THE COUNCIL OF TEN:
MINUTES OF MEETINGS FEBRUARY 15 TO JUNE 17, 1919
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Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at
the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, February 15, 1919, at
3 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. House

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. W. C. Churchill, M. P.

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries

Mr. L. Harrison
Mr. Norman

M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn

ITALY
M. Sonnino
M. Crespi

Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Lieut. Burden

BRITISH EMPIRE
Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.

ITALY
Major Jones

JAPAN
M. Saburi

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Gen. T. H. Bliss

BRITISH EMPIRE
Gen. Sir H. H. Wilson,
G. C. B., D. S. O.

ITALY
General Cavallero

(FOR PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF QUESTION I “SYRIA”)

FRANCE
Captain Coulondre
M. Gout

LEBANESE DELEGATION
Daoud Bey Mammoon
Negile Bey Abdel Malek
Abdel Halim Hajjar

Interpreter.—Professor P. J. Mantoux.
1. M. Clemenceau having declared the Meeting opened, asked that the Members of the Lebanese Delegation should be admitted.

Syrian Question

(Daoud Bey Mammon, President, Negile Bey Abdel Malek, Druse Delegate, and Abdel Halim Hajjar, Mussulman Delegate, then entered the Council Chamber.)

M. Clemenceau called on Daoud Bey Mammon to make his statement.

Daoud Bey Mammon then read the following statement:—

"Our Delegation holds its mandate from the Great Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, our national Parliament, elected on democratic bases by the suffrage of the whole nation of Lebanon.

In the fullness of its rights, the said Council has nominated the Delegation of which I am the President, and on behalf of which I am now speaking, to place before the Peace Conference, the claims of the nation of Lebanon.

Mount Lebanon has always been autonomous. Its autonomy has been maintained under Arabian, Turkish and Egyptian domination. At times it has even appeared as possessing a complete independence, which was recognised by Turkey itself.

Consequently [sic] to the incidents of 1860, Europe has sanctioned this autonomy and gave it, through the 1861–1864 treaty, with her guarantee, a modality, a form which is special, but definite. One only bond of vassalage bound it to Turkey. Now, as a consequence of the fall of the Sublime Porte, Lebanon finds itself independent, with a National Government and an elected Parliament. Its wish is to recover, together with the recognition of its independence, its historical and natural frontiers which had been encroached upon by the Turks.

The territories within the said frontiers are necessary to our existence; without them, no commerce, no agriculture is possible for us and our populations remain under obligation to emigrate; the mere closing of our frontiers, through administrative measure would drive us, as has been during this war, to actual starvation.

Besides the great majority of the populations living on these territories also ask to be attached to Lebanon. Their wishes are to be found in petitions addressed to the French Government.

By giving them over to us, the Conference will perform a deed of justice and reparation, while according to the principle of the peoples' own wish.

In the course of this war, by the part it has taken in it, Lebanon has acquired claims on the goodwill of the Entente. The participation, however modest, has been none the less actual.

From the very beginning of the war, the people of Lebanon have not feared, in spite of the worst reprisals which their isolation could bring on them, to take side resolutely for France and her Allies. They offered themselves by thousands to go and fight for a common ideal on the battlefield of Europe, but special circumstances and the assurance which was given them, that they would eventually [be] made use of on the spot, made it impossible for them to bring about their plan. Nevertheless, a certain number of them, joining their foreign brothers, went at once to enlist individually in the French Army, and later, in the American Army, distinct contingents, definite units were even constituted, which took part in the liberation of their country and have thus, still more officially, taken part in the war.

As for the sacrifices Lebanon made because of its having from the first taken side with the Entente, they are plain to everyone.

Over half its population was wiped out through exile, hanging and systematic famishing at the hands of the Turks. With due proportion, this country is among those which suffered most owing to the attitude it adopted and preserved until the end.

The Government of Mount Lebanon, enlightened by experience, its soil having been trampled on for over half a century through the numerous and consequently rival influences, and having realised the immense harm caused to the country and with a view to obtain a much desired union as well as preserve its dignity, intends to avoid in future the errors of the past.

Conscious of the inability of the country, especially at the start, to develop its resources unaided, deprived as it is of financial means, and technical advisors, the Government has sought the collaboration of a great power. One only could be thought of, France. Her liberal principles, her time honoured traditions, the benefits Lebanon never failed to receive from her in hard times, the civilisation she diffused throughout made her prominent in the eyes of all the inhabitants of Lebanon. Consequently the Administrative Council faithfully expressing public opinion, unanimously requested the collaboration of France.

In our opinion such a collaboration does not imply the least abandonment of our rights, the slightest abdication of our independency. The help thus given us will be that of a long experience, sparing us the mistakes which a newly-born community is unavoidably liable to make, giving us an umpire whose decisions will be accepted by the various groups in our country, and lastly safeguarding our independency from any possible attempt.

We must say a few words about our relations with Syria.

Between the two countries interests are closely connected. Syria requires our ports and mountains, we require her plains. Absolute separation would be detrimental to either. And yet Lebanon could
partake of the Syrian integrality, while retaining a distinct personality, only under the condition that Syria should profit by the same French collaboration. Lebanon would prefer the danger of its isolated position to the double peril of being drawn into the track of a country deprived of Government traditions and much less advanced in its evolution, or to be the possible sufferer in the quarrels that would unavoidably arise from a dual collaboration.

We ardently desire to strengthen the various ties which join us and our neighbours. This wish will be accomplished when the new Government of Syria gives satisfactory tokens of vitality, ability and tolerance. The only means to this end seems to reside in entrusting one Power only with this collaboration."

M. CLEMENCEAUS then called on Negile Bey Abdel Malek to speak. NEGILE BEY ABDEL MALEK, then read the following statement:

"As a Druse Delegate, I beg to be allowed to add a few words to the declaration which has just been made on behalf of the whole delegation, in order to render more precise the sentiments of my fellow believers.

We ardently wish for our country to be independent under recognition of our rights and prerogatives. On the other hand we know the advice and experience of a friendly and unbiased power to be necessary to our evolution.

With the conviction that any Government based on theocratic principles, while putting us in danger of being absorbed in a majority of a sectarian nature, would be particularly detrimental to us, we ask that the necessary help should be given us by a power whose liberalism and spirit of tolerance would constitute a guarantee to us.

Moreover we are anxious to see Lebanon partake of the Syrian integrality, while retaining a distinct personality, in order that the bonds should be tightened, which must of necessity bind her to Syria and that those of us who live there could come in close contact with their fellow believers. In order to achieve this result we are of the opinion that the collaboration of France, especially qualified to conciliate the various tendencies and interests non [now] existing side by side, must not be confined to Lebanon, but must extend to the whole of Syria. On this unity of collaboration it will depend that our national aspiration come to reality."

M. CLEMENCEAUS next called on Abdel Halim Hajjar to address the Conference.

ABDEL HALIM HAJJAR, Mussulman Delegate, read the following statement:—

"The claims that our delegation has been entrusted with defending before the Peace Conference in the name of the people of Lebanon have been clearly explained by our President.
As a Mohammedan Delegate, I wish to make more precise, on certain points, the sentiments of my fellow believers.

We are of opinion that it is necessary for our country to be helped by a friendly power in order to achieve its full development.

On the other hand, we are convinced that such a help would only completely satisfy our aspirations, if it made itself felt within recognition of our independence and, in the direction of a democratic Government, free from any religious and theocratic form. The spirit of liberalism and religious tolerance in France prompts us to trust this power and beg for its help.

We are moreover convinced that France’s collaboration must extend to the whole extent of the Syrian territory. We are of opinion that the unity of collaboration is necessary to the evolution of the various groups of which it is constituted towards the national unity of the country.”

(The Delegates, having been thanked by M. Clemenceau for their statements, then withdrew.)

2. Mr. Lansing said that he had certain additional remarks to offer in regard to the question which had been discussed the previous day, relating to the passage of troops and supplies through Holland. He would call on General Bliss to make a statement on his behalf.

General Bliss said that after referring to the documents in the American archives relating to this question, he found that he had yesterday correctly stated the facts of the case. The question of the passage of troops and supplies through Holland had first been mentioned in a letter addressed by General Pershing to Marshal Foch on January 15th last. In that letter General Pershing had submitted a request that all the Allied Armies of occupation should obtain, firstly, the right to transport supplies of all sorts through Holland, including gasoline, oil, etc., but not including military munitions, and, secondly, the right to withdraw their forces, military equipment and supplies via Rotterdam.

When the question had been taken up with Holland, sufficient stress had not been laid on the second point, and, therefore, the Government of the United States had taken up the question direct with the Dutch Government, through their representative at the Hague. As a result of the latter démarche, on the 15th February a telegram had been received by the American Headquarter Staff stating that the two requests made by the United States of America had been accorced by the Dutch Government, namely: the transport of supplies (not including material of war) through Holland, and the withdrawal by

2 See BC-32 (SWO-8), vol. iii, p. 1040.
the Rhine of troops and war material. The American Government thus obtained permission to use Rotterdam as a base for the supply of materials, but the American Government was not thereby accorded the right, desired by Great Britain, of conveying troops and munitions of war through Holland to Germany. Consequently, no precedent had been created, and the demands of the Allies in this respect could not be based on the concessions already accorded to the United States of America.

Mr. BALFOUR remarked that nothing could be clearer than General Bliss’ statement—it was clear that the concessions made by Holland to America were less than Great Britain demanded. On the other hand, the British authorities held that it would be impossible for them to maintain their forces in the occupied areas along the Rhine unless the right of importation was granted, as well as that of exportation. He did not himself feel competent to argue how far that necessity existed, but he would call on the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff to put the military case to the Conference.

General Sir Henry Wilson said that the British authorities wanted permission to bring troops up the Rhine as well as down the Rhine. The congestion on the railways was such that it was impossible either to demobilize or to forward reliefs to the British forces on the Rhine. The British had some 70,000 to 80,000 young troops to send to the occupied areas, and unless this could be done, it would be impossible for the British troops to be ready to march into Germany should the necessity arise.

Mr. LANSING said he appreciated the situation in regard to the replacement of troops. Everyone was anxious to aid in every way to make it easy to send troops. The last two paragraphs of the draft, however, were so worded as to give the impression that something was being asked as a matter of right, whereas it was not a matter of right. The paragraphs appeared to contain a threat, and, therefore, in his opinion, required some amendment.

Mr. BALFOUR expressed a doubt as to whether the last two paragraphs were really open to that interpretation. He did not pretend to judge international questions, but the appeal made was not to the technicalities of international law, but to the consideration of a situation without precedent. To obtain a durable peace an armistice had been made, which Germany had accepted. The armistice involved the necessity of moving troops, and this could not be done unless the Dutch yielded on the point in question. Should the Dutch entrench themselves behind the duties of Neutrals and refuse to facilitate a military action by nations, who, as a matter of fact, were still belligerents, he could give no good answer. But he would

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*a For the text of the telegram as finally agreed upon, see p. 9.*
appeal to the Dutch to take a broader view. It was true the Allies
were not at peace with Germany, but if Holland wished to facilitate
an early peace, it could do so by helping in the manner suggested.
Consequently he did not think the Allies went beyond the moral
principle of the matter in telling the Dutch that "the matter was so
grave and urgent that the Five Powers must express the earnest hope
that the Netherlands Government will consider the question of giv-
ing their immediate consent; failing which the responsibility for the
state of things which might ensue, and which might endanger both
the general peace and the flow of food and supplies into the countries
of Western Europe, will fall upon the Netherlands Government".

This message only stated the fact that if the Dutch adhered to
their view, a very serious situation would thereby be created.

M. Sonnino pointed out that the vital question had not yet been
put to the Dutch. Holland had accorded to the Americans the right
of passage for supplies, and she would no doubt extend the same
right to all the Allies. But, in regard to the transport of troops,
the question had still to be put to Holland. Should Holland refuse,
it would be difficult to see how pressure could be applied without
violating those very principles for which the Allies had fought,
namely, the integrity of neutral territories. The only reason that
could be given for putting pressure on Holland was "Necessity", but
no neutral need recognize that reason. The humanitarian side of the
question, namely, the transport of food and other supplies, had been
accepted by Holland. But as regards the military question, it would
only be possible to urge the reasons given by Mr. Balfour, that is to
say, that a refusal would result in a prolongation of the war. It
would, however, be impossible to go beyond that, though possibly in
international law some distinction did exist between the transport
through neutral territory of troops, arms, munitions and supplies.

Mr. Churchill wished to insist on the practical side of the ques-
tion. If 80,000 troops could not be sent by the Rhine route, a lesser
number of troops would have to be maintained in the occupied terri-
itories, and the promises made to Marshal Foch would not be fulfilled.
That would be the inevitable result. The Dutch Government had in
principle accepted all that was asked for. It did not object to troops
being sent down the river, why should it, in logic, object to troops
being allowed up the river? The principle was, therefore, already
accorded. Obviously the Allies could not go to war with Holland
on that question, but she would, by her refusal, have placed herself
in antagonism with the Allies, a position which she could not well
afford to maintain.

Mr. Balfour thought that he could perhaps suggest certain slight
alterations in the last two paragraphs of the draft despatch, which
would meet Mr. Lansing's difficulties.
M. Clemenceau said that, for his part, he would be sorry to see any toning down of the text of the telegram. As Mr. Churchill had said, Holland could not appeal to the question of principle, because she had already allowed troops to be moved in the opposite direction. The fact could not be overlooked that Holland had allowed 2/300,000 Germans to cross the province of Limburg. These 300,000 Germans would now have been prisoners of the Allies but for the action of the Dutch. Holland greatly feared the consequences of the act she had thus committed. She feared the Allies might call her to account, especially in view of the claims to Limburg so ably set forth a few days ago by M. Hymans.* It would not be necessary to pursue the argument, but it should not be lost sight of. Holland would not forget it. About a fortnight ago influential members of the Dutch Government, in conversation with members of an Allied Government, whose names need not be mentioned, had displayed considerable anxiety about Limburg, and had begged that Holland should not be made to pay for her act. They had even offered to bring a certain person to Paris to give evidence on the subject before that Conference.

It would not be necessary to recall the incident in writing to the Dutch Government, but he thought that in the present state of mind of the Dutch, the demands of the Allies would quickly receive satisfaction. For that reason he (M. Clemenceau) strongly supported Mr. Churchill's proposal, and asked his colleagues to do the same. The question was a serious one. It was well known how great were the difficulties, and the congestion of traffic in the North. It was not intended to commit any warlike act. It was not intended to reinforce the Allied troops in Germany. It was merely intended to substitute units in order to carry out certain demobilisation arrangements. He (M. Clemenceau) therefore urged that the text proposed be adhered to. Should Holland refuse, the Allies would be in a position to bring forward further arguments, without actually resorting to threats. The Dutch felt guilty and feared the consequences. And, when the time for making territorial adjustments came, there would be ample opportunities for obtaining satisfaction. But he thought that a simple and rather discreet allusion to the Limburg incident would suffice to obtain the desired concessions.

Mr. Lansing held that his reason for objecting to the despatch being sent was that it constituted an admission that the Limburg act was right, since the Allies proposed to do the same.

Mr. Balfour replied that he could not accept Mr. Lansing's contention for two reasons. Firstly, the substantial reason, that the course proposed by the Allies would cause no injury to Germany, whereas the act of Holland had caused an injury to the Allies by

depriving them of 300,000 prisoners. Secondly, a request was being made to Holland, whereas the Limburg act had been carried out by the Dutch on their own authority.

Colonel House enquired what alterations Mr. Balfour proposed to make in the draft telegram.

Mr. Balfour said that he had made certain alterations in the last two paragraphs of the telegram, which would now read as follows:

"In these circumstances the five Powers, sensible of the solemn duty which lies upon them to see that their efforts directed to the speedy conclusion of a durable peace for the benefit of the whole community of nations, earnestly request the Netherlands Government to cooperate with them to this end by facilitating in every way the movements of troops and supplies across Dutch territory strictly for the purpose agreed upon with the German Government under the terms of the Armistice.

The matter is so grave and so urgent that the five Powers must express the earnest hope that the Netherlands Government will see the necessity of giving their immediate consent; failing which the responsibility for the state of things which may ensue and which may endanger both the general peace and the flow of food and supplies into the countries of Western Europe, will fall upon the Netherlands Government."

He suggested that the text of the telegram as amended should be accepted.

Mr. Lansing said he would accept the telegram as amended.

M. Clemenceau laid particular stress on the fact that he accepted the amendments introduced by Mr. Balfour with regret, and wished that his regrets should be recorded.

Baron Makino pointed out that this was the first time he had seen the draft telegram. He was only too ready to associate himself with the Allies, but before engaging his Government he would like to obtain the views of his military advisers.

M. Clemenceau held that the matter was one which called for immediate action. He thought, therefore, the four Powers should act at once without awaiting the results of Baron Makino's reference to his Government.

Baron Makino agreed to this procedure being followed.

It was agreed that the four Allied and Associated Powers (United States of America, British Empire, France and Italy), should forward the following despatch to their representatives at the Hague for presentation to the Dutch Government:

"The four Allied and Associated Powers consider it of vital importance in the interests of the general peace which they are earnestly striving to conclude at the earliest possible moment, that the preliminary arrangements already entered into with the enemy to this end, shall be effectually carried out.

Those arrangements provide, among other things, for the occupa-
tion of the German territories left of the Rhine by Allied and Associated troops, and necessarily cover all measures which are essential for the purpose of effecting and maintaining such occupation, including the actual transport of the troops and supplies to their destination.

Owing to the extreme congestion of the railways in Belgium and Northern France the most serious difficulties are being encountered in carrying out the arrangements which have been agreed upon by both parties and which cannot be allowed to fail except at the risk of gravely imperilling the early establishment of a satisfactory peace. A ready means exists to meet this difficulty; and that is the utilisation of the communications by rail and by water across Holland.

The German Government having assented to the arrival of the troops on German territory cannot be, and in fact are not, interested in the routes to be followed in journeying to the Rhine, and no question of an infringement of any rule of neutrality therefore arises out of the transit of the troops across Dutch territory.

In those circumstances the four Powers, sensible of the solemn duty which lies upon them to see that their efforts directed to the speedy conclusion of a durable peace for the benefit of the whole community of nations, earnestly request the Netherlands Government to co-operate with them to this end by facilitating in every way the movements of troops and supplies across Dutch territory strictly for the purposes agreed upon with the German Government under the terms of the Armistice.

The matter is so grave and so urgent that the four Powers must express the earnest hope that the Netherlands Government will see the necessity of giving their immediate consent; failing which the responsibility for the state of things which may ensue and which may endanger both the general peace and the flow of food and supplies into the countries of Western Europe, will fall upon the Netherlands Government."

3. M. Clemenceau suggested that General Alby or General Wilson should, in the first place, give some explanation regarding the military situation in Russia.

Mr. Churchill agreed and asked that General Alby be permitted to make his statement.

General Alby then read the following statement:—

I

Northern Front (Archangel Region and Murman Region)

The Bolshevik forces, assuming a vigorous offensive have forced the Allied contingents to fall back considerably between the Vologda railway and the Dvina. Although the British C.-in-C., General Ironside, states that he is master of the situation, the latter continues to be rather disquieting and reinforcements have had to be hastily brought up from the Murman district. Their arrival to the South of Archangel can only be late and scattered, owing to the distance and the difficulties of communication.

The following forces are now on this front, viz:—

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Archangel Region</th>
<th>Murman Region</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allies</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolsheviks</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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II

WESTERN FRONT (BALTIC, LITHUANIAN AND POLISH REGIONS)

In the Petrograd region and on the Finnish frontier, the Bolshevist forces are few in number and not of much military value. General Mannerheim\(^6\) considers that he can easily take Petrograd unassisted, if the Allies were prepared to support him and to provision the city.

In Estonia the Bolsheviki, after having taken nearly the whole of the country, have suffered an absolute defeat. Local contingents, reinforced by Russian and Finnish volunteers, have thrown them back beyond the Narva and beyond Valk.

In Courland and Lithuania the Bolsheviki, having taken Riga, Eivisk and Vilna, are marching on Kovno and Grodno and approaching the German frontier. It appears to be certain that they are working in agreement with the Germans, following close on the heels of their retreat, without hastening it. The Germans are now [not\(^7\)] only supplying them with arms and war material, but are preventing the local (Lithuanian and Polish) contingents from defending their country.

Further South, the Bolsheviki have taken Pinsk and are advancing on Brest-Litovsk.

The following forces are now on this front, viz:\—

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Petrograd-Estonian</th>
<th>Courland-Lithuanian</th>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Bolshevist</td>
<td>32,500</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolshevist</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
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III

SOUTHERN FRONT (UKRAINE DON-N. CAUCASUS-CASPIAN)

In the Ukraine, the Bolsheviki are advancing rapidly and without difficulty, and have already taken Kieff, Harkoff, Ekaterinoslav, and a large portion of the Donetz: They may soon meet the Franco-Greek troops occupying Odessa and Herson. The Ukrainien (Vinichenko-Fetloura) Directorate, whose contingents have mostly dispersed or gone over to the Bolsheviki, is about to take refuge in Galicia.

Further East, the left wing of Krasnoff’s troops—which have hitherto fought well against the Bolsheviki near Veronej and Tsartzin—has had to fall back on Novo-Cherkassk and Rostoff (which are now threatened), in order to avoid being caught in the rear by the Bolshevist advance in the Donetz region.

The Volunteer Army alone has been able to maintain its position favourably in N. Caucasus, but General Denikin, who has just become C-in-C. of all the anti-Bolshevist Russian forces in South Russia, will now be obliged to use them for reinforcements to strengthen Krasnoff’s seriously threatened left wing.

On the Caspian, the British—who have taken Baku and Krasnovodsk (the Trans-Caspian railhead)—appear to have assured naval supremacy by means of their armed steamers. They are trying to get into touch with the anti-Bolshevist Cossacks in the Ural, via Gourloff. The Bolsheviki have, on the other hand, taken Astrachan, on the mouth of the Volga.

The following forces are now on this front, viz:\—

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allies</td>
<td>156th French Division . . . 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>130,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 7,000 remaining men of the Division are about 60,000 to 60,000 to be transferred.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^6\) Gen. Carl G. E. Mannerheim, Regent of Finland.
\(^7\) 314579—48—Vol. IV—2
The Allies could, however, bring up to this front:—

2 French Divisions (from Roumania)
2 Greek " " Salonika
1 Italian Division " Bulgaria About 100,000
1 English " " Salonika

and also various Roumanian divisions, now doing nothing in Bessarabia and Roumania, which could furnish a further 100,000 men.

IV

EASTERN FRONT (URALS AND W. SIBERIA)

The Siberian victory at Perm was not followed up. The Red armies again resumed the offensive on the entire front, and, by taking Orenburg, were able to separate Doutoff's Cossacks from the bulk of the Siberian Army and to link up with the Soviet forces from (in?) Turkestan.

The situation is causing General Janin's anxiety. The Siberian troops are insufficiently trained and their morale is weakening. The officers are poor or undisciplined.

The best elements (the Czecho-Slovaks) had to be sent to the rear to rest and to guard the Trans-Caspian railway, which was threatened by Bolsheviki in Siberia.

The forces now opposing each other on this front (excluding Turkestan) are as follows:—

Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120,000
Bolsheviki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . from 130,000 to 140,000

V

To sum up, the Red forces are at present advancing on all fronts, with the exception of Esthonia. By these successes the Bolsheviki are gaining:—

(a) very decided moral advantages;
(b) a very considerable amount of supplies, (agricultural products in the Ukraine and in Turkestan, and minerals in the Donetz).

These successes are due to:—

(a) the superiority of the Red armies both as regards men and matériel.
(b) their undoubted improvement as regards organisation and discipline.
(c) lack of cohesion in the opposing forces, which are badly equipped and of poor morale.
(d) systematic propaganda for which no expense is spared, and which everywhere precedes military action.

There are, however, irremediable sources of weakness in the Red Army, such as:—

(a) The lack of any nobler feeling, terror and the hope of loot being the only means of making the men obey orders.
(b) A High Command and General Staff of very unequal quality, with gaps in various ranks and services.
(c) Very inadequate communications.
(d) Insufficient technical equipment (heavy artillery, aircraft, &c.), owing to lack both of experts and of raw materials, which renders manufacture or even repairs impossible.

*A. I. Doutoff, Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks.
Gen. Maurice Janin, of the French Army, Supreme Commander of the Czechoslovak Army in Siberia.
Thus the Red Army owes its success to the fact that, up to the present, it has never encountered adversaries superior to it as regards either numbers, supplies, or moral[e].

Being better officered and equipped, even though numerically inferior, regular Allied troops would easily defeat it. Such a success could be won at very slight cost, provided that powerful technical means (such as armoured cars and bombing aeroplanes) were employed, which equipment the Bolsheviki entirely lack and the action of which their unequal moral[e] would make it impossible for them to withstand.

(On the suggestion of M. Clemenceau, it was agreed that General Alby's statement should be circulated to the Conference).

Mr. Churchill said that everyone there present knew the reasons which had led the Conference to adopt the policy of Prinkipo. Since then a month had passed and no decision which made any effect on the forces of the Allies had yet been reached. On the other hand, as General Alby's statement had shown, very disastrous events had been taking place in Russia during that period. In his opinion, it was essential to try and bring the faction[all] war in Russia to an end, and Great Britain adhered entirely to the position previously taken up. But if Prinkipo was not going to come to anything, the sooner it could be got out of the way the better. At the present moment all military action was paralysed by suspense, and there was very grave danger that as a result, the Allied and friendly armies would gradually melt away. The British Government held the view that that process of disintegration was proceeding very rapidly, and that the existing friendly armies would probably be the last, which it would be possible to raise against Bolshevism. Consequently, it was essential, either to carry Prinkipo through to a definite result, or to get it out of the way. With this object in view he had drafted a wireless message which he submitted for discussion. This telegram would, he thought, have the desired effect of settling affairs within a certain limit of time. The effect hoped for would be either to bring about a discussion at Prinkipo and a cessation of fighting in Russia, or the field would be left clear for such action as the Allies might wish to take.

Mr. Churchill then read the following text of the draft telegram:

"The Princes Island proposal of the Allied Powers has now been made public for more than a month. The Bolsheviks have replied by wireless on the 6th instant offering to meet the wishes of the Allied Powers as regards the re-payment of loans, the grant of concessions for mineral and forest rights, and to examine the rights of eventual annexation of Russian territories by the Entente Powers."

8 See telegram of February 4, 1919, from the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments, Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 39.
The Allies repudiate the suggestion that such objects have influenced their intervention in Russia. The supreme desire of the Allies is to see peace restored in Russia and the establishment of a Government based upon the will of the broad mass of the Russian people. It is solely with this object that the Princes Island proposal has been made. It is not essential to that proposal that any conference should be held or that representatives of the various Russian forces in the field should meet around a common table. But what is imperative is that fighting should stop and stop forthwith. The Bolshevik Government while verbally accepting the invitation to Princes Island have, so far from observing a truce of arms, taken the offensive in many directions and are at the present time attacking on several fronts. In addition they have called up new classes and expedited and expanded their military preparations.

It is therefore necessary to fix a precise time within which the Princes Island proposal must be disposed of. Unless within 10 days from the 15th instant the Bolshevik forces on all fronts have ceased to attack and have withdrawn a distance of not less than 5 miles from the present position of their adversaries' outpost lines, the Princes Island proposal will be deemed to have lapsed. If, however, within 5 days a wireless notification is received from the Bolshevik Government that they have ceased attacking, so ceased firing and so withdrawn, and if this is confirmed by the reports received from the various fronts, a similar request will be addressed by the Allies to the forces confronting them.

It is in these circumstances only that a discussion at Princes Island can take place."

Mr. Churchill, continuing, said that simultaneously with the above message, or something like it, he would propose the immediate setting up of an Allied Council for Russian affairs. This Council should have political, economic and military sections, with executive powers within limits to be laid down by the present Conference. In that way continuity of policy, unity of purpose and control would be obtained. He thought the council should get to work during the period before the Prinkipo proposal could be disposed of one way or another, for the proposed Council would be useful whatever happened in regard to Prinkipo. The Council would receive general directions from the Allied Governments in the light of what happened at Prinkipo, so that there would be no delay. But he laid stress on the fact that the military section should be formed and should get to work at once. If the Bolsheviks continued to attack and to drive back the Allied and friendly forces, a definite military policy would be required, and it would then be necessary to know what action was possible with the available resources. The military section of the proposed Council should, therefore, be asked at once to draw up a plan for concerted action against the Bolsheviks. The details in regard to the organization of the Council could naturally be worked out in a variety of different ways: But it was essential to have a body
whose duty it would be to study the situation and to estimate the forces the Allies disposed of for the purpose of waging war against the Bolsheviks. Then, if the Prinkipo proposal gave no results, the Supreme War Council would be in possession of a definite war scheme, together with an appreciation of the situation and an estimate of the chances of being able to carry through to success the suggested plans. The Supreme War Council could then make their choice: either to act, or to withdraw their troops and leave everyone in Russia to stew in their own juice. But in any case, the Supreme War Council would have been placed in a position to enable it to arrive at a decision. His proposal, therefore, contained two definite lines of action. Firstly, that a wireless message be issued with the object of bringing the Prinkipo proposal to an issue. Secondly, that a scientific and careful study of the situation be carried out in order to be ready with a plan of action in the event of the Prinkipo proposal falling through.

In conclusion he wished earnestly to bring the following facts to the notice of the Conference. A month ago a meeting had been held in London at which it had been decided that the Russian situation was so serious as to demand the immediate acceptance of a policy. A month had passed, and no decision had been reached. The situation in Russia did not brook delay. It was essential that some policy should be laid down. The alternatives were these—either to prepare some plan of military action in Russia, consistent with the resources available, or to withdraw the armies and to face the consequences of abandoning Russia to her fate. Before the war Russia was the counterpoise of Europe. Now the balance was maintained by large British and American armies. The British forces were being demobilised and the American forces were going home. He himself did not believe that Germany could resume war at the present moment, but he begged his hearers to consider what the position would be in five or ten years' time. The population of Germany was twice that of France. The number of conscripts annually available would be almost three times as great. If, in addition, the Allies abandoned Russia to her fate, would it be possible to make sure that Germany would do the same? Would it be possible to make certain that Germany, either by alliance with the Bolsheviks or with the other parties at present friendly to the Allies would not in the near future become the supreme influence in Russia? It was only from Russia that Germany could derive those resources which she had lost through the loss of her colonies and through her defeat on the Western front. But should Russia fall into her clutches, Germany would thereby become stronger than ever. In his opinion Russia was the key to
the whole situation, and unless she formed a living part of Europe, unless she became a living partner in the League of Nations and a friend of the Allied Powers, there would be neither peace nor victory. He would therefore implore the Conference to take up the Russian question and to pursue it unceasingly until a policy was agreed on. The terrible situation which faced the Allies in Russia compelled him to speak in very direct terms.

Mr. Lansing agreed that with a few changes in the text the message could be sent, but as regards anything like the formation of a policy or the creation of a Council, he thought no action should be taken until an opportunity for consultation had been given.

Mr. Churchill expressed the view that the creation of the Council might be postponed, but he considered it essential that the military section should forthwith be constituted.

M. Clemenceau agreed that the Supreme War Council could, without any inconvenience, call upon its military advisers to study the question.

Colonel House proposed that a decision in regard to the creation of a Council should be postponed until Monday next. He was willing to agree, however, to the immediate despatch of the proposed wireless.

Baron Sonnino pointed out that there were two questions to be decided. A military question and a question which entailed negotiations. As regards the military question he agreed that it was most urgent; that a policy was essential and that delay would be very dangerous. In his opinion it was not a question of what would happen in five or ten years’ time. The danger to be faced would have immediate reaction in all Allied countries.

M. Clemenceau asked that the military question should be considered at once as being most urgent.

Mr. House proposed that the military question should be adjourned until Monday, and that the Conference should confine itself to a consideration of the cable.

M. Clemenceau said that he had been completely opposed to Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal, but he had accepted it in order to avoid the introduction of elements of discord into that Conference. But the fact must now be recognised that the original wireless message had not been a great success, either in Europe or elsewhere. The people whose greatest interest it would have been to support the proposals therein contained (he was now speaking of the Russian political refugees of all kinds who continually visited their offices, with petitions for guns, munitions and money)—those people had gone off in a bad temper, instead of taking the unique opportunity offered them by the Conference of indicting Bolshevism and its abuses before the whole world. These people had refused to go to Prinkipo, whilst
the Bolsheviks had offered the Allies money. When people got into an awkward situation, they usually made an effort to get out of it. The Conference should not attempt to deceive itself, for that was what it was now trying to do. He thought that it should get out of its troubles as discreetly and as simply as possible. No further reference should be made to Prinkipo. He was not altogether opposed to Mr. Churchill’s draft message, but what was said in two pages could be put in ten lines. It would be very simple to summarise it. Personally, he would prefer to say nothing, but if the Conference insisted upon sending a message, it should be as simple as possible. Why should the whole world be told that this plan had failed? That was already known. Mr. Churchill had described the Allied situation in Russia as cruel and terrible, but he had described it truly. He himself agreed with all that Mr. Churchill had said; and he attached a great importance to the creation of the proposed Council. He did not favour the policy of leaving Russia to her own devices, because she would rapidly fall a prey to the Germans. He favoured the policy of encirclement: the policy of setting up a barrier around Russia. The results of such a policy would be that in the end the Russians would ask the Allies to intervene.

That very moment a telegram had been received to the effect that the Germans had, in spite of the orders issued, attacked the Poles on a wide front, and had already taken two towns. The Germans were endeavouring to meet Marshal Foch with an accomplished fact. He would speak of this matter again presently, because a decision would have to be taken. But he wished to mention it at once, because the Russian policy must be examined in its entirety and Poland was concerned in that policy.

He did not oppose the sending of a new message about Prinkipo. But he foresaw grave troubles, and a decision in regard to military policy in Russia should be reached without further delay. He himself was ready to make new sacrifices, but he did not court defeat in Russia, after having been victorious on the Rhine.

Mr. House thought the question to be decided was how to finesse the situation against the Bolsheviks. In England and America the Russian question had created a very serious situation and the Prinkipo proposal had produced a good effect in circles hostile to the Government. The point to be decided was how best to defeat the Bolsheviks and the German purpose. Unless tact were used, all people east of the Rhine might be thrown against England, the United States of America, and France. It was already being said that England and America were using France as an instrument for obtaining Anglo-Saxon supremacy throughout the world.

Mr. Balfour thought it was necessary to take steps to put the Bolsheviks in the wrong, not only before public opinion, but before
those who held the view that Bolshevism was democracy gone astray with large elements of good in it. Personally, he thought Bolshevism was the worst form of class tyranny. M. Clemenceau held the view that public opinion in France was unanimous against Bolshevism, and that any truck with it meant trafficking with the powers of darkness. But other views existed and could not wholly be ignored. He himself had never been sanguine about the issue of the discussions at Prinkipo; but he had perceived certain benefits arising out of the Allies’ declaration of an endeavour to secure peace in Russia. In any case, the Allies had embarked on the Prinkipo proposal, and, if abandoned as M. Clemenceau had proposed, all the advantages gained by the original proposal would be thrown away. Therefore, it would merely be worldly wisdom, having once invested money in Prinkipo, to extract all that was possible from the debacle. He thought, therefore, some sort of message should be sent to the Bolsheviks, which would compel them either to cease hostilities or to refuse negotiations. Such a message would put the Bolsheviks on the horns of a dilemma, and at the same time place the Allies in a better position in regard to public opinion.

Mr. House said that he had never been in favour of the Prinkipo proposal, but it had been embarked upon, and therefore they must go along with it and, if eventually the Allies were compelled to embark on military operations, they would do so in a stronger and better position.

M. Clemenceau said that he knew quite well that his proposal to take no further action in regard to Prinkipo would not be accepted. For that reason he had suggested shortening and simplifying Mr. Churchill’s draft. He thought it right to mention that French opinion had throughout been unanimously opposed to the Prinkipo policy, and the protests had not been limited to France. A violent protest had been received from Admiral Kolchak, who had accused the Allies of having thereby practically disarmed his troops. Were not the Allies responsible to some degree for the recent failures in Russia? The soldiers in the line did not know whether they ought to fight or to await the next armistice. The Allies should not lose sight of that. He (M. Clemenceau) was not reproaching them, but it was nevertheless a fact.

As Colonel House and Mr. Balfour had remarked, the Allies had got into this Prinkipo business, and now they had got to get out of it. He merely asked them to get out of it in as simple a manner as possible. He had no objections to offer to Mr. Churchill’s draft, but he would like it to be made simpler and shorter.

M. Sonnino agreed that the Allies would have to get out of the Prinkipo business. He himself had been opposed to it from the commencement, and he had then expressed the opinion that the
Bolsheviks would be the only ones to accept the Allies' invitation, as it gave the Bolsheviks the means of enhancing their prestige. His predictions had come true, and today the Allies possessed good grounds for abandoning the whole project. It could truthfully be said that the Bolsheviks had ignored the Allies' requests and had not ceased hostilities, and that the other Governments had not accepted the Allies' invitation. The matter should therefore be ended. It was proposed to send another message, with a short time limit for reply, say ten or fifteen days. It was said that procedure would lead to no harm. But it would do harm, if by enhancing still more the prestige of the Bolsheviks, the Allies increased still further the state of demobilisation of the friendly Russian forces, and of the Entente troops operating in Russia. Mr. Balfour had said "We must compel the Bolsheviks to acknowledge their errors". The Bolsheviks would never do that, and ten days hence the Allies would find themselves assailed by new and innumerable difficulties. The Bolsheviks would put forward many excellent reasons to prove that they had been compelled to attack in self-defence, and meanwhile the situation would have become worse, the Allies would have gained no benefits whatever, and the Allied troops would have become even more demoralised.

The Conference wished to create a Council to draw up a military plan of action for these troops, and at the same time measures were proposed which would still further demoralise those same troops. Prinkipo had failed; there was no doubt whatever about that. Prinkipo had, however, proved to the world the friendly desire of the Allies to be at peace with Russia. The Prinkipo policy had been a failure, and the less said about it the better; and the proposed Council should now be asked confidentially to suggest other solutions.

He would accept the proposal to send another message, but the offer to meet at Prinkipo should not be renewed.

M. Clemenceau expressed his desire to support Baron Sonnino's proposal.

Mr. Churchill said that Mr. Lloyd George was very anxious, should the Prinkipo policy fail, for the Allies to be ready with another policy. But the British Cabinet would never agree, having gone so far, to break off the Prinkipo policy without making it quite clear to the world that that proposal had been sincerely put forward and sincerely pressed, as long as any chance of its succeeding existed. He thought the dignity of the Conference demanded the acceptance of that procedure. The Conference had unanimously adopted the proposal which had been put forward by President Wilson himself. No one should be able to say "You made a false movement, and you abandoned it. The Bolsheviks were about to accept, and you with-
drew.” The British Government wished it to appear that they had acted fairly by the Bolsheviks. He had put forward proposals for a military enquiry to be held, but he did not pre-judge the decision. It might be that as a result of that enquiry, no action might be found possible. But, in any case, until the military experts had reported, it would not be wise brutally to brush aside the Prinkipo proposal until alternative plans were ready.

M. Sonnino enquired what would be the result if the Bolsheviks stated that they would stop all hostilities and come to Prinkipo. In ten days’ time it would be impossible to ascertain whether hostilities had really been stopped. On the other hand, the effect would have been to disorganise still further the Allied forces in Russia. His thesis was this: The Bolsheviks had been given a period of time up to the 15th February in which to comply with the conditions contained in the original wireless. The Bolsheviks had not complied with those terms and conditions (the Bolsheviks had continued their offensive). Why, therefore, prolong by ten days the period already granted? The Bolsheviks could not do more than fail to comply, as they had done, with the conditions of the Allies, and in ten days’ time the Allies would be faced with the same situation; but with the additional disadvantage that their own forces would have become further disorganised. He begged the members of the Conference to realise what effect this policy would have, not only in Russia but in Allied countries. The prestige given to Bolshevism was a real disaster in its effect on Allied countries. Consequently, no good effect could be obtained by granting the Bolsheviks this added prestige. The Bolsheviks had been given a chance; why should they be given a second and a third and a fourth chance? He strongly opposed the sending of the proposed message.

Baron Makino said that he also had received messages from Siberia bearing out the statements made by M. Clemenceau as to the disastrous effect the original wireless had created in the minds of all friendly groups in Siberia. At the time that the invitation had been issued to the various groups in Russia, no such consequence had been anticipated. If now a second telegram were sent, it was most important that its intent and purpose should not be misunderstood by the friendly forces in Siberia.

Mr. Balfour wished to ask the military authorities a question of fact. It was being said that the Bolsheviks had pretended to accept, but they had not in reality done so, because they had not complied with the fundamental condition in regard to the cessation of hostilities. But had the Allied troops abstained from hostilities? Or, to put his question in another way: had all the Allied military operations been defensive in their character?
Mr. CHURCHILL pointed out that during the interval between the dispatch of the invitation and the present moment, the Bolshevik forces had made the most heavy attacks on all fronts.

Mr. BALFOUR expressed the view that a good many points of great difficulty had been raised that afternoon. He proposed therefore that the further consideration of the two questions: the dispatch of the message and the creation of a Council on Russian Affairs, should be adjourned till Monday afternoon.

(It was agreed to adjourn until Monday, 17th February, at 3 p.m., the further consideration of the two questions relating to the situation in Russia, namely:—

(1) The wireless message in regard to Prinkipo, and
(2) The creation of an Allied Council for Russian Affairs.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU asked permission to read the following telegram, dated Warsaw, February 14th, 1919, which had been received from M. Paderewski:—

Situation in Poland

"German troops have commenced offensive on a large scale in German Poland. They have occupied the towns of Babimost and Kargowa. Their initiative will place them in an advantageous military situation before anticipated cessation of hostilities. Germans are making considerable use of asphyxiating gas. The Polish forces, numbering 25,000, only 10,000 being engaged, are insufficient to stop this offensive. The situation is grave. It is urgent that situation be placed immediately before Allied competent authorities.

(Signed) Paderewski."

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that he had prepared a draft reply which he submitted for the acceptance of his colleagues.

(It was agreed that the following telegram should forthwith be sent to Marshal Foch:—

"The Supreme War Council urgently draws Marshal Foch's attention to the following message received from the Polish Government. It is evident that the Germans have hastened their offensive in order to present Marshal Foch with an accomplished fact.

The Supreme War Council holds the opinion that the line of demarcation between the German and Polish troops fixed by Marshal Foch must be maintained.")

(The Conference adjourned to Monday afternoon, February 17th, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

February 16, 1919.
Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 17th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

**Present**

**America**, United States of
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. E. M. House

**British Empire**
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. W. C. Churchill, M. P.

**France**
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

**Secretaries**
M. G. Auchincloss
Mr. L. Harrison

**British Empire**
Mr. E. Phipps

**Secretaries**
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn

**Italy**
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

**Japan**
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

**Joint Secretariat**
M. Saburi

**Also Present**

**America**, United States of
Col. U. S. Grant
Major A. Jones

**British Empire**
Captain E. Abraham

**France**
Capt. A. Portier

**Italy**

**Japan**

**Interpreter**—Professor P. J. Mantoux

1. M. Clemenceau said that Marshal Foch had returned that morning from his journey into Germany with the signature of the Germans to the Armistice conditions agreed on by the Supreme War Council.

**Marshal Foch** said that he had met the German plenipotentiaries at 3 p.m. on the 14th. He had put before Herr
Erzberger the convention decided on by the Powers. Herr Erzberger had taken the text, and, in reply, had handed in a declaration covering 23 pages. (For text of which see Annexure "A"). This declaration contained a justification from the German point of view of the execution of the terms of the original armistice. The two principal demands made related:—

(1) To the repatriation of prisoners.
(2) To the action taken by the French in Alsace-Lorraine against German industrialists holding property removed from France and Belgium.

In respect to the first, Marshal Foch had addressed the following reply to the German Secretary of State:—

(a) Repatriation of German Prisoners

"In reply to your communication of February 3rd, I have the honour to inform you that the Supreme War Council of the Allied and Associated Powers considers the repatriation of German prisoners of war impossible for the moment; but these Powers will see to it with the greatest care that all the seriously sick and wounded are repatriated with the least possible delay.

Consequently, France is actually taking steps to begin the immediate repatriation of about 2,000 German prisoners of war besides the prisoners of war already sent to Germany or Switzerland. Great Britain is disposed to proceed in the same manner as rapidly as possible."

In respect to the second, Herr Erzberger's view was that proceedings could not be taken against private individuals holding property removed from France and Belgium during the war, because they had received it from the German Government. The restoration of this property must therefore be a matter for negotiation between the Governments. The Allied point of view was that these goods could be recovered wherever found. Marshal Foch had, therefore, addressed the following reply to the German Secretary of State:—

(b) Restoration of French & Belgian Property

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum contained in your letter of the 27th January.

In this connection, I would remind you that in the course of the last interview at Trèves, I stated that I could not accept the view of the German Government; that is to say, that German subjects who had carried away and taken in charge industrial apparatus coming from the occupied territories should benefit by the terms of Article 6 of the Convention of 11th November,1 as having participated in acts of war.

I merely undertake to transmit to the competent judicial authorities the special cases which you may think it your duty to submit to me.

1 For text, see vol. II, p. 1.
I have, therefore, forwarded the memorandum to the said judicial authorities, who will decide on this particular question of law."

Continuing, Marshal Foch said that on the 15th the German Pleni-
potentiaries alleged that, by reason of the slow communication with
Berlin and Weimar, they could not say when they
would be able to sign the Armistice. Further they
wished to modify and extend the text of the Conven-
tion submitted to them. Marshal Foch, on the 16th,
had sent them the following communication:-

"In reply to your letters of the 15th February, I have the honour
to inform you that:—

(1) The text of the Convention which was handed to you yesterday was drawn up by the chiefs of the Allied and Associated Governments.

I can neither change it nor add to it.

(2) As the Armistice expires on the 17th February at 5 o'clock in the morning, the latest hour for signing a new extension is 18 hours on the 16th February, — in order to give time for communicating orders to the troops.

If the Convention be not signed at the latter hour, I shall be obliged to leave Trèves and the Armistice will cease to operate at 5 o'clock in the morning of the 17th February."

After this, the conditions of the new Armistice were signed with a slight alteration respecting the line of demarcation between German and Polish troops. This modification affected the Silesian frontier, where, as there were no Poles, it was decided to adhere to the pre-war frontiers. (For final text, see Annexure "B.")

After signing the Convention, Herr Erzberger had handed to Marshal Foch a declaration from Herr Scheidemann, in the following terms:

"The German Government recognises the grave nature of the con-
sequences which would be involved both by the acceptance, and par-
ticularly by the refusal of the Convention. When it gave instruc-
tions to its delegates to sign it, it did so feeling convinced that the Allied and Associated Governments were going to make a serious effort to give to the world that peace which is so ardently desired, during the short period for which the armistice was being prolonged.

Nevertheless, the German Government feels obliged to indicate its own point of view as regards the three conditions imposed in the Convention, by making the following observations:—

I. The agreement ignores the fact that the German Government has been constituted by the popular will, in an orderly manner. The agreement imposes on the Germans, in the form of orders and prohibitions marked by harshness and favouring the rebelling Poles, the necessity of evacuating a number of important places such as Birn-
baum and the town of Bentschen without any delay. These places are in German hands, their population is mostly German, and they are particularly important in regard to the intercourse with Eastern Germany. In addition to this, the Allied and Associated Powers
do not even guarantee that the Poles, on their side, will abstain from preparing or undertaking further attacks, or that they will treat the German population with humanity—a population, the protection of which we are forced to give up: or that they will release the German hostages, the retention of whom has now no object; or that they will keep up the supply of food from the west in the same way as has been done up to the present.

Although we are ready to cease all military offensive action in Posania and in other regions, and to accept the present military situation in these countries as a basis of negotiation, we really must be able to expect the Poles in revolt also to respect the line of demarcation. If they do not, we ought to be permitted to defend ourselves by force of arms.

II. Germany is able to prove that she has striven to carry out the clauses of the Armistice until her economic strength was completely exhausted and until her transport services gave way. Now, once again, she will undertake to fulfill the conditions which she has not up to the present succeeded in carrying out, but at the same time she feels justified in assuming that her undertakings will not receive any interpretation inconsistent with the principles acknowledged by the two parties before the President of the United States of America and rendering nugatory the idea of a peace founded on right.

III. The fact that Germany is granted only a short undefined renewal terminable at the will of one party only at three days’ notice instead of an Armistice containing a fixed time limit enabling her to take the necessary dispositions to execute the clauses is the very thing to jeopardise quietness and order in Germany and constitutes an unjustifiable aggravation of our constitution. We cannot give up the hope that the Allied and Associated Governments will consider it possible to open negotiations on the German counter-proposals and to renew the Armistice until the Preliminaries of Peace."

MARSHAL FOCH said that, to ensure the execution of the terms of the Armistice relating to Poland, he suggested that the co-operation of the Allied Commission in Warsaw should be obtained. To this end, he proposed the following telegram:

“I send you below the text of Article 1 of the Armistice Convention signed on February 16th:

‘The Germans must immediately desist from all offensive operations against the Poles in the region of Posen or any other region. With this object, their troops are forbidden to cross the following line:—The former frontier of East and West Prussia with Russia as far as Luisenfelde, then from this point the line:—West of Luisenfelde, west of Gross Neudorff, south of Brzeze, north of Schubin, north of Exin, south of Samoczyn, south of Chodziensen, north of Czarnikow, west of Miala, west of Birnbaum, west of Bentschen, west of Wollstein, north of Lissa, north of Ravel, south of Krotozyn, west of Adelnau, west of Schildberg, north of Vieruchow, then the frontier of Silesia.’

The Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw should at once inform the Polish Government and Command of this Convention, reminding them that all hostilities must cease on the Polish side as on the German.”
The Commission must make sure that this injunction is observed on both sides.

It will settle on the spot the difficulties of detail which cannot fail to arise, the line of demarcation fixed serving as the basis of its decisions.

The German delegates have asked Marshal Foch that rules may be laid down for the protection of the 400,000 German subjects living in territory occupied by the Poles, for communication between this territory and the rest of Germany and for the rolling stock of railways. (*注*)

Marshal Foch has been unable to treat from a distance these questions of detail which can only be settled on the spot. The Allied and Associated Governments instruct the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw to decide them.

With this object, the Commission should establish relations with the German Government and High Command through General Dupont at Berlin.

The Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw will keep the Governments constantly informed of the progress of its work.”

(It was decided that this telegram should be sent by Marshal Foch.)

2. ADMIRAL BROWNING said that, as the provisions of Article 22 of the Armistice had not been completely fulfilled, he had had a meeting on the 14th with the German naval representative. The latter had been informed of what was required to complete the fulfilment of that Article. He had replied that Germany was disposed to bring to an end the submarine question once and for all. There were two classes of submarines:—

(a) Those to be surrendered.

(b) Those to be broken up in Germany.

Of the former, 45 still remained to be handed over, and the latter comprised all the surplus. The German naval representative had accepted the conditions laid down. Admiral Browning had also pointed out that, of the batch due for surrender in the previous month, two had been alleged to have sunk at the mouth of the Elbe. He had pointed out to the German representative that, whether this was due to negligence or bad seamanship, the Allies were not prepared to allow a repetition of such events. The Allies would require in exchange for any submarine lost a complete set of engines and electrical and other plant. The German naval representative had agreed. The Germans had also agreed to send to Great Britain special submarine docks and lifting vessels. Any in process of building would be destroyed and no further building would be undertaken. Dates had been fixed for the surrender of the material, with a small margin allowing for bad weather.
3. Admiral Browning had, further, drawn the attention of the German naval representative to the spreading of German propaganda by German Wireless Stations. The latter had asked whether this enquiry was intended to convey a warning. Admiral Browning had replied in the affirmative.

4. Admiral Browning had further pointed out that the apparent reluctance of Germany to surrender her merchant shipping, until minor points of finance had been settled, did not harmonise with the alleged desperate straits for food in Germany. The naval representative had agreed to convey these remarks to Herr Erzberger.

5. Mr. Balfour said that he had shown the Chairman the telegram from the British Admiralty requiring a decision by the Supreme War Council. He therefore wished to bring it to the notice of the meeting. He then read the following:—

"Instructions should be obtained from Supreme War Council as to whether Blockade of Germany should be relaxed in so far as is necessary to permit maintenance of German armies in Latvia and East Prussia.

Many requests are being received from Admiral Goette for free passage by sea from Western German ports to Danzig, Pillau, Memel and Liebau, of individual ships carrying troops, military supplies and coal for railways.

A decision in principle is required observing the German troops are engaged in operations against Bolshevists as well as against Poles and that in no case is it proposed to grant general permission."

He suggested the matter should be referred to the Military and Naval Experts, of the Supreme War Council.

M. Clemenceau asked whether it would not be better to refer it to the Blockade Committee.

Colonel House expressed the opinion that the questions involved were military rather than commercial.

M. Clemenceau then suggested that this telegram should be sent, at the same time, to the military and naval Advisors and to the Blockade Committee.

(It was decided, after some discussion, that the telegram should be referred, at the same time, to the military and naval Advisors of the Supreme War Council, and to the Blockade Committee, for reports.)

6. M. Clemenceau said that he must inform the meeting that he had received a letter from M. Pachitch to the effect that the Serbian Government proposed to submit their case against Italy to arbitration by President Wilson. He stated that he merely reported this as a statement of fact.
BARON SONNINO said that he thought it his duty, after hearing the communication made by the Chairman, to state that the Italian Government regretted that it could not accept any proposal for arbitration on any question for the solution of which Italy had engaged in war, and waged it for three and a half years in full agreement with her Allies, and the examination of which by the Peace Conference was pending.

7. A discussion on the policy to be pursued in Russia ensued, and after an exchange of views, it was decided to postpone the resumption of the discussion until later in the week.

8. M. CLEMENCEAU announced that the Serbian statement would be heard on the following day if there were no objection.

BARON SONNINO said that the position of the Italian Government in relation to the Serbs was a delicate one. The Italian Government did not wish to enter into a polemic at the Conference. He, therefore, suggested that the Serbs should be heard in the absence of the Italian Delegates, or that if heard in their presence, no discussion should ensue.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the last proposal was in accordance with precedent. The Serbs would be heard, and the Meeting would be adjourned.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 17th February, 1919.

Annexure "A"

[Declaration Handed by the Head of the German Armistice Commission (Erzberger) to the Allied Armistice Commission, February 14, 1919]

GENTLEMEN: For the third time, we have to meet again at Trèves to negotiate the prolongation of the Armistice. The prolongation of the Armistice until the conclusion of the Peace preliminaries as considered in Article I of the convention of 16 Jan. 19, has unfortunately not met with the approval of the Allied Government, any more than the promise of 18 Dec. 2

I ask why our people have the impression that this prolongation of the Armistice has but one aim; to impose upon us new and heavy conditions and prejudice peace. Thus the Armistice becomes a new source of distrust, of hatred between peoples, and even of despair.

By that, the Allies are preparing the way to Bolshevism. On the

2 Vol. II, p. 11.
contrary, the German people is trying hard to repulse this Bolshevism—At this very moment the German National Assembly is sitting; it has considered as the first and most pressing of its duties to constitute a Government in conformity with the result of the elections. Germany has a democratic and parliamentary government, which personifies and warrants the will of the people to arrive without delay to a peace of reconciliation. The new government rests on a broader basis than any other government in the world.

The German people has been obliged to buy the Armistice and its successive prolongations until today, by enormous sacrifices. It has abandoned to you property of a huge value. You have received German war material valued at more than a billion. The value of the warships which were delivered, amounts to more than a billion and a half. In the delivery of transportation material, Germany has gone beyond the limits of what she could do. The Prussian-Hessian State Railways alone have delivered more than two and a half billions of railway material. Up to 5 Feb. we have delivered to you 4,137 locomotives and 136,398 cars. Up to 11 Feb. 10,263 locomotives, and 216,072 cars had been turned over.

The demobilisation of the Army is complete. We have at our disposal in round numbers, 6,000 officers of the active army, less than in peace time in 1914. A very high percentage of the available officers is either sick or wounded. And from the discharge of the majority of the former officers of the Active Army who were mobilised, and of the reserve officers, we have released already, since the armistice, more than 200 general and field officers of the regular army, without any new promotion taking place.

As for enlisted men, at the end of February all classes will have been demobilised except one. And this class has sustained heavy losses during the campaign. If, in spite of that, the effectives and expenditures are still high, it is due on the one hand to high cost of living, and on the other to the large number of sick and wounded who are still treated in the hospitals—in round numbers, 200,000—and finally to the large number [of] unemployed soldiers, who according to regulations are still allowed to remain for four months at most on the pay roll of the troops, while looking for employment. This delay will only begin to come to an end during the following months. Enlisted men of this category are worthless in the military sense of the word; their only duties in their garrisons, and only in order to earn their salary, are solely fatigue work and guard duty. Men retained in military service are likewise, for the most part, worthless as soldiers on account of the revolution and local disorders which are still resulting.
Consequently, for the upkeep of order and the protection of the frontiers, we have been obliged to call upon volunteers. But, on the whole, they came only in small numbers. In order to allow the Government of the Empire to fulfill the duties which are absolutely necessary, it has been necessary, later on, to call back, in the eastern part of the country, men who were in their homes. The total strength of the units which can be used is so low that it is impossible on account of its weakness, to make an extensive use of this force. Taking into account the volunteer units in course of formation, the strength (which is, however, subject to constant changes on account of their formation) can be estimated, for the present, in the following figures, figures which are likely to be modified later because of the poor system of military information.

**Strength**

For the protection of the western frontier round numbers—on a line of about 600 Km 10,000 men.

For the protection of the Eastern frontier, in Courland, Silesia and Saxony, about 1800 Km 100,000 men.

Inside the empire—round numbers 70,000 men.

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Troops returning from Russia, in round figures 180,000 men.

(Besides isolated troops in the South-East or otherwise useless in round figures 60,000 men.)

Total of usable men, in round figures 200,000 men.

That is, one-fourth of the old German Army in peace-time. And of this strength 30 to 40% do not do real front-line service.

The repatriation of Allied war prisoners for the west was already in progress at the time of the last negotiations for the prolongation of the armistice at Trèves. The Serbian and Roumanian sick and seriously wounded were evacuated in hospital trains. The other Serbian prisoners of war have also been transported to Agram. However four of their trains had to be unloaded on German-Austrian territory owing to lack of coal. The War Ministry has immediately taken the necessary steps to insure the continuation of transportation by providing the necessary coal. The Roumanian prisoners of war will be evacuated later.

