanca; (2) to the Cape Verde Islands; and (3) to Dakar.

The President asked about the possibility of landing under fire at Casablanca.

General Marshall stated that this would be a very dangerous operation to attempt because of the hazards involved, especially in meeting an initial reverse, which would have a very detrimental effect on the morale of the American people.

Admiral Stark then stated that the Navy had stopped the conversion of four ships to airplane carriers in order to make these ships

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\(^6\)In his annual message to Congress, delivered on January 6, 1942, Roosevelt said “American land, and air and sea forces will take stations in the British Isles—which constitute an essential fortress in this world struggle.” See Department of State Bulletin, vol. vi, January 10, 1942, p. 42.

\(^7\)The telegram from Bullitt at Cairo is printed post, p. 244.
available for troop transports; in addition, there was available the Normandie, and one ship in Brazil; that seventy-one C-3's were being built; that the building program was working at maximum capacity; and that if any more transports were built, something else would have to stop.

The President handed the Secretary of the Navy the radio he had received from Mr. Bullitt; and at 12:45 p. m. the conference adjourned.

W. T. S.

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, AND SECRETARY HULL, DECEMBER 28, 1941, AFTERNOON, THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

United States

President Roosevelt
Secretary Hull

United Kingdom

Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No official record of this conversation has been found and none appears to have been made by either Roosevelt or Hull. Hull, vol. II, (pp. 1132-1133) describes the conversation in considerable detail but does not explicitly mention the date. From the general context it appears that the meeting took place just before Churchill's departure for Ottawa on the evening of December 28.

Hull describes the meeting as follows:

"I had a blunt conversation with Prime Minister Churchill at the White House on the whole question of our relations with Vichy France, with the seizure of the islands [St. Pierre and Miquelon] as a springboard. . . .

"I pointedly accused De Gaulle of being a marplot acting directly contrary to the expressed wishes of Britain, Canada, and the United States, and I asked the Prime Minister to induce him to withdraw his troops from the St. Pierre and Miquelon islands, with Canadians and Americans assuming supervision over the radio station at St. Pierre.

"Mr. Churchill said that if he insisted on such a request his relations with the Free French movement would be impaired."

According to the accounts of both Hull (vol. II, p. 1132) and Churchill (The Grand Alliance, p. 667), Roosevelt acted as moderator in this contentious discussion.

For summaries of the development of the St. Pierre-Miquelon issue, see the memorandum by Halifax, post, p. 378, and the memorandum by the Department of State, post, p. 383. For negotiations

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**MONDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1941**

**MEETING OF SECRETARY HULL WITH CERTAIN OF HIS ADVISERS, DECEMBER 29, 1941, MORNING, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**Present**

Secretary Hull  
Under Secretary Welles  
Assistant Secretary Berle  
Mr. Hackworth  
Mr. Savage

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**Hull Papers**

**Memorandum by Mr. Savage**

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1941.

This morning there was a conversation in the Secretary's office, at which were present the Secretary, Mr. Welles, Mr. Berle, Mr. Hackworth, and Mr. Savage.

It was understood that the President had not yet approved the memorandum regarding the creation of a Supreme War Council.  
Mr. Welles said that in the draft memorandum it was desirable to provide that on the Council should be represented the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations; and the U.S.S.R. in respect of warfare against the countries with which it is at war. Furthermore, when the Council had under consideration subjects directly affecting areas in which China or the Netherlands was interested, a representative of that country should participate in the deliberations on a footing of entire equality with the other representatives.

Mr. Hackworth and Mr. Savage redrafted the memorandum on the Supreme War Council to include these changes. Later in a conversation with the Secretary he looked over the new draft, making the comment that it should not be made compulsory for the Supreme War Council to create a Staff. At this point the conversation was interrupted; it was understood that this new draft would be considered again at the earliest practicable time.  

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1 The memorandum under reference is the draft of December 19, 6 p. m., ante, p. 40. See the discussion at the White House on December 27, ante, p. 124.

2 The "new draft" (a copy of which is in the Hull Papers) is not printed here because there was no further negotiation on this subject; see the Roosevelt-Hull telephone conversation of December 31, post, p. 149.
MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE NETHERLANDS MINISTER (LOUDON), DECEMBER 29, 1941, 12 NOON, THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

United States
President Roosevelt

Netherlands
Minister Loudon

Editorial Note

No record of this discussion has been found. The time of the meeting is derived from the President's appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers). In Welles' memorandum of January 5, 1942 (post, p. 306), there is a reference to the "agreement" on the ABDA Command handed by Roosevelt to the Netherlands Minister on December 29. From the comments on this "agreement" by the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies (post, p. 309), it appears that what Roosevelt gave to Loudon on this occasion was a copy of Churchill's telegram of December 28, 1941, to the Lord Privy Seal, post, p. 277.

MEETING OF SECRETARY HULL AND AMBASSADOR LITVINOV, DECEMBER 29, 1941, 12:30 P. M., DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Present

United States
Secretary Hull

Soviet Union
Ambassador Litvinov

Hull Papers

Memorandum by Mr. Savage

[Washington,] December 29, 1941.

Today at 12:30 the Soviet Ambassador brought to the Secretary the reply of his Government, which suggested the amendments indicated on the attached sheet.\(^1\) As the Secretary indicates in his memorandum of conversation of December 29,\(^2\) the Soviet Government had planned to make a separate declaration (copy attached)\(^3\) upon the possible assumption that the Joint Declaration was already in circulation among other countries for signature. The Secretary immediately sent to the President the amendments suggested by the Soviet Government.\(^4\)

Carlton Savage

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\(^1\) Post, p. 374.
\(^2\) The Hull memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. 1, p. 18.
\(^3\) Post, p. 374.
\(^4\) Ibid.
MEMEETING OF SECRETARY STIMSON WITH MR. HOPKINS AND GENERAL MARSHALL, DECEMBER 29, 1941, 2:30 P. M., WAR DEPARTMENT

PRESENT

Secretary Stimson
Mr. Hopkins
General Marshall
Colonel Peck
Colonel Handy
Commander Rodgers
Lieutenant Colonel Wyman

Defense Files

Memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Wyman

Subject: Preparation of message to be sent by the President to Chiang Kai Shek in conjunction with the announcement of details in connection with the Southwest Pacific Theatres.

The Chief of Staff, Colonel Handy, and Colonel Wyman then joined Secretary Stimson in his office where the group was joined by Mr. Hopkins and representatives from the Navy Department.

In discussing the subject letter, the following points were brought out:

a. Mr. Stimson objected to the term "Supreme Commander". He thought it was beside the point to indicate to Chiang Kai Shek that he would have command of troops in the China theatre because at the moment there were no troops there but Chinese.

b. Mr. Hopkins wanted an included idea which would indicate to Chiang Kai Shek that President Roosevelt desired Chiang's participation with the senior members of the Allied Nations in conversations related to all theatres.

c. Colonel Wyman again discussed the importance of including Burma, Thailand, and Indo China in any China theatre.

d. Colonel Peck recommended that Chiang Kai Shek be given command of the China Theatre and that it should include all of Burma. Colonel Handy stated that he thought this would create a British obstacle. Colonel Wyman indicated that he believed that Chiang Kai Shek would cooperate with an acceptable British commander for that theatre but that such a commander would have to give him, Chiang, much greater consideration than is now being given him in the Burma

1The "subject letter" was the draft of a letter from Roosevelt to Chiang, prepared by Handy for Marshall.
The dependence of the Chinese on the Burma supply line made this of the utmost importance.

Mr. Hopkins brought up the question of bringing the Allied Planning Group representing the southwest Pacific theatre together on a basis of mutual understanding. The Australians offered great difficulty due to their misunderstandings with Great Britain. Mr. Hopkins thought all the interested groups should be included, mentioning particularly New Zealand and Australia. He indicated that the British home government was disturbed as to whom the commander of the southwest Pacific theatre would be responsible. Mr. Hopkins wanted to avoid that issue in an urgent communication which was being sent to the Australian Government. This was agreed to and the Chief of Staff indicated that the Australian and New Zealand representatives in Washington should be included in future discussions.

Attached is the message prepared by Colonel Handy (Tab A) and the final redrafted message resulting from the conference (Tab B).

W. G. Wyman

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2 See the reference to the Tulsa affair, post, p. 272. For the difficulties between Wavell and Chiang Kai-shek as a result of Chiang’s offer of troops for Burma, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 53-56.

3 Presumably the President’s reply of January 1, 1942 (post, p. 302), to Prime Minister Curtin’s message of December 23, 1941, to Roosevelt and Churchill (Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. v, pp. 390-391).

4 Not printed.

5 “Tab B” is not attached to the file. The draft, as submitted by the United States Chiefs of Staff to the British Chiefs of Staff at the meeting at 4 p.m., is the typed version of the draft memorandum reproduced in facsimile, post, p. 283.

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MEETING OF UNITED STATES PRODUCTION LEADERS WITH THE BRITISH MINISTER OF SUPPLY, DECEMBER 29, 1941, 2:30 P.M., THE VICE PRESIDENT’S OFFICE

Present

UNITED STATES

Vice President Wallace
Secretary Jones
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Patterson
Mr. Forrestal
Mr. Lovett
Mr. Stettinius
Mr. Nelson
Mr. Knudsen
Mr. Henderson
Mr. Hillman
Mr. Batt

UNITED KINGDOM

Lord Beaverbrook
I. THE FIRST WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

W.P.B. Files

Memorandum by Mr. Nelson

December 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Notes on meeting held in the office of the Vice President in the Capitol on Monday, December 29, at 2:30 p.m.

Lord Beaverbrook emphasized the fact that we must set our production sites [sights] much higher than we have for the year 1942, in order that we might cope with a resourceful and determined enemy. He pointed out that we had yet had no experience in the losses of matériel incidental to a war of the kind we are now fighting. He also felt we had very little conception of the productive facilities of the Axis powers. He said that in talking to Stalin, Stalin told him that Germany had thrown 30,000 tanks into the fight with Russia, and in starting from scratch as we were we had to build up a reserve in addition to supplying our forces with the necessary tanks to fight. He made the statement that if an invasion of America [Europe?] was attempted we had no conception of the number of tanks we would have to cope with. He emphasized over and over again the fact that we should set our sites [sights] higher in planning for production of the necessary war matériel. For instance, he thinks we should plan for the production of 45,000 tanks in 1942 against Mr. Knudsen’s estimate of 30,000.2

I want to take up the question of what is preventing us from producing 25,000 medium and 15,000 light tanks per month [year?]. I want to check merchant shipping, the conversion factor from dead weight, gross weight and cargo carrying capacity. I want to check the bottlenecks on the 3 inch versus the 57 millimeter gun, the number of man-hours, machinery involved, etc.

Donald M. Nelson

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1 See Beaverbrook’s letter to Hopkins of December 29, post, p. 337, and his letter to Wallace of December 30, post, p. 338. See also the account in Nelson, p. 185.

2 In response to an inquiry from the Editors, Mr. Wallace wrote as follows: “Out of all these [meetings] I have no recollection whatsoever except the dynamism of Lord Beaverbrook. He was a power house with regard to what could be done and what had to be done. From a practical point of view I would remember him as having much more of an influence on Don Nelson and myself than Churchill. Some people did not like the Beaver but he stands out in my mind more than anyone else at this particular moment. The meeting with Beaverbrook which really counted was the one at 2:30 Dec. 29 at my office in the Capitol . . .” (Wallace to the Historical Office, May 4, 1963).
MEETING OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF,
DECEMBER 29, 1941, 4 P.M., FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Sexton
Rear Admiral Horne
Rear Admiral Towers
Rear Admiral Turner
Major General Holcomb
Brigadier General Lee
Lieutenant Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Little
Lieutenant General Wemyss
Air Marshal Harris

Secretariat
Captain McCrea
Lieutenant Colonel Robinett
Major Sexton
Colonel Jacob
Commander Coleridge

Defense Files

United States Minutes

SECRET

JCCSs—5

1. PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS
   EXPEDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

   The Conference approved a final draft of the Joint Planning
   Committee’s Report on Priorities for United States and United King-
   dom Overseas Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean. (U.S. Serial ABC-
   4/1, British Serial WW (J.P.C.) 1). (See Annex 1)\footnote{Post, p. 246.}

   2. AMERICAN-BRITISH STRATEGY (WW—1)\footnote{Post, p. 210.}

   At the request of Rear Admiral Turner, action on this paper was
   deferred.

   3. NORTHWEST AFRICA PROJECT, U.S. ABC—4/2, BRITISH
      WW (J.P.C.) 2\footnote{Post, p. 240.}

   Action on this paper was deferred at the request of the British.

   4. SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

   Action on U.S. ABC—4/3, British WW (J.P.C.) 3\footnote{Post, p. 280.},
   was deferred by common consent.

5. **UNITY OF COMMAND IN THE SOUTHWESTERN PACIFIC THEATER**

a. Method of handling questions concerning that theater.

**Admiral Pound** said that the proposal for the establishment of unity of command in the Southwestern Pacific Theater had been referred by the Prime Minister to London, for consideration by the War Cabinet. In his telegram he had included the following sentence, “He (General Wavell) would receive his orders from an appropriate joint body, who will be responsible to him as Minister of Defense, and to the President of the United States, who is also Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. forces.”

The Prime Minister had received an immediate reply, asking for information as to the nature of this joint body. He had been asked to defer giving his views to London on this point until the Chiefs of Staff had had an opportunity of putting forward their views.

One of the main objects in setting up a Supreme Commander was to achieve rapidity of decision on important matters. It would be difficult to attain this object if a cumbersome machine were erected to deal with important matters arising from the Southwestern Pacific Theater. The right course would be to utilize existing machinery, and the British Chiefs of Staff had formulated certain proposals which they hoped would prove acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

**Admiral Pound** then read his proposals to the Conference. (See Annex 2).

**Admiral King** said that he had been asked to consider this matter, and advise the President at very short notice. He had set down on paper an outline of a solution which he thought would achieve the object in view, namely, rapid decision through the use of existing machinery. His proposal was that the Prime Minister should appoint a deputy in Washington, who would act with the President on recommendations to be made by a Southwestern Pacific Council, which would be a military body composed of one representative from each of the following: U.S. Joint Board, the British Joint Staff Mission, the Dutch military representatives in Washington, together with one Anzac representative. The members of this Council would be instructed as necessary by the military bodies which they represented.

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5 The draft of Churchill’s telegram of December 28 is printed *post*, p. 277.
* Not found in American files.
7 *Post*, p. 282.
GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that it might be better not to introduce at this stage the complicated question of machinery into the business of setting up unity of command. He thought that an amendment might be made to the documents establishing the unified command, which would include a phrase to the effect that "matters would be dealt with by such joint machinery as the Associated Powers may hereafter set up".

ADMIRAL KING thought that the establishment of machinery was an indispensable part of the establishment of unity of command, if the latter were to start operating at once.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if such were the case, he was prepared to accept the proposals put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL KING and ADMIRAL STARK signified their agreement to these proposals.

ADMIRAL HORNE suggested that in order to achieve unity of command without delay, it should be agreed upon and established by the British and United States Governments forthwith—the other Governments concerned being presented with a fait accompli, and being asked to notify their acceptance.

ADMIRAL POUND said that the Prime Minister had already sent off telegrams to the New Zealand and Australian Governments, so that there was unlikely to be much delay. The British Chiefs of Staff proposed to telegraph their proposals to the Prime Minister forthwith for his approval.

ADMIRAL STARK said that he would also submit them forthwith to the President.

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff approved the proposals for handling matters concerning the Southwestern Pacific Theater, as set out in the Memorandum as Annex 2, and agreed to submit them forthwith to the President and the Prime Minister, for approval.

b. Letter of instructions to the Supreme Commander.

THE CONFERENCE was informed that a draft Letter of Instructions, prepared by the Joint Planning Committee, would be circulated to them that evening. The British Chiefs of Staff proposed to telegraph its contents to London for comment.

THE CONFERENCE took note of this, and agreed to meet at 11:30 the following morning to consider the Draft Letter.

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8 Not found in American files.
9 Churchill was in Ottawa on December 29-30 and the morning of December 31, returning to Washington late that evening.
10 The paper under reference is ABC-4/5, post, p. 280.
11 The Chiefs of Staff did not meet at 11:30 the following morning but convened at 3 p.m.
6. Proposed Communication to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek

General Marshall said that the President was very anxious to send a message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, so as to reach him before the public announcement of the setting up of unified command in Southwestern Pacific Theater. General Macarthur had reported that the Generalissimo was considerably upset by events in Burma, and particularly by the diversion to the British there of Lend-Lease material destined for China. It would therefore be desirable to send him an encouraging message, which would make clear that the other Associated Powers considered that he had an important part to play on the world's stage. This would obviate any danger which might exist of his resenting the fact that he had not been consulted about the setting up of the Southwestern Pacific Command. He (General Marshall) had accordingly drafted a message, which he read to the Conference.12

In the course of discussion, two minor amendments were agreed to, to meet the following points:

a. That it would be unwise to define at this stage the Southwestern Pacific Theater.

b. That in view of the controversial problem presented by Burma, it would be inadvisable to include any part of Burma in the Chinese theater. It would be best, in defining the latter theater, to make clear that it was an initial definition only.

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff approved the draft message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, as amended in discussion, and agreed to submit it to the President and to the Prime Minister, for their approval. (See Annex 3).13

The Conference adjourned at 5:30 P.M. to meet at 11:30 A.M., December 30, 1941.14

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12 The paper as presented by Marshall is the text as typed in the draft memorandum reproduced in facsimile, post, p. 283.
13 The text approved by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff is the text of the draft memorandum (post, p. 283) as amended in longhand by Marshall. For the text as sent on December 29, see post, p. 284.
14 See footnote 11, p. 139.

CONVERSATION OF PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL AND MR. HOPKINS,
DECEMBER 29, 1941, 6:45 P. M., BY TELEPHONE

Hopkins Papers

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President

[Extract 1]

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1941.

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1 The omitted paragraphs of this memorandum refer to the Joint Declaration of Allied unity; see post, p. 373.
ST. PIERRE & MIQUELON

The Prime Minister just phoned me at 6:45, reading me a cable from the Foreign Office to him, in which they indicate the most strenuous objection to the ousting of the Free French from Miquelon. They claim de Gaulle will not issue the orders to throw his commander out.

The burden of the message was that the whole business would kick up an unbelievable row, for which we could give no good public explanation. In spite of the fact that de Gaulle acted in bad faith, the British don't see how he can be forced out and think that the use of force would be very bad.

H. L. H.

2 Churchill was in Ottawa on December 29–30 and the morning of December 31, returning to Washington late that evening.
3 See the editorial note on the Churchill–Hull conversation on December 28, ante, p. 131.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1941

MEETING OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 30, 1941, 3 P. M., FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Sexton
Rear Admiral Horne
Rear Admiral Towers
Rear Admiral Turner
Major General Holcomb
Brigadier General Gerow
Brigadier General Lee
Brigadier General Eisenhower
Lieutenant Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM

Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Little
Lieutenant General Wemyss
Air Marshal Harris
Brigadier Dykes
Air Commodore Dickson
Captain Lambe

SECRETARIAT

Captain McCrea
Lieutenant Colonel Robinett
Major Sexton

Colonel Jacob
Commander Coleridge
I. THE FIRST WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Defense Files

United States Minutes

SECRET

JCCSs-6

1. HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA

The Committee gave further consideration to their Memorandum on the Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area,¹ which had been telegraphed to Ottawa, and had received the approval of the Prime Minister, together with a redraft of this paper, which had been forwarded by Mr. Hopkins for their attention, (Annex 1, Memorandum of Mr. Hopkins, December 30, 1941.)²

In the course of discussion, the following points were made:

a. It did not appear desirable to set up a special body to deal with ABDA problems, as only the United States Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff, through their representatives in Washington, could weigh the needs of the ABDA Area in relation to those of other theatres.

b. As the Dutch Government was in London, and as the machinery for consultation with the Dominions Governments already existed there, it seemed proper that consultation with these Governments should take place in London, and that the British Government should be responsible for obtaining the views and agreements of these Governments, and for submitting them to the United States Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff. While the representatives of the Dutch and Dominions Governments in Washington could, if thought desirable, be kept informed of developments, official consultation could only take place in London.

c. In order to avoid delay, communications from the Supreme Commander should be telegraphed to London and Washington simultaneously—the telegram for Washington being for action, and that to London to furnish a basis for immediate comment to Washington.

In view of the above considerations, it was felt that while some of the suggestions in the redraft forwarded by Mr. Hopkins could be accepted, the main principles contained in their original Memorandum should be retained. The Committee accordingly prepared a revised version of their Memorandum, in two parts. (See Annex 2).³

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed that the revised Memorandum on the Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area should be submitted to the President for his approval under a covering Memorandum setting out the reasons for the machinery proposed.³

¹This is the memorandum of December 29 entitled “Proposed Method of Handling Matters Concerning the Southwest Pacific Theater”, post, p. 282.
²Post, p. 286
³Annex 2 consisted of two parts: Part I was the memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff to the President (post, p. 287); Part II was the revised memorandum entitled “Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area” (post, p. 288), which was to be sent as the attachment to the memorandum to the President.
2. **Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area**

The Committee had before them a Report by the Joint Planning Committee (U.S. ABC-4/5, British WW (J.P.C.) 5). Discussion took place on the extent of the ABDA Area.

Admiral Stark reminded the Committee that a telegram had been sent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, in which it had been suggested that Indo-China and Thailand should be included in the Chinese theatre, and his comments on this arrangement had been requested. He felt, therefore, that, for political reasons, it would be necessary to exclude Indo-China and Thailand from the ABDA Area.

Admiral Pound and Marshal Dill agreed with this view, and explained that they felt that Burma should be included in the ABDA Area as an essential supply route to China. Burma had recently been transferred from the Far Eastern Command to the Indian Command, as being an important outpost of the Indian defense, but the British Chiefs of Staff now agreed that it should be included in the ABDA Area.

The British Chiefs of Staff agreed to a proposal put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff that a paragraph should be included to the effect that the Deputy Supreme Commander and, if required, a Commander of the combined Naval forces, should be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff accepted the Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area, as amended by the Committee, and including the Memorandum on the Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area (Annex 2 to the Report), as an agreed report, for submission to the President and the Prime Minister. (See Annex 3, U.S. ABC-4/5, British WW 3, December 30, 1941).  

3. **Next Meeting**

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed to meet at 2 p.m. the following day, Wednesday, December 31, 1941, to consider two reports by the Joint Planning Committee:

  (U.S. ABC-4/2; British WW (J.P.C.) 2).
  (U.S. ABC-4/3; British WW (J.P.C.) 3).

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*The report, as revised by the Chiefs of Staff, is ABC-4/5, WW-3, post, p. 289.
Ante, p. 140.
For report, and the two annexes thereto, see post, pp. 289-292.
Post, p. 240.
Post, p. 280.
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1941

MEETING OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, DECEMBER 31, 1941, 2 P. M., FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Sexton
Rear Admiral Towers
Rear Admiral Turner
Major General Holcomb
Brigadier General Gerow
Brigadier General Eisenhower
Lieutenant Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM

Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Little
Lieutenant General Wemyss
Air Marshal Harris

SECRETARIAT

Captain McCrea
Lieutenant Colonel Robinett
Major Sexton

Defense Files

United States Minutes

SECRET

JCCSs-7

WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES MARINES FROM ICELAND

Admiral Stark said that he was very anxious to withdraw the 4,500 U. S. Marines from Iceland as soon as possible, as they were urgently needed for other tasks. He hoped that this could be arranged even at the risk of delay in the relief of British troops.

Marshal Dill agreed as to the importance of withdrawing the Marines. He suggested that the local Commanders might be instructed to draw up the best possible plan for arranging this withdrawal as early as possible. He would telegraph to England to give the necessary instructions.

Admiral Stark said that the details of what was required could be furnished by Brigadier General Gerow.

It was agreed that the withdrawal of the 4,500 U. S. Marines now serving in Iceland should be arranged as soon as possible and Sir John Dill undertook to telegraph the necessary instructions to England on receipt of the details of what was required from Brigadier General Gerow.
2. AMERICAN-BRITISH STRATEGY

The Conference considered a revised version, prepared by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, of the Memorandum on American-British Strategy. (WW-1. U. S. Revised). The various amendments proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff were considered, and with a few exceptions were agreed to. It was also decided that the lists of sea and air bases contained in Paragraph 12 should be omitted. It was further agreed that the paper should be circulated only to the United States and British Chiefs of Staff and their immediate subordinates, and that a note should be inserted in the paper to this effect.

Air Marshal Harris said he would like to check with General Arnold the list of Air Routes which had been inserted.

Subject to a final check by Air Marshal Harris with General Arnold of the Air Routes paragraph, the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff approved the memorandum (See Annex No. 1, American-British Strategy, WW-1 (Final)), on American-British Strategy as amended in the discussion, and agreed that it should be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister.

3. SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

The Conference considered a report (U.S. ABC-4/3, British WW (J.P.C.)3), by the Joint Planning Committee on supporting measures for the Southwest Pacific. Admiral Pound said that as there would be an interval before General Wavell could take up his command, he thought it would be desirable to dispatch a telegram to the U. S. and British Commanders-in-Chief in the Far East to inform them of the general policy which had been agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff. He handed across copies of a telegram which he had drafted for this purpose. The draft telegram was considered and a number of amendments were agreed upon.

Later in the meeting, after Admiral King had entered, further consideration was given to the telegram, and some additional amendments made. A few minor amendments to the report were also accepted by the Joint Planning Committee.

It was agreed:

a. That the telegram, as amended in the discussion, should be dispatched forthwith to United States and British Commanders in the Far East.

b. That the report by the Joint Planning Committee, subject to the incorporation of the minor amendments agreed to in the discussion, should be approved.

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2 Post, p. 214.
3 Post, p. 280.
The report and the telegram in their final form were subsequently circulated as U.S. ABC-4/3, British WW-4 (See Annex 2).  

**NORTHWEST AFRICA PROJECT**

**Admiral Stark** said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not ready to discuss the report by the Joint Planning Committee on this subject, (U.S. ABC-4/2, British WW (J.P.C.) 2).

**Admiral Pound** said that certain officers bringing full information on reinforcements and shipping programs were expected to arrive from the United Kingdom on the following day. He thought that the Joint Planning Committee should then be in a position to examine the three main problems which were confronting us in the near future: namely,

- b. Relief of British Garrisons in Northern Ireland and Iceland.
- c. Reinforcements for the Far East and consequent replacements in the Middle East.

He thought that there were two cases which should be considered. First, one should assume that reinforcements to the Far East must be given priority; to what extent then must the gaps in the Middle East be filled, and could the Northwest Africa project be carried out? Alternatively, supposing the Northwest Africa project had to be carried out by invitation in the immediate future, what would happen to the rest of the program?

**Admiral Stark** said that with the Naval resources at present available, it did not appear possible to undertake anything which involved opening up a new convoy route.

**Rear Admiral Turner** said that the Joint Planning Committee felt the Northwest Africa project should be considered under more realistic hypotheses. Guidance from the Chiefs of Staff was required on this point. It should be realized that entry into French North Africa was only possible through Casablanca, which was a good but small port. The maximum rate at which forces could be disembarked was that given in the report, and this would be inadequate if opposition was likely to be met.

**Admiral Stark** thought that the Joint Planning Committee should consider what could be done in French North Africa if the situation was different from that assumed in the present report.

After further discussion, it was agreed that the Joint Planning

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*Post, p. 296.*

*Post, p. 240.*
Committee should be instructed to examine the questions in view of the discussion which had been raised.

General Marshall asked—on the assumption that it would be impossible to enter Morocco under resistance and the Germans moved through Spain—what would be the next move?

Admiral Pound replied, the occupation of the Canaries.

(At this point Admiral King entered the meeting).

5. RELIEF OF THE BRITISH GARRISON IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Admiral King said that it had been decided that for the present, U.S. forces destined for the relief of the British garrison in Northern Ireland should be transported in the S.S. George Washington, which would shortly be fit for service, this vessel being used on a continuous shuttle service to and from Northern Ireland. In a few weeks’ time, when the general trend in the Atlantic theatre could be judged, a decision could be taken as to whether the transport of these troops should be accelerated or not.

The Conference took note of this statement.

6. DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA

The Conference gave further consideration to this directive (U.S. ABC-4/5, British WW (J.P.C.) 5). One minor verbal alteration was agreed to and it was also decided to bring the statement of the general strategic policy into line with that telegraphed out to Commanders-in-Chief in the Far East by defining the Malay Barrier. (See Annex 2.)

Admiral King said that he had reason to believe that the directive would meet with the approval of the President, and this also applied to the statement on the higher direction of war in the ABDA Area contained in U.S. ABC-4/5, British WW-3 (Final), (See Annex 3.) He had also received a request that the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff should draft for consideration the public announcement setting up the unified command in the ABDA Area. He thought this should be completed on Friday.

The U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff gave final approval to the draft directive to the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area as

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6 As amended by the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on December 30, this report became ABC-4/5, WW-3, post, p. 289.

7 Annex 2 was the draft memorandum of December 30 from the United States Chiefs of Staff to the President, post, p. 287.

8 According to the President’s appointment calendar, King had lunch at the White House on December 31.

9 Post, p. 287.

amended in the discussion (U.S. ABC-4/5, British WW-3 (Final), (See Annex 3), and took note of Admiral King's statement.\textsuperscript{11}

7. Proposed Tasks for the Joint Planning Committee

The Conference considered the statement of tasks proposed for the Joint Planning Committee in U.S. Serial ABC-4/4, British WW (J. P.C.) 4, (See Annex 4)\textsuperscript{12} At the suggestion of Admiral Stark, it was decided that the following note should be added to the end of the paper:

"Consideration of the Southwest Pacific theater, including the matter of unity of command therein, was treated as a first priority, and a decision reached prior to the acceptance of the foregoing document."

The U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff accepted the statement (Annex 4, U.S. ABC-4/4, British WW(J.P.C.) 4), of the proposed tasks for the Joint Planning Committee, subject to the insertion of the note recorded above.

8. Naval Dispositions

Sir Dudley Pound suggested that one of the matters which might be discussed was the size of the Naval Forces available in the ABDA Area, and whether they were sufficient for the tasks they would encounter.

There was some discussion on this point in the course of which Admiral King pointed out that such a study would necessitate examination of the Naval resources in other theatres.

It was stated that the Naval staffs were already at work on this and it was finally agreed that this point should continue to be dealt with by them in direct consultation.

The Conference adjourned at 5:15 P.M.

\textsuperscript{11} The report, ABC-4/5, WW-3 (Final), was apparently sent to the President on the afternoon of December 31, under cover of the memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff to the President, \textit{post}, p. 287. Changes were made in the draft directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA area and in Annex 2 thereto as a result of the meeting in the White House on January 1, 1942; see \textit{post}, p. 162.

\textsuperscript{12} The report is printed \textit{post}, p. 247, with additional note suggested by Stark.

\textbf{Meeting of Secretary Stimson and Foreign Minister Soong, December 31, 1941, Afternoon, War Department}

\textbf{Present}

\textbf{United States} \hspace{1cm} \textbf{China}

Secretary Stimson \hspace{1cm} Foreign Minister Soong
No official record of this conversation has been found. Stimson, in his diary for December 31, has this to say about the meeting:

"In our talk it was brought out by Soong that Chiang Kai-shek is ready not only to permit his army to fight for the safety of Burma but is willing to put portions of it under foreign command. One of the difficulties has been the difficulty of separating the theatre of operations in China from the theatre of operations in Burma and also the southwestern Pacific. We have been drawing such a line of demarcation and it has been very difficult because the operations in one so vitally affect those in the other. Out of our conference came the decision that we must send one of our most important figures to China to be at the Generalissimo’s elbow and to give his seat of operations a recognition and dignity which we have not thus far afforded."

For the considerations leading to the appointment of General Stilwell as one of Chiang’s two chiefs of staff, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 63–76.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND SECRETARY HULL, DECEMBER 31, 1941, 4 P. M., BY TELEPHONE

Hull Papers

Memoranda by Mr. Savage

[WASHINGTON,] December 31, 1941.

The final text of the Joint Declaration was sent today to the White House for signature (memorandum attached).¹

There was a conversation in the office of the Secretary about four o’clock this afternoon to consider the question of making public this Joint Declaration. Those present were the Secretary, Mr. Hackworth, and Mr. Savage. During the conversation the Secretary called the President and suggested that since there would not be enough signatures on the document by tomorrow to make desirable its publication then, it would be preferable to wait a few days. It was agreed between the Secretary and the President that the Joint Declaration should be dated January 1 and made public on January 2 or 3.

CARLTON SAVAGE

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1941.

During a telephone conversation between the Secretary and the President, the President stated, with respect to the memorandum on the creation of a Supreme War Council,² that it seemed desirable to work in a cooperative way on a regional basis for the time, with the

¹ The memorandum is printed post, p. 376.
² See ante, p. 132.
possibility that eventually it might be feasible to create an over-all Supreme War Council.\(^a\)

Mr. Hackworth and Mr. Savage were present in the Secretary’s office during this telephone conversation.

**Carlton Savage**

\(^a\) There was no further consideration of the draft agreement for a multilateral Supreme War Council. The discussions on unity of command by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff eventuated in the establishment, as an alternative, of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; see *post*, pp. 206, 233.

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**THURSDAY, JANUARY 1, 1942**

**LUNCHEON MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, AND AMBASSADOR LITVINOV, JANUARY 1, 1942, THE WHITE HOUSE**

**Present**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President Roosevelt</td>
<td>Prime Minister Churchill</td>
<td>Mr. Litvinov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Hopkins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Editorial Note**

No formal record of the conversation at this meeting has been found. Hopkins’ account of the discussion (set forth below) appears as a long footnote added to his memorandum of January 6, 1942 (*post*, p. 170). Hopkins gives the date of this meeting as December 27, but this appears to have been an error. There was a luncheon meeting with the same participants on December 27 (see *ante*, p. 112), but the conversation described by Hopkins in the note under reference could not have taken place as early as December 27 because the Russian amendments and the British War Cabinet recommendation (referred to therein) were not received until December 29 (see *post*, pp. 374 and 371). Since Churchill did not return from Ottawa until the late evening of December 31, the editors have conjectured that the conversation described in the Hopkins note took place at the luncheon meeting on January 1, 1942. This seems to accord with the chronological sequence as reflected in Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 682, 685. Litvinov, in a conversation on January 10, 1942, referred to what was apparently this same discussion as having taken place “at the time of signing” the Declaration by United Nations; see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 31. The signing ceremony took place at about 10 p.m. on January 1, 1942; see *post*, p. 156.
Churchill’s exhibition of temper occurred at a luncheon between the President, Churchill, Litvinoff and myself on December 27 [January 1, 1942?] when the last finishing touches on the Joint Declaration were being explored.

The British were very anxious to have the word “authorities” included as well as “governments”. Litvinoff had wired the text to his Government and had their approval without the word “authorities” being in it.\(^1\)

The President and Churchill both tried to get Litvinoff to accept the amendment which had been urged by the British Cabinet so that the Free French might subscribe to the document.\(^2\)

Hull had been opposed to having the Free French in it and while he had not vigorously opposed the word “authorities”, it was clear Hull wanted no part of the Free French.\(^3\) His antagonism to the Free French is very deep seated and he still believes there is some way we can get on with Vichy. Nevertheless the President overruled Hull and agreed to the word “authorities”.\(^4\)

Litvinoff, however, told the President and Churchill that he had no power to agree to the inclusion of that word, that the approval of the Declaration was an approval by the Government in contradistinction to the Foreign Office and no ambassador of Russia has the power to agree to any textual change.

Churchill tried to argue that the change was inconsequential but it was perfectly clear that Litvinoff did not believe this and he insisted that he could not agree to a change and, because both the President and Churchill were anxious to have the text released at once, there was no time to cable to Russia.

At this point Churchill became quite angry and told Litvinoff in effect that he wasn’t much of an ambassador if he didn’t have the power to even add a word like this; that we were in a war and there was no time for long-winded negotiations. He said that we had agreed to every change in the text that the Russians wanted and it seemed to him they could agree to this.

Litvinoff stuck by his point, however, and the Declaration was issued without the word “authorities”.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Post, p. 374.
\(^2\) Post, p. 372.
\(^3\) See footnote 2, post, p. 376.
\(^4\) See the draft of January 1, post, p. 376.
Later I learned that Litvinoff had cabled for approval to include the word "authorities" and his Government had given it to him.\(^6\)

H. L. H.

\(^6\) On January 5, 1942, the Department of State issued the following release to the press: "In order that liberty-loving peoples silenced by military force may have an opportunity to support the principles of the Declaration by United Nations, the Government of the United States, as the depository for that Declaration, will receive statements of adherence to its principles from appropriate authorities which are not governments." (Department of State Bulletin, vol. vi, January 10, 1942, p. 44.) This statement was apparently issued at the request of the President; see Hull, vol. ii, pp. 1125–1126.

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL WITH THEIR MILITARY ADVISERS, JANUARY 1, 1942, ABOUT 6 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE\(^1\)

**PRESENT**

**UNITED STATES.**

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins  
General Marshall  
Admiral Stark  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General Arnold  
Rear Admiral Turner  
Brigadier General Gerow

**UNITED KINGDOM.**

Prime Minister Churchill  
Lord Beaverbrook  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Field Marshal Dill  
Air Chief Marshal Portal

**Secretariat**

Colonel Jacob

Arnold Papers

*Notes by Lieutenant General Arnold*

SECRET

The first item that was taken up was the Staff papers from the Chiefs of Staff’s Committee.

*Directive to Supreme Commander in Far East.* This item was approved by the President and the Prime Minister, except in certain paragraphs where he made changes which are recorded in the amended copy.\(^2\)

There was certain discussion as to the proper place in the war theatres of Burma. The 3 propositions discussed were: 1st. Burma as part of the Indian Command. 2nd. Burma as part of Chiang Kai-

\(^1\) Arnold’s notes show the meeting as starting at 5:30, while Gerow’s notes show 6 p.m. The President’s appointment calendar shows Hull, Halifax, Hopkins, and Churchill arriving at 5:30 and the American officers at 6:30.

\(^2\) ABC-4/5, WW-3 (Final), dated December 31, 1941, *post*, p. 297; for the text as eventually approved, see ABC-4/5 (Approved), WW-6, January 10, 1942, *post*, p. 313. For the discussion leading to these changes, see Gerow’s notes of the same meeting, *infra*. 
Shek’s theatre. 3rd. Burma as part of the ABDA theatre. 4th. Burma as an independent command.

It was pointed out that Burma as part of the Indian theatre would be an impossible situation; that Burma could not be a part of Chiang Kai-Shek’s command; that Burma as an independent command would gum the works for everybody. Accordingly, there was only one other solution—to make Burma a part of Wavell’s ABDA theatre, which was done.

The President then o.k.’d the directive to the Supreme Command. He directed that necessary instructions be sent out by cable with the “Scrambler”, and that the Chiefs of Staff’s Committee notify the Dutch. Churchill then brought up the question of the application of the ABDA agreement to the entire war. He stated that the powers of primary interest are the British and the United States because we control the sea. We supply most of the weapons of war such as airplanes and munitions for ground forces while Russia is doing a master job. Their activities are in one theatre only and that makes them a secondary power rather than a primary power.

The Prime Minister then asked what was the dividing line between our operations from the United States West Coast and the Eastern operations from Australia, and where was the dividing line between the Australian and New Zealand operations in the Fiji Islands. There must be some provision made to take care of the length between the ABDA, Australia and the New Zealand areas. Admiral King stated that he thought that probably the Australian and the New Zealand Navies might take care of the triangle. However, this matter would be taken under consideration.

The President then brought up the question of the French Fleet at Alexandria. He stated that he thought they would probably prefer to be transferred to the United States rather than the British Flag. Churchill stated that these ships were not in very good repair, and accordingly that he would much prefer to have them in cold storage in Alexandria. The only ammunition they had was in the holds of the ships and there were no repair parts for the ships. The President stated that he thought that if they would desire to come into the war we ought to take them over. Admiral Pound stated that the French Admiral was loyal to Vichy and that he had made all plans for scuttling his fleet and rebelling against orders. Churchill stated that if they wanted to move to the United States of their own free will, he would interpose no objection.

The President then read the telegram he had received from Bullitt and Lyttelton covering the invasion of Tokyo [Tunisia]. He stated that the resistance of the French was certain and that it would be

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8 The reference is to the telegram from Bullitt and Lyttelton, dated December 31, post, p. 249.
impossible to get supplies in North Africa if the French in Morocco were hostile. It was certain that the Germans would send air units against any invasion troops, that the operation could not be a success unless the U.S. movement into North Africa was simultaneous with the British invasion of Tokyo [Tunisia], that they believed there would be resistance against the U.S. invasion unless French leaders were brought into this plan. They recommended that the British in the Near East be reinforced, that the United States start action at once towards creating a force for Casablanca operations, that the necessary propaganda machinery be started so as to secure as much aid as possible in all countries prior to the invasion, and that we provide for taking over the Canaries and the Azores. Churchill stated that it was not necessary to take over the Canaries and the Azores first, but it was very remarkable that these two men, (Bullitt and Lyttelton) quite independent from the rest of them, had agreed with the British in general principle in these operations. The President then stated that we must consider this case at once while the Prime Minister is here with us. It was then agreed, after General Marshall had introduced the subject, that we would make plans and start movement of troops to North Africa and towards replacing the Marines in Iceland at once.

Defense Flies

Notes by Brigadier General Gerow

SECRET

The Prime Minister read a message from General Wavell regarding the assumption of supreme command of the ABDA theater. General Wavell desired to delay assumption of command until he could organize a headquarters and exercise his authority. He recommended that Burma remain under control of the Commanding General in India.

The President stated that Wavell and Brett had made a bad impression on Chiang Kai-shek, particularly with reference to the disposition of matériel at Rangoon. He asked that General Wavell and the British Commander at Burma be directed to cooperate with the Generalissimo.

With regard to Burma, General Marshall pointed out that that area would normally come under command of the Generalissimo. General Marshall appreciated that this would not be acceptable to the British. Mr. Churchill stated that the British would have to retain command in Burma. After considerable discussion it was agreed that Burma should remain in the ABDA area, and be under

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1 This is the telegram dated December 30, 1941, post, p. 292.
2 See the explanation of the Tulsa affair, post, p. 272, footnote 3.
the operational control of General Wavell. The local commander at Burma could deal directly with Chiang Kai-shek as Wavell's representative.

Churchill stated that London had suggested that Australia and New Zealand be included in the ABDA area, but that he thought that those two areas should be given separate treatment.

The President took up the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staffs Committees (British and American) for the appointment of a Supreme Commander in the ABDA area. The basic directive and the machinery for handling this theater were discussed. The President suggested that paragraph 5 of the directive be rewritten to eliminate the defensive concept. He also suggested changes in paragraph 13, paragraph 15 and paragraph 17. With regard to paragraph 15 the President objected to the inclusion of such a paragraph feeling, as he expressed it, that it was an invitation to commanders to protest against the orders of the Supreme Commander. The Chiefs of Staffs insisted on the retention of this appeal paragraph. The President consented provided the words "in the unlikely event" at the beginning of the paragraph be added.

The Prime Minister directed that a message be sent to General Wavell directing him to take over as soon as possible and notify London and Washington when he was prepared to do so.

The President suggested that two scrambled wires between the United States and London be provided so that the President and the Prime Minister could talk directly and secretly and also the Chiefs of the United States and British Staffs. The President and the Prime Minister wanted this possibility investigated.

The question was raised as to how to inform the Dutch of the British and American agreement with regard to the ABDA area. It was suggested that the Chiefs of Staffs inform the Military Attaché in Washington. No decision was made. It was also suggested that the ABDA Agreement be sent by machine to Magruder for delivery to Chiang Kai-shek.

The New Zealand-Australia-New Guinea sea areas were discussed. The British wanted the U. S. Navy to take over the responsibility for that area. Admiral King stated he was not prepared to do so at the present time, and felt that the Australians and New Zealanders should continue to carry on.

A dispatch from Bullitt and Lyttelton suggested that the United States take over French war vessels in Cairo. Mr. Churchill thought this question should be left in cold storage until the North African project was settled. Another dispatch from Bullitt and Lyttelton was

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3 See Arnold's notes of this same meeting, supra.
4 Probably means "machine code".
5 The reference is to Bullitt's telegram of December 27, post, p. 244.
read by the President.\textsuperscript{6} This dispatch discussed at considerable length the cooperation of the British and United States in simultaneous occupation of Tunisia and Casablanca.

The proposal presented by General Marshall\textsuperscript{7} to dispatch by January 15, 14,000 troops to Ireland and 6,000 to Iceland was approved by the President and the Prime Minister.

L. T. Gerow

\textsuperscript{6}The reference is to the telegram from Bullitt and Lyttelton, dated December 31, \textit{post}, p. 249.
\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Post}, p. 251.

MEETING FOR SIGNING THE DECLARATION BY UNITED NATIONS, JANUARY 1, 1942, 10 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

\textit{Editorial Note}

According to the President's appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers), this brief meeting, which took place in the President's study, was attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, Soong, Litvinov, and Hopkins. The first four signed the declaration at about 10 p.m.; there is no indication that matters of substance were discussed. Further signatures were affixed on January 2, 1942, in the Department of State; see \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1942, vol. I, p. 27.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 2, 1942

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, AND SECRETARY HULL, JANUARY 2, 1942, 11:40 A. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

\textit{Present}

\textbf{UNITED STATES}

President Roosevelt
Secretary Hull

\textbf{UNITED KINGDOM}

Prime Minister Churchill

\textit{Editorial Note}

No official record of this conversation has been found. The exact time of the meeting is derived from the President's appointment calendar in the Roosevelt Papers. From Hull's memorandum of January 2, 1942, to Roosevelt (\textit{post}, p. 387) it appears that the meeting considered the preparation and issuance of a communiqué regarding the problem of St. Pierre and Miquelon. According to Hull (vol. II, p. 1134), the Secretary of State told Churchill that the latter's remarks at Ottawa about the Vichy Government and de Gaulle had been "highly incendiary". He pleaded with Churchill to issue
a statement supporting the United States policy toward Vichy, but Churchill “was not cordial to the suggestion.”

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL WITH THEIR ADVISERS ON SHIPPING, JANUARY 2, 1942, NOON, THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

**United States**
- President Roosevelt
- Rear Admiral Land
- Captain Vickery

**United Kingdom**
- Prime Minister Churchill
- Lord Beaverbrook
- Sir Arthur Salter

*Editorial Note*

No official record of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above regarding the time of the meeting and the participants is taken from the President’s appointment calendar in the Roosevelt Papers. A reference to the meeting appears in Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 690, where it is referred to as one of a series of meetings on “supply issues” in which it was decided to raise drastically the United States output of merchant shipping for the years 1942 and 1943.

On June 25, 1963, the editors wrote to Vice Admiral Land to ask whether the meeting of January 2, 1942, was in fact the one at which the decisions were reached that were embodied in the President’s directive of January 3 and his Message to Congress of January 6 with regard to production of cargo ships. Admiral Land replied as follows:

“As I remember, the high spots of the meeting are as outlined in your letter.

“As always, the Prime Minister (as well as everyone else) requested more and more merchant ships. The President told the Prime Minister, ‘We have reached the bottom of the barrel’, whereupon the Prime Minister replied, ‘You can scrape the barrel’, and that is what resulted for we were forced to assign some additional ships to the British. Both Admiral Vickery and I politely disagreed with this decision but carried it out as far as was in any way practicable.

“My recollection is that the President’s message to Congress on January 6 was his own concept of the situation, but most likely this conference had a direct bearing on his ideas of ship tonnage required.

“The President was the most ship-minded gentleman I have ever heard of or known with Naval ships number one and merchant ships number two.”  (Land to the Historical Office, June 28, 1963, PR 10).

See also the testimony of Admiral Vickery in *Production in Shipbuilding Plants: Executive Hearings before the Subcommittee on
I. THE FIRST WASHINGTON CONFERENCE


SATURDAY, JANUARY 3, 1942

LUNCHEON MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, JANUARY 3, 1942, THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

The information set forth above regarding this meeting is derived from the list of functions that Hopkins attended during the First Washington Conference (Hopkins Papers).

No record of the discussion has been found. It appears, however, that the St. Pierre-Miquelon problem may have been discussed, for in the early afternoon a new version of the draft declaration on St. Pierre-Miquelon, said to have been “prepared at the White House between the President and Mr. Churchill”, was telephoned to the American Minister in Canada (Moffat) by Mr. Dunn of the Department of State. (See Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. II, p. 656.) The revised text of the draft communiqué is printed post, p. 389.

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL WITH THEIR ADVISERS ON WAR PRODUCTION, JANUARY 3, 1942, ABOUT 5 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Knudsen
Mr. Nelson

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Beaverbrook

Editorial Note

No official record of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above regarding the hour of the meeting and the participants is taken from Nelson, p. 185; the date of January 3 is derived from Churchill’s telegram of January 4 to Attlee, reporting on the results of various meetings on supply issues (The Grand Alliance, p. 690). According to Nelson’s account, the discussion con-
cerned the raising of production estimates for munitions of war, particularly Roosevelt's goals of 45,000 tanks and 60,000 planes which "startled" Nelson.

SUNDAY, JANUARY 4, 1942

CONVERSATIONS OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARNOLD WITH MR. HOPKINS, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, JANUARY 4, 1942, THE WHITE HOUSE

Arnold Papers

Memorandum by Lieutenant General Arnold

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 4, 1942.

I. General Arnold was called to the White House by Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. Hopkins talked over organization of the Air Forces, replacement of Chief of the Air Corps in the organization due to the present status of General Brett, whether anything was interfering with or retarding the expansion of the Air Forces and what, if anything, was holding up the Navy Air Program. He was informed as follows:

That the Chief of Staff was in full accord with our 1 million man, 115 Group Program;

That the only thing that was holding it up was approval by the President;

That the War Department was for getting this program, together with the Army Program, to the President for approval at an early date;

That with this program we expected to have 34 groups of heavy bombers and reach a grand total of 115 groups by December 31, 1942;

That we proposed to have 800 heavy bombers in England by December. In addition to that, we expect to have 2 Pursuit Groups each in England, Ireland and North Africa;

That this is in addition to any aircraft required for test [task?] force or aid to the Far East;

That we expect to have in the Far East within the next couple of months:

2 Heavy Bombardment Groups — 80 planes
4 Pursuit Groups — 320 planes
2 Medium Bombardment Groups — 114 planes
1 Dive Bomber Group — 52 planes

That we believed these forces with the British in Singapore would be more than ample to gain air superiority in any area in which they were concentrated. This mainly because Portal had just told me that he was increasing his air strength in Singapore. Further, the Japs have a total of less than 1 thousand airplanes in that area and they are spread from "hell to breakfast" so that we can concentrate more air force in any area than the Japs can, and by using our long-range bombers against ships can deny that area to carriers;

1 An account of these conversations is printed in Arnold, pp. 237–289.
That the Japs must be using about 2 minimum or 4 maximum carriers in the area and as soon as we start working on those carriers they will be forced to withdraw back towards Japan.

He asked me about the air routes to the Far East and I explained how Natal was the critical point.

He further asked me whether I expected to run into any obstacles in meeting this program. I told him as far as training was concerned everything was getting along beautifully, although we would have to bring in a lot of administrative civilians to replace trained Army Air Corps men who would go out with tactical units. I further stated that if there were any obstacles in our path I would propose to ride them with the aid of the Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

Question arose about what was wrong with the Navy Air Force. I told him that was a question for Towers to answer and not for me.

We talked at length about priorities. I told him it was not a question of allocations, but of priorities themselves.

I further told him that there had been a general awakening throughout the whole United States; that the fact that we are at war had caused us to want to get maximum production. This has been indicated by the increase in numbers of airplanes as follows: First, by Curtiss—7 to 14 a day. Next, by Boeing—35 to 60 during the month of December, both after the Japs made their attacks on Pearl Harbor. He assured me that the President was determined to get a maximum production of 48,000 airplanes during the year of 1942 and a total of 100,000 during the year of 1943.

II. After this conference, he told me the President wanted to see me. Shortly thereafter, I went to the President’s Study and was with him alone for about 45 minutes. He asked me various questions about our aircraft setup and I went over them in detail the same as I did with Harry Hopkins. He was very much interested in the number of planes we were going to send to England, Ireland and North Africa. He was also interested in our Program and whether or not we thought we could reach it and what obstacles there might be in our path. I gave him the same assurance that I gave Hopkins.

He then discussed Natal Peninsula, went into details as to why Vargas (President of Brazil) could not leap into action and give us permission to put more troops on the Natal Peninsula. Vargas had to sort of feel his way and be sure of his ground. I assured him that the Natal Peninsula was absolutely essential to our successful Ferry Service across the South Atlantic. He said he realized that.

He asked me how I was getting along with Portal and I said “100
per cent.” I told him of the agreement I made with Portal that no airplanes of the fighting class should be held back waiting for something to happen; that as soon as possible all such airplanes should be sent across where they could fight. He agreed with me that that was an excellent thing to do.

He expressed himself as being in accord with the Aircraft Program as outlined in every respect.

III. Between my talks with Hopkins and my visit to the President I was taken in to see Mr. Churchill, the Prime Minister. He received me and talked to me for 15 or 20 minutes. He asked me various questions concerning how we were getting along, what we had given the British and what units we had sent over. I gave him the same information that I had given Hopkins and the President.

He seemed very pleased and asked when we would get the Staffs over there so that they could get acquainted with British methods of operations and procedures. I assured him that they could be gotten over very shortly, that it was a question of weeks rather than months. He expressed great pleasure at this and told me to be sure to get them over as quickly as we could.

He asked questions about British organization and personnel and told me of a change he was going to make in the British organizations but asked me not to divulge it.

I told him about my proposed trip with Portal. He told me to take the trip because “I will be out of town for about a week myself and this gives you a good chance to take [talk to?] Portal.”

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL WITH THEIR MILITARY ADVISERS, JANUARY 4, 1942, 5:30 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

**United States**

President Roosevelt
Secretary Stimson
Secretary Knox
Mr. Hopkins
General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Turner
Brigadier General Gerow
Captain McCrea
Commander Libby
Major Sexton

**United Kingdom**

Prime Minister Churchill
Admiral Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Brigadier Holllis
SECRET

Subject: General Plans.

The President stated that there were one or two matters on which he desired clarification because certain Army-Navy action depended on political considerations.

The first matter was that it was problematical what would happen to the French, both in France and in West and North Africa, and that plans must be prepared for any situation which might arise.

The second consideration was the situation in Brazil—that at the present time we can do no more than guess, but that it was of great importance that we keep our lines of communication with Europe open.

Third, that we must be prepared to take Army-Navy action if no additional developments occur in either of these areas and the situation appears to be working in our direction. We must work on the basis that the Ireland and Iceland expeditions are in shape to proceed without delay in such a manner that these operations could be halted if other considerations intervened. We cannot, at this time, make a decision with reference to Africa and Brazil, but we must be ready to take proper action if both of these situations blow up in our face, and also we must be ready if nothing happens in either of these places; that the Secretary of War is correct when he says that we can take no chances on the possibility of our first major expedition being a failure; that if the risk looks great, we must think twice before we go ahead.²

Subject: Relief of Troops in Northern Ireland.

The Secretary of War stated that the expedition to Northern Ireland has been agreed upon, and the sailing date has been set. The question is, are the British ready for us?

Field Marshal Dill stated that he would see that all arrangements were made to receive the American troops.

The Secretary of War stated that he wanted to be certain that when the American troops arrive in Ireland they will not have to “roost on the rocks.”

Mr. Churchill stated that the British would take full responsibility for accommodating the American troops when they arrive;

¹The minutes are typed on War Department stationery and were prepared presumably by Major Sexton.
²Stimson, in his diary for January 4, makes the following statement: “To my surprise the President called on me to lead the discussion and in doing so he used some of the cautionary statements that I had emphasized to him last evening in my talk over the telephone.”
that the three divisions which were being relieved could be moved to England; that he felt it was of tremendous importance to begin this movement at once.

The President asked how many American planes were being sent to Northern Ireland.

General Arnold replied, "Two pursuit groups, about 160 planes."

The President asked if the British were going to withdraw their planes from Northern Ireland.

Air Marshal Portal replied that at present they have none in Northern Ireland; however, that the presence of American planes in Ireland would be of great assistance to the British because it would obviate the necessity of the British dispatching planes to that area in case Ireland were invaded, and that accommodations would be provided for the air units also.

Subject: Gymnast Plan.

It was agreed that the British plans for the occupation of Northwestern Africa would be known as Gymnast; British plans with American participation would be known as Super-Gymnast.

The Secretary of War stated that the Army representatives had just completed a meeting with the Navy, and that in his opinion, the situation depended on political considerations—(1) an invitation; (2) would the Spanish be able to delay a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in sufficient time to permit the occupation to be completed?

The President observed that we should discount any idea that the Spanish would offer opposition to the Germans.

The Secretary of War then stated that the crucial matter in the occupation depended as to whether the American-British forces could establish a canopy of air protection until the landing could be completed; that this meant the employment of considerable carrier forces, and that the matter was still under discussion; that he was troubled by the possibility that the Germans could quickly establish themselves in the Iberian Peninsula and employ a dangerous force against this operation; that the Germans are already on the ground; that they have a considerable knowledge of the situation in Africa and that what we need is a fifth column in the North African area; that our chances of success in this plan will fade as time goes on.

The President observed that, on the supposition that the Germans would move in immediately, it would take them as long to complete the occupation as it would us; that they would have the same problem as we have; that in this event he did not think that we could stand idly by and permit them to become established.
With reference to the time required to complete Super-Gymnast, Mr. Churchill observed that it had not required the Japs four months to get ashore in Luzon.

Admiral Turner stated that Casablanca was the only suitable port and it was small; that it will take each convoy two weeks to unload; that there are other small ports along the coast, but we could only furnish air protection for one of these.

Mr. Churchill observed that if we could complete the movement in one month, the opposition (from the Germans) would undoubtedly be small, but that if it takes four months we would probably be blasted out.

The Secretary of War stated that only one port is thoroughly available; that in other possible landing places, the force would have to land from an open roadstead, and he admitted that he could not understand why it would still take four months even if the British are not landing there but at Algiers.

The President asked if any investigation of the possibilities at Rio [de] Oro had been made.

Admiral Turner replied that the communications were very bad there and it would involve a movement over a desert road of 700 or 800 miles.

Mr. Churchill observed that if carriers are going to be involved in this movement, the time factor for unloading would have to be reduced because the Germans could assemble a strong U-boat concentration, and that the loss of carriers could not be afforded at this time.

The Secretary of War observed that, under the plans, the carriers would be moving out without delay; that there were two possibilities being studied—one to carry assembled Army planes on the carriers, and the other to use Navy planes.

