TURKEY

REFUSAL BY THE UNITED STATES TO COMMIT ITSELF TO MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES IN TURKEY

807.4016/459

The British Ambassador (Geddes) to the Secretary of State

No. 367

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1922.

Sir: I have the honour on instructions from my Government to draw your attention to the renewal in Asia Minor, by the Angora Turkish authorities, of the deportations of the Christian minorities. Evidence of the renewal of these deportations, gathered mostly from the workers of the American Near East Relief, is contained in the enclosed memorandum which embodies reports recently communicated to His Majesty's Government by His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

His Majesty's Government, who have, in the proposed terms of peace with Turkey now under discussion, assumed a serious responsibility for the future protection of these Christian minorities, feel that they cannot allow reports of this nature to remain uninvestigated or such incidents to continue unchecked. They accordingly propose that the United States, French, Italian and British Governments should at once depute a carefully selected Officer to proceed to Trebizond or to whatever Black Sea port may be most suitable for the purpose, with a view to proceeding to such places in the interior as may best enable them to conduct the necessary investigation. While the permission of the Angora authorities will have to be obtained and facilities demanded from them, His Majesty's Government consider that it will be difficult for these to be refused, since it is the contention of the Turkish nationalists, as evidenced by memoranda recently communicated to His Majesty's Government, that these deportations and massacres either have not taken place or, if they have, that they have been provoked by the conduct of the Greek and other minorities concerned. Should permission however be refused, His Majesty's Government feel that they will have no course but to reconsider their entire attitude towards the present peace.

1 For an account of American relief activities on behalf of Greeks evacuated from Turkish territory, see pp. 414 ff.

2 Not printed.
proposals which obviously could not be pursued with any chance of success in conditions such as those existing.

In communicating to the United States Government the views of His Majesty's Government on the present situation in Asia Minor, I am instructed most earnestly to urge that the United States Government may agree to the proposal outlined above and may be prepared to instruct the United States High Commissioner at Constantinople to act in concert with his British, French and Italian colleagues in carrying it out.

I have [etc.]

A. C. Geddes

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867.4018/463: Telegram

The High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 18, 1922—5 p.m.

[Received 11:06 p.m.]

70. Yesterday I received a visit from the British High Commissioner, who called to show me instructions which his Government had sent him concerning the British Foreign Secretary's proposal that a commission of Allied and American officers be appointed to investigate the condition of the Christian minorities in Anatolia. As I understand it, an invitation has been extended through our Embassy in London for American representation on this commission. I recommend that this invitation be declined although I fully realize the difficult position in which this invitation places the Department and the state of American public sentiment. My reasons are as follows:

1. The occasion for the present agitation is the report by Mr. Yowell. The events with which this report deals took place some months ago, and their causes go back to the occupation of Smyrna, the enlistment by the French of Armenians in Cilicia, and the Greek atrocities against the Turks a year ago along the Marmora coast.

2. There are many indications that the British are using the Yowell report for anti-Turkish propaganda, to strengthen their position in the Near East.

3. The plight of the minorities in Anatolia has been known for a long time by the British, full information having been given last fall to us among others by Colonel Rawlinson."

*Not printed.

*Lient. Col. Sir Alfred Rawlinson of the British Army.*
4. It is significant that the outcry at present coincides with report that the British are renewing their efforts to induce the French to make a strong reply to the last note from Angora.

5. The tone of the Foreign Secretary's telegram and the publicity which it was given in the Commons and in an official British press despatch clearly indicate that the purpose is political propaganda.

6. Within the last few days I have received a telegram from Miss Billings* saying that there have been no massacres at Harput. She is in constant communication with that place.

I transmitted Mr. Yowell's report with my despatch 201, May 9.* I reported the publicity which it was given and the results of this publicity in my despatch 214, May 17.*

BRISTOL

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The British Embassy to the Department of State

No. 382 Memorandum

There seems to His Majesty's Government to be a real danger that the Turkish deportations and outrages in Eastern Anatolia and the action being taken upon them may lead to retaliations in territory in Greek occupation either at once or when the evacuation begins. To avoid any such danger and in order that the Governments concerned may be in possession of accurate information as to what is passing on both sides, His Majesty's Government trust that the United States Government will see their way to instruct their Representative at Athens to join with his British colleague in requesting the Greek Government to assent to the despatch of officers also to regions in Greek occupation.

A similar communication has been addressed to the French and Italian Governments.

Washington, May 19, 1922.

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The Secretary of State to President Harding

Washington, May 20, 1922.

My dear Mr. President: I assumed in our interview yesterday that I was to await further word from you with respect to our participation in the proposed inquiry into the atrocities in Anatolia. I write you merely to be sure that there is no misunderstanding. Of

*Miss Florence Billings of the Near East Relief.
*Not printed.
course, I do not wish to ask for any decision until you have had
an opportunity to give the matter mature consideration.

Faithfully yours,

CHARLES E. HUGHES

President Harding to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1922.

MY DEAR SECRETARY HUGHES: I have your note of this morning
relating to our participation in the proposed inquiry into the atroci-
ties in Armenia. Frankly, I very much hesitate to hold aloof from a
participation which makes such a strong appeal to a very large por-
tion of our American citizenship. At the same time I can not escape
the feeling that we will be utterly helpless to do anything effective
in case an investigation proves the statements concerning atrocities
are substantiated. I am very sure that there will be no American
support for a proposal to send an armed force there to correct any
abuses which are proven. I am wondering if the possible manifesta-
tion of our impotence would not be more humiliating than our non-
participation is distressing. However, if you are well convinced that
we may venture upon this enterprise without regrets I am content
to trust your judgment quite as much as my own. We can call upon
General Harbord to participate in such an investigation and I should
have no hesitancy to place the fullest confidence in any report to
which he subscribes his name. I think, even at the risk of criticism,
our expressed willingness to participate in such an investigation
ought to carry with it a hint that it is not consistent with the Ameri-
can policy to call upon our armed forces to minister to all the
troubled spots of the world.

I am wholly conscious of a highly sentimental and very earnest
sympathy among our people for the unfortunate Armenians. I
doubt very much if that sympathy would assert itself in a positive
maintenance if we were called upon to participate in a drastic action
to cure conditions there.

Very truly yours,

WARREN G. HARDING

The Secretary of State to President Harding

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1922.

MY DEAR MR. HARDING: Referring to your letter, under date of
May twentieth, and our interview on Tuesday, with respect to the
British proposal for an investigation of the reported atrocities in Anatolia, I should like to emphasize the following considerations. I am unable to say that we can take part in the inquiry with complete assurance that there will be no occasion for regretting this course, but, on the other hand, it is necessary to take account fully of the alternative.

 Permit me to call attention to the exact nature of the proposal contained in the British Ambassador’s memorandum of May fifteenth to which I have referred in our interviews. I enclose a copy. The British Government, referring to the memorandum based on reports of American workers of the Near East Relief, proposes

“that the United States, French, Italian and British Governments should at once depute a carefully selected Officer to proceed to Trebizond, or to whatever Black Sea port that may be most suitable for the purpose, with a view to proceeding to such places in the interior as may best enable them to conduct the necessary investigation.”

Since the receipt of this note, the British Ambassador has sent me another memorandum (of which I also enclose a copy) stating “that the Turkish deportations and outrages in Eastern Anatolia and the action being taken upon them may lead to retaliations in territory in Greek occupation” and that “to avoid any such danger and in order that the Governments concerned may be in possession of accurate information as to what is passing on both sides” the British Government desires that the United States Government should join in the request that the Greek authorities should consent to the “despatch of Officers to regions in Greek occupation.”

It will be observed that the proposal may be taken as being limited solely to an inquiry to obtain accurate information as to atrocities, in Anatolia, committed on both sides. Certainly, if we designate an Officer, we can strictly limit his duty to participation in an inquiry and make it perfectly clear that we enter into no commitment to the employment of armed forces and do not pledge ourselves to any action beyond ascertaining and reporting the facts relating to the atrocities in question.

I am in entire accord with your suggestion that a difficult situation may arise in case an investigation proves the statements concerning atrocities to be correct. But I suggest that the real difficulty will be due to the fact of the atrocities rather than to our joining in the inquiry. The fact of the atrocities is likely to appear in any event. Whatever responsibility may attach to us by reason of the commission of the atrocities will exist in any event. Indeed, if our refusal to

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1 Not printed.
2 Memorandum of May 19, p. 921.
participate in the inquiry were believed to have resulted in a continuance of the atrocities we should be under a more serious responsibility. As it seems to me, we are faced with a situation created by the proposal for an inquiry and we cannot escape the responsibility which will attach to our action in refusing to participate. The question really is, I take it, what are likely to be the consequences of our refusal or consent?

Our refusal to join in the inquiry would probably have these consequences:

1. We should offend a large body of Americans who have deep interest in the Christians of Anatolia. It would be difficult to explain our refusal to their satisfaction, as we have not been asked to do anything more than join in ascertaining the facts. They would be ready to believe the charge that this refusal was to some extent the cause of subsequent difficulties. It would be the more difficult to explain our attitude in the light of our constant insistence upon the protection of our commercial interests in the Near East. It would naturally be said that we were far more solicitous about American interest in oil than about Christian lives.

2. Our refusal to take part in the inquiry, the British request having been made public, might easily lead the Turks to refuse permission to the other Governments to prosecute the inquiry within the territory under Turkish control. This would place upon us, in large measure, the apparent responsibility for defeating the inquiry and preventing the favorable consequences which might have followed it.

3. Our refusal to meet the wishes of the British Government, and of the other Governments, in a matter not entailing any commitment on our part beyond an inquiry would tend to make it the more difficult for us to secure acquiescence in our proposals relating to the Near East. We have most important interests, those of mission stations, schools and colleges, those of commerce and industry, and however determined we are to avoid associating ourselves with disputes over boundaries, or to becoming a party to military operations, we must insist upon being heard as to our rights and upon taking part in such negotiations as may involve American interests. Our refusal to join in this inquiry will certainly not aid us and may hinder us in prosecuting our policy.

4. Our refusal will also deprive us of the opportunity to exercise through the very fact of our presence a restraining and helpful influence. We do not need to attempt the role of mediator or arbiter, but in view of our relative disinterestedness, prestige and financial power, we may have a wholesome influence without implicating ourselves in controversies which are not of our concern. The important thing is that there should be peace in the Near East and that a condition of stability, favorable to the resident populations and likewise to our own commerce, should be created. Our refusal will make it more difficult for us to exert any helpful influence in this direction.

On the other hand, the consequences of our consent should be carefully considered:
(1) Let it be assumed, as I think it should be, that the reports as to atrocities will be proved to be correct to a substantial degree. The question, of course, will arise: What shall be done about it? We may be asked, in view of our participation in the inquiry: What are we going to do about it? It does not follow, however, that this will lead to a proposal of military operations. The British have a very small force in the Near East and are not likely to increase it. There seems no probability of an undertaking on the part of the Allies to deal with the matter by troops. They are hardly in a position to attempt that. At the most, I take it, coercion would be through a naval demonstration or economic pressure. I do not think an occasion will arise in which we will be pressed to send soldiers across the sea. Of course, anything of that sort is out of the question. Nor do I think that we will be put in a position by our joining the inquiry of being compelled to take part in measures of coercion. We have not been a party to the war in the Near East. Our position is quite different from that of the Allies. If the matter comes to a question of the employment of force, I see no reason to believe that we should get ourselves into a position even of great embarrassment. Certainly, we should not be under any commitment.

(2) On the other hand, there is a strong probability that the inquiry itself, if we join in it, will have a restraining influence and tend to prevent the commission of atrocities hereafter. It may create a situation in which it would be the easier to make peace. Dr. Barton, in his letter to me, under date of May nineteenth, makes the following points, among others:

"5. The United States' participation in such a commission of investigation would give England courage to publish the facts to the world even in the face of the Indian Moslem opposition. The cooperation of the United States would have a tendency to assure the people of India that the conditions as reported actually existed and that they were not published by England merely as a defense of her unsympathetic attitude toward the existing Turkish Government.

"6. Our participation in the investigation and in the report could not fail to have a salutary influence in France where there is a tendency to favor the Turk and to belittle reports of acts of injustice and cruelty. We cannot but believe that it would help bring about a better understanding among all the nations of Europe and furnish a basis in fact for a settlement of the Near Eastern question."

As I said at the outset, it is impossible to give an assurance that we shall not, if we join in the inquiry, find ourselves in a difficult situation. We cannot be positive, whatever course we take, that we shall not regret it; we are not infallible. But I am inclined to think we shall meet graver difficulties in refusing to join in the inquiry than through participation. We must meet each situation as it arises, and however difficult it may be, according to our best judgment. As I look at it, the probability that our participation in the inquiry will operate as a restraining influence as to future atrocities is so great that I feel that our consent is likely to be very helpful,

*Letter not printed; Dr. James L. Barton was the chairman of the Near East Relief and foreign secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.
while our refusal would entail a grave responsibility and expose us to severe criticism as having neglected a course which in the opinion of the large body of people interested in the Near East we could have taken without any serious commitment.

I have no desire to press the matter unduly, and I submit these considerations so that you may have all phases of it before you and may be able to reach a decision with which you will be entirely satisfied.

Faithfully yours,

Charles E. Hughes

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The Secretary of State to President Harding

Washington, May 27, 1922.

My Dear Mr. President: Referring to our conversation today with respect to the proposed inquiry into the atrocities in Anatolia, I take the liberty of enclosing a copy of a letter addressed by Dr. Ward and Mr. Yowell to the American Consul at Aleppo, under date of April 5, 1922, and also a copy of Dr. Barton’s letter addressed to me under date of May 19, 1922. I also enclose the report of the statement of Mr. Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons on May 15, 1922, taken from the New York Times.

Permit me to again express my view of the seriousness of the decision that you are called upon to make. Our interests in the Near East are the result of generations of effort and have engaged, I may say, the Christian sentiment of the entire country. If our failure to take part in this inquiry and thus, without any further commitment on our part, to exercise a restraining influence, should lead to the virtual expulsion of our Christian missionaries and educators from Asia Minor it would be most unfortunate.

