PALESTINE

EFFECT OF THE EUROPEAN WAR UPON THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE; BRITISH POLICIES REGARDING JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE

867N.01/1685

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

No. 1187

JERUSALEM, January 8, 1940.

[Received February 5.]

Sir: I have the honor to submit herewith a brief résumé of the various major currents of thought in this country as I have found them during the month following my return from four months leave of absence. I shall take as my text a comment made by the High Commissioner: “You will find it a very different country to that you left last summer.” He referred primarily to changes brought about by a world distraught by war.

Most notable of these changes, of course, is the ending of the three years of Arab insurrection. That, in fullest truth, there is today no Arab revolt is confirmed to me on every side, from British and Arab sources alike. The General Officer Commanding comments: “We have reestablished order and we shall maintain it.”* Able author George Antonius sees his people, as often throughout their history following a surge of effort, again carried backwards on an ebbing tide of almost fatalistic inaction. Their genius, he adds, unlike that of the Jews, does not include a capacity for long-sustained effort.

Among politically-minded Arabs I find an undercurrent of helplessness amounting almost to resignation. They are without effective leadership, largely impoverished. Their main support, the sympathy of the Arab and Moslem worlds, is largely inactive. They still mistrust British bona fides and fear Jewish influence in London and Washington.

In particular, these Arabs complain that the White Paper of last May** promised them restriction of Jewish immigration and land

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1 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. iv, pp. 694 ff.
2 British Cmd. 6019: Palestine, Statement of Policy.
purchases. Instead, they have seen a legal immigration of 14,000 supplemented by some 20,000 illegal entrants. And they still await the long-promised land transfer regulations. Of late, Jewish purchasers are, if anything, on the increase; and current cables from the United States bring reports of a United Palestine Appeal for record contributions.

It follows, too, that among these Arabs I have found no enthusiasm for the Allied cause. That they are better off under the British than they would be under the Germans is readily admitted. But for them this means, as one put it, "but the less objectionable of two imperialisms." Definitely, they feel, it is not their war; and they see, in an allied victory, little hope of better things in Palestine. They speak often, with little veiled regret at their own impotency to act likewise, of the Indian Congress Party's stand.

Withal, however, I am assured, there is a general willingness among the Arabs to cooperate helpfully with the Administration in meeting the pressing problems of the moment. The Palestine Arab has always sensed the pro-Arab sympathies of the local British official. With the ending of the revolt, old friendships have been renewed.

In Jewish circles I find less consideration given to the political aspects of the Palestine problem. There is readily voiced relief that the Arab revolt has ended and an evident underlying conviction that Zionism must ultimately triumph. But there is wanting that keenness—and bitterness—which has marked political discussion during the last four years. There is, in short, general acceptance of the proposition that, for the duration of the war, the question of the ultimate political status of the country is not to be raised. Meanwhile, it is their basic policy to consolidate and strengthen their position in the country and, by their support of the Allied cause, earn good will for the future.

In the latter field, as reported by Consul Steger, there was, following the outbreak of the war, extensive organization of Jewish manpower for possible enlistment in the Allied forces. But, on the Jewish side, this reduced itself to a desire to form, under British and Jewish officers, strictly Jewish units for service only in Palestine or, in an emergency, in neighboring countries. The political implications of this attitude were patent. The comment is current in British circles that "what the Jews most wanted was that we should train a Jewish army to serve a post-war Jewish State."

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE WADSWORTH

*Christian T. Steger.
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

No. 1207

JERUSALEM, January 24, 1940. [Received February 20.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that Jewish immigration into Palestine in 1939 showed remarkable increase in spite of having been governed by regulations especially designed to keep it under control on a quota basis. The purpose of this despatch is to give a brief preliminary report on immigration during 1939—to be followed by the usual annual report when more detailed information is available—and to assess the significance of the figures given. Advantage will also be taken of the opportunity to bring up to date the chronology of events in the field of illegal immigration left off with the Consulate General’s despatch No. 1096 of September 21, 1939.*

Before giving the 1939 figures, it will be helpful to review, at the risk of too-frequent repetition, the regulations and conditions governing immigration in that year. During the first three months, immigration was controlled by a schedule published on October 27, 1938, relating to the period October 1, 1938 to March 31, 1939. Under this last of the schedules based on the temporary expedient of political high level, 7,788 Jews entered the country during the first quarter or registered as immigrants after arrival as visitors. A new chapter in Palestine’s ever-changing immigration problem was inaugurated with the publishing on June 15, 1939, of the first quota, which provided for the issuance of 10,350 immigration certificates to Jews for the period April 1st to September 30. This quota, designed to replace the former schedules based on the traditional policy of economic absorptive capacity, gave effect to the immigration phase of the British White Paper of May 1939 which provided for the entry of 50,000 Jewish immigrants over a period of five years and for the admission of 25,000 Jewish refugees. For a discussion of this new policy and of Jewish and Arab reaction thereto, the Department is referred to despatch No. 978 of June 26, 1939.**

Jewish immigration during the second quota period, October 1, 1939 to March 31, 1940, was completely suspended as a result of the widespread entry of Jews into the country illegally. The determination of the British Government to suspend immigration for six months, or even longer if conditions warrant, was reported in despatch No. 1018 of July 21, 1939,*** and the translation of this intention into legal act in a telegram of October 23, 1939.**** It should be emphasized

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**Not printed.
****Ibid., p. 809.
here that Palestine's immigration quotas represent immigration certificates to be issued and not persons to be admitted during the periods covered. Jewish immigrants presently arriving in considerable numbers thus bear certificates issued before September 30 and not, as many persons fall into the error of believing, during the present quota period.

Turning now to the main theme of this despatch, some 16,000 to 16,500 Jewish immigrants entered Palestine legally in 1939, which estimate includes, in addition to immigrant arrivals, temporary visitors given permission to remain permanently. (It may be observed here that this practice of registering visitors as immigrants has been discontinued). These figures are based on statistics of the Department of Migration showing the entry for the first 10 months of 14,161 Jews and on a semi-official estimate of immigration of about 2,000 for November and December. This compares with legal Jewish immigration of 12,868 in 1938 and 10,536 in 1937, the only years with which comparison is possible as arbitrary numerical restriction of immigration was not imposed until mid-1937. Figures for 1939 are much smaller, of course, than those of 29,727 for 1936 and 61,854 for 1935, when immigration, restricted only by the test of economic absorptive capacity, reached its peak.

This small increase in legal immigration as compared with 1937 and 1938 has, in itself, little political significance for an even greater increase was to be expected under the new policy based on the White Paper. In fact, had the quota for the present period not been suspended, more than 20,000 Jewish immigrants would probably have entered legally in 1939. The Government's intention, as indicated in the White Paper and as carried out in the first quota based on it, was—and apparently still is—to admit Jewish immigrants at the rate of 10,000 a year for five years, plus (during the early part of the five-year period) as many of the specially authorized 25,000 refugees as the country may be able to absorb. Obviously, however, the number of refugees to be admitted will depend on political and psychological as well as economic factors. It would appear, therefore, that, such factors permitting, the Government has contemplated the admission of some 20,000 Jews a year for the next two years; hence, the entry of 16,000 in 1939 seems to be in keeping with present policy.

The immigration picture is not, however, complete unless we look behind the figures on the legal entry of immigrants and see how they are affected by illegal immigration. It is in this field that we find much of political importance in 1939 and it is here that much of the battle of Zionism versus White Paper must be fought. It is estimated that some 14,000 to 15,000 Jews entered Palestine illegally in 1939.
Of this estimated number, some 10,200 are by actual count, having arrived on the 19 illegal immigrant ships listed in the Consulate General’s despatches of May 3, June 26, July 21, September 21 and in this despatch. A further four to five thousand may be estimated to have entered, as during the preceding year, singly and in smaller groups or to have stayed illegally after arrival as temporary visitors. Thus, during 1939, almost as many Jews entered the country illegally as legally, bringing the total of Jewish immigrants for the year to at least 30,000. This is double the entries for 1938 and 1937, even if we add to the figures for the two previous years the generally accepted estimate of illegal immigration at the rate of several thousand a year.

More important, however, than the mere figures is the fact that the Government appears to have been powerless to prevent the illegal flow, in spite of apparently sincere efforts to do so. Clearly, the problem is one of considerable magnitude, particularly since the Government is deprived, for obvious humanitarian reasons, of its most effective means of combatting the traffic—that of deportation.

There has been a lull in the arrival of illegal immigrant ships during the last few months, only two having discharged their human cargoes on the shores of Palestine since the Consulate General’s despatch of September 21. These were the Bulgarian SS Rudnitchan, which landed its illegal immigrants, approximately 500 in number, in small boats near Tel Aviv on November 14 and an unnamed “auxiliary motor schooner” which landed 502 near Haifa on January 8, 1940. Excluding this latter vessel which arrived after January 1, our record shows that 19 ships landed some 10,300 illegal immigrants from the beginning of the first quota period on April 1 to the end of the year. The illegal immigrants were in all cases arrested but released shortly thereafter. The ships were, when it was possible to apprehend them, detained pending sequestration proceedings; most were confiscated by the Government but some were released on technical grounds. The crews were, also when they could be found, arrested; some were sentenced, others released for various reasons.

It is not to be supposed that the present lull in the arrival of shiploads of illegal immigrants indicates that the traffic has voluntarily ceased or that the Government has been successful in stopping it. It may, I believe, be attributed to three factors. First, the war has temporarily disrupted arrangements and made it difficult to obtain ships. Secondly, I am confidentially informed by an official of the Jewish Agency that that body is giving at present no active encouragement to the illegal traffic, as the arrival of thousands of penniless refugees has seriously hampered Jewish unemployment and relief work and has had disagreeable political consequences. Thirdly, the British

Government is known to be putting pressure "behind the scenes" on the Governments of those European countries where illegal immigrants embark to obtain cooperation in preventing the departure of ships. That the British Government, however, does not believe the threat of further mass illegal immigration has passed is evident from the following statement reported by Reuters to have been made by the Foreign Office on January 8, 1940:

It is reported that certain shipping agencies are engaged in organizing the transport of emigrants from Danubian countries to Palestine. There is reason to believe that intending emigrants do not know that they will not be admitted into Palestine unless they possess immigration certificates issued by the Palestine Department of Immigration and that if they arrive in Palestine without these certificates they will be liable to serious penalties and deportation under Palestine laws.

Furthermore, it is alleged that the ships, on which the immigrants travel at great expense to themselves, are small and unsanitary and unseaworthy.

The captains and crews of these ships do not appear to know that if they carry passengers who are not legally entitled to land in Palestine they are themselves liable to arrest and heavy fine.

A high official of the Palestine Government has confidentially informed me that this statement was issued primarily as a warning to official and shipping circles in southeastern European countries rather than to prospective immigrants or Jewish organizations. Local officials, too, have recently received specific information that certain ships—apparently, I gathered, of Greek or Rumanian registry—are making arrangements to transport further illegal immigrants to this country.

In summary, the considerable increase in Jewish immigration in 1939 may be attributed almost entirely to the mass entry of illegal immigrants in especially chartered ships although a smaller increase was to have been expected as a result of the new policy based on the White Paper. Although ship-load traffic in illegal immigrants has fallen off greatly in the last few months, it is not unlikely that it will pick up again in 1940.

As to the immediate future of legal immigration, no prediction is possible. It would appear, however, that at least a small quota for the period beginning April 1 will be established, providing that illegal immigration does not increase in volume prior to that date. This belief is based on two considerations—one statistical and one political. The first is that Jewish immigration for the two semi-annual quota periods, April 1, 1939, to March 31, 1940, will probably amount to only some five to eight thousand more than the 20,000 or so the Government apparently intended to admit under the new policy. Thus, it would seem that further total suspension of the issuance of immigration
certificates will not be justified in the light of the present policy and the decreased volume of illegal entries. The other, political, consideration is that the Government may wish to appease Jewish opinion which was hurt and outraged at the suspension of immigration at a time when the European refugee problem was so acute.

The Chief Secretary, in an after-dinner conversation last week, made a remark in discussing the possibility of a quota after April 1 which throws some light on this latter aspect of the matter and at the same time approaches the illegal immigration problem from a somewhat new and interesting angle. "There is a very good case," he said, "for a refugee quota after April 1, if only the Jewish Agency and leading Zionist organizations would come out into the open and declare that they disapprove of illegal immigration." By this he implied, in the light of preceding remarks, that although such organizations are in fact opposed to illegal immigration because disruptive of orderly development of the National Home, they hesitate openly to express themselves in that sense because of the unfavorable effect any such expression would have on world Jewry's support of the Zionist cause, faced as Jewry is with constant harrowing accounts of German persecution and as constant appeals for refugee relief contribution. A major element of strength in Zionism's current appeal is, of course, that Palestine still offers a place of asylum for many thousands of refugees from Central and Eastern Europe.

I venture to recall, in concluding, an observation made in my despatch No. 1018 of July 21, 1939, reviewing developments in this field following publication of the May 17 White Paper. It was to the effect that two contending forces, the Government and Zionism, were drawn up to do battle over Jewish immigration into Palestine. It would appear that the first round in this conflict has gone to the latter. Unless the Government can stem the flow of illegal immigrants, realization of the immigration phase, and indeed all, of the White Paper policy will be seriously prejudiced.

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE WADSWORTH

867N.01/1699

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1940.

