NICARAGUA

EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO PRESERVE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN NICARAGUA

817.00/3383a: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to the American Missions in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Salvador

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1926—7 p.m.

On October 25, General Chamorro seized the fortress dominating Managua and informed the American Minister that it was his express purpose to drive the Liberals from the cabinet and restore the Conservative Party to the power which it enjoyed before the last election. He stated that he wished Solorzano to remain President and himself to be appointed Minister of War and to have complete control of all arms. The American Minister immediately informed him that any Government assuming power by force would not be recognized by the Government of the United States. Chamorro forced Solorzano to sign a joint document agreeing (1) that the coalition pacts should be broken and be considered as of no value henceforth; (2) that the Government be entirely Conservative; (3) that full amnesty be granted to all participants in his military operations; (4) that the Government pay Chamorro 10,000 cordobas for the expenses of his uprising besides paying the troops; (5) that Chamorro be made General in Chief of the Army. Chamorro thus gained complete control. The middle of November he sent 1200 men to Leon and stated that they would be held there until Vice President Sacasa who was then in hiding should resign and he intimated that if milder means could not produce Sacasa’s resignation sterner measures might be adopted toward relatives and friends of the Vice President. Sacasa escaped and is now in the United States.

Chamorro was elected Senator on January 3, and states his intention of being elected first designado on January 11, whereupon he will cause Solorzano to resign and through intimidation will keep Sacasa from returning to the country and he will thus be President.

The Legation in Managua has been instructed to inform Chamorro that the United States would not recognize any Government headed by him since such a government would be founded on a coup d’etat

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and hence is debarred of recognition under the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923. The Nicaraguan Minister in Washington has also been definitely told that Chamorro will not be recognized if he assumes the presidency and it is hoped that this categoric statement made both here and in Managua may prove effective in preventing his taking this step. The Department feels that the signatories of the 1923 Treaty should make clear to Chamorro their position in the matter and it hopes that the Government to which you are accredited will instruct its representative in Managua by telegraph to tell Chamorro immediately that he will not be recognized by it should he assume the presidency during the present presidential term of office. This statement should be made before January 11, and should also be made public. The Legation at Managua reports on January 5, that Chamorro maintains that he can obtain recognition from the other Central American States.

KELLOGG

817.00/3384: Telegram

The Chargé in Salvador (Engert) to the Secretary of State

SAN SALVADOR, January 8, 1926—7 p. m.

[Received January 9—2:55 p. m.]

5. Department’s circular of January 7, 7 p. m. At a conference of the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the former pointed out that it was difficult for him to comply with the Department’s suggestion as the Salvadoran Chargé d’Affaires, Managua, was here on leave of absence and there was no one to whom such instructions could be sent. I then observed that in such cases it was not unusual for Foreign Office to communicate direct with Foreign Office and that in view of the urgency I hoped that course would be adopted in this instance. After some hesitation because he feared that the Salvadoran message would thereby receive greater prominence than messages, if any, from the other Central American States, the President agreed and in my presence instructed the Foreign Minister to telegraph the Nicaraguan Government tonight that the Salvadoran authorities would not recognize Chamorro if he should assume the Presidency during the present presidential term. A statement will be given to the press tomorrow or Monday.

Repeate to Managua.

ENGERT


*Telegram not printed.

*January 11.
817.00/3385: Telegram

The Minister in Guatemala (Geissler) to the Secretary of State

GUATEMALA, January 9, 1926—4 p. m.

[Received January 10—12:17 a. m.]

1. The President of Guatemala expressed much gratification at Department's January 7, 4 p. m. [7 p. m.?], saying that it will strengthen prestige of Washington treaties. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the diplomatic representative of Guatemala in Managua has been instructed by telegraph in harmony with the suggestion of the Department and that a statement will be published tonight.

Repeated to Central American Missions.

GEISSLER

817.00/3387: Telegram

The Minister in Honduras (Summerlin) to the Secretary of State

TEGUCIGALPA, January 10, 1926—10 a. m.

[Received 10:15 p. m.]

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs states that the Government of Honduras is in entire accord with the Department in regard to the strict observance of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923 and that its representative at Managua has been instructed by telegraph to make representations as indicated in the Department's urgent circular telegram of January 7, 7 p. m., but not to make public this declaration at the present time.

On account of menacing revolutionary movements from Salvador and Guatemala it appears that the authorities of Honduras are most anxious to avoid any act which might [tend] to alienate Nicaraguan sympathy and support.

Repeated to Managua.

SUMMERLIN

817.00/3389: Telegram

The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State

MANAGUA, January 11, 1926—10 a. m.

[Received 2:17 p. m.]

9. Contending that he alone can dominate the present situation in Nicaragua and reasserting his determination to conduct such a government that the United States will be forced to recognize him, only an eleventh-hour change can prevent Chamorro from carrying out
his expressed plans of “assuming the Presidency” by Wednesday the 13th at the latest and thus forcing nonrecognition. The plan is to impeach Sacasa today; Congress to elect Chamorro designado tomorrow; Chamorro to secure Solorzano’s resignation Wednesday by force if necessary and assume power. When this happens my further presence here will be out of the question and the Department’s instructions are solicited as to plans for the care of the Legation...

Eberhardt

817.00/3380: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt)

Washington, January 12, 1926—4 p. m.

4. Your 9, January 11, 10 a. m.

Should Chamorro nevertheless assume the presidency there is no reason for you to leave. Your presence in Managua will be necessary to protect American interests. The Minister was not withdrawn from Honduras on account of revolution and provisional government there. Our Minister is at present at Quito despite the fact that the régime now functioning there is not recognized by this Government. During the tenure of office of the two Military Juntas in Chile the American Ambassador remained in Santiago.

Should Chamorro assume office you will of course make it clear that this Government does not recognize him as President nor can it accord recognition to his Government. You will then address only personal letters and not official communications to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. They should be addressed to him personally omitting any title of office. Your representations should be confined strictly to protection of American interests. Passports issued by the new régime should not be visaed. This Government will not ask for exequatur for American consuls in Nicaragua under the new régime nor will it accord exequatur to consuls of the new régime in this country nor will it receive a new Minister accredited by the new authorities.

Kellogg

* See *ibid.*, pp. 64 ff.
* See *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 581 ff.
817.00/3391: Telegram

The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State

MANAGUA, January 13, 1926—10 a.m.
[Received 11:43 a.m.]

10. Congress yesterday declared the Vice Presidency vacant and sentenced Sacasa to two years' banishment from Nicaragua.

Eberhardt

817.00/3395: Telegram

The Minister in Costa Rica (Davis) to the Secretary of State

SAN JOSÉ, January 15, 1926—10 a.m.
[Received 2:15 p.m.]

6. Department's circular telegram dated January 7, 7 p.m. President Jimenez has definitely informed the Nicaraguan Chargé d'Affaires in Costa Rica that the Costa Rican Government will not recognize Chamorro should he assume the Presidency of Nicaragua. This decision has been made public. Repeated to Central American Missions.

Davis

817.00/3416: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt)

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1926—3 p.m.

11. Your 18, October [January] 20, 5 p.m. 9 Señor Castrillo addressed a formal note to the Secretary of State on January 19, 9 informing him that Solorzano having resigned Chamorro took charge of the executive power on January 17. I sent him the following informal reply today:

“Dear Doctor Castrillo:
In your communication of the 19th instant addressed to the Secretary of State you advise that President Solorzano having resigned his office General Emilio Chamorro took charge of the executive power on January 17.
The hope expressed in your letter that the relations which have been close and cordial for so many years between Nicaragua and the United States will continue and grow stronger has been noted with pleasure. The Government and people of the United States have

9 Not printed.
9 Note not printed; Dr. Salvador Castrillo was Nicaraguan Minister in the United States.
feelings of sincerest friendship for Nicaragua and the people of Nicaragua, and the Government of the United States will of course continue to maintain the most friendly relations with the people of Nicaragua. This Government has felt privileged to be able to be of assistance in the past at their request not only to Nicaragua but to all the countries of Central America more especially during the Conference on Central American Affairs which resulted in the signing of a General Treaty of Peace and Amity on February 7, 1923, between the five Republics of Central America. The object of the Central American countries, with which the United States was heartily in accord, was to promote constitutional government and orderly procedure in Central America and those Governments agreed upon a joint course of action with regard to the non-recognition of governments coming into office through coup d'état or revolution. The United States has adopted the principles of that Treaty as its policy in the future recognition of Central American Governments as it feels that by so doing it can best show its friendly disposition towards and its desire to be helpful to the Republics of Central America.

It is therefore with regret that I have to inform you that the Government of the United States has not recognized and will not recognize as the Government of Nicaragua the régime now headed by General Chamorro, as the latter was duly advised on several occasions by the American Minister after General Chamorro had taken charge of the citadel at Managua on October 25th last. This action is, I am happy to learn, in accord with that taken by all the Governments that signed with Nicaragua the Treaty of 1923.

I am, my dear Doctor Castrillo, Very sincerely yours, Signed
Frank B. Kellogg.”

You will please send a copy of this in an informal note to Señor Gutierrez Navas saying that this represents the attitude and policy of this Government toward the present régime in Nicaragua. After your letter is delivered to Señor Gutierrez you may make a copy of my letter to Señor Castrillo public, telegraphing the Department when this is done in order that it may likewise be released to the press here.

\[\text{Kellogg}\]

817.2318/ : Telegram

The Chargé in Costa Rica (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

\[\text{San José, May 5, 1926—10 p. m.} \]
\[\text{[Received May 6—2:22 a.m.]} \]

23. At the request of Minister for Foreign Affairs I called at Foreign Office tonight. He formally advised me that Cardenas, former Nicaraguan Chargé d’Affaires, today requested permission of President Jimenez to permit the passage of Nicaraguan troops through Costa

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\(^{10}\) Nicaraguan Minister for Foreign Affairs.

