THE FOUR POWER PACT, AGREEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION BETWEEN FRANCE, GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN, AND ITALY, SIGNED AT ROME, JULY 15, 1933

740.0011 Four Power Pact/20

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat)¹

[WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1933.

The accounts we have had to date of the origin and contents of the Mussolini proposal are not altogether clear and are in part conflicting.

The idea for a Four Power grouping appears to have originated not with Mussolini but with MacDonald. Prior to the latter's departure for Rome he discussed the idea in confidence at Geneva, notably with certain Polish officials of the League Secretariat, who subsequently told Mr. Gibson ¹a about it (telegram No. 581 of March 21, from Geneva.²).

According to these informants, MacDonald's main preoccupation was the setting up of a small super Council of the four principal European Powers which would sit almost continuously and take decisions to be carried out by the regular Council of the League, thus remedying the latter's unwieldiness and lack of policy and continuity.

A more far-reaching organization ³ of this sort is already in existence among the Little Entente States who have for some time been acting as a unit at Geneva, but who nevertheless are protesting against the Four Power project as spelling the ruin of the League.

Just how MacDonald's conversations at Geneva link up with the Mussolini proposal is not clear. At all events, Mussolini, on the morning of March 18, shortly before the arrival of the British Ministers,⁴ transmitted a tentative proposal to the British,⁵ French,⁶

¹ Submitted to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State.
² Hugh S. Gibson, Acting Chairman of the American delegation to the General Disarmament Conference; Ambassador to Belgium and Luxembourg.
³ A Pact of Organization providing for a standing council, permanent secretariat, coordination of policies, and economic collaboration was concluded at Geneva, February 16, 1933; for French text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xxxvi, pp. 630-632.
⁴ Prime Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald; Sir John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
⁵ Sir Ronald William Graham.
⁶ Henry de Jouvenel.
and German Ambassadors. The exact contents were kept secret and were withheld from our Ambassador at Rome, although in conversations with the diplomats concerned and with the Italian Foreign Minister he was able to obtain piecemeal some of the constituent elements. (Rome’s telegrams Nos. 12, 18, 14, 17, 18 and 19).

In general, Mussolini’s plan was one for a Four Power Pact among Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany, to be concluded for a period of ten years and designed to bring about collaboration of these Powers in preserving European peace. The draft not only recognized the need for revision of the peace treaties but made such specific suggestions as a revision of the Hungarian peace settlement and of the frontiers of the Polish Corridor—including the return to Germany of a strip of territory which would connect East Prussia with the rest of the Reich; the return of Danzig to Germany; a provision for collaboration among the Four Powers regarding their extra European, particularly their Colonial, interests. Apparently certain as yet undetermined advantages in Colonial territories were contemplated for Germany in return for a relaxation of her attitude toward the Corridor; similarly, some fulfillment of Italy’s Colonial aspirations in the Near East or elsewhere, was envisaged. (London’s No. 47 of March 21).

This draft proposal was submitted to and discussed with MacDonald and Simon in Rome. They found parts of it unacceptable and a new draft was consequently prepared. It was this second text which the British Ministers took with them to Paris for discussion with the French Government. Exactly what changes were made is not certain. While the Italian Government, according to the German Ambassador at Rome, takes the view that there are no essential differences between the two texts, Mr. Garrett understands that the references to the Polish Corridor, Danzig, Hungary and the Colonies were omitted at the request of the British.

The German and French reaction toward the first draft is reported by Garrett as follows (the attitude toward the second draft is not available):

Germany. The German Ambassador at Rome was instructed by his Government to inform the Italian Government that Germany can accept the text in principle. The Ambassador considers that the chief importance of such a pact would lie in the recognition by France that conditions have changed and that there should consequently be certain revisions of the peace treaties.

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7 Ulrich von Hassel.
8 John Work Garrett.
9 None printed.
10 For correspondence concerning the Polish Corridor, see pp. 448 ff.
11 Not printed.
France. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the French Ambassador at Rome that some change in the first text would certainly be necessary. The Ambassador thought that, in place of a bald statement of revision, a formula upholding the sanctity of treaties but recognizing changed conditions which might call for revisions, should prove acceptable to his Government.

In yesterday's debate on foreign policy in the House of Commons, the most interesting points made by the Government were:

1. The Prime Minister's success in securing active Italian cooperation towards Franco-German reconciliation.
2. A scheme is suggested of peaceful approach to the revision of the peace treaties within the framework of the League of Nations.
3. Consultation with smaller States where their interests are involved.
4. No consideration has been entertained for surrender of British mandates in general and Tanganyika in particular.

A purported text of the proposal was given in London's No. 48 of March 21, but it is not clear which of the two drafts it represents. A copy is attached, as well as a copy of telegram No. 18, March 22, from Rome, giving the text of a memorandum sent to Mr. Garrett by the Italian Foreign Office, which purports to describe the Pact.

P[ERREPOUNT] M[OFAT]

740.0011 Four Power Pact/17

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 28, 1933.

The French Ambassador came in and handed me a memorandum of three pages containing comment and views of the French Government relative to the recent MacDonald and Mussolini peace and disarmament proposals. I stated that I was especially glad to have the benefit of the French viewpoint to this partial extent at least.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Enclosure—Memorandum]

Before receiving Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon, Mr. Mussolini has communicated to the French Ambassador in Rome the political pact of which he is the author. This text provides for a pledge from France, Great Britain, Germany and Italy to enter into a policy

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13 Joseph Paul-Boncour.
14 Not printed.
15 Paul Claudel.
16 Copies of this memorandum were transmitted to the Ambassadors in France, Germany, and Italy and to the Chairman of the American delegation to the Disarmament Conference.
of collaboration for the maintenance of peace and to act in the domain of European relations so that such policy be adopted at the same time by the other powers, in the spirit of the Kellogg pact. 27

Article Second states the principle of the possibility of the revision of treaties "as provided for in the Pact of the League of Nations 28 and in a spirit of mutual comprehension and solidarity of interests involved".

Article Third stipulates that the equality of rights granted Germany concerning armaments will be effective, but that Germany can attain this equality only by degrees and after an agreement of the three other powers. The same disposition applies to Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

In Article Fourth, the contracting powers engage themselves to adopt as soon as possible a common policy in economic as well as in political matters.

The British delegates, on the 21st of March, have informed the President of the Council and Mr. Paul-Boncour of the conversation they had with M. Mussolini. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon have not thoroughly discussed with him the substance of the plan.

However, in respect to mention made of the Article 3 of Austria and Hungary, they have pointed out the fact that there were some other countries interested and that in any case, such an agreement could not be presented to them as an accomplished fact.

