TURKEY

EFFORTS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO OBTAIN RATIFICATION OF THE TREATIES CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY ON AUGUST 6, 1923[1]

711.67/46a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol)

[Extract]

WASHINGTON, *January 23, 1924—1 p. m.*

17. In a speech to be delivered today January 23, before the Council on Foreign Relations of New York, the Secretary is dealing with recent questions and negotiations and is devoting the concluding half of his speech to the consideration of Near Eastern questions. The Sections relating to the Near East are quoted below in full.[2]

The speech will be given to the press here for publication in the morning papers of January 24th.

"*The Near East, Turkey.*—Let me now direct your attention to affairs in the Near East. The events of the past few years have created a new situation, and the difficulty in clarifying present problems is largely due to the fact that so many of our people discuss them in terms which belong to the past. While there was some consideration of Turkish questions in 1919, and certain inquiries were prosecuted, it was not until 1920, after the Austrian and Bulgarian treaties had been disposed of, that the Allies definitely took up the Turkish treaty. This treaty, called the treaty of Sèvres,[3] was signed in August of that year. Its terms were severer than those of the European peace treaties, not only depriving the Turks of vast territories but imposing upon them an even greater measure of foreign control than had been the case before the war. In spite, however, of the Allied occupation of Constantinople, the Greek occupation of Smyrna and its hinterland, and the French occupation of Cilicia, the Turks refused to ratify the treaty. The Allies were not in a position to compel them to do so.

As one of the results of the Great War, a new spirit of nationalism and a desire for freedom from outside control had made itself felt in the Near East. Nowhere had the evangel of self-determination

[1] For negotiation and signing of general treaty and extradition treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1923, vol. II, pp. 1040 ff.

[2] Section dealing with Greece is printed in another extract from this telegram, *ante*, p. 262.

[3] *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1920, vol. CXIII, p. 652.

found a more eager response. The nationalistic movement was particularly significant in Turkey. That this movement had often been accompanied by violence is not to be wondered at, although it is nonetheless to be regretted. The outcome of the movement in Turkey was the establishment of a government which claimed the right to be dealt with as sovereign and which by its military achievements made good that claim.

As early as January, 1920, the so-called Turkish National Pact had been voted by the Ottoman Parliament which was then assembled at Constantinople. This pact set forth the aspirations of the Turks and later was adopted by the National Assembly at Angora as summarizing the object of the Turkish Nationalist movement. Among its provisions was the following:

ARTICLE VI. 'It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development should be rendered possible and that it should be possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more up-to-date regular administration.

'For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial, and other matters.'

In March, 1921, the Allied Powers clearly appreciated that it would be impossible, short of armed allied military intervention in Turkey, to impose the treaty of Sèvres. It would seem that at no time was such armed allied intervention seriously considered, although from time to time certain of the Allied Powers gave a measure of support to the Greek forces in the hope that the latter would be able, through their victory over the Turks, to make possible the realization of the Sèvres treaty at least in part. There were unsuccessful attempts to revise the treaty. At last the total defeat of the Greek forces and the withdrawal of the Greek Army from Anatolia completely changed the situation to the advantage of Turkey and effected the elimination of the treaty of Sèvres as a basis for negotiation. A victorious Turkish Army being in complete control of Anatolia and threatening Constantinople, the Allied Powers intervened to bring about an armistice between Greece and Turkey which was signed at Mudania in October, 1922. The Lausanne conferences of 1922 and 1923 followed.

The Allies frankly recognized that the situation of 1918 no longer existed and that after the stubborn resistance of the Turks, culminating in their recapture of Smyrna, it was impossible to dictate the terms of peace. A treaty was therefore negotiated in which the Turks ceded very considerable territories and for the first time in their history agreed to open the Straits not only to merchant ships but to foreign warships, but in which the Allies, on the other hand, agreed to renounce their historic capitulatory rights in Turkey.

In 1919 and 1920 the question was directly presented to the Government of the United States as to the nature and extent of its participation in the political and territorial readjustments of the Near East. At that time the spokesmen for the Allied Powers at Paris suggested that the United States assume a mandate for Constantinople and Armenia. The formal proposal was never presented for the consideration of the Congress, as it was clear as early as 1919 that the American people would not favor the assumption of a man-

date over Constantinople, which would immediately and directly involve this Government in one of the most vexing political and territorial problems of the world—the storm center of historic rivalries and bitter contests.

When the question of an American [*Armenian*] mandate was formally presented in 1920 as a result of the action of the Allied representatives meeting at San Remo, the Congress declined to sanction it. It thus again became apparent that the United States Government was not prepared to intervene in Near Eastern affairs to the extent of assuming any obligations of a territorial character. This course was in accord with our traditional policy. The United States had taken no part in the Turkish settlements which were embodied in the treaties of Paris in 1856, of Berlin in 1878, or in those which followed the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Even during the World War we did not declare war on Turkey or take the initiative in breaking relations with that country, notwithstanding the serious provocation, from a humanitarian standpoint, of the extensive Armenian deportations. Presumably it was felt that the policy then adopted was better calculated to enable the United States to exert its influence and to protect its interests so long as this country was not to join the military operations on the Near Eastern front.

If there ever was a time when we could have successfully intervened and have backed up our intervention by armed forces, it was early in 1919 when we had a large army abroad and were in a position to prosecute such a policy if deemed advisable. But this opportunity passed. It should be added that, contrary to an impression which is somewhat widespread in this country, this Government, while it has always exerted its influence in a humanitarian way, has not assumed political obligations with respect to the Armenians or other Christian minorities in the Near East. Treaties concluded by other powers undertook, however, to deal with such questions. This Government took no part in the negotiation of the treaty of Sèvres.

Such, then, was the situation prior to the year 1921. In developing our relations with the Near East subsequently, it was necessary to take into account the established policy of the Government and at the same time to serve American interests and humanitarian ends. It should also be remembered that a large part of the distress in the Near East has been caused by encouraging action which failed of adequate support. At various times the Armenians and Greeks have been encouraged to take up arms, later to be left to their own devices. This Government, however, would not be justified in promoting such a policy on the part of others which it was not prepared itself adequately to sustain. It has no mandate from the people to intervene by arms and thus to impose by force a solution of the problems of the Near East. And, for this very reason, it could not essay the rôle of a dictator in order to determine how others should solve these problems.

This, however, did not prevent this country from cooperating in a spirit of helpfulness and from bringing, as it has brought, its moral influence to aid in dealing with a situation of the utmost difficulty. This influence was brought to bear at the Lausanne Conference, where the efforts of the American representatives undoubtedly contributed in no small degree to the final agreement upon provi-

sions regarding the protection of minorities, the recognition of charitable, educational, and philanthropic institutions, the appointment of judicial advisers and the maintenance of equality of opportunity. As I have said, a state of war had not existed between the United States and Turkey, and the course of events following the German War had reaffirmed the historic policy of refraining from intervention in political and territorial readjustments. Turkey had severed diplomatic relations with us in 1917, however, and these had not been resumed. But the formal conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey, entailing as it would the resumption of full diplomatic and consular relations, would leave the United States, unless appropriate action were taken, in a relatively disadvantageous position. Accordingly, negotiations were undertaken between American and Turkish representatives which resulted in the treaty of amity and commerce and the extradition treaty signed on August 6 last.[4]

The treaty of amity and commerce followed very closely the Allied treaty without its territorial, political, and financial features. The United States gained the same general rights and privileges as the Allies, including the freedom of the Straits, and like the Allies consented to the abrogation of the capitulations, that is, of the exercise of the ex-territorial rights in Turkey which the Turks regarded as in derogation of their sovereignty.

In making this important decision the American representatives were obliged to take account of the following considerations. It was quite apparent that the only basis upon which negotiations could be conducted was that of most-favored-nation treatment and reciprocity. Either the Turks were to be dealt with on this footing or not at all. In these circumstances three courses were open to us: (1) To compel the Turks by force to give us better terms than the Allies; (2) not to negotiate at all; or (3) to negotiate with the Turks on equal terms as with a State enjoying an unqualified sovereignty.

The first course was out of the question. However desirable the maintenance of ex-territorial rights hitherto enjoyed might be, it was obvious that the public opinion of this country would not countenance a war for the purpose of maintaining them. Neither did it appear to be practicable to forego negotiations, in an attempt to maintain the *status quo*. After the armistice of 1918, we sent to Constantinople a high commissioner, with a naval detachment under his command, and in spite of his unofficial status in relation to the Turkish authorities he has succeeded in affording American interests appropriate protection. But this anomalous situation could not continue indefinitely. When the treaty of peace between the Allies and Turkey comes into effect, and diplomatic and consular officials of the Allied Powers return to Turkey, we should find ourselves in an extremely difficult position if action meanwhile had not been taken to regularize our own position, and in the absence of a treaty American interests in Turkey would be without adequate safeguards. In this event, the humanitarian interests which are closest to the American heart would suffer. It was also perfectly clear that

[4] *Foreign Relations*, 1923, vol. II, pp. 1153 and 1167.

no period of waiting would avail to secure for us ex-territorial rights which on their part the Allies surrendered.