\(^{11}\) Given to the Nicaraguan press January 25.
Rican territory in Colorado en route to Bluefields. This request was
denied. Cardenas then requested permission to send unarmed Nica-
raguan troops through the same territory, arms to be sent later over
the same route. This request was also denied.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also formally advised me that the
Costa Rican Government was determined to prevent invasion of Costa
Rican territory by Nicaraguan troops at all cost.

He intimated that the Government of Costa Rica was deeply in-
terested in knowing what measures the Government of the United
States might adopt in order to prevent invasion of Costa Rican terri-

tory and probable bloodshed. He intimated further that presence of
an American war vessel in the neighborhood of Colorado Bar might
prevent the invasion of Costa Rican territory.

GALLMAN

817.2318/—: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Costa Rica (Gallman)

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1926—4 p. m.

9. Your 23, May 5, 10 p. m. You may reply to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs that the Department is confident Costa Rica will main-
tain strict neutrality in the case of political disturbances in Nicaragua
and not permit Costa Rican territory to be used as a base of operations
by either faction. In so doing Costa Rica can count on the moral sup-
port of the United States Government, and, it is hoped, of the Central
American Governments also.

The U. S. S. Cleveland has been ordered to Bluefields to protect
American lives and property. The Department doubts the advisabil-
ity of ordering another war vessel to Colorado Bar at this time.
Watch situation closely and keep Department fully informed.

KELLOGG

817.00/3551: Telegram

The Consul at Bluefields (McCannico) to the Secretary of State

BLUEFIELDS, May 8, 1926—4 p. m.
[Received 12: 50 p. m.]

Cleveland arrived 6th, marines landed 7th and Bluefields declared a
neutral zone. Protection also accorded to Collector of Customs and
customhouse at El Bluff. Business resumed and feeling of confidence
prevails. Banco Nacional now fully protected but Government funds
taken by Liberals [who?] are in control of Bluefields, El Bluff, Rama,
La Cruz, Rio Grande, Bragmans Bluff and Corn Island. Americans
at Cape Gracias request protection and those at Rama fearing an at-
tack from Government troops are also asking for protection.

McCANNICO
The Secretary of State to the Consul at Bluefields (McConnico)

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1926—6 p. m.

Your May 8, 4 p. m., and May 10, 6 p. m. The Department desires American naval forces will maintain strictest neutrality between contending factions. Neither Liberal forces nor Chamorro forces should be hindered in their military operations except so far as may be necessary to assure protection to American lives and property. Liberal authorities should not be prevented from exercising civil jurisdiction in territory occupied by them and Chamorro authorities should not be prevented from exercising similar functions in any territory which they now occupy or may reoccupy.

Press reports American forces have been disarming Liberals at Bluefields. Department presumes this applies only to neutral zone.

Department approves protection accorded to Collector of Customs and customhouse but does not desire that American forces be used in the interest of either faction to protect revenues or moneys belonging to the Nicaraguan Government. Repeat to Managua.

Kellogg

Press Release Issued by the Department of State, June 8, 1926

Mr. Eberhardt, the American Minister to Nicaragua, having been granted leave of absence, left Managua for the United States on June 7. Mr. Lawrence Dennis, Secretary of the Legation, will remain in Managua as Chargé d’Affaires ad interim.

Mr. Eberhardt’s departure has no political significance whatever; he is simply availing himself of the leave of absence to which he is legally entitled during the current year. The attitude of the United States Government towards the Chamorro régime remains unchanged. The American Government continues to be, as it has always been, a warm friend of the Nicaraguan people, but it does not and will not recognize as the Government of Nicaragua the régime now headed by General Chamorro. Needless to say the American Government sincerely hopes that the Nicaraguan people will by a return to a constitutional form of government make it possible for the United States to extend recognition to such a government and enter into formal diplomatic relations therewith.

Latter not printed.
The Consul at Bluefields (McConnico) to the Secretary of State

BLUEFIELDS, August 23, 1926—4 p. m.

[Received 10:03 p. m.]

A warship is urgently needed to protect life and property of American citizens. Conditions growing worse, Rio Grande in the hands of Liberals. An attack on Bluff and Bluefields expected every moment. People of Bluefields are very apprehensive. The following is from the Chinese at Bluefields to the Chinese Minister at Washington:

"Please use your best efforts with the American Government to obtain protection of life and property of our colony during the present revolutionary movement and wire results through the American Consul at Bluefields."

McConnico

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis)

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1926—6 p. m.

61. U.S.S. Tulsa has been ordered to Corinto, and U.S.S. Galveston to Bluefields.

Kellogg

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis)

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1926—6 p. m.

63. I sent for the Nicaraguan Minister today and made the following statement to him. You should immediately ask an audience with General Chamorro and leave a copy with him, stating that you do so under instructions from your Government:

"The Government of the United States has viewed with grave apprehension the situation existing in Nicaragua brought about by the unconstitutional usurpation of the executive power by a military leader. That General Chamorro, who was one of the delegates to the Central American Conference of 1923 and, as the representative of his country, signed a treaty which has as its basic principle the prevention of revolution and the seizure of the Government through a coup d’état, could have permitted himself to have brought disaster upon his country through the usurpation of the executive power is
almost unbelievable. The Government of the United States reaffirms its statement that it will not recognize General Chamorro as President of the Republic of Nicaragua.

Since the assumption of power by General Chamorro last January two revolutionary movements have already broken out in Nicaragua, and reports which have reached the Department show a state of unrest in that country which cannot but cause serious concern. Should events in Nicaragua continue their present course which can only result in ultimate civil war and economic chaos and imperil the lives and property of Americans and other foreigners in Nicaragua, the United States Government will be compelled to take such measures as it may deem necessary for their adequate protection.

While anxious and desirous to avoid interference in the purely domestic affairs of Nicaragua the Department of State cannot but point out that actions on the part of those in control of the Government of Nicaragua which according to present advices received by the Department are tending to prevent the free operation of the Financial Plans of 1917 13 and 1920,14 entered into between the Nicaraguan Government and its foreign creditors under the good offices of the Department of State, are being viewed with considerable anxiety by the United States Government.

It would now appear that the only way by which further bloodshed and serious disorders, which can only bring about the ruin of the country, may be avoided is by the withdrawal of General Chamorro from the position which he now holds and a prompt return to constitutional government. It is believed that as a first step towards this consummation a conference could be held attended by the political leaders of importance of all parties in Nicaragua, with a view to deciding upon a feasible plan.15

[Paraphrase.] In case the political leaders should desire to take advantage of the neutral character of a United States war vessel on which to hold such a conference the Department of State would have no objection. However, should such a suggestion be made, the Department prefers that it should be made by the Nicaraguans themselves. It is the feeling of the Department that the situation calls for an agreement by all factions in Nicaragua which can guarantee the establishment of an administration satisfactory enough to all parties to prevent further revolutionary outbreaks and can facilitate the restoration of constitutional government in due season. [End paraphrase.]

KELLOGG

14 See César Arana, Compilación de contratos celebrados con los Banqueros de New York, con el Ethelburgha Syndicate de Londres y con el Banco Nacional de Nicaragua, Inc.—Leyes relativas a los mismos contratos, 1911–1928 (Managua [1928–9]), vols. ii and iii.
The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

MANAGUA, August 29, 1926—noon.
[Received August 30—12:37 a.m.]

116. Department’s telegram 63.\textsuperscript{15} Last night I read the Secretary’s statement to Chamorro who was visibly moved thereby but replied he had made up his mind to maintain his position against all Nicaraguans but would welcome intervention by American forces to whom he would cheerfully turn over government. I stated we did not wish solution along these lines but as indicated in Secretary’s statement and expected him patriotically to avert further useless bloodshed. He expressed confidence that he would ultimately triumph over his opponents and determination to fight to the end.

An hour later I discussed communication with Adolfo Díaz\textsuperscript{16} who is in constant conference with Chamorro. Former said he felt sure Conservatives would now succeed in peacefully coercing Chamorro to depart at once as first step toward settlement. Cuadra Pasos\textsuperscript{17} arrives tomorrow when I expect important conferences.

DENNIS

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The Consul at Bluefields (McConnico) to the Secretary of State

BLUEFIELDS, August 29, 1926—5 p.m.
[Received August 31—10:25 a.m.]

United States ship Galveston arrived 26th and landed naval force. Bluefields declared neutral zone because jefe político in a decree issued 25th informed noncombatants that in view of critical condition they would be compelled in the event of a battle to defend their own lives and property.

Bluff threatened with bombardment tomorrow morning. Puerto Cabezas captured by Liberals after bombardment 28th. Several combatants injured according to a report. Manager of the company requests intervention of the Navy. Pearl Lagoon also in the hands of Liberals.

If Bluff is captured and Crampton, Collector of Customs, is replaced, what action must be taken? Crampton insists upon transferring funds to Chamorro regime. Liberals insist upon retention of revenues for the use of themselves, not for enemies.

Conditions at Bluefields with naval force in charge are quite satisfactory.

McCONNICO

\textsuperscript{15} Supra.
\textsuperscript{16} Nicaraguan Senator, ex-President of Nicaragua. See Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 1016, 1063 ff.
\textsuperscript{17} Representative of General Chamorro.
The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

MANAGUA, September 10, 1926—6 p.m.

[Received September 11—1:15 a.m.]

130. At 3 p.m. today General Chamorro handed me a signed letter of which the following is a translation:

Sir: Inasmuch as the people [peace] of the Republic is disturbed by revolutionary elements who have found a propitious occasion for their plans because of the international difficulties of my Government, which has not been recognized by the Governments of the United States and of Central America, I desire to make an effort on behalf of national tranquility, establishing it, if possible, in a definite manner upon a policy of concord, which most [moreover] has always figured in the program of the Conservative Party.