The French Ministers, in reply, have emphasized the fact that, in view of the Pact of the League of Nations, of the Locarno Agreements 29 and of the special agreements entered into by France with Poland and the Little Entente and the " Accord de confiance" adhered to by the European countries, it was difficult to conceive a collaboration in the form of a board of four powers, of which the interested countries would be excluded.

In the opinion of Messrs. Daladier 30 and Paul-Boncour, it appears that the best way to obtain the object of Mr. Mussolini would be to consider the proposed collaboration as a collaboration of the prominent members of the Council and consequently in connection with the League of Nations.

As far as the revision of treaties and disarmament are concerned, the French ministers have emphasized the danger of having recourse to Article 19 of the Pact before the establishment of any procedure for

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30 Édouard Daladier, President of the French Council of Ministers.
its application, and of attaining the equality of rights not by a reduction but through an increase of armaments. The French Government feels obliged to stand by the declaration of November [December] 11th, 1932, and to connect those two questions with the question of security. Messrs. Daladier and Paul-Boncour objected to the exclusive introduction of those two questions in a general agreement of collaboration for the maintenance of peace.

In conclusion, they informed the British ministers of their intention to consult with the Governments of Belgium, Poland and of the Little Entente, and stated their conviction that this program of collaboration should be consistent with the spirit of the Pact of the League of Nations and the procedures already established in Geneva for the solution of the European problems.

740.0011 Four Power Pact/18 : Telegram

The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 31, 1933—3 p. m.  
[Received March 31—11:40 a. m.]

62. From Davis. Grandi has given me exact text of Mussolini proposal for an agreement between the four western powers which I will transmit by cable if you have not already received it from the Italian Ambassador.

Grandi told me there was no intention of having this result in a united front with regard to debts or anything else that would concern the United States and in fact that Italy has refused to join in the united front on debts. He expressed personally the hope that the United States could find it possible to join in some way on its own terms with the four powers in the proposed agreement the purpose of which is to promote peace and reduce some of the causes of tension. In saying this he remarked that he felt he was reflecting Mussolini's views and desires. [Davis.]

ATHERTON

740.0011 Four Power Pact/18 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton)

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1933—6 p. m.

61. For Davis. Your 62, March 31, 3 p. m. The Italian Ambassador has left with me a brief résumé of the proposed agreement.  

22 Norman Davis, Chairman of the American delegation to the Disarmament Conference.
23 Dino Grandi, Italian Ambassador to Great Britain.
24 Augusto Rosso.
24 Not printed.
New York Times, under London date line today, carries purported full text from "trustworthy source". Article 4 contains references to Colonial cooperation not mentioned in Italian Embassy's outline. Unless you can ascertain that the Times story is substantially accurate, please cable full text as given by Grandi.

HULL

740.0011 Four Power Pact/19 : Telegram

The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State 28

LONDON, April 1, 1933—11 a.m.
[Received April 1—10:05 a.m.]

65. From Davis. Department's 61, March 31, 6 p.m. Following is text of proposed four power pact as given to me by Grandi:

Agreement of understanding and cooperation between the four western powers.

ARTICLE No. 1

The four western powers, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, undertake to carry out between themselves an effective policy of cooperation in order to ensure the maintenance of peace in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact and of the "No resort to force" pact envisaged by the declaration signed by the above powers on the 11th December 1932. They undertake furthermore to follow such course of action as to induce, if necessary, third parties, so far as Europe is concerned, to adopt the same policy of peace.

ARTICLE No. 2

The four powers confirm that, while the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations embody a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations as a means of achieving international peace and security, they also contemplate the possibility of the revision of the treaties of peace when conditions arise that might lead to a conflict between nations. In order to regulate and define the application of this principle of revision, the four powers declare that such application should take place through agreements based on the mutual recognition of the interests of all concerned and within the framework of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE No. 3

The four powers reiterate their resolve to cooperate in the Disarmament Conference 28 with the other states there represented in seeking to work out a convention which shall effect a substantial reduction and a limitation of armaments with provision for future

28 Copy transmitted to President Roosevelt.

28 For correspondence concerning the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, see pp. 1 ff.
revision with a view to further reduction. But, should the Disarma-
ment Conference lead to only partial results, France, Great Britain
and Italy declare that principle of equality of right, must have a
practical value, and Germany agrees that such principle of equality
of rights shall only be put into practice by degrees under agreements
to which each of the four powers must be a party.

ARTICLE No. 4

The application of such principle of equality of rights to Austria,
Hungary and Bulgaria shall be governed by the same conditions as
those expressed in the case of Germany in the preceding article and
only under agreement to which each of the four powers must be a
party.

ARTICLE No. 5

The four powers pledge themselves to cooperate in the work of
finding solutions for the economic [problems?] which now face their
respective nations and the world as a whole.

ARTICLE No. 6

The present agreement of understanding and cooperation will,
if necessary, be submitted for the approval of the parliaments of
the contracting powers within 3 months of the date of its signatures.
Its duration shall be for 10 years. If no notice is given before the
end of the ninth year by any of the parties of an intention to treat
it as terminated at the end of such 10 years, it shall be regarded
as renewed for another 10 years.

ARTICLE No. 7

The present agreement shall be, in accordance with the Covenant
of the League of Nations, [registered?] at the Secretariat of the
League of Nations.

[Davis]

AHERTON

740.0011 Four Power Pact/21 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

Rome, April 3, 1933—6 p. m.
[Received April 3—2:40 p. m.]

20. My 18, March 22, 10 a. m.27 The British Ambassador presented
to the chief of the Italian Government this afternoon a revised text
of the proposed four power pact. He tells me that it differs from the
second text in two points, namely:

(1) Any reference to a possible failure of the Disarmament Con-
ference is omitted.

27 Not printed.
(2) Any power will be admitted at its request as an equal in any discussions that may concern it.

This third text has also been handed by Lord Tyrrell to the French Government and Sir Ronald Graham believes will be transmitted to Berlin through the Italian Ambassador there. Mussolini agreed to it in principle.

Repeated to the American Embassy, Paris, for Norman Davis.

GARRETT

Memorandum by the Chairman of the American Delegation to the Disarmament Conference (Davis)

The Italian Ambassador said that he had asked Mr. Marriner to arrange an interview for him in order to straighten out one or two points resulting from the conversation which Mr. Davis had had with Ambassador Grandi in London. He said that he wanted to assure Mr. Davis that there was absolutely no intention in the project of the Four Power Pact to indicate a united front against the United States or any other Powers, but that collaboration by the United States for the purposes of the Four Power Pact did not seem practicable in view of the fact that it was destined principally to assure the peace of Europe along the lines of Locarno and was intended to be within the framework of the pact.

