PALESTINE

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE BETWEEN ARABS AND JEWS

867N.00/450b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray)

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1937—6 p.m.

26. Deep concern is felt in important Jewish circles in this country over recommendations believed to be contained in the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry 2 into the recent disorders in Palestine. It is feared that the Report will recommend a complete cessation of Jewish immigration into Palestine or some sort of cantonization of the country. The view has been expressed that a prosperous National Home for the Jews in Palestine will serve as a stabilizing factor in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean and that it would therefore be in the interest of Turkey to give moral support to the development of the National Home.

I would appreciate your considered opinion as to whether views in the above sense would be favorably received by Atatürk 3 if you were instructed to seek an audience for that purpose.

HULL

867N.00/450a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham)

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1937—7 p.m.

155. Personal for the Ambassador. Important Jewish groups in this country are perturbed over rumors that in the forthcoming report to be made by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Palestine situation it will be recommended either that Jewish immigration into Palestine entirely cease or else that some system of Arab and Jewish cantons be established.

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1 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. III, pp. 434 ff.
2 For the appointment of this Commission and its objectives, see despatch No. 2494, July 31, 1936, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, ibid., p. 445.
3 Kemal Atatürk, President of Turkey.
I wish you to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to inform him orally and informally in the sense of the above, acquainting him at the same time with the hope of the above Jewish groups that no decisions with regard to the Palestine problem will be taken that may result in working greater hardship upon the Jews who are already suffering under repressive measures in various countries of Europe and are finding it necessary as a result of such measures to seek refuge in other countries.

You might mention that in the opinion of large sections of the Jews of this country the Jews of the world as a whole, by reason of their experience at the hands of certain European governments, have come to be the logical supporters of democratic institutions and naturally look to the democratic governments of the world to accord them fair and equitable treatment.

You may state to the Foreign Minister in conclusion that your Government presumes he would wish to be acquainted with the above views. You will at the same time carefully avoid leaving the impression that your Government is in any way endeavoring to inject itself into administrative matters relating to the Mandate or questions the authority or responsibility of Great Britain for the administration of Palestine.

Hull

867N.00/451: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

Istanbul, April 30, 1937—noon.
[Received 12:25 p.m.]

16. I regret that because of Turkey's special unwillingness to take a position at odds with the Arab peoples (particularly in view of the Sanjak question*), her present policy of close cooperation with Great Britain, her hard-boiled post-war policy with reference to minorities and her sensitiveness towards the idea of intervention in any form on behalf of minority groups, I could not in honesty encourage the hope that the Turkish authorities would receive favorably the views set forth in the first paragraph of your telegram No. 26, April 27, 6 p.m. I apprehend on the contrary that their presentation would be more likely to meet with a humiliating rebuff and impairment of such confidence and good will as our country enjoys in Turkey.

MacMurray

*The status of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, nominally a port of Syria, was being considered by the Council of the League of Nations as a result of differences between France and Turkey. See League of Nations, Official Journal, January, February, May-June, 1937.
The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Moore)

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1937.

Dear Judge Moore: In connection with our discussions on the Palestine situation and with particular reference to the matter of Jewish immigration into Palestine, I feel sure you will be interested in noting the attached correspondence of 1923 between Mr. Hughes, then Secretary of State, and Mr. Slep, then Secretary to President Coolidge.

In line with what I said this morning, I would point out and emphasize the following statement contained in Mr. Hughes' letter:

"As this Government cannot assume any responsibility for the situation which might be created in case Palestine were open to unlimited immigration, and since we ourselves take the most stringent measures to control immigration, I do not feel that we could properly approach the British Government with a view to any change in their present immigration regulations in Palestine."

Wallace Murray

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The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham)

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1937—5 p. m.

171. Paul Alling, Assistant Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, returning from Geneva, has been directed to stop off at London to consult with Embassy and appropriate British officials concerning developments with respect to Palestine.

Please afford him every assistance to obtain fullest information that British officials may be willing to disclose informally and confidentially. It is anticipated that the Department will be subjected to severe pressure in connection with the report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry.

Alling has been instructed to notify Embassy of date of arrival. Please do utmost to procure moderately priced hotel accommodations for him and his wife.

Hull

* Correspondence not attached to file copy of letter.
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 29, 1937—2 p. m.  
[Received May 29—9:35 a. m.]

320. Department’s 171, May 12, 5 p. m. From Alling. Acting Head of Eastern Department of Foreign Office told me today that Inquiry Commission's report was now being put in final form but would probably not be completed before the middle of June. Thereafter the Government will presumably have to decide whether to accept the report or to reject it in whole or in part. The Government will also have to determine whether to announce its policy with respect to Palestine at the same time the Commission’s report is published or to decide upon new policy after there has been time to estimate reaction to the report. It was understood that the Parliamentary opposition was pressing for the latter alternative but that for obvious reasons the former course would probably be followed. In any case it is expected that the report will not be made public before the first part of July. Except in the unlikely event that the report is rejected by the Government, it must of course be published prior to meeting of Mandates Commission about July 26 since there is no disposition to ask for another postponement of that meeting. [Alling.]

Bingham

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling) of a Conversation With the Head of the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office (Rendel)

[LONDON,] June 1, 1937.

After discussing a recent trip which Mr. Rendel had made across Arabia, I stated that I had had instructions from the State Department to stop in while passing through London to discuss the Palestine situation. I explained that from a conversation I had had on Saturday, May 29th, with Mr. Baggallay (then Acting Head of the Eastern Department) I had understood that the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry would not be in final form before the middle of June; that it would then be considered by the Government; and that it would probably not be published before the early part of July. I added that it was my understanding that after considering the report the Government would determine whether to announce its policy simultaneously with the publication of the report or to publish the report first and then to determine on policy after an opportunity had been afforded to study public reaction.
Mr. Rendel replied that the above résumé accurately described the situation except that the report would probably not be in final form before June 20th. Furthermore, he considered it altogether probable that, for obvious reasons, the Government would be likely to announce its policy at the same time the report was published rather than to wait until some later date.

I said that as he knew we had a large and influential Jewish population which was greatly interested, financially and sentimentally, in the Palestine problem and that, as he could surmise, this population was taking a particular interest in the present situation. Mr. Rendel stated that he was naturally aware of this interest, that the Jewish population in the United Kingdom was similarly interested.

He hoped that the State Department likewise appreciated the position of the British Government which had to consider not only the interests of the Jews but likewise those of the Arabs. Unfortunately Palestine was not an empty country to which unlimited numbers of Jews could be admitted; it was already populated with a considerable number of Arabs who had lived in Palestine for some thirteen hundred years. To turn the country entirely over to the Jews would be much like asking the present inhabitants of Long Island to withdraw from their homes in order that another population might move in. The Arabs were not, as some people appeared to believe, a savage race like the plains Indians of North America; they were a people with a certain culture and civilization who could not be treated as savages.

I said that I was sure that the State Department was fully alive to this aspect of the situation.

Mr. Rendel continued that unfortunately previous British Governments had made promises to the Jews and promises to the Arabs. It was quite apparent that these promises, which were conflicting, could not be carried out with respect to both peoples. It was therefore the logical thing and the fair thing to attempt to find a reasonable compromise and a fair compromise between these conflicting promises and once this settlement had been arrived at to carry it through without fear or favor. He realized that any such solution would raise cries of protest from both Arabs and Jews but that only by such a radical solution could the problem be finally settled.

I said that of course the State Department wished to make it perfectly clear that it was not endeavoring in any way even to attempt to interfere in the administration of Palestine since that was entirely a British problem. All that the State Department wished to do was informally to advise the Foreign Office of the interest of a large group in America in the Palestine problem. I said that I assumed that the Foreign Office would wish to be informed of that interest and that it would presumably be taken into consideration at the same time.
that other factors in the situation were being examined. Mr. Rendel replied that the Foreign Office was naturally glad to be told of the interest of American Jews in the Palestine problem. The Foreign Office would of course take into consideration the feeling of Jews in New York just as it would consider the feelings of the Jews in Warsaw and the Arabs and Moslems in countries which were neighbors of Palestine in the Near East.

I asked Mr. Rendel whether he considered it possible that the eventual solution of the Palestine problem would be of such a nature as to require that changes be made in the Mandate—changes which would necessitate the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. He replied that it was altogether possible that the solution finally decided upon would require changes in the Mandate and that naturally any such changes would require the consent of the Council of the League. I then referred to Article 7 of our Palestine Mandate Convention with Great Britain providing that no changes in the Mandate would affect the rights of the United States, as defined in the Convention, unless such changes had been assented to by the United States. Mr. Rendel replied that the Foreign Office was of course aware of this provision, but he could not conceive that any changes that might be made in the Mandate would in any way affect the rights of the United States. Those rights were to a large extent of an economic character, providing for equality of commercial opportunity, etc. He did not feel that it would be possible to hold legally that the British Government was under any obligation under the terms of the Mandate Convention to obtain the consent of the United States to changes in the Mandate unless those changes affected American rights as defined in that Convention. He did not see how any changes that might be proposed in the Mandate, as a result of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry would be likely in any way to affect those rights. Consequently he could see no basis on which the United States could claim that it should be consulted respecting such changes as it might prove necessary to make in the Mandate.