The general office of the Armistice commission, created for the prompt restitution of securities and documents according to article XIX has worked successfully since the last negotiations. Independently of the securities previously delivered, there have been returned 778,348,237.12 marks worth and 4,171,165 francs worth. The securities removed from Belgium and placed on deposit with the general war fund in Munich.
have been covered in lists which have been submitted. The work of the German commissioners in Brussels and in France is under way and progressing satisfactorily in agreement with the French and Belgian authorities. They have even been concluded for the most part. At Mayence, there are now being returned to France the securities paid or found which have been placed on deposit with the General War fund in Berlin and Munich, amounting in round figures to 120 boxes; a balance of two millions of local paper money (municipal bonds) is also being returned. The evacuation of the bank securities taken from France and deposited in Liège has begun during the last few days. According to the closing protocol of 1 Dec. the list has been supplied for all the works of art taken from Belgium and known at the present time. The greater part of the lists relative to works of art removed from France, has also been furnished; as regards collection of works of art themselves, the one in Brussels has been entirely delivered and a receipt has been given.

Thus Germany has employed all her forces to honour her engagements ensuing from the treaties. This is also true as regards the clause for delivery of agricultural machinery imposed by the treaty of 16 Jan. However, the difficulties which occur on this point cannot be overcome unless the supply of raw materials and partly manufactured products coming from the territories on the left and the right bank of the Rhine, promised by Marshal Foch on the 6th, can be assured in a large measure, if we obtain deliveries of coal from the Sarre, and if shipments from the left bank to the right bank are authorised.

Within the limits which are marked out for her by the Allied powers, and by present circumstances, which create almost insurmountable difficulties, Germany has done all in her power, and has called all her forces into play. The delivery of locomotives now under way has reduced the park of locomotives fit for service on the Prussia-Hessian railway system to such an extent that the maintenance of even the most miserable economic life is compromised. The stocks of coal for the use of the railways have been impoverished to a menacing degree. The supply for the gas plants and electric stations has failed. Owing to the impossibility of transporting the raw materials and partly manufactured products, unemployment is increasing. Our railways are completely worn out. If we go on with the delivery of engines, we may foresee with certainty an early discontinuance of the whole transport service. I do not need to explain in more detail what this means in the present situation of the coal and food supply. It is impossible to estimate the consequences. This is why no one in Germany can take the responsibility of continuing
the delivery of engines. At the same time you forbid us coast navigation on the North Sea and Baltic,—a navigation which we urgently need to relieve our railways, and you maintain the blockade, which leaves us without the raw materials we need to make repairs. Nevertheless, with regard to the values in question, we wish to fulfil the obligation we have contracted. Germany will execute in an entirely loyal manner the engagements which she has assumed. But, on this point, you must allow us to make an exchange. From 600 to 700 locomotives are still missing. I declare myself ready to put at your disposal, after detailed agreement, a certain number of railroad cars in exchange, and I propose that you institute without delay a subcommission for the settlement of this question.

In compliance with article VI of the Convention of January 16th 1919, relative to the restitution of machinery and material taken from Belgium and France, we entered into negotiations, at Spa, with the Industrial Sub-Commission of the Allies and we have fixed by a Protocol, the conditions of execution. Immediately after, the creation of a “bureau” has been undertaken at Francfort-sur-le-Mein, as contemplated in these conditions of execution. Conferences have taken place at Spa, as well as in Berlin, with the Representatives of the Allies, relative to the wording of the books of questions to be used in tracing up the machinery in question. An ordinance has been published with a view to ascertaining the declaration, the careful keeping up and restitution of this machinery.

Now that the naval clauses of the Convention of November 11th 1918 and of the first prolongation of the treaty of Armistice have been complied with in the requested time-limit, the demands formulated in the second prolongation of Armistice are being given satisfaction. Admiral Browning has recently stated his demands anew, by giving the exact indication of the various submarines. The list furnished by him, is not in accordance with the list which has been drawn up on the German side.

Consequently, a delay ensued, for which Germany is not responsible. Another delay might be caused by the fact that the situation of ice hinders the concentration of the tugs. We will fulfil our engagements as soon as possible. Admiral Browning now demands that the submarines of new construction be also delivered into English ports. We have promised the delivery of the docks for submarines and of the mine sweepers, as demanded in the Convention of January 16th. However, this delivery cannot actually be effectuated until atmospheric conditions make it possible for these ships to travel, which are not equipped for sea journeys. All the submarines which have not yet been delivered, new constructions
included, will be entirely dismounted, this work is already being executed. The internment of all ships, requested by the Allies, replacement of ships included, according to English informations, has taken place at Scapa Flow. Up to the present time, the protestation made by Germany against the non-observation of the Armistice by England who has not even tried the internment into neutral ports, has received no answer.

While Germany makes the greatest efforts to prove, in a loyal manner by the execution of the conditions which have been imposed upon her, that she is ready to make heavy sacrifices for her aspirations towards Peace, I regret to be obliged to note again, in the face of the world, that the attitude of the Allied Governments always remains in contradiction with the spirit of a future of Peace. The History of the world will record, as an example of the most extreme brutality, the fact that our prisoners of war are still pining away in the hands of the Allies. Since the beginning of negotiations relative to the Armistice, I have always requested that the restitution of the prisoners of war be considered as a measure admitting reciprocity. In a manner, incomprehensible for this German people, who has been slandered and treated as barbarous, you have taken advantage of the superiority of the forces on your side, to oblige us to send your prisoners back to you, while you were keeping ours. On my pressing request, you declared yourself ready, that is true, to recognise that the question of our prisoners' return was to be settled at the time of conclusion of preliminaries of peace. But that act of consolation has not occurred. Nobody, in Germany, could think that the preliminaries of peace would be so long delayed. On the other hand, the decision thus taken, did not prevent you from yielding to a human thought of which you consider yourself as guardians and special protectors, and to send our prisoners back to us after you had received yours. Your prisoners have long gone back to their homes already. They are in their families and can, in the midst of those that are dear to them, resume their civilian occupations. The sentiment, natural to any man, considers as an act of barbarity that, though you make for yourself a condition of armistice of the restitution of these prisoners, you would have refused to apply the same consideration to our prisoners and looked on their restitution as a condition of Peace. The records of negotiations of Armistice and Spa negotiations are full of requests, asking you to listen at last to the voice of humanity. The most we ever obtained were promises. And so, the time has come when we have lost faith in such promises. We want to see action. On no point relative to the Armistice does the German people show as feverish an emotion, as on that question of the prisoners. A wave of indignation and despair goes through the whole
country. From the smallest villages from the north, south, east and west of Germany I receive daily numerous letters and telegrams from the parents of prisoners who pour out their desperate hearts in earnest and often profoundly touching words. Children cry for their fathers, wives for their husbands; aged parents have but a single desire, to see their child once more before dying. Organisations have been established to defend the cause of our prisoners of war.

Our people rightly declares that it is absurd at the approach of peace to maintain from a single side a war measure. It is only by asserting your predomination that you keep our compatriots far from their country. We have sufficient proof that a great number of them are on the way to physical and moral ruin. I ask you: Where do you obtain the moral right to expose thousands of Germans to this danger? Where do you obtain the right, at the moment when the world wishes to establish a peace of right, where it is a matter of eliminating the principle of violence from the common life of nations, to keep thousands of men, women and children far from their human attachments? The Allies must be convinced that the reconciliation is not aided by this means. The German people resents this means of barbarous constraint as it would a blow in the face. If you believe that you can inflict this disgrace upon the German people without reaction you are mistaken. The preponderance of power is at present upon your side, but in spite of that you will have to reckon and work with the German people in common if European peace is to last. Therefore I ask once more that you render aid. Return our prisoners to us at once. Deliver them from captivity, permit their depressed spirits to return to life. If you do not do it for the men do it for the children of whom there are many who no longer know their father. Do it for the women that they may anew consecrate themselves to their family, while the father takes up the task of the protection and the support of the family. Do it for the parents who, deprived of their children by the war, deplore each of the days which delays the return of their beloved children now that the noise of arms has ceased. Finally fulfil the promises by which you have awakened and at the same time deceived our hopes. Marshal, it is to you especially that I address this urgent prayer, because it is you to whom people will listen when the Allied Governments take refuge behind the fears for military order. The German people do not think of taking up war again. The German people requests by my mouth the immediate return of these prisoners of war and these civilian prisoners. A certain number of severely wounded have been returned only by the American and British Governments and these small bits are all that have been given us. But the requests for an amelioration of the lot of the civilian prisoners and prisoners of war have been refused. What will the civilised
world say when it sees that not even German chaplains, doctors and nurses are permitted to visit them? History will one day reproach you severely if you have the intention of allowing this state of affairs to continue until the conclusion of the peace preliminaries. It is not a question of criminal prisoners. Therefore give the order that the German civilian and war prisoners be liberated from all the Allied countries. First send back all the wounded and sick, the interned civilians and the war prisoners who have been in the hands of the enemy for more than 18 months, especially the fathers of families. Marshal Foch himself has designated these categories as those which inspired the most sympathy. Until their situation is decided grant to all the civilian and war prisoners an alleviation of their situation. Give them a greater liberty of movement outside the camps, until nightfall. Remunerate their labour, exactly like that of your own workmen. Abolish the postal censorship and the systematic delay in the sending of mail, for which there is no longer a military reason. Extend the rights of correspondence. Have all mail sent immediately through the occupied territories and have the sealed cars containing packages coming from Germany taken as far as the camps. Give them the same food as your own population. Give them the opportunity of buying food freely. Improve their clothing. Free them from the green uniform of those condemned to forced labour and from the stigma of the "P. G." 4 Soften the disciplinary measures for punishable acts committed up to the day of the new prolongation of the Armistice. Permit immediately the chaplains, doctors & nurses & delegates of the German Red Cross to enter the Prisoner of War camps in all the Allied countries, to restore the broken spirits of the German prisoners of war and civilians.

I have a special word to devote to the Medical personnel. Article 12 of the Geneva Convention 5 stipulates the immediate return of the doctors and of the sanitary personnel whose services are no longer necessary. Numerous members of the sanitary service are in this position, having been left with the wounded and sick in the evacuated territories. I expect this article of the Geneva Convention to be followed. The least that one can demand is that personal liberty be accorded the sanitary personnel until their repatriation. Grant them the pay and the allowances which are due them by virtue of Article XIII of the Geneva Convention and give them the freedom of postal service.

Gentlemen, I cannot leave the chapter of our prisoners of war without once more expressing the unanimous request of the whole German people. Begin the evacuation of our prisoners of war at

4 Abbreviation for "prisonnier de guerre."
5 Red Cross convention of 1906 for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded of the armies, Foreign Relations, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1024.
once. At the first news appearing in the press on the subject of the
renewal of the armistice manifestations have come to me as I have
explained from all parts of Germany. They are summed up in the
cry: "Immediate return of our prisoners of war". The German
National Assembly, the legitimate spokesman of the German people
adopted a resolution containing the same request. I request that
the seriousness and the humane motives of this movement, with all
its lasting importance, be grasped. The German people requests
foremost and expects with certitude from the present negotiations
that the retention by force of our prisoners of war be terminated.
I can content myself neither with the assurance that this question
will be considered by the Allies nor with the assurance of Marshal
Foch that he will support this request to the Allied Governments.
I must have the assurance that the evacuation of the German pris-
oners of war will commence immediately. No one with humane sen-
timents can demand of me that I take the responsibility of formu-
lating another demand in this question than that which I set forth.

Since one has seen manifested in the occupied territories the
effort made to deprive them of normal relations with the unoccupied
territories, the German Armistice Commission has
drawn attention to the serious injury to the whole
German economic life which will be caused by this
separation between regions important for production and consump-
tion. Although promises have always been given us at Trèves and
Luxembourg, normal relations have nevertheless not been re-establish-
ed. At the last negotiations in Trèves, I remarked that the freedom
of relations could not in any way endanger the safety of the Allied
arms. This is especially true for the liberty of economic exchanges.
The authorisations of exchanges given in cases of specie can in no
wise satisfy the existing needs. It is only a general suspension of the
stopping of exchange of products from the left bank to the right bank
of the Rhine and vice-versa which can create the situation in which
the economic life can maintain itself and attain its goal. Numerous
exploitations will have to follow them shortly if there is no change.
This is true of the factories of the right bank as much as those on the
left bank, according to the location of the sources of their raw ma-
terials and of the region where they send their products. Marshal
Foch himself has indicated the results of the dismissal of workmen
during the course of the preceding negotiations at Trèves. If it is
the intention of the Entente to prevent the Bolshevist disorders and
intrigues, freedom of circulation can contribute a large part. I
emphasise also the detriment to the spring planting as a result of the
fact that the arrival of seeds has become almost impossible. Many
small market gardeners and workmen of the occupied zone must count
upon the sending of small quantities of grain from the non-occupied territory. As long as these shipments of grain by postal packages are not assimilated to packages of food an unendurable situation will last. It is also necessary that the circulation of persons between the occupied regions and the non-occupied regions be rendered freer. I understand perfectly that Marshal Foch wishes to prevent the introduction of germs of Bolshevism into the Allied armies. But there is nothing to prevent guarantees against this possibility from being found. Moreover it is an indignity for a civilized people to be submitted after the end of a state of war to such restraints in its relations by railroad and by mail with the territories belonging to its country as is actually the case here. Family and business relations are rudely interrupted. The youth in the schools in certain parts of the occupied territory must needlessly lose the necessary time for their instruction, because there exists no faculty in the occupied territory where they live and because they are prevented from going to another school. These are infringements of the right of free personal disposition and find no justification in the treaty of the Armistice of November 11th. I therefore request that this unendurable state of affairs end and that the economic and postal as well as personal circulation between the occupied and the unoccupied regions be made free.

I request for the Members of the National Assembly a permanent permission to travel in either direction without hindrance and I request also for them the freedom of postal relations.

I cannot commence these negotiations moreover without making a vigorous protest against the new excess of power on the part of the Allies. Although Marshal Foch had declared at Trèves January 16 that no owner of mechanical material bought a second time (verb left out), a certain number of directors of factories, and managers have been arrested and punished. Contrary to Marshal Foch’s conception, according to which the guarantee provided by Article VI of the agreement of 11 Nov. applies only to espionage, I have succeeded, opportunely, in having this point of view applied as a guarantee covering also the buyers of machines coming from seizures in the occupied territories, and covering persons charged with the execution of liquidation procedure. I maintain this point of view, and raise a protest against the arbitrariness with which these arrests have been made. In order to avoid all pretexts of arrests, the decree above-cited was issued to obtain the restitution of the machines. You expressly assured us that there would no longer be this question of new arrests of industrial persons as soon as such a decree had been promulgated.
The persons in question are innocent, and justice forbids punishing the innocent. I therefore request the immediate liberation of those who have been arrested and condemned.

The Allies have not ceased in their attempts to give a wide interpretation to the financial agreements arrived at, especially regarding that of 13 Dec. '18, attempting to extend para. 4 of this agreement to cover all Germany. If this interpretation is desired for the said para., it can be done only on the principle of reciprocity. Moreover: this is not part of the armistice. I am ready to accept the immediate establishment of a commission to treat this question independently of the armistice. For the protection of private property is to the interest of both parties.

The Expulsion of Germans from Alsace-Lorraine continues. Those expulsions have meanwhile reached such a number that they justify the conception of "evacuation", even in the French acceptance of the word with which Germany cannot entirely agree. In these circumstances women are treated in a way that is truly revolting. Alsace-Lorraine throughout is hermetically sealed. In this country, the near relative of a person in the unoccupied zone may be ill, or may die, without this person receiving the least word. Thus tragedies are taking place daily which will cause their full share of pain to the interested persons and to the whole world, but only when these barriers have once again been reopened. There is no reason for this state of things. I must raise a particularly keen protest against the fact that the French have confiscated private property of Germans (and to a large extent have put it under an organ for sequestration) in the territories occupied by them. The state of an armistice, which should be the beginning of a state of peace, furnishes no justification whatever for this measure. I raise a protest also against the fact that the National Assembly had to open without the presence of the representatives of Alsace-Lorraine to transmit the wishes of their country. The legal situation of Alsace-Lorraine is not modified by the fact of an armistice. Contrary to Germany's authorizing the Alsatians in 1871 to take part in the elections for the French National Assembly, France did not permit the elections for the German National Assembly in Alsace-Lorraine.

I find myself obliged to make a most serious protest against the attitude of the Allies towards the defence of Germany against the ambitions of the Poles for conquest of certain parts of Germany.

It is unheard-of that the German authorities in the territory coveted by the Poles in the East of Germany be prevented from taking part in its public life. Such an attitude is one the [that]

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*Vol. ii, p. 541.
leaves a person without knowing whether to attribute it to a complete misconception of conditions in the East, or to regard it as the final straw of foreign intermeddling with the interior independence of a people. The subject of Polish intrigue and ambition is being struggled for on German soil. It is not we who are the aggressors, but the Poles, who, in Posen, have everywhere assumed the offensive militarily. The best proof of the absence of any aggressive intention on the part of Germany is the absence of any military preparation on their side. For this sole reason, the Poles were able to obtain certain successes. The menace that the Poles are developing against the most important railroad lines of the East, confirms their very broad, offensive intentions. The objection that the Poles are a bulwark against Bolshevism is rendered untenable by the fact that Polish agitation especially in upper Silesia, but also in the provinces of the North, is working in close communion with Bolshevism. The Bolshevist agitators are, almost without exception, Poles. The Poles seem to have the intention of creating a state of general insecurity to have the pretext of intervention for the sake of re-establishing order. The German people cannot permit itself to be deprived of the right, and will not permit itself to be deprived of the right to protect itself against the insolent encroachments of the Poles on its own territory, with what forces it possesses. Germany has accepted the 14 points of Wilson, but the Allies have too. But the 11th point does not say that Germany has bound itself to stand aside inactive if the Poles attempt to appropriate by violence portions of German territory. The 11th point no more gives the right to the Allies of forbidding the German people to defend themselves from similar encroachments. The right of the German people to the undiminished possession of its entity within the framework of Wilson's points, and to defend this entity against all attacks, remains eternal and unassailable.

I raise still another protest against the fact that, among the ships used for the evacuation of French prisoners of war, the restitution of which had been guaranteed us by the Allies, 5 have been taken away from us simply without a word of explanation, and contrary to the previous assurances.

The agreement regarding navigation of 17 Jan. at Trèves gives the Entente no right to seize German ships by violence.

In the Agreement regarding navigation of Trèves, the German people put at the disposition of the Entente its merchant fleet, to help the food-supply of the world, and to secure its own food-supply. The Allies have already bound themselves, in the agreement of 11 Nov., '18, to accept the duty of turning over the food necessary for Germany throughout the duration of the armistice. Since then, long negotia-
tions have been carried on. The Germans have always repeated their request that the contractual obligations of the Allies be performed. Already three months have gone by since the 11th of November, and one month since Germany consented to put her fleet in the general “pool” of the world. Throughout this period, and up to today, the German people have not had the benefit of one gram of food, of fats, or of milk, more than they formerly had.

Do not make it too difficult for the German people to appease its hunger for bread and for work. In 1862–65, during and for some time after the Civil War, the United States of North America found themselves in a position similar to that of Germany to-day. At this time, American exchange was at 30–40% (greenbacks) and American 6% loans at 48–50%.

England was on the side of the “Confederates” (the South). Then it was that Germany came to the help of the United States giving them not only money, but also clothes, shoes, machines, etc. and making possible their economic recovery. To-day, 50 years later, the facts are reversed. Germany needs America to furnish her grain, fats, meat, oil, cotton, copper, and her own exchange has fallen. If the United States would to-day come to the aid of Germany as she came to their aid 56 years ago, they could furnish food and raw materials against German loans, and thus permit Germany to reconstruct itself by its own work, and could pull a good deal in the bargain.

Gentlemen, Germany can no longer live on the assurances that are offered her, nor can she live on long drawn-out negotiations in which more or less large figures are cited which make her mouth water. Here too I request Action. The German people are tired of always making gifts. At present they want to hear from the other side of the bargain. In the widest circles, Germans ask themselves with justice: “What do the Allies want of us?” We make sacrifice after sacrifice, and in giving up our goods we are reaching the very limit of poverty. We do not want the food that we need as gifts; we want to buy it. Nevertheless its delivery is always postponed more and more, and we are suffering from hunger. If the Entente wishes to annihilate us, it at least ought not to exact us to dig our own grave. Physicians have recently published the statistics of the victims of the blockade and of hunger. These figures had been hidden from the public during the war. They amount to hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children, dead of lack of nourishment, or of diseases resulting from the lessening of their powers of resistance. You have in your hands the means of putting an end to this horrible state of affairs.
In this connection, I appeal to you, sir. When the Franco-German armistice was concluded 48 years ago, Jules Favre—on the 28th January 1871—laid before Bismarck frankly the situation of the food-supply of Paris, which he had carefully concealed up to that moment: Paris had bread for only a few days longer. Bismarck was visibly moved; he immediately granted all imaginable facilities to bring about the arrival of transportation, and he offered Favre all the available food in the German stores. Favre recognised this fact with gratitude, and said: “If the Prussians had not given us flour, we should have died of hunger.”

Then it was ourselves who had the greater power. At present it is you who hold it. Make a good use of your power. Use it in such a way that you can stand before the conscience of the world after the lapse of several generations. For all power gives an eternal responsibility. Remember that hunger gives birth to destructive bacilli. Remember that if these bacilli develop and propagate themselves, the greatest dangers will arise for your own people as well. Despair is the mother of Bolshevism. It is a disease of physical and moral hunger. The best remedy is bread and justice. You have the same interest as ourselves in relieving the world from the disease of hunger with the least possible danger. Then bring it about that the German people may finally participate in the food-supply of the world which you hold in your hands. Give us too our inalienable right, guaranteed by you as well, to a peace of reconciliation among peoples. Those who sow hatred among peoples, reap Bolshevism.

Once again the appeal of the German people for the conclusion of peace has remained without echo. For four years and more the world has lived bearing an enormous weight on its moral and material powers of resistance. You desire rest and work, you people as well as the German people. If the striving toward peace shows itself with more force and intensity among us, this is because of the formidable exhaustion of the forces of our people. Do you desire the complete reduction of the German people, who has just now entered in the ranks of democracies under its new form of existence? The chariot of the world cannot drive onward if one of its horses pulls with force and vigour, while the other is exhausted and limps. It is only when the civilised Nations are together, side by side, almost in step, that the common happiness of all peoples is to be found. Renounce your policy of using force without scruples; think how such a policy is bound to have its cruel punishment in the life of peoples, as it has in the life of individuals. Violence is a weak foundation for the life of peoples. The German people has gone sufficiently far on the road of sacrifices and of suffering. The cry of
indignation caused by the numerous severe conditions that you have imposed on us, rings as well in your ears. If you do not wish to hear these cries of pain, you are sinning against the happiness of the entire world, even against your own people. The first duty of the conqueror is to grant the peace that is requested.—However, for what will soon be 5 months, this obligation has not been fulfilled by you, but this war without the spilling of blood has gone on with new victims. I serve you notice.—

Annexure "B"

[Additional Armistice Convention, Signed February 16, 1919]

(Translation)

CONVENTION

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, Admiral Wemyss being replaced by Admiral Browning, Major General von Winterfeldt being replaced by Major General von Hammerstein and Minister Plenipotentiary Count von Oberdorff by Minister Plenipotentiary von Haniel given the powers in virtue of which the armistice convention of 11 November was signed, have concluded the following additional convention:

I

The Germans must immediately cease all offensive operations against the Poles in the region of Posen or in any other region. With this end in view their troops are forbidden to cross:

The line: former frontier of East Prussia and of West Prussia with Russia, as far as Luijenfelde, then from this point the line west of Luijenfelde, west of Gross Neudorff, south of Broze, north of Schubin, north of Exin, east of Samoczin, south of Chodziensken, north of Czarnikow, west of Mialla, west of Birnbaum, west of Bentschen, west of Wollstein, north of Lissa, north of Rawicz, south of Krotozyn, west of Adelnau, west of Schildberg, north of Vieruchov, then the frontier of Silesia.

II

The armistice of 11 November prolonged by the conventions of 13 December 1918 and 16 January 1919, until 17 February 1919, is again prolonged for a short period without date of expiration, to which the Allied and associated powers reserve the right to put an end after a notice of three days.
III

The execution of the clauses of the convention of 11 November and of the additional conventions of 13 December and 16 January incompletely realised, will be carried on and finished during the prolongation of the armistice under conditions the details of which will be fixed by the Permanent Armistice Commission, according to the instructions of the High Command of the Allies.

Signed:    F. Foch
           M. E. Browning
           Erzberger
           Von Hanisch
           Von Hammerstein
           Vanselow

Trèves, 16 February, 1919.
Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 18th February, 1919, at 3 p. m.

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

- The Hon. R. Lansing
- The Hon. H. White
- Secretary
- Mr. L. Harrison

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

- The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
- The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden, G. C. M. G.

**Secretaries**

- Mr. H. Norman

**FRANCE**

- M. Clemenceau
- M. Pichon
- Secretaries
- M. Dutasta
- M. Berthelot
- M. de Bearn

**ITALY**

- H. E. Baron Sonnino
- H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi

**Secretaries**

- Count Aldrovandi
- M. Bertele

**JAPAN**

- H. E. Baron Makino
- H. E. M. Matsu

**Joint Secretariat**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

- Lieut. Burden

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

- Captain E. Abraham

**FRANCE**

- Captain A. Portier

**ITALY**

- Major A. Jones

**JAPAN**

- M. Saburi

**Also Present**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

- Mr. Lunt
- Mr. Dulles
- Maj. D. W. Johnson

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

- Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.
- Colonel Heywood
- Mr. A. Leeper

**FRANCE**

- General Alby

**ITALY**

- M. de Martino
- M. Galli

**FOR THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES**

- M. Patchitch
- M. Vesnitch
- M. Trumbitch
- Dr. Zolger
- Secretary
- M. Vosniak

**Interpreter:** Prof. P. J. Mantoux

(1) M. **Clemenceau** in opening the meeting asked the Serbian Delegation to make its statement.
M. Vesnitch said that he must begin by an apology. It had not, up to the present, been possible to supply the Conference with a full memorandum. There were certain difficulties due to distance, bad communications, etc., which had rendered this impossible. A memorandum giving general considerations had been supplied. Separate memoranda of a more technical order would be prepared subsequently.

In order to present the problem fully he wished first to draw the attention of the meeting to the origin of the war. This question had been dealt with publicly, but nevertheless he felt it must again be asserted before the Conference that the real cause of the war was the German tendency to expand towards Asia Minor and thereby to acquire dominion of the world. In its road this movement encountered a number of obstacles, the first of which was the Yugo-Slav people. Hence it was decided in Berlin and Vienna that this should be the first fortress to be taken.

The time-honoured German policy was well-known. Since 1848 and especially since 1878 Vienna under the direction of Berlin had sought to bring under its rule all the Serbians not yet included in the Dual Monarchy. This policy had involved the Great Powers. Since 1848, Great Britain, France and Italy had struggled to preserve the peace of Europe. One stage on this road to the East had been marked by the absorption of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another critical moment was the Balkan War. Serbia issued from it victorious and became the centre of attraction for all the Yugo-Slav peoples. The enthusiasm shown in Bosnia, Croatia, Slavonia and the Banat was even greater than that in Serbia proper. This had been carefully noted at the Ballplatz, where it was decided that the future must be secured as early as possible. This also was incontestably the reason which had rendered futile all the efforts of the Liberal Powers of Europe to find a peaceful diplomatic issue with the nations of Central Europe. The latter were determined to overcome the obstacle and to set forward on their march Eastwards in the quickest possible time. It had been impossible to stop them—hence the Great War.

The Yugo-Slav troops of the Dual Monarchy from the very first day of the war began to hamper the purposes of the Central Powers. When other means failed, they surrendered in large numbers on the Russian and Serbian fronts, and at a later stage, on the Italian front. They felt that this was a war of extermination for their people. Encouraged by the promises made by the Great Liberal Powers, especially by the declaration that the war was waged for the liberation of oppressed peoples, they had contributed by every means in
their power to the victory of the Allies. They were now inspired by the confident hope that their expectations of the fulfilment of the promises made by the victorious Allies would not be disappointed, and they felt that their services to the common cause had earned recognition.

Since the very beginning of the war the Great Liberal Powers, France, Great Britain, and with them Russia, had proclaimed that they were not fighting for individual national advantages, but for certain principles. These principles were stated publicly and solemnly and were the three great principles of (1) Nationality, (2) the right of self-determination, and (3) freedom of the small Nations. After the signature of the first Armistice, M. Clemenceau, when welcoming the delegates of all the Allied Powers, had said that from that moment there was no difference between great and small nations, as the small nations had been as great as the greatest during the war. He wished to recall this expression to make clear the difference between the principles of the Allied Powers and those of the Central Powers. Before the war there had been a conversation between Herr Von Jagow \(^1\) and M. Jules Cambon.\(^2\) The former had declared that there was no more room in the world for small nations. This was fully in accord with the feelings of his nation. What M. Clemenceau had expressed to the Allies was the principle which had encouraged the Nations to group themselves and to bring about the triumph of something far higher than the self-interest of individual nations. It was in accordance with this spirit that the peace of Europe and the League of Nations must be brought about.

Adhering to this spirit, the delegation he represented regarded the right of self-determination as an inviolable right. It could not recognise any treaty, public or secret doing violence to these principles, proclaimed by the Allies and latterly endorsed by the United States of America.

The Delegation he represented therefore regarded as null and void any agreement disposing of the Yugo-Slav people without its consent. He felt obliged to make this declaration in the name of his Government and of his colleagues present in the room. Had he not made it, he would have betrayed his obligation to the Yugo-Slav people. It was not in the habits of this people to sing its own praises, but it must be declared that if this people had endured martydom to assist the Allies, it was because their leaders had assured them that these sufferings were absolutely necessary, that it was probably the last effort required of them, and that the open

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\(^1\) Gottlieb E. G. von Jagow, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1913 to 1916.

\(^2\) French Ambassador at Berlin from 1907 to 1913.
declarations of the Great Allied Powers were a complete guarantee of the future. The leaders of the people had made themselves responsible for the execution of these promises. The Yugo-Slav people, through them, had put complete trust in the Powers whom he now begged to do nothing which might cause disappointment to the legitimate hopes aroused, and thereby sow the seeds of future deplorable conflict.

M. Vesnitch continuing, said that, if it was in order, he would approach the subject of the future frontiers of Yugo-Slavia. The Yugo-Slav people was in a peculiar situation. It had to delimit its territory with six or seven nations. On a former occasion explanations had been given concerning the problem to be solved with a friendly country. In tracing the boundaries separating them from enemy countries it was likely that no great difficulties would arise. But there was another friendly country with which there were problems to discuss. The Delegation would ask that it should be treated on a footing of equality with its Italian friends. He felt that in making this request he was not exceeding the limits of his rights and his duties. He hoped that the Allied and Associated Powers would consider this fair and practical and likely to ensure good understanding between two countries which were to be neighbours, and between which it was desirable that no germ of discord should arise.

M. Vesnitch explained, with the help of a map, what he proposed should be the future frontiers of Yugo-Slavia. On the south the boundary marched with that of Greece. It was not proposed in any way to alter the boundary laid down by the Peace of Bucharest.8

On the east the frontier was to be determined with Bulgaria. The behaviour of the Bulgarians towards the Serbians, even before they entered the war, was well-known, hence certain alterations of frontier were demanded.

The Yugo-Slav arguments concerning the boundary to be drawn in the Banat had been heard on a previous occasion. Failing all other means of settlement, the Delegation for which he spoke was ready to allow the populations to make a free choice of allegiance. He would like to point out that all invasions of Servia throughout history had come from that quarter. The latest examples furnished in the course of the late war were enough to prove this point. There were also ethnological, geographical and economic reasons. The divisions of the country made for administrative purposes by the common enemies of Serbia and

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8 For the text of the treaty of Bucharest, signed August 10, 1913, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. vii, p. 658.
Roumania were evidence in his favour. No less well-wishing judges could be found than the Magyars towards the Serbian people, nevertheless the division of the country made by them showed the Serbs to be in the majority.

In the North the Delegation proposed a frontier which corresponded not only to ethnic, but to geographical realities.

Dr. Zolger, continuing, explained that the proposed boundary with the Germans and Magyars was drawn in such a way as to include all the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes along the Drava. The frontier would not accord with the results of the Austrian census. This census could not be trusted. It did not record nationality, but professed to record the spoken language of the people. Workmen serving German employers and communicating with them in German would be represented as Germans. Even German authorities admitted that this method was deliberately devised in order to favour Germanisation. The Delegation therefore proposed to neglect the Austrian census and pin its faith to certain other means of obtaining information. Among these he would cite the ecclesiastical parish registers published yearly, showing the language used in the parish for confessional purposes. The language to which it was necessary to resort to spread the Gospel must be the spoken language of the people. A hundred villages shown in the Austrian census as German were proved by the parish registers to speak Slovene. There were other documents which might be consulted such as the census of 1849–51. This census had been conducted in a less partial manner than its successor, for since 1870 the Pan-German idea had become the official doctrine of the Central Governments.

In pursuance of this doctrine the most consistent efforts had been made to establish German contact with the Adriatic. In this process the Slovenes had fared perhaps worse than any other Yugo-Slav nation. The process had begun in the 18th Century. The danger had been realised by Napoleon, who had set up the Illyrian Province after the peace of Schoenbrunn, comprising all Slovene lands, to block the way from Vienna to the Adriatic and to guard the road to the East.

The frontier suggested in Carinthia gave to Yugo-Slavia certain areas in which the Slovenes were not a majority in the population. The justification of this was the forcible germanisation practised since 1850. Dr. Zolger drew attention to a work called "The Vilayet of Carinthia," published before the war. In this work it was shown that every means had been

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5 Apparently a reference to the book entitled *Aus dem Vilajet Kärnten* (Klagenfurt, 1918).
adopted of destroying Slovene nationality and the Slovene language. For instance, all writers, even the Germans, admitted that Celovec (Klagenfurt), was in 1850, two-thirds Slovene. At the present time the Slovenes were in the minority. This had been brought about by the educational policy forced on the country. Children were only taught the Gothic script. Where there had been a hundred Slovene schools, there were now but three. From all branches of the public service Slovenes had been extruded. The last Slovene judge died some ten years ago. The last Slovene notary was removed during the war. Barristers were not allowed to plead before the Courts in Slovene. Only one Slovene Deputy was sent to the Reichsrat, though on the population basis there should have been three. The people were afraid of speaking their own language, and a man had been arrested for demanding a ticket at a railway station in Slovene. The war had been used to give the death blow to Slovene life in Carinthia. It was therefore fair to say that the reduction of the Slovene element was not a process of natural evolution, but the work of a deliberate and forcible policy, carried out in contempt of all morality and law. In fixing the frontier between Yugo-Slavia and German Austria, the result of this policy should not be perpetuated. Wherever it was possible to show that 50 years previously the Slovenes had been in possession, he claimed that they should have ownership restored to them. The frontier suggested would be some compensation to the Yugo-Slav people for their losses in the long struggle with Germanism. He would point out that in the course of centuries the Slovenes had lost not only part of Carinthia and Styria, but also the Eastern Tyrol and Lower Austria. Wherever it was possible to establish an ethnic claim, he thought that it should be admitted.

M. Trumbitch said that in the name of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes he would place before the meeting briefly, the claims made on the subject of the western frontier, and he would explain the grounds on which the claims were based.

The area in question was that part of the ancient Austro-Hungarian monarchy situated on the Adriatic Sea or gravitating towards it, and inhabited by a Yugo-Slav population. As had been repeatedly proclaimed in public manifestations by official representatives of the people, the territorial claims were based on the rights of nationalities and on the principle of self-determination. It was on this basis that the new state laid claim to countries, the population of which was of Yugo-Slav nationality, desiring to enter into the community of that State. In a general way it must be observed that from the point of view of spoken language and national sentiment, the whole Adriatic Coast of the former Austria-Hungary from Monfalcone as far as Spizza was inhabited by Yugo-Slavs, in a compact and continuous
mass. The whole countryside and hinterland of this coast, with the sole exception of five Italian villages north of Pola, were Yugo-Slav. In most of the towns the Slav element was in the majority, save in some isolated towns such as Gorizia, Trieste, towns on the Western shore of Istria, Lussin, Fiume, and Zara, where the Italian element predominated. The Italian element, therefore, represented enclaves or cases in Slav surroundings, without any national continuity binding it to the Italian peninsula.

The Yugo-Slav majority had always been oppressed. This had been its fate during more than four centuries of Venetian domination. The Slav element, deprived of all national rights, was unable under that rule to obtain any school in its own language whether in the towns or in the villages. Nevertheless, Venetian domination had not succeeded in Italianising any area, and only left behind it along the Adriatic coast a few families and some vestiges of the Venetian dialect, as was the case also in the islands of the Ionian Sea and of the Aegean Sea, where the Venetian Republic had once ruled.

Austria in this province had continued to apply the system she found there. The Austrian regime was anti-democratic, based on the division of classes and nationalities in respect to civil and political rights. Hence, the Yugo-Slav element had always been oppressed and systematically neglected, while the Italian element in the towns received privileges. When, in 1907, universal suffrage was introduced throughout Austria, the first elections showed that the Yugo-Slav element was much stronger than appeared on the surface. The national revival of the Yugo-Slav masses began after the introduction of the constitution in 1861. It was then that the political struggle began between the Yugo-Slav and Italian elements. The Yugo-Slav population, being democratic, had struggled for the freedom of their language and political and social rights. In this struggle the Yugo-Slavs, day by day, obtained further successes and made progress in the acquisition of those rights.

Turning to the application of the principles of nationality and of the right of self-determination, he wished to refer to the regions now under consideration. For greater clearness, he would first mention the regions of the Adriatic Coast from Cape Promontore along the Eastern coast of Istria, past Fiume (Rjeka) and along the remainder of the Croatian coast-line, the Dalmatian coast as far as Spizza (the Southern frontier of Dalmatia), and all Quarnero and Dalmatian islands which, from every point of view, formed an integral part of this coast.

The coast-line just described was almost exclusively inhabited by Yugo-Slavs, both as regards hamlets and villages and most of the towns. There were sporadic groups of Italian-speaking inhabitants in certain towns, but their number was so small that this factor
would have no influence whatever on the national character of such coast-line and islands.

The Yugo-Slav population, which formed the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants, had a high regard for its national unity and was imbued with the unshakeable desire to remain within the bounds of their State as already constituted. Wherefore, in the name of the principle of nationality, they begged that this entire coast-line, with its islands, should be joined to their State.

It had to be remembered that all these regions were poor and incapable of development apart from the State of which their Hinterland would form a part. All the national, economic and commercial life of the majority of the provinces of their State gravitated towards the coast—i.e. of Croatia-Slavonia, Backa, the Banat, Northern Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia and Montenegro, all of whose existing roads and railways led to the sea. The islands on their coast sold all their export produce to the coast towns.

Austria’s economic policy did not allow railways to be built in this transverse direction, as would have been to the interests of these regions, but commercial routes were created longitudinally from North to South, with the idea of penetration into the Balkans. It would be the duty of their State to alter this entirely and to build transverse roads and railways which would contribute to the development of commercial relations beyond the sea and primarily with Italy.

The only commercial railway was that which, starting from Fiume, crossed Croatia-Slavonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Hungary. It was built by the Hungarian Government with money belonging to the common Hungaro-Croatian State, at the time when (by falsifying the laws of 1868) Fiume was torn from the Croatians. This port was, therefore, even now the only commercial access to the sea for all these regions, which could not develop normally without Fiume.

To-day, when the Peace Conference was concerned with guaranteeing commercial outlets to the sea even to nations having no direct access thereto, it would be incomprehensible if an attempt were made to take from their nation the ports situate in its territory and on its own coast-line. For these reasons they requested that the whole of the coast-line, including the islands already referred to, might be acknowledged to form part of their State.

The provinces of Gorizia, Gradisca, Trieste with its suburbs, and the Western portion of Istria were situated in the basin of the Upper Adriatic.

The province of Gorizia-Gradisca was composed of two parts, totally different both from the national and economic points of view. The Western part, which extended as far as the line Cor-
mons-Gradisca-Monfalcone, had its own life and constituted an economic unity. According to the language spoken in this region, it contained 72,000 Italians and 6,000 Slovenes, whilst from the geographical point of view it was simply a prolongation of the Venetian plain. As these territories, called the Frioul, belonged according to the principle of nationality to the Italian nation, they did not claim them in any way. The remainder of that province, to the East and North of the line Cormons-Gradisca-Monfalcone, which included the mountainous region, was inhabited by 148,500 Slovenes and 17,000 Italians, 14,000 of whom formed half the population of the town of Gorizia. This town was the economic and intellectual centre of that region.

The Slovenes were a highly cultured people and possessed a deep-rooted consciousness of their national unity with the other Yugo-Slav peoples, and they therefore demanded that this country be united with their State.

Geographically, the town of Trieste and its immediate surroundings formed an integral part of territories which, beyond these limits, were purely Slav. The majority of the population of the said town was Italian—two-thirds, according to statistics—the remainder being Slavs. The Slav element played an important part in the commercial and economic life of Trieste. Furthermore, if national continuity with Italy prevailed in Trieste, they would recognise the rights of the majority in the name of the principle of nationality; but the entire Hinterland of Trieste was purely Slav, and 20 kilometres of Slav coast separated the said town from Italian territory. The question of Trieste had, however, to be considered firstly from the point of view of its commercial and maritime importance. Commercially, Trieste was a world port. Its trade was linked with its Hinterland, which stretched as far as Bohemia, and in particular with its Slovene Hinterland, which absorbed one-third of the total trade of Trieste. Trieste was dependent on its Hinterland, and vice versa. Should Trieste become annexed to Italy, it would be separated politically from its commercial Hinterland, which separation would of necessity prove detrimental to its trade. Since the collapse of Austria as a sovereign Power, the natural solution of the problem of Trieste lay in its reunion with their State, and that was what they now asked for.

The population of Istria was partly Slavonic and partly Italian. According to the latest statistics there were 223,313 Yugo-Slavs and 147,417 Italians, the Slavs inhabiting Central and Eastern Istria in a compact mass. There were a few isolated Italian groups in certain small towns. Judging from the vast majority of the population Central and Eastern Istria were essentially Slav.
The Italian population was most numerous on the Western Coast of Istria, chiefly in the towns, where it occupied only five villages North of Pola. These were the only Italian-speaking villages on the entire Adriatic Coast from Monfalcone as far as Spizza. The Slavs constituted part of the population of some coast towns and of all the remaining villages. Thus the Italian sections of the population could claim no territorial unity. For these reasons, and also because the Istrian peninsula was united geographically with Carniola and Croatia, whilst separated from Italy by the Adriatic, it followed that this peninsula should be recognised as part of their State—which was what they now demanded.

Generally, it should be noted that none of the regions on the Adriatic coast between Monfalcone and Spizza had any vital interests in common with Italy, but rather with their regions, with which they were geographically united. This most important argument should be taken into consideration when this problem was being settled.

After concluding his statement, M. Trumbitch said he would like to add a few words about the population statistics of the areas mentioned. These statistics were made under Austrian rule by the communal authorities. In most cases where the population was partly Italian and partly Yugo-Slav, the communal authorities were Italian. In these cases, consequently, the statistics could not be accused of bias in favour of the Yugo-Slavs.

(At this stage the Delegation withdrew.)

(2) M. Clemenceau said that a request had reached him that M. Tchaikowski of the Archangel Government, should be heard by the Council. He thought it might be of interest at the next meeting to hear a statement by M. Tchaikowski on the state of Northern Russia.

Mr. Balfour said that he did not wish to object, but he would like to know whether this was part of a systematic endeavour to obtain evidence from all parts of Russia, or was it merely a suggestion that M. Tchaikowski should be heard because he happened to be in Paris.

M. Clemenceau said that there were two or three Russians in Paris, who might have interesting statements to make, for instance, there was M. Sazonoff. In his case, however, there might be some objection, lest it be alleged that the Conference was conspiring with Tsarism.

Mr. Balfour said that he thought some investigation should be carried out, but in accordance with a settled plan.

Mr. Lansing agreed, as he thought there was a danger that only one part of the evidence would be heard.
M. Pichon pointed out that M. Tchaikowski belonged to the same
group as M. Sazonoff; in fact, the request that M. Tchaikowski should
be heard was signed by both of them.

Mr. Balfour said that on reflection he thought it was perhaps
inopportune to accord a hearing to representatives of Governments
which had refused our invitation to proceed to Prinkipo.

Mr. Lansing observed that as the Council was in the midst of
considering its Russian policy, it should avoid the suggestion that
its decisions had been influenced by any one party in Russia.

M. Sonnino proposed that the military advisers should be heard
first and the policy could then be devised. After that, the Council
could consider whether certain Russians should be allowed to make
statements. He suggested that the request made by M. Tchaikowski
should be adjourned.

(It was decided that the question of hearing a statement by M.
Tchaikowski or any other representative of a Russian Government
should be adjourned.)

Mr. Balfour said that the Council had now heard the evidence
of the Yugo-Slavs. Similar evidence had been heard from other
nationalities, and in most cases the problems raised
had been referred for examination to a Committee
without power to decide on solutions, but with a Com-
mission to report on the facts. In the case of the
Yugo-Slav statement, he admitted that there were difficulties, espe-
cially by reason of the treaty commitments of some of the Powers
present. He wished to ask what should now be done. Was the
matter to be left just as it was?

M. Sonnino said that the subject was a difficult one. He wished
to be quite frank. Italy could not take part in any Commission or
in any discussion outside the Conference, or allow any Committee
to make recommendations, regarding questions outstanding between
Italy and the Yugo-Slavs. He would also oppose any Committee
which was to examine collectively all questions raised by the state-
ments heard that day. The question between the Yugo-Slavs and
the Roumanians was already being sifted by a Committee. To this
he had no objection.

Mr. Balfour then asked Baron Sonnino to state what procedure
he did recommend. He understood that Baron Sonnino would raise
no objection to a Committee on the subject of the Northern and
Eastern frontiers of Yugo-Slavia. But he would refuse to be a party
to any discussion of the frontiers between Italy and Yugo-Slavia
outside the Conference. He would point out that the object of a
Committee was to furnish the Council with facts, in order that the
Council should be in a position to discuss the matter with full
knowledge.
BARON SONNINO said that each Delegation was accompanied by its experts and he felt quite sure that at least eight members of the Council must have already consulted them.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Baron Sonnino whether he raised no objection to the formation of a Committee to investigate the other frontiers claimed by the Yugo-Slavs.

M. SONNINO said that he raised none, provided that the questions pending between Italy and Yugo-Slavia were excluded.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that a Committee should be set up and that the Dalmatian Coast should be excluded from the terms of reference. He thought it impossible to entrust this question to any Committee or Commission, by reason of the commitments of the Powers and certain difficult political aspects of the question. This question resembled that of the Rhine, which also could not be entrusted to a Committee. Such questions must be dealt with in the Council, which was not ill-supplied with the necessary statistics. In this matter, therefore, he agreed with Baron Sonnino. He proposed to name a Committee to deal with the problems raised, with the exception of those pending between Italy and the Yugo-Slavs.

MR. BALFOUR then read the following draft resolution:—

“It is agreed:

That the questions raised in the statements by MM. Vesnitch, Zolger and Trumbitch, on behalf of the Serbian Delegation on the Serbian territorial interests in the peace settlement (excepting only the question in which Italy is directly concerned) shall be referred for examination in the first instance to an expert Committee similar to that which is considering the question of the Banat.

It shall be the duty of this Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult representatives of the peoples concerned.”

MR. LANSING suggested that this question be referred to the same Committee as was dealing with the Banat.

M. PICKON said that some of the questions raised were different to the one under discussion in that Committee. It might, however, be convenient that the Committee on these other questions should be composed of the same members.

BARON SONNINO said that he supported Mr. Lansing’s proposal as questions of reciprocal concession might arise.

(It was therefore decided that the above Resolution be adopted and that the Committee be the same as that appointed to deal with the Banat) (See I. C. 180)*

*BC-20, vol. iii, p. 851.
M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that there should be no meeting on the following day as he wished to devote the whole day to thought on the Russian question.

(This was agreed to.)

(3) M. CLEMENCEAU said that he found some difficulty in fixing the Agenda for the next meeting. In addition to the military questions pending with Germany there was the Russian problem.

Among other questions that might be raised was that concerning Morocco.

MR. BALFOUR asked in what manner this question concerned the Peace Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it involved an agreement with Germany which France wished to revise. France desired to abolish some of the stipulations of the Treaty of Algeciras. He did not mean to raise any question as between France and Spain.

M. PICHON pointed out that eleven Powers had signed the Treaty of Algeciras. Its reconsideration would, therefore, affect them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not wish to surprise the meeting and would give full time for each delegation to reflect on the subject.

MR. BALFOUR said that there remained a subject of some interest, that of Schleswig Holstein. This was not like other questions, as it concerned a neutral.

M. PICHON observed that before discussing the Danish question he must ascertain whether the Danes had any representative in Paris ready to defend his case. He pointed out that the question of the Aaland Islands which would have to be discussed also involved neutrals.

BARON SONNINO said that the Albanian question still remained to be discussed. There were also the Armenians of the Erivan Republic.

(4) MR. LANSING said that he wished to ask informally whether in the opinion of the Council it would be wise to send an Inter-Allied Commission to Syria.

(This question was postponed.)

(5) SIR ROBERT BORDEN said it had occurred to him that possibly time might be saved if the Council made up its mind what questions could suitably be sent to Committees in anticipation of hearing statements. A list of such questions might be established beforehand and thereby in each instance a meeting of the Council might be saved.

MR. LANSING observed that this had been discussed before the departure of President Wilson. It had been thought that many dele-

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gations anxious to make statements would be dissatisfied if referred
direct to Committees.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that his suggestion only had in view the
saving of time. In the same order of ideas he would suggest that
statements reduced to writing should not be read aloud before the
Council.

(6) MR. BALFOUR submitted the following list of questions which
it would be necessary to discuss:—

List of Subjects
Awaiting
Discussion
Schleswig Holstein.
The Baltic Provinces.
Poland (Delimitation).
Luxemburg.
Albania.
Zionism.
Armenia.
The report of the Economic
Drafting Committee.

BARON SONNINO suggested the hearing of the Persian statement.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that as Persia was not a
belligerent the case did not arise.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that another item on the list
should be the question of recognising the Polish
Government.

(7) M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that at the following meeting the
question of the recognition of the Polish Government and the question
of Danish claims in Schleswig Holstein should be
discussed.

(This was agreed to.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, February 19th, 1919.
Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, February 21st, 1919, at 3 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. H. White
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.

Secretaries
Mr. E. Phipps

FRANCE
M. Pichon
M. Tardieu
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn

ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
British Empire
France
Italy
Japan

Col. U. S. Grant.
Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
Captain A. Portier
Lieut. Zanchi
M. Saburi

Interpreter.—Prof. P. J. Mantoux

Also Present

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. Mezes
Dr. Day
Dr. Haskins

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.
L. Col. Cornwall
Mr. Akers-Douglas

FRANCE
M. Klotz
M. Clementel / 2, 3 and 4 only.

ITALY
H. E. M. Crespi
M. de Martino
Count Vannutelli-Rey

DANISH DELEGATION PRESENT

FOR QUESTION 5

M. Bernhoft, Minister for Denmark in Paris
M. Clausen, Attaché, Danish Embassy, Paris
THE COUNCIL OF TEN

1. On the proposal of Mr. Lansing, Mr. Pichon was asked to take the chair during the temporary absence of M. Clemenceau.

M. Pichon, having thanked his colleagues for the honour conferred upon him, said that he had seen M. Clemenceau a few hours ago. He was progressing very satisfactorily and hoped to be able to take his place at the Conference on Monday next. Though this might not be possible, his return could, nevertheless, be expected shortly.

2. The first question to be discussed related to the creation of a neutral zone in Transylvania, and he would call on M. Tardieu, the Chairman of the Committee on Rumanian Affairs, to make a report.

M. Tardieu said that the Committee on Rumanian Affairs had reached the conclusion that the question of Transylvania should be referred back to the Conference for settlement, for the following reasons. When the General Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied Armies of the East had signed the Armistice with Hungary,\(^1\) Rumania had not yet re-entered the war and no reason had then existed for fixing a definite line of occupation between Rumania and Hungary. Hungarian troops, therefore, remained in occupation of Transylvania. These troops had been accused by M. Bratiano, in a report dated 9th February, 1919, of having committed acts of cruelty; and, consequently, Rumanian troops had moved forward with the intention of occupying the whole of that region up to the line fixed by the Treaty of 1916.\(^2\) On February 14th, 1919, General Franchet d'Esperey had cabled that the Rumanian troops were continuing their advance into Transylvania and had already reached the line:—Maramaros-Sziget, Zilak, Czuca, Nagy-Szeces, Zam.

Now, the final frontiers of Rumania had not yet been fixed by the Committee on Rumanian Affairs, who were still engaged in studying that question. But, owing to the advance of the Rumanians, it was possible that serious conflicts might take place at any moment between the Rumanian and Hungarian troops; an incident which would be doubly regrettable, seeing that the question in conflict was now under consideration. The Committee, therefore, had considered it expedient to report the situation to the Conference in order to avoid any conflict taking place in that region, and a proposal had been submitted four days previously, suggesting:

1. The fixation of two lines at a certain distance from each other beyond which the Hungarian and Rumanian troops should not be permitted to advance, and
2. The establishment of a neutral zone between the two proposed

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\(^1\) Vol. II, p. 183.
\(^2\) Italy, R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia e gli altri stati, vol. 23, p. 412.
lines, to be occupied by Allied troops with a view to preventing the spreading of Bolshevism, which was prevalent in Hungary.

During the last two days, the Committee had received reports from General Alby, the French Chief of Staff, and from the military advisers of the Italian Peace Delegation in Paris. M. Bratiano had also forwarded a note on the subject, and in addition, General Charpy, Chief of Staff to General Franchet d'Esperey, had just returned from those regions and submitted a report on the situation. Taking these facts into consideration, it was thought by the Committee that the military advisers of the Conference should be asked to fix the lines of extreme occupation above referred to and decide whether or not the intervening neutral zone should be occupied by Allied troops, in view of maintaining order against possible Bolshevist attempts.

Mr. Balfour enquired whether M. Tardieu's Committee had heard any military experts on the question under reference.

M. Tardieu replied in the negative, and explained that the Committee had merely read General Alby's report. They had purposely refrained from obtaining military advice, as the Committee might thereby have been led into a discussion of purely military questions, which were outside the terms of reference.

Mr. Balfour enquired how order would be maintained in the neutral zone if a neutral zone were constituted. Was that purely a military question?

M. Tardieu replied that in principle the maintenance of order in a neutral zone was not purely a military question, and for that reason the Committee had enquired into the matter. It had, however, been found that all sorts of military questions were involved—for instance: were Allied troops available for the occupation of the neutral zone? For that reason it had been decided to refer the question back to the Conference.

Lord Milner enquired whether it was intended that the question should be referred for report to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

M. Tardieu replied that that was the intention of the Committee.

(It was decided to refer to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles the questions raised in the following recommendation made by the Committee on Rumanian Affairs on February 17th, 1919:—

"The Commission on Rumanian Affairs beg to draw the attention of the Supreme Allied Council to the following situation:—

(1) General Franchet d'Esperey sent a wire dated February 14th, 1919, saying that the Rumanian troops were continuing
their advance into Transylvania and had already reached the line Maramaros-Sziget, Žilák, Czucza, Nagy-Szécs, Zam.

(2) The Rumanian Government (letter from M. Bratiano to the President of the Peace Conference dated February 9th) justifies such advance by the acts of cruelty committed by the Hungarians in that region.

(3) The Commission on Rumanian Affairs is at the present time studying the line to be drawn as a frontier between Rumania and Hungary, and wishes that no armed conflicts should take place in that region.

For the above reasons the Commission on Rumanian Affairs asks the Supreme Council if the present situation does not seem to warrant the fixation of two lines beyond which the Hungarian and Rumanian troops should not go, a zone free of military occupation being thus established between the two proposed lines:

(A) 10 kilometres, west of general line running from Vasaros Namény, point of confluence of the two Keres, Ággyo north of Szegedin; as regards Hungarian troops.
(B) 10 kilometres east of line Szatmar-Nemeti, Nagy-Varad, Arad, as regards Rumanian troops.

It is for the Supreme Allied Council to decide whether or not the zone forbidden to Hungarian and Rumanian troops should be, in view of maintaining order against possible Bolshevik attempts, occupied by Allied troops.”)

(3) M. Pichon said that the question of the recognition of Poland had been before the Allies for a considerable time. At the request of M. Paderewski, M. Dmowski had recently submitted the following Note, dated Paris, February 7, 1919:

"I beg to bring to the notice of your Excellency that M. I. J. Paderewski, Prime Minister and Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, has requested the Polish National Committee to inform the Allied and Associated Powers’ Governments of the Constitution of his Ministry and to ask that the Sovereign State of Poland should be officially recognised by the respective Governments of those Powers.

The Polish National Committee, as official representative of the Polish government, beg to support that application to the Government of the French Republic.

At the same time the National Committee take the liberty to call the attention of Your Excellency on the following facts: the Allied Powers, by their declaration of Versailles, June 3, 1918, have recognised Poland as an independent and unified State; on the other hand, M. Paderewski’s Government have the support of the great majority of the nation of the whole of Poland.”

M. Pichon, continuing, said that he thought the moment now appeared to be opportune to give satisfaction to the Polish wishes. He pointed out that a short time ago General Piłsudski had resigned and handed over his powers to the Polish Diet. He had now been

*Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 590.*
reinstated by acclamation. His Government could, consequently, be considered as firmly established, and could be recognised by the Allied Governments.

Mr. Balfour concurred as far as Great Britain was concerned.

M. Pichon remarked that the Allied and Associated Governments had already recognised the Polish National Committee and the independence of Poland. Official confirmation was, therefore, now merely asked for.

Mr. Lansing pointed out that the United States of America had recognised M. Paderewski’s Government about ten days previously. He saw no reason for renewing the recognition.

M. Matsui said that his Government had not yet recognised either the Polish Government or the Polish National Committee. He was therefore not authorised to do so without reference to his Government.

M. Sonnino was prepared, on behalf of the Italian Government, to accept the proposal before the Conference.

(It was agreed that the Great Powers would recognise M. Paderewski’s Government, taking note of the reservations made by the Japanese Representative.)

4. Mr. Balfour drew attention to the fact that the English and French texts of the draft terms of reference to the proposed Economic Commission of the Peace Conference, as agreed by the Economic Drafting Committee, (see Annexure “A”), were not identical. The original text had been drawn up in English, and consequently, if any discussion were to take place, it should be made on the English text.

M. Clementel explained that the text had been prepared in the two languages, (French and English), in parallel columns, and it was in that form that it had been signed by all the Delegates.

Mr. Balfour proposed that the report of the Economic Drafting Committee should be accepted, on the understanding that the French text should be made to agree with the English text.