Since my Government, both in the campaign carried on to dominate the emergency of last May as in that of the present, has demonstrated its ability to make prevail the principles of the Conservative Party with the unquestionable prestige of that group in which it has supported and supports my Government, I believe the moment has arrived to manifest once more our harmonizing spirit and a benevolent inclination to use gentler methods in order to realize our administrative policies.

To this end and with such intentions I apply to you, [accepting] the good offices of the Legation in your [worthy] charge, in order to see whether the ideals my Government cherishes may be put in operation in an honorable way which will mollify the situation of our opponents, thereby laying the basis of the partly [peaceful] living together of the two historic parties of the country.

In the way of realizing this you may count on my acquiescence for the holding of conferences between the representatives of both historic parties and of the Government in order to discuss and elaborate a plan of conciliation on the substantial basis of my withdrawal from power through the resignation [deposit?] of the Presidency in a member of the Conservative Party whom the National Assembly [Congress] may elect in order that he may carry on a Conservative administration with all the amplitude which may spring from the said conferences which surely will be within the broad views of our party.

It is my desire that the greatest success crown your mediation and the conversations which may result therefrom, but in case of [for] lack of agreement or any other unfortunate accident, these intentions of harmony fail, being convinced, as I am, that the international [situation?] is a considerable part of the causes of our intranquility, I now hasten to declare through you to the American Department of State my intention of withdrawing from the Presidency, resigning it in favor of the Conservative whom the National Congress may elect as soon as peace be established in Nicaragua."
I believe that this declaration on my part will be sufficient for the Department of State to consider in a friendly manner our position and aid us in removing all the external conditions which have been propitious up to the present to the elements of discord which seriously [perturb] the life of our Republic. [With the assurances] et cetera. Emiliano Chamorro."

I await instructions as to reply. Fighting Bluefields. The Government is without funds unless taken from bank. Anarchy threatening. Prompt peace impossible without good offices of the United States.

Dennis

817.00/3770: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1926—1 p.m.

72. Legation’s telegrams No. 128, dated September 10, 10 a.m., No. 129, dated September 10, 5 p.m., and No. 130, dated September 10, 6 p.m.

Because General Chamorro has requested the good offices of the Government of the United States for the purpose of reestablishing peace and constitutional government in Nicaragua, and because the Government of the United States is now, as it has always been, willing to lend its good offices to a friendly Nation in order to aid it (refer to the Department’s telegram No. 69 dated September 9, 7 p.m.) you are authorized to use your friendly good offices to the end that a truce may be established by the contending factions and that a conference may be held aboard an American warship provided all the contending factions express such a desire. In communicating with the Liberal leaders you will make it perfectly clear that you are merely using your good offices with the different factions for the purpose of obtaining a truce and restoring peace to the country. You will also make it clear that all agreements that may be reached are to be among the various political factions and that the Legation cannot be a party to such agreements, and that the Legation is merely exercising its good offices in this matter in order to restore peace and order in Nicaragua.

Kellogg

38 Neither printed.
39 Not printed.
The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

MANAGUA, September 13, 1926—5 p. m.
[Received 10:40 p. m.]

134. I replied yesterday to Chamorro’s letter\(^{20}\) on basis Department’s telegram September 11, 1 p. m. He will give me letter tomorrow covering details and submitting names of Liberal and Liberal Republican leaders he wishes to invite to conference. Legation’s good offices in transmitting these invitations through Legations in neighboring countries and press here and there seem necessary. I propose to only transmit invitations to those whose names are submitted. It is thought preferable to hold conference in Corinto but not on war vessel. Chamorro will request United States to have naval authorities maintain neutral zone either of entire port and town or of small area around wharf and adjacent hotel as naval commander may prefer. This will be simple matter and afford ample security to delegates. I recommend I should be at once authorized, if requested, to offer this.

Exchange of notes on the proposed conference will be officially published soon. Conservative Party apparently unanimous in desire for conference and peace although somewhat doubtful of successful outcome. Inactivity here indicates willingness to attend.

Dennis

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The Secretary of State to the Minister in Costa Rica (Davis)\(^{21}\)

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1926—1 p. m.

17. In view of the fact that there exist in Nicaragua conditions of domestic violence which might be promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States, the President of the United States, under a Joint Resolution of Congress approved by the President January 31, 1922,\(^{22}\) has issued a proclamation\(^{23}\) placing an embargo on the export of arms and munitions of war from the United States to Nicaragua. Please communicate the foregoing to the Government to which you are accredited for its information. You may also in your discretion suggest to the Minister for Foreign

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\(^{20}\) See telegram No. 130, Sept. 10, 6 p. m., from the Chargé in Nicaragua, p. 791.

\(^{21}\) The same, on the same date, to the American Missions in Honduras (No. 32), Salvador (No. 59), and Guatemala (No. 44). A similar telegram (No. 296) of the same date was sent to the Embassy in Mexico.

\(^{22}\) 42 Stat. 361.

\(^{23}\) Dated Sept. 15, 1926; 44 Stat. 2625.
Affairs that in the interests of the promotion of peace and order in Nicaragua his Government might consider taking the same action or such other steps as might prevent the exportation of arms or munitions of war from his country to Nicaragua.

**Kellogg**

817.00/3803 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State*

**MANAGUA, September 17, 1926—2 p. m.**

[Received 10:23 p. m.]

137. Please advise immediately whether United States will, as requested in writing by Chamorro, have neutral zone around wharf and hotel maintained by marines at Corinto for conference. This is necessary as lodging and meeting facilities of warship not adequate.

**Dennis**

817.00/3820 : Telegram

*The Consul at Bluefields (McConnico) to the Secretary of State*

**BLUEFIELDS, September 23, 1926—10 a. m.**

[Received 11:15 p. m.]

Contending factions have agreed upon an armistice of 15 days beginning today with an extension of time if it is deemed advisable for the conference. Conservatives will withdraw to Rama, Liberals to Pearl Lagoon. Neutral zone extended to include Bluff and islands of lagoon of Bluefields. Escondido River opened to commerce and navigation. Admiral Latimer to act as arbitrator.

**McConnico**

817.00/3821 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State*

**MANAGUA, September 24, 1926—10 a. m.**

[Received 8 p. m.]

142. After two days conference with me Liberal junta informs me it desires to attend conference on the basis of the Department's telegram of September 11, 1 p. m., authorizing my good offices, and is sending a mission of Federico Sacasa, Mariano Arguello, Benjamin Abaunza to Guatemala to talk with Juan B. Sacasa. Mission should leave in a day or two and conference be possible first or second week October. . . . It is clear now Liberals have poor military leaders and organization and resumption of hostilities would probably result in further useless disaster for them and country.

**Dennis**
The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

MANAGUA, October 10, 1926—10 a.m.

[Received 4:40 p.m.]

162. Captain Wyman, United States Ship Denver, established neutral zone Corinto this morning at 7 o'clock to continue until three days after peace conference. Transfer took place under most favorable conditions. This is the first time neutral zone at Corinto in history.

Dennis

The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

U. S. S. "DENVER," October 18, 1926—9 a.m.

[Received October 19—3:21 p.m.]

165. Preliminary meeting of the Secretariat of National Liberal and National Conservative delegations first met on the Denver on October 16, at 9 a.m. It was [the decision] of both delegates [delegations] to hold the sessions on a war vessel and that the meetings be presided over by the undersigned. Because the delegates stated that a neutral chairman was necessary I agreed to lend my good offices as presiding officer. It was understood that I would incur no responsibility therefor or would sign no final agreement, and that no remarks by me in conference be entered upon the record, and that no statement would be given to the press or outsiders except those signed by the two secretaries.

Plenary session met on October 16 at 4 p.m. In the two sessions held yesterday there was a spirit of extreme conciliation, cordiality and frankness and both delegations were fraternizing. Last night the program of the conference was agreed upon, mentioning the reestablishing of peace on the basis of a constitutional government. After much discussion and disagreement by Liberals, the formula for the reestablishment of constitutional government was admitted to be the problem for discussion and settlement in the conference.

I anticipate the necessity of allowing both parties to talk themselves out and expect conference to last a week. It was agreed upon by both parties, the Liberals being very insistent that until settlement between themselves had been reached the conference should

24 For the proceedings of the conference, see J. Barcenas Meneses, Las Conferencias del "Denver," actas auténticas de las sesiones, con introducción y breves comentarios (Managua, Tip. y Encuadernación Nacional).
be limited to the two belligerent parties after which time minor parties may be admitted.

The Government reports that on October 15 there was an engagement near the Honduran borders at Sonata with some 300 Liberals in which the latter were routed. The Liberal casualties were 17 killed and many wounded.

Dennis

817.00/3923: Telegram

The Secretary of the Conservative Delegation (Meneses) and the Secretary of the Liberal Delegation (Camorales) at the Corinto Conference to the Secretary of State

U. S. S. "Denver" [undated].

[Received October 18, 1926—11:30 a. m.]

At the inauguration of the peace conferences on board the Denver both delegations send Your Excellency their respects and hope that under the friendly offices of the American Government peace will be restored.

J. Barcenas Meneses
Camorales

817.00/3923: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis)

Washington, October 19, 1926—3 p. m.

93. For the Secretaries of the Conservative and Liberal Delegations:

"I thank you for your telegram of greeting on the occasion of the inauguration of the conference at Corinto and most earnestly hope that through the patriotic efforts of all parties an amicable agreement will be reached restoring peace and tranquility to your country and thus insuring a return to that economic prosperity and progress so notable in recent years. Frank B. Kellogg."

Kellogg

817.00/3943: Telegram

The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

U. S. S. "Denver," October 19, 1926—4 p. m.

[Received October 21—11:30 a. m.]