Permit me also to say that our refusal to take part in this inquiry will make, I fear, a very disagreeable impression not only here but also with that important section of opinion abroad which is most favorably disposed toward the United States.

I may add that the correspondence with the Department indicates a deep and widespread interest in this matter.

Faithfully yours,

Charles E. Hughes

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10 Not printed.
11 Not printed; see extract quoted supra.
12 See the New York Times of May 16, 1922.
The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Geddes)

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1922.

EXCELLENCE: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of May 15th last, referring to reports of the renewal of the deportation of Christians by the Turkish authorities at Angora, and the alleged atrocities connected therewith, and communicating the proposal of His Britannic Majesty's Government that the British, French, Italian and American Governments should at once depute carefully selected officers to proceed to such places in Anatolia as might best enable them to conduct an appropriate investigation.

In Your Excellency's subsequent memorandum of May 19th, you indicate that the Turkish deportations and outrages might lead to retaliatory action in territory held by the Greek forces and suggest that this Government should join in requesting the authorities functioning in Greece to permit the despatch of officers to regions under Greek occupation.

The situation of the Christian minorities in Turkey has enlisted to a marked degree the sympathies of the American people and it has been noted with deep concern that the work of benevolent and educational institutions in Turkey has steadily been hampered, that the rights which American citizens have long enjoyed in Turkey in common with the nationals of other Powers have often been disregarded and the property rights and interests of Americans and other foreigners placed in jeopardy.

In view of the humanitarian considerations which are involved and of the desire of this Government to have adequate information through a thorough and impartial investigation of the actual conditions prevailing in Anatolia, in order that this Government may determine its future policy in relation to the authorities concerned, the President is prepared to designate an officer or officers to take part in the proposed inquiry.

In taking this course, I should make clear to Your Excellency my understanding that the proposed action is limited in scope to an inquiry to obtain accurate data as to the situation in Anatolia for the information of the Governments participating therein, and I should advise you that this Government assumes no further obligation and enters into no commitment.

This Government suggests that in order to expedite the inquiry officers should be designated by the respective governments to institute inquiries concurrently in the districts respectively under Greek and
Turkish occupation, and that these two commissions, upon the com-
pletion of their investigation, should unite in a comprehensive report.

As I have not been advised of the reply which the French and
Italian Governments may have made to the British proposal, I shall
await further information before communicating with the American
representatives in Constantinople and Athens regarding the designa-
tion of officers or the sending of such communications to the local
Greek and Turkish authorities, as may be necessary to open the way
for the proposed investigation.

Accept [etc.]

CHARLES E. HUGHES

867.4016/517: Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, June 3, 1922—4 p. m.
[Received 4:55 p. m.]

75. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to telegraph Depart-
ment: “Greek Government earnestly hopes for American participa-
tion on commissions to investigate Asia Minor atrocities.”

[Paraphrase.] It is my opinion that the Greek Government is very
anxious to have the United States participate but that the Minister
for Foreign Affairs is not very hopeful that the Department will act
on his request. [End paraphrase.]

CAFFERY

867.4010/522

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE MEMOIRE

His Majesty’s Ambassador has been requested to express to the
United States Government the cordial appreciation of His Majesty’s
Government of their decision to participate in the proposed enquiries
in regard to alleged deportations and outrages in Anatolia.

Both the French and Italian Governments have also agreed to be
represented on the Commissions.

As soon as the Secretary of State has sent instructions to Constan-
tinople and Athens His Majesty’s Government will select the requi-
site officials to represent them on the two Commissions.

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Left with the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador, June 6, 1922.
TURKEY

867.4016/543a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain
(Harvey)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1922—7 p.m.

172. Foreign Office may be informed that at the proper time President Harding will name General James G. Harbord and General Henry T. Allen as the American representatives on the Commissions of Inquiry in Anatolia. This information is confidential and not for publication at present.

Keep the Department informed regarding progress with respect to the proposed investigation.

Hughes

867.4016/585

The British Chargé (Chilton) to the Secretary of State

No. 561

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and, with reference to the note which Mr. Hughes was so good as to address to His Majesty's Ambassador on June 3rd conveying the acceptance of the United States Government of the invitation to participate in a commission of enquiry into the recent massacres in Asia Minor, has the honour to inform Mr. Hughes that, in deference to the opinion of the French Government, His Majesty's Government are inclined to consider that, in view of the state of war still existing between the Allies and Turkey, the prospects of securing an early and satisfactory conclusion of the proposed enquiry would be enhanced if it were entrusted to a neutral agency. The International Red Cross of Geneva are prepared, if desired, to undertake the enquiry and Mr. Chilton is instructed to ascertain whether the United States Government would agree to this offer on the part of the International Red Cross being accepted.

In the event of the United States Government agreeing to this course, His Majesty's Government would propose to invite the International Red Cross to select the members of the two commissions as soon as possible and to send them to Constantinople to discuss the question with the representatives of the four Governments there. His Majesty's Government also hope that the United States Government would in this event be prepared to send the necessary instructions to their representatives at Constantinople and Athens in
order to allow of the necessary request for facilities being formally addressed to the Greek Government and the Nationalist Government at Angora with the least possible delay.

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1922.

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The Secretary of State to President Harding

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1922.

My Dear Mr. President: You will recall that on June 3rd last this Government accepted a proposal made by the British Government to participate in an investigation of alleged atrocities in Anatolia. Subsequently no action was taken to carry through this investigation due to the reluctance of the French.

I have now received a note from the British Embassy indicating that out of deference to the opinion of the French Government the British Government suggests that the inquiry be entrusted to a neutral body and propose, as an appropriate agency for the selecting of the Commissions of Investigation, the International Red Cross, which is prepared to undertake the task.

I am favorably disposed toward this suggestion, and unless you see objection, I should be glad to reply to the British Embassy that we are prepared to accept their proposal and to instruct our representatives at Constantinople and Athens to cooperate with their Allied Colleagues in extending such informal assistance as may be proper to the Commissions which may be selected by the International Red Cross.

Faithfully yours,

CHARLES E. HUGHES

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President Harding to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1922.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have yours of July 20th, relating to the revised proposal of the British Government concerning the investigation of the alleged atrocities in Anatolia. I think it is altogether a more acceptable proposition than that which was originally made, and I will be glad to have you advise the British Government of our approval, and instruct our representatives at Constantinople and Athens to cooperate with the Allied Colleagues in facilitating the work of the International Red Cross.

Very truly yours,

WARREN G. HARDING
The Secretary of State to President Harding

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1922.

My Dear Mr. President: The Department receives a large number of communications with respect to the persecution of Christians in the Near East, and I have not thought it necessary to trouble you with any further discussion of policy. But Bishop Cannon of the Methodist Church recently handed me in person the following resolution adopted by the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South:

"The General Conference memorializes the Government of the United States to take whatever steps may be necessary to stop the persecutions, which threaten the complete annihilation of the Christians in the Near East, and to give them such protection as will enable them to reestablish their desolated homes and to support themselves in decency and comfort."

I asked Bishop Cannon whether he thought we should send an American army to Turkey and I gathered that he rather favored such a course if nothing else would suffice. It seemed to be necessary to answer the communication which he left in my hands and I have accordingly drafted the enclosed reply.13a

As this states a little more definitely than we have hitherto been called to state that we shall not take action which would involve us in military operations or the forcible pacification of the Near East, I shall be glad to have your approval of this letter before it is sent.

Faithfully yours,

Charles E. Hughes

President Harding to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1922.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have read your proposed letter to Bishop Cannon. I cordially approve of all that you say therein. If I were to offer any criticism I should say that you have stated it with a certainty tempered with mildness which is more often attributed to me than to you. Frankly, it is difficult for me to be consistently patient with our good friends of the Church who are properly and earnestly zealous in promoting peace until it comes to making warfare on someone of a contending religion. It is, of

course, unthinkable to send an armed force to Asia Minor. We would have open rebellion in this country if we attempted it.

Let me repeat, I quite approve of your letter.

Very truly yours, 

WILLIAM G. HARDING

The Secretary of State to Bishop James Cannon, Jr., of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1922.

Dear Bishop Cannon: Allow me to acknowledge, in somewhat greater detail than was possible at the moment of the call you were good enough to pay me on July 10th, the letter which you then handed me on behalf of the Committee on Temperance and Social Service of the United Methodist Episcopal Church, South,

laying before the Department a resolution adopted on July 8th by your Committee, with regard to the Christians of the Near East.

I am fully aware that the situation of the Christian minorities in Turkey has enlisted a marked degree the sympathies of the American people. Recent response to this sentiment was made by this Government, in signifying its readiness to participate in an international inquiry in Asia Minor.

But deeply sensible of the humanitarian interests which are involved, I am unable to conclude that I should be justified in taking action which would involve us in military operations or in the assumption of responsibilities which could not be met except by an attempt at a forcible pacification of the Near East. I may add that the Department is following carefully developments in Turkey and sincerely desires to be of service in any practicable way.

I am [etc.]

CHARLES E. HUGHES

The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Chilton)

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1922.

Sir: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of July 19th in which, in adverting to my Note of June 3rd, last, regarding the proposed Commission of Investigation in Asia Minor, you indicate that His Majesty’s Government are inclined to con-

"Not printed.

"See letter of July 24, 1922, from the Secretary of State to President Harding, p. 931.
sider that, in view of the state of war still existing between the Allied Powers and Turkey, the prospects of securing an early and satisfactory conclusion of the inquiry would be enhanced if it were entrusted to a neutral agency. You inquire whether this Government would be willing to take advantage of the expressed willingness of the International Red Cross to undertake the investigation.

In agreeing to participate in the proposed inquiry in Asia Minor this Government's chief desire was to facilitate any humanitarian action which might tend to ameliorate the situation of the peoples of Anatolia. As the modification of the original proposal, by entrusting to the International Red Cross the conduct of the inquiry, will not alter its essential object, namely to obtain a full report regarding the situation in Asia Minor, I take pleasure in informing you of my Government's willingness to accept the offer of the International Red Cross and to extend to the Commissions which may be selected by that body the cooperation of American officials in Constantinople and Athens.

Accept [etc.]

CHARLES E. HUGHES

887.4016/597

The British Chargé (Chilton) to the Secretary of State

No. 600

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1922.

Sir: With further reference to the note which you were so good as to address to me on July 26th, in which you conveyed to me the readiness of the United States Government to accept the offer of the International Red Cross to undertake the inquiry into the recent massacres in Asia Minor, I have the honour to inform you on instructions from my Government that the International Red Cross who, at the time when they were originally invited to undertake this enquiry, were already negotiating with the authorities at Angora and Athens to secure facilities for the despatch of relief missions, have agreed to undertake this enquiry on the following specific conditions:

1. that their missions, while primarily devoted to improving the lot of the populations in the areas concerned, will supply a report on the situation to the American, French, Italian and British Governments. It is suggested that the two Commissions to be appointed should each be composed of three Red Cross representatives and two neutrals.

2. that the necessary expenses, which the International Red Cross have not the funds to meet, shall be paid in advance by the Governments interested. These expenses are approximately estimated at a sum of 100,000 francs as the cost of the two Commissions consisting of five members each for a period of two months. It is suggested that this sum should be secured by a contribution of one thousand pounds (£1000) from each of the four Governments concerned.
In view of the great desirability of the missions being able to proceed with the least possible delay, I am instructed to request that I may be informed at the earliest possible opportunity whether these stipulations are agreeable to the United States Government. Unless and until their suggestions are accepted, the International Red Cross are extremely anxious that no unnecessary publicity should be given to the proposed enquiry.

I have [etc.]

H. G. CHILTON

The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Chilton)

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1922.

Sir: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 3rd instant, referring to my note of July 26th last regarding the proposed investigation in Asia Minor. In intimating the conditions under which the International Red Cross has agreed to undertake the proposed investigation you have pointed out that this organization will require sufficient funds to meet the cost of the two commissions and have suggested that Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States should each contribute the equivalent of £1,000 for defraying the cost of the inquiry.

I take pleasure in informing you that this Government is prepared to advance to the International Red Cross for the purposes of the investigation in Anatolia the sum of £1,000 and otherwise to cooperate with the three Allied Governments in facilitating the investigation.

Accept [etc.]

CHARLES E. HUGHES

The British Ambassador (Geddes) to the Secretary of State

No. 625

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1922.

Sir: With reference to the note which you were so good as to address to Mr. Chilton on August 8th, conveying the acceptance of the United States Government of the proposal advanced by the International Red Cross that the cost of the forthcoming commissions of investigation in Asia Minor should be defrayed by the four Governments concerned, I have the honour to inform you, on instructions from my Government, that a formal reply has now been received from the International Red Cross agreeing to despatch to the Greek and Kemalist areas of Anatolia, and to Thrace, missions capable of conducting a proper investigation. The Interna-
tional Red Cross further agree to communicate the report of these missions to the four Governments.

The International Red Cross are approaching the authorities at Athens and Angora with a view to securing the necessary facilities. They will be glad to receive the sum of £1,000 which, as stated in your note under reply, the United States Government are prepared to contribute towards the expenses of the Commissions.

I have [etc.]

A. C. Geddes

867.4016/610

The Acting Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Geddes)

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1922.

EXCELLENCY: In reply to your communication of the 14th instant in regard to the proposed investigation in Asia Minor by Commissions to be selected by the International Red Cross, I take pleasure in informing you that the American Legation at Berne has been authorized to advance to the International Red Cross the equivalent of £1,000 which this Government has agreed to contribute toward the expenses of the Commissions.

Accept [etc.]

William Phillips

867.4016/664

The High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 455 Constantinople, September 14, 1922.

[Received September 30.]