In these circumstances, the only practicable course was to negotiate a treaty as with a fully sovereign State. If such a treaty falls short of expectations, especially in that it acquiesces in the abrogation of the capitulations, it should not be forgotten that the only way to maintain the capitulations was to fight for them. It should also be borne in mind (1) that the Lausanne treaty is such a treaty as would be negotiated with any other sovereign state, (2) that it gives us the same rights as other countries will enjoy under the new régime, and (3) that by regularizing our relations with Turkey, now interrupted for nearly seven years, it will provide safeguards for American educational, philanthropic, and commercial interests in Turkey.

Let me emphasize a further point. At no stage in the negotiations was the American position determined by the so-called Chester concession. This had been granted before negotiations of our treaty with Turkey had been begun. This Government took no part in securing it; this Government made no barter of any of its rights for this or any other concession. Our position is a simple one. We maintain the policy of the open door or equality of commercial opportunity; we demand a square deal for our nationals. We objected to the alleged concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company owned by foreign interests because it had never been validly granted, and in so doing we stood for American rights generally and not for any particular interest. Opening the door for American nationals we give them impartial and appropriate diplomatic support in the assertion of what appear to be their legal rights, but without otherwise involving this Government.

During the course of our recent negotiations, the Department of State was in frequent consultation with those whose interests in Turkey it is its privilege and duty properly to protect, particularly those whose humanitarian enterprises have long been established. They have clearly indicated their accord with the position that the present situation in Turkey should be frankly faced and that the Turkish authorities should have an opportunity to show that their expressed desire for American friendship and help and their willingness to protect American interests are sincere. It is on this basis that our policy toward Turkey is being developed. Let it be understood that Turkey, while insistent upon unqualified sovereign rights, does not reject the international obligations which are correlative to such rights. Let it also be appreciated that Turkey is not endeavoring to undermine our institutions, to penetrate our labor organizations by pernicious propaganda, and to foment disorder and conspiracies against our domestic peace in the interest of a world revolution.

No one is more competent to speak on the subject of the treaty than Dr. James L. Barton, secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Permit me to quote from his recent letter (November 24, 1923):

'To say that I have followed with keen interest the making of this treaty and its fate up to the present time is to express but mildly my own feeling as well as the feeling of the American Board and its friends. While the treaty does not contain all that we would like, yet I am sure I express the judgment of the

officers of the American Board and, so far as I know, the missionaries both on the field and here at home when I say that it is our earnest hope that the treaty will be ratified by the Senate and that without acrimonious debate. We are convinced that this is the best treaty that could be secured under the circumstances, but that it will furnish a basis for negotiations and for securing privileges not covered in the treaty.

'If the treaty should be rejected, I am convinced that the continuance of American institutions in Turkey, with their large invested interests, would be jeopardized. Under the treaty there are grounds for believing that they will be permitted to continue. I refer to educational, religious, medical, industrial, and philanthropic enterprises hitherto carried on by Americans, representing large American investments in Turkey. There are indications that the Government will look with increasing favor upon the continuation of these institutions and grant them enlarging privileges. This has already taken place in Smyrna, Tarsus, and at some other points.'

Let me add to this the statement of the distinguished educator, Dr. Caleb F. Gates, president of Robert College of Constantinople: After referring to the views of objectors, he says:

'Let us ask for a moment why it is that we have not made a treaty more in conformity with the wishes of so many of the American people. Is it because the American representatives were not skillful and allowed themselves to be outwitted by the Turks? The American representatives acquitted themselves exceedingly well; they gained the respect of their opponents as well as of the representatives of the Allied Powers. They came out of the conference with a reputation enhanced by the ability and fairness they had shown, and they gained for their country fully as much as the representatives of the Allied Powers gained for theirs. . . . The Turks were determined to become sovereign in their own domain, and they were willing and prepared to fight in order to obtain this sovereignty while the Allies were not. Even those Americans who now denounce this treaty as unsatisfactory were determined that their country should not go to war over these questions. . . . It is the only kind of a treaty which could have been made under the circumstances, when one party knew exactly what they wanted and were ready to fight to obtain it, and the other party was not willing to fight, but still wished to retain the former conditions. . . . As to the treaty itself, what does it give to us? It gives the good will of the Turks instead of their ill will. That is certainly worth something to all who live and work in Turkey. To them the treaty affords an opportunity to work out the problems which their life in Turkey presents and to exercise what influence they may possess in favor of the right. It still leaves an opportunity for missionaries and educators to try to make the principles of righteousness known and practiced in Turkey and it gives to business men a field for their legitimate activities. . . . The schools and colleges established by Americans are carrying on their work and many of those that had been closed are reopening.'

In order to accord adequate protection to American interests in the Near East during the period following the Great War, the Department of State has maintained its representatives throughout this area and a naval force has been stationed in Near Eastern waters since 1919. Until October, 1922, this force consisted of from three to nine destroyers with various other craft from time to time. When news was received of the Smyrna disaster 12 additional destroyers were immediately dispatched, arriving in Turkish waters during October of that year. These vessels have been of inestimable service to the representatives of the Department of State and to all American interests in the Near East. Through their radio they have furnished communication when no other means were available. They have transported American missionaries, philanthropists, relief workers, and business men, saving days and weeks of time when no other adequate means of transportation were available. They have assisted in the evacuation of refugees and they have been instrumental

in serving manifold humanitarian purposes. It is a pleasure to commend the admirable work that has been performed by the officers and men of these vessels.

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PHILLIPS

711.672/287b

The Secretary of State to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge

WASHINGTON, *May 5, 1924.*

MY DEAR SENATOR LODGE: With a letter dated May 2 [5] I laid before the President the treaties concluded between the United States and Turkey on August 6, 1923 and certain papers which were signed and authenticated in connection with the conclusion of these treaties.[6] It is my understanding that the President has transmitted the treaties to the Senate [7] and that they are now before the Committee on Foreign Relations. The following observations with reference to the treaties are submitted with a view to facilitating the consideration of these instruments by the Committee. If further information is desired I shall be happy to furnish it.

The events which led up to the conclusion of the treaties above mentioned were outlined in a general way in an address which I delivered on January 23, 1924. To the remarks made in that address, of which a copy is attached (Enclosure 1),[8] it may be useful to add the following observations concerning the part played by this Government in the Conference of Lausanne and concerning the circumstances in which the negotiations between the American and Turkish representatives at that Conference were initiated and conducted.

The United States, though never at war with Turkey, was deeply interested in the settlement of the problems growing out of the war between Turkey and the Powers with which this country was associated in the war against the Central Powers. Upon the invitation of the Allied Governments, the United States was accordingly represented at the Lausanne Conference but was not a party to the Treaty of Peace or other instruments concluded between the Allied Powers and Turkey.

During the first phase of the Conference, which extended from November 20, 1922, to February 4, 1923, the three representatives of the United States, as occasion arose, expressed the views of this Government upon questions affecting American interests. They pointed

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[5] Not printed.
[6] See *Foreign Relations*, 1923, vol. II, pp. 1139–1148.
[7] They were transmitted to the Senate May 3, 1924.
[8] See telegram no. 17, Jan. 23, 1924, to the High Commissioner in Turkey, *supra*.

out the vital importance of the adoption by Turkey of a policy calculated to reassure foreigners concerning the administration of justice. They urged that recognition and protection be accorded by the Turkish authorities to American missions, schools, and hospitals in Turkey. They supported the principle of the "Open Door" and the equality of economic opportunity. They advocated freedom of navigation and passage through the Straits and associated themselves heartily with the representatives of the Allied Powers in impressing upon the Turkish Government the necessity of agreeing to adequate measures for the protection of the non-Turkish minorities in Turkish territory and for the extension to such minorities of the rights and privileges believed to be essential to their well-being.

During the first phase of the Conference agreement was reached between the Allies and Turks with regard to many important features of the peace settlement, but as there was lack of accord on certain points at issue, an adjournment took place, during which the Turkish delegates returned to Angora to ascertain the views of the Grand National Assembly. The second phase of the Conference, which began on April 23, 1923, terminated on July 24, 1923, with the signature of a treaty of peace and several other instruments, including a commercial convention, a convention regarding residence, business, and jurisdiction, and a convention relating to the régime of the Straits. Copies of these instruments are enclosed for your information (Enclosure 2).[9]

The arrangements thus concluded provided for the acceptance by the Allied Powers of the complete abolition of the Capitulations from every point of view. The Turkish Government, however, agreed for a period of five years to certain limitations in matters of taxation and customs dues, and it undertook for a period of seven years to permit all questions involving the civil status of Allied nationals to be determined by courts sitting within the territory of the countries to which such nationals belonged. Certain assurances were, moreover, given by declaration in regard to the employment of legal advisers to collaborate in the administration of justice as it affects foreigners in Turkey and to assist in making reforms which might be deemed necessary to modernize the administration of justice, as well as in regard to the execution of awards made upon the voluntary arbitration of controversies concerning civil or commercial matters.