167. The conference is now in a deadlock over formula for "reestablishment of peace on basis of constitutionality and the treaty of Washington." 25 A Conservative executive and government with

* Conference on Central American Affairs, p. 287.
participation for the Liberals is insisted upon by the Conservatives. However, the Liberals insist upon the acceptance of Sacasa as the only possible constitutional solution. In the conference this morning the Liberals went on record that they had received aid from the Mexican Government and that if they did not secure the acceptance of Sacasa in the conference they were prepared to go on with the revolution, counting on further aid from Mexico and certain other Governments. They admitted that they could not hope for success without such aid. They further declared that they were under no obligations to the Mexican Government for such assistance. This was ridiculed by the Conservatives. I feel that the Liberals are divided, one group in favor of continuing the revolution with the aid of Mexico, and the other being of a desire to compromise on the basis of more favorable concessions from the Conservatives. It is now desirable for me to have a clear, forceful statement from the Department with respect to the continuation of the revolution with the aid of other Governments, especially that of Mexico. In order to bring about peace and to avert disaster, we must smash the doctrine of constitutional restoration by means of foreign aid to revolution, once and for all.

Have received a report of a second conflict near Somoto yesterday, indicating that Liberals were repulsed with casualties consisting of 26 killed and 5 wounded.

The Government reports that two launches, the Fernandino and Union, left Limon, Costa Rica, with revolutionists for Nicaragua.

Dennis

817.00/3931: Telegram

The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

Corinto, October 20, 1926—9 a.m.

[Received 3:12 p.m.]

168. Liberal delegation presented to conference yesterday a basis of proposal that the following question be submitted to arbitration by the Secretary of State of the United States and representatives of the four Central American Governments:

"Whether the reestablishment of the Government of Nicaragua on the basis of constitutionality and the treaties of Washington must be made with Dr. Sacasa as Chief of State or whether it is possible legally to constitute a government without taking account of the said Vice President Dr. Sacasa."
I am informing conference [delegates] 26 today:

1. The proposition submitted by the Liberal delegation does not appear to constitute a justiciable matter subject to arbitration foreign governments but is a domestic political problem which must be settled by Nicaraguans.

2. While the Department is not disposed to answer hypothetical questions as to possible solutions, it would probably indicate, if requested, whether a definite plan for a new government agreed upon in the conference would under the Nicaraguan Constitution and the treaty of 1923 offer a satisfactory basis for de jure recognition.

DENNIS

817.00/3946: Telegram

The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

CORINTO, October 21, 1926—10 p. m.

[Received October 22—1:10 p. m.]

178. Conservative delegation formally declined to accept proposition of Liberals communicated my telegram October 20, 9 a. m. Conservatives objected only to arbitration by Central American Governments, alleging these Governments would not be impartial. To the surprise of all, Liberals this afternoon presented statement that, in view of refusal of Conservatives to accept their first proposition of Sacasa and their second proposition for the submission of the question as to Sacasa to arbitration by the United States and Central American Governments, they felt obliged to withdraw from conference. I immediately suspended session until tomorrow and had conference with Cuadra Pasos 27 and Espinosa. 28 The former offered Liberals reinstatement of the 15 Congressmen and the expelled magistrates, also two new members in Cabinet, all former posts held under Solorzano government, free elections in return for resignation of Sacasa, and acceptance of designation by Congress of Adolfo Diaz.

The change in attitude of the Liberals is possibly due to the receipt of news by mail steamer which arrived this afternoon from Salvador. Report from Customs Collector Pietro indicates both sides preparing for resumption of hostilities. Report from Puerto Castillo, Honduras, states filibuster vessel manned by Mexicans passed bay headed for Bluefields. Rumors allege that all arms and ammunition were taken off El Tropical before it left Salvador and since landed at some point on Bay of Fonseca and that a general uprising in Leon is to be

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26 Correction telegraphed by Mr. Dennis in his telegram No. 170, Oct. 20; not printed (file No. 817.00/3932).
27 Dr. Carlos Cuadra Pasos, representative of General Chamorro at the conference.
28 Dr. Rodolfo Espinosa, Liberal Party delegate at the conference.
expected soon. According to reliable information the Mexican consul in Managua is sending and receiving unusual quantity of codes and has close liaison with Liberal delegates.

The Liberals are on record in conference as having received and as counting on further Mexican aid to carry on revolution. Their sudden determination to break up conferences either is a bluff to secure the utmost in terms from Conservative delegation or has been taken on the receipt of definite assurance of further support from Mexico. The Conservatives in conferences have shown an extremely conciliatory attitude and proposed compromises while the Liberals have held out for Sacasa or nothing, offering as a compromise the preposterous proposition of an international arbitration of an interior Nicaraguan political problem. As to this proposition the Conservative delegation suggested [asking] for an official statement which I had already given privately to both sides in the negative, but Liberals declined this suggestion.

If, as it would appear, should Liberals not modify their attitude tomorrow morning, they are not desirous of peace except on basis of their triumph and if they propose to carry on their fight for constitutionality as they have threatened with Mexican aid, I feel the United States Government must be prepared to take prompt and adequate measures to prevent foreign intervening in Nicaraguan affairs. I have full assurance from Conservatives and Chamorro that in the event of failure of conference he will immediately withdraw and allow a provisional government to be formed which will at once proceed constitutionally to recognize the government. The United States Government should immediately lend its full moral support to the provisional government during the transition period and extend recognition upon the satisfactory election of the new President. Please instruct immediately.

Dennis

817.00/3943: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Guatemala (Ellis)

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1926—5 p. m.

50. Under date of October 19, Chargé d’Affaires Dennis advised the Department from Corinto that the Liberals went on record in meeting of conference stating that they had received aid from the Mexican Government and that if they did not secure the acceptance of Sacasa in the conference they were prepared to go on with the revolution, counting on further aid from Mexico and certain other governments. They admitted that they could not hope for success without such aid. They further declared that they were under no obligations to Mexico. The Chargé d’Affaires states that he feels that the Liberals
are divided, one group in favor of continuing the revolution with the aid of Mexico and the other desiring to compromise on the basis of more favorable concessions from the Conservatives. . . .

[Paraphrase.] In view of the foregoing and the fact that Mr. Dennis on October 21, stated that the conference is now engaged in discussing a practical solution, and that the spirit of both parties is more conciliatory and that he is hopeful of a satisfactory settlement, the Department feels that it is most necessary to inform Sacasa regarding the Department’s position, in order that he may be held responsible should the conference fail because of any act on his part.

[End paraphrase.]

You are therefore instructed to seek immediately a personal and private interview with Doctor Sacasa and say to him that the Department has learned that many Liberals have admitted receiving from Mexico arms and assistance in their efforts to overthrow the régime now functioning in Nicaragua and there is good reason to believe that rather than come to any agreement at the conference now being held at Corinto some of the Liberals would prefer to renew hostilities and continue their efforts to overthrow the Chamorro régime by force, counting upon further aid from Mexico and certain other governments. That the Department is sure Doctor Sacasa does not approve of this course and really desires to see peace restored in Nicaragua without compelling that country to suffer first the unimaginable horror and disaster of a civil war, which, if one party accepts aid and material assistance from abroad, may be of long duration and frightful intensity. That the Department considers the Central American countries obligated by Article 14 of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923 not to intervene under any circumstances, directly or indirectly, in the internal political affairs of any other Central American country, and that other countries not signatories of this Treaty and having no plausible ground or valid reason for interfering in the domestic affairs of Nicaragua are equally obligated to maintain a strict neutrality in the event of civil war in that country. The United States Government therefore, anxious as it is to avoid any interference in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, itself, would view with grave disfavor any such interference on the part of any other nation; and any faction or party which solicited or accepted such aid or assistance could count upon the firm opposition of the United States Government.

Investigate and report to the Department as soon as possible as to the departure of The Star with ammunition and Mexicans from Guatemala.

The penultimate paragraph has been cabled to Dennis for his information.

Kellogg
NICARAGUA

817.00/3954 : Telegram

The Chargé in Guatemala (Ellis) to the Secretary of State

GUATEMALA, October 22, 1926—3 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

95. This morning I discussed with Doctor Sacasa the contents of Department’s telegram of October 22, 5 p. m., Military Attaché Gwynn being present. Sacasa demonstrating [sic] no definite or pertinent reply but explained at great length his personal position, pointing out that he is not a member of the revolution but an independent worker for the maintenance of treaties and a constitutional order in Nicaragua. He said that he had received no information from Liberals at the peace conference and did not know whether they considered it best to continue the revolution. He admitted that his party had sought arms and ammunition from all possible sources. He refused to discuss Mexican or Central American participation but did not deny their intervention on behalf of Liberals in Nicaragua.

                                                  Ellis

817.00/3958 : Telegram

The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

CORINTO, October 23, 1926—10 p. m.

[Received October 24—3:32 p. m.]

176. Final session of the conference to be held tomorrow morning, with vote of thanks by both delegations for American good offices. Neutral zone Corinto to continue until October 27, 4 p. m. Utmost cordiality reigns between delegates personally.

In final deliberative sessions today Liberals declined offer of Conservatives to restore members of Congress and Courts and to give two ministries local officials in Liberal departments and free elections on basis of resignation of Sacasa and withdrawal of Chamorro and designation of Senator Adolfo Díaz by Congress to complete present constitutional performance as President. Conservatives offered to consider further concessions. Liberals made counterproposal of provisional government headed by members of Progressive Party [such?] as Ramirez Calderon. Conservatives pointed out that the choice of such candidate resulted in disasters of Solorzano regime and they insisted on the designation of Conservative President. Conservatives maintained that a satisfactory government was only possible with a responsible leader of a major party and that while they were prepared
to make concessions on all other points they could not turn over power to one [a] candidate in whom they had not confidence. Failed [Failing] to [reach] agreement on this, the delegations decided close conference.