Finally Mr. Rendel again thanked me for the information I had given him regarding the views of certain Jewish groups in the United States concerning the Palestine problem.

867N.00/473a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham)

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1937—5 p. m.

256. Upon the forthcoming publication of the report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry the Department foresees the necessity of

considering a number of questions that may arise as a result of that report and the policy of the British Government with respect thereto.

In the circumstances the Department wishes to be kept advised fully and promptly by telegraph of all important developments including such information as may be discreetly obtainable revealing the views and intentions of competent government, parliamentary, and other circles in Great Britain on this subject.

It would be helpful in this connection to have your views as to the attitude likely to be taken by Parliament and by important Jewish leaders in Great Britain in the event some radical solution of the Palestine problem, such as partition, is recommended by the Commission and supported by the Government, and as to the possible attitude of the Government in case of strong opposition to the proposed solution.

Welles

877N.01/1604

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1937.

At Judge Moore’s suggestion I spoke to the British Ambassador this afternoon with further reference to the Ambassador’s conversation with Judge Moore on June 21. 8

I recalled Judge Moore’s remarks to the Ambassador on the above-mentioned occasion to the effect that, while we were of course at present unaware of the contents of the report to be submitted shortly by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Palestine situation, Judge Moore wished to state quite personally, informally and confidentially to the Ambassador that we might find it necessary after the report was published and studied to make representations to the British Government; that in view of the many matters of large importance of mutual concern to our Government and to the British Government we would of course be reluctant to get into any serious dispute with the British Government over Palestine; that, finally and generally speaking, our chief interest in all the mandated territories was the safeguarding of equality of economic opportunity for American nationals in those parts.

I told the Ambassador that Judge Moore desired me to make it entirely clear that his remarks regarding the Palestine situation were not to be taken as indicating in any way that, if and when it became necessary for this Government to make representations after

8 Memorandum of conversation not found in Department files.
the publication of the Royal Commission’s report, such representations might be regarded by the British Government as merely pro forma, for such was not the case. I emphasized on my own part to the Ambassador that since we were not yet in possession of the findings of the Royal Commission and are not aware of the position that will be taken by the British Government, it is obviously impossible at this time to state what position this Government may take with respect thereto.

The Ambassador said he appreciated the situation fully but was glad to have this further confirmation from me. He then told me that in communicating his conversation with Judge Moore to his Government in strict confidence he had merely stated (1) that a situation might arise after the publication of the Royal Commission’s report requiring representations by this Government regarding Palestine and (2) that this Government would regret to see any dispute arise between itself and the British Government at this time in view of the many large mutual interests of the two Governments. The Ambassador said he had made no reference to the matter of equality of economic opportunity. I suggested, and he agreed, that it would be well not to touch upon that matter at present with his Government in view of the fact that no final formulation of a policy in this respect had been reached by the Department and could not of course be reached until it had all the facts of the case in hand.

The Ambassador thanked me again for affording him this further clarification of the situation, which he said was very helpful.

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.00/478: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 1, 1937—2 p. m.
[Received July 1—10: 10 a. m.]

426. Department’s 256, June 23, 5 p. m. Colonial Secretary was asked in the House of Commons yesterday “whether it is proposed to consult the Government of the United States of America with regard to the future policy to be pursued in Palestine, in view of the treaty of 3rd December 1924, between Great Britain and the United States by which the latter became a party to the agreement to establish Palestine as the Jewish Homeland, and which included a provision in the first article that any modification in the mandate must be assented to by the United States?”

The Colonial Secretary replied “In considering the future policy to be pursued in Palestine, His Majesty’s Government will of course
keep prominently in mind any rights of the Government of the United States of America under the instrument to which the honorable member refers”.

To the further question “Have any representations been received from the Government of the United States of America up to date?” the Colonial Secretary replied “No sir”.

Asked when it is proposed to publish the report of the Royal Commission and to make a declaration of the Government’s policy in connection therewith, the Colonial Secretary replied “It is proposed to release the report in time for its publication with a Command Paper containing a short statement of the policy of His Majesty’s Government on the morning of 8th July and copies of the report and a summary will be available for honorable members in the vote office some time on Wednesday evening”.

Bingharn

867N.00/474 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham)

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1937—3 p.m.

277. Your 403, June 24, 5 p.m.º It is the Department’s understanding from Alling’s conversation with the Head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office (see penultimate paragraph of Alling’s memorandum of June 1) that American rights under the American British Convention of December 3, 1924, were considered to be “largely of an economic character” and that consequently the British Government would probably not find it necessary to consult this Government with respect to changes that might be proposed in Palestine as a result of the Report of the Royal Commission.

I should appreciate receiving at the earliest possible moment any further detailed elucidation of the official British position in this matter that you can obtain.

Hull

867N.01/767a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham)

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1937—10 a.m.

281. Please seek an interview with Mr. Edenºº at earliest possible moment and, after reading the following memorandum, leave a copy with him.

º Not printed.
ºº British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
"As His Majesty’s Government is aware, the American Government and large sections of the American public have for many years taken a close interest in the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. As early as August 1918, President Wilson expressed publicly his satisfaction at the progress which the Zionist movement had made in the United States and in the allied countries as a result of the declaration made on November 2, 1917, by Lord Balfour, on behalf of the British Government, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people. Each succeeding President has on one or more occasions expressed his own interest in the idea of a National Home and his pleasure at the progress made in its establishment. It will be remembered likewise that the American Congress adopted, and President Harding signed on September 21, 1922, a joint resolution favoring the establishment of the National Home. Numerous private organizations in the United States have from time to time expressed their sympathy for such a Homeland. It is perhaps pertinent to mention that the British Government itself has tended to encourage the interest which American nationals have taken in the Jewish National Home and in the general question of Palestine. As one example of this encouragement, reference is made to Lord Balfour’s letter of January 13, 1922, to the Secretary of State, a pertinent section of which reads as follows:

'The task which the British Government have undertaken in Palestine is one of extreme difficulty and delicacy. At Paris I always warmly advocated that it should be undertaken not by Britain, but by the United States of America; and though subsequent events have shown me that such a policy would never have commended itself to the American people I still think that, so far as the Middle East is concerned, it would have been the best. However this may be, the duty has devolved upon Great Britain; and I hope the American Government will do what they can to lighten the load.'

When to this general interest there is added the fact that several thousand American nationals have established themselves in Palestine and have made large investments there in agricultural, industrial and philanthropic enterprises, it is not surprising that our people should be deeply concerned with the future of the country. It seems altogether fitting and proper again to bring this interest and concern to the attention of His Majesty’s Government at this time when it is considering what steps should be taken, consistent with its existing obligations, to establish and maintain peace in the Land which is Holy to three great faiths."

HULL

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State

London, July 7, 1937—9 p.m.
[Received July 7—3:45 p.m.]

448. Request contained in the Department's 277, July 3, 3 p.m., was conveyed to the Foreign Office whose reply dated today just received reads:

"With reference to Your Excellency's memorandum No. 2662 of the 6th July," I have the honor to inform you that, in the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the rights of the United States Government and their nationals in regard to Palestine depend on the terms of the 'Convention between the United Kingdom and the United States of America respecting the rights of the Governments of the two countries and their respective nationals in Palestine', which was signed in London on the 3rd December, 1924, and of which the ratifications were exchanged in London on the 3rd December, 1925. The rights of the United States Government and their nationals as regards Palestine are those recited in articles 2 to 6 of the Convention, and in article 7 of the Convention. These rights must remain intact whatever changes may be made in the Mandate for Palestine, unless the United States assent to such a change.

2. In the view of His Majesty's Government, however, these rights are limited to those specified in the articles of the Convention referred to above, and the consent of the United States Government will, therefore, not be required to any change in the Palestine Mandate unless these specific rights in question are thereby affected. Indeed, the United States having assented, by article 1 of the Convention, to the Mandate as a whole, it follows that the United States Government have accepted the provision in article 27 of the Mandate which lays down that the Mandate may be altered with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom propose to seek the consent of the Council of the League at its September session for any changes in the Mandate of Palestine which may be required as the result of the Royal Commission's report; but, should any such changes affect any of the United States rights laid down in articles 2 to 6 of the Convention referred to above, His Majesty's Government will immediately inform the United States and seek their consent thereto.

