

RELATIONS OF JAPAN WITH THE EUROPEAN AXIS
POWERS

762.94/122

The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State

No. 2159

TOKYO, November 26, 1936.

[Received December 15.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegram No. 241 of November 25, 7 p. m.,¹ regarding the German-Japanese Agreement for co-operation against the Communist International and to enclose copies of the "unofficial translation" in English of the Agreement, which has been compared by the Embassy with the original Japanese text and found to be substantially correct.

There is also enclosed an "unofficial translation" of a statement issued by the Foreign Office in regard to the Agreement which was given out at the same time, as well as a memorandum of a conversation which I had with Mr. Horinouchi, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the subject.

The Embassy will submit a further report on this subject after it has had an opportunity to study the Agreement and the local reactions to it.

Respectfully yours,

E. R. DICKOVER

[Enclosure 1—Unofficial translation]

*Agreement and Supplementary Protocol Between Japan and
Germany, Signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936*

AGREEMENT GUARDING AGAINST THE COMMUNISTIC INTERNATIONAL

The Imperial Government of Japan and the Government of Germany,

In cognizance of the fact that the object of the Communistic International (the so-called Komintern) is the disintegration of, and the commission of violence against, existing States by the exercise of all means at its command,

Believing that the toleration of interference by the Communistic International in the internal affairs of nations not only endangers their internal peace and social welfare, but threatens the general peace of the world,

¹ Not printed.

Desiring to co-operate for defence against communistic disintegration, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting States agree that they will mutually keep each other informed concerning the activities of the Communistic International, will confer upon the necessary measures of defence, and will carry out such measures in close co-operation.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting States will jointly invite third States whose internal peace is menaced by the disintegrating work of the Communistic International, to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of the present Agreement or to participate in the present Agreement.

ARTICLE III

The Japanese and German texts are each valid as the original text of this Agreement. The Agreement shall come into force on the day of its signature and shall remain in force for the term of five years. The High Contracting States will, in a reasonable time before the expiration of the said term, come to an understanding upon the further manner of their co-operation.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have affixed hereto their seals and signatures.

Done in duplicate at Berlin, November 25th, 11th year of Showa, corresponding to November 25th, 1936.

[SEAL] (Signed) VISCOUNT KINTOMO MUSHAKOJI
*Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary*

[SEAL] (Signed) JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
*German Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary*

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT GUARDING AGAINST THE COMMUNISTIC INTERNATIONAL

On the occasion of the signature this day of the Agreement guarding against the Communistic International the undersigned plenipotentiaries have agreed as follows:

a) The competent authorities of both High Contracting States will closely co-operate in the exchange of reports on the activities of the Communistic International and on measures of information and defence against the Communistic International.

b) The competent authorities of both High Contracting States will, within the framework of the existing law, take stringent measures against those who at home or abroad work on direct or indirect duty of the Communistic International or assist its disintegrating activities.

c) To facilitate the co-operation of the competent authorities of the two High Contracting States as set out in a) above, a standing committee shall be established. By this committee the further measures to be adopted in order to counter the disintegrating activities of the Communistic International shall be considered and conferred upon.

Done at Berlin, November 25th, 11th year of Showa, corresponding to November 25th, 1936.

(Signed) VISCOUNT KINTOMO MUSHAKOJI
*Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary*

(Signed) JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
*German Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary*

[Enclosure 2—Unofficial translation]

Statement by the Japanese Foreign Office

[Tokyo, November 25, 1936.]

The Foreign Office issued the following statement at 10:00 p. m. November 25, 1936, on the Japanese-German Agreement and the Supplementary Protocol guarding against the Communist International.

(1) Ever since its establishment the Communist International, or the so-called Comintern, with its headquarters at Moscow, for the purpose of destroying the national and social structures in every country in pursuance of its fundamental policy of world revolution, has been engaged in all sorts of activities, greatly menacing the peace of the world. At its Seventh Congress held in the summer of last year, the Comintern decided upon a policy of organizing a unified front with the Second International to oppose Fascism and imperialism, and at the same time made it plain that the future objectives of Comintern activities were to be Japan, Germany and Poland, etc.; and it further resolved to support the Chinese communist armies in order to fight Japan. The actual operations carried on subsequently by the Comintern have become extremely ingenious, rendering them all the more dangerous. As to the extent to which the Comintern interferes with the internal affairs of all countries and exerts baneful influences on the well-being of the nations and the peace of the

world, a glance at the present disturbances in Spain will be sufficient to convince anybody of its magnitude. At least those countries which lodged protests with the Government of the Soviet Union at the time of the Comintern Congress must certainly have full cognizance of the harmfulness of Comintern activities.

(2) The communist invasion has hitherto been more marked in the Orient, especially in China. The Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang have already suffered from its calamitous effects while China Proper is now being subjected to the depredations of the communist armies. The activities of the Comintern in China have, as a matter of fact, notably increased in vigor since its Seventh Congress.

In Manchukuo, also, the Comintern has been surreptitiously endeavoring through the Manchurian District Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to organize cells, to win over and instigate the bandits, and to direct the raids by partisan troops all over the country.

In Japan, the extreme Leftist movement temporarily showed signs of decline after the Manchurian Incident. But since the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, the movement has again become energetic. It has crept into the channels of lawful agitation in conformance with the resolution of that Congress, and has launched a unified front movement to make it a basis for the revival of the communist movement.

(3) The Japanese Government, who, in order to safeguard Japan's immutable national polity and insure the national security, and to maintain an everlasting peace in East Asia have pursued a clear-cut and consistent policy toward the Comintern, find it necessary to take more rigorous measures of self-defense against its increased menace as stated above. The organization and the activities of the Comintern being of an international character, any program of counter action should necessarily be based upon international cooperation. Now Germany, ever since the establishment of the present regime in 1933, has put into execution drastic anti-communist policies. Last year at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern she was selected together with Japan as a special objective of Comintern operations. Thus Japan and Germany are placed in similar circumstances vis-a-vis the Comintern. Consequently the Japanese Government as the first step of their defensive undertaking conducted negotiations with Germany and concluded an agreement on November 25 to take effect immediately.

(4) This agreement, the fundamental object of which is common defense against the destructive operations of the Comintern, contains provisions for the exchange of information regarding Comintern activities, for the consultation on, and the execution of, de-

defensive measures and for the extension of joint invitations to third Powers. There is, besides, a supplementary Protocol stipulating in concrete terms the manners of executing the present agreement.

(5) The Japanese Government are desirous of co-operating with as many Powers as possible for the purpose of perfecting their defensive measures against the Comintern menace, but for that purpose alone. It should be pointed out that in connection with, or behind, this agreement there exists no special agreement whatsoever, and that the Japanese Government have no intention to form, or join in, any special international bloc, for any other purpose and finally that the present agreement is not directed against the Soviet Union or any other specific country.

[Enclosure 3]

Memorandum by the American Chargé in Japan (Dickover) of a Conversation With the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (Horinouchi)

[Tokyo], November 23, 1936.

I called on Mr. Horinouchi at the official residence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 5 o'clock at Mr. Horinouchi's request. After the usual greetings Mr. Horinouchi stated that there were many rumors in Tokyo and in the press abroad regarding a German-Japanese agreement—some said a German-Japanese military alliance. Because of these rumors he wished to tell me the facts as they stand at present. He then said that at the last general meeting of the Comintern Japan, as well as Germany and the United States, had been specified by the Comintern as countries against which that organization should direct its activities. As was well known, Japan did not like and was opposed to communistic doctrines and has always defended Japan against the spread of communism. Recently, moreover, the activities of the Comintern apparently have not been directed as much against countries in Europe as against countries in Asia, particularly against China, India, and Manchuria. Now that the activities of the Comintern have assumed an international scope the Japanese Government has adopted the policy that international defense against the activities of the Comintern should be taken by the countries threatened by those activities.