Liberal delegates have freely admitted in conversation that they cannot agree to one [a] Conservative President because this would mean abandonment of Mexican allies.

Conservative delegation informs me Chamorro will [deposit] Presidency this week in Adolfo Diaz or some other Conservative who will form provisional government which will hold a constituent election, make new constitution, and elect new President and Congress in accordance therewith.

Extension of armistice signed today at Bluefields between Arguello ²⁹ and Moncada ³⁰ to last three days after close of conference.

DENNIS

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817.00/3970 : Telegram

The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

CORINTO, October 25, 1926—10 a.m.

[Received 6:56 p.m.]

178. Referring to Department’s number 95, October 20, 11 a.m. ³¹
Admiral Latimer inquires whether use of the term “belligerents” by the Department indicates recognition of belligerency by the United States. I understand there is no recognition of belligerency but admission of insurgency by the United States Government in respect of contending factions on Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. Please instruct. Repeated to Admiral.

DENNIS

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817.00/3970 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis)

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1926—4 p.m.

101. Your 178, October 25, 10 a.m. Your understanding correct.

KELLOGG

²⁹ Gen. Gustavo Arguello, jefe político of Bluefields.
³⁰ Gen. José María Moncada, Liberal Party general.
³¹ Not printed.
The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

MANAGUA, October 30, 1926—8 p.m.

[Received 10:25 p.m.]

181. . . .

At 6 o'clock tonight, October 30, 6 p.m., in accordance with article 106 of the Constitution, Chamorro deposited Presidency in the second designate of Congress, Senator Uriza, the first designate not being absent in the United States. Uriza has informed me he will convocate immediately Congress in extraordinary session. First session should be held in eight or ten days.

Uriza, Cuadra Pasos, Alfonso Estrada and Martin Benard inform me that after a consultation with Conservative leaders and Congressmen, majority of whom are already in Managua, the Conservative Party proposes to carry out following program: (1) Reinstatement of exiled members of Solorzano Congress; (2) secure designation by said Congress of Adolfo Diaz as designate to receive the Presidency from Uriza, all to be accomplished within 15 days if possible. Some doubt is expressed in certain quarters as to the possibility of the election of Diaz by such a Congress due to refusal of some Conservatives to vote for him as designate. Cuadra Pasos tells me he believes however Diaz will be able to muster a majority even with reinstatement of the expelled members.

Dennis

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis)

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1926—3 p.m.

103. Legation's telegram number 181 dated October 30, 8 p.m. Considering the fact that Chamorro has withdrawn, it is the feeling of the Department that if Congress is convened in extraordinary session by Señor Uriza and is restored to its original form as elected in 1924, or if a sincere effort is made to accomplish this, then, because of the absence of Solorzano and Sacasa, the Government of the United States might properly recognize de jure a designado chosen by Congress.

Vicente Rappaccioli.
It is not the desire of the Department to suggest or favor any candidate for Congress to designate. However, it is the feeling of the Department that should Adolfo Diaz be designated he would be a wise choice. According to the best information now before the Department he is honest and capable and has that firmness of character which is absolutely essential for any person called to fill the difficult position of President of Nicaragua during these disturbed times. Moreover, it is the understanding of the Department that Adolfo Diaz is not debarred by article 2 of the treaty of 1923. This is essential for recognition. The Department is loath to see a person appointed designado who would be unable to dominate the internal situation or who would be simply a tool of the stronger characters. In that event it is almost certain that the Nicaraguan situation will go from bad to worse, and peace and tranquility will not be restored in the near future. The Department authorizes you to make such judicious use of the foregoing as you may think fit in discussing the situation informally with the political leaders, but it does not wish you to make any public statement in this connection. You should use the utmost care to avoid any criticism that the Government of the United States is endeavoring to direct Nicaraguan internal politics.

KELLOGG

817.00/4016: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis)

[Paraphrase—Extract]

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1926—5 p.m.

106. Should a Congress which may be considered as the duly constituted Congress of Nicaragua elect a designado, the Department would give careful consideration to recognizing him as the Constitutional President of Nicaragua. Should Doctor Sacasa subsequently establish a government in Nicaragua, the Department could not consider him other than a revolutionist.

The Government of the United States by withholding objection to a loan by bankers to the Provisional Government has given the only support which it feels it can give to the Provisional Government. The Department does not believe its moral support can go further.

When a constitutional government is set up which the Government of the United States can recognize, the customary support will be lent to it.

In a few days Minister Eberhardt will sail to return to Managua. The Department will inform you as to the date of his arrival.

KELLOGG

Mr. Eberhardt left Managua on June 7; see press release issued by the Department on June 8, 1926, p. 787.
817.00/4037: Telegram

The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

MANAGUA, November 9, 1926—4 p.m.
[Received 8:08 p.m.]

194. I had a discussion today with Diaz at [and?] Cuadra Pasos and it was understood that:

1. The 21 members will be permitted to resume their seats on the understanding that the 6 declared not elected by the National Electoral Council registering later be unseated by the legally constituted Congress. The other 15 members will be permitted of course to retain their seats.

2. Diaz will be designated on November 15 or sooner.

3. Diaz will retain the present Cabinet until peace is reestablished and will make proposals to the Liberals as soon as practicable.

4. As soon as he is recognized, if the Department will receive his request favorably, he will ask the Government of the United States for a mission of United States Army officers to organize and instruct the constabulary.

I was furnished today with copies of the convocation telegrams to the 21 members; also with the replies of many of them.

The day of the inauguration of Diaz will probably be the day after his designation. If I were to attend the ceremony that fact would create a most desirable impression locally. Because of serious revolutionary movements now going on, several days' delay in recognition might suspend proceedings. If the designation proceedings are carried out as indicated, could the Department authorize me in advance to attend the ceremony the next day? Or could the Department reach a decision on the question of recognition within 48 hours? In the latter case, the inauguration would have to be postponed one more day.

Dennis

817.00/4037: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, November 11, 1926—1 p.m.

108. Referring to Legation's telegram number 194 dated November 9, 4 p.m. The Department will give favorable consideration to according immediate recognition to the new President if designation is carried out in accordance with the present plans reported by you and which it is understood are according to provisions of the Constitution.

157512—41—Vol. II—57
The Department desires to inform the four Central American Governments that it intends to recognize as constitutional such a government and afford them an opportunity to recognize it at the same time. However, the Department believes that it would be better not to inform these Governments of its intention until the new President has actually been designated and has assumed the office.

The Department authorizes you to attend the inaugural ceremonies provided the present plans are actually carried out.

Kellogg

817.00/4044: Telegram

The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

MANAGUA, November 11, 1926—6 p. m.

[Received November 12—12:40 a. m.]

196. Diaz was designated this afternoon at 1 by Congress in joint session of both Houses. All 21 unseated members were admitted; 53 members present, of whom 44 voted for Diaz. Liberal members withdrew before vote and stated that they would present memorial tomorrow declaring they considered Sacasa President. Two votes were cast for resolution declaring Solorzano President. Inaugural ceremony to take place Sunday 14th at 4 afternoon which I shall attend. Diaz and Cuadra Pasos called at Legation immediately afterwards. Diaz stated he would form a new Cabinet. Repeated to Central American Republics.

Dennis

817.00/4059: Telegram

The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

MANAGUA, November 14, 1926—6 p. m.

[Received 9:23 p. m.]

200. Adolfo Diaz took oath of office at 4:30 this afternoon.

Dennis
Press Release Issued by the Department of State, November 17, 1926

In announcing that formal recognition had been accorded the Diaz régime in Nicaragua by the American Chargé d’Affaires, Lawrence Dennis, acting under instructions from the Department, the Secretary of State added:

“I am much gratified that a solution has been found for the Nicaraguan political problems which is in accordance with the constitution of that country and in harmony with the Central American Treaty of 1923. When General Chamorro seized the power a year ago it was of course impossible to accord recognition to his Government, since it originated in a coup d’état. When General Chamorro withdrew from power this left the way open for the election by Congress of one of its own members to assume the executive power as provided for by the Nicaraguan constitution under certain circumstances. The members of the Congress which was chosen at a popular election in 1924 were called to meet in an extraordinary session for this purpose and elected Señor Adolfo Diaz. Changes which had been made in the membership of this Congress during the régime of General Chamorro were nullified and members who had been expelled were invited to resume their seats, thus restoring the Congress to its original complexion. The entire Congress in joint session has a membership of sixty-four. Fifty-three members voted in the election of Diaz, and he received forty-five votes or an absolute majority of the total membership of Congress. The last constitutional President of Nicaragua, Carlos Solorzano, resigned in January 1926 and the Vice President elected with him has been out of the country since November, 1925. In the absence of these two the duty devolved upon Congress of naming a designate from one of its own members to fill out the unexpired term of President Solorzano.

“The Department has been informed that President Diaz intends to make overtures of peace and general amnesty to his political opponents, and that he will offer the Liberal Party participation in the new Government, including certain cabinet posts. I sincerely hope that this offer if made will be accepted by the Liberals, since only by cooperation between all factions can peace and tranquility be restored to that country now so unhappily torn by revolution, a condition which has invited interference from outside sources; a state of affairs which must cause concern to every friend of stability in Central America. It must be in the best interests, not only of Nicaragua but of Central America as a whole and all countries interested in its welfare, that normal conditions should soon be restored permitting a return to that prosperity and economic development which have been so marked in Nicaragua during the last decade and a half.”

*Recognition was extended by note delivered by the American Chargé to the Nicaraguan Minister for Foreign Affairs on Nov. 17 at 11 a. m.*
Doctor Rodolfo Espinosa to the Secretary of State

[Translation ***]

PUERTO CABEZAS [, December 1, 1926].

[Received December 2—midnight.]