This memorandum, copy of which was transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 3178, July 7, reads as follows:

"The American Ambassador presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honor to inform Mr. Eden that the United States Government would be glad to receive at the earliest possible moment a detailed elucidation of the official British position, having regard to the terms of the American-British Convention of December 3, 1924, on the question of consulting the United States Government with respect to any changes that may be proposed in Palestine as the result of the Report of the Royal Commission."  (867N.01/771)
3. While the foregoing represents the views of His Majesty's Government as to their legal obligations towards the United States Government in the matter, they fully appreciate, and indeed welcome, the interest taken by the United States Government in the question of the solution of the Palestine problem, and it is their intention to keep the United States Government fully informed of any proposals which they may put forward to the Council of the League for the modification of the Mandate. I have, et cetera,\textsuperscript{5}.

\textit{Bingham}

\textbf{867N.01/775 : Telegram}

\textit{The Consul General at Beirut (Marriner) to the Secretary of State}

\textbf{BEIRUT, July 9, 1937—noon.}
[Received 2:05 p.m.]

Arabic opinion as expressed in the press here and in Damascus is in general dissatisfied with Royal Commission report on Palestine\textsuperscript{19} stating that the "surgical operation" proposed by Great Britain is destined to create confusion, to leave all power on the divide and rule principle to England, and effectively to cut the Arabs away from the coast line and all the richer lands. At the request of the British, the general commanding here assures me that strict measures have been taken for guarding the Palestine frontier to prevent any armed bands from Syria crossing to assist in possible demonstrations. The intention attributed to the Nationalist Party of preparing and arming such bands, allegedly at the request of the Grand Mufti\textsuperscript{20} of Jerusalem who recently visited Damascus, has been categorically denied by Nationalist leaders. They state that while they sympathize with the Arabs in Palestine there can be no question of armed intervention.

\textit{Marriner}

\textbf{867N.01/774 : Telegram}

\textit{The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State}

\textbf{LONDON, July 9, 1937—7 p.m.}
[Received July 9—2:35 p.m.]

456. I saw the Foreign Minister by appointment this morning to deliver to him your 281, July 7, 10 a.m., and took advantage of the occasion to outline to him at some length American interest in the whole Palestine problem. I stressed not only the concern of my Government in the matter but likewise that of the American people. Eden said your message would have every consideration and assured

\textsuperscript{5} British Cmnd. 5479: Palestine, Royal Commission Report, July, 1937.
\textsuperscript{19} Haj Amin Efendi al-Husseini.
me that in all Cabinet discussions in connection with the Government's policy on the question of Palestine the attitude of the American Government and that great body of public opinion which is concerned therein was very much in their minds. He also asked me to realize the difficulties of the situation and that every endeavor was being made by the British Government to find an equitable solution among the many factors that must necessarily enter into consideration.

BINGHAM

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] July 12, 1937.

Mr. J. A. Moffett, Chairman of the Board of the Bahrein Petroleum Company, Ltd., New York, a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of California, called by appointment this morning upon the Under Secretary in connection with his company's interests in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. Present also were the Chief of the Near Eastern Division and the Economic Adviser.18

After describing briefly his company's operations in the above-mentioned area, Mr. Moffett stated that while King Ibn Saud had hitherto been regarded as very friendly to American interests, this company's representatives thought they had discerned a certain disposition on the part of the King to be less amenable and co-operative in meeting the company's wishes with regard to operations in Saudi Arabia and more particularly with regard to the expansion of operations in that area. It was felt that while Ibn Saud had in the past been fairly independent in his relations with the British he was showing signs at present of greater friendliness to the British and a disposition to cooperate with them more fully.

Mr. Moffett then stated that the competent officials of his company were fearful that any disposition on the part of this Government to support Jewish claims in the present dispute over the new pronouncement of British policy proposing a partition of Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews might have serious repercussions on American oil interests in Saudi Arabia and might even result in their expulsion. Mr. Moffett emphasized in this connection the truly American character of the oil concessions held by his company in Saudi Arabia and the importance of increasing production wherever possible in order to meet the constantly increasing demands.

18 Herbert Feils.
Mr. Welles told Mr. Moffett he appreciated being kept informed regarding the situation in Saudi Arabia, but added that this Government is not officially concerned in the present Palestine dispute nor had it taken any position with respect thereto.

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.01/784 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, July 12, 1937—6 p.m.
[Received July 12—5 p.m.]

Local reaction one of intense interest and feeling but no serious disturbance public security anticipated.

Discussion centers on Commission’s finding that mandate is unworkable and consequent recommendation for partition.

All Arabs accept the finding; all Jews repudiate it arguing fault lies with administration.

In both camps divergent views are held on the recommendation. Among Arabs Mufti refuses in principle and declines in practice to consider it; Emir Abdullah urges acceptance on ground realities must be faced but wants modification of proposed boundary and Arab administrations in neutral enclave; Nashashibi side-steps principle willing negotiate for favorable modifications. Among joint ownership [sic] general Zionists refuse in principle but imply would accept in practice if modifications made to include in Jewish State new Jerusalem and Jordan colonies, afford opportunity to develop Negev and avoid subvention to Arab State; important group of Labor Zionists while urging similar modification reported willing to accept what they can get.

Iraq Government’s statement categorically opposing partition believed based on combination sympathy and curiosity, [sic] strengthen internal position greatly fortifies Mufti’s stand.

WADSWORTH

867N.01/797 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, July 17, 1937—11 a.m.
[Received July 17—7:32 a.m.]

19. My 18, July 13, 1 p.m. Iraq Government appears to be taking lead in opposition to Palestine partition scheme and yesterday after-

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20 Abdullah Ibn Hussein of Transjordan.
21 Raghib Bey au-Nashashibi, ex-mayor of Jerusalem and leader of the National Defense Party.
22 Not printed.
noon permitted large public demonstration, committee of which has telegraphed Legation requesting support of the United States Government. Official and popular resentment against Emir Abdulah [Abdullah] reported increasing.

Satterthwaite

867N.01/800 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert)

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1937—8 p.m.

120. Your 244, July 20, noon. In as much as the Palestine question is presumably one for consideration at this stage only by the Mandates Commission and the Council, the Department would be interested in learning in what manner it is likely to come before the Assembly.

Is the Department correct in assuming that the protests received by the Secretary General are accorded no official recognition since they are not submitted within the League rules regarding petitions concerning mandated territories?

Hull

867N.01/808 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 22, 1937—noon.
[Received July 22—11: 40 a.m.]

498. Department’s 283, July 7, 2 p.m., and Embassy’s 493, July 21, 2 p.m. In the House of Commons yesterday the Colonial Secretary moved approval of the policy of the Government relating to Palestine. He said the Government was convinced by the arguments of the report and reminded the House that the debate concerned a problem affecting the whole of Jewry and the Moslem world and therefore future relations between East and West. After reviewing the history of the problem, he said that the correct facts were that the pledge to the Jews was a promise not of Palestine but of a home in Palestine, and the pledge to the Arabs was not a promise of Palestine but a general promise to promote their independence. It was indisputable that the continuance of the mandate would make the soreness worse. The chief obstacles were in the mandate itself which forbade joint education of Jews and Arabs. The essence of the problem was the

*Not printed.

*Neither printed.
clash of two vivid nationalisms sharpened by Jewish persecution in Germany and Arab nationalism sharpened by new grant of self government in Syria and the sudden increase of Jewish immigration. He briefly explained that only partition could remove reciprocal fears of domination and only permanent neutral guardianship of the holy places could guarantee peace. He asked for support only for the principle that the case for fundamental changes had been made out and that leave could be granted by the League to formulate a fully detailed scheme. He could not agree to refer the report to a joint select committee which would mean indefinite delay in making application to the League. He gave an optimistic account of the reception of the report.

The Labor opposition speaker subjected the scheme to detailed criticism in order to show that it was unworkable in its present form and suggested reference to a joint select committee.

The Liberal opposition speaker on much the same lines urged that only Jews had legitimate grievances and that it was much too early for the House to make an irrevocable decision.

Mr. Amery, Conservative, led the way toward compromise and thought that joint select committee might be set up at a later stage.

After several other speakers, Mr. Churchill said he would have preferred persevering with the mandate and could not vote for immediate approval of the partition in principle, the virtues or vices of that principle depending on its detailed application and no details had been settled. In view of the desirability of unanimity and the possibility that delay might bring Jews and Arabs together, he suggested as an amendment to the opposition amendment a proposal to send the report forward to the League with a view to the later preparation by the Government after adequate inquiry of a detailed plan in accordance with the policy set out in the Government's comments on the report. After further debate and a modification in the wording suggested by Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Churchill's motion, which the Government accepted, was carried unanimously except for third [sic] independent labor members.

In the House of Lords where the debate was resumed the suggestion was also made that the report should first be referred to a joint select committee. Lord Swinton for the Government argued that such a committee could only do over again the work of the Royal Commission. The debate which had merely been on a motion asking for information was concluded by the withdrawal of the motion.

BINGHAM
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, July 22, 1937—4 p.m.
[Received July 22—2 p.m.]