Mr. Davis said that he feared Grandi must have misunderstood his remarks since he had given no impression that America felt that the project of the Four-Power Pact was aimed against it and certainly understood perfectly in so far as the political purposes of the Four Power Pact were concerned there was no possibility of American association. Mr. Davis continued by saying that possibly American public opinion might have been disturbed by the clause in the original draft of common action in colonial matters, which indicated possible common interests outside of the purely European sphere.

The Ambassador replied that this clause had been taken out after the very first draft and on looking at the second draft the Ambassador's impression was confirmed.

The Ambassador then said that Mussolini wanted him to assure Mr. Davis that he (Mussolini) was going to take the first occasion to state

28 British Ambassador to France.
29 Of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador (Pignatti) at the Hotel Bristol, Paris, April 11, 1933, 4:30 p.m.; James Theodore Marriner, Counselor of Embassy in France, was also present. The memorandum was transmitted to the Department by Mr. Davis under covering letter of April 13, 1933; received April 23.
publicly the fact that the Four Power project was not intended as a common front against any nation and was merely an effort to ensure peace along the lines of similar efforts which had been successful in calming disturbed conditions in Europe previously. The Ambassador said that if this could be done it was the hope of Mussolini that some word could be said in Washington indicating America’s interest in the purposes of the pact because he felt that any word from America would have a great effect with the Disarmament Conference which should reconvene on April 25th.

Mr. Davis said that on this point the Ambassador had touched the center of the question; that America could associate itself with the Four Powers in efforts to promote disarmament, and if an agreement between them advanced these purposes, America was willing to sit down with them to discuss how far the result of the Four Power Agreement might be expected to bring about more rapid and more far reaching steps to disarmament.

The Ambassador felt that a statement of this kind in America at this time might be extremely helpful, as indicating the fact that there was no distrust of the purposes of the Four Power agreement, and that it was considered by the principal nations not included in its scope as giving hope for peace and promise of disarmament.

Mr. Davis said that he naturally could not commit himself on a question of this kind without mature reflection, but he was very glad to consider the Ambassador’s suggestions and hoped he would keep in touch with him.

NORMAN H. DAVIS

740.0011 Four Power Pact/42

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips)

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1933.

The French Ambassador left with me this morning the accompanying memorandum and “projet” in connection with the proposed Mussolini Four Power Pact; he said that the views of the French Government had been presented confidentially a few days ago to the British and Italian Governments and he was very happy to place them now confidentially before this Government; he felt that, in doing so, it was a token of “confidence” on the part of his Government and a desire to keep the United States in touch with the developments in connection with this proposal.

(After translation, I should be very glad to have these papers returned to me.)

WILLIAM PHILLIPS
FOUR POWER PACT SIGNED AT ROME

[Enclosure—Translation]

MEMORANDUM 30

The French Government appreciates fully the importance of the proposal initiated by the Chief of the Italian Government on the 18th of March. It recognizes the value that the closer cooperation of the four neighboring powers may have for peace and the fact that their character as permanent members of the Council confers upon them peculiar responsibilities toward the League of Nations and its members and those who have jointly signed the Locarno agreements. Having made the reinforcement of the peace of Europe the unalterable goal of its policy, the Government of the Republic is ready, in a spirit of well-disposed frankness, to associate itself actively with every effort which it may legitimately be hoped will contribute effectively to this result.

Such an effort must necessarily take place within the frame-work which the engagements assumed by the four powers have provided for their policies; the Locarno agreement; the pact of Paris; the declaration of non-recourse to force proposed by the declaration of December 11, 1932, and accepted by the political commission of the Disarmament Conference on March 2nd; finally, and at the foundation of all engagements, the covenant of the League of Nations.

If the strict observance of the covenant is a duty of all the members of the League, it is applicable with peculiar force to the powers who are permanent members of the Council; there can, therefore, be no question of those powers detracting in any way whatever from the methods or the procedures provided for by the charter of the League.

The latter guarantees to all states that no decision concerning them can be taken unless they accept it. There could not be any question of the four powers arriving at decisions which they might subsequently seek to impose upon others. There can only be question of arriving at decisions concerning themselves alone or of seeking in a general manner procedures, improvements, or more exact interpretations (précisions) concerning one or other article of the covenant for submission subsequently to the regular organs of the League of Nations.

Besides, there cannot be question of an arbitrary choice between articles. The bond which unites them cannot be separated. Article 19 offers the legal means, exclusive of recourse to force, of adapting existing treaties to international situations, the maintenance of which may be demonstrated as imperilling the peace of the world. This

30 French text dated April 10, 1933, is printed in France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Pacte d’entente et de collaboration paraphé à Rome le 7 juin 1933 (Paris, Imprimerie des Journaux Officiels, 1933), pp. 10–11.
article and these possibilities cannot be contested. But other principles which yield nothing to this one in importance are affirmed by other articles. For example, article 10 stipulates the obligation of maintaining the territorial integrity of the members of the League against all external aggression; article 16 provides for measures of an economic and military nature against states which have recourse to war in violation of their engagements. If one should assign to the collaboration of the powers precise objects within the limits of the covenant, the care to assure the full efficacy of these articles should not be less emphatically required than that of permitting an eventual application of article 19.

The Government of the French Republic, moreover, cannot refrain from emphasizing that by insisting in general terms on the principle of revision there is risk of giving rise to hopes which it would be subsequently impossible to satisfy and to awaken fears, which, even if unjustified, would not fail to present an obstacle to the closer relations of nations. It does not believe especially that, at a moment when there is in progress in a part of Europe an evolution of minds and of institution of which it is impossible to foresee the end, it is proper to attempt such an experiment.

The Government of the Republic has given testimony by its acts of its desire to see the success of the Disarmament Conference assured. The cooperation of the four powers should have as its first effect to reduce the opposition which has become manifest in their respective conceptions (views). The declaration of December 11, 1932, has provided for the concession to Germany of equality of rights in a régime assuring security to all nations: this declaration retains its full effect. The French Government is, moreover, happy to see that the Italian proposal as well as the British proposal recalls that equality of rights can only be realized by stages and in conformity with agreements which are to be arrived at looking to this end. It is proper to add that these successive stages can only be realized by a progressive disarmament to the exclusion of all rearmament.

In presenting a draft convention⁴¹ which embodies a part of the principles included in other proposals, notably in the French proposal, and on which the general Commission has already expressed itself, the British Delegation has furnished a practical basis for discussion which should permit the Conference to arrive at a result. The French Government will fully support the efforts which may be made to this end, reserving to itself, however, just as other governments have done and pursuant to the invitation itself of the British representatives at Geneva, the right to propose such amendments or modifications which appear to it to be indispensable.