Admiral Turner stated that carriers could not remain in the Casablanca area more than ten days; that two plans were possible—one to carry Army planes and have them fly off the carrier and immediately establish themselves in landing fields adjacent to Casablanca. This plan would not appear as feasible as the possibility of having Navy planes furnish the initial air canopy while fields were being established. These Navy planes could then return to the carriers, a matter which would be impossible for Army planes. Then after the fields were established the Army planes could be flown to them and landed. (Note: The point of this is that Army pursuit planes cannot land on the decks of a carrier).

The Secretary of War stated that from our experience in the Philippines it was of vital importance to have several dispersed fields, and that the basic necessity was to establish this canopy of air protection immediately following the beginning of the operation.
Mr. Churchill observed that the first wave should be accommodated in two or three days, and that even if the Germans hear about the movement, it would take them some time, at least ten days, to move supplies and get ready for an attack from Spain.

The Secretary of War asked how many ships could unload at Casablanca at once.

Admiral Turner replied that not more than ten or twelve could unload at once; that the first convoy would have twenty-two or twenty-three ships; that it would take two weeks for each convoy to unload; that the Americans had thought it could be done in ten days but the British believed two weeks.

The President asked that if the Commander was ordered to unload in one week instead of two, could he do it?

Admiral Turner replied that two weeks was the best estimate that they could make.

The Secretary of the Navy quoted General Arnold as saying that German fighters could not operate at Casablanca from bases in Spain; that Colonel Donovan's organization was attempting to get detailed information concerning the Casablanca area.

The President observed that he and Mr. Churchill and the two staffs appeared to know very little about the region, and that a matter of outstanding consideration was the possibility that the Germans might move into the area first.

The Secretary of War observed that he couldn't understand the lack of military intelligence concerning this area.

Admiral Turner stated that the Joint Planning Committee had a mass of information available, but there were still certain factors which could be obtained only by detailed inspection of the ground.

The Secretary of War stated that essential points should be boiled down to the matter as to whether it would be possible to get and keep air control, and whether it would be possible to land and disperse in fields around Casablanca.

The President asked concerning the sea conditions in the area.

Admiral Turner stated there was a large surf with a heavy roll at this time of the year.

Admiral King proposed a solution of using three carriers—one to carry Navy fighters, the other Army fighters, and the third, heavy Army bombers. While the Navy fighters were furnishing the canopy, the Army heavy bombers would carry supplies such as gasoline, bombs, etc., and land them on the fields at which it was desired to base the Army fighters. This would avoid the delay necessary to move the supplies to these fields. He thought that this could be done in three weeks and then the carriers could move out.
The President observed that the two-weeks period to completely unload one convoy seemed awfully slow for people who were in a hurry.

Mr. Churchill suggested that the landing be practiced at some place which would be similar to actual anticipated conditions, and the determination made as to how long it would actually take. While this was being done, the general plans for the operation would go forward.

General Marshall pointed out that an operation similar to this is being undertaken at the present time.

The President asked, in the amphibious exercises which had been held lately, how long had been taken to unload.

Admiral King replied that it had taken 48 hours to unload 12,000 men, but that this had not included heavy equipment.

The President then stated that the matter of the invitation is in the lap of the gods, but that we must be ready to have the transports sail within one week after the time it was received (if it is received).

Marshal Dill observed that if we did this, it would hold up other transportation which was needed for other purposes.

Admiral King stated that we could hold the ships in readiness.

General Marshall pointed out that present plans contemplate the sailing of the Ireland relief expedition on January 15; that if this convoy had already sailed, and it was desired to initiate Super-Gymnast, it would require three or four weeks to get it back; that meanwhile, effort would be made to figure out every possible way in which this expedition could be put across; that everyone agreed as to the strategic importance of the expedition; that we would push for information and explore all possibilities.

Mr. Churchill stated that he attached tremendous importance to the January 15 movement; that it was of great importance to the morale of the British to have American troops move into Ireland at this time. He suggested that planners push ahead with their plans for Super-Gymnast but make no diversion of shipping on the Ireland relief; that we should take no real ships from real jobs; and that we could talk about the matter again in a few days.

Admiral Pound observed that if the Ireland relief (Magnet) is undertaken, there would not be sufficient ships immediately available for Super-Gymnast.

Mr. Churchill inquired as to the possibility of using some of the fast, large ships for Magnet to move unescorted.

Admiral Pound agreed that the risks of using an unescorted fast ship are not too heavy, but that the price is frightful if the ship would be sunk.
Admiral King observed that he believed that a fast ship moving unescorted had a better chance of reaching its destination than slow-moving convoys.

The Secretary of War made the following summary: Assuming that the Magnet force now goes ahead as planned, we should try to get, in addition, twenty-two or twenty-three ships for the first convoy of Super-Gymnast so that if it becomes feasible to put Super-Gymnast into operation, the Magnet force will not interfere; that the first expedition on Super-Gymnast would consist of certain Marines and Air Corps units but would not contain armored forces; that even if the British would make a landing at Algiers, some armored forces should be provided for the first convoy in Super-Gymnast.

Admiral Turner thought that we could get enough ships (exclusive of Magnet) for the first U.S. convoy on Super-Gymnast; however, we could not dispatch the second convoy on Super-Gymnast until the Magnet ships get back.

Mr. Churchill said that under no circumstances should we delay Magnet going ahead.

Admiral Pound observed that the Queen Mary would be ready in a week, and that the Queen Elizabeth, the Aquitania and Normandie would also be available.

Admiral King suggested that we might send a token force (Magnet) on the Queen Mary and leave the other ships to rest on events.

Admiral Turner stated that we are all set for 21,000 men (Magnet) to sail on the fifteenth of January.

General Marshall stated that we will have troops ready to go as fast as the ships are ready to carry them.

The President stated that we might transport 6,000 men on the Queen Mary for Magnet and use the rest of the available space for cargo; that the matter should be given further study; and that we should get more information regarding Northwest Africa.

Mr. Churchill then asked "Then you rule that the Queen Mary can be used for this transportation?"

The President nodded apparent agreement.

Admiral Pound asked if an additional use could be made of American ships which had been turned over to the British for convoy from the Middle East to the Far East. 3

Admiral King stated that he would be willing to permit the British to make any emergency use of these ships that was desirable.

Admiral Stark stated that he would talk to Admiral Pound concerning the matter.

At 6:30 P.M. the Conference adjourned.

3 See the memorandum of January 3, 1942, by Hollis, post, p. 304.
SECRET

The President stated that he wanted first to talk about the French, what their attitude is toward our coming in to help them in France, in West Africa, or in North Africa; that we have to keep open the communications from Natal to Africa; that what takes place in North Africa depends upon the other fellow but we must be ready; that we have to be prepared for any eventuality—things may remain quiet for the next couple of months or the theatre of operations may turn in our direction at any time.

The President stated that action should be started at once on getting the United States Forces to Ireland and Iceland for the relief of the British garrisons there. The Secretary of War then wanted to know, if they were already for us, that we were proposing to send over 14,000 men. General Dill stated that they were ready for one Division to which the Prime Minister added, “We are ready. It is of the greatest importance that these troops get to their destinations at the earliest possible moment.”

The President then asked General Arnold how many groups were to be sent, to which General Arnold replied that 2 groups were to be sent as soon as ships can be provided.

The Secretary of War implied that we are spending a considerable amount of time on North and West Africa, at which the Prime Minister stated, “we call it GYMNASI and with you coming in, SUPER-GYMNASI.”

The Secretary of War then said that one of the conditions we are assuming is that Spain will offer no opposition to Germany; that we all agree that as a strategic move it is a necessity to go into Spain, and as time passes our opportunity fades. The President agreed to this and stated that the Germans will also require time the same as we do but that we can’t wait until they get in and entrench themselves. We should get in first so that we won’t have to drive them out.

The Prime Minister asked why it should have to take us 4 months when the Japs took only one day for their blitz. Everyone looked around at Turner for the answer and his reply was that Casablanca was the only port—it is small and can accommodate only one ship at a time as a lighter landing has to be used. The Prime Minister then continued that if we require 4 months, the Germans will get there much faster than we can support our advance troops; we must get it over in a fortnight—otherwise the Germans will concentrate troops hurriedly and drive us out.
The President then wanted to know if Rio de Oro had been taken into consideration and Turner advised him that it was a long distance away and connected by 7 or 8 hundred miles of poor road.

The Prime Minister then inserted that our carriers would be in constant danger from subs and bombers for 4 months, at which the Secretary of War interposed that this would be the case only until we got Army planes ashore and set up.

Turner stated that the carriers would be there only for a matter of ten days to two weeks.

The Prime Minister said that he rather pictured that we would arrive on Day 1 and twenty to thirty thousand troops would be landed on the day following, then everything would be dispersed by the time the Germans could assemble for attack.

After the Germans move into the airdromes in Southern Spain it would require ten days to get set and prepare to attack.

Turner told the Secretary of War that they could unload ten ships a day but could not work at night, upon which the Prime Minister stated they could work at night until the Germans attacked. The President then wanted to know if they could unload within a week if they got orders to and Turner replied that he could rest assured that they would take no more time than was necessary.

Admiral King said that there should be sent one carrier with Navy planes, one carrier with Army planes and one carrier with bombers, bombs and ammunition and that the way to do this is as follows:

1st—With 75 or 80 Navy fighters
2nd—With 80 or 100 Army fighters
3rd—With Army bombers—to carry bombs, gasoline, and ammunition.

By transporting these Army bombers on a carrier, it will be necessary for us to take off from the carrier, which brings up the question of what kind of plane—B-18 bomber and DC-3—for cargo?

(Note: Study on Sea Trains)

We will have to try bomber take-off from carriers. It has never been done before but we must try out and check on how long it takes.

The President said that we must get everything in readiness and hold all equipment available. Dill interposed that they would keep ships from other more important things—the Far East for instance—to which the President replied, “Part of them.”

General Marshall said we were all in agreement that it would be very bad for us if the Germans established themselves in Spain. We are about to start a move to Ireland and Iceland on January 15th. Meantime, we are making plans and trying to cut down the time to get things moving.

The Prime Minister said we should then keep up our studies and meet again within the next few days.
The President stated that for two men that are in a hurry to get things done, it seems to take a long time, with which the Prime Minister agreed and stated that the next step was to try to cut down on the time.

The next question that came up was the use of the Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, Normandie, Aquitania and George Washington for transport purposes. All agreed that with a fast ship the time of exposure is reduced.

Next question discussed was when the two pursuit groups were to go and General Arnold stated that they planned to send 21,000 on January 15th. General Marshall said we will have the troops ready to go to Magnet as fast as ships are available.

Another question raised was when will ship be ready to transport P-40s to Cairo. This question was held in abeyance until definitely determined.

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TUESDAY, JANUARY 6, 1942

LUNCHEON MEETING OF MR. HOPKINS AND AMBASSADOR LITVINOV,
JANUARY 6, 1942, SOVIET EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Hopkins

SOVIET UNION

Mr. Litvinov

Madame Litvinov

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum by Mr. Hopkins

... 

After an altogether pleasant luncheon, with the ever present caviar—this time not so good—and vodka, Litvinoff and I had coffee alone in his study.

I asked him what the significance was of the Pravda article attacking the Army for declaring Manila an open city. He told me it was written by an inconsequential writer and could not possibly represent the Government’s point of view.

I reminded him that Pravda was the party paper and there was a controlled press in Russia and that the article could not possibly have been published without the approval of the Government. Litvinoff then retreated to the argument that many critical things were published in America about Stalin and Russia and Russia never complained about them.

\(^1\) The omitted portions of this memorandum have no relevance to the First Washington Conference.
I told him that that was not a parallel case because he knew perfectly well we had a free and uncontrolled press while in Russia the press is entirely a state affair. I told him I thought the whole business was extremely unfortunate and if any more things happened like that it would make it very difficult for us.

We discussed the war at great length and he told me he had no confidence in Japan and he was sure that Japan was going to attack Russia at the earliest possible moment, but that Russia was at the moment unprepared but had little doubt that by spring she would be at war with Japan.

He asked me why I thought Churchill was so impatient with him at our conference the other day. I told him I had no idea and thought it was a matter of no very great importance.

Litvinoff was sure, however, that it was not directed at him personally but that Churchill was endeavoring to impress him with his impatience for some ulterior reason.

Litvinoff expressed the belief that Churchill was a great war Prime Minister but would not be very useful after the war was over.

He thinks that Roosevelt is going to be the dominating person at the peace table. He expressed himself with very considerable emotion about the President, stating that ever since he first met him in 1933 he believed that he had the best grasp of world economic and political conditions of any living man and he still holds to this belief.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

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2 At this point in the memorandum Hopkins added, by way of explanation, the long footnote quoted ante, p. 150.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 10, 1942

MEETING OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 10, 1942, 3 P. M., FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Sexton
Rear Admiral Horne
Rear Admiral Towers
Major General Holcomb
Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM

Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral Little
Lieutenant General Wemyss
Air Marshal Harris
Captain Belben

SECRETARIAT

Captain McCrea
Lieutenant Colonel Robinett
Lieutenant Colonel Sexton

Brigadier Hollis
Brigadier Dykes
Colonel Jacob
SECRET
JCCSs-8

1. SUPER GYMNASI

Admiral Pound said that the British Chiefs of Staff had made a careful examination of the various factors which affected the timing of this operation, and the earliest date on which the first convoy could arrive at Casablanca. He explained these to the Conference and undertook to let the United States Chiefs of Staff have a note on the subject. So far as the British were concerned, it appeared that if January 7 were taken as the date on which planning really began, the earliest date for D-1 on which the decision to load the first convoy could be given would be February 4. In this event the first convoy would arrive at Algiers and Casablanca on D-28, that is, March 3, depending upon the availability of shipping on that date. He also pointed out that the whole undertaking would depend upon the planning, the shipping, and the availability of troops and matériel. As to details at points of debarkation, Admiral Pound said that he anticipated no difficulty in Algiers, and that in the British opinion, 29,000 men and 8,500 vehicles could be unloaded at Casablanca in the fortnight.

General Marshall asked Admiral Pound if the British could undertake both Casablanca and Algiers.

Admiral Pound replied in the affirmative.

General Marshall then expressed some concern about the availability of shipping for the second convoy and undertook to confirm that January 7 could be accepted, from the American point of view, as the date on which planning began.

2. DIRECTIVE FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ABDA AREA—ATTITUDE OF THE DUTCH

Admiral Stark recalled that certain amendments to Annex 2 of the draft directive for General Wavell had been proposed by the British in order to meet certain points raised by the Dutch. These had not yet been accepted by the Dutch, but had been approved by the President and the Prime Minister. He confirmed that these proposed amendments were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall said that the Dutch representative in Washington had come into the War Department a good deal over the question of the Dutch position. It appeared that the population of the Nether-

\footnote{See the letter from Hollis to Hopkins, January 5, 1942, post, p. 304.}
lands East Indies were feeling rather hurt at not having been consulted over the question of supreme command. They did not consider that the Dutch Government in London was fully representative of them. Some trouble had also been caused through the omission from General Wavell’s directive of any instruction to set up his Headquarters in Java. In the original communication to the Dutch Government, which proposed the setting up of a Supreme Commander, a passage to this effect had been included.2

Every endeavor had been made by Brigadier General Gerow to smooth down the feelings of the Dutch representative in Washington and to induce him to fall in with the agreed views of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff,3 but in view of the fact that negotiations with the Dutch Government were being conducted by the British, the position was somewhat embarrassing.

Admiral Pound expressed the appreciation of the British Chiefs of Staff for the way in which the United States Staff’s were dealing with this matter. A telegram had been sent to General Wavell instructing him to set up his Headquarters in Java,4 and in fact, he was establishing himself at Batavia on January 10.

The Chiefs of Staff took cognizance of the prior approval of ABC-4/5, WW 6, with Annex 2 amended, and also of the fact that further amendments would possibly be made upon reply from the Dutch and Australian Governments. (See Annex 1)5

3. Procedure for the Assumption of Command by General Wavell

The Conference had before it an amendment by the British Chiefs of Staff on the procedure for the assumption of command of General Wavell (US–ABC–4/CS–3, British WW–9).6 Various minor amendments were agreed to.

Admiral King suggested that it would be advisable to insert in the draft telegram to General Wavell a sentence to indicate that instructions were being sent to Admiral Hart and General Brett telling them to report to him for duty in their respective posts. The following addition to the draft telegram at Annex B was accordingly agreed to:

“General Brett and Admiral Hart are being ordered by the United States Government to report to you as Deputy Supreme Commander

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2 The “original communication” to the Netherlands Government, as well as to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, was made by the British Government on January 2, 1942; see the statement in ABC–4/CS–3, WW–9 (Revised), post, p. 317.
3 See the letter from Gerow to Loudon, January 2, 1942, post, p. 303. See also Roosevelt’s memorandum of January 9 to Marshall, post, p. 313.
4 Not printed.
5 Post, p. 313.
6 Post, p. 317.
and Commander of the Combined Naval Forces in the ABDA area respectively." 7

It was agreed:

a. That the draft telegram in Annex C to the Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff should be dispatched forthwith. (See Annex 2) 8

b. That the procedure proposed in the Memorandum should be adopted and the Memorandum, subject to the amendments agreed upon in discussion, should be approved. (See Annex 2) 9

4. IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINA

The Conference had before it a memorandum received from the United States Chiefs of Staff on immediate assistance to China. (ABC-4/9, WW(J.P.C.) 9). 9

Admiral Pound said that the British Chiefs of Staff recognized the importance of doing everything possible to facilitate assistance to China, and were in general agreement with the proposals in the paper. They wished to suggest certain amendments to it, which were designed to make it conform to the idea of Unity of Command.

The British Chiefs of Staff proposed certain amendments, which were discussed at some length.

At the suggestion of General Marshall the word “operate” in the fourth line of the first amendment was altered to “engage in joint operation”. Similarly in the last line but one of the second amendment the words “General Wavell” were altered to “the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area.”

The following further amendment was agreed to.

On page 3, paragraph 4, line 5, the words “General Drum” were amended to read, “the United States Representative”. 10

Marshal Dill suggested that the United States Representative in China might be informed of the existence and scope of the organization which had been built up in China under General Dennys. He undertook to forward a note on this point to General Marshall. 11

The Conference approved the memorandum on immediate assistance to China as amended in discussion. (See Annex 3) 9

5. POST-ARCADIA COLLABORATION

This paper was brought up by British Chiefs of Staff and discussed briefly. (See Annex 4) 12

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7 The revised draft telegram is post, p. 318.
8 The annexed paper was ABC-4/CS3, WW-9 (Revised), post, p. 317.
9 The paper, as revised and approved, was serialized as ABC-4/9, WW-10, dated January 10, 1942, post, p. 319.
10 For the initial consideration of sending Drum to China, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 63-70.
11 Not printed.
12 The paper under reference is WW-8, dated January 8, 1942, post, p. 217.
The Conference adjourned at 5:30 P. M., to meet at 4:00 P. M., January 11, 1942.

SUNDAY, JANUARY 11, 1942

MEETING OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF,
JANUARY 11, 1942, 4 P. M., FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Sexton
Rear Admiral Horne
Rear Admiral Towers
Rear Admiral Turner
Major General Holcomb
Brigadier General Gerow

UNITED KINGDOM

Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral Little
Lieutenant General Wemyss
Air Marshal Harris
Captain Bebben

SECRETARIAT

Captain McCrea
Captain Denebrink
Lieutenant Colonel Robinett
Lieutenant Colonel Sexton
Commander Libby

Brigadier Dykes
Colonel Jacob

Defense Files

United States Minutes

JCCSs—9

January 11, 1942.

1. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMAND IN THE ABDA AREA

Admiral Pound read to the Conference Part I of a telegram which had been received from General Wavell, in which he gave an account of a Conference held on the afternoon of 10th January, with Admiral Hart, General Brett, the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, and other commanders, and stated that he was establishing his Headquarters ten miles north of Bandoeng. Part II of the telegram had not yet been received.

The Conference took note of the telegram.

2. SITUATION IN THE ABDA AREA

Admiral Stark said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had been giving thought to the situation in the ABDA Area, which appeared to be critical. They felt that there was a good case for subordinating everything in the immediate future to the necessity for

3 Not printed.
getting reinforcements quickly into that Area. Might it not be right, for example, to cut down the flow of United States troops to Northern Ireland and Iceland, if by so doing further assistance could be sent across the Pacific?

General Marshall said that it was not a question of diverting troops, since these were available for both purposes. The problem was to find the necessary tonnage. The immediate necessity was to convey [convoy?] to Australia anti-aircraft troops, ground staff and equipment for the aircraft arriving out there, and for personnel to organize and operate the bases which must be established in Australia.

The United States Chiefs of Staff had considered whether additional shipping could be provided by cutting down the programme of reinforcements to Hawaii, but there was little to be obtained in that way, as urgent reinforcements had already been diverted to Christmas and Canton Islands, and to Samoa. The present programme of shipments of men and materiel across the Pacific would take three months, the situation being what it was. Should not the priorities over the next few weeks be weighed, with a view of deciding whether the reinforcement of ABDA could be accelerated by diverting ships from other projects, such as the moves to Iceland and Northern Ireland, and operation Super-Gymnast?

Marshal Dill suggested that the best way of tackling the problem would be for the shipping experts to get together, consider total tonnage available, and see what sort of a programme could be drawn up.

Admiral Stark asked whether Singapore was in immediate danger, and how long it might be expected to hold out.

Marshal Dill said that it would be a race between the arrival of reinforcements, and the progress of the Japanese. If the projected reinforcements arrived, there seemed no reason why Singapore should not hold out indefinitely. A risk had had to be taken in moving the Australian Division from the Mersing Area over to the Northwestern front, but one Indian Brigade Group had already arrived, and a British Brigade Group and 51 Hurricanes were due to arrive on 13th January.

Admiral Stark thought that if there were a chance that the race could be won, it would be worth while doing anything possible to hasten the arrival of reinforcements, and to build up the position as quickly as possible. If Singapore and the Philippines were captured by the Japanese, they would be free to bring their whole weight to bear on the Netherlands East Indies.

General Marshall said that already the Japanese could move troops from the Philippines and use them for other purposes, and, in his opinion, certain indications pointed to their already being in process of doing so.
Air Chief Marshal Portal said that it would certainly be a great waste of matériel if aircraft reinforcements were poured into the ABDA Area without the necessary ground staff to operate and maintain them. He felt that before a decision was taken to sacrifice the North Atlantic move in order to provide ships for the Pacific moves, it would be well worth while holding a general review of the shipping situation. This might reveal other resources which would enable us to carry on with both projects. It should be borne in mind that the move of United States troops to Northern Ireland and Iceland was part of a chain of movements extending through the Middle East to the Far East; and he would be reluctant to see it abandoned.

General Marshall said that he did not think it would be necessary to do more than cut down the strength of the convoy which was shortly due to sail for Magnet, to approximately 10,000 men. The ships required for the Pacific move would have to be of a certain type in order to manage the long sea passage.

Admiral King inquired whether, if the North Atlantic convoy were cut so as to release personnel ships to carry 10,000 men, the urgent Pacific moves could then be accomplished.

General Marshall said that it would accommodate three anti-aircraft regiments badly needed in the ABDA Area; that it was not only a question of personnel ships; freight ships would also be required. That the basic problem was to accelerate movements requiring three months to consummate, into one month; those contemplated within the next few weeks to be undertaken within the next two weeks; that time—even days—is the pressing factor.

After further discussion it was agreed that the problem should be put forthwith to the British and American shipping experts, and the following terms of reference were approved:

“To make proposals for providing shipping from United States and British resources to carry to the ABDA Area the urgent reinforcements of men and matériel which the United States Army wishes to send in the immediate future; and to show at what cost to other commitments this shipping can be found.”

The above terms of reference were conveyed without delay to General Somervell, U. S. Army, and to Brigadier Napier, British Army, for immediate action.

General Gerow left the Conference in order to be present at the discussion.

3. Establishment of United States Forces in Northern Ireland

The Conference had before them a report by the Joint Planning Committee on the establishment of United States Forces in Northern
Ireland. (U.S. ABC-4/7, British WW (J.P.C.)7)²

Air Chief Marshal Portal referred to Paragraph 5 (e) 3 in which it was stated that it would be the responsibility of the British to provide adequate air protection and support for the United States field forces, establishments and installations in Northern Ireland. He explained that the British forces in Northern Ireland were generally protected by our own system of fighter defense, the local air forces in Northern Ireland for protection and support being one night fighter squadron, two day fighter squadrons, and one Army cooperation squadron. It was proposed to make no change in these forces so long as the United States forces were not engaged in active operations, except that in some emergency it might be necessary to make a temporary reduction in the British air forces in Northern Ireland, for example, if concentrated attacks were made on convoys on the Eastern coast of England. If active operations developed in Ireland, the present British plan was to send three bomber and two fighter squadrons in addition to the air forces already there. These additions were, of course, dependent on the general situation at the time. If the main attack on the United Kingdom was being put in at some other point and an attack on Ireland were only a feint, it might not be possible to send all these additional forces. On the other hand, if the main point of danger seemed to be in Ireland, they might well be increased. He inquired whether these arrangements would be satisfactory to the American Chiefs of Staff. He did not wish them to expect a higher scale of air support than the British would be able to provide.

General Arnold said that the scale proposed would be acceptable to him in the circumstances.

Admiral King pointed out that since it was a matter of judgment whether the air protection and support would be “adequate”, it would be more correct to change the word “adequate” to “appropriate.”

The Conference approved the report by the Joint Planning Committee (U.S. Serial ABC-4/7, British Serial WW (J.P.C.)7), subject to the substitution of the word “appropriate” for “adequate” in line 2 of paragraph 5 (e) (3). (See Annex 1.)²

General Marshall left the Conference at this point.³

4. Defense of Island Bases Between Hawaii and Australia

The Conference had before them a report by the Joint Planning Committee on the defense of island bases between Hawaii and Australia. (U.S. ABC-4/8, British WW (J.P.C.)8).⁴

³As amended and approved by the Chiefs of Staff, the report was serialized as ABC-4/7 (Approved), WW-12, post, p. 256.
⁴Marshall had an appointment with Roosevelt at 5:30 p.m.
⁴As amended and approved by the Chiefs of Staff, this report was serialized as ABC-4/8 (Approved), WW-13, January 13, 1942, post, p. 325.
GENERAL ARNOLD, referring to Paragraph 9 (d), questioned the advisability of sending air forces to New Caledonia “even if this has to be at the expense, initially, of the ABDA Area.” Even if shipping were available there were not available a pursuit squadron and a medium bomber squadron to be sent immediately except at the expense of the ABDA Area. He did not think that New Caledonia should have priority over Fiji or Samoa. Samoa was of particular importance, since if it were lost the air route for the heavy bombers from America to the ABDA Area would be cut.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that New Caledonia was of great importance to the ABDA Area. Not only were the nickel mines a tempting bait for the Japanese, but also if the Island was in Japanese possession, all reinforcements to the ABDA Area would have to take the long route south of New Zealand.

GENERAL HOLCOMB said that the garrison proposed for Samoa (in the Annex to the paper) was already en route. There was no question of diverting any part of it.

ADMIRAL POUND suggested that the shipping experts who were examining the possibility of providing additional shipping for reinforcing the ABDA Area should be instructed to take into account the needs of New Caledonia and see if it were not possible to send in the necessary reinforcements without taking anything away from what was proposed for the ABDA Area itself. General Gerow was notified of this.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that shipping was the limiting factor only for the land forces; in the case of air forces, it was availability.

After some discussion it was agreed that the first sentence of Paragraph 9 (d) should be amended to read as follows:

“That the defense of New Caledonia should, in principle, be accepted as an Australian responsibility, but that the United States should, as a temporary measure, furnish forces for the defense of the Island immediately after meeting the emergency in the ABDA Area.”

ADMIRAL KING said that the following addition should be made to Column (c) of the Annex under Item 3, Samoa:

1 Fighter Squadron
1 Dive Bomber Squadron

ADMIRAL TURNER explained that reference had been made to the need for obtaining from Australia an opinion as to the priority for arming the Free French on the Island because there was some doubt.

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The annex to ABC-48 (Approved), WW-13 is not printed. It consists of a four-page list of the military forces and equipment on, and en route to, New Caledonia, Fiji, Samoa, Canton, Christmas, Palmyra, and Bora Bora.
whether, in view of the shortage of equipment and shipping, these troops were worth arming at the expense of other requirements in, say, Australia. It had not been intended by the Joint Planning Committee that these forces should never be armed at all.

The Conference:

a. Accepted, in principle, the report of the Joint Planning Committee (U.S. ABC-4/8, British WW (J.P.C.)8), subject to confirmation by General Marshall, and to the amendments agreed in the discussion.

b. Invited the British Chiefs of Staff:

(1) To obtain without delay from Australia an opinion as to the priority for arming the 3,700 Free French in New Caledonia;

(2) To take up immediately with the Free French the question of the demolition, if necessary, of the furnaces and power plant of the nickel mines, and the loading facilities for chrome and nickel ore in New Caledonia.

c. Agreed that the American and British shipping experts should be instructed to include in the examination which they had been ordered to carry out (vide Minute 2) the possibility of sending urgent reinforcements from America to New Caledonia, without retarding the rate of reinforcing the ABDA Area itself.

5. Inclusion of Port Darwin in the ABDA Area

Admiral Pound said that a telegram had been received from General Wavell pointing out that it was not clear whether Port Darwin was included in the ABDA Area as defined in his directive or not. He felt that it should be, since it was linked up with the control of the Timor Sea, which was his responsibility. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed that there was more to be considered than the mere local defense of the port, but Australia would, of course, have to be consulted. It appeared that since Port Darwin was an essential base of the ABDA Area, the case might be covered by Paragraph 2 of the directive, which placed General Wavell in command of forces “located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective Governments for services in or in support of the ABDA Area.”

Admiral Stark expressed, on behalf of the American Chiefs of Staff, the opinion that the defense of Port Darwin should be made the responsibility of General Wavell, in view of the fact that it was a necessary base for the ABDA Area.

The Conference adjourned at 6:00 P.M., to meet at 2:00 P.M.,[1]

January 12, 1942.

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[1] i.e., section 2 of the minutes, ante, p. 177.
[1] The Chiefs of Staff did not meet until 4 p.m. on January 12; see post, p. 182.
MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND GENERAL MARSHALL, JANUARY 11, 1942, 5:30 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

Editorial Note

No official record of this conversation has been found. In the Stimson diary for the period January 8–11, the Secretary of War noted that the British had advanced “some propositions for the creation of a future strategic joint organization” which Stimson considered “completely wrong.” (See the memorandum WW–8, post, p. 217.) The diary note concludes with the following sentence: “Marshall told me over the telephone Sunday evening [January 11] that he had been in conference for two hours with the President that afternoon and had represented strongly the objections to this organization.”

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL WITH THEIR ADVISERS ON WAR PRODUCTION, JANUARY 11, 1942, 9:30 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Knudsen
Mr. Nelson

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Beaverbrook

Editorial Note

No official record of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above regarding the time of the meeting is taken from the President’s appointment calendar, which gives the name only of Nelson. From Nelson, pp. 187–189, it appears, however, that the other persons listed above were also present and that the principal subjects discussed were rubber and high-octane gasoline.

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, JANUARY 11, 1942, EVENING, THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

No record of this meeting has been found. The only reference to the discussion is in the Churchill telegram of January 12, 1942 (post, p. 399) from which it appears that Roosevelt took up the question of
St. Pierre-Miquelon on an urgent basis, that Churchill agreed to the Hull formula of January 8 (post, p. 393), and that Churchill proposed to bring pressure on de Gaulle to accept it.

MONDAY, JANUARY 12, 1942

MEETING OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF,
JANUARY 12, 1942, 4 P. M., FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Sexton
Rear Admiral Horne
Rear Admiral Turner
Major General Holcomb
Brigadier General Gerow

UNITED KINGDOM

Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral Little
Lieutenant General Wemyss
Air Marshal Harris
Brigadier Napier

Secretariat

Captain McCrea
Captain Denebrink
Lieutenant Colonel Robinett
Lieutenant Colonel Sexton
Commander Libby

Brigadier Hollis
Brigadier Dykes

Defense Files

United States Minutes

January 12, 1942.

SECRET

JCCSs-10

1. SHIPPING FOR UNITED STATES REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE FAR EAST

General Marshall gave the Conference an outline of certain proposals which had been submitted by the United States Staffs for expediting the move of American reinforcements to the Pacific and ABDA Area. (See Annex 1) He explained that these proposals had been developed since the meeting of United States and British shipping experts on the previous evening. If the proposals were accepted, it would be possible to sail a convoy of 21,800 men from New York for the Far East on January 20. Of this, some 10,000 were earmarked for the defense of New Caledonia, the remainder being ground staffs for air squadrons. The effect would be to reduce the Iceland convoy sailing on January 5 from 8,000 to 2,500 and the Northern Ireland convoy from 16,000 to 4,000. Certain additional American ships not at present scheduled for troop movements would

1 This is the memorandum of January 12, 1942, post, p. 229.
also be employed, such as ships on the South American trade, and train ferries.

Brigadier Napier said that the proposal for the Queen Mary to take American troops to the United Kingdom and pick up a load there for the Middle East was a new idea which he had not yet had time to study. At the shipping conference the proposal had been that she should take troops from New York to South Africa for onward carriage in the United States ships West Point and Wakefield across the Indian Ocean. The proposal that the Mount Vernon, Wakefield and West Point should be left in the Indian Ocean for a second round trip from the Middle East to the Far East was also new. London had already arranged an Indian Ocean convoy program which excluded these ships, in order that they should revert to American use, and must be consulted as to their most useful employment.

Sir Charles Portal inquired whether the shipment of some 400 aircraft to the Far East would cut into American aircraft replacements to the Middle East. It seemed very probable that there would be intensive air operations in the near future in the Mediterranean, and the rate of attrition there was likely to be much more heavy than in the Pacific, where air operations were sporadic and on a comparatively light scale. In these circumstances, he would not be able to agree to any diversion from the Middle East. It was the P-40 and Martin 187 Baltimores in which he was particularly interested.

General Arnold, after inquiry, confirmed that the proposed program would not interfere with the dispatch of replacement aircraft of the P-40 and Martin 187 types to the Middle East.

General Marshall pointed out that the reinforcements proposed would involve a cut of up to 30 per cent in monthly deliveries to Russia. This would be in addition to a certain deficiency which was already likely to arise on the program of supplies to Russia up to April 1, 1942. The ships involved in the United States reinforcement program would be diverted from carrying supplies to Russia for a period of up to four months.

Sir John Dill said that undoubtedly there would be considerable pressure on political grounds not to cut down Russian supplies in any way.

Admiral King pointed out that it was doubtful whether the Russians could clear the full amount of supplies which were delivered to them. In so far as this was the case, therefore, a cut in deliveries would be of no consequence.

Sir John Dill said that the effect of the proposed program, so far as Ireland was concerned, appeared to be a postponement of the arrival of some 20,000 troops by one month. In the case of Iceland, the rate of relief of British troops and the United States Marines would be cut down to about 2,500 per month. He thought these reductions
could be accepted in view of the urgent needs of the Far East. A
token force of some 4,000, at least, would be going to Northern Ireland
and that was of great political significance.

Brigadier Naifeh inquired whether, if 21,800 men were sailed from
New York on January 20 in the ships which were loading for Iceland
and Ireland, they would not arrive in the Pacific Area before their
equipment, which would have moved in slower freight ships. He had
had this consideration in mind when suggesting that the Queen
Mary should take United States personnel to South Africa for onward
carriage after she had finished docking in New York. Under this
arrangement the troops would have arrived about the same time as
their equipment.

General Marshall said that it seemed important to rush in person-
nel in one convoy, if possible, in order to simplify the escort problem.
Moreover, it was likely to be easier to get the troops through without
enemy interference if it were done earlier rather than later. It might
be necessary to accept the fact that the personnel would arrive without
all of their equipment. At the present time the only American forces
in Australia were the ground staff for one bomber group with a cer-
tain number of pilots, and an artillery brigade which had no ammuni-
tion. Ammunition and a certain amount of equipment for this brigade
were due to arrive there almost immediately.

In his view, the whole question was one of priorities. For example,
was the dispatch of some 10,000 troops for New Caledonia of greater
strategic importance than the relief of British troops in Northern Ire-
land, or supplies to Russia? An immediate decision was necessary
on the Ireland and Iceland shipping, since ships already loading in
New York would have to be unloaded and re-stowed if they were to
get away on January 20.

Admiral Stark summed up the effect of General Marshall’s pro-
posals as follows:

a. They would set back the relief of Northern Ireland by one month.
b. The Middle and Near East would not be affected.
c. The supply and Lend-Lease materials to Russia would be reduced
by 30% for a period of three to four months.
d. The situation in the Far East would be immeasurably strength-
ened.

After some discussion it was generally agreed that the postponement
of the dispatch of some 20,000 troops to Northern Ireland by one
month and the reduction in the rate of relief of the troops in Iceland
could be accepted, but that there should be no interference with the
supply of American aircraft to the Middle East. The crux of the
position, therefore, was whether a cut of up to 30 per cent in monthly
deliveries to Russia could be accepted for a period probably of four
months.
THE CONFERENCE:

a. Agreed that the provisional program as outlined by General Marshall would have to be referred to the President and the Prime Minister for a ruling on the question of interruption of Russian supplies;

b. That, before the proposals for the use of the Queen Mary and the three United States ships in the Indian Ocean could be accepted, it would be necessary to consult the British Shipping Authorities in London in order to insure that convoy programs already worked out were not upset, and that shipping was used in the most economical manner.

2. DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

General Marshall signified his acceptance of the report of the Joint Planning Committee on the defense of island bases between Hawaii and Australia (U.S. ABC-4/8, British WW (J.P.C.) 8) subject to the amendments which had been agreed to in discussion at the previous meeting. (See Annex 2)²

²As amended and approved by the Chiefs of Staff, this report was serialized as ABC-4/8, WW-13 (Approved), dated January 13, 1942, post, p. 325.

MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL WITH THEIR MILITARY ADVISERS, JANUARY 12, 1942, 5:30 P.M., THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Major General Watson
Lieutenant Colonel Sexton

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Beaverbrook
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Brigadier Hollis
Colonel Jacob

Defense Files

United States Minutes¹

SECRET

Subject: Super-Gymnast.

The President suggested that the status of SUPER-GYMNAST be discussed.

Mr. Churchill stated that he understood that the Staff had produced a time table which was approved in principle; that it looks

¹The source text is a copy from the files of the War Department. The minutes were taken presumably by Lieutenant Colonel Sexton.
as if Rommel might get away; that if defeated his defeat would be preceded by a stern chase; that the British are getting a new armored brigade into the Near East and there will be a battle soon; that information had been received of a convoy arriving at Tripoli with additional German matériel; that the possible date at which the Germans will be pushed back to Tripoli will be delayed, and that more time exists for the completion of SUPER-GYMNAST.

The President stated that politically there is more time available; that there is a tendency on the part of Vichy to say No to German demands; that reports received indicate that a growing number of French Army officers have been making inquiries as to whether their overtures would be accepted if they did something. That Admiral Darlan had asked if he would be accepted into a conference; that the answer had been—not under present circumstances. That if he brought the French Fleet over to the Allies, the situation would change. However, more time exists for SUPER-GYMNAST; it was desired to get a fairly well settled time table which would be fitted into the time of the negotiations. That as soon as the negotiations commence, the Germans are sure to know; that when the negotiations start, we should have the Army aboard ships ready to land in a week or ten days. (It had been figured that a period of three weeks grace could be obtained from the time the Germans commenced their movement into the Iberian Peninsula.)

The President then asked about the transports.

General Marshall stated that both Staffs had engaged in negotiations last night and had reached a tentative agreement which involved a reduction of the schedule of troops to Ireland. Also, a reduction of the cargo ships available for the MAGNET Expedition, which brought up the question of quarters and supplies for troops involved in MAGNET.

Mr. Churchill stated that there was no question about the quarters there; that one British Division was being moved out of Northern Ireland and the British will have quarters ready for the American troops.

General Marshall then explained briefly the substance of the plan agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in substance as follows:

21,800 American troops to sail from the East Coast January 20th, to arrive in the ABDA Area approximately February 14th. This convoy to consist of 10,000 ground troops for New Caledonia, which with the artillery brigade now in Australia, would furnish approximately a division for New Caledonia. The remainder of the expedition would consist of engineers and other ground service troops for the bombers now arriving in the ABDA Area. Also moving out were

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*This is the memorandum of January 12, 1942, post, p. 229.
20 cargo ships, carrying 250 pursuit, 86 medium bombers, 57 light bombers, 220 ship tons of cargo, and 4½ million gallons of gasoline. The airplanes were to replace attrition.

General Marshall further stated that in order to permit this expedition to depart, the following changes would have to be made in existing plans:

In the first convoy, for Magnet, the troops scheduled for Iceland on January 15th would be reduced to 2,500; the 16,000 scheduled for Ireland would be reduced to 4,000. The Queen Mary could carry 7,000 troops to Ireland February 1st; then transport whatever British troops were desired to the Middle East.

Three Navy transports—the West Point, the Wakefield, and the Mount Vernon—now being used to transport troops from the Middle East to the Far East by Suez, would be available for one round trip to move British troops over the same route. In addition, 4,400 more troops could be moved to Ireland on the George Washington early in February. This procedure would result in approximately 24,000 troops being in Ireland by the 25th of February.

The involvements in this plan are as follows:

(1) It would cancel the present movements to Ireland and Iceland, which have already been arranged for.

(2) It would cause some confusion in the Port of New York, due to the necessity of unloading ships.

(3) It would require the utilization of the Kungsholm, which at present is being held for the State Department.

(4) Some difficulty would be incurred in crating the medium bombers scheduled for the ABDA convoy.

(5) It would be necessary to use two vessels now on the South American route, and would involve the loan of three British ships.

The President asked, with reference to the ABDA convoy, about the matter of refueling.

Admiral King stated that refueling would not be necessary en route. General Marshall then stated that another serious consideration was the fact that the proposed ABDA convoy would result in a 30% reduction of lend-lease to Russia for a period of four months, and would also reduce the lend-lease material going to Basra.

The President stated that the plan sounded good.

Mr. Churchill asked what utilization was being made of the Queen Elizabeth and the Aquitania.

General Marshall stated that the Queen Elizabeth is being used for a third convoy to the Far East, which would involve the movement of 3 anti-aircraft regiments; also there are being moved from the West Coast, 7,000 troops on January 12th; 14,000 on January 30th; 11,000 early in February. It was understood that the Aquitania would not be available until the end of February. With regard to
the ABDA convoy from the East Coast, it would take three weeks to assemble the freight boats, and the American troops arriving on January 20th would arrive before their equipment, which would involve some complications in the convoy, but this was the best possible arrangement that could be made.

The President asked about troop accommodations in New Caledonia.

General Marshall observed that owing to the tropical nature of the climate, little difficulty could be expected in finding shelter for the troops; that they could take tents.

Mr. Churchill observed that the plan as prepared would result in some confusion; that a fact to be given consideration was the delay of shipments to Russia; that the Russians would undoubtedly be disappointed.

He asked if the plan had been the subject of joint discussion between the Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall stated that it had; and that this particular question had been brought up but there was no use sending troops to the ABDA Area without their equipment. That if a cut becomes necessary, the New Caledonia increment should be eliminated. It is of urgent necessity that the air reinforcements be sent.

Admiral Pound stated that the matter had been discussed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference and that the people in London were working on a slightly different shipping schedule, particularly with respect to the use of American transports to the Middle East, to the Far East, and the possible use of the Queen Mary from England to the Middle East; that an answer on this could be received by tomorrow noon.

The President asked, if the occupation of New Caledonia was eliminated, could we carry out our Russian promises?

General Marshall stated that he could not be sure, but if anything was to be pared, the New Caledonia occupation should be first.

Mr. Hopkins observed that 30% of the shipping to Russia involves only seven ships, and that we should be able to find seven ships, even if it involved stopping the shipment of some reserve equipment to England; that with the 1200 merchant ships we have available, locating seven should not be too difficult.

Admiral King observed that if Archangel is closed now, there is a question as to whether Russia could absorb the shipments.

The President stated that the Russians deny that Archangel is closed, and state that they can absorb the shipments.

Admiral Stark stated that the primary question was which was of the greatest importance—the 30% reduction of lend-lease to Russia, or immediate reinforcements for the Far East.

Mr. Churchill observed that the fighting in the Far East and the fighting the Russians are doing should take priority over other things;
that MAgNET and the Iceland relief are secondary. That he was sorry about reducing MAgNET, but he could understand the necessity therefor.

General Marshall observed that an early decision must be reached in order that the January 15th MAgNET shipment may be delayed.

General Arnold stated that there was no use sending planes to the Far East without their ground service crews.

Admiral Pound observed that the only immediate commitment was the matter of unloading the January 15th convoy for MAgNET.

General Marshall stated that if we unload this convoy, we must immediately commence loading for the Australian convoy.

Mr. Churchill again asked whether this matter had been taken up with the British Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall replied that they had worked most of last night together.

The President stated that he liked General Marshall’s program, if only some means could be found to take care of the Russians.

Mr. Hopkins suggested that Admiral Land be directed to find 6 or 7 more ships a month for Russia; that he did not think General Marshall should be held up by the necessity for Russian lend-lease.

Lord Beaverbrook stated that he would be very sorry to see ships diverted from the Atlantic because of the increased strain which would result; also that it was important that certain items be continued to England in order to keep up production schedules, and he hated very much to stop shipments to Russia.

The President agreed that there might be unfortunate repercussions in Russia if at the very time they are pinched as at present we let them down. He then asked how important is the occupation of New Caledonia.

Admiral King replied that this is on the line of Naval communication and is a potential subject for Japanese occupation.

The President asked if it would be easy to re-conquer.

Admiral King replied that none will be easy to re-conquer once they are occupied.

General Arnold stated that as far as flying routes are concerned, both New Caledonia and the Fiji Islands can be jumped if necessary.

Admiral King observed that the urgent question was assistance to the Far East.

Mr. Churchill agreed that it should come ahead of New Caledonia.

The President observed that the only thing holding up General Marshall’s plan is the seven cargo ships.

Mr. Hopkins asked if Russia were not involved, would General Marshall’s plan be approved?

It was agreed that it would be.
Mr. Hopkins then suggested that the President and the Prime Minister take the responsibility of getting lend-lease matériel to Russia, and not hold up General Marshall’s plan on this account.

Mr. Churchill suggested that the present ships on the Russian run continue, and that we find other ships to make up the deficit. He then asked if the Chiefs of Staff agreed on the mechanics of the plan.

Admiral Pound stated that it must be approved in London, because they had been working on a slightly different arrangement.

The President asked Mr. Hopkins if he could get enough ships to take care of the Russians.

Mr. Hopkins stated that if the President would get Admiral Land and Salter in and tell them the situation, he was sure it could be done.

General Marshall said that Admiral Land had told him earlier in the day that under our present protocol agreement with Russia, we were behind in furnishing materials.

Mr. Churchill suggested that the plan be accepted and a search made for the 7 ships, and asked if the British were behind in their deliveries to the Russians.

Lord Beaverbrook stated that the British are behind in some items, but that he anticipated that they would catch up.

General Marshall added that what we are doing in the Far East would help the Russians anyway.

Mr. Churchill observed that there was a possibility, if Japan continued to succeed in the Far East, of a Pan-Asiatic movement all over the Far East including all the brown and yellow race, which might complicate our situation there; that a symbolic landing in Ireland would be satisfactory except that he hoped matériel for England would not be piled up on the docks in New York awaiting ships.

Lord Beaverbrook observed that additional shipping had been scraped up for convoy movements to the ABDA Area; and that more could be found, he thought.

Mr. Churchill stated that the ABDA plan makes no provision for Super-Gymnast.

General Marshall stated that no ships arranged for combat loading are being used for ABDA.

The President suggested that [asked], assuming that we go through with the ABDA plan, and enough shipping for Russia could be found, when would Super-Gymnast be possible.

Mr. Churchill stated that the Joint Staffs had already established that some days would be required for planning; and if January 7th was established as the beginning of planning, D-Day (the day loading would commence) would be February 4th; and the earliest arrival in Casablanca would be March 23rd.

General Marshall stated that the shortage was not in troop carriers but in cargo carriers.
Mr. Churchill stated that the Staffs should get data as to the effect of this plan on Gymnast.

Admiral King stated that, for purposes of a round calculation, the date which the ships could be available for Gymnast would be determined by the turn around between the East Coast and Australia, which would amount to approximately three months, which would set back the possible date of loading for Gymnast to about April 15th. Also Admiral King stated that 15,000 troops, combat loaded, can be embarked for Gymnast without delay at any time.

Mr. Churchill then observed that the whole problem is to get planes to the Far East.

General Arnold stated that this is the only way we can stop the Japanese advance to the south.

The President then stated, ["we approve General Marshall’s plan. We will make Beaverbrook and Hopkins find ships and will work on Super-Gymnast at the earliest possible date."]

Air Marshal Portal pointed out that one point of the agreement which the Chiefs of Staff had come to was that the ABDA movement would not interfere with the movement of pursuit ships to the Far East.

Mr. Churchill then stated that the Staff is to check up on the actual impact of the plan on Gymnast and establish the earliest date on which it would be possible; and also what would be available for the expedition if an invitation arrived suddenly.

At 6:40 p.m. the Conference adjourned.

Arnold Papers

Notes by Lieutenant General Arnold

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, January 12, 1942]

The first subject discussed was Super-Gymnast and it was agreed that this is not so imperative now. We can have at least three weeks after arrival before Germany can cause any disturbance.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the Army which has arrived at Tripoli to help Rommel makes the British problem more acute.

The President asked about shipping.

General Marshall then told of the anticipated departure of 24,000 men to Iceland by March. This will release three ships to England for the round-trip, Cairo to Malaysia, which arrangements will permit

1 Arnold’s notes, headed “Conference in the Federal Reserve On the Afternoon of January 12, 1942 (5:30 P.M.)”, actually relate primarily to the 5:30 meeting at the White House rather than to the 4 p.m. meeting at the Federal Reserve building. Arnold lists Admiral Land and Captain Belben as also present.
the transportation of 21,000 men to Australia. Approximate dates of departure and arrival as follows:

Leave January 20—arrive about February 14th about 14,000 to New Caledonia.
Via air and air auxiliary—about 11,800 to Australia.
Planes, cargo and 4 million 5 hundred thousand gallons of gasoline on freighters.

The following involvements arise in connection with these movements:

1. Cancel Ireland & Iceland.
2. Confusion at Port of Embarkation.
3. Delay relief of the Marines in Iceland.
4. Require 20 cargo vessels and gasoline.
5. Delay in crating B-26's.
6. Must use some vessels from South Africa run.
7. British loan us 2 ships for Ireland in February.

Troop Movements to Ireland:

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<td>4,100</td>
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<td>7,100</td>
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<td>6,100</td>
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<td>4,100</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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Troop Movements to the Far East:

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<td>21,800</td>
<td>January 20th</td>
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These ships will make 17 to 20 knots an hour, averaging 15 as a convoy.

Admiral Land says that this will involve 30 per cent Lend-Lease to Russia by Archangel and Basra.

The Prime Minister wanted to know what part the Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth and Aquitania would play in the scheme of transportation. General Marshall stated that the Queen Elizabeth and Aquitania will carry 12,000 troops to the Far East in February. The schedule of troop movements is:

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January 12 — 7,000
January 27 — 13,000
February — 11,500
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It will take 3 to 4 weeks to assemble necessary freight boats.

The Prime Minister expressed an opinion that this plan had been prepared very suddenly and there followed a general discussion of the disadvantages of unloading, disorder, and delayed shipments to Russia (who will probably yell like hell and they are inflicting heavy casualties on Nazi troops.)
General Marshall expressed the opinion that if Russian aid must be maintained then we would have to cut out New Caledonia. The Prime Minister asked Admiral Pound if this matter had been threshed out by the 2 staffs. Admiral Pound replied that the people back in England would need a little time to work out the details but we should know by noon tomorrow.

Admiral Pound also wanted to know if we gave up New Caledonia would we still have enough shipping to carry out our shipments to Russia. Mr. Hopkins expressed his concern over the fact that the allocation of 30 per cent of the ships to Russia means only 7 ships, and that he could not conceive of our being that short in ships when we have 2400 ships.

The Prime Minister wanted to know if there was any other way to do it. He felt that the priorities should be:

1. Fighting forces.
2. Russia.
3. Ireland.
4. Iceland.

General Arnold stated that on the other hand we must have that equipment out in the Far East; that there is no use sending out planes out to the Far East unless we send out the necessary supplies.

The President wanted to know if there was not some way to find ships to take care of Russia—if we couldn’t scare up 7 ships from somewhere.

Lord Beaverbrook stated that he would be very sorry to see ships taken from the Atlantic.

The Prime Minister asked if this whole thing, as a matter of fact, was not caused by the air activities of General Arnold.

General Arnold replied in the affirmative.

Admiral Pound pointed out that the lack of 7 cargo ships a month would appear to be stopping this.

The Prime Minister stated that he put the Far East requirements ahead of Ireland.

Mr. Hopkins wanted to know if this would have been approved if the Russian question had not been brought up by General Marshall.

The Prime Minister stated that it would.

Mr. Hopkins then asked the President why he, with the Prime Minister, didn’t take the responsibility to secure these 7 ships.

The President again requested confirmation of the fact that it was only a question of 7 ships a month which was stopping air activities.

Mr. Hopkins stated that this would amount to 2 or 3 months delay in air activities, when actually we are going to launch 40 ships this month.
The Prime Minister stated that if that was the consensus of opinion, we should accept it and find the 7 ships.

The President advised that he thought he knew where he could find the ships. (The Prime Minister told him that if he couldn’t find the ships he would have to talk to the Russians, to which the President replied, “How do you get that way, we will both do it.”)

The Prime Minister then said that he agreed on the necessity for this movement to the Far East; that it will have a very bad effect if one Asiatic power runs wild over the Far East; that it is very urgent to have General Arnold’s planes sink their bottoms.

The President then wanted to know if we did go ahead with this could Mr. Churchill give him a time on which we could go ahead with Super-Gymnast.

The Prime Minister stated that a plan had been agreed to that fixed D-28 on March 1st for simultaneous arrival at Casablanca, that if we accepted this then the staff must rework the Super-Gymnast plan.

Admiral King said that 0-Day would be April 15, 1942.

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Defense Files

*Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)*

**SECRET**

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1942.

At a meeting at the White House late yesterday afternoon in which the Prime Minister, the British Chiefs of Staff and Lord Beaverbrook participated, and at which U. S. Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Harry Hopkins also were present, the President and the Prime Minister approved the attached proposal for the reduction of the troops scheduled for Iceland and Ireland on January 15th and for the rearrangement of shipping to permit the sailing of a convoy from New York on January 20th of some 21,000 troops for the Far East.

Regarding the collection of the necessary shipping to provide 228,000 ship cargo tons for this expedition and for the pursuit, medium and light bombardment planes set up for the expedition, it was decided that this should be done, but that other shipping would have to be found to permit the continued flow of materiel to Russia and pursuit, “Baltimore” planes and tanks to Cairo.

I explained at this meeting that Admiral Land and his principal assistants had informed me that to collect the necessary cargo ships—

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1 The source text is an unsigned copy. The memorandum was sent by Marshall to the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for War Plans, Operations, and Supply.
2 The attached proposal was a copy of the memorandum of January 12, 1942, post, p. 220.
some 20-odd—would force the reduction of shipments to Russia by something like 30%, though he stated that it was impossible to rate the reduction on a percentage basis without elaborate calculation as to involved turn-arounds, delays in unloading at Murmansk and Archangel, etc. Mr. Hopkins stated that he felt that the reservoir of shipping had not been exhausted and that the necessary vessels could be secured. Lord Beaverbrook presented difficulties in connection with maintaining vital shipments to England, which at the present time were delayed.

The President and the Prime Minister felt that it was highly important that there be no indication of reductions in the shipments to Russia.

Regarding the use of the Queen Mary and our suggested employment of the three U.S. Naval transports now in the Far East, the British requested an opportunity to confer with the Home Government. However, this phase of the matter would have no effect on the organization of the U.S. convoy for the Far East. It might involve a delay in the movement of U.S. troops to Ireland.

General Somervell was personally directed by me last night immediately to start on the rearrangement of shipping at the Port of Embarkation in New York.

G. C. MARSHALL.

DINNER PARTY AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY, JANUARY 12, 1942, 8 P. M.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Secretary Hull
Secretary Stimson
Secretary Knox
Secretary Morgenthau
Secretary Jones
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Donovan

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Beaverbrook
Lord Halifax
Commander Thompson

Editorial Note

The information given above regarding the time and place of the meeting and the guest list is taken from the Stimson diary. The dinner, for which Churchill was host, was not an official meeting and no official record was made of the discussion. The conversation, however, did touch on certain aspects of official business, as indicated by the following extract from Stimson’s diary:

“We had a very good dinner and a very interesting talk afterwards. Churchill told us a very interesting account of his experiences just after he had been made Prime Minister when he was trying to rally the
French nation into continuing the war by going over to North Africa and his conferences with the leaders of France at that time. The talk drifted into a discussion of our strategic plans, Knox taking the lead with his usual vigor and lack of caution. He started out with an attack on the proposal to go ahead with the Far Eastern war in which he very evidently had the support of Beaverbrook. Churchill was, however, evidently on the other side and I put in a few remarks to show why such action in the Far East was absolutely necessary and how it need not interfere with the other main theatres of the war, provided only that the Navy would do its part with carriers. Then they drifted over onto the Super-Gymnast proposition where Churchill joined Knox in being very earnest for immediate action. Donovan also pitched in on that side. Again I had to put in a few words of caution, pointing out how thoroughly the matter had been studied by the War Department and some of the difficulties which that would be.”

Hull (vol. II, p. 1153) indicates that he discussed the question of imperial tariff preferences and lend-lease with Churchill “while sitting beside him at a dinner at the White House on January 12.” Since there is no evidence that Hull was at the White House for lunch on January 12, the conversation to which Hull refers presumably took place during the dinner at the British Embassy. In an entry dated January 13, Long’s diary notes that Churchill had given “the official bludgeoning” to Hull’s plans for “political recrudescence through trade agreements”, which Long described as the cornerstone of Hull’s entire foreign policy. Long stated that at the Embassy dinner Churchill definitely refused to accept Hull’s proposal to include in the contract for “our compensation for Lend-Lease the agreement to discard the Empire tariff and trade program.” (The War Diary of Breckinridge Long, p. 242).