Sir: I have the honor to inform the Department that on September 8, 1922 I received a communication addressed to me by Raouf Bey, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Angora Government, protesting against the alleged atrocities committed by the Greeks during their recent retreat in Asia Minor. On receipt of the above mentioned communication, a copy and translation of which is enclosed for the Department's information, I was struck by the opportunity which was afforded me of informally approaching the Angora Government and calling to the latter's attention what a unique opportunity they had to gain the confidence of the Christian minorities residing in Asia Minor, as well as of our own Government, by adopting a humanitarian and civilized attitude in the conduct of the occupation of the districts recently retaken from the Greek forces. I believed that such representations, if made at the psychological moment, might serve to check the Turkish forces from carrying out reprisals, such as massacres and burnings, which
seem to be the custom of warfare in this part of the world. In this connection I have the honor to call the attention of the Department to the report drawn up by the Smyrna Committee of Investigation in 1919, of which I was the head, and which showed that when the Greek forces retreated from a village they set fire to the Turkish quarter before leaving, and similarly when the Turkish forces retreated from a village they set fire to the Greek quarter. I therefore had an interview with Hamid Bey, the Angora Representative, on September 7, and presented him with a copy of the enclosed Memorandum, together with a French translation. In this interview I attempted to impress upon Hamid Bey that the Memorandum in question embodied my personal feelings and I most earnestly requested that this Memorandum should be transmitted to Angora without delay.

Whether my representations which I have reported above, had any effect, it is impossible to say, but, at the same time, I think it worth while to call the attention of the Department to the fact that, up to the time of the writing of this despatch, all of the reports which I have received from my Naval representatives in Smyrna would seem to indicate that the Greeks during their recent retreat systematically laid waste to the country and committed many atrocities. On the other hand, I have received no reports up to the present time of atrocities committed by the Turkish forces, and all are agreed that the Turkish occupation of Smyrna—even during the first few days when that city was practically in a panic, and when disorders of all kinds were to be feared—was carried out in a most orderly and peaceful manner.

I have [etc.]

MARK L. BRISTOL

[Enclosure 1—Translation]

The President of the Turkish Council of Ministers (Hussein Raouf) to the American High Commissioner (Bristol)

ANGORA, August 31, 1922.

The undersigned, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister ad interim of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Great National Assembly of Turkey, has the honor to bring to Your Excellency's knowledge the following facts that he begs you will be so good as to bring to the knowledge of your Government.

As they did after the retreat to which they were forced by the battles of İnönü and of Sakaria, the Greeks commit, in all the localities which they are forced to evacuate, crimes which are only equalled by those which they committed after the above-mentioned battles.

26 Not printed.
Thus, before leaving Afion-Karahissar and its neighborhood, the enemy set on fire most of the Mussulman quarters of the town; a great number of the surrounding villages have been subjected to the same fate, and their population has been massacred.

In certain localities, notably at Ulujik, near Altun-Tash, all the inhabitants, with the women and children, were locked up in the mosque and burned alive.

During the battle of Dumlu-Pinar, the enemy burned completely the villages of Hamam-Kyoı and Tash-Kyoı, and the inhabitants were partly massacred, partly burned alive, and partly subjected to horrible tortures. The locality of Dumlu-Pinar was specially burned down.

It is clear that the Greek Army has decided to burn the whole occupied country and to exterminate systematically the civil population.

In denouncing these atrocities, the undersigned hopes that by loudly manifesting their reprobation the Government and the press 17 will try in the name of humanity to influence the Greek Government so that they will put a stop to the ferocity of their troops.

Hussein Raouf

[Enclosure 2]

The American High Commissioner (Bristol) to the President of the Turkish Council of Ministers (Hussein Raouf)

[Constantinople.] September 8, 1922.

Memorandum

I take this occasion in a spirit of personal friendship and with the most disinterested of motives to call your attention to the fact that the eyes of the world and especially of the people of the United States are turned upon the struggle which is taking place at the present time in Asia Minor. I am convinced that this is the greatest opportunity that Turkey has had to show the world that a new regime has been established and is successfully maintaining the highest principles of civilization and humanity, and that the members of the Government at Angora are statesmen in whom not only the minorities living within the boundaries of Turkey but the entire world can have confidence.

I venture to call to your attention the fact that the present time is a crucial one in the history of the Nationalist Movement and of Turkey; that the public opinion of the world is hanging in a bal-

17 i. e., of the United States.
ance and will be swayed one way or the other according to the attitude of the combatants in the present struggle be they Greek or Turk. At the present moment the Turkish forces, as is only natural, are elated at the victories recently achieved over their opponents. I trust you will not take it amiss, therefore, if I venture to impress upon you as earnestly as is within my power to do the expediency of the Turkish High Command taking the most energetic steps to insure the populations of the occupied territories against reprisals which are often the saddest and most regrettable part of a war, and which if carried out in the present instance by the Turkish forces would serve to antagonize the public opinion of the world, and would give the opponents of Turkey an opportunity of starting a propaganda which could not fail very seriously to impair the cordial relations which we all hope to see established in the future between Turkey and the rest of the world, and which would seriously diminish the influence and prestige of the persons in the Angora Government who are responsible for the actions of the armed forces.

867.4018/353: Telegram

The Right Reverend Alfred Harding, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Washington, to President Harding

PORTLAND, OREG., September 22, 1922.18

May I advise you that the Committee of the Episcopal Church to Cooperate with the Near East Relief has been instructed by the unanimous vote of the House of Bishops and House of Deputies to create a public sentiment which will support our President and Secretary of State in any effort, diplomatic, naval, or military, that they may make toward the establishment of justice, mercy, and peace in the stricken lands of the Near East.

ALFRED HARDING

867.4018/664: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol)

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1922—6 p.m.

165. I have today received your despatch No. 455, September 14, and your communication of September 8th to Raouf Bey for Kemal is fully approved. Lose no opportunity to voice American sentiment by impressing upon Kemal in appropriate informal communi-

18 Received at the Department of State from the White House Sept. 29.
cation necessity of adequate protection Christian minorities and abstention from cruel acts of reprisal. Failure in this respect would arouse strongest feeling of condemnation throughout this country. Emphasize importance of immediate peaceful settlement in interest of humanity.

Hughes

867.4016/854 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Herrick)

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1928—7 p.m.

I have received following telegram from Bishop James Cannon at Paris:

“Returned from Constantinople today find American papers quote my London Times article incorrectly. I said: ‘Personally believe Christian America will insist Government United States cooperate actively protect Christians in Asia Minor not only diplomatically but if necessary with army and navy to secure their result.’ I did not claim Government would certainly adopt that course. You will recall American church bodies urged State Department July take whatever steps necessary protect Eastern Christians. Prompt definite American demands supported if necessary by American naval units present would probably have prevented certainly greatly minimized Smyrna fires and massacres. I believe Almighty God will hold Government responsible for inaction while thousands murdered and deported and for failure protect against defiant heartless brutal Kemalist announcement that all refugees not removed today, Saturday, be deported which deportation means thousands more added to dead of previous Turkish deportations. Will not our Government realize its opportunity and responsibility as great Christian nation politically disinterested to demand that burnings outrages massacres cease and thus effectively prevent probably repetition in Constantinople and Thrace of 1915 Samsoun and Smyrna horrors. I believe world-wide humanity would tremendously approve. Who would dare condemn prohibition further such horror? Shall America have condemnation of Meroz? Judges 5: 23. Bishop James Cannon.”

I have sent a reply in care of Embassy for immediate delivery to Bishop Cannon or to be forwarded to him. This reply reads as follows:

“Bishop James Cannon, Care American Embassy, Paris, France. Your telegram of September 30th reached me this morning. In the present situation which has resulted from the clash of arms, the defeat of the Greek forces, the incidents of the retreat, and the reprisals effected, not only have we done all that is possible for relief and in aid of the refugees but we have exerted in an appropriate manner our influence against all acts of cruelty and oppression.
On September 8th, before the burning of Smyrna, the American High Commissioner at Constantinople voiced this country's feeling in earnestly impressing upon the Turkish Nationalist authorities the importance of taking the most energetic steps to insure the population of the occupied territories against reprisal. Instructions have been sent to continue and urge these representations and to emphasize the importance of immediate peaceful settlement in the interest of humanity. I have stated this Government's unequivocal approval of the Allied proposals to insure effectively the protection of the Christian minorities and the freedom of the Straits. American officials have intervened to secure the prolongation of the time limit for the evacuation of the refugees from Smyrna, and thousands have been evacuated as a result of American initiative.

You will also recall that in June last we agreed to join in an inquiry which we hoped would place responsibility and prevent the recurrence of atrocities.

Keenly alive to every humanitarian interest involved, this Government has not failed in any way to make the sentiment of the American people understood and to take every appropriate action. It is hardly necessary to add that we have taken proper measures for the protection of American interests.

As you are probably aware, the Executive has no authority to go beyond this and there has been no action by Congress which would justify this Government in an attempt by armed forces to pacify the Near East or to engage in acts of war in order to accomplish the results you desire with respect to the inhabitants of that territory and to determine the problems which have vexed Europe for generations. Charles E. Hughes, Secretary of State."

Repeat this telegram, including Bishop Cannon's message and my reply to Embassies London and Rome, High Commission, Constantinople and Legation, Athens.

Hughes

867.4016/724

The Representative of the Greek Government (Vouros) to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State (Dulles)

WASHINGTON, October 10, 1922.

My Dear Mr. Dulles: I beg to inform you that my Government has instructed me to lay before the American Government an urgent protest against the order of the Kemalists for the deportation of the male Christian population in the interior of Asia Minor.

The refugees, who up to the present moment, have arrived in Greece and who exceed half a million, are exclusively women and children under 15 years of age, or aged men above sixty. This separation of the heads of families from their own families, who
thus remain without support, makes the work of relief exceedingly difficult.

An elementary humanitarian duty imposes to the Christian world to come to the assistance of these Christians thus deported to the interior of Asia Minor.

My Government believes that it is advisable that committees be constituted by the International Red Cross and eventually also by the League of Nations and other organizations, especially American, which shall be entrusted with the duty of following the fate of these unfortunate populations and save them from certain death which will be the inevitable result of the exactions inflicted upon them.

According to existing information the deported exceed one hundred thousand men.

The Greek Government has already addressed in the above sense an appeal to the International Red Cross and the League of Nations. It considers, however, that it would be of real effect if the Allied Great Powers use all their influence with Kemal to the effect of saving these deportees and that they were willing to assist in the manner they deem advisable, the work for the relief of these unfortunate ones.

Trusting, my dear Mr. Dulles, that you will be kind enough to bring the above appeal to the attention of the American Government, I beg [etc.]

A. Vouros

887.4016/717

The International Committee of the Red Cross to the Department of State

[Translation 56]

Geneva, October 20, 1923.

[Received November 2.]

Gentlemen: We have the honor to forward herewith to you the various letters 50 we have exchanged with the Foreign Office about the organization of the Relief Mission to Anatolia and Thrace, with which the International Committee of the Red Cross had been charged by the American, British, French, and Italian Governments.

The International Committee of the Red Cross did not fail to take all necessary steps to that effect, but has not yet received from Angora the needed permissions to accomplish the above-mentioned mission.

56 File translation revised.
50 Not printed.
The International Committee of the Red Cross takes this opportunity to thank the Department of State for the confidence which the Department, jointly with the British, French, and Italian Governments, was pleased to place in it by charging it with that eminently humanitarian duty.

We beg [etc.]

LUCIEN BRUNEL
Secretary General of the Mission Service

897.4016/724

The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State (Dulles) to the Representative of the Greek Government (Vouros)

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1922.

MY DEAR MR. VOUROS: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, advising that you have been instructed to protest against the order of the Kemalists for the deportation of the male Christian population into the interior of Asia Minor, and stating, further, the belief of the Greek authorities that it is advisable that committees be constituted by the International Red Cross and eventually also by the League of Nations and other organizations, especially American, which should be entrusted with the duty of following the fate of these unfortunate people.

In this connection, I desire to advise you of certain relief measures already taken to meet the emergency in the Near East.

On October 8th the President issued a statement, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, regarding the distressing situation in the Near East. As you will note, a special fund has been created, to be known as the "Near East Emergency Fund" which is to be raised by a nation-wide appeal to be engaged in by the American Red Cross, the Near East Relief, the Young Men's Christian Association, the Young Women's Christian Association, the Federal Council of Churches, the Knights of Columbus, the American Relief Administration, the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and other organizations having interests in the Near East. To assist in the joint appeal to the public, a special committee has been named, under the chairmanship of Mr. Will H. Hays.

It has been arranged, further, that the American Red Cross and the Near East Relief shall be the instrumentalities through which relief will be extended. Dr. A. Ross Hill, of the American Red Cross,
has already left for Athens, where he will have charge of the relief activities of that organization in Europe.

As to the work already done in Turkey to meet the emergency, Admiral Bristol recently reported to the Department that for a month past American relief organizations in Constantinople have been working in the closest cooperation in emergency relief work under the direction of a central American committee. This committee has representatives on the committee headed by Mr. Nansen, in order to bring about the closest cooperation with the latter. Admiral Bristol has further reported, the evacuation, through Smyrna and neighboring ports, of two hundred and twenty-two thousand persons since the Smyrna fire. Of these refugees, one hundred and eighty thousand were evacuated by American Naval forces and the American Relief Committee, with the assistance of forces of the British Navy.

I am [etc.]

A. W. DULLES

867.4016/707a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the High Commissioner at Constantinople
(Bristol)

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1922—4 p. m.

211. Promptly telegraph information on following points:

(1) Has any exodus of Christian populations of Constantinople begun?

(2) Do you consider that Christian population Constantinople would be safe after reoccupation of city by the Turks?

(3) What guarantees do you think could be obtained from the Turks which would render their situation more secure?

(4) What is your estimate of the number of the Christian minorities at present in territory in Anatolia under Turkish occupation?

(5) What is your estimate of present population of eastern Thrace, exclusive of Constantinople, the proportion of Christians and the number of persons who will leave this territory previous to re-occupation by Turkey?

(6) Department has now received mail reports through you, Consul General Horton, and Vice-Consul Barnes regarding the Smyrna fire. It appears that three American citizens lost their lives, that American relief workers were robbed and threatened, that American sailors guarding the International College were attacked. What action, if any, was taken by American representatives in Smyrna to protest to Turkish authorities against such acts and to prevent their recurrence?

*Not printed.*
(7) Press reports indicate that at one moment during Smyrna fire British naval forces warned the Turkish authorities in the city that if killings continued the Turkish quarters would be bombarded. Is this correct and if so what attitude was taken by American naval forces present?

(8) Was any American protest made to Turkish authorities Smyrna against indiscriminate killing of Armenians and apparent systematic terrorization of Greek refugees during and subsequent to fire?