⁴¹ See telegram No. 569, March 17, noon, from the Acting Chairman of the American delegation, p. 43.
A policy of cooperation of the four powers would not be limited to questions which fall within the province of the League of Nations. It will apply naturally to all questions which are common to them; it should also lead to consultation on all questions of common interest to Europe, notably those which concern its economic recovery and which are so pressing, it being understood that such a cooperation may not be directed against any state whatever, that it should not exclude any collaboration and that it should be coordinated with the efforts of this kind already attempted by the European Union.

It is with the considerations which are given above in mind, that the Government of the Republic, on the basis of the proposals of the British and the Italian Governments, submits for their examination the draft agreement, the text of which is appended to this memorandum.

[Subenclosure—Translation]

_Draft of a Pact of Understanding and Collaboration Between Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy_ 32

Conscious of the peculiar responsibilities which their permanent membership in the League of Nations Council imposes upon them toward the League itself and its members, as well as of the responsibilities which result from their common signature of the Locarno Agreements;

Convinced that the troubled state which reigns in the world can be dissipated only by the strengthening of a solidarity capable of reinforcing European confidence in peace;

Faithful to the engagements which they have assumed under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaties, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and recalling the Declaration of Non-Recourse to Force, the principle of which was adopted on March 2, 1933 by the Political Commission of the Disarmament Conference;

Anxious to give full effect to all the provisions of the Covenant by conforming to the methods and procedures which it sets up and which they are not disposed to impair;

Recognizing the rights of each State which cannot be infringed without the consent of the interested Powers;

Have agreed to the following provisions:

**Article 1**

The High Contracting Parties will consult as to all questions affecting them and will endeavor to apply among themselves within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations a policy of effective collaboration with a view to the maintenance of peace.

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32 For French text, see _Pacte d'entente et de collaboration_, pp. 12–13.
ARTICLE 2

The High Contracting Parties, bearing in mind the possible application in Europe of the articles of the Covenant, and especially of Articles 10, 16 and 19, resolve to examine jointly, subject to the reservation that decisions can only be made by the regular organs of the League of Nations, all proposals designed to give full effect to the methods and procedures provided in its articles.

ARTICLE 3

Renewing, as far as concerns them, their common declaration of December 11, 1932, the High Contracting Parties regard the present British Draft Convention as a practical basis of discussion which must permit the Disarmament Conference to elaborate as quickly as possible a convention which will insure a substantial reduction and limitation of armaments with provision for its subsequent revision with a view to a new reduction. Germany, on her part, recognizes that equality of rights in a system providing security for all nations can only be realized in stages in conformity with Article 8 of the Covenant and in accordance with the agreements which will be concluded to this effect.

ARTICLE 4

The High Contracting Parties affirm in a general sense their determination to consult on all questions of common interest in Europe, especially on all questions concerning the recovery of European economy, the regulation of which, without becoming the object of procedure before the League of Nations, can usefully be sought within the framework of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union.

ARTICLE 5

The present Agreement is concluded for a duration of ten years, beginning with the exchange of ratifications. If before the end of the eighth year, none of the High Contracting Parties has notified the others of its intention to terminate the Treaty, it will be regarded as renewed and will remain in force without time limit, the Contracting Parties in this case retaining the power to terminate it by a denunciation with two years notice.

ARTICLE 6

The present Agreement shall be ratified and the ratifications thereof exchanged as soon as possible. It will be registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant.
The Ambassador in Italy (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

No. 1875

ROME, April 21, 1933.

[Received May 2.]

Sir: With reference to my despatch No. 1868 of April 7, 1933, with regard to Italy and the Four-Power Pact, I have the honor to inform the Department that according to Foreign Office circles the suggestions in connection therewith of the Governments concerned have now been formulated and submitted and that henceforth negotiations thereon will be conducted through regular diplomatic channels. As intimated in my telegram No. 22 of April 14, 7 p.m., the opinion in Italian official circles is that the French memorandum by no means bars the way to the conclusion of the Four-Power Pact.

Meanwhile the press has been forbidden to comment on the progress of negotiations on the Four-Power Pact and the subject is rarely even mentioned. The adverse speeches made in the House of Commons recently have been entirely ignored, the newspapers confining themselves to publishing Sir John Simon’s defense, which, when taken alone, does not suggest that keen opposition to the Four-Power Pact seems to have developed in certain British quarters.

The Italian press, in fact, has declared a holiday for the moment on its usual attacks against France, Yugoslavia, and the Little Entente. With the exception of Mussolini’s article on the subject of the Little Entente and treaty revision written for the Hearst newspapers in the United States and published in every newspaper in Italy on April 18th with flaming headlines, almost no political editorials of any kind have appeared recently. Mussolini’s article contains nothing new and its chief significance lies in the fact that France is not even mentioned therein. Heretofore the Italian press has never lost an opportunity to accuse France of being responsible for the constitution and activities of the Little Entente.

Respectfully yours,

John W. Garrett

The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 12, 1933—1 a.m.

[Received May 13—12:08 a.m.]

123. For the President and the Secretary of State from Norman Davis. Grandi called to see me this morning at the suggestion, so he told me, of Mussolini to explain the status of the negotiations of

* Not printed.
the Four Power Pact and to express the hope that we would use our moral influence to help get it consummated. I told him that in so far as the four powers upon whom responsibility for peace in Europe mainly rests shall have as their objective cooperation for the prevention of war in Europe we would naturally wish to be helpful because this would furnish a sound basis for disarmament. Grandi assured me this was the real purpose of the pact.

Grandi also told me Mussolini was ready to accept the French memorandum but the Germans had offered some serious amendments which the other three would not support; however, partly to satisfy Germany, the British and French Ambassadors to Italy had agreed with Mussolini on some minor modifications in the French draft treaty which have been submitted to Paris for final approval and then if the participating powers agree upon this he said that they could bring Germany into line. He said they wished to keep us informed and realized that our moral support is essential to success. He gave me confidentially the latest draft of the proposed pact which on comparison with the French text cabled you from Paris I find has drafting rather than substantive changes. A copy is being sent by mail.

He then said he wished to talk very confidentially with me about disarmament. In substance he thought it was of the utmost importance from every standpoint and particularly for the immediate beneficial effect it would have upon recovery from the depression and the success of the Economic Conference to get any early agreement on disarmament. This however he was satisfied could be done and only done by getting MacDonald, Mussolini, Hitler and Daladier together with the United States joining in. On [And?] that he was persuaded could only be brought about through my initiative as representing the President because of the great influence of the United States and our impartiality. He earnestly hoped therefore that I would make the effort.

I myself have felt for some time that something of this kind must be done. The main difficulty is that a move by any one of the four to that end is looked upon with suspicion by the others and they are all somewhat hesitant about running the risk of getting together and failing. I am satisfied there is more risk in not getting together. Grandi said he was sure Mussolini would be glad to take part in such a meeting.