For the reasons which he had just stated, the Vice Minister went on, the Japanese Government has been holding conversations with the German Government during recent months. These conversations have resulted in an agreement. The Vice Minister then gave me the following summary of the German-Japanese agreement:

"The exchange of information in regard to the activities of the Comintern and consultations in regard to defensive measures, as well as provisions for extending joint invitations to third powers, are provided for by the agreement. Concrete provisions concerning the carrying out of the agreement mentioned above, the manner of cooperation between the authorities of the two high contracting parties, the steps to be taken against persons connected with the Comintern, and the establishment of a standing committee, are embodied in a Supplementary Protocol."

The Vice Minister stated that the agreement would probably be concluded sometime during this week and upon conclusion would be published. I asked if the protocol as well as the main agreement would be published. The Vice Minister said that it would.

The Vice Minister went on to say that the agreement was not directed against any particular power. Moreover, he said, the Japanese Government had no intention of permitting the agreement to draw Japan into European politics and Japan had no intention of joining any bloc of nations—for instance any bloc such as a fascist bloc.

I remarked that rumors were current in diplomatic circles in Tokyo to the effect that the agreement included some secret trade or military clause. Mr. Horinouchi immediately said that the agreement was not an alliance and that no secret military or economic arrangement of any kind was included in the agreement.

Mr. Horinouchi then said that he was giving this information about the German-Japanese agreement only to the American and to the British Governments. He said that the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Clive, had informed the Foreign Office that questions had been asked in the House of Commons in regard to the rumors of a German-Japanese agreement and that, for that reason, the Foreign Office had informed the British Ambassador in regard to the agreement. He proceeded to state that the Japanese Government greatly valued its friendship with the American Government and did not wish that any misunderstanding should arise, and consequently he had decided to give the same information to the American Government. I thanked Mr. Horinouchi for the information, which I said I knew would be greatly appreciated by my Government, especially in view of the many conflicting and probably exaggerated press reports which were reaching the United States.

Mr. Horinouchi said that, as the information regarding an agreement was being given only to the above two governments, he had to request that it be kept strictly confidential for the time being. Before the agreement was given to the newspapers, however, he would give me a complete text for transmission to my Government.

E. R. D[ICKOVER]

762.94/204

*Protocol Concluded by Italy, Germany, and Japan at Rome, November 6, 1937*²

[Translation]

The Italian Government, the Government of the German Reich, and the Imperial Government of Japan,

Considering that the Communist International continues constantly to imperil the civilized world in the Occident and Orient, disturbing and destroying peace and order,

Considering that only close collaboration looking to the maintenance of peace and order can limit and remove that peril,

Considering that Italy—who with the advent of the Fascist regime has with inflexible determination combated that peril and rid her territory of the Communist International—has decided to align herself against the common enemy along with Germany and Japan, who for their part are animated by like determination to defend themselves against the Communist International,

Have, in conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement against the Communist International concluded at Berlin on November 25, 1936, by Germany and Japan, agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE 1

Italy becomes a party to the Agreement against the Communist International and to the Supplementary Protocol concluded on November 25, 1936, between Germany and Japan, the text of which is included in the annex to the present Protocol.³

ARTICLE 2

The three powers signatory to the present Protocol agree that Italy will be considered as an original signatory to the Agreement and Supplementary Protocol mentioned in the preceding article, the signing of the present Protocol being equivalent to the signature of the original text of the aforesaid Agreement and Supplementary Protocol.

ARTICLE 3

The present Protocol shall constitute an integral part of the above-mentioned Agreement and Supplementary Protocol.

² Copy transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch No. 643, November 12, 1937, from the Ambassador in Italy; not printed. Text taken from official Stefani communiqué.

³ Annex not printed.

ARTICLE 4

The present Protocol is drawn up in Italian, Japanese, and German, each text being considered authentic. It shall enter into effect on the date of signature.

In testimony whereof, etc. . . .

CIANO—VON RIBBENTROP—HOTTA

762.94/214

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 2660

TOKYO, November 13, 1937.

[Received November 29.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the adherence of Italy to the German-Japanese anti-Comintern pact took place at Rome on November 6 and that the news was hailed in this country with great enthusiasm. Not only did the press comment extensively and with approval, as reported by telegram,* but streets were decorated and parades were held in celebration of the event. By this step Italy has thus forged the third side of the German-Italian-Japanese anti-communist triangle and has definitely placed Japan in the so-called fascist block of nations. This event further marks the definite termination of Japan's period of political and moral isolation which followed the Manchurian venture in 1931 and also emphasizes the abandonment of Japan's previous and almost traditional alignment with the democratic powers.

The Embassy has, in a previous despatch,† discussed the use of the word "fascist" in connection with Japan, Italy and Germany. The term has come to be used to describe that which is the antonym of communist; therefore any state which is anti-communist is immediately labelled "fascist". If the present triangular combination is analyzed, however, it becomes immediately apparent that not only is the group not merely anti-communist but that its policies and practices equally run counter to those of the so-called democratic powers. Thus it can be seen that the question resolves itself into the simple fact that it is a combination of those states which are bent upon upsetting the *status quo* as opposed to those states which wish to preserve the *status quo*, or, more simply, of the "have-nots" against the "haves", and that anti-communism is merely the banner under which the "have-nots" are rallying.

*Telegram No. 528, November 8, 5 p. m., 1937. [Footnote in the original; telegram not printed.]

†Despatch No. 2631, October 15, 1937. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]

The threat to England is very real and immediately apparent upon reflection that with the addition of Japan to the Rome-Berlin axis the life-line of the British Empire is threatened from the North Sea through the Mediterranean and beyond Singapore.

It is of some interest to note that in completing this triangular anti-communist pact Japan, instead of signing a separate agreement with Italy, arranged to have Italy adhere to the already existing German-Japanese pact in the expectation of avoiding giving unnecessary and further affront to Moscow such as was given last November when Berlin and Tokyo announced the anti-Comintern pact. This is an example of the greater delicacy with which such matters are handled when arranged by the civil authorities and through the proper channels as compared with the heavy-handedness of the military who engineered the pact with Germany apparently without the knowledge of the Foreign Office and timed it so badly that news of it leaked out only a few days before the settlement of the very troublesome fisheries question with Soviet Russia was to have taken place. Comment from Moscow on Rome's recent action is lacking here but if there has been any it was undoubtedly directed largely against Italy. But it is easy to imagine the nature of the comment directed against Japan if Japan had signed a separate anti-Comintern agreement with Italy.

Respectfully yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

762.94/275 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance—Extract]

TOKYO, February 8, 1939—4 p. m.

[Received February 8—12:15 p. m.⁴]

73. Japan has entered into negotiations with Germany and Italy for a definite alliance, both military and political. The questions under present consideration concern the exact scope of the understanding; that is, whether it is to be aimed only at Russia or against other nations also. The above is based on reliable reports. Germany and Italy are said to be asking for the broad application while Japan wishes to restrict the scope of the alliance.

Apparently the Germans, and to a less extent the Italians, are seeking an arrangement recognizing and giving effect to the superior strategic position which they hold as compared with the Japanese should a conflict arise between Russia and any member of the alliance. We are reliably informed that the Germans and Italians consider Japan a natural ally because they feel sure that Japan would seize

⁴Telegram in five sections.

the opportunity to attack Russia should that power become engaged in war with either Germany or Italy or with both of them. That is why they do not wish to make commitments to come to the aid of Japan if only Japan comes into conflict with Russia.