Report fully and promptly.

Hughes

887.4016/107: Telegram

The High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 27, 1922—3 p. m.

[Received 8:10 p. m.]

286. Department’s telegram no. 212, October 24, 5:00 p. m.25 Subsequent to action taken by me on September 8th, and reported in my despatch number 455, September 14th, I requested interview with Hamid Bey on September 21st and again urged upon him the necessity for a humanitarian treatment of the refugees who were on that date gathered at Smyrna as well as those who had been evacuated into the interior. I informed him that the eyes of the world were turned upon Smyrna at the moment and that the judgment of the world would be largely determined by the treatment of these refugees by the Nationalist authorities—see my diary dated September 21st transmitted to Department in my despatch No. 481, October 5th.23

On receipt of the Department’s telegram no. 165, September 30, 6:00 p. m., I endeavored to see Hamid Bey but latter had already left for Moudania to attend armistice conference where he remained with the exception of visit of few hours to Constantinople until signature of the armistice convention. Latter event removed danger of Turkish aggression against minorities and in view of my previous representations reported above has rendered any further representations up to the present time inappropriate. We have no authentic reports since the receipt of Department’s aforesaid telegram of any incidents upon which to base representations. I have had one conference with Hamid Bey at which I appropriately set forth our general relief activities in order to create favorable attitude of the Kemalists towards humanitarian work. Should danger again arise

*Not printed.
Department may rest assured I will lose no opportunity to voice American sentiment as reported Department’s 165, September 30, 6:00 p.m.

BRISTOL

867.4018/708: Telegram

The High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 28, 1922—3 p.m.

[Received October 30—12:30 a.m.]

289. Department’s 211, October 24, 5 [4] p.m. Following are answers to questions embodied in the Department’s above-mentioned telegram.

1. Impossible to estimate number of departures from Constantinople but probably in neighborhood of 10,000. Departures continuing but up to this time this cannot be characterized as a general exodus of Christian population. Effect upon native Christians of the departure of British civilians and officers’ wives when war threatened should be borne in mind.

2. I am inclined to believe that the Christian population of Constantinople as a whole would be safe excepting for those Ottoman Greeks and Armenians considered by the Turks as traitors on account of having aided the Greeks or Allies since the armistice. At the same time there is certainly a danger of reprisals being instituted by the Turks in case overt acts are committed by local population which might serve to stir up racial animosity. Undoubtedly all races would take advantage of any confusion to pay off old scores and take reprisals. See reports of recent Greek troops and civilians devastating Anatolia and committing outrages also Turkish outrages in Smyrna.

Refet Pasha 24 has assured General Harington 25 that in case the Christian population remains tranquil and pursues its normal course of life it will not be molested, however it is most difficult to prophesy what would result from the occupation of Constantinople by the Turks where there are so many races and nationalities having large numbers of bad and disreputable characters. It is also possible that heterogeneous population of Constantinople might [result?] in looting and burning city; especially Christian races if deciding to leave might burn their own property to prevent its falling into the hands of the Turks. Population estimated 400,000 Turks, 150,000 other

24 Turkish Governor of Eastern Thrace.
25 Allied Commander at Constantinople.
Moslems, 400,000 Greeks, 140,000 Armenians and 100,000 Jews, Europeans and others.

3. In my opinion only effective guarantees would involve total exclusion Turkish troops from the city either for occupation purposes or victory celebrations and continued occupation by strong foreign police during transition period. I believe distinction should be drawn between actual guarantees and either verbal or written promises. Undoubtedly strong promises not to molest Christian population could be secured similar to that of Refet Pasha mentioned above.

4. Estimate, making allowances for massacres during Great War and recent exodus due to the Greek collapse, gives about 1,350,000 Christians at present in Anatolia under Turkish occupation. Total population of Anatolia about 11,000,000. This estimate while probably more accurate than that regarding Eastern Thrace is still unreliable.

5. Extremely difficult to estimate population of Eastern Thrace because since 1912 there have been successive military occupations that district due to the Balkan wars as well as Great War with consequent migrations. Closest estimate before present exodus appears to give about 400,000 Turks, 250,000 Greeks and 50,000 Bulgarians, Armenians et cetera. Reliable reports received to effect that approximately 250,000 Christians have already left Eastern Thrace since signing Moudania Convention. This estimate includes about 40,000 refugees who have arrived from Brousa and other places [in] Anatolia.

[6.] Case of Carathima, naturalized American citizen supposed killed, promptly followed up from moment arrest by naval officers and afterwards by consul through various officials and order for release secured. Still missing on day of fire and the Turkish authorities again notified. Reported wrong man released and Carathima probably sent interior. No reason to impute bad faith and not improbable Carathima still alive.

Case of Zafer Ellis, naturalized American citizen killed, promptly investigated and found apparently suicide when threatened by chetas or brigands. Body buried under guard American sailors.

Tara, naturalized American citizen killed, not discovered until several days after death. Representations made and Turkish investigation reported killed by Greek. Later evidence secured by consul that killing was by Turkish irregulars and brought to notice Turkish authorities.

Precautions for safety relief workers taken in advance by obtaining liaison officers, written passes and Turkish guards. Single case of Jacob, relief worker, robbed. No representation made at his special
request as he was injudiciously outside protected zone and intending remain. He did not desire arouse resident authorities.

Only attack on sailors guarding college occasioned by McLachlan 28 taking guard beyond protected area contrary to instructions.

Representations immediately made and increased Turkish guards promptly obtained.

7. I believe no foundation whatever for this report.

8. On September 9th upon entry of Turkish troops Smyrna and before any disorder occurred Captain Hepburn made representations to Murcelle Pasha in command of occupying forces, calling his attention to danger of the situation and urging that Turkish authorities take steps to prevent disorder. On September 11th Captain Hepburn saw Nourreddin Pasha who had succeeded Murcelle Pasha and called his attention to disorder which was occurring and urged upon him necessity for the protection of refugees. Captain Hepburn three times pressed for an answer as to exact measures which would be taken to preserve order. Immediately after fire and for several days during evacuation of refugees Commander Powell, who was then my senior naval officer present, made daily representations to the Turkish officers in charge of troops handling evacuation protesting against unnecessary brutalities and once made similar representations to Nourreddin Pasha and once to Nadji Bey commandant de la place. All such representations were cordially received and all requests for guard on American property were promptly granted and efficiently executed, however no determined effort was made by the Turkish military authorities to protect refugees or suppress disturbances especially in Armenian district.

Bristol

867.4016/725c: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France

(Herrick)

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1922—11 a. m.

350. The Secretary in his address at Boston on October 30 made the following reference to the Near Eastern situation as a part of his outline of our foreign policy.

"The most acute questions at the moment concern the Near East. The Christian world has been filled with horror at the atrocities committed at [in] Anatolia, especially in connection with the burning of Smyrna, rivaled only by the wholesale massacres and deportations of the Armenians in 1915. While nothing can excuse in the slightest

28 Dr. Alexander McLachlan, president of the American College at Smyrna.
degree or palliate the acts of barbaric cruelty of the Turks, no just
appraisal can be made of the situation which fails to take ac-
count of the incursion of the Greek army into Anatolia, of the war
there waged, and of the terrible incidents of the retreat of that
army, in the burning of towns, and general devastation and cruelties.
Anatolia in war has been the scene of savagery. Last June, the Pres-
ident gladly agreed to enter with the Great Powers into an investi-
gation of the atrocities which had been reported and be detailed
officers for that purpose. Later, it was suggested by the Powers that
the inquiries be undertaken by the Red Cross, and this was agreed
to, but before the inquiry could be made the final scenes in the
tragedy were being enacted.

We have not failed to voice American sentiment in our abhor-
rence of these cruelties practiced upon helpless populations. Our
American High Commissioner at Constantinople, during the past
year and a half, has not failed repeatedly and vigorously to pro-
test against them. Before the burning of Smyrna, fearing the
reprisals that might follow the Greek retreat, he most earnestly
impressed on the Turkish Nationalists the need of energetic measures
for the protection of the people of the occupied territories. In the
appalling distress at Smyrna, American officers were the first to
give and continued to give all the relief within their power, and
from that moment we have lost no opportunity to succor the refugees
by measures which have been rapidly and constantly broadening to
meet the exigency in every practicable way. Our representatives
have been instrumental in effecting the evacuation from Smyrna
of nearly 200,000 refugees. The President’s appeal on behalf of
humanity, and in support of all that the organized philanthropy of
America can do, has met with the most generous response.

It is easy to talk of prevention after the event. The fact is that
these latest occurrences have been the immediate result of a state
of war and we were not parties to that war. When the Allies were
at war with Turkey and we associated ourselves with the Allies in
the war with Germany and Austria-Hungary, we declined to go to
war with Turkey despite the occurrences of 1915. In the last 2
years, with armies in Asia Minor, the appeal has been to force, and
the American people would never have been willing to shoulder this
burden of armed intervention which the Allies with their forces
nearer the scene were unwilling to bear.

It would be equally futile now to talk of this country going to war
when all the other Powers are arranging to make peace. At no time
has the Executive had any authority to plunge this country into war,
even a holy war. I know there are those who think we should have
threatened even if we did not intend to make war. The Administra-
tion does not make threats which it does not purpose to carry out.
The American people cannot afford a policy where the words spoken
on their behalf do not mean all that is said, and when we threaten
we shall execute. Permit me to quote the words of Colonel Roose-
velt, whose name is often invoked by those who apparently have
but slight knowledge of his views. In relation to a diplomatic
situation which involved a similar question, he wrote as follows:
‘As I utterly disbelieve in the policy of bluff, in national and inter-
national no less than in private affairs, or in any violation of the
old frontier maxim, "Never draw unless you mean to shoot," I do not believe in our taking any position anywhere unless we can make good.

In the present exigency, in addition to the full measure of relief which the American people are giving, there are American interests which must be adequately protected and humanitarian interests which should have our support in every proper way. I cannot discuss these in detail tonight but I may mention the protection of American citizens in Turkey, the conserving with their just rights of our educational, philanthropic and religious institutions, the safeguarding of American commercial interests, the freedom of the Straits in the interest of commerce and equal opportunity, and the protection of minorities.

As we are not at war with Turkey we are not appropriately parties to the peace negotiations which are about to take place. While we have American interests to protect, these are not associated with the political ambitions of European Powers which have made the Near East a checkerboard for diplomatic play. We do not propose to connect ourselves with these rivalries, as such a connection would only confuse our aims with those of others, and obscure our clear and simple purposes. What we desire does not involve the slightest injury to others or derogation of the rights of others, and we claim the protection of American interests at every place from whatever sovereignty may be in charge. We trust that in the interest of freedom of opportunity there will be no endeavor to parcel out spheres of special economic influence. If we avoid the conflicting rivalries in which we have no proper part and hold to a clear and definite American policy we shall the more easily maintain our friendship with other Powers, foster good will and heighten rather than diminish the influence which we desire to be helpful."

The above is sent for your information in view of the possibility that it may reach you misquoted through other channels.

Repeat by cable to Constantinople as Department's 230 and by mail to London and Rome.

PHILLIPS

867.4016/720: Telegram

The High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

CONSTANTINOPE, November 4, 1922—3 p. m.

[Received November 5—3:25 a.m.]

301. I called a meeting of the Allied High Commissioners at the American Embassy this morning at which I presented them with the following memorandum:

"Reports have been received by the American High Commission to the effect that the Nationalist authorities are insisting upon the immediate departure of the Christian children in the orphanages of
the Near East Relief. It has been for some time past the policy of the Near East Relief to remove the orphans in its charge from Anatolia, and permission for such present condition [action?] had been requested from the authorities at Angora. The mere granting of this permission, therefore, would not in itself be cause for uneasiness were it not for the fact that the authorities have plainly expressed their desire that the orphans should leave Anatolia immediately and should be accompanied by the Greek and Armenian employees of the Near East Relief. Finally, an unconfirmed report has been received from Samsoun that Greeks and Armenians must leave within 30 days or be deported. These several reports taken together appear to indicate an intention on the part of the Nationalist authorities to evacuate the entire Christian population of Eastern Anatolia. The serious consequences of the carrying out of any such policy require no lengthy description. Over a million persons may find themselves homeless and another and more appalling refugee problem thereby created.”

Both the French and Italian High Commissioners had received similar reports, the French High Commissioner stating however that his information was to the effect the aforesaid Nationalist order referred only to the Christian population in the coastal provinces. He stated that in one locality at least notices of expulsion had already been published to take effect November 1st. The Italian High Commissioner stated that his reports were that males from 18 to 45 years of age would be deported into the interior and that the rest of the population would be expelled. I suggested that the Allied High Commissioners draft a note of protest to the Angora Government in order to attempt to have this order cancelled or at least in some way to ameliorate the situation and I stated I would transmit a similar note. I requested the Allied High Commissioners to take under consideration means of transportation and localities to which refugees would proceed in case the order for expulsion was actually carried out.

This morning before above in this connection I saw Hamid Bey and presented to him strong representations against the expulsion of Christians from Anatolia. He hopes [promised to?] transmit my protest to Anatolia.

BRISTOL

887.4016/726 : Telegram

The High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 7, 1922—9 a. m.

[Received November 11—6:35 p.m.]

310. My 301 November 4, 3 p.m. Destroyer at Trebizond reports Armenians and Greeks there have been officially informed that for
one month they may depart without hindrance. This is not considered obligatory or compulsory.

Destroyer at Samsoun on November 1st reported that Mutessarif had [ordered] all Greeks to leave inside one month under penalty of deportation into interior and that they could take only personal belongings and could not dispose of property. Same destroyer reports November 3d Samsoun becoming uneasy and entire Greek and Armenian population preparing to leave; are selling their belongings on the street at enormous sacrifices. No provisions made for sea transportation by local authorities. Exodus expected to begin in small numbers by those able to afford passage on regular steamer. Destroyer has received many requests for assistance.

I am endeavoring to obtain definite information as to whether action of Angora Government is to be construed purely as giving permission for Christians to leave if they so desire or whether non-compliance with this permission entails deportation into interior.