Participants: Dr. Chaim Weizmann;
Mr. Murray;
Mr. Alling;
Mr. Childs.
Dr. Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization and ex-officio President of the Jewish Agency, stated that he had come to this country, with Palestine as always uppermost in his mind, to raise $4,000,000 outside the United Palestine Appeal for strengthening the Jewish community in Palestine.

It was to be anticipated, Dr. Weizmann said, that at the end of the war there would be at least 2,500,000 Jews seeking refuge. Of these perhaps 1,000,000 would represent Jews with a future and the others Jews whose lives were behind them—"who were but little more than dust". He believed that it would be possible to settle in Palestine 1,000,000 of these refugees, so far as possible those with a future, one-fourth on the land, the remainder as an addition to the urban population. It was true that Palestine was not rich in the raw materials which were conducive to industrial development but Palestine did possess in its Jewish population the very quintessence of intellectual ability. It was not too much to expect, he thought, that Jewish brains might develop Palestine industrially in a way to make it fill the needs of the Near East in such items as pharmaceutical products for example. He had discussed this possibility in Turkey when he was there recently and had met with a favorable reaction to it.

Dr. Weizmann expressed the view that the most advantageous settlement of the Palestine question in his opinion would be the division of the country into Jewish and Arab cantons with wide powers of autonomy and the federation of Palestine and Trans-Jordan into one state under continued British supervision for some time to come. As Jewish cantons he would include Galilee (northern Palestine) and the coastal region of Palestine, and as Arab cantons the hill country and western Palestine, together with Trans-Jordan. The Negev or southern Palestine comprises 11,000,000 dunums of land inhabited by no more than 50,000 Bedouins. At least one-tenth of this region was cultivable and might serve as an eventual place of settlement of large numbers of people. He would leave this area, however, outside the cantonization plan for subsequent disposition.*

The hope was expressed by Dr. Weizmann that eventually such Jewish and Arab areas as might be set up in Palestine and Trans-Jordan could be merged in a larger federation of states, including

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*According to the Palestine Partition Commission Report, the Negev comprises 12½ million dunums of which from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 dunums are put under cultivation (one dunum equals 0.2217 acre or a little more than one-fifth of an acre). Well borings in this area, however, have not given promise of the possibility of irrigation from that source of water although Dr. Lowdermilk of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, who visited it recently, is of the opinion that greater utilization of the land might be possible through more scientific use of the rain water available. It may be said that, although the possibilities of the settlement of large numbers in the Negev remains to be demonstrated as feasible, the existence of so large an area comparatively unpopulated in Palestine makes it one of the most attractive potential possibilities for large-scale immigration in that country. [Footnote in the original.]
Syria and Iraq, but he was afraid that the French might be an obstacle to this.

The Jewish leader added that his proposed boundaries for cantonal settlement followed in general the lines of the partition proposals of the Royal Commission. He had succeeded in obtaining the approval of the partition proposals by the World Zionist Congress in 1937 as he felt that those proposals were something in hand which were worth accepting. Unfortunately, the partition scheme had had to be abandoned.

Dr. Weizmann stated that he would be one of the first to admit that the Jews had made many mistakes in Palestine. Twenty years had not been enough in which to reach a durable basis of settlement. It would take many more years than that.

Mr. Murray inquired what Dr. Weizmann's reaction had been to the statement in Parliament in 1938 of Viscount Samuel that the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine was as genuine as the Egyptian nationalist movement, the Irish nationalist movement, or the Indian nationalist movement. Dr. Weizmann replied that he was in entire accord with Viscount Samuel as to this.

Mr. Murray observed that he did not think that Dr. Weizmann's views as to the advantages of the partition proposals of the Royal Commission or as to the significance of the Arab uprising of the past three years in Palestine were generally shared by American Zionists. Dr. Weizmann replied that with all due respect to American Zionists he found them either too extreme in their views, on the one hand, or too lukewarm, on the other. By reason of their distance from the practical problems which the Jews had to face, American Zionists were insufficiently informed concerning the day-to-day development of those problems. As a result, American Zionists were either uncompromising in their outlook or completely disillusioned regarding the future.

Mr. Murray asked Dr. Weizmann whether he did not agree that the attainment of an Arab-Jewish understanding was of vital importance to the success of the Jewish National Home in Palestine; whether, in view of the, in general, higher intelligence, superior education and greater social consciousness of the Jews, the responsibility for effecting such an understanding rested to a far greater degree upon the Jews than upon the Arabs of Palestine; whether, in other words, it was not reasonable to expect that somewhere in World Jewry outstanding men of diplomatic skill and negotiating talent could be found to handle this all-important problem and to dispel the fear that had obsessed both Jews and Arabs in Palestine with such devastating

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effect on the vital interests of both races. Dr. Weizmann replied that he heartily concurred in the views expressed by Mr. Murray and that he would be the first to admit that the Jews must share with the Arabs the blame for what had happened in Palestine. He made the interesting observation in this connection that, while some effort had been made for farseeing Jews to effect a reconciliation with the Arabs, they had been blocked in many quarters not only by Jews but also by certain British officials who seemed to have no interest in the success of such an endeavor. Mr. Murray expressed the view that if the Jews and Arabs could come to an understanding among themselves and could present the world with a plan mutually agreed upon by them it would be difficult, if not impossible, to raise effective objection in any quarter to the execution of such a plan. Dr. Weizmann confirmed this view, and stated that the great obstacle which the Jews had experienced hitherto in dealing with the Arabs was that they had at all times been obliged to deal through British officials instead of direct with the Arabs. He also observed that in order to gain the confidence of the Arabs and to dispel their very real fear of the Jews he felt it would be a wise and farseeing policy for the Jews to devote as much attention and care to the welfare and well-being of the Arabs in the country as had been expended upon the Jews. In other words, he would like to see the Jews set up model villages for the Arabs in the proposed Arab area equal in every respect to those provided for the Jews. In this way he would hope to bring about a lasting spirit of good will and confidence between the two races.

When Mr. Murray mentioned that there were reports of a new spirit animating the Arabs and Jews in Palestine, as evidenced by increasing friendly cooperation, the President of the World Zionist Organization observed that he himself had been heartened by these reports and he had hopes that they would continue. He did not believe that exaggerated importance should be attached to them but they were straws in the wind.

Dr. Weizmann remarked that Mr. Murray had asked him how it was the Jews, with their brains and ability, had not succeeded in coming to terms with the Arabs. The inquiry was a very pertinent one, the Jewish leader observed. He recalled that he himself had entered into negotiations with Feisal\(^{10}\) in 1918 and that the two had signed an agreement with respect to Palestine\(^{11}\) which had never been realized owing to subsequent developments. At that time Feisal was recognized as the spokesman of the Arabs and any agreement which he signed had the force of authority of the Arab world.

\(^{10}\) Emir Feisal, acting on behalf of his father, the King of Hedjaz.

of the Near East behind it. Since that time, however, Feisal had
died and the Arab world, at least so far as Palestine was concerned,
had been without any single spokesman; consequently, it had been
correspondingly difficult for the Jews to enter into negotiations with
the Arabs with a view to reaching an understanding. That, of
course, was what was most desired and he had hopes that it might
still be possible to achieve it.

He added that while in London recently Mr. H. St. J. B. Philby,
the great Near Eastern authority and friend of King Ibn Saud, had
called on him and had stated that he would like to take back with
him to Saudi Arabia some basis of settlement which the King might
be willing to support. Dr. Weizmann said that he had remarked to
Philby that the only thing the Jews had to offer was money. If
an amount of a million pounds was wanted by the King of Saudi
Arabia for enlisting his aid in achieving a settlement for Palestine
he, Dr. Weizmann, would answer that the price was much too small;
if the sum were fifteen or twenty million pounds he would answer
that it was beyond hope of realization by the Jews but if the amount
were three to four million pounds as the price of the King's support
of a scheme whereby the Arabs of Palestine would be voluntarily
transferred to Trans-Jordan and Iraq, Dr. Weizmann stated that he
would prepare to undertake to raise the sum. Philby had promised
to convey the offer to the King but Dr. Weizmann had no means of
knowing whether anything would come of it. He did feel that King
Ibn Saud would be an excellent spokesman for the Arabs and one with
whom he could deal. Consequently, he was awaiting with interest
information from Mr. Philby as to Ibn Saud's reactions to the dis-
cussions.

867N.01/1687: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary
of State

JERUSALEM, March 3, 1940—noon.
[Received March 3—9 a.m.]

9. Local reaction to the publication last Wednesday of "land trans-
fers regulations" in substance prohibiting, except by special author-
ization and for limited special purposes, transfer of all Palestine
Arab-owned land save to Palestine Arabs, other than in municipal
areas, the Haifa industrial zone and a central coastal area of some
one thousand square kilometres, may be summarized as follows.

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12 Announced in the House of Commons on February 28, 1940; for text, see
British Cmd. 6180, Miscellaneous No. 2 (1940): Palestine Land Transfers
Regulations.
Jewish opposition is as widespread and bitter as that following publication of the British White Paper of last May. General strike and synagogue services recall those of that month. Street demonstrations were probably prevented from deteriorating into serious rioting by prompt British police action and military imposition of curfew at Haifa and Tel Aviv. Placards carried by demonstrators demand repeal, calling "down with MacDonald" and his Nuremberg laws" and "Hitler smote us in front, the British in the back". The "free" coastal area is derisively termed a pale of settlement. The Jewish Agency has protested officially that the regulations "not only violate the terms of the mandate but completely nullify its primary purpose". Arab reaction is [not?] unfavorable but with undercurrent of continuing mistrust of British bona fides and apprehension that Jewish pressure will induce modification.

British officials welcome move as one showing intention to make White Paper policy with emphasis on the modifying clause of article 6 of the mandate. I sense that, as British Palestine policy last spring when war threatened was designed in large measure to re-establish good will in the Arab and Moslem worlds, it is today being implemented by immigration and land transfer restrictions not only because such action is believed to be just but also with that same larger political objective in view.

WADSWORTH

867N.01/1712

The Minister Resident in Iraq (Knabenshue) to the Secretary of State

No. 1541

Baghdad, April 8, 1940.

[Received May 16.]

Sir: I have the honor to give below a summary of recent comment in Iraq on the developments in Palestine.

Al-Istiqlal of March 26, 1940, gives the text of a letter sent by the Grand Mufti to the London News Chronicle, in response to its inquiry as to his attitude towards the recent land transfer regulations promulgated in Palestine. This article may be summarized by stating that the Grand Mufti expresses complete dissatisfaction. This letter has, in all probability, been reported by the Embassy in London, but a copy of it is enclosed, as it may differ in some respects from the version published in London, which was subject to censorship.

An interesting sidelight on the attitude of political exiles from Palestine now residing in Baghdad is given by Abdul Razzak, leader of the

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12 Malcolm MacDonald, British Secretary of State for the Colonies.
14 Not printed.
Palestine rebellion, who called at the Legation in connection with his desire to send his brother to the United States for graduate study. When it was remarked that conditions in Palestine seemed to be much more quiet in recent months, he replied succinctly, "That's because I'm here." His attitude regarding the land transfer regulations was essentially that of the Grand Mufti, namely that the Jews already possessed all of the good land, and that the regulation prohibiting further transfers would offer no solution for existing problems.

The then Prime Minister, and present Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nuri as-Said, made a statement regarding Palestine during the debate on the budget of the Foreign Office on March 29. While making no comment on the land transfers, he remarked, "I should like to point out once more, in the name of the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi Nation, and the whole of the Arab world, that the only way to settle the present difficulties in Palestine and Syria is to establish self government and independence in both countries." A translation of the complete statement is enclosed.15

The Iraqi Government has, through the Chamber of Deputies, made a further practical contribution to the Palestine Arabs in the form of a grant of I. D. 6,000 for the relief of distress in Palestine. This is in addition to an earlier contribution of I. D. 6,000.

The reaction of the Jews in Baghdad has not been particularly evident, and one gathers from conversations with local Jews that they regard the land transfer regulations as a logical outcome of the White Paper, and a matter which does not particularly concern them.

Respectfully yours,

P. KNABENSHUE

867N.55/204: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, April 25, 1940—2 p. m.
[Received 4:48 p. m.]

25. By an order dated April 22 made under section 5A of the Immigration Ordinance the High Commissioner has authorized the issuance during the first 2 months of the semester begun April 1 of 2,050 immigration certificates to individual immigrants and of such additional certificates as are needed for wives and minor children of such immigrants and of immigrants previously admitted.

An appended explanatory note estimates at 8,000 the total number of certificates to be issued under this order and announcing as a matter of policy that there will be issued during each of the succeeding 2 bimonthly periods of the semester a similar total minus the number of

15 Not printed.
illegal immigrants recorded during the immediately preceding bi-monthly period, thus providing for an estimated total immigration of 9,000 during the current semester. Of the 2,050 figure 1,950 certificates are reserved for Jews.

According to the note, total immigration during the year ended March 31 was approximately 26,000 of which 10,500 was legal, the remainder being made up of immigrants recorded as unlawfully arriving and/or remaining. Ten thousand of this total are therefore charged to last year’s authorized immigration quota and 16,000 to the special 5 years’ refugee quota, thus leaving 9,000 of the latter unfilled.

Of the current semester’s estimated total immigration 5,000 is to be charged against the year’s authorized immigration quota of 10,000 and 4,000 against the remainder of the refugee quota.

The significance of the new order lies in the fact that after 6 months’ suspension, imposed to counterbalance illegal immigration, Palestine’s immigration regime has [been] brought back in line with that announced in the British White Paper of last May.