Important moderate influences are in operation to keep the Japanese Government from joining itself completely with the Rome-Berlin Axis. However, strong pressure is being exerted on the other side; the younger army officers are especially keen for this tie-up. It is thought that Foreign Minister Arita favors making the alliance. It was he who sponsored the anti-Comintern Pact.

I have acted through informal channels to convey to Arita the idea that Japan would do well to consider, before taking an irrevocable step, what would be the possible effects upon relations with the United States of such an alliance. My British colleague feels that it would be useful for me to seek an interview with Arita on this question but I am not convinced that a direct approach is desirable. It is my belief that the best course would be to limit myself, should future conversations with Arita bring up this question naturally, to stressing the view that if her ultimate welfare is to be served Japan must cultivate and maintain friendly relations with all nations, and that friendly relations with the United States and Great Britain are of especial value because Japan's rapid development economically and industrially would have been impossible without the liberal American and British trade policies. It seems to me that the principal benefit to which we can invite Arita's attention as an offset to whatever the Japanese expect to gain from an arrangement with the Axis is the value to Japan of British and American markets. No matter what a government's policy may be, a government cannot necessarily control moral sanctions by the people.

The Department can determine better than I the advisability of approaching the Foreign Minister directly on this matter and whether such an approach, if made, should be under instructions or on my own responsibility.

GREW

762.94/275: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Substance]

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1939—6 p. m.

33. With reference to your telegram No. 73 of February 8, 4 p. m., we leave to your discretion the form and substance of any further approach on this subject, but in our opinion whatever approach you make should be on your own responsibility. We agree entirely with

you that it is desirable that Japan should not enter into the proposed alliance. As regards your mention of the desirability of good relations with all countries, especially the United States and Great Britain, we suggest that you merely say with all countries, among which the United States is important. If you think best, you might emphasize the conviction that mutually beneficial and friendly relations among the nations of the world and the general adoption of policies which will serve as a basis for broadening rather than narrowing such relations will serve the best interests of all nations, including Japan. Naturally you will take care not to say anything implying that the United States might give any specific compensation to Japan for giving up the idea of entering the proposed Axis alliance.

HULL

762.94/280 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

Tokyo, February 14, 1939—10 p. m.

[Received February 14—10:45 a. m.]

89. In keeping with your telegraphic instruction No. 33, February 10, 6 p. m., I have told the Foreign Minister my personal views as to the negotiations now under way between Japan and the Axis Powers. This conversation with Arita convinces me that the Japanese will fully consider all factors before reaching whatever decision may be made. Talks with several newspaper men who maintain close relations with Arita confirm this view.

I hear that Japan is still standing out for limiting the proposed alliance so that it will be applied as against Russia only, but this information is not confirmed.

GREW

762.94/295 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, March 7, 1939—6 p. m.

[Received March 7—9:32 a. m.]

120. Our 104, February 21, 8 p. m.⁵ Reference Japanese-German-Italian conversations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is reported to have made the following statement yesterday at a meeting of the Budget Committee of the Lower House:

“The present pivot of Japanese foreign policy today is the relations arising out of the Japanese-German-Italian anti-Comintern Pact

⁵ Not printed.

which was established to combat the destructive designs of the Comintern. The present conflict with China derives from many causes but the most important of these is the activity in China of the Comintern, a fact which is generally admitted. Accordingly, to bring about an adjustment of the China incident and to establish firmly the new order in China, resistance to the destructive activities of the Comintern is for Japan an extremely important matter. The anti-Comintern Pact was made the pivot of present Japanese policy for this purpose. However, the firm establishment of the new order in East Asia and making secure Japan's general international position is not being left only to the anti-Comintern Pact. In another direction, such as relations with Great Britain and the United States, there is need for bringing about on the part of those countries an understanding of Japan's position and attitude. In Great Britain, the United States, and in various other countries, there is a tendency to look upon present relations between Japan, Germany, and Italy as an association of totalitarian states opposed to the democracies. As pointed out on various occasions by the Prime Minister as well as by myself, that is an absolutely erroneous observation. The reasons for the establishment between Japan and Germany and Italy of relations opposed to communism are merely those which I have already described. I think, therefore, that it is clear these relations contain no implication of opposition to Great Britain, the United States, and other democracies. I have briefly and only in the most general terms outlined Japan's foreign policy. I have also been asked to explain conditions in various other countries but I doubt the wisdom of complying with the request in this place. Perhaps an opportunity will present itself in the near future for me to make a further statement with regard to these matters."

Cipher text by mail to Shanghai, Chungking and Peiping.

GREW

762.9411/21 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Тоуко, September 27, 1940—10 p. m.

[Received September 27—2:15 p. m.]

909. At 9:45 o'clock tonight we were given by the Foreign Office the following four documents in English translation shortly before their release to the press:

1. Summary of the three-power pact between Japan, Germany and Italy signed on September 27, 1940 at Berlin;
2. Radio address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs;
3. Imperial rescript by the Emperor;
4. Message of the Prime Minister.

In view of the prime importance of these documents in connection with the present critical crisis and being informed that complete texts may not be cabled to the American press, I feel obliged to telegraph documents numbers 2, 3, and 4 in full so that Department may study their tone and substance without delay. The texts follow

in three ensuing telegrams. The summary of the pact⁶ itself had already been announced on the radio from the United States tonight.

GREW

762.9411/136

Summary of the Three-Power Pact Between Japan, Germany, and Italy, Signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940⁷

The Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three Governments to extend cooperation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

ARTICLE 2

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

ARTICLE 3

Japan, Germany and Italy agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

ARTICLE 4

With a view to implementing the present Pact, Joint Technical Commissions the members of which are to be appointed by the re-

⁶ Summary of pact as transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Japan in his despatch No. 5038, October 5, 1940, is printed *infra*.

⁷ Tentative translation as received from the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, September 27, 1940.

spective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy will meet without delay.

ARTICLE 5

Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

ARTICLE 6

The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its removal [*renewal?*].

762.9411/25: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, September 27, 1940—11 p. m.
[Received September 27—2:30 p. m.]

910. Number 2. Translation radio address by Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, Minister for Foreign Affairs, September 27, 1940:

"Today, on the occasion of the conclusion of the three-power pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, an Imperial rescript—I am profoundly moved to say—has been issued to the nation. What we His Majesty's subjects should do has been plainly indicated by the Prime Minister in his message. I sincerely believe that it is incumbent upon all of us to lay to heart the august will of our Sovereign and put forth our best efforts in order to surmount the current emergency.

Our country is now faced with a most difficult situation, unparalleled in its history. What step we should take at this moment is a grave problem upon which hangs the fate of our nation. The Government, keenly conscious of the gravity of its responsibilities, is seeing to it that nothing shall come amiss.

The objective of Japan's foreign policy is no other than to dispose of the China affair, to construct a sphere of common prosperity in greater East Asia and to contribute thereby to the establishment of true peace for the entire world. But when we look at the actual international situation we find that this intention of Japan is not yet fully understood. There are countries which have the mistaken idea that peace means the mere maintenance of the old order, or those which, while realizing the inevitability of change, are reluctant to part with the old order. Moreover, there are countries which attempt to obstruct, directly or indirectly, our construction of a new order in greater East Asia, and even those who resort to all sorts of stratagem in order to block the path of Japan's advance toward the

fulfillment of her great historic mission—that of establishing world peace. The Japanese Government has assiduously striven to remedy this regrettable state of affairs. Nevertheless, I regret to say that the situation has not only failed to improve, but it has even shown signs of aggravation in certain quarters.

Circumstances have now brought Japan to the point where she can no longer permit the international situation to drift as it will. At this juncture there is only one course for Japan to take. That is to say internally we should stand resolutely together—one hundred million people as one—by establishing speedily the new state structure for national defense; and externally, we should first unite with Germany and Italy which have the same aspirations and policy as ours and later with those powers who can cooperate with us. We should thus go fearlessly forward to carry out our conviction, calling at the same time upon those powers that obstruct us to reconsider their attitude. In such manner, the Government expects to achieve the ultimate aim of our Yamato race—namely, the establishment of a new order in East Asia.