If you agree that it would be advisable for me to take any initiative in this direction it would be most helpful if I could say to them

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88 For French version of these amendments (dated April 24, 1933), see Pacte d’entente et de collaboration, pp. 16-17.
89 For correspondence concerning the Monetary and Economic Conference, held at London, June 12–July 27, see pp. 352 ff.
that the President is most eager that there should be an early and successful consummation of the work of the Disarmament Conference and believing as he does that the chances of success would be greatly increased if the responsible heads of the four principal western European powers could arrange to meet to consider the matter he would be glad to have his representation [representative] take part in such a meeting if held.37 [Davis.]

ATHERTON

740.0011 Four Power Pact/72: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

ROME, May 19, 1935—1 p.m.
[Received May 19—12:36 p.m.]

37. I am informed that yesterday the British Ambassador here was instructed by his Government to urge Mussolini that in view of the precarious conditions prevailing in Europe every possible effort should be made to rush through the Four Power Pact at the earliest possible moment even at the cost of concessions on all sides. The British Ambassador communicated these instructions to Mussolini this morning who stated that he too was of the same opinion and had instructed Grandi yesterday to make similar representations in London. Mussolini added that apparently the Hitler Government also felt the necessity for speedy action and that Goering was arriving in Rome this afternoon when negotiations would start with a view to reaching a prompt decision in regard to the pact.

GARRETT

740.0011 Four Power Pact/84: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Acting Secretary of State

ROME, May 31, 1933—5 p.m.
[Received May 31—3:35 p.m.]

53. For the President. I am informed that an agreement has been reached on the Four Power Pact and that there now remain only minor questions of form in connection with the preamble which are being discussed by the legal experts in Geneva. The initialing of the pact is expected to take place tomorrow or the next day in Rome.

In connection with this I have learned in my conversations with Suvich38 that it would be considered particularly helpful if you would

37 For subsequent development of this proposal, see telegram No. 650, May 21, 9 p.m., from the Chairman of the American delegation, p. 165, and telegram No. 336, May 22, 3 p.m., to the Chairman of the American delegation, p. 165.

38 Italian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
make some statement commendatory of the pact. I refer not to its implications for Europe but as it may concern the peace of the world. May I commend to your careful and generous consideration an expression favorable to the pact as far as the general interests of the United States in world peace may be affected.

I am requesting that the head of the Government furnish me with the official text as soon as it shall be initialed. Immediately it is received it will be forwarded to you but prior to its arrival I will advise the Department that it has actually been initialed. The text will then follow.

My recommendation above is based on the information from Signor Mussolini and from the other officials of the Government here of the very [high?] esteem in which you are personally and officially held and of their belief that your influence would contribute toward world stability. And in Geneva the same opinion of you prevails.

I may further add that particular attention, rather unusual honor and most complete courtesy have been accorded me as your representative and because of the esteem in which you are held. This has been my entire experience since crossing the border on Sunday and includes the ceremonies attending and the time consumed in audiences with Mussolini and with His Majesty, the latter of unusual length and accompanied by extraordinary honors. The foregoing recommendation is made in view of all this and with the understanding that if you see your way clear to make some expression it will not only be received here with real enthusiasm but will be an actual contribution to the things I know you have at heart.

LONG

740.0011 Four Power Pact/87: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS, June 3, 1933—noon.
[Received June 8—10 a. m.]

251. During the course of my first visit to the Foreign Minister today Monsieur Paul-Boncour informed me the Four Power Pact was at present encountering difficulties because of the provision of article 3 for the reaffirmation of equality of rights without any engagement on the part of Germany not to rearm except in agreement with the other signatories.

France was willing to stand on the declaration of the 11th of December last on this subject but did not wish to reaffirm the position in agreement with the three powers without some equivalent understanding by Germany.
Monsieur Paul-Boncour would be willing, however, to leave article 3 entirely out and make the pact an instrument necessary for the collaboration so essential at the Economic Conference but felt that Germany did not feel this sufficiently important to make it worthwhile. He did not, however, despair of an ultimate accord which I told him everyone considered very necessary at this time.

Monsieur Paul-Boncour asked me to convey the substance of these views for the information of the President and to assure him of the value which his initiative has had at Geneva.


STRAUS

740.0011 Four Power Pact/114

The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 10

Rome, June 6, 1933.

Sir: With reference to my telegrams No. 54 of June 2nd, 11 a. m., and No. 56 of June 3rd, 7 p. m., on the situation of the Four Power Pact, I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum of the conversation I had with the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Signor Suvich, on which telegram No. 56 of June 3rd, 7 p. m., was based.

Respectfully yours,

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy (Long)

When Mr. Suvich, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, came this afternoon to the Embassy to return my call, he took advantage of the opportunity to discuss at length the Four Power Pact. He confirmed the statements recently made, which were the subject of a telegram to the Department, giving the British Ambassador’s estimate of the Four Power Pact and the failure of the French to use the correct text as agreed on here by the French, English and German Ambassadors and by Mr. Suvich.

Mr. Suvich outlined the history of the Pact. I summarize it briefly as follows: Italy proposed a text which I designate as text A. England had some objections to the mention of colonies, taking the position that it would embarrass her at this time. That part of the text was then eliminated and it became text B. Then the French proposed a substitute text without mention of colonies. It specifically

*Neither printed.*
alluded to Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and that became text C. Germany consented to this text under pressure from Italy and it was accepted as the basis for further discussion, which proceeded in Rome.

Article 3 of text C was redrafted in Rome with slight modifications and became text D. It was agreed to here by the representatives of the Four Powers, including the French Ambassador, and the text of it was sent to each of the governments. Slight alterations were made in this text D during the few days in Rome when it was under discussion, and these changes were telegraphed to Paris. It was all then sent to Geneva to be approved by the legal experts of the League of Nations, when it developed that the French had been using text C instead of text D and that they had made on text C the modifications intended to be placed on text D.

The difference between the two texts is said by Suvich to be one of phraseology only and not of any real substance. The texts are reported to have the same meaning but France has taken the position that she has obtained the agreement of the Little Entente of text C and is unable to propose to them the acceptance of what she now discovers is text D.

Both texts are said by Suvich to permit Germany to make certain progress in armament but each such step in armament to be subject to approval by all of the other Powers.

With the circumstances as they now exist, and with France having taken the position that she had been using one text and was ready to agree to it, and the other Powers having accepted another text, it seems as if negotiations were at a standstill as far as any effective agreement is concerned. Mr. Suvich expressed the thought that there might be some solution. He said he was "not sure but still hopeful". I gathered from his remarks that he felt that there might be some agreement but that it might not be very effective or of very great substance, and that he had little hope that text D, on which they had built their hope, would be accepted.