The status of Allied charitable, educational, and philanthropic institutions in Turkey was dealt with in a letter addressed by the Turkish representatives to the British, French, and Italian Delega-

[9] Enclosures not printed. Texts of agreements signed at Lausanne July 24, 1923, are printed in the League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. XXVIII, and British Cmd. 1929, Treaty Series No. 16 (1923): *Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and Other Instruments, Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923*, etc.

tions at Lausanne, and in the convention relating to the régime of the Straits recognition was given to the principle of the freedom of navigation and passage for commercial vessels and aircraft and war vessels and aircraft both in time of peace and in time of war, subject to certain limitations in the case of war vessels and to certain restrictions in the event of Turkey or the country to which the vessels or aircraft belong being engaged in the war.

The Treaty of Peace incorporated provisions assuring to the non-Moslem minorities in Turkey, among other rights or privileges, the full and complete protection of life and property; the free exercise of creed, religion, or belief; freedom of movement and of emigration; equality with Moslems in civil and political rights; the right to maintain charitable, religious, social and scholastic institutions and to use their own language and exercise their own religion therein; and the right to determine questions of personal status and domestic relations in accordance with their own usages. These provisions the Turks undertook to recognize as fundamental laws. Representatives of the United States who were present at the meetings of the committee which framed and adopted these provisions, played an important part in their elaboration.

In the second phase of the Conference at Lausanne the Government of the United States was represented by the American Minister to Switzerland, the Honorable Joseph C. Grew. Shortly after the beginning of this phase of the Conference Mr. Grew was approached by Ismet Pasha, the head of the Turkish Delegation, with the suggestion that a new treaty should be made between the United States and Turkey. In response to inquiries as to the basis upon which the Turkish Delegation envisaged the making of a new treaty, Ismet Pasha stated that a new treaty or treaties should be, in general, upon the fully reciprocal basis which he regarded as alone compatible with the sovereignty of Turkey and the changed conditions in the country, but that Turkey was prepared to grant to the United States any privilege which she granted to any other Power.

The negotiations which followed between the American and Turkish Delegations at Lausanne resulted in the conclusion of the treaties of August 6, 1923 which are now before the Committee on Foreign Relations. By way of general observation, I may state that these treaties are in essential respects of the same character as the treaties usually concluded concerning similar matters between the United States and other sovereign States. As will appear from the parallel summaries which I attach (Enclosure 3),[10] the provisions of the new treaties are much more detailed and definite than those of the Treaty

[10] Not printed.

of Commerce and Navigation of 1830[11] and the Extradition Treaty of 1874[12] with the Ottoman Empire.

The provisions concerning the capitulatory régime in the treaty of general relations merit further comment. Many of the rights enjoyed by foreigners in Turkey under the capitulations were such as are enjoyed by foreigners in other countries under international law or under treaties of a reciprocal character. To the maintenance of such rights the Turkish Government had no objection, as is evidenced by the fact that in the Treaty of Peace and other instruments concluded with the Allies at Lausanne, as well as in the treaty with the United States, the Turkish representatives readily agreed to the introduction of provisions of a reciprocal character granting to foreigners the right to enter and establish themselves in Turkey, subject to the observance of the laws and regulations in force therein, and assuring to them the most constant protection and security for their persons and their property in accordance with generally recognized international law. The special privileges, of a juridical and economic character, conferred upon foreigners by the Capitulations were, however, considered by the Turkish Government to be burdensome and unfair.

The Turkish National Pact which was adopted on January 28, 1920 and which was stated by the Turkish Government before the convening of the Lausanne Conference to embody the conditions upon which alone a durable peace could be made, contained a declaration that the restrictions imposed upon Turkey by the Capitulations could no longer be tolerated. In the negotiations with the Allies at Lausanne the Turkish representatives steadfastly adhered to that declaration. The result of the negotiations between the Turks and the Allies with reference to the Capitulations has already been noted. The negotiations between the United States and Turkey could have been conducted on no other basis than the agreement of this country to take towards the Capitulations an attitude similar to that adopted by the other Powers in dealing with Turkey.

The treaties which I am transmitting to you were supplemented by assurances in a formal communication to Mr. Grew from Ismet Pasha regarding the recognition and protection of American educational, charitable, and philanthropic institutions in Turkey.[13] In substance the communication provides that such American institutions as had been recognized prior to October 30, 1914 shall continue to be recognized and that the situation of such of them as have been established subsequently shall be favorably examined. This communication was transmitted with the treaties.

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[11] Miller, *Treaties*, vol. 3, p. 541.
[12] Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776–1909, vol. II, p. 1341.
[13] Note of Aug. 4 and its enclosure, *Foreign Relations*, 1923, vol. II, pp. 1141–1142.

On the date of the signature of the treaties Ismet Pasha formally communicated to Mr. Grew copies of the declarations of the Turkish Delegation regarding the administration of justice and regarding sanitary affairs in Turkey. Copies of these declarations and translations thereof, with a copy and translation of the transmitting letters, were also submitted with the Treaties.[14] The declarations were made under authorization of the Grand National Assembly at Angora and may doubtless be regarded as constituting international commitments. It is believed that their formal communication to the American representative was desirable in order to emphasize the interest of the United States in the matters to which they relate.

A question which it was found impracticable to settle at Lausanne was subsequently dealt with by an exchange of notes at Constantinople. This was the question of the disposition of the pecuniary claims of American citizens against Turkey. On the date of the signature of the treaties at Lausanne this question was formally reserved by an exchange of notes of which copies and translations are attached (Enclosure 4).[15] In the subsequent negotiations at Constantinople it became apparent that the Turkish Government, having in mind the disturbed conditions of the last fifteen years in Turkey, as well as the financial problems incidental to the establishment of a new Government, was indisposed to make any formal commitment regarding the final settlement of claims in advance of the examination of the claims themselves. It was finally deemed to be the most feasible method of procedure to effect an agreement by an exchange of notes for the examination of all claims by a Mixed Committee which will endeavor to determine the merits of the claims examined, and to agree upon modes of settling such claims as may be deemed to possess merit. Copies and translations of the notes on this subject exchanged at Constantinople on December 24, 1923, between Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, United States High Commissioner, and Dr. Adnan Bey, Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, are attached (Enclosure 5).[16]

With reference to assurances regarding the treatment of minorities in Turkey, I desire to recall the part played by representatives of the United States in connection with the framing of the provisions regarding minorities contained in the Allied Treaty with Turkey. The interest of the United States in the welfare of the Minorities was appropriately expressed at both phases of the Lausanne Conference. This Government, however, in dealing with this subject has avoided the advocacy of measures impossible of realization by methods short of war or of measures which would only be calculated to make more

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 1139–1141.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 1143.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 1190.

difficult the reaching of adjustments between the Minorities and the authorities in control of the country. In the long run the protection of Minorities has rarely been furthered by foreign interference on their behalf and often the result of such interference has been quite the opposite of that sought to be achieved. Further, in this connection it was necessary to give consideration to the traditional policy of the United States against intervention in behalf of the nationals of other countries or the assumption of treaty obligations in such matters.

It is my deliberate opinion, predicated upon a careful consideration of the situation in Turkey, that the rights and activities of American citizens in that country can best be protected through the adoption of the new treaties which, while consenting to the abrogation of the Capitulations, assure to American citizens and concerns in Turkey rights and privileges as great as those accorded to citizens and concerns of any other Power in Turkey. Those who might be disposed to advocate an attempt to maintain the pre-war status should remember that the rights enjoyed by American citizens under the régime of the Capitulations were for the most part specifically granted to other Powers and applied to American citizens by virtue of most-favored-nation provisions in our Treaty of 1830. The Powers concerned agreed at Lausanne to surrender these capitulatory rights and the practical value of the Treaty of 1830 has therefore been seriously impaired. Unless we are willing to go to war with Turkey, a persistence on our part in claiming capitulatory rights formerly enjoyed would simply expose our Government to a series of futile negotiations and would render most arduous, if not altogether impossible, the continuance of the philanthropic, educational and commercial activities of our citizens in Turkey; instead of the substantial rights provided under the new treaties, this Government would have no recourse but to illusory claims based on a régime which the United States would be alone in endeavoring to maintain.

This is also the opinion of Americans at present actually engaged in such activities in Turkey. These Americans, who will be most directly affected by the new treaties and those interests were carefully borne in mind throughout the negotiations at Lausanne, have expressed the view that the results secured afford the only practicable basis for the carrying on of their activities in Turkey under present conditions.

Before submitting the treaties to the Senate, which as you will note were negotiated nine months ago, it was considered important, (1) to conclude the negotiations with Turkey with reference to the formation of a committee to consider outstanding claims between the two countries and their nationals, (2) to ascertain the attitude of the Allied Powers toward the treaty of peace concluded between those powers and Turkey at Lausanne shortly before the signature of the

treaty between the United States and Turkey and (3) to secure all available information as to whether the government with which the United States had negotiated was willing and able to carry out its international obligations.