Mr. Lansing said that he could not agree to accept the report, as suggested by Mr. Balfour, because he had not seen it before; he had had no time to study it or to obtain the advice of his experts. He proposed, therefore, that the further consideration of the report in question should be adjourned to next Session.

M. Klotz asked permission to invite the attention of the Conference to the fact that the draft in question was not an agreement or convention which might commit the representatives of the Great Powers to some definite line of policy. The Conference was merely asked to accept a questionnaire, addressed to a Committee whose con-

stitution had still to be decided; and the various countries represented reserved to themselves full right of making their suggestions and observations when the proposed Committee came to be appointed. Today, no question of principle was involved, but merely a question of procedure.

M. Clementel pointed out in support of the statement made by M. Klotz that the Economic Committee to be appointed would have a very big programme to carry through, and any delay at the present moment might have serious consequences. M. Baruch had, before leaving Paris for Brussels, particularly asked that the terms of reference to the proposed Economic Committee should be settled with as little delay as possible.

Mr. Lansing said that he would not, under the circumstances, insist on an adjournment.

M. Crespi remarked that an Italian text of the terms of reference was being prepared and would be circulated shortly.

(The Terms of Reference to the proposed Economic Committee of the Peace Conference as agreed by the Economic Drafting Committee were approved, subject to the French and English texts being brought into accord.)

Lord Milner enquired how the Economic Committee was to be formed.

M. Clementel replied that the composition of the proposed Economic Committee would have to be decided by the Conference.

Lord Milner said that the British Dominions felt that this was a question in which they were particularly interested. The Dominions possessed very distinctive interests, which were not always identical with those of Great Britain. It would therefore be only right and reasonable to give direct representation to the Dominions; and if it were decided to give two delegates for each of the Great Powers, as is usually done, and five representatives for the Smaller Powers, he would suggest that two representatives should be allotted to the British Dominions and one to India.

Mr. Lansing said that he understood Lord Milner's suggestion to be that a Commission of 18 members should be appointed, of which the British Empire would have five.

M. Klotz drew attention to the fact that on the proposal of President Wilson a Supreme Economic Council had been created, consisting of five representatives of each of the Great Powers. Why should not the various questions dealt with in the terms of reference be referred to that Committee, who would be instructed to carry out the work entailed by the creation of sub-Committees, the procedure to be followed being left to the Committee itself to settle?
Mr. Lansing enquired whether the Supreme Economic Council gave representation to any but the five Great powers.

M. Klotz replied in the negative, and said that provision would have to be made for the smaller Powers to be represented when questions affecting them came up for discussion. On the other hand, the representatives of the British Dominions could form part of the five representatives allotted to each of the Great Powers.

Lord Milner agreed that if the question were to be referred to the Supreme Economic Council, the special views of the British Dominions could be represented among the five British Delegates. He wished to lay stress, however, on the fact that the British Dominions occupied a very distinct position, especially on the interests of the Dominions frequently conflicted with those of Great Britain. He thought that was a solid reason. It was desirable to have all points of view represented. It was not merely a question of giving the British Dominions a stronger position.

M. Pichon reported that he had received a request from Mr. Hughes to the effect that Australia should have separate representation, and that he (Mr. Hughes) should be the selected representative for Australia. He (M. Pichon) thought that the representation of the British Dominions was legitimate, but he thought the smaller powers should also receive due consideration.

M. Clementel thought that the draft submitted by the Economic Drafting Committee contained two very distinct parts. A first part, dealing with all transitory measures, such as: the supply of materials for the restoration of the devastated areas, the economic restoration of the countries which had suffered most from the war, and the supply of commodities to neutral and ex-enemy countries. All such questions, in his opinion, could be referred to the existing Supreme Economic Council. Secondly, all permanent questions relating to the future, which really constituted economic questions connected with the Treaty of Peace, such as: future permanent commercial relations, contracts and claims, and the abrogation or revival of economic treaties. These questions should, in his opinion, be referred to a special Economic Committee of the Preliminary Peace Conference, which would have to be created.

M. Klotz agreed, and asked that the five signatories of the report of the Drafting Committee should be instructed to draft a plan of procedure for the new Committee, sub-committees being formed therein, and to make suggestions regarding its composition.

Lord Milner accepted this proposal and expressed the hope that the Committee would consider the point he had tried to make for proper representation of the British Dominions.
(It was agreed that the first part of the terms of reference under
the heading "Transitory Measures" should be referred to the Supreme
Economic Council, and that the permanent subjects mentioned in
the report should be referred to a special Commission of the Pre-
liminary Peace Conference.

It was further agreed that the five signatories of the report of the
Drafting Committee should meet to consider and report as to the
procedure and method of work of the Economic Commission, and
on its composition, having in mind Lord Milner's request that the
Dominions and India should be accorded separate representation and
that the small Powers should also be represented.)

(At this stage MM. Klotz and Clementel withdrew. M. Bernhoft,
Danish Minister in Paris, and M. Clausen, Attaché of Danish Legation
in Paris, entered the Council Chamber.)

5. M. Pichon said he had been asked in the first place to distribute
a letter, dated 6th February, 1919, addressed by M. H. A. Bernhoft,
the Danish Minister in Paris, to M. Clemenceau,
President of the Peace Conference. (For full text
see Annexure "B").

A mémoire by Mr. Jonas Collin, Professor at the
Academy of Surgery in Copenhagen, one of the representatives of
the Central Schleswig Committee, had also been forwarded to the
Secretariat-General and would be distributed. The conclusion
reached in this mémoire was that Central Schleswig up to the Sli-
Danevirke-Husum frontier should be ceded to Denmark.

He would now call on M. Bernhoft to make a statement.

M. BERNHOFT then read the following statement.

(See Annexure "C").

Mr. Lansing enquired up to what line the German
troops should be withdrawn, if such a proposal were agreed to.

M. BERNHOFT replied that there were five German Garrisons at
present in Northern Schleswig, and he thought the German troops
should be withdrawn to the Southern line of Central Schleswig.

Mr. Lansing enquired who would maintain order in these territ-
ories after evacuation by the German troops.

M. BERNHOFT expressed the view that the population would be able
to govern themselves to a certain extent. He thought that the Ger-
am civil authorities and priests and schoolmasters should be allowed
to remain, because the people themselves were strong enough to keep
these down. The Danish workmen in this region were so strongly
organized that small controlling Committees had already been ap-
pointed to supervise the work of the Landrats and of the local Police
Officials. The only danger spot was at Flensbourg, a town of 67,000
inhabitants, which contained anarchical elements, and there a strong military force might be required to maintain order.

Mr. Lansing further enquired whether any arrangement was contemplated for the assumption of part of the German National debt.

M. Bernhoff replied that Denmark had hoped that if the country were restored to Denmark, it might come back without a debt.

Mr. Lansing asked whether that would be an inducement for the German population to remain and form part of Denmark.

M. Bernhoff agreed that that would probably be the case.

(The Danish representative and the Experts withdrew.)

Mr. Balfour said he had intended, as in previous cases, to move a resolution for the appointment of a new Committee to enquire into the Danish claims. Mr. Lansing had, however, suggested to him that this enquiry could best be carried out by the Committee already occupied in considering Belgian questions. He wished, therefore, to propose the following resolution:—

It is agreed that the questions raised in M. Bernhoff's statement on the Danish territorial interests in the peace settlement shall be referred for examination, in the first instance, to the Committee now examining the Belgian problems.

It shall be the duty of the Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult the representatives of the peoples concerned.

M. Pichon said he had no objection to make to the proposal, except that the Kiel Canal question was involved. This was a very important matter, and he felt some doubt as to whether the existing Belgian Committee were the best prepared to advise on that question.

Mr. Balfour said he had reason to believe that the members of the Belgian Committee were fully qualified to report on the question to be referred to them.

(It was agreed that the questions raised in M. Bernhoff’s statement on the Danish territorial interests in the peace settlement shall be referred for examination, in the first instance, to the Committee now examining the Belgian problems.

It shall be the duty of the Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee shall be authorised to consult the representatives of the peoples concerned.)
6. **Mr. Balfour** said that he understood the statement of the Albanian claims would be heard on the following day. He wished to give notice that he proposed to submit to the Conference a resolution on the general conduct of business, which would be circulated to the Conference that evening. He thought the time had now come to take a survey of the immediate task of the Conference.

(It was agreed that the following questions should be discussed at the meeting to be held at 3.0 o'clock on Saturday afternoon, the 22nd February, 1919:—

1. General conduct of business.
2. Statement of the Albanians' Claims. (Hearing of Albanian representatives.)

(The Meeting then adjourned to Saturday, 22nd February, 1919, at 3.0 p.m.)

Paris, 22nd February, 1919.

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Annexure "A"

The President of the Commission Charged With Laying Down the Programme of the Economic Commission of the Peace Conference to the President of the Peace Conference

The Commission named on the 27th January, for the purpose of drawing up a programme of questions of which the study and preparation were to be entrusted to the Economic Commission of the Peace Conference, has carried on, between the 5th and the 11th of February, the exchanges of view which have resulted in the scheme which it has the honour to lay before you herewith.

This draft has been elaborated with the double object in view of exactly defining the elements of the task which will devolve upon the Economic Commission, and, while ensuring any necessary cooperation, of also preventing the Commission's functions from encroaching upon those of other special Commissions: the Financial Commission, the Commission on Reparations, on Transport, on the League of Nations, etc.

Along with this draft which has received the unanimous assent of the delegates of the five Powers represented, it has seemed useful to send you, as documents, the preliminary drafts worked out by the French, English, and American delegates.

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*Translation from French text supplied by the editors.
*See B/211, vol. III, p. 730.
*French text, arranged in parallel column with English text, not printed.
If the programme, which is proposed to the Conference, receives its approval, it would be desirable that the Economic Commission be constituted without delay, since its labours, which require the collaboration of many technical subcommissions, are concerned as much with the period of transition as with the permanent order following the war.

Clementel

[Enclosure to Annexure "A"]

Draft Terms of Reference to the Proposed Economic Commission of the Peace Conference

I. TRANSITORY MEASURES

To consider what economic measures, if any, should be taken in common during the period of reconstruction following the war, with a view to ensuring:

a) The due supply of materials and other commodities necessary for the restoration of the devastated areas;

b) The economic restoration of the countries which have suffered most from the war;

c) The supply of neutral and ex-enemy countries without detriment to the supply of the needs of the Allies and Associated countries.

II. PERMANENT COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

To consider what common measures are possible and desirable with a view to the removal of economic barriers and the establishment on an equitable basis of the principle of Equality of Trade Conditions in International Commerce.

Under this heading will arise such questions (among others) as customs regulations, duties and restrictions; the treatment of shipping, including port facilities and dues; unfair methods of competition, including false trade descriptions and indications of origin, “dumping”, etc.; and the exceptions and reservations, transitory or otherwise, which may be found necessary to meet special circumstances.

III. CONTRACTS AND CLAIMS

To consider:

(1) What provision should be made with regard to pre-war contracts agreements and commercial obligations to which subjects or citizens of belligerent States were parties;

(2) Whether claims should be admitted on either side for damage or injury arising out of the requisition, liquidation, sequestration or sale of enemy property or businesses, or the treatment or use of patents, trade-marks, trade descriptions, or designs or copyrights, or regulations relating to Trading with the Enemy, and, if so, on what basis.
IV. Ex-Enemy Aliens
To consider what common action, if any, should be taken by the
Allied and Associated Governments to prohibit or regulate the car-
rying on either individually or through Companies, of certain busi-
nesses and occupations by ex-enemy aliens during the period
immediately following the war.

V. Abrogation or Revival of Economic Treaties
To consider what Treaties and Conventions of an economic char-
acter to which Enemy States were parties should be revived or
abrogated respectively.

(Under this heading will be considered, among others, the Con-
ventions relating to Industrial Property, Copyright, Posts and Tele-
graphs, etc.)

Note.
The Economic Commission, before formulating proposals as to
any economic questions having a special aspect in regard to which
other Commissions have been or may be set up by the Peace Con-
ference, should consult the competent Commission; and on the other
hand such other Commissions should, in the same circumstances con-
sult the Economic Commission before formulating any proposal re-
lation to one of the above classes of questions which fell within the
scope of the Economic Commission.

CLEMENTEL
BARUCH
CRESPI
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH
FUkUI

Annexure "B"

DANISH LEGATION,
PARIS, 6th February, 1919.

Monsieur Georges Clemenceau,
President of the Peace Conference.

Mr. President: The triumph of the principles proclaimed by the
Allied and Associated Powers having been assured by the victory
of their Armies, the Association of Danish Electors in Northern
Schleswig, led by their former members in the German Legislative
Assembly, proclaimed, on behalf of the Danish population of North-
ern Schleswig, their desire, unchanged since 1864, of rejoining
Denmark, at a Meeting held at Aabenraa on the 17th November
last.7

7 See vol. ii, pp. 450 ff., and infra.
This resolution was communicated to the Danish Government on the 18th of the same month, and they were asked to take the necessary steps with the Peace Conference to obtain recognition of their rights and their return to Denmark. The Danish Government readily accepted this commission, and sent a formal request to the representatives of France, England, the United States and Italy to be allowed to raise the question at the Peace Conference. Later on, the Danish Government received a request from the Danes of Central Schleswig.

Soon after these resolutions, the Soldiers' Councils exhibited a very liberal spirit in regard to the national claims of the Danes in Schleswig, but very soon their German sentiments came to the surface, and their attitude was modified. Since then, the German Soldiers' Councils, elected in the towns, (Haderslev, Aabenraa, Toender, Soenderburg and Flensburg) sought to intimidate the Danes by every possible means, and have made them subject to all kinds of provocations, particularly in Flensburg, where the population contains a large element of Germans. The Soldiers' Councils have both tolerated and encouraged anti-Danish demonstrations, prevented Danish meetings, allowed windows of Danes to be smashed, failed to protect the Danes against menace of assault, etc.

The Danes in Schleswig are willing to preserve for the present all German laws, courts, systems of education and administration, so as to avoid all danger of anarchy. Nevertheless, the Councils of Workmen and Peasants, which the Danes in Schleswig have elected, have placed Danish controllers over the magistrates (Landrat) and over the local Police authorities (Amtsvorstöcher). The German civil authority is thus kept under control. The Soldiers' Councils have acted quite differently. They rely on armed force, and the Danish population of Schleswig has no means of defence against their exactions. It is the unanimous desire of this population that the Soldiers' Councils and the German troops, who have elected them, shall be removed. The intellectual, moral and social level of the population of Schleswig is high enough to ensure order being maintained there without the necessity of replacing the German troops if they are withdrawn.

Flensburg alone, a town of some 67,000 inhabitants, contains turbulent elements from whom disorder may be feared if there is no military protection. In the present circumstances, whilst the question of Danish Schleswig is being considered by the Peace Conference, this protection could hardly be asked from Denmark, but the presence of an Allied man-of-war would suffice to put down any inclination to violence.

Not only are the Germans trying to terrorise the Danish popula-

tion, but they are also committing acts of plunder. Although 6,000 out of 25,000 combatants have been killed in a war in which they have been forced to fight under the German flag, the Danes find themselves subjected to heavy taxes and to pitiless requisitions of cattle, wheat, butter and other agricultural products. These requisitions have now become exorbitant. Live stock is especially affected. They propose to take one cow out of four. If this threat is carried out, the stock of milch cows, which forms the basis of the country's agricultural industry, will be reduced to such a state that it will take years to build it up again. Moreover, these requisitions are paid for at ridiculously low prices, and even not paid for at all in regard to some of the more recent requisitions. The presence of the German troops ensures the execution of these requisitions, and these troops, who come from the German industrial districts, are particularly interested in watching that nothing escapes the requisition of foodstuffs destined for their own country.

In the near future, the burden of taxes in Germany will be greatly increased, including possibly the confiscation of capital. It would seem unfair that a population which is on the eve of separation from Germany should have to submit to these taxes.

If the German troops and the Soldiers' Councils could be removed from Schleswig, the people would be in a position, without fear of violence from the Germans, to take a plebiscite by which they desire to make known their attachment to Denmark, whilst the Peace Conference, before whom they have pleaded their just cause, will fulfil their most ardent desire to go back to their old fatherland without being completely impoverished.

In the name of the Danish population of Schleswig, I have the honour, Mr. President, to beg you to submit to the Peace Conference, their position to be delivered from the armed German forces which oppress them, by insisting on the withdrawal of the garrisons of Haderslev, Aabenraa, Flensburg, Soenderburg and Toender, and of the German Fleet at Flensburg and Soenderburg, so that Northern and Central Schleswig may no longer be under the direct influence of German armed forces.

If, in addition, the Peace Conference would decide on the sending of an Allied man-of-war to Flensburg, and possibly another to Haderslev or to Aabenraa, the Danish population of Schleswig would feel that their liberties were assured.

These measures would be welcomed with the most profound thankfulness by all Danes, both by those of the Danish Kingdom, and by those of Schleswig.

Receive, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) H. A. Bernhoff
Danish Minister
Appendix "C"

Re-adjustment of the Danish-German Frontier

(Statement by M. Bernhoft)

We have the honour to approach your Excellencies not only as representatives of the Danish Government, but also as Danes of Schleswig.

In the sitting of 23rd October, 1918, of the German Parliament, the Danish Deputy Konna [Hansen?], associating himself with his colleagues from Alsace-Lorraine and Poland, once more claimed the right of self-determination for the Danes of Schleswig. He cited Art. 5 of the Treaty of Prague in 1886 [1866],¹ which on the initiative of France, promised that the Danes of Northern Schleswig should resume their original nationality if, as the result of a free ballot, they expressed the wish to be reunited to Denmark. This promise has never been fulfilled and Art. 5 was declared abolished in 1878 by a Treaty between Germany and Austria,² but the promise of the various nationalities expressed therein served as a basis for the political protests made by the Schleswigers, and they have never ceased to claim the right it conferred upon them.

On the same day, both Chambers of the Danish Parliament passed a unanimous resolution expressing the desire that our national aspirations might be realised in conformity with the right of self-determination of nations. But it was not until the victory of the Allied and Associated nations had assured the triumph of that principle, that the Schleswigers were able to take their cause into their own hands. On the 16th November, the Council and Governing Committee of the Association of Electors of Northern Schleswig passed the following resolution, which was ratified next day by a Grand Assembly of the Danish population:—

“(1) We desire that the question of Northern Schleswig should be settled by considering it a political unity, the population of which is free to decide by vote whether it wishes to be reunited to Denmark.

“(2) Northern Schleswig is that part of the Duchy of Schleswig, situated to the North of a line starting from the Southernmost point of the Island of Als, following the Flensburg fjord as far as Kobbermölle and thence along the valley of the river Krusaa, passing to the south of Frostrup, so that Padborg forms a frontier station, following the boundary between the jurisdictions of Slog and Kaer, the small stream called the Skelbaek, and the rivers Sondersaa and Vidaa as far as the point where the latter turns northward, and from that point to the North Sea and north of the northernmost point of the Island of Sild.

¹ British and Foreign State Papers, vol. lvi, p. 1050.
² Ibid., vol. lxix, p. 773.
“(3) All persons over 20 years of age shall exercise the franchise, provided:—

“(a) that they have been born and are domiciled in Northern Schleswig;
“(b) or that they have lived in Northern Schleswig at least 10 years;
“(c) or that they were born in Northern Schleswig but were expelled by former Governors.

“(4) The ballot shall be taken in writing and shall be carried out by methods guaranteeing freedom of vote to everyone. The late authorities shall have no influence on the voting.

“(5) It is understood that the neighbouring districts of Central Schleswig, if they so demand, shall be entitled to make known by a separate vote whether they wish to be restored to Denmark.

“(Signatures)"

The signatories hereof associate themselves with the foregoing resolution with the reservation that:—

(a) In their opinion Flensburg forms part of Danish Northern Schleswig;
(b) Any ballot taken in the neighbouring districts, should, in their opinion, be taken simultaneously with the voting in Northern Schleswig.

The Association of Electors addressed a petition to the Danish Government, praying that their cause might be laid before the Peace Conference and their interest might be there represented. Which request the Government had great pleasure in granting.

The aggression of Prussia and Austria against Denmark terminated in the Peace of Vienna on 30th October, 1864, by which Denmark was forced to give up Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg. The two latter provinces were and always have been German, Holstein having been annexed to the Danish Crown in 1460 and Lauenburg in 1815; the King of Denmark was Duke of Holstein and Lauenburg, and, in that capacity, was a member of the Germanic Confederation. Schleswig, on the contrary, has belonged to Denmark ever since the latter country existed, and has never formed part of the Germanic Confederation.

The question of Schleswig has often been compared to that of Alsace-Lorraine: the questions are similar but not identical. Whilst the whole of Alsace-Lorraine from Altkirch to Wismesbourg protested in 1871 against separation from France, only the Northern half of Schleswig was annexed by Prussia in 1864 against its will. Southern Schleswig separated itself from Denmark of its own free will: it was already German or germanized, and had aimed at sep-
oration from the Danish Monarchy and annexation to Germany long before 1864.

If Southern Schleswig were now to be incorporated with Denmark, there would be a striking difference between that annexation and the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France. On the one hand, France, a great country with 40 million inhabitants, would receive about 2 million new citizens, who would throw themselves with joy into the arms of their former mother-country, to whom they are attached by the strongest ties. On the other hand, Denmark, a little country of 3 million inhabitants (including the Danish Schleswigers) would have its population increased by about 800,000 foreigners, whose sympathies would be with Germany, which they would not cease to consider as their real home.

It is unnecessary to point out that Northern Schleswig has remained Danish notwithstanding 55 years of Prussian domination. A Memorandum which we shall shortly have the honour to lay before the Conference and which unfortunately is not yet ready, will show that the spirit of Danish nationality has grown more accentuated among the Danes of Northern Schleswig than it was at the time of the separation in 1864. The stubborn and incessant fight waged against germanization by the Danes of Schleswig for 55 years has rendered them worthy of the sympathy of France. They have not given up hope that justice would triumph and that they would one day be restored to their own country.

The Danish peasants of Schleswig have derived the strength to sustain this unequal conflict against oppression from their high moral and intellectual culture. The population of Schleswig which has remained Danish now cherishes its nationality more deeply, with more understanding and firmer will, than did the population which passed under Prussian domination in 1864. The younger generation, to whom the future belongs, has remained Danish in spite of German schools, military service and the attraction that Germany could exert over characters ambitious of power, honour or money.

The Danes of Northern Schleswig have, so to speak, had to form a State within the State, with their own laws and their own institutions. Their principal means of action have been the press and their associations.

It is difficult to appreciate the high level of that press without knowing the Danish language, but it is possible to demonstrate by statistics its increasing circulation, of which the three maps annexed hereto 12 attempt to give some idea. The first shows how the circulation of newspapers is distributed over the various districts; the second and more interesting map shows how many individual sub-

12 Not filed with the minutes.
siders there are to each paper in the same districts, and the third
gives the increase in the number of subscribers in the 11 years from
1901 to 1912. The war created an unusual situation and the Danish
press has been the victim of a great deal of chicanery, merciless
censorship, and numerous confiscations. Taken together, the three
maps give an idea of the extent and intensity of Danish feelings
towards the South. In the rural districts of Northern Schleswig
each copy of a paper is read by between 6.9 and 12.9 individuals,
including immigrated Germans and persons of German sympathies
speaking the Danish language who, not knowing German, read the
Danish newspapers. In how many countries, even the most civilized,
is this proportion attained? In the towns, whose inhabitants num-
ber many German officials, the corresponding figures are lower (be-
tween 7.9 and 25.9 [5.9?]). Danish newspapers also penetrate into
the districts of Central Schleswig adjoining Northern Schleswig.
Further South, in the Angel region, and towards the town of Schles-
wig, Dannevirke and the Schleswig fjord (the Sli), where the
Danish language disappeared many generations since, and in Fries-
land, where Danish has never been spoken, the Danish newspapers
have no subscribers. The three maps show clearly what is the
southernmost limit of the territory in which there is any possibility
of restoring Danish nationality. In Schleswig, the Dane-Schleswig
press had 12,678 subscribers in 1901 and 19,278 in 1912.

As it was almost entirely impossible to assemble for meetings and
lectures at the inns and other public halls, the Danes built 52 club-
houses, their strongholds, which for the most part have been erected
during the last few years, as shown by the annexed map. Four new
houses were being built when the war broke out. Vast club-houses
have, moreover, existed for many years at Haderslev and Flensburg,
but none in other parts of Schleswig. The Schleswiger population
itself subscribed one million Marks for the construction of these
houses.

Map No. — shows the growing number of libraries during the last
few years. Out of 170 libraries, those founded since 1909 are under-
lined. They have been founded by the “Association for the Preser-
vation of the Danish Language in Northern Schleswig”, and number
approximately 100,000 volumes. Between 1890 and 1911 the said
Association also distributed 255,000 books, maps and pictures.

When the Danish language was completely prohibited in the
schools, the “School Association” was founded with the object of
sending youths and girls without means to schools in Denmark after
they had passed through the German schools. The parents teach
them to read Danish, and in Denmark they learn to write it and to
know the history and geography of their own country. It was
from the parents of these young scholars that the Prussian Govern-
ment wished to take the right of guardianship; it recognised the
danger to the germanisation of the younger generation of these
studies in Denmark, since they stultified all the work of German
teachers and were both superior in their methods of instruction and
liked by the young people for the very reason that they were Danish.
The pupils who left the Danish schools formed the armament of
the rampart raised against Germanism.

These two great Associations and the “Association of Electors”
numbered 26,000 members in 1914, that is to say, one out of every
six inhabitants in Northern Schleswig, including the officials and
the German population.

When danger directly menaced their own country, the Danes of
Schleswig gave a final proof of their energy and self-sacrifice. A
portion of the sum destined to rob the Poles of their land was placed
at the disposal of the Prussian authorities in Schleswig. The Prus-
sian Government purchased estates; the system of “Rentegüter” was
established, under which land was purchased by a society correspon-
ding to the “Hakatist” society in Prussian Poland. The Danes how-
ever faced the danger and (in their usual unostentatious way)
founded a rival organisation, which in 1910 became a public insti-
tution, and took the form of an Agrarian Bank. They were not
unsuccessful in the struggle. The Prussian Government then adopted
the same line of action as in Poland. It took measures to prevent
any estate purchased by a German from returning into Danish
hands. The Schleswigers themselves founded in every parish a new
Association, the members of which pledged themselves not to sell
their land to Germans. When war broke out these parochial asso-
ciations were banded together in one large Association with 402
confidential agents. Thus nearly the whole of Northern Schleswig
was secured against Prussian designs upon the land.

Such was the defensive organisation of the Danes of Northern
Schleswig at the outbreak of the war; taking effect in the economic
sphere through their Banks, Savings Banks, Agricultural Associa-
tions and Co-operative Societies, founded on the Danish model;
politically through the “Associations of Electors”; on the land, both
politically and economically, through the Association for preventing
the re-purchase of land and the Agrarian Bank; in the intellectual
sphere through the Association for the Preservation of the Danish
Language, the School Association and the club-houses and finally
through the press.

After half a century’s struggle against a powerful and unscrupu-
losous Government, this small peasant population emerged with all the
greater consciousness of nationality, well organised, and subject to
its own self-imposed discipline, thanks to a will-power which affords
splendid proof of the vitality of the Danish race and its capacity for development.

Was the object of the efforts above described merely that of defence against German supremacy within German territory? No, the struggle was maintained by the Schleswigers in order to preserve their Danish nationality until the day when they should see a possibility of returning to their own country. Never during the 55 long years since the separation have they ceased to hope for the eventual triumph of justice. To-day the realisation of their hopes is assured through the victory of the Allied and Associated peoples, and the Peace Conference has summoned all oppressed peoples before its tribunal. The Danes of Schleswig confidently submit their righteous cause to its decision. They have experienced the tragic fate of shedding their blood on behalf of their oppressors, thirty thousand having been forced to fight by the side of those whom they felt to be their enemies and more than five thousand having fallen for a cause, the defeat of which they desired. All those who were able to do so fled to Denmark, but the majority shared the cruel fate of so many Poles, Czechs, Serbs, Croats, Italians and Roumanians, who were forced to bear arms against those whom they considered their friends. The noble peoples of France and England understood that the small isolated population of Schleswig was entitled to their sympathy, which they showed by granting Schleswig prisoners special treatment in separate camps. For this Denmark of the future, which will include Schleswig, will always owe them a debt of gratitude.

The Association of Electors of Northern Schleswig has itself defined the boundaries of that country (Kortet) which extends over an area of 3,994 square kilometres, and contains a population of 166,966. It includes the districts of Haderslev, Aabenraa, Sonderborg, half the district of Toender, and a small portion of the district of Flensborg. The rural districts North of this line are Danish, and most undoubtedly they desire re-union with Denmark (Kort). In the towns of Haderslev, Aabenraa, Toender and Sonderborg, Danish is the language of the majority. According to Danish statistics Danish is the native tongue of three-quarters of the population (not including the officials) and is understood by everyone. According to German statistics, the Danish language predominates in the following towns: Haderslev, 5,679 as against 3,448, and Aabenraa, 3,489 as against 3,405. At Toender according to German Statistics, German speaking inhabitants number 2,953 as against 1,117 speaking Danish, but such statistics must be accepted with caution considering the manner in which they are compiled; at Toender the majority of the population speak Danish and all understand it. At Sonder-

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12 The maps referred to are not filed with the minutes.
borg, German is at present predominant owing to the fact that a
Naval station has been established there, but this preponderance
will disappear when the said station is abandoned.

At the elections of 1867, 27,488 Danish votes were recorded, of
which some 23,000 were from North Schleswig. At the elections of
August, 1867, Danish majorities were returned in all the towns
(except Toender), all the boroughs (except Hoyer), and in all the
rural constituencies.

In 1884 by reason of emigration and of inclination only 14,447
Danish votes were recorded, but from 1884 onwards a Danish reac-
tion set in which has continued up to the present day. In 1912,
17,293 Danish votes were recorded, 16,500 of which were from Nor-
thern Schleswig, this being the most favourable election since 1877.
The elections of 1912 resulted in a German majority in the four
towns, some of the boroughs, and two or three rural constituencies,
and a German majority is driving in a wedge between Toender and
Flensborg. An analysis of the election results shows that the Ger-
man majority is due to the German officials; if these are excluded,
the votes are about equal; when the votes of Danish officials were
included and those of persons now calling themselves German but
who would assuredly welcome Danish rule, only a German minority
would remain. Even at Toender where the richer citizens have
always been Germans, a Danish nucleus has persisted, and there has
never been so large a number of Danish voters at Toender as during
the last few years. By way of recapitulation, it may be stated that
German voters have never had a majority in rural constituencies.
A really German majority among the owners of the soil only exists
in the town of Toender, and the borough of Augustenborg (Als) the
home of the family of the German ex-Empress.

The position of Northern Schleswig is so clear that there seems
nothing to prevent the immediate institution of a plebiscite there.
At least three-quarters of the voters may be relied on to declare in
favour of returning to Denmark. The Danish population is be-
coming anxious and the Germans have recovered from their first
despondency and are resuming their former arrogance of manner.
Soldiers’ Councils and officials annoy the population, requisitions
impovery the country, heavy war taxes threaten its prosperity at
a time when the people of Schleswig consider that they are de facto
separated from Germany. On the other hand, the Germans are
already endeavouring to meet the loss of Schleswig by placing their
capital there and by establishing commercial branches, in the hope
of escaping to some extent from the financial ruin of Germany. We
therefore earnestly commend to the Conference the desire of the
Danes of Northern Schleswig to be allowed their plebiscite as soon
as possible.
It might perhaps be said that Denmark could accept Northern Schleswig without a plebiscite, since there is no doubt of the Danish sympathies of its population. But the Danes of Northern Schleswig are eager to give themselves freely to Denmark; they long for the day of that great manifestation of their nationality, of their triumph over the Germans who will then have no excuse for attempting annexation in the future.

Middle Schleswig includes those regions south of Northern Schleswig in which Danish is spoken, or partly spoken, or in which Danish sympathies still exist. These two standards exist separately or together. These districts differ from Northern Schleswig in that they were subjected to German influence much earlier and on a much larger scale. Danish sympathies are not so widespread. A display of them may lead to unpleasantness, and as German has been used for several centuries in churches and schools, Danish culture has not been able to penetrate. But while the Danish language is still known, or Danish sympathies still exist as a tradition dating from before 1864, it is possible for the population to become pro-Danish once more, even in a country where German is spoken. The Danish Government, as well as the Danes of Northern Schleswig, desire therefore that central Schleswig may be allowed to vote, if it expresses a desire to do so. This desire has been expressed in petitions signed by 4,277 persons. All the petitions have not yet come to hand. The resolution of Aabenraa, of 16th November states:

"It is evident that the districts adjoining central Schleswig be entitled, if they claim the right, to proclaim by separate vote if they desire to return to Denmark;"

and, in a subsequent resolution of 30th December the Association of Electors of Northern Schleswig declared (inter alia) as follows:

1. "The German authorities in Central Schleswig are endeavouring to oppose liberty of assembly and of petition, and also to prevent the Danish population of those districts from establishing the conditions necessary for a free ballot; we protest energetically against this conduct.

2. "We affirm that these proceedings of the Germans render the right of self-determination a fallacy for the time being in Central Schleswig.

3. "We request the Danish Government, when it lays our interests before the Peace Conference, to call the attention of the Conference to the fact that, in these conditions, the Danish population of Central Schleswig cannot hope to obtain its national right by means of ballot."

Thus the conditions necessary for a plebiscite are already present in Northern, but not in Central, Schleswig. There are good reasons for holding the plebiscite immediately in Northern Schleswig, while
Central Schleswig, on the other hand, should be allowed time to weigh the pros and cons and to form an opinion.

The Central Schleswig in question does not include the districts of Danevirke, the fjord or town of Schleswig, the district of Angel, nor the Frisian district to the west. The town of Schleswig has been German for many generations, Angel for two or three; the Frisian district was never Danish. No voice has been raised in these districts to ask for return to Denmark.

The southern boundary of that part of Central Schleswig in which there is a possibility of finding or awakening Danish sympathies includes those parishes or communes in which the Danish language still survives and those which showed a Danish majority in the first elections to the German Parliament in 1867. For topographical and economic reasons this zone should include the parishes of Adelby, Munkbrarup and Glücksbourg, forming the southern coast of the Flensborg fjord and in which the Danish language has not completely disappeared. For topographical reasons and to allow the Danish elements of the islands Foer and Amrum to vote without risk of being isolated, the plebiscite should take place over the whole Toender district.

Central Schleswig in which there can be question of a plebiscite would include the southern half of the Toender district (which does not belong to Northern Schleswig), part of the district of Flensborg, the town of Flensborg and the parish of Hjoldelund, or about Km. 1300 with a population of 101,500, of which more than 60,000 are at Flensborg.

At Kaerherred Danish is spoken by the people, but not by immigrants.

Laek, although chiefly German, belongs naturally to these districts; some Danish sympathies also remain on account of the railway to For and Amrum; if these islands pronounce in favour of Denmark, they will bring with them the northern parts of the Frisian district, with the river Soholm as a natural frontier.

The western part of the island of For and a part of the island of Amrum, together with the north of the island of Sild, are still inhabited by a population speaking Danish and with sympathies which are Danish for historic reasons. They belonged to the Duchy of Ribe and were always under Danish influence.

The population of these islands is only 4,000 persons speaking Frisian and Danish, but Danish is stronger wherever both languages exist. It should also be pointed out that at the beginning of the war the German Government had begun the construction of a dyke at Klangsbol, doubtless with the intention of joining up with the railway on the island of Sild, by establishing a station of Marines in Sild bay.
In the parishes of Hanved, Valsboel, Haksted, Vi and Oversoc, together with Hjørlodelund, German[y] has made progress, but an active Danish minority has always existed there.

Some 90 percent of the inhabitants of Flensborg speak German, but, on the other hand, its connection with Denmark is vouched for by its history, the celebrated men it has given to Denmark, its traditions, the memory of its ships flying the Danish flag for centuries, and the graves of thousands of Danish soldiers fallen in our wars against Germany. There is a very active Danish minority with a paper (“Flensborg Avis”), a Club, a Lecture Society (1000 members), a Young People’s Union (250 members), and a church (1923).

Wholesale Trade. Its chief market is Northern Schleswig; towards the South, competition from Hamburg, Lübeck and Kiel is met with. The Commercial Association states that, from reports received from its branches, from 25 percent to 80 percent of the town’s trade is deflected towards the North. Many clerks and dock labourers are employed.

Retail Trade. Chiefly in the town, but also along the fjord and towards the West.

Industry. Ship-building yards (third on the entire European continent); give employment to about 10 percent of the population.

Large working population. Socialists, having voted for the Socialist candidate without having been given the option of voting for a German or a Dane. It is difficult to prophesy which side it would take, but the more favourable conditions for workmen in Denmark must not be forgotten.

The town of Flensborg has petitioned the Danish Government to be attached to Denmark. This petition, however, was only signed by 3,401 men and women above 20 years of age, whereas the number of men and women voters was 38,000, which corresponds to barely 10 percent. On the other hand, the population is under the tyrannical régime of the German authorities and Soldiers’ Councils, and it is presumed that a free vote would be more favourable for the Danes. Up to 1885, Danish sympathies were in the ascendant, but German sympathies have since gained the upper hand. Is an awakening of the former sentiment in favour of Denmark now taking place, even among people who have considered themselves German up to the present?

Only the people of Flensborg can answer this question.

CONCLUSION

1. That the population of Northern Schleswig, considered as a single group, be allowed to decide positively by ballot, as soon as possible, whether they desire to be re-united to Denmark or not.
2. That those districts of Central Schleswig bordering on Northern Schleswig (including the town of Flensborg) which evince a desire to do so, be called upon to express by an individual plebiscite, voting in districts, whether they wish to return to Denmark.

3. That the conditions necessary for freedom of voting be ensured by the evacuation of the districts in question by German military forces, and by the setting up of an International Convention to safeguard the preparation and direct the carrying out of the plebiscite.
Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 22nd February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. E. M. House
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

SECRETARIES
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.

FRANCE
M. Pichon
M. Tardieu
SECRETARIES
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn

ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi
SECRETARIES
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
M. O. T. Crosby

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe, K.C.B.

FRANCE
M. Klotz

ITALY
H. E. M. Crespi

JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF......Lieut. Burden
BRITISH EMPIRE..................Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE.............................Captain A. Portier
ITALY..............................Lieut. Zanchi
JAPAN..............................M. Saburi

Interpreter: Prof. P. J. Mantoux

(1) Mr. Balfour said he wished to raise a small matter which required decision. The Portuguese Government had expressed to him its very strong feeling of pain that it was the only nation, which had suffered at the hands of Germany, and yet had no representative on the Allied Commission on Reparation. The coasts of Portugal had been bombarded; Portuguese ships had been sunk; and the Por-
tuguese African Colonies had been overrun by the enemy, consequently, Portugal had claims against Germany, and it was extremely hard that she was not represented on the Allied Commission which had been appointed to examine and report on the amount for reparation which the enemy countries ought to pay.

M. Pichon confirmed the fact that Portugal had submitted a complaint as soon as the composition of the Allied Commission on Reparation had been announced. He (M. Pichon) personally had no objection to Portugal being duly represented.

Mr. Lansing enquired whether under the circumstances Brazil also should not be granted representation. Brazil had lost ships, sunk by German submarines. It would be difficult, therefore, to grant representation to Portugal without at the same time doing the same for Brazil.

Baron Sonnino enquired what was the composition of the Allied Commission on Reparation.

M. Klotz explained that in accordance with the Resolution passed by the Conference on Thursday, January 23rd, 1919, it was decided that a Commission should be appointed of not more than three representatives apiece from each of the five Great Powers, and not more than two representatives apiece from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Serbia and Roumania. Subsequently, both Portugal and Czechoslovakia had claimed the right of representation. The Conference had decided to admit the claims of Czechoslovakia, but not those of Portugal, and accordingly two Czechoslovak representatives at present formed part of the Commission. Should the Conference now decide to accede to Portugal's request she should be given two representatives; the number allotted to all other small Powers represented.

Mr. Balfour expressed the view that the claims of Portugal were as great as, if not greater than, those of Bohemia, which had been granted. Bohemia had not become a belligerent until the very end of hostilities; whereas Portugal had fought throughout the war, and had suffered just those kind of damages which called for reparation.

(It was agreed that Portugal should have the right to nominate not more than two representatives to serve on the Allied Commission on Reparation.

It was also agreed that an invitation should be sent to Portugal to attend the next meeting of the Allied Commission on Reparation to be held on Monday next, February 24th, at 10.30 a.m.)

\footnote{See BC-8, vol. III, p. 698.}
(2) Mr. Balfour asked permission to move the following resolution:—

"(1) Without prejudice to the decision of the Supreme War Council to present Naval, Military and Air Conditions of Peace, to Germany at an early date, the Conference agrees that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of other preliminary Peace Terms with Germany and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.

(2) The Preliminary Peace Terms, other than the Naval, Military and Air Conditions, shall cover the following points:—

(a) The approximate future frontiers of Germany:
(b) The financial arrangements to be imposed on Germany:
(c) Our economic relations with Germany after the war:
(d) Responsibility for breaches of the Laws of War.

(3) In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of Peace with Germany."

A general feeling of impatience was now becoming manifest in all countries on account of the apparent slow progress the Conference was making in the direction of Final Peace. It would be folly to ignore altogether the danger that feeling might produce. It would be realised that abstract questions, (such as the Financial Arrangements and Economic Relations), did not touch the hearts and interests of families; but the question of demobilisation did touch them very nearly. Now, the progress of demobilisation depended very largely on the final Military Terms to be imposed on Germany. A short time ago the Conference had agreed that it could not continue to add month by month new terms and conditions to the Armistice. It had been agreed that the Military Terms to be imposed on Germany should be drawn up in the form of a final scheme, which would definitely regulate her future armament. That problem had been occupying the attention of the Military Advisers of the Supreme War Council who were now almost prepared to present their final report. He realised that it would probably take some time for the Conference and for the Governments of the Great Powers to consider the military report. Nevertheless the Naval and Military Terms of Peace appeared to be in advance of all other
questions, such as frontiers, future economic relations, and attempts to bring to justice criminals, who had abused the Laws of War. That being the case, if the final Military Proposals were shortly to be ready for consideration by the Conference, should not advantage be taken of that fact to obtain an important instalment of the Preliminary Peace? If that instalment were carried, it would be possible for the Allies subsequently to impose on Germany all the other terms that might be considered just and fitting. His proposal did not imply that he did not consider it to be of the first importance to press on all the other enquiries mentioned in his draft note, namely:—

The approximate future frontiers of Germany.
The Financial Arrangements to be imposed on Germany.
Economic Relations with Germany after the War, and
The Responsibility for Breaches of the Laws of War.

In fact, in order to help on the acceleration, which he desired, the last paragraph of his draft note proposed that the various Commissions dealing with those questions should send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. He was in no way prejudiced as regards the date given, but from the information which he had received it appeared very hopeful that by the 8th March next the various Commissions would be in a position to submit their reports.

In conclusion, he wished to add that he had that morning, in company with M. Pichon, discussed the question with M. Clemenceau, who inclined to the view that the Naval and Military Terms of Peace should not be separated from the other aspects of the case. M. Clemenceau was extremely anxious to expedite matters but he thought that end would be best obtained by waiting until a conclusion had been reached on all subjects. M. Clemenceau held the view that if the stimulus towards a rapid decision were removed by the acceptance of the Naval and Military Terms by Germany, the other questions would be delayed for an infinity of time by small controversies. M. Clemenceau held, therefore, that the end desired would best be obtained by treating all questions abreast rather than by taking up questions one by one as they reached maturity.Personally, he (Mr. Balfour) was in favour of his own proposal, but he would be glad to hear the views of his colleagues. Perhaps M. Pichon would confirm his report of M. Clemenceau’s views.

M. Pichon agreed that Mr. Balfour had correctly interpreted M. Clemenceau’s views. M. Clemenceau held that the whole of the Preliminary Peace Terms should be pressed forward with as little delay as possible in order to take full advantage of the present situation in Germany. In this opinion M. Clemenceau was supported by Marshal Foch and his military advisers.
Mr. House said he was very glad to see that the Conference intended to bring about as soon as possible a Preliminary Peace. In his opinion, the Peace Negotiations should have commenced on November 11th last, directly after the signing of the first Armistice. He had always felt that delay could only be favourable to Germany, and the longer the signing of Peace were postponed, the more chance would there be of circumstances becoming less favourable to the Allies. In regard to the two proposals now before the Conference, very severe military terms would have to be imposed on the Germans. And, he thought, the Germans would be more inclined to accept those conditions if, at the same time, the whole Peace Terms were made known to them. The Germans would then be made fully cognisant of their position.

M. Sonnino said that he had no objections to raise against the proposal to speed up as much as possible the settlement of Peace Preliminaries. But he must draw attention to the fact that Germany alone had so far been mentioned (e.g. the military conditions to be imposed on Germany, the economic, financial conditions to be imposed on Germany, &c.), and all other questions were presumably to be adjourned indefinitely. Now, the other questions were frequently just as complicated and contained elements even more dangerous than those included in the German settlement. In the case of Germany, as a matter of fact, the Allies were faced by one enemy only with whom an Armistice had been signed, with whom negotiations were being carried on, and by whom certain terms had already been accepted. For Italy, the Austrian question was more complicated in that the former Austrian Empire was now divided into various states, some of whom were friendly, others semi-friendly and others hostile. The Austrian question was, therefore, a delicate and awkward one to settle.

Should the military, economic and financial conditions to be imposed on Germany first be settled, what would happen to the other questions requiring settlement? He felt compelled to ask that question in the interests of his own country. Germany was an enemy of Italy, and the Italians had fought against her. But Italy also had another enemy, Austria, and in fighting her she had borne the full burden of the war. The Russian question, which had given rise to an infinity of dangers during the last few months must also not be lost sight of.

What guarantees, what pledges would Italy have that all these other questions would be dealt with? It seemed to him that Mr. Balfour's proposal would have the effect of adjourning all those other questions indefinitely.

Mr. Balfour had said that the German question should first be settled and then demobilization could proceed. But when the British Army had been demobilized, and the American Army had gone home, Italy
would be left to face alone a difficult situation. What would she be able to do? Whatever conditions the Allies might impose on Germany, she would be able to start again as soon as she saw fit, and no-one would be there to prevent her doing so. He (M. Sonnino) agreed that everything possible should be done to hasten the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace. Some time had perhaps been wasted. That had been inevitable. But, in his opinion, the conditions of peace to be imposed on all enemy countries should be drawn up as quickly as possible and presented for acceptance. Otherwise, a separate peace having been made with Germany, the Allies might a few days later find themselves at war with half of Austria and perhaps also with Russia. What forces would the Allies then possess with which to defend themselves and what would be the final consequences?

Mr. Lansing expressed the view that it would be a mistake to treat the military terms of peace as distinct from the other terms of peace. He would prefer to embody all the terms of a preliminary peace in one document: a separate Treaty being made with each of the enemy countries on identical lines.

As soon as the future frontiers of the territories of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey had been fixed, the state of war with the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-Slavs would ipso facto also cease and, at the same time, peace would have been made with the principal enemies.

He was strongly of the opinion that when peace terms came to be discussed with Germany, a complete document should be presented including everything and not merely a few Naval, Military and other conditions. He thoroughly agreed with M. Clemenceau’s viewpoint.

M. Taridei said that Baron Sonnino had displayed considerable anxiety at the proposal that the final military terms of peace should be forthwith imposed on Germany, for the reason that demobilisation in that quarter would ensue. That question had already been considered by the Supreme War Council and their military advisers were about to produce a definite scheme. The Conference was now asked to decide whether other questions, financial and economic questions, should be added to the military terms in order to present to the Germans at one time the whole of the Preliminary Peace Terms. In his opinion, the military situation would remain the same whether the financial or economic conditions were added to the military terms to be imposed on Germany, or not. He agreed with Baron Sonnino that after the conclusion of the preliminary peace with Germany, difficult questions would still remain to be settled with other enemy countries. Nevertheless it would be agreed that all other problems would become easier of solution once peace with Germany had been concluded. For instance, the question of German Austria would become easier to solve after the frontiers of Germany had been fixed. Similarly, the conclusion of peace with Germany would remove one
of the disturbing factors in the Russian situation. Consequently, he thought it would be possible to reconcile the two proposals before the Conference, namely, Mr. Balfour's proposal for a separate peace with Germany, and Baron Sonnino's desire to include all enemy countries. Meanwhile, he would urge all the commissions and Committees to expedite the submission of their reports with as little delay as possible.

Mr. Balfour pointed out that the third paragraph of his draft note covered the last point raised by M. Tardieu.

Mr. House enquired whether the final military terms would be embodied in the Armistice, or in the Final Peace Treaty.

Mr. Balfour thought that Mr. House's question did not arise out of the proposals now being discussed, since the present Armistice could be terminated at three days' notice.

M. Pichon thought the Conference should consider first of all the German question, because it was, as M. Tardieu had said, the principal and the essential question.

M. Sonnino here interjected "for you".

M. Pichon, continuing, said that he thought it was the principal and essential question for the Italians also, because Germany was the principal enemy. Furthermore, the conditions under which the last armistice had been renewed must be considered. Germany had been told that the Armistice would be renewed for a short term only, and the Allied military experts had been instructed to draw up and submit the final naval and military Terms of Peace for the consideration of the Conference.

Mr. Balfour's proposal, which he (M. Pichon) thoroughly approved of, could very well be said to cover the points raised by M. Sonnino. The sole object of Mr. Balfour's proposal was to complete the military terms to be imposed on Germany by the addition of economic and financial clauses, the whole of which document would thus constitute the Preliminaries of Peace. The whole situation with Germany was, at the present moment, extremely serious and delicate, and it might become very unfavourable to the Allies if, after having announced to the Germans the fact that the final conditions would shortly be sent, the Allies found themselves unable to do so. Further, public opinion expected that this should be done, and great disappointment would arise should the Conference fail to keep its engagements, for the public considered that all other problems were bound up in the settlement of the German question. He thought it would be impossible to settle all the peace questions relating to every enemy country at one time. But as soon as the German question had been settled, he agreed the Conference could at once devote its attention to the settlement of the problems relating to Turkey, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary; though, as regards the latter country, which had no Gov-
ernment, he did not know with whom the Allies could discuss conditions. To sum up, however, he thought the Conference should at once settle the German problem, and immediately afterwards the Austrian. In his opinion, the Conference would only be complying with public opinion, and with the necessities of the present moment by adopting the procedure suggested by Mr. Balfour.

Mr. House enquired whether the Conference agreed to accept M. Clemenceau’s proposal that all the terms of Peace should be dealt with together, instead of first dealing with the Military Terms.

Mr. Balfour said he would be prepared to accept that proposal provided it expressed the unanimous view of the Conference.

Baron Sonnino said that when last treating the question of the Armistice, the Conference had decided to invite the Allied military advisers to propose final Military Terms of Peace. The reason then given for agreeing to that procedure had been the desire to settle the military question with as little delay as possible. Firstly, in order to remove once for all, the necessity for the constant renewal of the Armistice and, secondly, also because once the military terms had been accepted by Germany it would be easier later on to impose all other necessary conditions. On that occasion, M. Orlando supported by President Wilson, had asked that the same procedure should be followed in regard to Austria-Hungary. That proposal had also been accepted, and consequently no distinction had then been made between the two cases of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The two cases could not, therefore, now be separated, thereby creating a dangerous distinction. He, M. Sonnino, fully agreed that everything should be done to speed up the settlement of all questions. He would prefer first to get the military conditions out of the way, after which all the rest could be examined together. But, if the Conference decided to make a distinction and to separate the German question from the Austro-Hungarian question, and let everything else slide, the situation so created would spell revolution in Italy. Such a procedure would mean an indefinite prolongation of the Peace Negotiations with all other enemy countries: Italy would be obliged to keep up armaments whilst the other Allies were demobilising, thus bringing about in Italy a state of general discontent which could not with safety be allowed to continue.

In order to show a conciliatory spirit, he would be prepared, however, to accept the proposal made by Mr. Balfour on the understanding that whenever the word “Germany” appeared in his draft note, the words “and Austria-Hungary” should be added. Otherwise the words “enemy powers” should be substituted for “Germany”. As far as the military conditions were concerned, he held the view that it would be preferable to settle the military terms at once, as the allies would then be in a position to impose on the enemy the
economic, financial and other conditions which might be considered just and equitable.

Mr. House thought that the peace terms to be imposed on all enemy Powers should be worked out simultaneously. Eventually, when the Conference met to decide the final Peace Terms, all the belligerents would be able to attend at the same time.

M. Sonnino agreed to accept that proposal. He asked that the words "Austria-Hungary" should be added after the word "Germany" wherever it occurred in Mr. Balfour's note. Otherwise, "enemy countries" could be substituted for "Germany."

Mr. Balfour said that the Conference had a most important question to decide. He fully agreed with Baron Sonnino that other questions should not be delayed, whilst the questions with Germany were being settled. All he pleaded for was that the Conference should at all events get through with Germany with all due speed: that the settlement of Germany should not be held up until the more complex problems of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria had been solved. The latter questions were, no doubt, fully as important, but the German question was more ripe for decision. Baron Sonnino had expressed the view that after Germany had been got out of the way, serious military troubles would arise with Austria-Hungary and Turkey. In his opinion that was a delusion. It was very difficult to believe that military troubles would arise in those countries once peace had been concluded with Germany. He (Mr. Balfour) was willing to accept any course that would not delay peace with Germany. If other cases could be got ready at the same time, so much the better: but it was essential that settlement with Germany should not be postponed until all other questions were ripe for settlement. In conclusion, he wished to ask the Conference to accept the following re-draft of his note:

"1. Without prejudice to the decision of the Supreme War Council to present naval, military and air conditions of peace to Germany at an early date, the Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of Preliminary Peace Terms and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.

2. The Preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover the following points:

(a) the approximate future frontiers of enemy countries;
(b) the financial arrangements to be imposed on enemy countries;
(c) our economic relations with enemy countries after the war;
(d) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.

3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects it is requested
that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Germany.

4. The Conference are of opinion that the question relating to the preliminary peace with Germany shall not be held up till the questions relating to other enemy countries are determined."

Baron Sonnino said he had two observations to offer to Mr. Balfour’s proposal. He would first deal with a question of secondary importance, but it would be recollected that the Conference had decided on M. Orlando’s proposition, to instruct their Military Advisers to draw up the final Military and Naval terms with Germany and Austria-Hungary. He would therefore ask that the first paragraph should be made to read as follows:—“Without prejudice to the decision of the Supreme War Council to present Naval, Military and Air conditions of Peace to Germany and Austria-Hungary at an early date, the Conference agree, etc.”

The second and more important question he wished to raise had reference to paragraph 4. He could only see in it an invitation to all Commissions to expedite the solution of questions dealing with Germany to the exclusion of all other questions. If paragraph 4 had any meaning at all, it could only mean that henceforth the Conference would push on Peace with Germany and the rest could wait. Otherwise it had not raison d’être. In his opinion, it was an invitation to the Conference to postpone all other questions with the exception of those relating to Germany.

Mr. House said he would suggest going back to Mr. Balfour’s original proposition regarding Germany, and similar proposals would be drawn up for the other enemy countries, with such alterations as might be necessary. The Conference would then, without delay, appoint the necessary Committees to deal with the various questions which still required to be examined and reported on.

M. Tardieu thought that M. Sonnino was mistaken in his interpretation of paragraph 4 of Mr. Balfour’s new draft proposal. It was not suggested that settlement with Germany should be expedited to the exclusion of a settlement with other enemy countries. It would be relatively easier to make peace with a country like Germany, which still existed as a whole, rather than with Austria-Hungary, which had now disintegrated into a number of entities, partly friendly, partly hostile. For this reason he wished strongly to support Mr. House’s proposal.

M. Sonnino held that the same result would be obtained by accepting Mr. Balfour’s amended text with the omission of paragraph 4.
Mr. Lansing suggested that the first paragraph of Mr. Balfour's first proposal should be made to read as follows:—

"The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of Preliminary Peace Terms and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed."

If so corrected the whole note would yield a text that would be made to apply to all enemy countries, a separate resolution being drawn up for each country.

M. Sonnino said he would gladly accept the first paragraph as just amended by Mr. Lansing. That being done, he would further be prepared to accept Mr. Balfour's original draft, provided the words "enemy countries" were substituted for "Germany" in paragraph 2 and provided the last two words "with Germany" were omitted from paragraph 3. He clearly understood that under these conditions paragraph 4, proposed by Mr. Balfour, would disappear. In his opinion, there was no reason why Germany should go ahead of all other enemy countries, though it would be in the competence of the Conference at any moment to dispose of any set of subjects which might be ripe for solution. The inclusion of paragraph 4, as he had already stated, could only be interpreted as an invitation to delay all other subjects except those dealing with Germany.

Mr. Balfour said that he could not admit the inference. Paragraph 4 of his Draft Resolution did not imply that the Conference took no further interest in Austria-Hungary. It merely said that the Conference was of the opinion that the questions relating to the preliminary peace with Germany should not be held up until the questions relating to other enemy countries were determined. The view therein expressed in reality constituted the main part of the policy he wished to recommend to the Conference. Paragraph 3 of the Draft Resolution laid down that the consideration of all subjects should be speeded up. But, on the other hand, it was most important to get a preliminary peace with Germany as soon as possible. He felt that on that point Baron Sonnino and he himself held quite different views. The arrangements to be made with other countries should not be stopped on account of Germany; but, on the other hand, other countries should not prevent a settlement being reached with Germany.

M. Sonnino said that all he asked for was that no statement should be made to the effect that German questions should have preference over all others. Naturally, when reports were submitted by Committees, the Conference could decide to dispose of them irrespective of the enemy country involved. Otherwise, he feared the Committees would be influenced by the adoption of any resolution, such as had been proposed by Mr. Balfour.
Mr. Lansing thought that the Conference had lost sight of his proposals to have separate identical resolutions in respect of each enemy country.

Mr. Balfour understood that to mean that separate Commissions would have to be appointed dealing with each enemy country. He wished to enquire whether it would be possible to man all such Commissions, not only as regards the settlement of frontiers, but also as regards economic, finance and other questions.

Mr. House said the American Delegation would be in a position to do so.

M. Pichon said that it was highly desirable to hasten on as soon as possible the settlement of all questions with Germany. That was the basis of the proposal made by Mr. Balfour. All information received from sure sources in Germany seemed to point to the fact that the present moment was particularly favourable for an immediate settlement. Therefore the present opportunity of reaching a settlement with Germany should not be allowed to pass, and it was essential that the various Commissions dealing with financial, economic and all other questions should also submit their reports without delay.