Also with reference to the dinner at the British Embassy, Morgenthau on January 13 described to a meeting of Treasury officials and others, including Hornbeck, recent developments relating to proposed financial assistance to China, including a long conversation of the previous evening with Halifax and then Churchill about possible direct payments to Chinese troops. For the text of Hornbeck’s memorandum describing the meeting at the Treasury, see Foreign Relations, 1942, China, p. 438, and for related documentation, see ibid., pp. 419 ff. John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, 1941-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), pp. 92-98, gives a parallel account which includes the statement that Morgenthau told Churchill that in the absence of significant aid Chiang Kai-shek might move closer to the Japanese and others of the “yellow races.”
TUESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1942

MEETING OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 13, 1942, 4 P. M., FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Sexton
Rear Admiral Horne
Rear Admiral Turner
Major General Holcomb
Brigadier General Gerow

UNITED KINGDOM
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Admiral Little
Lieutenant General Wemyss
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Air Marshall Harris

SECRETARIAT
Captain McCrea
Captain Denebrink
Lieutenant Colonel Robinett
Lieutenant Colonel Sexton

Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier Hollis

Defense Files

United States Minutes

JANUARY 13, 1942.

JCCSs-11

1. POST-ARCADIA COLLABORATION

The Conference had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff on Post-Arcadia Collaboration (WW-8).¹

Sir Dudley Pound said that the arrangements for collaboration on the operational side proposed in the paper would be suitable not only for ABDA, but for all other operational matters as well. The question of intelligence was closely bound up with planning, and this aspect was also dealt with in the paper. As regards the allocation of war materiel, the British Chiefs of Staff felt that if we were to get the best use out of our resources, allocation must be made on strategic grounds in accordance with general directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. America and Great Britain would each take on certain groups of Associated Nations and, after receiving bulk allocations from United States and British production, would sub-allocate them among their own groups.²

¹ The reference is to the original version of WW-8, post, p. 217.
² See the memorandum by Macready, post, p. 349. For discussion of the staff talks on the question, see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 249–250.
The Conference then considered the paper paragraph by paragraph. It was agreed that Paragraph 2 would be better worded as follows:

"2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the word 'Joint' should be applied to Inter-Service collaboration of One Nation and the word 'Combined' to collaboration between two or more United Nations."

Admiral Stark, referring to Paragraph 2, said that the United States Chiefs of Staff felt that if anyone could carry out the duties laid down therein, they would rather have Sir John Dill than anyone else. They felt strongly, however, that there should be no Military Representative of the British Government above the Chiefs of Staff level. They would not desire for a moment to have any similar arrangement in London whereby a Military Representative of the United States had direct access to higher political authority. He thought it only right to express the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff quite frankly on this matter, though he realized that the President and the Prime Minister might have come to some other agreement on the matter.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the British Chiefs of Staff would have to refer the matter to the Prime Minister, as any decision on this point would have to be taken on a higher level.³

Admiral Stark said that the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted, without comment, Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the paper, but in Paragraph 6 would like to have the following amendments made:

Line 4—delete "either".
Lines 5 and 6—delete "or considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their next meeting".

The principle that coordinated intelligence should be available for the Planning Staffs was fully accepted, but the details would have to be worked out by the Planning Staffs in collaboration.

As regards Paragraphs 8 to 11 (Priorities and Allocation), the United States Chiefs of Staff entirely agreed with the principle enunciated in the first sentence of Paragraph 8. The United States organization for allocation was not, however, yet in final shape, and before accepting the remainder of these paragraphs, they would like to examine the matter further.

Sir Dudley Pound suggested that the principle involved in this matter was so important that it would be desirable for the Combined

³ In telegram 277, January 20, 1942, to Hopkins, Churchill agreed that it would be "far simpler and plainer that he [Dill] should come into the Combined Staff as our chief representative" without standing in any "undefined relation between me and the President." (740.011 E.W. 1939/18676)
Chiefs of Staff to submit their recommendations to the President and the Prime Minister.

A draft minute was handed round for discussion and agreed to, subject to certain amendments. A copy of the agreed minute is attached to Annex 1.

General Marshall in this discussion emphasized that there could be no question of having any duplication of the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization in Washington and in London. There could only be one Combined Chiefs of Staff who would give broad directions on the allocation of matériel. He saw no objection whatever to having parallel Allocation Committees in Washington and London, dealing with the allocation of American and British war matériel respectively.

The discussion then turned on the control of shipping dealt with in Paragraph 12.

General Marshall felt that the Chiefs of Staff should have control over shipping resources so that they could apply them to the best strategic purposes. It was hoped that something similar to the British system for the control of shipping would be set up in the United States; but the problem was more difficult since they were not a maritime nation like Great Britain, and the importance of shipping was not well realized in the United States. Many other interests clashed with strategic requirements when it came to dealing with shipping.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the British Chiefs of Staff had no control over the Ministry of War Transport in the matter of shipping, but they had access to all the facts and could make their case to the Prime Minister on military grounds if there was a clash of interests between strategical requirements and imports.

Admiral Stark said that the United States Chiefs of Staff could not accept anything more than the first sentence of Paragraph 12, since their own organization for the control of shipping was not yet settled. It followed, therefore, that Paragraph 13 also could not be accepted at present.

Sir Dudley Pound undertook to let the United States Chiefs of Staff have a short memorandum on the British system for the control of shipping and raw materials.\(^6\)

The Conference—

a. Took note of the proposals for Post-Arcadia Collaboration made by the British Chiefs of Staff in WW-8, and of the extent to which these had been accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff in the discussion recorded above.

\(^4\) The “draft minute” is the attachment to the revised version of WW-8, *post* p. 232.

\(^6\) Not printed.
b Agreed that the minute on the principle for the allocation of finished war matériel, as amended in discussion, should be submitted by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister respectively. (See Annex 1. Portions in Annex 1 indicated as deleted are those indicated in the discussion above as subjects for further consideration by the United States Chiefs of Staff.)

2. Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theater—First Half of 1942

The Conference had before them a report by the Joint Planning Committee on movements and projects in the Atlantic theater for the first half of 1942 (U.S. Serial ABC–4/6, British Serial WW (J.P.C.) 6). Sir Dudley Pound welcomed the idea of United States forces being sent to the Freetown-Bathurst area in certain circumstances, as proposed in Paragraph 14.

Admiral King pointed out that the adverse effects on other operations of carrying out various projects had only been set out in the case of North Africa. It should be made clear that any of these projects would have repercussions on others. Some reference should also be made in the final paragraph to the Northeast Brazil project.

The Conference—

Approved the report by the Joint Planning Committee, subject to the following amendments:

a. At the end of paragraph 6, add:

"Note. If any of the other operations mentioned in this paper are undertaken, they will adversely affect other operations in some or all of the above ways to a greater or less extent."

b. Paragraph 17, insert new subparagraph (4) as follows:

"(4) That the United States plans for the security of Northeast Brazil should be kept active."

Renumber existing subparagraph (4) as subparagraph (5).

(See Annex 2.)

3. Operation Super-Gymnast

The Conference agreed to postpone consideration of the Joint Planning Committee's reports on Super-Gymnast (U.S. ABC–4/2 and 4/2A and British WW (J.P.C.) 2 and 2A) until the next meeting.

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*Annex 1 consisted of the revised version of WW–8 plus the attached "draft minute", post, p. 230.

7 As amended and approved by the Chiefs of Staff, this report was serialized as ABC–4/6, WW–14, January 13, 1942, post, p. 258.
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1942
MEETING OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF,
JANUARY 14, 1942, 3 P. M., FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
General Marshall
Admiral Stark
Admiral King
Lieutenant General Arnold
Rear Admiral Sexton
Rear Admiral Horne
Rear Admiral Towers
Rear Admiral Turner
Major General Holcomb
Brigadier General Gerow
Brigadier General Somervell
Commander Libby

UNITED KINGDOM
Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Field Marshal Dill
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral Little
Lieutenant General Wemyss
Air Marshal Harris
Brigadier Napier
Lieutenant Colonel Bourne

SECRETARIAT
Brigadier General Lee
Captain McCrea
Captain Denebrink
Lieutenant Colonel Robinett
Lieutenant Colonel Sexton
Brigadier Hollis
Brigadier Dykes

Defense Files

United States Minutes

JANUARY 14, 1942.

JCCSs–12

1. MOVE OF UNITED STATES REINFORCEMENTS TO THE FAR EAST

Brigadier Napier, referring to the arrangements proposed for the move of urgent United States reinforcements to the Far East, said that information had now been received from London that the Queen Mary would take United States troops from New York via the Cape to Australia, sailing early in February. To make up for the loss of transportation from America to Northern Ireland thereby occasioned, it was proposed to allot additional British personnel ships returning from the Middle East, to sail about February 10 for Northern Ireland. Their total carrying capacity would be about 15,000. The Queen Elizabeth would sail early in February from San Francisco with United States troops for Australia, and the Aquitania would go into the Hawaiian run at the end of February. This program had been agreed to by General Somervell.

1 See ante, p. 182.
2. Super-Gymnast

The Conference had before them a paper prepared by the United States Planning Staff based upon a report by the Joint Planning Staff (U.S. ABC-4/2A), British WW (J.P.C.)2A. 2

This paper was discussed paragraph by paragraph, and a number of amendments agreed to.

Sir Charles Portal asked whether more United States ships could not be provided by further sacrifices, e.g., cutting into trade.

General Somervell said that the whole range of United States shipping, both passenger-carrying and freight, had been reviewed and no further resources could be tapped. All passenger ships, including those on the South American lines, would be taken up. The only way of increasing the number of freight ships would be to use ships already earmarked for supplies to Russia and the Middle East.

Admiral Turner confirmed that escorts could be provided for the last American convoy but one, shown in paragraph 9 on D-163 instead of D-178. (See Annex 1) 3

The Conference accepted the paper prepared by the United States Planning Staff, subject to the amendments agreed in discussion, as a basis on which the Combined Chiefs of Staff should inform the President and the Prime Minister regarding the time factor for Super-Gymnast. (See Annex 1) 3

3. Post-Arcadia Collaboration

The Conference had before them a draft prepared by the United States Chiefs of Staff on Post-Arcadia Collaboration (U.S. ABC-4/CS4). 4

This draft was considered paragraph by paragraph and certain amendments agreed to.

The Conference approved the draft as amended in discussion and agreed that it should be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister. (See Annex 2) 4

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2 As amended and approved by the Chiefs of Staff, this report was serialized as ABC-4/2A, WW-17, January 14, 1942, post, p. 262.
3 See post, p. 264.
4 This paper, as amended and approved by the Chiefs of Staff, is printed post, p. 232.

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MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, MR. HOPKINS, AND GENERAL MARSHALL, JANUARY 14, 1942, ABOUT 5 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

Editorial Note

No official record has been found of the meeting described in Sherwood, pp. 471-472, at which Roosevelt read a statement concerning
the proposed “make-up of the Munitions Assignment Board . . . to be divided into two coequal parts, one at Washington, headed by Hopkins, and the other in London, headed by Beaverbrook . . . on a level with and independent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” According to Sherwood, Marshall informed the President that unless the Munitions Assignment Board were under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with “no question of having any duplication of the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization in Washington and in London”, he could not continue to assume the responsibilities of Chief of Staff, on the ground that it was not possible to plan and execute military operations without control of the necessary matériel. Sherwood added that Hopkins supported Marshall “vociferously” both in the small meeting and in the larger meeting immediately afterward.

**MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL WITH THEIR MILITARY ADVISERS, JANUARY 14, 1942, 5:30 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE**

**Present**

**UNITED STATES**

President Roosevelt  
Secretary Stimson  
Secretary Knox  
Mr. Hopkins  
General Marshall  
Admiral Stark  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General Arnold  
Major General Watson  
Rear Admiral Beardsall  
Commander Libby  
Lieutenant Colonel Sexton

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Prime Minister Churchill  
Lord Beaverbrook  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Field Marshal Dill  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Brigadier Hollis

Defense Files

*United States Minutes*¹

**SECRET**

The President stated that he thought that a public statement should be issued in both Great Britain and the United States concerning the accomplishments of the Conference. This should be issued at an appropriate time.²

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¹The minutes are typed on War Department stationery and were presumably taken by Lieutenant Colonel Sexton.

²No announcement was made until after Churchill's arrival in England on January 17, 1942. At that time the White House announced that “complete understanding” had been reached in the conference regarding present and future military operations. The press also learned in general terms about the establishment of a “U.S.-British War Council” and of the boards for allocation of munitions, raw materials, and shipping. See the New York Times, January 18, 1942, p. 11.

The President stated that he was opposed to creating additional boards, but under the circumstances it appeared desirable to create certain agencies to insure the more efficient prosecution of the war. One would be a combined Raw Materials Board, which would involve the allocation of raw materials. The President stated that twenty-six nations were involved in the matter, and that he did not want the smaller nations to feel that they were left out of the proceedings.

Lord Beaverbrook stated that the British had already nominated Sir Clyde Baillieu as the British representative on this Board.

The President and Mr. Hopkins agreed that the American representative had not been decided upon.

The President then stated that this Board would have working under it a staff of appropriate size to insure efficient planning and the speediest development of raw materials. It would make recommendations to the heads of the Government in collaboration with the other nations. The Board would also confer with Russia and China on this matter.

Admiral King asked to whom the Board would make recommendations.

Lord Beaverbrook stated, “The President and the Prime Minister.”

The President then stated that it was proposed to establish an Anglo-American Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, which would have agencies in London and Washington. The executive power of this Board would be exercised by the United States Maritime Commission, in coordination with the British Minister of War Transportation. This Board would also confer with Russia and China and other interested nations on matters pertinent to its duties.

The President then stated that a matter of primary interest at this time is the assignment of munitions, and that he felt that all munitions should be placed in a common pool; that General Marshall and General Arnold had thought that a Board for this purpose should operate as a subcommittee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. This Committee would have a civilian chairman, one group operating in London and one in Washington, and would operate under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a manner similar to the arrangement for unity of command in the Southwest Pacific area. The Board would advise on all assignments and priorities with reference to finished munitions.

Lord Beaverbrook asked who would advise him on the matter of apportionment.

The President stated that it would be handled the same as the arrangements for the ABDA Area; that if disagreement occurred, appeal could always be made to the President and the Prime Minister.

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2 The word “Joint” as used in this document undoubtedly meant “Combined,” i.e., United States-United Kingdom.
LORD BEAVERBROOK then asked if it was desired to obtain goods for Russia, for example, to whom should we go?

The President stated that he should go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except that he would nominate a civilian chairman; also that the munitions subcommittee would invite comments on their allocations from representatives of the State Department and production agencies in both countries.

LORD BEAVERBROOK then asked that, if he was to go to the British civilian, where would the decision rest?

The Prime Minister stated that the two committees (one in London and one in Washington) would discuss the matter through the Chiefs of Staff Committees; that the arrangement of the British and American Committees would be somewhat different, due to the difference between the British set-up in Washington and the American set-up in London.

Admiral Pound asked who would be the British representatives in Washington.

The Prime Minister stated that the British representatives would be the members of the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, with Mr. Hopkins as chairman.

General Marshall stated that the arrangement suggested by the Prime Minister above was not his understanding of the matter; that he understood that the Munitions Allocation Committee and its civilian chairman would be a subcommittee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and should deal purely with munitions. It would be composed of Army, Air and Navy representatives, plus British representatives, and would have Mr. Hopkins as chairman.

The Secretary of War stated that he felt it was important that Great Britain have representatives on the Committee, so that overall treatment of the problem would be on the same basis. In other words, that the purpose of the set-up was that the economic resources of the two countries would be combined.

The President stated that this particular Board pertained to finished munitions coming off of the line, and applied to final allocations.

The Secretary of War stated that, prior to the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, it had been necessary for the War Department to deal with ten or twelve buyers from foreign nations; that he understood that this proposed plan was one step nearer to insuring that allocations would make most effective the associations with our Allies.

Mr. Hopkins stated that the movement of tanks and airplanes, even if they are not given American troops, is under the present manner of waging war, an operational problem and a proper subject for action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee; that the subcommittee would make recommendations for the distribution of munitions of war and report to the President through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
If the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not like the subcommittee’s recommendations, they can alter them or throw them out. However, room is left open for an appeal to the President by agencies below the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

**General Marshall** stated that he did not think that we should duplicate the Chiefs of Staff Committee in London; that the purpose was to set up a command post in Washington; that, at the present time, strategy is dominated by matériel, and any proposal with regard to matériel should come from the same source; that if the recommendations of the subcommittee, headed by Mr. Hopkins and the Munitions Committee in London, were not given proper appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the President or the Prime Minister could reverse the Chiefs of Staff’s decision; that it is not logical to have some agency independent of operations, control the matériel which is a basic requirement to successful operations.

The **Prime Minister** stated that the Committee in London would be able to give surveys of matériel available, and as Minister of Defense, he could tell the British Staff, and through them their representatives in Washington, what line to take.

The **President** added that one reason for having the civilian chairman is to permit Lord Beaverbrook and similar individuals to bring up the political viewpoint with regard to certain allocations.

**Lord Beaverbrook** asked if the matter would have to be referred to Washington.

The **President** stated that it would.

**Admiral King** stated that if the Chiefs of Staff Committee has representatives in London, which would meet in London, that it would duplicate the present set-up and this was not the idea intended.

**General Marshall** stated that in London there would be a British Committee on matériel; that a similar committee would exist in the United States and that the recommendations of these committees would focus up into the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. That he did not see how it would be possible to conduct a war properly with two independent agencies making allocations.

The **Prime Minister** observed that he thought the military representatives would take the purely strategic view.

**General Marshall** stated that under the present situation there are two lots of munitions—British and American—and they should be merged.

The **Prime Minister** suggested that no announcement of this method of handling allocations be made, but that it be tried out for a month.

The **President** suggested that Paragraph 1 of the memorandum, which called for the pooling of resources and the exchange of information on materials be released but that the procedure not be released at this time.
Lord Beaverbrook stated that before the system was permanently established, it should be given a trial; that he could envisage many difficulties which would obtain in England.

The Prime Minister suggested that the machinery be set up at once and the system tried for one month; then, if necessary, there could be a redraft. That the British are counting on lots of allocations from the United States and will want to know what the situation is; that they would be deeply interested in the margin or balance over and above 80% of the munitions.

General Marshall stated that there was more to the matter than this 15 or 20 percent margin, actual requirements have been the basis for most of our allocations of materials; for instance, many American units have kept below full equipment in order that this equipment could be sent to places where it was more urgently needed; that at the present time, the Army was planning to augment the number of divisions but only on a basis of about one-half of their equipment.

The President then stated, “We will call it a preliminary agreement and try it out that way.”

The Prime Minister suggested that the thing to do was to put it in practice, see how it looks a month from now, and then make an announcement.

Admiral Pound agreed that the system should be given a trial.

Admiral King stated that he was disturbed as to whether the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington would be duplicated in London.

It was agreed that the proposed system did not involve this.

Subject: Communications with London.

The President stated that he wanted to work out a system of better communications with London.

General Marshall stated that the Signal Corps had advised him that there was no way in which secret messages could be sent by telephone; that the so-called scrambler system merely assured privacy.

Admiral Stark added that the longest cable line for telephone purposes is between Miami and Cuba.

The President stated that he thought it should be possible for the two Governments to have the full use of one cable.

General Marshall stated that at present one trunk cable is under lease.

The President added that if the Government had its own line, it could not be cut in on.

General Marshall stated that complete secrecy would be difficult because of the necessity of having the transmission go through the hands of a certain number of individuals and added that he would check on the matter and advise the President at the earliest practicable date.
The President further stated that a study should be made as to the best method for improving the communications between Washington and London.

Admiral Stark stated that we have a set-up of that nature now—that direct connections exist, but messages cannot be sent by telephone.

Air Marshal Portal stated that the British were working on an instrument which he felt would be available in four months, which would insure secret radio telephonic transmission.

Subject: Gymnast.

The Prime Minister asked if anything further was to be said about Gymnast.

Marshal Dill stated that under the present plans, merchant shipping necessary for Gymnast operations would be delayed until May.

General Marshall stated that, regardless of the ABDA reinforcement, four weeks after D Day for Gymnast, it was estimated there would be enough shipping to send another 12,500 men from the United States, in addition to the original 12,000 to go on the available combat loaded type of ships.

The President asked, if the political situation could be kept stable until May, could the operation be put into effect?

It was agreed that it could be.

The President then stated that if the Germans should move into the Gymnast area in the interim, the thing to do would be to utilize whatever forces were available.

The Prime Minister observed that in this case we should make a slash with whatever forces were available and, if necessary, operate on the guerrilla basis.

The Secretary of the Navy suggested that we could take advantage of the delay to undertake some softening in the Gymnast area.

The President stated that he had taken steps to accomplish this. After the exchange of certain amenities, the Conference adjourned at 6:30 p.m.

DINNER MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, JANUARY 14, 1942, EVENING, THE WHITE HOUSE

Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITED STATES</th>
<th>UNITED KINGDOM</th>
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<tr>
<td>President Roosevelt</td>
<td>Prime Minister Churchill</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Hopkins</td>
<td></td>
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Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

[WASHINGTON,] January 15, 1942.

The last evening of Churchill’s visit (January 14) the President, Churchill and I had dinner together.

During dinner we wound up the last details of the agreements relative to shipping, raw materials and the allocation board. It was agreed that the text of these would not be given out but at the appropriate time the President would release a general statement governing all of them. The President and Churchill initialed the several documents.

The President and Churchill reviewed together the work of the past three weeks and Churchill expressed not only his warm appreciation of the way he and his associates had been treated but his confidence that great steps had been taken towards unification of the prosecution of the war.

Churchill had not decided even then whether to fly from Bermuda or to go in a battleship. The President did not know until later that Churchill had actually flown to England.

They were supposed to leave at 8:45 but it was a quarter of ten before we got up from dinner and the President and I drove with Churchill to his train to Norfolk, Virginia. A special train had been put on the siding at Sixth Street.

The President said goodbye to Churchill in the car and I walked with him and put him on the train and said goodbye to him, Pound and Portal.

On the way back, the President made it perfectly clear that he too was very pleased with the meetings. There was no question but that he grew genuinely to like Churchill and I am sure Churchill equally liked the President.

Harry L. Hopkins

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1 Certain additional information about arrangements worked out at the First Washington Conference for Anglo-American cooperation in merchant shipping was included in a letter of May 28, 1943, from Roosevelt to Churchill. The text of this letter is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of this series including documentation on the Third Washington, or Trident, Conference of May 1943. A slightly abbreviated text of the letter was read by Churchill to the House of Commons on August 3, 1943 (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 391, col. 2088).

2 Post, pp. 360 and 361.

3 See the editorial note, post, p. 359.
3. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

A. MILITARY STRATEGY AND COMMAND

(1) GRAND STRATEGY; ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

Defense Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, December 24, 1941].

WW-1 (U.S. Revised)¹

I. GRAND STRATEGY

1. At the A–B Staff conversations in February, 1941,² it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.

3. In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A–B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.

II. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY

4. The essential features of the above grand strategy are as follows. Each will be examined in greater detail later in this paper.

a. The realization of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry.

b. The maintenance of essential communications.

c. Closing and tightening the ring round Germany.

¹The memorandum is printed as it was revised by the United States Chiefs of Staff. The source text was Annex 1 to JCOSS–1; see ante, p. 89. Further revisions of the memorandum were agreed to on December 31; see ante, p. 145.

²A footnote on the source text identifies “A–B” as “American-British”. For a reference to sources of information on these conversations, see ante, p. 16, footnote 2.
d. Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities, and propaganda.

e. The continuous development of offensive action against Germany.

f. Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will safeguard vital interests and deny to Japan access to raw materials vital to her continuous war effort while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany.

III. STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN 1942 TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE ABOVE GENERAL POLICY

The Security of Areas of War Production.

5. In so far as these are likely to be attacked, the main areas of war industry are situated in:—

a. The United Kingdom.

b. Continental United States, particularly the West Coast.

c. Russia.

6. THE UNITED KINGDOM. To safeguard the United Kingdom it will be necessary to maintain at all times the minimum forces required to defeat invasion.

7. THE UNITED STATES. The main centres of production on or near the West Coast of United States must be protected from Japanese seaborne attack. This will be facilitated by holding Hawaii and Alaska. We consider that a Japanese invasion of the United States on a large scale is highly improbable, whether Hawaii or Alaska is held or not.

8. The probable scale of attack and the general nature of the forces required for the defense of the United States are matters for the United States Chiefs of Staff to assess.

9. RUSSIA. It will be essential to afford the Russians material assistance to enable them to maintain their hold on Leningrad, Moscow and the oilfields of the Caucasus, and to continue their war effort.

Maintenance of Communications.

10. The main sea routes which must be secured are:—

a. From U.S.A. to the United Kingdom.

b. From U.S.A. and the United Kingdom to North Russia.

c. The various routes from the United Kingdom and U.S.A. to Freetown, South America and the Cape.

d. The routes in the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, to India and Burma, to the East Indies and to Australasia.

f. The Pacific routes from United States and the Panama Canal to Alaska, Hawaii, Australia and the Far East. In addition to the above routes, we shall do everything possible to open up and secure the Mediterranean route.
11. The main air routes which must be secured are:—
   a. From the U.S. to South America, Freetown, Takoradi, and Cairo.
   b. From Cairo to Karachi, Calcutta, China, Malaya, Philippines, Australasia.
   c. From the U.S. to Australia via Hawaii, Christmas Island, Canton, Palmyra, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia.
   d. The routes from Australia to the Philippines and Malaya via the Netherlands East Indies.
   e. From the U.S. to the U.K. via Newfoundland, Canada, Greenland and Iceland.
   f. From the U.S. to the U.K. via the Azores.
   g. From the U.S. to Vladivostok via Alaska.

12. The security of these routes involves:—
   a. Well-balanced A-B naval and air dispositions.
   b. Holding and capturing essential sea bases. The main sea bases which are, or may be, required, apart from the terminal points to the various routes, are:—

   Bermuda
   Iceland
   Gibraltar or the Canaries
   The Azores
   Cape Verdes
   Freetown
   Dakar
   Madagascar
   Ceylon
   Hawaii
   Samoa

   c. Holding and capturing essential air bases. The main air bases which are or may be required, apart from the terminal points to the various routes, are:—

   Newfoundland
   Greenland
   Iceland
   Azores
   Bermuda
   Trinidad
   Belem
   Natal
   Freetown
   Ascension Island
   Takoradi
   Lagos
   Kano
   Ft. Lamy
   Khartoum
   Massaua
   Cairo
   Habbaniya

   Basra
   Teheran
   Kuibyshev
   Dakar
   Karachi
   Calcutta
   Hawaii
   Christmas Island
   Palmyra
   Canton
   Samoa
   Fiji
   New Caledonia
   Townsville
   Darwin
   Glencurry
   Koepang (Timor)
   Soerabaja
Closing and Tightening the Ring Around Germany.

13. This ring may be defined as a line running roughly as follows:

Archangel—Black Sea—Anatolia—The Northern Seaboard of the Mediterranean—The Western Seaboard of Europe.

The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the gaps in it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African coast.

14. If this ring can be closed, the blockade of Germany and Italy will be complete, and German eruptions, e.g. towards the Persian Gulf, or to the Atlantic seaboard of Africa, will be prevented. Furthermore, the seizing of the North African coast may open the Mediterranean to convoys, thus enormously shortening the route to the Middle East and saving considerable tonnage now employed in the long haul around the Cape.

The Undermining and Wearing Down of the German Resistance

15. In 1942, the main methods of wearing down Germany’s resistance will be:—

a. Ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American Forces.

b. Assistance to Russia’s offensive by all available means.

c. The blockade.

d. The maintenance of the spirit of revolt in the occupied countries, and the organization of subversive movements.

Development of Land Offensives on the Continent

16. It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany, except on the Russian front, will be possible. We must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that may result from the wearing down process referred to in paragraph 15 to conduct limited land offensives.

17. In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, via the Scandinavian Peninsula, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by simultaneous landings in several of the occupied countries of Northwestern Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself, and the scope of the victory programme should be such as to provide means by which they can be carried out.

The Safeguarding of Vital Interests in the Eastern Theatre

18. The security of Australia, New Zealand, and India must be maintained and Chinese resistance supported. Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be
developed must be secured. Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:

a. Hawaii and Alaska.

b. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier, and the Philippines.

c. Rangoon and the route to China.

d. The Maritime Provinces of Russia.

The minimum forces required to hold the above will have to be a matter of mutual discussion.

Defense Files

Memorandum by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

December 31, 1941.

United States: ABC-4/CS-1

British: WW-1 (Final)

AMERICAN-BRITISH GRAND STRATEGY

NOTE: The circulation of this paper should be restricted to the United States and British Chiefs of Staff and their immediate subordinates.

I. GRAND STRATEGY

1. At the A–B* Staff conversations in February, 1941, it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.

3. In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A–B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.

II. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY

The essential features of the above grand strategy are as follows. Each will be examined in greater detail later in this paper.

a. The realization of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry.

*The source text was Annex 1 to JCCSs–7; see ante, p. 145.

* For brevity the abbreviated A–B is used to denote American-British. [Footnote in the source text.]
b. The maintenance of essential communications.

c. Closing and tightening the ring around Germany.

d. Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.

e. The continuous development of offensive action against Germany.

f. Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will safeguard vital interests (see paragraph 18) and denying to Japan access to raw materials vital to her continuous war effort while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany.

III. STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN 1942 TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE ABOVE GENERAL POLICY

The Security of Areas of War Production

5. In so far as these are likely to be attacked, the main areas of war industry are situated in:—
   a. The United Kingdom.
   b. Continental United States, particularly the West Coast.
   c. Russia.

6. The United Kingdom.—To safeguard the United Kingdom it will be necessary to maintain at all times the minimum forces required to defeat invasion.

7. The United States.—The main centers of production on or near the West Coast of United States must be protected from Japanese sea-borne attack. This will be facilitated by holding Hawaii and Alaska. We consider that a Japanese invasion of the United States on a large scale is highly improbable, whether Hawaii or Alaska is held or not.

8. The probable scale of attack and the general nature of the forces required for the defense of the United States are matters for the United States Chiefs of Staff to assess.

9. Russia.—It will be essential to afford the Russians assistance to enable them to maintain their hold on Leningrad, Moscow, and the oilfields of the Caucasus, and to continue their war effort.

Maintenance of Communications

10. The main sea routes which must be secured are:—
   a. From the United States to the United Kingdom.
   b. From the United States and the United Kingdom to North Russia.
   c. The various routes from the United Kingdom and the United States to Freetown, South America, and the Cape.
   d. The routes in the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, to India and Burma, to the East Indies, and to Australasia.
The route through the Panama Canal, and the United States coastal traffic.

The Pacific routes from the United States and the Panama Canal to Alaska, Hawaii, Australia, and the Far East.

In addition to the above routes, we shall do everything possible to open up and secure the Mediterranean route.

11. The main air routes which must be secured are:
   a. From the United States to South America, Ascension, Freetown, Takoradi, and Cairo.
   b. From the United Kingdom to Gibraltar, Malta and Cairo.
   c. From Cairo to Karachi, Calcutta, China, Malaya, Philippines, Australasia.
   d. From the United States to Australia via Hawaii, Christmas Island, Canton, Palmyra, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia.
   e. The routes from Australia to the Philippines and Malaya via the Netherlands East Indies.
   f. From the United States to the United Kingdom via Newfoundland, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland.
   g. From the United States to the United Kingdom via the Azores.
   h. From the United States to Vladivostok, via Alaska.

12. The security of these routes involves:
   a. Well-balanced A—B naval and air dispositions.
   b. Holding and capturing essential sea and air bases.

Closing and Tightening the Ring Around Germany

13. This ring may be defined as a line running roughly as follows:

   Archangel—Black Sea—Anatolia—The Northern Seaboard of the Mediterranean—The Western Seaboard of Europe.

The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the gaps in it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African coast.

14. If this ring can be closed, the blockade of Germany and Italy will be complete, and German eruptions, e.g. towards the Persian Gulf, or to the Atlantic seaboards of Africa, will be prevented. Furthermore, the seizing of the North African coast may open the Mediterranean to convoys, thus enormously shortening the route to the Middle East and saving considerable tonnage now employed in the long haul around the Cape.

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15. In 1942 the main methods of wearing down Germany's resistance will be:
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17. In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself, and the scope of the victory program should be such as to provide means by which they can be carried out.

The Safeguarding of Vital Interests in the Eastern Theatre

18. The security of Australia, New Zealand, and India must be maintained, and the Chinese war effort supported. Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be secured. Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:—

a. Hawaii and Alaska.
b. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier, and the Philippines.
c. Rangoon and the route to China.
d. The Maritime Provinces of Siberia.

The minimum forces required to hold the above will have to be a matter of mutual discussion.

Defense Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1942.

WW–8

POST-ARCADIA COLLABORATION

1. We think that the United States Chiefs of Staff will wish to know what representatives of the Minister of Defence and the British Chiefs of Staff organization it is proposed to leave in Washington after the departure of the Arcadia party.

1 The source text was circulated on January 10 and was attached as Annex 4 to JCCs–8; see ante, p. 174.
2. To avoid confusion, we suggest that hereafter the word "Joint" should be applied to Inter-Service collaboration and the word "Combined" to collaboration between two or more allied nations.

Representative of the Minister of Defence.

3. Field Marshal Sir John Dill is remaining in Washington as representative of the Minister of Defence. He will have contacts with such authorities on the highest level as may be arranged between the President and the Prime Minister.

Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff.

4. The Heads of the Joint Staff Mission, Admiral Sir Charles Little, Lieut. General Sir Colville Wemyss, and Air Marshal A. T. Harris, will continue to represent the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. It is hoped that a meeting between the United States Chiefs of Staff or their representatives and the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff may be held weekly or more often if necessary. An agenda would be circulated before each meeting.

Combined Planning.

5. For the time being the British representatives on the Planning Staff will be—

Navy
Captain C. E. Lambe, R.N., Deputy Director of Plans, Admiralty

Army
Lieut. Colonel G. K. Bourne

R.A.F.
Group Captain S. C. Strafford

Combined Intelligence.

6. The arrangements for production of complete intelligence to serve the Planning Staffs are of great importance and we suggest that this matter should either be referred to the Combined Planning Staffs for report or considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their next meeting.

7. We have here representatives of the Joint Intelligence Committee in London and these are available to work in conjunction with any organization the United States Chiefs of Staff may desire.

Priorities and Allocation.

8. In our view, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should settle the broad programme of requirements based on strategic policy. We suggest that it will be the duty of the Combined Planning Staffs, advised by appropriate Allocation Officers, to watch, on behalf of
the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the production programmes and to bring to notice instances where output does not conform to strategic policy.

9. Similarly, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should from time to time issue general directives laying down policy to govern the distribution of available weapons of war. Effect should be given to these directives by appropriate Combined Allocation Committees. These would meet periodically and make both long-term allocations (on which planning and training of forces must be based), and short-term allocations to meet immediate military needs.

10. The British representatives on the appropriate Combined Allocation Committees will for the present be—

Navy
  Rear Admiral J. W. Dorling, R.N.

Army
  Brigadier D. Campion

R.A.F.
  Air Commodore E. B. C. Betts

11. Allocation should be made as between the United States and the British Commonwealth, each caring for the needs of the Allies for whom it has accepted responsibility.

Military Movements.

12. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would settle the broad issues of priority of overseas movement. In order to advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to coordinate the movement of United States and British troops and equipment so that the shipping resources of both countries are put to the best use, it appears to us that a Combined Body is desirable. The British representatives for such a body are available under Brigadier H. R. Kerr.

13. It is suggested that this Combined Body should work in close touch with the Combined Planning Staffs through whom their advice to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be submitted.

Secretariat.

14. A British Secretariat under Brigadier Dykes is available to serve the above organizations and to work in with any similar Secretariat system which the United States Chiefs of Staff may establish.

DUDLEY POUND
J. G. DILL
A. T. HARRIS
(for Chief of Air Staff)
SECRET

Prime Minister to General Ismay for C.O.S. Committee and Defence Committee.

I have availed myself of a few days quiet and seclusion to review the salients of war as they appear after my discussions here.

1. The United States has been attacked and become at war with the three Axis Powers, and desires to engage her trained troops as soon and as effectively as possible on fighting fronts. Owing to the shipping stringency this will not be possible on any very large scale during 1942. Meanwhile the United States’ Army is being raised from a strength of a little over thirty Divisions and five Armored Divisions to a total strength of about sixty Divisions and ten Armoured Divisions. About 3¾ million men are at present held or about to be called up for the Army and Air Force (over a million). Reserves of manpower are practically unlimited, but it would be a mis-direction of war effort to call larger numbers to the armed forces in the present phase.

2. It does not seem likely that more than between a quarter and a third of the above American forces can be transported to actual fighting fronts during the year 1942. In 1943, however, the great increases in shipping tonnage resulting from former and recent shipping programmes should enable much larger bodies to be moved across the oceans, and the Summer of 1943 may be marked by large offensive operations which should be carefully studied meanwhile.

3. The United States Air Force, already powerful and rapidly increasing, can be brought into heavy action during 1942. Already it is proposed that strong bomber forces, based on the British Isles, should attack Germany and the invasion ports. American Fighter Squadrons can participate in the defence of Great Britain and the domination of such parts of the French shore as are in Fighter reach. Additional United States’ Fighter and Bomber forces are much needed in Egypt and Libya, and it may be that the attack of the Roumanian

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1 The source text, which bears no place or date, incorporates various editorial changes in Churchill’s hand, with paragraphs numbered as shown here. In The Grand Alliance, pp. 699-700, Churchill referred to it as follows: “During my rest in Florida I prepared a fourth memorandum in two parts addressed to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and for the Defense Committee of the War Cabinet. This was written also for American eyes. It differed from the three previous papers in that it was composed after the opening discussions in Washington between me and the President and his advisers and between the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently on my return to London I circulated all these papers to the War Cabinet for information. A very large measure of agreement had already been reached between our two countries, and the War Cabinet accorded in effect a very wide degree of approval to the direction which had been given to our affairs.” An abbreviated text of this memorandum is printed ibid., p. 700.
oilfields from Persia by the heaviest American bombers is a project which should be entertained. Meanwhile, also, continuous streams of American bombers are proceeding both westward and eastward to the Pacific theatre of war, which will, of course, be the main scene of United States’ air action in 1942.

4. The Declaration by the President to Congress of the enormous increases in United States’ output of munitions and shipping to proceed during 1942, and reach full flow in 1943, makes it more than ever necessary for Hitler to bring the war to a decision in 1942 before the power of the United States can be fully brought to bear. Hitler’s need to invade the British Isles has always been great. The difficulties of the operation are also very great. Our preparations to resist have continually improved during the past year, and will be still further augmented by the time the Spring invasion season is reached. Improvements in British preparations comprise:

\((a)\) a far better trained and equipped Army;
\((b)\) stronger and more elaborate beach defences, including substantially increased coast batteries;
\((c)\) the marshalling by the Spring of between three and four thousand medium and heavy tanks in Great Britain, forming the equivalent of seven or eight Armoured Divisions;
\((d)\) by the need imposed upon the invader, arising from the above, of bringing a very large invading Army across the sea, with consequent aggravated difficulty of finding the shipping and of assembling it in the ports and river mouths, and of the greater target presented to British naval and air action.

\((e)\) by the increase in the actual and relative power of the British Fighter Command which can now, instead of fighting at odds, bring superior numbers to bear upon the enemy Air Force over British soil, and can moreover dominate the French coastal regions nearest to the British Isles, viz., from Dunkirk to Dieppe, as well as Cherbourg, during the daytime, thus permitting daylight bombing under Fighter escort, of the nearest and most dangerous regions of hostile embarkation.

5. Notwithstanding all the foregoing, we must continue to regard the invasion of the British Isles in 1942 as the only supreme means of escape and victory open to Hitler. He has had the time to prepare, perhaps in very great numbers, tank transporting vehicles capable of landing on any beach. He has no doubt developed airborne attack by parachutes, and still more by gliders, to an extent which cannot be easily measured. The President, expressing views shared by the leading American strategists, has declared Great Britain an essential fortress of the United Nations. It is indeed the only place where the war can be lost in the critical campaign of 1942 about to

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*For text of the Annual Message of the President to the Congress, delivered before a joint session of the two Houses of Congress on January 6, 1942, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. xvi, January 10, 1942, p. 39.*
open. It would be most imprudent to allow the successful defence of the British Isles to be hazarded. We have, of course, to continue to send about 40,000 men a month, with proportionate munitions and air forces, to the Armies of the Middle East. We have to send, as soon as shipping can be found, several additional Divisions to the Far East, or to replace Divisions withdrawn from the Middle East for the Far East. We also hold certain Divisions ready for particular overseas enterprises. The naval position in the Eastern Mediterranean also requires a very marked increase in British air power along the North African and Levantine shores. We must, therefore, face a continued outward flow of strength from the British Isles, and apart from equipment and armour there is no way in which our home defence army can be sensibly augmented by us. Indeed, the despatch of further Divisions abroad cannot be replaced by us.

6. The sending of four United States’ Divisions (one armoured) into Northern Ireland is therefore a most necessary war measure, which nothing should be allowed to prevent. The replacing of the British troops in Iceland liberates an additional British Division. It is suggested, however, that the United States’ authorities should be asked to consider:

(a) the training in Iceland of as many troops as possible to work in mountains and under snow conditions, as only the possession of such trained mountain and ski troops in considerable numbers can enable liberating operations in Scandinavia to be prepared for the future; and

(b) that the American troops once settled down in the North of Ireland should pass in rotation, first by Brigades and then by Divisions, for tours of duty on the beaches of England and Scotland. This would be of interest to the American troops as well as adding to their experience and the defence of the island.

(c) It is further suggested that, in the absence of other more urgent calls, American Divisions beyond those already under orders may be sent into the United Kingdom where they can if need be perfect their training.

7. The Operation “Super-Gymnast” might become ripe, or might be forced upon us in the near future by unpredictable political or military events. It would be a misfortune if it were to interrupt the movement called “Magnet”. Provided the situation in North Africa, France or Spain, undergoes no sudden deterioration, a month or six weeks’ delay might be accepted. Moreover, the military fact which would set French North Africa in a ferment and bring matters to a head would be the arrival of General Auchinleck’s vanguards at the frontiers of Tunis. We cannot tell yet if and when this will be possible; certainly the stubborn resistance of the enemy in Cyrenaica; the possibilities of General Von Rommel withdrawing, or being able to escape with a portion of his troops; the reinforcements which have
probably reached Tripoli, and others which must be expected during the delay, and above all, the difficulties of supply for our advancing troops—all will retard, or may even prevent the full completion of Acrobat. We are therefore in a position to study Super-Gymnast more thoroughly, and to proceed with Magnet with the utmost speed.

8. For reasons which are known, the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean is greatly in excess of the British, and it is only the poor morale of the Italian fleet that enables us to dispute the command of the sea, having regard especially to the very numerous well posted air-bases which the enemy has in Tripoli, in Sicily, in Italy, in Greece and in Crete. The concentration of German aircraft in large numbers at these air bases and the number of U-boats they maintain in the Mediterranean, may conceivably portend an overseas expedition to the African shore, or alternatively or as a preliminary, an attack upon Malta, that cruel thorn in their sides. It is, therefore, most important that the maximum air-power—bomber fighter and torpedo-carrying types—we can gather and transport must be installed along that portion of the North African coast which is under our control. Substantial British Air reinforcements are already on the way. The employment of American squadrons, based primarily on Egypt and extending westwards would be invaluable. It would be for our advantage to develop air war in the Mediterranean on the largest scale on both sides, with constant bombing of enemy airfields and sea-traffic. The German front-line Air Force is already less strong numerically than the British. A considerable portion of it must now be left opposite Russia. But the bulk of the British Air Force has to be tied up at home facing at the present time a much smaller concentration of German bombers and fighters, and yet not able to be moved because of the good interior communications possessed by the enemy and his power of rapid transference. In addition, there is the Italian Air Force to consider. What comparative value should be placed upon them is a matter of opinion.

11. [Sic] The object we should set before ourselves is the wearing down by continuous engagement of the German Air power. This is being done on the Russian front. On the British front it can only be done to a limited extent, unless the enemy resumes his bombing or daylight offensive. But in the Mediterranean the enemy shows an inclination to develop a front, and we should meet him there with the superior strength which the arrival of American Air Forces can alone give. It is of the utmost importance to make the German Air Force fight continuously on every possible occasion, and at every point of attack. We can afford the drain far better than they can. Indeed, like General Grant in his last campaign, we can almost afford to lose two for one, having regard to the immense supplies now coming for-
ward in the future. Every German aircraft or pilot put out of action in 1942 is worth two of them in 1943. It is only by the strain of constant air-battle that we shall be able to force his consumption of air-power to levels which are beyond the capacity of his air-plants and air-schools. In this way the initiative may be regained by us, as the enemy will be fully occupied, as we have been hitherto, in meeting day to day needs and keeping his head above water.

12. Coming further east we must acclaim the very great deliverance to us afforded by the successful Russian resistance along the Don and in the Crimea, carrying with it the continued Russian command of the Black Sea. Three months ago we were forced to expect a German advance through the Caucasus to the Caspian and the Baku oilfields. That danger is almost certainly staved off for perhaps four or five months till the winter is over; and, of course, continued successful Russian resistance in the south gives complete protection to us. This fact alone has enabled us to divert the 18th Division, the 17th Indian Infantry Division and to plan the withdrawal of two out of the three Australian Divisions in Palestine, together with considerable air reinforcements and much material, from the Levant-Caspian front to the new emergencies in Malaya and the Far East. It must be emphasised that we could not possibly have provided for the Libyan operations, the maintenance of the Levant-Caspian front and the Malayan needs simultaneously. Even without the war with Japan we could only have maintained a very doubtful defence of Palestine, Iraq and Persia.

13. The danger may, however, recur in the late Spring. The oil stringency which is already serious in Germany and the German conquered countries, makes the seizure of the Baku and Persian Oilfields objects of vital consequence to Germany, second only to the need of successfully invading the British Isles. No-one can forecast the future course of the Russo-German struggle. Evidently the Germans will suffer increasingly heavy losses during the winter. They may even sustain disasters so great that the Russian counter-strokes will reach the former frontier with consequences to the Nazi regime, both military and internal, which cannot be measured. On the other hand, the enormous power of the German Army may be able to reassert itself as soon as weather conditions improve. In this case they might well be content to adopt a defensive attitude along the northern and central sectors of the Russo-German front, and thrust an offensive spearhead south-east through the Caucasus to the oilfields which lie beyond.

14. They may also persuade or compel Turkey to grant them passage through Anatolia to attack successively Syria, Palestine and Egypt. It would, however, seem unlikely, first that Turkey would agree in view of the Russian strength in the north and of the British
activities in Egypt and Libya, and also of the world situation, now that the United States is a full belligerent. Secondly, in the event of a Turkish refusal it seems unlikely that Germany would, after her Russian losses, wish to bring into the field against her the 50 Turkish Divisions by which the inhospitable and difficult mountainous regions of Anatolia would certainly be stubbornly defended. Moreover, if the south-eastward spear-thrust through the Caucasus were successful, the Anatolian line of advance would not be indispensable to the acquisition of the oilfields. The resistance of Turkey as a friendly neutral should be stimulated in every way, and especially by sending whatever supplies are possible in aircraft, anti-aircraft, tanks and antitank equipment. Great Britain has already made promises to aid the Turks with considerable air and land forces if they are attacked and resist. Our ability to fulfil these promises has been prejudiced by the diversions necessary for making head against Japan. On the whole, however, it would seem reasonable to assume that the main danger to be faced in the spring of 1942 in this theatre will be a breakdown in Russian defence of the Caucasus and Baku, and the German advance thence to the oilfields of Persia, and to Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf.

15. We thus see ourselves drawn away towards the West by Crusader, Acrobat and perhaps Gymnast and Super-Gymnast, while at the same time we are drawn farther to the East by the increasing scale of the Japanese war. How are we to meet the danger outlined in the two preceding paragraphs? It will not be possible for Great Britain to replace the 18th British, 17th Indian, and two Australian Divisions moved or already assigned to the Far East, especially if Gymnast or Super-Gymnast should develop. The monthly drafts for North Africa, for the Levant-Caspian front and for the Malayan theatre, which have already averaged for many months 35,000 a month, will probably rise to 50,000 if existing units are to be maintained and if the necessary British contingents of the five new Divisions being raised in India are to be supplied. This will strain to the utmost both the escorts and the shipping necessary to move these monthly convoys in and out of the danger zones in the British Isles, and it is a three or four months' round voyage via the Cape of Good Hope to Suez, Basra or Malaya. It is doubtful whether more than one, or at the outside two, new Divisional formations can be transferred from Great Britain to the various eastern theatres in six or eight months. It would not be wise to call upon India for further reinforcements for the Levant-Caspian theatre, as all her resources will be needed to nourish the war against Japan in the Malayan theatre, to defend Burma (and it may be India) and keep open the Burma Road to China. After the move to the Far East of the Divisions mentioned above has been completed we shall, therefore, have
in the Levant-Caspian region only the 5th Indian Division in Cyprus, the 50th British Division at Baghdad, one Australian and one Armoured Division (as yet only partly formed) in Palestine, the 8th, 9th and 10th Indian Divisions in Persia and Iraq—total 7 Divisions. We shall have in Egypt and North Africa three British Armoured, the 70th British, the New Zealand Division, 2 South African Divisions, 4th US Indian Division and various British Brigade Groups and Polish and French contingents the equivalent of, say, three Divisions—total 11 Divisions. It seems likely that this force will be fully occupied in maintaining the North African shore, especially if the fighting front should extend westwards into Tunis.

16. It is a question to be profoundly considered whether the United States would not be wise to contemplate the development of an American Army, based on the Persian Gulf ports, to operate to the northward with the British and Empire forces set out above. The monster liners sailing from United States’ east coast ports could perhaps find their fullest employment in carrying American troops through the great ocean spaces via the Cape to the Persian Gulf. If an American Army of six or eight Divisions could be developed north of the Persian Gulf, it would, added to the seven we have and proportionate air forces, with any reinforcements we can send, be a powerful factor in the war against Germany. Whether this Army of, say, 15 Divisions, or any part of it, should stand purely on the defensive or should move forward to the Caucasus and even to the Russian southern front north of the Black Sea, would be dependent upon events on the Russo-German front, on where that front would be standing in the third quarter of 1942 and on the development of the communications by road and rail from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. It must be observed that any large force moved and maintained from the Persian Gulf in the Caspian basin will, of course, choke the southern warm water supply lines by which it is proposed to carry munitions into Russia. If nothing can be done and the Russian southern front is beaten in (which may not happen), a frightful gap will be open which at present there is nothing in sight to fill, and the loss of the oilfields of the Caspian and Persia, and of all the regions between the present Russian front and the frontiers of India cannot be excluded from our thoughts. It is suggested that the Joint Staffs should study and report on the possibilities which are open, the precise object being the development of at least fifteen Divisions in the Levant-Caspian theatre.

**Far East**

**The War Against Japan**

17. It is generally agreed that the defeat of Germany entailing a collapse will leave Japan exposed to overwhelming force, whereas
the defeat of Japan would not by any means bring the world war to an end. Moreover, the vast distances in the Pacific and the advantageous forward key-points already seized or likely to be seized by the Japanese will make the serious invasion of the homelands of Japan a very lengthy business. Not less lengthy will be the piecemeal recovery, by armies based mainly on Australia and India, of the islands, airfields and naval bases in the south-west Pacific area now confided to General Wavell. It seems, indeed, more probable that a decision can be reached sooner against Germany than against Japan. In any case, we cannot expect to develop adequate naval, air and military superiority in the aforesaid area for a considerable time having regard to other calls made upon us and the limitation of shipping.

18. While, therefore, it is right to assign primacy to the war against Germany; it would be wrong to speak of our "standing on the defensive" against Japan; on the contrary, the only way in which we can live through the intervening period in the Far East before Germany is defeated is by regaining the initiative albeit on a minor scale. Certain measures stand out clearly and are indeed imposed upon by events:

(a) The Philippines must be held as long as possible if only to detain Japanese forces there.
(b) The supply lines to China via Burma must be kept open and fought for with the utmost energy.
(c) The Singapore fortress and its immediate approaches must be defended to the utmost limit.
(d) The Dutch Possessions in Java and Sumatra must be disputed on a constantly increasing scale.
(e) The air routes from Australia to the S.W. Pacific area and the sea routes from the United States to Australia must be maintained.

19. None of the above defensive operations will be successfully accomplished apart from the development of a counter-stroke offensive on a minor, but nonetheless, considerable scale. In a theatre of a thousand islands, many capable of being converted into make-shift air and naval bases, insoluble problems are set to purely passive defence. The Japanese having obtained temporary command of the sea, and air predominance over considerable areas, it is within their power to take almost any point they wish apart from the fortress of Singapore. They can go round with a circus-force and clean up any local garrisons we or the Dutch have been able so far to hold. They will seek to secure their hold by a well-conceived network of air bases and they no doubt hope to secure, in a certain number of months, the possession of the fortress of Singapore. Once in possession of this as well as Manila, with their air bases established at focal points, they will have built up a system of air and naval defence
capable of prolonged resistance. They may succeed in doing this, in which case the end of 1943 or 1944 may well see them still ensconced in the possessions they have so easily won. On the other hand, the wider they are spread the greater the weight of the war upon them and the larger the target they expose. Their air-power cannot be replenished or maintained at strength comparable to that of the United States and Great Britain. The naval superiority of the United States, to which Great Britain will contribute to the best of her ability, ought to be regained by the Summer of 1942.

20. It is not proposed here to discuss the steps by which the American-British naval superiority will be attained. Thereafter, or at least as soon as possible, raids should be organized upon islands or seaports which the Japanese have seized. The President has, I understand, ordered the formation of a force akin, on the West Coast of America, to the Commandos. Such a force, on account of its individual qualities, will be exceptionally valuable by gaining key-points and lodgments in amphibious operations. It would require to be supported by a number of small Brigade Groups whose mobility and equipment would be exactly fitted to the particular task foreseen, each task being a study in itself. It is not necessary, unless required on strategic grounds, to stay in the captured or re-captured islands. It will be sufficient to destroy or make prisoners of the garrison, demolish any useful installations, and depart. The exact composition of the forces for each undertaking and enterprise is a matter for separate study. According to our experiences it would seem essential that there should be adequate cover by sea-borne aircraft and detachments of tanks and tank landing craft. The enemy cannot possibly be prepared and must be highly vulnerable at many points. After even a few successful enterprises of this character, all of which are extremely valuable experiences to the troops and Commanders for instructional purposes, he will be terrorized out of holding places weakly, and will be forced to concentrate on a certain number of strong points. It may then be possible for us to secure very easily suitable islands, provided we do not try to hold too many, in which air and re-fuelling bases of a temporary or permanent character can be improvised. The establishment of a reign of terror among the enemy’s detached garrisons would seem to be an extremely valuable preliminary to the larger operations for re-conquest and the building up of strong bases as stepping stones from Australia northward. (Unfinished)
Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1942.

PROBLEMS TO BE SETTLED

3. In what way can Russia, China, the Dutch, the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations be associated in some type of joint body to plan the united war effort?

5. What joint organization should be responsible for advice and planning for theaters of war outside of the Far East?

1 For other excerpts from this memorandum, see post, p. 356.

Defense Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM OF PROPOSED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENTS

Ireland

Reduce present plan for sailing January 15 of 16,000 as follows:

4,100 troops to sail January 15
7,000 troops on Queen Mary to sail February 1
9,000 troops on Andes, Oronzay, and Orion, to sail February 15-20

4,400 troops on George Washington to sail February 24.

Total . . . . . . . 24,500 to sail January 15 to February 24.

(Note: Cargo tonnage extremely short. British must provide shelter, or lumber to winterize tents).

Iceland

Reduce present plan for sailing January 15 of 8,000 as follows:

2,500 troops on January 15.

(Note: Remainder as shipping becomes available. Probably about 2,500 per month.)

British Troops

Near East and Far East

7,000 on Queen Mary to load in England.

5,100 from Cairo on Mount Vernon—Now in Far East.

1 The source text was Annex 1 to JCCSS-10; see ante, p. 182.

* Another copy of this memorandum gives the name of this vessel as “Uruguay”.

1 The source text was Annex 1 to JCCSS-10; see ante, p. 182.

* Another copy of this memorandum gives the name of this vessel as “Uruguay”.
11,200 from Cairo on second round trip of West Point and Wakefield—Now engaged in first round trip for Far East.
Total . . . 23,300 British troops for Near and Far East on United States ships and Queen Mary.

United States Troops
Far East
21,800 troops, to sail from New York January 20.
250 Pursuit planes
86 Medium Bombers
57 Light Bombers
228,000 Cargo Tons.
4½ million gallons of gasoline.
(Note: Troops are air and supporting services, except for a reinforced brigade for New Caledonia of 10,000 men).

Defense Files

Revised Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January [13], 1942.

WW-8

POST-ARCADIA COLLABORATION

1. We think that the United States Chiefs of Staff will wish to know what representatives of the Minister of Defence and the British Chiefs of Staff organisation it is proposed to leave in Washington after the departure of the Arcadia party.

2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the word "Joint" should be applied to Inter-Service collaboration of one Nation and the word "Combined" to collaboration between two or more Allies United Nations.

Representative of the Minister of Defence.

3. Field Marshal Sir John Dill is remaining in Washington as representative of the Minister of Defence. He will have contacts with such authorities on the highest level as may be arranged between the President and the Prime Minister.

Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff.

4. The Heads of the Joint Staff Mission, Admiral Sir Charles Little, General Sir Colville Wemyss, and Air Marshal A. T. Harris, will

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1 The source text was Annex 1 to JCCs-11; see ante, p. 200. This memorandum was a copy of the memorandum of January 8 (ante, p. 217) with indicated revisions in the text and with the addition of the attached "draft minute." Since these amendments to the original memorandum were made at the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on January 13, 1942, the editors have supplied this date on the revised version.
continue to represent the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. It is hoped that a meeting between the United States Chiefs of Staff or their representatives and the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff may be held weekly or more often if necessary. An agenda would be circulated before each meeting.

**Combined Planning.**

5. For the time being, the British representatives on the Planning Staff will be—

Navy
   Captain C. E. Lambe
Army
   R. A. F.
   Group Captain S. C. Strafford

**Combined Intelligence.**

6. The arrangements for production of complete intelligence to serve the Planning Staffs are of great importance and we suggest that this matter should either be referred to the Combined Planning Staffs for report or considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their next meeting.

7. We have here representatives of the Joint Intelligence Committee in London, and these are available to work in conjunction with any organisation the United States Chiefs of Staff may desire.

**Priorities and Allocation.**

8. In our view the Combined Chiefs of Staff should settle the broad programme of requirements based on strategic policy. We suggest that it will be the duty of the Combined Planning Staffs, advised by appropriate Allocation Officers, to watch on behalf of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the production programmes and to bring to notice instances where output does not conform to strategic policy.

9. Similarly the Combined Chiefs of Staff should from time to time issue general directives laying down policy to govern the distribution of available weapons of war. Effort should be given to these directives by appropriate Combined Allocation Committees. These would meet periodically and make both long-term allocations (on which planning and training of forces must be based), and short-term allocations to meet immediate military needs.