The Italian Government takes very seriously the prospect of failure to reach agreement. Suvich said that with the disarmament conference suspended and the Four Power Pact a failure there would be no real sense of security in Europe and that there was the fear that the economic conference could not succeed.

They are making another desperate effort to secure agreement, but with France committed to one text and antagonistic to the other, and Germany agreed to the other, it seems quite doubtful that success will crown the efforts to reach agreement. However, conversations will

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Pacte d'entente et de collaboration, pp. 12-18.
proceed through Sunday and Monday. Signor Mussolini's address to the Senate is postponed from tonight until Tuesday.

Having discussed the effect that the Pact might have on European security and on the future peace of the world, and taking into consideration also the comparative failure at Geneva during the last week, Suvich expressed the hope of his Government that the President might feel moved to make some communication to each of the Four Governments, indicating the desire of the United States to see some agreement which would reflect the prospect of continued peace in Europe. He said that his Government felt that such an expression from the President would be very helpful and would serve to bring accord.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

740.0011 Four Power Pact/92: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Acting Secretary of State

ROME [undated].
[Received June 7—3:48 p.m.]

60. Four Power Pact \(^a\) is being initialed in Rome at 7:30 p.m. Repeated to Geneva, London, Paris, Berlin.

LONG

740.0011 Four Power Pact/99: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State

ROME, June 9, 1933—1 p.m.
[Received June 9—11:20 a.m.]

66. In conversation yesterday with the German Ambassador concerning the Four Power Pact he said that Germany was both pleased and displeased; that it had been hurriedly considered and that certain phrases of the text now after initialing appeared displeasing. The full import of those phrases was not apparent in the hurried consideration. He said he was glad that some kind of agreement had been reached but had doubts that it meant substantial progress. His comments on the use of the wrong text by France were extremely sarcastic and implied falsity of the statement to that effect. Repeated to London, Geneva, Paris.

LONG

\(^a\) For English text, see p. 417.
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Long) 42

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1933—3 p.m.

30. The President gave out the following statement this morning:

"The initialing at Rome of the Four Power Pact between France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy is a good augury. The United States welcomes every effort toward replacing conflicting national aims by international cooperation for the greater advantage of all. This agreement of the principal European Powers to work closely together for the preservation of peace should give renewed courage to all who are striving for the success of the Geneva and London Conferences."

Please inform the Italian Government of the text of this statement, making clear that you are acting under instructions from your Government.

PHILLIPS

The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 33

LONDON, June 9, 1933.
[Received June 16.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose copies of a White Paper issued on June 8, containing the text of a despatch 43 by the Foreign Secretary to the British Ambassador in Rome on the so-called Four Power Pact between the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, which was initialled in Rome on June 7. The terms of the Agreement are included in the White Paper.

In his despatch, Sir John Simon reviews the negotiations incident to the initialing of the Four Power Agreement, and re-asserts the British Government's attitude towards it as embodying "the expression of that spirit of conciliation and mutual cooperation without which European recovery would be impossible and the prospect of world peace would be jeopardized". It may be noted that the Foreign Secretary re-affirmed the British Government's position that the new Agreement "does not imply any extension of the obligations of the United Kingdom in European affairs".

For the moment, English public opinion is concentrated on the questions at issue in the approaching World Economic Conference, among

42 The same, mutatis mutandis, June 9, to the Ambassadors in France, Great Britain, and Germany and to the American delegate to the Disarmament Conference.

43 Despatch not printed.
which that of the June 15 War Debt payment is persistently included, which accounts for the relatively slight interest shown here in the initialing of this Four Power Agreement.

There are enclosed copies of the only editorials of any interest appearing on this subject in the London press.

Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador:

RAY ATHERTON

[Enclosure]

Agreement of Understanding and Cooperation

PREAMBLE

The President of the German Reich, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the King of Italy;

Conscious of the special responsibilities incumbent on them as possessing permanent representation on the Council of the League of Nations, where the League itself and its members are concerned, and of the responsibilities resulting from their common signature of the Locarno agreements;

Convinced that the state of disquiet which obtains throughout the world can only be dissipated by reinforcing their solidarity in such a way as to strengthen confidence in peace in Europe;

Faithful to the obligations which they have assumed in virtue of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaties, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and taking into account the Declaration of the renunciation of force, the principle of which was proclaimed in the declaration signed at Geneva on the 11th December, 1932, by their delegates at the Disarmament Conference and adopted on the 2nd March, 1933, by the Political Commission of that Conference;

Anxious to give full effect to all the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, while conforming to the methods and pro-

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44 Not printed.
45 Reprinted from Great Britain, Cmd. 4342, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1933) : Despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome in regard to the Agreement of Understanding and Co-Operation between France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, London, June 7, 1933.
47 Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1910-1923, vol. xii, p. 3356.
48 Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 158.
49 Ibid., 1932, vol. i, p. 627.
procedure laid down therein, from which they have no intention of departing;

Mindful of the rights of every State, which cannot be affected without the consent of the interested party;

Have resolved to conclude an agreement with these objects, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: 52

The President of the German Reich:

The President of the French Republic:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India: for Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

His Majesty the King of Italy:

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

**ARTICLE 1**

The High Contracting Parties will consult together as regards all questions which appertain to them. They undertake to make every effort to pursue, within the framework of the League of Nations, a policy of effective co-operation between all Powers with a view to the maintenance of peace.

**ARTICLE 2**

In respect of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and particularly articles 10, 16 and 19, the High Contracting Parties decide to examine between themselves and without prejudice to decisions which can only be taken by the regular organs of the League of Nations, all proposals relating to methods and procedure calculated to give due effect to these articles.

**ARTICLE 3**

The High Contracting Parties undertake to make every effort to ensure the success of the Disarmament Conference and, should questions which particularly concern them remain in suspense on the conclusion of that Conference, they reserve the right to re-examine these questions between themselves in pursuance of the present agreement with a view to ensuring their solution through the appropriate channels.

**ARTICLE 4**

The High Contracting Parties affirm their desire to consult together as regards all economic questions which have a common interest

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52 The plenipotentiaries were as follows: For Germany: the Ambassador, Ulrich von Hassell; for France: the Ambassador, Henry de Jouvenel; for Great Britain: the Ambassador, Ronald Graham; for Italy: Benito Mussolini.
for Europe and particularly for its economic restoration, with a view to seeking a settlement within the framework of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 5

The present agreement is concluded for a period of ten years from the date of its entry into force.

If, before the end of the eighth year, none of the High Contracting Parties shall have notified to the others his intention to terminate the agreement, it shall be regarded as renewed and will remain in force indefinitely, each of the High Contracting Parties possessing in that event the right to terminate it by a declaration to that effect on giving two years’ notice.