An interesting modification provides that no certificates shall be issued to persons who have resided in enemy territory after the outbreak of war or in enemy occupied Poland after October 1st.

WADSWORTH

867N.55/210

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

No. 1852

JERUSALEM, August 29, 1940.

[Received September 25.]

Sir: Continuing the Consulate General’s series of despatches on the subject of immigration in Palestine, I have the honor to report the issuance of a governmental order dated August 20, 1940, copy of which is transmitted herewith,14 whereby the number of immigration certificates which may be issued during the months of August and September is fixed at about 3,500.

In despatch No. 1289 of May 6, 1940,19 I enclosed and commented on an Order of the Palestine Government dated April 22, 1940, under which the country’s immigration regime was, after six months’ suspension, brought back in line with that announced in the British Government’s White Paper on Palestine of May 17, 1939. The reason for the suspension, it will be recalled, had been the large illegal immigration (16,000 recorded) during 1939.

14 Not printed.
This Order of April 22 laid down the policy to be followed during the current semester to end September 30 and authorized, for the first two months thereof, the issuance of an estimated total of 3,000 immigration certificates. The policy envisaged the issuance of a similar number of certificates during the succeeding second and third two-monthly periods of the semester and provided: 1) that, if the authorized number of certificates was not issued in any two-monthly period, the authorized number for the ensuing period might be increased accordingly; and 2) that deduction should be made from the resulting figure of the number of recorded illegal immigrants during the preceding two-monthly period.

The immigration schedule fixed by the Government for June and July was reported in my despatch No. 1309 of June 17 [12], 1949, which mentioned that a total immigration of between 4,000 and 4,500 was authorized.

The schedule for August and September is the third, and last, of the three schedules covering the current semester to end September 30. The following table shows pertinent details of this latest schedule:

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>Basic schedule for the two months (i.e., the same figure as those authorized for the first two months and for the second two months of the semester)</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deduct recorded number of illegal immigrants during May, June and July (deductions for the month of April have been made from the provision for certificates in the months of June and July)</td>
<td>366</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Jews</td>
<td></td>
<td>1584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Basic schedule for the two months (i.e., the same figure as those authorized for the first two months and for the second two months of the semester)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependents</td>
<td>Estimated number of wives and minor children of the above and of immigrants previously admitted</td>
<td>1816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total—about</td>
<td></td>
<td>3500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be recalled that in May 1939 His Majesty’s Government declared its policy in regard to Jewish immigration into Palestine in the following terms:

“For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed, on the understanding that shortage in any one year may be added to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five years’ period, if economic capacity permits.

In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High

—Not printed.
Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependents."

In the execution of that policy for the six months April-September 1940, the High Commissioner decided that approximately 9,000 Jewish immigrants would be admitted into Palestine on authorities granted during these six months, namely, 5,000 against the annual quota of 10,000, and about 4,000 against the remaining (unissued) 9,000 of the special refugee quota of 25,000.

For the second semester of the year (to begin October 1, 1940) it was envisaged, therefore, that there would be issued the remaining 5,000 certificates chargeable against the regular annual quota and an additional number of certificates (not to exceed the remaining unissued 5,000) chargeable against the special refugee quota.

Against this still remaining balance of the special refugee quota, however, 300 individual certificates have already been specially authorized (see despatch No. 1809 of June 12, 1940). For the current semester, therefore, total authorizations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period—1940</th>
<th>Individual Certificates</th>
<th>Estimated Dependents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April and May</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June and July</td>
<td>2,557</td>
<td>1,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August and September</td>
<td>1,684</td>
<td>1,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>6,291</td>
<td>4,459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The foregoing table shows that a total immigration of 10,750 has been authorized for the current semester. While this shows an excess above the initially envisaged immigration of 9,000, actual immigration for the semester will in all probability be less than that figure because of the difficulty holders of certificates are having in securing passage to Palestine as a result of the war.

The above statement is borne out by official statistics published by the Government of Palestine which show that 3,840 legal immigrants entered the country during the first six months of 1940 as compared with 9,724 during the corresponding period of 1939, a decrease of approximately 60 per cent. Of the 1940 figure, 3,181 or 83 per cent were Jews, 241 Arabs (6 per cent) and 418 (11 per cent) were others. Of the 1939 figure, 8,509 or 88 per cent were Jews, 91 (1 per cent) were Arabs and 1,124 (about 12 per cent) were others.

On enclosure No. 2 to this despatch 20 there are given tables for the periods indicated above, showing immigrants by leading categories. Of special interest in the table covering the first six months of 1940

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20 Not printed.
may be mentioned the number of immigrants classified as capitalists, that is, persons with LP.1,000 and upwards. The total number under this category was 556 or approximately 14 per cent of the total, and the number of dependents on such persons was 790. The combined total of these two figures, viz. 1,346, represented 34 per cent of the total immigrants in this table. During the first six months of 1939 the number of capitalists and persons dependent upon them was 1,869 or 35 per cent of the total registered for that period.

There is given as enclosure No. 3 to this despatch a table showing countries of origin of immigrants entering Palestine during the first six months’ periods of 1939 and 1940. In both periods the greatest number of immigrants came from Germany (including Austria), the total 1940 figure being 728 or about 18 per cent of the total for that period, and 6,799 for the first six months of 1939, representing 37 per cent of the half year total. Poland in both periods furnished the second largest number of immigrants, the 1940 half-yearly figure being 556 or 14 per cent of the total, and 1,232 during the first half of 1939 or 10 per cent of the total.

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE WADSWORTH

867N.55/211: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, October 17, 1940—2 p.m.
[Received October 18—2:05 a.m.]

140. Referring to standing instructions to keep the Department informed regarding Palestine immigration policy and quotas I have the honor to report that the Chief Secretary last evening gave me informally the following information.

1. Approximately one month ago the High Commissioner urged on the Colonial Office that no quota be authorized for the current semester beginning October 1, primarily for the reason that the country’s economic situation precluded effective assimilation of further immigrants.

2. He has at the same time suggested postponement of such a decision pending receipt and study of the usual Jewish Agency recommendations in the matter.

3. In striking contrast to its past practice, however, the Agency submitted no recommendations, presumably because while recognizing the soundness of the Government’s position it preferred for reasons of Zionist politics to refrain from admitting it openly.

*Not printed.*
4. In the meantime reliable information was received that three shiploads of intending illegal immigrants from Rumania totaling perhaps 8000 persons were nearing Palestine waters and that five other ships carrying an approximately equal number were known to be quitting Rumania, not improbably with the connivance of Germany which wishes thus further to embarrass the British position here.

5. This information not only constituted added reason for announcing the proposed decision but raised also the serious problem of what should be done with such illegal immigrants.

6. It is now proposed to reship them to Mauritius, an added reason for such action being the danger that among them are Nazi agents.

7. Simultaneously arrangements are being made for the evacuating to Australia of some 2000 interned non-Jewish Germans and Italians.

WADSWORTH

867N.55/212

The British Embassy to the Department of State

The Foreign Office state confidentially that they are thinking of granting the Jewish Agency’s recent request that the ban on admission into Palestine of immigrants from enemy countries, or territories occupied by the enemy, might be relaxed in respect of children up to 16 years.

In present circumstances, of course the grant of this request naturally depends on the United States authorities in enemy territories being willing to undertake, in this connexion, the work formerly performed by British Passport Control Officers.

It is not thought that very much work would be involved, aside from the production of a certificate of health for the prospective immigrant and the establishment of his identity. Most of the applications for immigration certificates will no doubt be made by the children’s relatives either in Palestine or in the United States and if they are approved the Government of Palestine will probably issue some form of immigration certificate which would be forwarded to the American Consulate concerned.

It is desired to know whether the State Department would be willing in principle that American Consular Officers concerned should assume these additional duties on behalf of His Majesty’s Government. If so, the authorities in London will no doubt provide the necessary guidance for the Consular Officers concerned.

WASHINGTON, November 11, 1940.
The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1940—7 p. m.

3510. You may, at the request to us of interested Jewish groups in the United States, make a pro forma inquiry of the Foreign Office as to the veracity of reports which have been received by Jewish circles from Syria to the effect that the British authorities in Palestine will not permit 1700 refugees of German and Austrian origin to land from a Greek ship now off the Palestine coast and are suggesting that they proceed to Mauritius.

Welles

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 19, 1940—4 p. m. [Received November 19—10:55 a.m.]

3783. Your 3510, November 16, 7 p. m. Foreign Office indicates informally that report is true and that the British Government contemplates attempting to send on to Mauritius any further shiploads of persons seeking illegal entry into Palestine. They consider this action necessary to discourage further traffic of this character.

Full information has been telegraphed confidentially to British Embassy in Washington. Foreign Office is consulting Colonial Office as to your inquiry and non-confidential reply to your 3510 will be transmitted shortly.

Johnson

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 19, 1940—5 p. m. [Received 12:10 p.m.]

3784. Your 3510, November 16, 7 p. m. Am advised by Foreign Office that British Government intends hereafter to refuse admission into Palestine to all illegal immigrants. Accommodation for such persons is to be arranged elsewhere. An announcement of the foregoing is to be made tomorrow in Palestine. British Embassy in Washington has been fully advised of details and instructed to advise you.

Johnson
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, November 20, 1940—noon.
[Received 7 p. m.]

165. Referring to my telegram No. 140 of October 17, 2 p. m.

1. On November 1 and 3, two small steamships flying the Panamanian flag, the Pacific and the Mylos with respectively Greek and mixed Turkish-Bulgarian crews, brought total of almost 1800 intending Jewish illegal immigrants to Haifa, where they are being held and well cared for aboard the detained French passenger liner Patria. Embarked last month at Rumanian Danubian ports and largely of Central European origin, many of them are known to have relatives or friends in this country, an advertisement carrying some 1100 of their names having been published in the three leading Hebrew afternoon papers of November 12 with the result that the papers have since been suspended.

2. While the British censorship authorities have prohibited any reference to the matter in the local press or in outgoing news agency cables it has become generally known, as have the facts that the High Commissioner has urged the British Government to authorize deportation aboard the Patria to Mauritius and that the Jewish Agency has lodged strong protest here and in London. This has resulted in growing bitterness in local Jewish circles where threats are current of widespread demonstrations similar to those of last March following publication of the land transfer regulations. A general strike has been called from noon to midnight today.

3. Yesterday I learned from reliable official sources that, while the British Colonial Secretary is expected to announce in Parliament this afternoon that the proposed deportation has been decided upon, no serious local disturbances are expected for the reason that the question has been fully thrashed out in London with competent Jewish leaders, in this latter connection I was told in strictest confidence that Dr. Weizmann had "played up very well".

4. Two other similar refugee steamers are known to be approaching Palestine waters, the Panamanian Atlantic and the Bulgarian Pentocho, carrying a total of almost 2400 persons.

WADSWORTH
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. J. Rives Childs of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1940.

Mr. Malcolm 22 called and stated that he understood the Department had instructed the American Embassy in London to inquire of the Foreign Office concerning the reported decision that the British authorities in Palestine were refusing to permit illegal Jewish immigrants to land, but were suggesting that they should proceed to Mauritius. Mr. Malcolm stated that he wished to leave the attached memorandum, dated November 22, 1940,23 which had been received from the Foreign Office on the subject. Mr. Malcolm added that he could leave with us also the attached printed confidential memorandum on Jewish illegal immigration into Palestine,24 which he would ask us to return to him when we had an opportunity of reading it.

Mr. Malcolm stated that the Jewish [sic] were apparently finding it difficult to understand the British policy in this matter, but that it had to be emphasized that very vital issues were at stake, as was explained in the accompanying memorandum.

Mr. Malcolm stated that a copy of the memorandum of November 22, 1940 had been made available to the British Press Service in New York for use as background purposes in dealing with the Press on this subject.

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

The problem of illegal immigration into Palestine has given a great deal of trouble in the past especially since the publication of His Majesty’s Government’s statement of policy in May, 1939, which set a definite limit of 75,000 to further Jewish immigration except with Arab consent. The Zionists have never accepted this decision and ignoring the law of Palestine which regulates immigration by a system of half-yearly quotas, extreme Zionist organizations in Central Europe have organized the transport of considerable numbers of Jews of all ages and both sexes without immigration certificates to the shores of Palestine. These immigrants arrive in unseaworthy vessels generally chartered from Greek shipowners and, if not intercepted and brought into Haifa, hover off the coast at a distance of anything

22 A. C. E. Malcolm, Second Secretary of the British Embassy.
23 Infra.
24 Not reprinted.
up to 50 miles and disembark their passengers at night in small boats which are left to make their way to the shore. The difficulty of detecting every small boat load by night has led the Palestine Government to pass legislation enabling it to seize any ships carrying prospective illegal immigrants whether they are inside Palestine territorial waters or not. Such ships have hitherto been brought into Haifa harbour, the captain and crew sentenced to long term imprisonment and ships confiscated. There has been no alternative but to release Jewish passengers after necessary period of quarantine and (so far as accommodation is available) of internment to become a burden on the Jewish community, deducting their numbers from the next six months quota.