10. The British representatives on the appropriate Combined Allocation Committees will for the present be—

Navy
   Rear Admiral J. W. S. Dorling
Army
   Brigadier D. Campion
   R. A. F.
   Air Commodore E. B. G. Betts
11. Allocation should be made as between the United States and the British Commonwealth, each caring for the needs of the Allies for whom it has accepted responsibility.

Military Movements.

12. The Combined Chiefs of Staff should settle the broad issues of priority of overseas movement. In order to advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to coordinate the movement of United States and British troops and equipment so that the shipping resources of both countries are put to the best use, it appears to us that a Combined Body is desirable. The British representatives for such a body are available under Brigadier R. Kerr.

13. It is suggested that this Combined Body should work in close touch with the Combined Planning Staffs through whom their advice to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be submitted.

Secretariat.

14. A British Secretariat under Brigadier Dykes is available to serve the above organisations and to work in any similar Secretariat system which the United States Chiefs of Staff may establish.

DUDLEY POUND
J. G. DILL
A. T. HARRIS
(for Chief of Air Staff)

[Attachment]

Draft Minute for Submission by the United States Chiefs of Staff to the President and by the British Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister

"We, the combined United States–British Chiefs of Staff are agreed in principle that finished war equipment shall be allocated in accordance with strategical needs. We accordingly submit that an appropriate body should be set up, under the authority of the combined Chiefs of Staff, in Washington, and a corresponding body in London, for the purpose of giving effect to this principle."

Defense Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff *

SECRET

United States: ABC-4/CS4
British: WW-16

[WASHINGTON,] January 14, 1942.

* The source text was Annex 2 to JCCSs–12. It incorporates the amendments accepted in the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on January 14, 1942; see ante, p. 202.
POST-ARCADIA COLLABORATION

1. In order to provide for the continuance of the necessary machinery to effect collaboration between the United Nations after the departure from Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Chief of Staffs (formerly designated as “Joint Chiefs of Staff”) propose the broad principles and basic organization herein outlined.

2. To avoid confusion we suggest that hereafter the word “Joint” be applied to Inter-Service collaboration of one nation, and the word “Combined” to collaboration between two or more of the United Nations.

3. Definitions.—

   a. The term “Combined Chiefs of Staff” is defined as the British Chiefs of Staff (or in their absence from Washington, their duly accredited representatives), and the United States opposite numbers of the British Chiefs of Staff.

   b. The term “Combined Staff Planners” is defined as the body of officers duly appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make such studies, draft such plans, and perform such other work as may from time to time be placed on the “Combined Chiefs of Staff Agenda” by that Body, and duly delegated by them to the Combined Staff Planners.

   c. The “Combined Secretariat” is defined as the body of officers duly appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to maintain necessary records, prepare and distribute essential papers, and perform such other work as is delegated to them by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. Personnel.—

   a. The Heads of the Joint Staff Mission, Admiral Sir Charles Little, Lt. General Sir Colville Wemyss, and Air Marshal A. T. Harris, will represent the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington.²

   b. The Joint Staff Planners will be:

      (1) For the British (for the time being):
         Captain C. E. Lambe, R.N.
         Lt. Col. G. K. Bourne, British Army
         Group Captain S. C. Strafford, R.A.F.

      (2) For the United States, the principal members are:
         Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S. Navy
         Capt. R. E. Davison, U.S. Navy
         Col. E. L. Naiden, U.S. Army

   c. Combined Secretariat

      The British members of the Combined Secretariat will be headed by Brigadier Dykes. The United States members will be headed by Commander L. R. McDowell, U.S. Navy.

² For the replacement of Wemyss by Dill, see ante, p. 198, footnote 3.
5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff shall develop and submit recommendations as follows:
   

   b. For other areas in which the United Nations may decide to act in concert, along the same general lines as in a above, modified as necessary to meet the particular circumstances.

6. The Combined Chiefs of Staff shall accordingly:

   a. Recommend the broad program of requirements based on strategic considerations.

   b. Submit general directives as to the policy governing the distribution of available weapons of war. (It is agreed that finished war equipment shall be allocated in accordance with strategical needs; to effectuate this principle, we recommend the utilization of appropriate bodies in London and Washington, under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff).

   c. Settle the broad issues of priority of overseas military movements.

7. The question of the production and dissemination of complete Military Intelligence to serve the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Combined Staff Planners has been referred to the latter body for a report. Here also, it is contemplated that existing machinery will be largely continued.

8. It is planned that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet weekly, or more often if necessary; an agenda will be circulated before each meeting.

(2) THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY AND ITALY

Oral Message From President Roosevelt to General Weygand

[Editorial Note. No written text of this message has been found, and it appears that none was made or preserved. The information set forth below with respect to the message has been derived from the following sources: a letter from Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II to the Historical Office, December 14, 1961 (023.1/12-1461); a letter from Ambassador H. Freeman Matthews to the Historical Office, January 15, 1962 (640.001/1-1562); a memorandum by Matthews, January 17, 1945 (Matthews File); and two dispatches from Leahy to Roosevelt, dated respectively January 12 and 25, 1942 (Roosevelt Papers). Reference to the message may be found in William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), pp. 209-210; in General Maxime Weygand, Recalled to Service (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1952), pp. 391-392; and in Leahy, pp. 72, 75.

The substance of the message was decided upon at the White House meeting on December 23, 1941 (ante, p. 67) and was transmitted by
Matthews, who was assigned as Counselor of Embassy at London, to Henry P. Leverich, Second Secretary in the American Legation at Lisbon. Leverich memorized the message and proceeded to Vichy where he repeated it orally to Ambassador Leahy and Mr. MacArthur, who was then Third Secretary in the Embassy. Since Ambassador Leahy was under close surveillance by German or pro-German agents in Vichy, it was agreed that MacArthur should deliver the message and that this should be done under cover of a family vacation trip to the Riviera. The oral message and the President's letter of December 27 (post, p. 244) were delivered by MacArthur to Weygand in the latter's apartment in a hotel at Grasse on January 20, 1942. In conveying the oral message, MacArthur spoke from cryptic notes which he buried the same evening.

In response to an inquiry from the Historical Office in 1961, Ambassador MacArthur stated that the message was still "engraved" in his memory and that he could give a "rather accurate and full summary of it." MacArthur's summary (which was characterized by Matthews as extremely accurate) reads as follows:

"I said to General Weygand that I was charged by President Roosevelt to deliver to him a letter, together with an important oral communication. The written communication from the President was to serve as my introduction to General Weygand and to establish my bona fides and the authenticity of the oral message I had also been charged to deliver. (I then gave him the written message. After reading it he expressed appreciation of the President's references to himself.)

"I then said that the oral message related to the future course of the war. Recently three very important interrelated new developments had taken place, which made it quite clear that the whole course of the war had changed and that ultimately the allied cause would triumph. The three new developments were:

1. the serious German reverses in Russia, which in themselves cast doubt in a final German victory;
2. the recent British successes in Cyrenaica, which made it impossible for Germany to seize the Suez Canal and all of North Africa and the Middle East;
3. the entry of the United States into the war, with its tremendous industrial, economic and military potential, which would greatly increase the aid which the allies would receive in prosecuting the war against Germany.

"While these three developments made it clear that Germany could not win the war, they also led the United States to attach particular and vital importance to French North Africa, because what happened in North Africa could affect favorably or adversely the length of the war on which depended the liberation of metropolitan France and the restoration of France's overseas possessions. In this connection, the President wanted General Weygand to know that the United States firmly intends to see to it that the integrity of France and her empire
is respected after the war and that the French possessions in North Africa remain in French hands. The United States had no desire whatsoever to replace France in North Africa, nor to see the British or the supporters of General de Gaulle take over the area. However, at the same time it was quite clear that the Germans were planning to take French North Africa and, indeed, the principal reason that General Weygand had been removed as Supreme Authority in North Africa under the Vichy Government was because the Germans knew he would resist to the end German efforts at infiltration, and because they also knew he had great standing and influence in North Africa.

"In light of the obvious German objective of seizing French North Africa, the President wanted General Weygand to know that he had reached the firm conclusion that if there were a change in the 'status quo,' threatening the integrity of French North Africa, the United States would be obliged to take preventive action to keep French North Africa from falling into German hands. These steps would, if necessary, include an attack on German armed forces should they move into French North Africa. By a change in the 'status quo' President Roosevelt particularly had in mind the following:

(1) the replacement of Marshal Pétain's government by a government under German domination;
(2) the utilization of the French fleet against American forces;
(3) the ceding of African bases by the Vichy Government to the Germans or their allies;
(4) a military threat against North Africa, such as preparation for a German attack against North Africa through Spain or from any other direction;
(5) German infiltration into North Africa designed to facilitate a military takeover.

"To summarize, if in the judgment of the President it appeared that the Germans were preparing to move into North Africa, or if the Vichy Government should take steps which would assist the Germans or had the effect of facilitating a German takeover, it would be essential for the United States to act before French North Africa fell into Nazi hands.

"I said the President greatly regretted that General Weygand was no longer in French North Africa to cope with German endeavors to take over that vital area. The principal purpose of my call on General Weygand was to ascertain whether, in the event of any of the eventualities listed above, he, General Weygand, would be willing to plan a role of leadership in French North Africa and rally the people and the French military there to the allied cause and cooperate fully with the United States and the allies in keeping French North Africa out of German hands. The President believed there was no one as well equipped as he to carry out such a great mission which would aid in the ultimate victory over Nazi Germany, the liberation of France, and the restoration of France's overseas territories."

Leahy's report of January 25 to Roosevelt (Roosevelt Papers) indicates that Weygand's response was "courteous and agreeable" but that the General declined even to consider the possibility of his playing an active role in French North Africa. Weygand insisted that he was
honor-bound to inform Marshal Pétain of the secret American approach to him, but he promised to do so in such a way that it would not become known to others.]

Defense Files

Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 25, 1941.

United States: ABC-4/1
British: WW. (JPC)1

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

Report by the U. S.-British Joint Planning Committee

1. One of the directives to the Joint Planning Committee issued by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 24, 1941, may be summarized as follows:

Study and report outlined plans for the overseas employment of United States and British troops in the Atlantic region, indicating recommended relative priorities of importance:

a. The relief by United States troops of British troops in Iceland and North Ireland.

b. The occupation by invitation of the following positions:

   (1) The Azores.
   (2) The Cape Verde Islands.
   (3) The Canary Islands.
   (4) French West Africa.
   (5) French North Africa.
   (6) Diego Suarez in Madagascar.
   (7) Curacao and Aruba.
   (8) Northeast Brazil.

2. The Joint Planning Committee recommends that the initial occupation by invitation of the foreign positions indicated in the directive should be allocated as follows:

a. To the United States—the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, French West Africa, Curacao and Aruba, Northeast Brazil.

b. To the United Kingdom—the occupation of the Azores, the Canary Islands, and Diego Suarez in Madagascar.

c. To the United States and the United Kingdom acting jointly—the occupation of French North Africa.

1 The report was attached as Annex 1 to JCOSs-3; see ante, p. 96. The following statement appears at the head of the report: “This paper was not approved but was returned to the Joint Planning Committee for reconsideration and re-submission for further consideration.”
3. If the operation in French North Africa as submitted in our plan (U.S. Serial ABC-4/2, British Serial W.W. (J.P.C.) 2 is undertaken, we see no prospect of any major movements being carried out in the Atlantic area for at least three months, and normal reinforcements to the eastward from the United Kingdom will be severely curtailed.

4. No major overseas operations can be performed by the United States unless adequate shipping is immediately made available for preparation as troop transports.

Post, p. 240.

Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 25, 1941.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Before the present conferences finish I want to ask again for the reconsideration of one matter which, though minor militarily, is in my opinion very important from the standpoint of the morale of our troops. I refer to the garrison of Iceland.

You will remember that before Churchill arrived I suggested at one of our conferences that it would be better to let the British take over the entire military garrison of Iceland. Admiral King objected on the ground that it would interfere with his convoy duties in the North Atlantic. I then did not press it further. On reflection I do not think King’s reason was valid, for he can have a naval base in Iceland even if the entire military garrison is British. Admiral Pound is planning to do just that thing in case we garrison it. He will retain a naval base.

Now the importance of my point is this: It is much more difficult for American troops to garrison Iceland permanently than it is for British troops. The British are nearer home, and the monotony of the life can be relieved by alternating tours of duty or brief leaves in their homes; whereas to Americans no such means of relief are possible. Our men must be there for the duration. I have received already some reports on the morale of our garrison in Alaska which is similar to Iceland in its winter lack of sunshine. And I remember very well myself that during the Great War the British and the French troops had a great advantage in sustaining their morale over ours in their seven day leaves at home, while we were all in a strange land for the duration of the war. Luckily it then did not last long; but, if you think that you can keep American troops in Iceland for

1 See the discussion of this subject on December 24, ante, p. 83.
2 See Stimson’s memorandum of December 21, ante, p. 57.
a couple of winters without psychological trouble, I think you will find yourself mistaken. And now is the time to fix that. Iceland is a most dreary place and especially so to a sunshine loving American in winter. They much prefer the rigors of battle to the rigors of boredom in such a climate!

Faithfully yours,                                      HENRY L. STIMSON

Defense Files
The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 26, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: North Africa.

Assumption: The French will invite the United States and Great Britain jointly to occupy and defend North Africa.

U. S. FORCES

The United States is prepared to embark the following forces for movement to Casablanca:

a. One Marine Division, combat loaded (11,000 men). Shipping is immediately available to move 2/3 of the division on 10 days' notice. Shipping will be available for the entire division on or about January 15.

b. Two pursuit groups (160 planes) one light bombardment group (57 planes) and one medium bombardment group (57 planes), (12,000 men). Units will be equipped by January 15 and can be ready to embark ten days thereafter. Twenty days will be required to collect and prepare the necessary commercial shipping after the decision to do so is made.

c. One Infantry Division, reinforced (21,000 men). Units can be ready to embark on ten days' notice. Twenty days will be required to collect and prepare the necessary commercial shipping.

d. One armored division (13,000 men). The Division will be supplied with the necessary ammunition (37 mm and .50 caliber in particular), by February 15. Ships utilized for Marine division should be available for the armored division 45 days from date of initial sailing. Units can be ready to embark on ten days' notice after February 15.

The antiaircraft units are to be supplied by the British.

The U. S. Army is prepared to reinforce the foregoing initial contingent with air and ground forces to the extent necessary to maintain its position in North Africa against probable Axis attack. Adequate U. S. antiaircraft defense cannot be provided prior to July.

If the above operation is ordered, shipping will not be available for other overseas movement in the Atlantic.

\footnote{For the origin of this memorandum, see the discussion on December 23, ante, p. 72.}
I. THE FIRST WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Defense Files

Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, December 26, 1941.]

United States: ABC-4/2
British: WW(JPC)2

PROJECT—GYMNAST

We submit below a provisional examination of the project for joint operations in Northwest Africa. Our examination is based on the following hypotheses:

a. That we receive an actual invitation or reasonable assurance there will be only token resistance.

b. That owing to their pre-occupations on the Eastern front, it would take the Germans six weeks to prepare to invade Spain, the forces now in France being unsuitable, and that without Spanish cooperation it would take them about a further six weeks to become firmly established with land and air forces in the South of Spain after they had crossed the Pyrenees. We therefore anticipate a period of about three months before a heavy scale of attack could be mounted against French North Africa from Spain. Spain would probably offer no very effective resistance on the mainland to a German invasion, but would not give the Germans free entry and full facilities. Once the mainland had been invaded our forces would probably be admitted freely into Spanish Morocco.

c. That the Germans are not established in French North Africa in sufficient strength to oppose effectively the occupation of French Morocco.

Objective.

We consider our primary object is to establish ourselves in Northern French Morocco as quickly as possible. This would provide a base from which Spanish Morocco could be occupied at short notice and thus block Germany’s line of advance from Spain. The area would also form a base from which Allied control of all North Africa could be extended.

Base.

The only suitable main base in the area is Casablanca. This port is well developed, served by railways and roads, and lies outside the Straits of Gibraltar. It would be unsound to use as a main base any port inside the Straits as the sea communications to it from the Atlantic would be liable to interruption once the Germans reached South

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1 The report bears no date but it was submitted on December 26 and was attached as Annex 2 to JCCSs-3; see ante, p. 98. The following statement appears at the head of the report: “This paper was not approved but was returned to the Joint Planning Committee for reconsideration and resubmission for further consideration.” Further consideration was given to the report at the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on December 31; see ante, p. 146.
Spain. Initially, owing to scarcity of anti-aircraft defenses and air forces, a single main base must be used for the whole force in North Africa.

Establishment of Base.

There is the possibility of at least token resistance by French forces at Casablanca, which has a considerable garrison and coast defenses. The first force to enter must, therefore, be combat loaded. The United States Marine Division is eminently suitable for this task, and there would be much greater likelihood of French acquiescence in the entry of American forces rather than British.

Support to French in Tunisia.

The immediate result of our forces gaining an entry in Western Morocco, or perhaps a condition of their entry, would be a demand from the French for support against a German threat in Tunisia. We must, therefore, have a suitable force prepared to meet this. This might consist of an Armored Brigade, an Infantry Brigade, two Anti-aircraft Regiments, and three Fighter Squadrons. The forces should be ready to go straight through by sea to, say, Algiers almost simultaneously with the arrival of the advance guard at Casablanca.

Defense of Moroccan Area.

It will be essential to get sufficient forces into the Casablanca area in the early stages to avoid the possibility of the expedition being driven out by German air forces operating from Southern Spain. This points to the very early establishment of adequate air forces and anti-aircraft defenses.

The early arrival of a substantial Army contingent is also essential in order to rally the French and Spanish forces and secure the key positions in Morocco.

The joint forces which we should aim at landing during the first three months are estimated at:—

1 Marine (combat loaded) Amphibious Division
3 Infantry Divisions
2 Armored Divisions
320 First line fighter aircraft
57 First line medium bomber aircraft
57 First line light bomber aircraft
63 First line observation aircraft
120 Heavy anti-aircraft guns
216 Light anti-aircraft guns
Base and L. of C. units

As further forces become available, all points of entry along the coast will be secured.
Total Forces Required.

The total forces ultimately required to hold French North Africa against possible German attacks through Spain and Italy, and to open the Mediterranean route by providing air cover along the coast, will depend on the assistance that may be furnished by the French and Spanish. The combined British and United States forces might amount to about:

2½-2 Armored Divisions
5-3 Infantry Divisions
Anti-aircraft weapons (350 heavy and 700 light)

First line aircraft:
800 Pursuit
105 Heavy Bombardment
228 Medium Bombardment
171 Light Bombardment
100 Naval Patrol

Joint American-British Effort Necessary.

Neither country has sufficient forces available to undertake the whole commitment single-handed in a short time. It must, therefore, be a joint expedition. At present the area is one of British strategic responsibility, as defined in ABC-1. As soon as decision is reached on the operation, it will be necessary to determine responsibility for command so that detailed planning can proceed.

NAVAL FORCES

British.

Unless there is reason to believe that enemy surface units are loose in the Atlantic, close protection of British convoys by heavy ships or aircraft carriers will not be essential. Protection provided by the Home Fleet watching the northern passages and by Force H in the Gibraltar area should be sufficient.

There will probably be 6 British convoys, each divided into a fast and slow portion, sailing from the United Kingdom at about fortnightly intervals. This amounts to doubling the rate of sailing of normal United Kingdom to Cape convoys and the extra escorts will have to be withdrawn from trade protection for a considerable period.

United States.

The U. S. Atlantic Fleet will provide appropriate protection and support for the transit and landing of U. S. Expeditionary Forces.

American Convoy Escorts.

a. Advance American Division—
One Marine Division embarked in 15 vessels escorted by units from Task Force Three.

* For explanation of ABC-1, see ante, p. 16, footnote 2.
b. Remainder of initial U.S. forces—

Three convoys at about one month intervals, escorted by units withdrawn from Task Forces Three and Four. Successive logistic convoys require escorts withdrawn from Task Force Four.

Timings.

D-1 is the day on which the order is given to mount the expedition.

a. U.S. Forces

The U.S. Marine Division could reach Casablanca on D-20.

b. British Forces

The first British convoy could reach Algiers on D\ldots, or Casablanca on D\ldots. Subsequently the despatch of the remaining British forces, totalling 1 armored and 2 infantry divisions with ancillary troops would take about another\ldots weeks. Its movement would therefore be complete about D\ldots.

Summary of Plan.

a. U.S. Marine Division, combat loaded and closely supported by United States Naval forces, to secure an entry into Casablanca, against sporadic opposition if necessary.

b. A British force consisting of:

- 1 Armored Brigade,
- 1 Infantry Brigade Group,
- 2 Anti-aircraft Regiments,
- 3 Fighter Squadrons,

to be ready to move in practically simultaneously with a to Tunisia in case the French demand support in that area; otherwise into Casablanca in support of the advance guard.

c. Main body to follow a and b:

- 1 American Army Division,
- 1 American Armored Division,
- 2 British Divisions,
- 1 British Armored Division (less detachments in b).

Air Forces:

- 320 First line fighter aircraft
- 57 First line medium bomber aircraft
- 57 First line light bomber aircraft
- 63 First line observation aircraft.

d. Base and L. of C. organizations. Air defenses of the base area to be found by the British initially.

Each country to provide its own domestic base administrative services, sharing the base area and port facilities.

U.S. to provide as high a proportion of engineer, technical, stevedore, and labor units for development of static base installations, aerodromes, etc.

The ultimate force to be built up as rapidly as possible.
President Roosevelt to General Weygand

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1941.

My Dear General Weygand: I am taking advantage of the departure of a courier a few days before the opening of the New Year to send you my cordial greetings. I have followed the situation in North Africa during your stay in that region with great interest and I am conscious of your courage and devotion in maintaining in so far as possible under the Armistice limitations the integrity of the French Empire. I am convinced that your resolution to do everything possible for the people of France has not ended with your departure from North Africa. I also believe that France cannot fail to recognize now and in the future what your contribution is and has been to its welfare and future greatness. As a lifelong friend of France I share your resolution.

It is in this particular sense that I write you as I am confident that in the difficult hours that lie ahead, your devotion to the best interests of your country will rise above any adverse circumstance.

In conclusion, I express my cordial greetings to you.

Very sincerely yours,

[Franklin D. Roosevelt]

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1 A copy in the files of the Department of State (851A.01/87B) shows that the letter had been drafted in the Department and was sent to Roosevelt for signature on December 27. The letter, together with an oral message, was delivered by Douglas MacArthur II to Weygand on January 20, 1942; see the editorial note ante, p. 234. For a somewhat similar New Year's letter from Roosevelt to Pétain, also dated December 27 but unaccompanied by any secret message, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. II, p. 205.

2 The source text is unsigned but the signature appears on the letter as printed in General Maxime Weygand, Recalled to Service, pp. 390-391.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President's Personal Representative (Bullitt) to the President

SECRET

Cairo, [December] 27, [1941.]

When I first reached Cairo, I suggested to Lyttelton that it should not be impossible to get the French Fleet in Alexandria (1 battleship, 3 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 4 dd's, and 1 sub) to come over to our side. He said that the difficulty was that there was much too much hostility on the part of the French officers & men both to the British and to the Free French to be willing to join either of those forces. It was my suggestion that perhaps they would be willing to join the American fleet. Lyttelton was impressed with the idea and telegraphed to Churchill but has had as yet no reply. When I returned to Cairo yesterday I again discussed the matter with Lyttelton.

[Sent via Navy channels.]
He is still of the opinion that it could be put through if you and Churchill so desire. I should like to minutely explore the possibilities and suggest that you and I use as a private code “John Paul Jones” and refer to it in future communications merely by the word “John” “Paul” or “Jones”. The French ships are in bad condition; and I may find difficulties which would make any action undesirable. It is obvious that should our cause be joined by the French fleet at Alexandria it would bring about the danger of an eruption from Darlan and the Germans. I should be inclined to take a chance on that. How do you feel about it. Would you have any objections to French fleet here running up the American flag? Until I hear from you I shall do nothing.  

For references by Roosevelt to Bullitt’s suggestion, see the meeting of December 28, 11:45 a. m., ante, p. 130, and the meeting of January 1, 1942, 6 p. m., ante, p. 153.

Roosevelt Papers

_The Coordinator of Information (Donovan) to the President_

No. 112

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1941.

The following information has just been cabled to me by our representative in Cairo:

British advances in Libya necessitated by the escape of Rommel twice from complete encirclement is creating situation which may further weaken British position in Near East if Rommel should escape to Tripoli and there receive air and land reinforcements. Entire Libyan army which has been weakened by losses and hampered by inadequate supply, would be in precarious position. It is believed by all here that drastic enemy action directed in North Africa is in the offing. Large enemy troop movements to Tunisia possible in the near future. British Intelligence Officers are outwardly optimistic but admit privately their inability to predict situation if German North Africa move materializes.

Immediate reinforcement of North African army by American air and ground troops seems the only possible move which could retrieve situation. Entire war here is being run on a shoestring. It should be kept constantly in mind that there is no margin of safety here for mistakes or losses in men or equipment. Double thrust at Africa under present circumstances would almost surely succeed.

Tempo of German propaganda among Arabs has been stepped up to high pitch in the past ten days causing concern to the British. Theme[. ] deliverance fast approaching[. ] American effort here hampered by poor communications, much waste and confusion resulting.
Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1941.

United States: ABC-4/1
British: WW(JPC)1

PRIORITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

1. One of the directives to the Joint Planning Committee issued by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on December 24, 1941, may be summarized as follows:

Study and report outline plans for the overseas employment of United States and British troops in the Atlantic region, indicating recommended relative priorities of importance:

a. The relief by United States troops of British troops in Iceland and North Ireland.

b. The occupation by invitation of the following positions:

   (1) The Azores.
   (2) The Cape Verde Islands.
   (3) The Canary Islands.
   (4) French West Africa.
   (5) French North Africa.
   (6) Diego Suarez in Madagascar.
   (7) Curaçao and Aruba.
   (8) Northeast Brazil.

2. The Joint Planning Committee recommends that the initial occupation by invitation of the foreign positions indicated in the directive should be allocated as follows:

a. To the United States—the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, French West Africa, Curaçao and Aruba, Northeast Brazil.

b. To the United Kingdom—the occupation of the Azores, the Canary Islands, and Diego Suarez in Madagascar.

c. To the United States and the United Kingdom acting jointly—the occupation of French North Africa.

3. If the operation in French North Africa as submitted in our plan (U.S. Serial ABC-4/2, British Serial WW[(JPC)2]) is undertaken, we see no prospect of any other major movements being carried out in the Atlantic area for at least three months, and normal reinforcements to the eastward from the United Kingdom will be severely curtailed. The reason is lack of an adequate amount of troop transport, in

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1 The source text was Annex 1 to JCCSs-5; see ante, p. 137.
2 See the discussion on December 24, ante, p. 82.
3 Ante, p. 240.
view of the heavy reinforcements being sent to Hawaii, Samoa, and Australia, and requirements for the continuous support of outlying United States and United Kingdom field armies, garrisons, and naval forces. Furthermore, minimum requirements for naval protection of new lines of naval communications will seriously reduce the protection now being afforded the trade routes in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

4. No major overseas operations can be performed by the United States unless adequate shipping is immediately made available for preparation as troop transports.

Defense Files

Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff 1

SECRET

United States: ABC-4/4 (Final)
British: WW (JPC) 4

PROPOSED TASKS FOR THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

1. A study of the relative importance and interrelation of the various military projects and movements which affect the Atlantic theatre and which may be required to give effect to the agreed Grand Strategy during the first part of 1942.

This report will include consideration of the following:

a. Movements

(1) Relief of Iceland.
(2) Movement of three Divisions and one Armored Division from the United States to Northern Ireland.
(3) Movement of United States air forces to the United Kingdom.
(4) Relief of British in Aruba and Curaçao.

b. Projects

(1) Joint United States-British occupation of French North Africa.
(2) United States occupation of:
   (a) French West Africa and Cape Verde Islands.
   (b) Northeast Brazil.
(3) British occupation of:
   (a) The Azores.
   (b) The Canaries and Madeira.
   (c) Diego Suarez.

2. Coordination of the Victory Programs of the United States and the British Commonwealth and adjustment of their broad outlines in accordance with strategic considerations and production possibilities.

1 The report was Annex 4 to JCCSs-7; see ante, p. 148.
3. A consideration of any steps that should be taken in the light of experience up to date to implement, improve, or extend the system of collaboration between the United States-British Staffs as laid down in ABC–1; the need for allocating joint resources on a strategic basis to be taken into account.

Note: Consideration of the Southwest Pacific Theatre, including the matter of unity of command therein, was treated as a first priority and a decision reached prior to the acceptance of the foregoing document.

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2 See ante, p. 16.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President's Personal Representative (Bullitt) to the President

SECRET

PERSONAL

CAIRO, December 31, 1941.

[Received January 2, 1942.]

Following secret for the President from Bullitt.

(1) Lyttelton has asked me to join him in a statement of our views which are in agreement on the possibility of an invasion of Tunisia in case Auchinleck's forces should reach the Tunisian frontier. As his means of communication and codes are much more rapid than our own he is telegraphing tonight to the British Ambassador for you and Churchill a draft which we have prepared together.

(2) I consider it important that you should give the orders requested in my telegram of December 20th and in my telegram I sent on the same date through General Maxwell to the War Department. The problem of transportation and telegraph and telephone communications in this area is becoming more serious with each step that the British advance.

Bullitt

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1 Sent via Navy channels.
2 Intra.
3 Ante, p. 47.
4 Not printed, but see the characterization of the telegram in Bullitt's telegram to Roosevelt of December 29, ante, p. 49.

Roosevelt Papers

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the President

PERSONAL AND

MOST SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1941.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I enclose herein a copy of a telegram which I have just received from our Ambassador in Cairo. This telegram is headed "Following from Mr. Bullitt and Captain Lyttelton".

1 For an explanation of the reasons for this method of transmitting the joint telegram, see Bullitt's telegram, supra.
I am having a copy sent to the Prime Minister.
Believe me, Dear Mr. President,
Yours very sincerely,

HALIFAX

[Enclosure]

The President's Personal Representative (Bullitt) and the British Minister of State in the Middle East (Lyttelton) to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

MOST SECRET

CAIRO, December 31, 1941.

Following from Mr. Bullitt and Captain Lyttelton.
Please convey simultaneously to President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister personally.

This telegram represents the agreed views of Mr. Bullitt and myself on the subject of possible invasion of Tunisia if and when all Tripolitania should be occupied by His Majesty's Forces. We have had the advantage of a general discussion with Catroux, particularly upon the French officers in Tunisia, but we could not carry on the discussion very far for obvious reasons.

2. We assume the following premise applies to-day:

(a) That some resistance by the French in Tunisia is certain and that French blood would be shed.

(b) That the strain on shipping and Naval escorts would preclude the immediate supply of substantial forces in Tunisia from Alexandria and that, therefore, the bulk of any supplies for these forces must come through the Western Mediterranean.

(c) That it would be impossible to supply forces through the Western Mediterranean if the French in Algeria and Morocco should be engaged in hostilities against us. We must count on the probability that German Air reinforcements would cross to Algeria and Morocco and operate against our shipping from those bases. We must also count on the probability that the Vichy French fleet would operate against us.

3. The Commanders in Chief have not yet completed their study of the problem and the above premises may consequently be qualified, but we do not think they can be materially changed.

4. Catroux put the minimum force necessary to invade Tunisia from the South at six Divisions. We think this should be accepted with reserve but taking into account the possibility of large reinforcements being brought from Algeria and Morocco we consider the force must be substantial.

*For a reference by Roosevelt to this telegram, see the meeting of January 1, 1942, 6 p.m., ante, p. 158.
5. We consider that in view of 2(c) above operation would not be sound unless simultaneous with the invasion of Tunisia United States Forces should seize Casablanca or possibly Agadir. Such an operation would seem to involve preliminary seizure or control of Canaries, the Azores and Madeira; we think invasion of Tunisia must not be considered in isolation from the problem or of reactions of all French North African Colonies. We believe there would be French resistance to landing of American forces unless careful preparations should have been made within French North African Colonies. We think it may be possible to have American forces welcomed in French North African Colonies provided certain French leaders can be approached and informed that an American landing in force at either Casablanca or possibly Agadir is to be expected.

6. Above opinions are based on the present situation remaining unaltered. We believe the Germans may take action which would bring the majority of the French in North Africa over to our side if we should be in a position to give them effective and immediate aid.

7. We therefore recommend that if resources permit (a) British forces in Middle East which are already estimated to be considerably short of minimum required for defence of two fronts, should be reinforced; (b) U.S.A. should immediately start preparations for Casablanca expedition; (c) propaganda and subversive activities in all French North African Colonies should be immediately concerted between the United States and Great Britain.

8. With regard to 7 (a) considerable supply problems will be involved in employing forces in Tripolitania and if premise 2 (b) is correct we must look to supplies and reinforcements for Tunisia after its occupation being shipped through Western Mediterranean.

9. With regard to 7 (c) the nature of the propaganda is one of nice judgement and Bullitt and I propose to sketch tentative plan for submission to you.

10. We would emphasize that this is a preliminary telegram which is sent by us to reach you while the Prime Minister is still in Washington and that it is sent without full consultation between Commanders in Chief. It appears however to us that if resources are available in the near future the planning must start at once in order that we may either be ready to undertake invasion by force at a later date or reach the highest possible state of preparations to take advantage of any favourable opportunity produced by German action against France.
Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)\(^1\)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, January 1, 1942.]

Subject: Initial Atlantic Troop Movement.

The Navy reports it will be impossible for the George Washington to be in serviceable condition before the 20th of January and perhaps not until after that date. This vessel will not leave the yard until some time between the 10th and 12th of January, is a coal burner, and will have a green crew.

Prior to the receipt of instructions concerning the use of the George Washington, a convoy was being assembled for dispatch to North Ireland. The Navy feels it imperative to return approximately 4250 marines in Iceland to reconstitute the First Marine Division which must be the spearhead of any landing force.

The Navy (Admiral King) and I strongly recommend that the convoy now being assembled be completed for dispatch to Iceland and North Ireland on or about January 15. This convoy will carry about 20,000 troops, 14,000 for North Ireland and 6,000 for Iceland to relieve the marines. The Navy states that sufficient escorts will be available for one convoy per month for combined movements to Iceland and the United Kingdom. It is planned to schedule subsequent convoys at monthly intervals using the ships that are not necessary for other more urgent missions which may have been approved in the meantime.

The adoption of such a course will permit the use of the facilities now loading for North Ireland, on another mission (GYMNAST) with a delay of six days if the decision to carry out the other mission is taken prior to January 13, 1942. After that date these ships will be committed to the movement to Iceland and United Kingdom for a period of about three weeks.

G. C. MARSHALL

Approved: by President and Prime Minister
January 1, 1942. 7:30 P.M.

Notify: G-4 and GHQ
G. C. M.

\(^1\) The source text was the copy annexed to Gerow’s notes of the meeting on January 1, 1942, 6 p.m.; see ante, p. 156.
Following secret for the President from Bullitt.

I hope that you and Churchill in your planning are keeping in mind the vital need to retain Egypt as a secure base not only for operations in Libya, Tunisia, Palestine, The Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey but also for transit of planes to India and the Far East.

As I have noted in previous messages the distances in this area are so immense and the forces engaged relatively so small that a comparatively slight increase in force on the German side might change the picture entirely. For example one large convoy from Italy to Tripoli with sufficient aviation gasoline to furnish the German second flying corps now waiting in Sicily and Italy would enable that Corps to operate in Libya and take control of the air from the British. In view of the present state of the British Naval Forces based on Alexandria of which Churchill has certainly informed you the stopping of convoys to Tripoli will not be easy. To draw forces away from this area or to fail to reinforce this area because of demands from the Far East might lead to a repetition of events in Libya when forces were withdrawn to go to Greece. The successes which the British have gained in Libya have been dearly bought and will lead to no decisive result unless Tripoli should be occupied. Some days ago I was shown the telegram in which the British command here stated its requirements. Churchill doubtless has already communicated this to you. I wish to add only that the chief asset of the British in this area is their quality of being without fear. I think they need in addition at this moment reinforcements in naval vessels, aircraft, tanks, and transport and signal units.

Bullitt

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2 Sent via Navy channels.
2 On December 19, 1941, the battleships H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth and Valiant had been damaged by time-bombs in Alexandria harbor and put out of action for several months. See Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 576.
2 Not found.

Roosevelt Papers

The President’s Personal Representative (Bullitt) to the President

CR 0584

Cairo, January 2, 1942.

SECRET

Roosevelt Papers

The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President

Washington, January 2, 1942.

Memorandum for the President:

Has Bullitt been answered relative to the French fleet, Alexandria? 1

You will recall that he, in effect, asked for instructions and I gather

1 See ante, p. 244.
that the joint view of the British and ourselves is that Bullitt should not stir that up at the moment.²

Harry L. Hopkins

²See the discussion at the White House on January 1, 1942, ante, p. 153.

851.00/2583: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

Rush Vichy, January 2, 1942.

6. Although it is still too soon to judge accurately the reaction of the French public to Marshal Pétain’s address of last evening, among our friends in official circles we hear the opinion expressed that the Marshal, although he had to pay lip service to the “European conception” of the Germans, went further than he has ever heretofore dared in his exposition of France’s difficulties and his inference that the occupying authorities are not without their responsibility for the present state of affairs. His public admission that he is a prisoner, coupled with his declaration that it is not possible to breathe life into the new constitution until the government has returned to Paris and French territory has been liberated have not been well received in collaborationist or German circles in Vichy. The fact that the publication of the Marshal’s speech (full text of which we understand was cabled by American journalists here) was forbidden in occupied France would seem to support this conclusion (the new year’s messages of Darlan and Hitler were on the contrary given pride of place in today’s Paris press). His statement that with the world in flames France is remaining outside the conflict is also taken as a guarded expression of France’s neutrality, which can hardly be pleasing to Berlin which has so ardently endeavored to bring about France’s active participation in the conflict on the side of the Axis.

The informant mentioned in our 1600, December 23, 4 p. m.¹ tells us in strict confidence this morning that yesterday Darlan, Pucheu and others made repeated attempts to persuade the Marshal to eliminate certain portions of his speech which they felt would prove displeasing to the Germans. Our informant said that Darlan took exception to several parts of the speech, particularly the reference to the Paris press which was not published accurately in the official text which appeared this morning. The Marshal actually said: “I have the right to call ‘deserters’ all those who in the press as well as on the radio in Paris and London indulge in contemptible tasks of disunion and all those who, abroad and in the country, resort to calumny and accusations.” In the officially published text, the words “abroad, as

¹Not printed (851.00/2583). The informant had been identified as “a member of Darlan’s Cabinet” in telegrams 1450 and 1453 from Vichy, November 17 and 18 1941 (see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. III, p. 460).
well as in France” are substituted for “in Paris and London”. Darlan so our informant said was highly critical of this open criticism of Déat, Luchaire and others of the Paris press (who in the past have frequently attacked the Vichy Government) who are paid by the Germans and expressed a desire to have the phrase read “in the American and British press and radio” with no mention of the French radio and press.

The Marshal, however, refused to change his original text when giving the broadcast but agreed that the less positive phrase could be employed in the text as officially published.

As a result of the exceedingly acrimonious argument between the Marshal and Darlan on this subject, our informant stated that “there is this morning bad feeling between the Marshal and Darlan and the latter was so persistent and maladroit in his protestations yesterday afternoon that the Marshal finally had said, ‘I am the one who makes decisions in France’”.

Leahy

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President to the President’s Personal Representative (Bullitt), Temporarily at Cairo

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1942.

From the President for Bullitt.

Have received your messages ¹ which have been read by the Prime Minister and me with great interest.

Apropos of your Cr 0584 of January 2, supplies are moving steadily forward and full appreciation here of need for their continued and prompt dispatch.

ROOSEVELT

¹ The channel of transmittal, although not indicated on the source text, was presumably Naval radio.
² Ante, pp. 244, 248, 249, and 252.

51.00/2504: Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 3, 1942.

5. From Murphy.

I am told by a reliable official that he has just seen the copy of a communication from the Government at Vichy to the effect that the memorandum handed by Marshal Pétain to Goering at the time of their recent meeting at Saint Florentin ² had been cancelled. The memorandum presented demands by France on Germany for economic

² See ante, p. 42.
and political relief. It was recovered by de Brinon at the time of
his last visit to Berlin. The official said that this was done under
Pétain’s orders on the grounds that Germany either had no intention
of cooperating with France or was unable to do so; that obviously
France could expect nothing but grief from Germany. He said that
the French demands which probably contemplated some form of un-
disclosed *quid pro quo* are therefore to be considered as never having
been presented.

According to my contact this information, read in the light of
Pétain’s New Year’s message to the French people, which in his
opinion is a declaration that the policy of collaboration is at an end,
signals an encouraging and rising spirit of resistance to the Axis.

Repeated to Vichy and Tangier.

Cole

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Roosevelt Papers

*The Coordinator of Information (Donovan) to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1942.

**MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT**

No. 125. The following information has just been received from
our representative in Cairo:

“Along with all the others here, I urge an immediate consideration
of air reinforcement. Reports of British Near East Intelligence show
complete ground organizations in Crete, Sicily and Greece which are
ready to receive large reinforcements. Due to losses and lowered
morale from exhaustion, the military situation is deteriorating. The
Near East is wide open and ripe for plucking. The British Command
agrees on this, but can’t get results from London. The situation in
Alexandria is pathetic.”

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1 A note attached to the file indicates that on January 4 Roosevelt sent this
memorandum to Churchill for his information.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Coordinator of Information (Donovan) to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1942.

**MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT**

No. 129. The following is a copy of a cablegram which I have just
received from our representative in Cairo:

“For Donovan only. Do not repeat until you hear from the Presi-
dent. Plans are being discussed here for French North Africa, in-
volving every phase of propaganda needing printing and radio equip-
ment in large quantities, also extensive carefully-selected personnel
and organization, as anything British is poison to the French. This
effort will have to be strictly an American one, as written reports on the way show British technical equipment to be very scarce. Will you cable details as available, so we can inform people here of our ability to meet requirements. You in Washington will know immediately whether recommendations and general plans being forwarded to the President are rejected or accepted."

Defense Files

Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

Washington, January 11, 1942.

United States: ABC-4/7 (Approved)
British: WW-12

EEstablishment of United States Forces in North Ireland

1. Mission.

United States Army troops will be dispatched to North Ireland for the accomplishment of the following missions:

a. To relieve the mobile elements of the British forces in North Ireland and, in cooperation with British local defense forces, to defend North Ireland against attack by Axis Powers.

b. To be prepared to move into South Ireland for the defense thereof.

2. Forces.

The forces which will be employed are the V Army Corps, consisting of the 32d, 34th, 37th Divisions, Corps Troops, Army and Corps Service Elements, with the 1st Armored Division attached. This force is under the command of Major General Edmund L. Daley, U. S. Army. The strength of the field forces, less aviation and auxiliary units and anti-aircraft units, is approximately 103,000 officers and men, for which approximately 1,207,500 ship tons are required. The strength of the anti-aircraft personnel (to be provided later) is approximately 31,000 officers and men. The strength of aviation and auxiliary personnel is approximately 22,000 officers and men. Movement of air units can commence on or about February 1, 1942, if shipping is available. When the air and anti-aircraft support is assumed by the United States forces, an additional 583,000 ship tons will be required.

3. Command.

Command of all United States Army forces and personnel in the British Isles, including those in North Ireland, is vested in Major General James E. Chaney, who has been designated, "Commander

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1 The source text was Annex 1 to JCCSs-9; see ante, p. 178. This paper is the amended and approved version of the Joint Planning Committee's report, dated January 10, 1942, serialized as ABC-4/7, WW (JFO)7 (not printed).
United States Army Forces in the British Isles.” The term “command” is defined as that control of individuals, forces, functions, and establishments which is normally vested in, and exercised by, United States Army commanders by law, regulations, and competent orders. General Chaney is authorized to arrange with appropriate British authorities for the employment:

(1) of organizations of his command under British control, and
(2) of British organizations under United States control.

4. Strategic Direction.

a The strategic direction of the United States Army Forces in the British Isles will be exercised by the British Government through the Commander, United States Army Forces in the British Isles.

b The term “strategic direction” is defined to mean the function of prescribing for a force as a whole the general mission which it is to carry out over a long period of time, and such modifications of that general mission as may from time to time become necessary or desirable, without any control of details of tactical operations or administrative matters.

c It is agreed however that units assigned to the United States North Ireland Force will not be moved to areas outside Ireland without prior consent of the Commanding General, Field Forces, United States Army.

5. Arrangements for the Operation.

The following agreements in respect to arrangements for the operation have been arrived at:

a Questions relative to despatch of United States Army Forces and materials from the United States that may require British collaboration will be handled through the British Mission in the United States.

b Matters connected with command, reception, distribution, accommodation and maintenance of the United States Army Forces in Northern Ireland that may require collaboration between the two governments will be handled for the United States through the Commander, United States Forces in the British Isles.

c Weapons and equipment.

(1) Anti-Aircraft. Initially all anti-aircraft protection for United States Field Forces, establishments and installations will be the responsibility of the British. Eventually anti-aircraft protection for United States forces in Northern Ireland will be provided from United States personnel equipped and maintained for armament and ammunition from British sources.

(2) Field Artillery. Initially 144 25-pounders, with 1500 rounds per gun, will be delivered by the British to United States Forces in Northern Ireland. The British will supply additional ammunition
and maintenance equipment for these weapons as requested by the Commander, United States Forces in the British Isles.

(3) Air. It will be the responsibility of the British to provide appropriate air protection and support for the United States Field Forces, establishments and installations in Northern Ireland, in their mission, until such time as the means are made available to the Commander, United States Forces in the British Isles, to assume this responsibility.

Shelter.

It will be the responsibility of the British to provide shelter for the United States Army Forces in Northern Ireland.

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Defense Files

Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 13, 1942.

United States: ABC-4/6

British: WW-14

MOVEMENTS AND PROJECTS IN THE ATLANTIC THEATER—for First Half of 1942

1. We have carried out a study of the relative importance and interrelation of the various military movements and projects which affect the Atlantic Theater and which may be required to give effect to the agreed Grand Strategy during the first part of 1942, and submit our conclusions below.

MOVEMENTS AND RELIEFS

Iceland and Ireland

2. We consider that the move of the United States forces into Northern Ireland and the relief of the British Iceland garrison should proceed as expeditiously as possible in order to relieve British Divisions for the replacement of Australian Divisions in the Middle East and to release forces for operations in French North Africa.

3. The movement of United States Army Air Forces to the United Kingdom should proceed as soon as these forces and shipping become available, so as to increase the weight of attack on Germany.

Relief of Aruba and Curacao

4. The relief of Aruba and Curacao, subject to Dutch concurrence, is to be completed before the end of January.

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1 The source text was Annex 2 to JCCSs-11; see ante, p. 200. This paper is the amended and approved version of the Joint Planning Committee's report originally serialized as ABC-4/6, WW(JFC)6 (not printed).
JOINT UNITED STATES–BRITISH OCCUPATION OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

5. We regard this project as of the first strategical importance in the Atlantic area. We do not, however, possess the resources within the period under consideration to force an entry into French North Africa. We cannot, therefore, initiate this operation unless we are reasonably sure of the assumptions upon which the plan is based, which are:

a That, due to Spanish resistance, the Germans will require a period of three months before they can mount a land attack from Spain against Morocco;

b That once the Spanish mainland has been invaded by Germany, our forces will be admitted freely to Spanish Morocco, and that the Spanish there will not attack us; and

c That French forces will offer only sporadic resistance, if any. During the period in which we await this opportunity we think that plans and preparations should be completed and that the movements referred to above (Paragraphs 2, 3, 4) should continue.

6. If we undertake the North Africa operation, it will have the following adverse effects on other projects:

a Reduction in British troop movements to the Middle East and Far East by 25,000 men.

b Suspension of major operations against the Canaries, Cape Verdes, and Diego Suarez.

c Suspension of the relief of British troops in Iceland by United States troops.

d Reduction in the rate of movement of United States troops to North Ireland.

e Weakening of British strength in the United Kingdom.

f Inability to move sizable forces to Northeast Brazil if such action should become necessary.

g Reduction in the supply of British fighter aircraft to Russia.

h Serious delay in the despatch of urgently needed United States reinforcements and supplies to Pacific island positions and the Far East, to the Pacific Fleet, and to the outlying island bases.

i Reduction in Atlantic convoys to the United Kingdom and Russia, due to diversions of shipping and escorts.

(Notes: If any of the other operations mentioned in this paper are undertaken, they will adversely affect other operations in some or all of the above ways to a greater or less extent).

CANARIES AND PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS

7. A German invasion of Spain will lead to the immediate denial of Gibraltar as a Naval Base and in all probability the involvement of Portugal as well as Spain in the war. In those circumstances, it will be essential to secure the Canaries as a Naval Base. It is possible that
the Spaniards would themselves offer us facilities in these islands. On the other hand, the Spaniards may oppose our occupation of the Canaries. While a Spanish offer of facilities would eliminate the need for a large occupying force, it would be necessary to provide sufficient additional air and anti-aircraft defenses to meet the threat of German air forces based on the mainland of Africa, as well as harbor protection for the Naval Base, and for an air patrol of the sea.

8. If we have gained an entry into French North Africa and the Spaniards subsequently acquiesce in a German move into Spain, we could not at the same time undertake an operation to capture the Canaries.

9. If the opportunity to carry out North Africa operations does not occur, and the Germans move into Spain with Spanish acquiescence, the capture of the Canaries, even against opposition, and the occupation of the Azores and Cape Verdes will become essential.

10. It has been agreed that the responsibility for the occupation of the Canaries is a British one, but it would probably be necessary to obtain Naval assistance from the United States. A British assaulting force is already earmarked for this operation and should, we consider, be kept in being.

11. Occupation of the Cape Verdes has been accepted as a United States responsibility. A portion of the United States Army forces set up for North Africa would be used for this operation. The necessary naval support would have to be provided by United States Naval Forces.

12. In the event of a German move into the Iberian Peninsula, it is almost certain that Portugal will admit British forces into the Azores, and probably Madeira. For the security of these islands the chief requirement will be air and anti-aircraft defenses and harbor protection. The provision of these forces is a British responsibility and the necessary forces should be earmarked. Considerable difficulty, however, will be found in providing the shipping for this operation simultaneously with that for North Africa or the Canaries.

13. If the move of British forces to the Azores becomes possible, we are of the opinion that the United States should occupy the Cape Verdes in order to make certain that these islands are denied to the enemy and secured for future use. The occupation of the Cape Verdes will be of considerable importance if we do not succeed in gaining entry into French North Africa and are compelled to undertake operations in French West Africa at a later date.

**OCCUPATION OF FRENCH WEST AFRICA**

14. If we fail to occupy North Africa and Axis occupation appears imminent, then the capture of French West Africa will be essential. If we do not obtain French cooperation in French North Africa, it is unlikely that we shall gain free entry into Dakar. It is therefore
necessary to plan the capture of Dakar against opposition. With
the joint resources available it is not, in our opinion, possible to under-
take an operation of this nature until the late Autumn of 1942 when
the weather conditions become favorable. It has been agreed that
the United States should be responsible for this operation and we sug-
gest that the planning and training should be put in hand. We pro-
pose for consideration that as a preliminary, and simultaneously with
the occupation of the Cape Verdes, United States Air and other ap-
propriate forces should be moved to the Freetown-Bathurst area.
Their presence in this area will increase the security of the Trans-
African Reinforcement Route and the naval base at Freetown.

**NOR THE AST BRA ZIL**

15. The security of Northeast Brazil is of strategic importance as
a link in the communications between America and the Trans-African
reinforcement route. Germany established in West Africa immedi-
ately becomes a threat to the South American Continent, in addition
to the threat to Atlantic sea communications. The danger of an Axis-
inspired uprising in Brazil, which would interrupt the air route
through Africa to the Middle and Far East cannot be disregarded.
The operation is a United States responsibility. Plans have been
prepared and formations set up for this task.

**DIEGO SUAREZ**

16. Although the denial of the naval base of Diego Suarez to the
enemy is of considerable strategic importance, no British force will
be available to undertake this operation within the period under con-
sideration if the force for the Canaries operation is kept in being.
Moreover, if this operation were carried out in the near future it
might prejudice our chance of obtaining French collaboration in
North Africa. We are therefore of the opinion that we can not hold
a force ready to undertake this operation at present.

17. We therefore recommend that:

1. The movement of United States Army and Air forces to Iceland,
Ireland, and the United Kingdom should proceed as expeditiously as
possible.

2. That the perfection of a Joint United States–British Plan and
preparations for operations in French North Africa should proceed
as rapidly as possible.

3. That under the hypotheses set out in this paper, the United
States should prepare plans for:

(1) The occupation of the Cape Verde Islands both against oppo-
sition and by invitation.

(2) The capture of Dakar against opposition for the Autumn
of 1942.
d That the United States plan for the security of Northeast Brazil should be kept active.

e That under the hypotheses set out in this paper, the British should prepare or perfect plans for:

(1) The capture of the Canaries.
(2) The occupation of the Canaries by invitation.
(3) The occupation of the Azores and Madeira by invitation.
(4) The capture of Diego Suárez against opposition.

Defense Files

Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 14, 1942.

United States: ABC-4/2A
British: WW-17

OPERATION SUPER-GYMNAST

1. The Joint United States–British Planning Committee has been advised that the President and the Prime Minister have agreed to the immediate dispatch of additional United States reinforcements from the east coast to Australia, the terms of the agreement being as follows:

a. Approved the proposal put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff that the United States convoy sailing on the 15th January should be reduced from 16,000 to 4,000 for Northern Ireland and from 8,000 to 2,500 for Iceland, in order permit of the dispatch to the Far East of 21,000 troops, with aircraft and other equipment.

b. Agreed that the remainder of the proposed shipping adjustments set out in the Annex should be referred to London for confirmation.

c. Invited Mr. Hopkins and Lord Beaverbrook to investigate the effect of the above shipping adjustment on the delivery of United States supplies to Russia during the next three months and to coordinate the provision of shipping to make good any deficiency, it being understood that nothing must be done to interfere with the planned flow of tanks, aircraft and ammunition from the United States to the Middle East.

1 The source text was Annex 1 to JCOSSs–12; see ante, p. 202. A typewritten notation on the cover of this document reads as follows: “Accepted as amended—Joint Planning Committee Report, as a basis on which the Combined Chiefs of Staff should inform the President and Prime Minister regarding the time factor for SUPER-GYMNAST”. This paper is the amended and approved version of the Joint Planning Committee’s report, dated January 13, 1942, serialized as ABC-4/2A, WW(JPC)2A (not printed).
2. Based on the above terms of agreement, the combined Chiefs of Staff have directed the Combined Planning Committee to examine and report on the following questions:

a. The earliest date which could be fixed for D-1 of Operation SUPER-GYMNAS, on the assumption that the shipping adjustments approved in 1 above are carried out and that shipping to carry United States supplies to Russia is provided in full.

b. To what extent Operation SUPER-GYMNAS could be executed, on the assumption that the favorable opportunity arises at some date between the end of February and the date on which D-1 of the full operation could be fixed (vide 2 a above).

**REPLY TO THE FIRST QUESTION**

**British**

1. The movement of United States Troops to Australia will not affect the readiness date of the British to carry out their part of SUPER-GYMNAS.

**United States**

2. The readiness of United States Troops to carry out SUPER-GYMNAS will not be affected by the movement of reinforcements to the Far East. The delay to SUPER-GYMNAS caused by the Far East movement will depend upon the date of return to Atlantic ports of the ships involved in that movement.

3. We estimate that the vessels diverted from the Atlantic to make the Far East move can be back in the Atlantic ports on the following dates:

   a. Passenger vessels . . . . . April 10–20
   b. Cargo vessels . . . . . . May 15–25

(Capacity of the above group of vessels is 22,000 troops and 230,000 tons of cargo).

4. The execution of SUPER-GYMNAS, as originally planned, is dependent upon the return of the Far East convoy, therefore the earliest date that could be fixed for D-1 is May 25.

5. The May 25 date can not be accepted without certain reservations, since no allowance has been made for ship losses and possible increased demands for shipping arising from enemy operations, accelerated production, and additional lend-lease commitments. Furthermore, it seems probable that these vessels may continue to be needed in the Pacific for further movements to Australia.

**REPLY TO THE SECOND QUESTION**

**British Available Forces**

6. British land forces, i.e., one armored division and two divisions with antiaircraft units, will be ready for dispatch. The British air
contingent of GYMNASI consisting of three fighter and two A.C. squadrons could also be made ready. This force is not alone sufficient, but could not be increased from British resources.

United States Available Forces

7. United States Forces, as originally planned for SUPER-GYMNASI, will be available, but their participation will be limited by the withdrawal of shipping for the troop movements in the Pacific. Combat loaded ships for one Division (12,000) are being held in readiness. This shipping will permit the employment of that division. It can be supported by one carrier group of naval aircraft or equivalent, disembarked from an aircraft carrier. All antiaircraft troops would have to be found by the British, also base troops, until additional United States shipping could be made available, either from Pacific or from shipping now employed on other tasks. This latter shipping is more fully discussed in Paragraph 11 below.

Rate of Movement

8. The rate at which the British force could be received would not be limited, as in the SUPER-GYMNASI plan, by the capacity of Casablanca Port. It would depend upon the provision of shipping and naval escorts. The following table is based upon the assumption that the British could not afford to rob the Middle and Far East reinforcements of more than 25,000 men from one reinforcement convoy. The United States program is based upon the repeated use of the combat loaded ships, and the use of no other troop transports until the return to the Atlantic Coast of the Far East cargo convoy, about 15-25 May. For movements after the first one, 8 additional cargo vessels will be required. Possible acceleration of the movement will be governed by the priority needs stated in Paragraph 11 below.

9. The table below shows the earliest dates on which British and United States forces can arrive at Casablanca if D-1 falls on March 1st:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>March 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Casablanca</th>
<th>Algiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D-1</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 28</td>
<td>D-28</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-43</td>
<td>6,000*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-73</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-88</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-103</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-118</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 21</td>
<td>D-133</td>
<td>12,000*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-148</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-163</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 19</td>
<td>D-193</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>67,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Paragraph 10. [Footnote in the source text.]
Acceleration of Movement

British

10. If the situation were such that we could afford to stop the flow of British reinforcements to the Middle and Far East completely for a time, the second British convoy could be increased from 6,000 to 18,000 capacity, thus eliminating the fifth British convoy shown above.

United States

11. The priorities listed below will govern the availability of additional United States vessels for Super-Gymnast:

1st Priority: Continuous maintenance of existing overseas Army and Navy garrisons and the United States Fleets.

2nd Priority: Continued delivery of supplies to Russia, and planned flow of tanks, aircraft, and ammunition to the Middle East.

3rd Priority: Continuous movements and maintenance of United States forces in the Far East.

12. All military requirements for shipping other than those listed above will have to be deferred, including:

a. Reinforcements to Hawaii and other overseas possessions and bases.

b. Movements to Iceland and North Ireland.