Accordingly, we have conducted negotiations with the representatives of Germany and Italy which have resulted in the conclusion of the three-power pact, made public just a short while ago.

The establishment of this historic relationship of alliance between the three countries is of course due to the wisdom of our gracious Sovereign. At the same time it owes much to the judgment and decision of the eminent leaders of Germany and Italy—Chancellor Hitler and Premier Mussolini. Again, the German Foreign Minister, Mr. von Ribbentrop, has earnestly made efforts for German-Japanese cooperation from the very day he assumed his present post, while the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, having been once stationed in East Asia, and understanding fully Japan's position in East Asia, has ceaselessly labored for the promotion of Italo-Japanese friendship. Needless to say, these two Foreign Ministers have played important roles in the conclusion of the present pact.

The pact provides that Japan, Germany and Italy shall cooperate freely with one another toward the construction of a new order, respectively in greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, in which these powers are at present engaged. It also provides that if any one of the contracting parties should be attacked by an outside power, at present not involved in the European war or in the China affair, the three contracting powers shall render mutual assistance with all possible means, political, economic, and military. Accordingly, it does not mean that because of this pact Japan is to enter the European war at present, nor that she intends to challenge any power without provocation. It may be added also that the present treaty will not affect in any way the existing political status between Japan, Germany and Italy on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other.

The Treaty also provides that Germany and Italy recognize Japan's position of leadership in regard to the construction of a new order in greater East Asia. We in turn recognize the leadership of Germany and Italy in the European regions where they are now engaged in the establishment of a new order, staking even their national existence in the undertaking. And thus the three powers are to join forces and help one another to the utmost.

With the conclusion of this treaty, Japan's responsibilities as leader of the new order in greater East Asia becomes even greater than before. Although it is the intention of the Japanese Government to fulfill these responsibilities always by peaceful means, there is no telling whether there might not arise occasions and circumstances calling for a momentous decision on the part of our nation. Our future is beset with countless obstacles and difficulties which, it must be fully realized, no ordinary effort will be sufficient to surmount. Our Government and people, united as one and grasping fully the situation both at home and abroad, should be prepared to endure all hardships and sacrifices, and redouble their efforts so as to conform to the august will of our Sovereign."

GREW

762.9411/27 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, September 27, 1940—midnight.

[Received September 27—2:40 p. m.]

911. No. 3. (Translation.) Imperial rescript:

"To enhance justice on earth and make of the world one household is the great injunction, bequeathed by our [Imperial] Ancestors and which we lay to heart day and night. In the stupendous crisis now confronting the world, it appears that endless will be the aggravation of war and confusion, and incalculable the disasters to be inflicted upon mankind. We fervently hope that the cessation of the disturbances and the restoration of peace will be realized as swiftly as possible.

Accordingly, we commanded our Government to deliberate on the matter of mutual assistance and cooperation with the Governments of Germany and Italy which share in the views and aspirations of our empire. We are deeply gratified that a pact has been concluded between these three powers.

The task of enabling each nation to find its proper place and all individuals to live in peace and security is indeed one of great magnitude, unparalleled in history. The goal lies still far distant. Ye, our subjects, clarify evermore the concept of national polity; think deeply and look far; unite in heart and strength, and surmount the present emergency, to assist thereby in the promotion of the Imperial fortune coeval [with] heaven and earth. September twenty-seventh, the fifteenth year of Showa (1940)."

GREW

762.9411/26 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, September 28, 1940—1 a. m.

[Received September 27 (?)—3:47 p. m.]

912. No. 4. (Translation.) Message of the Prime Minister:

"On the occasion of the conclusion of the three-power pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, an Imperial rescript has been issued, setting forth clearly the aims of our empire and pointing the path

our nation should follow. I am greatly moved by the boundless benevolence of our Sovereign.

To maintain world peace and to insure the stability of East Asia is indeed the immutable national policy of Japan, firmly rooted in the principle on which our empire was founded.

With war breaking out in Europe last autumn, conflict and confusion have spread increasingly over the world. It is an urgent necessity of this moment to devise a measure for the cessation of the disturbances and the restoration of peace. Germany and Italy share with our empire in the same ideal and aspirations. Accordingly, with a view to joining hands with these powers to establish a new order in the respective regions, and furthermore to cooperating with them toward the restoration of world peace, Japan has now concluded a three-power pact. The time has come for our nation to proceed with fresh resolve to construct a new order in greater East Asia.

However, to carry out fully the conviction of our country and to enable all nations to find each its proper place is indeed a difficult task. The goal lies far. We must expect to encounter numerous obstacles as we go on.

I confidently hope that, in obedience to the Imperial will, our people, in order to surmount the present emergency, will make clear the concept of our national polity; unite heart and soul, and overcome any and every obstacle—and thereby set at ease the august mind of our Sovereign.”

GREW

762.9411/63

*Press Release Issued by the Department of State on
September 27, 1940*

At his press conference today, in response to inquiries, the Secretary of State said:

“The reported agreement of alliance does not, in the view of the Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation which has existed for several years. Announcement of the alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long existed in effect and to which this Government has repeatedly called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has been fully taken into account by the Government of the United States in the determining of this country’s policies.”

762.9411/48: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

TOKYO, September 29, 1940—11 a. m.

[Received September 29—6:58 a. m.⁸]

916. The signing of the Japanese-German-Italian alliance is obviously a tremendous Japanese gamble on the defeat of Britain by Ger-

⁸ Telegram in two sections.

many. In an off-the-record talk with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Grew informally expressed his opinion that Japan by tying herself to the Reich would become merely a satellite of Germany, however the war in Europe turned out. Mr. Grew said that in his opinion the present Japanese course must throw Japan on the rocks; that Germany is not and will not be in any position really to support Japan, no matter what intentions along that line Germany may have expressed. Japan, by tying herself to an economic bloc in East Asia which is economically unsound and sacrificing the flow of free commerce with the world, is putting her financial and economic future in a hopeless position. Matsuo commented only that these things were matters of opinion. Mr. Grew has heard but is without confirmation that an outright alliance was opposed by the Foreign Minister himself.

Although the alliance with the Axis has of course been a potentiality from the inception of the present government^{8a} and its trend of policy, few observers expected it to materialize so rapidly. There was of course considerable speculation prompted by the secretiveness of all the proceedings. However, right up to the last moment some members of the diplomatic corps failed to believe that the pact had actually evolved. Two hours before the pact was to be signed in Berlin a usually well-informed American newspaper correspondent in Tokyo was completely unaware of the development. Stahmer^{8b} is believed to have been responsible for actual negotiations in Japan.

The value of the alliance to the European side of the Axis is obvious, but the value of it to Japan is certainly less clear. Obviously the primary aim of the pact is the United States, and the German-Italian hope is naturally that the pact will increase American fears of developments in the Pacific. The proportionate gain to Japan seems to be much less. There may of course be secret provisions to the treaty. Such provisions might be: (1) The agreement of the U. S. S. R. to an arrangement freeing Japan of anxiety on the Russian front, (2) intervention by Germany looking to mediation between China and Japan, (3) Axis support for Japan in the Dutch East Indies and Indochina. With regard to the first point, although there is wide talk of the conclusion of a U. S. S. R.-Japan nonaggression agreement there is no real information available as to Russia's stand. The Ambassador of the U. S. S. R. told a member of the diplomatic corps in Tokyo on September 28 that he had not had any knowledge before the alliance of its terms. With regard to German mediation in the China conflict, it is not seen that that is possible, barring Soviet pressure on the Chiang Kai-shek government. In Indochina the German-controlled government at Vichy is probably

^{8a} Headed by Prince Konoye as Prime Minister, July 22, 1940.