With regard to these three points the first, the question of claims, has already been dealt with in this letter. With reference to the attitude of other powers towards Turkey I may state that Italy, Greece and Rumania have ratified the treaty of peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey. This treaty has been approved by the British Parliament and has been favorably reported by the appropriate committee of the French Chamber of Deputies and the French Senate. There is every reason to believe therefore that the Allied Powers will establish peace with Turkey at an early date on the basis of the agreements negotiated by those Powers at Lausanne.

The fact that the Turkish Government has during the last nine months maintained and consolidated its position is *prima facie* evidence of stability but to secure the latest information, Admiral Bristol the American Representative in Turkey has recently made a trip throughout Anatolia, visiting Angora, Konia, Tarsus, Adana, Mersina and other points. According to his report the Turkish Government is stable, is in control of the country and is believed to be in a position to assume on behalf of Turkey, and to carry out, international obligations.

Further, the constitutional changes which have taken place in Turkey during the last nine months, the separation of church and state, the adoption of a new constitution, and the establishment of a republic have indicated a desire on the part of Turkey to modernize its institutions, and thereby to facilitate an administration of law more in conformity with western ideas of justice.

I have desired to set forth in this letter and its enclosures the information which appeared to be necessary to an understanding of the treaties and of the circumstances which preceded and attended their negotiation and conclusion. If further information is desired I shall be happy to furnish it.

I am [etc.] CHARLES E. HUGHES

711.672/306a

The Secretary of State to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge

WASHINGTON, *June 7, 1924.*

MY DEAR SENATOR LODGE: My attention has been called to a resolution introduced into the Senate by Senator King (*Congressional Record* of June 3, page 10571 ff.[17]) with regard to the Lausanne

[17] Vol. LXV, pt. 10, p. 10292, in bound edition.

Treaty and the so-called Chester concession. The treaties concluded with Turkey are now before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate together with the information which I felt might be useful to the Committee in its consideration of these instruments. I do not feel therefore that it would be appropriate for me at this time to enter into any detailed discussion of the various allegations contained in the statement accompanying Senator King's resolution. At the appropriate time and as desired by the Foreign Relations Committee I shall be glad to give full information with regard to any matters pertinent to the consideration of these treaties.

Certain of the statements of Senator King are of such a character, however, that I did not feel that I should allow them to pass unnoticed, although their inaccuracy has been indicated in the information which I have already laid before the Committee.

1. The charge "that the United States participated in the Lausanne Conference apparently for the sole purpose of securing and confirming the Chester oil concession and that in pursuance of that purpose, vested and essential rights of American nationals in Turkey were sacrificed and Armenia forsaken, if not betrayed," is absolutely unfounded. As I stated in January last, "At no stage in the negotiations was the American position determined by the so-called Chester concession. This had been granted before negotiations of our treaty with Turkey had been begun. This Government took no part in securing it; this Government made no barter of any of its rights for this or any other concession."

Senator King in referring to the date of our negotiations with Turkey has apparently confused the negotiations between the Allied Powers and Turkey with the negotiations of the American Plenipotentiary at Lausanne and the Turkish representatives. The latter negotiations were not initiated until subsequent to May 1, 1923. While the United States was represented at Lausanne during the earlier phases of the conference it had not prior to May 1923 undertaken the negotiation of a Treaty.

2. Senator King contrasts the action of this Government in 1920 with respect to the Sèvres Treaty with that of 1923, indicating that there was in 1923 a reversal of the earlier attitude toward Turkey. It is possible that the Senator does not recall that the United States was represented at the San Remo Conference in 1920, which had under consideration the Treaty of Sèvres, in the same capacity as at Lausanne. The United States, however, was neither a party to the Treaty of Sèvres nor to the Lausanne Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey.

3. In view of the fact that the reference in Senator King's statement to my memorandum of October 30, 1922, with regard to the Near Eastern Settlement is inaccurate I beg to enclose a copy of the

full text of this memorandum which was given to the Press at that time.[18] At the Lausanne Conference this Government stood for the principles outlined in this memorandum and was able to obtain substantial guarantees with respect to the points of interest which this communication outlined.

4. Senator King states:

"The Allies declined to make concessions to the Turks, both on the subject of the capitulations and upon the Armenian case. The conference was deadlocked largely upon these two points, and it was finally suspended on February 4, 1923.

"Meanwhile, on April 10, 1923, the crafty Turks ratified the Chester concession. The conference was resumed on April 23, 1923, and the American observers, who, during the first session of the conference, had supported the Allies, whole-heartedly in some matters, half-heartedly in others, transferred their support in all matters to the Turks, with the result that the Turks were enabled to impose their views and will upon the Allies."

This statement is totally inaccurate. In the draft treaty of peace as communicated to the Turks by the Allies on January 31, 1923 it is provided in Article 26:

"The High Contracting Parties agree to abrogate the capitulations relating to the regime of foreigners in Turkey both as regards conditions of entry and residence and as regards fiscal and judicial questions."

Thus prior to the adjournment of the Conference on February 4th, the Allies had agreed to abrogate the capitulations. This was not one of the points which brought about the interruption of the Conference. Nor was the issue with respect to the Armenians instrumental in deadlocking the Conference in February 1923 since the Turkish plenipotentiary had agreed to the provisions of the Allied treaty as communicated on January 31, which related to the protection of minorities. The statement that the American representatives after the adjournment "transferred their support in all matters to the Turks with the result that the Turks were enabled to impose their views and will upon the Allies" is utterly false.

5. In answer to the allegation that the treaty surrenders American rights and interests I would call your attention to the fact that the Americans who have interests in Turkey, whether philanthropic or commercial, have urged its ratification.

6. Senator King's remarks with regard to the status of American philanthropic and missionary work in Turkey are both inaccurate and misleading. In this connection it is significant that the Americans who are responsible for carrying on this work in Turkey have

[18] See telegram no. 344, Oct. 27, 1922, to the Ambassador in France, *Foreign Relations*, 1923, vol. II, p. 884.

indicated their view that their work could best be aided by the ratification of the treaty with Turkey and have submitted encouraging reports of recent progress.

In case there are further points in Senator King's statement on which the Committee might desire to obtain additional information, I shall be most happy to furnish it.

I am [etc.] CHARLES E. HUGHES

711.672/306a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, *June 12, 1924—11 a. m.*

106. On June 7 the Senate adjourned *sine die*. No action had been taken on Lausanne treaty.

It does not seem at all likely now that Congress will meet again before the regular December session. Department will send written instructions.

HUGHES

711.672/325a

The Secretary of State to Senator William E. Borah

WASHINGTON, *December 8, 1924.*

MY DEAR SENATOR BORAH: It is my understanding that the Treaties concluded between the United States and Turkey on August 6, 1923 are now before the Committee on Foreign Relations.

In a letter to the late Senator Lodge dated May 5th last, of which I attach a copy,[19] I described the negotiations which led up to the conclusions of these treaties and outlined the considerations which led me to believe that American interests would best be served by prompt ratification.

The events which have occurred during the past six months have confirmed this view. During this period the treaties concluded by the Allied Powers at Lausanne with the new Turkish Republic have been ratified and have gone into effect and Turkey has negotiated additional treaties with most of the other Powers of Europe. Further, since the date of my letter to Senator Lodge Turkey has carried out substantial reforms in her judicial organization and in administrative matters as provided for under the new Constitution of the Turkish Republic of April 20, 1924.

American citizens who have interests in Turkey, whether of a philanthropic, educational or commercial character, have consistently

[19] *Ante*, p. 715.

urged the early ratification of the Treaties. It is now sixteen months since our treaty with Turkey was signed at Lausanne and in view of recent developments this Government will be at a serious disadvantage in safeguarding these legitimate American interests unless early action is taken to regularize our relations with that country. The Treaty of August 6th furnishes what I consider to be an appropriate, and the only present available, basis for so doing.

I should be very glad at any time to take up with you any phase of this matter in greater detail or to lay before the Committee any information which might be helpful in connection with the consideration of the treaties with Turkey.

The matter is one which I consider to be of real urgency.

I am [etc.] CHARLES E. HUGHES

711.672/326

Senator William E. Borah to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, *December 8, 1924.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of December 8th relative to the Treaties concluded between the United States and Turkey on August 6, 1923.

I have already made some inquiry among the Members of the Committee relative to taking up these Treaties. I find considerable opposition and I doubt if we shall be able to do anything with them before the holidays. I hope, however, to bring them up for consideration at the next meeting after the session on Thursday.

I have not myself concluded my study of these Treaties and cannot express a view, but I am thoroughly in sympathy with the proposition of disposing of them. I see no reason why longer delay should be had.

Very respectfully,

WM. E. BORAH

711.672/328 : Telegram

The High Comissioner in Turkey (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 12, 1924—3 p. m.*

[Received December 13—6 : 53 a. m.]

232. Minister of Foreign Affairs intimated informally day before yesterday to delegate at Angora that our treaties would not be presented to Assembly for ratification until our Senate had ratified or at least seemed to be on the point of ratifying them. It would be most helpful if I could have exact present status of treaties before Senate.

BRISTOL

711.672/329a

The Secretary of State to President Coolidge

WASHINGTON, *December 18, 1924.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As you will recall, the Treaty concluded on August 6, 1923, between the United States and Turkey was transmitted by you to the Senate during the last session of Congress and was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, but did not come up for consideration prior to the Senate's adjournment.