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that His Excellency, Dr. Juan B. Sacasa, Vice President of Nicaragua, on this day in this city, pursuant to the Constitution, assumed the Presidency of the Republic and organized his Cabinet as follows:

Minister for Foreign Affairs: Dr. Rodolfo Espinosa. Under Secretary: Dr. Geronimo Ramirez Brown.

Gobernacion: Dr. Leonardo Arguello. Under Secretary: Dr. Antonio Flores [Vega].

Treasury: Dr. Arturo Ortega. Under Secretary: Don Julio Portocarrero.


Fomento: Dr. Onofre Sandoval. Under Secretary: Dr. Ramiro Gámez.

Public Instruction: Dr. Modesto Armijo. Under Secretary: Don Hernan Robleto.

Your Excellency will remember that the constitutional order created by the elections of October 1924 was expressly recognized by your Government after the President, Don Carlos Solorzano, and the Vice President, Dr. Juan B. Sacasa, who were sworn by the National Congress, took possession of their high offices on January 1, 1925, in the presence of the Honorable Chargé d'Affaires of your Republic, Mr. Thurston. The lawful regime that had been recognized was interrupted by the coup d'état initiated by Gen. Emiliano Chamorro on October 25, 1925, and culminated when the latter on January 16, last, assumed the Executive power which he later transferred to Señor Sebastian Uriza who, in turn and in the same unconstitutional manner, transferred it to Don Adolfo Diaz. Constitutional order having been restored in my country with the installation of the legitimate government of His Excellency, Dr. Sacasa, this office has reason to believe that by the same fact the cordial friendship and official relations that have united our peoples and Governments are to be considered as restored, and that the recognition granted Señor Adolfo Diaz by your Government is no obstacle since I must assume that that recognition was due to the interpretation of it by Your Excellency's Government that in the absence of the President and Vice President the exercise of the Executive power corresponds to the first

*** File translation revised.
designado elected by the Congress, for, if it was not so held, the Constitution of the country and the Central American treaties of Washington would be fatally injured.

It affords me satisfaction to state that the constitutionalist army, in arms against the de facto regime, has recognized the legitimate authority of His Excellency President Sacasa and has placed itself under his orders to maintain it and to defend the institutions of the Republic. The only remaining obstacle to peace is Don Adolfo Diaz who in agreement with General Chamorro has rebelled against the constituted authority; but the Government proposes to subdue them in a short time relying on the support of legal and material forces, and on public opinion, and on the moral force which it is to receive from the express recognition of Your Excellency’s Government.

In taking charge of this office, I avail myself of the opportunity to express to Your Excellency the wishes of my Government and of myself for the prosperity of your friendly Nation and the happiness of its worthy mandatario and the distinguished co-workers of Your Excellency.

With distinguished consideration, respectfully,

RODOLFO ESPINOSA
Minister for Foreign Affairs

S17.00/4197: Telegram

The Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis) to the Secretary of State

[Translation *]

MANAGUA, December 8, 1926—3 a.m.
[Received 12:54 p.m.]

“November 15. The Honorable Lawrence Dennis, Chargé d’Affaires of the United States. My dear Mr. Dennis: Upon assuming the Presidency I found the Republic in a very difficult situation because of the attitude, assumed without motive, by the Government of Mexico in open hostility to Nicaragua. It must be clear to you that, given the forces which that Government disposes of, its elements of attack are irresistible for this feeble and small Nation. This condition places in imminent risk the sovereignty and independence of Nicaragua, and consequently, the continental equilibrium on which the pan-Americanism is founded which the United States has fostered with such lofty spirit.

* This telegram is in reply to telegram No. 129, Dec. 7, from the Department, requesting the Chargé to cable the full text of a personal letter received by him from President Diaz; the Chargé had quoted an extract from the personal letter in his telegram No. 203, Nov. 17, to the Department. (File No. S17.00/4971.)

** File translation revised.
Naturally the emergency resulting from these conditions places in peril the interests of North American citizens and other foreigners residing in our territory and renders it impossible for a Government so rudely attacked, to protect them as is its duty and as it desires.

For these reasons and appreciating the friendly disposition of the United States towards weak republics and the intentions which your Government has always manifested for the protection of the sovereignty and independence of all the countries of America by morally supporting legitimate Governments in order to enable them to afford a tranquil field of labor for foreigners which is needed for the stimulation of the growth of the prosperity of these countries, I address myself to you in order that, with the same good will with which you have aided in Nicaraguan reconciliation, you may solicit for my Government and in my name the support of the Department of State in order to reach a solution in the present crisis and avoid further hostilities and invasions on the part of the Government of Mexico.

I desire to manifest to you at the same time that whatever may be the means chosen by the Department of State, they will meet with the approval of my absolute confidence in the high spirit of justice of the Government of the United States.

With the assurances of my highest consideration I subscribe myself your obedient servant and friend. Adolfo Diaz.”

Dennis

817.00/4198: Telegram

The Ambassador in Mexico (Sheffield) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

MEXICO, December 8, 1926—11 a.m.

[Received 4:39 p.m.]

503. Press today published a telegram dated December 2 from Espinosa, the Foreign Minister of the Sacasa regime at Puerto Cabezas, to the Mexican Foreign Minister requesting Mexican recognition, and a telegram dated December 7 from the Mexican Foreign Minister to Espinosa extending recognition.

Sheffield

817.00/4227a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Nicaragua (Dennis)

[Extract—Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1926—7 p.m.

... The Department of State has perceived with regret that there appears to be a tendency on the part of the Diaz administration to rely upon the Government of the United States to protect it against
the activities of the revolutionists by physical means. If President Diaz in his conversations with you should indicate that he expects armed assistance from the Government of the United States you are instructed to state plainly to him that the fact that the Government of the United States has recognized his Government does not imply any such obligation.

This Government is prepared to lend such encouragement and moral support to the Diaz government as it generally accords to constitutional governments with which it maintains friendly relations when they are threatened with revolutionary movements. The Government of the United States is not prepared to go further than this.

KEILLOGG

817.00/4257 : Telegram

The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

MANAGUA, December 15, 1926—11 a. m.
[Received 4:30 p. m.]

239. Yesterday I received a note from the Foreign Minister asking me to forward to the Government of the United States a long communication stating that Mexican aid of the revolution if not checked would inevitably overthrow the Diaz government, and soliciting American aid to protect the lives and property of Americans and foreigners, to defend the independence of Nicaragua against Mexico, and to restore peace. The note states further that the government of President Diaz, having full confidence in the Government of the United States, authorizes in advance any measures which the Government of the United States may take for these ends.

EBERHARDT

817.00/4261 : Telegram

The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State

MANAGUA, December 16, 1926—noon.
[Received 2:45 p. m.]

240. . . Chamorro turned over army yesterday, left Managua this morning at 4 o'clock, arrived at Corinto at 10 whence he is to sail today or tomorrow on a diplomatic mission to principal European countries.39

EBERHARDT

39 General Chamorro sailed from Corinto on December 20.
The Secretary of State to the Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1926—6 p. m.

140. Department desires immediate answer to question as to whether Liberals have rejected peace proposal of President Diaz.

Upon receipt of request from shippers in the United States and authorization of the Nicaraguan Legation the Department will immediately issue licenses for arms to the Diaz government. Yesterday the Navy Department was requested to issue instructions to the Commander of the Special Service Squadron to afford all proper protection on the east coast of Nicaragua to American lives and property and to land forces if necessary for that purpose.

Protection has been requested by American interests at Braggman's Bluff and other places.

It is the belief of the Department that you should fully understand its position with respect to the present situation in Nicaragua and realize that the Government of the United States cannot take any steps which would be considered as American armed intervention.

Telegraph Department immediately following data: Number of Government troops now under arms; relative positions of such forces in Nicaragua; and names and qualifications of the high commanding officers.

It was the understanding of the Department from the Legation's reports that President Diaz could count upon the support of a substantial majority of the people of Nicaragua and that his designation by Congress seemed to confirm this understanding. For this reason the Department cannot understand your reference to a possible general uprising against the Government of President Diaz contained in Legation's telegram number 237, December 13, 1 p. m.⁴⁰ which would result immediately in the speedy collapse of the Diaz government accompanied by conditions of anarchy.

Department has been informed that Costa Rica is prepared to offer to mediate between the Government of Nicaragua and the party of Sacasa. Telegraph your views on this subject immediately, setting forth what effect such an offer would have on the present situation and whether there would be any chance of a successful outcome. Does the departure of General Chamorro from Nicaragua tend to bring about a peaceful solution of the situation?

Kellogg

⁴⁰Not printed.
The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State

Managua, December 19, 1926—8 p.m.
[Received 9:43 p.m.]

246. Your 140, December 18, 6 p.m. See Legation's telegram 201, of November 15th, its despatch 301 of November 24th, and Latimer's telegram November 22, 9 p.m. These same peace terms have been made within last 10 days by Diaz through his representative in Salvador and again refused by representatives of Sacasa. Liberals repeatedly and openly state that they will not accept any peace terms so long as there is no prospect of active American intervention and they can continue to count on Mexican aid.

The "general uprising" mentioned in my 237 of December 13th referred to such an uprising on both coasts backed by Mexico. Diaz could formally [formerly?] and apparently still count on the support of the majority of Nicaraguans but such support cannot avail against Liberals aided as they seem to be by Mexico. In these conditions it is my opinion that neither Costa Rica nor mediation would serve any useful purpose. On the other hand were Mexico eliminated it is my further opinion that the Liberals would immediately be brought to treat with Diaz.

Chamorro's departure will facilitate solution only in giving Diaz a free hand to offer satisfactory peace terms. Chamorro is expected to sail tomorrow for Panama.