^{8b} Head of the German Economic Mission in Japan.

able to guarantee Japan's freedom to carry out her plans in Indochina. What is possibly one of the most dangerous potential consequences of the alliance is a possible ruthless application of power by Germany in Holland to bring about changes in the situation in the Dutch East Indies.

Yesterday Mr. Grew was told in confidence by an officer of the Gaimusho who is sympathetic to the United States and Britain that if the British were to make a public offer of the use of the Singapore base to America, or if an American squadron were to visit Singapore, this would be the most effective possible counter to the alliance, and, the official believed, would give pause to the extremists in Japan.

GREW

762.9411/77 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance—Extract]

TOKYO, October 2, 1940—7 p. m.

[Received October 2—2:10 p. m.⁹]

929. Some members of the Diplomatic Corps in Tokyo, in informal conversations with Mr. Ohashi, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon asking what advantage Japan expected to gain from the pact, have been told that it was specifically directed against the United States. Mr. Ohashi has told these persons that ever since 1924, the date on which Japanese exclusion was embodied in the American immigration laws,^{9a} the United States has been hampering Japan in its inevitable necessity for expansion. Mr. Ohashi pointed out that it was only natural that Japan should secure as allies countries opposed to the present world order and that world totalitarianism would effectively wipe out the nearly bankrupt Anglo-Saxon democracies.

GREW

762.9411/99 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, October 5, 1940—10 p. m.

[Received October 5—5:31 p. m.]

948. The Foreign Minister asked me to come this afternoon to his private residence informally and alone "for a cup of tea" and for two hours and a quarter he talked on a variety of subjects. His discourse was largely of a historical and philosophical nature but outstanding points will be reported in separate telegrams tonight and tomorrow.¹⁰ At the commencement of the talk Mr. Matsuoka com-

⁹ Telegram in two sections.

^{9a} Sec. 13 (c) of act approved May 26, 1924; 43 Stat. 153.

¹⁰ Not printed.

municated orally in English and handed to me the Japanese text of "a statement to the United States concerning the three-power alliance" of which our translation follows.

"A statement to the United States concerning the three-power alliance.

The recent three-power alliance is not aimed at any particular country. If Japan, Germany and Italy unite, the probability of being attacked by another country is decreased, the spreading of world disorder may be prevented, and in this sense the alliance contributes to world peace. By this treaty Japan has further clarified its intention to establish a new order in greater East Asia including the South Seas.

The construction of a new order in East Asia means the construction of a new order under which Japan establishes the relationship of common existence and mutual prosperity with the peoples of each and every land in greater East Asia, that is East Asia including the South Seas. In a position of equality with every other country, Japan may freely carry on enterprises, trade and emigration in and to each and every land in greater East Asia and thereby be enabled to solve its population problem. This does not mean these areas are to be exploited and conquered, nor does it mean these areas are to be closed to the trade and enterprises of other countries. Japan has long tried to solve its population problem through emigration, trade and enterprises abroad, but the various countries of Europe and America have nullified Japan's reasonable and peaceful efforts concerning its population problem since those countries have turned back Japanese immigrants to their great territories and have obstructed trade and enterprise.

In the greater East Asia sphere of mutual prosperity, the endeavor is being made to abolish such unnatural restrictions on the free activities of mankind. It is expected that this endeavor will be accomplished insofar as possible through peaceful means and with the least possible undesirable change in the *status quo*.

Japan's policy toward China forms an important part of the above endeavor. However, owing to the lack of understanding on the part of some Chinese people and to the attitude taken by England and the United States in not recognizing Manchukuo, which gave rise to Chiang Kai-shek's hope of recovering Manchukuo, an unfortunate clash of arms broke out. This clash is, in fact, war and therefore it is impossible for the Japanese Army during its activities to avoid affecting rights and interests of the powers in China. This is particularly true when such rights and interests hinder the prosecution of Japan's war against China. Accordingly, if the effects upon these rights and interests are to be brought to an end, it is most desirable to encourage and promote peace between Japan and China. This fact notwithstanding the powers are not only checking Japan's actions through legalistic arguments and treaty pronouncements which have become inapplicable because of changing conditions, but are also oppressing Japan through such means as restriction on the exportation of important commodities to Japan and at the same time are giving positive aid to Japan's enemy, the Chiang Kai-shek regime. These actions spring from hidden motives to keep the Orient under condi-

tions of disorder as long as possible and to consume Japan's national strength. We must believe that these actions are not for the love of peace and are not for the purpose of protecting rights and interests. Japan concluded a defensive alliance with Germany and Italy for no other purpose than to resist such pressure from the powers, and there is not the slightest intention to proceed to attack another country. If the United States understands the aforementioned conditions and circumstances and Japan's intentions with regard to the establishment of a new order in East Asia, there will be no change whatever in the relationship between Japan and the United States following the conclusion of this treaty. Japan is determined to settle all pending questions and to promote and foster friendship with the United States."

GREW

762.9411/133 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

BERLIN, October 26, 1940—1 p.m.

[Received 1:50 p.m.]

4466. The first indication of action to implement the Axis pact with Japan has been the sending of a commission, said to be composed of experts on naval affairs, to assist the Japanese to construct in Japanese islands air and naval fuel bases. The despatch of any further military aid to Japan by Germany, however, is not as yet indicated.

MORRIS

Radio Address by President Roosevelt, December 29, 1940^{10a}

This is not a fireside chat on war. It is a talk on national security; because the nub of the whole purpose of your President is to keep you now, and your children later, and your grandchildren much later, out of a last-ditch war for the preservation of American independence and all of the things that American independence means to you and to me and to ours.

Tonight, in the presence of a world crisis, my mind goes back eight years ago to a night in the midst of a domestic crisis. It was a time when the wheels of American industry were grinding to a full stop, when the whole banking system of our country had ceased to function.

I well remember that while I sat in my study in the White House, preparing to talk with the people of the United States, I had before

^{10a} Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, January 4, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 80), p. 3.

my eyes the picture of all those Americans with whom I was talking. I saw the workmen in the mills, the mines, the factories; the girl behind the counter; the small shopkeeper; the farmer doing his spring plowing; the widows and the old men wondering about their life's savings.

I tried to convey to the great mass of American people what the banking crisis meant to them in their daily lives.

Tonight, I want to do the same thing, with the same people, in this new crisis which faces America.

We met the issue of 1933 with courage and realism.

We face this new crisis—this new threat to the security of our Nation—with the same courage and realism.

Never before since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our American civilization been in such danger as now.

For, on September 27, 1940, by an agreement signed in Berlin, three powerful nations, two in Europe and one in Asia, joined themselves together in the threat that if the United States interfered with or blocked the expansion program of these three nations—a program aimed at world control—they would unite in ultimate action against the United States.

The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country, but also to enslave the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world.

Three weeks ago their leader stated, "There are two worlds that stand opposed to each other." Then in defiant reply to his opponents, he said this: "Others are correct when they say: 'With this world we cannot ever reconcile ourselves.' . . . I can beat any other power in the world." So said the leader of the Nazis.

In other words, the Axis not merely admits but proclaims that there can be no ultimate peace between their philosophy of government and our philosophy of government.

In view of the nature of this undeniable threat, it can be asserted, properly and categorically, that the United States has no right or reason to encourage talk of peace until the day shall come when there is a clear intention on the part of the aggressor nations to abandon all thought of dominating or conquering the world.

At this moment, the forces of the states that are leagued against all peoples who live in freedom are being held away from our shores. The Germans and Italians are being blocked on the other side of the Atlantic by the British, and by the Greeks, and by thousands of soldiers and sailors who were able to escape from subjugated countries. The Japanese are being engaged in Asia by the Chinese in another great defense.