246. Department’s telegram 120, July 21, 8 p.m.

1. Although juridically the Council is the competent body for deciding questions relating to mandates, the Assembly in past years has consistently maintained that the functioning of the mandates system is a matter of interest to all League members. Each year a resolution usually introduced by Norway was passed placing mandates on the Assembly’s agenda and extensive general discussions thereon have taken place in the Sixth Committee. Matters relative to Palestine have already frequently formed a subject of discussion particularly on the part of the Polish and Iraq representatives. Secretariat officials are convinced that under the present circumstances an extensive discussion on Palestine will take place in the forthcoming Assembly. Although it may be held that such discussion, or resolution if any, would have no juridical force, nevertheless, it would serve to inform the Council of the sentiments prevailing in the Assembly and would undoubtedly influence Council action.

2. The questions of what constitutes a petition is a matter of interpretation in the light of established rules and practice. Secretariat officials are of the opinion that the protests thus far received are not, at least in most cases, petitions in the technical sense. Should any be decided to constitute petitions they will be communicated verbatim to the members of the Mandates Commission and the latter will decide whether they warrant formal consideration. In the case of mere protests it is customary for the Secretariat to make summaries thereof and communicate them to members of the Commission. Full texts are then made available if requested. Thus in the case either of petitions or of protests the Commission is informed and is in a position to decide whether such documents demand or justify consideration as pertinent to the matter in hand.

3. With Iraq and the contemplated procedure as regards Syria as precedents, it is considered that the conversion of a mandated territory into an independent state is predicated on its becoming a member of the League of Nations and likewise in the present case it is presumed that in addition the states concerned would be required to give certain guarantees particularly as regards minorities. Acceptance of League membership and corollary obligations implies agreement between the states concerned and the Council. It is, therefore, suggested that unilateral action on the part of the Council would presumably not be sufficient to carry out the proposals of the Royal Commission. Should
opposition in Palestine prove to be widespread and vehement, particularly if encouraged by the opposition of a group of League states, the Council might be obliged to seek some other alternative, or to continue for an indefinite period the mandatory régime.

GILBERT

867N.01/618: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, July 26, 1937—1 p. m.
[Received 5 p. m.]

1046. In conversation with an official of the Levant section of the Foreign Office concerning the Royal Commission’s report on Palestine this official said that while the Foreign Office had not yet had an opportunity to examine carefully the voluminous report he was confident that the French Government would raise no objection to the principle of the partition scheme. The present mandate had proved unworkable he said and only time could tell if the partition scheme would be more workable. He was somewhat skeptical on this point but said that the French Government had had sufficient experience with problems in mandated territories to realize that full scope for working out solutions must be left to the Mandatory Power subject of course to adequate protection being afforded the legitimate interests of other states.

He remarked that France had important interests in Palestine in the way of schools and hospitals and would have to see that these were protected. He also said that the French Government was not informed as to the precise scope of the proposal for conceding on [to?] the British a permanent guardianship over the holy places. There are arrangements between the French Government and the Holy See regarding churches in this region and the French Government will desire further information on this aspect of the scheme.

This official said that in reading the report he had been struck by its tendency to encourage Arab unity. This was of course the British fashion of coating the pill for the Arabs. He remarked that during the war the British had done much the same thing in order to gain the assistance of the Arabs and that this had proved later on to be of doubtful wisdom. He felt that conditions in the Arab countries are such as to make it impossible, at least for the present, to realize Arab unity in any appreciable degree and he wondered if by encouraging hopes which would be disappointed the British might not be creating difficulties for the future.

It appears that considerable pressure is being brought on the French Government by Jewish organizations to object to the Palestine report.
The Foreign Office however is taking the position that this is a matter to be dealt with primarily by the Mandatory Power subject to details of execution which will protect French interests.

The official with whom we spoke remarked that when the report comes before the Mandates Commission at Geneva at the end of this month he would not be surprised if action were limited to the appointment of a reporter to examine the question and report to the Commission at a later session.

Copy to Geneva, London.

Bullitt

867N.01/836: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Everett) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, August 3, 1937—4 p.m.
[Received August 3—2:15 p.m.]

251. Consulate's 246, July 22, 4 p.m.

1. On July 30 the Mandates Commission began its consideration of Palestine but which has thus far consisted of hearing the statements of the British accredited representative and of drawing up its program. As indicative of the Commission's approach to the problem I quote below a portion of a communiqué issued by the Secretariat on March 2:

"The Commission interrupted its hearing of the accredited representatives this morning to consider its programme of work.

As a result of an exchange of views, it was considered that the task of the Commission should be: (1) to examine the administration of Palestine in the last 2 years. This was thought necessary not only because the Covenant and the mandate imposed this duty, but also because it was calculated to cast light upon the fundamental issue, namely, the modification of the Palestine régime proposed by the Mandatory Power; (2) to ascertain whether the material now before it is sufficient to enable the Council to form an opinion on the problem as a whole, as well as on the various solutions suggested (should it be necessary, the accredited representative will be asked to supplement the information in the course of the session [ ]); (3) to give the Council an account of the advantages and disadvantages of each of the possible solutions to the problem, namely:

(a) maintenance of the existing mandate;
(b) modification of the mandate;
(c) cantonization;
(d) partition; or
(e) any other possibility which might arise out of the discussion.

In the course of the examination of the foregoing documentation, it will be necessary to ascertain whether the mandate as drafted in

24 For the full record of these meetings and hearings, see League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 32nd (Extraordinary) Session.
1922 is in itself unworkable, or whether intervening circumstances have made it impossible to contemplate its being carried out without fundamental changes.

It decided to adopt as the basis of its work the 1936 report on the administration of Palestine, while taking account in considering the various matters dealt with in this report of the information and comments on these matters contained in the report of 1935 and in the report of the Royal Commission. The Committee will also consider the petitions sent to it in connection with the disorders and the proposals of the Royal Commission."

2. I learn in confidence from an official who attended the meetings that the British statements thus far have been largely on the lines of the Government's declarations to Parliament on presenting the Royal Commission's report except that in addition confidential details have been imparted concerning the attitude of certain of the Arab leaders. Ormsby-Gore has notified the Commission that he is leaving August 5 but has agreed to return later if his presence is desired.

A member of the Commission referring to paragraph 4 of the Government's statement of policy published as Command Paper 5513 inquired what were the "other international instruments" alluded to therein. Gore replied that this referred particularly to the treaty of 1924 with the United States and added that when the League had expressed its opinion on the matter it would be necessary to consult the United States. He explained that negotiations with the United States could take place only after the League had expressed an opinion inasmuch as the Mandatory Power was responsible to the League for the mandate. A member inquired whether this did not give the United States a de facto power of veto. Gore replied that the juridical status of the United States with respect to the mandate was not clear due to the divergence of opinion resulting from the circumstances that the United States had not technically been at war with Turkey.

3. My informant tells me that the Commission is showing itself unusually independent in its attitude and that it has by no means committed itself by inference or otherwise to any plan.

Everett

867N.01/686a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Geneva (Everett)

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1937—5 p.m.

124. The Department would appreciate any information which you can obtain discreetly as to accuracy of statements in Streit's article

British Secretary of State for Colonies and accredited representative on the Permanent Mandates Commission.

on Palestine in today's *New York Times* in which Ormsby-Gore is reported to have said that his Government agreed that it was necessary under the terms of the American-British Palestine Mandate Convention of 1924 "to get Washington's consent for any changes in the mandate" and that the British hope was that if the League and the United States would agree with Britain on some solution the authority thus obtained would bring both Jews and Arabs around to the plan.

**Hull**

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The American Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) 27

No. 2744                LONDON, August 4, 1937.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of July 7, 1937, 28 concerning the rights of the United States and its nationals in Palestine, as determined by the American-British Convention of December 3, 1924.

Since the receipt of the above-mentioned note, the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Palestine has been published and my Government has noted that the Commission proposes that the Mandate for Palestine should terminate and be replaced by a treaty system in accordance with the precedent set in Iraq and Syria. In this general connection, His Majesty's Government will recall that at the time of the termination of the special relations between the United Kingdom and Iraq in 1932, the United States Government set forth in some detail its views regarding its rights relating to the termination of mandatory régimes. At the request of my Government, which was anxious to have its views in this matter receive wide publicity, His Majesty's Government was good enough to transmit copies of that correspondence to the League of Nations, and the text of the correspondence was reproduced in the League of Nations *Official Journal* for January, 1933. 29 The attitude of the American Government, as revealed by this correspondence, was summed up in two paragraphs, one of which appeared in a letter dated March 1, 1932, 30 from the First Secretary of this Embassy to the Head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, and the other in an *aide-mémoire*, dated

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27 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 8262, August 4; received August 14. Department's instruction No. 1808, July 27 (867N.01/776), directed the Ambassador to deliver to the British Foreign Office the text of note here printed.

28 See telegram No. 448, July 7, 9 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 891.

29 See also *Foreign Relations*, 1932, vol. ii, pp. 672 ff.

July 8, 1932, left at the Foreign Office by this Embassy. For convenience of reference these paragraphs are quoted below:

"Since the termination of a régime in a mandated territory necessarily involves the 'disposition' of the territory and affects the interests of American nationals therein, the right of the United States to be consulted with respect to the conditions under which the territory is subsequently to be administered is on precisely the same basis as its right to be consulted with regard to the establishment of a mandatory régime."