This procedure, though unsatisfactory, served the purpose before the outbreak of war and in fact had a considerable deterrent effect. Lately, however, the problem has again become acute and under war conditions assumes a graver aspect. There are indications that the Axis powers are encouraging influx of Jews to Palestine (giving them choice of embarking on a ship for Palestine or remaining in a concentration camp) their object being not only to embarrass His Majesty's Government by inflaming Arab sentiment, but to introduce enemy agents into Palestine and the Middle East. To admit into Palestine any further shiploads of illegal immigrants and to allow the law of Palestine to be openly flouted would undoubtedly involve the risk of serious trouble with the Arabs and jeopardize our whole military position in the Middle East.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies has therefore approved strongly the recommendation of the High Commissioner for Palestine that the two shiploads (totalling one thousand seven hundred and seventy) who have already arrived at Haifa should be refused admission to Palestine and should be shipped at the earliest possible moment to Mauritius where it is hoped that provisions can be made for their detention during the period of the war. A further ship carrying Jewish "refugees" has since arrived off Cyprus, having run out of fuel, provisions and water, and unless (as is unlikely) she can be induced or compelled to proceed elsewhere it will be necessary to take her to Haifa and there to arrange for the deportation of the passengers. It is hoped that when it has been made widely known that illegal immigrants will no longer be admitted into Palestine but will be sent abroad for detention, the game will be found to be not worth the candle even with the Axis' encouragement, and traffic will cease; but we must allow for the possibility of having to accommodate anything up to three thousand Jews apart from those who are destined for Mauritius.
The Jews are already making a great grievance about the decision to refuse these people admission into Palestine. They enlarge upon the inhuman turning away of these "refugees from Nazi oppression"; they claim, without foundation, that every Jew has a right to enter Palestine as his homeland and they profess complete disregard to the immigration law of Palestine. They point out that the White Paper of 1939 itself provides for the admission into Palestine of twenty-five thousand refugees (included in the total of seventy-five thousand) but they ignore the proviso that these refugees are only to be admitted when the High Commissioner is satisfied that their maintenance can be assured.

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1940.

807N.55/212

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State is in principle willing that its officers in charge of British interests serve, as indicated in the British Embassy's memorandum of November 11, 1940, as a medium of transmission for the delivery of immigration certificates to children up to fifteen years of age whose admission into Palestine is contemplated by the British authorities. It is understood that the Department's officers will not be called upon to act in a manner requiring interpretation or enforcement of the Palestine immigration law but will merely receive the certificates referred to for delivery to children specifically designated by the Palestine Government upon establishment of their identity and production of certificates of good health. The Department will, of course, instruct its officers to ascertain in advance that the appropriate local authorities entertain no objections before they proceed to act in the manner just outlined.

The Department assumes that it will in due course be informed if the British Government determines to put the contemplated arrangement into effect and that it will be given such general indications of the details of procedure which the British Government wishes observed as will enable the issuance to the Department's officers in charge of British interests of uniform instructions intended for their guidance.

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1940.
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

Jerusalem, December 2, 1940—10 a.m.

[Received December 3—1:30 a.m.]

175. Supplementing my telegram No. 165 of November 20, noon.

(1) On that afternoon the expected official announcement was made here that the illegal immigrants in question numbering 1,771 and any similar parties which might reach Palestine in the future would be deported and detained in a British colony for the duration of the war. The Jewish protest strike was generally observed but without marked enthusiasm, largely because of dissension among Jewish leaders, many of whom had argued that overt action against British authority in wartime could but harm the Zionist cause.

(2) On November 22, when preparations for the sailing of the Patria on November 24 were all but complete, word was received that the 700-ton Panamanian steamship Atlantic carrying some 1900 more Jewish refugees from Rumania had been picked up by British naval patrol in Cyprus waters and held at Larnaca. I am informed confidentially that the Governor of Cyprus declined, because of unsanitary conditions on board, to permit its remaining there even temporarily. On the 24th it was brought into Haifa harbor, the sailing of the Patria being delayed to permit the transfer thereto of some 500 of its passengers.

(3) The following morning, after some 100 such transfers had been made, an explosion occurred aboard the Patria which caused it to sink in 15 minutes, port boats performed excellent rescue work. Of the approximately 1900 refugees on board, 30 are known to have drowned and 2 died in hospital, some 200 are missing, and the others, except for 13 reported to have escaped from Hadassah Hospital have been interned in detention camps. Of the missing the majority are also believed to have escaped. One British policeman and a ship’s officer were also lost. The remaining Atlantic passengers who were to have been deported aboard a converted freighter have also been detained.

(4) I am assured by the Chief Secretary that the sinking has in no way caused the Government to modify its policy, but that some time must elapse before new arrangements for deportation can be made. Official circles are unanimous in condemning the act as a rank flouting of Government authority outstandingly serious in the light of conditions and increasing shortage of shipping. Responsible Jewish opinion recognizes the force of this view, and the Jewish Agency and other national institutions hotly deny any complicity.
(5) Although suggestions of fifth column sabotage are heard, there is general concurrence that some Jewish group is responsible. Several persons were seen to jump from the ship just before the explosion occurred. A revisionist or labor federation extremist youth group is naturally most suspect. A general staff political intelligence officer has commented categorically to me in this sense, adding that he believed the explosive was taken aboard as the vessel was coaling. However, the Government official in direct charge of frontier control tells me informally "there is not a shred of direct evidence". Both believe it improbable that the Navy will permit any vessel carrying these refugees to transit the Suez Canal.

WADSWORTH

867N.55/216: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, December 10, 1940—6 p.m.
[Received December 12—6:20 a. m.]

183. Referring to my telegram No. 175 of December 2, 10 a. m.
1. On December 4 the Palestine Government issued an official statement exempting from deportation "as an exceptional act of mercy" the survivors of the steamship Patria but no others. The Chief Secretary has informed me in strict confidence that this was done under a decision of a special meeting of the British War Cabinet, that obviously the decision was the result of further representations of Jewish leaders in London and that it was so worded as to convince the High Commissioner and General Wavell 25 that no further discussion of the matter would be entertained.

2. Jewish reaction was one of high appreciation and hope that the Government could be induced on grounds of humanity and principle (that the Jew is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance) similarly to exempt the 1800 other refugees who had arrived on the steamship Atlantic. Arab circles naturally argued that the decision was one more example of the power of Jewish influence on the British Government. British officials generally felt "let down" but the Chief Secretary assured me that no further exemptions would be made and that arrangements were being concluded with General Wavell for deporting the 1800 detainees.

3. Yesterday morning two Dutch ships arrived in Haifa harbor

25 Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, Commanding General of British forces in the Middle East.
which was closely cordoned. Into them the detainees were hurried under strong police escort and the vessels sailed at nightfall. Today, I have just been reliably informed, they safely transited the Suez Canal. I understand the Red Sea convoy by which the detainees will continue their journey to Mauritius should leave Suez tomorrow morning.

4. Reaction among Palestine Jews is one of bitter disappointment. As developments became known in Haifa yesterday afternoon a protest strike spontaneously developed. Last night their National Council published a strong condemnation of "this act which has outraged the national and humanitarian feelings of Palestine Jewry". Today there was a general Jewish strike throughout the country. There is, however, little fear that violent demonstrations will develop. Associated Press correspondent informs me all press cables are held by censor because ship movements are involved.

5. Meanwhile the number of recovered Patria victims has mounted to almost 60 and on December 7 a commission headed by a British puisne judge was appointed by the High Commissioner to inquire into and report regarding the circumstances of its sinking.

WADSWORTH

867N.55/218: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 27, 1940—1 p. m.
[Received December 27—8:35 a. m.]

4216. Your 3567, November 23, 1 p. m. Foreign Office note dated yesterday expresses appreciation for Department's offer of assistance in transmitting Palestinian immigration certificates. It states that the Department's understanding of the procedure to be followed and the responsibilities involved is entirely correct. The High Commissioner in Palestine has been requested to furnish information concerning the procedure to be followed in connection with the issue of these certificates and a further communication on this subject is promised.

JOHNSON

26 Not printed.
27 See memorandum of November 23, p. 852.
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

Jerusalem, December 30, 1940—noon.
[Received December 31—10:55 p.m.]

188. A notice issued December 26th under the Palestine Immigration Ordinance announces that no immigration quota will be prescribed for the current semester ending March 31st next. It then gives information regarding immigration under the preceding semester’s quota and for the entire period from April 1, 1939, to September 30, 1940, during which the British White Paper policy of May 1939 has been enforced.

Against 9,400 authorities issued during the [apparent omission] semester only 1,300 persons were able to immigrate. The unused authorities have been extended to March 31 next, after which replacement certificates may be granted “in strictly limited number” only and where admission “will be to the clear advantage of the country”.

Against the 75,000 certified to be issued over 5 years, 19,600 authorities were granted; but 28,800 arrivals were recorded. Of the latter some 12,300 were legal immigrants and 16,500 recorded illegal immigrants.

The last figure does not include the 1800 survivors from the steamship Patria referred to in recent telegrams nor to an unspecified smaller number of other illegal immigrants permitted to remain during the current semester, all of whom “will be deducted from the next quota”.

If these latter be added to the 28,800 recorded arrivals and it be assumed that the approximately 8,000 outstanding authorities are all utilized, there will remain some 37,000 certificates to be issued during the balance of the White Paper 5-year period.

The controlling reasons for not prescribing a current quota are stated to be circumstances of international travel, difficulty of transferring new capital, restricted opportunities for investment and unemployment. December 31, 10 a.m.

Wadsworth
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Kennedy)

No. 1305

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1940.

SIR: In the Department's telegram no. 1638 of December 19, 1939, you were requested to address a note to the Foreign Office and to inform the British Government that this Government confidently expected that that Government, in accordance with the obligations under its mandate conventions with the United States, would continue to recognize that American products must be admitted to Palestine and British mandated territories in Africa on a basis of full equality in all respects with British and all other products.

Subsequent to that telegram, the Department was informed by the American Consulate General in Jerusalem, in a despatch of January 29, 1940, that the Palestine authorities were declaring "any intent to discriminate in favor of British trade" in the administration of the import licensing system in Palestine. However, Mr. Scott of the Consulate General was informed by Mr. Fletcher, the authority in Palestine administering the import licensing system, that:

"It had been decided to stop the importation of apples from the United States and Canada. When I pressed him for an answer as to whether, when the Australian apple export season begins, licenses would be granted for Australian apples, he replied that while the question had not yet definitely arisen he would have to admit that in all probability importers would be able to obtain licenses for Australian apples."

The Department decided that note should be taken of Mr. Fletcher's statements to Mr. Scott and, accordingly, in a letter dated February 29, 1940 to Mr. Wadsworth, the American Consul General in Jerusalem, he was instructed to inform Mr. Fletcher "that the issuance by the authorities of licenses for the importation of any commodity such as apples from a source other than the United States, when permission for importation of the like commodity from the United States had been previously withheld, would be regarded as a breach of American treaty rights in Palestine".

The Department is now informed in a despatch No. 1225 of February 20, 1940 from the American Consulate General in Jerusalem, a

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19 Ibid., p. 815.
20 Not printed.
copy of which was forwarded you by that office, that licenses have been refused an applicant desirous of importing apples from the United States although licenses to import into Palestine apples from Australia, Rumania and Turkey have been granted. The same despatch reports that a license applied for by an American firm to import Kolynos toothpaste from the United States has been refused, although the same firm was notified that an application to import the same toothpaste from the United Kingdom would be granted. The Consulate General reports at the same time that the Palestine agent of the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company has been refused permission to import Camel cigarettes.

You should address a note to the Foreign Office reciting the foregoing facts and stating that you have been instructed to make a formal protest against the action of the Palestine authorities in withholding licenses for the importation of commodities from the United States when permission is granted for the importation of similar commodities from sources other than the United States. You should add that such action is, of course, inconsistent with the terms of the American-British Mandate Convention of December 3, 1924,\(^n\) assuring American trade with Palestine equality of treatment with that of the Mandatory Power or of any foreign state, and that this Government must hold the British Government responsible for any losses sustained by American interests in Palestine or in British mandated territories in Africa as a result of such violations of American treaty rights.

Please keep the Department informed of all developments in connection with this matter.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

R. WALTON MOORE

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667N.116/68

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

No. 5043  

LONDON, April 9, 1940.  
[Received April 23.]

SIR: Referring to my telegram No. 888 of April 9, 1940 \(^{32}\) reporting the receipt of a note outlining the British Government’s position with regard to the effect on American commercial rights of the exchange control and import licence system in Palestine, in other British mandated territories and in the British territories within the Congo Basin, I have the honor to enclose a copy of the note in question which is dated April 8, 1940 (File No. W 5104/280/49).


\(^{32}\) Ante, p. 121.
There is also enclosed, in order to complete the Department's files, a copy of note No. 1716 of December 21, 1939, in which this Mission brought to the attention of the British Foreign Office the considerations embodied in the Department's telegram No. 1688 of December 19, 7:00 p. m., regarding the effect on American commercial rights of the exchange control and import license system established in Palestine.

Previous correspondence referring to questions touched on in the enclosed note includes the Department's instruction No. 1134 of December 26, 1939 (File No. 645T.006/), its telegram No. 38 of January 6, 4:00 p. m., and this Mission's despatch No. 4392 of January 17, 1940.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

HERSCHEL V. JOHNSON

[Enclosure 1]

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Halifax) to the American Ambassador (Kennedy)

No. W 5104/280/49

[LONDON,] 8 April, 1940.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In Mr. Herschel Johnson's note No. 1716 of the 21st December, 1939, he was good enough to draw my attention to the establishment by the Palestine Government of an import license system and to state that the United States Government were unable to recognize the necessity or justification for the administration of the exchange control and import license system in a manner to give preference to imports from British Empire sources, with a resultant discrimination against imports from the United States of America.