M. Sonnino had said that the Allied military advisers were ready to submit the final military terms to be imposed on Germany. He thought that only emphasised the fact that the other Commissions should rapidly come to a conclusion, so that, with as little delay as possible, the Allies might be in a position to present their preliminary peace terms to the Germans. That would not, however, in any way retard the examination of problems concerning Austria-Hungary and other enemy countries.

He (M. Pichon) thought M. Sonnino was mistaken in thinking that the Conference proposed to separate the two problems of Germany and Austria-Hungary in order to hasten the solution of the one at the expense of the other. He thought, however, the proposition that all questions concerning Germany should come first would be unanimously accepted, both on account of its situation and on account of promise made at the last renewal of the armistice.

These, then, were the reasons in favour of giving the German question priority; these were the reasons which had led Mr. Balfour to make his proposal. The Conference had never for a moment dreamt of adjourning or retarding the consideration of all other questions. But the settlement of the German question was urgent.

M. Sonnino said that the Allies had only had one front during the war; were now two or three fronts to be created during the peace? He could not consent to that. He quite understood the necessity for pushing on the settlement of the final terms to be
imposed on Germany; but if the German question were detached from the rest of the questions which called for settlement, that would be like constituting a second front, and he could never accept a proposal of that kind. Such a procedure would have most deplorable and most disastrous results in Italy, for it would be impossible to keep such decisions from the ears of the public.

If the Conference persisted in its intention, he (M. Sonnino) could not prevent it: each member must vote as he thought best; but he could not approve a decision which would constitute a positive menace to his own country.

He would not be opposed to priority being eventually given to the German questions, if those were the first to become ripe for solution. But he could not agree that a condition to that effect should be made in advance.

Lord Milner enquired whether it would not be more important than anything else for the Conference to devote its time to a consideration of the final naval and military terms with Germany, provided the reports of the military advisers were ready. Once an agreement was reached on that subject, one compartment of the peace work would be finally dispensed with, even though the decisions reached were not at once presented to Germany.

Mr. House persisted in his opinion that the Conference should go back to Mr. Balfour's original proposal as regards Germany, and then pass similar resolutions as regards Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. He thought no one could object to that procedure.

Mr. Balfour thought that a decision had been reached that the Conference would not proceed with the military terms of peace as a separate proposition, and he regretted that M. Sonnino had again referred to that proposal. M. Clemenceau objected to it, and he (Mr. Balfour) did not wish to insist. In any case, it was a relatively small matter. The question of real importance was whether the Conference should decide to press on all questions leading to peace with Germany without getting entangled with all other questions relating to Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. He felt very strongly on that point and urged his colleagues to accept the proposals contained in the fourth paragraph of his revised note.

M. Sonnino enquired whether Mr. Balfour would agree to accept Mr. House's and Mr. Lansing's proposal.

Mr. Balfour said he preferred his own draft, but he would accept Mr. House's proposal merely with a view to reach a unanimous agreement.

M. Picton said he would accept Mr. House's proposal for the reason given by Mr. Balfour.
M. Sonnino also expressed his willingness to accept Mr. House’s proposal as an act of conciliation. He understood that four texts would be prepared, identical in form, except that a different enemy country would be mentioned in each. The note would, in each case, commence with the words: “The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary peace terms, etc.”

Baron Makino enquired whether the approximate future frontiers of Germany, referred to in paragraph 2 (a), included the German colonies.

Mr. Balfour replied that it was intended to include the colonies.

Baron Makino thought that, in that case, leased territories of Germany should also be included.

Mr. Lansing proposed that paragraph 2 (a) should be made to read “The approximate future frontiers of Germany and the renunciation of colonial territories and treaty rights outside Europe”, the words “and the renunciation of colonial territories and treaty rights outside Europe” being omitted from the texts relating to Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria.

(This was agreed to.)

Mr. Lansing further proposed that the first part of paragraph 2 should be made to read as follows: “The preliminary peace terms, other than naval, military and air conditions, should cover, inter alia, the following points.”

(This was agreed to.)

M. Klotz suggested that paragraph 2 (b) should be made to read: “the financial conditions to be imposed on . . . .”

(This was agreed to.)

Mr. Lansing next proposed that paragraph 2 (c) should be made to read: “the economic conditions to be accorded to . . . .”

(This was agreed to.)

M. Matsui enquired, with reference to paragraph 2 (a), whether that would include all rights, such as rights over the railways and mines in China acquired by Germany.

Mr. Balfour thought that the words “inter alia” would cover such questions.

Mr. Lansing agreed, and remarked that the words “inter alia” would also cover the question of prisoners of war, which he had intended to raise separately.

(It was agreed that texts of the following draft Note, relating respectively to Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, should be prepared and distributed that evening, for consideration at the next meeting of the Conference:—

“1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without
3. **M. Pichon** suggested that the statement of the Albanian claims should be heard on Monday, as well as a French statement relating to Morocco.

**Mr. Balfour** said that he wished another question to be entered on the agenda for the next meeting, namely, the sending of troops to Poland. Very strong recommendations had been received on this subject from the British members of the Allied Commission in Poland.

M. Pichon pointed out that this question had been referred to the Polish Commission sitting in Paris. The reports received from the Polish Commission in Poland had been transmitted to the Commission in Paris, which had been created with a view to co-ordinating the information received from Poland.

**Mr. Balfour** said that he understood that the Commission on Poland in Paris were ready to submit a report on the subject of the sending of troops to Poland.

**M. Pichon** agreed that under the circumstances the Committee would be invited to bring their report on the despatch of troops to Poland on Monday, as well as any other questions ready for discussion.

(It was agreed that the following questions should be placed on the Agenda Paper for the Meeting to be held on Monday afternoon, February 24th, at 3 p. m.):

1. Procedure of Conference.
2. Statement of the Albanian claims.
3. Despatch of troops to Poland.
(4) On the proposal of Mr. Lansing, the following resolution was accepted:—

⌜Creation of a Neutral Zone in Carinthia⌝

"In view of the fact that disorders have arisen in Carinthia as result of the absence of a definite boundary between the territories of the German-Austrians and the Yugo-Slavs,

It is agreed
That the question of the establishment of a neutral zone between the two peoples be referred to the same Military Committee charged with the investigation of establishing neutral zones in the Banat and Transylvania, (Military Representatives, Supreme War Council, Versailles)."

(The Meeting then adjourned until Monday, February 24th, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

Paris, February 23rd, 1919.
Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 24th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. E. M. House

Secretaries

Mr. A. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison
Mr. Anchincloss

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour,
O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner,
G. C. B., G. C. M. G.

Secretaries

The Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice

FRANCE

M. Pichon
M. Tardieu

Secretaries

M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn

ITALY

H. E. Baron Sonnino
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi

Secretaries

Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

Also Present

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Dr. Mezes
Dr. Day
Mr. Dolbeare
Mr. Beer

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.
The Hon. H. Nicholson
Lt. Col. W. H. Gribbon, C. M. G.

Sir W. Tyrrell,
K. C. M. G., C. B.
Lt. Col. Kisch, D. S. O.

FRANCE

 Marshal Poch
General Weygand

M. J. Cambon
M. Hermitte
M. Degrand
Lieut. de Perchin

ITALY

H. E. M. Crespi

Col. Castola
M. Galli
Marquis della Torretta

ALBANIAN DELEGATION

Touran Pasha.
Mehemid bey Konitza
M. Louis Gouracontchi

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Colonel U. S. Grant.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Major A. M. Caecia, M. V. O.

FRANCE

Lieut. Zanchi.

ITALY

M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.
(1) Mr. Pichon having declared the Meeting open, asked permission for Mr. Balfour to put a question, which was not on the Agenda Paper.

Mr. Balfour said that Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India and a member of the Committee for drafting terms of reference to the Financial Committee, had asked him to bring to the notice of the Conference a matter which the British Treasury and the British Finance Authorities regarded as of pressing interest to all the Allied and Associated Powers. The coupons of the Austrian Debt would fall due for payment on 1st March next. The representatives of all the fragments of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire were about to meet at the Ballplatz, Vienna, to consider what should be done in regard to this and other matters.

If the coupons in question were not paid on the 1st March next, and Austria were prematurely declared bankrupt, a general distrust of credit would result, followed by the closure of all banks and a general disturbance of business. If that were to happen, how was the food, which Mr. Hoover was arranging to supply, to be paid for? Although it might be impossible to make any definite arrangements to prevent the eventual bankruptcy of the fragments of the Austrian Empire, nevertheless the British Financial Authorities held the view that that was a situation which should be gradually prepared for. If that situation were suddenly sprung on the public, disaster would follow. Therefore the British suggested that a joint letter should be addressed by the Allied [and] Associated Powers to the Financial Authorities now assembled in Vienna to say that it was very important that the coupons due on 1st March should be paid, but the various countries that had formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would not thereby assume any obligation in regard to the future apportionment of the debt. He understood that this was merely a temporary method of getting over the immediate crisis. It was, however, a very pressing case which the Conference should forthwith discuss with its financial advisers and decide.

Mr. House enquired what was the amount of the interest involved, and when would the next instalment fall due.

Mr. Balfour replied that he could not answer that question, but he presumed the interest would be payable quarterly.

Mr. Sonnino was under the impression that the subject had already been discussed by the Financial Committee, and enquired whether any decision had been reached.

Mr. Balfour explained that the Committee itself would not in any case be in a position to send the letter suggested, but M. Klotz, who was Chairman of the Committee in question, could be invited to attend on the following day and give the necessary explanations.
M. Crespi said that he was a member of the Finance Committee and in a position, therefore, to give some explanations. The question under reference had not yet been discussed by the Financial Committee, but would come before it that afternoon. He could positively state that there were sufficient funds available in Vienna to pay the Coupons. The representatives of the different parts of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire had, however, stated that they would not agree to the payment of the interest due unless the question raised by Mr. Balfour were first settled, namely the future distribution of the Austrian Debt amongst the various new States to be constituted. Consequently, if a letter were sent to Vienna, as suggested by Mr. Balfour, stating that the payment of the March coupons would in no way prejudice the final apportionment of the debt of the late Austrian Empire, payment would, he thought, easily be made. On the other hand, the repudiation of the debt would be most disastrous, both to the various new States and to the Allied countries. He would, therefore, strongly support Mr. Balfour’s proposal, and he hoped the matter would at once be referred to the Finance Committee for report.

M. Pichon enquired whether Mr. Balfour’s resolution was accepted. If so, M. Crespi would perhaps inform the Finance Committee at the Meeting, which he would attend that afternoon: and the whole question could then be discussed by the Conference tomorrow afternoon.

(It was agreed that the question relating to the payment of the coupons of the Austrian Debt, due for payment on 1st March next, should forthwith be referred to the Committee for drafting terms of reference to Financial Committee, whose recommendations would be considered by the Conference on the afternoon of Tuesday, February 25th.)

2. M. Pichon said that the four texts had been circulated in accordance with the Resolution passed on Saturday last, and he called on M. Sonnino to make his remarks.

M. Sonnino called attention to the fact that the words: “and the renunciation of Colonies and territorial rights outside Europe” had been omitted from paragraph 2 (a) of the Resolution relating to Austria-Hungary. He agreed that Austria-Hungary had no Colonies, but Austria certainly had certain territorial rights outside Europe. He proposed, therefore, that the paragraph in question should be made to read as follows:—

(a) The approximate future frontiers of Austria-Hungary and the renunciation of territorial rights outside Europe.

3 See ante, p. 83.
(This was agreed to.)

M. Pichon pointed out that considerable objection had been raised to the use of the words “Preliminary Peace Terms” in Clause 1 of the Draft Resolutions. The view was held that those words implied that whatever might be done under the heading of Preliminary Peace Terms would in some cases, (as in the case of the United States of America), entail a reference to the national legislature. He proposed, therefore, to use the words “Preliminary Conditions” instead of “Preliminary Peace Terms”.

Mr. Lansing enquired what was meant exactly by the words “Preliminary Conditions.”

M. Pichon replied that his definition would be conditions, which did not form part of the Peace Terms. That is to say, the conditions would in reality form part of the Armistice.

Mr. Lansing said that he would very strongly object to any such change.

Mr. Balfour said that he shared Mr. Lansing’s view. But M. Pichon’s contention was that in the case of the United States of America, decisions taken under the heading: “Terms of Peace” would have to be referred to the Senate.

Mr. Lansing explained that in America only a final and negotiated Treaty, after having been signed by the President, had to be submitted to the Senate for approval, before the exchange of ratification. In regard to the provisions inserted in the Resolutions, if these were finally negotiated with Germany, the document containing these conditions would become a Treaty of Peace and ipso facto would have to be submitted to the Senate. Had he wished to raise an objection, it would have been to the use of the word “Preliminary”, but he did not wish to press that point.

(It was agreed to retain the words “Preliminary Peace Terms” in paragraph 1.)

Lord Milner said:

“Speaking for myself, personally, I still think that the final disarmament of Germany, I mean our bringing her down to that degree of strength for war purposes which we are willing to allow her permanently to maintain, is extremely urgent, that it is a step which we ought to take as soon as we possibly can, and that it is a step which when taken, will greatly expedite the acceptance, not only by Germany but by all our enemies, of all other conditions of peace. It is also an absolutely essential preliminary to our own demobilisation on anything like the scale on which we all hope to demobilise.

Till Saturday last I thought we were all agreed upon this. Now I feel some doubt about it. I do not wish to raise any further dis-
discussion over the Resolutions which we are just about to pass. But I hope I am justified in assuming that the passing of these Resolutions does not preclude us from proceeding at once to impose upon Germany those final military, naval and other conditions of a like nature, which Marshal Foch and his colleagues are at present discussing, if when we see them, they commend themselves to us. I hope in other words that it still remains free to any one of us to raise at that juncture the question of their immediate presentation."

M. Sonnino said that he had himself made the same proposal yesterday and it had been opposed.

M. Pichon thought that paragraph 2 gave complete satisfaction to Lord Milner's opinions, since the naval, military and air conditions had been specially excluded. He thought that in accordance with the decision reached on Saturday last, military terms could be discussed and settled as soon as they could be presented by the Commission appointed to draw up the necessary recommendations.

Marshal Foch pointed out that the military conditions would merely define Germany's military situation for the time being. Certain military conditions would be imposed on Germany: but in three or four months when the other conditions would have to be imposed, the moment might be less favourable to the Allies; for whatever military conditions might be imposed on Germany she would still be in a position in due course to reconstitute her army, material means to that end being still available. In addition to the military clauses, it was essential that other clauses relating to frontiers, indemnities, etc., should at the same time be imposed on Germany. That is to say, a summary of the Peace Treaty should forthwith be drawn up and presented to Germany. Otherwise, when the time came to present the final peace terms, the Allies who would have continued to demobilise, would find themselves unprepared to face a re-constituted German army.

M. Tardeu thought that in reality no contradiction existed between Marshal Foch's and Lord Milner's views. He thought the military terms would be ready for discussion in a few days' time, and in accordance with the Resolutions the rest of the conditions would be submitted to the Conference by the 8th March next, so that only a short interval of time would elapse between the settlement of the two sets of questions.

Marshal Foch explained that all he had meant to say was that a connection between the two sets of questions would be necessary.

Mr. House expressed the view that in reality no difference of opinion existed between the Members of the Conference. He suggested that further discussion could be deferred to the time when the necessary reports of the Committees would be received.
(It was agreed to accept the four sets of Resolutions relating to the procedure of the Preliminary Peace Conference, as amended. For full texts see Appendices A(i), A(ii), A(iii) & A(iv).)

(Members of the Albanian Delegation and the experts entered the council Chamber.)

(3) **Touran Pasha** read the following statement:—

(Note—The Statement will be inserted later.)

(The Delegates and experts then withdrew.)

(It was agreed that the questions raised in Touran Pasha’s statement on the Albanian territorial interests in the peace settlement should be referred for examination, in the first instance, to the Committee now examining Grecian problems.

It should be the duty of the Committee to reduce questions for discussion within the narrowest possible limits and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee should be authorised to consult representatives of the peoples concerned.)

(The representatives of the Allied Commission on Poland entered the Council Chamber.)

(4) **M. Pichon** said that it would be within the knowledge of the Conference that M. Noulens, the Chairman of the Allied Commission to Poland, had telegraphed to ask that a division of General Haller’s Army should be sent to Poland as soon as possible, together with complete equipment and a reserve stock of ammunition. The question had been referred to the Polish Liaison Committee, who had submitted the following report:—

“After taking notice of the telegrams 8 and 9 from M. Noulens, the Committee for Polish Affairs in their meeting of February 20th, have been unanimous in expressing the opinion that there was occasion to send to Poland within the shortest possible delay, General Haller’s division, as per request of the Inter-Allied Committee of Warsaw.

General Le Rond observed that, in order that the transportation of the Polish troops might be effected, it was absolutely necessary to occupy Danzig, the only possible landing base, and the railway lines Danzig-Thorn (doubled by waterway) and Danzig-Mlawa. He recalled that the principle of this occupation had been already agreed to previous to the departure of the Inter-Allied Mission for Warsaw.

He ended by saying that pending the settlement of the Eastern frontiers of Germany, the best way to ensure the occupation of Danzig and of the rail-and-water ways would be to exact from the Germans the withdrawal of their troops on this side of a line to be determined: on one hand west of the Danzig-Thorn railway line, on the other hand East of the Danzig-Mlawa railway-line according

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2 It appears as an addendum, p. 111.

3 Polish army in France.
to the procedure which has been applied in Posnania, as the Committee have given their support to the views expressed by General Le Rond, the matter should be referred to the Supreme Allied Council that Marshal Foch may receive instruction."

M. Jules Cambon said that he had little information to add to that contained in the report just read. He had communicated to the members of the Liaison Committee the contents of the telegram received from the Allied Commission in Poland. In addition, General Le Rond, who had attended the meeting as the representative of Marshal Foch, had explained the military situation in Poland. General Le Rond had been asked whether General Haller’s troops could be sent to Poland by land by the southern route. He had replied in the negative, and insisted that the only possible route was the one by Dantzig. To proceed from Dantzig into Poland two lines of railways could be used: the Dantzig-Thorn line, and the Dantzig-Mlawa line. These two railway lines represented a length of some 160 miles, and would have to be militarily occupied. He (M. Cambon) used the word “occupation” to cover any means which might be devised for ensuring security. As a result of General Le Rond’s report, the Committee had reached the conclusion set forth in the report read by M. Pichon, as affording the only practical means of obtaining the desired result.

M. Pichon said that Marshal Foch might perhaps be able to give the general military point of view.

Marshall Foch said that to constitute Poland, an army must be sent. In order to send General Haller’s army, the Allies have reserved to themselves the right by the terms of the Armistice to use the Dantzig-Thorn railway line. That railway line was at present in the occupation of the Germans and therefore, though apparently unavailable for the free transportation of troops, it was in fact the only possible means of communication. Consequently, steps must be taken to make that route available, and only one measure was possible, namely: Allied military control of the line.

On the 11th January, 1919, the Military High Command had suggested to the Supreme War Council the occupation by Allied contingents of the railway lines in question. But the proposal had been rejected, and the Conference of the Great Powers had eventually decided to send an Allied Commission to Warsaw to enquire and report on the possible measures to be taken. So far no definite proposals had been submitted, and the only possible solution appeared to be the following: the eastern boundaries of Germany should forthwith be determined as a line passing to the west of the Thorn-Dantzig railway and at the next meeting with the Germans, they should be required to accept that frontier line and to withdraw their troops behind it. In that way free transit over the Dantzig railway lines would be obtained.
Mr. Balfour said he wished to put a question to Marshal Foch. On the 11th November, 1918, the Allies had obtained the right to use the railway line in question for the purpose of maintaining order in Poland. Consequently, the Germans had no right to take any action along the Dantzig-Thorn line, which would prevent the free exercise by the Allies of the rights granted them. It was therefore merely a case of making the original armistice effective. Consequently, he wished to enquire wherein the difficulty really lay.

On the other hand, he feared another difficulty might arise in connection with the transport of troops to Poland by sea. So far, no mention had been made of that question, either by M. Cambon, or in the report which had been submitted by the Polish Liaison Committee. He wished to enquire, therefore, what decision, if any, had been reached on that point.

M. Jules Cambon replied that the question had been discussed by the Polish Liaison Committee, but Sir William Tyrrell had pointed out that the question had already been studied by the Maritime Transport Council, whose report should be awaited.

Marshal Foch explained that in theory the Allies did possess the right to use the railway lines in question, but in practice a base would in the first place have to be established at Dantzig and, in order to establish a base, some territory would have to be occupied by the Allies. The Allies, however, were not, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, entitled to the occupation of any territory at Dantzig, and the Germans would only grant the request under compulsion. Furthermore, in order to transport the troops, trains would have to be secured, and those would have to be obtained from the Germans, who would probably express their inability to supply them. Finally, the passage of the trains along the railway line would have to be assured, and that implied the military occupation of the railway line. In a word, all these things were unrealisable unless effective occupation were undertaken.

That was the reason why the Military High Command had submitted in January last a proposal to the effect that Allied troops should be sent to that region to supervise all such works. But the Governments had refused.

Mr. Balfour found some difficulty in reconciling the various statements which had been made. Apparently it appeared to be possible to send Allied troops to Dantzig to occupy the town and the railway lines between Dantzig and Thorn without first establishing a base. That being the case, why could not the same thing be done by Polish troops? The Military experts agreed that Allied troops could be sent, followed by Polish troops. Why could not Polish troops be sent straight away?

Marshal Foch explained that it was evident the Germans would
never dare to interfere with Allied troops for fear of energetic retaliatory measures on their western frontier. On the other hand the Germans would naturally raise very violent opposition to an occupation of the line by the Poles, with whom they were at war, especially in view of the fact that the Polish troops were not fully organised.

Mr. Balfour suggested, for the consideration of the military authorities, that a very small contingent of American, French, British and Italian troops should accompany General Haller’s forces. The Germans would then realise that any attack on these forces would immediately be followed by reprisals on their Western front.

Marshal Foch agreed that Mr. Balfour’s plan would no doubt help to make a start. But the best and most effective solution of the difficulty would be, as he had already stated, to fix straight away the Eastern frontiers of Germany, thus freeing the town of Dantzig and the railway lines leading from that port into Poland.

Mr. House stated that it would be necessary for the American representatives to discuss the whole question with General Bliss, and he suggested an adjournment.

Mr. Balfour agreed that the case should be postponed for two reasons. In the first place, it would be necessary to await the report of the Maritime Transport Council, and in the second place, for the reason given by Mr. House. In the face, therefore, of these military and naval reasons, an adjournment became inevitable; but he trusted the matter would be finally disposed of with as little delay as possible.

Sir William Tyrrell explained that General Le Rond had promised to submit a report relating to the transportation of the troops without delay, but, so far, the report in question had not been received.

M. Cambon said that he would undertake to obtain the report from General Le Rond for to-morrow’s meeting, if possible.

M. Pichon, summing up, said that there were two proposals before the Conference, namely—

1. Marshal Foch’s proposal to fix, as soon as possible, the temporary Eastern boundaries of Germany, and
2. The immediate despatch of General Haller’s Army, provided necessary transportation could be made available.

(It was agreed to adjourn the consideration of these two questions to the Meeting to be held on the afternoon of Tuesday, 25th February, 1919, at 3 p. m.)

5. M. Pichon suggested that the following questions should be discussed at the Meeting to be held on the following day:—

Agenda for Next Meeting

1. Austrian Debt: Payment of Coupons due March 1st next.
2. Poland.
(3) Morocco: the Act of Algeciras.

Mr. Lansing enquired how the Moroccan question was to be presented, as it was of importance that his delegation should know what character the discussion would take.

M. Prichon said that a memorandum on this question had been circulated by the French Government, and read the following extract:—

"In the treaty of Peace with Germany, the settlement of the Moroccan question is of especial importance to France. France requests that in the articles of the Peace Treaty, there be stipulated: Firstly, the Repeal of the Algeciras convention imposed by Germany; Secondly, the necessary guarantees to make it impossible for Germany to resume the policy which she has for ten years pursued against France in Morocco."

Mr. Lansing enquired what was meant by the words "imposed by Germany". The Allied and Associated Powers had all participated in the Algeciras Conference and could hardly claim that its terms had been imposed on them by Germany.

(It was agreed that the following questions should be discussed at the Meeting to be held on Tuesday afternoon, 25th February, 1919, at 3 p. m.:—

(1) Austrian Debt: Payment of Coupons due March 1st next.
(2) Poland.
(3) Morocco: the Act of Algeciras.

(The Meeting then adjourned until Tuesday, February 25th, 1919, at 3 p. m.)

Appendix A (i)

Resolution No. I

(Relating to Germany)

1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary Peace Terms with Germany and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.

2. The preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover inter alia the following points:—

(a) the approximate future frontiers of Germany, and the renunciation of colonies and territorial rights outside Europe;
(b) the financial conditions to be imposed on Germany;
(c) the economic conditions to be accorded to Germany;
(d) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.
3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects, it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Germany.


Appendix A (ii)

Resolution No. II

(Relating to Austria-Hungary)

(As Amended—See I. C. 148 [BC–38], Minute 2)

1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary Peace Terms with Austria-Hungary and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.

2. The Preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover inter alia the following points:

(a) the approximate future frontiers of Austria-Hungary and the renunciation of territorial rights outside Europe;
(b) the financial conditions to be imposed on Austria-Hungary;
(c) the economic conditions to be accorded to Austria-Hungary;
(d) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.

3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects, it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Austria-Hungary.

Paris, 22nd February, 1919.
Appendix A (iii)

Resolution No. III

(Relating to Bulgaria)

1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary Peace Terms with Bulgaria and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.

2. The preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions should inter alia cover the following points:

   (a) the approximate future frontiers of Bulgaria;
   (b) the financial arrangements to be imposed on Bulgaria;
   (c) the economic conditions to be accorded to Bulgaria;
   (d) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.

3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Bulgaria.

Paris, 22nd February, 1919.

Appendix A (iv)

Resolution No. IV

(Relating to Turkey)

1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary Peace Terms with Turkey and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.

2. The preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover inter alia the following points:

   (a) the approximate future frontiers of Turkey;
   (b) the financial arrangements to be imposed on Turkey;
   (c) the economic conditions to be accorded to Turkey;
   (d) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.

3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the
Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Turkey.

PARIS, 22nd February, 1919.

Addendum

ALBANIAN CLAIMS

Statement by Touran Pasha

Refer to Page 8, 4 BC–38, Report for February 24, 1919

The Albanians base all their hopes on the justice of this High Assembly, on whom they rely utterly. They trust that the principle of nationality so clearly and solemnly proclaimed by President Wilson and his great Associates will not have been proclaimed in vain, and that their rights—which have, up to now, been trampled underfoot—will be respected by the Congress whose noble mission it is to dower humanity with a peace which, to be durable, must be based on right and justice.

It was the Congress of Berlin which first of all denied the rights of the Albanian nation. The reasons therefor are explained by the fact that Albania, unlike other Balkan nations, has never had any protectors, and also by Albania’s very advantageous geographical position, which has from time immemorial excited the cupidity of her neighbours.

The Treaty of Berlin 5 deprived Albania of the territories of Antivari, Hoti, Grouda, Triopchi, Kichi, Podgoritza, Plava and Goussigne, to the benefit of Montenegro; and of a part of Southern Albania (Epirus) between the Gulf of Proveza and the Kalamas River, to the benefit of Greece. This flagrant injustice led the Albanians to form the Prizrend Patriotic League, which opposed the handing over of the territories of Plava, Goussigne, Hoti, and Grouda by force of arms. The Great Powers thereupon gave Montenegro the port of Dulcigne in compensation for those territories, which the Albanians retained. This compensation was carried out by means of a naval demonstration, well known under the name of “Dulcigne Naval Demonstration”.

In the south, the Prizrend League made the same energetic resistance. The International Commission which came to Preveza to

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4 See minute 3, p. 104.
5 Foreign Relations, 1878, p. 895.
carry out the transfer of Albanian territory to Greece met with popular resistance, and had to leave the country without fulfilling its ungrateful task. On the strength of its report, the Powers who had signed the Treaty of Berlin were obliged to acknowledge as Albanian the region which they had decided to cede to Greece, and fixed the Greek frontier at the Arta River.

The Treaty of Berlin has justly been called “Albania’s Funeral Treaty”. Nevertheless, the mutilations made by it might be called scratches, when compared with those later inflicted on Albania by the Conference of London of 1913. This Conference not only settled the Kalamas line (repudiated by the Albanians, as stated above), but also gave Greece the whole region from Arta to Cape Stilos. This region, which is known as the Chameria and is between 30 and 40 kilometres long, had a population of 63,000 before the Balkan War—40,000 being Albanians, 14,000 Christian Albanians, and 9,000 Greeks (or speaking Greek among themselves).

To the North, the Conference gave Montenegro and Serbia the territories of Kraya and Anamalit and the clans of Hoti and Groudja, the districts of Plava, Gousagne and Ipek, the Eastern part of the Mitrovitsa district, the districts of Prichina, Guilan, Ferizovitch and Kachanik, part of the Uskub district, and the districts of Prizrend, Kalkandelen, Gostivar, Karchevia, Dibra, Struga and Ohrida. The Albanian population of these districts, which are situated in the ancient vilayets of Kossova and Monastir, forms an 80% majority over the Slav elements. We therefore claim all these territories, which were torn from us by the Treaty of Berlin and the Conference of London of 1913.

Kossovo, also known as Old Serbia, has been inhabited by Albanians from time immemorial. The Serbs only appeared there in the 7th century, but could never establish their mastery owing to continual insurrections by the Albanians and to Bulgar rivalry.

Serbian preponderance in the Kossovo region has always been transitory, and in spite of Serbian oppression and persecution the large majority of its population has always been Albanian. The Serbian population which has penetrated there forms a minority of only 15%.

During the last few years and especially in 1910, 1911, and 1912, the Albanians attempted to regain their independence by insurrections. In 1912, 18,000 Albanians of Kossovo captured the town of Uskub after a desperate struggle against the Turkish Army, and compelled Turkey to grant them certain concessions.

The Ottoman Government was about to own the justice of Albanian aspirations by granting autonomous administration to part of Albania comprising the vilayets of Kossovo, Scutari and Yaninia, and part of the vilayet of Monastir. The Balkan States realised the weakness of a Turkey unable to subdue the Albanians, and feared the creation
of an autonomous Albanian state in territory which they had long desired to possess. They therefore hastened to declare war against Turkey, and so the Albanians were unable to benefit by the concessions which they had won by armed force.

At the time of the territorial readjustment of the Balkans in 1913, our country was sacrificed for the sake of its neighbours, because the imminent danger of a European conflagration had to be averted at all costs. But now that the conflagration is over and the questions connected therewith are being settled by the triumph of the rights of nationalities, we are fully convinced that the rich districts which are wholly Albanian and as such necessary to the existence of Albania, will in justice be restored to their mother country.

Even though small foreign minorities must inevitably be included within the boundaries of the State of Albania, large groups of Albanians will, on the other hand, remain outside its boundaries.

The Conference is certain to appreciate the difference between our own legitimate desire for the return of brother Albanians to the Albanian family and the unjust claims of our neighbours, who, not content with having snatched from us so much wholly Albanian territory by force, now ask permission from the Congress to take yet more away.

Thus Greece claims the part of Southern Albania called Northern Epirus, arguing that it has a population of 120,000 Greeks and 80,000 Albanians. We dispute these figures, and maintain that the pro-Greek population of that region does not exceed 20,000 inhabitants. These 20,000 inhabitants live in the valley of Drinopoli and the plain (Vourse) of Delvino; they are farmers who possess neither fields nor houses, but cultivate the land belonging to the Albanians.

It is also argued that all orthodox Albanians should be considered Greeks, regardless of nationality. This empty claim has naturally induced the Greek clergy to make their religion an instrument of oppression and tyranny.

The League of Prizrend had wrung from Turkey permission to open an Albanian school at Koritza; but the Greek clergy excommunicated orthodox parents who sent their children to this school, and denounced them to the Ottoman Government as conspirators against the State.

By this means they procured the deportation and imprisonment of many heads of Albanian families and led to the said school being closed.

As the Ottoman Government, for its part, brought the same pressure to bear on Mussulman parents to prevent them from sending their children to the Albanian school, the Greek clergy were in this instance allies of the Ottoman Government against patriotic Albanians.

Those who consider orthodox Albanians as Greeks urge that it would
be unjust to attempt to subject a Christian majority, with a superior civilisation, to a Mussulman minority with an inferior civilisation.

There can be no question of a difference of civilisation between children of the same race who live together under the same conditions, speak the same language, and have the same customs. If orthodox Albanians have attended Greek schools, Mussulman and Catholic Albanians denied the right to be taught in their native tongue have, on the other hand, attended Turkish, French, Italian, English and American schools.

Much emphasis is laid on the Greek sympathies of orthodox Albanians. In contradiction to this we bring forward the opinion of Lord Hobhouse, who accompanied Lord Byron to Albania and at the beginning of the 19th century wrote as follows concerning the populations forming the Ottoman Empire:

"Only the Albanians are conscious of nationality; all the other peoples of the Empire are grouped according to religion."

Monsieur Aubaret, French delegate on the Commission for Eastern Roumelia, says in a Memorandum presented to the said Commission on August 18th, 1880:—

"They (the Albanians) live in complete unity; they are Albanian before everything else. If it is true that the Catholics are warmly attached to their religion, it is not less true that both they and their Mussulman fellow-countrymen value national consciousness, love of the soil and respect for old customs very highly, and put them before all other considerations."

In "L'Illustration" of 7th April, 1917, M. Vaucher writes concerning the Koritza district:—

"Albania for the Albanians is the motto of all the inhabitants of this rich plain of Koritza . . .

"For two months (as a Republic) the Albanians have . . . shown that they are capable of living on good terms with one another. There are no more religious quarrels, for the excellent reason that there is nobody now to stir them up."

Our opponents claim precisely that part of Albania which was burnt out by the Cretan bands of Zographos and disguised Greek soldiers under the command of Greek officers. This is clearly shown by the sketch which I have the honour to submit to you, and which gives the names of the villages concerned.

It is a curious fact that the Greeks set fire to precisely those villages which they considered and still consider Greek. On this subject M. Vaucher, correspondent of "L'Illustration," writes:—

"The whole region of Kolonia has been laid waste since Greek bands passed through it in 1913. Names marked on the map are

*Not filed with the minutes.
merely memories, for in reality they are only represented by shapeless ruins marking the site of Mussulman villages."

The Greeks are probably claiming Northern Epirus in order to intimidate the Albanians and make them renounce their just claim to Southern Epirus and especially to the Chameria district, which is essentially Albanian.

At a time when our opponents maintain that the orthodox Albanians of Northern Epirus desire to be united to Greece, the Vlachs of Pindus (who, nevertheless, have experienced Greek rule) are asking for union with Albania. How can these two desires be reconciled?

How can one admit that the Albanians wish to disown their fellow-countrymen, when a foreign community like the Vlachs, which has lived under Greek rule, asks nothing better than to be united to Albania?

Taught by suffering, Albania in her reconstituted form will feel it incumbent upon her to live in perfect unity, in a spirit of wide tolerance, and she will allow foreign minorities all rights granted to them by the most civilised countries.

The southern boundary line of Albania seems to have been drawn by nature; it is the chain of the Gramos and Pindus mountains. This is the only boundary corresponding to the defensive and economic requirements of a country as weak as Albania.

If Albania had been free to act, she would certainly have offered to help the Allies by every means in her power. Until the country was invaded by the enemy she put all available resources at the disposal of the Allies, by helping and feeding Serbian troops during their retreat through Albanian territory.

This help given to Serbian troops gains a new significance in view of the atrocities and systematic massacres perpetrated on the Albanian population of Kossovo by those same Serbian troops during and after the Balkan wars. They also burnt numerous Albanian villages, as all European press correspondents reported at the time.

The Albanians were of the greatest assistance to the Italian and French troops after their arrival in Albania, and furthermore refused to form auxiliary Albanian corps in Southern Albania, in spite of all the promises made them by Austria and a Balkan State.

The Conference desires to lay the foundations of a lasting peace. There can be no such peace in the Balkans unless the rights of nationalities are respected.

If, for instance, the Congress, contrary to this principle, were to confirm the dismemberment so unfortunately effected in 1878 and 1913, the country would never enjoy the peace which is essential to its economic development. Such a proceeding would, moreover, give rise to periodical crises in Greece and Serbia, neither of which could
absorb an Albanian majority so proud of its independence and so deeply attached to its national traditions. Such a situation would stir up continual disturbances along the frontiers of the Albanian State.

The excesses and massacres suffered by the Albanian populations inhabiting districts annexed by the above-named States give just cause to fear the fate in store for them, and their only hope of peace would be emigration or death.

The probable fate recalls the words of Tacitus: “Ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant”.
Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 25th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing
Hon. H. White

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.

Secretaries
Mr. E. Phipps

FRANCE

M. Pichon
M. J. Cambon

Secretaries
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn

ITALY

H. E. Baron Sonnino
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi

Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

ALSO PRESENT

PRESENT DURING QUESTIONS 1, 2 AND 3

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. Meses
Mr. Beer

FRANCE

Marshal Foch
General Weygand
M. de Peretti

ITALY

M. Galli

JAPAN

M. Otchial

PRESENT DURING QUESTIONS 1 AND 2 ONLY

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. E. M. House
General Tasker H. Bliss
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. Auchincloss

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir W. Tyrrell, K. C. M. G., C. B.
Lt. Col. Kisch, D. S. O.

FRANCE

M. Degrand
M. Hermitte
Lieut. de Percin

ITALY

H. E. General Diaz
General Cavallero

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 1 ONLY

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Klotz.
ITALY
H. E. M. Crespi.
PRESENT DURING QUESTION 2 ONLY
ITALY
Marquis della Torretta.
PRESENT DURING QUESTION 3 ONLY
BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.
Col. R. Meinertzhagen, D. S. O.
FRANCE
M. Tardieu.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF .......... Lieut. Chester Burden
BRITISH EMPIRE .................. Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O
FRANCE ......................... Captain A. Portier
ITALY ......................... Lieut. Zanchi
JAPAN ......................... M. Saburi

Interpreter: Prof. P. J. Mantoux

(1) M. Pichon called on M. Crespi to report to the Conference the results of the reference to the "Committee for drafting terms of reference to Financial Committee" relative to the payment of the March Coupons of the Austrian Debt.

M. Crespi said that the question had been raised yesterday by Mr. Balfour and the broad facts of the case were therefore well known to the members of the Conference. The coupons, which fell due for payment on 1st March, 1919, represented a sum of Two Hundred and Eighty Millions of Crowns. The Committee for drafting terms of reference to the Financial Committee had prepared the following draft telegram to be addressed to the late Austrian Empire Financial Conference about to be held at the Ballplatz, Vienna:

"The Allied and Associated Governments are informed that there is some danger that when the coupons of the Austro-Hungarian loans fall due on March 1st, they will not be paid owing to the inability of the Austrian Government, the Hungarian Government and the other Governments concerned to come to an understanding as to the respective quotas due on such payments. The Allied and Associated Governments declare that as far as they are concerned any arrangement now made with regard to the payment of the coupons in March out of common funds will not prejudice in any way the settlement by the Peace Conference of the quotas to be imputed to each for the Austro-Hungarian debt."
A copy of the telegram had been circulated in English, French and Italian, the English being the original official text.

Mr. Balfour said he had nothing to add to what had been stated by M. Crespi. He was perfectly agreeable that the proposed telegram should be sent: but he did not pretend to be an expert on the subject. He wished to enquire, however, who would send the telegram.

M. Pichon said that the telegram would be sent by the French Foreign Office in the name of the five Great Powers. In addition, each Great Power could, if it so wished, send a copy of the telegram to its own representatives in Vienna.

Mr. Balfour agreed and said that the British Government would forward a copy of the telegram to the British Military Mission in Vienna.

(It was agreed that a copy of the following telegram¹ should be addressed by the French Foreign Office in the name of the five Great Powers to the Gesamter Konferenz, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ballplatz, Vienna:—

"The Allied and Associated Governments are informed that there is some danger that when the coupons of the Austro-Hungarian loans fall due on March 1st, they will not be paid owing to the inability of the Austrian Government, the Hungarian Government and the other Governments concerned to come to an understanding as to the respective quotas due on such payments.

The Allied and Associated Governments declare that as far as they are concerned any arrangement now made with regard to the payment of the coupons in March out of common funds will not prejudice in any way the settlement by the Peace Conference of the quotas to be imputed to each for the Austro-Hungarian debt."

The British Delegation would also send a copy of the same telegram to the British Military Mission in Vienna.)

(2) M. Cambon informed the Conference that no report had yet

¹The "Brief Summary" of the minutes of this meeting (BC-39a) and the telegraphic report of the meeting from the American Mission to the Department of State give the address and text of this telegram as follows:

"Gesandten Konferenz, p. a. Stantsamt des Eueneren, 1 Ball Platz, Vienna.

The Allied and Associated Governments understand that there is some risk that the coupons payable first March on the Austro-Hungarian loans will not be paid, owing to inability of the Austrian, Hungarian and other governments concerned to arrive at an agreement as to their respective liabilities to contribute towards payment.

The Allied and Associated Governments declare that so far as they are concerned any action taken now with regard to the payment of the March coupon from the common fund will not prejudice the settlement at the Peace Conference of the distribution of the liability for the Austro-Hungarian debt."

(Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/46)
been received on the subject of the transportation of General Haller’s troops by sea to Dantzig. Apparently some misunderstanding had occurred yesterday. The question was being studied by the Allied Maritime Transport Council in London, and not by the International Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission in Paris. General Weygand would, however, be able to make a statement on this subject.

General Weygand said that the question of the transport of troops by sea to Dantzig had formed the subject of a study by the French General Staff. To give some indication of the magnitude of the shipping problem involved, he would quote the following figures:—suppose twenty ships of 5,000 tons each could be made available, the transfer of the four Polish Divisions, now in course of formation, would take three months, provided a continuous circulation of the ships were arranged. On the other hand, if transport of the troops were to be completed in two months, the period required for the complete organisation of the four Polish Divisions, twenty-seven ships of 5,000 tons each would be required for the purpose. Those figures would provide a basis for an appreciation of the problem. The problem, however, was far more complex. Provision would have to be made for the transport of the necessary horses required by the four divisions. But, if horses could be found in Poland, then with the same twenty ships the transport could be completed in two months instead of three months. Furthermore, the harbour accommodation at Dantzig must be sufficient to cope with the requirements of the case. In his opinion the Allied Commission in Poland should be asked to report on the following two questions, namely:

1. Number of horses obtainable in Poland to meet requirements of General Haller’s Divisions.

2. The accommodation available for disembarkation of troops at the Port of Dantzig.

Mr. Balfour agreed that an enquiry to that effect should be sent to the Allied Commission in Poland. In addition, however, he thought that an enquiry should be sent to the Allied Maritime Transport Council in London regarding the supply of the ships required for the transport of the troops in question.

M. Picton expressed the view that a question of principle still remained unsettled, namely, the military conditions to be fulfilled. The view had been expressed by Marshal Foch that the military occupation of the railway line between Dantzig and Thorn by Allied troops would be necessary, otherwise the Poles would always be liable to attack by the Germans. A question had been put by Mr. Balfour as to whether small Allied contingents could not be sent to accompany the Polish troops. Thereto Marshal Foch had replied that such an arrangement would undoubtedly help matters; but it
would not guarantee the safety of the Polish troops. Consequently, the question as to what could be done to secure the safety of the Polish troops in transit from Dantzig to Poland still remained to be settled. Marshal Foch had expressed the view that the best plan would be straightaway to fix the Eastern frontier of Germany.

Marshal Foch agreed that that would undoubtedly be the best solution. Whatever measures might be taken to ensure the transport of the troops by sea to Dantzig, the Allies would still be faced with other problems connected with the disembarkation of the troops at Dantzig, and their transport along the railway lines from Dantzig to Thorn, and from Dantzig to Mlawa, since the Port of Dantzig and the railway lines were under control of the Germans. The Port and the railway lines could be occupied by the Allies, but that solution would cause great difficulties, would entail great expense, and would not appeal to all of the Allied nations. Consequently, it was not a practicable solution. The second solution would be to fix the Eastern Frontiers of Germany at the next meeting with M. Erzberger, and so free the Port and the railway lines of all German control.

The present difficult situation of the German Government was well known; internal troubles were daily increasing; at Mannheim, Carlruhe, Baden and Düsseldorf, the Soviet movement was rapidly extending. At the present moment Germany would therefore accept any terms that the Allies might demand. The German Government only asked for a Peace. That was the only thing that would satisfy the people and enable the Government to master the situation.

In his opinion, whatever attempt might be made to settle the situation in the East would be fruitless until the Western question had been settled. It was imperative, in his opinion, that the account with Germany should forthwith be settled in a summary manner by fixing the Frontiers and by assessing the sums due on account of indemnities and reparations. It should be realised without disillusionments that in the year 1918 a favourable situation on the Western Front had only been created as a result of victory; but since the Armistice had been signed, the Allies had been marking time in the West, and they had lost ground in the East. Consequently, the situation on the Western Front should forthwith be settled so that all the resources in men and material thus set free could be made available for the solution of the Eastern problem.

In Russia at the present moment Bolshevism and complete anarchy reigned, and sooner or later these Russian questions must be solved, otherwise the fruits of victory would be lost, either through the cementing of an alliance between Germany and Russia, or through the spread of Bolshevism in Germany. On the other hand, if care-
fully considered, the Eastern problem would not be more difficult to solve than the Western problem. From 1812 up to 1917, Russia had ever been the burial ground of every government and of every army that had attempted to enter the country without first establishing sufficient bases and sufficient lines of communication, and without an adequate number of men. A war in that country had to be carried on under very special difficulties, due to the enormous extent of country that had to be penetrated, occupied, and defended.

Mr. Lansing, intervening, enquired whether when Marshal Foch had spoken of settling the Allies' difficulties in the West, he had meant that the Allies should forthwith enter into a Treaty of Peace with the Germans.

Marshal Foch replied that what he had meant had been that the Preliminaries of Peace must be signed, and that could be done with Germany alone in a fortnight's time: and the same thing could be done as soon as possible with the other enemy countries. In other words, his plan would be to settle all the important outstanding questions on the Western side in order to enable the Allies to use the resources thus made available for the solution of the Eastern questions.

The difficulties which the Allies had to face in Russia were due, not only to the enormous distances, to which he had already referred, but also to the nature of the enemy that had to be dealt with. The enemy might be badly organised, but he was scattered over an enormous territory, acting like a violent virus. Now to fight against such an enemy, troops of a particular composition were required; and in great numbers in order to cover the whole territory involved. But those troops need not be strongly organised or of superior quality. The necessary conditions would be fulfilled by the employment of such armies as might be raised locally in the countries of Eastern Europe. For instance, the Polish troops would be quite able to face the Russians, provided the former were strengthened by the supply of modern appliances and engines of war. But great numbers were required, which could be obtained by mobilising the Finns, Poles, Czechs, Roumanians and Greeks, as well as the Russian pro-Ally elements still available.

These young troops, in themselves not well organised, (though better organised than the Bolsheviks), would, if placed under a unique command, yield a total force sufficient to subdue the Bolshevik forces and to occupy their territory.

If this were done, 1919 would see the end of Bolshevism, just as 1918 had seen the end of Prussianism. But in order to attain that object, just as the Allies had a base on the Western front, the Rhine, which enabled them to impose their will on Germany, so would it be necessary to constitute a similar base on the Eastern
side, consisting of a chain of independent states—the Finns, the Estonians, the Poles, the Czechs and the Greeks. The constitution of such a base would enable the Allies to impose their demands on the Bolsheviks.

Finally, to enable the Allies to transfer their resources from the Western base to the Eastern base, an end would have to be put to all further discussions on the West by imposing on Germany the Preliminaries of Peace, which she would be bound at the present moment to accept.

Mr. House enquired from Marshal Foch whether he thought a preliminary peace with the Germans should be hurried on, to include the determination of the eastern boundaries of Germany besides including a summary decision of the military conditions, and questions relating to frontiers, finance and reparation; the whole to be disposed of simultaneously.

Marshal Foch replied that Mr. House had correctly stated his views.

Mr. Balfour said that everybody must admit that Marshal Foch had made a speech covering a wide field and of far reaching importance. On the other hand, the proposition which he (Mr. Balfour) had moved yesterday was that the Polish division now in France should be sent to Poland: a small and modest suggestion involving no particular question of principle at all. On that narrow foundation Marshal Foch had started out to build a great plan stretching from the Rhine to Vladivostock, which involved the immediate conclusion of the preliminary terms of peace with Germany.

He (Mr. Balfour) was most anxious to hasten the conclusion of the preliminary terms of peace. He had, himself, moved a proposition with that object in view. He could not, therefore, be accused of hampering the attainment of that object. But when Marshal Foch asked the Conference to defer the sending of a Polish division to Poland until the preliminaries of peace had been concluded with Germany, he evidently underrated the difficulties of the latter task. A discussion with a view to bringing about a preliminary peace could hardly be brought to a satisfactory conclusion unless three or four such questions as the following were first settled, that is to say: financial questions, the question relating to the left bank of the Rhine, the question of Danzig, etc., questions which could hardly be settled before President Wilson's return to Paris. No doubt other questions connected with the future frontiers of Germany could practically be settled in President Wilson's absence. For instance, the frontiers between France and Germany, the frontiers between Denmark and Germany and the frontiers between Poland and Germany excluding Danzig.
On the other hand, the Conference could not move a step until the reports of the Allied Commissions, which were now at work on these problems, had been received. Those reports could not, however, be expected before the 8th March next. The Conference would then have a week to consider those reports before the return of President Wilson, and during that time no doubt some spade work could be done. It was evident, however, that, if the dates suggested by him were correct, it would be impossible to have the preliminary terms of peace ready, covering finance, disarmament, future maritime conditions, the question of the left bank of the Rhine, territories adjoining Alsace-Lorraine, Dantzig, etc., regarding which well-informed people held very divergent views. It would be impossible to draft a peace, involving all these questions, at the earliest before the end of March, and even that would be a very sanguine estimate. He would, therefore, press for the acceptance of his original proposal. It would be impossible to wait five or six weeks, which appeared to be the shortest time within which the preliminaries of peace could be drawn up, before sending to Poland the Polish troops which were so urgently required.

As regards Marshal Foch’s plan to mobilise the whole of Eastern Europe, the Finns, the Estonians, the Poles, the Roumanians and the Greeks into a great anti-Bolshevik army to be hurled against Russia, he had no objections to offer, as he was not qualified to express an opinion. But the plan undoubtedly dealt with tremendous issues: it could not be regarded as part of the accepted policy of the five Great Powers, and the Conference could not be asked to settle that question before deciding to carry out the small and most desirable operation of sending General Haller’s army to Poland. He fully agreed with Marshal Foch that not a single hour should be lost in settling the preliminary terms of peace, since a settlement of that question would help to solve all other problems. On the other hand, the question of sending troops to Poland must, for the moment, be dissociated from the greater question of policy raised by Marshal Foch: a question which must await the receipt of the recommendations of the various Allied Commissions and the return of President Wilson.

MARSHAL FOCH said he did not object to the idea of sending a division to Dantzig with as little delay as possible. But, at the present moment, the wish could hardly be realised, as the gates of Dantzig were closed. The Allied Commission in Poland could be asked if the thing were possible. But he, himself, could not see how the Poles, who were at war with Germany, could disembark in a German town. He quite agreed with Mr. Balfour that troops should be sent, but for the moment he failed to see how it could be done, and some other solution of the difficulty might have to be found.
Lord Milner enquired whether it would not be possible to open the gates of Danzig, if closed, by giving an order to Germany to open them. Marshal Foch had stated that on the west front an effective source of pressure on Germany could be exercised, especially as Germany would be unable to refuse to accept demands, which the Allies had a perfect right by the terms of the Armistice to make. Would it not, therefore, be sufficient to say to Germany: “Let these Polish troops through, or we shall attack on the western front?”

Mr. House expressed the view that it would be well to ask the Allied Commission in Poland, who were in touch with the Germans, to report exactly what views the Germans held regarding this matter. He thought a dispatch should be framed to the Allied Commission asking for a definite answer.

Marshal Foch agreed, and said that he had himself intended to propose the despatch of a telegram to the Allied Commission in Poland, embodying, inter alia, the following four questions:—

1. Whether the transport of troops by the Danzig-Thorn route was possible without previous occupation of the port of Danzig and the railway lines by Allied contingents.
2. The capacity and resources of the port of Danzig for disembarkation of troops.
3. Transport facilities and rolling stock available on the Danzig-Thorn and Danzig-Mlawa railway lines.
4. Whether horses could be obtained in Poland to meet the requirements of the troops to be despatched.

As the Allied Commission in Poland was in touch with the Germans, it would be in a position to reply after consulting the latter.

M. Pichon understood that Marshal Foch’s proposal was accepted. Under the circumstances, he would ask Marshal Foch at once to draft the necessary telegram, which would be sent in the name of the five Great Powers to the Allied Commission in Poland. At the same time, he would point out that the Commission would only be in a position to supply information; it could not carry on negotiations. The question to be put to the Germans could, however, be based on the terms of the armistice which permitted the Allies to use the railway lines in question. Negotiations could only be carried out by Marshal Foch.

M. Sonnino invited attention to the fact that certain Polish contingents, numbering some 10,000 to 12,000 men were now in Italy. The question did not perhaps arise at the present moment, as it was intended merely to ask for a report on the possibilities of the Danzig route to Poland. He wished, however, to bring the fact to the notice of the Conference.

M. Cambon suggested that, in drafting the telegram, the Allied
Commission should be invited to carry out the necessary enquiries through the medium of General Dupont, the Chief of the French Military Mission in Berlin, as he was already on the spot, and had ready access to the competent German authorities.

After a short interval, Marshal Foch submitted the following telegram to be despatched to the Allied Mission in Poland. The telegram was approved, Marshal Foch being requested to forward the same:

"In accordance with the terms of Clause XVI of the Armistice of 11th November, 1918, the Allies have free access to all territories evacuated by the Germans on their Eastern front, either by way of Dantzig or by the Vistula, both for the purpose of sending supplies to the populations and for the purpose of maintaining order.

Taking advantage of this clause, the Allied and Associated Governments intend shortly to transport to Poland the Polish troops now in France and in Italy. These troops will disembark at Dantzig, whence they will proceed by rail via Thorn and Mlawa.

The Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw is requested to inform the Allied and Associated Governments:

(1) Whether the proposed disembarkation of troops at Dantzig and their transportation by rail can be guaranteed by the German Government without the necessity of securing this guarantee by a previous occupation of Dantzig and of the railways by Allied contingents.

(2) What are the capacities of and the material facilities available at the port of Dantzig, both as regards the establishment of a base and the disembarkation of troops.

(3) What quantity of transport is available, especially as regards rolling stock on the Dantzig-Thorn and Dantzig-Mlawa lines, and also on the Polish lines connecting with them.

(4) As the transport of Polish troops could be greatly expedited by the exclusion of horses, it is important to know whether any of the horses required could be obtained in Poland.

The Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw should, as in the case of previous negotiations, avail itself of the services of General Dupont as intermediary."

Mr. Balfour enquired whether a telegram should not also be sent to the Allied Maritime Council in London, asking it to furnish a plan in the event of the transportation of troops by sea being decided on.

It was agreed that the following telegram should be sent to the War Cabinet by the British Delegation for communication to the Allied Maritime Council in London:

"The Council at the Quai d'Orsay this afternoon decided to refer to the Allied Maritime Transport Council the preparation of a plan for the shipment at an early date of General Haller's Polish army from France to Dantzig en route to Poland. The Commission of the Allied
and Associated Powers in Poland has been instructed to communicate
details as to the capacity of the port of Danzig and the railways
serving it. I understand that the Ministry of Shipping are in posses-
sion of the facts regarding the numbers of General Haller’s army but
the number of horses to be shipped will depend on information to
be furnished by the Commission in Poland. Please ask Secretary,
Allied Maritime Transport Council, to take the matter up. The
Proces-verbal of this part of the meeting will in due course be sent to
the Secretary, Allied Maritime Transport Council."

(3) M. Pichon called on M. de Peretti to explain the views of the
French Government on the Moroccan question with special references
to the Act of Algeciras.2

M. De Peretti then read the following statement:

(Statement will be circulated later.) 3

Mr. White said that as a signatory of the Act of Algeciras he
had listened with great interest to M. de Peretti’s statement and,
as far as his knowledge went, the facts appeared to him to have
been fairly and accurately stated. In signing the Act of Algeciras
the United States had made the following reservations:

"The Government of the United States of America had no politi-
cal interests in Morocco and had taken part in the present Confer-
ence with no other desire or intention than to assist in assuring to
all the nations in Morocco the most complete equality in matters of
commerce, treatment, and privileges and in facilitating the intro-
duction into that Empire of requirements which should bring about
a general state of well-being founded on the perfect cordiality of
her foreign relations, and stable internal administrative declara-
tions— that in subscribing to the regulations and declarations of
the Conference by the act of signing the General Acts subject to
ratification according to constitutional procedure of the additional
protocol and in consenting to the abrogation of American rights and
interests in Morocco, it assumes no obligation or responsibility as
to the measures which may be necessary for the enforcement of the
said regulations and declarations."

He had heard with great pleasure the statement made by M. de
Peretti that France intended to observe the open door in Morocco.
M. de Peretti had also made a statement to the effect that France
would demand compensation for her sacrifices. He wished to en-
quire whether that meant that France would require special con-
cessions for herself. However: as long as the open door was
maintained, the United States had no objections to offer in principle
to the proposals made by France. She would, however, reserve her
final adhesion until the wording of the clauses to be inserted in the
Peace Treaty had been made known.

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2 See addendum, p. 131.
MR. BALFOUR said that it would perhaps be unnecessary for him to say anything concerning the interests of Great Britain in Morocco, because her special interest in that country had ceased after the signing of the Treaty of 1904. Furthermore, Great Britain did not now wish to take advantage of any conditions which Germany might now be compelled to renounce, to extract advantages which Britain had deliberately given up by the earlier treaties. He was glad to hear that it was the fixed intention of France to perpetuate the policy of the open door which would be extended to all countries, including Great Britain. It was not, however, from the point of view of Great Britain that he wished to put a question on the international aspect of the case. It was possible he might have misunderstood some of the details of the case: but the Treaty under consideration was apparently one in which many Powers, both Allied and Neutral, were concerned, other than those represented at the Conference.

In regard to a Treaty in which so many parties were concerned he did not know what international rule would apply when one or two of the parties in question had gone to war. It was clear that Germany and Austria could no longer possess any rights; and no one would wish to defend rights which Germany had obtained by abusing her power and threatening the world with war.

In regard to the exact relation, which the proposals made that afternoon would have in connection with other parties such as Spain, he would like to enquire whether the Peace Conference had any right without consulting Spain to remove or abrogate a Treaty in which Spanish interests appeared to be very intimately concerned.