"Accordingly the American Government desires to make a full reservation of its position in this matter and, with a view to avoiding any possible misconception which may arise in the future, to make clear that its action in refraining from insisting upon a fulfillment of its rights in the case of Iraq is not to be construed as an abandonment of the principle established in 1921 that the approval of the United States is essential to the validity of any determination which may be reached regarding mandated territories."

The views of my Government as set forth in the above-mentioned correspondence are, of course, fully applicable to the proposed termination of the Palestine Mandate, and it is pertinent to add that those views were brought to the attention of the French Government in August, 1936, during the negotiations between the French Government and a Syrian delegation looking to the termination of the Syrian Mandate. It is hardly necessary, however, to repeat the assurances heretofore communicated to His Majesty’s Government that the position of my Government as set forth in the quoted correspondence is based exclusively on its obligation and purpose to provide for the protection of American interests in Palestine on a basis of equality with those of other governments and their nationals.

In expressing satisfaction and appreciation for the assurances furnished that His Majesty’s Government intends to keep the United States Government fully informed of any proposals which may be made to the Council of the League of Nations for the modification of the Palestine Mandate, I am instructed to request that these proposals may be communicated to my Government in ample time to enable it to determine what, if any, observations it may desire to make with a view to the preservation of American rights in Palestine.

I have [etc.]

(For the Ambassador)

Herschel V. Johnson
Counselor of Embassy

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n See ibid., 1936, vol. iii, pp. 496 ff.
PALESTINE

867N.01/337 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Everett) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, August 5, 1937—noon.
[Received August 5—11:59 a.m.]

252. Department’s telegram 124, August 3, 5 p.m. I have now been given an opportunity in strict confidence to examine the provisional minutes of the meeting in which the question of consultation with the United States was discussed. I believe that paragraph 2 of my 251, August 3, 4 p.m., summarizes accurately the substance of that discussion. Gore is not recorded as having used the expression “to get Washington’s consent for any change in the mandate”. He used the expression “confer with the United States Government”. I can discover no statement or allusion to the effect that agreement between the United States, Great Britain and the League on some solution would bring both Jews and Arabs around to the plan. Although the provisional minutes may not always record every remark made it seems probable in this instance that Streit drew that inference himself or from his informant.

As regards Gore’s remarks on the juridical status of the United States with respect to the mandate as reported in my telegram under reference, he said in addition that he believed it to be an historical fact that the Palestine Mandate was actually conferred not by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers but by the Principal Allied Powers alone.

Full text by mail.

Everett

867N.01/840 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, August 6, 1937—1 p.m.
[Received August 6—6:18 a.m.]

22. My 18, July 13, 1 p.m. The Foreign Minister yesterday outlined to me plan of his Government for the solution of the Palestine problem which he will present to the League personally in September. Plan involves formation of an independent state with a constitution similar to that of Iraq, limitation of Jews to a minority of 30 per cent and an alliance with Great Britain and Iraq. Full report by mail.

Satterthwaite

Not printed.
The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Zurich (Frost)

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1937—4 p. m.

The Department would appreciate any information which you can discreetly obtain, without consulting American delegates, as to position such delegates have taken in World Zionist Congress on question of authorizing Zionist Executive to negotiate with British Government ad referendum on Palestine partition scheme.

HULL

The Consul General at Zurich (Frost) to the Secretary of State

ZURICH, August 13, 1937—10 a. m.

[Received 10:15 a. m.]

Department's telegram August 11th, 4 p.m. Dr. Stephen S. Wise, American delegation head and a bitter irreconcilable against partition of Palestine, led a small American minority against ad referendum resolution to negotiate with British Government on partition scheme approved by Zionist Congress August 11th. Majority American delegates supported Louis Lipsky, who favored negotiations. 300 Congress delegates voted for resolution, 158 opposed. Reliably informed American delegates divided 51 for, 38 against. Divided among the four groups of American delegates the vote was as follows:

Group 1, general Zionists, 16 favored and only 5 backed Wise in opposition;

Group 2, Hadassah Women's Zionist Organization of America of which Mrs. Judith Epstein is President, 14 opposed, 3 favored;

Group 3, entire Mizrahi, conservative orthodox religious group consisting of 18 members voted against;

Group 4, Labor or Socialist Zionists numbering 32 favored.

Frost

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, August 16, 1937—1 p. m.

[Received August 17—9 a. m.]

The Mufti of Jerusalem during a call which I made him yesterday handed me a note on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee based on its understanding of the reports concerning communications exchanged in London between Ambassador Bingham and Mr. Eden with
respect to America’s right to be consulted concerning changes in the mandate that might affect American interests. The gist of the note is contained in its penultimate paragraph.

["""" If the United States is upholding the Jews out of sympathy for them it should be remarked that the Arabs are more deserving of that sympathy as they are in the right and are the owners of the country and the victims of aggression. If on the other hand the United States is upholding the Jews on account of their financial influence it should be remarked that the United States enjoys in Arab countries great respect and affection and a moral standing of great value which are a result of the accomplishments of groups of Americans over a great number of years. These are worthy of being safeguarded and developed. The United States has also cultural relations and widely extensive business connections with the Near East and the Moslem world which are also worthy of being safeguarded and developed. It is our belief that these possess no less present and future value than what the United States is likely to reap from supporting the fallacious Jewish cause. In fact it exceeds it by far inasmuch as it embraces far-flung eastern countries.""]

Before the Mufti disclosed his intention of making any communication to me or had raised the question of the American attitude in the premises, I had mentioned the exchange of notes in London telling him that this action was similar to that taken or contemplated for all other mandate treaties including those with Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. I said that our concern in these matters was limited to the American interests involved which in the case of Palestine were as he would readily understand in large measure Jewish.

He was well pleased to discover that the American action was not unique and designed against the Arabs, a point of view which he said was heavily stressed by Jewish propaganda. He said that if the policy of the United States was the same with respect to all mandates, he could see that in this case we were not departing from that impartiality which has for many years characterized the various good works of the United States in the Near East for which the Arabs had every cause to be gratified.

In acknowledging this note do you desire me to make any observations other than those contained in Radio Bulletin No. 188 received today? August 17, 8 a.m. [sic].

WADSWORTH

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34 For text of convention signed at London, January 9, 1930, by the United States, Great Britain, and Iraq, see Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. iii, p. 302; for further correspondence, see ibid., 1932, vol. ii, pp. 672 ff.
35 See ibid., 1936, vol. iii, pp. 496 ff.
36 Dated August 13, 1937; missing from Department files.
The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1937—7 p. m.

Your August 16, 1 p. m. The Department considers that it would be preferable merely to acknowledge the Mufti’s note and inform him that you are forwarding it to Washington.

Referring to the last sentence of the third paragraph of your telegram you will appreciate that our concern with respect to the protection of American interests, as opposed to other interests, is not based on any racial or religious considerations. Obviously an equal effort would be made to protect American interests in Palestine, as elsewhere, irrespective of the race or religion of the American nationals concerned.

The Embassy at London is being requested to send you by air mail text of recent correspondence with British Government.

Hull

The Consul at Geneva (Everett) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, August 19, 1937—4 p. m.
[Received 8:15 p. m.]

256. The session of the Mandates Commission has terminated. I have had an opportunity privately to examine the Commission’s report on the questions raised by the British Government’s proposal for the partition of Palestine.37

The report calls attention to the preliminary nature of its opinion, the complexity of the problem, the diversity of views among its members on a number of points and then “formulates in general terms a few conclusions”.

Following is a summary of the chief points in these conclusions:

1. After reviewing the inherent causes of the hostility between Arabs and Jews the report states that the very success of the Zionist experiment “aroused the hostility of the chiefs of the Arab movement and even tended to alarm a Mandatory Power which was anxious to maintain good relations with the Moslem world”. Intimating that notwithstanding the great difficulties involved the Mandatory Power by a firm policy might have prevented outbreaks of violence, the report states: “The present system became unworkable on the day on which it was publicly declared to be so by a British Royal Commission speaking with the double authority conferred upon it by its impartiality and unanimity and by the Government of the Mandatory Power itself.

37 For text of report, see League of Nations, Official Journal, December 1937, p. 1089.
The most optimistic must recognize that the execution of the present mandate well interpreted and vigorously applied would be difficult in the present circumstances.” Interpreted as it has been and “applied by Government which has informed its own Parliament and its Palestine subjects that it no longer has any faith in its mission as originally conceived, the present mandate has been made practically unworkable by this fact alone”.

2. “The Commission therefore considers that the examination of the advantages and drawbacks of a new territorial solution deserves to be pursued.” The report calls attention, however, to the inherent difficulties which abide regardless of the solution adopted and states that “if the partition scheme should be applied its success would depend more on its effects with relations between Arabs and Jews than on the territorial solution adopted.”