Since the submission of this Treaty to the Senate the treaties concluded by the Allied Powers with Turkey at Lausanne have been ratified and formal diplomatic relations have been resumed by these Powers as well as by many of the other Powers of Europe which have also concluded treaties with the new Turkish Government. In view of this situation it has become increasingly important that this Government should secure a proper basis upon which to protect American interests in Turkey through early ratification of our Treaty.

I have brought this situation briefly to the attention of Senator Borah, who has replied that while he finds considerable opposition to the Turkish Treaty he hopes to bring it up for early consideration.

While the United States never declared war on Turkey we have had no formal diplomatic or consular relations with that country since April 1917, and the present Treaty has been negotiated for the purpose of facilitating the resumption of relations on a secure basis, taking into account the changes which have resulted from the events of the past seven years. The Treaty is, in effect, the last of the series of treaties we have negotiated with the Central Powers to regularize the situation resulting from the World War. Under this Treaty we secure substantially all the privileges which the Allies obtained under their peace settlement with Turkey, but without incurring the political obligations relating to the Near East which those Powers have assumed.

We can hardly expect to receive more favorable treatment than the Allied Powers. In fact, I do not believe that it would be conducive to friendly international relations or consistent with our general policy to endeavor to secure a régime of special privileges in Turkey. The Turks have indicated their willingness and desire for friendly relations with the United States. American citizens who have interests in Turkey have very emphatically indicated the importance which they place upon the early ratification of the Treaty. If ratification should be unduly delayed we would have to face the possibility that the Turkish Government would not extend indefinitely to the United States the benefits of the régime which other Powers have

secured by treaty. In fact, two cases have already arisen in which the Turkish authorities have declined to extend to American citizens the privileges secured to nationals of the Allied powers under their treaty settlement with Turkey. I cannot view without very serious concern the situation in which this Government would be placed with respect to the protection of American interests in Turkey in the event that the present anomalous situation should be continued for any great length of time.

I venture to bring this matter to your attention in the hope that you may deem it proper, should the occasion be presented, to emphasize to members of the Senate the importance of early action on the Turkish Treaty.

In the event that you should desire to have available further information on the subject of the Treaty, I enclose with this letter a copy of a communication which I addressed to the late Senator Lodge on May 5, 1924,[20] outlining in some detail the negotiation of the Treaty, its provisions, its relation to the Allied settlement, and the importance of favorable action by the Senate.

Faithfully yours,

CHARLES E. HUGHES

711.672/335

The Secretary of Commerce (Hoover) to the Secretary of State[21]

WASHINGTON, *December 29, 1924.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I want to call your attention to the importance, from the viewpoint of American commerce, of the prompt ratification of the treaty with Turkey, concluded at Lausanne on August 6, 1923. Whatever differences of opinion there may have been with regard to the desirability of the major changes of a noncommercial character involved in the treaty, it appears that the broad alterations in the political and legal relations and powers of the Turkish Government are now accomplished facts, the original treaty of July 24, 1923, between the Allied Powers and Turkey having been ratified by the governments of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, Rumania, and Greece, and actually brought into operation.

Since the treaty between Turkey and the United States consists essentially of an exchange of assurances of most-favored-nation treatment, there are involved no specific new obligations upon the United States, but until a treaty with Turkey is ratified by the United States, the benefits of any concessions or privileges established by Turkey in

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[20] *Ante*, p. 715.

[21] Copy transmitted by the Secretary of State to Senator William E. Borah, Jan. 3, 1925.

favor of any of the treaty countries under the new régime may be denied to the United States and its nationals. In fact, a tariff discrimination has already been established, through an order issued by the Angora Government to its customs officials on October 9, putting into effect as from August 6 the provisions of the Lausanne Commercial Convention granting reduced import duties on certain products from the treaty countries. The benefits of these concessions are not being extended to similar products from the United States.

I inclose copy of a report on the situation received from Trade Commissioner Gillespie at Constantinople,[22] and would call your particular attention to the statement that he has investigated and found correct the complaints, brought to his attention by a local merchant who had endeavored to import leather from the United States, that "because the United States has not ratified the treaty negotiated with Turkey at Lausanne on August 23 [*6*], 1923, the importation of American leather into Turkey at the present time is virtually prohibited, in view of the discriminatory attitude of the Turkish Government." A note of protest against this situation presented to the Turkish Government has thus far received no reply.

The particular difficulty in the case of leather has also been brought to our attention through recent inquiries from several prominent American leather exporters, whether they could possibly obtain a certificate of origin through the Turkish consul at London for transshipment of their merchandise to Turkey. While a certificate of British origin naturally can not be obtained on American goods, the fact that an extreme alternative of this sort is being considered is significant of the difficulty in which that trade finds itself. American exporters of wheat flour and of edible oils, trades formerly of considerable volume, have for some time been complaining of the tariff treatment of their products in Turkey, but I understand that it has not been possible to approach the Turkish Government in these matters until there had been recognition in the form of a treaty.

Should the disposition of this treaty be postponed until the next session of Congress, a year hence, increasing handicaps may be imposed on American commerce with Turkey through the establishment of preferential duties or other privileges, which it would be later more difficult to remove than now to anticipate through a treaty assuring the United States automatically of most-favored-nation treatment.

There is involved in this situation not only the trade with Turkey, but with all the areas surrounding the Black Sea, for one of the important provisions embodied in the original treaty, which is ex-

[22] Not printed.

tended freely and without obligation to the United States by our treaty, is the assurance to ships of treaty nations of the freedom of the straits, through which vessels for Black Sea ports must pass. The interests of our shipping as well as our trade, therefore, make desirable the early ratification of the treaty with Turkey in the form essentially as concluded.

Yours faithfully,

HERBERT HOOVER

711.672/337

The Secretary of State to Senator William E. Borah

WASHINGTON, *January 10, 1925.*

MY DEAR SENATOR BORAH: I wish to inform you that I am in receipt of a telegram from the American High Commissioner at Constantinople, dated January 6, 1925,[28] in which he informs me that he has had a discussion with the chief representatives of American business and philanthropic organizations in Turkey and that he is in a position to state that they unanimously favor immediate ratification of the Turkish Treaty. Admiral Bristol reports the general consensus of opinion to be:

(1) That with regular relations between the two countries American interests could be more effectively supported;
(2) That present difficulties concerning the transfer of property would automatically be done away with;
(3) That Article 29 of the Treaty is necessary to protect corporations and individuals from the retroactive application of new and possibly excessive taxes;
(4) That since many Turkish officials are now proceeding on the assumption that the Treaty will be ratified, a rejection of the Treaty would incur their ill will and expose our institutions to unfavorable treatment;
(5) That if the Treaty fails of ratification American nationals will not be in a position of equality with European competitors.

Admiral Bristol reports that this opinion is supported by the President of Robert College, the President of Constantinople Woman's College, the representatives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, as well as by the representatives of prominent American business organizations in Turkey and the Levant Chamber of Commerce.

I am [etc.] CHARLES E. HUGHES

[28] Not printed.

EFFORTS TO PROTECT AMERICAN INTERESTS IN TURKEY PENDING RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF AUGUST 6, 1923

123 B 773/73 : Telegram

The High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

[Extract—Paraphrase]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 15, 1924—11 a. m.*

[Received April 16—9 : 38 a. m.]

71. Following message received from Admiral Bristol who is in Anatolia:

I visited Angora from April 7 to 13. Representative of Foreign Office met me and, during my entire stay, I was cordially received by Turkish officials. I had a long conference April 6 with Ismet Pasha in which we discussed in a general way American and Turkish interests with respect to business and benevolent institutions. I conferred with the President of the Assembly, Fethi Bey, and attended a session of the Assembly. By appointment I conferred with Ministers of Finance, Interior, Education, and Health. I discussed in these conferences the great necessity of having all present and future issues settled by investigation and on the principle of a square deal from the Government without such arbitrary actions as the closing of institutions thus adversely affecting public opinion in the United States. I believe the relations which I have established will in the future facilitate the protection of American interests.

. . . . . .

For Bristol:
SCOTTEN

711.672/280a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, *April 21, 1924—4 p. m.*

69. For the High Commissioner: It is the Department's wish that as soon as you return to Constantinople you telegraph a summary of your observations and conclusions regarding the following subjects:

1. The attitude toward American interests shown by the Turkish authorities.
2. Stability of existing government and its ability and willingness to fulfill international obligations.
3. The attitude which the Turkish authorities show toward the treaty with America and the likelihood that it will be ratified by Turkey at an early date.

The Department is considering submitting this treaty to the Senate soon and wishes your report so that before doing so it may have the benefit of the observations which you made on your trip. You should

stress, of course, besides the above points anything else which you believe should be considered by the Department in connection with the treaty.

The Department does not desire you at present, with reference to point 3, to do anything which might be interpreted as urging ratification by the Turks. When the situation has clarified here you will be given further instructions on this point. However, you should report, with reference to your telegram no. 71 of April 15, 11 a. m., any information you receive as to time when Angora Assembly will probably adjourn.