It had been stated that by one or other of the Treaties France had been given the protectorate over the whole of Morocco including the Spanish sphere of influence and Tangiers. That might be so, but by those same instruments, Spain had also been given a sphere of influence in which she had similar rights to those claimed by France elsewhere. He could not say which view was right, but Spain conceived herself to have claims equal to those of France and other countries in Tangiers. Whether Spain exercised those rights to the benefit of mankind, whether the laxity of her administration had permitted the Germans to make Morocco a base for submarine warfare, he did not know. But did the Assembly of the five Great Powers now meeting in Paris to deal with problems between the Allies and the Central Powers, have the right to deal with claims which Spain possessed under those Treaties with which it was proposed to deal so drastically.

The five Great Powers were there as guardians of the Treaty rights of the world. Therefore he would deeply regret if anything were

done which might have the appearance of an attempt to impose conditions on neutrals, apparently depriving them of their rights.

It was imperative, therefore, that great care should be taken in moving in the matter. He did not know what form of conclusion should be reached. But it was impossible that day to deal with other parts of the proposal beyond these which took away from Germany and Austria the things they had legitimately lost. In any case, the consideration of the parts dealing with international and allied parties would have to be postponed until the Conference had time to consider the proposals put before them.

In conclusion he wished to make one more observation. He was reminded that the Spanish sphere and the internationalisation of Tangiers did not depend on the treaties of 1905, 1909, 1911, and 1912, but on the treaty between France and Spain of 1904. Under Article 1 of that Treaty Spain adhered to the terms of the Anglo-French Treaty; Article 2 defined the Spanish sphere of influence and Article 9 dealt with the town of Tangiers. Those Treaties could not be said to have been forced on Spain, France and Europe since the claims of Spain against France and Great Britain went back to the Treaty of 1904.

M. de Peretti expressed his satisfaction at the complete agreement which appeared to exist between Great Britain, America and France on the question of the clauses concerning Morocco to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Germany. For the moment the French Government did not ask for anything more. In reply to Mr. White's enquiries in regard to the privileges which France claimed, he could assure him that he had merely referred to those moral privileges which devolve on a well-educated country in its relations with a less educated people. No other privileges were claimed by France. Mr. White had also expressed his approval of the maintenance of the "open door". Not only did France intend to maintain this, but no discrimination would be shown between one country and another, all being placed on an equal footing.

The statements made by Mr. Balfour were quite correct, and the French Government held exactly the same views. There was no question of imposing anything on any country not represented at the Conference. All that France asked was that the Powers represented at the Conference should voluntarily renounce the privileges which they had acquired by the Act of Algeciras, which privileges would be ac-

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* Franco-German declaration of February 8, 1909, Great Britain, Cd. 6010, Morocco No. 5 (1911).
* French-German convention of November 4, 1911, *ibid.*, No. 6.
* Great Britain, Cd. 6010, Morocco No. 2 (1911).
corded to them by the declaration he had that afternoon made on behalf of the French Government. The rest merely concerned France and Spain.

Mr. Balfour had referred to the Treaty of 1904. That Treaty had, however, been modified by the Franco-Spanish Treaty signed on the 27th November, 1912, which defined the Spanish sphere of influence within the French Protectorate. France had every intention of adhering to the terms of that Treaty. The Sultan of Morocco recognised only one protectorate in Morocco, namely, the French protectorate, and it was only by an agreement entered into between France and Spain that the Spanish sphere of influence came to be recognised.

In regard to Tangier, Mr. Balfour had referred to Clause IX of the secret Treaty of 1904 between France and Spain, wherein it was laid down that the town of Tangier should be subjected to a special régime, owing to the presence there of a diplomatic body. Now, in the statement which he had made that afternoon, he had informed the Conference of the intention of the French Government to establish a special régime at Tangier, not an international régime, but something in the nature of a municipal régime. The British Minister at Tangier had expressed his approval of these proposals.

Mr. Balfour enquired whether there had not been an exchange of notes between France, Great Britain and Spain, laying down that Tangier should be granted an international régime.

M. de Peretti agreed, and said that in 1914 France and Great Britain had agreed upon a plan for an international statute to be applied to Tangier.

Mr. Balfour, intervening, remarked that the agreement relating to the application of the international régime at Tangier had been agreed to by Great Britain in 1912.

M. de Peretti, continuing, explained that though the agreement with Great Britain had been signed in 1912, discussions with Spain had subsequently lasted for two years, before Spain had agreed to consider a definite plan. That plan had been submitted to the Spanish Government in December, 1914, but so far no reply had been received. A few days ago M. Romanones* had stated in the Cortes that the war had prevented the Spanish Government from signing the agreement. As he had already stated, all that France asked, however, was that certain clauses which concerned Germany should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with that country. Although every question relating to Allied and Neutral countries could not be embodied in the Peace Treaty, France hoped that the question could be profitably discussed during the presence of the representatives of those countries in Paris.

* Alvaro de Figueroa y Torres Romanones, Spanish Prime Minister from December 3, 1918, to April 15, 1919.
Mr. Balfour enquired whether the best plan would not be that a definite resolution embodying the general views of the French Government should be drawn up and circulated for discussion at a future meeting.

(It was agreed that a draft resolution embodying the views of the French Government on the Moroccan question, with special reference to the Act of Algeciras, should be drafted and circulated by M. de Peretti, and the question would be discussed by the Conference at an early meeting.)

(4) It was agreed that the following questions would be discussed at a meeting to be held on Wednesday afternoon, February 26th, 1919, at 3 o'clock:—

Agenda

(1) A statement by M. Tardieu, Chairman of the Allied Commission on Belgium, on behalf of that Commission.

(2) The report of the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, Versailles, on the creation of a neutral zone in Transylvania.

(3) Armenian Claims.

(The Conference then adjourned to Wednesday, February 26th, 1919.)

Paris, 26th February, 1919.

Addendum

The Moroccan Questions

Statement by M. de Peretti


The task of dowering Northern Africa with modern civilization has been laid upon France by the force of circumstances.

In the first instance, France was compelled to obtain a footing in Algeria in order to protect her trade against the attacks of the Barbary pirates. Then the same reasons which drove her to intervene in Tunisia, where the unsettled situation was a menace to Eastern Algeria, forced her to enter Morocco, to stamp out a hot-bed of anarchy which threatened Eastern Algeria.

Since 1905, Germany has hindered France in the fulfilment of this task. Germany, whose hope of universal hegemony was thwarted by France, thought Morocco would provide an opportunity of opposing such a troublesome neighbour. She had no interests of any kind there, and even seems to have insisted on the fact that she only interfered in Moroccan affairs because it pleased her to do so. For ten

— See minute 3, p. 127.
years they provided her with a weapon against France, and the German Government used this sharp sword, this dry powder, whenever wishing to deal a blow to France.

In 1908 [1905] the Emperor William landed at Tangiers. The Moroccan Government at once invited the Powers to an International Conference to discuss reforms to be introduced in Morocco, which were precisely those which a French Mission to Fez was attempting to carry into effect at the time.

France was thus deprived of the position she had assumed in Morocco with the consent of England and Spain, and which fell naturally to her on account of the connection between her interests and those of the land ruled by the Sherif. Moroccan affairs were put under international control instead of being directly controlled by France. As soon as invitations [to] the Conference were issued by the Sultan, the German Government, who had suggested them and made them their own, supported the suggestion in diplomatic circles.

The French Government, whose intentions were peaceful, did not attempt to question German interference in a discussion which did not concern her, nor to urge that the French right was universally recognised. Its conscience was clear, for it had no hostile intentions towards Germany in Morocco, and only desired peace and security for French possessions in Northern Africa. It therefore agreed to confer not only with Powers such as Spain and Great Britain, who had special interests in Morocco, but with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, the United States, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia and Sweden, who had none at all.

The Algeciras Conference came to an end on 7th April, 1906, when a general Treaty was signed. During the proceedings the Powers bound to France by previous agreements adhered strictly to them, and the remainder maintained a correct and friendly attitude; no attention was paid to German advances, and Germany was isolated in her campaign against France. Towards the end Austria-Hungary certainly pretended to side with Germany as a splendid second, but this was less to support her ally than to help her out of an awkward situation.

Germany was therefore defeated at Algeciras. Her attitude towards France found no support, and her aggressive policy was universally condemned. The Conference achieved her moral downfall. But the German Government had attained its ends, holding that the Algeciras Conference had not decided the Moroccan question. On the contrary, although it recognised the exceptional situation and special rights of France and Spain, the general Treaty of 7th April, 1906, provided the German Government with the weapon they sought against France, by creating international institutions, by burdening the administration of the country with complicated and detailed
regulations controlled by the Diplomatic Corps at Tangiers, and by
the power of daily interference in local affairs thus given in theory,
to all the Powers, but in reality to Germany alone, since the others
had no desire to exercise it.

From the end of the Conference to the war of 1914, events have
shown how often the German Government made use of these weapons,
how frequent were the blows it was able to strike at France, and
what advantages it gained through them. In this way to [sic] Ger-
man policy first proclaimed in the speech made by William II at
Tangiers has become daily more clearly defined: it aimed at keeping
an open sore in the side of France, and at preventing the wound from
healing so as to be able at pleasure to harass the Government of the
Republic and thus to influence its general policy.

The French Government, led by force of circumstances to occupy
part of Morocco, was faced at every step by fresh difficulties created
by Germany, but instead of seeking excuses for quarrelling, it took
every opportunity of showing an extremely conciliatory spirit, so
great was its desire to maintain peace in Europe.

The French Government, moreover, sought later to justify German
interference by deliberately creating German interests in Morocco
for this purpose. This was its reason for the Agreement of 8th
February, 1909, and the Contract of 17th February, 1910. Indeed,
if the stipulations thereof had been carried out, the Germans would
have possessed real interests in Morocco, but these would have been
compatible with French interests and would have united nationals of
both countries in a common task. The Berlin Cabinet had to admit
that German interests would have been inaugurated in Morocco by
the means we suggested, but it wished them to be separate from and
entirely opposed to French interests. Both the Agreement and the
Contract therefore remained a dead letter.

After this failure, the French Government made another attempt
to maintain peace; it offered to make sacrifices in the Congo to com-
 penseate Germany for renouncing her claims in Morocco. By the
Franco-German Agreement of 4th November, 1911, Germany at last
acknowledged that France had a right to carry out reforms in
Morocco, and that she must therefore establish a protectorate over
the whole of Morocco.

This agreement was a bargain; the German Government accepted
the sacrifices made by France and endeavoured to make them as painful
as possible by sending the “Panther” to Agadir, where she remained
till negotiations were at an end. But Germany gave nothing in ex-

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22 The portion of M. de Peretti’s statement comprised in this and the three
following paragraphs appears to be substantially a translation of pp. 200-202
of a work by Louis Maurice, La Politique marocaine de l’Allemagne (Paris,
1916).

23 For a description, see ibid., pp. 136-156.
change. After taking possession of the stipulated Congo districts, she did not disarm in Morocco, but adopted an attitude which, during 1912 and 1913, became more bitterly hostile than ever before.

Notwithstanding her recognition of the French Protectorate in Morocco, Germany had no intention of refraining from fostering disorder and anarchy in the Shereef’s kingdom, provoking fresh insurrection and strife, or causing “incidents” within the country and beyond its boundaries, thus attacking France in her vital operations by imperilling her possessions in Northern Africa, without exposing German interests to any counter-attack. She continued this practice until the day when, having provoked the world-war, she bore down upon Paris with the massed forces of von Klück’s and von Bülow’s armies.

Since the war, Germany has created a battle-field against France in Morocco. She has assisted rebels (making use of the Spanish zone as a base for operations), furnishing them with money, arms and ammunition, thus compelling France to maintain a force of 80,000 men on this front.

Since the signing of the Armistice, the French Government has received irrefutable proof of the fact that Germany has continued to subsidise Moroccan rebels.

Through the victory of the Allies, which has cost France so dear, that country is now free from the German menace which confronted her unceasingly in Morocco. She is now justified in insisting on her legitimate claims at the Peace Conference.

By the Treaty of Peace with Germany, all conditions and charges which hampered the French Protectorate after German intervention must be removed. This is but right and proper. Further, Germany must henceforward play no part in Morocco.

Penalties must be exacted from her for the past and guarantees demanded for the future; she must not be in a position to recommence her old tactics.

The Treaty of Peace must, therefore, stipulate that the German Government shall accept the abrogation of the Treaty of Algeciras, the Franco-German Agreements of 2nd February 1909 and 4th November, 1911, as also of all treaties and agreements in force between Germany and the Kingdom of the Shereef. The German Government, which duly acknowledged the establishment of the French Protectorate over the whole of Morocco, shall agree to accept all consequences resulting therefrom, and in particular the absolute cancellation of all capitulations. It shall pledge itself to take no part in any negotiations which may arise between France and other Powers on the subject of Morocco.

Special clauses must be included in the Treaty of Peace concerning property belonging to the German State or its nationals, the
admission of Germans into Morocco, as also concerning mining disputes and the Moroccan State Bank.

These clauses shall be defensive in character. Germany, who had no interests in Northern Africa, merely entered these regions in order to hinder France in her work of civilisation; she must therefore be kept at a distance until the said work is so advanced that it cannot be checked or hindered by any malevolent influence.

Germany's Allies, like herself, must renounce all advantages which have accrued to them under treaties dictated by Germany, and must recognise all conditions resulting from the French Protectorate in Morocco. There is no reason, however, why the said defensive clauses should apply to them, for they have not played the same part as Germany in the past and do not, like Germany, threaten to hinder France in her future schemes for civilisation.

As regards the other signatory Powers of the Treaty of Algeciras, whether Allies of France, Associates or Neutrals, they cannot refuse to recognise the injustice of maintaining a state of affairs created through the malevolent intervention of Germany. They have all either already renounced the system of capitulations as regards Morocco, or are prepared to do so. It would be unjustifiable for them to take advantage of the Treaty of Algeciras. They will most decidedly follow the example of Great Britain, who has already declared herself ready to adopt the point of view of the French Government; for the British Government merely asks for a return to the Franco-British Agreements of 1904, which guaranteed to British nationals in Morocco all privileges compatible with the French Protectorate. The French Government is pursuing no selfish aims with regard to Morocco; in guiding that country along the path of progress, it merely wishes to reserve therein some compensation of French sacrifices, but is far from desiring in any way to close this country to foreigners and claim monopoly thereof. The regime of the open door will prevail in Morocco, for France has not made this country accessible with the intention of closing it to those who desire to work therein on an equal footing with the French.

The repeal of the Treaty of Algeciras would, therefore, in no way prejudice the Allied or Neutral Powers. But the Treaty of Algeciras concerned the whole of Morocco; its abrogation would be felt not only in the French zone of the Shereefan Empire, but also in the Spanish zone and that of Tangiers.

As regards the Spanish zone, it is evident from the declarations made to the Cortes by the Spanish Government, that it intends to cause that zone to benefit by the cancellation of the conditions imposed by the Treaty of Algeciras. Does the Spanish Government also wish to renounce the rights admitted, by the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 27th November, 1912, to belong to it in its zone of in-
fluence? Will it listen to the protests of the Sultan of Morocco, who complains, in the name of the guiding principles of the League of Nations, that the national integrity of the Shereefan Empire has been assailed, by releasing certain portions of that Empire from his authority? Those are questions which do not come before the Peace Conference and only concern France and Spain, by whom they might, if necessary, be settled by amicable negotiation.

It is otherwise in Tangiers. The abolition of the Treaty of Algeciras would alter the present situation in Tangiers. France demands that the new position created in that town by the abolition of the regulations prescribed at Algeciras should be recognised by the Powers who were parties to that Treaty. The maintenance of the present situation in Tangiers would, moreover, enable Germany to return to Morocco and resume the policy which she pursued there for ten years, greatly to the peril of the peace of Europe.

What is the present position of Tangiers, in point of law and of fact?

In point of law, the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 30th March, 1912, which established the French Protectorate over the whole of Morocco, and the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 27th November, 1912, which delimited the Spanish zone of influence in Morocco within the French Protectorate, both made a special reservation regarding the Statute of Tangiers. The town of Tangiers and its suburbs were to be given a separate constitution, the form of which was to be determined subsequently, by reason of the presence of the various International Commissions created or maintained under the Treaty of Algeciras.

The draft of an International Statute, prepared for Tangiers in 1914 by the French and British Governments, remained a dead letter, as the Spanish Government neglected to adopt it.

In point of fact, no stable administration can be established in Morocco by any Protecting Power which does not dispose freely of Tangiers. It is the old diplomatic capital of Morocco, it is the gate which opens Morocco to Europe. To refuse Tangiers to France, who has charge of Morocco, would be to refuse her the key to the house in which she lives. Now, up to the present Tangiers has remained in the same condition as that of the whole of Morocco before the Protectorate Treaty. It is a veritable diplomatic Tower of Babel, in which no one governs, where every kind of intrigue is fostered, where the administration is anarchical and every ancient abuse is perpetrated under cover of the capitulations and the Treaty of Algeciras.

This state of things could not endure without great danger to Tangiers, Morocco, France, and Europe generally.

For these reasons, de jure and de facto, France asks her Allies, in so far as they are severally concerned, to recognise that, after the abolition of the Treaty of Algeciras (which imposed upon Morocco an
internationalisation directed against France), Tangiers can no longer be subject to international administration. Tangiers, which in point of law forms part of France's Protectorate, must be, in fact, annexed to the French zone. France, moreover, desires nothing more than to seek to institute the special administration provided for in the Franco-Spanish Treaty, an administration which would be in no wise international, but would give satisfaction to all rightful interests existing in the town.

To sum up, it is indispensable to France that the Treaty of Peace should provide for the cancellation of all international guarantees (Hypothèques?) now burdening Morocco by the action of Germany; to this intent, various clauses must be inserted into the Treaty after having been considered and drafted by a Special Commission, which the Supreme Council of the Allies is asked to constitute at the earliest possible moment from among the delegates of those Allied Powers who were signatories of the Treaty of Algeciras.
Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 26 February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing.
Hon. H. White.
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.
Secretaries
Mr. E. Phipps.

FRANCE
M. Pichon.
M. Tardieu.
Secretaries
M. Berthelot.
M. de Bearn.

ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino.
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi.
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi.
M. Bertele.

JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.

ALSO PRESENT

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 1
GREAT BRITAIN
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.
ITALY
H. E. M. Crespi.

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 2
AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. C. H. Haskins.
GREAT BRITAIN
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.
ITALY
H. E. M. Crespi.

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 3
AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. C. H. Haskins.
GREAT BRITAIN
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.
Maj. Gen. The Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G.
FRANCE
General Bellin.
Maj. Lacombe.
ITALY
H. E. M. Crespi.
Gen. Cavallero.

PRESENT DURING QUESTION 4
AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Dr. W. L. Westermann.
GREAT BRITAIN
Mr. Toynbee.
Lt. Col. Gribbon.
M. Pichon said that before beginning the Agenda Mr. Balfour wished to make a proposal.

Mr. Balfour said that the matter to which he wished to draw attention was one of some importance. The Conference was anxious to make all possible arrangements for completing a speedy Preliminary Peace with Germany. One of the matters requiring settlement was the frontier between Germany and Poland. He had supposed that a Committee was dealing with this matter, but on enquiry he had found that he was mistaken. He therefore suggested, either that a Committee should be employed to investigate this question, or that it should be added to the labours of an existing Committee. For instance, that dealing with Polish affairs. If this were accepted M. Jules Cambon would be the President. He then read the following draft terms of reference to the Paris Commission on Polish Affairs:

“It is agreed:

That the question of the boundaries of the Polish State shall be referred for examination and report by the Committee set up by the Preliminary Peace Conference in Paris for the consideration of Polish affairs.

The Committee is instructed to report on the boundary between Poland and Germany not later than March 8th.”

M. Pichon asked whether Baron Sonnino agreed.

Baron Sonnino pointed out that the frontiers of Germany in general had not been handed over for discussion to any Commission.
Nevertheless, the other frontiers would also have to be dealt with. The various Commissions, it had been agreed, were to be asked to make their reports by March 8th. On March 8th, therefore, the Conference would have before it material concerning portions only of the frontiers requiring definition. There would not be on that date any report concerning the frontier of Germany with Austria-Hungary.

Mr. Balfour pointed out that the land frontiers of Germany marched with Denmark, Belgium, France, Switzerland, German-Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. In all cases, save that of German-Austria, the question was being dealt with mostly by Commissions. The question raised by Baron Sonnino referred to the frontier with German-Austria. Was it proposed that there should be a Commission on this subject?

Mr. Lansing said he thought there was to be a Commission on the approximate frontiers of Germany as a whole.

Mr. Balfour suggested that co-ordination of all the reports of the Commissions could take place after they had been received.

Baron Sonnino said that he did not care whether a Commission was appointed to deal with the frontier of German-Austria or not, but if the Council was to be in a position to settle frontiers on March 8th, it was clear that the present procedure would not furnish material for a general discussion. Part of the work had been farmed out to Commissions. Was the rest expected to settle itself, or to be dealt with by each delegation separately?

Mr. White questioned whether any alteration was foreseen in respect to the frontier between Germany and German-Austria.

Baron Sonnino said that perhaps there would be no need to alter this frontier, but there were many other questions not being dealt with by Commissions. For instance, the frontiers of Bulgaria and Turkey.

M. Salvago Raggi said that it was important to decide whether such questions were to be dealt with separately by delegations, or collectively in Commissions.

M. Pichon pointed out that there were Commissions on Greek, Roumanian, Serbian and Yugo-Slav questions.

M. Salvago Raggi said that there [is] none on Turkey.

M. Pichon suggested that the Greek Commission might be charged with this question.

Mr. Balfour said that he thought it would be a mistake to entrust the big political question connected with Asia Minor to any Commission.

Baron Sonnino asked in what other manner it would be possible to deal with Greek aspirations in Asia Minor.
Mr. Lansing suggested that all boundaries not specially referred to Commissions or Committees should be entrusted to a co-ordinating committee to be formed at a later stage. The frontiers of Germany which were more particularly under discussion might be dealt with by that co-ordinating body. He said he would have something to propose on the following day on this subject and suggested that the discussion be postponed.

Baron Sonnino concurred with this proposal.

It was then decided that the discussion on boundaries in general should be postponed until the following day, but that the question of the boundary of the Polish State should be referred for examination and report by the Committee set up by the Preliminary Peace Conference in Paris for the consideration of Polish Affairs. The Committee is instructed to report on the boundary between Poland and Germany not later than March 8th.

(2) M. Tardieu said that the Commission at the outset had been stopped by certain hesitations and doubts which it had decided to submit to the Council. He then read the following statement:

“At the first meeting of the Committee, the following opinions were expressed:—

(1) It is difficult to state an opinion regarding possible compensations in favour of any Power without recording, in that respect, the opinion entertained by the Power under consideration.

(2) It is difficult to express any opinion regarding possible compensations without having first studied what these compensations are to make up for.

Now:

(1) On the first point, the Committee is unanimously of opinion that under present conditions it is not entitled to ask the representatives of Holland to give evidence.

(2) On the second point, several members of the Committee believe that the Committee does not hold any brief from the Supreme Council to take up that study.

Under these conditions, the Committee begs to submit to the Supreme Council the following questions:

(1) If the Committee is entrusted only with the study of the compensations to be eventually granted to Holland in exchange for territories eventually transferred by Holland to Belgium, is the Committee authorised to hear the representatives of Holland, and in what way shall this hearing be called for?

(2) Is the Committee authorised, under the reservations resulting from the present situation, to study from the ethnical, political, economic and military point of view the territorial claims of Belgium on the left bank of the Scheldt and on the southern part of Dutch Limburg?
M. Pichon said that the proposal leading to the creation of the Commission had been made by Mr. Balfour. Subject to any explanations Mr. Balfour cared to make, it appeared to him that the Commission should be empowered to examine Dutch witnesses.

M. Tardieu said that Dutch delegates on receiving an invitation from the Commission might attend, but it was not unlikely that they would say that they had no explanation to offer. Should they refuse to make any statement, the work of the Commission would not be much assisted. His own suggestion was that the Commission should be empowered to study the Belgian claims. Without knowing what they were the Commission could not decide what ought to be given to Holland by way of compensation.

Mr. Balfour said that if he were appealed to for a statement of the position he would say that Belgium had no claim, in the ordinary sense, to any territory belonging to a neutral and friendly State. The sort of question that arose between Roumania and Hungary did not arise as between Belgium and Holland. The Conference had no power to ask Holland, a friendly and neutral State, to cede any portion of its territory; and if this were admitted, as he thought it must be admitted, the question for the Commission was a purely practical one. The Belgians said that certain portions of Dutch territory were very inconvenient to Belgium, interfering with their waterborne traffic or rendering their strategic defence risky. No right to an alteration was alleged, but it was suggested that certain territories, now under German sovereignty, but Dutch in sympathy, language and tradition, might be so much desired by Holland, that their cession would incline the Dutch to offer Belgium the territories she desired. This he understood to be the Belgian argument. The Commission had not been asked to adjudicate on the value of the exchange. Only the Dutch could decide whether it satisfied them. But there were certain questions on which the Conference should obtain data before contemplating any such exchange between Holland and Belgium. It would be manifestly wrong to hand over unwilling German populations to Holland. The problem was to know whether they were willing to be Dutch. Such a problem was quite outside the scope of the question raised by M. Tardieu. On this subject he thought it right to inform the Council that the Dutch Minister in London had called on him in a state of considerable agitation after reading in the newspapers that the question of taking Dutch territory and giving it to Belgium had been discussed before the Council. The Dutch Minister had said that nothing would induce Holland to give up an inch of its territory. Mr. Balfour had not thought himself justified in mentioning the question of an exchange.
of German territory for territory ceded to Belgium. He had said that the Conference did not consider it any part of its functions to offer territory belonging to a neutral and friendly State to another State.

M. Pichon said that the Dutch Minister in Paris had come to see him on a similar errand. M. Pichon had replied very much as Mr. Balfour had. He had said that the Belgian Delegation had suggested a possible exchange, but that the Council had not made any decision on such a subject, and certainly would do nothing without the knowledge and consent of Holland. The Dutch Minister had left a formal declaration by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs that Holland would not consent to yield any portion of its territory.

M. Tardeü said that according to Mr. Balfour’s interpretation, all the Commission could do was to gather information about Frisia and Guelderland; respecting the language, race, economical situation, etc. of the populations. Even this he thought would be difficult, unless the Commission knew roughly the extent of territory over which their investigation must be carried out. The extent of this territory would no doubt be governed by the amount of compensation required to satisfy the Dutch. The view expressed by Mr. Balfour had been the view of the British and American Delegates on the Commission, but, as there had not been complete agreement, it had been decided to refer the matter to the Council. As Chairman, he could now make the position quite clear to the Commission.

Mr. Balfour agreed that the scope of the Commission must remain somewhat vague. The limits could not be laid down exactly.

Mr. Lansing said that the Commission must take into account the views of the populations in the territories to be surrendered by Germany to the Dutch and also by the Dutch to the Belgians.

Mr. Balfour said that he thought it was hardly necessary for the Commission to investigate the feelings of the population of Maestricht and on the south bank of the Scheldt.

Lord Milner remarked that it seemed unnecessary to disturb the minds of those people.

M. Tardeü said that he wished to make an observation not as Chairman of the Commission, but as a member of the Conference. He admitted that the Belgians had no territorial claims in the ordinary sense, but the underlying principle of their whole demands was that the régime of neutrality set up in 1839 had been destroyed by the war. Belgium did not wish to return to that status. Two of the signatories of the Treaty of 1839—France and Great Britain—supported Belgium in this, and President Wilson had declared himself in favour of complete sovereignty for Belgium. But as long
as the Great Powers had not declared openly that a new régime must be substituted for the old, the work of the Commission would continue to be hampered. It would have doubts as to whether it could deal with one subject or another. It would be involved in diplomatic difficulties, especially in dealing with Holland. He thought that not only in the general interest, but in fairness to Belgium, this question should be decided once and for all. If it were declared that the 1839 Treaty had ceased to exist, it would follow that fresh negotiations between the signatories of that Treaty had become necessary.

Mr. Balfour said that he was quite of M. Tardieu’s view. He felt inclined to suggest that the Commission over which M. Tardieu presided should be asked to consider the question. He would suggest some such terms of reference as the following:

“Inasmuch as circumstances have, in the opinion of the Conference, profoundly modified or destroyed the Treaty of 1839, the Commission should consider what steps ought to be taken to put the status of Belgium on a new basis.”

Mr. Lansing said that he had no wish to disagree, but he doubted whether the Treaty had been destroyed merely by the outbreak of war. As between the belligerents, the Treaty might have come to an end, but it was unlikely that the war terminated it between Belgium and neutrals.

M. Tardieu said that this was an additional reason for his statement that revision was necessary. So long as the treaty remained unrevise, Belgium remained bound to Holland, even though she and the Allied Powers were anxious to be free from this old arrangement.

Mr. Lansing said that he was raising no objection to the reference of the question to the Commission.

Mr. Balfour pointed out that the Commission had no right to abrogate a Treaty.

M. Tardieu enquired whether there was any objection to hearing Belgian representatives before the Commission to assist in the study of this matter.

Mr. Balfour pointed out that this might be troublesome, in as much as the Commission had no right to call Dutch evidence.

M. Tardieu then suggested that without hearing any evidence, Dutch or Belgian, the Commission should give its own view of the neutrality Treaty. After hearing the report, the Conference could then consider what decision should be taken. After a decision had been taken, the Council would be in a position to call witnesses from all countries interested.

(It was decided that the Belgian Commission should examine the question of the neutral status of Belgium as established by the Treaty of 1839, and make recommendations to the Council concerning modifications of this status.)
(3) At M. Pichon’s request, General Belin read the following report:

“The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, after taking cognisance of the decision reached by the Prime Ministers of the Allied and Associated Powers at their meeting on the 21st February, 1918 [1919], concerning the delimitation of a neutral zone in Transylvania between Hungarians and Roumanians:

After hearing in succession

The Roumanian General Coanda on the general conditions, historical, moral, political and ethnographical relating to these questions:

The Roumanian Colonel Dimitresco on the strategical conditions required to place the Roumanian armies in a position to defend themselves against all eventual aggression by Hungarian troops:

Dr. Vaida, Roumanian Minister, on the general internal conditions of Transylvania:

General Henrys, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army of the Orient:

General Charpy, Chief of Staff of the General Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in the East, on the possibility of the occupation by these Armies of the neutral zone to be defined;

Agree:

On the principle that the proposals which they submit to the Conference of the Prime Ministers relate only to provisional measures of occupation, without prejudice in any manner to the final attribution of the occupied regions.

The Military Representatives further consider:

That the advance of Roumanian troops to contact with Hungarian troops may have the consequence, among others, of causing serious conflicts between them;

That it is desirable to take all measures to avert such conflict as would impede the work of the Peace Conference and create between the peoples destined in the future to live side by side profound causes of hostility likely to disturb the peace.

The Military Representatives therefore conclude:

That it is desirable to create in Transylvania between Hungarians and Roumanians a neutral zone free from all Hungarian and Roumanian troops, the important points in which should be occupied by Allied troops (approximately 2 infantry battalions with some squadrons or 1 regiment of cavalry) with the mission of maintaining order and tranquillity in this zone, with the assistance, if necessary, of Inter-Allied Commissions whose function it will more particularly be to control the various administrative offices, the administration of the territories continuing to be carried out in accordance with the conditions fixed by the Armistice with Hungary.

They propose that the zone should be defined as follows:

Eastern or Roumanian Limit: The main road from Arad to Nagyszalonta thence the railway Grossweidein (Nagy Varad)—Nagy Karoly, Szatmar Nemeti. All localities mentioned to be ex-

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1 See BC-36, p. 58.
cluded from military occupation by the Roumanians but, together with the railway, to be available for the use of the Roumanian troops and inhabitants, under Allied control, for economic purposes.

Northern Limit: The River Szimos.

Western or Hungarian Limit: A line 5 kilometres west of the treaty line of 1916.²

Southern Limit: The armistice line of November, 1918 (River Maros), Arad and Szeged being occupied by Allied troops to the exclusion of both Roumanian and Hungarian troops.⁹

M. PICHON asked General Belin whether he felt sure that the Inter-Allied Control could be organized.

GENERAL BELIN replied that this question had been put to General Charpy, who thought that General Berthelot’s army could spare the two battalions required. There was not between the Hungarians and Roumanians any very notable tension, and a very small force would apparently suffice to maintain order. This had been found to be the case at Arad and at Szegedin, where one squadron of cavalry and one company respectively had been stationed. He had since heard that a report from General Pathé stated that General Berthelot could not furnish the two battalions. The Military Representatives, therefore, only stated that two battalions were required to keep order and left it to the Governments to find them. General Charpy, however, had told him that, if the Allied Governments decided to adopt the recommendations made by the Military Representatives, he felt sure General Henrys would contrive to ensure order.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would like to draw attention to a small point in the drafting of the report. The western limit of the zone was described as a line 5 kilometres West of the Treaty line of 1916. There had been a great deal of discussion as to whether this treaty had or had not been abrogated by the agreement made between Roumania and the enemy. This discussion had caused considerable excitement of public opinion in Roumania. It was perhaps desirable not to allude to it in such a document. He would suggest, therefore, that the geographical description of the line should be substituted for the description given.

(It was agreed that the draft should be altered accordingly.)

M. TARDIEU asked whether so small a force as that suggested would be able to occupy the railway effectually.

GENERAL BELIN explained that a company would be situated at each of the main junctions, together with a “Commission de gare” which would regulate the working of the line. The line would be used to furnish the necessary supplies to the Roumanian forces and to the local populations, under Allied control. Any trouble occurring be-

² For the French text of the treaty of August 17, 1916, between Roumania and the Allied Powers, see Italy, R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d' Italia e gli altri stati, vol. 23, p. 412.
tween these occupied points could be dealt with rapidly by small flying columns. Very little trouble was anticipated. The same arrangements were contemplated on the Hungarian side, and a company would be stationed at Debreczen. In addition to the troops on the south, this force would be able to police the whole zone.

M. Salvago Raggi pointed out that mention was made in the document of an armistice with Hungary. He suggested that the words “with Hungary” be deleted.

(This was agreed to.)

He further suggested that in the last paragraph, for the words “the armistice line of November, 1918 (River Maros)”, the words “the line of the River Maros” should be substituted.

(This was agreed to.)

(With the alterations noted above, the report of the Military Representatives was adopted. For final text, see Annexure “A”.)

(The Military Representatives then withdrew.)

(The Armenian Delegates then entered the Room.)

(4) M. Ararontian read the following statement:

“As representatives of the Armenian Republic—which has been regularly constituted for a year in Transcaucasia, with Erivan as the seat of its Parliament and Government—we have the honour to lay the following facts before the Conference and to make the following request:

Before the war of 1914–1918, there were about 2 million Armenians in Transcaucasian Russia, to say nothing of Armenians in Turkey and Persia. A fifth of these were scattered in the big cities, especially Tiflis, Batum and Baku, and the remainder, i.e. more than a million and a half, lived as a compact community in the districts of Erivan, Kars, Chuchua, and Alexandropol, which have been the dwelling-place of our race for two or three thousand years and where the Supreme Head of the Armenian Church, the Catholicos of all Armenians, lives in his monastery of Echmiadzin.

At the beginning of the war, our nation not only forgot all grievances against Tsarist rule and rallied whole-heartedly to the Russian flag in support of the Allied cause, but our fellow-countrymen in Turkey and all over the world offered to the Government of the Tsar (the archives of the Russian Embassy at Paris prove this) to establish and support Armenian legions at their own expense to fight side by side with Russian troops under the command of Russian generals.

The Tsar’s Government stated, through its Ambassador in Paris, that it would be preferable if individual Armenians enlisted in the Russian Army. They at once did so and during 1914, 1915, 1916 and 1917 Armenian volunteers from all parts of the world fought for the Allied cause side by side with their fellow-countrymen who
were regulars in the Russian Army; more than 180,000 Armenians defended the freedom of nations, and this devotion to the common cause called down on the Armenian people the hatred of Ottomans and Young Turks, which gave rise to massacres lasting two years and laid waste all the Armenian vilayets of the Ottoman Empire.

In 1917, when the Russian revolution summoned the Constituent Assembly, the Armenian deputies (who had been freely elected by our nation) received a mandate to fight to a finish and to help loyally in the organisation of a Russian Republic based on a Parliamentary constitution and federative rule. Russia had no more faithful helpers during Kerensky's rule than our nation, either on the battlefields of Europe and Asia or in any administrative offices of the capital or provinces.

In the Autumn of 1917, when all Armenian territory and the Ottoman vilayets freed by the combined efforts of Russia and Armenia, as well as the provinces of Transcaucasia, were exposed to the Turkish invasion owing to Bolshevist defection, the leaders of our people, both laymen and Churchmen, begged the authorities and the Russian Command not to forsake them and renewed their offers of help to continue the struggle. But the Russian generals themselves were forsaken by their men, and the Peace of Brest-Litovsk handed over to Turkey the western half of Caucasian Armenia, including the gate of Kars which laid all Transcaucasia open to invasion.

In order to oppose this invasion and still remain faithful to the Allied cause, the Armenian people in the Caucasus summoned the National Congress on 20th October, 1917; 125 delegates duly elected by the Armenian people, appointed a Council, or rather a Government for National Defence. I became its President, and the mandate given to its 15 members was to resist the Turkish invasion by all possible means and to replace the collapsed Russian front in Asia by an Armenian front.

From October 1917 to June 1918 this Government, under my direction, reorganised and maintained an Armenian army with the help of Armenian resources alone without any help from Russia (which we considered from then onward as a foreign country) or the Allies, who were too far away from us to send more than encouragement and promises. Even Armenian soldiers serving with the Russian armies on the European front could not rejoin us, and Armenian volunteers still fought in the Allied ranks in Palestine.

Through the French Consulate at Tiflis, the French Government sent us a telegram from His Excellency Boghos Nubar Pasha (head of the Delegation sent to the Allies by the Armenian Catholicos), in which our fellow-countrymen throughout the whole world urged us to hold on whatever happened and not to abandon the cause of the Entente.
On behalf of the National Council, I replied, through the French Consulate at Tiflis:

(1) That the Armenian Nation was ready to do its supreme duty, as it had done since the beginning of the war;

(2) That it counted on the material, moral, and, if possible, military help of the Allies.

(3) That it asked them to acknowledge the independence of Armenia.

In reply to this telegram, I received a second communication from His Excellency Boghos Nubar Pasha (still through the French Consulate) in which the promise of help and assistance was renewed to us.

As regards the independence of Armenia, we were told that the declarations made in the British House of Commons and the French Chamber of Deputies were of such a nature as to satisfy our claims.

Although we did not know what the text of those declarations was, the Armenian Nation rallied round its National Council, in order to fling itself yet again into the struggle against the Turks. A levée en masse was decreed, and an army of 50,000 men organised in the latter months of 1917, notwithstanding the endless difficulties created by the antagonism which our various Caucasian neighbours manifested against us and against the Entente.

The Tartars and the Kurds, siding openly with Turkey, organised themselves at our rear and did whatever they could to hamper us. The Georgians—with whom we had been linked in the past by the common bond of religion and of suffering—did not consider it their duty to side with us. Though far from the Allies and without their promised help, alone, abandoned and even harried by our neighbours, we nevertheless threw ourselves once more into this supreme struggle, intending, even if we could not be victorious, to stop the Turkish advance towards the interior of the Caucasus, whilst awaiting that Allied victory as to which we never cherished the least doubt.

General Nazarbekian—whose military skill had been greatly appreciated in the Russian Army—was appointed Commander-in-Chief, and the renowned Andranik, who had fought Abdul Hamid and Turkish tyranny for 30 years, was placed at the head of a division of Turkish Armenians. It was this Armenian Army which entered the front abandoned by the Russians, and held it from Erdinjan to the Persian frontier.

This unequal struggle against a greatly superior enemy lasted 7 months. The most sanguinary battles took place at Erdinjan and at Van. There were encounters at Erzerum, Sarikamish, the fortress of Kars, Alexandropol, Sarderabad, and Karaklis, when the Turks lost very heavily. I myself went to Sarikamish, in order to re-
establish moral[e]. It was this heroic Armenian resistance which not only prevented the Turks from advancing into the interior of the Caucasus, but also, by holding back their army, prevented their descent into Mesopotamia for 7 months and helped General Allenby to victory in Palestine by deflecting a large proportion of Syrian forces.

In the meantime, German troops having reached the Caucasus, Georgia declared its independence under German military protection. Tartary, with the help and support of the Turkish army, also declared its independence under the name of Azerbaijan. Caucasian unity was thus destroyed. It was then that the Armenian National Council proclaimed the independence of Armenia.

Our Republic has been in existence for nearly a year. She has repulsed Tartar and Georgian aggression, and has maintained a regular and disciplined army approximately 40,000 strong. We have been untouched by Bolshevism and any other demoralising taint, and have kept perfect order over a territory of 60,000 square kilometres.

It is on behalf of the Armenian Republic that I now make the request set forth below:

In view of the fact that Russia abandoned the Armenians to their fate, in spite of their entreaties, allowed a war beyond their strength to devolve on them alone, and that, moreover, without even consulting them, she handed over to Turkey by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Armenian provinces of Kars, Ardahan and Kaghisman, and so ruined hundreds of thousands of Armenians; that by these very acts she broke all ties which bound her to the Armenian nation, the Armenian Republic asks for recognition of the independence it won on the battlefield, and which the success of its arms has forced even our enemies to acknowledge. In view of the sacrifices which Armenia made, without bargaining, for the cause of the Allies, I have the honour to demand, on behalf of the Armenian Nation, that it should be given, through its delegates, a well-merited seat at the Peace Conference.

The Caucasian Armenians ardently desire reunion of the republic with the Armenian provinces of Turkey, for the following reasons:

1. Because the two main sections of the nation, Turkish Armenia and Caucasian Armenia, though separated from each other in an entirely arbitrary manner are identical as regards essential characteristics, speaking the same language, and possessing the same traditions and customs, religion, church and ecclesiastical head—the Catholicos of all Armenians.

2. Both sections of Armenia represent a single geographic and economic whole, extending from Lori [Gort?] and Borchalu in the

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*Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, p. 442.*
north down to the Mediterranean and, in the south, to the Armenian Taurus.

(3) This national unity is imperative not merely by reason of historical rights, but also by reason of present necessity, for Caucasian Armenia, which is civilised and powerful and possesses a population of nearly 2,000,000, would be the only sufficient basis for the reorganisation and restoration of Turkish Armenia, now depopulated and ruined by the Turks.

(4) The desire of the Caucasian Armenians to be united to their compatriots in Turkey is all the more intense and justifiable from the fact that a large portion of the population of Caucasian Armenia originated in Turkish Armenia, and was transplanted by the Russians during the last century. In fact, the districts of New Bayazet, Kaghismen, Kars, Alexandropol and Akhaltzikh are populated almost exclusively by Turkish Armenians.

(5) The ecclesiastical centre for all Armenians is situate within the territory of the Republic at Echmiadzin, on the banks of the Arax. Within this territory are also to be found nearly all the capitals of the various dynasties of Great Armenia, i.e. Armavir, Vagharshapat, Dvin, Artachat, Yervandakert, Yervandachat and Ani.

(6) The valley of the Arax which is the centre of Armenia—has also from time immemorial been the centre of Armenian culture and civilisation. The ruins of the capitals above mentioned bear witness thereto.

(7) Armenian unity is necessary, for should the two sections of the people remain divided, such division would give rise to an undying desire for union, which desire would inevitably cause disturbance and unrest.

(8) The union of Turkish and Caucasian Armenia is already an accomplished fact, for within the territory of the Armenian Republic there are at present from 400,000 to 500,000 Turkish Armenians who have escaped massacre by the Turks during the war, and the younger generation of which has fought for the conquest of liberty on all our battle-fields.

The Caucasian Armenians, for their part, have during the last thirty years continually sent the best of their youth, under the leadership of such glorious chiefs as Durman, Vartan, Dro, and many others, to fight against Turkish tyranny and deliver Turkish Armenia from the Ottoman yoke.

Our history has proved that unity and independence alone have served the Armenian Nation.”

BOGHOS NUMAR PASHA made the following statement:—

“I shall try to be as brief as possible in order not to tax your patience. I think it is needless to recall the numerous promises of reform made by the Porte since the Congress at Berlin. These
promises were never fulfilled. Nor need I recall the massacres and deportations concerning which you have full knowledge. You also know by official evidence, which has been published, the unheard of crimes surpassing in horror all that history has registered hitherto, the victims of which reach and even exceed one million.

I wish, however, to recall that at the beginning of the War the Turkish Government had offered to grant the Armenians a sort of autonomy, asking from them in exchange, volunteers to rouse the Caucasus against Russia. The Armenians rejected this proposal and placed themselves without hesitation on the side of the Entente Powers from whom they expected liberation.

The Armenians have fought at the side of the Allies since the first days of the War, until the signature of the Armistice on all fronts.

I shall not repeat what they achieved in the Caucasus. M. Ahrourian, President of the delegation of the Armenian Republic has just given you a long account far better than I shall be able to do.

I would like to mention, however, that in Syria and Palestine, in the Legion d’Orient where Armenian Volunteers, in accordance with the invitation made by the French Government to the National Delegation in 1916—when the agreement between the Allied Powers was signed—gathered to the number of five thousand forming more than half the French contingent and took so brilliant a share in the great Palestine victory, which liberated Syria, that General Allenby sent them an official congratulation.

Lastly, in France, in the Foreign Legion, a crack Corps which has covered itself with glory, Armenian Volunteers gained a special distinction for bravery and endurance. Of 800 recruits at the beginning of the campaign, scarcely 40 have survived. All the rest fell facing the enemy.

This Military contribution has been officially and warmly appreciated by the Allied Governments and I need not press the matter further. All that I wish to indicate is that this attachment of the Armenians to the cause of the Entente was one of the motives of the massacres and deportations.

The Armenians, therefore, have been belligerents. The complete victory of the Allies has finally liberated Armenia from the Turkish yoke. That is an accomplished fact. We would add that, if to the victims of massacres and deportations, be added our losses on the field of battle, it will appear that the tribute of life paid by Armenia is heavier than that of any other belligerent nation. Her losses reach more than one million lives out of a total population of 4½ million souls. Armenia has earned her independence by the arms and the blood of her children.
I have two kinds of observations to present. I wish first to speak of the delimitation of the future Armenian State as we understand it. I shall then give you some details concerning the population.

Delimitation.

Our claim is that independent Armenia should comprise all Armenian territory and should be formed of:

1. Cilicia (with Sandjak of Marash) the six vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, Diarbekr, Kharpout, Sivas and a portion of the vilayet of Trebizond giving access to the Black Sea.
2. The territory of the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus the population of which demands union with its brothers in Turkey under one single Armenian State.

It has sometimes been said and written that we wish to include within the limits of this State the future Armenian State territories which are not Armenian. This is untrue. Not only do we not make any such demand, but on the contrary, we ask that the final frontiers be fixed not by us but by a mixed Commission which shall work on the basis of historical, geographical and ethnical rights. The present administrative limits of the provinces or Armenian vilayets are arbitrary and false. They were drawn by Abdul-Hamid for the purpose of his policy in such a way as to include capriciously non-Armenian regions, in order to bring about a Mussulman majority. Our request is that these outlying regions, generally Kurdish or Turkish, should be detached.

Thus, the whole of Hekkiari and the South of Diarbekr which are mainly Kurdish should be excluded from Armenia; similarly the Turkish region west of Sivas and many others. As to Trebizond we recognise that the population is mainly Greek, but the Port of Trebizond is the only considerable outlet for the whole of Upper Armenia on the Black Sea. Our claim is moreover in accord with the declaration made by M. Venizelos who treated the question in a broad spirit of equity, which I am happy to recognise, in his Memorandum addressed to the Peace Conference.

As to our border with Syria, our Syrian neighbours have latterly put forward very unjustifiable claims to the major part of Cilicia which they would include in Syria.

This pretension cannot be maintained. Cilicia is an essentially Armenian Province. It was for four centuries until 1375 the State of the last kingdom of Armenia. Some parts of it, such as the region of Zeitun maintained up to our time a semi-independence under Armenian Princes. At Sis, capital of Cilicia, the Catholicos, religious head of all the Armenians of Turkey, has, from time immemorial up to the present day, maintained his pontifical seat.
As to the population the great majority is Armenian and Turkish. The Syrian element is insignificant. Before the war, there were in Cilicia only 20,000 Syrians as against 200,000 Armenians. No atlas of the ancient or modern world includes Cilicia in Syria. Geographically, historically, ethnically, Cilicia is an integral part of Armenia and its natural outlet in the Mediterranean.

The North frontier of Syria is the chain of the Amanus, not that of the Taurus, as represented in the publications of the Syrian Committee with the object of including Cilicia in Syria.

Population.

A few words now on the subject of population. I would like to say at the outset that there have never been exact statistics in Turkey. The Turkish Government always falsified those returns intentionally with the object of proving that the Armenians were an insignificant minority. I wish to cite a few examples of these falsifications. The Turkish Government showed the Armenians of the vilayet of Van as numbering 80,000. Now there is certain evidence that the number of Armenians from this vilayet who took refuge in Russia exceeds 200,000.

At the other extremity of Armenia in the whole of Sandjak of Marash the Turkish Government reckoned about 4,200 Armenians; now in the town of Marash alone according to Elysée Reclus there were more than 20,000 Armenians, half the population of the town. Zeitun in the Sandjak of Marash with its eight villages had, in accordance with statistics made on the spot in 1880, 27,460 Armenians and 8,344 Mussulmans.

It has been alleged that there are no Armenians left in Armenia since the massacres and deportations, or at all events that those who remain form an insignificant minority. Happily this is untrue.

Firstly, according to principles no one today disputes, the dead must count as much as the living. It would be intolerable that the unspeakable crimes committed against a whole race should benefit their authors. But the purpose of exterminating a whole people was not achieved. After this War the Armenians will be, as before it, more numerous than the Turks and even than the Turks and Kurds combined.

In fact, although the losses of the Armenians were very great, those of the Turks in the course of the war have not been less. A German report gives 2½ millions as the total losses of the Turks by war, epidemic and famine, which have caused terrible havoc owing to improvidence and shortage of hospital personnel and medicines. At least half of these losses have been sustained by the population of the Armenian provinces, which have been practically the only recruiting grounds for the Turks, and which have been invaded both by Russian and Armenian armies. If, therefore, it is admitted
that the Turkish population has at least sustained equally heavy losses, the Armenians are still in the majority after the war, as they were before it. But this majority will be still greater when the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus is united to Turkish Armenia to form one State, as both the Armenians of the Caucasus and those of Turkey ardently desire.

M. Abronian [Aharonian] has just laid the case before you and I support all he has said. I cannot overemphasize the point that this is a matter of the greatest importance for the Armenians, because the two groups of Armenians are interdependent. The Caucasian Armenians are more numerous than the Turkish Armenians. The latter, however, are more favourably situated as regards fertile land.

As has already been said (and it is perhaps unnecessary to repeat it) there are bonds of race, blood, religion and language between the two groups. We are, in fact, brothers. The Armenians in the Caucasus have established themselves in that country to escape from Turkey. They have now only one desire, to return to their native land. During the massacres before the war it was due to the Caucasian Armenians that the Russian and Allied Governments were asked in 1915 and 1914 to approach Turkey in favour of the Turkish Armenians.

I wish now to say a few words with regard to the position of the Armenians in the East and in the Ottoman Empire. I shall demonstrate by a few facts that they are quite capable of governing themselves when the time comes for them to set up an independent State.

Just to give some idea of the economic activity of the Armenian element in Turkish Armenia, I will quote some figures, taken from pre-war commercial and industrial statistics of the Vilayet of Sivas, which I have produced at previous negotiations in Paris in 1912 and 1913.

The Vilayet of Sivas is the least Armenian of the six Vilayets, but if you look at the figures relating to imports you will see that out of 166 wholesale merchants, 141 were Armenians and only 13 were Turks. In the export trade there were 127 Armenian merchants and 23 Turks. Out of 87 bankers and capitalists, 32 were Armenians and 5 only were Turks. It appears, furthermore, according to the book recently published by M. Leipzius, that out of a total population of 20,000,000 inhabitants, of whom 2,000,000 were Armenians, the latter held some 80 to 90 percent of the commerce in their own hands.

M. Leipzius, after his enquiry at Constantinople in regard to the Massacres, stated that the result would be very detrimental financially to Germany and Austria, because, all commerce being in the hands of the massacred Armenians, the Germans and Austrians would be unable to recover their debts.
I will quote a passage from a book by Dr. Rohrbach, a well-known pan-Germanist, who desired to see Germany annex Armenia, and this will give you an idea of the German opinion on the Armenians before the war:

“In present-day Turkey, reduced almost entirely to its Asiatic possessions, the Armenians carry much more weight than their numbers would seem to warrant. Owing to their high intellectual and commercial standards, they are without doubt the most active people among Eastern nations. In fact it might be said that they constitute the only people in those regions who are imbued with what might be called national qualities. The Armenian has that energy and tenacity of purpose which are quite contrary to the usually accepted attributes of the Eastern character”.

That is the opinion of a German, and it is simply because the writer is a German that I have made the quotation.

It remains for me to address you on Armenian policy, claims and aspirations. I have already told you what is meant by the Armenian State from a geographical standpoint. I must now point out that, from the political point of view, our programme has not varied in any way as far as the national delegation is concerned. This programme, which I have already had the honour to explain to the Great Allied Powers, may be summed up in three points:

1. Liberation from the Turkish yoke.
2. It is not sufficient to liberate the Armenian people who have been in bondage. As they will now find themselves in an inferior position I asked for the joint protection of the Powers. I have not asked for joint rulership, to which I already knew the meeting would be opposed. There had already been unfortunate examples of condominium, and I know that the meeting would not feel disposed to make one more example. As an Egyptian, I know exactly what it means.

By joint protection of the Powers I mean that kind of protection which would prevent aggression from outside, and not an intermeddling with internal political and administrative affairs.
3. From the first I have also asked that the Great Protecting Powers should give a mandate to one or other of them to administer and organise Armenia.

That is the programme we adopted in 1915. We modified it when the idea of a League of Nations was formulated by President Wilson, and we adapted our programme to the new ideas.

The first point of our programme is now realised, since we are freed from the Turkish yoke. The two other points are realised also, if the newspaper reports are correct, since the Peace Conference has already decided to place the peoples oppressed by the Turks under the protection of the League of Nations with a Power as mandatory. We therefore have the firm hope of seeing our aspirations realised.

We need only entrust ourselves to the sense of justice of the Peace
Conference, and we have no doubt but that the Conference will approve the programme of our national claims. The Powers now know and can trust the Armenians, whose national feelings, vitality and warlike valour have been strikingly revealed in the course of the war.

The Powers can rest assured that, with the qualifications all now recognised, the Armenians, under a régime of peace, justice and liberty, and under the tutelage of the League of Nations, will soon form a flourishing and prosperous State, and will be one of the most powerful factors of peace and civilisation in the East.”

M. Pichon thanked the Armenian Representatives, and the Armenian Delegation withdrew.

(5) On M. Pichon's proposal, it was decided that the following questions should be discussed at the next Meeting to be held on Thursday, February 27th, at 3.0 p.m.:

Agenda of Next Meeting
1.—Proposal by Mr. House for a Commission to deal with delimitation of frontiers.
2.—The Zionist question.

(The Meeting adjourned to Thursday, February 27th, at 3.0 p.m.)
VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 27th February, 1919.

Annexure “A”

Report on the Creation of a Neutral Zone Between Hungarians and Rumanians in Transylvania

The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council after taking cognisance of the decision reached by the Prime Ministers of the Allied and Associated Powers at their meeting on the 21st February, 1919, concerning the delimitation of a neutral zone in Transylvania between Hungarians and Rumanians;

After hearing in succession

The Rumanian General Coanda on the general conditions, historical, moral, political and ethnographical relating to these questions;

The Rumanian Colonel Dimitresco on the strategical conditions required to place the Rumanian armies in a position to defend themselves against all eventual aggression by Hungarian troops;

Dr. Vaida, Rumanian Minister, on the general internal condition of Transylvania;

General Henrys, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army of the Orient;

General Charpy, Chief of Staff of the General Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in the East, on the possibility of the occupation by these Armies of the neutral zone to be defined;
Agree:—

On the principle that the proposals which they submit to the Conference of the Prime Ministers relate only to provisional measures of occupation, without prejudice in any manner to the final attribution of the occupied regions.

The Military Representatives further consider:—

That the advance of Rumanian troops to contact with Hungarian troops may have the consequence, among others, of causing serious conflicts between them;

That it is desirable to take all measures to avert such conflict as would impede the work of the Peace Conference and create between the peoples destined in the future to live side by side profound causes of hostility likely to disturb the peace.

The Military Representatives therefore conclude:—

That it is desirable to create in Transylvania between Hungarians and Rumanians a neutral zone free from all Hungarian and Rumanian troops, the important points in which should be occupied by Allied troops (approximately 2 infantry battalions with some squadrons or 1 regiment of cavalry) with the mission of maintaining order and tranquility in this zone, with the assistance, if necessary, of Inter-Allied Commissions whose function it will more particularly be to control the various administrative offices, the administration of the territories continuing to be carried out in accordance with the conditions fixed by the Armistice.

They propose that the zone should be defined as follows:—

Eastern or Rumanian Limit: The main road from Arad to Nagysalonta thence the railway Grosswardein (Nagy Varad)—Nagy Karoly, Szatmar Nemeti. All localities mentioned to be excluded from military occupation by the Rumanians but, together with the railway, to be available for the use of the Rumanian troops and inhabitants, under Allied control, for economic purposes.

Northern Limit: The River Szamos.

Western or Hungarian Limit: A line leaving the Theiss 5 Km. North West of Vasaros Nameny passing then 5 Km. to the West of Debreczen to 3 Km. West of Deva-Vanya, and continuing to the West of Gyoma, 5 Km. West of Oroshaza, Hotmez-Vasarhely and Szegedin, then rejoining the Southern frontier to the South of Szegedin.

Southern Limit: The line of the River Maros, Arad and Szeged being occupied by Allied troops to the exclusion of both Rumanian and Hungarian troops.

Military Representative,
French Section,
Supreme War Council

Gnl. BELIN

Major-General,
Military Representative,
British Section,
Supreme War Council

C. SACKVILLE WEST

Military Representative,
Italian Section,
Supreme War Council

CAVALLERO

Military Representative,
American Section,
Supreme War Council

P. D. LOCHRIDGE
Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 27th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Present

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing.
Hon. H. White.
Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.

Secretaries
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.

FRANCE
M. Pichon.
M. Tardieu.
Secretaries
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de Bearn.

ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino.
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi.
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi.
M. Bertelet.

JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.