3. “While declaring itself favorable in principle to an examination of a solution involving the partition of Palestine, the Commission is nevertheless opposed to the idea of the immediate creation of two new independent states.” The Commission feels that the projected states could not from their inception fulfill the conditions for independence laid down in 1931 in its report on its 20th session.38

4. The report mentions as a possible solution a régime analogous to that rejected by the Royal Commission under the name of “Cantونization”. It also mentions as a possible solution that the two entities resulting from partition might become fully independent of each other but remain under mandate until one or both gave sufficient proof of fitness for self government.

The Commission agreed that in case a scheme of partition were applied Jerusalem should be placed under a special régime.

5. The report terminates with a tribute to the Mandatory Power and an appeal to Jews and Arabs to abate their grievances and rather bear in mind the benefits they have received from Britain and from the mandatory régime.

In view of my knowledge of the discussions in the Commission I wish to make the following comment. It appears evident that the majority of the Commission consider the present mandate as inherently unworkable except under the constant menace of military force but the discussions show that the Commission desired to avoid a categorical statement to that effect in the report in order to leave a bridge for retreat in case the negotiations for a solution through partition or for some other solution should fail. This was stated in so many words by one member. This is the reason that the conclusion regarding the unworkability of the mandate is made to repose expressly on the Royal Commission’s report and its approval by the Government. Serious objections to the scheme of partition were raised during the discussions. Some, however, considered such a solution as probably unavoidable. Others leaned rather towards some immediate solution. It was admitted, however, in regard to the whole problem that it was a question of finding the least unsatisfactory solution.

The British representative during the discussions repeatedly stated that his Government did not expect the Mandates Commission to approve the scheme of partition but desired complete freedom to explore that solution before any other proposals were considered. The report seems to meet that requirement.

Mailing report to Department and London.

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867N.01/902: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State

GENEVA, September 16, 1937—11 p. m.  
[Received September 16—5:35 p. m.]

305. Consulate’s 294, September 14, 8 p. m. 39 The Council this afternoon passed a resolution 40 authorizing the British Government to proceed with a study of the British proposal for the partition of Palestine, it being understood that the British Government would submit a report to the Council and that the Council reserved its position on the substance of the question. Text of resolution will be mailed.

Bucknell

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867N.01/7531

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] September 17, 1937.

It will be recalled that in the Report of the Palestine Royal Commission it was proposed that the British Government eventually negotiate with the Zionist Organization a treaty regarding the position of the suggested Jewish State. In a previous memorandum we expressed some surprise that such a treaty should be negotiated with the Zionist Organization, since under the Mandate the Jewish Agency is recognized as “a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine.” Since 1929 the Jewish Agency has been composed of representatives of both Zionists and non-Zionists. Under the circumstances it would have appeared to be more logical if the Commission had recommended that the proposed treaty be negotiated with the Jewish Agency rather than with the Zionist Organization. Moreover, this same point of view was held by the group of American non-Zionists which recently attended the meeting of the Jewish Agency in Zurich. At the time of that meeting Mr. Felix Warburg, leader of the American non-Zionists

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39 Not printed.
on the Agency, made it clear that no settlement of the Palestine question could be made without the cooperation of the non-Zionists.

We have just observed in a letter written to the London Times last month by a Jewish leader in England the following statement:

"There seems some misapprehension regarding the place of the Zionist Congress in the discussions around the prospective settlement of the Palestine problem. The misapprehension was started by the Royal Commission itself, which spoke of a treaty with the Zionist Organization, but the Government quickly corrected this by substituting Jewish Agency for Zionist Organization. Palestine and its future are the concern of the Jewish people, not of any party in it."

We appear to have no confirmation of the assertion that the British Government "substituted" the Jewish Agency for the Zionist Organization in the proposal of the Royal Commission. It seems not unlikely, however, that such was the case and we are seeking confirmation on the point from the Embassy at London. If the report is confirmed it will be of some importance to us for it will affect the domestic Jewish situation. Thus, if the British Government acknowledges that it should negotiate with the Jewish Agency rather than with the Zionist Organization, the latter group in the United States will be unable to assert that its views are representative of American Jewry so far as the Palestine situation is concerned. The representatives of the non-Zionists in this country would therefore be in a position to insist that we give consideration to their views as well as to those of the Zionist Organization.

At the present time the great majority of the Zionists favor partition and the establishment of a Jewish State. A minority is opposed to partition at this time, not because they object to a Jewish State per se, but because they want all of Palestine to be included in such a State. They would hope eventually to achieve that end by continuing the present Mandate until the Jews were a majority of the population. The non-Zionists in this country, on the other hand, are opposed to the very idea of a Jewish State, implying as it does Jewish nationality. Louis Lipsky appears to be the leader of the first group, Rabbi Wise of the second, and Mr. Warburg of the third.

In view of this clear division of opinion among the representatives of American Jewry it seems to me that we are in a strong position to request that they come to some agreement among themselves before they approach us with a view to our taking any particular line of action. In other words we seem to be in good position to ask Rabbi Wise to produce some proof that he speaks on behalf of all of American Jewry before we comply with any specific requests that he may make.

Wallace Murray

*For Embassy report on this matter, see despatch No. 3532, November 4, p. 913.*
The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem
(Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1937—2 p.m.

The Department would appreciate your comments on press reports emanating from Jerusalem regarding the imposition of a strict censorship in Palestine by the British authorities, the removal of the Grand Mufti as head of the Supreme Moslem Council, and action looking to his deportation along with other Arab leaders who are reported as having already been arrested and removed to the British cruiser Susseh in Haifa harbor.

The Department would be pleased also to receive from you a general estimate of the present state of public order in Palestine to be followed by reports by telegraph as circumstances warrant so long as the situation may remain in a state of uncertainty.

HULL

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, October 2, 1937—3 p.m.
[Received October 2—11:40 a.m.]

While Arab reaction to drastic action taken by Palestine Government consequent to Arab terrorist assassination of British District Commissioner Galilee District is recognizedly one of bitter resentment, I am assured by highest British officials no general disorder is anticipated. Other well informed observers concur. Some apprehension is however felt that terrorist activities directed primarily against British officials will continue.

British circles view repressive measures as only logical action. Jews naturally express high satisfaction.

Attorney General explains non arrest of Mufti still in Haram area as prompted by apprehension reaction in Moslem world. It is also hoped that having clipped his wings by cutting off most important source propaganda funds he will be forced to retreat from present uncompromising attitude.

WADSWORTH
867N.01/916: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, October 4, 1937—9 a.m.
[Received 9:25 a.m.]

My October 27 [§], 3 p.m., crossed Department’s October 2, 2 p.m., and I believe answered query except as regards censorship which prohibits telephone calls and censors telegrams to neighboring countries but not to Europe or America.

Local press may publish news but not comment, this being designed to prevent incitement Arab public and inter-racial strife which it is feared would be precipitated were Jewish press further to embitter Arab feeling by exulting over eoi-disant victory.

Conversations yesterday with Chief Justice, Solicitor General, Staff Intelligence Officer and others convince me current measures are not simply punitive action consequent upon assassination District Commissioner but rather initial moves in new policy of firmness and repression vis-à-vis Arabs, adopted in full accord with home Government to replace last 18 months conciliation policy.

Battalion Black Watch arrived Saturday to replace Sussex which will remain pending developments. General officer commanding has informed Merton troops now eight battalions are adequate to control situation which remains substantially as described.

WADSWORTH

867N.01/922: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, October 9, 1937—9 a.m.
[Received October 9—8:45 a.m.]

Since sending my October 4, 9 a.m., conversations with officials and others give me no reason substantially to reverse estimate of situation. Acting High Commissioner considers matters well in hand and assures me his rural reports occasion no immediate concern as to public security.

While Arab undercurrents, primarily among Mufti adherents, are reported still characterized by resentment at extensive preventive arrests, deportation leaders and humiliation Mufti, lightening of press censorship and ensuing generally restrained editorial comment have eased tension.

In the circumstances if the Department perceives no objection I shall fly Alexandria Wednesday to meet my wife and return following Monday.

WADSWORTH
The Consul at Jerusalem (Scott) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, October 16, 1937—3 p. m.
[Received 12 p. m.]

Arab terrorists in concerted action during the night October 14th attacked two Jewish buses, ambushed police cars, derailed and attacked passenger train and fired upon Jewish settlements in various parts of the country. Reported casualties 4 Arabs and 2 British constables killed, 12 Jews slightly injured. Further terrorist activities during the night October 15th included burning temporary buildings Lydda airport. Many arrests made, curfew established in Jerusalem and Government otherwise active in keeping situation under control.

Scott

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 21, 1937—6 p. m.
[Received October 21—1:55 p. m.]