2. I would ask Your Excellency to assure the United States Government, first, that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are determined to respect the rights of the United States of America in Palestine to the utmost of their ability and anxious to justify, or alternatively to rectify, any situation of fact or law which might seem inconsistent with those rights; and secondly, that whatever other motives may have led to the adoption of the measures to which Mr. Herschel Johnson's note refers, a desire to increase the export trade to Palestine of the United Kingdom or any other part of the British Empire at the expense of other countries was not among them.

37 Not printed.
38 Ante, p. 118.
39 Enclosure 2, infra.
3. I am confident that the United States Government will share the view of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom that the paramount obligation imposed upon the Mandatory Power by the Mandate for Palestine is to protect the interests of Palestine and its inhabitants, and that the rights conferred by the Mandate or by international instruments concluded within the framework of the Mandate upon third parties (whether these parties be the Mandatory Power itself, States Members of the League of Nations, countries like the United States of America with rights analogous to those of States Members or non-Members) must in case of conflict defer to this obligation.

4. The interests of Palestine and its inhabitants require first and foremost that Palestine territory should be protected from foreign aggression and it might well be argued that so long as the possibility of aggression continued this would in itself justify the Mandatory Power in taking any step, even if that step were at variance with the letter of its obligations under the Mandate to States Members or States with analogous rights, which might directly or indirectly increase its ability to protect this territory. His Majesty’s Government, however, do not wish to rely unduly upon this general consideration in the present case, since the measures to which Mr. Herschel Johnson drew attention can, in their opinion, be justified by the more particular considerations arising out of the economic and financial interest of Palestine which are explained below, but they nevertheless regard it as lying at the basis of the Mandatory system.

5. It must be remembered that the export trade of Palestine has been seriously damaged by the war. As a result the purchasing power of the country has been greatly diminished and strict control of the import trade is necessary. In particular the very limited quantities of non-sterling currency which are now being received render the utmost economy in their use essential. The whole basis of the present system of control is that the best use should be made of the purchasing power available to Palestine and licenses are issued solely with that object in view. The legislation which has been introduced is non-discriminatory, the licenses being granted for imports both from the British Empire and from foreign sources, and although it is no doubt the case that the Palestine authorities are able to grant import licenses more freely for goods from most Empire sources than from foreign countries, since these goods are paid for in sterling, this does not apply to the whole British Empire as such, Canadian imports for example being treated on the same basis as United States imports in view of the similarity of the exchange position of Canada to that of the United States.
6. As regards United States goods in particular, the United States Government will no doubt realize that the balance of trade between the United States and Palestine has in the past been very favourable to the former, imports from the United States to Palestine in the three years 1936 to 1938 having averaged over £1,000,000 per annum, while the total exports to the United States from Palestine averaged under £100,000 per annum and has since fallen much below that figure. As Palestine currency is based on sterling, the large excess of imports from the United States during this and previous periods was in effect being paid for by the purchase of United States dollars with the proceeds of Palestine exports to other countries, that is (except to the extent that dollars were provided by an import of capital from the United States) mainly with the sterling proceeds of exports to the United Kingdom, the principal importer of Palestine products.

7. If, therefore, the emergency measures in force throughout the British Empire generally were not to be put into force in Palestine, the effect would be that the United Kingdom would have to provide Palestine importers with dollar exchange to finance Palestine imports from the United States in excess of those balanced by exports to the United States. The United States Government are aware that the United Kingdom is finding great difficulty in providing foreign exchange to meet her own essential imports, and she cannot continue to provide unrestricted exchange to meet Palestine imports of non-essential commodities from the United States or other countries from which Palestine cannot import without creating a drain on sterling.

8. It is not desired, nor would it be possible, to reduce United States exports to Palestine to the level of the Palestine exports to the United States and so to remove all exchange burdens on this account from the United Kingdom, but I trust that the United States Government will agree that it is inevitable that the Palestine authorities should not be able to grant import licenses for all applications whatsoever for imports from the United States, and reasonable in the circumstances that they should not be expected to try to do so.

9. I trust that these explanations will reassure the United States Government as to the manner in which His Majesty's Government and the Palestine administration intend to use the powers conferred upon them by the Palestine import and exchange control legislation, and I would ask Your Excellency to add, when transmitting them to the United States Government, that His Majesty's Government will gladly furnish any further explanations on points of detail which the United States Government may desire.

10. The same considerations apply mutatis mutandis to the position in other Mandated Territories administered by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and in the British territories within
the Congo Basin, regarding which an *Aide-Mémoire* was received from the United States Embassy on the 16th January.38

I have [etc.]  

(For the Secretary of State)  

N. B. RONALD

[Enclosure 2]

The American Chargé (Johnson) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Halifax)

No. 1716  

LONDON, December 21, 1939.

My LORD: Under instructions from my Government, based on information received from the American Consul General at Jerusalem, I have the honor to invite your Lordship’s attention to the establishment by the Palestine Government of an import licence system, effective December 11, 1939, applicable to some 422 items of the total of 760 items of merchandise in the Palestine Customs classification list, including almost all articles imported from the United States.

The Department of State is also informed that in an interview on December 12, 1939 between a representative of the American Consulate General and the Economic Adviser of the Palestine Government, the latter stated that he was unable to give assurances that American trade will not be subject to restrictions placing it on a less favorable footing than British trade with Palestine.

The Economic Adviser is stated to have explained that the policy of the Palestine Government, in accordance with instructions from the British Government, is to accord preference to imports from British Empire sources, such a policy having been justified by the Economic Adviser on the ground that the British Government cannot cut Palestine adrift during the war but must afford its currency and economic interests the protection of emergency measures applied throughout the British Empire.

Any effort on the part of the Palestine authorities to discriminate against American imports into Palestine with a view to reducing the demand for foreign exchange or for exchange from countries outside the sterling exchange control area would, of course, be viewed by my Government as violation of American treaty rights in Palestine and particularly those embodied in Article 2 of the American British Mandate Convention of December 3, 1924, and the related Article 18 of the Mandate assuring American trade with Palestine equality of treatment with that of the mandatory power or of any foreign state.

While the United States Government is not disposed to raise any question regarding the adoption of measures in Palestine which may

38 Ante, p. 119.
be reasonably necessary and consistent with the status of Palestine and the obligations of the British Government as mandatory for that territory, it cannot overlook illegal and unwarranted interferences with American treaty rights and it does not find itself able to recognize either the necessity or justification for the administration of the exchange control and import licence system in Palestine in a manner to give preference to imports from British Empire sources, with a resultant discrimination against imports from the United States.

The foregoing observations are deemed equally applicable, mutatis mutandis, to British mandated territories in Africa where a control import licence system is understood to have been introduced similar to that in Palestine.

I have the honor to add that the United States Government feels confident that, in accordance with the obligations under its mandate conventions with the United States, the British Government will continue to recognize that American products must be admitted to Palestine and British mandated territories in Africa on a basis of full equality in all respects with British and all other products.

I have [etc.]

Herschel V. Johnson

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667N.116/67: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

London, April 20, 1940—4 p.m.
[Received April 20—10:48 a.m.]

1015. Your mail instruction 1305, April 2, and my 883 of April 9th 39 regarding discrimination against American products in Palestine. Since Embassy's despatch of April 9 enclosing Foreign Office note giving British position on this question crossed your instruction 1305, unless otherwise instructed, [apparent omission] pending opportunity for Department to consider British note.

Kennedy

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648T.116/18

Memorandum by Mr. Gordon P. Merriam of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[Washington,] December 19, 1940.

I asked Mr. Ward 40 for his views on the desirability of forwarding to the British Government a note such as the one drafted last summer. 41

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39 Ante, pp. 857 and 121, respectively.
40 Frank X. Ward, Assistant to the Legal Adviser.
41 Not printed.
pressing the British on the question of trade restrictions which discriminate against imports of American goods into Palestine, British mandated territory in Africa, and British territory in the Congo Basin.

Mr. Ward considers that we have a clear case against the British of violation of treaty rights. This was made a matter of record by the Embassy’s communications to the Foreign Office of December 21, 1939 and January 16, 1940. After initialising the draft of a further communication, Mr. Ward came to the conclusion that, in view of the difficulties under which the British were operating, their position, while legally unjustifiable, was reasonable because the conservation and channelling of available dollar exchange to pay for armament manufactured in the United States was for them a matter of survival which outweighed the legal aspects of the matter and could even be considered as in our own basic self-interest. Moreover, since at that time there was no way to ship American goods to Palestine, the matter was in large part academic. Accordingly, Mr. Ward felt that it would be best to hold the instruction in abeyance.

In the meantime the situation as regards Palestine has changed in two respects. The authorities there, from experience gained over the past few months, have decided that certain commodities, regarded as essential, can be secured from the United States and from no other source. They are allowing, or will allow, these to come in. Moreover, the question of transport from the United States, while far from satisfactory, is not quite as difficult as before. These are, however, minor factors.

Mr. Ward notes, however, that present developments point to the definite possibility or likelihood that in the near future, by one means or another, British war requirements from the United States will be financed by this country. If and when that occurs, it is to be presumed that the British need of dollar exchange will be greatly reduced. For that reason, and because of the important financial service which would be rendered by this country, Mr. Ward considers that when such an arrangement is in definite form and working order we could very properly approach the British again in regard to the discriminations against our trade, but he does not believe the time to do so has arrived quite yet.

We did, of course, press the French on the matter in August and apparently got no reply whatever. The French were then no longer fighting or receiving war materials or much of anything else from the United States. Another justification for handling the British and

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42 *Aute*, pp. 862 and 119, respectively.
43 The instruction was not sent.
44 See pp. 926 ff.
the French differently in the matter, which seems to bulk rather largely in Mr. Ward’s eyes, is that the French reply to our original representations was short, vague, and nasty, whereas the British reply gave every evidence of careful consideration on their part and of a desire to fulfil their legal obligations to the greatest possible extent, and they went to some pains to justify their departure therefrom by overwhelming necessity.

NON-RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE RIGHT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH A NAVAL CONTRABAND CONTROL IN PALESTINE

740.00112 European War 1939/497a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem
(Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1940.

The Department assumes that, in view of the absence of reports from you on the subject, the British prize court and contraband control base reported to have been established in Palestine by the British Government have not attempted to function.

Hull

740.00112 European War 1939/556: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, January 18, 1940—4 p.m.
[Received January 18—2:45 p.m.]

2. The following reply to the Department’s telegram of January 15 is based on information informally given me yesterday by the Attorney General.

By Admiralty warrant issued in London September 3 Supreme Court of Palestine was authorized to proceed on all matters of Prize Court. British Prize Court rules are applicable and the Attorney General is designated to conduct proceedings on behalf of the Crown. On the same date a British naval contraband control base was established at Haifa.

Only 10 ships all west bound (8 Italian, 1 Dutch and 1 Swedish) have thus far been diverted to Haifa. All were boarded in the Red Sea and a British naval officer accompanied by two or three ratings put in charge.
The first six ships, handled prior to December 31, were released after unloading alleged contraband cargo. This cargo, seized by the naval control officer, was turned over to a civilian detaining officer representing the Attorney General, and the latter issued through the court registrar writs to all known interested persons. As yet, however, no case has come on for trial and the Attorney General expects that through sources out of court a considerable part of the detained goods will be released after study of pertinent documents.

The first week in January the “hold-back” guarantee system was introduced under orders from London. Under this system the next three ships (all Italian) and their cargoes were held only a few hours, the guarantee of the master and agent, countersigned by the Italian Consul, being taken that their alleged contraband cargo would not be delivered to the consignees except upon release of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare to be communicated through the British Embassy in Rome and if not so released would be returned to Haifa.

Under this system with which the Italian Government is cooperating the alleged contraband is detained in Government warehouse after unloading at Italian port.

Were an American ship to be similarly diverted to Haifa a similar guarantee would be accepted but my countersignature would not be taken unless believed by the Department helpful to American shipping interests.

The last ship handled was the Conte Verdant brought into Haifa yesterday morning with alleged contraband cargo for transshipment at Italian port to an American bound vessel. It was released after 3 hours detention on guarantee that the transshipment would be witnessed by a British Consul.

The Attorney General believes that under the new system only contraband cargo consigned to persons on the British blacklist will be detained at Haifa.

WADSWORTH

740.00112 European War 1939/956 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem
(Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1940.

Your 2, January 18, 4 p.m. You should keep the Department fully and currently informed of all important action taken by the British Government tending to give Palestine a belligerent status. You should report in particular at once any effort on the part of
the British authorities to extend any assumed jurisdiction of the British Prize Court in Palestine or the British contraband control base at Haifa over American vessels or goods.

The Department desires that you refrain from countersigning any guarantee under the arrangements referred to in your telegram or from taking any action that might possibly be construed as implying acquiescence by this Government or its representative in the application to Palestine of any belligerent measure.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/1942

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem
(Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1940.

SIR: The Department has received your despatch no. 1201 of January 22, 1940,\(^4\) quoting a telegram forwarded by you under date of January 18, 1940 regarding the British Contraband Control Base and Prize Court in Palestine and containing supplementary information furnished you by the Attorney General for facilitating the release of goods which may be detained by the Contraband Control at Haifa.