Also Present

Present During Question 2
AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. David Magie.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Major Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, M. P.
Lt. Col. W. H. Gribbon, C. M. G.

ITALY
M. Galli.
M. Placentini.

ZIONIST MISSION
Dr. C. Weizmann.
M. N. Sokолов.
M. Sylvain Lèvi.
M. Spire.
M. Ussischkins.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE Captain Portier.
ITALY Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.
1. M. Pichon, circulated a copy of the following Resolution, which had been received from Colonel House, for formal acceptance by the Conference, and said he understood an agreement had already been reached on the subject:

"It is agreed that:

In order to expedite the work of the Conference in defining the approximate future frontiers of the enemy countries in the preliminary treaties of peace a Committee composed of one representative, each, of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, be appointed with the following terms of reference:

(a) to draw up for the consideration of the Preliminary Peace Conference the frontiers based on the recommendations of the territorial Commissions which have been, or may be, appointed.

(b) to make recommendations as to any part of the frontiers of enemy States which are not included in the scope of any Commission, excepting such frontier questions as any of the Powers concerned may reserve for discussion in the first instance at the Quai d’Orsay Council."

M. Sonnino thought it would not be sufficient to have only one representative of each of the Great Powers on the Committee. It might not always be possible for the same representative to attend and, though he might be replaced by a substitute, the latter would find great difficulty in taking part in the deliberations, owing to his not having kept in touch with the previous proceedings. Colonel House had, he believed, originally proposed three representatives. He (M. Sonnino) had agreed that that number was probably excessive, but he thought that each Power should certainly have the right to appoint two representatives, in order to ensure the proper continuity of the work.

Mr. Lansing said that his own preference would be for a small Committee of five members, with the power of introducing as many experts as might be thought useful. Consequently, a representative could always be replaced by one of his experts, should the necessity arise.

M. Sonnino said that he would not press the matter, but he certainly thought one representative would be too few.

Mr. Balfour said that he would not, himself, fight one way or the other. He enquired, however, whether the difficulty could not be overcome by allowing one representative, with power of substitution.

M. Tardieu pointed out that the power of substitution already existed. He would suggest, therefore, that each representative should be permitted to have one permanent assistant delegate, who would have the advantage of following the discussions day by day.

M. Sonnino enquired whether the permanent assistant delegate would have the power of taking part in the discussions.
He wished to point out that the proposed Committee would not merely be a co-ordinating Committee; it would also have the duty of taking the initiative on all questions which had not been referred to a Commission.

Mr. Lansing, intervening, said that his purpose in suggesting five representatives had been to avoid discussion by a large number of people.

M. Sonnino, continuing, said that it was understood the decisions of the proposed Committee would come before the Conference of the Great Powers before being submitted to a plenary session of the Preliminary Peace Conference.

(It was agreed that:—

In order to expedite the work of the Conference in defining the approximate future frontiers of the enemy countries in the preliminary treaties of peace a Committee composed of one representative, each, of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, be appointed with the following terms of reference:—

(a) to draw up for the consideration of the Preliminary Peace Conference the frontiers based on the recommendations of the territorial Commissions which have been, or may be, appointed.

(b) to make recommendations as to any part of the frontiers of enemy States which are not included in the scope of any Commission, excepting such frontiers questions as any of the Powers concerned may reserve for discussion in the first instance at the Quai d'Orsay Council.

It was also agreed that each of the five representatives of the Great Powers should have the right to bring an Assistant with him, in order to ensure continuity in the proceedings.)

(At this stage the Zionist Representatives and the technical experts in Zionism entered the Council Chamber.)

2. M. Pichon, having welcomed the Zionist Deputation, called upon M. Sokolow to address the meeting.

M. Sokolow introduced himself as representing the Zionist Organisation and the Jewish population of Palestine. He had prepared a printed "Statement of the Zionist Organisation regarding Palestine," 1 and he asked permission to distribute copies of the same to the members of the Conference.

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1 The "Brief Summary" of the minutes of this meeting (BC-41a) and the telegraphic report of the meeting by the American Mission to the Department of State give the text of this statement as follows:

"1. The High Contracting Parties recognize the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Home.

2. The boundaries of Palestine shall follow the general lines set out below:—

"Starting on the North at a point on the Mediterranean Sea in the vicinity
Continuing, M. Sokolow said that the Conference would understand his emotions, now that the solemn hour awaited during 18 centuries by the Jewish people had, at length, arrived. The Delegates had come to claim their historic rights to Palestine, the land of Israel, where, in ancient times, the Jewish people had created a civilisation which had since exercised an enormous influence on humanity. There they had lived happily until the country had been lost; since when a long continued martyrdom had been suffered. Now this people possessed no land and no national power. Undoubtedly, happy groups of Jews lived in the countries of Western Europe and in the United States of America; but those, comparatively speaking, only small groups. The great majority of the Jewish

South of Sidon and following the watersheds of the foothills of the Lebanon as far as Jisr el Kornon, thence to El Bire, following the dividing line between the two basins of the Wadi el Korn and the Wadi el Tiem, thence in a southerly direction following the dividing line between the Eastern and Western slopes of the Hermon, to the vicinity West of Beit Jenn, thence Eastward following the northern watersheds of the Nahr Mughaniye close to and west of the Hedjaz Railway.

"In the East a line close to and West of the Hedjaz Railway terminating in the Gulf of Aqaba.

"In the South a frontier to be agreed upon with the Egyptian Government.

"In the West the Mediterranean Sea.

"The details of the delimitations, or any necessary adjustments of detail, shall be settled by a Special Commission on which there shall be Jewish representation.

"3. The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be vested in the League of Nations and the Government entrusted to Great Britain as Mandatory of the League.

"4. (Provision to be inserted relating to the application in Palestine of such of the general conditions attached to mandates as are suitable to the case.)

"5. The mandate shall be subject also to the following special conditions:

"(I) Palestine shall be placed under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish National Home and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

"(II) To this end the Mandatory Power shall inter alia:

"(a) Promote Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land, the established rights of the present non-Jewish population being equitably safeguarded.

"(b) Accept the co-operation in such measures of a Council representative of the Jews of Palestine and of the world that may be established for the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine and entrust the organization of Jewish education to such Council.

"(c) On being satisfied that the constitution of such Council precludes the making of private profit, offer to the Council in priority any concession for public works or for the development of natural resources which it may be found desirable to grant.

"(III) The Mandatory Power shall encourage the wisest measure of self-government for localities practicable in the conditions of the country.

"(IV) There shall be forever the fullest freedom of religious worship for all creeds in Palestine. There shall be no discrimination among the inhabitants with regard to citizenship and civil rights, on the grounds of religion, or of race.

"(V) (Provision to be inserted relating to the control of Holy Places.)"

(Paris Peace Conf. 160.03101/48)
people did not live in those countries and the problem of the masses remained to be solved. The Jews would never forget that France had been the first to recognise the rights of man and personal liberty, and it was under that influence that the Jews had obtained rights of citizenship in other countries. It was in Great Britain that the ancient traditions of Zionism first took root. It was in Great Britain, and especially in the British Colonies, that the Jews had been able to establish prosperous settlements. In Italy, the Jews had taken an important part in the wars of liberation: the Jewish people there were happy, well organised and able to take a part in the government of the country. In the United States of America, 3,000,000 Jews enjoyed the rights of citizenship. Mere rights of citizenship, however, were not sufficient to satisfy the ideals of the Jews, who craved for a national existence. Consequently, for the great suffering majority of the Jews, living in Eastern Europe, a place would have to be prepared where they would be at home and among their own kind. During the late terrible war the Allies had promised to help the Jews to found a Jewish national centre, where the real home of the Jewish people had always been. This was the only possible solution of the Jewish problem. Sustained by that promise, the Jews had been able to organise and to support the Great Powers loyally by creating an entente of all the Jewish parties within the Entente of the Great Powers. Now, a victory of great ideals and of justice having been gained, the hour of deliverance of his unhappy people had struck: and the old Jewish traditions could again be introduced in the land of their ancestors, combined with the ideals of New Europe, thus leading to a reconstitution of a people and the transformation of a country. The memoir which he had circulated merely gave the Zionist plans for the realisation of the hopes of the Jewish people, and, with the permission of the Conference, he would read the following extract:—

"The Zionist Organisation respectfully submits the following draft resolutions for the consideration of the Peace Conference:—

1. The High Contracting Parties recognise the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Home.

2. The boundaries of Palestine shall be as declared in the schedule annexed hereto.

3. The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be vested in the League of Nations and the Government entrusted to Great Britain as Mandatory of the League.

4. (Provision to be inserted relating to the application in Palestine of such of the general conditions attached to mandates as are suitable to the case).

5. The mandate shall be subject also to the following special conditions:—
(1) Palestine shall be placed under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish National Home and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

In conclusion, he would be ready to answer any questions that might be put to him, but he would, in the first place, ask the Conference to hear his colleague, Dr. C. Weizmann, the President of the Enquiry Committee sent to Palestine on behalf of the Zionist Executive Committee, who would give practical information on the subject of the realisation of the Zionist programme.

Dr. Weizmann pointed out that the war had left the Jewish people weaker comparatively than any other people in the world. Before the war, six to seven million Jews in Russia had been systematically oppressed but that oppression had possessed the grandeur of a great tragedy, which had acted as a source of inspiration to all Jews. Now, even the grandeur had disappeared, and the community was being ground down by the political machinery which had been set up in Russia. It was impossible for him to make any forecasts, but even the most sanguine would agree that those parts could not settle down for many years to come. Meanwhile the Jews, as the most feeble element, would suffer most, and as a result Jewish emigration, which before the war had reached the figure of 250,000 a year, would increase enormously, whilst at the same time the power of absorption in the countries of Western Europe and of America would considerably decrease. The Great Powers would naturally scrutinise every alien who claimed to enter their countries, and the Jew would be regarded as a typical wandering alien. As a result the Jews would find themselves knocking around the world, seeking a refuge and unable to find one. The problem, therefore, was a very serious one, and no statesman could contemplate it without being impelled to find an equitable solution.

In his opinion, the solution proposed by the Zionist organisation was the only one which would in the long run bring peace, and at the same time transform Jewish energy into a constructive force, instead of its being dissipated into destructive tendencies or bitterness.

Palestine possessed great possibilities. The country was not very densely populated: There were some 600,000 to 700,000 people occupying 40,000 square kilometres, which gave a population of 15 to 18 per square kilometre. On the other hand, in Lebanon, which resembled it in many aspects, the density of the population was 160
per square kilometre. Consequently, in Palestine there was room for an increase of at least four to five million people, without encroaching on the legitimate interests of the people already there.

The Zionists wished to settle Jews in the empty spaces of Palestine, organising the settlements to be created by the expenditure of their own money and the exercise of their brains.

The Zionist Association demanded, in the name of the people who had suffered martyrdom for eighteen centuries that they should be able, immediately peace was signed, to tell their co-religionists in the Ukraine, in Poland, and in other parts of Eastern Europe, that they would be taken to Palestine, there to be put on the land. That was the essence of what the Zionists required, and with that object in view they had taken the liberty of drawing up the following resolution:—

“To this end the Mandatory Power shall inter alia:—

(a) Promote Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land, the established rights of the present non-Jewish population being equitably safeguarded.

(b) Accept the co-operation in such measures of a Council representative of the Jews of Palestine and of the world that may be established for the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine and entrust the organisation of Jewish education to such Council.

(c) On being satisfied that the constitution of such Council precludes the making of private profit, offer to the Council in priority any concession for the development of natural resources which it may be found desirable to grant.”

In conclusion, he would add that he spoke in the name of a million Jews who, staff in hand were waiting the signal to move. It would be the duty of the Zionist Association to organise immigration successfully, but the Jewish leaders would be faced with a far greater catastrophe if they found themselves unable to tell their people to wait until they received the signal. For the fulfillment of their plans the Jewish Associations required the support of the Great Powers, and in full hope they left their case in their hands.

M. Ussischkins said that he appeared before the Conference in his capacity as a member of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organisation, and also as President of the National Assembly representing 3,000,000 Jews of South Russia, an Assembly which, in the month of November last adopted a resolution proclaiming the historic rights of the Jewish people to Palestine. It was his earnest desire to support the claims submitted by the two previous speakers, the representatives of the Zionist Organisation.
M. SPIRE said that he spoke in the name of the French Zionists, who were not in the majority amongst the Jews in France. He wished to associate himself entirely with the claims put forward by the Zionist Organisation. He felt certain that France, which had ever defended the rights of the oppressed, would support these claims. Furthermore, it was only natural for a French Jew to express those views. It was only on one point that the Zionist movement could disturb the French, namely, on the question of the ancient privileges which the French had always enjoyed in Palestine. In regard to that question, the French Zionists trusted to the justice of the Conference, feeling confident that the mandate would be granted to the country most competent to exercise the power, not only in its own interests, but in the interests of all nationalities.

M. SYLVAIN LEVI said that his only claim to speak was that he had accompanied, on the invitation of the Zionist Association and at the request of the French Government, the Zionist Committee of Inquiry, sent from France to Palestine to report on the Zionist movement. He greatly appreciated the honour which had thereby been accorded to him, since he was not himself a Zionist, and only a Jew by origin, that is, Jewish in sentiment, but French above all.

He had devoted much time to the study of this question, and for that reason wished to present certain aspects of the case to the Conference. It would not be necessary for him to call the attention of the Conference to the situation of the Jews in Eastern and Central Europe. His colleagues had already drawn a picture of the indescribable misery which the Jewish people were there suffering. Millions of men who were not at home in the countries in which they lived, felt that they possessed no mother country, and that their national life was confined to intercourse amongst themselves. For these people Palestine was the “country of their ancestors”; the country of their dreams—a sort of terrestrial paradise; and it was there that they thought they would best be able to develop their national energies. That feeling was so strongly implanted in the minds of the Jewish people that it could never be uprooted. The only question was: how could those national ideals best be satisfied? The Zionist movement in Palestine did not propose to initiate an entirely new work; a beginning had already been made, and magnificent results had already been achieved. It would be unnecessary for him to point to the splendid Jewish colonies already established in Palestine under the auspices of Baron Rothschild: Colonies which formed veritable oases in the middle of the surrounding desert. Furthermore, the “Universal Jewish Alliance”, which had been in
existence for over 50 years having been founded on the true principles of the French Revolution, had begun its work in Palestine by the establishment of an agricultural school in 1876. Subsequently, other schools had been opened in other localities, such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, etc. each of which had rendered the greatest service to the people. In the end, Zionism had arisen. To that movement he was legitimately entitled to pay a high tribute, as he did not himself belong to it. Its great merit lay in the fact that it had raised the Jewish moral[e] in those countries of Eastern Europe, where the moral[e] had been fast sinking, by supplying spiritual food and by engendering a true religious feeling. As a result of the feeling so engendered, the desire for Palestine was born. The special task which Zionism had set for itself was to direct a flow of Jewish immigration towards Palestine, especially from Eastern Europe. That was the problem for which a solution now had to be found. With the permission of the Conference he would talk with the frankness of a historian, who desired to face the problem honestly and squarely, without attempting to hide any of the difficulties.

The first difficulty lay in the great disproportion which existed between the area of Palestine and the millions of people who might want to go there from Eastern Europe. In the second place, the actual condition of the country, which was at present able to maintain only a small population owing to the climatic and other causes brought about by the action of men and the misgovernment of the authorities. At the present moment, some 600,000 or 700,000 Arabs only dwelt in that country, but it would be impossible for an equal number of Jews to adapt themselves to the same conditions of life, since they had in Europe, and especially in Western Europe, acquired certain methods of life which would not be satisfied by the conditions which were sufficient for the Arabs. In the third place, the masses of people who might wish to return to Palestine, would largely be drawn from those countries where they had been persecuted and ill-treated, and the mentality which such a regime was likely to engender could be easily realised. Those people would carry with them into Palestine highly explosive passions, conducive to very serious trouble in a country which might be likened to a concentration camp of Jewish refugees. The Conference that had created the League of Nations would easily understand that nations could not be created at will, and the realisation of a certain number of aspirations would not suffice to create a national entity. The problem was an extremely difficult one, especially as it would concern Jewish people drawn from so many countries such as Poland, the Caucasus, Balkans, Morocco, Spain, etc.; the fusion of all these people would take time, and the time required might be lengthy. This difficulty had been fully recognised by the Zionist Organisation,
which had attempted to find a solution. A solution had been found and put forward consisting in the creation of an International Jewish Council, which by some means or other (about which he was not quite clear) would act both as the guardian and the political ruler of Palestine. The idea was an ingenious one, but, as a Frenchman of Jewish origin, he feared the results. It would be dangerous to create a precedent whereby certain people who already possessed the rights of citizenship in one country would be called upon to govern and to exercise other rights of citizenship in a new country. In other words, an attempt would be made to apply the principles of the law of Delbrück to the Jews, already sufficiently suspect; and it would in his opinion be a sad beginning to inherit anything of the kind from Germany. In this way people possessing dual rights of citizenship would have been created able to exercise their rights in the country of their residence and also in Palestine, in which they had no rights and which they did not inhabit.

The Zionist Organisation, however, placed their confidence in the mandatory system, provided the Jews who decided to settle in Palestine could little by little be granted the right of self-government. The Jewish groups already settled in Palestine clearly showed how quickly they could enter into municipal life, and solve the most difficult problems; some of the Jewish municipalities having even joined together to form, as it were, small autonomous republics, which had only been molested by the Turkish authorities. Having visited the country, he was able to realise that this municipal activity could become national, as soon as the country was occupied by a large Jewish majority.

He (Mr. Levi) had previously referred to the spirit of the French Revolution which had led to the creation of the Universal Jewish Alliance. To this spirit all its members adhered. For many years the Jews had, in the countries inhabited by them, claimed equality of rights, but those claims had not yet everywhere been admitted. Under the circumstances, it seemed to him shocking that the Jews, as soon as their rights of equality were about to be recognised in all countries of the world, should already seek to obtain exceptional privileges for themselves in Palestine. Privileges so obtained as a rule did not profit either the giver or the receiver. He had sufficient confidence in the activities and driving force of the ideals of the Jews of Eastern Europe to believe that they would never abandon the attainment of their goal, and even if their other aspirations were to weaken, the time would come when violent upheavals would again cause a flow of emigration towards Palestine, which must, sooner or later, become a purely Jewish territory. He was not in a position, neither was he entitled, to find a solution, but it appeared to him that it might be possible to create some large Jewish Committee by group-
ing together all the interested parties, whose function it would be to supervise emigration, to act as bankers, to buy and distribute land, to organise public works, to undertake sanitary measures and to take charge of education, etc., but without possessing any political rights.

In conclusion, he wished to place on record the great part played by France in the organisation of the Jews in Palestine. Whatever country might eventually be appointed the Mandatory in Palestine, he trusted France would be permitted to continue her beneficent educational work, by maintaining the schools which had been of such inestimable value to the peoples of Palestine. France and Palestine were both Mediterranean nations, and both, in their own time, had had a great influence on the development of civilisation throughout the world. Leaving out of consideration the political aspect of the case, he would remind the Conference that a very serious and important problem required solution. He neither over-estimated nor under-estimated the virtues of national groups. But it would be admitted that the Jewish race had, during the period of its martyrdom, displayed a magnificent resistance and proved its constant passion for civilisation, high culture and science. It was the Jews in Palestine who first proclaimed those ideals towards which the world was still endeavouring to advance. For those ideals Jews had suffered persecution and death, and they believed that on the shores of the Mediterranean they would find the realisation of their hopes. They believed that, if restored to the conditions which had enabled their ancestors to give rise to the great Hebrew movement, they would again be able to recover their past splendour and to contribute their share towards the regeneration of mankind.

Mr. Lansing asked Dr. Weizmann to clear up some confusion which existed in his mind as to the correct meaning of the words "Jewish National Home". Did that mean an autonomous Jewish Government?

Dr. Weizmann replied in the negative. The Zionist organisation did not want an autonomous Jewish Government, but merely to establish in Palestine, under a mandatory Power, an administration, not necessarily Jewish, which would render it possible to send into Palestine 70 to 80,000 Jews annually. The Association would require to have permission at the same time to build Jewish schools, where Hebrew would be taught, and in that way to build up gradually a nationality which would be as Jewish as the French nation was French and the British nation British. Later on, when the Jews formed the large majority, they would be ripe to establish such a Government as would answer to the state of the development of the country and to their ideals.

The Zionist Association fully realised the great difficulty of the problem, and, in fact, had the problem been an easy one to solve,
it would never have been submitted to the Conference of the Great Powers. On the other hand, the solution suggested would be easier than the solution of the difficulties which would arise if the Jews were left in Russia. The formation of a Jewish organisation had been proposed, embracing all elements that would co-operate in solving the problem to be faced. That Council would have no political rights. Consequently the fear that the Jews would be accused of double allegiance was groundless. On the other hand the Jews outside Palestine must supply the money and the men, and the Council would have to be organised for that purpose and for that purpose only. A similar Council had already existed in the creation of the Jewish Alliance, which had been an international organisation created for the express purpose of establishing schools in Palestine.

As a Russian Jew, he was entitled to say that the Jews in Russia lived in an atmosphere which was not conducive to quiet thinking. On the other hand the colonies in Palestine which had been described in such glowing terms by Professor Levi had been created by Russian Jews, and they had succeeded in transforming deserts into flourishing gardens, even under the Turkish yoke.

In conclusion, at the present moment Palestine could not hold a large number of people. The Conference had no doubt noticed the discrepancy between the figures which he had given as representing the possible population of Palestine and the number of emigrants, 50,000 to 60,000 per annum, which he had subsequently suggested. That was due to the present condition of the country. But the Association desired to transform the country, to make it capable of supporting a much larger number of inhabitants, just as had been done in California and in Tunisia. In the latter country in 1882 around Sfax only 45,000 olive trees were to be found, whereas in 1914, 8,000,000 olive trees had been planted. What had been done in Tunisia might be done even better in Palestine, since the climate and soil in the latter country were infinitely superior. With the help of Jewish funds an Association had been formed to carry out that programme, and it would undoubtedly achieve success. The difficulties to be met with in attempting to solve these problems were nothing if compared with the difficulties to be faced by the Jews living in Eastern Europe, who constituted 96% of the total number of Jews in Europe.

In making his statement he spoke for 96% of the Jews of the world, who shared the views which he had endeavoured to express that afternoon.

(The Zionist Mission and Experts in Zionism then withdrew)

3. M. PROCHON suggested that the following questions should be
considered at the next meeting to be held on Saturday next, March 1st:—

(1) Report of the Financial Drafting Committee.
(2) Report of the Economic Drafting Committee.
(3) Report on Morocco.
(4) Statement by the representatives of the Island of Aaland.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had only received a copy of the resolutions concerning Morocco late the previous evening. The question was a very difficult and complicated one, and it would be necessary for him to obtain papers from London. Under these conditions he suggested that the discussion of that question should be adjourned until the following Monday.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. BALFOUR, continuing, said that in regard to the Aaland Islands he understood the people of Aaland wanted to be joined to Sweden. Technically, they were Finnish at the moment, though they had been Russian before Finland became a separate country. He wished to enquire whether it was a matter which the Conference had either the right or the competence to determine.

M. SONNINO said that Finland had not been recognised by Italy, so that from the Italian point of view the Islands were still Russian.

MR. WHITE reported that the representatives of the Island of Aaland had been to see him, and had stated that they wished to join Sweden, for the reason that modern guns would be able easily to reach Stockholm from the Aaland Islands.

But Mr. White had enquired from the representatives how they thought the Conference could deal with the question. They had replied that the Islands of Aaland now formed part of Finland, and Finland had previously belonged to Russia.

M. SONNINO expressed the view that the Conference had agreed to reserve all questions appertaining to Russia, such as those relating to the Estonians, Lithuanians, Lettians and Ukrainians, until the Russian question came under discussion. Only one exception was made, in the case of Poland, because Russia herself, when an Ally, had recognised the independence of that country.

Taking these facts into consideration, he thought it would be better to study the whole Russian question at one and the same time, especially as in the case of the Aaland Islands the Conference was being asked to take something from someone and give it to a third party.

As a matter of fact, he thought the question fell outside the competence of the Conference, though it might be taken up by the League of Nations.
M. Pichon said that the representatives of the Aaland Islands had also been to see him, basing their request for annexation to Sweden on the ground of the right of peoples to self-determination as enunciated by President Wilson.

The representatives of the Aaland Islands had also submitted a memoire. The Swedish Government had also asked to send representatives to the Conference to discuss this same question. He thought the question of the Aaland Islands should be adjourned until a decision had been reached on the question of Russia.

(It was agreed to postpone consideration of the question relating to the Aaland Islands.)

It was agreed that the following questions should be discussed at the next meeting to be held on Saturday, March 1st, 1919 at 3 o'clock p.m.:


4. Mr. Balfour enquired what action had been taken on the resolution reached the previous day in regard to the creation of a neutral zone in Transylvania. Who would be responsible for carrying out the policy decided upon?

M. Pichon replied that a despatch had already been sent by the French Government to General Franchet D’Esperey, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies of the Orient, calling on him to take the necessary action.

(The meeting then adjourned to Saturday, March 1st, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

Paris, 28th February, 1919.
Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 1st March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. R. Lansing
Mr. E. M. House

Secretaries

Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison
Mr. G. Auchincloss

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.

Secretaries

The Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries

M. Dutasta
M. Berthelet
M. de Bearn

ITALY

H. E. Baron Sonnino

Secretaries

Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Lieut. C. Burden.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Major M. Caccia, M. V. O.

FRANCE

Captain A. Portier.

ITALY

Lieut. Zanchi.

JAPAN

M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Professor P. J. Mantoux.
1. M. Clemenceau having declared the meeting opened, enquired whether the Conference would agree to consider the report of the Committee, appointed to draft the Naval and Military Peace conditions to be imposed on Germany, on Monday afternoon next. The Military conditions had been submitted by Marshal Foch yesterday, and copies had been distributed to the representatives of the five Great Powers. The principle involved had been duly accepted both by President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George. Consequently, he thought that a decision might be reached without delay. When the Armistice had last been renewed, no term had been fixed. The Great Powers had reserved the right to terminate the Armistice at three days notice, and the Germans had been given to understand that the final military Peace conditions would be presented to them with as little delay as possible. The Allied and Associated Powers would, therefore, place themselves in an awkward position if the final Military Peace terms could not be presented within the period of one month from the date of the last renewal of the Armistice.

Mr. Balfour felt some difficulty in accepting M. Clemenceau’s proposal. He thought that some confusion of idea appeared to exist. He quite agreed that the object of the Conference had been to come to some preliminary arrangement with Germany, as soon as an agreement had been reached on the Naval and Military Peace terms to be imposed on Germany. He himself had, in fact, proposed at a previous Meeting that the Military instalment of the preliminary Peace should be presented to Germany separately. But, he thought M. Clemenceau had objected to that procedure; and in the absence of M. Clemenceau and in deference to his view, the Conference had agreed that the Preliminary Peace with Germany should not only include the final Naval and Military terms, but also territorial questions, financial arrangements and questions relating to the economic future of Germany. That decision in his opinion meant that whether the Military terms of peace would be decided on Monday or not, it would make no difference in regard to the termination of the Armistice.

M. Clemenceau said he quite agreed with Mr. Balfour that no preliminary Peace terms could be presented to Germany until the territorial, financial and economic questions had also been settled. The Conference could, however, only take up one subject at the time. The Military question should therefore be settled first, and then the other questions could be taken up in succession, with as little delay as possible.

Marshal Foch pressed for an early decision to be reached on the final Naval, Military and Air conditions to be imposed on Germany. He enquired whether the Allied Military Advisers, as well as the Naval Experts, should attend the Meeting on Monday next. He understood
the Naval clauses would then also be ready for consideration by the Conference.

(It was agreed that the Naval, Military and Air preliminary conditions of Peace should be discussed on Monday afternoon next, and Marshal Foch was requested to invite the Naval and Military Experts to attend.)

2. M. Crespi, who had acted as Chairman of the Financial Drafting Committee in the absence of M. Salandra, read the following report, dated February 26th, 1919:

"Several questions which the Financial Drafting Committee might have included in the programme of financial questions to be considered by the Financial Commission fall within the competence of other Commissions already appointed by the Conference and are being considered by them.

The Financial Drafting Committee has therefore excluded them from the list which they now submit.

They recommend that when another Commission or the Supreme Conference itself is dealing with a question which has a financial aspect it should seek the advice of the Financial Commission.

QUESTIONS TO BE DEALT WITH IN THE TREATIES OF PEACE

A. Financial Questions.

1. In cases where an Enemy State cannot meet all its obligations the question must be considered whether the State should be allowed to choose for itself the order in which they shall be met or whether the Allies should insist on settling the order. The matter must be considered in connection with, inter alia:

   1. Reparation demands.
   2. Public debts and other obligations incurred prior to the War.
   3. Public debts and other obligations incurred during the War.
   4. Debts and obligations internally held.
   5. Debts and obligations externally held.
   6. Liabilities incurred during the Armistice.

2. The question must also be considered whether in any circumstances the debtor State shall be allowed or obliged to modify the rights of creditors holding security for the payments of their debt.

3. Question of the liability of Allied nationals to contribute to special war taxes levied or imposed in the enemy countries.

4. In cases of territorial re-adjustment, the following questions arise:

   (a) The re-apportionment of any part of the public debt.
   (b) The re-apportionment of any part of the other debts or obligations of the State.
   (c) The assumption of any liability or obligation in connection with the currency organisation. (See also Monetary Questions).
   (d) Terms of transfer of State or other public property in the ceded area, and re-apportionment of debts or obligations of public bodies other than the State.
(e) Financial measures to be adopted as to public utility enterprises, such as railways belonging to private companies operating in the ceded territory.

B. Monetary Questions.

1. The currencies in which any new national obligations created by the Peace Settlement must be stated should be determined.
2. It must also be decided whether the currencies in which existing national obligations are expressed should be modified.
3. Currency questions arising out of territorial re-adjustments.
4. The effect of any forced surrender of gold upon the currency of enemy countries.

OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED

1. Inter-Allied agreements as to the consolidation, re-apportionment, re-assumption of War Debts.
2. Temporary Inter-Allied agreements for the support of the foreign exchanges.
3. Credits requested by certain Allies secured on the reparation payments to be exacted from the enemy.
4. Inter-Allied co-operation in seeking credits from neutrals.
5. Allied financial interests in Russia.
6. Protection of rights and interests of Allied holders of concessions in enemy countries:
   (a) Preservation of pledges and guarantees.
   (b) Problems arising out of the internationalisation of ports, waterways and railways.
7. The elimination of enemy elements from the international organisations for control now existing in various countries (such as Turkey, Morocco, China).
8. Settlement of pre-war debts between Allied and enemy nationals.
   (a) Question of establishing a clearing house.
   (b) Disposition of the proceeds of liquidations of businesses and of sales of enemy property and interests.

SUBJECT TO ADDITIONS

The Committee will report separately at a later date on Mr. Klotz’s project for a Financial Section of the League of Nations.”

LORD MILNER said he wished to make an observation which he thought would apply equally to the financial and to the economic commission. The programme which each Commission had to work through was very large and very important, and it was necessary that the questions to be dealt with should be settled promptly. Many of those questions, however, concerned the Allies among themselves far more than the enemy. The Commissions would eventually have to decide all those questions, but he thought they should, in the first instance, devote themselves entirely to those points which would
have to be embodied in the preliminary Peace. He, therefore, asked the Conference to accept the following resolution:

"The Commission is instructed to report not later than March 22nd, on all matters on which it is necessary to include in the preliminaries of Peace."

Mr. House suggested that the Commission should be instructed to report not later than March 15th, instead of March 22nd.

M. Crespi agreed. There were not many financial questions to be included in the preliminaries of Peace. He thought, therefore, that a report could be submitted by March 15th.

(It was agreed to accept the following resolution:—

"The Commission is instructed to report not later than March 15th on all matters which it is necessary to include in the preliminaries of Peace.")

Mr. Montagu invited the attention of the Conference to the fact that the Financial Commission had not yet been appointed. It still remained to be decided who would sit on that Commission. If it were agreed that the 5 members of the Financial Drafting Committee should now constitute the new Financial Commission, he thought one delegate from each of the five Great Powers would be too small an allowance, especially if the final report had to be submitted not later than March 15th next. Moreover, some representation would have to be given to the smaller Powers.

M. Klotz thought the question could with good practical results be referred to the Financial Drafting Commission, but the Commission thus constituted should have power to appoint Sub-Commissions who should be empowered to hear experts, as well as the representatives of the smaller Powers, whenever any question affecting them came up for consideration.

Mr. House said he accepted M. Klotz's proposal. In his opinion, the work would be carried out far more expeditiously with a Commission of 5, with power to appoint Sub-Commissions.

Mr. Lansing proposed that the present Financial Drafting Committee should constitute the Financial Commission, containing the same personnel, with the power of appointing Sub-Commissions from outside their number, as they thought fit.

Mr. Montagu, whilst agreeing that it would be a good arrangement to have Sub-Commissions to represent special interests, thought that the questions to be considered were so important that one representative of each of the five Great Powers would not be sufficient. Should the one representative, for instance, be ill, either one Power would remain unrepresented, or everything would have to be held up. Therefore, whilst keeping the proposal for Sub-Commissions, he
would propose that the number of representatives of the main Commission should be increased to two.

Lord Milner said that, in order to reconcile the various opinions expressed, he would suggest that the proposal, contained in the report of the Economic Drafting Committee, which would be considered that afternoon, should also be accepted in the case of the Financial Commission. That is to say, that the Commission should be constituted of two members for each of the five Great Powers, together with five members elected by the remaining States. There would, therefore, be 15 representatives on the Financial Committee, 10 to represent the Great Powers, and 5 the remaining States.

(It was agreed that the Financial Commission should be constituted of 2 members for each of the five Great Powers, together with five members elected by the remaining states.)

(It was agreed that the members of the Financial Drafting Committee should form part of this Commission and that the names of the remaining five representatives of the Great Powers should be handed in to the Secretary-General on or before Monday next, March 3rd, 1919.)

(It was also agreed that the Secretary-General would invite the small Powers to meet on Monday next to elect their five representatives to serve on the Financial Commission.)

3. M. Klotz, Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparation read, with the permission of the Conference, the following resolution adopted by the Commission at a meeting held on February 19th, 1919:

"The question having been submitted to the Committee for Reparation of Damages as to what principles Reparation should [be] based on.

The French Delegation having presented the following motion:

"The right to reparation of the Allied and Associated Powers is entire.”

"The enemy must repair all damage, a right of priority being reserved to certain claims.”

and, concerning the first part of this motion, the question having been put and discussed as to whether the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to include in their claim for reparation all war costs be limited by the American note under date of November 5th, 1918,¹ to the German Government and by the Memorandum of the Allied Governments therein included.

The Committee have unanimously agreed to submit to the Supreme International Council of War such as it was constituted on November 4th, 1918, together with the proceedings of the Committee, the following question:

"Would the acceptance of the first part of the Motion of the French delegation to wit: "the right to reparation of the Allied

¹ Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 468.
and Associated Powers is entirely contrary to the intentions of the principles of the Supreme War Council (constituted as it was at that date) as they have been expressed in the memorandum reproduced by the American note of November 5th, 1918?"

M. Klotz, continuing, said that it would be impossible for the Commission to apportion among the interested Allied and Associated Powers the total sum to be paid by Germany, unless a ruling were obtained as to the interpretation to be given to the word "reparation": that is to say, whether damage suffered by private individuals alone should be included, or whether State losses and war costs should also be taken into account.

Mr. House held that the question of the allocation between the Powers of the lump sum to be paid by Germany on account of reparation for damages could be settled at a later date, as no allusion would have to be made to the matter in the preliminaries of Peace. He would, therefore, prefer that the consideration of the question should be adjourned until President Wilson's return.

Mr. Lansing suggested that alternative texts should be prepared for inclusion in the Articles of Peace, embodying the two hypotheses suggested by M. Klotz.

Mr. Balfour said that the preliminary Peace would give merely the lump sum to be paid by Germany, the dates of payment and the manner in which payment should be made. No mention of the eventual distribution of this lump sum amongst the Allies would be made in the preliminary Peace. Consequently the question raised by M. Klotz would in no way delay the work of the Commission, since it merely had to decide what was the maximum amount that Germany could pay. In his opinion, there would therefore be no objection whatever in adjourning the question raised by M. Klotz until M. Orlando, President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George were here.

M. Klotz said he was willing to accept Mr. Lansing's proposal that two texts should be drafted giving effect to the two suggested interpretations of the word "reparation". He would report that decision to his Committee.

(It was agreed that the Commission of the preliminary Peace Conference on Reparation be instructed to prepare its report on the alternative hypotheses that war costs are or are not included in the claim of the Allied and Associated Powers for reparation.)

4. M. Clementel said that at the meeting of the Conference of the great Powers held on 21st February, 1919, (I. C. 146, Minute 4), it had been agreed that the first part of the terms of reference of the Economic Drafting Committee, under the heading "Transitory Measures", should be referred to the Supreme Economic Council, and that

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Report of Economic Drafting Committee

BC-36, p. 62.
the “permanent subjects”, mentioned in the report, should be referred to a special Commission of the Preliminary Peace Conference.

It had further been agreed that the five Signatories of the report of the Drafting Committee should meet to consider and report as to the procedure and method of work of the Economic Commission, and on its composition, having in mind Lord Milner’s request that the Dominions and India should be accorded separate representation and that the small Powers should also be represented. In accordance with that decision the members of the Economic Drafting Committee had met together and prepared the following report:

“As regards the composition of the Economic Commission it was stated on behalf of the British Empire Delegation that they did not press any suggestion for separate representation of the British Dominions and India. We accordingly recommend that the Commission should be constituted of two members for each of the five Powers, together with five members selected by the remaining States. We consider, moreover, that it is essential that the members of Sub-Committees dealing with technical subjects should not necessarily all be members of the main Commission. We think it desirable that the Commission, when established, shall have freedom to set up any Sub-Committees which they think necessary, as is the case with the other Commissions of the Conference, and we consider that, in the interests of speedy work, all the Sub-Committees should be as small as possible.

As regards the work of the Economic Commission we attach the programme already approved by the Delegates of the Great Powers at their meeting on Friday 21st, February, after excluding the transitory measures which have been transferred to the Supreme Economic Council.”

TERMS OF REFERENCE TO THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

(AS AGREED BY THE ECONOMIC DRAFTING COMMITTEE)

I. PERMANENT COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.

To consider what common measures are possible and desirable with a view to the removal of Economic barriers, and the establishment of an equitable basis of the principle of Equality of Trade Conditions in International Commerce.

Under this heading will arise such questions (among others) as Customs regulations, duties and restrictions; the treatment of shipping, including Port facilities and dues, unfair methods of competition, including false trade descriptions and indications of origin “dumping” etc., and the exceptions and reservations, transitory or otherwise, which may be found necessary to meet special circumstances.

II. CONTRACTS AND CLAIMS.

To consider:

(1) What provision should be made with regard to pre-war contracts, agreements or commercial obligations to which subjects or citizens of belligerent States were parties;

(2) Whether claims should be admitted on either side for damage or injury arising out of the requisition, liquidation, sequestration or sale of enemy property or businesses, or the treatment or use of patents, trade marks, trade
descriptions, or designs or copyrights, or regulations relating to trading with
the enemy; and, if so, on what basis.

III. EX-ENEMY ALIENS.

To consider what common action, if any, should be taken by the Allied and
Associated Governments to prohibit or regulate the carrying on, either in-
dividually, or through companies, of certain businesses and occupations by
ex-enemy aliens during the period immediately following the war.

IV. ABRIDGMENT OR REVIVAL OF ECONOMIC TREATIES.

To consider what Treaties and Conventions of an economic character to
which enemy States were parties should be revived or abrogated respectively.
(Under this heading will be considered, among others the Conventions relat-
ing to Industrial Property, Copyright, Posts and Telegraphs etc.)

NOTE:—

The Economic Commission, before formulating proposals as to any
economic questions having a special aspect in regard to which other
Commissions have been or may be set up by the Peace Conference,
should consult the competent Commission; and on the other hand such
other Commissions should, in the same circumstances consult the
Economic Commission before formulating any proposal relating to
one of the above classes of questions which fall within the scope of
the Economic Commission.

(It was agreed to approve the recommendations of the Economic
Drafting Committee and the Terms of Reference to the Economic
Commission of the Peace Conference, as above given.)

On the proposal of Mr. House, the following resolution was
adopted:—

"The Economic Commission is instructed to report not later than
March 15, on all matters which it is necessary to include in the
Preliminaries of Peace."

(It was agreed that the Financial [Economic?] Commission should
be constituted of 2 members for each of the five Great Powers, to-
gether with 5 members selected by the remaining States.

It was agreed that the members of the Financial [Economic?] Drafting Committee should form part of this Commission and that
the names of the remaining 5 representatives of the Great Powers
should be handed in to the Secretary General on or before Monday
next.

It was also agreed that the Secretary General would invite the
small Powers to meet on Monday next to elect 5 representatives to
serve on the Economic Commission, as well as 5 representatives to
serve on the Financial Commission (see item 2 (c) above)."

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 2nd March, 1919.
Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 3rd March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing
Hon. E. M. House

Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison
Mr. G. Auchincloss

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

Secretaries
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
M. Tardieu

Secretaries
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Bearn

ITALY

H. E. Baron Sonnino
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi

Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Admiral W. S. Benson
General Tasker H. Bliss
Major General M. N. Patrick
Brigadier General D. Nolan
Colonel W. S. Browning
Captain F. H. Schofield

BRITISH EMPIRE

Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, G.C.B.,
C.M.G., M.V.O.
Major General W. Thwaltes, C.B.
Major General Hon. C. J. SackvilleWest, C.M.G.
Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves, D.S.O.
Brigadier General H. W. Studd, C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O.
Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., R.N.
Paymaster Captain B. St. G. Pollard,
C.B., R.N.

FRANCE

Marshal Foch
General Weygand
General Belin
Comdt. Lacombe

ITALY

Admiral Grassi
General Cavallero

JAPAN

Admiral Takeshita
General Nara
Colonel Nagai
Capitaine Fujioka
Capitaine de Vaisseau Nomura
Capitaine de Vaisseau Yamamoto

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

BRITISH EMPIRE

FRANCE

ITALY

JAPAN

Colonel U. S. Grant
Captain E. Abraham
Captain A. Portier.
Lieut. Zanchi.
M. Saburi.

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux
1. M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the Powers were ready to nominate their delegates for the Financial and Economic Commissions.

Mr. LANSING, on behalf of the United States, asked for a day's delay for decision.

(It was agreed that the names of the delegates should be communicated to the Secretary-General and that the Commissions should meet forthwith, without awaiting the nomination of all the members.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch had summarised the report of the Military Commission in a short document, which he would read to the meeting.

M ARSHAL FOCH then read the following document:—

(distributed in English as here recorded.)

“I have the honour to forward herewith the Regulations concerning the definitive military and aerial Statutes of Germany.

These regulations have been formulated by the Inter-Allied Committee comprising three representatives of each Government designated in the report of February 12th, 1919, and working under me as president, and are based on the decisions of the Supreme Allied Council which met at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 12th, 1919. The decisions were arrived at after consulting the Commanders-in-Chief.

These regulations provide for the military and aerial statutes of Germany, under the principle that Germany will only keep the forces necessary to ensure order and to police the interior of her territories.

They decide therefore:

(1) The maximum aerial and military strength.

(2) The staffing of this strength within a certain number of large units: Infantry divisions, Cavalry divisions, Army and Army Corps H.Q.

(3) The method of recruiting of this strength (officers and men).

(4) The armament, the war machines and the ammunition that the Germans will be authorised to keep, to maintain and to manufacture.

(5) The controlling measures which should be taken in view of the limitation of the strength and of the armament of the Germans.

(1) Strength.

All the delegations agreed to admit:

(a) that the land forces of Germany shall not exceed a strength of 200,000 men (officers not included)—that the number of officers and those assimilated from the land forces shall not exceed 9,000;

(b) that the air forces shall not exceed 1,000 men (officers in-

\*\* See BC-29 (SWC-6), vol. III, p. 971.
cluded) and that these forces shall not be maintained after October 1st, 1919.

(2) **Staffing of large units.**

All the delegations agreed to fix the maximum number of the large units and staffs for the above strength at 15 Infantry divisions and 5 Cavalry divisions, 5 Army Corps H. Q. and one Army H. Q.

(3) **Method of recruiting the strength.**

The principle of permanent armies is applied to the officers and to the non-commissioned officers of the land forces; they are recruited voluntarily under the obligation to serve a long term, i.e. 25 years for the officers and 15 years for the non-commissioned officers.

The men of the land forces are, on the contrary, taken exclusively in each class of recruiting by drawing numbers, or by any other method chosen by Germany, under the reserve:

(a) that the total length of these men's service shall not exceed one year and that the service shall be continuous;

(b) that the number of trained men, in each class of recruiting shall not exceed 180,000.

The British delegation was of opinion that a voluntary service for a long period would have been preferable; but they accepted the above conditions in order to arrive at a decision.

(4) **Armament, war machines and ammunition.**

The armament, the war machines and the ammunition left to the Germans are settled according to the quantities that are necessary for an army of 200,000 men staffed as indicated in paragraph (2), taking as a basis the armament of the German divisions shortly before the armistice.

The surplus armament, war machines and ammunition shall be handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers to be destroyed or rendered useless.

All the delegations agreed upon these questions.

(5) **Controlling measures.**

All the delegations also agreed to establish a Committee of Control with the object of supervising the execution, of the reductions imposed upon Germany as regards her strength and her armament within the prescribed period.

It has been unanimously admitted that this Committee will cease its duties at the end of such period, it being understood that in future the control will be continued by such means and such body as the League of Nations may deem necessary."

Mr. BALFOUR said that he did not propose to criticise the work of the Military Commission. He thought, however, that there were probably some points on which all the military authorities were not agreed.
M. CLEMENCEAUSaid that there was one such point.

Mr. BALFOUR, continuing, said that there were also points which the civilian representatives would have to examine and that they would have to ask a number of questions to help them in their examination, which, if stated in the present meeting, might waste an undue portion of the Council's time. He would like, himself, to have the opportunity of going over the proposals clause by clause with his own military advisers, and to resume the discussion in the Council after completing this preparatory examination.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was not possible to refuse the extra time required by Mr. Balfour for consideration. All he would ask Mr. Balfour to say was on what approximate date he thought the discussion could be resumed.

Mr. Balfour said that he thought it not unlikely that Mr. Lloyd George would like to examine the report. As far as he was himself concerned, a very few days would be enough. One of his objects was really to save time. Some of the questions he would wish to ask would be answered with less loss of time to the business of the Conference by a meeting with his military advisers outside the Council. For instance, he gathered from the document that it was proposed that every officer in the future German army was to serve until he had reached the age of 45. He quite understood the object of this provision, but he had considerable doubt about its practicability. He had been told that there was a network of strategic railways on the left bank of the Rhine answering to no commercial necessity whatever. If this was so, it might be desirable to destroy them. On this point he required enlightenment and would prefer to discuss the question with his military advisers. He had also been told that there was a divergence of opinion between the Naval and Military Commissions. There should be harmony between them. He further noted that Admiral Benson dissented from some of the naval proposals on important issues. This also he would like to discuss outside the Council.

M. SONNINO remarked that the military representatives had been asked to make recommendations concerning the final military conditions of Austria-Hungary. He enquired whether any results had been obtained.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had prepared a note on this subject. The note was then distributed. (See Annexure "A.")
Mr. House suggested that this matter should also be deferred, according to Mr. Balfour’s proposal.

Marshal Foch said that the present rate of demobilisation in the Allied Armies required that the discussion with the Germans should not be delayed after 1st April. The Allies could impose their will on Germany until that date. If they were to be in a position to impose their will on Germany after that date, the whole plan of demobilisation would have to be altered. He, therefore, begged the Council to agree upon the terms early enough to allow of a meeting with the Germans by March 20th. He considered that the period between that date and April 1st would not be too long for the discussion that would ensue with the Germans.

Mr. Balfour enquired whether the Council had ever laid down the principle that the terms of peace were to be ready by April 1st. He had no recollection of any such decision. The military delegates, however, appeared to have assumed that there was some such undertaking. They had, it seemed, so ordered demobilisation as to fit in with this plan. In effect, they wished to force the Council to settle peace by that date under pain of not being able to enforce their will upon the enemy. This was equivalent to holding a pistol at the head of the Council. If this were so, President Wilson would only have four days after his return to examine the conditions and to agree to them. This policy, Mr. Balfour added, was a complete novelty to him.

Mr. Lansing said that he would like to correct what seemed to be an error in Mr. Balfour’s statement. The American military authorities did not understand that there was such a policy; but they considered that these terms were final and evidently the Council could not be expected to settle the final peace terms by March 20th.

Mr. Balfour said that if he understood Marshal Foch aright, his view was that the terms must be ready by March 20th, or, failing that, that the Allies would not be able to enforce them. He felt it would not be right to put President Wilson in the dilemma of choosing to decide so important an issue in four days, or allowing it to go by default.

Mr. House suggested that, as the Council was awaiting reports from various Commissions on March 8th, this question might also be left over, at least until the return of Mr. Lloyd George.

Lord Milner observed that two of the Commissions set up had not been asked to report until the 15th. Some portion of the peace terms, therefore, could not be settled until after that date.

M. Clemenceau pointed out that the subject had been placed on the Agenda. Nevertheless, he was ready to put off the discussion
until Thursday, if Mr. Balfour and Mr. House maintained their proposal.

Mr. Balfour said he thought it would be wise to decide to do this. He had only received the resolutions on the previous day. There were in them certain large questions which did not exclusively affect one or other of the fighting services. There was, for instance, one question which might be discussed immediately, namely, the question of the period during which the various proposals were to be enforced. The Aviation authorities wished to enforce their terms until the final conclusion of peace. The Naval authorities wished to enforce theirs until Germany had fulfilled all the terms of the armistice. The Military authorities wished to enforce theirs for all time. It might be desirable, therefore, to discuss the principle there and then in the Council.

M. Clemenceau said that an abstract discussion of this kind might not lead to useful results. The duration of the conditions could not be fixed without considering the nature of the conditions themselves. If this matter were discussed out of relation to the conditions, it might be necessary to discuss it again in connection with the conditions themselves.

Mr. Balfour said that he saw the force of the suggestion, but he begged to submit that the Council should lay down some principle for the guidance of the experts. He thought it would not do to say to the Germans: “Here are aerial terms to last a short time, naval terms to endure for perhaps a generation, and military terms to last until the Day of Judgment.” He thought that the task of the experts would be made easier if they were told exactly what they were to provide for.

Mr. House said that the air terms referred to were, he understood, contrived to meet the purpose of seeking out mines, and October was set as the time limit for this purpose. As far as he could see, no conflict arose from these terms.

Marshall Foch said that from a report he had seen of the proceedings of the Council on February 12th, both Mr. Balfour and President Wilson had expressed the view that the final military condition of Germany was to be laid down. If this was so, it was unnecessary to discuss what principle was to be adopted, as the principle had been fixed on February 12th, and had remained unchanged since then.

Lord Milner enquired whether, in Marshal Foch’s opinion, the resolution taken on that date implied that the terms to be imposed on Germany were to last in perpetuity.

Mr. Balfour said that this point ought to be cleared up by the Council at once. For his part, he did not agree with Marshal Foch’s
interpretation of the decision of February 12th. The word "final" he thought could not be held to convey the meaning of perpetuity. It had not been so interpreted by the Naval authorities and by the Aviation authorities. The Naval Terms, requiring a limitation of forces until certain undertakings had been carried out, were final terms, but not terms laid down to last for ever.

MARSHAL FOCH said that if a definition of the term "final" were to be sought, it should be sought in the statements made on the 12th February by President Wilson.

(He then read certain extracts from an account of the proceedings of February 12th made by the French Foreign Office.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he understood the discussion of the naval, military and air terms was postponed until the following Thursday.

(This was agreed to.)

The question of the meaning of the word "final" could, if Mr. Balfour so desired, be discussed immediately.

Mr. House drew attention to Marshal Foch's suggestion in the concluding paragraph of his statement, vesting the power of enforcing the continuance of the limiting clauses in the League of Nations. He thought that if this suggestion were adopted, the naval and military terms would be in harmony.

Mr. BALFOUR said that during the discussion he had composed a draft, which he thought contained practically the same suggestion as Mr. House's. He proposed the following draft:

"The limitation on German armaments, whether military, or naval, or aerial, shall last until Germany has fulfilled all the obligations imposed on her by the Peace Terms, and thereafter for as long as, and with such modifications as, the League of Nations may determine."

ADMIRAL DE BON said that the Naval Advisers had not interpreted the terms of reference in the same manner as the Military Commission, because they had not had the advantage of having before them the proceedings of February 12th. They had therefore not worked on the same basis as the Military Commission. There was not, however, any essential divergence of view between the naval and military authorities.

Mr. LANING called attention to certain of the proposed naval terms, which were evidently intended to be of indefinite duration, for instance, the dismantling of Heligoland, and of coastal forts denying access to the Baltic and the Kiel Canal.

Mr. BALFOUR said that his proposal referred only to the limitation of armaments.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this did not dispose of the seriousness of the question. Naval Powers had means of defending themselves which were not open to land Powers. He was not content to tell
Germany to limit her forces until Peace Terms were fulfilled, and to leave the future at the mercy of events.

M. Sonnino said that on the 12th February the settlement of naval, military and aviation conditions had been referred to Commissions. These Commissions had worked independently, and, in consequence, the results obtained were not in complete harmony. Co-ordination of the results should have been obtained by Marshal Foch as Chairman of the Main Commission. Had this been done, the question of the period of enforcement would certainly have been discussed. The alternative now before the Council was either to decide this matter in principle or refer it to Marshal Foch to settle, together with the co-ordination of the three Reports.

M. Clemenceau asked whether Baron Sonnino’s suggestion that the three Commissions should meet together and co-ordinate their results, was accepted.

Lord Milner said that he thought the Council should lay down the principle on which the Commissions should proceed. Either the terms should be imposed on Germany until she had fulfilled the Terms of Peace, or they should be imposed unconditionally for ever.

M. Clemenceau said that President Wilson in that very room had declared that Germany must be disarmed. He did not say that Germany must be temporarily disarmed. Other countries might be content with transitory naval terms. He himself was not prepared to sign an invitation to Germany to prepare for another attack by land after an interval of three, ten, or even forty years. He would not be prepared to sign a Peace of that character.

Mr. Balfour said that before asking Marshal Foch to undertake co-ordination of the various Reports, some general direction should be given to him. He noticed that in the Naval Report, Admiral Benson had on four occasions made reservations relating to the period of enforcing the terms on Germany.

Admiral Benson said that he understood that the German Fleet was to be reduced to a fixed strength and kept there for an indeterminate period, and that the continuance of this régime was to be assigned to the League of Nations.

M. Clemenceau said that this might meet the case, provided the constitution of the League of Nations was satisfactory.

M. Sonnino suggested that Mr. Balfour’s proposal should be referred to the three Commissions, which were to meet to co-ordinate their reports.

Marshal Foch said he therefore understood that the Commissions would have to study the question of enforcing certain terms pending the execution of the conditions of Peace. If so, this represented an abandonment of the policy sketched by President Wilson on February 12th.
Mr. House proposed that the discussion be adjourned until the following Thursday.

M. Clemenceau agreed, but suggested that the three Commissions should meet together and co-ordinate their Reports in time for the renewal of the discussion on Thursday.

(This was agreed to.)

M. Sonnino asked whether the terms to be imposed on Austria and Hungary would also be discussed.

(It was agreed that the Note put forward by Marshal Foch—Appendix “A”—should be submitted to the Council on Thursday.)

Marshal Foch asked that the question of Germany’s future frontiers should also be taken up.

M. Clemenceau said that in the absence of Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson, it would not be possible to undertake the discussion of this question.

3. General Belin begged to submit a Joint Note of the Military and Naval Advisers to the Supreme War Council on this subject, in pursuance of the reference made on the 17th Feb. (I. C. 144, Minute 5.)

(For Joint Note see Annexure “B”.)

(After some discussion the Joint Note was accepted, and Marshal Foch was requested to communicate the result to the Germans.)

4. M. Sonnino proposed that the Montenegrin case should be heard.

(It was agreed that a statement on behalf of Montenegro should be heard on the following Wednesday, at 3 p.m.)

(The Military, Naval and Air conditions of Peace were postponed until the following Thursday, and the question of Russia to a later date.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)


Annexure “A”

Note Concerning Limitation of Armaments in Austria-Hungary

The Military and Aviation members of the Committee appointed by the Supreme Allied Council to define the limitation of armaments, after examining the very detailed proposals of the Italian Delegation concerning the armaments of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, beg the Supreme Council of the Allies to re-examine the question as a whole. They further express the view that frontiers should be laid down as speedily as possible between the various States which

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*See BC-34 (SWC-9), p. 27.*
are to be set up in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Once this delimitation has been made, the members of the Committee will make recommendations similar to those made for Germany for such of those States as are considered enemy States.

The Naval Delegates have agreed to the text attached to this Note.

Appendix "B"

Naval and Military Representatives,
Versailles, 3rd March, 1919.

Report on the Question of Permitting Transport by Sea of German Troops to East Prussia and to Latvia

(In Execution of the Decision of the Supreme War Council of 17-2-19.)

The Naval and Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council,
After taking cognizance:
A. Of the request of the German Government for:
    Free passage by sea between German ports in the West and ports of the Eastern shores of the Baltic for ships carrying troops, military stores and coal, in order to continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks on the frontiers of East Prussia and in Latvia;
B. Of the opinion expressed by the Blockade Committee at their Meeting of February 24th to the effect that the Naval and Military Representatives on the Supreme War Council were alone competent to express an opinion;
    Considering further:
    (a) That the request of the German Government described above is contrary to Articles 12 and 13 of the Armistice Convention concluded on the 11th November 1918 with Germany;
    (b) That Marshal Foch has already, on several occasions, refused to comply with a German demand for the rearming of certain Naval Units, notably on the 24th January, 1919 and on the 13th February, and that a similar refusal was made by the Naval Armistice Commission;
    (c) That the authorisation for the Government of Germany to transport troops and material beyond the pre-war frontiers of Germany would lead to the sanctioning of co-operation in a common struggle against the Bolshevik of German forces on the one hand and

*See BC-34 (SWC-9), p. 27.
of Russian contingents on the other, for whose up-keep and supply the Allies will be answerable;

That from this state of things might arise claims made by the German Government and even discussions with that Government likely to impede the work of the Peace Conference;

(a) That the Germans have already attempted to re-establish commercial relations in the Baltic, contrary to all the rules of the Blockade and specially to Article 8 of the Armistice Convention of January 16th last, which provides for the delivery to the Allies of the whole German Commercial Fleet for use in re-victualling Europe;

The Naval and Military Representatives are of opinion

1. That there is no ground for granting the German request to transport troops and supplies in the Baltic from West to East.