13. If this is done, we estimate that additional passenger vessels up to an estimated capacity of 12,400 might be available after about four weeks’ notice.

14. Approximately 13–15 cargo vessels will be required in addition to the passenger vessels. The availability of the cargo ships will have to be determined by the Maritime Commission.

(3) THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Defense Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, December 24, 1941.]

Probable Maximum Scale of Enemy Attack on West Coast of North America

Examination of Probable Form of Enemy Attack.

1. Enemy attack on the western seaboard of North America might be undertaken with the object of reducing United States offensive power in the Pacific through material destruction at shipyards and bases and also with the object of containing forces in America.

2. The following forms of attack have been considered:—

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1 The memorandum was attached as Annex 2 to JCCSs–1; see ante, p. 90.
a. Seaborne expeditions;
b. Naval bombardment;
c. Carrier-borne air attacks;
d. Mine-laying in ports and their approaches and attacks by
   human torpedoes.

Seaborne Expeditions.

3. So long as a United States capital ship force is retained in the
   Pacific, it is extremely improbable that the Japanese would venture
   to launch a large scale expedition against a North American objective
   without battleship cover. It must also be assumed that apart from
   the destroyer escorts for the convoys, destroyers would be essential
   for A/A and A/S protection for the battleships.

4. The diagram attached to this Annex 2 illustrates the large
   distances to be covered and shows that even if the enemy secured Dutch
   Harbour and Hawaii, it would be necessary to carry out the refueling
   of destroyers at sea.

   While the refueling of an expedition at sea in hostile waters can
   not be ruled out positively, the complications and risks of such an
   operation on a large scale are sufficiently great to make it extremely
   unlikely. Added to this factor is the problem of maintaining a large
   scale expedition over 4,000 miles from its base.

5. These difficulties do not apply so strongly to a small scale raiding
   force escorted by cruisers and aircraft carriers which have much
   greater endurance. For this reason it is necessary to take into ac-
   count the possibility that a force comprising 10–15 fast merchant
   ships carrying up to 2 brigades on a low scale of transport might
   undertake a destructive raid.

Naval Bombardment.

6. For the reasons given above, the employment of enemy battleships
   any great distance to the eastward of Hawaii is improbable.
   Naval bombardment of important objectives on the west coast of
   North America is therefore likely to be restricted to bombardment
   by armoured ships other than ships of the line and cruisers.

Carrier-Borne Air Attacks.

7. The employment of a carrier force escorted by cruisers for the
   air attack of important naval and industrial objectives is the most
   probable threat which has to be met. It is considered that the Japa-
   nese could make available a force of from 2–3 aircraft carriers es-
   corted by 4 cruisers, without interfering with her dispositions for
   the other operations upon which she is now engaged. This would

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2The diagram attached to the source text as Appendix A is not printed. It
shows mileages across the Pacific Ocean between such points as San Francisco,
Hawaii, Tokyo, Jaluit, and Sydney.
involve an attack by some 80–100 dive and/or torpedo bombers, with ship escort of approximately 24 fighters.

Mine-Laying in Ports and Their Approaches and Attacks by Human Torpedoes.

8. Mine-laying by raiders and submarines in coastal waters must be expected. The enemy's ability to carry out attacks by human torpedoes has, it is understood, been demonstrated at Hawaii. It cannot therefore be ignored.

CONCLUSIONS

So long as the United States maintains a battle fleet in the Pacific, large scale seaborne expeditions against the western seaboard of North America and the employment of capital ship forces in this area are considered impracticable. The most probable enemy threat is carrierborne air attacks and sporadic naval bombardment, but a small scale destructive raid cannot be ignored. In view of the great distances over which these operations would have to be undertaken, it is probably not necessary to provide a strong scale of defense except at selected points of great importance, which can be covered by the normal form of coast and air defense supplemented by mobile land and air striking forces.

Defense Files

The Secretary of the British Chiefs of Staff (Hollis) to the Secretary, War Department General Staff (Smith)¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 24, 1941.

At a meeting held in the White House at 6 p.m. this evening, at which the President and the Prime Minister were both present, certain urgent matters arose.

1. In order to meet the immediate need for reinforcements in Malaya, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East had asked whether British Brigade Group embarked in the United States transport Mount Vernon, and now on its way to Colombo, could be diverted to accompany the convoy of Indian troops sailing from Bombay so as to arrive by the 8th of January at Singapore. This point was put to the President by the Prime Minister, and the President consulted Colonel Knox,² who was also present. The President decided that in view of the urgency of the situation this diversion should be authorized and that the British Admiralty should be empowered to convey

¹ The memorandum was addressed to "The Secretary General to the United States Chiefs of Staff". Hollis (p. 92) indicates that it was sent to Colonel Smith. The source text is a copy apparently made in the War Department.

² Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy.
the necessary instructions to the Captain of the *Mount Vernon*. A telegram has accordingly been sent to London, so that the necessary action can be taken.3

2. The First Sea Lord4 explained that in order to ensure the safe arrival at Singapore of the convoy including the *Mount Vernon* it would be most desirable that Admiral Hart should be asked to cooperate with Admiral Leighton [Layton] (British Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet), and that joint Naval dispositions should be made to the best advantage. The President conveyed this request to Colonel Knox, who undertook to look into the matter with the Navy Department.

3. The President stated that the news from the Philippines indicated that there was little likelihood that the land and air reinforcements now on their way from the U.S.A. via Australia could arrive at their destination. His view was that these reinforcements should be utilized in whatever manner might best serve the joint cause in the Far East and in agreement with the Prime Minister he expressed the desire that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff should meet the following day to consider what measures should be taken to give effect to his wishes.5

4. It is suggested that the above matter should be brought to the notice of the United States Chiefs of Staff to work out together and a joint meeting with the British Chiefs of Staff at 3 p.m. tomorrow (December 25th)6 is proposed at a place convenient to the United States Chiefs of Staff, at which the disposal of United States forces in, and destined to arrive in, Australia should be discussed.

L. C. Hollis
Brigadier

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*Not printed. For further details on the orders regarding the rerouting of the *Mount Vernon*, see JCCSs—2, ante, p. 91.
4 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound.
5 For Stimson's comments on this portion of Hollis' paper, see the White House discussion of December 25, ante, p. 95.
6 The Chiefs of Staff met at 4 p.m. on December 25; see ante, p. 90.

740.0011 European War 1939/18712

*Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt*

CHUNGKING, December 24, 1941.

Mr. President: The Chinese Government and people wish to express their whole-hearted support of your proposed conference of American,
British, Chinese and other representatives. We venture to offer the opinion that a Supreme Allied War Council should be established forthwith in Washington for the speedy formulation of comprehensive war plans. This will constitute a concrete step on the part of the nations of the democratic front to coordinate and concert their efforts against the aggressor nations of the Axis, and will be a most effective factor in bringing about the early destruction of our common enemy.

For this purpose I have designated Mr. T. V. Soong, newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the Chief Delegate of China to such Conference or Supreme War Council as you contemplate to set up in the immediate future, and request you to be good enough to notify him to participate in your deliberations on all questions relevant to the conduct of the war.

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1 For Roosevelt’s proposal for preliminary military conferences at Moscow, Chungking, and Singapore, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, pp. 751–753.

2 Roosevelt’s message of December 14 to Chiang had contained the sentence: “I venture to hope that these preliminary conferences especially that in Chungking may lead to the establishment of a permanent organization to plan and direct our joint efforts.” For a report on the Chungking Conference, which met on December 23–24, see post, p. 271.

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Defense Files

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, December 25, 1941.]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Utilization of U. S. Forces in Australia.

1. U. S. combat troops now in Australia and expected there at approximate dates indicated:

a. Now present:
   18 pursuit planes
   52 dive bombers

Elements of 2 regiments of 75 mm. artillery, (28 of its 48 guns are present. The 20 others are on a slow boat which left Samoa December 18). Only 500 rounds of 75 mm. ammunition available until about January 8, when 5,000 rounds will arrive at Brisbane.

b. Expected soon:

(1) 55 pursuit planes and crews (about January 8).

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1 The source text is the unsigned copy which appears as Annex 1 to JCCSs–2; see ante, p. 91. The memorandum was prepared presumably in response to a request from the President. For an urgent appeal on December 23 from the Australian Government to Roosevelt and Churchill, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. v, p. 390.
(2) To begin arriving in theater on or about January 3; three heavy bombers per day until a total of eighty is assembled. These planes are now directed to report to General MacArthur for orders upon arrival at Bangalore. For operations of the immediate future, there is an adequate number of 500 lb. and smaller bombs, as well as 56 1000 lb. bombs on the convoy now proceeding from Brisbane to Port Darwin. Already at Darwin are 560 of the 500 lb. type, with 260 at Port Moresby.

(3) 55 pursuit [planes] and crews, about January 16.

(4) 70 pursuit planes and crews, about January 18. (It is possible that capacity of ship will be found to be 40 planes).

(5) A pursuit group, complete as to matériel, including 80 planes, will leave San Diego on the Kitty Hawk about January 10. Additional ships will be necessary for the personnel.

Note: Dates at which there can arrive in Australia necessary ground crews and maintenance facilities for all the planes listed in the first three shipments are still uncertain. But, including the pilots sent from the Philippine Islands to Australia, and with maximum help from Australian sources, all planes can temporarily operate usefully, pending the arrival of necessary maintenance units. Including planes already arrived or en route, the U. S. Air Corps has already allocated a grand total of 333 pursuit planes for shipment to Australia. The above represents the maximum capacity of ships now available.

2. All U. S. forces in Australia are to be commanded by Major General George H. Brett. General Brett has been under orders to take his instructions from General MacArthur. However, the situation in the Philippines apparently has changed to an extent that makes it improbable that pursuit plane reinforcements can be forwarded to General MacArthur. Therefore, the following instructions were sent General Brett at Chungking December 24th A. M:

"Proceed as quickly as possible to Australia to assume command of U. S. Army interests in that region. Report arrival and follow immediately with a preliminary recommendation of action to be taken in view of situation in Philippines at that time. Marshall."

It is intended that General Brett's status with regard to subordination to General MacArthur will be settled in the light of the situation in the Philippines at the time of his arrival in Australia.

4. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff jointly recommend:

a. That immediate request be made upon Australian, British, and
Dutch authorities to render maximum assistance to the U. S. Commander in Australia in the preparation of his air elements for combat, and in the establishment and protection of the necessary bases, with a view to the immediate entry of these air forces into action.

b. That the responsible British and American Commanders be directed to make preliminary arrangements for effective combat cooperation between other forces of the Associated Powers and the U. S. Air Force in the Southwestern Pacific. Preliminary plans for early support of Singapore to be initiated at once.

5. The current U. S. Air Corps objective in the Southwestern Pacific, exclusive of China and Russia, is:

2 Heavy Groups—80 planes  
2 Medium Groups—114 planes  
6 Pursuit Groups—480 planes  
Necessary base and auxiliary units.

This strength can be attained as rapidly as shipping facilities permit.

Defense Files: Telegram

The Chief of the American Military Mission to China (Magruder) to the President

CHUNGKING, December 25, 1941.

For President. Copies for Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. On night of December 22, at the home of the Generalissimo, exploratory talks toward the initial joint military conference were held with Chinese, British and U.S. members present in accordance with War Department’s No. 69 and our No. 112. At the request of the Generalissimo another conference was held on the morning of December 23 with War Minister Ho Ying Chin. Neither Russia nor the NEI were represented. General Chiang opened the formal conference on the afternoon of December 23 which continued into the morning of the 24th.

Following is a paraphrase of 5 points which were adopted by the conference:

1. The defense of Burma is of primary importance with a later extension of joint action from China, with concurrent air offensive
against enemy bases to the fullest extent possible with present resources.

2. Maintain the Chinese resistance by continuing supply toward the preparation of Chinese armies for future offensive action.

3. Chinese to contain enemy forces on their front by pressure and attack and threats of attack upon vulnerable communications.

4. Assume the offensive with all British, Chinese and American means available as soon as resources permit.

5. The Joint Military Council set up in Chungking to submit information and recommendations on the strategy involved in the East Asian Theatre. These plans to be presented for consideration to a supreme War Council which Chungking representatives hope will soon be established as a permanent organization.

It was agreed for the present:

1. That the Chungking Council should consist of Ho Ying Chin and the Chiefs of the British and U.S. Missions.

2. That an American appointed by the Chief of U.S. Military Mission act as Chairman of the Council Secretariat.

Prior to arrival in Chungking Wavell and Brett had no knowledge of the President’s plans for the conference. Wavell had three missions to accomplish:

1. Obtain control of Chinese Lend-Lease supplies in Burma.

2. Assign at least 2 of the 3 AVG squadrons for Burma defense.

3. To discuss participation of the Chinese troops in the defense of Burma.

Reference Lend-Lease material.³ My personal effort was necessary to cause (garble) Wavell to abandon his apparent intentions to make blanket demands on Chinese rather than request specific items. My instructions that Chinese acquiescence was a prerequisite to retransfer of this Lend-Lease material had to be impressed repeatedly on Wavell.

The Chinese offered 2 army corps for the defense of Burma but they were declined by Wavell to the displeasure of the Generalissimo. The British attitude was inconsistent in view of the picture of Burma’s defenselessness which had been presented by the British in their pleas for air assistance and transfer of Lend-Lease material.

Chiang Kai Shek did not commit himself to the release of additional AVG squadrons to Burma. His announced reason for this was

³The reference is to American lend-lease material in Rangoon which was destined for China but was hastily turned over to the British (in part seized by British troops) on December 19–20 because of the immediate Japanese threat to the area. The incident, known as the Tulsa affair, is discussed in detail in Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 57–60; see also Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. v, pp. 767–773.
that the existing air warning nets in Burma were insufficient. I believe his real reasons to be:

1. Objection to the AVG serving out (our) side [outside] China.
2. Desire for strong defense of Kunming.
3. Adverse Chinese political reaction which would result if the only effective air defense were relinquished.

Wavell and Brett departed for Rangoon night of December 24th.

MAGRUDER

Hopkins Papers

The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹

WASHINGTON, [December 26, 1941.]

You should work on Churchill. He is being advised. He is open minded & needs discussion.

¹A memorandum by Hopkins, dated January 3, 1942, attached to this file, reads as follows:

“This is a note that Lord Beaverbrook handed me when the Unity of Command was being discussed and Churchill seemed to be a stumbling block.

“It was as a result of getting this message that I arranged that Marshall see Churchill.”

For the discussion of December 26 to which this note pertains, see ante, p. 103.
For the meeting of Marshall and Churchill on the morning of December 27, see ante, p. 108.

Defense Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff ¹

[WASHINGTON, December 27, 1941.]

ABC-4
C/S USA

Proposed Draft of Instructions to the Supreme Commander, Southwestern Pacific Theater, Submitted by United States Chiefs of Staff for the Consideration of the Joint United States-British Chiefs of Staff Conference

Letter of Instructions to be signed by the government of the country from which the Supreme Commander is chosen, and counter-
signed by representatives of each of the other powers in the group, Australia, Dutch East Indies, British and the United States.

To: Supreme Commander, Southwestern Pacific Theater.

(Letters, similar in content, will be sent by each of the ADBU governments to its highest Army, Navy and Air Commander in the Southwestern Pacific Theater.)

Subject: Letter of Instructions.

1. By agreement among the Governments of Australia, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, hereinafter referred to as the ADBU governments, the Southwestern Pacific Theater has been constituted, to comprise all land and sea areas included in the region Malaya–Australia–Philippine Islands, all inclusive.

2. You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the Southwestern Theater and of all armed forces afloat, ashore and in the air of the ADBU governments stationed therein and allotted by their respective governments for service in that theater, except that you are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ADBU governments land troops of that government except with the consent of the local commander or his government. You are authorized to employ naval and air forces in general support of operations in the theater assigned you. However, during the period of initial air reinforcement, it being the view of all the associated governments that air superiority over the enemy should be attained as soon as possible, each government reserves the right to assign and employ its pursuit and fighter airplanes at its own discretion. All accumulations of pursuit and fighter airplanes beyond the minimum requirements fixed by each government, will pass to your general reserve, for use under your direction.²

3. The ADBU governments have further agreed as follows:

a. The mission of the armed forces in the Southwestern Pacific is immediately to:

(1) Prevent further Japanese penetration of the Southwestern Pacific Theater.

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² According to Stimson’s diary for December 27, Stimson feared that Marshall’s original language in this paragraph was not strong enough to ensure the accumulation of pursuit planes until superiority was achieved. The present language reflects Stimson’s suggested wording which Marshall promptly accepted in the early afternoon of December 27.
(2) Establish security of essential land, air and sea communications within the theater. At this time essential communications in the Southwest Pacific theater are:
   (a) The approaches from India and to East Australia; and
   (b) Extending from such approaches to Singapore, and, through the Dutch East Indies, to the Philippines.

(3) Eventually defeat the Japanese forces in the theater and expel them therefrom.

b. Your duties, responsibilities and authority are defined as follows:

(1) To coordinate in Southwestern Pacific theater the tactical and strategic operations of all armed forces of the ADBU governments, to assign them strategic and/or tactical missions and objectives, and, where desirable, to organize task forces for the execution of specific operations.

(2) To submit recommendations to the Associated Governments in all matters pertaining to that theater, regarding which specific authority is not herein delegated to you.

(3) To require, from the Commanders of the Armed Forces of each of the ADBU governments, such reports as you deem necessary in the determination of tactical strength and effectiveness, and/or in the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

c. The following specific limitations are placed by the ADBU governments upon your authority as Supreme Commander, Southwestern Pacific Theater:

(1) You may not relieve from duty the Commander of any of the Armed Forces of any of the ADBU governments, or any subordinate of such commander.

(2) You may not destroy, revise or alter the major tactical organization of the armed forces of any ADBU government. Each national component of a task force will operate under its own commander and will not be distributed into small units attached to the other national components of the task force.

(3) You may not take over for general use the supplies, munitions or other material resources belonging to any one of the ADBU governments without the consent of the appropriate commander, nor may you interfere in the administrative and/or disciplinary control of such Commander over his own forces.

(4) You may not prevent or interfere in direct communication between the Commander of the Armed Forces or any one of the ADBU governments with his home government.

(5) You may not prevent the Commander of the Armed Forces of any ADBU government from obeying the orders of his own government in detaching troops, individuals or material to any other theater.

(6) You may not assume direct command of any portion or part
of the forces assigned to the theater or of any particular portion or section of such theater, but will exercise your authority through the duly designated commanders of the ADBU governments.

(7) You may not, at any time, locate your headquarters within the limits of any critical tactical zone, but will so situate such headquarters as to facilitate establishment and maintenance of communications with all tactical zones and so as to provide you with a balanced perspective of the complete theater.

4. The ADBU governments have also agreed that they will jointly and severally support you in the execution of the duties and responsibilities as above defined, and in the exercise of the authority as above defined, and in the exercise of the authority as above delegated and limited. Commanders of all naval, air and ground forces within your theater will be immediately informed by their respective governments that all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this letter will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your theater nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your theater except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto.

5. As Supreme Commander of the Southwestern Pacific Theater, you are directly responsible to this government, and all instructions to you will follow established methods. Any recommendation, report, request, or other communication between you and any of the other governments of the ADBU Powers will be processed through this government.

6. Your headquarters will be established, initially, in Java.

Signed

(By Power furnishing
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:

Other ADBU representatives.
PRIME MINISTER TO LORD PRIVY SEAL.

I have agreed provisionally with the President, subject to Cabinet approval, that we should accept his proposal, most strongly endorsed by General Marshall,

(a) That unity of command shall be established in the South Western Pacific. Boundaries are not yet finally settled but presume they would include Malay Peninsula, including the Burmese front, to the Philippines and Southward to the necessary supply bases, principally Fort Darwin, and supply lines in Northern Australia.

(b) That General Wavell should be appointed Commander-in-Chief, or if preferred Supreme Commander, of all British, United States and Dutch forces of the land, sea and air who may be assigned by the Governments concerned to that theatre.

(c) General Wavell, whose Headquarters should in the first instance be established at Surabaya, would have an

\[ A \text{ memorandum by Hopkins of December 30 attached to this file reads:} \\
\text{"This is the draft of a telegram which the Prime Minister handed me December 28th. "I showed it to the President, who agreed there were certain things in it that shouldn't be there. General Marshall and Admiral King and I stepped in the next room and made the eliminations noted here. \\
\text{"The Prime Minister's final draft represents these additions and deletions."} \\
\text{See the minutes of the meeting at 11:45 a. m., December 28, ante, p. 128. The telegram as sent on December 29 contained a few additional changes not shown on this draft; see Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 675.} \]
American officer as Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

(d) That the British and Dutch naval forces in the theatre should be placed under the command of an American Admiral, who would, in accordance with the general principles set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b), be directed to conform to the plans and policies of the Supreme Commander.

(e) It is intended that General Wavell should have a staff in the sort of proportion as Foch’s High Control staff was to the great staffs of British and French Armies in France. He would receive his orders from an appropriate joint body, who will be responsible to me as Minister of Defence and to the President of the United States, who is also Commander-in-Chief of all United States Forces.


(g) India, for which an Acting Commander-in-Chief will have to be appointed, and Australia who will have their own Commander-in-Chief, will be outside General
Wavell's sphere except as above mentioned, and are the two great bases through which men and material from Great Britain and the Middle East on the one hand and the United States on the other can be fed into the fighting zone.

(h) United States Navy will remain responsible for the whole of the Pacific Ocean west of the Philippines and Australasia including the United States approaches to Australasia. The British will assume responsibility for the security of the Atlantic Ocean in the existing close collaboration with United States naval forces there assigned.

(i) A letter of instructions is being drafted for the Supreme Commander safeguarding the necessary residuary interests of the various Governments involved and prescribing in major outline his task. This draft will reach you shortly.

2. I have not attempted to argue the case for and against our accepting this broadminded and selfless American proposal, of the merits of which as a war winner I have become convinced. Action is urgent and may perhaps have to be taken even before my return from Canada on January 1. Australia and New Zealand must of course be consulted. Meanwhile the staffs here will be working upon details on the assumption that all consents will be obtained. 28.12.41.
Defense Files

Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1941.

United States: ABC-4/3
British: WW (JPC) 3

Supporting Measures for the Southwest Pacific
(The Far East Area and Adjacent Regions)

DIRECTIVE

1. Chiefs of Staff Directive to the Joint Planning Committee.

Until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area is solved, the aim must be to reinforce the Philippine Islands, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies, to the maximum extent, and to make the best possible arrangements for ensuring the safe arrival and the most effective intervention of these reinforcements.

Having regard to the existing situation in the Far East and the Southwest Pacific, the Joint Planning Committee is asked to make recommendations as to the disposition of the reinforcements, particularly air forces, expected to be available in the Southwest Pacific Area on:

a. 15th January, 1942.
b. 1st February, 1942.

on the following alternative assumptions:

(1) The Philippines and Singapore both hold.
(2) Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not.
(3) Neither Singapore nor the Philippines holds.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

2. Our basic strategic concept is to maintain initially the strategic defensive in the Southwest Pacific Theatre. The present strength of forces in that area is insufficient to maintain that defensive position.

After providing immediate reinforcements for defense, and as additional forces become available, it will become possible to undertake offensive operations and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. Accordingly, although our operations in the near future must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further our preparations for a future offensive.

3. The general strategic policy should therefore be:

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*This report was considered at the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on December 81, ante, p. 145.
a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the Far East Area, and to operate air and sea forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Far East Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China and to the defense of India.

c. To reestablish communications with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

d. To maintain communications to Burma and Australia, and to and within the Far East Area.

e. To obtain in the Far East Area and Australasia all possible supplies to relieve shipping requirements.

**FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS**

4. The estimated strength of forces initially in the Area, and the reinforcements ordered or planned to be sent are shown in the attached tables (Annexes I, II, and III). Future reinforcements should be planned in accordance with approved strategic policy, having due regard to the essential requirements of other theatres.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

5. It is recommended that, until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area is solved:—

a. Under the assumption that the Philippines and Singapore both hold, the total reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, as shown on the attached table, should go forward as now arranged, subject to the direction of the commander to whom they are assigned.

b. Under the assumption that Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not, the total United States reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, should be employed in furtherance of the defenses of key points on the Malay Barrier, and for protection of the vital lines of communication from the east. In the absence of unity of command, detailed dispositions of these reinforcements must be left to the senior United States Army commander, in collaboration with the senior British, Dutch, and Australian commanders. Under this assumption the planned disposition of British reinforcements remains unchanged.

c. Under the assumption that neither Singapore nor the Philippines holds, the total reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, be used for the defense of the remainder of the Malay Barrier, Burma, and Australia, United States reinforcements being used to the eastward, and British reinforcements to the westward.

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*Not printed.*
I. THE FIRST WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Note.—The subject of reinforcements for New Zealand and Fiji is being considered separately.

Defense Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1941.

PROPOSED METHOD OF HANDLING MATTERS CONCERNING THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER

1. It is assumed that the chief matters on which decisions would have to be given would be:
   a The provision of reinforcements.
   b A major change in policy.
   c Departure from the Supreme Commander’s directive.

2. It is suggested that no special body should be set up for this purpose because it would tend to clog the machine for the following reasons:
   a It would be necessary to have Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand representatives on this body.
   b Each representative in a would probably wish for time to consult his government before giving an opinion.

3. It is proposed, therefore, that existing machinery should be used in the following manner:
   a The Supreme Commander would telegraph to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, both in London and in Washington, his proposal, whatever it might be.
   b The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London would immediately telegraph to the British Mission in Washington to say whether or not they would be telegraphing any opinions.
   c On receipt of these opinions, the United States Chiefs of Staff and the Representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff would meet and consider the problem and would submit their recommendations to the President and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister would then inform the President whether he was in agreement with their recommendations.

4. As the Dutch Government is in London, and as the principal representatives of the New Zealand and Australian Governments are also in London, it is proposed that the agreement of these Governments to any proposal should be obtained by the British Government and this would be included in the final telegram to Washington.

5. Agreement having been reached between London and Washington, the orders to the Supreme Commander would then be dispatched from Washington.

1This memorandum was accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff at the meeting on December 29; the source text was Annex 2 to JCCSs—5; see ante, p. 138.
Draft Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)\(^1\)

Dear Harry: The Chiefs of Staff informally agreed to the following. The British have asked us to send our position to the Prime Minister.

November 29, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

It is suggested that as soon as a preliminary decision is reached as to the delimitation of the Southwest Pacific theater, and in agreement with the British and Dutch authorities, a communication in substance as follows be dispatched to Chiang Kai-shek:

1. In order to insure immediate coordination and cooperation in our common effort against the enemy, there is being established a supreme commander for all British, Dutch and American forces in the Southwest Pacific theater, which includes southwest Burma.

2. The advisability of a similar command of activities of the Associated Powers in the Chinese theater appears evident. This theater we suggest should include northeast Burma, and such portion of Thailand and Indo-China as may become accessible to troops of the Associated Powers. In agreement with the representatives of the British and Dutch Governments, I desire to suggest that you undertake to exercise such command over all forces of the Associated Powers which are now, or may in the future be operating in the Chinese theater.

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\(^1\)This memorandum, as originally typed, is the draft prepared at the meeting in Stimson's office on December 29, 1941 (ante, p. 134), and presented by Marshall to the British Chiefs of Staff in the meeting later the same afternoon (ante, p. 140). As a result of that discussion, Marshall crossed out the following phrases: "which includes southwest Burma" (par. 1) and "northeast Burma and" (par. 2). He also inserted the word "initially" and wrote the word to Hopkins at the top of the page. The substitution, in three places, of the word "United" for "Associated" was made by Roosevelt. Before sending this message (infra) to Chiang, Roosevelt also eliminated the Arabic numerals before the first two paragraphs and the word "Dutch" in the third paragraph.
It is our thought that, in order to make such command effective, a joint planning staff should at once be organized consisting of representatives of the British, Dutch, American, and Chinese governments. If you consider it practicable, and Russia agrees, a Russian representative might be included. This staff should function under your supreme command.

The commander of the Southwest Pacific theater and the commander of the British forces in India would be directed to maintain the closest liaison with your headquarters. A mutual exchange of liaison officers between the three headquarters would be desirable.

Such arrangements would enable your counsel and influence to be given effect in the formulation of the general strategy for the conduct of the war in all theaters. Your views in this matter will be greatly appreciated by me.

740.0011 Pacific War/1624: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1941.

In order to insure immediate coordination and cooperation in our common effort against the enemy, there is being established a supreme commander for all British, Dutch and American forces in the Southwest Pacific theater.

The advisability of a similar command of activities of the United Powers in the Chinese theater appears evident. This theater we suggest should initially include such portion of Thailand and Indochina as may become accessible to troops of the United Powers. In agreement with the representatives of the British and Dutch Governments, I desire to suggest that you should undertake to exercise such command over all forces of the United Powers which are now, or may in the future be operating in the Chinese theater.

It is our thought that, in order to make such command effective, a joint planning staff should at once be organized consisting of representatives of the British, American and Chinese governments. If you consider it practicable, and Russia agrees, a Russian representative might be included. This staff would function under your supreme command.

The commander of the Southwest Pacific theater and the commander of the British forces in India would be directed to maintain the

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1 The source text is the copy sent by President Roosevelt on December 30 to the Secretary of State with the notation: “for your information”. A memorandum for the file by Hopkins, dated December 30 (Hopkins Papers), notes that Roosevelt made a few changes in the text approved by the Chiefs of Staff before sending the telegram. The final paragraph of the Hopkins memorandum reads as follows: “I personally don't think Chiang Kai-Shek is getting much of a command out of this. In fact all he is getting that he hasn't already got is that any of our or any British troops in China will fight under him.”
closest liaison with your headquarters. A mutual exchange of liaison officers between the three headquarters would be desirable.

Such arrangements would enable your counsel and influence to be given effect in the formulation of the general strategy for the conduct of the war in all theaters. Your views in this matter will be greatly appreciated by me.

Roosevelt

Hopkins Papers

Memorandum by the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM:

The suggestion of an “appropriate joint body” has kicked up a hell of a row.¹

As a matter of fact I suggested the words to the Prime Minister when I found he was getting all set to issue all the directions himself. It seemed to me so essential to get the unity of command through in the South West Pacific that rather than try to define what the “appropriate body” would be, I urged both the Prime Minister and the President to send it along and decide the make-up of the “appropriate joint body” later.

It now develops that everybody and his grandmother wants to be on the joint body and it now looks as if it would end by having the joint British and American staffs assist the President. At any rate they will run it.

H. L. H.

¹ See the draft telegram by Churchill, ante, p. 278, and JCCSs–5, ante, p. 138.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt¹

IMMEDIATE

MOST SECRET

[OTTAWA,] December 30 [1941.]

Following for President from Prime Minister.

Naturally both the declaration and the Unity Plan, having to be referred to so many different parts will require final review by us on Thursday afternoon. Meanwhile as I am out of touch I hope you will discuss outstanding minor points on declaration with Halifax, and points raised by H. M. Government on Unity Plan with Pound after they have been considered by our (Mission?). In principle, everything seems settled, but I expect it will take till the end of week

¹ The source text is marked “copy”.
to get final fair copies. This will be a pretty considerable achievement.

Defense Files

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Stark)^1

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1941.

Dear Betty:^2 Here is the redraft which the President did last night and which he would like to have the Joint Staffs chew over.

Cordially yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Revised by President Roosevelt

PROPOSED METHOD OF HANDLING MATTERS CONCERNING THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATRE

1. It is assumed that the chief matters on which decisions would have to be given would be:
   a. The provision of reinforcements.
   b. A major change in policy.
   c. Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. It is suggested that a special body be set up for this purpose in Washington.
   a. Three Americans and three British.
   b. One Australian, one New Zealander and one Dutch, for consultation and advisory purposes.

3. It is proposed, therefore, that the above machinery should be used in the following manner:
   a. The Supreme Commander would telegraph to the above Committee in Washington his proposal, whatever it might be.
   b. The Committee in Washington would immediately telegraph to London to ask for any recommendations or opinions.
   c. On receipt of these opinions, the Washington Committee would submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister would then inform the President whether he was in agreement with their recommendations. He could of course consult with Australia, New Zealand, and The Netherlands if advisable.

^1 The source text was Annex 1 to JCCSs-6; see ante, p. 142.
^2 Nickname for Stark.
4. Agreement having been reached between the Prime Minister and the President, the orders to the Supreme Commander would then be dispatched from Washington in the name of both of them.

Defense Files

Draft Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA

The Chiefs of Staff have somewhat revised their original memorandum on the above subject, so as to incorporate certain of the President's suggestions. With respect to those points where the revised memorandum, hereto attached, differs from the President's re-draft, the following explanation is submitted:

a. The United States Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff, through their representatives in Washington, are in an especially favorable position to weigh the needs of the ABDA area in relation to those of other theaters of war. Recommendations to the President and to the Prime Minister emanating from the Joint Chiefs of Staff would reflect this balanced perspective.

b. Consultations with the Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand governments can not well be carried out in several places without serious loss of time, and creation of confusion. For the reasons set out in paragraph 4 of the attached revised memorandum, London would appear to be the logical place for carrying on such consultations. The Chiefs of Staff committee in Washington can, of course, keep the representatives of the Dutch and Dominion governments informed, should this be considered desirable.

c. The suggested duplication of messages from the Supreme Commander to London and Washington is for the purpose of saving time. The copy sent to Washington would be the action copy, but the one to London would furnish the basis for immediate comment to Washington.

d. Admiral Pound feels that, in view of his conversation with the Prime Minister this morning, the attached procedure will be entirely acceptable to the Prime Minister.

Chief of Staff

Commander-in-Chief

U.S. Fleet

Chief of Naval Operations

Chief of Air Forces

\[1\] The source text was part I of Annex 2 to JCCSs-6; see ante, p. 142.

The source text, being a draft, bears no signatures. According to Matloff and Shell (p. 126, footnote 26), it was signed and sent to the President on the afternoon of December 31; see the discussion of the Chiefs of Staff on December 31, ante, p. 147.
SECRET

DECEMBER 30, 1941.

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decision by the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. Among the chief matters on which decisions will be required are:
   a. The provision of reinforcements.
   b. A major change in policy.
   c. Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. This agency will function as follows:
   a. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and in London.
   b. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinions.
   c. On receipt of these opinions, the United States Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. The Prime Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement, and for including these in the final telegram to Washington.

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, the orders to the Supreme Commander will be dispatched from Washington in the name of both of them.

*The source text was part II of Annex 2 to JCCSs-6; see ante, p. 142.
Defense Files

Report by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

December 30, 1941.

United States: ABC-4/5
British: WW-3

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA

By agreement among the Governments of Australia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, hereinafter referred to as the ABDA Governments:

1. **Area.**

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all land and sea areas included in the general region Burma–Malaya–Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area will be known as the ABDA Area.

2. **Forces.**

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore and in the air, of the ABDA Governments which are:

a. Stationed in the Area;

b. Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for services in or in support of the ABDA Area.

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDA Governments, land forces of that government without the consent of the local commander or his government.

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and/or, if required, a commander of the combined naval forces and a commander of the combined air forces will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

4. No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your Area except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto.

5. **Strategic Concept and Policy.**

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your Area is to maintain initially the strategic defensive. The ABDA Governments intend to provide immediate reinforcements for defense. As additional forces become available,

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1 The source text was Annex 3 to JCCSs–6; see ante, p. 143.
it will become possible to take the offensive and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Although your operations in the near future must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further preparations for that offensive.

6. The General Strategic Policy Will Therefore Be:

a. To hold the Malay Barrier as the basic defensive position of the ABDA Area, and to operate air and sea forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

c. To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon, and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

d. To maintain essential communications within the Area.

7. Duties, Responsibilities and Authority of the Supreme Commander.

You will coordinate in the ABDA Area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces.

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments.

10. You are authorized to require from the commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiqués concerning the forces under your command.

12. Through the channels specified in paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furtherance of your mission.

13. Limitations.

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of
the ABDA Area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be
exercised through the commanders duly designated by their respective
governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative
processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments,
including free communication between them and their respective gov-
ernments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical
organization of such forces, and each national component of a task
force will normally operate under its own commander and will not
be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national
components of the task force. In general, your instructions and
orders will be limited to those necessary for effective coordination
of forces in the execution of your mission.

14. Relations with ABDA Governments.
The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in
the execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in
the exercise of the authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders
of all sea, land and air forces within your Area will be immedi-
ately informed by their respective governments that, from a date
to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity
with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such com-
manders as emanating from their respective governments.

15. If any of your immediate subordinates, after making due represen-
tations to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would
jeopardize the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified
by the general situation in the ABDA Area, he has the right, subject
to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct
to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals
will be made by the most expeditious method and a copy of the appeal
will be communicated simultaneously to you.

16. Staff and Assumption of Command.
Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA powers. You
are empowered to communicate immediately with the national com-
manders in the Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential
to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional
staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the
ABDA Governments through channels of communication described
in Paragraph 18.

17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry
out the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your as-
sumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

18. Superior Authority.
As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2.²

Signed
(By Power furnishing
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:
Other ABDA Representatives.

Annex 1
BOUNDARIES OF ABDA AREA

1. The ABDA Area is bounded as follows:

On the North: By the boundary between India and Burma, thence eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to the latitude of 30° North, thence along the parallel of 30° North to the meridian of 140° East.

Note: Indo-China and Thailand are not included in this area.

On the East: By the meridian of 140° East from 30° North, to the equator, thence east to longitude 141° East, thence South to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the South Coast, thence east along the Southern New Guinea Coast to the meridian of 143° East, then south down this meridian to the coast of Australia.

On the South: By the northern coast of Australia from the meridian of 143° East, westward to the meridian of 114° East, thence north-westward to latitude 15° South, longitude 92° East.

On the West: By the meridian of 92° East.

2. Forces assigned to the ABDA and adjacent areas are authorized to extend their operations into other areas as may be required.

²Annex 2 was a copy of the memorandum of December 30, entitled “Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area”, ante, p. 288.

Hopkins Papers

The British Commander in Chief in India (Wavell) to Prime Minister Churchill¹

MOST SECRET [NEW DELHI?] December 30, 1941.

Taut 298. Personal and most secret for Prime Minister from General Wavell.

¹A notation on the source text indicates that the telegram was relayed to Churchill at Ottawa on the morning of December 31.
Your 60946 (Grey 157) just received.\(^2\)

I will of course, as you know, undertake to best of my ability any task which you consider can further the war effort. But sincerely trust that no necessary arrangements for public announcement will be made until I am in a position to exercise command which must take some little time. Otherwise confusion seems bound to occur and there will be a misleading impression that my H.Q. can function at once which it obviously cannot. There is also effect on India to be considered and arrangements to be made about which I am flying to Calcutta to consult Viceroy tomorrow. Earnestly request therefore that no announcement be made at least till I have received instructions and had time to study them.

\(^2\)Not found in American files. This is presumably the telegram informing Wavell of his nomination as Supreme Allied Commander, ABDA Area; see Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 677.

Roosevelt Papers

**Prime Minister Fraser to Prime Minister Churchill\(^1\)**

**MOST SECRET**

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

Addressed Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs No. 564 repeat Prime Minister Australia No. 430. Your telegram of 29th December No. 550 (Grey No. 159) and 551 (Grey No. 148).\(^3\) Following for Prime Minister.

H.M. Government in New Zealand are in cordial agreement proposal to appoint General Wavell in whose capacity they have every confidence and for whose character and standing they have the highest regard, to supreme command of that portion Pacific to which the proposed arrangements relate.

2. In opinion of H.M. Government in New Zealand the proposal does not go far enough. Defeat of Japan is essentially a question of sea power. Our object must be to regain that command of Western Pacific Ocean which is now completely in Japanese hands. Once we can cut Japanese sea communications, we shall regain any possession which we have lost and can ensure defeat of Japan by economic pressure as well as by military means. To attain this object the New

\(^1\)Forwarded from London by the Lord Privy Seal (Attlee) as telegram Taut No. 296 to Prime Minister Churchill, December 31; the source text in the Roosevelt Papers is Churchill's copy No. 1.

\(^2\)These telegrams have not been found in American files, but evidently one or both transmitted from London to Wellington the language contained in Churchill's telegram of December 29 to Attlee concerning command in the Southwestern Pacific; for draft of December 28, see ante, p. 277, and for final text, see Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 675-676.
Zealand Government feels it is essential all Naval forces in Pacific entente, including United States Pacific Fleet and British Eastern Fleet, should be under one unified command, which might be exercised by an American Admiral working in closest possible co-operation with General Wavell.

3. Until the above policy can be implemented H.M. Government in New Zealand are willing to concur in proposals in general. At the same time they are not without doubts on certain aspects on which they have made assumptions set out below. They would be glad to have confirmation of these assumptions or further information.

(a) It is assumed that General Pownall now becomes “Commander-in-Chief at Singapore and Malaya”, and that the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, is to be superseded by “American Admiral” referred to in para. (d), who is to be subordinate to General Wavell.

(b) It is noted that Naval command in area “East of Philippine Islands and Australasia” is to be American. They presume ambiguous term, “Australasia”, is intended to include New Zealand and that the line of demarcation is intended to follow line of ABC 1 report.* If this is otherwise, it appears New Zealand must be dependent upon joint resources of Royal Australian Navy and Royal New Zealand Navy for Naval defence within this area, and that land and air defence of Fiji will remain a New Zealand commitment. H.M. Government in New Zealand are particularly concerned that this point should be clarified, and that a definition should also be given of Naval responsibility for protection of line New Hebrides—Fiji—Tonga which is at present apparently protected only by an air patrol operating from Fiji and such small Naval force as can be made available from Australia and New Zealand.

(c) It is assumed from para. (f) that General Wavell’s authority is to include lines of communications from America to area in question and New Zealand Government are not without doubt as to whether this would give him authority over Fiji, which is one of the essential bases [apparent omission] prolonged lines of communication. They would raise no objection if this is so, but they would call attention to paramount importance of sea fortifications to safety of Fiji, which would appear to depend upon American Fleet at least until Fiji is powerfully reinforced.

(d) No reference is made in para. (d) to New Zealand Naval forces. It is presumed they are intended to be included.

* For explanation of ABC-1, see ante, p. 16, footnote 2.
4. H.M. Government in New Zealand have two further observations to offer:

(a) While they fully realise the necessity in time of war of making very urgent decisions, they feel it will be realised in London and in Washington that the short time at their disposal may not have given them adequate opportunity to raise proposals with care they require, and that further observations may become necessary after further study;

(b) If General Wavell’s proposed command impinges directly or indirectly upon defence New Zealand or Fiji, they would wish instituted from the outset some form of liaison between them and General, perhaps by representations on joint staff referred to in para. (c), and they would also wish to be represented on “appropriate joint bodies” also referred to in para. (e) as to constitution of which they would be glad of further information.

740.0011 Pacific War/1508 : Telegram

The Consul General at Wellington (Cox) to the Secretary of State

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

WELLINGTON, December 31, 1941—noon.

[Extract 1]

Prime Minister Fraser has just told me that the position of New Zealand in the Pacific war is a source of great anxiety. He has already communicated with Prime Minister Churchill on the matter and assumes that his representations 2 have been laid before the President. He continued that he would appreciate any reports from me which would aid the United States in understanding this country’s position. It was possible the Japanese would by-pass New Zealand, but on the other hand he felt that if they succeeded in progressing south an attack on New Zealand could be considered as probable. He reasoned that it would be a feather in the Japanese cap to seize a part of the British Empire which was peopled with the white race and whose defense was slight. The Dominion would also provide a jumping off place for an attack on Australia.

Cox

1 The omitted portion deals with specific military measures being taken by the Government of New Zealand.

2 Supra.
SECRET
United States: ABC–4/3
British: WW–4

SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC (THE FAR EAST AREA AND ADJACENT REGIONS) UNTIL ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIFIED COMMAND

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff approved the Joint Planning Committee report of December 29 [28], 1941, on “Supporting Measures for the Southwest Pacific”\(^2\) as appropriate action to be taken in the interim prior to the establishment of the unified command of the forces in that region.

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed to send immediately to the United States and British Commanders-in-Chief in the Far East Area the following telegram:

“The general strategic policy for operations in the Far Eastern theatre which has been agreed upon by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff is as follows:

\(a\). To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and North Australia, as the basic defensive position in that theatre and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

\(b\). To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the theatre, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

\(c\). To reestablish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines’ Garrison.

\(d\). To main essential communications within the theatre.

In disposing of the reinforcements arriving in that theatre, you should be guided by the above policy and consider the needs of the theatre as a whole. To this end, close co-operation among the British, Dutch and United States Commanders is essential, and you should continue to concert measures accordingly.

The British Commander-in-Chief, Far East, will inform the Dutch and request their cooperation.”

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\(^1\) This report was Annex 2 to JCCSs–7; see ante, p. 146.

\(^2\) ante, p. 280.
Defense Files

Report by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

December 31, 1941.

United States: ABC-4/5
British: WW-3 (Final)

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA

By agreement among the Governments of Australia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, hereinafter referred to as the ABDA Governments:

1. Area.

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all land and sea areas included in the general region Burma-Malaya-Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area will be known as the ABDA Area.

2. Forces.

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore, and in the air, of the ABDA Governments, which are:

a. Stationed in the Area;

b. Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for services in or in support of the ABDA Area.

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDA Governments land forces of that government without the consent of the local commander or his government.

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and, if required, a commander of the combined naval forces and a commander of the combined air forces will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

4. No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your Area except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto.

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1 The source text was Annex 3 to JCCs–7; see ante, p. 147. The report was apparently sent to the President on the afternoon of December 31, under cover of the memorandum signed by the United States Chiefs of Staff, ante, p. 287.

2 Despite the designation "Final", the draft directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA area and Annex 2 thereto were subsequently modified as a result of the meeting in the White House on January 1, ante, p. 162. See ABC-4/5 (Approved), WW-3, January 10, 1942, post, p. 313.

3 Annex 1 was a copy of the paper entitled "Boundaries of ABDA Area", which was Annex 1 to ABC-4/5, WW-3, dated December 30, 1941, ante, p. 292.
5. Strategic Concept and Policy.

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your Area is to maintain initially the strategic defensive. The ABDA Governments intend to provide immediate reinforcements for defense. As additional forces become available, it will become possible to take the offensive and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Although your operations in the near future must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further preparations for that offensive.

6. The general strategic policy will therefore be:

a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the ABDA Area, and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

c. To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines’ Garrison.

d. To maintain essential communications within the Area.

7. Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority of the Supreme Commander.

You will coordinate in the ABDA Area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces.

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments.

10. You are authorized to require from the Commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiqués concerning the forces under your command.
12. Through the channels specified in Paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furtherance of your mission.

13. Limitations.

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of the ABDA Area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through the commanders duly designated by their respective governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and their respective governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical organization of such forces, and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and will not be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national components of the task force. In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in the execution of your mission.


The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the exercise of the authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all sea, land, and air forces within your Area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

15. If any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representation to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardize the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA Area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious method, and a copy of the appeal will be communicated simultaneously to you.

16. Staff and Assumption of Command.

Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA powers. You are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through channels of communication described in Paragraph 18.

17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.
18. **Superior Authority.**

As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2.4

**Signed**
(By Power furnishing
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:
Other ABDA Representatives.

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4 Annex 2 was a copy of the memorandum of December 30, entitled "Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area", ante, p. 288.

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**Hopkins Papers**

*The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

[WASHINGTON, December 31, 1941.]

My Dear Harry: I have made inquiries into the confiscation in Rangoon of war weapons and trucks consigned to China.2

It appears that the Governor of Burma asked on the 12th of December whether Lend-Lease stores in Rangoon could be diverted from the Chinese for other uses. The War Department replied that the consent of the Chinese authorities would be necessary before any diversion took place.

We are of opinion here that certain weapons had been diverted and that on this decision these were restored to China.

There is no evidence of any diversion since that time, though we know that the British authorities are trying to secure the consent of the Chinese to further diversions.

Does this answer satisfy you? If not, shall I go further and make inquiries in Rangoon? Do you wish a War Office order given to the Governor of Burma directing that stores destined for China must not be interfered with until the consent of the Chinese authorities has been obtained?

Yours ever,

Max

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4 The reference is to the *Tulsa* affair; see Magruder's telegram of December 25, footnote 3, ante, p. 272.
Hopkins Papers

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook)

[Washington,] January 1, 1942.

Dear Max: With reference to your note of December 31st and the confiscation in Rangoon of war weapons and trucks consigned to China, this is all I wanted to know about it. ¹

Very cordially yours,

Harry L. Hopkins


Defense Files

The Secretary of the British Chiefs of Staff (Holli to the Secretary, War Department General Staff (Smith) ¹

SECRET

Washington, January 1, 1942.

I am instructed by the British Chiefs of Staff to say that to ensure positive action, it seems to the British Chiefs of Staff that until unity of command in the ABDA Area is operating, it is important that General Brett should act for General Wavell as regards the distribution of United States Air Forces in that area.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff are particularly anxious that there should be no delay whatever in sending aircraft to support the Philippines, to protect the Sunda Strait or to reinforce Malaya as may be expedient. Time presses and every day the risks to movement may become greater.

3. The British Chiefs of Staff would be very grateful if they could be informed of any action which General Brett finds it possible to take.

4. I am instructed to request that the above communication may be made to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

L. C. Hollis
Brigadier,
Secretary, British
Chiefs of Staff Committee

¹The memorandum, addressed to “The Secretariat, U.S. Chiefs of Staff”, was presumably delivered to the office of the Secretary, War Department General Staff. The source text is a copy with typewritten signature.
I. THE FIRST WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Defense Files

The Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, United States Army (Gerow) to the Secretary of the British Chiefs of Staff (Hollis)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 1, 1942.

Reference your memorandum of to-day transmitting a message from the British Chiefs of Staff:

General Marshall feels that the instructions already issued to the American Commander in Australia will insure the proper disposition of United States Air Force arriving in that area. The radio message accepted at yesterday’s meeting of the Joint [Combined] Chiefs of Staff was dispatched to all concerned. This was followed by a radio from General Arnold, specifically directing the establishment of air bases well northward in Australia, so as to operate into the Dutch East Indies.

Additional instructions, pending receipt of definite reports from Australia would probably be confusing.

L. T. GEROW
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff

1 See ABC-4/3, WW-4, December 31, 1941, ante, p. 296.
2 Not printed.

Roosevelt Papers

President Roosevelt to the Australian Minister (Casey)

[WASHINGTON, January 1, 1942.] 1

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: I should be grateful if you would transmit to Mr. Curtin the following reply to his message given in your note of December 28, 1941: 2

“Mr. Churchill and I have considered your message with the urgency which the situation clearly demands. I need not tell you the importance which we attach to holding every possible strongpoint in the Western Pacific. To this end we and our military, naval and air advisers have given the most urgent consideration to the matter of despatching reinforcements at the earliest possible moment. The necessary steps are already under way for the flight to Australia of effective air assistance, which I hope will arrive in the very near future.

We are deeply conscious of the magnificent contribution which Australia has made and is making to the common effort and of the need to replace the strength which she has despatched to other theaters”.

Sincerely yours,

1 The source text is an unsigned carbon copy of a letter prepared by Welles at the President’s request and transmitted to the White House on January 1, 1942; the summary of developments prepared by Alan Watt of the Australian Legation (post, p. 822) quotes the President’s reply under date of January 1.
2 For text, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. v, p. 390. See also Churchill’s telegram to Curtin, December 25, 1941, printed in The Grand Alliance, p. 668.
Defense Files

The Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, United States Army (Gerow) to the Netherlands Minister (Loudon) 1

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1942.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have been directed by General Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to inform you that, by agreement between the Prime Minister and The President, the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area will be instructed as follows:

"Your headquarters will be established, initially, in Java."

L. T. GEROW
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff

Note for Record:
Delivered to the Netherlands Minister by General Gerow in person at 8:30 p. m. on January 2.

1 For a reference by Marshall to the background of this letter, see the discussion in the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on January 10, 1942, ante, p. 172.

Defense Files

Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt 1

CHUNGKING, January 3, 1942.

From Chiang Kai-shek
For President Roosevelt.

Generalissimo's reply follows:

Your suggestion 2 that I should exercise the supreme command over all forces of the United Powers which are now or may in the future be operating in the Chinese theater, including initially such portions of Indo China and Thailand as may become accessible to troops of the United Powers, is one which I have considered with a full sense of all the grave responsibilities it entails toward the other countries and peoples concerned as well as toward China. If it were simply a question of my own capacities and military qualifications, I could not accept this supreme command with its attendant duties and responsibilities. However I do not hesitate to accept it at your suggestion in agreement with the British and Dutch Governments. The establishment of a supreme command will unify the strategy and promote the full cooperation of the United Powers in the Chinese theater. The effective coordination of these forces in [is] the common need that must be placed before everything else. Your own initiative and efforts have brought this unity of purpose and made them within

1 Sent by the United States Naval Attaché at Chungking via Navy channels.
2 See Roosevelt's message of December 29, 1941, ante, p. 284.
reach of achievement and I shall spare myself nothing to second your effort and serve the common good of all the nations which are now linking to their resources at home, their communications and their fighting forces on every front. This growing unity has rallied the entire Chinese people behind it. In line with your suggestions I welcome the prompt disposition of American and British representatives to serve on a joint headquarters planning staff. The question of Russian representation can be considered as soon as this staff has assembled and begun its duties. The proposed exchange of liaison with the commander of the British forces in India and the commander of the Southern Pacific theater can be carried out as soon as the command and headquarters staff of the Chinese theater have been established. In every successive phase of development I would be happy to have your views and suggestions.  

*The source text bears a notation by the President’s secretary indicating that it had been shown to Churchill.

Defense Files

The Secretary of the British Chiefs of Staff (Hollis) to the Secretary, War Department General Staff (Smith).  

SECRET  

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1942.

The British Chiefs of Staff have instructed me to say that they would be most grateful if the six United States ships now transporting the 18th British Division to the Far East could be retained in the Middle East–Far East Area for the purpose of taking more reinforcements to the South-West Pacific Area.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff would be most grateful if they could be informed of the decision on this matter as early as convenient, since the organisation of further convoys from the Middle East to the Far East cannot be proceeded with until a decision on this point is obtained.  

L. C. Hollis  
Brigadier

*The memorandum, addressed to “The Secretariat, United States Chiefs of Staff”, was presumably delivered to the office of the Secretary, War Department General Staff. See the memorandum of December 24, 1941, by Hollis, ante, p. 267.  
* See the discussion of this subject at the meeting on January 4, ante, p. 167.

Hopkins Papers

The Secretary of the British Chiefs of Staff (Hollis) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

SECRET  

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1942.

DEAR MR. HOPKINS: At a meeting this morning between the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff, during which the President
came in for a few minutes, Mr. Churchill mentioned that the Dutch Government in London want to amend Annex 2 to General Wavell’s Directive which deals with the machinery for obtaining decisions on points which General Wavell may refer to higher authority.¹

2. The Dutch want to be taken into consultation in Washington as well as in London,² and you will remember that the arrangement was for the British Government to bring this consultation between the Dutch and Dominion Governments in London and the final decision would be issued from Washington after American-British discussions only. Any other system would cause chaos and indefinite delay.

3. At the Prime Minister’s suggestion the President agreed that I should draft a reply to London explaining why we could not accept the Dutch proposal, but mentioning that of course it would be open to the ABDA machine in Washington to call in the Dutch Authorities if their advice was required on any particular point.

4. I attach a draft telegram to London which the Prime Minister says I am to send them subject to the President’s approval. If the President approves, I should indicate in the telegram that he has done so.

5. I attach a copy of the telegram from London (Flag ‘A’)³ as well as a copy of Annex 2 to General Wavell’s Directive (Flag ‘B’).¹

Yours sincerely,

L. C. HOLLIS

Draft Telegram From Prime Minister Churchill to Foreign Secretary Eden

[1.] Your Taut 379.⁸

2. We are most anxious that Dutch views should be given fullest consideration at all stages of ABDA discussions.

3. If decisions are to be obtained quickly, however, representation on the High Executive Body in Washington, who will issue the final instruction to General Wavell, must be cut down to the smallest possible number. If Dutch have official status as members of the ABDA machine in Washington, Dominions will also demand representation resulting in confusion and delay.

4. For the above reason it was considered right that machinery for consulting Dutch and Dominion Governments should be centred in London, and that British Government should be responsible for ob-

¹ This is the document entitled “Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area”, dated December 30, 1941, ante, p. 288.
² The amendments proposed by the Netherlands Government are attached to the letter of January 5 from Welles to Roosevelt, post, p. 308.
³ Not found.
taining their views and agreement and for forwarding them to Washington.

5. Naturally if Washington required information about local conditions or technical advice from the Dutch, their representatives would be consulted, but they would not attend meetings as a regular practice unless invited to do so.

6. Following amendments to Annex 2 to General Wavell’s Directive are, therefore, proposed.

   Paragraph 1. After “Minister of Defence”
   Insert “on behalf of ABDA Governments”.

   Paragraph 2 (b). After “London”
   Insert “having consulted Dutch Staff”.

   Paragraph 3. After “agreement”
   Insert “at every stage”.

   Paragraph 4. Delete “both of them”
   Substitute “the ABDA Governments and respective Governments will be fully informed”.

7. We feel sure that if given a trial Dutch Government will find this arrangement satisfactory.

Hopkins Papers

The President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Stark)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1942.

DEAR BETTY:¹ The attached is a draft of a proposed cablegram which the Prime Minister sent to me.² It relates to matters concerning the Unity of Command and I am, therefore, sending it to you.

Very cordially yours,

HARRY

¹ Nickname for Stark.
² The attachment was the draft telegram supra.

740.0011 Pacific War/1944A

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the President

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Minister of the Netherlands¹ has just called to see me.

He has received instructions from his Government reprimanding him severely because his Government was not afforded the opportunity of passing upon the text of the statement given out by the White House on Saturday regarding the joint command in the Pacific.²

¹ Alexander Loudon.
² The reference is to the White House Press Release of January 3, 1942, ante, p. 147.
He has received further instructions to inform you that his Government approves in general lines secret document No. 1 (instructions to General Wavell), together with Annex 1 to that document. His Government desires, however, to request modifications of Annex 2 to that document. These modifications are contained in the first of the documents enclosed herewith.

With reference to the text of the “agreement” handed by you to the Minister on December 29, the Minister has received observations thereto from the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies under date of January 2. These observations are likewise attached herewith.

The Minister has likewise received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands naval forces certain information, together with observations, concerning the activities of the American naval forces under the command of Admiral Hart. The information and observations are likewise enclosed herewith.

The Minister has likewise received from his Government in London an instruction stating that the Netherlands Government requests the United States to send troops to Curaçao under the same conditions as the British troops which have previously been defending the islands. In essence this implies that the cost of our troops are to be borne by the United States and that our troops are to be under the command of the Dutch Government and military commander in the islands. The Dutch Government will later communicate with you with regard to the number of the American troops to be sent.