In consonance with the position indicated in the Department's telegram to you of January 23, 1940, and in order to avoid any possible implication that your transmission to the Department, at the suggestion of the Attorney General, of the information mentioned in the preceding paragraph constitutes acquiescence in the establishment of a British Contraband Control Base in Palestine, you are requested to inform the Attorney General that, in as much as this Government does not recognize the right of the British Government to establish a Naval Contraband Control in Palestine, it cannot, of course, give any recognition to any regulation or procedure adopted in connection with such control.

As you are no doubt aware, one of the practical consequences which would result from the recognition by this Government of the belligerent status of Palestine would be the application to that territory of the pertinent provisions of the Neutrality Act of 1939,\(^5\) including the prohibition of American vessels calling at Palestinian ports.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

A. A. Berle, Jr.

\(^4\) Not printed.

\(^5\) 54 Stat. 4.
OPPOSITION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO THE GRANTING OF
RED CROSS AID TO PALESTINE WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE REL-
LIEF NEEDS OF THE NEAR EAST AS A WHOLE

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] September 23, 1940.

Mr. Welles: Mr. Ernest J. Swift, Vice Chairman in charge of
Insular and Foreign Operations, of the American National Red Cross,
called me by telephone this morning to state that, at the instance
of Rabbi Silver,* a donation of $25,000 had been promised to the
Jewish Agency in Palestine for the relief of sufferers from the
recent Italian bombing raids in that country. Mr. Swift wished to
know whether the above-mentioned amount could be transmitted by
the Department to the American Consul General in Palestine for
delivery to the Jewish Agency for relief purposes among the Jews.

I inquired of Mr. Swift whether it had not been the custom of
the American Red Cross to ask the advice of the Department prior to
the granting of donations of this kind and he said that it was but
that the matter had been put through hurriedly last Saturday morn-
ing before the Department could be consulted.

I pointed out, in this connection, to Mr. Swift that, while there
had as yet been only one bombing of the Jewish city of Tel Aviv,
Palestine, Haifa had already been bombed three times with almost
the same number of casualties among the Arabs and, in view of the
fact that Haifa is one of the terminals of the Iraq Petroleum Com-
pany's pipeline to the Mediterranean and has large quantities of oil
stored there in addition to the operation of its refinery, it appeared
not unlikely that there would be further and more severe bombings
at Haifa in the future with heavy loss of life among the overwhelm-
ingly Arab population of the town.

I also inquired of Mr. Swift as to whether any thought had been
given to transmitting funds for relief in Palestine to a relief organ-
ization administered by the British, who are the responsible authorities
in the country, possibly to some British Red Cross organization there.
I added that after all the Jewish Agency was exclusively a political
organization designed to further the establishment of a national home
in Palestine for the Jewish people and that it would appear highly
improper for an American Consular Officer in that country to use
exclusively for Jewish relief, funds raised in this country for general
relief purposes at home or abroad. Such action would, I felt sure,
create a deplorable impression not only among the non-Jewish two-
thirds of the population of the country but also among British Gov-

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* Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, National Chairman of the United Palestine Appeal.
ernment officials and could scarcely fail to be compromising to Mr. Wadsworth 47 in his official capacity.

I added further that it seemed somewhat surprising that the American Red Cross should be donating $25,000 for the relief of the Jewish victims of the Italian bombings in Palestine where about one hundred had been killed when only $5,000 was originally donated to Turkey last winter after the earthquake in Anatolia when nearly 40,000 people were killed. While this sum was eventually increased to $10,000, our representatives in Turkey reported later that the assistance coming from this country during that appalling disaster compared unfavorably with the aid rendered by several other countries.

I have discussed this matter meanwhile with Mr. Berle 48 and he has talked with Mr. Norman Davis. 49 As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that the matter should be reopened with Rabbi Silver, informing him that it would not be feasible to donate the sum in question exclusively for Jewish relief in Palestine, and a means is being sought to generalize the use of funds for the relief of victims regardless of race or religion.

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.45/34a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem
(Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1940—6 p.m.

The American Red Cross has received appeals that it make available funds for the relief of those stricken by air raid attacks in Palestine and it is considering the donation of $25,000 for such a purpose.

Please telegraph the Department whether the Palestine Red Cross mentioned in your despatch no. 1247 of March 21, 1940 50 is adequately organized to ensure an efficient and impartial distribution of funds which might be made available by the American Red Cross, bearing in mind that the distribution would have to be made without distinction of religion and race. If in your opinion the Palestine Red Cross is not adequate, the Department desires your recommendation concerning other organizations through which such distribution might be made.

Please inform the Department also whether the British authorities have made plans for the relief of those affected by the air raid attacks and, if so, the extent of the financial aid envisaged.

HULL

47 George Wadsworth, Consul General at Jerusalem.
48 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.
49 Chairman, American Red Cross.
50 Not printed.
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, September 27, 1940—2 p. m.
[Received September 28—8:15 a. m.]

123. Referring to Department's telegram of September 22, 6 p. m.

1. In conversation yesterday with the Chief Secretary and confirmed today by informal personal note after discussion with the High Commissioner, he expressed keen appreciation of the provisional offer of American Red Cross funds and termed the suggested amount of $25,000 "very handsome indeed".

2. At the same time, he said, he felt it only fair to add that the Palestine Government did not view the situation resulting from the air raids to date on Haifa and that on Tel Aviv as being in the nature of an emergency such as would ordinarily warrant an appeal for Red Cross assistance from abroad.

3. The immediate needs of victims of the raids and their dependents, he explained, had thus far been cared for by local social welfare organizations, notably the Tel Aviv and Haifa municipalities, aided chiefly by Jewish organizations, the expense being borne from funds already at their disposal supplemented by a special Government grant of 2000 to the Tel Aviv municipality, by donations from local Red Cross funds of 500 each to Haifa and Tel Aviv municipalities, by a similar donation from Hadassah to the latter and by small gifts from many individuals wishing to show their sympathy for the victims.

4. Evacuation, and finally medical aid and direct relief to the air raid victims.

5. In the last mentioned field, he said, the Government is preparing a scheme based on current British practice and which will be retro-active for the payment of compensation to civilian victims, but this may be restricted to persons engaged in work contributing to the prosecution of the war or in vital industries and in transport in particular areas.

6. Thus far, we estimated roughly, there have been in the 8 raids on Haifa some 85 fatal casualties. In that on Tel Aviv there were 124. Of all these, however, but few would be considered victims in the sense of such a scheme. The same may be said of the somewhat lesser number who suffered serious injury.

7. There is no Palestine Red Cross but, in addition to the military service unit of the British Red Cross mentioned in my despatch under reference, there has been established a joint organization of the British Red Cross and Order of St. John of Jerusalem under the presidency of Lady MacMichael and the chairmanship of the Financial Secretary of the Government.
8. It was this organization which made from funds previously collected locally the two mentioned LP500 donations for expenditure by competent municipal agencies in Haifa and Tel Aviv. While it has not as yet seen the need for a centralized program of direct relief of air raid victims it could readily undertake and ensure through such agencies the impartial distribution of American Red Cross funds both for that specific purpose and, if desired, for general emergency needs of the Jewish and Arab communities such as those mentioned in paragraph 4 above.

WADSWORTH

8671N.48/41

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. J. Rives Childs of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1940.

Participants: Rabbi Breslau, of the Zionist Organization of America
Mr. Montor, Director of the United Palestine Appeal
(and also of the United Jewish Appeal)
Mr. Murray
Mr. Alling 51
Mr. Childs

Rabbi Breslau and Mr. Montor stated they had been for some time in touch with the Red Cross with a view to Red Cross assistance for Palestine; that they had obtained what they regarded as a commitment from the Red Cross for the allocation of a sum of $25,000 for Palestine but that they had learned within the past few days some questions had been raised by the Department, first as to the distribution of such a sum among Arabs as well as Jews and, secondly, as to the advisability of extending the scope of the aid to include Egypt as well as Palestine.

Mr. Murray stated that he welcomed their visit as he thought it would afford an opportunity for a meeting of minds on the subject and would promote a clarification of our respective points of view. He added that when the question of Red Cross aid in Palestine had first come to the notice of the Department, Mr. Berle, as the executive officer having oversight over the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, had desired to consider the problem as a whole in relationship to the Near East. In such a survey a number of considerations had obscured, including the fact that a neighboring country, Egypt, had suffered and was liable to suffer equally if not greater from the war than Palestine. It was pointed out in that connection that while

51 Paul H. Alling, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.
there had been only ten bombings of Palestine towns, Alexandria alone had suffered more than thirty bombings with a considerable loss of life, necessitating the evacuation of more than a third of the population of some 600,000 of that city.

Mr. Montor stated that he thought it would contribute to a clarification of the position of the United Palestine Appeal with reference to Red Cross aid for Palestine if he sketched briefly the background of that question. He observed that as early as April when the appropriation of a fifty million dollar grant by Congress to the Red Cross for war relief was under consideration the United Palestine Appeal had approached the President concerning the making available of a part of this for Jewish relief. The President had stated that the Red Cross would give consideration to Jewish needs as a part of the whole problem of war relief. Before the bombings in Palestine they had approached the Red Cross and had pointed out the pressing need of relief for those stricken by the war who had sought haven in Palestine. They had been concerned with that problem much before the bombings in Palestine and Egypt had taken place. The conversations with the Red Cross on the subject had been concerned with the alleviation of that general problem rather than with the special problem created by the bombings.

Mr. Murray observed that the problem as it had been presented to us by the Red Cross was one viewed in the light of the bombing of Tel Aviv, that we had understood that relief had been sought exclusively for the relief of the Jewish victims of that air raid and that it was felt that any restriction of Red Cross aid to only one element of the population in Palestine would have repercussions prejudicial to the British whose position was hanging in the balance, prejudicial to our own interests and prejudicial no less to Jewish interests. We had telegraphed to our Consul General in Jerusalem at the request of the Red Cross and he had consulted with the Jewish Agency and the Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government. The Chief Secretary had stated to the Consul General that the emergency was not such as would ordinarily warrant an appeal to the Red Cross and it would appear also from the statements made by the Chief Secretary to the Consul General that the Mandatory Power and local organizations were dealing adequately with the situation.

Mr. Montor replied that he thought that the British authorities might be deliberately minimizing the needs of Palestine out of a desire not to have to admit that the needs were greater than their own resources could meet. He added that he had understood from the Red Cross, in explanation of the difficulties that had developed incident to the extension of the promised Red Cross aid for Palestine, that a political angle had developed incident to the question. Mr.
Montor stated that he wished to make it quite plain that his organization was not seeking, and would not seek, to press the Red Cross to make an allocation of funds or of aid to Palestine which the American Government might consider contrary to the interests of the British cause or contrary to the interests of this Government.

Mr. Murray answered that the attitude expressed by Mr. Montor made it easier for us to see eye to eye. Mr. Murray continued by setting forth the larger aspects of the question, that the problem of relief for Palestine could not be isolated from the larger problem of relief for Egypt as well. There was stressed the importance of the world of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen to Britain, the unfavorable repercussions which a grant to Palestine alone would have on that world. It was noted that in 1938 the King of Saudi Arabia had addressed himself to the President expressing his concern over the attitude of this Government toward the Arabs. More recently there had been disquieting reports of a pro-German tendency of King Ibn Saud. It was pointed out that the Suez Canal was flanked by Egypt and that the Mosul oil fields and pipelines were in Arab territory; that Aden, important gateway to the Red Sea, was encompassed by Arabs. These considerations made it essential that nothing should be done to add to Britain's difficulties in the Near East, where the outcome of the battle in Egypt was only a little less vital to the British than the battle in Britain itself.

Mr. Montor stated he would like to interject the comment whether it was not more advisable for Britain to concern itself with the Jews in Palestine on whose loyalty it could count rather than to be concerned for the Arabs whose loyalty was uncertain. He also observed that Egypt was an independent country which had developed its own social services but Palestine was dependent for most of its social services on non-governmental organizations.

It was observed to Mr. Montor in that connection that the Egyptian Fellaheen who might be bombed would hardly be disposed to concern themselves with abstract considerations of governmental policy. It was observed also that our Consul General in Jerusalem had recently quoted the Palestine press as recognizing that Palestine's frontier was no longer at Sinai but on the Libyan frontier. It was further observed that if Egypt fell Palestine would inevitably fall with it and that therefore Palestine's fate was bound up with Egypt.

Rabbi Breslan inquired whether it might not be well to suggest to the Red Cross that they send an investigator to the Near East to study the problem of relief on the spot. Mr. Murray raised the question whether the needs in the Near East could be in any way comparable with those of Europe and particularly of London and else-

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where in England. He added further that established Jewish agencies in Palestine were excellently equipped to deal with the relief of those war refugees who might be finding their way to Palestine; that he could not imagine any war areas where refugees might find better equipped facilities for their aid than were to be found already in Palestine.

Mr. Montor stated that he felt Rabbi Breslau and himself had greatly profited from the extended discussion which had taken place. He had at first suggested the Jewish Agency as a suitable instrument through which Red Cross aid might be dispensed in Palestine, not with any thought of confining such aid to Jews alone but because the Government and the Arabs had no such organizations as Hadassah capable of dealing with the relief problem. He entirely shared the opinion that had been expressed that any aid given to Palestine should be extended to Arab and Jew alike. He added that he and Rabbi Breslau had come to the Department seeking enlightenment and instructions on how best to proceed and they were desirous of deferring in all respects to the opinions of the Government.

Mr. Murray expressed gratification at their attitude and said a telegram had gone out at the suggestion of the Red Cross to our Legation in Cairo requesting a report on the situation in that country with reference to war relief. It was added that it was believed best to suspend consideration of Palestine relief until the report from Cairo had been received and we were in a position to consider the problem in its larger Near Eastern aspects.