Telegraph Department if Bristol has been delayed in returning to Constantinople.

HUGHES

711.672/283 : Telegram

The High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 27, 1924—noon.*

[Received 10:45 p. m.]

81. Your 69 of April 21, 4 p. m.

1. Friendly attitude toward American interests was expressed by Turkish representative[s?] with whom I conferred at Angora. However, the medical department of Constantinople College was closed within a week of my conversations with the Minister of Public Instruction and with Ismet. [Garbled sentence omitted.] Marash school has been refused permission to reopen. The Standard Oil Company has encountered a series of obstacles. Difficulties have arisen concerning the military transport tax. A resentment has been produced among Americans, and even more markedly among other foreigners, by the accumulation of such acts . . . However, Turkish legislation has not become harmful to American interests. Also due consideration should be given to the fact that certain outstanding issues have recently been settled.

2. I believe the Turkish Government is stable and can fulfill its international obligations.

3. I see no reason to think Turkey will not ratify treaties as soon as the United States has done so. No action can be taken for 6 months, however, as Assembly has recessed for that length of time.

4. British representative has informed me that the royal signature of the treaty with Great Britain is being delayed. The Department might learn the details through British Embassy in Washington or through our Embassy in London.

5. I strongly favor submission of our treaties to the Senate at the earliest really opportune moment and their ratification as soon as

possible. I hope to be able to adjust the various matters referred to in my paragraph 1, especially as Angora Ministers can give more time to such questions now that the Assembly has recessed. I leave it to the judgment of the Department whether the wiser course is to submit the treaties to the Senate now with existing issues still unadjusted, or delay until an effort to settle these issues has resulted one way or the other. Due consideration should be given in this connection to the possibility that new incidents or difficulties may arise.

BRISTOL

711.672/285 : Telegram

The High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 6, 1924—10 a. m.*

[Received 8:30 p. m.]

92. My 81 of April 27, noon, which I assume Department has received, answers your paragraph 1. With reference to your paragraph 2, my feeling is that should the Senate ratify the treaty soon the effect would be to give some added weight, at least, to representations by me concerning treaty rights of Americans. I do not, however, believe that the assistance which might be given this mission, pending ratification by the Turkish Government, by such early ratification on our part, is important enough to lead the Department to send the treaty to the Senate before the Department considers such action to be opportune, in view of the political situation in the United States. In my opinion it is doubtful whether the rise of new incidents, such as those discussed in my telegram no. 81 of April 27, noon, will be at all affected by the ratification of our treaty. If the Senate, however, should ratify the treaty before [adjournment?], I think prompt ratification by the Turkish Assembly would be thus insured when it meets again on November 22, and, in this way, the delay which would result if the treaty were not ratified by the Senate before the opening of the next session in December would be obviated.

Pending the ratification of the treaty there is no plan which I can suggest to protect American interests other than the essentially opportunist and defensive policy being now pursued. However, I urge that the recommendation in my telegram 88 of April 30, 2 p. m.,[24] be accepted by the Department and that the Department aid the Turkish Government in securing American advisers.[25] . . .

BRISTOL

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[24] Not printed.

[25] The Department suggested Sidney de la Rue, formerly General Receiver of Customs and Financial Adviser of the Liberian Republic, for the position of customs adviser to the Turkish Government, and, in Sept. 1924, De la Rue visited Turkey in that capacity.

711.672/308 : Telegram

The High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 9, 1924—3 p. m.*

[Received July 12—6:40 p. m.]

148. My telegram 81 of April 27, noon, paragraph 1. None of questions mentioned have been settled. Indeed the situation has become worse, as will be shown by following brief summaries of matters immediately pending.

1. Case of George W. McCarthy.[26] I communicated to the Turkish Government substance of the note proposed in your telegram 111, June 17, 3 [*6*] p. m.[27] I am informed now that as the views of the Foreign Office in regard to according diplomatic immunity to McCarthy are not shared by the Minister of Justice, the Turkish Government cannot act in accordance with the assurances which were given previously to [*by?*] the Under Secretary.

2. . . .

3. On June 26 Barnes[28] was informed by the Minister of National Defense that Adamopoulos[29] would be freed within a week and that orders had been sent to Smyrna for his release under general amnesty. Bird[30] reported on July 7 that corps commander had received no such orders.

4. Report from head of Tarsus school says that orders prohibiting reopening of school have just come from Angora.

I have instructed Barnes to make categorical protests on the first two points. To date repeated representations on the last two points have had no results.

I request in view of this accumulation of serious difficulties that the Department authorize me to go to Angora and confer with Ismet Pasha, if that is necessary. At the same time I would like instructions as to just how far I can go in informing Ismet of the consequences which will result from the unfriendly attitude which appar-

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[26] A petty officer in the U. S. Navy on duty with the High Commission at Constantinople. On May 22, 1924, while on guard, he discharged his pistol, fatally wounding a Turk. The Navy board of inquiry found the shooting to be accidental. McCarthy was arrested by the Turkish authorities on a charge of murder and held in jail for about three weeks, after which he was released on bail. The United States claimed diplomatic immunity for McCarthy and demanded that the charge be withdrawn. This was refused. McCarthy forfeited bail and left Turkey without awaiting trial.

[27] Not printed.

[28] Maynard B. Barnes, delegate at Angora of the American High Commission at Constantinople.

[29] Adam Adamopoulos, a naturalized American citizen born in Greece, who had been residing in Smyrna, was arrested by the Turkish authorities on charges of high treason and other crimes allegedly committed during the Greek occupation of Smyrna. The treason charge was dropped and Adamopoulos was acquitted on other charges and released Aug. 18, 1924, after being held in jail for more than six months.

[30] Frederick O. Bird, vice consul at Smyrna.

ently the Turkish Government is intent upon taking. It is my belief that it would not be of value to me to receive detailed or mandatory instructions, but I should wish to be able, if I find Ismet indifferent or hostile, to state with authority the extent to which the American Government would be prepared to go, in addition to remonstrating and placing diplomatic protests on record.

In my opinion the situation is graver than it has been at any time during my service as High Commissioner. I suggest possibility of conferring in London with you to give you complete information but do not wish this proposal to delay your immediate instructions.

BRISTOL

711.672/308 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, *July 17, 1924—6 p. m.*

130. Your telegram no. 148 of July 9, 3 p. m. You are authorized in your discretion to visit Angora for the purposes outlined in your telegram under reference.

The representations to be made are left largely to your discretion but the views of the Department on some of the points at issue will be indicated by the following:

1. The Department in earlier telegrams has already given its views on such questions as the Adamopoulos and McCarthy cases, the closing of the school at Tarsus, and the issues presented in your telegram no. 81 of April 27. Besides what has been said already on these points, you may suggest to Ismet that the influence upon the relations of the United States and Turkey of the accumulation of unsettled issues of this kind cannot fail to be unfortunate and that the way seems open to settle these issues promptly to the mutual satisfaction of the two countries.

2. . . .

3. You may tell Ismet that you will soon take leave of absence and that if when you return you find the same unsatisfactory situation, your Government would not consider itself justified in retaining in Turkey a person of your rank and importance to this Government in other branches of its service. Reluctant as it would be to take such a course, this Government might find it necessary to have a subordinate official temporarily as its representative in Turkey.

4. In your discretion you may add a personal message from me to Ismet. You may state that it is a matter of personal regret after our association at Lausanne for me to see the unsatisfactory turn which events have taken in Turkey, that pending issues are being followed most closely, and that the attitude of the Turkish Government is making it most difficult to assist in placing our mutual relations on a satisfactory basis although we would welcome any opportunity to do so.

The instructions given above are not mandatory but are to be used in your discretion. In applying them you may be guided by the status when you meet Ismet of the various points at issue which you have outlined in your telegram.

This telegram and your 148 of July 9 are being repeated to London for the information of Secretary Hughes. Considering the short time he will be abroad it is probable that arrangements cannot be made for you to meet him but further instructions will be sent should such a meeting prove possible. It seems important that there should be no undue delay in your visit to Angora. You may, therefore, go at any time after July 24. This will give the Department ample time to give you further instructions before you start if Secretary Hughes should send any telegram from London making this desirable.

GREW

711.672/311 : Telegram

The High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *August 9, 1924—3 p. m.*

[Received 6:18 p. m.]

166. On August 7 I had a conference with Ismet lasting 5 hours and 45 minutes. I took up cases of Adamopoulos, Fisher,[31] and McCarthy, and also the closing of Marash, Mersina and Tarsus schools. At the end of conference I handed Ismet memoranda of the most important cases pending and also the following *aide-mémoire:*[32]

Admiral Bristol has sought a personal interview with His Excellency Ismet Pasha, for the purpose of pointing out that his Government considers that the relations between the United States and Turkey have reached so unsatisfactory a state as to arouse serious anxiety as to the future.