In view of above-mentioned situation I have instructed commanding officers of destroyers as follows:

"Imperative commanding officers in all Turkish Black Sea ports scrupulously observe detachment policy regarding evacuation refugees from these regions as follows: Our attitude towards evacuations from these ports not in any sense same as in Smyrna area. We have assumed no obligations and do not intend to assume in the line of protection, patronage, or assistance to non-American refugees in Black Sea area. Discourage any attempt or suggestion to involve naval forces in any commitment, expressed or implied, in favor of refugees."

After consultation with acting director Near East Relief latter has telegraphed representative Samsoun to prevent movement of orphans if possible in order to forestall civilian stampede which might result from such an act. I will continue to press Angora authorities to assume humane attitude toward Christian population. I fear present attitude of Kemalists means getting rid of all Christian minorities.

Bristol

867.4016/720: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol)

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1922—2 p. m.

245. Department approves action described in your 301, November 4, 3 P. M. In case you or Allied High Commissioners make written representations, telegraph text. Advise Department if reported decision of Kemalists to evacuate Christians is confirmed.

Hughes
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the British Ambassador (Geddes), November 10, 1922

The British Ambassador left a memorandum referring to the information received by the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople from Admiral Bristol to the effect that the American High Commissioner had been informed that the Turkish Nationalist authorities were insisting upon the immediate departure of the Christian children in orphanages of the Near East Relief, and that the American High Commission also had an unconfirmed report from Samsoun that Greeks and Armenians must leave within thirty days or be deported. Reference was also made to the confirmation of these reports from the French High Commissioner and the Italian High Commissioner. Without detailing the full contents of the memorandum, the main point was the action of Admiral Bristol in suggesting protests to the Angora Government, this action being based on Admiral Bristol’s view that there appeared to be an intention on the part of the Turkish Nationalist authorities to evacuate the entire Christian population of Eastern Anatolia. The concluding paragraph of the British memorandum stated that His Majesty’s Government had information that the Turkish Government were preparing to expel the entire Christian population of Constantinople; that Armenians and Greeks were already being forced to leave in large numbers while all Christian men between 15 and 45 were being retained in Anatolia and deported to the interior where they could not long survive.

The Ambassador said that the British Government desired to know to what extent they could rely upon the United States Government for support in an ultimatum to the Turks that they would be held accountable if such procedure was followed.

The Ambassador said that it was apparent that the Turks would not be impressed by protests unless the Allies made it clear that they were ready to take forcible measures. The Ambassador said he did not know whether the British would decide to go it alone or not; that it was not unlikely that they would; that it was uncertain whether the French could be depended upon; that if the American Government stood with the British Government he thought the French would feel that they must join in taking the same position, but that if the American Government stood aloof the French might stand aloof also.

The Secretary said that this Government was desirous of doing all that it could in the interest of humanity and was deeply impressed

*Not printed.*
by the exigency; that Admiral Bristol, as the Ambassador had said, was already using his influence to the utmost degree to prevent such atrocities as were feared, and that Admiral Bristol was in a position to be of great service as he had no little influence with the Turks. It was difficult to believe that the Turks, unless insensate, would enter upon a course which would arouse the entire civilized world against them. The Secretary said that there had evidently been a break in the cable communications, and that we had had no information for several days as to the situation in Constantinople, but that we would communicate at once by radio, if possible, and ascertain from Admiral Bristol what the real condition was and whether such a serious catastrophe was threatened in Constantinople as the British memorandum contemplated.

The Secretary asked what sort of an ultimatum was contemplated. He said that the United States Government was ready to use diplomatic pressure to the utmost extent but that if it was desired to threaten war the American Government was not willing to do that unless it was ready to go to war. The Secretary pointed out that the populations to which the Ambassador had referred were not Americans and that the Executive would have no right to commit this country to war in their behalf, despite the humanitarian interests involved unless Congress authorized it. The Secretary pointed out that Congress was about to convene; that whatever might possibly be said of an emergency arising when Congress was not to convene in the near future, there was no such emergency now, and within a few days Congress would be here. The Secretary said that it would be idle for the Executive to take a position which would not have the support of Congress, as he would need in the event of hostilities to have a force raised and the necessary appropriations made.

The Ambassador said that he felt that if the Powers stood together and the Turks were convinced that they would not permit the threatened action to be taken it would not be taken. The Secretary again asked what form of ultimatum the Ambassador had in mind, pointing out that it evidently meant a demand after diplomatic pressure had been used in vain. The Ambassador endeavored to explain and as the ultimatum he suggested was nothing but a threat of war the Secretary said again that what the Ambassador really wanted to know was whether the American Government was ready to go to war with the Turks and support the British in such a war. The Secretary said that he felt that he could not answer such a question in the affirmative without assuming that Congress when it convened would authorize or approve such a course and at present he had no basis for such an assumption. The Secretary said that he would take the matter up with the President as the
President was the best judge of the political situation and of the attitude of the people as it would be reflected in Congress. The Secretary pointed out that events might occur which would have an immediate effect upon American sentiment, but that he could say nothing more until he had further reports from Admiral Bristol and the Secretary had had an opportunity to obtain the President's views.

The Ambassador then referred to the relation of the United States representatives to Turkish matters at the peace conference. He said that the Secretary had no idea of the influential position that President Wilson had occupied; that it was in deference to his wishes, who was the spokesman for the United States, that the Allies had deferred making settlement with Turkey; that the Allies had desired to go ahead, but that they had delayed for months, because of hope of American support; that the present difficulties were largely the result of that delay. The Ambassador said that the British public had the feeling that they were being deserted by America, and that this was a very important factor in the situation; that it would be very unfortunate if at this time the British public got the idea that Great Britain was left alone. The Ambassador said that the British had not desired mandates. The whole mandate idea was Mr. Wilson's idea and that the British had deferred to his views in the hope of American cooperation. The Secretary asked, if they did not wish the mandates, whether they desired the territories or whether the Ambassador meant to imply that they did not wish any territories at all as a result of the war. The Ambassador did not directly meet this question. He said he was in the Cabinet at the time and knew that these territories would be a burden and that the British had taken up their share of the burden in the expectation that America would take its share and now they feared that they were being left alone.

The Ambassador said that if the Secretary would look into the records of the Department of State he would find that the statements were fully borne out.

The Secretary said he had no desire to engage in any controversial discussion of what took place at the peace conference; that it was quite evident to those who knew American opinion that this Government would never consent to accept a mandate over the Near East; that the American conception of the situation was quite different from what the Ambassador had stated the British conception to be; that the American Government had never sought for any territories and if it had desired that whatever territories were taken as a result of the war should be administered with special reference to the needs of the inhabitants and should be accepted in the nature
of a trust, it was not at all because the American Government desired any aggrandizement or failed to understand that the other Powers did desire acquisition of territory.

The Secretary said that while he preferred not to enter into a discussion of the general subject, he would say that he could not for a moment assent to the view that this Government was in any way responsible for the existing conditions. The Secretary said that the United States had not sought to parcel out spheres of influence in Anatolia; that the United States had not engaged in intrigues at Constantinople; that the United States was not responsible for the catastrophe of the Greek armies during the last year and a half, and that diplomacy in Europe for the last year and a half was responsible for the late disaster. The Secretary said that that was the American point of view and that he was quite ready, if the Ambassador desired, to elaborate and substantiate it at any time. The Secretary said that what troubled the dreams of the British statesmen was their maintenance of their imperial power, the question of India, the question of Egypt, of the Suez Canal, and their relations to the Near East in connection with their vast imperial domain. The Secretary said he did not criticise this attitude. He was quite ready to admit that the British Empire was a supporter of civilization. The Secretary said he must point out, however, that whatever these imperial ambitions and difficulties were, that the American Government was not associated with these imperial aspirations and difficulties. The Secretary said that we were dealing with an existing situation and it would not be to any advantage to discuss the past. The Ambassador said he did not care to discuss the matter further at this time, but he felt that if the Secretary examined the records of the Department he would see that the Ambassador’s statements were well founded. The Secretary informed the Ambassador that the Secretary of War had cancelled the engagement for Mr. Fortescue, President of the Royal Historical Society, to lecture at West Point because of certain statements reflecting upon American honor which had appeared in Mr. Fortescue’s published works.

The interview then ended with an appointment for Monday, November 13, at noon.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the British Ambassador (Geddes), November 13, 1922

The British Ambassador called pursuant to appointment. The Secretary said that he had not yet heard in answer to his request
for information from Admiral Bristol as to the present situation in Constantinople and Anatolia with respect to the deportations of Greeks and Armenians, and the effect of the protest already made.

The Secretary said he had been carefully considering the situation; that he understood there were about a million three hundred thousand Christians left in Anatolia; that these were scattered throughout Anatolia; that they had been largely removed from the villages in the West and were found more to the Center and to the East; that being a scattered population in towns and on farms and on the highways en route to the coast cities, it would be quite impossible for any force that could be gathered actually to save them; that in the event of war they would probably be the first to perish; that no force could be put into Anatolia that could really rescue such a scattered population. The Secretary said that there was a different situation in Constantinople. The Secretary said that he understood that the British had about ten to fifteen thousand troops in Chanak and about five thousand holding the approaches from Ismid; that he understood General Harington had said some time ago that by concentrating these forces he could police Constantinople, but that he could not police Constantinople and hold the approaches at the same time. The Secretary said he understood that there were about fifty thousand Turks in Constantinople more or less armed; that in this situation it would be very difficult to put any force there which could command the situation. The Secretary pointed out that our present military forces were too meager to permit of sending of any detachment that would be adequate in a war against the Turks; that such a force could only be raised by the consent of Congress and would require a very deep feeling throughout the country—probably another draft and a special military organization to meet the exigency. The Secretary said that he could not tell what would be the effect of the commission of atrocities on the part of the Turks; that there might be over night a tremendous American sentiment created, but there was nothing to indicate it at the moment. The Secretary said that he had discussed the matter with the President and the President was very much opposed to anything in the nature of an empty threat; that it would be much worse in the near future for all interests concerned if we joined in a threat which we did not make good, and that we were not in a position at the moment to make good a threat of force. The Secretary pointed out that ships might lay off Constantinople and threaten bombardment. This could add to the destruction, but could not prevent it. He pointed out that the great danger in Constantinople was not of a well organized military invasion with a massacring of the population but a state of panic produced by rumors and an uprising in the
city itself which would be taken advantage of in the burning and looting and destruction of lives and property without it being possible to ascribe it to a definite military movement, or to fix responsibility in a clear way upon the Turkish command. The Secretary pointed out that if this happened the thing would be done and would be irretrievable.

The Ambassador said that the only thing that could prevent it, in his judgment, was that the four Powers should unite in informing the Turks that if anything of the sort occurred vengeance would be exacted. The Secretary said he supposed he meant an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, and proceedings of reprisal. The Ambassador said that that was what he meant, and that the Turk must appreciate that if this was done he must suffer the penalty.

The Secretary pointed out that this meant a threat of war against the Turk, which was the only way by which he would suffer the penalty if he committed these atrocities, and that exactly presented the difficulty, for this Government was not in a position to threaten a war of vengeance against the Turks which would be a war of indefinite extent against an aroused Moslem population threatening the entire Near East.

The Ambassador said it was his hope and confident expectation if the Allies took a stand together the Turk would be afraid to proceed. The one thing that could be done was to fill the Turk with fear. The Secretary noted that, saying that he must repeat that this Government was very desirous of using diplomatic pressure to the utmost, and that he was not satisfied that this would be ineffective; that he had not yet heard from Admiral Bristol and could not believe that the Turks would proceed to wholesale atrocities. The Secretary repeated that the difficulty was that there might be a panic in Constantinople and something like the condition at Smyrna, and that there might be a similar situation after such an ultimatum and then the Allied Powers would be bound to wreak vengeance according to their ultimatum, although they were in no position to prevent what had occurred. The Secretary said that there were two courses; one was an appeal to sanity and the other an appeal to fear; that if Kemal was in control and was not driven by mad men there ought to be success in the appeal to judgment because the Turk had nothing to gain by offending the sentiment of the civilized world. Still, if there were mad men in control it was by no means clear that threats would not excite them the more. The Secretary said he understood that what the Ambassador really wanted was a joint ultimatum to the Turks couched in such phrase as to inspire a fear, because of threat of actual war. The Secretary said he was not in a position to join in such a threat for the reasons he had already stated.
The Secretary repeated that he could not tell what a day might bring forth and that there might be such action or reports from Constantinople as would create a tremendous sentiment, a crusading spirit in America, but that he had no such sentiment to deal with at present and he simply had the inescapable fact that the Executive in this case had no authority to commit the nation to war. The Ambassador said that he understood the limitations of our forces, and that possibly we had underestimated the extent of the British forces; that he would know after the elections in Great Britain what attitude Great Britain was likely to take. The Ambassador said he realized that very little could be done with the existing land forces at the command of the United States Government, but that we had an excellent fleet, and he wanted to know whether we would be willing to cooperate with our fleet and the use of our marines. The Secretary asked—'Cooperate in what?' The Ambassador said in supporting the British and the Allies. The Secretary again asked—'Supporting them in what particular enterprise?' He said that we were desirous of cooperating in the protection of lives and property, but he understood that the Ambassador desired a pledge of assistance in war, which would be a war of unknown duration which would be substantially a war of vengeance. The Ambassador said that he hoped that the action suggested would avert such a war. The Secretary pointed out that the hope of averting it rested in a very definite and concrete threat of such a war with a promise on the part of this Government of its cooperation, and that if we gave that promise we should have to make it good, as the Allies would rely upon it. The Secretary said that while our military forces were small this country still had its great capacity for military endeavor and could within a short time equip a force to meet any situation, and that generally it would do more than it promised to do but that it required the determination of the American people expressed through Congress to accomplish these results and the Executive at this time could not make a pledge of military cooperation in such a war.

867.4016/732 : Telegram

The High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 15, 1922—noon.

[Received November 16—8:10 a. m.]