Diaz states that he now has some 7,000 men under arms distributed as follows: Jose Solorzano Diaz, nephew of President, general in chief of army, has some 1,500 men in vicinity of Managua, biggest group being 500 under General Viquez who took Rama in May.

General Arguello commands 2,000 troops on the Atlantic, 1,000 with him at Rama and 1,000 with Deldadillo at Perlas. They beat off Moncada in August at Bluff.

Hurtado has 200 men at Rivas. He beat Liberals at Casaguiana in August.

Saenz has 1,000 men at Leon. Vargas leads 800 men at Chinandega. Gomez leads 1,000 men at Quezalguaque. These generals are all seasoned fighters; believed to be loyal to Diaz and any of them better than the best leaders among the Liberals with the possible exception of Moncada. There are reported to be 200 armed Liberals in and about Leon and some thousand unarmed Liberals to have left for the coast of Casaguiana where they await arms to be brought by Mexican vessel when they will immediately launch the general uprising of Liberals referred to above.

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41 None printed.
42 Not printed.
In order maintain itself against Mexican-aided revolution the Nicaraguan Government must spend more than its revenues allow. The maintenance of the troops now under arms costs $10,000 per diem. Only [§1] 20,000 remain of the recent $300,000 loan and there is no prospect of securing further advances as bankers will not lend money to wage a futile war against a Mexican-aided opponent. When the Government reaches the end of its financial resources its soldiers cannot be expected to continue fighting and its overthrow by Liberal uprising should be comparatively easy. As the country is fairly evenly divided between Conservative and Liberals either party when out of power can raise sufficient men to overthrow a tottering government provided arms and ammunition are supplied in sufficient quantities by an outside government.

EBERHARDT

817.00/4431

Doctor Rodolfo Espinosa to the Secretary of State 42

[Translation 42]

PUERTO CABEZAS, December 24, 1926.

His Excellency, the Secretary of State: As I had the honor to inform Your Excellency in a wireless message of the 1st of this month, confirmed by a detailed note of the same date, His Excellency, Dr. Juan B. Sacasa, elected Vice President of Nicaragua for the term beginning on the 1st of January, 1925, and ending on the 1st of January, 1929, assumed in this city the Executive power of the Republic and organized the Government over which he presides in the name of the Constitution and by the express will of the Nicaraguan people.

Yesterday, at about 11 a. m., the warships Cleveland and Denver, without any forewarning or action of any kind, forcibly landed the regular forces of the United States Navy in the semblance of war and placed this city, the provisional residence of the Executive power, under military occupation. After the landing had taken place, the commander of the Cleveland, Mr. Lewis, and another officer presented themselves at the Executive Mansion and gave His Excellency, President Sacasa, a violent verbal warning, which, at the request of the latter, they afterwards put in writing, as follows: 44a

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42 Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Secretary of the Navy in letter of Jan. 14, 1927; covering letter not printed.
43 File translation revised.
44 Ante, p. 808.
44a The text of the memorandum which follows is not a translation, but is the exact English text as quoted by Doctor Espinosa.
"Puerto Cabezas, Nic., Dec. 23 de 1926.
Memorandum for Dr. Sacasa, confirming conversation of this afternoon.
The following territory is hereby declared neutral zone: Puerto Cabezas and Bilwi, including the outskirts for a distance of two miles.
There will be no carrying of arms, ammunition, knives, etc., in the neutral zone. There must be no recruiting or any other activities carried on in the neutral zone, which have any bearing on the prosecution of hostilities.
Doctor Sacasa and his forces may leave the neutral zone by 4 p.m. 24th of December, 1926, by water, with their arms if they so desire; otherwise they must disarm and deliver such arms to the Cleveland's Landing Force Commander.
The radio station may send only plain messages and these messages must have no bearing on the prosecution of hostilities.

President Sacasa, deeply astounded by this attitude so offensive to the sovereignty of the Nation and so in conflict with the principles which regulate the relations of civilized peoples, orally and energetically protested against the unlawful proceedings in the presence of those who brought the notification.
Later, a commission of the Government consisting of the Minister of Fomento, Dr. Onofre Sandoval, and the undersigned, with Don Luis Mena Solorzano as their interpreter, met by appointment the Captain of the Cleveland, Mr. Wainwright, and in the presence of the Captain of the Denver, Mr. Wymann, and Commander Lewis of the Cleveland, confirmed the protest of the Government and people of Nicaragua against the unspeakable outrage of which they were the victims and asked for an explanation of what happened. The Captain of the Cleveland stated that he was obeying orders from Rear Admiral Latimer; that it was intended simply to establish a neutral zone; that Doctor Sacasa and the members of his government could use the wireless office to send messages in Spanish or English, but not in code, or relating to military matters; and that we could remove our military equipment without any interference, over a mole of the harbor, and to that end he had already spoken with the Bragmans Bluff [Lumber] Company so as to procure the trucks and other things necessary for the removal.
It is well to note here for a better appreciation of these facts that, while these things were going on, a detachment of marines which altogether numbered about 500, distributed in groups, surrounded the Executive Mansion, protected by a guard of 20 men; and the two war vessels had their guns trained some on the Executive Mansion itself, and others on the barracks in the city in which the small garrison of the place was quartered.
This morning messages in Spanish relating to the affair addressed to the Director of the Pan American Union at Washington and to the Representative in Costa Rica of the Constitutional Government were rejected by the wireless office. And a part of the armament which was on the mole for shipment and removal outside of the alleged neutral zone was held by the American forces under a pretext of inquiring whether that material came from the United States and had come after the laying of the embargo by the Department of State. Hours after the declarations of the note verbale signed by Commander Lewis had been put in writing, and also after the promises made to the Government’s commission relative to the arms and messages, both were modified, that which was written and promised being ignored in an unusual manner.

At the same time and under the same conditions there were landed at Rio Grande, where the Government had a part of its war implements over which a garrison of 18 men was watching, about 600 American marines; they declared, of their own accord, that place to be a neutral zone, disarmed the soldiers, and took possession by violence of the war material there found. I must place it on record that the time chosen for this was when the main body of our army was far away, engaged in a severe battle at Pearl Lagoon, where the Constitutional armies were assured a practically final victory.

The mere statement of facts will bring to Your Excellency’s mind the conviction that the American forces, which without any right are now holding by military force this city and that of Rio Grande, have violated the sovereignty of Nicaragua not only by setting foot on the territory of the Republic, but also by imposing restrictions on the highest official of the State, on him who represents the dignity of the Nation, because he was solemnly chosen by the free vote of the people in the full exercise of their inalienable rights.

It is pertinent to put it on record here that there was no ground or pretext whatsoever for the establishment of neutral zones. When the legitimate Government was installed, far from being exposed to any menace, American life and property were duly guaranteed, better than at any time, because it has been and is the constant aim of this Government to add prestige to its authority by strictly complying with the law and respecting all private interests in the territory which it controls.

The neutral zones in fact have been established by the American forces without the consent of the respective civil or military authorities, without the pretext of a threat to foreign interests, and only for the evident purpose of hampering the action of the lawful Government, in support, undoubtedly, of the de facto Government presided over by Señor Adolfo Diaz at Managua. That attitude is in
open contradiction to the positive statements made on the subject of Nicaragua by the Department of State when it gave assurances of its neutrality in the dispute because of the unquestionable right of the Nicaraguan people to choose their own Government and decide on their own destiny. The undersigned, as a member of the Liberal delegation at the peace conference on board the Denver at Corinto many times heard the American Chargé d’Affaires, the Honorable Lawrence Dennis, declare that the United States would observe an impartial attitude and would not intervene in favor of any one of the parties that are fighting in Nicaragua, because that was a domestic affair exclusively for the Nicaraguans to decide.

As the facts here related are not new—since in 1912, in order to maintain Adolfo Diaz in the Presidency of Nicaragua against the will of the Nation, a large force of American marines then as now set foot on our territory; and since there has been a repetition of intervention sought by the same Señor Diaz in order to impose him again as President against the Constitution and against public opinion—it is proper once for all to define what is the international statute [status?] of Nicaragua. Is it a free, sovereign, and independent Nation, capable therefore of choosing the Government that it sees fit, or must we arrive at the painful conclusion that it is a colony or a protectorate? Or is it that the United States of America has reached the point of forgetting that small nations have the right to an independent life in the international concert? Who names the President of Nicaragua: is it the people by their votes at the polls or the Government of the United States of America by its recognition?

The mere fact that Don Adolfo Diaz solicits the aid of foreign forces to maintain himself in power demonstrates that he has no standing with the people of the country, and the moral and physical support given him by your Government is his only title to usurp the office which under the Constitution belongs to His Excellency, Doctor Sacasa.

Would it not be more worthy of the greatness of your country to let the Nicaraguans determine their own affairs as they have a right to? That is what is demanded by the general rules of international law and the most elemental principles of equity and justice proclaimed by Your Excellency’s Government and set forth as law in the Central American treaty of Washington. Thus we could directly arrive at the peace which is so much needed by my country, through the operation of its free institutions, and sincerely strengthen the relations between our peoples.

Because of all these facts, I hereby most energetically protest to Your Excellency in the name of the people and Government of Nicaragua, and I trust that in respect to reason and justice your enlight-
ened Government will be pleased to make the proper corrections, which will redound to the prestige and honor of the great American democracy.

I am [etc.]

ROD[OLFO] ESPINOSA

817.00/4314: Telegram

The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State

MANAGUA, December 26, 1926—11 a. m.

[Received December 27—11:40 a. m.]

254. President Diaz has ordered army to withdraw from Pearl Lagoon via False Bluff to El Bluff, Bluefields, where soldiers will disarm if required. They will proceed to Managua via San Juan River. Withdrawal not due to defeat but desire to avoid further futile conflict in coast region. Diaz wishes Navy to declare neutral zone at Rama which I strongly recommend on account of American interests there and to avoid futile hostilities. This would complete neutralization of important centers on Atlantic coast and contribute towards early peace. The Government is in full control on the west side.