ARTICLE 6

The present agreement, drawn up in English, French, German and Italian, of which the French text prevails in case of divergence, shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be deposited at Rome as soon as possible. The Government of the Kingdom of Italy will deliver to each of the High Contracting Parties a certified copy of the procès-verbaux of deposit.

The present agreement will enter into force as soon as all the ratifications have been deposited.

It shall be registered at the League of Nations in conformity with the Covenant of the League.

Done at Rome, the [7th of June 1933] in a single copy, which will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the Kingdom of Italy: certified copies will be delivered to each of the High Contracting Parties.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present agreement.

740.0011 Four Power Pact/103: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Acting Secretary of State

Rome, June 10, 1933—noon.
[Received June 10—10 a. m.]

69. The German Ambassador this morning said that the French had given an interpretation to the pact which was not acceptable to Germany. France advised the Little Entente concerning the pact to

* Italy approved by Royal Decree 941 of July 29, 1933, which became effective upon publication in Gazzetta Ufficiale of August 4, 1933; the Pact never entered into force.
reassure them and to prevent their opposition to it.\textsuperscript{53} The interpretation of the pact in this communication was the subject of the Ambassador’s remarks to the effect that Germany would not subscribe to it.


\textit{LONG}

\textbf{740.0011 Four Power Pact/120}

\textit{The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Acting Secretary of State}

No. 39  \hspace{1cm} \textbf{PARIS, June 16, 1933.}  \hspace{1cm} [Received June 24.]

\textit{Sir:} I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had with Lord Tyrrell, the British Ambassador, yesterday afternoon at the Embassy residence.

Lord Tyrrell was desirous that I should convey to the President his opinion as to M. Daladier’s sincerity and intelligence, and in particular to the moderating influence which he had exercised with respect to the conclusion of the Four Power Pact.

Respectfully yours,  \hspace{1cm} \textbf{JESSE ISIDOR STRAUS}

\[Enclosure\]

\textit{Memorandum by the Ambassador in France (Straus) of a Conversation With the British Ambassador in France (Tyrrell), June 15, 1933}

Lord Tyrrell called at the residence and in the course of conversation mentioned that Daladier is a very honest courageous man, who is responsible for the Four Power Pact; that the differences between Italy’s and France’s views were so great that the pact almost fell through and would have, had it not been for Daladier’s personal courage and his desire to prove Germany’s good faith; that he wanted to put that good faith to test; that he is entirely sympathetic to President Roosevelt’s views as to the abandonment of offensive weapons, and was willing to have France disarm gradually after five years, as soon as she had evidence that German promises would be kept. He said that he wished I would communicate his opinion of Daladier to President Roosevelt. Furthermore, that Daladier is an unusually well informed and intellectual man, who had travelled as have few other French politicians, and has sympathy with, and knowledge of, the\textsuperscript{53} The French statement, dated June 7, was transmitted to the Governments of the Little Entente and Poland; for text, see \textit{Pacte d’entente et de collaboration}, pp. 23-30.
problems of other nations. Lord Tyrrell also stated that the French Parliament was very much opposed to the whole idea of the Four Power Pact and that Daladier had won them over.

In so far as Germany and Hitler are concerned, Lord Tyrrell expressed great fear of the future. He said that Hitler would have 12,000,000 people to feed next winter, and must lose out, unless he found means of carrying out his many promises which were to result from an Organized Germany; that then the great danger of a communistic uprising might threaten the peace of Europe; that no more powerful a dictatorship existed anywhere, and that in the long run dictatorships would prove dangerous (without any specific reference to Italy), and that the only stable form of government in these modern times was the democratic form, and that the sort of mediaeval rule that Germany was now suffering from, could not last. He expressed the opinion that, ever since the war, the Allied nations had made mistakes insofar as Germany is concerned, and that both England and the United States are responsible for the rise of Hitlerism. He did not specify what, in his opinion, were the mistakes; in other words, he made no reference to the Treaty of Versailles or war debts.

JESSE ISIDOR STRAUS

740.0011 Four Power Pact/130
The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Acting Secretary of State
No. 43 Rome, June 22, 1933.
[Received July 3.]

Sir: With reference to my despatch No. 32 of June 16, 1933, on the Four-Power Pact, I have the honor to transmit to the Department the following sidelights on the recent negotiations looking to the conclusion of the Four-Power Pact which have been gathered from conversations members of this Embassy have had in Foreign Office and diplomatic circles here.

When the French Ambassador, M. de Jouvenel, first arrived in Rome last January, he began to sound out the Italian government as to the possibility of solving the recognized outstanding problems between France and Italy, namely, colonies, the status of Italians in Tunisia, opportunities for Italian expansion in the Balkans, etc. M. de Jouvenel soon found, however, that Italian tactics in regard to Italo-French relations had changed and that Mussolini had become much more interested in the possibilities of elaborating a formula for the collaboration of the four great powers of Western Europe (the Duce had already

*Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1910–1928, vol. iii, p. 3820.

*Not printed.
publicly affirmed the necessity for such collaboration in his Turin speech on October [23,] 1932, reported in the Embassy’s despatch 1654 of October 27, 1932^7) than he was in the immediate solution of the classical Italo-French divergencies mentioned above. In the early stages of his mission here, the French Ambassador, during informal and inconclusive exchanges of views with Mussolini in regard to such a formula, let it be known that it was the French view that a pact should be negotiated and signed by England, France, and Italy, and that once this were done, Germany would then feel herself obliged to collaborate with the other three powers whether she wished to or not. Mussolini, on the other hand—and M. de Jouvenel was soon given to understand that the British concurred in this opinion—insisted that it would be more prudent to include Germany in the negotiations from the beginning, since such a courtesy would ensure a better spirit of collaboration on the part of that country. Apparently the informal discussions on the subject never emerged from the exploratory stage and, although M. de Jouvenel had impressed upon Mussolini the fact that his mission was to terminate in July and that if anything were to be done to better Italo-French relations it had to be done quickly, Mussolini’s project in concrete form looking to a Four-Power Pact came as a complete surprise to him just as it did to the other ambassadors involved.

According to well informed circles here, once Mussolini had made his proposal for the Four-Power Pact, he stepped aside and allowed the other three powers to come to an agreement without interference on his part. It will be recalled that while a British text, a French text, and a German text were submitted in turn for consideration as negotiations progressed, no Italian text other than Mussolini’s original one was ever advanced. Mussolini was agreeable, it is said, without exception to every modification of his original proposal suggested or made, his one idea being to get something done.