The Dutch Government likewise requests that when an announcement is made by the White House covering the dispatch of our troops to the Netherlands West Indies the statement make it clear that the troops are to be there only temporarily and will be withdrawn upon the conclusion of hostilities. The Dutch Government is very anxious to avoid any implication of “an occupation” by United States military forces. The Minister has asked that he be informed twenty-four hours before any statement is issued by the White House in order that he may have the opportunity of explaining to American press correspondents the nature of the assistance which we are giving the Dutch Government in the Netherlands Indies and why the term “occupation” should not be used by the press.

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8 ABC-4/5, WW-3 (Final), ante, p. 297.
9 Annex 2 was the memorandum of December 30, 1941, entitled “Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area,” ante, p. 288.
10 From the comments made by the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies (enclosure 3 in/for), it appears that the “agreement” under reference may have been a copy of Churchill’s telegram of December 28, 1941, to the Lord Privy Seal, ante, p. 277.
11 For documentation on the sending of American troops to Curaçao and Aruba, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 49-77.
The Minister has asked me to request that you receive him at your earliest convenience in order that he may be advised by you of your decisions with regard to the various questions raised by his Government in the documents which I am transmitting herewith.

May I let him know that the White House will inform him when you are able to receive him? 

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

[Enclosure 1]

Amendments Proposed by the Netherlands Government

The Netherlands Government in London requests the insertion of the following additions in annex 2 of U.S. ABC/4/5:

1. par. 1 after the word “British” the words “and Dutch”.
2. in same paragraph, after the words “Minister of Defense”:
   “acting together on behalf of the ABDA Governments”.
3. in par. 2 b, after the words “in London”: “having consulted
   the Dutch staff”.
4. in same paragraph, after the word “representative”: “and the
   Dutch representative”.
5. in par. 2 c after the word “British”; “and Dutch”.
6. in par. 4 after the words “in the name of” replace last 3 words
   of paragraph by the following:
   “the ABDA Governments and the respective Governments will be
   informed”.

[Enclosure 2]

Netherlands Legation Memorandum

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1942.

Information was received from the Commander in Chief of the Netherlands Naval Forces, Admiral Helfrich, that important Japanese forces and troopships are being gathered on the south coast of Holo and Davao. Because of lack of sufficient Netherlands fighter planes it is for the time being impossible to attack these objectives with our bombers. Some American fighting [flying?] fortresses have arrived in Malang and Adm. Helfrich hopes that they will as soon as possible participate in bombing operations. The attitude of the American-Asiatic fleet remained unchanged. Adm. Helfrich will urgently ask Adm. Hart for more activity and to make a more intensive use of American submarines operating from Sourabaya. At present an

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*Marginal note in Roosevelt’s handwriting at head of first sheet, to Hopkins: “Harry Talk to me about soon FDR.”*
American submarine tender is already located in Port Darwin as are all American auxiliary vessels, some American submarines, however, are now on their way to Sourabaya.

The greatest need is for fighter planes, anti-aircraft guns, class A cruisers, aircraft carriers, not to speak of capital ships. Admiral Helfrich is strongly convinced that more success can be obtained even with the combined forces at present in that area, if they could all be put under our own command for offensive action.

Admiral H. expressed once more the hope that the American authorities will fully realize that also for the general war operations it is of the greatest importance that a strong stand should be made, not only in the mainland (Java, Sumatra, etc.) of the Netherlands Indies, but that also the oilfields in Borneo and elsewhere should be strongly defended considering that when these oilfields should be lost the use of Australia as basis would encounter very great difficulties in view of the fact that then all oil supplies would have to be shipped to Australia via a long and very hazardous searoute.

(These observations were made by Admiral Helfrich on January third, 1942.)

[Enclosure 3]

Netherlands Legation Memorandum

MEMORANDUM

The Governor General has raised the following questions.

Why has a General been appointed supreme Commander and not an Admiral[?] Does this mean that no important fleet including battleships will be sent[?] Because if the latter would be the case the fleet would come to the forefront. A large fleet is of the greatest importance. The three most important functions are being held by British and American officers which is only comprehensible if the United States and Great Britain have the intention to send considerable armed forces of their own to this theatre of war. If they, however, would not have such intention the geographical situation and local knowledge of the theatre of war which to a great extent lies within the boundaries of the Netherlands Indies, would lead to expect that one of three commandants [commands] would be given to a Netherlands officer.

A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer.
The best line of action would be to make the supreme commander responsible to an appropriate joint body in which all participants are directly represented.

In view of the fact that the Netherlands Indies constitute a very great part of the operational area in which the allied forces are under the command of the supreme commander, the Netherlands would desire to have a more direct part in the command, whilst naturally the United States maintains the exclusive command in the Pacific and Great Britain in the Indian Ocean.

If the arrangements were made for a more extensive operational area the Netherlands would be willing to content itself with a less important part in the high command, but in this arrangement which covers a restricted area it seems that the local knowledge of Netherlands Indies commanders has not been taken into account sufficiently.

It is not clear whether in point F operational control is meant. The Netherlands would like this to be so as in this way cooperation with local authorities would be easier.

In the Netherlands Indies the Governor General is the Commander in Chief. However, it is not possible for the Governor General to be under command of the Supreme Commander. It is therefore suggested that in the place of ["Commander in Chief of the Netherlands Indies"] should be mentioned the "Commanders in Chief of the Netherlands Navy and the Netherlands Indies Army."

(These observations were made by the Governor General on January second, 1942.)

Hopkins Papers

The Chief of Naval Operations (Stark) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS

I am returning the papers you sent me last night.¹

Army and Navy accept the changes.

Have drawn up a new paper, making it easy for the President to check:— the changes are underlined and, in paragraph 4, the words which it was suggested be deleted are crossed out.

Betty²

¹ See Hopkins’ letter of January 5, 1942, ante, p. 306.
² Nickname for Stark.
Revised Draft of Annex 2 to ABC-4/5, WW-3 (Final)

SECRET

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA

January 5, 1942.

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decision by the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, on behalf of ABDA Governments. Among the chief matters on which decisions will be required are:

   a. The provision of reinforcements.
   b. A major change in policy.
   c. Departure from the Supreme Commander’s directive.

2. This agency will function as follows:
   a. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA Governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and in London.
   b. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London having consulted Dutch Staff, will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinions.
   c. On receipt of these opinions, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement at every stage, and for including these in the final telegram to Washington.

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the orders to the Supreme Commander will be dispatched from Washington in the name of both of them the ABDA Governments and respective governments will be fully informed.

*Notation on the source text: “Underlined words show insertions”.*
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached is a telegram which Churchill proposes to send to the Dutch apropos of their complaints about the agreement.\(^1\)

I gave it to Stark and he consulted Marshall, King and Arnold and they find the telegram is all right.

Immediately following the draft telegram is a memorandum of explanation which Stark drafted.\(^2\) I don’t quite understand it but the main thing is that your staff recommend that the cable go as dictated.

If it has your approval I will give it to the British and they will get it off tonight.\(^3\)

HARRY L. HOPKINS

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\(^1\) The attached telegram was a copy of Churchill’s draft telegram of January 5, 1942, ante, p. 305.

\(^2\) The attachment was a copy of Stark’s letter to Hopkins, supra.

\(^3\) The memorandum was returned with the handwritten notation: “H.L.H.—OK FDR”.

740.0011 Pacific War/1699

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

London, January 9, 1942.

Netherlands Series 5 from Biddle.

My No. 8, January 6, paragraph four.\(^1\)

van Kleffens has asked me to let you know of his deep regret that the Netherlands Government’s request to insert “and Dutch Chiefs of Staff” in paragraph one of Annex 2 of the Wavell instructions\(^2\) had not been accepted since both Batavia and the Government here held this point to be of paramount importance. He said that in conversation with Eden today, he had emphasized his government’s disappointment over this rejection and Eden had pointed out that inclusion of a Dutch Chief of Staff would undoubtedly have given rise to a like request by the Australians. van Kleffens replied that the present position of the Dutch East Indies was different from that of Australia since former were now in the forefront of the fight. Hence he felt that at this stage it would be only reasonable to include the Dutch in the planning body and to say to the Australians that they might be included later if they should come into a similar front.

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\(^1\) Not printed.

\(^2\) The amendments proposed by the Dutch are in enclosure 1 to Welles’ letter of January 5, 1942, to Roosevelt, ante, p. 308.
Van Kleffens went on to say that since his talk with Eden his reactions in the matter had been confirmed by his examination of subparagraph B of paragraph 2 of the main body of the Wavell instructions, which he interpreted as meaning that Australian forces were outside of the Wavell command until such time as those forces were specifically allotted by the Australian Government to the ABDA area.

I thereupon asked him whether he had taken into consideration the possibility that the phrase: “in or in support of the ABDA area” might be constructed to mean that Australian forces on Australian territory were actually in support of the ABDA area. He replied he did not believe this was the meaning intended.

WINANT

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Roosevelt Papers

The President to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)

WASHINGTON, January 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

In view of the rather tense situation caused by the announcement of Wavell’s appointment, without prior approval by the Dutch Government in London, I am wondering if it would not relieve the tension a bit if you could—this afternoon—go over the list of the Dutch request for munitions of war and make some releases to them, even though they be very modest, such as some light tanks, depth charges and sub-machine guns.

I think it is very important in our own relations with the Dutch that they fully understand that we are going to do everything we possibly can for them.

F. D. R.

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Defense Files

Report by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 10, 1942.

United States: ABC-4/5 (Approved)
British: WW-6

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA

Approved by the President and the Prime Minister

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1 The source text was Annex 1 to JCCSs-8; see ante, p. 173.
By agreement among the Governments of Australia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, hereinafter referred to as the ABDA Governments:

1. Area.

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all land and sea areas included in the general region Burma—Malaya—Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area will be known as the ABDA Area.

2. Forces.

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore, and in the air, of the ABDA Governments which are or will be:

a. Stationed in the Area;

b. Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for services in or in support of the ABDA Area.

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDA Governments land forces of that government without the consent of the local commander or his government.

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and, if required, a commander of the combined naval forces and a commander of the combined air forces will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

4. No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your Area except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto.

5. Strategic Concept and Policy.

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your Area is not only in the immediate future to maintain as many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Your operations should be so conducted as to further preparations for the offensive.

6. The General Strategic Policy Will Therefore Be:

a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the ABDA Area, and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

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*Annex 1 was a copy of the paper entitled “Boundaries of the ABDA Area”, which was Annex 1 to ABC-4/5, WW-3, dated December 30, 1941, ante, p. 292.
5. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

6. To reestablish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines’ Garrison.

7. To maintain essential communications within the Area.

7. Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority of the Supreme Commander.

You will coordinate in the ABDA Area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces.

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments.

10. You are authorized to require from the Commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiqués concerning the forces under your command.

12. Through the channels specified in Paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furtherance of your mission.

13. Limitations.

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of the ABDA Area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through the commanders duly appointed by their respective governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and their respective governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical organization of such forces, and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and will not be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national components of the task force, except in the case of urgent necessity. In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in the execution of your mission.
14. Relations with ABDA Governments.

The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the exercise of the authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all sea, land, and air forces within your Area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

15. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representations to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardize the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA Area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious method, and a copy of the appeal will be communicated simultaneously to you.

16. Staff and Assumption of Command.

Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA powers. You are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through channels of communication described in Paragraph 18.

17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

18. Superior Authority.

As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2.3

Signed
(By Power furnishing
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:
Other ABDA Representatives.

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3 Annex 2 was a copy of the paper entitled “Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area”, as revised on January 5, 1942, ante, p. 311.
SECRET

Washington, January 10, 1942.

United States: ABC-4/CS-3
British: WW-9 (Revised)

PROCEDURE FOR ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY GENERAL WAVELL

1. General Wavell was informed on 29th December, 1941, by the Prime Minister that he was to be the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area. He was told that his directive would be given to him shortly and that any observations which he might wish to make on its terms would be considered.

2. When the directive was finally approved by the President and the Prime Minister, orders were sent to London (2nd January) that it should be telegraphed to General Wavell immediately—copies were also to be sent to General Pownall and all other British Commanders concerned.

3. At the same time the terms of the directive were communicated to the Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand Governments.

4. The Dutch Government has suggested certain amendments to Annex (ii) to the directive, and these are still under discussion. It is not known whether they have communicated the directive to the Dutch Commanders in the ABDA Area.

5. The Australian Government has put forward views and opinions about the whole arrangement, and have not yet notified their agreement with the directive. It is presumed that they have not yet informed any of their Commanders.

6. The New Zealand Government is only indirectly concerned. There has been no comment on the directive from them.

7. On 2nd January General Wavell was told that much importance was attached to his taking over as soon as possible, and he was asked to specify the earliest date on which he would be ready to assume command. He is now at Singapore, but is expected to be in Batavia today, 10th January. No observations have yet been received from him about his directive, nor has he yet specified a date for assuming command.

8. Neither the Dutch nor the Australian Government has yet agreed to the directive, though their objections are mainly to the machinery of control laid down in Annex (ii) rather than to the directive itself. The discussions which are proceeding with those Governments may of course be successfully concluded before it becomes necessary to promulgate the date of General Wavell’s appointment; but even if

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1 The source text was Annex 2 to JCCSs–8. It was approved by the Chiefs of Staff in this amended version on January 10, 1942; see ante, p. 174.
they are not, we do not think there need be any delay on that account. We suggest that General Wavell’s appointment should be promulgated as soon as he reports he is ready, and that he should then be instructed to carry on, pending the final confirmation of his directive.

9. We accordingly propose that the following action should be taken as soon as General Wavell reports the date on which he will be ready to assume command:

a. His Majesty’s Government should make a communication in the terms of Annex A to the Governments of the United States, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, India, and China.

b. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom should telegraph to General Wavell in the terms of Annex B.

c. On receipt of the communication mentioned in a above, the Governments of the United States, The Netherlands, and Australia should at once notify their local Commanders of the date of the assumption of command by General Wavell, and should give any necessary consequential instructions so that the system planned for the ABDA Area can become effective.

d. The terms of the directive for General Wavell, including Annex (ii), should be settled as soon as possible, and the outcome notified to all concerned.

10. We propose to telegraph home in the terms of Annex C to secure the assent of the Dutch and Australian Governments to this procedure.

DUDLEY POUND
J. G. DILL
C. PORTAL

Annex “A”

Draft communication from His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to the Governments of the United States, The Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, China, and India:

Instructions are being sent today to General Wavell that he should assume command of the ABDA Area as from January . . . . .

Pending final agreement between the Governments concerned on the terms of his directive and on the machinery for the higher direction of war in the ABDA Area, (Annex II to the Directive), General Wavell is being instructed to proceed in accordance with the directive as at present drafted and to communicate with Washington and London as laid down in Paragraph 18 thereof.

Please inform all Commanders concerned, accordingly.

Annex “B”

Draft telegram from His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to General Wavell:
You are to assume supreme command in the ABDA Area on January . . . .

Pending final agreement between the Governments concerned on your directive, you should act in accordance with the directive sent to you in Telegram No. . . . , and you should address communications to superior authority in accordance with Paragraph 18 thereof.

General Brett and Admiral Hart are being ordered by the United States Government to report to you as Deputy Supreme Commander and Commander of Combined Naval Forces, respectively, in the ABDA Area.

Governments concerned are notifying their Commanders accordingly.

Annex “C”

Draft telegram from British Chiefs of Staff to Chiefs of Staff Committee, London:

Please put following to Lord Privy Seal:

It is of highest importance that General Wavell should exercise supreme command without delay, as soon as he reports himself ready to do so.

Please propose to Dutch and Australian Governments that as soon as General Wavell reports himself as ready he should be authorized to assume command, pending the acceptance by those Governments of the ABDA machinery as set out in Annex II of his directive.

United States Chiefs of Staff agree.

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Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff ¹

SECRET

United States: ABC–4/9
British: WW–10

IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINA

1. The United States War Department has been exploring methods of increasing assistance to China so that better effect might be realized from utilization of that country’s resources against Japan. Information, currently available, seems to indicate a definite and progressive weakening, morally and materially, in China’s war effort. The War Department regards it as of profound importance that such steps

¹ The source text is the report as amended and approved by the Chiefs of Staff on January 10, 1942; see ante, p. 174. As originally submitted by the Joint Planning Committee, the report was serialized as ABC–4/9, WW(JPC)9 (not printed).
as may be practicable and are consistent with other commitments be promptly taken to reverse this trend.

2. The chief obstacle to producing a better military result in China, aside from a general scarcity of munitions, is that country's almost complete isolation. Communication with the Generalissimo is difficult and subject to delay and possible interception. The long, poorly maintained, and insecure Burma Road can, at the best, support only a limited truck tonnage—while air raids, confusion and lack of coordination at Rangoon further limit the amounts of supplies possible to deliver to the Chinese. Several things are indicated as necessary:

a. Closer and more effective liaison with the Generalissimo.

b. Increased security for Rangoon and the Burma Road, by air and ground.

c. Improvement in the control, maintenance, and management of the Burma Road.

d. Increase in base facilities and technical services.

e. Increase in Chinese combat strength resulting from above measures.

f. Close and effective liaison between China and the Commanding General, ABDA Area.

3. The War Department is considering initiation of the following steps to meet the requirements listed in Paragraph 2:

a. Arrange with the Generalissimo to accept a United States Army officer of high rank as the United States Representative in China, and to agree to the following as his functions:

(1) Supervise and control all United States Defense Aid affairs for China.

(2) Under the Generalissimo, to command all United States forces in China, and such Chinese forces as may be assigned. Should it be necessary for any of these forces to engage in joint operations in Burma, they will come under the command of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, who will issue the necessary directions for the cooperation of the United States Representative's forces with the forces under the British Commanders in Burma.

(3) Represent the United States Government on any international War Council in China.

(4) Control and maintain the Burma Road, in China.

(Note: The following are projected upon the condition that a is, in its entirety, previously accepted by the Generalissimo.)

b. Dispatch to the South China—Burma area additional aviation strength, initially raising and maintaining the American Volunteer Group at war strength in planes and personnel. In addition, it is considered possible that several Chinese divisions may be quickly equipped for effective combat service in this area, under command of the United States Representative.
c. Arrange (with the consent of the British) for auxiliary bases in support of the Chinese effort in Burma and India, and provide the technical equipment and troops to assure the efficiency of such Rangoon facilities as are allocated to China, and to assist in the maintenance of the Burma Road.

4. To make this project reasonably effective, British cooperation and agreement are required on the points set forth hereinafter. It is understood that British agreement and cooperation will become effective only in the event that the Generalissimo accords to the United States Representatives the authority implied and indicated in Paragraph 3 a above.

**Points on Which British Agreement Is Sought, Under Conditions Stated in Paragraph 3 a**

a. In cooperation with commanders of adjacent areas, the United States Representative to be permitted to establish and/or use bases, routes, and staging areas in India and Burma to support his operations in and north of Burma.

b. The United States Representative to be authorized to make every effort to increase the capacity of the Burma route, throughout its length from Rangoon to Chungking. To do this he will probably be given complete executive control of the China Section of the route. On the British Section, control will still be exercised by the British authorities, both military and civil. To achieve the general aim, these British authorities will be instructed to carry out every possible improvement to the route in accordance with the requirements of the United States Representative and will accept such American technicians and equipment as may be necessary for the improvement of facilities in the Port of Rangoon and along the route itself.

c. The United States Representative, by arrangement with the British Commanders in Burma, to be permitted to construct and/or use necessary airfields in Burma.

d. The United States Representative to be accepted as the principal liaison agency between the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

740.0011 PW/13763

Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Stewart of the Division of European Affairs

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1942.

AUSTRALIA AND THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC

I have had several talks in recent days with Mr. Alan Watt of the Australian Legation concerning general developments in Australia
and the Southwest Pacific. In this connection Mr. Watt showed me a confidential summary of recent developments which he prepared for the use of the Australian Minister, Mr. Casey, and which covers the main points discussed with me. I asked Mr. Watt if I might have a copy of this summary for my strictly confidential information and for very restricted distribution to certain other persons in the Department. Mr. Watt agreed that I might have a copy for these purposes. I assured him that it would be treated as strictly confidential. The text of his summary is as follows:

"January 9th, 1942

1. The Australian Government is gravely concerned over the adequacy of the measures so far taken to maintain in Allied hands vital areas in the southwestern Pacific, including Australia, as a base of operations from which to attack Japan. It believes that Singapore is the key point in this area, and that the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies are also of vital importance. Yet, in its opinion the forces at present available in the southwestern Pacific, together with the additional reinforcements which have so far been allocated to that area, are insufficient to withstand Japanese attacks with any reasonable degree of certainty. If the Philippines, Malaya and the Netherlands Indies are lost to Japan, the consequences will be incalculable—not only directly to Australia itself, but also to Burma and India and to the United States, which may be compelled to fight Japan from Hawaiian bases at great disadvantage and cost in time, men and materials. In view of her own vital interests involved, the Australian Government feels strongly that Australia and also the Netherlands Indies should have a direct voice in policy decisions affecting the southwestern Pacific area so that their views may be given full weight before decisions on policy are reached.

2. Australia has not been represented at the United Kingdom—United States discussions in Washington. The Government has been compelled, therefore, to put its views from time to time in writing and to address these to Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt jointly in the hope that they may be considered in time to affect decisions. These views have had to be formulated in the absence of precise information as to the progress of the discussions. Replies to the representations of the Australian Government have been received both from Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt. The difficulty of carrying on adequate discussions in this way, however, has been very well illustrated by certain major misunderstandings and difficulties which have arisen from some of these replies. The main points involved are referred to below.

3. The Inter-Allied Conference held at Singapore from 18th to 20th December came to the conclusion that the situation was 'serious' but need not give rise to 'undue pessimism', provided necessary reinforcements were supplied within the time still available. It stressed the fact that time was the essential factor. The Conference agreed on a list of 'minimum' reinforcements necessary to withstand a Jap-
anese attack on the then existing scale. If additional Japanese forces were thrown into the battle, the scale of Allied reinforcements would have to be increased.

4. On 23rd December the Australian Prime Minister sent an urgent message to Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt jointly expressing the opinion that British air reinforcements known to be earmarked for Singapore were quite inadequate and asking that urgent additional aid should be given.

5. In his reply, dated 24th or 25th December, Mr. Churchill indicated that he and his advisers did not accept the view that there was danger of an early reduction of the Singapore fortress. He referred to reinforcements which were being sent and stated that commanders in the Middle East had been directed to concert a plan for sending fighters and tanks to Singapore 'immediately the situation in Libya permits'. Mr. Churchill added that President Roosevelt and his advisers were not only impressed with the importance of maintaining Singapore but were 'anxious to move a continuous flow of troops and aeroplanes through Australia for the relief of the Philippines' if that were possible. Should the Philippines fall, the President was agreeable to troops and aeroplanes being diverted to Singapore and he was also 'quite willing to send substantial United States forces to Australia', where the United States was anxious to establish important bases.

6. On 1st January, President Roosevelt informed the Australian Prime Minister that he and Mr. Churchill, with their Chiefs of Staff, had given the most urgent consideration to the despatch of reinforcements at the earliest possible moment. He added that the necessary steps were already under way 'for the flight (sic) to Australia of effective air assistance'.

7. From information subsequently supplied by the United States Army Air Corps it would appear that by the end of January between 200 and 250 American fighter planes will have arrived in Australia en route to the Philippines or Singapore or elsewhere. In addition, it is proposed that some 80 heavy bombers will be flown from the United States to the Far East via Africa, their probable dates of arrival being unknown at present.

8. On 29th December Mr. Churchill informed the Australian Government that he and President Roosevelt had 'agreed', _inter alia_, on the following important matters:

(a) Unity of command in the southwestern Pacific (Mr. Churchill said the boundaries of the command were not yet finally settled but would presumably extend southward to the 'necessary supply bases, principally Port Darwin and supply lines in Northern Australia').

(b) Wavell would be Commander-in-Chief of all land, sea and air forces and 'would receive his orders from an appropriate joint body' responsible to Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt.

(c) The United States Navy would 'remain responsible for the whole of the Pacific Ocean east of the Philippines and Australasia including the United States approaches to Australasia'.

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1 For text, see _Foreign Relations, 1941_, vol. v, p. 390.
Mr. Churchill added that a Letter of Instructions to Wavell was being drafted.

On 30th or 31st December the Australian Prime Minister informed Mr. Churchill that the Australian Government assented to the 'text agreement'. Mr. Curtin added that the Australian Government 'expect that Australia will be included in the composition of the joint body' from which Wavell was to receive his instructions.

"9. About 3rd January Mr. Churchill forwarded to the Australian Prime Minister Wavell's Letter of Instructions 'approved by the President and the Prime Minister'.

"10. On 7th January the Australian Minister in Washington was informed that the Australian Prime Minister had telegraphed Mr. Churchill regarding Wavell's Letter of Instructions along the following lines:

(a) Australia was **not** included in the composition of the 'joint body' which was to direct Wavell.
(b) Dominion views on policy, reinforcements, etc. regarding the southwestern Pacific were (in accordance with the Letter of Instructions) to be conveyed merely to London, which would then inform Washington.
(c) Australia had been totally excluded from the southwestern Pacific area assigned to Wavell.
(d) There was nothing at all to indicate that the United States Navy would assume responsibility for the waters east of Australia.

"The Prime Minister expressed his dissatisfaction with the present position and stated that this dissatisfaction was shared by the Australian War Council and the Australian people. Mr. Curtin added that without adequate naval protection, the line of communication with Australia for American supply ships could not be maintained. The Japanese had only to 'walk into' New Caledonia, where they would be astride this line and in a position to launch air attacks on the most northern Australian ports which were being used by the United States for unloading aircraft and other supplies for transit to Darwin and the Netherlands Indies.

"11. In short, the views of the Australian Government can be summarised as follows:

(a) Singapore, the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, Australia itself and points like New Caledonia and Fiji are in grave danger of falling under Japanese control because—

(i) insufficient forces are at present in the southwestern Pacific to repel Japanese attacks, and
(ii) insufficient reinforcements have been assigned to that area.

(b) In view of the fact that vital Australian and Dutch interests are involved, the machinery set up to control policy in this
area is unsatisfactory because there is inadequate provision for Australian and Dutch participation at the appropriate time and places in policy decisions affecting the southwestern Pacific.

(c) For reasons not explained General Wavell's area of command excludes the whole of Australia, although according to Mr. Churchill it had been agreed that this area would include Port Darwin and supply lines in Northern Australia.

(d) No adequate provision has been made to ensure the control of waters east of Australia on the supply line from the United States or for the defence of important points like New Caledonia. This is a matter of great urgency as Intelligence Reports show that it is quite possible a heavy Japanese attack on New Caledonia or Fiji might develop at any time after January 10th."

Defense Files

Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1942.

United States: ABC-4/8 (Approved)
British: WW-13

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

1. There is under development and approaching completion, an air route suitable for the use of both long and medium range aircraft and extending from Hawaii to Australia. Airdromes are located at Palmera, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, Fiji, and New Caledonia. In addition to their use as staging points along the air route, all of these islands are valuable outposts of the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands or of New Zealand and Australia. They will serve also as operating bases for naval and air forces.

2. In addition to its military importance, New Caledonia is an important Japanese objective, since it is the principal readily accessible source of supply for nickel, of which the Japanese have at present only a limited supply. At present the total output of nickel is shipped to the United States. In emergency this source of supply could be denied to the Japanese for some time by the destruction of the blast furnaces, power supply, and limited loading facilities.

3. It is planned also to establish at Borabora, in the Society Islands, which are under Free French jurisdiction, a base for refuelling naval

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1 The source text was Annex 2 to JCCSs-10; see ante, p. 185. This paper is the amended and approved version of the Joint Planning Committee's report, dated January 10, 1942, serialized as ABC-4/8, WW(JPC)8 (not printed).
vessels and other shipping en route to and from the Southwest Pacific.

4. The defense of all the island positions along the route depends ultimately upon their support by naval and air forces. The final strength of forces recommended herein is based on the length of time which in present circumstances may elapse before naval and air support can be made effective. The strength of the forces required will have to be kept under constant review. In the present situation, the Japanese appear to be able to attack New Caledonia or Fiji at an early date with a force of at least one infantry division, supported by strong naval and air forces.

5. The present garrisons of the island bases are inadequate to hold out unsupported against the attacks of which the Japanese are capable. The degree of resistance to the Japanese of the French and native troops in New Caledonia is unknown.

6. The United States is able to provide forces for the defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, and Borabora.

7. New Zealand is sending most of the personnel needed for the defense of Viti Levu. The United States already is providing one pursuit squadron and very considerable quantities of the equipment required for the Fijis. The remainder is being supplied from British sources. Most of the equipment needed will be supplied in the near future.

8. Although we consider that New Caledonia should be an Australian responsibility, we are informed that, owing to the scarcity of troops for home defense in the absence of four divisions overseas, Australia is unable to increase the small garrison of one company now in New Caledonia within the next six months. Australia is laying minefields in the approaches to Noumea and Tontouta. We consider that it is important to provide more adequate defenses in the island as early as possible. The only way to do this would be for the United States to send the necessary forces. These would, however, initially be at the expense of the ABDA Area. An opinion should also be obtained from Australia as to the priority for arming the 3700 Free French on the island. A list has been received of their requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. a. That the United States arrange for the local defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, and Borabora. This is now being accomplished.

b. That the Dominion of New Zealand be responsible for the local defense of the Fiji Islands.
c. That the United States assist in providing equipment and air defenses for the Fiji Islands.

d. That the defense of New Caledonia should in principle be accepted as an Australian responsibility, but that the United States should as a temporary measure, furnish forces as early as possible for the defense of the island, immediately after meeting the emergency in the ABDA Area. The question of arming the Free French troops should be taken up between the United States and British Staffs as soon as an opinion has been obtained from Australia as to the priority.

e. Arrangements should be made immediately by the British with the Free French for the demolition, if necessary, of the furnaces and power plant of the nickel mines and the loading facilities for chrome and nickel ore in New Caledonia.

f. That Australia and New Zealand afford all practicable logistic support to United States forces which may be assigned to assist in the defense of the Fijis and New Caledonia.

g. The attached table shows forces present in the islands, or en route, and those we recommend should be sent in the future as shipping and naval escorts become available.

2 Not printed.

B. WAR PRODUCTION AND ALLOCATION

Hopkins Papers

Memorandum by the Director of Materials, Office of Production Management (Batt)

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

RELATIONSHIP OF THE RAW MATERIALS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO THE SHIPPING PROBLEM

Assuming that there is a high level strategy board made up of, for instance, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, Mr. Hopkins, the head of the Maritime Commission, and representatives of other powers, would there not be underneath them a working group to implement their decisions on which we, as the raw materials interests, would have our place. In that respect the operations of the shipping round table would be similar to the operations of the raw materials round table. We would have in the materials group what might be called a cargo clearance function where we would indicate

1 The source text is a copy of the memorandum with the words “To Mr. Hopkins” written in longhand and signed “Bill”.

the relative priorities, specific allocations, both by commodity and by area, which package would be wrapped up and carried to the shipping table by our representative. He would be competing for space with the representatives of the armed services and other applicants. If a reasonably satisfactory settlement were jointly arrived at, there would be no occasion for an appeal to the top board, but if on raw materials we were convinced that the defense effort was being handicapped by an inequitable distribution, then we would appeal to the top strategy board through Mr. Hopkins.

W. L. Batt

Roosevelt Papers

The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to President Roosevelt

Washington, December 27, 1941.

Dear Mr. President: I am so anxious to step up the production of war weapons in the United States and Britain that I take the liberty of sending you this letter to support the arguments I put forward yesterday.

You will see in the accompanying document that the combined output of the United States and Britain planned for 1942 is utterly inadequate when you take into account the necessities of the nations.

It is my hope that you will permit Mr. Hopkins to take charge of a committee of production with full powers and entire authority.

Such a committee would not only dispose of the production requirements but would also be responsible for mobilising and distributing the necessary raw materials.

There is no question of a soldier’s programme. The soldiers’ demand in the United States and Britain can be fully satisfied.

But, thereafter, the need for an arsenal of tanks and anti-tank guns, aircraft and anti-aircraft guns is so very pressing that there should not be any limitation in the production of these four weapons.

And I would ask you to lay down the simple rule that military programmes should be fulfilled and thereafter the weapons I have mentioned should be produced in an increasing degree for the arming and supplying of all the nations fighting on the side of democracy.

I am, Mr. President,

Yours sincerely,

Beaverbrook

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1 The reference is to the meeting at the White House at 3:30 p.m., December 26, 1941, ante, p. 98.
2 Beaverbrook expressed this idea more explicitly in his letter of December 30 to the Vice President (post, p. 339): “It seems to me the plan of production should be founded on supplying the soldier with everything he asks.”
SECRET

THE AMERICAN-BRITISH PRODUCTION PROGRAMME 1942

The production of weapons in the United States, Britain and Canada is entirely inadequate.
The deficits are so considerable that immediate steps must be taken to increase the production programme in all directions.
There can be no delay, as the production of our enemies may, before the year 1942 is over, leave us in a difficult and dangerous situation.

To take one instance. We are told that the Russian tank production is in excess of 25,000 a year. Only a few days ago, Stalin declared that it had now reached a peak since the outbreak of war.
 Yet Stalin considers that his output is 16,000 below his requirement. We have every right to suppose, therefore, that enemy tank production must be in excess of the Russian output.

It is reported, with authority, that the Germans have more than 100,000 guns of 40 mm and over.

Already we know only too well the immense naval resources of the three chief powers confronting us.

In the tables below, I make a brief and rough examination of Britain’s total requirements for the major weapons, and of Russia’s requirements for these weapons from the United States and the British Empire.

These requirements represent the quantities demanded by the constituted authority in each country.

We have no means of knowing the requirements of the United States. It would be reasonable to suppose that these exceed the requirements of Britain or Russia. Indeed, the United States might be expected to require as many arms as Britain and Russia together.

But it has been assumed in the tables which follow that the United States requirements will be no higher than those of Britain. This assumption is manifestly absurd.

Even so, it will be seen that when the external requirements of Russia, the total requirements of Britain and this purely arbitrary figure for United States requirements are set against the total planned
production of the United States, Canada and Britain, the deficits are considerable.

It would be convenient to supply a list of the actual requirements of the United States, then it would be shown that the deficits are, in fact, overwhelming.

**Tanks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1942 Requirements:</th>
<th>1942 Production:</th>
<th>Deficit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>16,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States—assumed figure</td>
<td>19,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>54,500</strong></td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S., U.K., &amp; Canada</td>
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**Aircraft (Bombers, Fighters, etc.)**

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<th>1942 Production:</th>
<th>Deficit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>34,700</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States—assumed figure</td>
<td>34,700</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>75,400</strong></td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S., U.K., &amp; Canada</td>
<td>48,670</td>
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<td></td>
<td>26,730</td>
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**Artillery (Anti-Aircraft, Field & Anti-Tank)**

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<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>31,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
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<td>United States—assumed figure</td>
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<td><strong>71,600</strong></td>
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<table>
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<th>1942 Production:</th>
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<td>U.S., U.K., &amp; Canada</td>
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<td>22,600</td>
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**Rifles**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States—assumed figure</td>
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<td><strong>3,400,000</strong></td>
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<th>1942 Production:</th>
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<td>1,800,000</td>
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<td>1,600,000</td>
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*The Russian requirements are confined entirely to anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, as they have 35,000 field guns and require no more. [Footnote in the source text.]
Hopkins Papers

The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1941.

My Dear Harry, I enclose a copy of a letter and document which I have sent to the President this morning. I have also sent a copy to the Prime Minister and attach a copy of my Minute to him.

If the leaders of our race will look at the supply situation they will see the imperative necessity for an immense increase in production here and in Great Britain. Canada may also be relied upon to do something more.

Yours ever,

Max

[Enclosure]

The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to Prime Minister Churchill

DECEMBER 28, 1941.

Prime Minister

Here is an important document which I have sent to President Roosevelt.

It is imperative that supplies should be determined as soon as possible.

I support a Supreme Command in supplies as well as in strategy. Mr. Harry Hopkins is the proper authority and he should be asked to co-ordinate the production of the United States, Great Britain and Canada, including raw materials.

There is also a pressing need for the co-ordination of radio production, which requires the immediate attention of the authorities.

Supra.

Roosevelt Papers

Mr. Marvin, of the Office of Production Management, to the President

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1941.

Dear Mr. President, Thank you ever so much for the Christmas present which you and Mrs. Roosevelt gave me. I am deeply appreciative.
[Enclosure 1]

Proposed Controls of Merchant Shipping

Joint Shipping Board

<table>
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<tr>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
<th>British Commonwealth</th>
<th>Associated Powers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 Members</td>
<td>7 Members</td>
<td>5 Members</td>
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<tr>
<td>National or Cooperative</td>
<td>National or Cooperative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agencies of the</td>
<td>Agencies of the</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>British Commonwealth</td>
<td>Associated Powers</td>
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U.S. Shipping Board 7 Members

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<tr>
<th>1</th>
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<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Merchant Shipping</td>
<td>Import</td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>Lend Lease</td>
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State Department

U.S. Army U.S. Navy U.S. Maritime Commission Cargo Control Board 7 Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R.F.C.</th>
<th>O.P.M.</th>
<th>O.E.D.</th>
<th>Lend Lease</th>
<th>State Dpt.</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

Liaison with All Gov’t Agencies and with Private Industries
Attached are some charts and ideas on Allied control of cargoes and of merchant shipping, which I have worked up after extensive discussions with interested persons; in the hope that they may prove suggestive to someone in your Executive Office who may be working on the problem.

Very best wishes for the New Year to you and to Mrs. Roosevelt from your godson,

Don Marvin

[Enclosure 2]

MERCHANT SHIPPING CONTROL

(A proposal for New Controls or Reorganization of Existing Controls)

I. Domestic Controls

II. International Controls

(N.B.: These controls could be established by treaty or by executive agreement based on provisions in the statute setting up domestic controls.)

(1) Joint Shipping Board

An independent, international agency should be established, to be known as the Joint Shipping Board. Seven citizens of the United States should be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the United States Senate, and such appointments should extend for the duration of the unlimited national emergency. Each member of the Board should have one vote, and decisions should be made by majority vote. The seven American members of the Joint Shipping Board should complement the members appointed by other nations, to wit: by the British Commonwealth of Nations (7), by the Allied or associated powers fighting the Axis (5).

The Joint Shipping Board should be vested with control of all offshore shipping under the authority or control of the governments represented on the board. The Joint Shipping Board should be vested with the following powers:

(1) To establish priorities certificates or a priorities list of all cargoes to be carried by the ships owned or controlled by the respective governments, and to order the ships to load these cargoes according to


2 Marvin's proposals with regard to domestic controls are reflected in the chart printed as enclosure 1, p. 332. See also Rosen, pp. 82-91.
the priorities certificates list, except where strategic or safety factors are controlling, as interpreted by the Naval authorities of the respective governments.

(2) To control the operations of all merchant ships under the authority or control of the respective governments.

(3) To allocate ships among the associated powers and to allocate ships to any trade routes or areas.

(4) To recommend to the appropriate national authorities the control of port and storage facilities by the respective Naval or Maritime Commission authorities.

(5) To recommend to the appropriate national authorities the purchase of certain commodities where such purchase is important to the defense or war effort of the associated powers.

(6) To order the appropriate national authorities directly to execute any of the foregoing powers.

N.B.: The Joint Shipping Board should be an international policy-forming agency, with a small immediate staff of its own, while the great bulk of staff work and the execution of the Joint Board’s decisions should be done by the appropriate national agencies. The place of meeting of the Board would have to be determined by international negotiation, but it is suggested that much of the Board’s work could be carried on at the headquarters of the respective governments.

The Joint Shipping Board should be the place where the most important international problems of Naval strategy (convoys, etc.), of operations of merchant ships, and of the acquisition of strategic raw materials and implements of warfare are all reconciled and settled.

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Hopkins Papers

*The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1941.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES**

I am asked to say my opinion of the production requirements of the United States for war weapons in 1942.

I confine my recommendations to tanks and anti-tank guns, to aircraft and anti-aircraft guns.

These are the principal weapons in any programme, whether of defence, attack, or assistance to other countries.

The programmes allied to these projects should of course be stepped up accordingly. But the main purpose must always be the production of these four weapons.
Now the stock of the United States in medium and light tanks appears to have been 631 on October 1st last.

On the other hand, the stock of the United Kingdom on the same date was 5,163 tanks, on account of the generosity of the United States in helping Great Britain. About 500 obsolete light types are included in these figures.

But it is evident that the United States has a duty during the year 1942 not only to replace shortages of existing supplies, but also to secure an output consistent with needs.

I heard Mr. Knudsen's suggestion that the output should be no less than 45,000 medium and light tanks, including of course a few heavy tanks. This discussion took place in the Cabinet Room last Friday.

The proportion of tanks should be as suggested: two-thirds medium and one-third light.

You will see that this programme involves a very considerable increase of 75 mm. guns, which will be a difficulty. But it is possible to require from Great Britain and the Dominion of Canada an increased production of 6-pdr. guns which could be substituted for 75 mm. guns.

Both Britain and Canada would require some assistance in materials and possibly in the permission to place sub-contracts in the United States.

The anti-tank gun is one of the most important productions for defence purposes and also for attack.

On October 1st last Britain possessed three times as many anti-tank guns as the United States. The British necessities for 1942 amount to 15,000 anti-tank guns.

To be on the same basis as Great Britain, it would be necessary to produce here 17,000 guns in the year 1942. But the basis is not at all comparable. United States' necessities far exceed Britain's. And the output capacity of the United States is in every respect greater than that of the United Kingdom. In fact, the British programme is not a complete unit at all. It is a programme which relies entirely on assistance from the United States.

The present United States programme of anti-tank guns is 7,000 guns, with possibly 4,700 added when the target is increased.

It appears to me imperative that a further increase of 6,000 guns should be provided for at once.

The aircraft programme does not surpass the British programme of operational types in any direction, with the exception of light bombers. These are very useful, but other classifications are of more value.
I have already urged that the fighter programme should be doubled. Many difficulties will arise and much argument will take place before such a large target is realised. But it seems to me that the immense possibilities of American industry justify such an expectation.

The need for 24,000 fighters is shown by experience of heavy losses through combat, through flights in war conditions and through operational training exercises.

An examination of British operational experience will convince you of the present necessity for this increased programme.

If the fighter programme is increased by as much as 12,000 in output in the year 1942, then of course other types must also show an increase in output, though not on the same scale as the fighter programme.

In anti-aircraft guns, the United States Government has a very unsatisfactory supply in hand.

The Government is therefore involved in a programme of anti-aircraft weapons not only sufficiently extensive to provide for necessities during the year 1942, but also to build up a reasonable stock for the defence of centres of population possibly exposed to enemy attack.

Stalin told me that Moscow is defended by 800 anti-aircraft guns, and my experience in the Russian capital leads me to believe that he did not under-estimate his resources.

If this indication of anti-aircraft necessities is used for the purpose of providing a programme here, then it appears likely that the anti-aircraft project should be based on programmes more than double the present projects, including all increases now contemplated.

The concluding arguments, I regret to say, are based on calculations which can be torn to bits by all those who are experienced in production.

None the less these arguments in support of increased production here should be considered.

I have received from one of the Canadian authorities a statement of output for 1942, which I am assured will be realised.

This Canadian output should be increased fifteen times by the United States, taking into account the national incomes of the two countries. In fact, the resources of the manufacturing community in the United States far exceeds fifteen times the Canadian resources. At the same time Canada gets engines and other parts from the United States.

But on the basis of this multiple of fifteen, the United States output in tanks would be 45,000, in anti-tank guns, 36,000, and in anti-aircraft guns 45,000.

Beaverbrook
**The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to the Vice President (Wallace)**

**WASHINGTON, December 29, 1941.**

**Dear Mr. Vice-President:** I enclose you copies of a letter and two documents sent to the President by me.\(^1\)

The first document was sent on the 27th of December and the second document on the 29th of December.

If I can answer any questions, will you please let me know?

I am most grateful for all the time you gave today and the patience you displayed.

Yours sincerely,

**Beaverbrook**

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\(^1\) The enclosures were copies of Beaverbrook’s letter to Roosevelt, dated December 27, 1941 (ante, p. 328), Beaverbrook’s memorandum enclosed with that letter (ante, p. 329), and Beaverbrook’s memorandum for Roosevelt of December 29 (ante, p. 334).

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**The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)**

**WASHINGTON, December 29, 1941.**

**My Dear Harry,** I spent the afternoon in the Vice-President’s office.\(^1\)

The conference went very well, I thought. The sights were raised immensely, but not nearly high enough.

At 35,000 tanks, the programme is far from meeting the necessities of the United States and Russia.

On the aircraft programme, I fear the meeting was somewhat confused and indecisive.

Lovett put forward his estimates in gross totals which included trainers.

He stated his production to the middle months of 1943. The discussion did not get back to the operational requirements of 1942.

Now I have been 18 months on the job of stirring men up to do more production.

If Britain had not taken the task seriously in the summer of 1940, the war would have been ended.

France fell for the want of adequate supplies of tanks and aircraft. America cannot stand on the programmes of 1942.

Is there anything more I can do?

Yours ever,

**Max**

---

\(^1\) See the memorandum of conversation by Nelson, ante, p. 136.
THE FIRST WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to the Vice President (Wallace)  

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1941.

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT, We spoke yesterday of the drawings for the 6-pdr. guns. These are in Washington with the Ordnance Corps. They were delivered some months ago. But I gather from conversation this morning that the gun does not find favour with the American Army. Their own type is more easily produced, and that is always an advantage.

There are two six-pdr. guns here, sent from Britain some time ago.

The 3-inch gun mentioned yesterday is duplicated in Great Britain and is known as the 17-pdr. You have 600 on order and you propose to increase to 1,200. We have 500 on order in Britain and hope to get into production shortly.

The 3-inch gun is longer than the 6-pdr. and is not suited to a medium tank, but we believe it will make the best anti-tank gun. The gun can be used in a heavy tank.

Our 6-pdr. is adapted to our heavy tanks now in production and to cruiser tanks.

It will be necessary to raise your fighter programme in 1942.

An adequate force of fighter aircraft is essential on the Pacific Coast now. If Britain fails to hold the Atlantic, fighter aircraft will be needed on the Atlantic Seaboard in numbers far outstripping the present provisioning plan.

It is my belief that the programme should be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy and Medium bombers</td>
<td>17,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light, dive and torpedo bombers</td>
<td>10,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you add to this total 1,500 fighters and 4,500 medium bombers for Russia, the total output will be 58,600.

Now this programme is beyond the American capacity in 1942. But that capacity should be driven up to meet the programme.

The programme of 45,000 tanks is not beyond the capacity of the manufacturing plants of the United States in the new year. Special machine tools are not needed in any quantity for a tank programme. We can get along with the tools that are available, since engine capacity exists.

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1 The source text is an unsigned copy which Beaverbrook sent to Hopkins on December 30 with the query “Is there anything more I can do in support of the bigger programme?”

2 See the discussion in the Vice President’s office on December 29, 1941, ante, p. 136.
Armour plate is essential. If you are satisfied that armour plate is available, all other difficulties can be dealt with.

The 75 mm. gun will be in short supply. But Great Britain and Canada can produce a number of 6 pdr. guns for the purpose if given plenty of notice. These 6-pdrs. may be adapted to the M.3 medium tanks in place of the 75 mm. without difficulty. This substitution is already practised by Great Britain.

It seems to me the plan of production should be founded on supplying the soldier with everything he asks. In addition, a vast quantity of tanks and aircraft, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns should be prepared as a reserve.

Besides, there is a demand in foreign countries for these weapons of which the soldier knows nothing.

Unless the "higher direction" takes hold of the situation the supplies will be inadequate to the necessities, and the war will be prolonged for many years.

I am, Mr. Vice President,
Your sincerely,

W.P.B. Files

The Executive Director of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board (Nelson) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 1, 1942.

DEAR MR. HOPKINS: Attached is a statement which was asked for by the President and which was approved this morning by S. P. A. B.

Sincerely yours,

DONALD M. NELSON

[Attachment]

Statement by the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board

When a nation is at war its aim must be to achieve complete and decisive victory in the shortest possible time. The United States is at war. We must, and we shall, marshal our full energy and resource for swift and inexorable victory.

No nation has a monopoly of courage on the part of its fighting troops. Our combat forces have not and will not be found wanting in bravery. But the outstanding lesson of this war to date is that equipment provides the margin of victory in the air, in the field, on

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1 The statement was apparently prepared for use by the President in discussing production goals with the British and in preparing his Annual Message to the Congress. For Beverbrook's comments on portions of this program, see post, pp. 344 ff. For the text of the President's message of January 6, 1942, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. vi, January 10, 1942, pp. 39-43, particularly p. 41.
the sea. This war will be won with planes, bombs, tanks, guns, ammunition, ships.

The United States, among the nations of the world, has incom-parably the greatest resources for building these items of war equip-ment. We, above all others, have the resources in raw materials, in industrial equipment, in trained man power and managerial skill to produce munitions of modern war upon really massive scale. De-cember seventh, and the events which have followed, have given us both the urgent necessity and the will to extend our effort in this direction to the utmost.

Our goal is to provide for 40 billion dollars worth of war output, planes, ships, tanks, guns, bases, and the like, along with the facilities necessary to produce them, before the end of the current year. Non-contractual items such as pay and subsistence, and food for our Allies, will require substantially higher gross expenditures, but this would be the measure of our industrial effort. We propose, in this calendar year of 1942, to devote 50% of our entire national resource to the war effort.

A program of this magnitude, one so far beyond the dimension of our 1941 performance, will require the full and sustained cooperation of every citizen of this great Nation. It will entail drastic and far-reaching dislocations of our domestic and industrial habits and pro-cedures, particularly in the initial gearing of a peacetime economy to the all-out effort of war. We are confident that the people of the United States will make every necessary sacrifice willingly and with eager enthusiasm at being offered the chance of sharing with the marines of Wake Island, and the troops and population of the Philip-pines, a direct part in fashioning the means to Victory.

We know, of course, that wars are not won with dollars. Expenditures have meaning only as they measure tangible production of fighting equipment. We have not prepared our budget in money terms, and then filled in requirements to match. We have spelled out the specific munitions items needed, and which we believe we can produce in this year, and have drawn our expenditure budget accordingly.

The 1942 goals of production have been set boldly, with full confi-dence that, together with the production of our Allies, they will be beyond anything the Axis powers can match. There is always a question of how much it may aid our enemies to state our programs in definite terms, but upon sober reflection I have decided to put these 1942 production goals on record:

We plan to build—this year—fifty thousand completely equipped airplanes; we plan to build and equip—this year—forty thousand tanks; we plan to build one hundred and twelve major combat ships
and six hundred minor naval craft; we plan to build at least seven million tons of merchant shipping, we plan to supply the complete equipment and armament for a ground-army force of a size comparable to that which was raised in the World War, and at the same time furnish large quantities of similar equipment for the fighting forces of our Allies.

In stepping up our present monthly production rates to meet the 1942 quotas, we shall reach, by the end of the year, rates that will assure enormously larger annual production for the future. Thus, our annual rate of plane production by the end of 1942 will approximate 80 thousand per year, and our annual tank production rate will be about 60 thousand.

All of these goals have been set as definite responsibilities for those who are in charge of production and procurement. They have been directed to take the steps necessary to assure that these goals shall be met.

We state them confidently, with full conviction that they are within the potential of our National resource and our National will. We state them confidently, in the conviction that they will tip the scales of the world struggle, and assure the ultimate defeat of the forces arrayed against the values to which we, as a people, are dedicated.

Hopkins Papers

The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1942.

MY DEAR HARRY, Some days ago we had conversation together about a proposal from London that American lorries consigned to the Russians should be diverted to the Poles.

There was also a question of shipping the lorries via Karachi instead of Basrah. You told me that the Russians were afraid that, if the lorries were sent through Karachi, we would take them for our own purposes.

I have now received a telegram which informs me that the facilities in the Persian Gulf for unloading and assembling are so congested that it will take forty days to discharge the 2,500 lorries at present en route and more than three months to assemble them.

If a proportion of the lorries are shipped to Karachi, the Russians will get quicker deliveries. In addition, there will be less delay in the turn-round of American ships engaged in this traffic.

So it has been suggested to me that ships carrying approximately one-half of these lorries should be diverted to Karachi.
This has already been discussed with Mr. Kerr, who represents the National Maritime Commission in London. I am informed that he is cabling the Commission about it.

I would like very much to have your directions.\(^1\)

Yours ever,

\(\text{Max}\)

\(^1\) No reply has been found and the subject does not appear to have been discussed at the First Washington Conference. The question of the utilization of Karachi was under discussion with Soviet authorities through Army channels; see T. H. Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 141–143.

Defense Files

*The President to the Secretary of War (Stimson)\(^1\)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The victory over our enemies will be achieved in the last analysis not only by the bravery, skill and determination of our men, but by our overwhelming mastery in the munitions of war.

The concept of our industrial capacity must be completely overhauled under the impulse of the peril to our nation.

Our associates amongst the united nations are already extended to the utmost in the manufacture of munitions and their factories fall far short of the needs of their own armies. We must not only provide munitions for our own fighting forces but vast quantities to be used against the enemy in every appropriate theater of war, wherever that may be.

I am, therefore, sending this directive and instruction to the War Department, which relates to two phases of our munitions effort.

First, a large increase in the production of various munitions of war in 1942 and, secondly, the production to be achieved in 1943.

Every non-essential civilian use must give way to the urgency of the needs of our armed forces. Our men and machines must be used to the very limit to attain our goals.

Following are the list of munitions and the schedule you are directed to fulfill:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Range, Heavy &amp; Medium Bombers</td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light, Dive, Torpedo &amp; Scout Bombers</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuits</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation &amp; Transports</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) The source text is a copy, with typewritten signature.
Tanks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>19,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anti-Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light 37 mm.</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 mm.</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy 90 mm.</td>
<td>5,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anti-Tank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37 mm.</td>
<td>13,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot;</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Machine Guns (Ground, Tank A.A.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.30</td>
<td>330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above, I want the ammunition produced commensurate to this program on the assumption that these munitions of war are to be used in combat.

In so far as aircraft are concerned, I wish you would confer with Secretary Knox as to the appropriate distribution by types as between the Army and the Navy.

I realize that you may wish to recommend some increases or amendments in this program but I wish the substance of this instruction to be initiated at once in all its implications.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Defense Files

The President to the Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission (Land)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1942.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LAND: I have given consideration to the merchant shipping required to be built in the United States in 1942 and 1943 if we are to attain superiority over the enemy.

The moving of men and munitions of war to the appropriate theaters of operation is one of the most vital necessities of our war program. Two things must be done.

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1 The source text is the copy which Roosevelt sent to Stimson on January 3, 1942, with the following statement in the covering letter: "As part of this program I have approved the building of the 45 transport ships and at the same time am providing for a substantial increase in the number of cargo ships."
First, we must have a very substantial increase in our merchant ships for 1942 over and above the very large program which has already been laid out.

Secondly, our 1943 program must exceed the 1942 program by at least two million tons.

You are therefore instructed and directed to build merchant ships in the calendar year 1942 to the extent of eight million dead weight tons and in 1943 to a minimum of ten million dead weight tons.

I wish to consider with you at the end of three months whether or not the necessities require the 1943 program to be increased still further.

I have issued appropriate instructions to the other Departments of the Government to provide the ship plate required to accomplish these objectives.

I know you will let nothing interfere with the accomplishment of this program. It must be carried out with the utmost urgency. I have every confidence that you will do this.

Very sincerely yours, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Hopkins Papers

Memorandum by the British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook)¹

[WASHINGTON,] January 4, 1942.

NOTE ON THE U.S. TOTAL BOMB PROGRAMME

In 1942 the U.S. will need to provide for 22,000 new bombers.

" " U.K. will have " " 9,000 " "

A bigger proportion of the U.K. programme is in the heavier types. The bomb requirements for British built aircraft in 1942 are 360,000 long tons.

So the U.S. requirement on the British scale would be of the order of 7-800,000 tons in the year.

Average per month in 1942

U.K. 30,000 tons
U.S. 60,000 tons

Present (Nov.) rate of filling

U.K. 12,000 tons
U.S. 7,000 tons

Again a tremendous acceleration will be needed—and especially in the larger bombs.

¹ The source text, marked "copy", bears no signature, but was presumably by Beaverbrook.
The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1942.

Dear Mr. President, Now that you have disposed of the programme for weapons of war and also for the mercantile marine, I beg to bring to your notice the naval projects in contemplation.

In 1942 it is expected that 112 major naval craft and 600 minor craft will be brought to completion.

But 600 minor naval craft is not an output consistent with the great projects which have been launched in other directions. And I would make bold to recommend that the building of minor vessels in 1942 be increased by not less than 640 craft.

These might be built in the yards already at the disposal of the navy and also in places engaged in building river vessels and ferry boats.

If this proposal finds favour with you, then I would recommend that 150 of the vessels should be tank landing craft each carrying 20 tanks of 25 tons and equipped to make ocean passages.

These tank landing craft would be made use of by the United States or Great Britain for landings on the beach in France or elsewhere according to the strategical programme that you may direct.

The 150 tank landing craft should be supplemented by 300 vessels of smaller type, each carrying 4 25-ton tanks, and suitable for landings on shallow sand beaches.

Expeditions on this scale would require in addition to merchant ships, (for which there is an expanded programme) not less than the following protecting vessels to maintain sea communications:—

80 minesweepers,
60 Small anti-submarine vessels of 500 tons each,
50 Convoy escort vessels of the D.B.E. type

These 50 convoy escort vessels are already projected and delivery is promised in 1943. But acceleration should bring delivery to pass in 1942.

Outside the naval programme proper is the essential provision of auxiliary aircraft carriers. These will be adapted merchant ships. The present programme is 24 fast vessels. But the merchant ship building programme has been increased by a third. So I suggest that a further 8 slower vessels be adapted to provide convoy air protection.

1 The source text, marked “copy”, was presumably sent by Beaverbrook to Hopkins.
No doubt questions arise touching ship plate, and certainly turbine and Diesel engine output. All these issues present considerable difficulties.

But determination will certainly overcome the obstacles in the way.