In the Pacific is our fleet.

Some of our people like to believe that wars in Europe and in Asia are of no concern to us. But it is a matter of most vital concern to us that European and Asiatic war-makers should not gain control of the oceans which lead to this hemisphere.

One hundred and seventeen years ago the Monroe Doctrine was conceived by our Government as a measure of defense in the face of a threat against this hemisphere by an alliance in continental Europe. Thereafter, we stood on guard in the Atlantic, with the British as neighbors. There was no treaty. There was no "unwritten agreement".

Yet, there was the feeling, proven correct by history, that we as neighbors could settle any disputes in peaceful fashion. The fact is that during the whole of this time the Western Hemisphere has remained free from aggression from Europe or from Asia.

Does anyone seriously believe that we need to fear attack while a free Britain remains our most peaceful naval neighbor in the Atlantic? Does anyone seriously believe, on the other hand, that we could rest easy if the Axis powers were our neighbors there?

If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia, and the high seas—and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us in the Americas would be living at the point of a gun—a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military.

We should enter upon a new and terrible era in which the whole world, our hemisphere included, would be run by threats of brute force. To survive in such a world, we would have to convert ourselves permanently into a militaristic power on the basis of war economy.

Some of us like to believe that even if Great Britain falls, we are still safe, because of the broad expanse of the Atlantic and of the Pacific.

But the width of these oceans is not what it was in the days of clipper ships. At one point between Africa and Brazil the distance is less than from Washington to Denver—five hours for the latest type of bomber. And at the north of the Pacific Ocean, America and Asia almost touch each other.

Even today we have planes which could fly from the British Isles to New England and back without refueling. And the range of the modern bomber is ever being increased.

During the past week many people in all parts of the Nation have told me what they wanted me to say tonight. Almost all of them expressed a courageous desire to hear the plain truth about

the gravity of the situation. One telegram, however, expressed the attitude of the small minority who want to see no evil and hear no evil, even though they know in their hearts that evil exists. That telegram begged me not to tell again of the ease with which our American cities could be bombed by any hostile power which had gained bases in this Western Hemisphere. The gist of that telegram was: "Please, Mr. President, don't frighten us by telling us the facts."

Frankly and definitely there is danger ahead—danger against which we must prepare. But we well know that we cannot escape danger, or the fear of it, by crawling into bed and pulling the covers over our heads.

Some nations of Europe were bound by solemn non-intervention pacts with Germany. Other nations were assured by Germany that they need never fear invasion. Non-intervention pact or not, the fact remains that they were attacked, overrun, and thrown into the modern form of slavery at an hour's notice or even without any notice at all. As an exiled leader of one of these nations said to me the other day: "The notice was a minus quantity. It was given to my government two hours after German troops had poured into my country in a hundred places."

The fate of these nations tells us what it means to live at the point of a Nazi gun.

The Nazis have justified such actions by various pious frauds. One of these frauds is the claim that they are occupying a nation for the purpose of "restoring order". Another is that they are occupying or controlling a nation on the excuse that they are "protecting it" against the aggression of somebody else.

For example, Germany has said that she was occupying Belgium to save the Belgians from the British. Would she hesitate to say to any South American country, "We are occupying you to protect you from aggression by the United States"?

Belgium today is being used as an invasion base against Britain, now fighting for its life. Any South American country, in Nazi hands, would always constitute a jumping-off place for German attack on any one of the other republics of this hemisphere.

Analyze for yourselves the future of two other places even nearer to Germany if the Nazis won. Could Ireland hold out? Would Irish freedom be permitted as an amazing exception in an unfree world? Or the islands of the Azores which still fly the flag of Portugal after five centuries? We think of Hawaii as an outpost of defense in the Pacific. Yet, the Azores are closer to our shores in the Atlantic than Hawaii is on the other side.

There are those who say that the Axis powers would never have any desire to attack the Western Hemisphere. This is the same dangerous

form of wishful thinking which has destroyed the powers of resistance of so many conquered peoples. The plain facts are that the Nazis have proclaimed, time and again, that all other races are their inferiors and therefore subject to their orders. And most important of all, the vast resources and wealth of this hemisphere constitute the most tempting loot in all the world.

Let us no longer blind ourselves to the undeniable fact that the evil forces which have crushed and undermined and corrupted so many others are already within our own gates. Your Government knows much about them and every day is ferreting them out.

Their secret emissaries are active in our own and neighboring countries. They seek to stir up suspicion and dissension to cause internal strife. They try to turn capital against labor and vice versa. They try to reawaken long slumbering racial and religious enmities which should have no place in this country. They are active in every group that promotes intolerance. They exploit for their own ends our natural abhorrence of war. These trouble-breeders have but one purpose. It is to divide our people into hostile groups and to destroy our unity and shatter our will to defend ourselves.

There are also American citizens, many of them in high places, who, unwittingly in most cases, are aiding and abetting the work of these agents. I do not charge these American citizens with being foreign agents. But I do charge them with doing exactly the kind of work that the dictators want done in the United States.

These people not only believe that we can save our own skins by shutting our eyes to the fate of other nations. Some of them go much further than that. They say that we can and should become the friends and even the partners of the Axis powers. Some of them even suggest that we should imitate the methods of the dictatorships. Americans never can and never will do that.

The experience of the past two years has proven beyond doubt that no nation can appease the Nazis. No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it. There can be no appeasement with ruthlessness. There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb. We know now that a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender.

Even the people of Italy have been forced to become accomplices of the Nazis; but at this moment they do not know how soon they will be embraced to death by their allies.

The American appeasers ignore the warning to be found in the fate of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and France. They tell you that the Axis powers are going to win anyway; that all this bloodshed in the world could be saved; and that the United States might just as well throw its

influence into the scale of a dictated peace, and get the best out of it that we can.

They call it a "negotiated peace". Nonsense! Is it a negotiated peace if a gang of outlaws surrounds your community and on threat of extermination makes you pay tribute to save your own skins?

Such a dictated peace would be no peace at all. It would be only another armistice, leading to the most gigantic armament race and the most devastating trade wars in history. And in these contests the Americas would offer the only real resistance to the Axis powers.

With all their vaunted efficiency and parade of pious purpose in this war, there are still in their background the concentration camp and the servants of God in chains.

The history of recent years proves that shootings and chains and concentration camps are not simply the transient tools but the very altars of modern dictatorships. They may talk of a "new order" in the world, but what they have in mind is but a revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny. In that there is no liberty, no religion, no hope.

The proposed "new order" is the very opposite of a United States of Europe or a United States of Asia. It is not a government based upon the consent of the governed. It is not a union of ordinary, self-respecting men and women to protect themselves and their freedom and their dignity from oppression. It is an unholy alliance of power and pelf to dominate and enslave the human race.

The British people are conducting an active war against this unholy alliance. Our own future security is greatly dependent on the outcome of that fight. Our ability to "keep out of war" is going to be affected by that outcome.

Thinking in terms of today and tomorrow, I make the direct statement to the American people that there is far less chance of the United States getting into war if we do all we can now to support the nations defending themselves against attack by the Axis than if we acquiesce in their defeat, submit tamely to an Axis victory, and wait our turn to be the object of attack in another war later on.

If we are to be completely honest with ourselves, we must admit there is risk in any course we may take. But I deeply believe that the great majority of our people agree that the course that I advocate involves the least risk now and the greatest hope for world peace in the future.

The people of Europe who are defending themselves do not ask us to do their fighting. They ask us for the implements of war, the planes, the tanks, the guns, the freighters, which will enable them to fight for their liberty and our security. Emphatically we must get these weapons to them in sufficient volume and quickly enough, so

that we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of war which others have had to endure.