EBERHARDT

817.00/4366

Draft Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Wilbur)\textsuperscript{49}

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1926.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 18, 1926, referring to mine of December 17,\textsuperscript{48} concerning the situation in Nicaragua, in which I stated that the adequate protection of American lives and property on the east coast of Nicaragua required the landing of American armed forces for that purpose, and recommended that Admiral Latimer be instructed to land such forces as might be necessary at Puerto Cabezas, Bragmans Bluff and such other places as he might deem necessary in order to prevent interference by the revolutionists with American citizens and American companies in the lawful discharge of their commercial activities.

I note in your letter above mentioned a paraphrase of a telegram which you have sent to the Commander of the Special Service Squad-

\textsuperscript{49}Attached to this draft letter is a memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, dated December 29, which reads: "The attached letter, prepared but not sent, was shown to the President and the Secretary of the Navy at a conference at the White House December 28. A telegram embodying the main points of this letter was drafted at the White House and despatched to Admiral Latimer the same evening."

For the text of the telegram as sent, see letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State, December 29, infra.

\textsuperscript{48}Neither printed.
ron stating that the establishment and maintenance of neutral zones by the employment of landing parties, or the taking of such other measures as may be necessary for the protection of American lives and interests, will, it is hoped, control effectively the Liberal bases now present on the east coast of Nicaragua and will cut off the sources of further supplies which are arriving from outside and cannot with propriety be stopped at this time before landing.

Unfortunately your letter did not come to my personal attention until yesterday. I am afraid Admiral Latimer will take this as an instruction. Although I have the utmost confidence in his ability and discretion, I believe it would be wise for you to now instruct him to confine his activities to protecting the lives and property of American and foreign citizens where they are in danger and there is no other assurance of their protection. I assume this is all he has done.

It is not the Government's policy to intervene by armed force in the internal affairs of Nicaragua. This has been made perfectly plain by our action in the past. It is reported in the press this morning, although I do not credit it, that the whole east coast is to be declared a neutral zone. I do not think so-called neutral zones should be declared except where it is necessary for the protection of American citizens and their properties. While the State Department is loath to see munitions of war landed on the coast of Nicaragua which facilitates the continuation of hostilities between the two contending parties, I do not feel that American armed forces should endeavor to control this traffic providing the arms and munitions are not despatched from this country contrary to the provisions of the embargo on their exportation from the United States. I have been compelled reluctantly to recommend the landing of American armed forces but only for the protection of American and foreign lives and property and I feel that great care should be exercised by the American forces in Nicaragua to preserve the strictest neutrality between the revolutionists and the constitutional authorities.

I have [etc.]

817.00/4366

The Secretary of the Navy (Wilbur) to the Secretary of State

S.C. 117–24

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1936.

Sir: The following despatch which has been sent this date to the Commander of the Special Service Squadron in Nicaraguan waters is quoted for your information:

"The following instructions for your guidance; neutral zones should be of local nature only and solely for the protection of lives
and property of Americans and foreigners. There should be nothing in the nature of intervention or interference with the internal affairs of Nicaragua. Arms and ammunition found in the neutral zones at Rio Grande and Puerto Cabezas should be returned to owners. Ammunition held for inspection should be returned unless you know of some reason for holding same not yet disclosed, in which case advise us fully at once and await instructions. But in the future no arms or ammunition or armed forces of either party should be allowed to pass through the neutral zones. Keep the Department fully informed of any action taken by the forces under your command and any recommendations in the premises. Your action up to date is fully approved."

Respectfully,

CURTIS D. WILBUR

817.00/4362: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt)

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1926—3 p. m.

147. The Minister of Costa Rica has informed the Department that President Jimenez desires to offer his good offices as mediator between the contending parties in Nicaragua, and desires to know if the Department would see any objection to his doing so. In reply the Department has informed Señor Oreamuno that it sees no objection to President Jimenez taking this course if he desires to do so and that the Department will look with favor on any attempt made by the Costa Rican Government to bring about an agreement between the contending factions in Nicaragua and a peaceful and mutually satisfactory solution of the Nicaraguan problem.

You may informally advise President Diaz of the foregoing.

KELLOGG

817.00/4832c: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt)

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1926—4 p. m.

148. With reference to Department's 147, December 29, 3 p. m., the Minister of Costa Rica advised the Department today that President of Costa Rica has officially requested President Diaz and Sacasa to inform him if the good offices of Costa Rica would be acceptable to both parties in bringing about a settlement of their difficulties based on neutral [mutual?] concessions. Please report at once what are the views of President Diaz in regard to accepting Costa Rican mediation.

KELLOGG
The Minister in Nicaragua (Eberhardt) to the Secretary of State

MANAGUA, December 31, 1926—3 p. m.
[Received 10:20 p. m.]

257. Department’s 148, December 30, 4 p. m. President Diaz telegraphed a reply yesterday to President Jimenez’s offer of mediation stating that he had received similar [offer] from the Guatemalan Government which he had answered with a proposal to send a diplomat to Guatemala. While these conversations with the Guatemalan Government on mediation were in course, Diaz stated in his telegram he could not discuss a new offer of mediation.

President Diaz expressed surprise at the Department’s indorsement of the Costa Rican offer of mediation, pointing out that, of the four Central American Republics, Costa Rica was alone in definitely declining the invitation of the American Government to recognize his government, moreover that President Jimenez had in an official and published statement declared that Sacasa had “title” while Diaz had “control” or “possession” and that the Costa Rican Government could not recognize a government in Nicaragua which did not realize these two conditions of title and possession. President Jimenez had therefore prejudged the political issue in Nicaragua and pronounced publicly a judgment against the constitutionality of the Diaz Government exactly in contradiction of the opinion officially proclaimed by the United States Government. Under these circumstances Diaz did not see how he could be expected to accept as impartial the mediation of President Jimenez and surely the United States could not recommend that he accept mediation by a biased party. Diaz added that he would prefer the mediation of the Guatemalan Government which while unfriendly to him was frank in its hostility and had at least observed in its communications to his government the courtesy of giving him and his Minister of Foreign Affairs the official titles which they claimed, while the President of Costa Rica had addressed President Diaz without using a title.

(Admiral Latimer just telegraphed that main base of supplies for revolutionists is Port Limon, Costa Rica.)

Diaz failed to see how the mediation of Costa Rica, known to be prejudiced against the Conservative Party in Nicaragua, could be expected to succeed in bringing about an agreement where the good offices of the United States, known to be impartial, had been unsuccessful owing to Mexican support of the revolution. The situation with respect of Mexican [influence?] remained unchanged. All Central American countries, in view of recent events in Nicaragua,
now naturally in awe of Mexico wherefore a conference held under the auspices of any one of them would necessarily be dominated by the overwhelming Mexican influence over both the Central American Government mediating and the Liberal delegates. The Salvadoran representative in Managua had confidentially indicated to Diaz (he made the same statement to this Legation) that in view of recent unchecked Mexican aid of the revolution his Government regretted its hasty recognition of Diaz at the invitation of the American Government since it was feared that Mexican displeasure thereat might soon result in a decision to support a revolution to overthrow the Salvadoran Government and since it was generally understood that the United States was not disposed to check Mexican armed expeditions against Central American Republics, thereby leaving Mexico a free hand.

Diaz remarked that no conference held under the auspices of one Central American State had ever settled a conflict similar to that in progress and he referred to the proposal made by Guatemala last September for "fraternal action" to be taken by the Central American countries to bring about peace in Nicaragua in respect of which the Department had stated that it did not "think any beneficial results would be obtained by such action" (Department's telegram 71, September 10, 8 p. m.\(^4\)).

Diaz concluded by saying that he is still repeatedly offering to treat with the Liberals for peace on the broadest bases but they so far decline to consider his offers.

The Legation is conferring with some Liberal leaders this afternoon with a view to bringing about conference between them and the Government.

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817.00/4341: Telegram

*The Minister in Costa Rica (Davis) to the Secretary of State*

**San José, January 3, 1927—11 a. m.*

[Received January 4—12:15 a. m.]

1. President Jimenez sent the following message to Sacasa and Diaz on December 29th:

"The deplorable situation of Nicaragua profoundly affects the Costa Ricans. As matters are going, the victorious party will seat itself over ruins. If the mediation of Costa Rica were accepted by both groups I would offer it with the understanding that only

"Not printed."
mutual concessions can bring peace to Nicaragua. If you believe my mediation acceptable upon the base mentioned I would request you to inform me. I have addressed Don Adolfo Diaz in the same terms."

Sacasa replied as follows:

"I highly appreciate Your Excellency's message of the 24th [29th]. The Nicaraguan situation which afflicts Costa Rica saddens me profoundly. My persistent efforts for the reestablishment of constitutional peace and order by means of a correct application of the Washington pacts and my telegram to the Presidents of Central America on the 14th of November manifest my desire for a decorous, peaceful solution in accordance with the principles for which the Nicaraguan people threw themselves in the struggle, exasperated by the violence of made [de facto?] regimes. The brilliant victory of our arms at Laguna Perlas does not modify the impersonal criterion indicated and I receive (acejo in the Spanish text) with pleasure the mediation suggested through the noble patriotism of Your Excellency."

Diaz replied that the Guatemalan Government had offered mediation and that:

"In reply my Government said to that of Guatemala that it was disposed to send to that sister Republic a Legation for the purpose of informing [Guatemala] fully of our actual [present] political condition and to converse in the sense of its generous offer. This point has not been resolved and I therefore feel obliged to await until it is decided in order to be in a position to discuss any other mediation, however esteemed the person may be who has been a party to the new offer."

Repeated to Nicaragua and Guatemala.

Davis