I am, Mr. President,

Yours sincerely,

Beaverbrook

Minutes of Meeting XXI of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, January 6, 1942

[Extracts]

Present

Board Members, Alternates, and Staff

Vice President Henry A. Wallace, Chairman of the Board, who presided
Mr. William S. Knudsen, Director General of the Office of Production Management (For discussion of Items 1 through 4, and 7 through 9)
Mr. Sidney Hillman, Associate Director General of the Office of Production Management (For discussion of Items 1 through 4, and 7 through 9)
Mr. Frank Knox, the Secretary of the Navy
Mr. Jesse H. Jones, the Secretary of Commerce (For discussion of Items 1 through 7)
Mr. Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, acting for the Secretary of War (For discussion of Items 1 through 4, and 7 through 9)
Mr. Leon Henderson, Administrator of the Office of Price Administration
Mr. Isador Lubin, acting for Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, the Special Assistant to the President Supervising the Defense Aid Program
Mr. Herbert Emmertich, acting Executive Director
Mr. John Lord O'Brien, General Counsel
Mr. G. Lyle Belsley, acting Secretary

By Invitation

Mr. James V. Forrestal, Under Secretary of the Navy (For discussion of Items 1 through 4, and 7 through 9)
Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt, Executive Director, Army and Navy Munitions Board (For discussion of Items 1 through 4, and 7 through 9)
Mr. Douglas MacKenzie, Director, Division of Purchases, Office of Production Management (For discussion of Item 1)

4. International Control of Raw Materials

With reference to international control of raw materials (Minutes XVII, Item 2), Mr. Batt reported that at the request of the President, he is undertaking, in cooperation with representatives of the British and other governments, a review of the raw materials situa-


2 Ante, p. 10.
tion throughout the world. Meetings on this question have been held with the Right Honorable Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Supply for Great Britain, and a procedure for conducting this survey is now being established.¹

³No records of these meetings have been found.

Hopkins Papers

The Chief of the Materials Division, Office of Production Management (Batt), to the President

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In accordance with your letter of December 17¹ which suggested the desirability of a working conference on raw materials of the world, I have brought together the representatives named in your letter. With the consent of Mr. Hopkins, a member of the Maritime Commission was added to this group. A tentative organization chart is attached.²

Two meetings have been held—one with Lord Beaverbrook to clear up the ground for the joint conference group.³ On his part, Lord Beaverbrook has appointed Sir Clive Balieu to act as permanent representative for the British. Lord Beaverbrook has informed me of his intention to send additional representatives shortly to sit with Sir Clive.

It has seemed natural to us to use the already existing Canadian Raw Materials Coordinating Committee as a means of securing Canadian representation on this conference.⁴

Work has already been begun with British and Canadian representatives, in conjunction with American representatives, through a Joint Secretariat. Some of the most important materials, particularly those that have been lost or endangered by Japanese action, have already been subjected to a preliminary review and recommendations are being formulated for the consideration of the conference.

In most cases, the facts assembled by the Joint Secretariat will clearly indicate the action required. Wherever this is not the case, the alternatives will be stated for final recommendation ⁵ by the Joint Conference, and decision ⁵ by SPAB or other appropriate agency for

¹ Ante, p. 19.
² Not printed.
³ No records of these meetings have been found.
⁴ For the establishment and operations of the Canadian-American Materials Coordinating Committee, see Industrial Mobilization for War, p. 125.
⁵ Underlined in source text.
the United States Government, the Ministry of Supply for the British Government, and the appropriate agency of any other governments concerned.

In the case of tin, as an example, one conclusion is already indicated from the studies the Joint Secretariat has made, namely that the capacity of the Texas City tin smelter should immediately be increased to a minimum of 50,000 tons a year. This is needed to take care of the redistribution of ores which will be necessitated by the loss of East Indian smelting and ore resources. If this recommendation is approved by the Conference, the matter will be taken up directly with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

A somewhat different instance occurs in the case of hemp and sisal. Here it appears that it may be necessary for us to supply the United Kingdom with quantities of hemp during the next two years, and receive from them comparable amounts of sisal, in order that the supply positions may be balanced over the next three years. If this recommendation is accepted by the Conference, SPAB will be requested to make the necessary policy decision for the United States Government, and the Ministry of Supply for the British Government.

I have discussed our relation with SPAB and the Economic Warfare Board with the Vice President, and I believe he agrees that the relationship described above is the best practicable one between the agencies working in the raw materials field.

In all our recommendations, we shall think of the world's available raw materials as a joint pool, to be allocated to the United Nations according to where they can best be used for the joint effort.

I attach a tentative organization chart, which, you will note, includes a cargo clearance committee. This committee was agreed in principle by both the British and American representatives to be an essential implementing agency of the conference. A memorandum on the subject is inclosed.

I hope the actions which have been taken are in accord with your wishes and have your approval.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. Batt

Copy to Mr. Harry Hopkins

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*Not printed.*

*In transmitting this copy to Hopkins on January 8, Batt wrote:*

"If the President and you approve what is proposed, I think it would be most useful if he would give it a build-up at an early Press Conference.

"As we see it, the outlook for this is tremendously impressive." (Hopkins Papers)
Hopkins Papers

The Secretary of the British Chiefs of Staff (Hollis) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 9, 1942.

DEAR MR. HOPKINS: At a meeting between General Moore of the U.S. War Department and General Macready (Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff), the procedure for allocating equipment to Allies, whether under Lend-Lease or otherwise, was discussed.

2. I attach a copy of General Macready’s report of this meeting. As this matter has a political as well as a military aspect, I thought it right to let you see the arrangements proposed by General Moore and General Macready.

3. You will see that in the final paragraph it is proposed that the procedure outlined should be agreed by the highest U.S. and British authorities, and that subsequently the interested parties should be notified and asked to comply with these arrangements forthwith.

4. I hope I am right in addressing this matter to you.

Yours sincerely,

L. C. HOLLIS

[Attachment]

SECRET

7 January, 1942.

Allocation of Finished Military Equipment to Allies

At a meeting with General Moore of the U.S. War Department to-day, we discussed the procedure for allocating equipment to Allies whether under Lend-Lease or otherwise.

The situation arose from large demands by the Dutch for various types of equipment and we discovered that the Dutch are demanding equipment simultaneously from the Americans and from the United Kingdom and, incidentally, usually not providing very satisfactory data as a basis for the quantities asked for.

We finally came to the conclusion that if completed war equipment is to be allocated as it comes out of production on a proper operational basis, and if confusion arising from duplicate demands is to be avoided, the following procedure should be adopted:

1. The Americans and ourselves will each take certain of the Allied and friendly powers as their protégés, receive their requirements, and arrange for allocations of equipment to them.
We agreed that the split should be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.K.</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Empire countries</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including India.</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free French</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Russia* (see also under U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Dutch East Indies</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia* (see also under U.S.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. If the above division is agreed to, we envisage the procedure being as follows:

(a) The various Allies put in their total demands to London and Washington respectively, irrespective of whether the equipment is to be of English or American pattern.

(b) In the case of demands for American equipment submitted to London, the War Office (or Air Ministry and Admiralty) notify the British Army Staff in Washington.

(c) The British Army Staff obtain at the monthly meetings of the Joint Allocation Committee in Washington a bulk allocation for the British Empire and its protégés as regards all equipment manufactured in the U.S.A., whether it happens to have originated from Lend-Lease, British contracts or War Department appropriations.

(d) This bulk allotment for the British Commonwealth and its protégés is notified to the War Office, London, and the War Office Allocation Committee allocates in detail to the various parts of the British Empire and to the Allies in accordance with the needs of the situation at the time. The same Committee will of course also allocate equipment of U.K. origin.

(e) In the case of American equipment thus allocated, the War Office notify the British Army Staff, Washington, who inform the American War Department, who arrange with the necessary authorities to have the material transferred formally under Lend-Lease.

(f) The Americans will similarly deal with the requirements of their protégés, allocating to them from the bulk U.S.A. allotment agreed at the Joint Washington Allocation Committee. In the case of British equipment being required either for U.S.A. or its protégés from the U.K., the demand will be passed to the War Office by the British Army Staff, Washington.

The main point of this arrangement is that we must, in the present circumstances, allocate according to the military situation and that

*Issue of equipment to Russia is made in accordance with the protocol and is not subject to the normal allocation procedure. [Footnote in the source text.]
we cannot issue equipment according to the origin of the order which produces it. It means, however, that although an allied country may have been told that it will obtain equipment under Lend-Lease arrangements, there can be no guarantee as to when the equipment thus promised will be issued. The deciding factor must be the military situation ruling at the time the equipment becomes available.

It is most important that this procedure should be agreed by the highest authorities on both sides and that all the interested parties should be notified and asked to comply with these arrangements forthwith.

J. N. Macready

Hopkins Papers

The Executive Officer, Division of Defense Aid Reports, Office of Lend-Lease Administration (Burns) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS.

Subject: Allocation of finished military equipment to Allies.

1. There is attached hereto copy of memorandum on “Allocation of Finished Military Equipment to Allies” furnished me by General Moore. He asked me to forward it to you for approval in principle. He recommends such approval and will be glad to discuss it with you if you so desire.

2. It contemplates the establishment of a Joint Allocation Committee in Washington which, based upon the military situation ruling at the time the equipment becomes available, would make bulk allocations of U. S. production of finished military equipment to the United States and to the United Kingdom only.

3. The allocation to the United States would be, in turn, similarly allocated by the United States to its own forces and to its “protégés”, China, Latin America, Iceland and Russia.

4. The allocation to the United Kingdom, together with Britain’s production, would be similarly allocated by the British War Office Allocation Committee of London to all countries in the British Empire, including India, and also to United Kingdom “protégés”, including Free French, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Greece, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Dutch East Indies, Turkey and Russia.

5. There are two major questions involved which are more or less interdependent, namely—the organizational setup for making alloca-

1 The attachment was a copy of Macready’s memorandum of January 7, 1942, supra.
tions, and the assignment of various countries as “protégés” to the United States and the United Kingdom. The memorandum is directed primarily at the latter question.

6. This latter question divides into two parts—the military and the political. From the overall military point of view the general idea seems to me to be sound provided that changes are in order when circumstances justify. I do not feel justified in commenting on the general political phase.

7. It is believed, however, that the U.S.S.R. must not be considered as a “protégé”, either of the United States or the United Kingdom. It is rather a full partner, for it is certainly carrying its full share of the load at the present time. The protocol program will change with circumstances. Allocations to Russia should probably be treated jointly by the United States, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. as a special question and on a high level. Not only United States production but also British production should be considered in the effort to meet Soviet needs.

J. H. BURNS

Hopkins Papers
The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1942.¹

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS:

I have a copy of Burns’ memorandum to you on the subject of the allocation of finished military equipment to the allies.² I have talked at some length to General Moore about it and I think that his approval in principle is only in principle. I believe that the set-up is too compartmentalized and that the only way to go about it is to treat the united production of the United Kingdom and the United States as one pool and have a Joint Allocation Committee [;] in accordance with the principles of paragraph 7 of Burns’ memorandum, dispose of it all. As a matter of practice the British will be able to dispose of their own production, in large part, to their own armies and to the countries that are within their particular sphere of influence, but the fundamental principle of joint production for joint effort should not be lost sight of.

We are preparing a counter-memorandum here which I think will set the thing up on a better basis than that suggested by General

¹The source text erroneously reads “1941”.
²Supra.
The recommendation of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff was embodied in the "draft minute" attached to WW-8, ante, p. 232.


John J. McCloy

Hopkins Papers

Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant
(Hopkins)¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1942.

I should be grateful if you would look at this. The statements marked by me in red would, if true, be catastrophic.²

There surely should be a joint Consultative Board so that your people can hear what we have to say before taking decisions on allocation.

Perhaps you will let me know what you advise.

W. C.

10/1/42.

[Attachment 1]

Sir Arthur Salter to Prime Minister Churchill

Copy

Prime Minister:

1. In a note of January 4th (summarizing at your request what I had said to you in conversation the previous day) I urged the great importance of an appropriate organization here, both American and Anglo-American, to decide upon the allocation of Merchant Shipping.

The difficulties of allocations are now very great because, with the new demands, there is much less tonnage than is required for urgent work.

Till recently the Maritime Commission has controlled the disposition of U.S. shipping and we have been able to secure assistance for British needs by negotiation with them. This method has worked well till recently but does so no longer. The Navy and Army are taking U.S. ships directly, (without requiring the assent of the Maritime Commission) from existing services. The new American "Strategic Shipping Board" is not at present equipped with the neces-

¹The source text, marked "Copy", bears Churchill's typewritten initials.
²The statements and figures marked in red by Churchill on the attached memorandum (final paragraph of section 2) are indicated by underscoring.
sary information and staff to enable it to decide upon the relative importance of the services from which the ships are withdrawn and those to which they are diverted. This is true even when the existing services are American; it is still more true when they are British.

2. Events of the last few days have illustrated the urgent need of an improved system.

The main shipping assistance (apart from tankers) which we have received this year from the U.S.A. has been in the conveyance of our munitions from the U.S.A. to the Red Sea. 15 ships a month, or a total of some 100 ships in constant employment, have been allocated to this service. This assistance has been indispensable for our Middle East supplies, and has also helped the U.K. import position by enabling British ships that would otherwise have had to be sent to the Red Sea to be kept in the N. Atlantic.

For this month, however, as a result of the pressure of the new demands, the Maritime Commission were only able to allot 10 ships, and of these 4 have been suddenly, without notice of consultation, taken away for Army needs.

Some British ships are being diverted to the Red Sea from the N. Atlantic imports service. But our U.K. importing service is itself now in a very serious condition. The Ministry of War Transport estimate that the January–February loadings for U.K. in all areas (excluding oil) will only amount to 3.85 mil. tons and that means a rate of import of only 23 mil. tons even without allowance for losses. This figure compares with the 32 mil. tons you instructed me to press for only a few weeks ago.

3. May I suggest that, before you go, you should try to obtain decisions

(a) To equip the Strategic Shipping Board, or whatever may take its place, with a suitable organization to enable it to allocate shipping in relation to the relative importance of the different services.

(b) To associate my Merchant Shipping Mission with this authority so that decisions affecting British services or shipping may be taken after joint consultation.

(c) As an interim measure that the allocation of U.S. tonnage to the Red Sea, on the scale adopted in the last six months, should continue and enjoy a priority equal to the highest.

I should, of course, be glad to supplement this note by an oral explanation if you are able to give me the opportunity.

I enclose, for convenience of reference, a copy of my note of January 4th.

ARTHUR SALTER
Prime Minister:
I submit the note you asked for yesterday.

Merchant Shipping—Arrangements for Allocation

1. The strain on shipping, at least in 1942 and perhaps in 1943, will be much greater than any yet experienced.

The total transporting capacity available to the U.K. and the U.S.A. cannot be greater for the year 1942 as a whole than it has been in 1941. We have extra demands in respect of (a) the Russian needs; (b) the Pacific situation; (c) the transport of U.S. troops. The decision to increase the U.S. programme taken two days ago in all that is practicable as regards building.

The real problem now is one of allocation.

2. The U.S. Government has just created a new "Strategic Shipping Board", consisting of the Chairman of the Maritime Commission, General Marshall, Admiral Stark and Mr. Hopkins with alternates.

This Board will need a "ship planning" organization to prepare the issues for decision; and will then decide on broad lines the use of American shipping, while similar decisions are taken in London as to the use of British controlled tonnage, including the time-chartered Allies and neutrals.

It is extremely important since British services and imports depend to an important extent upon U.S. assistance, that the American Board should take its decisions after full consideration of the British position.

The best arrangement would be that, in addition to meeting as a purely American Board, with executive authority, to decide on the use of American ships, this Shipping Board should also meet as a Joint Consultative Board, myself as Head of the British Shipping Mission being added at such meetings; and that members of my Mission should collaborate with the American officials in preparing the plans and statements of fact, for consideration of the Board.

Such an arrangement would be consistent with what is proposed for the allocation of supplies. Mr. Hopkins would, I think from a recent conversation, be in favor of it. Lord Beaverbrook strongly supports it.

An early decision to this effect would be of great value.

I should, of course, be glad to elaborate this brief note orally if opportunity offers.

Arthur Salter

January 4, 1942.
Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1942.

PROBLEMS TO BE SETTLED

1. Consideration of an organization to plan the joint use of the merchant ships of the world.

2. Consideration of an appropriate machine to control the raw materials available to the United Nations.

4. A joint machinery which would be set up for the distribution of manufactured munitions of war to various theaters.

1 For other excerpts from this memorandum, see ante, p. 229.

Hopkins Papers

The Legal Counsel, Office of Lend-Lease Administration (Cow) to the Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinus)

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1942.

Subject: The Macready Memorandum on the Allocation of Finished Military Equipment to Allies.

1. The plan of having the United States and the United Kingdom alone allocating military equipment to "protégés" allies is open to question.

2. Russia, China, the Dutch East Indies and the other allies cannot be treated as stepchildren "protégés" if we want to win this war sooner rather than later. They, together with the U.S. and the U.K., should sit at the table as full members of the family. This should be so, whether they all decide on the division of the equipment or the "old man" makes the division himself, after listening to the needs and desires of all of the different members of the family.

3. There are innumerable practical reasons of political strategy and administration which lead to the conclusion that the United States should allocate its own production, after giving due consideration to the needs and wants of all of the allies. It is important not only to the United States, but to winning the war for all of us, that all of the allies—Russia, China and the others, as well as the U.K.—feel they are getting a just and fair share of our production by our good grace, rather than by the good grace of the U.K. We have already seen the signs of this even in the case of a part of the British Empire such as

2 Ante, p. 349.
Australia. If we want air bases, naval bases and other things from them for our joint effort, we can get them on a better basis because we supplied them before our need arose.

4. It strikes me that the allocation not only of the United States' production of guns and planes, but the allocation of our machine tools and other things directly related to the production of finished military equipment, as well as our shipping, should be handled on substantially the same basis. Experience has shown that as long as shipping is less plentiful than munitions, shipping is the more important limiting and strategic factor. This will doubtless be even more so in the next year. In many cases, the question of whether certain machine tools should be used here, or in Australia, for example, for making guns or tanks, is of primary strategic importance, particularly if the shipping factor is taken into account. The same may be true even in the case of certain raw materials where there is not enough for all military purposes, even though civilian consumption has been cut to the bone.

5. Administratively, the allocation of finished military equipment, tools, etc. directly related to finished equipment and shipping might be handled somewhat as follows:

a) A United Nations Supply Council is set up.

b) All of the 26 nations that signed the Joint Declaration would have membership on it.

c) For the purposes of allocating U.S. supplies and ships, there would be a U.S. executive committee. Such a committee should preferably be chaired by Mr. Hopkins, since he has the originality, imagination and astuteness to see the over-all picture and be aware of the reactions of the leaders and people of the countries in a way no military or naval expert could. The U.S. executive committee should also have Army, Navy, Maritime, Lend-Lease and Economic Warfare representation. The executive committee should utilize the Lend-Lease Administration as its secretariat, having it augmented either by personnel or information from some of the other interested agencies, or, in the alternative, it might set up another secretariat.

d) The U.S. executive committee would keep a continuous inventory of the needs and wants of all of the United Nations. It should be kept continuously informed by the United Kingdom and the others as to what they are supplying to the other United Nations. Wherever necessary or desirable, it would consult with their representatives. But the final decisions on allocations of U.S. supplies would be with this committee.

e) The U.K. should probably set up a similar executive committee to allocate British equipment and shipping. The U.K. executive committee and its secretariat should work very closely with the U.S. executive committee.

Oscar Cox
MEMORANDUM to MR. HOPKINS:

I can’t too strongly endorse the general tenor of the suggested remarks for the President in Eberstadt’s memorandum on machine tools sent you by Bob Patterson.¹

I have tried to impress on Max² and everyone else who has been talking this over-all program that, if it is to be accomplished, it is absolutely necessary to double the 1941 machine tool output. And this, in turn, can only be accomplished by the most intensive use of machine-making facilities. Despite the heroic efforts of Bill Harrison I do not think this is now being done.

JAMES FORRESTAL

¹Not printed. The Patterson memorandum, dated January 10, 1942, (Hopkins Papers) had enclosed a statement drafted by Eberstadt, which the President might issue on the importance of increasing the output of machine tools.
²Lord Beaverbrook (William Maxwell Aitken).

Hopkins Papers

The Legal Counsel, Office of Lend-Lease Administration (Cox) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)¹

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1942.

H.L.H.: Here’s the redraft which Averell ² asked me to leave for you. This is the one that was worked out with and is agreeable to Sir Arthur Salter. Brig[adier] Napier of General Dill’s staff also participated.

OSCAR COX

[Enclosure]³

Draft Agreement by the President and the Prime Minister

JOINT MEMORANDUM BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER CREATING AN “ADJUSTMENT BOARD FOR THE USE OF MERCHANT SHIPS”

To prosecute the war efficiently, it is necessary and desirable that our Governments make the fullest and best possible use of ships under both American and British control in the interest of all of the United

¹The memorandum is written by hand on White House stationery.
²W. Averell Harriman.
³Also attached to this file was a draft letter (not printed) which the President might use in appointing members of the proposed board.
Nations. To meet this objective, we hereby create "The Adjustment Board for the Use of Merchant Ships".

This Board shall have the following composition and powers:

a) Mr. . . . . will be the United States member of the Board. Sir Arthur Salter, as representing the Minister of War Transport, will be the British member. The members shall have the power to appoint the staff which is necessary to carry out the responsibilities vested in the Board.

b) Subject to such instructions as its members receive from their respective Governments, the Board shall coordinate the use of merchant ships (including tankers) under American and British control, and make the necessary and appropriate recommendations as to requisitioning, allocating and any other ways of securing the best utilization of the shipping available.

Requests for shipping involving the allocation of vessels controlled by one country for the service of the other shall be referred to this Board.

c) The Board shall consult the interested authorities with a view to obtaining agreement, so far as possible, as to priorities and allocation.

The policy formulated after such consultation will be subject to appeal, where necessary, to us, or to such appeal authorities as are established.

d) The policy so formulated will be executed by the Maritime Commission, the Ministry of War Transport and the other appropriate departments of the Governments.

President
Prime Minister

JANUARY . . , 1942.

Roosevelt Papers

Memoranda of Agreement Between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

[EDITORIAL NOTE. The authorship of these three memoranda is not indicated, but they appear to have been worked out by Roosevelt and Churchill on the basis of drafts prepared by the latter. They were approved in substance by the President and the Prime Minister prior to the meeting at 5:30 p. m. on January 14; see ante, pp. 203ff. According to the Hopkins memorandum (ante, p. 209) the final details of the agreements were settled at the Roosevelt–Churchill dinner meeting on the evening of January 14, at which time the "President and Churchill initialed the several documents." The source texts are all initialed "WSC 14–1", but no copies of this date have been found bearing Roosevelt's initials or signature.]
After Churchill's return to London, a few minor changes were made in the wording of the memoranda, and agreement was reached on the text of a covering statement to be released to the press along with the three memoranda on January 26, 1942. The texts as released on that date in Washington and London contain editorial variations. See Department of State Bulletin, vol. VI, January 31, 1942, p. 87; British Cmd. 6332, Co-ordination of the Allied War Effort: Agreements Between The Prime Minister and The President of the United States of America; and H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), p. 508.]

**Joint Memorandum of the President and the Prime Minister Creating a "Combined Raw Materials Board"**

A planned and expeditious utilization of the raw material resources of the United Nations is necessary in the prosecution of the war. To obtain such a utilization of our raw material resources in the most efficient and speediest possible manner, we hereby create the "Combined Raw Materials Board."

This Board will:

(a) Be composed of Mr. . . . . . . as the United States member, and Mr. . . . . . . as the British member representing and acting under the instructions of the Minister of Supply. The Board shall have power to appoint the staff necessary to carry out its responsibilities.

(b) Plan the best and speediest development, expansion and use of the raw material resources, under the jurisdiction or control of the two Governments, and make the recommendations necessary to execute such plans. Such recommendations shall be carried out by all parts of the respective Governments.

(c) In collaboration with others of the United Nations work toward the best utilization of their raw material resources, and, in collaboration with the interested nation or nations, formulate plans and recommendations for the development, expansion, purchase, or other effective use of their raw materials.

(d) The Board will confer with representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China and such others of the United Nations as may be necessary to the attainment of common purposes.

**President**

**Prime Minister**

**January . . . . , 1942.**
MUNITION ASSIGNMENTS

1. The entire munition resources of Great Britain and the United States will be deemed to be in a common pool, about which the fullest information will be interchanged.

2. Committees will be formed in Washington and London under the Combined Chiefs of Staff in a manner similar to the South-West Pacific Agreement. These Committees will advise on all assignments both in quantity and priority, whether to Great Britain and the United States or other of the United Nations in accordance with strategic needs.

3. In order that these Committees may be fully apprised of the policy of their respective Governments, the President will nominate a civil Chairman who will preside over the Committee in Washington, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain will make a similar nomination in respect of the Committee in London. In each case the Committee will be assisted by a Secretariat capable of surveying every branch and keeping in touch with the work of every sub-committee as may be necessary.

4. The Civilian Chairmen in Washington and London may invite representatives of the State Department, the Foreign Office or production ministries or agencies to attend meetings.

5. The Committee will confer with representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China and such others of the United Nations as may be necessary to the attainment of common purposes.

6. Any differences arising, which it is expected will be rare, will be resolved by the President and the Prime Minister in agreement.

President

Prime Minister

JANUARY 14, 1942.

ANGLO-AMERICAN SHIPPING ADJUSTMENT BOARD

1. In principle, the shipping resources of the two countries will be deemed to be pooled. The fullest information will be interchanged.

2. Owing to the military and physical facts of the situation around the British Isles, the entire movement of shipping now under the control of Great Britain will continue to be directed by the Ministry of War Transport.

3. Similarly, the appropriate Authority in the United States will continue to direct the movements and allocations of United States shipping, or shipping of other Powers under United States control.

4. In order to adjust and concert in one harmonious policy the work of the British Ministry of War Transport and the United States
Government, there will be established forthwith in Washington a
Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, consisting of a representative
of the United States Government as soon as nominated by the Presi-
dent, and Sir Arthur Salter, representing and acting under the instruc-
tions of the British Minister of War Transport.

5. A similar adjustment Board will be set up in London consisting
of the Minister of War Transport and a representative of the United
States Government.

6. In both cases the executive power will be exercised solely by the
United States Maritime Commission in Washington and by the
Minister of War Transport in London.

7. The Board will confer with representatives of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, China and such others of the United
Nations as may be necessary to the attainment of common purposes.

14. 1. 42

C. DECLARATION BY UNITED NATIONS

Hopkins Papers

The Polish Ambassador in the United States (Ciechanowski) to the
President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

PERSONAL—URGENT

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1941.

DEAR MR. HOPKINS, With reference to our very personal conversa-
tion, I should like to add that I have thought the situation over and
have come to the following conclusions:

In the direct interest of all our nations concerned and of the un-
precedented prestige and unique position of The President and of
Mr. Churchill in the eyes of the entire world today, but especially in
view of the German reverse in Russia, and the internal crisis in Ger-
many,—it is really essential that some formal outward visible proof
of the absolute and close collaboration in this conference of all co-
belligerent nations, regardless of their immediate importance in the
struggle and of their size, should be given to the world at large now
during the opening stage of the conversations and also before the end
of the conference.¹

This might perhaps be done by inviting the Representatives of the
countries concerned to the White House for a short session during
which The President would briefly address them, informing them of
the scope of the conference, assuring that each country will be ad-
mitted to have its say if and when questions directly interesting it
will be discussed, and that all will be asked to participate in any final
arrangement regarding solidarity of action in this war.

¹ Underscored in source text.
In my opinion, such a meeting should be photographed and widely publicized here and abroad.

Please forgive me for so direct a suggestion, but I feel that the importance of the present conference should be fully taken advantage of in order to stress the genuineness of the principles which we have declared we are fighting for, to maintain and raise the morale in the occupied countries so essential to subversive warfare, especially in Poland in view of the Russian advance westwards.¹

I believe that in this way the fullest advantage could be taken of this most psychological moment.

In venturing to make this suggestion I do so with the firm conviction that it is directly in the interest of the prestige of this country.

Yours very sincerely,

Jan Ciechanowsky

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE PARTICIPATION OF POLAND IN THE PLANNING OF THE JOINT PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

In view of the conversations about to take place in Washington between The President and the British Prime Minister on matters relating to the joint conduct of the war against the Axis Powers and the definition of the relationship between the United States, Great Britain, Poland, China, the U.S.S.R. and other nations likewise engaged in the war against the Axis Powers—the Polish Ambassador has been instructed by the Polish Prime Minister General Sikorski, at present on his return journey from Russia to London, to request for Poland participation in the discussion and conclusion of any eventual arrangement between the United States, Great Britain and her Allies and the U.S.S.R. concerning the establishment of joint collaboration as co-belligerents in the war. This request is based on the following considerations:

1) Poland is an Ally of Great Britain, by virtue of a Treaty of Alliance signed in London on August 25th, 1939.

2) Poland was the first country to offer armed resistance against the German aggression of September 1, 1939, and since that time her national army, her navy, her air force as well as her mercantile fleet have never ceased to fight on land, on sea and in the air for the defeat of Hitlerism throughout the world.

3) The Polish Nation in Poland unanimously resists the invader both actively and passively, regardless of terrorism and inhuman oppression which have never succeeded in breaking its spirit of resistance. The subversive warfare conducted by Polish organizations has been continuous and is becoming ever more effective.

4) At the present time the Polish Government is forming an army of about seven divisions under Polish Command in Russia. In addition 25,000 Polish soldiers from Russia are shortly to strengthen the

¹ Underscored in source text.

735-606-88—28
Polish Armed Forces in Scotland and in the Near East, as well as the
Polish Air Force and the Polish Navy.
5) Poland declared the existence of a state of war with Japan on
December 11, 1941.
6) The Polish-Soviet declaration of Friendship and Mutual As-
sistance signed by Prime Minister General Sikorski and Prime Minis-
ter Stalin on the 4th of December 1941, establishes the principles of
full active military collaboration between them during the war and
the existence of good neighborly collaboration and friendship and
mutual observance of undertakings assumed—after the war.
7) The Polish-British Alliance and the recent formally established
collaboration between Poland and Soviet Russia would appear to
make the full participation of Poland in a jointly established agree-
ment of collaboration between the United States, Great Britain with
her Allies, and Soviet Russia a natural consequence.

Through its fighting spirit and resistance and the subversive war-
fare which it carries on, the Polish Nation in Poland has been and
continues to be, an important active factor of the joint war effort.

The maintenance of the high degree of morale of this population is
therefore of utmost necessity.

To all Poles, whether in or outside Poland, in Russia or in other
countries, the persons of The President of the United States and of the
British Prime Minister are the living guarantees of justice and equity.

It is hardly necessary to add that five million loyal American citizens
of Polish origin feel likewise in regard to Poland’s future.

The full participation of Poland as a co-belligerent in the partners-
ship about to be established between the United States and the other
 Democracies fighting in this war, appears therefore of primary im-
portance to all concerned.

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1941.

Roosevelt Papers

The British Lord Privy Seal (Atlee) to Prime Minister Churchill

MOST SECRET

IMMEDIATE

No Cop[ies]

Taut No. 185. Following from Lord Privy Seal for Prime Minister.
Your Grey Number 78 considered by War Cabinet this afternoon.
We are in general agreement with draft declaration of common pur-
pose but with following comments:

(i) It is not clear from draft what States are to sign. The con-

\footnote{1}{The source text is the copy of this telegram that Churchill left with Roo-
sevelt. See Roosevelt’s memorandum of December 27 to Hull, Foreign Relations,
1942, vol. I, p. 13.}

\footnote{2}{Not found in American files.}
cluding sentence in first draft suggests possibility of subsequent signatures. This may be only to keep open a door for South American States. We think it difficult to find any satisfactory halfway house between a declaration signed

(a) by yourself and President, and
(b) by all allies.

We do not see how one can pick and choose in view of generality of declaration.

The Polish Prime Minister has strongly urged this afternoon that if there is to be any declaration(s), Poland as our first ally in this war should be a party to it. We believe other allied governments would hold same view(s), and we strongly favour a declaration signed by all allies. It was intended this would give necessary emphasis to fact that this war is being waged for freedom of small nations as well as great. We would hope allied governments would be given a chance of adhering to declaration before it is published, even if this means a day or two's delay.

(ii) Para (i) of first alternative came to us in following form

"Court of Governments pledges itself to employ its full resources against Axis forces conquest and to continue such employment until these forces have been finally defeated." We assume this is a mistake for "each government pledges itself to employ its full resources against Axis forces of conquest".

We take it that endeavours in this, as in other draft is to find a form of working which without any explicit statement recognizes distinctive position of U.S.S.R. in respect of enemy power(s).

It may be that this device is only one whereby the signature(s) of all the allies can be obtained to one declaration. But it gives a certain obscurity to declaration.

(iii) Should it be decided to embody in final declaration a reference to Governments which signed the tri-partite Pact this should take form of "the Governments which have signed and adhered to tri-partite Pact of (Repeat) of 27th November 1940 and not on (Repeat) on 27 November 1940 since when there have been many adherences to Pact."

(iv) We think declaration should include a pledge by each Government not to conclude a separate peace. We therefore favour first alternative draft.

(v) On terms of declaration, while we appreciate that Atlantic Charter is mentioned, we think that immediately following the words,

*The only draft which appears to have contained such a concluding sentence is the draft of December 14, ante, p. 12. The "second draft" was presumably the text of December 19, 6 p.m., ante, p. 39. For a draft of December 19, 1 p.m., see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. 1, p. 8.

which in effect recites many main points in Charter, will be criticised for omission of any reference to social security. We suggest this might be inserted as follows: “Righteous possibility of human freedom justice and social security not only in their own lands, etc.” 5

5 This insertion was apparently intended to be made in the third paragraph of the “first draft”, i.e., the draft of December 14, ante, p. 12.

Hopkins Papers

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to Prime Minister Churchill

[WASHINGTON,] December 25, 1941.

MINUTE SHEET

PRIME MINISTER

I attach a re-draft of the Joint Declaration embodying the War Cabinet’s views expressed in telegram Taut No. 185.2

I should call attention to the following points:—

1. The list of Governments in the preamble includes the Governments of all those countries which are actually fighting against the Axis powers or are in enemy occupation. It does not include the Central American countries which have declared war against Germany and Italy but are not actually involved in hostilities. The order in which the countries are mentioned may perhaps require revision. I have put the United States first, the United Kingdom and the Dominions next, and the other Allies in alphabetical order. This follows the system adopted at the St. James’s Palace Conference last September when the United Kingdom and Dominion representatives were mentioned first and then the Allies in alphabetical order.3

2. In their telegram the War Cabinet definitely stated that India was not to be included, and I therefore made no mention of India in the draft. I think with all respect to the War Cabinet that this is a mistake, and I would hope it might be reconsidered. India was a separate signatory of the Treaty of Versailles; and, as you will remember, the Secretary of State for India represented India at the St. James’s Palace Conference. Amery also represented Burma on the latter occasion.

3. What about the Free French? I have left them out, as they are not an actual Government. But, as you will see from the White Paper attached,4 at the St. James’s Palace Conference the names of

1 The source text is a copy given to Hopkins.
2 Supra.
4 No “White Paper” was attached to the source text but the reference is probably to the Command Paper identified in the preceding footnote.
the Free French representatives were included in distinctive form at the end of the list of the Allied delegates. In spite of St. Pierre and Miquelon, I should like to see Free French representatives associated with the Declaration and undertaking on behalf of the Free French movement to observe its principles.

4. You will no doubt arrange with the President about quickest means of securing assent of Allies and Dominions to the draft when agreed.

H.

[Attachment]*

DRAFT JOINT DECLARATION

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Belgium, China, Czecho-Slovakia, Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugo-Slavia,

Having subscribed to a common programme of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain dated August 14th, 1941 and known as the Atlantic Charter,

Being convinced that the complete and world-wide victory of all the Governments is essential to defend and preserve life, liberty and independence as well as the righteous possibilities of human freedom, justice, and social security not only in their own lands but throughout the world, and that the struggle in which they are now engaged is the common defense of human decencies everywhere against savage and brutal force seeking to subjugate the world, declare:

1. Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources against the Axis forces of conquest and to continue such employment until these forces have been finally defeated;
2. Each Government pledges itself to the other Governments associated in this Declaration to effect the full coordination of its military effort and the use of its resources against the common enemies;
3. Each Government pledges itself to continue war against, and not to make a separate peace with the common enemies or any of them.

Other Governments desirous of associating themselves with this Declaration are hereby privileged to accede to it.

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* A small note by Halifax attached to the draft reads as follows:

"1. Draft follows President's first alternative text almost exactly, except for (a) one or two verbal changes to avoid repetition; and (b) inclusion of War Cabinet's point about 'social security'.

"2. It includes the point about 'No Separate Peace'".

From textual evidence, the "first alternative text" seems to have been the draft of December 14, ante, p. 11."
WASHINGTON, December 27, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I think, if possible, you should make every effort to get religious freedom in this document. I believe it will be necessary for you to talk to Litvinoff this noon about this.

I think the wording in "1" on page 2 is a very difficult one for the U.S.S.R. to subscribe to. Paragraph 1 might read

"Each government pledges itself to employ its full resources against those Axis forces of conquest with which it is at war. Each government pledges itself to continue such employment until these forces have been finally defeated."

As long as this list in paragraph 1 must include a great many names, I think we should include them all, including the South American Republics. I think there are distinct advantages having a long list of little countries joining with us.

I would lift the countries like China and the U.S.S.R. out of their alphabetical listing and place them with our own and the U.K., the distinction being those actively engaged in war in their own countries and those that have been overrun by the Axis.

I think this listing is extremely important and should be gone over with great care by the State Department.

I think it is up to the British to decide whether or not India should be included, although for the life of me I don't understand why they don't include it.

My own feeling is that at the moment the Free French should not be included.

At the end of the second paragraph of the Joint Declaration, another sentence should be added including a restatement of our aims for human freedom, justice, security, not only for the people in our own lands but for all people in the world. I think a good deal of care should be given to the exact words of this and I do not think the reference to the Atlantic Charter is adequate.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

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1 The draft under reference is the one of December 19, 6 p. m., ante, p. 39.
2 For the conversation with Litvinov, see ante, p. 112.
3 A small memorandum of December 27 by Hopkins attached to this file reads:
   "I showed this memorandum to the President this morning and he agreed with these ideas.
   "I drafted the attached letter for him to sign to Hull to get this really off the ground."
   The memorandum to Hull is printed infra.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The Prime Minister showed me the War Cabinet recommendations relative to the draft of a Joint Declaration. I have reread the draft and I have these comments to make:

1. I think every effort should be made to get religious freedom into this document. I believe Litvinoff can be induced to agree to this.

2. I think the language on page 2, paragraph 1 is difficult for the Russians. Some such language as this might handle it:

"Each government pledges itself to employ its full resources against those Axis forces of conquest with which it is at war. Each government pledges itself to continue such employment until these forces have been finally defeated."

I have been trying to think of a way to obviate the necessity of two different documents.

3. I believe the list of countries in paragraph 1 should include all of the nations at war, including the South American Republics. It seems to me a distinct advantage to have as long a list of small countries as possible in this Declaration.

4. I believe that China and the U.S.S.R. should be lifted from an alphabetical listing and included as are the United States and the British Empire on the theory that they are fighting in their own countries.

I have a feeling the U.S.S.R. would not be pleased to see their name following some of the countries which are realistically making a minor contribution.

5. I presume it is up to the British to decide whether or not India should be included, but I don’t understand why they don’t include it. Perhaps you could prod them a little.

---

1 This memorandum was sent to the Department of State on the afternoon of December 27, i.e., after Roosevelt’s lunch with Litvinov; see ante, p. 112.

2 The War Cabinet’s recommendations are printed ante, p. 364.

3 From textual evidence it is clear that the draft which Roosevelt had in mind was the draft of December 19, 6 p. m., ante, p. 39.

4 The paragraph under reference is the paragraph numbered (1) in the draft declaration, ante, pp. 39-40.

5 The other document under reference is the draft agreement for a Supreme War Council, December 19, 6 p. m., ante, p. 40. In response to this expression of the President’s wishes, the Department of State immediately prepared a new document combining both proposals. Hull took this “amalgamated draft” to the White House meeting at 6 p. m. (ante, p. 124), but since it was then decided to proceed with the joint declaration of Allied unity by itself, there was no further consideration of the “amalgamated draft”. The text of this draft is printed in Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. I, p. 16.
6. I feel that the Free French should not be included in this document.
   I am anxious that the most careful thought be given to the language
   in this Declaration, which will supplement the Atlantic statement,
   particularly in reference to the real purposes for which we fight.
   As soon as you and Halifax have reached a meeting of minds on
   a Joint Declaration, I think we should have a prompt conference
   between yourself, Halifax, the Prime Minister and me.\footnote{For the discussion with Halifax, which took place later the same afternoon, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. I, p. 15. Immediately after this discussion Hull and Halifax went to the White House for the meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill, ante, p. 124. For a memorandum by Welles of a related conversation with Halifax on the morning of December 27, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. II, p. 204.}

   \hspace{1cm} F. D. R.

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*Hopkins Papers: Telegram

\textit{The British Ambassador (Halifax) to The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)\footnote{\textsuperscript{1}}}

\textbf{IMMEDIATE} \hspace{1cm} [WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1941.

6080. Your telegram Taut 185.\footnote{\textsuperscript{2} Ante, p. 304.} My immediately following telegram gives text of declaration which President has re-drafted, and which Prime Minister has approved. He realises that the order of mention of Governments is not as we should have it, but President pressed this arrangement.

2. State Department are giving it to foreign representatives concerned to secure approval from their Governments.

3. I am doing the same on Prime Minister’s instructions to Dominion representatives, including Mr. Langstone for New Zealand.

4. I am awaiting telegram in reply to my telephone message to Bridges about India. Prime Minister and President both anxious to include India, especially in view of war developments.

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*Hopkins Papers: Telegram

\textit{The British Ambassador (Halifax) to The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)\footnote{\textsuperscript{1}}}

\textbf{IMMEDIATE} \hspace{1cm} [WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1941.

6081. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is text:
   Joint Declaration by the United States of America, China, the
   United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union

\footnote{\textsuperscript{1} The source text is a copy given to Hopkins.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{2} Ante, p. 304.}
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa and Yugoslavia.

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain dated August 14, 1941 known as the Atlantic Charter,

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice not only in their own lands but everywhere, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world,

DECLARE:

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents, with which such government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the other Governments signatory hereto; and to continue war against, and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the common enemies or any of them.

The foregoing Declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions towards the defeat of members or adherents of the Tripartite Pact.

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Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to the British Ambassador (Halifax)¹

MOST IMMEDIATE [LONDON,] December 29, 1941.

7304. Your telegram No. 6081.

Cabinet note that both Czecho-Slovakia and Luxembourg have been omitted.

2. They presume this is an oversight. If not please represent most strongly to United States Government that omission of Czecho-Slovakia would have disastrous effect on Czecho-Slovakian resistance which is [play]ing² important part in Allied war effort and that omission of Luxembourg will cause greatest disappointment and will not be understood in view of fact that small Central American Allies such as Costa Rica are included. Possibly U.S.G. feels that they have not conceded quite the same degree of recognition of Czecho-Slovakian Government as other Allies but they have exchanged dip-

¹The source text is a copy given to Hopkins.
²Appears as in source text.
lomatic representatives and in any case can not veto their inclusion in list of Allies.

3. We also think it essential that Free French should be party to declaration as they were to resolutions adopted at Inter-Allied meetings in London in one of which they formally subscribed to Atlantic Charter. They are in every sense an Ally. Their armed forces are collaborating with ours and they control Territories which are strategically of highest importance to us. On outbreak of war with Japan they placed all facilities offered by bases in Free French Pacific Islands at disposal of Allied Forces. Soviet Union and other European Allies have all like H.M.G. established relations with Free French National Committee and fact that U.S.G. have not done so does not in our view entitle U.S.G. to veto participation of Free French in proposed declaration.

4. If Free French participate it would be necessary to add “Free French [?] National” Committee at end of list of participating Governments and to add words “or Authority” after word “Government” in each place where it occurs in Text of declaration.

5. See also my immediately following telegram.

*Bracketed insertion appears as in source text.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

MOST IMMEDIATE

[LONDON,] December 29, 1941.

7305. My immediately preceding telegram.

Cabinet feels that we ought not to consent to arrangement by which various states of British Commonwealth are separated in list. It has been the practice hitherto in inter-Allied declarations to group together the Commonwealth states in view of their common Sovereignty and this is the rule which should govern the present case. To depart from this precedent now may well give us a great deal of trouble later on. In St. James’s Palace Declaration the Commonwealth Governments were grouped together, although the Declarations were inter-Governmental in form. It is particularly [?] desirable at the present moment to emphasize the fact that separate members of the British Commonwealth are acting together. What are the [?] special reasons advanced by the President which make it necessary for us to give this concession?

2. It is true that in the case of international declarations and treaties practice has been to use either (1) recital of heads of States

1 The source text is a copy given to Hopkins.

2 Underscored in source text.

3 Bracketed insertion appears as in source text.
[?] in which] case U.K. and Dominions are grouped under The King; or (2) to refer to "Government of U.K. etc." in which case alphabetical order of countries is strictly adhered to but we would not wish to extend the practice under (2) to inter-allied declarations such as the present.

3. You probably will inform Dominion representatives of views contained in paragraph one above.

4. The Viceroy's view is that India should be associated with the declaration but that this should be done with the assent of his Council which he is consulting. He promises to let us know as soon as he has their answer. We are telegraphing text of declaration to the Government of India.

5. The Cabinet also note with great [?] regret] that there is no reference to social security in revised declaration.

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*Bracketed insertion appears as in source text.

*Underlined in source text.

Hopkins Papers

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President

[Extract]

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1941.

Joint Declaration

Attached are two memoranda from Eden to Halifax relative to the Free French and the listing of the various countries.²

The Prime Minister, in his talk with me late this afternoon, suggested the elimination of Section E of the Declaration on the ground that it was repetitious.³

H. L. H.

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¹The omitted paragraphs of this memorandum refer to the problem of St. Pierre and Miquelon; see ante, p. 140.
²The "memoranda" under reference are the two telegrams from Eden to Halifax, supra.
³The "Section E" is not identified and no other reference has been found that would indicate its identity. The reference may be to the phrase "and to continue war against," which appears in paragraph numbered (2) of the draft. This phrase was dropped in the process of incorporating the Russian amendments; see post, p. 373.

Hopkins Papers

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)

MOST IMMEDIATE

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1941.

6087. Your telegram no. 7304 first paragraph.¹ Czechoslovakia was included as tenth country in list. Please check decyphering as telegram as sent from here was correct.

Luxembourg was however omitted.

¹Ante, p. 371.
Draft Statement Proposed by the Soviet Union Regarding the Joint Declaration of Allied Unity

The government of the U.S.S.R. shares the general principles laid down in the declaration of the governments of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . but is unable to sign it, not being at war with one of the states of the Tripartite Pact. The Government of the U.S.S.R. declares that it considers the chief enemy of freedom-loving peoples, and the center of the axis, to be Hitlerite Germany, against which the Soviet Union is fighting and now bearing the brunt in the war against Hitlerite tyranny.

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1 The source text is an annex to Savage’s memorandum of December 29, ante, p. 133. The Soviet Government had proposed to make this unilateral statement, on the assumption that the joint declaration would be signed only by those governments that were at war with all three original signatories of the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940. Hull assured Litvinov that the alternative Soviet amendments to the draft joint declaration would probably be found acceptable and that if such proved to be the case, the need for a separate Soviet statement would be obviated. See Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. i, p. 18.

2 On the source text, the word “tyranny” is written in by hand as a substitute for the word “Germany”.

Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

CONFIDENTIAL AND IN HASTE

I enclose herewith the proposed amendment[s] to our Joint Declaration offered by the Soviet Ambassador for his Government. The Soviet Ambassador tells me that the word “Hitlerism” with his country includes Nazism, Fascism and Japanism, and hence his Government may stick rather strongly for this word. I mention this so you will have the full background. I see no particular objection to the other proposals.

C. H.

AMENDMENTS:

Preamble: . . . “in their own lands as well as in other lands . . . instead of “not only in their own lands, but everywhere.”

(2) “Each government pledges itself to cooperate with the governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies . . . .”, instead of the original text.

Final Para: “and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism,” instead of “and contribution towards the defeat of members, etc.”]
The President's Secretary (Tully) to the Secretary of State

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, December 30, 1941.

Dear Mr. Secretary: The President asked me to get these copies of the re-draft of the Joint Declaration to you at once.
He asks that you make a copy available to the British Ambassador.
Very sincerely yours,

Grace G. Tully

[Attachment]

A Joint Declaration by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia

The Governments signatory hereto,
Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,
Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world,

DECLARE:

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.
(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

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1 The source text is a copy made in the Department of State. A copy in the Hopkins Papers bears the initials of Hopkins as the drafter of the memorandum.
2 A handwritten marginal note on the attachment reads: "CH OK. It is approved now by Russia and WSC but not yet by China. FDR. Let's get it out on Jan. 1. That means speed... FDR". For a facsimile of Roosevelt's redraft of the declaration incorporating the Russian amendments, see Sherwood, pp. 450-452.
I. THE FIRST WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Hull Papers

The Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Herewith is the Joint Declaration for signature by yourself and Prime Minister Churchill. The text is as you sent it to me yesterday ¹ except that, at the request of Lord Halifax, the expression "Prime Minister of Great Britain" in the first paragraph has been changed to "Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland".²

You may or may not desire to ask Ambassador Litvinov and Foreign Minister Soong to attach their signatures at the White House.

¹ Supra.
² Halifax, reflecting the comments of the British War Cabinet, had also suggested (1) that "high contracting parties" be substituted for "Governments signatory hereto"; (2) that "social security" be inserted; and (3) that the final sentence be altered so as to enable such organizations as the Free French to sign document. Hull did not favor any of these suggestions, and in any case he did not feel at liberty to accept any substantive changes without the President's approval. On December 31 the Canadian Government had also made several suggestions for improving the language of the draft declaration, but the Department of State indicated the undesirability of reopening the draft to further amendment. See Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. i, pp. 23-25; Hull, vol. ii, p. 1123.

Hopkins Papers

Draft Declaration of Allied Unity

DECLARATION BY UNITED NATIONS

A JOINT DECLARATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, CHINA, AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, CANADA, COSTA RICA, CUBA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, EL SALVADOR, GREECE, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONDURAS, INDIA, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NICARAGUA, NORWAY, PANAMA, POLAND, SOUTH AFRICA, YUGOSLAVIA

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles

¹ This draft bears no date but it was presumably prepared at the White House on the morning of January 1, 1942. According to Churchill (The Grand Alliance, p. 683) the title "Declaration by United Nations" was proposed by Roosevelt on the morning of January 1. The draft is otherwise the same as the draft approved by Roosevelt and Churchill on December 30 (ante, p. 375), except that the words "or authorities" were inserted in the final sentence. It was presumably this draft that was discussed with Litvinov at the luncheon meeting on January 1; see ante, p. 151.

² For the text as signed, which omitted the words "or authorities", see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. i, p. 25.
embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world, DECLARE:

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations or authorities which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

D. ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON

851A.01/12-2541

Memorandum by the Minister in Canada (Moffat)

[OTTAWA,] December 25, 1941.

[Extract]

MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITIES ON CHRISTMAS DAY 1941

12. At 10:15 [p. m.] Mr. Pearson telephoned and read me the following message from Mr. King and his colleagues, which he asked me to pass on to Washington:

"Canada is in no way responsible for the Free French occupation of St. Pierre. We have kept in close touch with both the United Kingdom and the United States on this question and have always been ready to cooperate in carrying out an agreed policy. We decline to commit ourselves to any action or to take any action pending such agreement. In the circumstances and until we have had an opportunity of considering action with the President and Mr. Churchill, the Canadian Government cannot take the steps requested 1 to expel the Free French and restore the status quo in the islands."

1 See the statement issued by Hull on December 25 (Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. 11, p. 551).
Mr. Pearson explained that despite a great deal of pressure there would be no statement issued at Ottawa tonight and that the situation would thus be left completely liquifled, to be handled in Washington tomorrow.

13. I put through a call to Washington and got in touch with Mr. Atherton. I read him the statement from Mr. King's train. I then said that I had two suggestions to offer for his consideration. The first was that they should start putting pressure via the British on General de Gaulle to recall Admiral Muselier of his own free will. Atherton told me that according to Lord Halifax, de Gaulle had just about the time of the occupation informed the British that all previous understandings were off and that he was going to proceed with the occupation on his own responsibility. I said that none the less he was so completely dependent on the British that they could, if they desired, put the requested pressure on him. The second suggestion was that either he or Jimmy Dunn travel to Baltimore tomorrow morning and spend an hour with Mr. King on his car before he reached Washington. As soon as he arrived in Washington he would be so involved at the White House with other matters that I did not think another opportunity would be given for uninterrupted discussion.

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Hopkins Papers

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to Prime Minister Churchill

[WASHINGTON,] December 25, 1941.

PRIME MINISTER

ST. PIERRE MIQUELON

1. On December 16th we had a telegram from the Foreign Office in which, after setting out the prospects of successful action in the Islands, they say:

"We are therefore informing the Free French Headquarters that we see no objection to their undertaking this operation."

In the same telegram they asked me to be sure that this action did not embarrass the United States Government and to give time for this said that they were asking de Gaulle to postpone the issue of orders for 36 hours.

---

1 The memorandum was evidently prepared in response to a request from Churchill and it was presumably addressed to him in the first instance. The source text is a copy with the heading "The President", which was presumably added when it was sent to Roosevelt by Churchill or by Halifax at Churchill's suggestion.

2 Not found in American files.
2. The matter was put to the State Department the same day who referred it to the President, who said that he was strongly opposed to the suggested action.  

3. On the 17th December, the Foreign Office telegraphed to say that the President's view had been reported to de Gaulle who agreed that the proposed action should not now be undertaken.

4. A telegram from the Foreign Office on December 19th said that in the view of the Chiefs of Staff nothing short of the occupation of the Islands "would be satisfactory from Military point of view. This course however now seems to be ruled out by United States attitude."

5. We received this morning a message despatched from the Admiralty to the British Admiralty Delegation, Washington, as follows:

"Following has been received from Admiral Muselier. *Begins:*

'I have the honour to inform you that in compliance with order quite recently received from General de Gaulle and request of inhabitants I have proceeded this morning to Island Saint Pierre and rallyed people to Free France and Allied cause with enthusiastic reception.' *Ends.*

"2. Please inform His Majesty's Ambassador urgently. This action has come as a complete surprise to us."

6. From this it appears quite clear:

(a) that the Foreign Office knew and approved the general authority given to the Free French headquarters to try their luck with the Islands, but that
(b) they held up the operation while the United States Government were being consulted, and that
(c) on receipt of information about the President's feeling they secured de Gaulle's agreement that the operation should not now be undertaken, and that finally
(d) Muselier has gone off on his own with or without de Gaulle's knowledge and assent.

7. An alternative plan to ensure control of the wireless station at St. Pierre has been under discussion between the Canadian and the United States Governments for some weeks. On December 18th Mr. Welles said that he hoped the Canadian Government would give immediate effect to this plan, which involved the use of force if the Administrator of the islands did not agree to Canadian supervision of the station.

Our Chiefs of Staff in London commented on this as set out in paragraph 4 above.

8. Since dictating the above I have just seen F.O. telegram 7243 (Flag "A"), which tells the complete story, and seems to place the

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*See the memorandum of December 26 surveying these developments, post, p. 383.  
*Not found in American files.  
*Enclosure 1.

735—006—63—29
blame very squarely on de Gaulle, who I see has issued a congratulatory telegram in London to Admiral Muselier and announced that a plebiscite is being held today.

9. I attach a note (Flag “B”) giving all the information in possession of the F.O. on the agreement between the United States Government and Admiral Robert.

10. I am seeing Hull at six o’clock, and will let you know if anything of importance emerges.7

As our information was complete on both points you raised I did not think it necessary to telephone to the F.O.

H.

[Enclosure 1]

Copy of Telegram From the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

MOST IMMEDIATE [LONDON,] December 25, 1941.
[No. 7243.] My telegram no. 7008.8

The Admiralty received a telegram from Admiral Muselier dated December 24th in which he stated that “in compliance with the order quite recently received from General de Gaulle and the request of the inhabitants” he had proceeded on the morning of December 24th to St. Pierre and rallied the people to Free France and the Allied cause with an enthusiastic reception.

2. This was a complete surprise to us since General de Gaulle had authorized an assurance to be given to us on December 17th that no orders for the operation had been issued and that it would not be carried out by the Free French Naval forces. You were informed accordingly in my telegram under reference.

3. Free French Commissioner for Foreign Affairs was at once summoned to the Foreign Office and asked for an explanation. He admitted General de Gaulle had in fact given orders for the operation to be effected. His reason for doing so had been that when he gave the assurance mentioned in the second paragraph above he did not know the Canadian Government intended with the approval of the United States Government to send certain personnel to St. Pierre in order to secure control of the wireless station by peaceful means and if this failed by force. On learning this General de Gaulle had addressed a letter to the Foreign Secretary in which he protested against such a decision being taken without consultation with him.

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6 Enclosure 2.
7 No memorandum of a Hull–Halifax conversation at 6 p.m. has been found; see, however, the memorandum of Hull’s conversation with Halifax on December 26 in Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. ii, p. 557.
8 Not found in American files.
and had declared the National Committee would lose its reasons for existence if it agreed to forceful action being taken by the Allied forces on French Territory. General de Gaulle had asked that his views should be brought to the notice of the Canadian Government. This was done by telegram on December 24th. Free French Delegation in the United States had been already instructed to inform the State Department. A summary of this letter went to you in my telegram No. 7216.9

4. It was pointed out to Mons. Dejean that General de Gaulle in his letter had not withdrawn his assurance of December 17th which His Majesty’s Government had conveyed to Washington and Ottawa. H.M. Government were now placed in an embarrassing position and they would have to inform the Canadian and United States Government[s] that General de Gaulle had without consulting them decided to cancel the assurance which he had given in a matter affecting American Defence Zone. Mons. Dejean admitted that this was correct.

Please inform the United States Government of above and also the Prime Minister.

[Enclosure 2]

Copy of Memorandum Prepared in the British Foreign Office

United States Government made an agreement with Admiral Robert in August 1940 under which Robert gave assurances about French warships, etc., in return for United States Government assurances about finance and essential supplies for Martinique and Guadeloupe.10

This agreement was renewed on December 15th, 1941,11 but we have never been shown the text. So far as we have been informed, the agreement was not concerned with St. Pierre and Miquelon.

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9 Not found in American files.

Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Since our conversation this afternoon 1 in regard to the St. Pierre-Miquelon seizure by the Free French and its possible consequence, I have carefully reviewed the record, including some despatches that

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1 A memorandum by Savage (ante, p. 149) refers to a telephone conversation between Roosevelt and Hull on December 31, but there is no indication of what was said on the subject of St. Pierre and Miquelon.
came in during the afternoon. It is a mess beyond question and one for which this Government was in no remote sense responsible.

Here to attached is a somewhat detailed memorandum covering the entire matter as prepared and agreed to by all of the appropriate members of the European Division. I think it very important that you read this so as to get an up-to-date perspective clearly set forth.

The repercussions, in my opinion, are going to be much greater than one would ordinarily suppose. For example, the following is a quotation from a cable giving the conversation between Darlan and the Marshal with Admiral Leahy:

“Darlan then referred to the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident and said that Germany has already used the seizure of those islands by de Gaulle as an argument for the entry of Axis troops into Africa in order that it may be protected against a similar invasion.”