It is also pointed out here that M. de Jouvenel was able to help the negotiations along in a way that no career ambassador could have done. For instance, toward the end of the negotiations he left his post and made a trip to Paris without obtaining the authority of the Quai d’Orsay beforehand. Not only was he absent from his embassy without leave, but he assumed the responsibility while in Paris of exerting an influence wherever possible upon members of the French government and upon French politicians of all shades in favor of the pact. As no career ambassador could have done, he also gave out statements in explanation of the provisions of the Pact to the French press. It was M. de Jouvenel who, with Mussolini’s approval, first called attention publicly to the fact that since the four powers

^7 Not printed.
were already running things in the League of Nations anyway, the activities of the four powers within the framework of the Pact would not represent a dangerous innovation in the European set-up, as opponents of the Pact had argued.

On the other hand, M. de Jouvenel's lack of experience as a diplomat almost got him into serious trouble. It appears that a final text as drafted here was telegraphed to Paris the same night that Paris telegraphed to Rome its version of the final text. M. de Jouvenel was under the impression that the two texts were identical and began final negotiations on the basis of the Rome text, only to find out later that it was not acceptable to Paris. The misunderstanding was the cause of a disconcerting and even alarming delay in the initialing of the Pact. A career diplomat, it is said, would have compared the two texts before going ahead.

In French circles in Rome it is believed that the bad impression that the progressive emasculation of the original Mussolini proposal created could have been avoided if the project had been submitted in secret to the interested governments beforehand for their advice and consent. In this way there could have been the appearance of a uniform agreement at the outset with the resultant good moral effect. Opponents of this view state that the sensational suddenness of the proposal fired the popular imagination and was not a small element in its success. Besides, it is argued, it is impossible for the Quai d'Orsay to keep important international negotiations secret. In support of this last theory it is pointed out that as soon as M. Paul-Boncour received the telegram with the text of the proposal (the afternoon of the same day that Mussolini handed the text to M. de Jouvenel), he immediately took it over to M. Daladier, who was talking at the time with a well known French journalist. The French Prime Minister read the document and in disgust handed it to the journalist to glance at, with the words: "That's what you get when MacDonald travels around Europe."

In concluding these sidelights on the negotiations on the Four-Power Pact, it may be of interest to state that it is generally understood here that in dealing with the Germans Mussolini rarely had recourse to regular diplomatic channels, that is, to the German Foreign Office and the German Embassy here. The Chief of Government time and again spoke directly with Herr Hitler or Captain Goering by telephone, and it appears to have been Herr Hitler's wish that both Baron von Neurath of the German Foreign Office and Herr von Hassel, German Ambassador to the Quirinal, be excluded as far as possible from the negotiations.

There has been little comment in the Italian press recently regarding the Four-Power Pact, although yesterday the newspapers carried des-
patches from Paris to the effect that the French Prime Minister, Daladier, had apparently made up his mind to pay a visit to Mussolini. Although there has been much talk of such a meeting between the two statesmen (see my despatch No. 32 of June 16, 1933), no official announcements have been made as yet in regard thereto.

The *Giornale d'Italia* of June 14th publishes an editorial on the Russian reaction to the initialing of the Four-Power Pact and endeavors to put Soviet fears concerning the Pact at rest. Italy, says the newspapers, has always been the champion of Russia. In recognizing the Soviet government, Italy declined to follow the policies of other countries which looked forward to an early end of the regime in Russia and therefore refused their recognition. Italy, furthermore, took the initiative—against the advice of several countries—in suggesting that Russia be admitted as a member of the Committee on the European Union. Under these circumstances, concludes the *Giornale d'Italia*, the mere fact that Italy, who is a proven friend of Russia, is included in the Four-Power Pact should constitute a guarantee of peace for Russia as well as for other nations. These soothing words addressed to the Soviets by the authoritative *Giornale d'Italia* may be regarded as another indication of Italian solicitude for the maintenance of friendly relations between Italy and Russia.

Respectfully yours,

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

740.0011 Four Power Pact/140

*The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 93

ROME, July 21, 1933.

[Received August 2.]

SIR: With reference to my telegram No. 78 of July 15, 1933, 11 a.m.\(^{68}\) reporting the signature of the Four-Power Pact, I have the honor to inform the Department that the ambassadors of Great Britain, France, and Germany and the Chief of the Italian Government signed the documents in Signor Mussolini’s office in the Palazzo Venezia on the above-mentioned date. Although some disappointment was felt here that it was not found possible, as had been hoped, for the heads or foreign ministers of the signatory governments to come to Rome in the end and sign the Pact themselves, the telegrams of congratulation sent to Signor Mussolini by Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon, by M. Daladier, and by Herr Hitler have nevertheless done much to soften the blow to the expectations of the Italian public that there would be a gathering in Rome of distinguished statesmen with the resultant enhancement of the prestige of the country.

\(^{68}\) Not printed.
The expected declaration on the part of the Chief of Government at the time of the signing of the Pact (see my telegram No. 77, 4 p. m. July 7, 1933, and despatch No. 53 of June 30, 1933 *) which was calculated to offset the unfortunate effect in Germany of the French communications concerning Article 19 of the League of Nations Pact to the Little Entente and to Poland and thereby to appease German public opinion was not forthcoming. From reliable sources the Embassy has learned that shortly before the signature of the Pact the Italian Government addressed a reassuring note in this connection to the German Government which proved satisfactory to the latter and made the declaration referred to above unnecessary. It appears that the Italian note under reference, which was in reply to German protests to the effect that a unilateral interpretation of the provisions of the Pact such as France had made to the Little Entente and to Poland was inconsistent with the spirit of collaboration among the four powers the creation of which was one of the chief purposes of the Pact, pointed out to the Germans that since the French communications merely reaffirmed the principle of unanimity of decision at the present time in force within the Assembly of the League of Nations, there could be no cause for complaint on the part of the Germans in so far as the substance of the French communications was concerned. On the other hand the note went on to say that the Italian Government was of the opinion that henceforth interpretations regarding the provisions of the Four-Power Pact should be made only in collaboration and not unilaterally.

Italian press comment on the signature of the Pact is, of course, extremely enthusiastic and optimistic with regard to the future, and all editorials emphasize that it means peace in Europe for at least ten years, one newspaper even going so far as to state that in substance the Pact may prove everlasting. Coming at a time when the World Economic Conference is breaking up, when the Disarmament Conference is in the doldrums, and when the prestige of the League of Nations is at a low ebb, Italian public opinion is inclined to regard the Four-Power Pact as the only worthwhile machinery in existence today for international collaboration. Long extracts from eulogistic articles in the foreign press are also reproduced in the newspapers here, and the general impression prevails that the Pact means the salvation of Europe at a critical period in its history.

There is enclosed herewith a translation of an interview ** to the Rome correspondent of the Paris Temps by Ambassador de Jouvenel on the genesis of the Four-Power Pact and the subsequent negotiations thereon.

Respectfully yours,

Breckinridge Long

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* Neither printed.
** Not printed.