A number of important matters affecting American interests, notably the Adamopoulos and McCarthy cases and the closing of the American schools at Marash and Tarsus, have been repeatedly brought to the attention of the Turkish Government. Throughout the representations which have been made the utmost patience and forbearance have been shown but on none of the matters in question have results been secured. The general situation as a whole, therefore, has steadily grown worse and Admiral Bristol has felt bound so to inform his Government. He is now in possession of instructions adapted to whatever developments the situation may take in

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[31] Edgar J. Fisher, professor at Robert College. The Turkish Director of Public Education had demanded his dismissal, under threat of closing the college, the reason given being alleged remarks made by him during a lecture on board a tourist ship. On representations by the High Commissioner and by the college authorities, Professor Fisher was reinstated in October 1924.

[32] *Aide-mémoire* not paraphrased.

the more immediate future. Admiral Bristol, however, is confident that the personal intervention of His Excellency Ismet Pasha will insure a prompt adjustment of the settlement of matters at present at issue between the United States and Turkey and that there will therefore be no need for taking measures other than an appeal to His Excellency Ismet Pasha's sense of justice and to the watchful regard for Turkey's international interests of which he has given proof on so many occasions. Admiral Bristol has been granted a month's leave of absence by his Government, of which he proposes to avail himself immediately. He feels certain that upon his return he will have abundant proof that the confidence which he has reposed in His Excellency Ismet Pasha has not been misplaced and that the results hoped for will have been achieved.

Although the results of my conference with Ismet are not immediately apparent I hope that he has been led to see how serious is the present situation and that favorable action may be secured within the next few weeks by his personal intervention. I am leaving the office of delegate at Angora vacant for a short time to emphasize the idea that the period when I will be on leave from Constantinople is a period of probation during which we expect results.

On August 12 I will leave Constantinople for Venice.

I will mail full report of my conference.

BRISTOL

365.115 D 58/78 : Telegram

The High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 2, 1924—1 p. m.*

[Received 8:05 p. m.]

194. Have received note dated September 28 from Turkish Foreign Office which is substantially as follows:

As the treaty between the United States and Turkey signed at Lausanne has not as yet gone into effect and as it has not yet been decided to apply certain provisions before the treaty takes effect, authority shall not be given American citizens to purchase [33] real property. Pending the taking effect of said treaty they may, however, mortgage or transfer property which they already own either to Turkish citizens or to foreign nationals who have the right to own property in Turkey.

I believe the Department should authorize me to answer the note outlined above by referring to the protocol of 1874 [34] and reserving the rights of citizens of the United States under that protocol to hold property. The Turkish Government made clear at Lausanne

[33] In telegram 215, Oct. 31, 1924, the High Commissioner stated that the French word in the note was "*acquérir*" (file no. 365.115 D 58/80).

[34] Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776–1909, vol. II, p. 1344.

its position with respect to the abrogation of all previous treaties but I think it unwise to acquiesce in the Foreign Office note of September 28, tacitly or otherwise.

Of course I will continue my efforts to have the Turkish Government reverse its decision in the matter.

BRISTOL

711.67/51 : Telegram

The High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 7, 1924— 10 a. m.*

[Received 5:40 p. m.]

196. Having returned from leave I submit the following estimation of the situation and recommendations as to policy:

1. I give the present status of the more important questions pending, most of which I discussed on August 7 in my conference with Ismet, as follows: (*a*) the Adamopoulos and Fisher cases have been settled and the McCarthy case has been arranged; (*b*) there has been no change in the situation regarding the schools at Marash, Mersine, and Tarsus; (*c*) see my telegram 194 of October 2, 1 p. m., regarding transfers of property.

2. The representations which I made to Ismet nearly two months ago have been only partially successful, therefore, as far as tangible results go. There are two possible policies which we can follow: A. Take issue with the Turks on any or all of the unsettled questions mentioned above, my recall being used as an extra sanction. B. Act on the theory that the Turkish Government with its nationalistic temper will not be affected by the taking of drastic measures, avoid giving offense, and continue policy of patience and plain speaking.

3. There is little to be said at present for policy A except that judged by the standards of normal diplomatic practice or by the irritation and impatience which at times, with feelings as they are now, it is difficult to avoid, such a course is always obvious and tempting.

With respect to policy B there are three points which should be stressed: (*a*) Other foreign governments having interests in Turkey more extensive than our own are renewing diplomatic relations and are taking care to avoid issues even in the face of greater difficulties than we face. In view of this, for us to follow a directly opposite policy would be anomalous at least. (*b*) It is impossible to know at all accurately the character and importance of the opposition until the Assembly reconvenes on October 23. It would be a serious matter to embark upon anything like policy A in the absence of this information. . . .

. . . . . .

5. I strongly recommend for the present that we follow policy B. I would like as soon as possible to receive the comments and instructions of the Department.

BRISTOL

711.67/51 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, *October 10, 1924—6 p. m.*

174. Your telegram 196 of October 7, 10 a. m. The recommendations in your telegram in general meet the views of the Department, which is led by the satisfactory settlement of the Fisher incident to hope that other outstanding questions may be solved by patient but persistent endeavor.

For the moment, certainly, pending the next meeting of the Turkish Assembly and until the situation in this country with respect to our Lausanne Treaty can be more accurately gauged by the Department, it would serve no useful purpose to make an immediate issue of the pending questions named by you. All of these questions the Department believes are susceptible of adjustment.

GREW

365.115 D 58/79 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, *October 27, 1924—6 p. m.*

182.

. . . . . .

(2) Please instruct delegate at Angora to take up orally with appropriate Turkish officials question of transfer of real property. The delegate should state that our Government is loath to believe that, at a time when neither Turkey nor the United States has ratified the treaty signed at Lausanne, the Turkish Government will desire by an arbitrary decision to raise openly an issue as to American rights in this matter which existing agreements between Turkey and the United States clearly define. The delegate may add that Turkish nationals are freely given the right to acquire and own real property in the United States, despite the breaking of diplomatic relations, to the extent that other friendly aliens enjoy this right and that the American Government has observed with concern that Tur-

key has continued restrictions against citizens of this country, which the state of relations between the two countries at no time justified and which Turkey has now withdrawn as applied to nationals of states with which Turkey has recently been at war. Under these circumstances it would obviously be a discrimination against citizens of the United States to continue these restrictions.

GREW

365.115 D 58/81 : Telegram

The High Commissioner in Turkey (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 3, 1924—noon.*

[Received 8 p. m.]

218. Department's 182, October 27, 6 p. m. Delegate at Angora on November 2nd made representations as instructed in above-mentioned telegram and reports as follows:

"November 2, 3 p. m. Discussed at length this morning with Tewfik Kiamil Bey[35] property transfer question, using arguments outlined in High Commission's 86, October 30, 3 p. m. He stated the Turkish Government considers protocol of 1874[36] and Ottoman law of 1873 [*1867?*][37] as null and void and right to acquire real property therefore non-existent until coming into effect of Turkish-American treaty. I replied that my Government did not accept this point of view and I urged him to examine the question in a practical way with a view to avoiding an issue. He undertook to do this but he holds out little if any hope of satisfactory adjustment."

BRISTOL

ASSURANCES TO GREAT BRITAIN THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD DISCOUNTENANCE THE SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO TURKEY

867.113/30

The British Chargé (Chilton) to the Secretary of State

No. 965 WASHINGTON, *November 13, 1923.*

SIR: I have the honour to inform you, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that since peace between Turkey and Greece was concluded by the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, His Majesty's Government have been in receipt of applications for licences to export to Turkey arms and war material generally, and for support in obtaining concessions from

[35] Turkish Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
[36] Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776–1909, vol. II, p. 1344.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 1346.

the Turkish Government for the erection in Turkey of plant for the manufacture of munitions.

As you are aware, the whole of Turkey, except European Turkey, lies within the prohibited zone as defined in Article 6 of the Arms Traffic Convention of September 10th, 1919.[38] It was so included because it was generally agreed that if Turkey could become an arms exporting state, such arms would inevitably reach areas from which the Arms Traffic Convention was specially designed to exclude them. Though the Convention has not been ratified, it is, as you are aware, in force, so far as the prohibited zone is concerned, by informal agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Governments of France, Italy, Belgium and Japan, all of which are interested in areas where the importation of arms would be bound to prove a source of uneasiness. I am therefore to inform you that it is the present policy of His Majesty's Government to refuse applications for the export of arms to the region of the former Ottoman Empire.

His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the co-operation of the French, Italian, Japanese and Belgian Governments in loyally observing by an informal agreement the spirit of the Arms Traffic Convention in so far as it affects Turkey, would lead to no useful result should the Government of the United States feel themselves free to export arms to Turkey or to encourage United States citizens to seek for concessions for their manufacture in that country.

It will be remembered that in May, 1922, when the Government of British Honduras wished to dispose of certain arms to one or other of the Central American Governments, permission to do so was withheld out of deference to the wishes of the United States Government, and in the note which you were so good as to address to Sir Auckland Geddes on June 22nd, 1922,[39] you informed His Excellency that it was the view of the Government of the United States that the sale of arms to a country where political conditions were known to be unstable, might create embarrassment to foreign governments whose nationals have property interests in the countries concerned and might indeed prove a factor in making the political situation still more unstable. It is the policy, therefore, of His Majesty's Government to refuse licences for the export of military arms to the Central American Republics.