Let not defeatists tell us that it is too late. It will never be earlier. Tomorrow will be later than today.

Certain facts are self-evident.

In a military sense Great Britain and the British Empire are today the spearhead of resistance to world conquest. They are putting up a fight which will live forever in the story of human gallantry.

There is no demand for sending an American Expeditionary Force outside our own borders. There is no intention by any member of your Government to send such a force. You can, therefore, nail any talk about sending armies to Europe as a deliberate untruth.

Our national policy is not directed toward war. Its sole purpose is to keep war away from our country and our people.

Democracy's fight against world conquest is being greatly aided, and must be more greatly aided, by the rearmament of the United States and by sending every ounce and every ton of munitions and supplies that we can possibly spare to help the defenders who are in the front lines. It is no more unneutral for us to do that than it is for Sweden, Russia, and other nations near Germany to send steel and ore and oil and other war materials into Germany every day.

We are planning our own defense with the utmost urgency; and in its vast scale we must integrate the war needs of Britain and the other free nations resisting aggression.

This is not a matter of sentiment or of controversial personal opinion. It is a matter of realistic military policy, based on the advice of our military experts who are in close touch with existing warfare. These military and naval experts and the members of the Congress and the administration have a single-minded purpose—the defense of the United States.

This Nation is making a great effort to produce everything that is necessary in this emergency—and with all possible speed. This great effort requires great sacrifice.

I would ask no one to defend a democracy which in turn would not defend everyone in the Nation against want and privation. The strength of this Nation shall not be diluted by the failure of the Government to protect the economic well-being of all citizens.

If our capacity to produce is limited by machines, it must ever be remembered that these machines are operated by the skill and the stamina of the workers. As the Government is determined to protect the rights of workers, so the Nation has a right to expect that the men who man the machines will discharge their full responsibilities to the urgent needs of defense.

The worker possesses the same human dignity and is entitled to the same security of position as the engineer or manager or owner.

For the workers provide the human power that turns out the destroyers, the airplanes, and the tanks.

The Nation expects our defense industries to continue operation without interruption by strikes or lock-outs. It expects and insists that management and workers will reconcile their differences by voluntary or legal means, to continue to produce the supplies that are so sorely needed.

And on the economic side of our great defense program, we are, as you know, bending every effort to maintain stability of prices and with that the stability of the cost of living.

Nine days ago I announced the setting up of a more effective organization to direct our gigantic efforts to increase the production of munitions. The appropriation of vast sums of money and a well-coordinated executive direction of our defense efforts are not in themselves enough. Guns, planes, and ships have to be built in the factories and arsenals of America. They have to be produced by workers and managers and engineers with the aid of machines, which in turn have to be built by hundreds of thousands of workers throughout the land.

In this great work there has been splendid cooperation between the Government and industry and labor.

American industrial genius, unmatched throughout the world in the solution of production problems, has been called upon to bring its resources and talents into action. Manufacturers of watches, of farm implements, linotypes, cash registers, automobiles, sewing machines, lawn mowers, and locomotives are now making fuses, bomb-packing crates, telescope mounts, shells, pistols, and tanks.

But all our present efforts are not enough. We must have more ships, more guns, more planes—more of everything. This can only be accomplished if we discard the notion of “business as usual”. This job cannot be done merely by superimposing on the existing productive facilities the added requirements for defense.

Our defense efforts must not be blocked by those who fear the future consequences of surplus plant capacity. The possible consequences of failure of our defense efforts now are much more to be feared.

After the present needs of our defense are past, a proper handling of the country’s peacetime needs will require all of the new productive capacity—if not more.

No pessimistic policy about the future of America shall delay the immediate expansion of those industries essential to defense.

I want to make it clear that it is the purpose of the Nation to build now with all possible speed every machine and arsenal and factory that we need to manufacture our defense material. We have the men, the skill, the wealth, and above all, the will.

I am confident that if and when production of consumer or luxury goods in certain industries requires the use of machines and raw materials essential for defense purposes, then such production must yield to our primary and compelling purpose.

I appeal to the owners of plants, to the managers, to the workers, to our own Government employees, to put every ounce of effort into producing these munitions swiftly and without stint. And with this appeal I give you the pledge that all of us who are officers of your Government will devote ourselves to the same whole-hearted extent to the great task which lies ahead.

As planes and ships and guns and shells are produced, your Government, with its defense experts, can then determine how best to use them to defend this hemisphere. The decision as to how much shall be sent abroad and how much shall remain at home must be made on the basis of our over-all military necessities.

We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice, as we would show were we at war.

We have furnished the British great material support and we will furnish far more in the future.

There will be no "bottlenecks" in our determination to aid Great Britain. No dictator, no combination of dictators, will weaken that determination by threats of how they will construe that determination.

The British have received invaluable military support from the heroic Greek Army and from the forces of all the governments in exile. Their strength is growing. It is the strength of men and women who value their freedom more highly than they value their lives.

I believe that the Axis powers are not going to win this war. I base that belief on the latest and best information.

We have no excuse for defeatism. We have every good reason for hope—hope for peace, hope for the defense of our civilization and for the building of a better civilization in the future.

I have the profound conviction that the American people are now determined to put forth a mightier effort than they have ever yet made to increase our production of all the implements of defense, to meet the threat to our democratic faith.

As President of the United States I call for that national effort. I call for it in the name of this Nation which we love and honor and which we are privileged and proud to serve. I call upon our people with absolute confidence that our common cause will greatly succeed.

762.94/492 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Substance]

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1941—8 p. m.

200. Department has received following information from the Embassy in Germany with regard to Matsuoka's visit to Berlin:

The German Government hopes that, as result of visit of Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan will be completely bound to the Axis. An impressive display is to be made in order to convince the Minister of the irresistible force of Germany's military machine and of the absolute assurance of victory over Britain. Germany may also have new military or political successes in Greece or Yugoslavia to show him. Not very long ago a prominent German stated privately that although the Government was highly desirous of obtaining Japan's adherence to Axis, it feared lest advantage might be taken of the alliance by the Japanese to attempt movement of some extreme sort against Britain in the Pacific and get the United States into the war. The same man said that the Axis wants Japan to play the part of a threat which would prevent the United States from giving aid to the British, including all-out naval assistance, but which would stop short of any action that would bring the United States into the war.

If foregoing information is correct, the appearances are that German efforts will be directed toward convincing Japanese Minister that Britain will soon be decisively defeated or disabled and that then Germany will give effective support, either in political or military way, if necessary, to Japan's claims. Matsuoka will certainly discuss Soviet Union's attitude toward Japan. Our Chargé in Germany has not directly heard any speculation in Berlin, however, as to whether German Government is ready to bring pressure to bear on the Soviets to bring the Russians to abandon or modify their anti-Japanese policies, nor has he personally heard it speculated that Germany will be asked to bring the said pressure. The Foreign Office had hoped that arrival of the Japanese Minister in Berlin would take place before passage of our Lend-Lease Bill,²¹ and that a declaration might be made likely to affect the measures taken under that act. It seems highly probable that the Germans are apprehensive that new measures may be taken in the United States or continued statements may be made either in the United States or in Britain before Matsuoka arrives that may deter him and Japanese Government from allying Japan more closely with Axis. The Foreign Minister's absence from Japan is taken generally to be silent

²¹ H. R. 1776, approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

assurance that Japanese Government will not undertake any provocative action while he is away. His visit to Rome besides being one of courtesy is also to enable him to gain personal impression of Italian people's morale and of Italy's military strength. Observers in Germany have also in mind the possibility that in view of the resolute attitude of the United States toward aggression by totalitarian powers the Japanese Foreign Minister may be designing to evolve a formula for extricating Japan from the folly of its adherence to the Tripartite Pact.