326. Department's 245, November 7, 2 p. m., and 253, November 10, 6 p. m. Following is aide-memoire handed by me to Hamid Bey on November 4th:

28 Latter not printed.
"The American High Commission has been informed that the Nationalist authorities at Samsun have proclaimed that all Greeks and Armenians must leave within the period of one month under penalty of being deported into the interior and that the Near East Relief has been ordered to evacuate immediately its orphans and its Christian employees. These declarations if they are accurately reported would seem to indicate an intention to expel the entire Christian population of Eastern Anatolia. However Admiral Bristol cannot believe that the Great National Assembly has actually adopted such a line of conduct. He is more disposed to believe that the above-mentioned declarations may be attributed to either an inaccurate report or to the excess of zeal on the part of the local officials. It is impossible to conceive that the Great National Assembly or the Council of Ministers would deliberately two weeks before the reunion of the conference of peace initiate a policy which would create more than a million refugees and which would place further obstacles in the way of the solution of the present complicated situation in the Near East. Besides Admiral Bristol is of the opinion that the harmful effect of such measures on Turkey itself cannot be questioned."

Following is note verbale sent Hamid Bey on November 8th:

"The American High Commissioner has the honor to refer to his aide-memoire dated November 4, 1922, in which he called the attention of His Excellency Hamid Bey to certain information he had received concerning the apparent intention of the Government of Great National Assembly to evacuate the Christian population from Anatolia.

With further reference to the above memorandum, the American High Commissioner has the honor to inform His Excellency, Hamid Bey, that he is in entire accord with the sentiments expressed by the Allied High Commissioners in the note verbale which they addressed to His Excellency, Hamid Bey, on November 6, 1922, the contents of which are as follows:

The High Commissioners of France, Great Britain and Italy have learned that the Government of the Great National Assembly insists on the immediate departure of children of Greek and Armenian origin who are now maintained in the orphanages of the Near East Relief in Anatolia.

They have learned also that it is the intention of the Government of the Great National Assembly to evacuate in a period of from 15 to 30 days the entire Greek and Armenian population of Western [Eastern?] Anatolia. They hear that the Greek and Armenian inhabitants of the Black Sea coast have already been notified of this decision; and that it is even the intention of the Government of the Great National Assembly to eventually apply this same measure to the population of Constantinople.

The consequences, if only from the point of view of humanity of such a measure being applied to a population of between one and two million people cannot be disregarded by the Government of the Great National Assembly. Its application would be the more to be regretted on the eve of a conference where the world hopes the basis will be laid for a just and durable peace in the Near East.

The High Commissioners have therefore the honor to beg His Excellency Hamid Bey to be so good as to bring the proposed measure urgently to the knowledge of the Great National Assembly at Angora and to express the hope of the undersigned that this measure, even if it has been contemplated, will be canceled or at least that the period indicated will be prolonged so that the question of the future of these populations can be discussed at the peace conference. Signed by Pellé, Garenny, Rumbold."
No official reply to above-quoted communications received as yet from Angora although Hamid Bey informed me several days ago he had received a reply to my aide-memoire and would forward me copy as soon as translation made. He read me the reply however which was to the effect that no order of expulsion had been issued by Angora Government but simply a permission for Christians to leave within one month. He stated many of these people had wished to leave for a long time but for military reasons had been prohibited from so doing prior to Mudania convention. The military exigency having now passed no reason seen by Angora Government to retain those who wished to go. I took up this question with Refet Pasha, who is acting as Hamid Bey’s successor during latter’s absence at Lausanne, yesterday and his statements coincided with those of Hamid Bey. Refet stated no necessity for order of expulsion existed as Christians had wished to leave for a long time. Speaking of Constantinople he complained that British press accused him of having ordered expulsion of Christians which was [due?] entirely to the thousands leaving at present of their own free will and stated that should he prohibit their departure it would create a worse situation than letting those who wished go voluntarily. I told Refet that in Anatolia the permission referred to was being misconstrued as an order and that should such an impression gain headway it would result in rush to coast of thousands of people in a state of panic and would create just as bad a situation as an actual order of expulsion and I suggested that Angora authorities take measures to correct this impression.

Refet assured me he would immediately wire his Government in this sense.

My information indicates no order of expulsion or even permission for Christians to leave Constantinople has been as yet promulgated by local Turkish authorities and those leaving at present are doing so voluntarily and in the same frame of mind as the recent exodus of the Christian population from Eastern Thrace. Some of those that I know have left are people who would leave any country under such circumstances because of past political activities.

Statement in British memorandum 29 referred to in the Department’s telegram above mentioned, concerning deportation of Christian men between 15 and 45, is [sic] to the best of my information, refers to those males held as prisoners of war at Smyrna, reports of which have already been sent Department. Situation in Anatolia however somewhat different from Constantinople as official permission for Christians to leave Anatolia has actually been promulgated. Mutassirif of Samsun repeated to commanding officer my destroyer

29 Not printed; see memorandum by the Secretary of State, Nov. 10, p. 952.
at that place in three interviews that local Christians were ordered
to leave within one month under penalty of deportation into interior
and in reply to question of commanding officer repeated that this
was a distinct order and not a permission alone. I have received
no information to effect that similar statement has been made by
officials in other places in Anatolia and this order categorically
denied by Refet.

Department must be aware that should Angora Government de-
termine to get rid of Christian population permission as mentioned
above could be equally as effective as an order of expulsion if officials
spread the rumor that failure to avail of this permission would entail
deposition or other penalties. While I feel that Turkish Govern-
ment would like to be rid repeat [sic] may be making use of the
method discussed above to accomplish that end, I do not feel justified
until receipt of further information as to the development of the
situation in accusing the Government of such a step.

BRISTOL

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867.4016/741 : Telegram

The High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Secre-
tary of State

CONSTANTINOPEL, November 19, 1922—11 a. m.
[Received 8:23 p. m.]

338. Department’s telegram number 253, November 10, 6 p. m.\(^3\)
and my telegram number 356[320], November 15, noon. Latest in-
formation makes me certain that Nationalist Government wishes to
get rid of entire Greek and Armenian population of Anatolia and
Constantinople and would like to have this a fait accompli or at
least well under way before question of minorities arises at the con-
ference.\(^4\) The Turkish feeling is that the presence of these people
has offered most of the pretexts in the past for the political inroads
of Western powers and further inroads of this sort are abhorrent
to the newly awakened ideals of Nationalism in Turkey. This de-
sire should be considered furthermore in connection with the prob-
lem of the continuance of the special privileges heretofore accorded
to Greek and Armenian and other non-Moslem communities.

The refugee situation in Anatolia has not as yet become serious
however and according to present indications I have hope that suffi-
cient time for departure will be granted Christians to prevent the

\(^3\) Not printed.
\(^4\) Lausanne Conference.
great hardships which were incident to the Smyrna evacuation. Men from 18 to 45 years of age are being detained but I have no information to the effect that they are being deported into the interior or maltreated.

Departure of Armenians and Greeks continues from Constantinople by the normal means of transport and is entirely voluntary and no measures have as yet been taken by the Turkish authorities to hasten it. As situation develops I will keep the Department informed.

BRISTOL

867.4016/742 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Herrick)

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1922—6 p. m.

391. Following received from American Consul at Aleppo:

“November 18, 11 A. M. Turks obliging all Christians to abandon all and leave Turkish territory or become Moslem. Untold suffering, great loss of life certain. Situation extremely precarious. Have advised Constantinople requesting intervention. British and Italian Consuls taking like measures. Jackson.”

Inform Foreign Office of information which Department has received and inquire whether they have reports of a like nature from Syria. Repeat your reply to Ammission, Lausanne, as well as Department.

HUGHES

867.4016/743 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Herrick) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 22, 1922—4 p. m.

[Received November 22—2:26 p. m.]

481. Your 391 November 21, 6 p. m. Foreign Office is receiving similar reports from Syria. French Government realizes that Turks are determined to expel all Christians from Turkish territory but has no intention of using anything but diplomacy to solve the problem. It is hoped that something to alleviate the situation may be accomplished at Lausanne although there appears to exist no very sanguine confidence that the present attitude of the Turks in this respect will be altered.

Repeated to American Mission Lausanne.

HERRICK
The British Ambassador (Geddes) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1922.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: On the 17th instant you were good enough to send me a confidential memorandum communicating the text of two notes addressed to the Angora Government by the United States High Commissioner at Constantinople in regard to the deportation of Christians by the Turkish authorities. You also informed me of the conversations which had taken place on the subject between Admiral Bristol and representatives of the Angora Government. I desire to express my cordial thanks for your courtesy in making this communication, which will, I know, prove of great interest to His Majesty's Government.

My latest news from Constantinople is that there are at present in that city some thirty-five thousand Armenian refugees from Anatolia without means of support. Refugees continue to arrive daily from the Black Sea ports, at which there are understood to be some thirty-nine thousand Greek in addition to an unknown number of Armenian fugitives. The Christians from the interior who are taking advantage of the "permission" granted them by Turkey to leave Anatolia by the 30th instant are also making for the Black Sea ports. The number of people ultimately to be evacuated from those ports is estimated at not less than a quarter of a million.

Having regard to the near approach of the date by which evacuation must cease, my Government have asked me to express to you the hope that, on purely humanitarian grounds, the Government of the United States will be prepared to instruct their representative at Constantinople to press strongly for an extension of the time limit. It is, of course, obvious that the evacuation cannot be effected in the time allowed and there can be little doubt, I fear, of the fate which awaits those who remain after the date fixed by the Angora Government for the termination of the evacuation. My Government are of opinion that representations designed to secure an extension of the time limit, if made, are less likely to prove ineffectual if addressed by the United States representative independently of his colleagues.

I hope to call on you tomorrow, when we shall have an opportunity to discuss this. In the meantime I think it well to let you have my fresh information without delay.

I am [etc.]

A. C. Geddes

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\[ Footnotes: \]

11 Not printed.
12 See telegram no. 326, Nov. 15, from the High Commissioner at Constantinople, p. 968.
The Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople (Dolbeare) to the Secretary of State

Constantinople, November 26, 1922—10 a. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

360. Greek High Commissioner has made following requests upon me: (1) to intervene with the Nationalist Government to secure extension of the time limit for departure of Christians; (2) to secure guarantees from Nationalist Government that Greek ships proceeding to evacuate refugees shall not be attacked but allowed to navigate freely in the Black Sea; (3) that an American destroyer be stationed in the Anatolian port to which a Greek ship is proceeding and act there as intermediary between ship and the Turkish authorities; (4) that American destroyers escort and protect Greek ships referred to above.

To question three, I have replied that for humanitarian reasons I will endeavor to keep destroyers in those ports where Greek ships are expected to arrive to evacuate refugees and that the destroyers’ commanders will act as intermediaries between local Turkish officials and guarantee ship [Greek ships?] to secure permission for the latter to enter and will assist in the actual work of evacuation but that I will not assume the responsibility for breach of faith on the part of Turkish officials. To question four, I replied in the negative. To questions one and two, I have replied that I would have to request instructions from my Government.

Latest reports of our destroyers Anatolian ports indicate arrival of considerable numbers of refugees from interior. Approximately 8,000 already at Mersina and equal number at Samsun. If it has not already arisen therefore a situation may arise in immediate future where our assistance in work of evacuation may be imperative on purely humanitarian grounds. It is true that an injudicious or premature compliance with the Greek High Commissioner’s first and second requests might be considered inconsistent with previous representations to Turks against evacuation of Christians from Anatolia and might even be used by the Turkish Government as an excuse for hastening such evacuation. The Department should bear in mind, however, that in spite of our representations the evacuation is becoming more of a fait accompli every day and it is not likely that any action taken at Lausanne will alter situation at least so far as Anatolia is concerned. I do not believe we should refuse our help in a situation which is rapidly assuming many of the characteristics of a relief problem pure and simple and I request authorization therefore to comply with Greek High Commissioner’s first and second re-
quests at such opportune time and through such informal channels as local conditions may suggest.

DOLBEARE

867.4016/759 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople (Dolbeare)

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1922—6 p. m.

275. Your 360, November 26, 10 a. m.

(1) On humanitarian grounds you may use your good offices to facilitate the granting of permission for Christians to depart from Anatolia if they so desire. Department believes that such permission should be given without reference to any specific time limit and that Turkish authorities should afford adequate protection to the Christians who may desire to remain in Anatolia.

(2) As this Government was not a party to the Mudania armistice between Greece, Turkey and the Allies, it would not be appropriate for you to take the initiative in securing guarantee of immunity for Greek ships as requested by Greek High Commissioner. You may of course make clear to the Turks the necessity for proper protection of refugees, whether during evacuation or while remaining in the country.

(3) Destroyers may appropriately assist during the evacuation of refugees in so far as this is consistent with instructions of the Navy Department.

(4) Department approves your action in declining the request for the convoying of Greek ships.

HUGHES

867.4016/744

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Geddes)

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1922.

My Dear Mr. Ambassador: Referring to your letter of November 22nd and our conversation of November 23rd in regard to the question of the Christian minorities in Turkey, I desire again to express my great interest in this question.

I have instructed our representatives at Lausanne34 that they should lose no opportunity to impress upon the Turkish delegates that they were compromising their position before the world in failing to make it clear that there was no desire or intention on their

34 Instructions not printed.
part to drive out over a million people under conditions of extraordinary hardship, suffering and loss of life. The Department impressed upon the American Mission at Lausanne the desirability of securing from the Turkish delegates a satisfactory assurance that there was no intention to force an evacuation of the Christian minorities in Turkey, and also that the male relatives of refugees in Greece should be allowed to rejoin their families.

The High Commission at Constantinople has been authorized to use its good offices to facilitate arrangements for the departure of Christians who desired to leave Anatolia but [it was?] pointed out that adequate protection should be afforded to those who remained in Turkey. American naval forces in the Near East have also been assisting in facilitating the departure of the Christians who had reached the sea coast of Anatolia in their effort to flee the country.

As I indicated to you orally on November 23rd, I feel that it would be most helpful if a comprehensive plan of relief could be adopted to meet the grave conditions that have arisen.

I am [etc.]

CHARLES E. HUGHES

NEGOTIATIONS BY THE OTTOMAN-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (CHESTER PROJECT) AND OTHER AMERICAN INTERESTS FOR CONCESSIONS IN TURKEY

867.602 Ot 81/183

Rear Admiral C. M. Chester to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1922.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Understanding from the public press that you will soon take up again for consideration “the solution of the Anglo-American dispute over the Mesopotamia oil fields and other questions growing out of the world’s oil supply” I respectfully request to be accorded an interview with you, as the Attorney of the Ottoman-American Exploration company, that has a pending claim on petroleum deposits in the Middle Eastern States.