This is just the beginning of ominous and serious developments which, in my opinion, will occur. Our British friends seem to believe that the body of the entire people of France is strongly behind de Gaulle, whereas according to all of my information and that of my associates, some 95 percent of the entire French people are anti-Hitler whereas more than 95 percent of this latter number are not de Gaullists and would not follow him. This fact leads straight to our plans about North Africa and our omission of de Gaulle's cooperation in that connection. The developments revolving around the Vichy-North African situation and those revolving around the South American and Rio Conference situation are calculated to be very materially affected to our disadvantage if the fact goes out to the world that the British Government was really behind this movement and we abandon our own policies without serious protest, et cetera, et cetera. This may also seriously affect the question of the French naval units in Martinique by giving Robert a chance to pronounce our agreement null and void.

While, of course, I do not know yet just how agreeable the French will be in working this matter out in an amicable manner, provided Churchill would be disposed to talk with you, or rather to let you talk with him, about the necessity from our standpoint to work out the matter and announce to the general public that nobody is censorable and that the matter came up on account of confusions and

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2 For text, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. II, p. 503.

3 On the preceding day (December 30) Churchill had made the following remark in his address to the Canadian Parliament:

“Some Frenchmen there were who would not bow their knees and who like their General de Gaulle have continued to fight at the side of the Allies. They have been condemned to death by the men of Vichy but their names will be held and are being held in increasing respect by nine Frenchmen out of every ten throughout the once happy, smiling land of France.” (New York Times, December 31, 1941, p. 6)

For Hull’s reaction to Churchill’s remarks at Ottawa, see Hull, vol. II, p. 1133.
misunderstanding as to the complications in this Hemisphere with respect to such action.

C. H.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

December 26, 1941.

The first suggestion that the Free French forces were interested in St. Pierre-Miquelon was communicated to this Government on December 15, 1941. On that day the American Minister to Canada received, at the request of the Chief of the Canadian Naval Staff, Admiral Muselier of the Free French naval forces. Admiral Muselier said that he had in his possession orders from General De Gaulle which would enable him to land forces in St. Pierre-Miquelon and take over the islands. Admiral Muselier added, however, that he was not going to act until he was sure that this proposed action was agreeable to the Governments of Canada, Newfoundland and the United States. The Admiral intimated that his proposed action in the islands had the approval of the British Government. The Admiral requested an expression of the American Government's views in the matter. In the same conversation he discussed the French islands in the West Indies without, however, asking for an indication of our views. After referring to the admitted difficulties which existed there and granting that from the standpoint of the United States some action might have to be taken, he stated that both General De Gaulle and he feel that it would have a most unfortunate effect upon public opinion in France, in both occupied and unoccupied, if the United States Government had to take over these islands.

On the night of December 15 a member of the British Embassy informed the Department in strict confidence of a telegram from the Foreign Office. This telegram referred to conversations which had been in progress at various times since November 3 between the American and the Canadian Governments concerning the radio station at St. Pierre and a proposal of the Canadian Government to send civilian personnel to the island to control all outward messages from the radio station to prevent information from being sent out concerning ship movements. The telegram from the Foreign Office stated in effect that Prime Minister Churchill felt that it would be desirable for Free French forces to land and control this radio station rather than for

*For additional documentation on the problem of St. Pierre and Miquelon during the period surveyed in this memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. II, pp. 546–552.*
the Canadian Government to take action in what might be an embarrassing political situation. The telegram continued that no action would, however, be taken unless the consent of the American and Canadian Governments were obtained.

After consultation with the President the Canadian Counselor and the American Minister in Ottawa were informed as follows: The President did not favor a policy whereby the Free French would be permitted to take action in the St. Pierre-Miquelon situation. In this specific instance this was the issue at stake but if subsequently the question should arise as to Free French action as regards other French territorial possessions in this Hemisphere, the attitude of this Government would undoubtedly be the same, particularly in view of the recent exchanges between Washington and Vichy and the commitments of this Government with respect to the other American Republics.

The American Minister was further informed by the Department that the President entirely approved the general tenor of the original Canadian idea which had been that persuasion should in the first instance be used but that if such means failed to establish Canadian control of the radio station, recourse might then be had to force. It was made clear in these conversations that it was the understanding of this Government that control of the radio station was the objective of the Canadian authorities.

This question was also discussed in the same sense with the British Embassy and it was added that since the British Government as well as the American Government is interested in the maintenance of relations with the Vichy Government certainly any action by the Free French in moving into French possessions in this continent with the approval of the British and the American Governments would be bound to be detrimental.

On December 16 Admiral Muselier was orally informed of the views of this Government. Admiral Muselier expressed bitter disappointment and said that he felt that the American Government was making a mistake but that he would accept this decision.

On December 22 the Counselor of the Canadian Legation in Washington telephoned to inform the Department under instructions from his Government that the British Government did not “go along” with the policy suggested in the American-Canadian discussions for action by Canada to supervise the radio station of St. Pierre; consequently the Canadian Government due to Empire policy as laid down by the British Government was not going ahead with the proposed action in that regard. Mr. Wrong added that he could state, however, that any action by the Free French forces had been “called off”.

On December 22 the Canadian Under Secretary of State of External Affairs referred to the decisions to do nothing for the present.
Mr. Robertson, however, placed more emphasis on the temporary nature of this decision than had Mr. Wrong and intimated that the whole question was on a twenty-hour basis. Subsequently the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King informed Mr. Moffat that he agreed with the decision of the United States Government in regard to St. Pierre-Miquelon and felt that any slight advantages of action by the Free French there were outweighed by the bigger issue involved which he said he understood.

On December 24 the Canadian Legation informed the Department of the landing of Admiral Muselier’s forces in St. Pierre-Miquelon and that this action had been taken without the prior knowledge or consent of the Canadian Government.

On December 25 Mr. Moffat reported from Ottawa that he had been told at the Department of External Affairs that the Canadian Government was “shocked and embarrassed by the action of Admiral Muselier in occupying St. Pierre-Miquelon”. Mr. Moffat’s telegram continued that when Muselier was recalled from Ottawa to London on December 18 he had, despite a natural disappointment, accepted the veto against occupying the islands and had asked for air transportation across the Atlantic; he was on his way to Newfoundland to take a bomber when the incident occurred. Mr. Moffat continued that the Canadians feel that Muselier’s action “was so close to a breach of faith that it cannot fail to embarrass their future relations with the Free French”. It was stated that Mr. Mackenzie King plans to discuss the subject in Washington upon his arrival around noon today.

On Christmas morning the French Ambassador asked for an appointment with the Secretary of State “to present an expression of the gravity with which the situation in St. Pierre would be viewed by his Government. He recalled that St. Pierre was under the administration of Admiral Robert with whom a re-affirmation of the agreement relating to the status quo of French possessions had just been concluded”.

The Free French delegate in Washington telephoned Christmas afternoon to say that he had learned of Muselier’s action only by radio and that he had been completely without any previous information that this step was contemplated by Admiral Muselier.

Christmas night Mr. Moffat telephoned to say that the Canadian Prime Minister was very embarrassed and had said that Canada was not responsible. Mr. Mackenzie King added that it had been decided that Canada would act to restore the status quo of the islands only upon specific request of the British and American Governments. He said Canada would prefer United States action rather than acting

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* See ante, p. 377.
alone. Mr. Moffat had been further informed that Admiral Muselier had said he was acting under direct instructions from General De Gaulle.

The British Ambassador likewise told the Secretary of State that General De Gaulle had withdrawn the assurances he had given the British Government to the effect that no action would be taken when he had received reports from Admiral Muselier in Canada that the radio station was the object of concern to the Canadian Government.

Draft Statement by the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1942.

Prior to the seizure last week, the main question of interest in this connection to Great Britain, Canada and the United States related to possible dangers to shipping from the operation of a wireless station originally installed to benefit French fishing vessels off the Great Banks of Newfoundland. There had been, during recent months, exchanges of views among these three interested Governments. The Government of the United States had been officially notified that the Free French forces would take no action with regard to these Islands. On December 24, however, the Free French proceeded, by force, to seize and occupy the Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon and to take charge of their entire affairs.

This act was committed without the knowledge or the consent in any sense of the United States Government. This Government immediately thereafter made clear that it was not a party to this action. This Government then proceeded to approach the British and the Canadians on the one hand and the Government at Vichy on the other and to urge a fair arrangement between all parties concerned which would safeguard Great Britain, Canada and the United States against danger to their shipping from the operation of the wireless station in question. This proposal would make all the more logical the prompt retirement of the Free French forces occupying these Islands. No material progress has yet been made with this proposal.

The United States Government was actuated in its course of opposition to the forcible seizure of these Islands by its treaty obligations expressed in the Habana Convention and by other important policies, agreements and plans relating to vitally important international phases of the war situation. For purposes of hemispheric defense,

1 The draft statement, which is marked “Copy” and “Draft” and which bears the typewritten initials of Hull as drafter, has the penciled notation: “Copy to the President 1/1/42”. An earlier draft in the same file bears the notation, in Hull’s handwriting: “Original sent to President 1/1/42. CH.”
these Habana agreements specifically outlawed the use of force to effect "any transfer or attempted transfer of the sovereignty, jurisdiction, possession or any interest in or control over" any of the territories or possessions in the Americas which any of the belligerent nations abroad may possess. The seizure of the Islands of St. Pierre-Miquelon falls within these prohibitions.

It has been and still is the view of the Government of the United States that this matter pertaining to the operation of the wireless station in question could and should be settled amicably to the satisfaction of all persons and parties concerned, and that this course would definitely facilitate the conduct of the war.

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum by the President

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1942.

I told the Secretary of State I thought it inadvisable to resuscitate this question by making a statement;¹ that the French Admiral has already declined to leave the St. Pierre-Miquelon; that we cannot afford to send an expedition to bomb him out and that Sumner Welles could best handle this situation verbally when he gets to Rio on the above basis.²

F. D. R.

¹ Presumably the draft statement supra.
² There is no evidence that this question came up at the Conference of American Foreign Ministers held at Rio de Janeiro, January 15-28, 1942. For documentation on that Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. v, pp. 6 ff.

Hull Papers

The Secretary of State to the President¹

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the conversation between you and the British Prime Minister and myself today² in regard to a communiqué by you and the Prime Minister in order to quiet steadily spreading rumors and reports very damaging to the British-American situation, some of the gentlemen here in the Department prepared the enclosed memorandum in the hope that it might be of possible aid to you.

I may say that the French Ambassador has just left my office and I went after him very strongly about simply closing down the wire-

¹ The source text bears the typewritten initials of Hull as the drafter but carries no signature.
² For an editorial note on the conversation under reference, see ante, p. 156.
less station and agreeing for a Canadian citizen to be about the premises at all times to see that it is kept closed down, and also to change Governors—all of this to be done if and as the Free French who are occupying the islands make their departure, thereby restoring the status quo. He committed himself strongly to a promise to communicate tonight with his Government and arrange for such concurring action.

If he should succeed, the question again arises as to whether the Prime Minister will cooperate with us to see that the Free French, having thus made their contribution to clearing up this wireless situation, move out, with the thanks of their friends interested. This proposed communiqué that I am attaching hereto would be a suitable prelude to such possible settlement as I have just outlined.

[Enclosure]

Draft Communiqué

The President and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have had under consideration the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident and have been studying this problem with a view to working it out in complete cooperation. They are in entire agreement that an arrangement satisfactory to all concerned should not be difficult and the matter is receiving further attention, having in mind the commitments of the Government of the United States under the Habana Treaty of 1940 and other international policies and agreements of great importance to the conduct of the war. Meanwhile in the light of the relevant facts there should be no occasion for confusion or misunderstanding since there is complete cooperation and understanding between the United States, Great Britain and Canada in this as in other matters.

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1 For Hull’s memorandum of his conversation with the French Ambassador, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. II, p. 355.
2 Copies of the draft were sent by Hull to Churchill in the White House and to Mackenzie King at Ottawa (Memorandum Relating to the St. Pierre-Miquelon Situation, January 11, 1942, 851A.01/1–1142).
3 For documentation regarding this treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. v, pp. 180 ff.; for text of treaty, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 977 or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1273.

Roosevelt Papers

Prime Minister Churchill to Secretary of State Hull

WASHINGTON, 3 January, 1942.

My Dear Secretary of State, I have tried my hand at an alternative draft written before I saw yours. I am not particularly in love with it, but I have an idea it would bring this matter to an end, which is what we all wish.

1 The source text is a copy, with the signature “Winston Churchill” written in parentheses by someone other than the Prime Minister. The source text bears the handwritten endorsement: “despatched by special messenger.”
I shall be in all the morning, and if you think well I will consult my own Government and Mr. Mackenzie King over the telephone. It would be very nice to add the Governor had gone on leave. Supposing that the Free French are recalcitrant, I should be prepared to put considerable pressure on General de Gaulle.

[Enclosure]

DRAFT COMMUNIQUÉ

[January 2, 1942.]

SUGGESTED STATEMENT ABOUT MIQUELON

The United States, British and Canadian Governments view this incident as on a very small scale compared to what is going on all over the world. Nonetheless it must be made clear that General de Gaulle’s action was taken not only without their assent but in the face of the declared orders of the British Government. This caused embarrassment to the United States on account, inter alia, of their working agreement with Admiral Robert which provides for the maintenance of the status quo under certain well-defined conditions.

Accordingly the three Governments have agreed that the principle that these islands are to be regarded in the present phase as demilitarised and out of the war, shall be maintained. All armed forces will be withdrawn except the handful of Canadian officials necessary to make sure that the important radio station shall not be used contrary to the interests of The United Nations. The local inhabitants will be left in full exercise of their rights of domestic self-government, arrangements being made both to continue the supplies from the United States and Canada on which they are dependent and also to provide for the seasonal supply of fish to the French inhabitants of Martinique.

2.1.42

EUR files

Revised Draft Communiqué on the Problem of St. Pierre and Miquelon

[January 3, 1942.]

The United States, British, and Canadian Governments view this incident as on a very small scale compared to what is going on all

1This draft, prepared in the Department of State, is a combination of the Hull and Churchill drafts of January 2 (supra). The source text bears the typewritten endorsement: “This draft given to Mr. Churchill and to Mr. Mackenzie King on Saturday morning, January 3, 1942, by the Secretary.” The draft was approved by Roosevelt and Churchill at their luncheon meeting that day (ante, p. 158), and was then telephoned to the American Minister at Ottawa for transmittal to Mackenzie King through the Canadian Department of External Affairs; see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, p. 656.
over the world. The problems involved relate to the safeguarding of British, Canadian and American shipping in the North Atlantic and existing international commitments. None the less it must be made clear that the Free French action was taken not only without their assent but in the face of the declared wishes of the British Government.

Accordingly, the three Governments have agreed that the principle that these islands are to be regarded in the present phase as demilitarized and out of the war shall be maintained. All armed forces will be withdrawn, it being understood that at the same time adequate steps shall be taken to assure that no radio station situated on the islands shall be used contrary to the interests of the United Nations. The local inhabitants will be left in full exercise of their rights of domestic self government, arrangements being made both to continue the supplies from the United States and Canada on which they are dependent and also to provide for the seasonal supply of fish to the French inhabitants of Martinique.

Meanwhile in the light of the relevant facts there should be no occasion for confusion or misunderstanding since there is no divergence of policy and there is complete cooperation and understanding between the United States, Great Britain and Canada in this as in other matters.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill

MOST SECRET

[LONDON, January 4, 1942.

Taut 376. Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary. Your telegram Grey 210 (of 3rd January: St. Pierre and Miquelon).²

I assume that under this formula the islands will be regarded as independent and entitled to choose their own regime, pending their restoration to whatever government is established in France after the war, subject only to demilitarisation and control over certain installations which will be exercised by the three governments.

2. I am not however clear about what the position will be if local inhabitants, in “full exercise of their rights of domestic self-government” decide to ask General de Gaulle to appoint a Governor and elect to be under authority of national committee. In these circumstances I assume the three governments would not oppose the declared wish of the inhabitants.

¹ The source text is marked “copy no. 1.”
² Not found in American files. The telegram presumably transmitted the text of the revised draft communiqué of January 3, 1942.
3. I expect the greatest difficulty in getting General de Gaulle to agree to withdraw his forces under proposition formulated. He will no doubt say the preservation of French sovereignty is a fundamental point for him and that national committee would lose all justification for its existence if it consented to removal of islands from its direction. Nevertheless, provided that the Canadian Government agreed to it, I am of course, prepared to make the attempt.

4. It had appeared to us from Halifax’s telegram number 19 (of January 2nd) that if de Gaulle is adamant about withdrawal his forces Mr. Hull would not insist. Is this still the position?

5. I would however suggest following amendments and additions:

(a) At end of paragraph 1 we should say “All 3 Governments” instead of “British Government”?

(b) To forestall criticism both from Vichy and General de Gaulle that we intend to keep the islands, it would be well to make clear that French sovereignty remains. To meet this point I would suggest in first sentence paragraph 2 after words “Have agreed that” the following might be inserted:

“While islands are French and will remain French”.

(c) In third sentence paragraph 2 after words “Domestic self-government” would it not be well to insert “Under a Governor of their own choosing”?

6. I assume that Vichy will not be consulted about this formula.

7. It is essential that nothing should be said to Press until agreement has been reached between all 3 Governments and General de Gaulle whom I shall not approach until I know terms of formula agreed upon by both the United States and Canadian Governments with yourselves.

8. After completion[:] immediately following telegram will show you the lines on which I was thinking before your telegram arrived. Please let Halifax have a copy.

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3 Not found in American files.
4 Hull presented the gist of the formula to the Vichy Government on January 3, but the latter in effect rejected it on January 5. See Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. II, pp. 657-660.
5 Infra.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Edén) to Prime Minister Churchill

MOST SECRET

[LONDON,] January 4, 1942.

IMPORTANT

Taut 377. Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary. Washington telegrams No. 6147 and 6160 of December 31st: St. Pierre and Miquelon; I am not surprised at Vichy’s reaction in

1 The source text is marked “copy no. 1”.
2 Not found in American files.
view of Vichy Government's published denial of the 29th December that they had entered into negotiations with Foreign Government concerning the occupation. They object, no doubt, to control of radio station by U.S. and Canadian technicians and perhaps, indeed, to any negotiations at all until Vichy's sovereignty has been restored.

2. It was thus surely a mistake for the State Department to make an approach to Vichy. The Germans are no doubt following, and being kept informed of, these exchanges, and quite apart from the merits of the case in regard to which you know His Majesty's Government's views, there is therefore in my view, no possibility of a satisfactory settlement with Vichy. State Department have merely courted a rebuff.

3. I am not, however, convinced that failure to reach a settlement need bring contact[s] between U.S.A. Government and Vichy to an end. We ourselves would like to see them maintained. Russian successes and entry of U.S. into the war should have strengthened Pétain in his resistance German pressure and should make him cling more tenaciously to Fleet and North African bases and to his connection with United States.

A breach in relations with U.S. would deprive the Vichy Government of even the little respect which it enjoyed in France.

The Vichy Government have thus strong reasons to maintain relations with U.S., their sole remaining link with respectability, and their re-entry card for return to circle of Allies.

I hope therefore that U.S. Government will take no hasty decisions to sever relations with Vichy.

4. Mr. Hull's delineating public statement has of course made it difficult for him. Since it was made the inhabitants of the islands have almost unanimously declared they do not wish to have anything more to do with Vichy.

There have been no disorders. The islands have ranged themselves in an orderly way on the side of the Allies and a hindrance to Allied war effort has been removed. A solution which did not recognise these facts and which enabled Vichy to victimise a population for its loyalty to the Allied cause would not be acceptable to public opinion here.

Value.*

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* See page 377, footnote 1.

* A typewritten notation on the source text at this point reads as follows: "(Original had to be returned to Prime Minister before this copy could be finished.)"
Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1942.

My Dear Mr. President: After giving careful consideration to all of the circumstances in connection with the St. Pierre-Miquelon situation and with a view to arriving at an acceptable solution I have drafted the enclosed suggested telegram to Admiral Leahy setting forth a formula for the settlement of the matter. My suggestion would be that before sending this telegram in the event you approve it the telegram be submitted to the British and Canadian Governments for their concurrence.

Without specifically stating so this would amount to a trusteeship. It seems to me advisable to steer away from any specific statement implying a trusteeship, or an administration by the three Governments for the reason that we are likely to run counter to provisions in the Habana Convention which as you know provides for the administration of regions of this hemisphere under certain circumstances by the American Republics. I do not think that we should give the other Republics occasion to feel that we are circumventing the Convention through the establishment by the United States, Great Britain and Canada of an administration of the Islands.

On the question of bringing about the removal of de Gaulle’s forces from the Islands I am sure that you have in mind our commitments to Vichy and Admiral Robert on which they have been and are now counting and to which they have referred. In your message of December 13 to Marshal Pétain which Admiral Leahy transmitted textually to Marshal Pétain you stated that

“You may rest assured that the Government of the United States under present circumstances and in view of the instructions which you have issued to Admiral Robert will continue to give full recognition to the agreement reached by our two governments involving the maintenance of the status quo of the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere.”

Moreover in the letter which you handed to Mr. Matthews for transmission to Marshal Pétain you stated

“I again repeat that as long as French sovereign control remains in reality purely French, subject solely to the limitations of the Armistice

\[1\] The copy of this memorandum in the Department’s files (851A.01/87A) does not have the enclosure mentioned in the memorandum.

[2] Hull (vol. ii, p. 1135) states that the President was at his home at Hyde Park, New York, when this letter was sent to him. The President’s appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers) indicates that Roosevelt was away from the White House from January 7 through January 10.

Agreement, the Government of the United States has no desire to see existing French sovereignty over French North Africa or over any of French colonies pass to the control of any other nation.”

Admiral Robert has already referred in connection with the St. Pierre Miquelon incident to your communication of December 13 and has stated that he regards this Government “as obligated to obtain the reestablishment of French sovereignty over St. Pierre Miquelon”.

We have already discussed the application of the Habana Convention to this situation and I do not need to go into that here. I am confident, however, that the American Republics are watching the matter and will not be loathe to view our action with circumspection.

If the proposed telegram meets with your approval I shall at once take it up with the British and Canadian Governments.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

[Enclosure]

Draft Telegram to the American Ambassador at Vichy

Your 15, January 5, 7 p.m. In consultation with the British and Canadian Governments we have given very careful study and consideration to the situation created by the occupation of St. Pierre-Miquelon, which was accomplished without the consent or knowledge of any of these three Governments. With a view to reaching a solution satisfactory to the governments concerned, and with the concurrence of the British and Canadian Governments, we have worked out the following formula:

“Suggested arrangement with regard to St. Pierre-Miquelon:

1. The islands are French and will remain French.
2. To avoid any potential threat to the shipping of the Governments concerned, the use of the wireless stations on the islands will be subject to supervision and control by observers appointed by the American and Canadian Governments and attached to their respective consulates.
3. The islands shall be neutralized and demilitarized and shall be considered out of the war.
4. The present Administrator shall be withdrawn for the period of the war; the appointment of an Administrator shall be withheld for the same period, and the administration of the islands shall be left in the hands of the Consultative Council.

Ibid., p. 206.
6 The President apparently insisted that the telegram not be sent to Vichy, at least until he had had an opportunity to discuss the matter with Churchill, who was away from Washington, January 6–11, on a trip to Florida. See the document infra, and Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 691–698. There is no indication that the telegram actually was sent.
5. All armed forces will be withdrawn.
6. The Canadian and American Governments agree and undertake to continue economic assistance to the inhabitants of the islands and the respective consuls of those countries will confer with the local authorities as to the nature of the assistance to be given."

This formula is in conformity with the commitments given by this Government.

We fully realize the concern and anxiety of the French Government in maintaining the integrity of its colonial possessions. We feel that the formula submitted, with its guarantee that the islands shall remain French, and with the undertaking to continue economic assistance to St. Pierre and Miquelon, will fully safeguard the French Government’s concern about these islands during the war.

You should see Marshal Pétain at the earliest possible moment and impress upon him the importance of reaching a solution along these lines which maintains the purely French tradition of these islands for the future. You may, in your discretion, point out that time is of the essence, since the longer the matter remains in its present status the more likely it is to become crystallized and the more difficult it will be to bring about a satisfactory solution.

We have shown this telegram to the Canadian and British Governments and it has their full concurrence.

Until we receive an expression of opinion from the French Government regarding this formula, the matter will not be discussed with Admiral Robert or the French Ambassador.

C. H.

Hopkins Papers

Memorandum by the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, January 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

Hull sent the President a revised statement which he proposed to take up with the British and the Canadians to see if they would agree.¹

In the statement Hull retreats from his original position that the Governor and his German wife shall be placed back in the administrative office for a temporary period. The new plan provides that not only will the Administrator not be returned to the Islands but that no new Administrator will be appointed by the Vichy Govern-

¹The “revised statement” is the formula quoted in the draft telegram to Vichy (supra).
ment. Instead the government will be a consultative body which is made up of four appointees of Vichy and seven elective officials. The President did not know whether these officials were pro-Vichy.

The plan would be that the radio station would be monitored by the Canadians and ourselves and the Islands declared of no military value for the balance of the war, and that on these terms the Free French would get out.

The President suggested to Hull that he, with the President, talk it over with Churchill when he arrives on Sunday but Churchill [Hull?] demurred at this. Obviously Hull is so mad at Churchill because of his anti-Vichy speech in Canada, which he thinks made the settlement of this issue in the Islands so much more difficult for Hull.

I think Hull also believes that the British have turned their press agents loose on him. He is obviously very sensitive of the criticism he is receiving and blames it on the British and particularly on Churchill.

Hull really wanted to take the whole thing up through the normal diplomatic channels but the President insisted on handling it with Churchill.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

740.0011 EW '39/18197 3

Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Hackworth)

WASHINGTON, January 9, 1942.

THE SAINT PIERRE–MIQUELON INCIDENT

V.

THE HABANA CONVENTION OF 1940

Paragraph Two of the preamble to the convention signed at Habana in 1940 1 contemplates situations in possessions in this hemisphere of European powers resulting from events which were then taking place in Europe “which may extinguish or materially impair the sovereignty which they [the European powers] exercise over them, or leave their government without a leader”. Such a situation is declared to constitute a danger to the peace of this hemisphere.

Paragraph Three of the preamble states that force “cannot constitute the basis of rights” and that the American republics condemn all violence “whether under the form of conquest, of stipulations which may have been imposed by the belligerents in the clauses of a treaty, or by any other process”. The fourth paragraph states that any transfer or attempted transfer of the “sovereignty, jurisdiction, possession or

1 See Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. v, pp. 180 ff.; for text of treaty, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 977 or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1273.
any interest in or control over any such region to another non-American State, would be regarded by the American Republics as against ... the rights of American States to maintain their security and political independence”. Paragraph Five states that no such transfer or attempt to transfer or acquire any interest or right in any such region, directly or indirectly, shall be recognized or accepted by the American republics “no matter what form was employed to attain such purposes”. Paragraph Six states that “the acquisition of territories by force cannot be permitted”.

Article I of the convention provides that if a non-American state shall directly or indirectly attempt to replace another non-American state in the sovereignty or control which it exercised over any territory located in the Americas, “such territory shall automatically come under the provisions of this convention and shall be submitted to a provisional administrative regime.”

The convention then proceeds to state how the administrative regime shall be created and shall exercise its functions, all of which is to be of a temporary character pending the time when the region in question is in a position to govern itself or is restored to its former status, the whole purpose of the convention being to safeguard the interests of the inhabitants of the region or regions and the security of the American republics.

The islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon were occupied by force and the French governmental administrator was replaced by a military official of the Free French. The action was plainly in contravention of provisions of the convention in that (1) the sovereignty exercised by the Government of France over the islands was at least “materially” impaired; (2) the action was taken through the use of force; and (3) regardless of whether there was a transfer of sovereignty, there was a transfer of “jurisdiction, possession or any interest in or control over” the islands, within the meaning of paragraph Four of the preamble to the convention. The American republics declared in paragraph Five that no such transfer or attempt to transfer or acquire any interest or right in any such region will be recognized by them regardless of the “form ... employed to attain such purposes.”

While the convention refers to action taken by a non-American state, and while the Free French organization is not a state, its action is clearly within the intendment of the convention, which had for its purpose the keeping of possessions in this hemisphere of European powers free from fluctuations in the fortunes of war then and now going on in Europe. Moreover, it is not to be forgotten that the Free French could without great difficulty acquire the status of a state, the control over territory and people being among the essentials of statehood. It might moreover be said, whether with
or without justification, that the Free French have acted as the agent for some other state. In any event, the convention was designed to prevent these regions from becoming the object of barter or of military operations. In other words, it was the purpose of the convention to maintain the status quo during the period of the war with respect to European possessions in the Western Hemisphere. It was for these reasons that article I of the convention provided that if a non-American state should attempt to replace another non-American state “in the sovereignty or control which it exercised over any territory located in the Americas”, such territory should automatically come under the provisions of the convention.

Another reason why the fact that the Free French do not constitute a state cannot be construed as eliminating the Saint Pierre-Miquelon incident from the operation of the convention, is the further fact that if the term “state” as used in the convention should be construed strictly, the whole structure of the convention could be undermined by such methods of procedure. For example, Germany, Italy or Japan could create and send out expeditions under similar titles, such as “Free Germans”, “Free Italians” or “Free Japanese”, ostensibly opposed to the respective Governments but in fact instrumentalities of those Governments, with all the potentialities of danger to the American republic envisioned by the convention. While we are friendly to and have been assisting the Free French in other directions, and while the action of the Free French in Saint Pierre and Miquelon may not present any immediate and direct danger to the Western Hemisphere, indirect dangers may exist in other directions. If the French Government should see that the Habana convention and the Monroe Doctrine afford no protection to her possessions in this hemisphere, she might conceivably find it necessary to take military action to protect them, or what might be worse, she might enter into an alliance with our enemies in connection with which these and other possessions would be made available to our enemies, and the danger which the convention was designed to avoid would become an actuality.

In brief, the Saint Pierre-Miquelon incident standing alone is not of great moment, but the precedent which it would establish might become serious. It is contrary to the spirit of assurances given by this Government to the Vichy government, which assurances it is believed have had a stabilizing influence on that government as regards its outlying possessions, its fleet, and the general attitude of the French people, all of which could in the pivotal situation readily be turned to the advantage of our enemies.

Green H. Hackworth
Prime Minister Churchill to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)\footnote{The source text is marked “copy no. 1”.
\footnote{Not found in American files.}}

**Most Secret**

[Washington,] January 12, 1942.

Grey 305. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

Reference your telegram to Lord Halifax, No. 237 of Jan. 10th.\footnote{Refers to the evening of January 11, on which Churchill returned from his trip to Florida. The telegram was sent early on the morning of January 12.}

1. President raised the Miquelon issue with me tonight as an urgent matter. He pressed that we consider it in connection with Super-Gymnast. United States’ relations with Vichy have strengthened since German-American war. He does not wish to break sharply with Vichy. The State Department for their part are boring along on their old lines quite oblivious of the fact that the further they go against de Gaulle the worse they will fare in American opinion. Nevertheless, I am of opinion that the following proposal should be embodied in a communiqué representing the policy of the United States, Canadian and British Governments. I understand that MacKenzie King says he will agree to whatever the President and I settle.\footnote{For the Canadian reaction, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. II, pp. 663-667.}

It would have to be understood that Vichy will have to conform:

(i) The islands are French and will remain French;

(ii) To avoid any potential threat to the shipping and interests of the Governments concerned, the use of the wireless stations on the islands will be subject to the supervision and control by observers appointed by the American and Canadian Governments and attached to their respective consulates;

(iii) The islands shall be neutralized and de-militarized and shall be considered out of the war;

(iv) The present Administrator shall be withdrawn for the period of the war; the appointment of an Administrator shall be withheld for the same period, and the administration of the islands shall be left in the hands of the Consultative Council.

(v) All armed forces will be withdrawn.

(vi) The Canadian and American Governments agree and undertake to continue economic assistance to the inhabitants of the islands and the respective consuls of those countries will confer with the local authorities as to the nature of the assistance to be given. Arrangements are being made both to continue the supplies from the United States and Canada on which the islands are dependent and to provide the seasonal supply of fish to the French inhabitants of Martinique.

2. I think this is a reasonable compromise, and that in the circumstances it is only prudent to accept and enforce it. This means that
you should tell de Gaulle that this is our settled policy, and that he must bow to it. He has put himself entirely in the wrong by his breach of faith. If he is to retain any measure of our recognition he must send orders to Muselier which the latter will obey. You should dwell on the many advantages gained by Free France and that many of the points agreed will be a bitter pill to Vichy, but however you dish it up he has got to take it. I cannot believe he will refuse to give Muselier orders or that Muselier will disobey. If he were to they are in a mood here to use force—i.e., the battleship Arkansas which the President mentioned or starvation without stint. It is intolerable that the great movement of events should be obstructed, and I shall certainly not intervene to save de Gaulle or other Free French from the consequences.

3. I hope to hear from you tomorrow that it is all fixed. Personally, I think the terms are very reasonable considering the embarrassing position in which United States has been placed by its agreement with Admiral Robert, and the breach of faith by de Gaulle. By all means consult the Cabinet if you will, but we shall soon be flitting and I must settle this before I go.

For Secretary Hull’s reported reaction to this mention of the Arkansas, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. II, p. 666.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram
The British Lord Privy Seal (Attlee) to Prime Minister Churchill

MOST SECRET
MOST IMMEDIATE

[LONDON,] January 12, 1942.

Taut 499. Following for Prime Minister from Lord Privy Seal. Reference Grey 305 to which Eden is replying separately (Taut No. 502).

Cabinet felt public opinion here would not understand why after Dakar, Syria, etc. de Gaulle was not allowed to occupy French territory which welcomed him. People will not appreciate going easy with Vichy. In our view State Department overestimated Vichy reaction. Would not American democratic sentiment welcome a plebiscite as proper way out of difficulty? I do not think Cabinet will acquiesce to our compelling de Gaulle though they have agreed to Eden trying persuasion.

1 The source text is marked “copy no. 1”.
2 Supra.
3 Infra.
The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill

MOST SECRET

MOST IMMEDIATE


Taut 502. Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary. Your telegram Grey Number 305 (of January 12th: St. Pierre and Miquelon).^2

Cabinet has considered this and, since you deem it essential, agree that I should do my best with General de Gaulle. But they doubt whether it will be possible to obtain his consent and cooperation; and they would feel greatest reluctance to join in coercing him. It would be impossible to justify this to public opinion here.

2. In any case mention of consultative council in point (iv) is not clear to us. If it means consultative council existing under Vichy regime is now to take over administrative functions, this would be particularly difficult to put to de Gaulle. Indeed it would seem essential that Council which is to be in charge of administration of Islands should be newly elected by Islanders themselves. This should be so stated in communiqué and should help us considerably both with General de Gaulle and with public opinion. The substitution of words “an elected council” would meet this point.

3. In paragraph 1 (iv) does “present administration” mean Vichy administrator or (?) If so word “present” should be omitted since there is presumably a Gaullist administrator now in Islands.

4. I will await your reply before speaking to de Gaulle.

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Draft Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)


Your 15, January 5, 7 p.m.^5

Since receiving your telegram under reference and the more detailed reply^4 submitted through the French High Commissioner at Fort

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1 The source text is marked “copy no. 1”.
2 Ante, p. 399.

Draft Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Leahy)


Your 15, January 5, 7 p.m.^5

Since receiving your telegram under reference and the more detailed reply^4 submitted through the French High Commissioner at Fort

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1 A copy of this draft telegram (a revision of the draft telegram of January 8, ante, p. 594) was sent at Hull’s request by Berle to the White House on January 27, 1942. The previous day Roosevelt had requested “another copy for my files” of Hull’s “last memorandum to me before the Prime Minister left”, since the Prime Minister had taken away the President’s only copy. In transmitting this draft telegram, which bore Hull’s typewritten initials as the principal drafter, Berle stated to the President: “We are assuming that you gave the original of this to Prime Minister Churchill” (SSIA.01/1-2742).
2 The telegram was evidently drafted on or before January 14, Churchill’s final day at the Conference, for dispatch on January 15.
4 Ibid., pp. 661-662.
de France, we have given very careful study and consideration, in consultation with the British and the Canadian Government, to the situation created by the occupation of St. Pierre-Miquelon, which was accomplished without the consent or knowledge of any of these three Governments. With a view to reaching a solution satisfactory to the Governments concerned, and with the concurrence of the British and Canadian Governments, we have worked out the following formula:

"Suggested arrangement with regard to St. Pierre-Miquelon:

1. The Islands are French and will remain French.
2. To avoid any potential threat to the shipping of the Governments concerned, the use of the wireless stations on the Islands will be subject to supervision and control by observers appointed by the American and Canadian Governments and attached to their respective consulates.
3. The Islands shall be neutralized and demilitarized and shall be considered out of the war.
4. The present Administrator shall be withdrawn for the period of the war; the appointment of an Administrator shall be withheld for the same period, and the administration of the Islands shall be left in the hands of the Consultative Council.
5. All armed forces will be withdrawn.
6. The Canadian and American Governments agree and undertake to continue economic assistance to the inhabitants of the Islands and the respective consuls of those countries will confer with the local authorities as to the nature of the assistance to be given. Arrangements are being made both to continue the supplies from the United States and Canada on which the Islands are dependent and also to provide for the seasonal supply of fish to the French inhabitants of Martinique."

This formula is in conformity with the commitments given by this Government.

We fully realize the concern and anxiety of the French Government in maintaining the integrity of its colonial possessions. We feel that the formula submitted, with its guarantee that the Islands shall remain French, with its assurance that the present Consultative Council shall administer the Islands in accordance with the desires of the population and with the undertaking to continue economic assistance to St. Pierre-Miquelon, will fully safeguard the French Government's concern about these Islands during the war.

You should see Marshal Pétain at the earliest possible moment and impress upon him the importance of reaching a solution along these lines which maintains the purely French tradition of these Islands for the future. You may further explain to him that this formula represents the greatest degree of agreement which it has been possible to obtain and that we are convinced that if accepted by the Marshal and his Government it will go far to preserve the basis for an understanding between this Government and the people of France. You may, in your discretion, further point out that time
is of the essence, since the longer the matter remains in its present status, the more likely it is to become crystallized and the more difficult it will be to bring about a satisfactory solution.

Until we receive an expression of opinion from the French Government regarding this formula, the matter will not be discussed with Admiral Robert.

740.0011 E.W. 1939/1-2842

Draft Communiqué by Prime Minister Churchill

[WASHINGTON, January 14, 1942.]

DRAFT COMMUNIQUÉ

1. The islands are French and will remain French.

2. The present Administrator shall be withdrawn; the Administration of the islands shall be exercised by the Consultative Council.

3. The above-mentioned Council will agree to the appointment of Canadian and United States officials to assist them in the operation of the wireless stations on the islands in the common interests of the Allies.

4. The Free French National Committee have informed His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that they never intended that ships of the Free French Naval forces should remain in the islands, and that these ships will shortly resume their normal duties of attacking the enemy wherever they may find him.

5. The Canadian and American Government agree and undertake to continue economic assistance to the inhabitants of the islands, and the respective Consuls of those countries will confer with the local authorities as to the nature of the assistance to be given. Arrangements are being made both to continue the supplies from the United States and Canada on which the islands are dependent, and to pro-

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1 Before departing from Washington on January 14, the Prime Minister gave the President this draft communiqué, and then on January 28 he sent a personal message informing him that "after a severe conversation" on the previous day de Gaulle had "agreed to the communiqué which I left with you being published by United States, British and Canadian Governments without any acceptance by us of his proposed secret conditions." For this message, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. II, pp. 667-668.

The source text is the Department of State file copy of an enclosure to a memorandum of January 28 from Hull to Roosevelt pointing out differences between (a) the "formula which you showed Mr. Churchill as offering the possibility of acceptance all around and which I understood he had agreed to discuss with General de Gaulle" (i.e., the six numbered conditions stated in Churchill's telegram of January 12 to Eden, ante, p. 369), and (b) "the Churchill formula which he refers to as the 'draft communiqué' left with you prior to his departure, and which apparently was the basis for his discussions in London" (i.e., the source text).

2 The source text, which is on stationery of the British Embassy at Washington, bears the penciled date "January 14, 1942" (presumably the date of the original proposal left by Churchill with Roosevelt) and the typewritten date "January 27th, 1942" (presumably the date of retyping at the Embassy).
vide the seasonal supply of fish to the French inhabitants of Martinique.⁴


E. THE FREE FRENCH MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Roosevelt Papers

The Coordinator of Information (Donovan) to the President

[WASHINGTON,] December 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

It is suggested that you might wish to take up with the Prime Minister the deplorable condition of the whole Free French movement in this country and inquire into the advisability and possibility of getting out of France some leader, perhaps like Herriot.¹

740.0011 European War 1939/18663

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)

[WASHINGTON,] December 26, 1941.

Participants: Mr. Ray Atherton, Department of State
Mr. Adrian Tixier, Free French Commissioner, Washington
Mr. Samuel Reber, Department of State

Mr. Tixier called on me in the late afternoon of Christmas Eve to present a communication regarding the technical use of Free French airfields at New Caledonia. The communication has been referred to the War Department for an early expression of its views.

Mr. Tixier expressed his interest in the conversations which were going on between the President and the British Prime Minister in regard to which he understood that the Allied and associated Governments would be kept informed. He said further that he hoped that a Free French representative would be invited to participate in any

¹There is no documentary evidence that Roosevelt discussed this aspect of the Free French problem with Churchill during the First Washington Conference, but on December 27 Welles spoke to Halifax about the movement's difficulties and the need for "some man like Herriot" to "get out of France and lead" it (Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. ii, pp. 204–205). For documentation on the status of the Free French movement in the United States, see ibid., 1942, vol. ii, pp. 502 ff.
ceremony which might be planned for communication to the Allied Governments of the results of the joint Anglo-American conversations. I told Mr. Tixier that I anticipated it would be possible to keep the Free French Commission currently informed.

Mr. Tixier then expressed the view, on behalf of General de Gaulle, that in any arrangements pertaining to ultimate control of French territories in the Western Hemisphere the Free French should be entitled to assume their share in the administration of such territories. I explained the position of this Government as regards territories of the French Empire had been that they should be preserved as French territories and that the Empire should remain intact.

R. A.

F. CONTROL OF TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES

811.7441/41

The Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the President

[WASHINGTON, December 27, 1941.]

Suggestions for cooperation between communication facilities owned or controlled by American or British interests in other parts of the world

There are two matters of radio communication which may prove troublesome; so I present them to you as briefly and succinctly as possible in the hope you may be able to present them jointly to Mr. Churchill and obtain his cooperation in solutions.

First. Direct radio telegraphic communication should be permitted and established between the United States and the various parts of the British Empire. Now all messages must go to London and be relayed. This imposes extra burden on the communication facilities in England and retards the delivery of messages. The military and naval authorities are urgently pressing me to arrange direct communication. I have just succeeded in doing so with Australia. Negotiations for circuits to India and South Africa are not proceeding satisfactorily or rapidly. I feel very strongly that we should have direct communications with those particular places immediately and that we should have as a matter of course direct communication to

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1 The matter of control of telecommunications evidently was handled by Hopkins for the President. A memorandum of December 30 by Long recorded that he had explained the problem to Hopkins at the White House that morning and that the latter "understood the situation and said that he would present it to Mr. Churchill and that he hoped to have the complete accord by Saturday night. He is entirely in accord with the proposals." (811.7441/42)

2 The date "Dec. 27, 1941?" has been written in pencil on the source text and on attachment 2. "December 27, 1941" was typewritten on attachment 1 as part of the original text.
other parts of the Empire as and when our diplomatic, military and naval dispositions require it.

Second. Somewhat more delicate but of equal importance and of pressing urgency is the question of radio communication in South America. Private companies operate the radio facilities in Argentina, Brazil and Chile and are in direct communication with Tokyo, Berlin and Rome. Also they communicate to and from “Blacklist” firms in South America and serve as the medium for exchange of information between those firms and from them to Japan, Germany and Italy.

It is a very bad set-up in that it ties our enemies together as well as holds our neighbors closer in contact to our enemies.

The ownership of these companies is partly American, partly British, partly German and partly Italian (?) in about equal shares. Recently the R.C.A. and British interests have increased their holdings so they now own a majority of the stock. We have tried to induce them to cease working their beams to Rome, Berlin and Tokyo but have had no success whatever in obtaining the help of the British interests. It is patent we will make no headway unless the British Government itself takes the matter in hand and directs that its own citizens, resident in England, cooperate whole-heartedly with us in our efforts to close these circuits. Obviously we will then have to secure the cooperation of the governments in South America, but we will not be in a position even to ask that unless the British cooperate.

The I.T. & T. operates one station at Lima and is doing the same thing but it has asked us to take steps with the Government of Peru to permit it to stop. The Government of Peru has indicated its willingness, if requested,—but we have not seen fit to close that one circuit if the others continue because to do so would not prevent communication with and between our enemies but would only cause a rerouting of messages to the other circuits.

Something ought to be done immediately.

I hope you can present these mutual problems to Mr. Churchill and secure from him a directive to the appropriate officials of his Government and ask him to instruct his Ambassador in Washington to confer with me at his earliest convenience so we can arrange satisfactorily both of these questions.

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*For text of the Proclamation Authorizing a Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals and Controlling Certain Exports, July 17, 1941, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. v, July 19, 1941, p. 42, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1657. For documents relating to the application of the Proclaimed List in Latin America, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. vi, and *ibid.*, 1942, vols. v and vi, Index entries under Proclaimed List.

4In the copy in the Hopkins Papers, “Italian (?)” has been altered in ink to read “French”.

I am attaching two supporting memoranda, one on each subject, in case you want more information than the necessarily limited amount given in this memorandum.

[Attachment 1]

December 27, 1941.

Subject: Direct Communication with various Elements of the British Empire.

In the present state of the world emergency and considering,
First, the close cooperation of the British and American Governments and
Second, the presence of American diplomatic, military, naval and air personnel on active duty in or near various parts of the British Empire—

It is essential that telegraphic communication by radio be established between the United States and these scenes of activity.

The Department of State has been in negotiation with Australia, India and South Africa in an effort to establish direct communication with those three countries. The Department has also been in communication through our Embassy at London with the British Foreign Office in an effort to coordinate and expedite the agreements between that Government, its dominions and the United States. The Department has just succeeded in establishing communication to Australia. No progress has been made in establishing communications with South Africa or with India.

Under the present practice it is necessary to radio to England. The message from England is rebroadcast to destination. This practice requires an unnecessary use of the British radio receiving and transmitting facilities in England and of radio wave bands and frequencies to and from England in that it is unnecessary for these messages to proceed to England. By proceeding there, as they do, they consume time on wave lengths going into England and again consume time going out of England. The receiving and transmitting facilities in England are crowded. They could be relieved of a part of the load if these messages went direct to destination instead of to England. Furthermore, transmission direct would permit the additional use of wave bands by the British receiving and sending facilities because they would not be used by messages intended for India or South Africa.

In addition to these reasons which would simplify communication as far as England is concerned, direct communication from the United States to India and South Africa would expedite necessary communi-
cations to our diplomatic, military, naval and air representatives in those regions and would facilitate our necessary activities in connection with those areas.

Part of the difficulty in coming to agreement with the governments concerned seems to be the fact that Cables and Wireless Limited (a British private industry) has contracts with communicating companies in various parts of the British Empire, securing to itself a monopoly of communication and causing messages to be transmitted to England prior to their re-transmission to their companies in these various jurisdictions. Irrespective of the fact that Cables and Wireless might lose some revenue by reason of the diversion of traffic to direct channels, it would seem that the exigencies of the public service, both as regards that of Great Britain and that of the United States, assume an importance which transcends the convenience of private telegraph companies.

Having succeeded in securing direct radio telegraphic communication with Australia, it seems that an agreement for the extension of those facilities to India and South Africa could be very easily approved in principle by Mr. Churchill and directions given by him to his Government to carry them into immediate execution. The situation developing in the neighborhood of India justifies the immediate institution of direct communication. The sea route around Africa and other activities there have long since demonstrated the need for direct communication with Pretoria.

The acceptance in principle by the British Government of direct radio telegraphic facilities with various parts of the Empire, once accepted, could be utilized to establish communications from time to time, as circumstances develop, in various parts of the world. Direct communication would contribute to the closer cooperation and more immediate activity of the United States forces in the areas concerned.

[Attachment 2]

It is understood between the British and American Governments that it would be desirable to stop all communication between South American radio telegraph and radio telephone stations and Tokyo, Berlin and Rome respectively.

That some of the companies engaged in these communications are wholly American owned and controlled and others are partly American and British but controlled. [sic]
That the American Government and the British Government will adopt a concurrent policy and direct their respective nationals in control of these communications to close the circuits to the Axis.

That the American Government will then proceed at the Inter-American Conference about to be held at Rio de Janeiro and individually with the Governments of South American countries in the territories of which these communicating companies actually operate, to secure the cooperation of those Governments.

That time is of the essence considering the approaching Rio de Janeiro Conference and urgency is apparent.

Hopkins Papers

The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1942.

My Dear Harry, Cables & Wireless will agree to the proposals for prohibiting transmissions by wireless from South America to Italy and Tokyo.

Cables & Wireless warn me that diplomatic action in South America will be necessary, as the services there are controlled by local companies.

I am getting a cable on the subject tomorrow and I will then write another letter.

Yours ever,

Max

Hopkins Papers

The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) ¹

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1942.

My Dear Harry, You asked me to look into the question of Cables & Wireless Limited permitting transmissions by wireless to Germany, Italy and Tokyo.

I wrote to you yesterday telling you that I was expecting a cable from London on the subject.

I now send you a copy of the cable.

I am unhappy to send you such a long telegram, but I am sending it just as I received it.

Yours ever,

Max

¹The source text bears the notation "Copy to Breckinridge Long 1/5/42".
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF PROGRAMMES IN THE BRITISH MINISTRY OF
SUPPLY (LAYTON) TO THE MINISTER OF SUPPLY (BEAVERBROOK)

SECRET


I have seen Campbell Stuart and Sir Edward Wilshaw. The former is not Chairman or Director of Cables and Wireless but the officially nominated Chairman of the Imperial Communications Advisory Committee, on which Sir Clive Baillieu was formerly Australian representative. Wilshaw is Chairman and Managing Director of Cables and Wireless operating companies and Managing Director of the holding company. His appointment is also approved by the Government.

Cables and Wireless are members of a consortium which handles wireless telegraph traffic from Argentine, Brazil and Chile, through local companies.

The holdings of the parties are approximately one-quarter British (C. and W.), one-quarter American (R.C.A.), one-quarter French (C.G.T.S.F.) and one-quarter German (T.G.D.T.). An Italian company also holds some shares in the Argentine and Brazilian companies.

The Managing Director of the company is a Pole who has an office at Electra House. The Managing Director in the Argentine is French, in Brazil French, and in Chile British.

The parties pooled their interest by trust deed in 1921, there being two trustees for each party. Since the war the Germans have substituted two Swedes for their German nominees. The position of Chairman with casting vote is at present vacant.

Wilshaw assures me that this is the first time the question of closing traffic from South America to enemy countries has been raised with him. He would personally be delighted to see the traffic stopped and will co-operate in whatever line the Government proposes.

The British and American members, however, do not hold control and the national boards in South America would probably refuse to act without instructions from their Governments, who have licensed them to carry out their services.

Further, the consortium only controls three out of ten wireless services operating from South America, apart from services operated by governmental administration. Six other commercial services are under I.T. & T., while R.C.A. has an independent service in Colombia.

Also closure of circuits with enemy countries would only mean that traffic would be diverted through Sweden, Portugal, Spain, etc. While, therefore, Wilshaw is sure that the British and American members of the consortium would gladly take action under the instruction

*Not found in American files.*
of their respective governments, this course would, in his opinion, be less effective than action through the State Department and the Pan American Union.

The South American governments could be approached by the U.S. and British diplomatic representatives and instructions issued to the companies or telegraph administrations as the case may be, by the Ministers of Posts and Telegraphs.

Do you want me to mention the matter to the Foreign Office in London?

Grateful thanks for your New Year message and for your good wishes, which I very sincerely reciprocate. The past six months, though strenuous, have been delightful. The Ministry will get its full harvest in 1942.

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811.7441/39

The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1942.

MY DEAR HARRY: You spoke to me the other day about direct Cable and Wireless communication between the United States and British Empire countries. You asked that direct communication should be permitted for Government messages for the duration of the war and I have now received a report¹ on the position from Sir Walter Layton.

The Advisory Committee on Imperial Communications is meeting next week and I am putting forward the request for direct communications for Government messages during the war.

It is expected that the Committee will consent to your plan.

Yours ever,

MAX

[LORD BEAVERBROOK]²

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¹ Not found in American files.
² Brackets in source text; signature “Max” typewritten in source text.

811.7441/42A

The Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1942.

DEAR HARRY: I have yours of January 3d, with enclosures of January 2nd from Lord Beaverbrook to you and copy of a memo to Lord Beaverbrook from Layton.¹

¹ Hopkins’ message of January 3 to Long has not been found, but the enclosures are printed ante, pp. 409 and 410, respectively.

735–006–68—31
Referring to the latter paper. I have read it carefully and agree with it all except as to procedure. I am referring to the antepenultimate paragraph.

If the British Government will direct its citizens—in this case the Cables and Wireless—to cooperate with the American interests associated with them in the consortium and with the other American interests of I.T. & T. and RCA, which have already agreed to the cessation of transmission, then the matter will be in such shape that Mr. Welles can present it to the inter-American conference about to be held at Rio. It would be necessary to have the private interests ready to cooperate before the political action is taken and we are prepared to present the matter to the other American Republics at the conference.

We consider it of the utmost importance. While closing of these stations will not—as clearly stated in the memorandum—close all circuits, it will prevent the communication by blacklist firms with their principals and it will hamper and interfere with the communications of the enemy. Having proceeded as far as the present plan proposes and when we have concluded that operation, we will then start on the next step, which will contemplate the closure of other circuits.

B. L.

Hopkins Papers

The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

WASHINGTON, 11 January, 1942.

MY DEAR HARRY: You asked me to make arrangements to enable the United States Government to communicate with colonies direct by Cable & Wireless instead of through London as at present.

That project has now been carried into effect for the duration of the war according to your word.¹

I bless and praise thy matchless might,

Yours ever,

Max

¹In telegram No. 361 to London, January 30, 1942, not printed, Hopkins requested Beaverbrook's further assistance with regard to establishing direct communications. Beaverbrook's reply, transmitted in telegram No. 517 from London, February 4, not printed, described British measures taken and to be taken. (811.7441/44, 46)
Washington, January 12, 1942.

Dear Harry: I have your memorandum dated January 11 from Lord Beaverbrook stating that the arrangements for the United States to communicate direct with the British colonies has been carried into effect for the duration. That’s perfect.

Now can we button up the South American situation as per my memorandum to you of several days ago? The Rio conference convenes today and if we could get assurances that the British Government would direct their people to cooperate with us with the understanding that it is our diplomatic responsibility to make the arrangements down there, then that would be one thousand percent.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

1 Underscored on the original.
2 The Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, which met at Rio de Janeiro, January 15–28, 1942, agreed upon a number of resolutions, including one on telecommunications (No. XL), in which it was resolved “To recommend that each American Republic adopt the necessary and immediate measures to close all radiotelephone and radiotelegraph communication between the American Republics and the aggressor states and all territories subservient to them, except in so far as official communications of the American Governments are concerned.” For complete text, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. v, February 7, 1942, p. 140. For documentation on the Rio Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. v, pp. 6 ff.; for the further development of this question, see section entitled “Efforts to Prevent Communication with the Axis Countries through Commercial Wireless Companies”, ibid., pp. 108 ff.

G. ECONOMIC AID TO SPAIN

740.0011 European War 1939/1941

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. George of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1942.

Participants: Mr. Barclay, British Embassy;
Mr. George, Division of European Affairs.

Mr. Barclay stated that General Kindelan, now Captain General in Barcelona, recently sounded by the British Consul General in that city, stated that the Germans appear to be exerting no special pressure at this time.
In regard to Spain, Mr. Barclay stated that the British are in possession of information from an irrefutable source, to the effect that Axis submarines have been refueling in Vigo. He added that a strenuous protest was being lodged with the Spanish Government by Sir Samuel Hoare, and that the Government was being asked to put a stop to this refueling at once and, moreover, to immobilize Axis supply ships in Spanish ports by placing Spanish guards aboard them. I remarked that this sort of thing made it very difficult for us to go on with the policy of supplying Spain, to which Barclay agreed. He added, however, that it was nonetheless the conviction of the British Government that now, more than ever, it was extremely important to continue a limited aid to Spain. It was not felt that isolated incidents of the character of the one just cited should be permitted to disrupt a policy which was felt to be of vital importance in the whole western European situation. In fact this was felt to be so important that the Government in London was understood to have asked Mr. Churchill particularly to mention the matter to President Roosevelt.

In connection with the recent occupation of Portuguese Timor by a combined Dutch and Australian force, Mr. Barclay said that as the result of subsequent conversations with the Portuguese Government it appeared to have been decided in principle that a Portuguese force, numerically stronger than the Allied force now holding Portuguese Timor, would be or had already been despatched to Timor, and that upon arrival of this Portuguese force the Allied forces of occupation would be withdrawn.

Roosevelt Papers

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, [January 5, 1942.]

Mr. President:

Please will you very kindly consider giving a few rationed carrots to the Dons to help stave off trouble at Gibraltar? Every day we have the use of the harbour is a gain, especially in view of some other ideas we have discussed. I am told it only needs a word to Wallace.  

W. C.

5. 1. 42

1 The source text is on White House stationery; Churchill’s initials are typed.
2 Vice President Wallace was Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare.
No direct reply by Roosevelt has been found, but for related documentation, see “Concern of the United States Over Maintenance of Neutrality by Spain”, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 248 ff., and “Negotiations Between the American Chargé at Tangier and the Spanish High Commissioner Regarding Economic Aid to Spanish Zone of Morocco and Tangier”, ibid., vol. iv, pp. 439 ff.
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON, January 14, 1942.]

Mr. President:

May I leave with you this reminder about your promise to make some statement confirming that there is to be no question of the transfer to the United States of the British West Indian Colonies either under the Bases Agreement or otherwise.

I stated in the House of Commons on August 20, 1940, “There is of course no question of any transference of sovereignty—that has never been suggested—or of any action being taken without the consent of or against the wishes of the various Colonies concerned.” Anxiety is however still felt on the subject in many Islands, and it has been suggested that, as this is likely to be revived by the publication of the proposed communiqué about the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, that announcement would be a suitable occasion for your statement, possibly in reply to an inspired question at a Press Conference, subsequent to the Press release.

W.C.

14.1.42

1 The source text is labeled “copy”; Churchill’s initials are typed.
2 In a statement released to the press on March 9, 1942, Roosevelt emphasized that the United States did not seek sovereignty over the islands or colonies on which the bases were located; see Department of State Bulletin, vol. vi, March 14, 1942, p. 230.