I am instructed to point out that the situation at present existing in Turkey and the adjacent countries is, in many respects, similar to that in Central America, and the arms traffic in such areas is, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, no less immoral and destructive of life than the opium traffic elsewhere. His Majesty's Government, therefore, feel justified in hoping that the United States Gov-

[38] *Foreign Relations*, 1920, vol. I, p. 180.
[39] Not printed.

ernment will do what may be in their power to prevent arms reaching or being manufactured in Turkey through the action of United States citizens, both on grounds of reciprocity, and in pursuance of their declared policy, as set forth in the statement issued to the press by the Department of State on September 27th last,[40] in making public the text of a communication to the League of Nations[41] with regard to the Arms Traffic Convention, not to allow arms to be exported to areas where disturbed conditions exist.

I should be glad to receive in due course an expression of the views of the United States Government in regard to this matter for communication to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I have [etc.] H. G. CHILTON

867.113/30

The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Chilton)

WASHINGTON, *December 6, 1923.*

SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your note of November 13, 1923, informing me that since the conclusion of peace between Turkey and Greece by the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, the British Government has been in receipt of applications for licenses to export to Turkey arms and war material generally, and for support in obtaining concessions from the Turkish Government for the erection in Turkey of a plant for the manufacture of munitions. You point out that the whole of Turkey, except European Turkey, lies within the prohibited zone as defined in Article 6 of the Arms Traffic Convention of September 10, 1919, which, although not ratified, you state to be in force, so far as this zone is concerned, by informal agreement between the British, French, Italian, Japanese and Belgian Governments. You indicate the opinion of the British Government that this agreement, in so far as it affects Turkey, would lead to no useful result should the Government of the United States feel itself free to export arms to Turkey or to encourage United States citizens to seek for concessions for their manufacture in that country. You state that the British Government feels justified in hoping that the Government of the United States will do what may be in its power to prevent arms reaching Turkey or being manufactured in Turkey through the action of United States citizens, both on grounds of reciprocity and in pursuance of its policy as set forth in a statement issued to the press on September 27, 1923. In con-

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[40] See telegram no. 61, Sept. 27, 1923, to the Minister in Switzerland, *Foreign Relations*, 1923, vol. I, p. 42.

[41] See telegram no. 53, Sept. 12, 1923, to the Minister in Switzerland, *ibid.*, p. 38.

clusion you request an expression of the views of the Government of the United States for communication to your Government.

With regard to the informal agreement between the British, French, Italian, Japanese and Belgian Governments, to which you refer, it is not entirely clear to what extent such an agreement would be effective in preventing arms from reaching Asiatic Turkey as long as European Turkey is not included within its scope. Further, I should be glad to be informed whether in the view of His Britannic Majesty's Government this informal agreement has been effective in preventing the shipment of arms to Turkey on the part of the nationals of the governments which you indicate have cooperated in its observance.

However, in view of the policy which was outlined in the statement of September 27, 1923, to which you refer, this Government under existing conditions will decline to sell government war supplies of the character of instruments of destruction to countries in the troubled areas of the Near East, and it will not extend support to its nationals in any effort to promote the manufacture in Turkey or the shipment and sale to Turkey of such supplies. Further, under present conditions this Government would not favor the flotation of a foreign loan in this country of which the proceeds would be utilized for armament.

I may add that I am not informed that United States nationals have been engaged to any appreciable extent in the traffic in arms with Turkey.

Accept [etc.] CHARLES E. HUGHES

867.113/33

The British Ambassador (Howard) to the Secretary of State

No. 314 WASHINGTON, *April 5, 1924.*

SIR: With reference to Mr. Chilton's note No. 1052 of December 10th last,[42] regarding the prohibition of the export of arms and munitions to Turkey, I have the honour, under instructions from my Government, to inform you that, notwithstanding their efforts to obtain an agreement on this subject, they have not secured unanimity among the various governments concerned. His Majesty's Government have therefore been reluctantly obliged to postpone any further attempt to secure the provisional application to Turkey of the arrangements contemplated in Article 6 of the Arms Traffic Convention of September 1919. In these circumstances my Government propose to remove the embargo on the export of arms and munitions from Great Britain to Turkey which has hitherto been enforced.

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[42] Not printed.

Similar communications are being made by His Britannic Majesty's Representatives at Tokio, Brussels, Paris, Rome and Prague to the Governments to which they are accredited.

I have [etc.] ESME HOWARD

867.113/33

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Kellogg)

No. 155 WASHINGTON, *April 15, 1924.*

SIR: With reference to the Department's instruction No. 1053 of December 10, 1923,[43] there is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a note from the British Embassy dated April 5, 1924 [44] with reference to the removal by the British Government of the embargo on the export of arms and munitions from Great Britain to Turkey. The Department has acknowledged the receipt of this note without comment.

The Department perceives no reason for altering at the present time the policy set forth in its note of December 6, 1923 to the British Embassy, a copy of which was enclosed with the instruction referred to above.

I am [etc.] CHARLES E. HUGHES

APPOINTMENT OF AN AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE TO PARTICIPATE IN A CONSULTATIVE CAPACITY IN THE WORK OF THE SANITARY COMMISSION FOR TURKEY

867.12/26

The British Ambassador (Howard) to the Secretary of State [45]

No. 636 MANCHESTER, MASS., *July 21, 1924.*

[Received July 22.]

SIR: Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour to call your attention to the provisions of Article 116 of the Treaty of Peace signed between Turkey and the Allied Powers on July 24, 1923 at Lausanne which reads as follows: [46]

"All questions relating to . . . the final liquidation of the former sanitary administration, as well as all other similar or cognate questions, shall be regulated by a commission *ad hoc* which shall be composed of a representative of each of the Powers represented on the Superior Council of Health of Constantinople, except Germany, Austria and Hungary."

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[43] Not printed.
[44] *Supra.*
[45] Identic notes were received from the French and Italian Chargés.
[46] For full text of art. 116, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. XXVIII, p. 97.

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government it is most desirable for practical reasons that this commission should meet as soon as possible after the coming into force of the treaty—an event which may now be expected shortly.

In these circumstances and in concert with my French and Italian Colleagues I have the honour to invite the United States Government to appoint a delegate to represent them on this Commission at an early date.

I have [etc.] ESME HOWARD

867.12/30

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Howard) [47]

WASHINGTON, *August 29, 1924.*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of July 21, 1924, in which, acting in behalf of the Government of His Britannic Majesty and in concert with your French and Italian colleagues, you invited the Government of the United States to appoint a delegate to represent it on the Commission to be established, under Article 116 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, between Turkey and the Allied Powers, for the settlement of questions incident to the liquidation of the former sanitary administration in Turkey.

I desire to express to you my appreciation of your courtesy in inviting the Government of the United States to designate a member of the Commission to which you refer. Having regard to the circumstances of the former participation of the United States with other Powers in the regulation of sanitary affairs in the Ottoman Empire, this Government would naturally desire to observe the work of the Commission and to have such voice in its decisions as American interests may seem to require. It is noted, however, that under the Treaty Article mentioned above the final authority on the questions presented to the Commission is to be the Council of the League of Nations, a body on which the United States is not represented. Such being the case, this Government could not appropriately designate a member of the Commission with authority to participate in its decisions. I shall be pleased, however, if such a course is agreeable to the Governments concerned, to designate a representative to sit with the Commission in a consultative capacity and should occasion arise to enter appropriate reservations regarding any American interests that may be disclosed.

Accept [etc.] CHARLES E. HUGHES

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[47] The same, *mutatis mutandis*, to the French and Italian Chargés.

867.12/41

The British Ambassador (Howard) to the Secretary of State [48]

No. 891 WASHINGTON, *October 2, 1924.*

SIR: I have the honour to refer to the note which you were so good as to address to me on August 29th last in regard to the possible appointment of an American delegate to the Commission to be set up under Article 116 of the Lausanne Treaty for the liquidation of the former sanitary administration in Turkey, and to inform you, under instructions from Mr. Secretary MacDonald, that His Majesty's Government would welcome the appointment of a representative of the United States Government to participate in the Commission in a consultative capacity, as suggested in the last paragraph of your note under reference.

I understand that my French and Italian colleagues are also communicating with you in regard to this question and are informing you that their Governments share the desire of His Majesty's Government for the appointment of the American delegate above referred to.

I have [etc.] ESME HOWARD

867.12/45: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Constantinople (Ravndal)

WASHINGTON, *October 23, 1924—5 p. m.*

Surgeon W. W. King of the United States Public Health Service, now at Paris, has been designated to participate in a consultative capacity in the meeting of the proposed Sanitary Commission which the Department understands will take place shortly at Constantinople. The Department desires that you should cooperate with Dr. King in his work with the Commission. The Department has been in correspondence with the High Commission on this subject and it is suggested that you confer with the latter. In the event that any questions should arise which might require this Government's consideration, they should be referred to the Department through the High Commission.

GREW

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[48] Similar notes of the same date were received from the French and Italian Chargés.