So much has occurred relating to this subject since I last had the honor to consult you which has a strong bearing on the case, that I think you should be informed concerning the action that has already been taken by the company.

To refer briefly to some major points I would mention the result of interviews held by Sir John Cadman, the British Royal Petroleum Expert and myself and capitalists who have invested in the claims. Also to an interview, held in Constantinople, between M. Franklin Boullion, the Representative of the French Government, who nego-
tiated the Franco-Turkish Treaty, and Commander Arthur Chester, the Agent of the Ottoman-American Exploration Co. concerning cooperation between the French and American interests in Syria.

Commander Chester, who carried on the negotiations for the American company, in 1911, with the Ottoman Government for the construction of railroads and the exploitation of minerals in Turkey, is now here getting ready to return to Constantinople, where he has resided for the past two years, as Director of American Shipping in the Near East, to proceed with negotiations with the Angora Government, at its request, for the consummation of the Chester Project.

I request the privilege of presenting him to you as a witness for the American claimants.

Very respectfully yours

C. M. Chester

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1922.

Sir: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of February 8, 1922, requesting an interview with the Secretary of State on behalf of the Ottoman American Exploration Company, which is stated to have a claim to petroleum deposits in the Near East.

The Secretary of State is now absent from the Department, but upon his return your request will be called to his attention. It is suggested, however, that, in view of your conversation with the Secretary on May 24, 1921, a further interview would hardly seem necessary; and, accordingly, you may wish to take up with the officials of the Near Eastern Division or the Foreign Trade Adviser's Office any new aspects of the matter which you have in mind.

I am [etc.]

Henry P. Fletcher

No. 184

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 15, 1922.

[Received April 1.]

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of a letter which I have received from Mr. Robert H. McDowell, as well as of

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*Agent of the U. S. Shipping Board.

certain memoranda enclosed with Mr. McDowell's letter. These documents contain an account of Mr. McDowell's recent visit to Angora.

I believe strongly that we should extend all proper assistance to American business interests which may desire to go into the Anatolian field. This is the policy which I have followed not only with Mr. McDowell, but in other cases as well.

I have [etc.]

MARK L. BRISTOL

[Enclosure]

Mr. Robert H. McDowell, of the Foundation Company of New York, to the High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol)

CONSTANTINOPLE, March 8, 1922.

Sir: I take pleasure in enclosing herewith copies of the memoranda exchanged between the Minister of Public Works and myself during my recent conversations with the Nationalist Turkish Government at Angora. The Government were desirous of concluding a contract of concession at this time, and promised to have the necessary action by the Assembly completed within two weeks. Since I could take no action at this time they promised to hold the offer open until I should have time to communicate with my company.

It will be noticed that the Government do not include the right to construct in the Mosul area in their written statement. Verbally they stated that the right to build extensions which they will give in this concession will take in the Mosul area, and they specifically stated that they would favor the holder of this concession. This is important as the line to Mosul and the Persian border passes thru a part of the oil area around Mosul. The Arghana copper mines and the Kaban silver mine, the best mines in Asia Minor, are specifically included in this concession. Minerals known to exist along the line of the proposed railroad include copper, iron, lead, silver, coal, lignite; along the line of certain branches that will be dependencies of the main road, are found, in addition, tin, asphalt, oil, salt, and gold. The oil is found in the Sassun and Van regions.

The line of the proposed railroad will follow the line of the most important existing artery of trade in Asia Minor, the highway from Samsun to Mesopotamia. The existing traffic, over very poor roads that have caused transportation rates to rise to L7tq. 200. per ton, per 50 kilometers, amounts to more than 500 tons daily, each way, at Samsun. The country thru which the line will pass is everywhere capable of producing a much larger surplus than is the case now. The principal products are cereals, tobacco, fruit, eggs, live stock, hides, wool, cotton, silk, flax, and opium.
This concession has been several times sought by the French. They were interested in the railroad when there was no prospect of the mineral rights being included. They repeatedly have tried to secure the Arghana copper mines. A great deal of pressure is being brought to bear on the Turkish Government to prevent this concession from being granted to American interests. If no political activity would be manifested by other interests there is no doubt but that the concession would be granted to Americans. If this concession should be granted to us there would be wide spread resultant benefit to all American interests in Turkey. If thru political influence we fail to secure the concession, there will be, as a result, loss of prestige to American interests, that will be a serious handicap to business.

It is well to point out that it is my idea that, without waiting for the results of the Peace Conference, preliminary articles should be signed between the company and the Angora Government, that will secure us the concession without obligating us to commence work, or to go to large expense. The final terms should be signed after the results of the Peace Conference are clearly determined. If no steps are taken now to hold the concession, nothing can be done after the Conference.

The company, according to its usual custom, will look to our Government for advice in this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert H. McDowell

[Subenclosure 1—Memorandum]

Mr. Robert H. McDowell, of the Foundation Company of New York, to the Turkish Minister of Public Works (Fevzi Bey)

1. The Foundation Co. desires to obtain a concession to build and to operate a railroad as specified below, to build and to operate a port at a place suitable for such a railroad, and to enjoy the rights specified below as well as such others as are in common usage accorded in such a concession.

2. The line of the railroad will follow one of the two alternative routes given below, i.e.

(a) From a port on the Gulf of Alexandretta, near Ayas, to run through the regions Marash-Aintab, Malatia, Arghana, Diarbekir-Mardin, Lake Van, Mosul, and to the Persian frontier.

(b) From a port on the Black Sea, near Samsoun, to Amasia, Sivas, Harput, Arghana, Diarbekir-Mardin, Lake Van, Mosul, and to the Persian frontier.

3. The company will have the right within this same concession, to construct such branches and extensions as may be necessary to serve as “feeders.”
4. The exact line to be followed by the railroad and all details not specified herein, will be settled after the necessary studies have been made by the engineers of the Company.

5. The Government will give the company the sole right to develop the mineral resources and the hydro-electric power in a region covered by the length of the lines to be constructed within the terms of this concession, to a distance on either side of the lines of twenty kilometers.

6. The company will have the right to place such harbor dues and railroad tariffs as will establish a fair profit of [on] the capital invested.

7. The company will have the sole right to construct and operate, at the port and along the line of the railroad, warehouses for the storage of goods before shipment.

8. For the rights granted to the Company, it agrees as follows:

(a) To seek no kilometric guarantee.
(b) To welcome the participation of Turkish capital.
(c) To organise locally as a Turkish Stock Co.
(d) To accept Turkish jurisdiction and laws, which it is understood will be based on internationally accepted principles of law.
(e) To employ Turkish subjects for all positions for which there are such subjects properly trained.
(f) To undertake to train as apprentices such subjects with the idea of fitting them to take over positions which cannot now be filled by such subjects.
(g) The company agrees to begin work within one year after the signing of the concession.

9. While the idea of an advance in cash upon obtaining a concession is foreign to the ideas of American business men, yet being desirous of benefitting Turkey as soon as possible, such an advance can be arranged if the terms of the Government regarding the rights included within this concession are sufficiently favorable as to enable the company to be reasonably sure of a satisfactory return on their investment.

[Subenclosure 2—Memorandum]

The Turkish Minister of Public Works (Fevzi Bey) to Mr. Robert H. McDowell of the Foundation Company of New York

In answer to your letter of February 6, 1338.
I affirm that negotiations can be made with regard to this matter on the basis of the following principles, and confirm my friendship.
1. Naturally the railroad and the port concessions will include such rights, authorities and obligations as are given in similar concessions.
2. We consider it proper to give the line marked (b), namely Samsun port, with a railroad which begins from there and runs through Amasia, Sivas, Harput, Arghana, Diarbekir, and from there, or its neighborhood, goes to Bitlis and Van.

3. The right to build branch lines, which are dependencies of this line, can be given later.

4. The definite route will be determined by the studies to be made by the engineers of both parties.

5. Reparation and building of roads, and the giving of raw materials, are not connected with this concession, and this subject can be discussed later.

6. The monopoly over mines within twenty kilometers on each side of the railroad can be given on condition that these mines are worked. The form and conditions of this right can be decided upon.

7. The right to use water power in that region, for all sorts of works pertaining to the concession, can be given. Naturally in this article the existing acquired rights are reserved.

8. A port duty and a railroad tariff which will give a reasonable return for the capital invested is natural.

9. The right to build warehouses at the port and at railroad stations is natural.

10. In Article 8 (of your new memorandum) clauses a, b, and c are accepted. The reservation regarding Turkish law in clause d is superfluous. All Turkish law is based on international law. Clauses e, f, and g are appreciated.

11. The matter of an advance, being very important, you are especially requested to endeavor to settle it.

Fevzi

867,602 of 81/189

Memorandum by the Economic Adviser of the Department of State
(Millspaugh)

[WASHINGTON,] March 29, 1922.

Major Kennedy, who visited me on March 9 (see attached memorandum), came for the purpose of obtaining certified documents or a statement showing the status of the Chester project for railway and oil concessions in Turkey.

He indicated that it was the purpose of the people who are now interested in the Chester project to endeavor to obtain the ratification by the Angora Government of the concession which was pending in the Turkish Parliament in 1909. He said that he had assurance

K. E. Clayton-Kennedy, a Canadian citizen.

* Not printed.
of the favorable attitude of the Angora authorities toward American interests.

He showed me letters from Pouch and Company, Calloway, Fish and Company, and George W. Goethals and Company, stating in effect that these people would consider participating in the enterprise if a valid claim existed.

Major Kennedy indicated that each of these firms had taken a very small interest in the proposition, apparently in the form of a few shares of stock in the Ottoman American Exploration Company. He stated that the Foundation Company had an interest amounting to 2% and that Admiral Chester had a majority of the shares. He stated that it was the intention to incorporate a new company to take over the claims of the Ottoman American Exploration Company, and said he thought Judge Tracy, who was with Mr. Taft in the Philippines, was taking steps at Albany toward the incorporation of the new company. He said that Mr. MacArthur had a small interest but that he did not think that James L. Laidlaw had any interest.

Major Kennedy said that he is going to Turkey with Admiral Chester and will be followed by Arthur Chester. He says that he realizes that Admiral Chester does not have a completed concession but that he is sure that he has enough to afford a basis for negotiations with the Angora Government. He said that his associates were willing to take the risk of the unrecognized status of Angora.

I asked him how the ratification of the concession would have any effect in Mesopotamia and Syria, parts of which were included in the old concession. He said that the concession would be dated back to 1909; but he seemed to have a very vague idea as to how this would be done.

I told him again, as I had told him previously, that I could not give him any documents or statements regarding the concession for the following reasons: (1) that no such statement would present an exact picture of the situation since all information may not be in the Department; (2) that the information might work injury to an American company.

I told him that if any information were given it should be given formally and every step should be on record. The request for it should come from some person financially interested in the company. I suggested that Goethals, Calloway, MacArthur or Chester make such a formal request of the Department. Major Kennedy said that Calloway was a very close friend of the Secretary and he asked if Calloway should see the Secretary. I suggested that a statement might be made in the letter that if the Department felt an interview
would be desirable Mr. Calloway or someone else would visit the Department.

Major Kennedy said that he would have such a letter written.

A. C. M[ILLSPAUGH]
tions with the Nationalist authorities concerning a concession for railway, mining and other rights in Anatolia. The Department has also received by courtesy of the Department of Commerce a copy of a recent letter from Mr. Julian E. Gillespie giving further data on this subject.

For your information and guidance it is desired to advise you that on April 17th last Mr. Franklin Remington, President of the Foundation Company, consulted the Department with reference to the question of securing concessions in Anatolia. He outlined the interest of his company in the Chester project and referred to the results of Mr. McDowell's visit to Angora. He added that he himself or Mr. Doty of his firm expected shortly to proceed to Constantinople in order to investigate the situation. In the meantime he had authorized Mr. McDowell, in reply to a telegram from the latter, to assure the High Commission of the interest of the Foundation Company in the proposals put forward by the Angora authorities.

On the following day two representatives of the Edgar Howard Company, of Philadelphia, discussed the same question with the Department, further stating that Mr. McDowell had severed his connection with the Foundation Company and had entered the employ of their own firm. Mr. Gillespie's letters of May 29th and 30th explain a situation which at the time appeared to the Department somewhat confused. It remains to be added, however, that various representatives of the Chester interests, and notably Major Clayton-Kennedy, a Canadian citizen, have repeatedly communicated with the Department in regard to a resumption of activity by that group. From statements made by Major Clayton-Kennedy and others the Department understands that the Ottoman Development Company has been reorganized under the presidency of a Mr. Max Berg, and that George W. Goethals and Company, Pouch and Company, and other firms have apparently agreed to assist in financing the present needs of the Ottoman Development Company in return for a part interest in any rights acquired.

In reply to queries as to the attitude of the Department toward American promoters in Turkey, it has been pointed out that in view of the existing political situation this Government cannot be expected to accord full diplomatic support to any rights or concessions granted by unrecognized authorities. On the other hand, it has in each case been stated that the Department has no desire to discourage prelimi-
nary investigation by interested concerns, and that this Government will endeavor to secure for American enterprise in Turkey the benefits of most-favored-nation treatment.

The Department thoroughly approves and commends the opinion expressed in your despatch of March 15 to the effect that all proper assistance should be extended to responsible American business interests in Turkey. The Department realizes that the nationals of other Powers are actively engaged in the attempt to secure rights and concessions, and while there is no reason to encourage competitive negotiations with the Turkish authorities between American and European interests, there is every desire that the principle of equality of opportunity should be maintained in Turkey as well as in the Mandate territories.