629. The following statement was made in the House of Commons this afternoon by the Secretary of State for Colonies.

“In the light of the resolutions passed by the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations last month His Majesty's Government now regard themselves free to undertake the investigations required for the purpose of working out a scheme of tripartite partition in Palestine on the general lines recommended in part 3 of the report of the Royal Commission. It is accordingly proposed to appoint in due course a further special body to submit proposals, after local inquiry in Palestine, for a detailed scheme of tripartite partition. The Council and Assembly of the League will be invited to approve such a scheme... I am sure the House will agree that the immediate and primary duty of His Majesty's Government is to take the most strenuous measures to quell terrorism, to protect the lives of British officers and to restore the effective authority of the British civil administration throughout Palestine”.

Johnson


* Omission indicated in the original telegram.
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

Jerusalem, October 26, 1937—2 p.m.
[Received October 26—10:22 a.m.]

Reference Consulate’s telegram of October 16, 3 p.m., Acting High Commissioner has confirmed to me specifically that “new policy” of firmness in dealing with disorder will be maintained. While recognizing probability of further sporadic attempts at assassination and sabotage by paid terrorists he anticipates continuation repressive measures with emphasis on collective fines and punishments will result in gradual lessening of current disturbances.

Incidents since outbreak of October 14–15 attending Mufti’s flight include five further reported instances of shooting at Jewish buses and approximately a dozen each of wire cutting, bombing or attempted bombing, sniping at Jewish settlements or road patrols (all without casualties) and attempted assassination. Toll of latter is two Jews killed and four wounded and apparently through acts of Jewish retaliation three Arabs and one Armenian killed and three Arabs wounded. Success of new policy will be furthered by Arab disinclination to take to the hills with approach of winter weather and fall ploughing and citrus picking season.

Wadsworth

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State

No. 3532

London, November 4, 1937.  [Received November 12.]

Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s instruction No. 1942, September 20, 1937, directing the Embassy to investigate and report upon the statement made in a letter to The Times of August 18 that the treaty which it is proposed to conclude with respect to the Jewish State in Palestine would be negotiated with the Jewish Agency rather than with the Zionist Organization.

The question was discussed with the appropriate official who said that the Foreign Office had no information concerning such an announcement. He added in this general relation that the whole question of the modification of the Palestine mandate now seems much

*Not printed.*
farther off than it did at the time the Royal Commission's report was issued and that the whole situation was still so fluid and the future still so uncertain that "we seem no where near the point where the question of negotiating a treaty will arise".

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Herschel V. Johnson
Counselor of Embassy

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 344

JERUSALEM, November 10, 1937.

[Received December 10.]

Sir: I have the honor to supplement herewith the brief news items reported in Section IV-1 of my Press Review of October 30, 1937, regarding local reaction to the Draft Immigration (Amendment) Ordinance published in the official Palestine Gazette of October 21, 1937, and designed to effect certain modifications of the Palestine Immigration Ordinance of August 31, 1933. The provisions of this original, or so-called principal, ordinance were analysed at length in the Consulate General's voluntary report of May 5, 1937, entitled "History of Post-War Jewish Immigration into Palestine."

The new draft ordinance contains only two provisions warranting special attention, the remainder being of relatively unimportant regulatory and routine nature.

Narrower Definition of Dependent.

First, and less important, is the much narrower definition of "dependent" for immigration purposes. The new draft ordinance limits this term to include only wives, children and fatherless grandchildren under 18, and, under certain prescribed circumstances, other relatives who may be found on investigation to be wholly dependent on an immigrant or permanent resident.

The Jewish Agency, I am confidentially informed by Dr. Maurice Hexter, American non-Zionist member of the Agency Executive, is dissatisfied with this definition, considering the deviation from the former broad principle is unwarranted. However, while protesting such deviation as a matter of principle, the Agency Executive, Dr. Hexter explained, accepts the narrower definition as a matter of prac-

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tice and is limiting its present action to urging on the Government a proposal to the effect that the draft definition be enlarged to embrace parents over 55 years of age. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the Royal Commission in Paragraph 84 of its Report recommended a definition in substantial accord with that of the draft ordinance, although they suggested on Page 295 that "it would seem to be not unfair to define dependent immigrants in the case of an immigrant head of a family as wife, children under the age of 18, and old parents, in whose case some such minimum age as 55 might well be fixed". It would seem not unlikely that favorable consideration will be given the proposal of the Jewish Agency in this respect.

Temporary Abandonment of Absorptive Capacity Principle.

The part of the draft ordinance which impels attention by its political implications and because of its strongly unfavorable reception in Zionist circles is the following proposed amendment to Section 5 of the Principal Ordinance:

5. The Principal Ordinance is hereby amended by the insertion immediately after Section 5 of the following new section:—

5A. The High Commissioner may, in his unfettered discretion, by Order in the Gazette, exercise all or any of the following powers, that is to say, he may—

1. prescribe the maximum aggregate number of foreigners to be admitted to Palestine as immigrants during any specified period;

2. prescribe categories of immigrants and fix the maximum number of persons to be so admitted in respect of any category;

3. prescribe what proportion of

   (a) the maximum aggregate number of immigrants,
   (b) the maximum number of immigrants in any category,

may be persons of Jewish race.

Provided that if any question shall arise as to whether a person is or is not of Jewish race it shall be referred to the Director whose decision shall be final.

The purpose of this new section, as explained by the Attorney-General in an accompanying statement, is to give effect to the policy of His Majesty's Government declared in Official Communique No. 11/37 dated July 7, 1937, the relevant passage being:

Further, since the period of the current Labour Schedule expires at the end of July, and some provision must be made for the ensuing period, they propose that a total Jewish immigration in all Categories of 8,000 persons shall be permitted for the eight months' period from August, 1937, to March, 1938, provided that the economic absorptive capacity of the country is not exceeded.
This statement of policy, it may be noted, is generally accepted as having been based on a recommendation of the Palestine Royal Commission which, when considering "palliatives" to be adopted in the event that its major recommendation for partition should be rejected, advised (page 306 of Report):

... that there should now be a definite limit to the annual volume of Jewish immigration. We recommend that Your Majesty’s Government should lay down a "political high level" of Jewish immigration to cover Jewish immigration of all categories. This high level should be fixed for the next five years at 12,000 per annum, and in no circumstances during that period should more than that number be allowed into the country in any one year. The political maximum having been fixed, the High Commissioner should receive instructions to the effect that he may use his discretion to admit immigrants up to the maximum figure, but subject always to the economic absorptive capacity of the country.

Two questions here suggest themselves. Will the action proposed in the new draft ordinance constitute a departure from the principle of absorptive capacity; and, if so, is it intended that such departure be permanent?

In considering the first question it may be well to review briefly the history of the principle of absorptive capacity. This principle, that is, that immigration into Palestine should not be of such volume as to exceed the economic capacity of the country to absorb new arrivals, was first stated in the well-known Churchill Memorandum of 1922, i.e., a year prior to the entry into force of the Palestine Mandate. It was not, however, stated in the Mandate itself. The principle was immediately put into effect by the Palestine Administration and has since been repeatedly affirmed by both the Administration and the Mandatory (i.e., British) Government, as being the recognized basis of its immigration policy. It was specifically reaffirmed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1930.49

In this latter connection, it is interesting to note that, when referring to the above-mentioned decision of the Mandatory Power to reduce immigration for the eight months beginning August 1, 1937, to an arbitrary figure of 8,000, the Permanent Mandates Commission commented (see Page 233 of Minutes of the 32nd Extraordinary Session, August 1937) as follows:

The Commission does not question that the Mandatory Power, responsible as it is for the maintenance of order in the territory, may on occasion find it advisable to take such a step and is competent to do so,

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48 British Cmnd. 1700: Palestine, Correspondence With the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation, June 1922, p. 17.
49 In its resolution of September 8, 1930, approving the recommendations and conclusions of the Permanent Mandates Commission; League of Nations, Official Journal, November 1930, p. 1294.
as an exceptional and provisional measure; it feels, however, bound to draw attention to this departure from the principle, sanctioned by the League Council, that immigration is to be proportionate to the country's economic absorptive capacity.

Further indicative of the League's attitude is the following from page 112 of the same minutes:

The Chairman also disclaimed any intention of opening a lengthy discussion on the point; he recalled, however, that in 1930 the Council, on the advice of the Mandates Commission, had accepted the principle put forward by the Mandatory Power itself—namely, that Jewish immigration should be authorized to the extent allowed by the country's capacity of economic absorption.

If the accepted criterion were replaced by that of political possibilities, the result would be to modify the interpretation given up to the present to the Mandatory Power's obligation to encourage by means of immigration the creation of the Jewish National Home.