Rabbi Breslau and Mr. Montor expressed themselves as in full agreement with this course.

883.48/7a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Fish)

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1940—1 p. m.

113. For your confidential information, the American Red Cross is contemplating the donation of 25,000 dollars for war relief in Palestine, including in particular the relief of those stricken by air raid attacks in that country.

The Department is of the opinion that, for numerous reasons, it would be inadvisable for the Red Cross to attempt to isolate the relief problem in Palestine from the larger problem of war relief in the Near East, including in particular Egypt. The Department has in mind in that connection the reports which have been received from Egypt of the repeated bombing of Alexandria and of the evacua-

*Infra.*
tion of a large proportion of the inhabitants of that city. It is believed, accordingly, that the war relief problem in Egypt is actually as well as potentially as serious, if not more serious than that of Palestine, and that contributions made by the Red Cross to Palestine alone would have most undesirable repercussions in Egypt as well as in other countries of the Near East.

In order to assist the Red Cross in reaching a decision you are requested to telegraph the Department as soon as possible (a) an estimate of the total number of civilian casualties resulting from Italian bombings in Egypt; (b) an estimate of the civilian property loss; (c) an estimate of the number of people who have evacuated their homes in consequence of the bombings of Egyptian towns and (d) the approximate amount of financial aid which the Egyptian Government and local organizations have provided for war relief.

The Department desires also your opinions and recommendations, based on all the considerations involved, regarding a possible allotment by the Red Cross for Egypt. In the event the Red Cross may find it possible to make a donation for Egypt in addition to that contemplated for Palestine the Department has in mind suggesting the Red Crescent as the agency through which the sum might most appropriately be administered. Your recommendations in this particular are also desired, bearing in mind that the Red Cross would expect an efficient and impartial administration of the funds.

Hull

883.48/9: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Fish) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, October 15, 1940—9 a.m.

[Received 8:10 p.m.]

248. Department’s telegram No. 113, October 8, 1 p.m. Upon discreet discussion of the war relief problem in Egypt with several Egyptian officials and the Comptroller General of the Red Crescent the distinct impression was given that the existing relief question here is not regarded with serious concern and that there is no conscious need for further measures to meet the situation at this time.

As regards the four points on which information was requested the following observations were made by the officials consulted: (a) casualties resulting from bombings in Egypt have been small; (b) civilian property loss has been also small and a recent proposal made to the Prime Minister for Government compensation for such losses was shelved on the ground that the matter was not sufficiently consequential; (c) evacuees from Alexandria are estimated to have reached about 200,000 and from Cairo about 120,000 by August 1 but large
numbers have since returned to both cities. It is to be noted that this evacuation movement was almost exclusively in anticipation of danger rather than in consequence of actual bombing. Casualties in Alexandria have usually been cared for by Government hospitals and dispensaries. The only assistance rendered by the Red Crescent has been donation of 500 Egyptian pounds to the Ministry of the Interior for relief of evacuees with an offer to provide additional funds if necessary but no such a request has been made.

In the light of the foregoing it is my considered opinion that there is no present need for outside assistance to meet the present relief situation in Egypt. However, the trend of present developments is such that an intensification of hostilities, with greatly increased loss of civilian life and property, is not improbable. In that event a very vital need for outside assistance might well result and it is respectfully suggested that the offer of aid by the American Red Cross be held in abeyance pending such an eventuality. At that time it is believed that the Red Crescent, which is a semi-official agency and whose head is Dr. Aly Ibrahim Pasha, Minister of Public Health, would be the appropriate agency through which to work.

The above recommendation is based entirely on the facts of the local situation and does not take into consideration the unhappy comparison which would very probably be drawn if relief were offered in Palestine and not here, in which respect I am in entire accord with the Department’s views. At the risk of possibly seeming to express views not in my competence might I suggest that in Palestine as in Egypt the actual damage done thus far may be but a relatively mild foretaste of much more serious events to come, and that under these considerations it might seem advisable to leave relief in both areas to local agencies and reserve possible American assistance for the future.

FISH

887N.48/36: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem
(Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1940—6 p.m.

Your 123, September 27, 2 p.m. In a letter which Rabbi Silver has addressed to the Chairman of the American Red Cross the statement is made that you have informed Kaplan \(^{(4)}\) that on September 27 you had cabled the Department as follows:

"Palestine Jewry is faced with a real financial emergency in its efforts to meet various war-born problems, the absorption of indigent

\(^{(4)}\) Elizer Kaplan, Financial Director of the Jewish Agency in Palestine.
refugees, and unemployment resulting from economic dislocation as well as those of air-raid precautions, possible urban evacuation, medical aid and direct relief for air-raid victims."

In as much as no such passage appears in your telegram under reference please telegraph the facts in order that the Department may be in a position to comment on the statement.

HULL

867N.4846 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

Jerusalem, November 11, 1940—5 p.m.
[Received November 12—4:35 p.m.]

155. Referring to Department's telegram of November 9, 6 p.m., I regret exceedingly that coded text of numbered paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 123 was either not given to typist or was omitted by her when copying.

It read as follows:

"4. He recognized, however, the force of the Jewish Agency's contention, stressed by its Financial Director in my conversation with him of the preceding day, that Palestine Jewry is faced with a very real financial emergency in its efforts to meet the various war-born problems of absorption of indigent refugees and unemployment resulting from economic dislocation as well as those of air raid precaution, possible urban evacuation, and, finally, medical aid and direct relief to air raid victims."

The Financial Director referred to in this paragraph is the Kaplan mentioned in the Department's telegram under reference. He concurred in the accuracy of my recapitulation of his statement. Doctor Magnes, with whom I also discussed the matter, asks me to say that he "supports strongly the Kaplan statement and, while recognizing that no immediate emergency need exists for the relief of air raid victims, urges the desirability of an American Red Cross unit or representative because of developments in this part of the world".

As a matter of fact, Tel Aviv suffered its only air raid on September 9 and there has been no serious air raid at Haifa since that of September 21.

Lady MacMichael has discussed with me what might be done with the proposed American Red Cross gift if made, and we have suggested to Colonel Jardine of the British Red Cross, Middle East Headquarters, Cairo, that his organization consider duplicating in money or supplies the amount of any such American donation.

55 Judah Leon Magnes, President of Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
Our common idea was that any such gifts should not be used for the care of past air raid victims but held as the nucleus of a special Red Cross fund to be used to supplement, in an emergency and where most needed, funds available to local social welfare agencies which are equipped, as her committee is not equipped, to render direct aid to future air raid victims in the Holy Land.

This idea is approved by the Chief Secretary as well as by Magnes, Kaplan and the Political Director of the Jewish Agency.

WADSWORTH

867N.48/46 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem
(Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1940—9 p.m.

Your 155, November 11, 5 p.m. The American Red Cross, in consultation with the Department, has given careful consideration to the question of Red Cross relief in Palestine, and has reached the conclusion that the time has not yet arrived when the relief problem of Palestine and the whole problem of relief in the Near East can and should be dealt with.

The Red Cross understands that there are at present no immediate emergency needs for relief of air raid victims in Palestine. So far as concerns the problems of indigent refugees and unemployment, the Red Cross points out that these needs are matters for the consideration of the country as a whole and are hardly within the scope of the kind of emergency relief that the American Red Cross is usually prepared to extend. It is added “On the other hand, with developments in the Middle East threatening to involve Palestine in major difficulties, the Red Cross must stand ready to assist when the moment arrives.”

In communicating these conclusions to Rabbi Silver of the United Palestine Appeal, the American Red Cross has assured him that “the way is being prepared to give this assistance when the time arrives in full cooperation and collaboration with your organization and the other agencies interested in relief in Palestine.”

You may communicate the foregoing to the Palestine authorities and other interested individuals and groups with whom you have conferred on this subject.

HULL
PALESTINE

PROBLEMS ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH EVACUATION AND REPATRIATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN PALESTINE

340.1115A/651: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, May 20, 1940—4 p. m.
[Received 5:15 p. m.]

30. Referring to Department’s telegram No. 37 of May 16, 6 p. m. repeated from Ankara.56 The Department of course is aware that the estimated 8,000-odd American citizens in Palestine present a very special problem.

Almost 90 percent are Jews, of whom at least two-thirds are naturalized citizens. They have been admitted to Palestine under immigration schedules on visas authorizing permanent residence. For the most part ardent Zionists, their dominant interest is Jewish settlement and realization of the National Home ideal. Their first and preeminent loyalty is to that ideal and its concomitant concept of Jewish statehood in their lifetime.

It follows that retention of American citizenship by these settlers is in many cases primarily a matter of not wanting to burn one’s bridges. Few only among them, I believe, will want to leave Palestine even in the event of Italy entering the war and consequent hostilities in the Mediterranean. To these relatively few, of whom I anticipate most will apply to me for advice, I propose to communicate the pertinent substance of the telegram under reference and to extend all possible assistance in obtaining transportation.

Other American residents include several hundred naturalized citizens of Palestine, Arab origin, against at least a majority of whom presumption of expatriation due to protracted residence abroad has arisen. They are for the most part safely situated in scattered inland villages. If desirous of returning at this time, they may be counted on to consult my office. Its advice and assistance will be freely given.

There remain the Kellogg Company’s 70-odd employees with 90-odd wives and children in Haifa and, including dependents, roughly 100 missionaries, consular staff, and others. The substance of the telegram under reference has been communicated privately, through heads of institutions to practically all of these.

In the circumstances set forth and because, in the light of Italy’s threatening attitude, Mediterranean travel appears to involve serious risk, I should prefer not to issue any public notice inviting American

56 Vol. II, p. 95.
citizens to leave Palestine. A further consideration, with respect to which I am consulting with the Legation in Cairo, is the difficulty of obtaining passage even on Mediterranean sailings.

At the same time, and after consulting Magnes, Totah and Miller (respectively heads of the Hebrew University, Ramallah Friends' Schools and the Y. M. C. A.), I have made tentative plans for the care of Americans, who, if Italy enters the war, may, from fear of bombing attacks, wish to leave Haifa or Tel Aviv. Kellogg Company families would be cared for at the Friends' Boys' School, Jews at the Hebrew University.

Also, and in line with the Department's telegram No. 42 of May 13, noon, to Bern 87 regarding which the Legation at Cairo consulted me, I have been assured of ample accommodation at the Y. M. C. A. and the School of Oriental Research for Legation and Consular families in Egypt who may wish to remove to the safety which no one doubts would be afforded by residence in the Holy City.

None of my American staff or members of their families desire to leave Jerusalem, although my wife hopes to depart on usual summer visit to the United States if and when safe means and route of travel are available.

WADSWORTH

340.1115A/683: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, May 23, 1940—9 p.m.

[Received May 24—7:48 a.m.]

33. Supplementing my telegram No. 30 of May 20, 4 p. m., as the following Reuters' message with today's Washington dateline is to appear in tomorrow morning's Palestine newspapers: "A general warning has been issued to all Americans in Iraq, Palestine, Tunis, Egypt and Tangier to leave while communications are still open." I have arranged with the Government Press Bureau that the following supplementary comment be concurrently published. "The American Consul General in Jerusalem explains in this connection that there is no insistence by the Government in Washington on the departure of American citizens from these countries and that each citizen must decide for himself whether to remain or to depart".

I believe and Magnes concurs that thus presented this warning will not occasion panic among resident American Jews. We have particularly wished to avoid this because according to Thomas Cook

87 Vol. II, p. 87.
the only current sailings available for departures are on Italian steamer leaving for Venice May 30 which could accommodate some 200 persons and an east bound Japanese vessel leaving Port Said June 1st. American passenger vessel sailings are reported fully booked but the Legation at Cairo is endeavoring to arrange use of cargo ships if emergency arises. All current British sailings are reported diverted via the Cape.

WADSWORTH

340.1115A/651: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1940—7 p.m.

Your 30, May 20, 4 p.m. Department deems it important that all American citizens alike receive the invitation to return to the United States while there still remains opportunity for them to do so. Department has noted your despatch No. 1003, July 12, 1939, suggesting channels through which such invitation may be made.

HULL

340.1115A/700: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, May 25, 1940—6 p.m.

[Received May 25—5:05 p.m.]

36. As the Department’s telegram of May 24, 7 p.m., may have been sent without reference to my telegram No. 33 of May 22, 9 p.m., I desire to report that the Reuters’ message and my supplementary comment, both quoted in my telegram under reference, were published prominently yesterday in all morning newspapers, namely the four Hebrew and three Arabic dailies and in the English language Palestine Post. The Department may rest assured that through such publication its warning to American citizens has become generally known throughout Palestine.

My telegram No. 33 reported that only two vessels are currently available for travel from Palestine. It now appears that departure by the former is not to be recommended because reliable reports received today have it that all Italian line sailings from Italy to New York have been canceled and that United States Line sailings are

*Not printed.
fully booked. This constitutes, I believe, a strong added reason for my taking no further steps at this time to invite American citizens here to return to the United States while, in the words of the Department’s telegram, “There still remains opportunity for them to do so”, such opportunity appears to exist in fact for at most a few hundreds of our more than 8,000 citizens in Palestine. I am therefore hesitant to add, by press release or other form of additional notification, further fuel to the smoldering fire of panic now reliably reported to be spreading in the Palestine Jewish community.

WADSWORTH

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340.1115A/700: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem
(Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1940.