In this connection reference is made to a letter dated April 13, 1922, addressed by Mr. Alexander V. Dye, American Trade Commissioner at London to Mr. Julian E. Gillespie, Assistant Trade Commissioner at Constantinople. A copy of this letter has been submitted to this Department indicating that certain British firms are interested in concessions in Turkey. At the same time the Department has noted and called to your attention, recent reports that the Italian Government has concluded a commercial agreement with the Sublime Porte to cover rights and concessions in the so-called Italian Zone of Economic Influence. The correspondence between the British and French Governments concerning the Franco-Kemalist Agreement of October last, enclosed with your despatch No. 87 of February 20, 1922, also contains information regarding the efforts of French interests to secure rights in the Arghana copper mines and in Cilicia. It is further understood that French interests are still engaged with the project of the Samsun-Sivas railway, on the construction of which a French firm is stated to have commenced work, for the Ottoman Government, prior to the outbreak of the war.

With regard to French claims to railway and mining rights in Anatolia, and to the alleged Turco-Italian Treaty, you are instructed to submit specific reports. In general, however, it is important that the Department be kept fully informed of the endeavors of foreign interests to secure concessions in Asia Minor and of the progress made by American interests already in the field.

I am [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

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*Not printed.*
867.602 Ot 81/213: telegraph

The Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, to the Naval Station at Constantinople

[WASHINGTON,] 2 October, 1922.

1602. Your 0031–1800. Following sent with approval General Goethals. Referring cablegram September eleventh to Goethals and Barnard, Major Kennedy has no authority to act on Chester Project. He is proceeding under false pretense and is repudiated by Goethals and all other purported stockholders found.

It is believed Abdul Hamid heirs' claim is wildcat scheme concocted in England to antagonize American claim.

Ottoman Company will be organized on legal basis and Arthur Chester only authorized to represent it in Turkey. Tell Chester have nothing to do with Kennedy. Signed Chester. 1535.

867.602 Ot 81/211: Telegram

The High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 5, 1922—5 p.m.

[Received 11:21 p.m.]

242. Please transmit following to Goethals, 40 Wall Street, New York.

"Have concluded agreement with Government on greatly improved terms and to date from 1909. Parliament ready to ratify immediately we comply with law which requires deposit in bank known here to guarantee that we make scientific investigations. After two years work we have option of giving results investigations to Government and getting money back from bank holding guarantee or of continuing with construction. In original negotiations amount was $85,000 but amount reduced for us to 50,000 pounds Turkish equals about $30,000. Deposit money or securities Guaranty Trust New York, have them telegraph agent here authority sign letter which I will present outlining about [above?] terms. Owing to political conditions absolutely necessary act immediately after this maintain the present unparalleled position with Government. Also have other very valuable construction contracts, orders for goods and mines concessions which other countries trying to get on terms most favorable to Government. I have borrowed 50,000 pounds for a few days to retain undisputed title but very necessary act immediately there. Calloway and others will assist to minimize delay. Advise buying pounds Turkish as likely rise. Telegram [telegraph?] immediately on receipt of this how long I will have to wait even hours are precious. Clayken."

BRISTOL

14 Copy received in the Department of State as enclosure to letter of Oct. 10, from the Navy Department.

14 i.e., Clayton-Kennedy.
The High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 7, 1922—2 p. m.  
[Received October 8—1:57 p. m.]

247. Strongly urge Department to try to clear up question of Kennedy’s status in relation to Ottoman-American Development Company, and inform me by cable... Kennedy has power of attorney, authenticated by Secretary of State of Delaware, giving full authority to act on behalf of company. On strength of this document am still giving appropriate support to Kennedy in spite of his repudiation by Admiral Chester. Commercial attaché asks that Secretary of Commerce receive paraphrase of this telegram.

BRISTOL

The Secretary of State to the High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1922—7 p. m.

207. Department has received the following telegram dated October 14 from General Goethals: 47

“On my return to office from California Wednesday morning surprised to learn of Admiral Chester’s communication to Admiral Bristol. 48 At conference with Admiral Chester yesterday learned that latter had come to the office during my absence, made derogatory statements concerning Kennedy, and, without knowledge of particulars, my associate thought Chester warranted in using my name as he did. Advised Chester yesterday that telegram as worded would not have been sent had I been here or had he awaited my return, for I do not repudiate Major Kennedy. He has authority to act and believe is doing so in good faith. Letter with full details will follow. George W. Goethals.”

General Goethals confirmed above telegram by letter of October 14. He requested that Department inform you of his position, and indicated that arrangements would be made for deposit which Kennedy requires.

Copy of Admiral Chester’s telegram alluded to above has been received by Department, and his attitude toward Kennedy is fully

47 Quoted telegram not paraphrased.
48 See telegram of Oct. 2 from the Office of Naval Intelligence to the Naval Station at Constantinople, p. 976.
known. Department has also taken note of Gillespie’s despatch of September 6 to the Department of Commerce. 49

In management of Ottoman-American Development Company there is disagreement between General Goethals and Clarence Chester on one hand and Admiral Chester on the other. Impossible to send definite instructions regarding attitude to be taken toward Kennedy and his activities until harmony is restored at this end and Department can learn who is properly qualified to speak for the company. As soon as matters are straightened out you will be notified. Department leaves to your discretion in the meantime the protection of American interests which in your judgment appear to be concerned.

Hughes

867.002 Ot 81/225

Major General George W. Goethals to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State (Dulles)

NEW YORK, October 26, 1922. 50

Dear Mr. Dulles: I am in receipt of a communication dated October 20th, file marked NE, from the Department of State. 49

The Ottoman-American Development Company is organized under the laws of the State of Delaware. The authorized stock issue is 5,000 shares of no par value. The stock record shows that a large majority of this stock is held by American citizens.

The by-laws provide for four directors, and they are the following: F. S. Blackall, Kermit Roosevelt, C. A. Barnard 51 and myself:—three Americans and one Canadian. I am President of the Company; Mr. Barnard is Secretary and Treasurer.

From the foregoing, the Ottoman-American Development Company is an American corporation, officered, with one exception, by Americans.

The control of the Company is in the hands of the stockholders, and the stock list shows 4,347 shares held by American citizens and 623 shares by citizens of Great Britain.

While I knew that the stock list indicated a majority of stock in the hands of American citizens, whether it was all held unqualifiedly was a matter to be cleared up, which could not be done until I could see Mr. Barnard. He could not entirely satisfy me on this point. His own stock was transferred and assigned and appears in the name of an American citizen who is to return to Mr. Barnard.
any benefits that may accrue to stock transferred to him by Mr. Barnard and who, I assume, will be guided in his actions by such instructions as Mr. Barnard may from time to time care to issue. I assume that other Canadian stock holdings have been disposed of in the same way, but on this point I have no information.

Apparently, therefore, the majority of the stock, while held by American citizens, may be controlled by Canadian interests.

Mr. Barnard states that he and his associates have transferred their stock in good faith, but if this be not satisfactory, they are willing to pool all stock and create a voting trust composed of three American citizens, who will be given unrestricted authority to vote the stock, thereby giving control of the Company to Americans.

Under the contract with the Chesters a large amount of cash was to be paid in installments and I understand negotiations are now under way by which stock holding interests will be substituted for these cash payments, in which case the Chester family would be large holders. The Canadian interests have thus far advanced practically all of the money that has been expended in the venture.

The foregoing are all the facts in the case that I have been able to ascertain and they are submitted in response to the inquiry of the Department whether the Ottoman-American Development Company is an American corporation, officered and controlled by American interests. Major Kennedy, a Canadian citizen, is the representative of the Ottoman-American Development Company in Turkey.

Sincerely yours,

Geo. W. Goethals

887.802 Ot 81/229: Telegram

The Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople (Dolbeare) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 5, 1922—2 p. m.

[Received 9:45 p. m.]

370. Chester concession now contemplates the building of the following railways, with grant of mining rights within 20 kilometers on each side of lines: (1) Yumurtalik-Diarbekir, (2) Samsun-Sivas-Harput-Diarbekir-Mosul-Suleymania-Persian border, (3) Lake Van-Harput, (4) Angora-Sivas, (5) Sivas-Erzerum.

The Council of Ministers and the Public Works Commission of the National Assembly have been kept fully informed of negotiations conducted through Ministry of Public Works. Negotiations now nearing conclusion. Principal points remaining for future
discussion are clauses relating to purchasing rights of Government and to forfeiture.

Kennedy under suspicion of being a British spy is denied permission to return to Angora. Both he and Arthur Chester now here trying to clear him of charges. Turkish authorities wish to have High Commission's guarantee of Kennedy before permitting his return, but as he is British subject guarantee has of course been refused. High Commission has been guided by Department's 207, of October 20, and has been guarded in its relations with Kennedy, but has also been most careful to avoid statements which might injure him with the Turkish authorities. Chester leaves tomorrow for Angora, Kennedy following later if possible.

Kennedy's credentials as representative of company appear to be in due form. Assertions of both Kennedy and Arthur Chester are to the effect that Admiral Chester's opinions in affairs of Ottoman-American Development Company should be ignored, and that he has no part whatever in management of company.

For the sake of the better protection of American interests concerned I should be glad to be informed by telegram (1) whether in the opinion of the Department Admiral Chester is competent to speak for the Ottoman-American Company, and if so, on what basis this competency rests; and (2) whether there is substantial ground for believing that Kennedy is or has been in the British secret service. . . .

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DOLBEARE

867. 602 Ot 81/229 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople (Dolbeare)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1922—7 p. m.

282. Referring to High Commission's telegram 370, December 5. Following message is transmitted to you on request of Goethals, Barnard, and Rousseau, who called at Department on December 6:

"Kennedy and Chester are accredited agents of the Ottoman-American Development Company, a corporation officered and controlled by American citizens, owning all rights to the Chester Project. The deposit required by the Turkish officials has been made to secure the concession, but it is alleged that obstacles are being put in the way of securing the necessary parliamentary confirmation. I am asking the State Department that you render such assistance under the circumstances as can be done consistently with its policy and your duties. Signed. Goethals."

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Rear Admiral H. H. Rousseau, U. S. N.

Quoted message not paraphrased.
Department has received copy of a memorandum of a voting trust agreement signed by Goethals, Barnard, and Rousseau. The agreement vests the control of the company in three American trustees for five years, and provides that the concession, if obtained, shall be eventually transferred to a new company in which 49 percent of stock will go to Barnard.

A substantial American interest in the Ottoman-American Development Company is shown by evidence submitted. You may, therefore, give such diplomatic support as may be proper, but of course without participating in negotiations. The Department desires to maintain the principle of the "open door" and to secure freedom of opportunity to American interests, but it should be borne in mind that the Department plays no favorites and cannot give special support to a single American concern.

There is no substantial ground for believing that Kennedy is in British secret service. However, your action in declining to meet Turkish request for guarantee of Kennedy is approved by the Department, and has been explained to Barnard and Goethals.

Hughes

867.602 Ot 81/239

The Vice Consul in Charge at Angora (Imbrie) to the Secretary of State

ANGORA, December 7, 1922.
[Received January 29, 1923.]

Sir: I have the honor to inform the Department that about the middle of September Mr. Arthur Chester arrived in Anatolia for the purpose of re-opening negotiations with the Turkish Nationalist Government looking toward the acquisition of railroad concessions in Anatolia and, as incident thereto, mining concessions, such concessions to be substantially coextensive with those embraced in the original, so-called, "Chester Project", whose inception, as the Department is aware, dates back to 1908–1909.

Accompanying Mr. Chester was a Major K. E. Clayton-Kennedy, who carried no passport, whose cards, samples enclosed, showed him as representing (1) National Aeronautical Committee of Canada, (2) The Aircraft Manufacturing Company of Canada and (3) the Ottoman-American Development Company—the company in behalf of which Mr. Arthur Chester is conducting his negotiations—and who Mr. Chester informed me was a Canadian citizen and British Subject.

* Not printed.
I advised Mr. Chester that, in my opinion, it was a tactical mistake to associate himself with a British subject in his negotiations at this time, since, owing to the British attitude in the Near East Sphere, the Turkish Government and people were antipathetic to anything or person British. I further informed him, that in view of this and also in view of the fact that I considered to intervene in behalf of, or support, any person not an American would weaken my influence and lessen my usefulness in assisting Americans and American interests, I could not vouch for, introduce or be associated in any way with Kennedy. At the same time, I offered to give Mr. Chester, himself, every assistance possible and introduce him to the various Ministers with whom he might wish to conduct negotiations. This I have done.

Mr. Chester came to Angora and Mr. Kennedy, as being associated with him, was permitted to accompany him. After several weeks of negotiation, Kennedy left Anatolia for Constantinople, to obtain, I was informed, some thirty odd thousand dollars, the deposit required by the Nationalist Government as a condition precedent to further negotiations. Chester remained in Angora to further confer with the Government.

Some time after Kennedy’s departure, the Angora Government advised me that he had made application for permission to return to Anatolia and inquired whether I wished such permission granted and whether I would guarantee Kennedy. I replied that Kennedy, not being an American citizen, I could neither ask for his admission nor guarantee him. The Government then informed me that it had proof that Kennedy was in the British Intelligence Service and an agent of the British Government.

Early in November Kennedy again entered Anatolia, this time by way of Hydar Pasha, and reached Ismet [Ismid]. Here he was stopped by the Turkish authorities, arrested and jailed. After being held a week, he was deported. About this time, Chester left Angora for Constantinople and since then there has been no one here representing these interests.

The impression created among Government circles here, and generally in fact, is that there is little back of the Chester proposition. The prolonged negotiations, covering a period of nearly three months, have apparently led to nothing definite. The deposit, an insignificant sum when the magnitude of project is considered, has not been forthcoming. The Kennedy incident has created an unpleasant impression, and led to the suspicion that, perhaps, the project is backed by British interests. The Minister of Public works informs me, so far, there has been nothing but “talk”. The proposition has received wide newspaper publicity within Anatolia.
and, if nothing results, the retroactive effect will unquestionably be injurious to American commercial interests and prestige.

If the Department can advise me as to its attitude toward the project generally and can inform me as to the status, financial and otherwise, of the Ottoman American Development Company and the interests back of it, I shall be greatly appreciative.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT W. IMBRIE

867.602 Ot 81/229: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople (Dolbeare)

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1922—6 p. m.

285. See Department’s 282, December 7, 7 p. m. Following sent at request of General Goethals:

“For Kennedy. All interests at this end now working harmoniously. Trust that you and Chester will cooperate closely in all matters. Advise if any assistance can be rendered here. Signed Goethals.”

HUGHES