WELLES

762.94/485 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Substance]

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1941—9 p. m.

201. The Department has been informed by the American Ambassador in the U. S. S. R. that when Matsuoka was in Moscow the chiefs of the German and Italian diplomatic missions there as well as those of the powers associated with the Axis were received by him on March 24. The substance of his remarks to them is as follows:

1. Japan was with the Axis one hundred per cent.

2. He was going to Rome and Berlin in order to confer with Japan's allies, for no nation acted by itself under conditions as they exist, each nation acts as part of a bloc; and on his return trip here the character of his visit would rest wholly upon the result which his talks in Rome and Berlin would have. The Minister then stated categorically that he did not intend to go anywhere except to Rome and Berlin. (This statement is an interesting contrast to the one he made to the American Ambassador that it was his desire and intention to visit several of the occupied capitals and Vichy.)

3. Japan had entered into the tripartite pact because of her desire for peace, not for the making of war, and specifically because Japan wished to prevent the entry of the United States into the war. Matsuoka said he was convinced that the United States would not join the war, but in the contrary event, Japan would come in likewise on the side of her allies.

4. Matsuoka stated that he was informed that production in the United States could not be substantially increased before June of this year and that the United States would not be in a position to render Britain effective help before the end of the year. By that time Britain will have been defeated, though an empire the size of Britain could not, of course, collapse in a couple of days.

5. After Britain's collapse there would be no continuation of the struggle by the United States, but that country would withdraw and would give its attention to its own affairs and interests. The Minister said that it was chimerical to talk about the war's being continued by the United States with the aid of the British Fleet. He added that

to his personal knowledge it was an illusion to see any possibility of Britain's continuing to carry on the war by transferring the seat of government to Canada or some other place.

When Matsuoka had finished speaking he was asked by the Bulgarian Minister for an expression of his views on the Balkan situation. The Japanese Minister replied that it was his belief that Greece would be persuaded by Italy and Germany to conclude peace for the reason that Yugoslavia is now becoming a member of the tripartite, and that he was unable to think that Greece would continue to wage a hopeless contest with Italy and Germany. Greece could not expect to receive sufficient effective help from Great Britain, in his opinion, to make it possible for Greece to continue to resist, and added, also as his opinion, that the Greeks would think of their own best interests as they were intelligent. He also said that then peace would be assured in the Balkans—as Turkey would be unable to do anything—once Greece had made peace.

The Rumanian Minister made the observation on this point that everything, it seemed to him, hinged upon how Greece would play her cards, and on the conditions of peace which might be offered by Germany. Matsuoka answered that he could state definitely and of his own knowledge that Germany had no desire to force the issue and would do the utmost to convince the Greeks by diplomatic means that to make peace was in their own interest.

WELLES

762.94/519 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

Moscow, April 11, 1941—5 p. m.

[Received 9:50 p. m.¹²]

738. This afternoon I called on Matsuoka and, with reference to the conversation I had with him on April 8, I read to him the following set of excerpts from the report I had drawn up of what he had said in that conversation:

(1) Mr. Matsuoka had made no commitments either to Berlin or to Rome.

(2) Japan's reason for entering the tripartite pact was preservation of the peace.

(3) Japan was not under an obligation to go to war with the United States, but the situation might not be the same were the United States to declare war on Germany.

(4) The Japanese Minister does not expect a declaration of war on the United States by Germany, but if that action does take place, the

¹² Telegram in two sections.

Minister hopes that the United States will not make any move in the Pacific until Japan shall have made her position clear.

(5) Japan's obligations under the tripartite pact will be adhered to by that Government.

(6) Both Ribbentrop and Hitler had expressed to the Minister their desire that the sphere of war be limited, and had stated to him that involvement in a war with the United States was not their desire.

(7) The suggestion had been made to the Minister by Ribbentrop and Hitler that steps be taken by him leading to the discouragement of anti-American agitation in Japan.

(8) All three men had expressed desire for peace.

(9) Hitler's personal impression on the Minister had been favorable.

(10) Admiration for the way the British were fighting was expressed by Ribbentrop.

(11) Hitler would not attempt an invasion of Britain unless it became necessary, as his expectation was that he would win the war by aerial and submarine activities against that country.

(12) Mr. Matsuoka was unable to see any possibility that Britain could drive a wedge between Italy and Germany, Italy being in large measure already under German control.

(13) Russian demands had been so excessive that Mr. Matsuoka had not made any real progress in his talks with the Russians.

(14) It was possible for the United States to be indifferent to the U. S. S. R., but Japan's alternatives were either to reach an agreement or to become embroiled.

(15) The Minister desired that the war in China be terminated, and he had suggested that President Roosevelt could bring this about if he indicated to General Chiang Kai-shek that further assistance would not be forthcoming from the United States should the latter refuse a just and honorable peace.

(16) The Minister had expressed his desire for trust in him by President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State.

Matsuoka categorically indicated his approval as I read each statement. The only times he commented was when I read items (3), (8), (10), and (15), of which he gave the following amplifications.

(a) Under item (3) Mr. Matsuoka said that in his view Japan is obligated under the tripartite pact to go to war with the United States if the latter should declare war on Germany, but that Japan would first confer with Germany.

(b) Under item (8) the Minister said that while they had expressed their desire for peace, Ribbentrop and Hitler had left him in no doubt that at the present time there was no possibility for peace and that several times Hitler had said to him emphatically that unless Britain capitulated there would be no peace.

(c) Under item (10) he added that in Ribbentrop's opinion, as expressed to him, Britain at the present moment was in a stronger position defensively than she had been when the war started.

(d) Under item (15) he expanded what he had previously said by stating that peace between China and Japan could come only as the result of direct negotiation between them; an intermediary would not be accepted by the Japanese public.

761.9411/76 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State*Tokyo, April 14, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received April 14—7:30 a. m.]

551. The following statement by Prime Minister Konoye was issued by the Board of Information last night:

"The Japanese Government some time ago made public both at home and abroad their unalterable determination, by concluding the tripartite pact among Japan, Germany and Italy to prevent a worldwide spread of war and to secure the peace of greater East Asia with that pact as the axis of the country's foreign policy. It goes without saying that, in order to realize such a purpose, it is essential that Japan and the Soviet Union, which are neighbors in the Far East, should strengthen their peaceful and friendly relation on a lasting basis, reinforcing thereby the spirit of the said pact of alliance. With this conviction, the Government has for some time been conducting negotiations with the Soviet Government with a view to bringing about a fundamental adjustment of Japan's relation with the Soviet Union. With the present visit to Moscow of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, as a turning point, the conversations between the two Governments have made rapid progress, resulting in the signature today, April 13, of the pact of neutrality between the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, and Ambassador Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, and the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vyacheslav Molotov, which has just been announced. At the same time the joint declaration by the two countries has been issued through which Japan respects the territorial integrity and inviolability of the People's Republic of Mongolia and the Soviet Union respects the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo, thereby expecting to bring tranquility to the Manchukuo-Soviet and Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian borders.

It is my belief that the present pact has an epoch-making significance in the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union and that it will greatly contribute toward the promotion of world peace. I have no doubt that the pact will serve as a basis for rapid solution in a concrete manner of various pending questions between the two countries."

GREW

761.9411/134

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on April 14, 1941

In reply to inquiries at his press conference today, the Secretary of State made the following statement:

"The significance of the pact between the Soviet Union and Japan relating to neutrality, as reported in the press today, could be overestimated. The agreement would seem to be descriptive of a situation which has in effect existed between the two countries for some time past. It therefore comes as no surprise, although there has existed doubt whether the two Governments would or would not agree to say it in writing. The policy of this Government, of course, remains unchanged."