Your 36, May 25, 6 p.m. Your position approved.

Hull

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340.1115A/1418

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

Jerusalem, July 20, 1940.

[Received August 27.]

Sir: [Here follows information similar to that brought up to date in despatch No. 1411, November 15, printed infra.]

As to the general problem of evacuating American Jews from Haifa, and possibly Tel Aviv, I early suggested to Jewish-American leaders that these communities would do well to consider, through their local organizations, the question of how their position might be affected by a possible spread of hostilities to the Eastern Mediterranean, adding that the Consulate General would be glad to furnish advice and all possible assistance. This matter—the fourth and last subject to be treated in the present despatch—will be discussed in some detail below.

About the middle of May, also, I arranged for the formation of a small committee of three representative Americans with whom the Consulate General might consult informally regarding any emergency which might arise. Its members were:

Dr. J. L. Magnes, President of the Hebrew University
Dr. Totah, Director of the American Friends’ Schools
Mr. A. L. Miller, Director of the Jerusalem Y. M. C. A.
Subsequently, and largely on Dr. Magnes’ recommendation, we decided it would be advisable to form a special subcommittee of leading American Jews to consider the problems especially affecting resident citizens of that faith. Such a committee finally met with me on June 26. Its members were:

Dr. J. L. Magnes, as Chairman
Mr. J. Simon, President of the Palestine Economic Corporation
Dr. I. Kligler, of the Hadassah Medical Organization
Mr. H. Viteles, of the Central Bank of Cooperatives
Mr. H. Margalith, head of the Jerusalem branch of the American-Jewish Association of Palestine.

With members of this subcommittee and with representatives of the other two branches of the American-Jewish Association (at Tel Aviv and Haifa) the matter of organized arrangements for the assistance of American Jews has been discussed on several occasions. Tentative plans have already been made to receive and care for any needy refugees who may be forced by circumstances—such, for instance, as further bombing of Haifa—to leave dangerous areas.

The most notable contribution in this field is an offer made by Drs. Magnes and Kligler to house such refugees in buildings to be made available by the institutions they represent. And Mr. Simon has made a generous offer of financial assistance towards putting such buildings into “habitable” condition should need therefor arise.

Officials of the American-Jewish Association are also cooperating with the Consulate General in effecting a more complete registration of American Jewish residents of the country. In this latter connection the matter of the financial situation of these citizens will also be considered.

The ultimate aim of this move, which is the sub-committee’s own proposal, is to perfect some arrangements for the collection of funds for the assistance of any who may find themselves evacuated and in real need. The investigation is at present proceeding.

In conclusion and to recapitulate the major points made in the present despatch and its enclosures:

1) Some 250 resident citizens have left Palestine since receipt of the Department’s telegram of May 16 advising Americans to return to the United States; and an approximately equal number are known to wish to leave and to possess funds more or less sufficient for the purpose;

2) There remain in the country some 7,000 citizens (roughly 6,500 Jews, 400 Arabs and 100 others) against at least 3,000 of whom presumption of expatriation is believed to have arisen; and

3) Some 1,000 of these remaining citizens reside in Haifa, in which connection there exists a potential emergency evacuation—and possibly relief—problem of some magnitude.
Finally, and in explanation of the relative smallness of the numbers of citizens who have left or made known their desire to leave the country, I venture to quote the following paragraph from my telegram of May 20:

"About 90 per cent are Jews of whom at least two-thirds are naturalized citizens. They have been admitted to Palestine under immigration schedules on visas authorizing permanent residence. For the most part ardent Zionists their dominant interest is Jewish settlement and realization of the National Home ideal. Their first and preeminent loyalty is to that ideal and its concomitant concept of Jewish statehood in their lifetime."

Respectfully yours, G. WADSWORTH

340.1115A/1700

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

No. 1411 JERUSALEM, November 15, 1940. [Received December 23.]

Subject: War emergency problems affecting American citizens in Palestine.

SIR: In my despatch No. 1331 of July 20, 1940, there was submitted a detailed review of the above subject as presenting itself at the time. In the present despatch I shall have the honor to bring that review up to date. As to the number of American citizens involved, the situation was, briefly, as follows:

During the period from May 18 (date of the receipt of the Department’s advice to American citizens to return to the United States) to July 15, some 250 resident citizens had left Palestine.

Approximately 7,000 citizens (then estimated at roughly 6,500 Jews, 400 Arabs and 100 “others”) were believed to remain in the country.

Of these estimated 7,000, only some 250 were known to wish to leave and to possess more or less sufficient funds for the purpose.

Many more, it was believed, would wish to leave were the Middle East to become the scene of major hostilities and the country to be threatened by Axis invasion.

During the intervening four months, only some 150 citizens have left the country. This figure has been confirmed by enquiry made of local travel agencies. Fifty-odd departed in August on the Egyptian S. S. El Nil via the Red Sea and the Cape of Good Hope, the others via Iraq and India.

These departures included: all of the remaining American employees (23 in number) of the M. W. Kellogg Company, which had
concluded its construction work of the new oil refinery at Haifa; one single missionary and one missionary family departing on furlough; and, the balance, 120-odd residents (for the most part Jews). In addition seven missionaries from Egypt who had spent the summer here returned to that country.

On the basis of these figures, there should remain in the country something over 6,000 American Jews, the originally estimated 400 naturalized citizens of local Arab origin and rather less than 100 "others". Further enquiries made during these intervening four months confirm the substantial accuracy of the latter two figures but suggest the desirability of reducing that of the number of American Jews.

As to "others" the following table is believed to be substantially correct as of the present date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Adults</th>
<th>Dependents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assembly of God</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Friends Mission</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franciscan Custody of the Holy Land</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Baptist Convention</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian and Missionary Alliance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Carmelit Fathers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other &quot;missionaries&quot; (YMCA, American Colony Aid Association, etc.)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total &quot;missionaries&quot;</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
<td><strong>23 [22]</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consulate General (including two F. S. O. families evacuated from Cairo)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others registered at the Consulate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total &quot;others&quot;</strong></td>
<td><strong>65</strong></td>
<td><strong>33 [32]</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As to the estimated number of resident American Jews, it is to be noted that the survey—reported in my last despatch as having been undertaken by the American-Jewish Association of Palestine—has led the officials of that association to put the total at an outside figure of approximately 5,000. They suggest that the estimate prepared by the Consulate General erred in not allowing for a higher percentage of departures during recent years.

They argue, and I believe with considerable justification, that American Jews have adjusted themselves less readily than Europeans to conditions in Palestine and, therefore, especially during the “disturbances” of 1936-39, returned in considerably larger numbers than the Consulate’s estimate showed for permanent residence in the United States. They suggest that this divergence was due in many instances to the fact that Jews so leaving Palestine were ashamed to admit that they were definitely “deserting the ship” and hence applied to the Consulate and to the Palestine Migration Department for passports or other services for seasonal travel only.
Be this as it may—and the Consulate's citizenship section is now engaged in a further study of the matter—the survey in question led the officers of the American-Jewish Association to the interesting conclusions set forth in my telegram No. 159 of November 13, 2 p. m. A confirmation copy is transmitted herewith, together with a copy of the Association's letter of November 12 which enclosed a draft text (which I did not modify) of the first and second numbered paragraphs of my telegram.

The most interesting point made in the Association's conclusions was that, of the 2,500 American Jews for whom it claimed to speak, only some 500 "wish to return to the United States at the present juncture or at an early date", the others "preferring to remain unless the country is threatened by Axis invasion."

Of these 500, the Association's survey showed, "barely 100 are financially able to pay present fares" and the remainder require assistance in the form either of cheaper fares or of full repatriation relief. The Association's officers believed that a somewhat similar situation would be found to exist among the other half of the Jewish American residents not directly represented by them.

If this be the case—and the Consulate's observations suggest its substantial accuracy—there are today in Palestine only some 800 American citizens (all Jews) who desire to return to the United States at this time and who do not possess sufficient funds for the purpose. And, of such 800, approximately one-half would be able to pay between $200 and $400 for steerage or tourist-class fares.

The numbers (of all categories) of those wishing to depart would, of course, as my telegram and earlier despatch suggested, multiply rapidly were the Eastern Mediterranean to become the scene of major hostilities and Palestine be threatened by Axis invasion.

In that latter event, the problem of the evacuation of American citizens from this country would indeed be one of serious magnitude and difficulty; and the Association's officers urge that the Department accord it full and sympathetic consideration. They present their case substantially as follows:

They came to and settled in this country primarily because inspired by the Zionist ideal. As Jews, they wished to make their contribution towards building the Jewish National Home. As Americans they wished that contribution—in the field of spiritual as well as material progress—to be representative of the best traditions of their former, American homeland.

They admit thus frankly to a dual loyalty; and they feel that that which they owe to Palestine precludes their deserting the Zionist ship now seriously endangered by but not as yet actually caught in

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*Not printed.*
the maelstrom of world war. They recognize, however, that in this stand they may be risking life itself, that as Jews (even though American citizens) they would receive short shrift at the hands of a Nazi invasion.

In the circumstances—which they feel may rightly be deemed to set them apart as unique among all Americans now resident abroad in war-threatened areas—they hold to the belief that, in dire emergency, their government should and will come to their aid with all the power (financial and otherwise) at its command.

In my many conversations with these and other leaders of the local Jewish-American community I have not encouraged them in this stand, and I have let no opportunity pass to impress on them—and through them on their community—the seriousness of the Department's advice that Americans should leave this and other Near Eastern countries.

I cannot but feel, however, that, even in the face of their failure to heed that advice, their Government could not “in dire emergency” wash its hands of all responsibility for their welfare and remain loyal to the humanitarian principles for which it has always stood. The vision is grim of what their lot would be in a Nazi-occupied Holy Land.

My hope is that, should such a tragedy come to pass, funds for their repatriation or relief would be made available by public American charity. It is a hope with which Dr. Judah Magnes, my chief counsellor in these matters, wishes very particularly to associate himself. Millions of dollars have been and, we gather, still are being contributed, notably by American Jewry, for the rendering of similar assistance to European Jews.

It might be well were the Department to consider drawing, through appropriate charitable institutions, the attention of these same American donors to this potential need of American Jews in Palestine.

Respectfully yours,

G. WADSWORTH

340.1115A/1700: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem
(Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1941—2 p. m.

Your despatch 1411, November 15.

1. In accordance with the Department's instructions to its officers in the Near East, it was suggested by you to Americans in Palestine, in anticipation of the spread of hostilities to the Mediterranean, that they return to the United States while transportation facilities were available and opportunity remained for them to do so. Despite that
advice and the subsequent spread of hostilities to the Mediterranean and although there still exists means of transportation to the United States via the Persian Gulf and India, the large number of persons referred to in your despatch have remained and continue to remain in Palestine.

2. The persons in question admit a loyalty to Palestine compelling them to remain there and they do not propose to leave unless a dire emergency should occur when, they say, they will expect this Government to come to their aid with all the power at its command, financial and otherwise. The Government will, of course, at all times extend to bona fide citizens abroad every possible protection and assistance, but citizens choosing to remain in a dangerous situation must understand that the Government's efforts to protect and assist them may be vitiated by circumstances beyond its control. It is very possible that the Government would be unable in particular to arrange for the removal of Americans in Palestine, especially of such a large number as are remaining, should an emergency arise.

3. While the Department will continually endeavor to arrange, in so far as it can, for sufficient transportation facilities for Americans returning home from war areas, it is not the obligation of government to repatriate its citizens and the Congress has not appropriated funds for that purpose. The Department has on occasion since the outbreak of hostilities made allotments to its officers abroad for advances as loans against promissory notes to destitute Americans in hazardous areas for their transportation expenses to the United States. It has made these allotments from special funds which are limited by reason of other purposes for which they are used. When it is found necessary and possible to make such allotments, the loans therefrom may only be made to bona fide American citizens. In this regard the Department in its telegraphic instruction to its offices in France, covering the recent repatriation of Americans from that country defined bona fide American citizens for purposes of Government financial assistance for repatriation as:

"Persons resting under unrebutted presumption may not be afforded the benefit of the arrangements including the loan of government funds to qualify under Rule G. Bona fide citizens are those citizens who are in complete and unquestioned possession of their citizenship rights, including the right to passports and the full protection of this Government, who have ties in the United States and who have continually held themselves out while abroad as American citizens and are in every way identifiable as such. They are citizens temporarily abroad desiring to return home. They are not persons merely possessing some circumstantial claim to American citizenship which they have not validated by residence and maintenance of ties in the United States.

and by truly identifying themselves abroad as bona fide citizens of the United States. The affording of transportation to the United States to the latter class of destitute persons, particularly with the aid of funds of this Government, would undoubtedly cause just public criticism of the action and is not the intent of the Department. Each and every officer concerned will take careful note of these instructions and be prepared to give the Department evidence as may be desired by it of his compliance therewith in any case which he should pass for repatriation.”

While applications for loans when allotments are granted for that purpose are considered upon the merits of the individual case, it is hardly possible that persons, such as those referred to in your despatch, who have left the United States and settled in a foreign country to which they admit a loyalty at least equal to that which they may have for the United States, should be able to qualify as bona fide American citizens properly entitled to the use of the public funds of the United States.

4. You are authorized to use the foregoing in your discretion.

5. You are also authorized to state to the persons concerned, with reference to the possible need of those whom they may represent for repatriation or relief funds supplied by American charity, that the Department itself cannot properly undertake to solicit those funds.

Hull