2. That the Blockade of Germany should be maintained in full force as at present in the Baltic.

3. That in order to prevent the Germans from representing this denial as an abandonment by the Allies of the Baltic provinces to the mercy of Bolshevism, it is urgently necessary to examine the question of furnishing support to such local contingents as may be in a position to resist the Bolshevik troops.
Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, March 5, 1919, at 3 p.m.

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**
Hon. R. Lansing.
Hon. E. M. House.

**Secretaries**
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.
Mr. G. Auchincloss.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.

**Secretaries**
Mr. E. Phipps.

**FRANCE**
M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

**Secretaries**
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. Arnavon.
M. de Bearn.

**ITALY**
H. E. Baron Sonnino.
H. E. M. Crepil.

**Secretaries**
Count Aldrovandi.
M. Bertele.

**JAPAN**
H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.

**ALSO PRESENT**

**PRESENT DURING QUESTIONS 1 TO 7**

**FRANCE**
Marshal Foch.
General Weygand.

**PRESENT DURING QUESTION 6**

**FRANCE**
M. Jules Cambon.

**PRESENT DURING QUESTION 7**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**
Mr. Davis.
Mr. Hoover.
Mr. McCormick.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**
Lord Robert Cecil.

**FRANCE**
M. Clementel.
M. Seydoux.

**PRESENT DURING QUESTION 9**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**
Dr. Lybyer.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**
Mr. Leeper.

**FRANCE**
M. Delaroche Vernet.

**ITALY**
Colonel Castoldi.

**MONTENEGRO DELEGATION**
M. J. Plamenatz.
Dr. P. Chotch.
General A. Jvozdenovitch.
Joint Secretariat

America, United States of ........ Col. U. S. Grant.
British Empire ...................... Captain Abraham.
France ............................. Captain A. Portier.
Italy ....................... Lieut. Zanchi.
Japan .......................... M. Saburi.

Interpreter.—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. Clemenceau opened the Meeting with a statement that he had an application from the Belgian Delegation to be given representation in the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Nations when the subject of preliminary peace terms was being discussed. Belgium claimed to be as vitally interested in the terms formulated as any other nation represented in the Council, and he thought it would be difficult to refuse her request.

Mr. Balfour agreed that a refusal would be very difficult, but he asked the Council to consider the consequence of admitting Belgian delegates. It would set a precedent which would give rise to claims by the other small Powers, some of whom were equally interested, as for instance the Poles, the whole future of whose country depended on the terms that would be considered.

Mr. Lansing suggested that the Bohemians might well claim an equal interest.

Mr. House thought the difference between the Belgians and the other cases mentioned was, that the latter were newly created States while the Belgians had waged the entire war with the Allies.

Mr. Balfour was not sure that the distinction could be sustained. Poland had been acknowledged and had representatives on an equal footing in the Plenary Conference. It might be difficult to justify any discrimination between her status and that of Belgium. The same question might then arise in regard to Serbia, Greece, Portugal, etc. He would like to have representatives of all of them present were he assured that their presence would not materially reduce the Council’s ability to do business.

M. Clemenceau called attention to the fact that a rule had already been adopted in the regulations for the Conference, which provided that delegates of every nation should be admitted when a subject was being discussed in which they were interested. Belgian representatives must, therefore, be admitted when such a subject as the West frontier of Germany was under discussion, while Polish representatives would have to be admitted under this rule when the Eastern frontier was being discussed.

(It was agreed that the right of the Belgian Government to be represented on the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers during the discussion of the Preliminary Peace Terms should
be limited to the occasions coming within the regulations for the Peace Conference, viz., when terms in which Belgium was specially interested were under discussion.)

2. M. Clemenceau stated that the Danish House of Representatives had sent a special Delegation to be heard in the matter of Schleswig. As the Danish Minister had already been heard, he suggested that this Danish Delegation be referred to the special Commission on Belgian Affairs, to which the Danish claims had been referred.

(There being no objection, the above suggestion was adopted.)

3. M. Clemenceau announced that Luxemburg had requested to be given a hearing. Luxemburg was not an Allied Power (if a power at all) but neutral or possibly enemy. The present Government in Luxemburg had not been officially recognised. He thought, therefore, that Luxemburg need not be heard for the time being.

(It was agreed that Luxemburg would not be given a hearing for the present.)

4. M. Clemenceau stated that Marshal Foch had submitted a Report of financial rather than military interest on the subject of the cost of maintaining the Allied Army of occupation in Germany. As this report had only just been distributed, it could not be advantageously discussed immediately, but would be referred to the Finance Committee or put on the Agenda of a future meeting.

(It was agreed to put discussion of this report on the Agenda of a future meeting.)

5. M. Clemenceau said that he had received from the American Delegation a proposal requiring that the Commissions and Committees should attach to their Reports, to be handed in on the 8th or 15th March, a special drafting for such articles as were to find a place in the preliminary Peace Treaty. He suggested that examination of this proposal, which he understood was due to Mr. Lansing, should be postponed to the meeting on Thursday, March 6th.

(This was agreed to.)

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1 The "Brief Summary" of the minutes of this meeting (BC-44a, SWC-11a) gives the text of this draft resolution as follows:

"Each Commission and Committee established by the Conference should attach to its report a draft of a clause or clauses embodying its recommendations for insertion in the Preliminary Peace Treaty provided its report is approved. In preparing such clauses, the members of the Commissions and Committees should consult their legal advisers."

(Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/51)
6. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a Report from M. Jules Cambon regarding a request by the Powers with special interests. He would ask M. Cambon to explain the matter.

M. JULES CAMBON said that in pursuance of the Order of the Council he had on Monday, 3rd March, presided over a Meeting of the Delegations of the smaller Powers.² These Delegations were to nominate five Members to serve on the Financial and Economic Councils in accordance with the decision of March 1st. At the beginning of the Meeting the principal representative of Brazil, M. Epitacio Pessoa, read the text of a declaration drawn up that very morning in an informal meeting of the small Powers demanding that the Council should allow them 10 representatives instead of 5 in each of these Bodies. They further declared that they would abstain from nominating any representatives until this request had been granted. M. Cambon had reminded them of the precedent of the 2nd Plenary Session in which they had nominated 5 representatives though expressing at the time the wish for more, a wish which had subsequently been taken into account. He had also pointed out to them that the form of their decision was somewhat discourteous. In this he had been supported by some Delegates especially those of the smaller European Powers. These Delegates after the meeting had informed him that the opposition was not directed so much against the decision of the great Powers as against the alleged privileged treatment of the smaller European Powers. In the end the meeting had not maintained its refusal to nominate Delegates. It had adopted a list of ten States requiring representation on each of the Councils. These lists had been drawn up in alphabetical order and from them when the number of Delegates had been fixed a choice would be made. As Chairman he had been asked to support this suggestion before the present meeting. The list was as follows. For the Financial Council:—Belgium, Brazil, Ecuador, Greece, Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia. For the Economic Council:—Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Peru, Poland, Roumania, Serbia, Hedjaz and Czecho-Slovakia. M. Cambon concluded by asking that the matter be settled as soon as possible in order that he might inform the Delegations of the smaller Powers.

MR. HOUSE expressed the view that the original decision for 5 representatives should be adhered to.

MR. LANSING agreed as he thought this the best means of minimizing conflict. He observed that Bolivia and Peru asked for inclusion in the Economic Commission and that Ecuador was a candidate for the Financial Commission. None of these States had been at

² For minutes of this meeting, see vol. iii, pp. 450 ff.
war with Germany. Cuba and Nicaragua on the other hand, which had declared war on Germany, were not included. The Hedjaz representing a few hundred thousand men figured in both lists. He thought, therefore, there would be more confusion in allowing ten members than in maintaining five.

M. Clemenceau said that as no objection was raised Mr. Lansing’s proposal was adopted.

(It was therefore decided that the former decision be maintained; that the Powers with special interests should be represented on the Financial and Economic Councils by 5 Delegates. M. Jules Cambon was requested to inform the representatives of these States of this decision.)

7. M. Clemenceau said that he had had this subject placed on the Agenda after a conversation with Mr. Balfour and Mr. House. They had all agreed that the matter was urgent, and that it was incumbent on the Allied Powers to show goodwill to the German Austrians, in particular with a view to preventing them from throwing themselves into the arms of the Bavarians and Germans of Germany. This preamble was made for the benefit of Baron Sonnino who had not been present at the consultation. If he also agreed that it was advisable to discuss this matter at once, the discussion might proceed. If he preferred to think it over, the discussion might be delayed, but it would undoubtedly be advantageous to get the Germans in Austria in a good temper.

Baron Sonnino said that he had no objection to immediate discussion. Italy had always done her utmost to feed Austria.

M. Clementel said that before producing the conclusions of the Supreme Economic Council, he wished to say that he had only heard on the previous night that the question was to come up before the Council. He had called together the four Secretaries, and between them they had drawn up the Procès-Verbal of the Session held on the 3rd March. The text he was about to read had therefore been arrived at by Agreement of the four Secretaries but had not been formally passed, as was usual, by a subsequent meeting of the Council itself. In practice however, the text drawn up by the Secretaries was always passed without objection.

M. Clementel then read the following extracts from the Minutes of the fourth Session of the Supreme Economic Council:

Credits to enemy countries other than Germany.

1 (ex 8) “That credits to enemy countries other than Germany be granted only in the event of no cash assets being available for payment: that the best available non-liquid assets be taken as collateral security against such credits: and that their repayment be a first charge on the future resources of such country ranking in front of any payment for reparation or indemnity. The above principle is established in respect of credits not exceeding $90,000,000 in the first instance.”
Agreed with the following reservations:
1) That the U. S. Treasury is not empowered to make such loans excepting insofar as the Christian population of Turkey is concerned.
2) The Italian and French Delegates agreed to this only in this specific case which should not be construed as a precedent in other cases.

Finance of Supplies for Austria.

3(ex 5) "In order to secure immediate action for the finance of food supplies required in German-Austria to prevent extreme hardship and starvation and the spread of anarchy the following arrangement is proposed:
   a) "That Great Britain, France and Italy agree to advance credits in equal thirds up to a maximum of $30,000,000 between now and the next harvest, to finance such food supplies as may be consigned to German-Austria under the direction of the Supreme Economic Council inclusive of those already provided under provisional arrangements, it being clearly understood that the above figure is a maximum and that the question of actually opening credits up to this amount depends on the progress of events and the decisions of the Economic Council from time to time."

Agreed. The French and Italian Delegates making the same reservation as in the instance of paragraph 3 above.

Paragraph 6 was amended and agreed in the following form.

3 b (ex 6).
   b) "That as security for such credits the Austrian Government should formally agree to place at the disposal of a Commission or Commissioners representative of the three leading powers a suitable lien on (a) the salt mines in Austria, (b) the properties of the City of Vienna, and (c) such other assets as may be agreed upon, in Austria, immediate steps being taken in the case of the salt mines to clear these mines of all prior claims."

Paragraph 7 was amended and agreed in the following form:—

3 c (ex 7).
   c) "That an Interallied Commission be appointed of three or four members with a view to taking the necessary steps to make arrangements for due repayment of the credits out of the income of the above properties or otherwise."

3 d (ex 8).
   d) "That the repayment of such credits be a first charge on the future resources of Austria, ranking in front of any payment for reparation."

Agreed. The French and Italian Delegates making the same reservation as in the instance of paragraph 3 above.

Paragraph 15 was amended and agreed as follows:—

4 (ex 10)
"The associated Governments are prepared to allow imports of cereals from the Argentine into German-Austria up to a maximum of 30,000 tons, provided German-Austria is able to make its own financial arrangements subject to the approval of the financial Section of the Supreme Economic Council."

"The Associated Governments are prepared to transmit through the Wheat Executive to addresses in the Argentine cable messages from the Austrian Government promptly and necessarily arising out of the said transactions. In the event of contracts being arranged by Austria the Associated Governments will as far as possible facilitate shipping arrangements, any cost being charged by the Associated Government providing the Shipping against credits available for the purpose accruing to the Austrian Government in respect of the Austrian mercantile marine under the management of the Associated Government."

Lord Robert Cecil said that the texts read by M. Clemenceau represented the financial clauses of the scheme for revictualing
Austria. These clauses had been adopted on the advice of the Financial Advisers of the Council. If the clauses were accepted by the Powers the financial side of the matter was disposed of, but there were other difficulties of a material nature which the Supreme Council would have to settle. He referred especially to railway transport between the ports and the countries for which the food was intended.

M. Clemenceau said that before proceeding to deal with that aspect of the matter, it might be well to dispose of the financial clauses. He asked whether there was in any quarter any comment to make on them.

(No objection having been raised, the clauses above mentioned were adopted.)

Mr. Balfour said that he had no objection to raise but would like to make a remark concerning the resolution just taken before proceeding with the most difficult part of the problem. He thought it was unnecessary that every proposal of the Supreme Economic Council should be referred for sanction to the five Powers. The Economic Council had, he understood, executive authority within the terms of its reference.

This principle was accepted.

Mr. Balfour said that the difficult question remained of finding means to convey the corn shipped from America, from the Adriatic ports to the consumers in Germany, Austria, Bohemia and Hungary. He did not know exactly what the obstacles were that impeded this process, but he was assured that they were producing very grievous results, and that before long these results would be even more grievous. He would suggest that Mr. Hoover be asked to furnish the Council with an explanation of these difficulties.

Mr. Hoover then read the following statement:

The chaotic political and economic conditions in the states of the old Austrian Empire render the solution of the food problems extremely difficult. The newly constituted governments jealously guard their own supplies of food and coal and have created artificial barriers in the distribution of such native products as exist, and have made the distribution of imported foodstuffs extremely difficult by the disintegration of railway management and barriers on coal movements.

While the states comprising Czecho-Slovakia and the old state of Austria and some portions of Jugo-Slavia near seaboard are dangerously short of food, there are apparently sufficient surplus supplies in the interior of Jugo-Slavia and in the Banat to supply a sufficiency for some months to the interior of Jugo-Slavia, to Hungary and to Northern Serbia.

The problem, therefore, of maintenance of human life and the preservation of order through adequate food supplies not only re-
volves upon a large amount of imports with the proper finance and overseas transportation thereof, but also upon the organisation of some kind of economic unity amongst these states in respect to the distribution of supplies which they have available, and of transportation, and coal.

The total amount of imported food supplies required for these states as from the first of March until next harvest is approximately 185,000 tons per month of breadstuffs and 15,000 tons of fats per month. The total cost of such a programme will amount to approximately $50,000,000 per month. Of this amount, the American Relief Administration has arranged directly for about $14,000,000 to Czecho-Slovakia and Greater Serbia. A provision of approximately $8,000,000 per month has been arranged for the State of Austria through advance of England, France and Italy against securities, these countries in turn receiving an advance for the cost of food supplies purchased in the United States from the United States Government. Further finance from England, France and Italy is necessary for the other states. Recently the British Treasury has made an appropriation for these purposes but as yet no definite programme has been defined.

The overseas shipping, as to the American programme, has been undertaken by the United States Shipping Board. Further provision must be made from Allied shipping.

In an effort to secure some economic unity, a commission of the Associated Governments has been established at Trieste, through whom it is hoped that an adequate inter-change of such surplus commodities as there are in the different states could be secured.

During the month of February, the American Relief Administration provided approximately 70,000 tons of food-stuffs at various Adriatic ports for distribution into this area and the Allied Governments provided by advances from Italy approximately 20,000 tons; but, owing to inherent transportation difficulties and more particularly to the disturbances at Lubiana, which resulted in the Italian Government establishing a blockade against the Jugo-Slav area, it has been impossible to secure distribution of more than 30,000 tons during the month. This blockade has, I am informed, been raised yesterday.

Further arrivals by the American Food Administration make it possible to give a distribution of approximately 90,000 tons during the month of March, if transportation difficulties can be solved. Double this amount is needed but the balance must await arrangements by the Allied Governments. Aside from the arrangement of these further supplies, action by the Supreme War Council is critically necessary in the matter of control of interior transportation.

The solution which I propose, after elaborate investigation by American Railway Engineers, is one that I not only believe is feasible but will meet the various exigencies of the political situation. To this end the following plan is proposed: (a) All the states of the old Austrian Empire, including the areas held by the Italians on the Adriatic, should be called upon to furnish a definite contribution of railway rolling stock; (b) This rolling stock should be marked as belonging to the Relief Administration and used solely for its purposes; (c) The Director General of Relief should be made the mandatory for the disposition of this rolling stock; (d) A regular train service should be established under his direction that will carry out the
necessary programmes of food to the different localities; (e) This service should have entire freedom of movement over all railways regardless of political boundaries and in complete priority to other services; (f) The railway servants of any nationality may be employed in operations over any territory regardless of nationality or political boundaries; (g) Definite portions of port facilities should be assigned to the Relief Administration at Trieste and Fiume for the consumption of these ends; (h) The rolling stock should not be demanded by any of the Allied Governments until this service is completely equipped; (i) That the railway officials of each state and port officials in each port should be called upon to co-operate in maintenance of this service.

With reference to the 7th. paragraph of this statement, Mr. Hoover pointed out that the main line to Prague and Vienna had been cut off by the blockade. This had led to serious disturbances in Yugo-Slavia and in Austria. The Italian Government had made efforts to relieve the situation by using the Udine line, but this line could only convey about 800 tons of food a day, whereas to save the situation, 3,000 tons were required.

Mr. Hoover added in regard to his recommendation (c) that he proposed that one person should be made Director-General, because he did not think that any inter-allied body could give the requisite executive punch to a situation of this kind.

M. Clementel said that the Economic Council had reached a somewhat similar conclusion but instead of proposing to hand over the control to a single director it had instituted a sub-section of Military men with railway experience, one British, one French, one American and one Italian. This sub-section was already at work and it was somewhat difficult to supersede it by a single director, unless the execution of the director’s decision be left to them.

Lord Robert Cecil said that he entirely agreed with M. Clementel’s account of what the Council had proposed. The four railway experts on the sub-section were dealing with communications and were doing admirable work but the real lever in our possession to deal with the situation in Austria was food. It would, therefore, be necessary that the authority dealing with food should control this section. He would therefore suggest that in place of paragraph (c) of Mr. Hoover’s recommendations the following should be substituted:

(c) The Director of Relief, working through the communications section of the Supreme Economic Council, should be made the mandatory for the disposition of this railway stock.

M. Clementel said that this proposal would satisfy him. He pointed out that there might be a conflict for instance for priority between troops and food on the railways. If the principle of absolute priority for food were accepted, a principle embodied in the decision to give the supreme directorate to the Food Controller, while
the execution of his orders remained in the hands of those dealing
with the transport of troops, no trouble ought to arise.

M. Cresser said that as Minister of Supplies in Italy he was in a po-
sition to give the Council some interesting details. Immediately after
the Armistice, Italy began to send food to the ex-enemy countries
beyond her frontiers. This was done gratis and out of Italian stocks.
Food had gone to all nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in-
cluding the Yugo-Slavs. As soon as agreement had been reached
with the Allies, Italy was charged with the revictualling of Austria.
By the first agreement Italy supplied Vienna with 24 thousand tons
of food. In this matter Mr. Hoover and himself had worked in com-
plete accord. The undertaking was fully carried out. Meanwhile,
Mr. Hoover employed other stocks accumulated at Trieste for Yugo-
Slavia and Czecho-Slovakia. The trains passed through Innsbruck,
Tarvis and Lubiana. Vienna was satisfied with what had been done.
He had himself received a report on the previous day that, though
the food situation remained critical, the supplies sent from Genoa
had afforded great relief. He had received a similar letter from M.
Benes, thanking the Italian Government for the help sent to Bo-
hemia, especially to Prague. As regards Yugo-Slavia, with Mr.
Hoover's consent, Italian trains were employed to carry food through
Lubiana or Fiume. Traffic through Fiume still continued. It had
been suspended through Lubiana owing to unfortunate incidents.
On February 12th a train of Italian refugees was attacked by soldiers
in Serbian uniform near Lubiana. Many were wounded; Italian
flags were burned. Italy had asked for an apology from the pro-
vincial authorities. This had been followed on the 20th February
by a demand that the Italian Armistice sub-Commission at Lubiana
should withdraw immediately. This Commission was a branch of
the Commission established in Vienna in accordance with Article 7
of the Armistice of Villa Giusti. The officers composing it had called
on the local authorities, and the Commission was fully recognised
and well established. Nevertheless it was compelled to leave Lubiana.
The pretext alleged was that Lubiana was situated in the Kingdom
of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to which the Armistice could not
apply, since the Entente Powers had recognised Yugo-Slavia. No
such recognition in fact had been made. One of the officers composing
the Commission was ill at the time and permission for him to remain
was requested. This was denied, unless he submitted to medical
examination by a local Doctor. This insult could not be overlooked
by the Italian Government, which had in consequence closed the
frontier line of the Armistice by way of protest. A Commission
from Trieste was at that time in Rome, being received by the Italian
Government. The English Delegate on this Commission, Mr. Butler,
took it upon himself to go to Lubiana to settle the difficulty. Two
days ago a report had been received that a settlement had been reached. The settlement was to the effect that the Italian Commission should return to Lubiana and should be honourably received. In consequence Baron Sonnino and he thought that the incident was closed. Mr. Hoover had said that the blockade had been raised on the previous day. Neither Baron Sonnino nor he had previously been aware of this, but they were glad to hear it. Nevertheless the Council must understand that the political situation remained very strained and that Mr. Hoover’s proposals required very careful consideration. The Italian Government had tried to relieve the situation in Bohemia through Tarvis and General Badoglio had just telegraphed that three trains a day were going to Prague. Attempts were being made to increase this number to five.

Mr. Lansing enquired how much food was represented by three trains.

Mr. Hoover said that the maximum delivery of three trains was about 800 tons, whereas 3,000 represented the minimum requisite.

M. Crespi said that he thought three trains could carry as much as 1,000 tons. The whole situation was governed by the dearth of engines, Austria up to date having failed to supply what was required of her by the Armistice. It was only on the 28th February that deliveries of engines had begun at Vienna.

Mr. House said that he thought M. Clementel’s suggestion was a good one and might be adopted.

M. Clemenceau said that the amendment proposed by Lord Robert Cecil had been accepted by M. Clementel.

M. Sonnino said that the proposals put forward were of the greatest importance and could not, in his opinion, be adopted there and then. M. Clementel had confessed that they involved political questions. Italy could not allow a mandate to be given to any one man to override all national services, all political considerations, all military necessities, to establish complete priority for one kind of traffic, and to employ agents of all nationalities. M. Crespi had given some details about the Lubiana incident. Italy had done all it could to mitigate the consequences of the insult received. Italy had shown the greatest forbearance and had agreed to accept the solution proposed by Mr. Butler. He did not yet know what were the results of Italy’s effort at reconciliation. Before knowing it, he was asked to hand over the whole control to a single director. He could not do so. When at the beginning of the discussion he had said that he had no objection to talking over the question, he thought only the financial proposals of M. Clementel were to be brought forward. This was a far wider proposal and he must emphatically oppose its adoption at that sitting.

Mr. Balfour said that the position appeared to him to be very
serious. Most of the delegates, except M. Sonnino, were agreed that the proposal suggested by Mr. Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil, and M. Clementel, furnished adequate machinery for the conveyance of food to Austria. It appeared to him that no other machinery would do this. M. Sonnino objected that the Yugo-Slavs had behaved extremely badly, whereas Italy had shown a very conciliatory spirit. The situation was such that of the two possible railways by which food could go to German Austria, the larger was closed for political reasons. He, of course, accepted M. Sonnino’s account of the event, but he felt that the results of this incident were of extreme gravity. We could only send 800 or at the most 1,000 tons of food a day to a country that needed 3,000 to live. Could M. Sonnino offer any other solution than that proposed by Mr. Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil and M. Clementel?

M. SONNINO said that he had already accepted the solution arranged by Mr. Butler. He was not prepared to accept the other proposal without an adjournment.

MR. BALFOUR suggested a resolution that the question of opening the railway from Trieste to Vienna through Laibach (Lubiana) is one of the most pressing urgency, on grounds not only of humanitarian, but also of political importance; that every hour’s delay may produce consequences of an incalculable character; and that no temporary or local difficulties should be permitted to interfere with the opening of the main line for the transport of supplies.

Mr. House said that the question should be settled either at once or on the following day. All reports indicated that the sending of food to German Austria would weigh heavily in the scale when the German-Austrians came to decide whether or not they would throw in their lot with Germany. This was the political aspect of the case.

M. PICHON said that he wished to support Mr. Balfour and Mr. House. It appeared to him most urgent to revictual German Austria, and not only German Austria, but Hungary. German Austria was about to take a decision regarding its adhesion to Germany. There was a possibility of influencing the decision. This was a question of general policy and of great interest to the whole of the Alliance. Similar considerations applied to Hungary. He understood M. Sonnino’s scruples, but he would ask that the question be settled on the following day.

MR. LANSING pointed out that the Agenda for the following day contained the Naval and Military terms of the Preliminary Peace with Germany. This matter had already been once adjourned. He, therefore, suggested that the question now before the Council should be dealt with on Friday at the beginning of the Agenda for that day.

M. CRESPI said that he thought there was some misunderstanding. German Austria was being re-victualled via the Brenner and not via
Lubiana. Italy entirely agreed with the sentiment just expressed and
had always done its utmost to serve the same ends. He, himself, had
been seeking to arrange the question of credit since the 17th February,
and he had only succeeded in obtaining a reply on the 5th March. It
was, therefore, a little surprising to be told that the matter was so
urgent that an hour’s delay was dangerous. He wished to draw the
attention of the Council to the very sensitive condition of Italian
public opinion since the incidents at Lubiana and Spalato. The
Italian Delegation would agree to discuss the question on Friday,
provided they had time to communicate with the President of the
Council in Rome.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that delay appeared to be dangerous.

M. SONNINO said that no notice had been taken of the far simpler
solution proposed by Mr. Butler. As a provisional measure it ap-
peared to him to be the most appropriate suggested. He would accept
the discussion for Friday, provided he had time to obtain news and
to communicate with the President of the Council in Rome. In the
meanwhile, the Economic Council might study the means of mitigating
the proposal put forward. He thought that a political consideration
which was really foreign to the discussion was being used to establish
its urgency and the Council was forgetting that it ran the risk of
causing great offense to Italian public opinion.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would have liked the Council to adopt as
a resolution what he had proposed before.

M. SONNINO said that, as the matter was to be decided on Friday,
he begged Mr. Balfour not to insist on putting this forward. The
reasons for requiring an early and effective solution of the problem
had been heard. He had agreed that a solution should be found on
Friday. He deprecated any resolution taken in anticipation which
could, in any way, pre-judge the decision to be taken on Friday.
He, personally, would certainly resist any such anticipated resolution.

LORD ROBERT CECIL said that he had no wish to make any statement
affecting policy but he would like to impress on Baron Sonnino the
extreme urgency of sending food to Austria, and of getting the rail-
ways into working order for that purpose. He thought it was
impossible to exaggerate the gravity of the situation. People were
dying of hunger, not only in German Austria but in Bohemia. If
this state of things continued, it would cause disaster, not only in the
countries directly affected but throughout Europe. Unless the Allies
were ready to put the transportation of food on a business footing,
the direst consequences would result in all the Allied Countries.
All that was proposed was that a certain quantity of rolling stock
should be ear-marked, and given priority over other means of trans-
port. Even the Germans had done as much for the civilian popula-

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tion. Even if the Council could not see its way to accept the proposal at once, he suggested that it should express general approval and remit the means of execution to the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr. Lansing said that after hearing this, he would withdraw his proposal that the discussion should be delayed until Friday. He suggested that it be resumed at the beginning of the next day's meeting.

Baron Sonnino said that he regretted Mr. Lansing's change of mind. The Italian Delegation must have an opportunity of consulting Rome. The proposal, as it stood, put all the guilt on Italy, and by implication exonerated the Serbs from responsibility for the unjustifiable insult suffered by Italy. He requested that the resumption of the discussion be delayed until Friday. Each Delegation could make a firm resolve that a solution of the problem should be found on that day. There was of course another possible solution, namely, the military occupation of Lubiana. This could be done at any moment, but the Italian Government did not wish to proceed to that extremity on its own undivided responsibility.

Lord Milner asked whether the Italian Delegation would not be able to communicate by telephone with Rome.

M. Crespi explained that the Italian Government in Rome would have to communicate with Trieste.

Lord Milner observed that people were dying for want of food.

M. Crespi expressed the view that this was an exaggeration. In any case, the situation was governed by the absence of rolling stock. Even the opening of ten lines of railway would not improve matters unless rolling stock could be found.

M. Clemenceau said that in his view the disquieting feature of the discussion was that, to safeguard Italian susceptibilities, a delay was being agreed to, which might endanger the whole European situation, and compromise the results of the war. He quite understood national susceptibilities, but in certain circumstances they must not be given precedence over other considerations. Baron Sonnino was well aware that France had suppressed her feelings on more than one occasion; notably in relation to certain Naval occurrences in the Adriatic. Baron Sonnino, to save Italian susceptibilities wished the discussion postponed until Friday. If on Friday, the Yugo-Slavs had not given satisfaction to Italian sentiment, what was to happen? France was ready to advise the Yugo-Slavs, and had already done so, to be as conciliatory as possible. He felt that an urgent decision should not be postponed for a question of sentiment.

Baron Sonnino said that he did not ask for delay for any such reason. He agreed that the matter should be decided finally on
Friday. He had explained his reason for the delay. He must consult the President of the Council in Rome, and he must ascertain what had taken place. He would further point out that no notice had been given him that this matter would be discussed.

M. Cresser begged to read a letter dated March 1st, from M. Benes. He had previously mentioned this letter but thought it would interest the Council to hear it read. (For text see Annexure “A.”) He wished to add that on the previous day he had received a similar expression of thanks from M. Cramarz. In view of these expressions of gratitude he thought that the fears expressed on that day were exaggerated.

Mr. Balfour said that as Baron Sonnino had appealed to him and represented his proposed resolution as directed against Italy, he must express his regret that this interpretation should have been put upon it. Such had not been his intention, nor did he think that his words really suggested it. On the understanding that the question would not only be discussed but also solved on Friday, Baron Sonnino asked him to withdraw the Resolution. He recognised that the Italian Delegation had a right to consult the Government in Rome, and in view of this, he would reluctantly withdraw the Resolution, provided Baron Sonnino undertook to inform Signor Orlandó that the other Powers represented were very strongly of the opinion which he had attempted to put into words in his proposed Resolution.

(Baron Sonnino undertook to do this. The discussion was accordingly postponed until Friday.)

8. Marshal Foch drew attention to a request received from the German Armistice Delegation to the effect that German troops be allowed to co-operate with the Poles in their resistance to Russian Bolshevik Forces, and that maritime transportation towards Libau should be authorised for that purpose.

(For text of communication see Annexure “B”)

It was agreed that the discussion of this request should be taken up at a subsequent Meeting.

9. General Jvozdenovitch then read the following statement:

We consider it our duty to speak here, as we think we are entitled to address you on behalf of Montenegro.

Notwithstanding the intrigues and wiles of our adversaries (who are, alas! allies and brothers) we are the only official, legal and legitimate Government of the country.

Moreover, our existence is not denied by you, but rather clearly recognised—seeing that the Great Powers continue to accredit diplomatic representatives to the Royal Government, and that the Federal Re-
public of the United States recently approved the creation of a Royal
Legation at Washington.

As a legitimate Government recognised by the Allies, the Royal
Government considers that it has claims upon your good-will. Can
you forget that it was its Head who, from the very beginning, wished
to fight side by side with the Entente?

But, despite its heavy sacrifices and cruel sufferings during the war,
Montenegro is the only one of your Allies—and even of your enemies—
against whom the doors of the Conference have been closed.

The Royal Government has not been asked to name a representative
for the seat reserved for it, because in your opinion the position of our
country required explanation.

May we be permitted to say that its position is neither obscure nor
confused? A perfidious propaganda has tried to make you believe
that our country as a whole wished to be absorbed by Serbia, and
Serbia has tried to do this by one audacious and forcible coup. But
Montenegro opposed this arbitrary and impudent annexation. She
cried aloud despite the gag; her defenceless hands smote the fresh
oppressors still armed with weapons you had given them against a
common enemy. That is the outline of what occurred. However tell-
ing it may be, permit us to add some details thereto.

The scheme of an official Serbia (which is only a part of the Im-
perialistic dreams of certain of its politicians) had been long in
preparation, and in their haste since 1916 to carry them into effect
gave rise to the amazing Corfu Agreement,\(^a\) which, without a single
Montenegrin being consulted disposed of Montenegro from July, 1917
onwards.

This agreement was not only opposed to the laws of every age and
country, but was also an insult to the high principles which the Allies
have made their own.

In France, where the Royal Government received hospitality, in
Italy, in England, in the whole of America, a fierce campaign was
waged against us, our deeds and our persons—a campaign so false
and mean that it stooped to any means of injuring us.

The word treason was repeatedly used. Without compunction
King Nicholas was reproached for asking for peace in December, 1915
(in obedience, so it was said, to certain secret engagements). We
state clearly that this rumour was the work of Serbian Agents. Such
insults can best be answered by an authentic document. From the
beginning of the war, the King decided to entrust the command of
the Montenegrin armies to Serbian Staff Officers; their Chief, the
Serbian Staff Colonel Pechich, was the real Commander-in-Chief of
our troops.

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\(^a\)The text of the Corfu agreement is printed in H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of
the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. v (London, 1921), p. 393. For a discussion
of the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, pp. 828–831.
When the Austrians advanced and lack of food and ammunition made it impossible for our soldiers to hold their positions, Colonel Pechich proposed asking for an armistice. When the Supreme Austrian Command answered this request with the utmost harshness and cruelty, Colonel Pechich advised the King to make peace.

In our memorandum you will find the text of this letter, written on 31st December, 1915, (13th January, 1916) and received by King Nicholas on the same day at 7 a.m.

The two most important passages are:

"Sire, the Officers in Command of the Army on the Western Front declare that our Army is so demoralised that the enemy can no longer be resisted . . . .

". . . Having shown you the true state of affairs in the army, I have the honour to point out to Your Majesty that it is utterly impossible to carry on the struggle under such conditions, and that, without delay and as quickly as possible, we must (1) ask to make peace with the enemy, since he would not accept the proposal for an armistice made two days ago by the Royal Government . . . ."

Peace was asked for, or, to be more exact, King Nicholas resigned himself to sue for it at the pressing request of his Government and of the Serbian Colonel Peter Pechich. The reply of the Austrian Government is well-known, it was of such a nature that the Montenegrin Government decided to break off negotiations, the King preferring exile to dishonour.

Serbia, in her desire to forget the part she played in this affair, has continually tried to distort the facts, to alter texts and destroy all memory of the sacrifices and the heroism of Montenegro. She made unscrupulous use of calumny in order to further this secret design which she was pursuing and which events soon permitted her to bring about.

In October, 1918, after the evacuation of Albania by Austrian troops, the Eastern Army advanced towards Montenegro, and the Serbian troops which formed part thereof rapidly poured over our territory. Our compatriots, glad to meet men of their race, greeted them joyfully; their welcome however met with no response.

The Serbs immediately assumed the attitude of conquerors, overthrowing established institutions and imposing their own authority by means of intimidation and bribery. They were dealing with a starving population, whose consciences it was not hard to corrupt. The Serbian Government considered that the time had come for the annexation it had premeditated. By means of bribery a number of persons of all descriptions were suborned and persuaded to act as an artificial skupchina. It will be remembered that at the very first meeting, the illegal assembly at Podgoritza, after making a pretence of deliberation proclaimed the union of Montenegro with Serbia, and the abolition of the Dynasty.
Mere villages had been permitted to elect four deputies, while entire districts had only sent one or two representatives. Out of fifty of the King’s former Ministers, only two voted against him. Not a single officer or priest voted for the abolition of the Dynasty. Out of the 56 Deputies elected by the people to the Parliament of 1914, only 5 declared against Nicholas I.

Events had developed too far and too rapidly. Such shameless juggling with a regularly established Kingdom could not be accepted by an intelligent population, proud of its history and traditions and conscious of its individuality and need for liberty. Discontent rapidly developed into indignation, which indignation manifested itself both against the Serbian troops and the Montenegrins in the pay of Serbia.

In Paris, the Royal Government protested to the Allies against the violence done to our country, against this contempt of all rights. Our complaint has hitherto met with no response. The Serbs are still in Montenegro, pursuing their aims by armed force. Martyrs fall each day; but it has at any rate been proved before the whole world that the will of Montenegro has not been freely manifested.

We most earnestly desire that our protests shall not be misinterpreted. We will not permit Montenegro to become a Serbian province and be ruled by princes neither of her own choice nor her own royal line. It affords us satisfaction to consider that our country has firmly resisted such brutal and humiliating annexation. We are conscious, however, of all that we owe to our race and our people. We will not set our faces against a confederation of the Jugo-Slav countries, the States constituting which league would retain full and complete autonomy. Thus it is evident that we are merely claiming for Montenegro a right which is now recognised as legitimate for all people—that of self-determination. If this right is to be exercised, an end must be made to the rule of terror and despotism from which our country has suffered so much. After investigation by you, the Serbians must be asked to evacuate Montenegrin territory at once. Their gold and their bayonets must affect us no longer.

Then the task which it has consolled us to think of during defeat and exile can be fulfilled; Montenegro can be restored, as we have been solemnly and repeatedly promised by the great Allied statesmen, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Poincaré, Mr. Briand, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Orlando, and Mr. Wilson, the President of the United States, whose eloquent telegram, dated July 1918, we here beg to record:

"I thank Your Majesty sincerely for the courteous greetings you so kindly despatched to me on July 4th, which I value highly. I deeply sympathise with Your Majesty in the calamity which has overtaken Montenegro by the invasion of a ruthless force. I trust

that Your Majesty and the noble and heroic people of Montenegro will not be cast down, but will have confidence in the determination of the United States to see that in the final victory that will come, the integrity and rights of Montenegro shall be secured and recognised."

The logical result of this restoration is the return to Montenegro of its lawful Government, which would ensure the working of its constitution and restore the country to normal conditions. We venture to hope that you will help us in this peaceful task.

Montenegro would then be free to express its aims, through the Parliament provided by its constitution, but for the present we can make known to you its fair and moderate claims.

Montenegro was poor, very poor; the present war has made it poorer still, and has deprived those who dwell in its mountains of the slight agricultural and commercial resources with which they were content. The losses caused by 18 months of fighting and 34 months of occupation must be made good. Its want is fearful. Montenegro is deserving of your help.

To allow of the restoration of the country, and to ensure its development and safety, its frontiers should be more logically connected with historical facts and natural features. We shall make known to the Peace Conference what we hold to be the legitimate frontiers of Montenegro, allowing her to exist peacefully without fear of compromising the independence so dear to her and which has been maintained since the 5th century by the heroism of our ancestors.

We have tried to express our views shortly, knowing only too well how precious is the time of the great Council which has given us a hearing; but in a memorandum which we take the liberty of presenting to each one of you you will find more detailed explanations of the questions which we have raised, together with documents justifying our statements and proving our good faith.

(M. Clemenceau thanked the Delegation, which then withdrew.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Paris, 6th March, 1919.

Annexure "A" to IC-154 [BC-44]

[The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs (Benes) to the Italian Ambassador in France (Bonin-Longare) 6]

Paris, March 1, 1919.

EXCELLENCY: I have just received the report of Commandant Fierlinger on his return from Trieste where he had been sent to

6 Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
make contact with the Italian authorities with regard to the shipment of supplies for the Czechoslovak countries by way of the port of Trieste. The Royal Government of Italy was good enough to agree that our shipments of food stuffs be sent by the Udine-Tarvis route, on account of the recent closing of the railways in the south. Although the overloading of that route permits the passage of only a very limited number of our supply trains for Bohemia, there is hope of increasing their number as soon as the situation will permit.

I venture to ask, therefore, Your Excellency, that you will kindly be the interpreter to your Government of our warm gratitude for the measures mentioned above, which will greatly assist in bringing help to our populations at a critical moment, and also for the extreme good will with which the Royal Government of Italy so kindly carried out all the measures taken on our behalf in connection with this important matter.

Please accept [etc.]

E. Beneš

Annexure “B” to IC-154 [BC-44]

Messages, General Nudant, President Cipa, to Marshal Foch, 4 bis, Boul. Invalides, Paris

SPA, March, 1919.

No. 649. Wako* has delivered long note on Bolshevism and necessity help of Entente to ward it off. First, to send supplies, then to help in establishing front against bolshevik offensive expected in Spring. German Supreme Command puts to Entente following plain question: Are Governments interested, yes or no, in having our troops fight Bolshevism? If yes, that transportation be authorized to the region of Libau, so as to constitute in East Prussia a front continuing that of the Poles. I remind you:

(1) That the Germans had prepared five boats for such transportation, but that Allies forbade sailing;
(2) That quarters for a German army corps are at Libau.

*Abbreviation for Commission interallée permanente d’armistice (Interallied Permanent Armistice Commission).

*Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

*Abbreviation for Waffenstillstandskommission (German Armistice Commission).
Minutes of the 17th Session, Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Thursday, March 6, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing.
Hon. E. M. House.

Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.

Secretaries
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretaries
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. Arnavon.
M. de Beurn.

ITALY
H. E. Baron Sonnino.
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi.

Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi.
M. Bertele.

JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
General J. J. Pershing.
General Tasker H. Bliss.
General Andrew [McAndrew?].
Major-General M. N. Patrick.

BRITISH EMPIRE
General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.
Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, G. C. B., C. M. G., M. V. O.
Major-General W. Thwaites, C. B.
Brigadier-General P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O.
Brigadier-General H. W. Studd, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O.
Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N.
Paymaster Commander H. Miller, D. S. O.

FRANCE
M. Klotz.
M. Tardieu.
Marshal Foch.
General Bellin.
General Degoutte.
General Weygand.
General Duval.
Admiral de Bon.
Comdt. de V. Levavasseur.
Lieut. de V. Odend'hal.

ITALY
Admiral Grassi.
General Cavallero.

JAPAN
Admiral Takeshita.
General Nara.
Colonel Nagai.
Captain Fujikawa.
Captain Nomura.
Captain Yamamoto.
Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF ......... Lieut. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE ................. Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE .................................. Captain A. Portier.
ITALY .................................. Lieut. Zanchi.
JAPAN ............... M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. Clemenceau having declared the meeting open, said that a draft resolution containing instructions to Commissions and Committees, whose reports were due on March 8th and March 15th, had been handed in by the American Delegation. He asked the American Delegation to explain the exact scope of the resolution.

Mr. House explained that the resolution had been drafted with a view that all proposed Preliminary Peace terms submitted by Commissions and Committees should be framed in such legal form that no re-drafting would become necessary.

(The following resolution was duly approved:—

"Each Commission and Committee established by the Conference should attach to its report a draft of a clause or clauses embodying its recommendations for insertion in the preliminary Peace Treaty provided its report is approved. In preparing such clauses, the members of the Commissions and Committees should consult their legal advisers."

2. Mr. Lloyd George said that he had just received a message, telephoned from Spa, to the effect that negotiations relating to the supply of food and stores to Germany, and the surrender of merchant ships by Germany, had been broken off. The Germans had refused to surrender any ships without a firm guarantee that food supplies would be furnished up to the time of the next harvest. This condition the Allied Delegates felt unable to accept. They were returning tonight to Paris and would be able to report the facts of the case to the Conference tomorrow.

Marshall Foch said that he had so far received no communication on the subject from Spa.

(It was agreed to adjourn the further consideration of the question to the meeting to be held on the following afternoon, March 7th, 1919.)

—The "Brief Summary" of the minutes of this meeting (BC-45a, SWC-12a) gives a copy of the telegraphic report on this subject received by the British delegation from the British representatives at Spa, the text of which also appears as Annexure "A" to BC-46 (SWC-13), p. 266.
3. **MARSHAL FOCH** said that in accordance with the decision reached by the Supreme War Council at the meeting held on 3rd March, 1919, he had again assembled the Military, Aerial and Naval Advisers in order to co-ordinate their work. The revised texts of the Military, Aerial and Naval Clauses, which had that day been circulated, gave the conclusions reached by the Military, Aerial and Naval experts. No attempt had been made to define the duration of the terms to be imposed on Germany.

(For full text of draft regulations concerning a definitive Military status of Germany, see Appendix "A".)

Mr. BALFOUR said that the difference between the revised text, now submitted, and the one considered on Monday was that the Military, Naval and Air Departments, each of whom had originally given different periods of time for the duration of the terms to be imposed on Germany had now come to an agreement. That agreement had, however, only been reached by omitting all reference to any period of time. With that exception, he understood, all the clauses remained as previously submitted.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that that was not quite the case. He would call on Marshal Foch or General Degoutte to explain wherein the differences between the two texts lay.

GENERAL DEGOUTTE said that no essential differences existed between the first text and the final text, now submitted. The Military, Naval and Aerial Advisors had merely met to arrive at an agreement on special points, and to give effect to the conclusions reached, it had merely been found necessary to make slight alterations in certain sentences. He would point out, however, that the Military Advisors had from the beginning been in complete agreement as regards the principles advocated.

As regards the minor amendments now introduced in the text he would invite attention to the following:—

(a) In Chapter 1, Article 1, Paragraph 1, for "The total effective of the German land army", the following words had been substituted, namely:— "The total effective of the land army of the States both present and future constituting Germany".

(b) In Chapter 1, Article 6, Paragraph 1, instead of:— "the Staff Officers of the Ministry of War, and of the administrations directly attached to it, shall be included in the total effective given in Article 2 and shall not exceed 800 officers", the following words had been substituted: "The Staff Officers of the Ministries of War and of the German States and of the administrations directly attached to it shall be included in the total effective given in Article 2 and shall not exceed 300 officers".
(c) In Chapter 1, Article 7, Paragraph 2; for "In consequence, the War Academy, and the different schools of officers, students, etc.," the amended paragraph read: "In consequence the War Academies or similar institutions of the German States and the different schools of officers, students, etc."

(d) In Chapter 2, Article 8A, an attempt had been made to define more precisely the works to be disarmed or dismantled by Germany. The paragraph which in the original text read as follows:— "All fortified works, fortresses, and land forts at a distance of less than 50 kilometres from the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled," had been amended to read:— "All fortified works, fortresses, and land forts which are situated in German territory west of the line traced 50 kilometres east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled."

(e) Finally, on the suggestion of the American representatives, Chapter 5 had been amended to read as follows:—

Article 1 (a). All the provisions of this Convention shall be applicable throughout all the territories constituting Germany as she shall be on the signing of the Treaty of Peace or as she may be constituted at any time thereafter.

(b) Germany undertakes to respect all the clauses of the present Convention and is responsible for their execution towards all the Powers who have signed the Convention with her.

(c) The execution of these clauses will continue in the future to be supervised by such means and by such organs as the League of Nations may see fit to employ or create.

M. Clemenceau remarked that from what had been said the two texts were substantially identical. He thought, therefore, that the draft regulations could now be taken up and discussed one by one.

Mr. Lloyd George said that before the text came under discussion, he wished to ask a few questions. Moreover, he thought that the text itself should not be discussed before so large a Meeting.

The British Delegates could not see their way to accept the terms as they appeared at the present moment without large modifications; but those were questions which the Delegates themselves could alone discuss, as they alone would be responsible for the final decisions taken. On the other hand, in the draft resolution certain fundamental questions had been raised regarding which he would like to have explanations or enlightenment. He would, therefore, like to put certain questions to Marshal Foch before the text itself came under discussion.

He would ask Marshal Foch to explain how he proposed that the Germans should raise their army. The maximum army proposed had been fixed at 200,000 men. How were those men to be raised?
 Marshal Foch replied that the 200,000 men could be raised by annual recruitment, which could be either voluntary or by drawing lots or by any other system. He would point out, however, that the men so recruited would only serve for a period of one year.

Mr. Lloyd George said that in accordance with that scheme, the total length of service being restricted to one year, 200,000 men would be recruited and trained annually, so that in ten years 2,000,000 men would have been trained, in 15 years 3,000,000 men and in 20 years 4,000,000 men. Was that really Marshal Foch’s proposal?

Marshal Foch replied that it was evident that by renewing the personnel annually, soldiers of a sort would be produced. But in an Army it was not the common soldier that constituted the quality of an Army, but the “cadres”. In accordance with the proposal made by the military advisers a large number of soldiers would undoubtedly come under training, but there would be no corresponding staffs; that was the weak point of the system that was to be imposed on Germany. On the other hand, even a small standing army represented ready-made cadres for the training of a vast force. He would quote the words of Marshal Bugeaud, who, early in the nineteenth century, had stated that it would be better to have an army of sheep commanded by a lion than a number of lions commanded by an ass. By that he meant that it was the staff that was of importance and not the common soldiers; and the system which the military advisers had proposed to impose on Germany prevented the Germans from constituting staffs which would, after a period of years, enable them to gather and drive the large flocks of sheep which would still be found in Germany.

Mr. Lloyd George said that, with all due respect to Marshal Foch, he did not think the reply given met the real difficulty. Marshal Foch had said that the Germans would have no officers to lead the large Army of men available. Trained officers were, however, already plentiful in Germany, and would be for the next twenty-five years. He himself knew many distinguished officers who had fought both in the war of 1870 and again in the present war, and yet an interval of 46 years had elapsed between those two dates. In Germany at the present moment scores of officers and non-commissioned officers existed who had fought in this war and would be ready to come forward, thirsting for revenge, at the first opportunity. He would ask: Why should the Allies present Germany a scheme which would enable her to raise four or five million men in the next twenty years? Both England and America had had some experience of what that meant. Before 1914 Great Britain only had an army of some 200,000 men. Had she had an army of 2,000,000 men, besides the officers and non-commissioned officers whom Germany now had, results would have been very different. Outside
the small regular army Great Britain had merely possessed a few territorial officers, that is to say, civilians who did a little training every Saturday evening. Nevertheless, three months after the declaration of war these men were fighting in the trenches and had given a very good account of themselves. On the other hand, under the proposed scheme, Germany would have an Army of three to four million trained men led not by donkeys, but by officers who had had considerable war experience. Surely that could not be called disarmament. He himself would be very sorry to leave France after the signing of peace with that threat facing her across the Rhine.

Mr. Lansing remarked that in order to avoid any confusion Mr. Lloyd George should recognise that two or three million trained soldiers already existed in Germany. Consequently, the whole question was really one of disarmament, that is to say, the Germans must be made to surrender their surplus arms and armaments.

Marshal Foch pointed out that in reality the Allies had to deal both with the present situation and with a future situation in Germany. No doubt to-day Germany had millions of men, besides officers and non-commissioned officers who had been trained and could be brought to the colours very rapidly. Consequently, for some time to come Germany would have at her disposal all the elements of a well-organised army. That could not be prevented. Mr. Lloyd George had said that the trained officers and non-commissioned officers would remain available for 25 years and more. In his opinion, that would certainly not be the case. The men now demobilised would in three or four years’ time be of little value, owing to the interruption of their training. Germany owed her great strength before the war to the large body of 120,000 professional non-commissioned officers, who formed the backbone of the army. Under the proposed scheme that backbone would be broken. If Germany were now to be allowed to raise a permanent standing army consisting of even 40,000 or 50,000 men, that would mean practically 40,000 or 50,000 possible non-commissioned officers available for training large armies. No doubt “cadres” at present existed, but these would daily lose their value if demobilised as proposed. Mr. Lloyd George had spoken about the organisation of the British Army. That army had certainly not been a large one, but it had contained a comparatively large number of permanent officers and non-commissioned officers, serving in the Colonies and at home, who became available for training new armies. On the other hand, if the cadres were split up, and if the officers and non-commissioned officers were prevented from training after being demobilised, that would be the best method of dissipating an existing army.
MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would not dare to enter into a military argument with Marshal Foch; but he would point out that what had enabled Great Britain to train the new armies had been the old non-commissioned officers and the old officers, who had returned to the colours on the outbreak of the war, and a similar state of affairs would exist in Germany for many years to come. He would enquire, therefore, why a present of this great force should be made to Germany. He thought history would be repeating itself, and the Allies would be doing exactly the same thing as Napoleon had done after the Battle of Jena. The annual renewal of the whole army as suggested merely meant in the course of years the creation of an enormous army. That was a mistake which should not be repeated.

The British point of view, however, was the following: Germany should not be permitted to maintain a bigger army than Great Britain possessed. Great Britain had no idea of having an army of 4,000,000. Consequently, the regulations should lay down that Germany should not maintain a bigger army than Britain. It was useless to say that the Germans would not have the “cadres”, for, with millions of trained ex-officers and ex-non-commissioned officers burning with a desire to avenge their defeats, cadres would undoubtedly be raised somehow or other. He would therefore ask permission to make a suggestion, namely that an opportunity should be given to him to put a new proposal before the meeting. He suggested therefore, that the debate on the military terms should be adjourned to enable him on the morrow or the next day to submit an alternative proposal limiting the German army much more effectively than in the draft regulations now under consideration.

MARSHAL FOCH asked permission to invite the attention of the Conference to the fact that the regulations presented to the Conference had been unanimously accepted after consulting all the Allied Commanders-in-Chief, Marshal Haig, General Pershing, General Diaz, as well as other specially chosen military experts. The regulations did not therefore reflect merely his own personal views, but the agreement reached by all the Allied Military experts.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he fully realised that fact. On the other hand, the question was not wholly a military one; it was also a political one and, therefore, the Heads of Governments were entitled to express their view on the question.

M. CLEMENCEAUX agreed, and said that it would be the duty of the Heads of Governments finally to decide the whole question. He suggested that the further consideration of the question should be adjourned until the next meeting of the Conference, and he proposed that the Naval Clauses should at once be taken under consideration.
(It was agreed to adjourn the further consideration of the draft regulations concerning the definitive military status of Germany until the next meeting of the Conference, to be held on Friday afternoon at 15 o'clock.

It was understood that the British representatives would then submit an alternative proposal relating to the limitation of effective.)

4. M. LÉYGUES said that before the Naval Conditions for Peace with Germany came to be discussed clause by clause, he wished to be permitted at once to raise a question which the French Government considered to be exceedingly controversial. The Naval Clauses for Terms of Peace with Germany contained a condition which should never have been entered, and regarding which he had made certain important reservations. He referred to the proposal that the ships which would definitely be surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America should be broken up or destroyed in the shortest possible time. In his opinion, it would be sufficient to tell Germany that she must surrender so many ships, but it was unnecessary and inexpedient to state what was to be done with those same ships. That was a question which only concerned the Allies, and a decision could be reached separately and at a later date.

His proposal therefore was that this question should not come under discussion on that date. If this were done the work of the Conference would be greatly simplified, and he thought the remaining Naval Clauses could be disposed of that afternoon.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE agreed as far as that afternoon was concerned, but he would press for a final decision on the question to be reached as early as possible. In his opinion, the sooner the question was settled, the better it would be for the Allies. He did not despair about coming to an agreement, but the question was a very important one, at all events as regards the future peace of the world. He was quite willing, however, that the question should be reserved for a few days. The Admirals would have time in the interval to look into the matter again, and to decide whether the ships should be broken up, sunk, or distributed among the Allies.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether, in Mr. Lloyd George's opinion, any reference should be made in the Peace Treaty with Germany, to the manner of disposal of the ships to be surrendered by her.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would rather not discuss that point for the moment. He would not say that he disagreed, but he would reserve his decision.

(It was agreed to reserve for the moment the question relating to the disposal of the ships to be surrendered by Germany.)

M. CLEMENCEAU then called on Admiral Wemyss to read through the Naval Conditions, clause by clause.
ADMIRAL WEMYSS then read the Naval Conditions for the Terms of Peace with Germany, clause by clause. (For full text, see Annexure "B").

Mr. Lloyd George said that he wished to raise exactly the same question here as he had done in the case of the military terms. He was not prepared to agree to 15,000 men being trained every year.

ADMIRAL WEMYSS pointed out that Clause XI (i) qualified Clause I (a). It was therein stated that the personnel for the German Navy would be recruited on a long service system.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he wished nevertheless to suggest that the whole question should be reserved until to-morrow afternoon, so that the question of personnel could be considered together, both as regards the Army and the Navy.

(This was agreed to.)

ADMIRAL BENSON explained that the reason for the reservation he had made to this clause was that no period of time had been given for the limitation of the strength of the German Fleet.

Mr. BALFOUR enquired whether it had not been intended to leave all such questions to the Conference to decide.

ADMIRAL BENSON said that M. Sonnino had made a suggestion that the Naval experts should advise the Supreme War Council on that question. And, since no reference had been made to it in the draft regulations, he wished to place his views on record. If the Conference wished to erase his note from the document, now that he had had an opportunity of making his statement, he was ready to agree.

Mr. BALFOUR said he quite saw the force of what Admiral Benson had said. He wished to suggest that the duration of the terms, both naval and military, should be reserved until the terms themselves had been finally agreed. As soon as the conditions had been fixed, it would be possible to settle a reasonable period for the execution of the Naval conditions, and also to decide what action should be taken after that period had elapsed. The matter could then either be referred to the League of Nations to impose further limitations, or Germany could be granted complete freedom of action. In his opinion, that was the only business way to settle the matter.

(It was agreed to reserve all questions relating to the duration of the Naval conditions for Peace with Germany.)

(Clauses 2 (a) and 2 (b) were accepted subject to a decision being reached on the question of the duration of the Naval Conditions. See Clause 1 (b).)
M. LEYGUES said that the reservations which he had made earlier in the meeting relating to the destruction of the ships to be surrendered by Germany, applied to each of these clauses, which should therefore be reserved.

**Clause 3 (a)**

ADMIRAL WEMYSS thought that the conference should straight-way approve the principle that the ships were to be definitely taken away from Germany. The question as to what should be done with them should alone be reserved for the moment.

(Clause 3 (a) was accepted, the question of the manner of disposal of the ships to be surrendered by Germany being reserved.)

(Clauses 3 (b) and 3 (c) were accepted.)

**Clause 3 (b)**

(Clause 4 was accepted: the question of the manner of disposal of the ships to be surrendered by Germany being reserved.)

**Clause 4**

MR. BALFOUR drew attention to the following paragraph, namely: “With the above reservations the German Government may remove from these ships before they are sunk such material as has a commercial value”, and he enquired why the Allies should give to the Germans material of commercial value.

(It was agreed to delete the paragraph in question.)

(Clause 5 as amended was accepted: the question of the manner of disposal of the ships to be surrendered by Germany being reserved.)

**Clause 6**

(Clause 6 was accepted.)

M. LEYGUES expressed the view that this Clause also should be reserved for further consideration. It was inexpedient to prejudge what should be done with the materials resulting from the breaking up of German vessels of war, especially as it might eventually be decided that they should not be destroyed.

(It was agreed, for the present, to reserve Clause 7.)