Further, the Chairman of the Mandates Commission, speaking at the meeting of the League Council held last September, said when referring to the decision of the Mandatory to reduce immigration:

... the Commission felt it to be its duty to draw attention to the decision, temporary as we hope, taken by the Mandatory Power, and think it is clear that such a decision cannot become final unless it is sanctioned by a new decision to be taken by the Council reversing the decision already taken in 1930.\[50\]

Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, in a speech before the same meeting of the League Council, commented on September 14 as follows:

The Permanent Mandates Commission have drawn attention to the reduction of Jewish immigration to a total of 8,000 persons in the next eight months. That, as the Commission recognized, is a purely temporary measure designed to meet temporary and exceptional conditions. If, as they say, it is a departure from a principle sanctioned by the Council on a former occasion, my colleagues will, I am sure, appreciate the special circumstances in which this decision has been taken. What is to happen when the period of eight months is over, that is to say, after the 31st of March, 1938, must necessarily depend upon the progress made in the meanwhile with the partition scheme.\[51\]

There can be no doubt, therefore, that there has been an abrupt departure, temporary though it may be, from the principle of absorptive capacity.

This brings us to the second and more important question as to whether this departure is designedly only temporary in character. This has now become the crux of the question, since Zionism, acting through the Jewish Agency, has had, perforce, to accept the current

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\[51\] Ibid., p. 802.
application of the new restrictive policy. In so doing, however, Dr. Hexter explains, the Agency Executive has expressed surprise that the draft ordinance appears practically to permit the giving of permanent effect to this policy. In this connection stress is laid on the assurances given in Mr. Eden's statement (quoted above) that the measure was "purely temporary" and "designed to meet temporary and exceptional conditions". The Agency Executive has, therefore, officially recommended that the proposed revision of Section 5 be amended by adding a proviso that it shall expire on March 31, 1938—this in spite of the above-cited concluding sentence of Mr. Eden's comment to the effect that future policy must depend upon progress made towards adoption of the partition scheme.

A later statement in the matter is reported by press telegrams to have been made by the British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, in reply to a question in the House of Commons on November 3, 1937.\footnote{United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1937–38, vol. 328, p. 900.} He is recorded as having admitted that the draft ordinance under consideration involves a departure from the principle of absorptive capacity, while reiterating at the same time Mr. Eden's statement that its measures are of a temporary nature.

In concluding this discussion of the new draft ordinance, I venture to express concurrence in a view frequently heard in informal discussion in British official circles to the effect that the problem of administering this country will be so affected during the next year or so by primary considerations of a political nature as to require the maintenance in force of the current restriction of Jewish immigration to a maximum of not to exceed 12,000 a year.

Respectfully yours,

George Wadsworth

887N.55/110

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

No. 353

Jerusalem, November 17, 1937.

[Received December 28.]

Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 344 of November 10, 1937, discussing the political implications of proposed changes in the Palestine Immigration Ordinance and reviewing local reaction thereto.
There is attached a copy of this amendment ordinance as finally enacted on November 11, 1937.

Two changes of importance were made in the original draft ordinance. First, Section 5A was amended to eliminate the provision giving the High Commissioner authority to determine what proportion of foreigners admitted may be of the Jewish race and to omit the proviso giving the Director of Migration authority to decide whether or not a person is of the Jewish race. This change is of little practical importance, since Section 5A still vests in the High Commissioner the right to fix the number of foreigners to be admitted and to regulate the numbers within the various categories. It is, however, of political significance, marking a concession to Jewish opinion, which had bitterly decried the use of the term "persons of the Jewish race" as introducing race discrimination into Palestine legislation for the first time.

The second change is the insertion in Section 5A of a proviso that the section will "expire on March 31, 1938, or at such later date as the High Commissioner in Council with the approval of the Secretary of State by notice in the Gazette may appoint". This is a partial concession to the Jewish Agency, which had petitioned the Government to amend Section 5A to provide for its definite termination on March 31, 1938, since, as explained in my previous despatch on the subject, that agency fears the permanent abandonment of the absorptive capacity principle in favor of the new political high level policy.

On two points the final ordinance failed to accede to pressure from the Jewish press and the Jewish Agency. First, the definition of "dependent" was not altered to include aged parents of immigrants or permanent residents. Second, the term "foreigners" as applied to prospective Jewish immigrants was not stricken from Section 5A.

By virtue of the powers vested in the High Commissioner by the new Section 5A, regulations were immediately put into effect carrying out the newly-adopted policy of restriction of immigration. This order, adopted on November 9, 1937, provides as follows:

(1) The maximum aggregate number of foreigners to be admitted to Palestine as immigrants during the period between the 1st August, 1937, and the 31st March, 1938, shall be 9,600.

(2) The categories of immigrants to be admitted under this Order, and the maximum number of persons to be so admitted shall be as follows:

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5 Not reprinted.
6 The regulations were adopted on November 9, 1937, although the law itself is dated November 11, 1937.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category as defined in Rule 4 (1) of the Immigration Rules</th>
<th>Maximum number of immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A(1) persons in possession of and who freely dispose of capital of £P.1,000</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A(4) persons with secured income of not less than £P.4 per month, exclusive of earned income</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B(1) orphans less than 16 years old whose maintenance is assured until they become self supporting</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B(2) persons of religious occupation whose maintenance is assured</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B(3) students whose admission into an educational institution in Palestine and whose maintenance are assured until such time as they are able to support themselves</td>
<td>1440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C persons who have definite prospects of employment in Palestine</td>
<td>2380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D dependents of permanent residents, of immigrants who belong to the capitalistic category, of persons in the religious category, and of persons who have definite prospects of employment</td>
<td>4570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total of all Categories</strong></td>
<td><strong>9600</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is supposed that the Government will adhere to its policy expressed by the British Government in Official Communiqué No. 11/37 dated July 7, 1937, which proposed that Jewish immigration into Palestine be limited to a total of 8,000 for the eight month period from August 1, 1937, to March 31, 1938. It would appear, therefore, that the maximum quota for this period will be 8,000 Jews and 1,600 non-Jews.

The Palestine Government approved on November 9, 1937, a Labor Immigration Schedule of 1780 certificates for the six month period from October 1, 1937, to March 31, 1938, of which 1500 will be delivered to the Jewish Agency for distribution and 280 retained by the Department of Migration. It is understood that these 1780 certificates for the six month period are included in the 2380 approved for immigration under Category C for the eight month period and are not in addition to the total of 9600.

The Government announced in Official Communiqué No. 19/37 of November 10, 1937, that with the approval of this labor schedule the Jewish quota has been filled and no new applications for immigration will be accepted until January 1938. The Department of Migration will decide whether applications already received but not acted upon can be approved within the maximum quota or must be held over until after April 1, 1938.

Respectfully yours,

George Wadsworth
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] December 2, 1937.

The British Ambassador called on me by appointment yesterday to discuss the Palestine situation.

Sir Ronald stated that he was able to obtain anything but a clear impression in the American press as to the present attitude of American Jewry regarding the proposed partition of Palestine, and said he would appreciate any information that the Department was in a position to furnish him.

In reply I recalled the meeting of the World Zionists Organization at Zurich last summer when the American delegation, despite the vigorous opposition of its leader, Rabbi Wise, had joined with the majority of the World Organization in approving negotiations with the British Government on the basis of the partition proposal. Since Rabbi Wise had in the past been the most active spokesman in this country on the questions relating to Palestine it seemed only natural that his activities should be somewhat hampered by the outcome of the Zurich conference.

I also reminded the Ambassador of the position taken by Mr. Felix Warburg, speaking for the non-Zionist members of the Jewish Agency which convened in Zurich shortly after the Zionist congress. Mr. Warburg at that time made an urgent plea against the termination of the mandate and the establishment of a Jewish state, but, for reasons entirely different from those put forth by Rabbi Wise. The Rabbi does not want a restricted Jewish state established such as was proposed by the Royal Commission. Mr. Warburg and other distinguished American non-Zionists, members of the American Jewish Committee, are opposed in principle to the establishment of a Jewish state and separate Jewish nationality on the grounds that such action would seriously prejudice the position of Jews the world over and lead almost inevitably to widespread anti-Semitism.

There was, I said, on the other hand, undoubtedly a considerable portion of American Jewry which, while deploring the necessity for abandoning the present mandate, nevertheless accepted the partition proposal as a basis for negotiation in the hope that much more favorable terms for the establishment of the new Jewish state would result from such negotiations with the British Government.

In conclusion I reminded the Ambassador that American Jewry in general, regardless of undoubted disagreements as to policy, is united in a feeling of profound concern over the present plight of Jews in various European states and, whether Zionist or non-Zionist
in conviction, American Jews had shown themselves prepared to contribute generously toward the amelioration of the situation in which their European co-religionists find themselves and to endeavor by every practicable means to provide a refuge for their co-religionists whether it be in a Jewish national home or in a Jewish state. In this connection I recounted the views of the New Zionist Organization—the former Revisionists and radical wing of the World Zionists Organization—who regard the present plight of the Jews in Central Europe as a grave menace to peace and the establishment of a strong Jewish state embracing all of present Palestine and Transjordan as in the interest of not only Great Britain herself but of all countries of the world concerned in the preservation of peace.

Sir Ronald thanked me for this information and added that, as far as he was able to gather, progress in London with respect to the partition proposal seems to have slowed down and to be attended with some confusion.

Wallace Murray