MR. BALFOUR said he could not altogether understand the meaning of paragraph (b). Supposing a light cruiser, for instance, went down, a new light cruiser would be built, and, in his opinion, it would be absurd to say that it could only be replaced by something designed purely for coast defence. He thought Clause 8 (b) should be re-drafted.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. BALFOUR, continuing, said the second question related to paragraph 8 (d). According to that paragraph the birthday of a ship counted from “the first year in which credit would be taken in the Budget for the construction of the ship, which was to be replaced”. That pre-supposed that Parliamentary arrangements in Germany would be the same as those, for instance, in Great Britain. If Germany, however, had a law which did not impose an annual Budget, the
Naval Condition in question could be evaded. He thought, therefore, a more rigid date was required.

M. Leygues suggested that the date on which the ship was placed on the stocks should be taken.

(It was agreed to re-draft Clause 8 (d).)

(Clause 8 was approved subject to paragraphs 8 (b) and 8 (d) being re-drafted.)

M. Clemenceau said that this Clause would have to be reserved until the constitution of the League of Nations had been decided.

(This was agreed to.)

Mr. Balfour said that presumably the question of the disposal of the arms, ammunition and naval war material to be surrendered by Germany should be reserved.

M. Leygues agreed.

(This was agreed to.)

Mr. Balfour said that he noticed a note to the effect that Admiral Benson did not agree to the final paragraph relating to preventing the manufacture in Germany of naval ordnance, ammunition, mines, torpedoes or their parts, or naval war material of any description. He should have thought that condition was in agreement with the views of the American Delegates.

Mr. Lloyd George expressed the hope that the American delegates would see their way to withdraw their objection. If Germany were able to manufacture for foreign countries, a very serious situation would be produced. Germany would be able to say that she did not want any ships, that she was merely manufacturing for other countries, and, then, when war came, she would do exactly what England had done and requisition all these ships for her own use. Unless a condition of this nature were inserted the whole of the attempt to disarm Germany would be futile. The question under reference was not a League of Nations business; it was an essential part of the programme of the disarmament of Germany. He sincerely hoped the American delegates would allow this Clause to remain.

Mr. Lansing agreed to withdraw his reservation.

(Clause 10, as amended, was accepted, the Note by Admiral Benson being deleted: the question of the disposal of the arms, ammunition and naval war material, including mines and torpedoes to be surrendered by Germany being reserved.)

Mr. Lloyd George said that in accordance with the statement he had previously made, the whole of this Clause should be reserved until the question of the personnel for the German Navy had been further considered.

(It was agreed to reserve Clause 11 for further consideration.)
Clause 12

(These Clauses were approved.)

Mr. Lloyd George said he noticed a suggestion that the disposal of the islands would be decided by the Final Treaty of Peace. That was a question of great importance to Great Britain, and, in his opinion, whatever happened to the islands of Heligoland and Dune, he was anxious they should not be left in the hands of the Germans.

Admiral Wemyss said that he did not mind what happened to the islands, as long as they did not revert to Germany.

(It was agreed to reserve this Clause for further consideration.)

Clause 2

(This clause was accepted.)

Mr. Lansing said that his Naval advisers held the view that this Clause was more an Army than a Naval question. Naval armaments were being limited; why then should Germany not be allowed to defend her own coasts? In his opinion, it would be very difficult to prevent a nation from doing that, and he thought the Conference was going beyond reason. In his opinion, Germany should be permitted to defend herself.

Mr. Balfour held that the fortifications referred to in the Clause under consideration were not for defensive purposes; they were in reality Naval Bases to be used for offensive purposes, that is to say, centres from which offensive naval operations could be undertaken. He thought it would be admitted that the coast could best be defended by guns disseminated about the coast. In the Military Conditions for Peace with Germany, provision had been made for the destruction of all fortifications situated 50 kilometres East of the Rhine, and when that Condition came up for consideration he intended to ask why a similar condition should not be imposed as regards the Eastern frontier.

To sum up, if the fortifications in question were of value only for defensive purposes, he would at once accept the American view. But under present conditions of Naval warfare, fortified bases merely became jumping-off places for offensive operations.

Mr. House enquired why the clause should not be limited to defensive bases only.

Mr. Lansing held that once the enemy vessels had been reduced to the smaller number proposed, Germany was entitled to keep any bases she might have for the protection of her Navy.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that there was a good deal of force in the contention of the American delegates that Germany should not be deprived of such defences. It would be unwise to give the impression that the Allies had been merciless and had displayed a spirit of revenge. On the other hand, in his opinion, the fortifications should be given such a character that they could not be used as bases for attacking other countries. But as regards bona-fide trading ports,
Germany should be allowed to defend them to the best of her ability. He proposed, therefore, that the Clause should be referred back to the Admirals to be so drafted as to distinguish between fortifications maintained for offensive and those maintained for defensive purposes.

Marshal Foch insisted on the application of the principle contained in this clause. Otherwise, the fortifications of Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven, for instance, would not be destroyed.

(It was agreed to refer this Clause back to the Admirals for further examination with a view to separating the defensive from the offensive fortifications.)

Mr. Balfour said he did not know what principles had guided Admiral Benson in making his reservations. The importance of the Kiel Canal question was, however, very great. If Germany were permitted to continue to hold the Canal under the present conditions, the strength of the German Fleet would be doubled, the Baltic would be a German lake, the freedom of Sweden and Denmark, Finland, Latvia and Estonia, and even of Russia, would be jeopardised, if the last ever again became a maritime power. Consequently, from an international point of view, the question was of extreme importance. The use of the Canal for purely strategic reasons must be restricted as had been done in the case of the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal, where the provisions now suggested were already in operation.

Mr. Lansing said he was not unmindful of the arguments in favour of the provisions contained in the clause under consideration. The strategic advantage to Germany of the Kiel Canal was great; it could double the power of Germany to transfer ships from the Baltic to the North Sea. But he did not see why the same purpose could not be accomplished by destroying the fortifications of the Kiel Canal and at the same time preventing their reconstruction. Furthermore, he failed to see why all commercial ships of other countries passing through the Kiel Canal should be given special privileges. The same privileges might be asked in the case of the Cape Cod Canal, in the United States of America. He could see little justice in allowing the proposed clause to remain, in view of the fact that the German Fleet was to be reduced to very small figures, combined with the destruction of the fortifications in the Kiel Canal.

Mr. Lloyd George said he failed to see any injustice to Germany in saying that she must allow ships of all nations to pass through the Kiel Canal, which was no more than was done in the case of the Panama and Suez Canals. Far from being a disadvantage or injustice to Germany, the traffic so created would be of great benefit to her ports.

M. Tardieu remarked that equal rights to all nations could not be interpreted as an injustice.
Mr. House proposed that the question should be referred to the International Ports, Waterways & Railways Commission.

(It was agreed that the question of the Kiel Canal should be referred to the International Ports, Waterways & Railways Commission.)

Mr. Lansing suggested that the word "final" should be omitted from Clause 5 (i) and (ii). He did not know what it meant, as qualifying the words Treaty of Peace.

Mr. Balfour thought that if the word "final" were omitted, the Clause would have no meaning. The document under consideration was a Treaty of Peace, and consequently should not contain clauses becoming inoperative at the moment of signature.

Admiral Wemyss pointed out that the document under reference had been termed a "Convention". The use of the word "Treaty" had purposely been avoided.

Mr. Lansing said that as far as phraseology was concerned, the question of using an adjective to qualify the term "Peace Treaty" should be reserved until the question of the number of Peace Treaties to be signed with Germany had been decided.

(It was agreed that the qualifying adjective to be employed in connection with the term "Treaty of Peace" should throughout the draft Naval conditions for peace with Germany be reserved.)

Mr. Lansing drew attention to paragraph 4 of Clause 5 and enquired how that Clause would be applied. Who would select the one government to represent all the independent or semi-independent states into which Germany might be divided?

(Clause 5 was agreed to, subject to the above reservation.)

Mr. Lansing enquired whether the German cables therein enumerated were to be taken over as an indemnity due by Germany or on other grounds.

Admiral Wemyss said that the capture of enemy submarine cables was a legitimate application of the use of sea-power, and could be secured by the use of no other agency. Submarine cables must be considered as instruments of warfare and therefore subject to such action as might be taken in the case of naval, military, and aerial armaments. The cables in question had been cut on the outbreak of war. Large portions of them had since been diverted, taken up, or relaid, for use in situ by the British and French Governments. Their possession and use by the enemy would have enabled him to affect to a large extent the effects of the economic blockade.

Admiral Benson pointed out that only a certain number of these had been captured during the war. He did not agree that they were subject to capture and permanent retention in the same way as ships of war. At all events, that question had never been decided
in international law. He would be willing, as no precedent existed, that the question should be referred to a Prize Court.

Admiral de Bon said that as far as the French Government was concerned, the question was perfectly clear. Submarine cables were undoubtedly considered to be instruments of war, since they were used for the transmission of enemy messages. Their value was evidenced by the care Germany had taken to maintain her cable lines via Spain. As a naval war operation, ships had run considerable risks in attempting to cut the enemy submarine cables, and, in fact, one French boat had been sunk whilst employed on that duty. Consequently, as far as France was concerned, there was no doubt that submarine cables were considered to be war material, and fair prize, resulting from war operations. Such cables belonged to France just as much as telegraph wires captured on the battle-field. From the military point of view, the Allies acted within their rights in seizing these cables and in utilising them, and would be justified in keeping them. He fully realised, however, that the question had never been discussed from an international point of view, and if the Meeting insisted, a judicial Commission should be appointed to consider the whole question.

Mr. Lansing held the view that the question involved was one not only of international law, but also of policy. Had anyone the right to take enemy property lying on the highways open to all nations? He agreed that the cables could have been taken out of the ocean, and destroyed, but they could not be kept in situ and confiscated. They could be taken as an indemnity by agreement, but not as a capture of war. In his opinion, the very fact that the naval authorities had found it necessary to include these clauses showed that they were not sure of their ground.

Admiral Wemyss replied that as far as the naval experts themselves were concerned, they had no doubts as to what should be done, but he agreed that no international law appeared to cover the question.

Admiral de Bon pointed out that in many places the French had removed the cables and relaid them elsewhere, so that they had done the very thing which Mr. Lansing considered a sign of capture. He agreed, however, that the question could be referred to a judicial body on the condition that the naval authorities were called in to give their views, and that the naval point of view was not overlooked.

M. Sonnino thought that in referring the question to a legal commission a distinction should be made between cables which had been seized and those which had not been seized.

Mr. Lansing agreed to the question being referred in the first instance to a judicial committee, but he felt compelled to point out that in his opinion a very large question of policy was also involved.
M. Tardieu agreed that the question of the capture of the cables should be settled by the Law committee. But there was a further question to be settled, namely, whether these cables should be restored to the German owners or not.

Mr. Lansing remarked that that was the very question of policy he had himself referred to.

Baron Martino said that some of the cable-lines in question were at the present moment held by the Japanese Government. They had been taken over because they were being used for the purposes of naval warfare. The Japanese delegates had agreed to the clause under consideration for the reason that they thought the cables in question were not to be returned to the Germans. But as regards their future disposal, the Japanese had their own views, which he did not think it necessary to express that day. The meeting should therefore agree that the cables must be taken from Germany. But as regards their future disposal the question should be reserved.

Mr. Balfour expressed the view that the whole question could be summed up in two very concise propositions.

Firstly, was it in accordance with the spirit of international law that all submarine cables captured should, or should not, be taken from Germany? That was a purely legal question. If answered in the affirmative, namely, that Germany should be deprived of all or of some of the cables, then . . . . .

Secondly, what should be done with them? That was a question of high policy and not of law. It was a question analogous to the one dealing with the disposal of the money or ships to be taken from Germany, and it should be referred to some other commission. Finally, he thought the further discussion of the whole question should be reserved until the two questions he had propounded had been reported on.

Mr. Lansing agreed, but he would also like to refer, in connection with question 1, whether any international right existed to seize the cables in question either as prizes of war or as indemnities.

Mr. Balfour proposed that Mr. Lansing should be asked to draft the terms of reference. He thought that a committee would have to be created to report on the question with one representative for each country.

(It was agreed that terms of reference for a Commission to consider the question of the submarine cables referred to in Clause 6 should be drafted and submitted by Mr. Lansing at the next Meeting to be held on Friday afternoon, March 7th.)

(It was also agreed that a Committee should be appointed to consider the question of international law, to consist of one representative of each of the Great Powers, whose names would be handed in on the following afternoon.)
Mr. Lloyd George enquired why this question should be brought into the naval convention. It was purely a question of reparation, and, in his opinion, should be referred to the Allied Commission on Reparation without note or comment.

(It was agreed to refer the question of the reparation for Allied shipping losses to the Allied Commission on Reparation.)

Mr. Lansing said that Admiral Benson had made certain reservations in connection with the appointment of Commissions for the execution of the naval terms, as there was no indication of the length of time these Commissions would have to act.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he did not quite know what Mr. Lansing had in his mind, but if he would submit counter-proposals, the question would be made quite clear.

(It was agreed that Mr. Lansing should draft and submit an alternative reading of Part III, Clause 1.)

(Clause 2 was accepted without discussion.)

Clause 2

Admiral Wemyss then read the following statement:

"The Admirals understand that the German Colonies are not to be returned to Germany, and, on that hypothesis, have not included the subject in the Naval conditions."

The Naval clauses for the Conditions of Peace with Germany were approved, subject to the following reservations:

I. That the following questions be reserved for further consideration:

Part I. Clauses 3 (a), 4, 5, 7 & 10

The manner of disposal of ships to be surrendered by Germany, and of the material arising from the vessels broken up, and of other Naval war material.

Part I. Clauses 1 (a) and 11

The strength of the personnel of the German Navy.

Part I. Clause 1 (b)

The duration of the Naval Conditions of Peace with Germany.

Part I. Clause 9

Prohibition of the construction of submarines.

Part II. Clause 1

Final disposal of Heligoland and Dune.

Part I. Clauses, Part II. Clause 5

Use of the word "final" before "Peace Treaty" throughout the Naval conditions.

Part III. Clause 1

Commission for the execution of the Naval Terms of Peace with Germany.

II. That the following question be referred back to the Allied Naval Commission for re-drafting:

Construction of Vessels of War by Germany.
III. That the following question be referred to the Inter-Allied
Naval Commission:—To separate the coast fortifications maintained
by Germany for offensive purposes from those maintained for defensive purposes.

Part II. Clause 3

IV. That the following questions be referred to Special Com-
mittees:—

Part II. Clause 4

Kiel Canal to be referred to the International Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission.

Part II. Clause 6

The German submarine cables to be referred to a special judicial committee to be created.

Appendix to Part II.

Reparation for Allied shipping losses to be referred to the Inter-Allied Commission on Reparation.

(The Meeting then adjourned until Friday, March 7th, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

Paris, 7th March, 1919.

Appendix “A” to IC-155 [BC-45]

Draft Regulations Concerning a Definitive Military Status of Germany

Chapter 1.—Limitation of Effectives

Article 1.

The total effectives of the Land Army of all the States both present and future, constituting Germany, fixed so that Germany can ensure order and police control within her territory, does not exceed 200,000 men (not including Officers.)

The non-commissioned officers and men in excess of this figure shall return to civil life.

Article 2.

The total effectives of Officers shall not exceed 9,000, including the staffs of Commanders of fortresses, garrisons, etc.

Article 3.

The German Army shall consist of not more than 15 divisions of infantry and 5 divisions of cavalry.

Article 4.

These divisions may be formed with not more than 5 Army Corps Staffs and 1 Army Staff.

The formation of forces differently grouped and of other organisations of command is forbidden.
Article 5.

The composition of the divisions and that of Army or Army Corps Staffs is given in Table No. 1.

The number of small units of infantry, artillery, engineers, and of technical services and troops, provided for the divisions, as well as the effective[s] allowed for these small units, technical services of troops, must not be exceeded.

Article 6.

As the German Army can have no other duty than the maintenance of internal order, and, in cases of necessity, the police control of the frontiers, the High Command of the Army is confined to functions of an administrative character. The Staff of Officers of the Ministries of War of all the German States and of the Administrations directly attached to it, shall be included in the total effectives given to Article 2, and shall not exceed 300 officers.

No organisation shall exist intended to prepare troops for employment in any warlike operations, and in particular, the German Great General Staff or similar formations shall be dissolved and cannot be reconstituted in any other form.

Article 7.

Only the number of military schools strictly indispensable to the recruitment of the officers of the units to be maintained, shall continue to exist.

In consequence, the War Academies or similar institutions of the German States and the different schools of officers, officer-students, cadets, non-commissioned officers, and non-commissioned officer students, shall be suppressed; the only schools authorised shall be those intended for the recruitment of the officers of each arm in the proportion of one school for each arm.

The number of students admitted to attend the lectures in these schools shall be strictly proportion to the vacancies to be filled up in the cadres of officers, students and cadres being included in the effectives mentioned in Article 1.

Manoeuvres of cadres and troops of a strength exceeding that of a regiment are suppressed.

Article 8.

All the measures prescribed in the present chapter must be carried out within two months at the most.

Chapter 2.—Limitation of Armaments

Article 1.

The Units forming the German Army shall have an armament the total amount of which shall not exceed that stated in Table No. 2.
Article 2.

The German Army may have besides, at its disposal, to provide for eventual replacements, an amount of material equal to 1/25th part for small arms and to 1/50th part for cannons of the quantity provided for in the preceding Article.

Article 3.

The German Army may have at its disposal stocks of munitions the amount of which shall not exceed that fixed by Table No. 3.

Article 4.

These stocks of munitions shall be stored at points fixed by the German Government of which it shall inform the Allied and Associated Powers.

Apart from these depôts it shall be forbidden to form stocks, depôts or reserves of munitions.

Article 5.

Production or use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, any liquid, any material and any similar device capable of use in war are forbidden.

Article 6.

The manufacture of armoured cars or of any similar machines which can be used for military objects is forbidden.

Article 7.

The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material shall be permitted only in a very limited number of factories, the exact names of which shall be communicated to the Allied and Associated Powers with a statement of the amount of material ordered.

No other establishment having for its object the design, preparation, manufacture or storage of munitions or any war material whatever shall exist.

In particular, the arsenals shall be suppressed, unless they are used as depôts for the authorised stocks of munitions. The personnel of the suppressed arsenals shall be dismissed.

Article 8.

(a) All fortified works, fortresses and land forts, which are situated in German territory west of a line traced 50 kilometres east of the Rhine, shall be disarmed and dismantled.

The construction of any new fortifications, of whatever importance or nature, within this zone is forbidden.

(b) The status quo is and shall be preserved as regards fortified works on the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany.

(c) The armament of the fortified works, fortresses and land or coast forts which Germany is allowed to retain shall never exceed,
as regards the number and calibre of guns, those existing at the date
of the signature of the present Convention, which number and cali-
bres shall at once be communicated by the German Government to the
Allied and Associated Powers.

The stocks of ammunition for these guns shall be maintained at the
following uniform rates, 3,000 rounds apiece for those the calibre of
which is 10.5 cm. and under; 1,000 rounds apiece for those of higher
calibre.

Article 9.

No military force or establishment shall exist on the left bank of
the Rhine and till further orders police control shall be ensured by
Allied troops.

Article 10.

All German arms, munitions and war material, existing in Ger-
many, including those mentioned in Articles 5, 6 and 7, in excess of
the quantities allowed by the present regulations shall be surrendered
to the Allied and Associated Powers at points to be fixed in German
territory, with a view to their being destroyed or rendered useless.

The same shall be done in the case of special machinery intended
for the manufacture of war material in excess of that recognised as
necessary for the manufacture authorised.

War material of all sorts, even if not in working order, or origin
other than German, shall be sequestered; the Allied and Associated
Powers shall decide as to its disposal.

Article 11.

Germany is forbidden to manufacture war material for other coun-
tries.

The German State or States or German private individuals shall
not receive by purchase, exchange or cession of any sort war material
coming from abroad.

Article 12.

The measures prescribed by Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10 of the present
chapter shall be carried out within one month.

The measures prescribed by Articles 7 and 8 of the present chapter
shall be carried out within 3 months.

Chapter 3.—Limiting Clauses Concerning German Military Laws

Article 1.

Clauses of the following article shall form an integral part of the
German Military Laws.

These laws moreover shall not include any provision in contradic-
tion of the clauses contained in the different chapters of the regula-
tions. They shall on the contrary prescribe the abrogation of all
previous legislative, financial, or administrative measures which may be in contradiction with these clauses.

These laws shall be enforced in all German territory and promulgated within three months.

Article 2.

The total number of 200,000 men, given in Article 1 of Chapter 1, includes:

(a) The number of these enlisted or re-enlisted (non-commissioned officers included) which shall not exceed 20,000;

(b) The number of those called up in each class of recruitment.

Beyond this number of men, no military force shall be raised in Germany either in the form of a militia or any other form.

Article 3.

The total number of these called up in each class of recruitment who shall receive any military instruction shall be less than 180,000 men.

The men of the contingent embodied shall, after their service be definitely freed from all military obligation.

Men not embodied shall not be obliged to fulfill any military obligation.

The total length of the service of those called up must not exceed 1 year and their service must be continuous.

Article 4.

Officers who have previously belonged to any military formations and who are not included in the units the maintenance of which is authorised, shall not participate in any military exercise, whether theoretical or practical, and shall not be liable to any military obligation.

Officers kept in the Army shall serve at least till the age of 45 years.

 Officers newly commissioned shall sign an engagement to serve on the active list for at least 25 years.

No officer shall leave the army without being pronounced unfit on grounds of health. If, by an exception, he is authorised to do so, his place shall not be filled before he has reached the age of 45 years or the period of service of 25 years provided for is ended.

The proportion of officers thus pronounced unfit on grounds of health shall not exceed in any one year 5% of the total effectives of officers provided for in Article 2 of Chapter 1.

Article 5.

Those who have re-enlisted (non-Commissioned officers and men) shall be obliged to serve for at least 15 years. Before the end of that time they shall only leave the army under the conditions fixed for Officers.
Article 6.

No measure of mobilisation shall be provided for.

In no case shall troops, services, or staffs include supplementary cadres.

No census or classification of horses shall be made for the requirements of the Army.

Article 7.

The following units may have a depot of their own:

A regiment of Infantry,
A regiment of Cavalry,
A regiment of Field Artillery,
A battalion of Heavy Artillery,
A brigade of Horse Artillery,
A battalion of Pioneers.

The effectives of the depots of the German Army included in the total figure given in Article 1 of Chapter 1.

Article 8.

The administrative services the staff of which are neither officers, non-commissioned officers or men, shall have their effectives reduced for each category, to the fifth part of those provided for in the Budget of 1913. They are not included in the effectives indicated in Articles 1 and 2 of Chapter 1.

Article 9.

Public servants such as Gendarmes, Custom House Officials, Forest and Coast Guards, and Local and Municipal Police Officials, shall never be assembled to take part in any military training.

Article 10.

Societies of retired soldiers, rifle, sporting or touring clubs and, in general, associations whether incorporated or not, whatever may be the age of their members, shall not concern themselves in any military question. They shall, in particular, be forbidden to instruct or exercise, or to allow to be instructed or exercised, their members in the vocation of war or use of weapons of war. The same rule applies to Schools or Universities not provided for in Article 7 of Chapter 1.

These Societies, Associations or Schools shall have no connection with the Ministry of War or any other Military Authority. They shall have no military instructors.

Chapter 4.—Control

Article 1.

The provisions of all Articles of Chapter 1 and of Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 10 of Chapter 2 will be carried out under the control
of a special Commission, delegated for that purpose by the Allied and Associated Powers. That Commission will work until the provisions of the Articles mentioned above are carried out by Germany within the prescribed period; if, for any reason, any one of those provisions be not carried out within the allotted period, the delegates of that Commission will immediately bring those facts to the knowledge of their respective Governments, who will give them new instructions.

This Commission shall be established at the seat of the Central German Government, but will be able to send Sub-Commissions or delegates to any other part of German territory.

Article 2.

The German Government undertakes to facilitate so far as possible the exercise of this control, especially from the point of view of military and financial measures, and to communicate to the Commission in its entirety the War Budget.

It undertakes also to communicate to the said Commission all orders given by it for the carrying out of the provisions of the present regulations and to furnish, moreover, on questions which may be put to it, all information which may be asked.

Article 3.

The destruction and putting out of action provided for in Chapter 2 will be carried out by orders of the German authorities, under the supervision of the delegates of the said Commission.

Article 4.

The Allied and Associated Powers reserve to themselves the right of exercising their control over importations of raw material, which might be used for the production of war material.

Chapter 5

Article 1.

(a) All the provisions of this Convention shall be applicable throughout all the territories constituting Germany as she shall be on the signing of the Treaty of Peace or as she may be constituted at any time thereafter.

(b) Germany undertakes to respect all the clauses of the present Convention and is responsible for their execution towards all the Powers who have signed this Convention with her.

(c) The execution of these Clauses will continue in the future to be supervised by such means and by such organs as the League of Nations may see fit to employ or to create.
**Table No. 1**

**State and Establishment of the Army and Army Corps Staffs of Infantry and Cavalry Divisions**

(These tabular statements do not form a fixed establishment to be imposed on Germany, but the figures contained in them (number of Units and strengths) represent maximum figures which should not in any case be exceeded.)

**I. Army and Army Corps Staffs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Maximum number authorised</th>
<th>Maximum strengths of each unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Corps Staff</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**II. Establishment of an Infantry Division**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent Unit</th>
<th>Max. No. of such unit in a single division</th>
<th>Maximum strength of each unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff of an Infantry Div.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff of Divisional Infy.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff of Divisional Art.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment of Infantry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each Regiment comprises:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Battalions of Infantry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each Battalion comprises:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Companies of Infantry &amp; 1 Machine Gun Company</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench Mortar Company</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisional Squadron</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each Regiment comprises:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Groups of Artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each Group comprises:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Batteries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Battl (3 Batteries)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pioneer Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This Battalion comprises:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Companies of Pioneers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Pontoon Detachment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Searchlight Section</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison Detachment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This Detachment comprises:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Telegraph Detachment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Microphone Section</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Carrier Pigeon Section</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisional Medical Service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks &amp; Convoys</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**III. Establishment of a Cavalry Division**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff of a Cavalry Division</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each Regiment comprises:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Squadrons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse Arty Group (3 Batteries)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table No. 1—Continued

**State and Establishment of the Army and Army Corps Staffs of Infantry and Cavalry Divisions—Continued**

**IV. Horse Establishment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Saddle</th>
<th>Draught</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Div.</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>2531</td>
<td>15 Infantry Div...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry Div.</td>
<td>8333</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>5 Cavalry Divisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table No. 2

**Tabular Statement of Armoury Establishment for a Maximum of 15 Infantry Divisions, 5 Cavalry Divisions and 5 Army Corps Staffs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Infantry Division</th>
<th>For 15 Infantry Divisions</th>
<th>Cavalry Division</th>
<th>For 5 Cavalry Divisions</th>
<th>5 Army Corps Staffs</th>
<th>Total of columns 2 4 and 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy machine guns.</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>This establishment must be drawn from the increased armaments of the divisional infantry.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light machine guns.</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>2,430</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary trench mortars.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>135</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light trench mortars.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>405</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77 mm. guns.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 mm. Howitzers.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150 mm.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 mm. Heavy guns.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table No. 3

**Maximum Stocks Authorised**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Maximum number of arms authorised</th>
<th>Establishment per unit</th>
<th>Maximum Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>400 rounds</td>
<td>84,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbines</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>8,000 rounds</td>
<td>32,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy machine-guns</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>400 rounds</td>
<td>54,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light machine-guns</td>
<td>2,430</td>
<td>400 rounds</td>
<td>324,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary Trench mortars.</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>800 rounds</td>
<td>144,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Trench mortars.</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery 77 mm. Guns.</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>1,000 rounds</td>
<td>420,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery 105 mm. Guns.</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>800 rounds</td>
<td>36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Artillery 150 mm. Howitzer</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>600 rounds</td>
<td>72,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy 105 mm. Gun.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>600 rounds</td>
<td>36,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conditions To Be Imposed on the German Government in Regard to Military and Maritime Aeronautics

Article I.

The effectives of the German Air Service in material and personnel shall be reduced to the following figures:—

(1) Material.

(a) Aeroplanes.

The military forces of Germany having to be limited to the necessary minimum to allow her to maintain order in the interior, must not comprise any military aeroplanes.

(b) Hydroplanes.

Germany can for a period not longer than 1st October, 1919, maintain a total of 100 hydroplanes or water gliders for the purpose of seeking out submarine mines, with the necessary equipment, but without armaments, munitions or bombs.

(c) Motors.

In addition to the motors mounted on hydroplanes, and water gliders mentioned above, one motor may be allowed for each hydroplane or water glider.

(d) Dirigibles.

No dirigible balloons shall be kept.

(2) Personnel.

(a) Land Aviation.

Land aviation being suppressed, no personnel is allowed under this heading.

(b) Naval Aviation.

A total number of 1,000 men for the whole of the cadres, navigating and non-navigating personnel of all formations and establishments.

(c) The whole personnel, excepting a total of 1,000 men mentioned in Paragraph I (2) (b) figuring at present on the control lists of the German land and sea forces will be demobilised or sent to other arms or services, (but the effectives provided for in the Military and Naval Statute must not be exceeded).

Article II.

No aviation ground and no shed for dirigibles must be maintained or established:—

(1) to the East of the Rhine, at a distance of less than 150 Kilometres from that river.

(2) to the West of the Eastern German frontier at a distance of less than 150 kilometres from that frontier.

(3) to the North of the Southern German frontier at a distance of less than 150 kilometres from the frontier of Italy or of Czecho-Slovakia.
All grounds now existing which do not satisfy these conditions are to be immediately placed out of use. The sheds are to be dismantled and the earth is to be ploughed up.

Article III.

Germany will allow to all Allied aircraft free passage through the air, free transit and right to land on her territory until complete evacuation of German territory by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article IV.

The manufacture of parts of aeroplanes, hydroplanes, water gliders, dirigibles and motors shall be forbidden in the whole of German territory until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace.

Article V.

The material now existing in the German land and sea forces or in process of manufacture, in excess of the figures given under Article I shall be handed over to the Allies. In that material must be comprised, in particular:—

- complete aeroplanes and hydroplanes, as well as those in process of manufacture, repair, or of being put together;
- dirigible balloons able to take the air in process of manufacture, repair or being put together;
- machinery for the manufacture of hydrogen;
- dirigible sheds and every kind of shelter for balloons or dirigibles.

Pending their delivery dirigible balloons are to be maintained blown out with hydrogen at Germany’s expense and the apparatus for the manufacture of the hydrogen, as well as shelters for dirigibles may, at the discretion of the Allied and Associated Powers, be left to Germany until the moment when the dirigibles are handed over.

Motors.

Cells.

Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb throwers, torpedo throwers, synchronisation apparatus, aiming apparatus).

Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs, loaded and unloaded, stocks of explosives or material for their manufacture).

Instruments for use on aeroplanes.

Wireless apparatus; photographic or cinematograph apparatus.

Detached parts connected with any of the preceding categories.

Article VI.

Any movement of material mentioned in Article V shall be forbidden without special authorisation by the Allied and Associated Powers.
Article VII.

The terms of the various articles of the present Convention shall be carried out under the control of a Special Commission delegated for that purpose by the Allied and Associated Powers.

This Commission shall work at the seat of the Central German Government, but shall be able to send a sub-Commission or delegates to any other part of German territory.

This Commission will have every power to settle directly and without appeal any disputes which may arise in regard to the execution of the present Convention.

The German Government will immediately hand over to it:

(1) A numerical list of the personnel belonging to all the German Air Services and of the existing material as well as that in process of manufacture or on order.

(2) A complete list, with their position, of all establishments working for aviation, and of all landing grounds and sheds.

The German Government will immediately place at the disposal of this Commission all documents relating to the German Air Service.

The German Government will give to all the delegates of this Commission every facility to carry out their mission, and in particular:

- to effect over the whole extent of German territory a census of the material mentioned under Article V;
- to inspect, whenever called upon, aeroplane, balloon and motor manufactories, and arms, munitions and explosive factories, aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks and depôts.
- to take any photographs and sketches.

The German Government will immediately hand over to this Commission all the information and documents set forth in Articles V and VII, and all the material mentioned in these Articles shall be handed over as rapidly as possible, and before the 1st October, 1919, at latest.

Article VIII.

Directly Germany has fulfilled the conditions stipulated in the present convention, the Commission instituted under Article VII shall be suppressed.

Article IX.

The rules relative to the organisation of a commercial air service in Germany after the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace, and to its being granted international circulation shall be determined by the said Treaty of Peace.

Note—The Officer Air Delegates request that the Commission instituted by Article VII as regards Aviation shall form part of the
Commission instituted with the same objects by the Military Convention, and should operate according to the same principles and within the same time limits.

Appendix B to IC-155 [BC-45]

Naval Conditions for Peace With Germany

In pursuance of the instructions of the Supreme War Council, the proposed Naval Clauses are resubmitted in three Parts, I., II. and III., as set out in the attached schedule.

2. With regard to the reservations noted at the foot of some of the purely Naval subjects, the Admirals desire to point out that they are in complete accord on the main issue, viz., the extent to which the German Fleet should be reduced.

3. The Admirals understand that the German colonies are not to be returned to Germany, and on that hypothesis have not included the subject in the Naval Conditions.

4. As it is important from the Naval point of view that full reparation should be exacted for the shipping losses of the Allies and the United States of America, the Admirals have appended to Part II. a draft containing their views, in order that these may be embodied in the Reparation clauses of the Convention.

Signed by
Admiral Benson
Admiral Wemyss
Vice-Admiral de Bon
Rear-Admiral Grassi
Vice-Admiral Takehita
United States of America
British Empire
France
Italy
Japan.

Paris, 5 March, 1919

[Enclosure]

Naval Conditions for Peace With Germany

Schedule of Clauses

Part I. Purely Naval Subjects.
1. Strength of German Fleet.
2. Disposal of Surplus.
4. Surface vessels-of-war now interned.
5. Further reduction of surface vessels-of-war.
6. Vessels-of-war under construction.
7. Materials arising from vessels broken up.
10. Naval war material.
11. German Naval Law.
12. Merchant cruisers and Fleet auxiliaries.
Appendix. Nominal list of Merchant Cruisers and Auxiliaries.

PART II. Subjects intimately connected with Naval matters on which the Admirals deem it essential to present their views and recommendations.
1. Heligoland.
2. Routes into the Baltic.
3. Coast fortifications.
5. Wireless telegraphy.
Appendix. Reparation for Shipping Losses.

PART III. Execution of Terms.
1. Appointment of Commissions.
2. Conventions.

NAVAL CLAUSES FOR TERMS OF PEACE WITH GERMANY

PART I

Clause 1. Strength of German Fleet.

(a) Personnel.

The total personnel for Naval purposes, including the manning of the Fleet, coast defences, signal stations, administration and other land services, shall not exceed 15,000 (officers and men of all grades and corps included), of whom not more than ten per cent shall be officers and warrant officers.

(b) Seagoing Fleet.

The strength of the seagoing fleet shall not exceed:

- 6 battleships of the “Deutschland” or “Lothringen” type;
- 6 light-cruisers;
- 12 destroyers;
- 12 torpedo boats

for coastwatching and fishery duties;

or an equivalent number of vessels built in accordance with Clause 8.

Until the completion of the minesweeping prescribed by Clause 13, Germany will keep in commission the number of minesweeping vessels fixed by the Allies and the United States.

Note. Admiral Benson does not agree to a continuing limitation of the German Fleet once its present strength has been reduced, unless that limitation is imposed by the League of Nations.

Clause 2. Disposal of Surplus.

(a) Personnel.

Officers and men belonging to the German Navy in excess of the numbers authorised by Clause 1 shall be demobilised within a period of two months from the signature of the present Convention.

(b) Vessels-of-war.

Vessels-of-war over and above the seagoing fleet authorised by Clause 1 shall be disposed of as required by Clauses 3, 4, 5, 6 and 12,
or, if not specially provided for in these clauses, shall be placed in 
reserve or utilised for commercial purposes.

Note. Admiral Benson does not agree to a continuing limitation 
of the German Fleet once its present strength has been reduced, un-
less that limitation is imposed by the League of Nations.


(a) All German submarines, without exception, submarine salvage 
vessels; and docks for submarines (including the tubular dock), are 
to be surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America. 
Those which can proceed under their own power, or which can be 
towed, shall be taken by the Germans into Allied ports, to be there 
destroyed* or broken up.

Germany shall inform the neutral Powers concerned that she author-
ises the delivery to the Allies and the United States of America of 
all German submarines in neutral ports.

(b) The German submarines which cannot be delivered in Allied 
ports, as well as those which are in course of construction, shall be 
completely broken up by the Germans, under the supervision of Allied 
and United States Commissioners.

The breaking-up of these submarines shall be completed within a 
maximum period of three months after the signature of the present 
Convention.

(c) The Naval Commission appointed by the Allies and the United 
States of America to supervise the execution of the terms of the 
Armistice has decided as to which submarines are to proceed or are 
to be towed to Allied ports and which are to be broken up by the 
Germans. The decisions of this Commission shall be strictly 
carried out.

Clause 4. Surface Vessels-of-War Now Interned.

All German surface vessels-of-war now interned in Allied ports, in 
conformity with the terms of the Armistice, or interned in neutral 
ports, cease to belong to Germany; they are definitely surrendered to 
the Allies and the United States of America for the purpose of being 
broken up or destroyed* in the shortest possible time.

Germany shall inform the neutral Powers concerned that she author-
ises the delivery to the Allies and the United States of America of 
the German surface vessels-of-war in neutral ports.

Clause 5. Further Reduction of Surface Vessels of War.

The German vessels-of-war named below shall be sunk* under the 
supervision of the Allies and the United States of America within two 
months after the signature of the present convention.

* Admiral de Bon, by direction of the Minister of Marine of France, makes 
reservations on this point. [Footnote in the original.]
Commissions of the Allies and the United States shall fix the localities where these vessels shall be sunk.

The vessels are to have their guns on board. In other respects they are to remain disarmed as ordered by Article XXIII. of the Armistice Convention dated 11 November, 1918.

With the above reservations the German Government may remove from these ships before they are sunk such material as has a commercial value.

The vessels are:

**Battleships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oldenburg</th>
<th>Posen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thüringen</td>
<td>Westfalen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostfriesland</td>
<td>Rheinland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helgoland</td>
<td>Nassau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Light-Cruisers**

| Stettin | Strassburg |
| Danzig | Augsburg |
| München | Kolberg |
| Lübeck | Stuttgart |

Forty-two modern destroyers.
Fifty modern torpedo boats.


All German surface vessels-of-war now under construction shall be broken up under the supervision of Allied and United States Commissioners.

*Clause 7. Materials Arising From Vessels Broken Up.*

The materials arising from the breaking-up of German vessels-of-war, whether surface vessels or submarines, may be used, but solely for industrial or commercial purposes, and on no account for warlike purposes.

Germany shall not sell or dispose of these materials to other Countries.


No vessels-of-war shall be constructed in Germany nor acquired by Germany except as follows:

(a) New vessels shall only be built to replace units of the seagoing fleet authorised by Clause 1.

(b) They shall be designed purely for coast defence and coast watching purposes.
(c) New vessels shall not exceed the following displacement:

- Armoured ships . . . . . 10,000 tons
- Light-cruisers . . . . . 6,000 "
- Destroyers . . . . . . . 800 "
- Torpedo boats . . . . . 200 "

(d) Except in the case of the loss of a ship, units of the different classes shall only be replaced at the end of—

- 20 years in the case of battleships and cruisers;
- 15 years in the case of destroyers and torpedo boats.

This number of years expresses the duration of the life of the ship and shall count from the first year in which credit is taken in the Budget for the construction of the ship which is to be replaced to the year in which credit is taken in the Budget for the construction of the new ship.

Note. Admiral Benson does not agree to a continuing limitation of the German Fleet once its present strength has been reduced, unless that limitation is imposed by the League of Nations.


No submarines for any purpose whatever, commercial or otherwise, shall be built in Germany or acquired by Germany, until such time as the League of Nations may order otherwise.


The allowance of arms, ammunition, and all important items of naval war materiel for the German Navy will be fixed by a Commission of the Allies and the United States of America on the basis of the seagoing fleet and personnel authorised by Clause 1. The reserve of naval ordnance, arms, ammunition, and war materiel shall be in proportion to the number and types of the units of the seagoing fleet.

All arms, ammunition, and naval war materiel, including mines and torpedoes, belonging to Germany and now in possession of the German authorities, in excess of the above establishment, shall be surrendered to the Allies and the United States of America, at places to be determined, to be destroyed or made useless. The surrender of material under this clause shall be executed within a period of thirty days from the date of signature of the present Convention.

The manufacture in Germany for foreign countries of naval ordnance, ammunition, mines and torpedoes, or their parts, or naval war materiel of any description, is prohibited.

Note. Admiral Benson does not agree to the final paragraph of this clause.
Clause 11. German Naval Laws.

(1) The personnel for the German Navy shall be recruited on a long-service system.

The authorised complement shall be obtained by classes of recruits, but the service of the men of the contingent called-up each year shall be continuous, and these men shall after their service, be definitely freed from all military obligation.

No measure of mobilisation shall be provided for, and men not called-up shall not be subject to any obligation for service in the Navy.

(2) The above regulations and Clauses 1, 8, 9 and 10 of Part I. of the present Convention shall form an integral part of the German Naval Laws.

(3) The German Naval Laws shall not include any provision in contradiction of any clauses of this Convention. On the contrary, they shall abrogate all previous legislative, financial or administrative measures which may be in contradiction of the Convention.

These laws shall be enforced in all German territory and shall be promulgated within three months from the date of this Convention.

Note. Admiral Benson does not agree to a continuing limitation of the German Fleet once its present strength has been reduced, unless that limitation is imposed by the League of Nations.

Clause 12. Merchant Cruisers and Fleet Auxiliaries.

Armed German merchant cruisers, whether in ports of the Central Powers or interned in neutral ports, and Fleet auxiliaries which can be readily adapted for commercial purposes or which have been converted from merchant ships, shall be disarmed and treated as other merchant ships.

The vessels affected by this clause are given in Appendix.


Germany shall sweep up all mines in the areas which have been assigned to her in the agreement already entered into between the Allies and the United States of America.

In accordance with this agreement, Germany shall be responsible for sweeping in the following areas:

(1) That portion of the North Sea which lies to the eastward of longitude 4°00' E. from Greenwich—

(a) between the parallels of latitude 53°00' N. and 59°00' N.

(b) to the northward of latitude 60°30' N.

(2) The Baltic Sea, excluding Russian waters. In regard to these waters further details will be given as soon as the Russian question is determined.
APPENDIX TO PART I.—ARMED GERMAN MERCHANT CRUISERS AND FLEET AUXILIARIES

(List referred to in Clause 12 (Part I) of Naval Terms.)

Interned in neutral countries (3).
Berlin
Santa Fe
Yorck.

In Germany (28).
Ammon
Answald
Bosnia
Cordoba
Cassel
Dania
Rio Negro
Rio Pardo
Santa Cruz
Schwaben
Solvingen
Steigerwald
Franken
Cundomar
Fuerst Buelow
Gertrud
Kigoma
Rugia
Santa Elena
Schleswig
Moewe
Sierra Ventana
Chemnitz
Emil Georg von Strauss
Hobsburg
Meteor
Waltraute
Scharnhorst

PART II

Clause 1. Heligoland.

The fortifications, military establishments, and harbours of the Islands of Heligoland and Dune shall be destroyed under the supervision of Allied Commissioners, by German labour and at the expense of Germany, within a period to be determined by the Commissioners, which shall not exceed one year from the date of this Convention.

The term "harbours" shall include the north-east mole; the west wall; the outer and inner breakwaters and reclamation works within them; and all naval and military works, fortifications and buildings, constructed and under construction, between lines connecting the following positions taken from British Admiralty Chart No. 126 of 19 April, 1918:

(a) Lat. 52°10'49"N., long. 7°53'39"E.
(b) 54°10'35"N., 7°54'18"E.
(c) 54°10'14"N., 7°54'00"E.
(d) 54°10'17"N., 7°53'37"E.
(e) 54°10'44"N., 7°53'26"E.

The disposal of the Islands will be decided by the final Treaty of Peace.

Note. Admiral Benson makes a reservation regarding the destruction of the harbours.
Clause 2. Routes Into the Baltic.

In order to ensure free passage into the Baltic to all nations, Germany shall not erect any fortifications in the area comprised between latitudes 55°27' N. and 54°00' N. and longitudes 9°00' E. and 16°00' E. of the meridian of Greenwich, nor install any guns commanding the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic.

The fortifications now existing shall be demolished and the guns removed under the supervision of Allied Commissioners.

The German Government shall place at the disposal of the Allies and the United States of America complete copies of all hydrographical information now in its possession concerning the channels and adjoining waters between the Baltic and the North Sea.

Clause 3. Coast Fortifications.

All fortified works and fortifications within 50 kilometres of the German coast or on German islands off that coast shall be disarmed and dismantled. The construction of any new fortifications within the same limits is forbidden.

Note. Admirals Benson and Takehita make reservations on this clause.


The Kiel Canal shall be open at all times to all war or commercial vessels of every nation. No nation shall benefit by especially favourable treatment, and no class of vessels shall be excluded from the Canal.

Note. Admiral Benson does not agree to this Clause and believes that it cannot be justified except as a punitive measure.

Clause 5. Wireless Telegraphy.

(1) The German high-power W/T stations at

Nauen,
Hanover, and
Berlin

shall not be used for the naval, military or political purposes of Germany, or of any State which has been allied to Germany in the war, without the assent of the Allied Powers and the United States of America, until the signature of the final Treaty of Peace. These stations may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America, who will decide the wavelength to be used.

(2) Germany shall not build any more high-power W/T stations in her own territory or that of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey, until the signature of the final Treaty of Peace.

(3) In the event of Germany violating the provisions of the Treaty of Peace, the Allies and the United States of America shall
be at liberty to withhold the services of their W/T stations from German stations.

(4) Germany shall have only one vote at the next International Radio-Telegraph Conference, irrespective of the number of independent or semi-independent states into which Germany may be divided.


The German cables enumerated below shall not be returned to Germany:

- Emden-Vigo
- Emden-Brest
- Emden-Teneriffe
- Emden-Azores (two cables)
- Azores-New York (two cables)
- Teneriffe-Monrovia
- Monrovia-Pernambuco
- Monrovia-Lome
- Lome-Duala
- Constantinople-Constanza
- Chifu-Tsingtau-Shanghai
- Yap-Shanghai
- Yap-Guam
- Yap-Menado (Celebes)

Note.—Admiral Benson disagrees.

Appendix to Part II.—Reparation for Allied Shipping Losses

Reparation for Allied shipping losses shall be made by Germany to the extent and in the method to be laid down in the permanent Treaty of Peace. Part of such reparation shall consist in the handing-over by Germany to the Allies and the United States of America of all merchant ships (with such exceptions as may be laid down in the Treaty of Peace), completed, launched, or under construction, which were on 11 November, 1918, the property of the German Government or German owners or entitled to fly the German merchant flag.

For the removal of doubt as to the interpretation which shall be placed upon certain points which might be deemed open to question, and without prejudice to the further elucidations which may be inserted in the Treaty of Peace, it is hereby declared that:

(a) Reparation for Shipping Losses.

The reparation required from Germany for shipping losses shall be based upon the total number of ships destroyed or lost, constructively or actually, through the hostile action of Germany, irrespective of the means employed for their destruction.

For the purpose of this paragraph the terms “ships” and “shipping” shall be deemed to include fishing vessels.
(b) Merchant Vessels captured by Germany.

All allied or neutral merchant vessels which have been condemned by the German Prize Court and which were German property at the date of the Armistice shall be regarded as being German vessels for the purpose of being included in the number of German merchant vessels which may be required to be surrendered under the heading of Reparation.

(c) Salvage of Allied Ships and Cargoes.

Notwithstanding that reparation may have been paid for sunken Allied ships and cargoes, the property in such ships and cargoes, if salved outside German territorial waters, shall remain at the disposal of the Allies.

**PART III**

**Clause 1. Commissions for the Execution of Naval Terms.**

All the measures prescribed by the Naval Clauses of this Convention shall be carried out under the control of a special Naval Commission appointed for the purpose by the Allies and the United States of America.

This Commission will act under the supreme direction of the Admiralties of the Allies and the United States. It will be established at the seat of the Central German Government and may appoint Sub-Commissions or Delegates as may be found necessary to visit any part of German territory.

The German Government shall facilitate, by all possible means, the exercise of this control, and shall furnish the fullest information demanded of it on all questions in connection with the same, including designs of warships, details and samples of naval war material, guns, ammunition, torpedoes, mines and other explosives, and W/T apparatus.

**Note.** Admiral Benson disagrees as to requiring Germany to furnish designs, samples, &c., of war materiel, and makes reservations regarding the participation by Naval representatives of the United States of America in any Commissions appointed to deal with the execution of Clauses 1, 2, 8, 10 and 11 of Part I and Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Part II.

**Clause 2. Conventions.**

Nothing in the present Convention shall invalidate anything done or required to be done under the Armistice Convention of 11 November, 1918, or subsequent Conventions for its renewal.

Germany undertaking to respect all the clauses of the present Convention and is responsible for their execution towards all the Powers who sign this Convention with her.
Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the 17th Session, Supreme War Council, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 7th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing
Hon. E. M. House

Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison
Mr. G. Auchincloss

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour,
O. M., M. P.

Secretaries
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey,
K. C. B.
Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Bearn

ITALY

H. E. Baron Sonnino
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi

Secretaries
Count Aidrovandi
M. Bertele

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Admiral W. S. Benson
General Tasker H. Bliss
Major General M. N. Patrick
*Mr. Hoover
*Mr. Davis
*Capt. F. H. Schofield

BRITISH EMPIRE

*The Rt. Hon. Lord Robert Cecil, K. C., M. P.
General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.
Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, G. C. B., C. M. G., M. V. O.
*Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
Major General W. Thwaites, C. B.
Brig. Gen. P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O.
*Capt. C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N.
*Paymr. Capt. C. F. Pollard, C. B., R. N.
*Mr. J. M. Keynes, C. B.

FRANCE

M. Leygues
*M. Clementel
*M. Tardieu
Marshal Foch
*General Belin
General Degoutte
*General Weygand
General Duval
*Comdt. Lacombe
*Comdt. de V. Levassasseur
*Lieut. de V. Odend'hall

ITALY

*H. E. M. Crespi
Admiral Grassi
*General Cavallero
JAPAN
Admiral Takeishita
General Nara
*Captain Nomura
*Captain Fujioka
*Captain Yamamoto

* Present for Items 1 to 4 only.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . Colonel U. S. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . . . . . . Captain E. Abraham
FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Captain A. Portier
ITALY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lieut. Zanchi
JAPAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. Saburi

Interpreter: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAUX said that the Report of the Belgian Commission had been received.

(It was decided that it should be circulated).

2. The Council had before them copies of a telegram, for the text of which see Annexure "A".

LORD ROBERT CECIL said that Admiral Hope had returned from Spa and reported that the negotiations with the Germans concerning the surrender of their mercantile fleet had failed altogether. There had been in the morning a meeting of the Supreme Economic Council at which it had been decided that Germany was clearly bound by the Armistice to yield the ships, that it was of the greatest importance for the Allies to obtain possession of them, and also, in the general interest, that Germany should be supplied with food. Proposals had been made by the American Delegates and by himself and tentative conclusions reached. The French and Italian Delegates, however, had wished to see the conclusions in writing and to have some time for reflection before accepting them. He therefore suggested that a day's delay be granted for the Supreme Economic Council to consider its resolutions which could be furnished on the following day.

M. CLEMENCEAUX asked Lord Robert Cecil if he could give an outline of the resolutions proposed.

LORD ROBERT CECIL said that two clauses had been agreed to by all the Delegates. The meeting had only broken up at 2.15 p. m. that day and final texts could not be given. The first clause adopted was to the effect that in accordance with the Armistice Germany must deliver the ships. The second clause provided that 270,000 tons of food should be supplied to Germany as soon as the German Government had given evidence of an intention of complying with the Armistice. The third clause concerning which there was not yet full agreement dealt with the future revictualling of Germany. De-
etailed proposals had been put forward by the American Delegates and agreed to by himself on behalf of the British Government. For reasons previously given he proposed that the final draft should be produced on the following day.

M. Clementel explained that this clause involved principles concerning which the French and Italian Delegates felt they must consult their Governments.

(It was decided to postpone the discussion to the following day.)

3. Mr. Lansing put forward the following draft:

It was agreed that,

Mr. Lansing's
Proposal for a
Commission to
Consider the
Question of
Enemy Owned
Submarine Cables

In consideration of clause 6 of Part II of the Naval conditions for peace with Germany, the following questions should be submitted to a Committee composed of five Members, one to be named by each of the five Powers:

Is it (legally) right under the rules or principles of international law to treat as capture or prize submarine telegraph cables of an enemy cut or taken possession of by naval operations?

Is it (legally) right under the rules or principles of international law for a Government whose naval forces have cut or taken possession of a submarine telegraph cable of an enemy, to retain such cable by way of reparation?

In the event that the cut or captured cable of an enemy is landed on the territory of another nation, what right and authority does such nation possess under contracts or permits granted to the enemy to cancel the same or to control the use of the cable?

Mr. Balfour said that he would only question, in this draft, the use of the word "legally"; as no international law existed concerning the point in question he asked whether it would not be better to suppress this word.

Mr. Lansing agreed to the suppression of the word "legally" at the beginning of the second and 3rd paragraphs of the draft.

Baron Makino said he wished to ask a question. Should the Commission decide that it was not legitimate to take possession of the cables, would the consequence be their return to Germany?

M. Clemenceau said the power of deciding on this remained with the Council.

Baron Sonnino said that the text proposed specifically related only to cables cut during the war or taken possession of by naval operations. He understood that there were enemy owned cables which did not come under either of these categories.

Mr. Lansing said that the question did not arise, as unless they had been taken from the enemy they could not be returned.

Baron Sonnino said that from the previous day's discussion he understood that there were some enemy-owned cables neither cut nor
seized during the war. If so, should they not be taken into account?

M. Leygues said that there were some such in the East.

Admiral de Bon said that in the naval report a full list of cables had been given and this list should be submitted to the Commission.

Mr. Lansing said he objected to any change in the draft because a legal opinion was required on the captured cables and not on any other. The question was an abstract one and he thought it undesirable to mention any cables by name.

(Mr. Lansing’s resolution was therefore accepted with the omission of the word “legally” in the second and third paragraph).

The following nominees were then appointed to the Committee:

For the United States of America . . . Mr. James Brown Scott.
" Great Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dr. Pearce Higgins.
" France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. Fromageot.
" Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. Tosti.
" Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. Yanaka.

4. Mr. Lansing suggested that Mr. Hoover should make a statement about the actual situation.

M. Crespi said he had a similar statement to make, but had no objection if Mr. Hoover preceded him.

Supply of Food to Austria, and the Italian Blockade at Lubiana

Mr. Hoover said that on the previous Wednesday he had brought forward certain proposals. He would remind the Council that the difficulties encountered did not entirely arise from the situation about Trieste, but were the result of enmity and differences among the various divisions of what was once an economic unit. He had therefore proposed that a certain amount of rolling stock be turned over exclusively for use in shipping food, and Lord Robert Cecil had suggested an amendment which he had been very glad to accept. Because of an unfortunate incident at Lubiana, the Yugo-Slav area was entirely closed, and consequently Bohemia and German Austria were rendered partly inaccessible. The Italian Government had made the greatest efforts to make shipments by other routes, but 1100 tons was the greatest amount that had yet been shipped in one day, while 3,000 tons were needed. It was manifestly impossible to ship food to the North through Yugo-Slavia without at the same time feeding the Yugo-Slavs, and while they were still starving. The efforts of the Italian Government had succeeded in getting 20,000 tons into Czecho-Slovakia in five weeks, whereas at least 45,000 tons per month were needed. He believed that the peoples concerned would welcome the intervention of a fourth party, as they could not agree amongst themselves for obvious reasons. There was no possibility of dealing with the food situation in Austria Hungary without unimpeded control of the rolling stock, and the removal of the blockade.
M. Crespi said that at the last meeting when Mr. Hoover's proposal had been brought forward there were two questions before the Council. One was a general question of re-victualling the whole of the former Austro-Hungarian territory. There were difficulties of various kinds to be overcome. The Italian Government was in complete agreement with its Allies that it was desirable to overcome these difficulties and to feed these populations. It was ready to co-operate with the other Governments to this end.

The second question raised by Mr. Hoover, put so clearly by Mr. Balfour in a previous meeting, concerned the difficulty between the Italian Government and the Local Authority at Lubiana. He wished to give an account of the events that had led to this crisis. In accordance with clauses 7 and 10 of the Armistice of Villa Giusti of November 3rd, 1918, each Allied Government had a right to establish Commissions of Control in Austria Hungary. The Italian Government accordingly placed a Commission in Vienna under General Segre. General Segre during the month of January had found it necessary to establish a sub-commission at Lubiana. This sub-commission took up its work on the 27th January in full agreement with the Local Authorities. On the 12th February a train carrying Italian refugees passing through the station of Saloch was fired on by men attired in Serbian uniform. Several of the passengers were wounded, and Italian flags were torn down and burnt. Major di Giorgi, head of the Sub-Commission demanded satisfaction from the Local Authorities. He was told on the 14th, that an enquiry was being made. On the 17th, he called on the Local Authorities again, and was given no reply. On the 18th, he was asked to show his passports. On the 20th, he was ordered to quit Lubiana as his passports were not in order, and as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was not subject to the Armistice. Major di Giorgi was compelled to leave Lubiana at once.

Another incident occurred on the 20th. A Commission composed of French and American Officers was working on the Frontier of Yugo-Slavia at Marburg. General Segre sent certain Italian Officers to join this Commission. On their arrival these Officers were ordered by the Yugo-Slave Authorities to withdraw. They refused to do so. After the dismissal of the Commission from Lubiana the Italian Government had made a protest at Belgrade. No answer had been returned. The Italian Government then considered means of closing this incident. The first means suggested was the military occupation of Lubiana. The second was the closing of the Armistice Frontier. The less severe of these alternatives had been chosen. The Frontier was closed. Mr. Butler of the Trieste Relief Commission had gone to Lubiana and it was thought that he had arranged for

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1 Vol. ii, p. 175.
the Italian Commission to return there and to be received with due honour. It now appeared that he had not obtained this result. It was just at this moment that Mr. Hoover’s proposal was brought forward, and that clearly put the Italian Government in a very embarrassing position. Meanwhile the Italian Government was sending trains to Bohemia by three other routes. Two routes led through Tarvis and one through Innsbruck. The whole question of victualling Austria depended on the supply of rolling stock. Any number of trains could be sent up the lines still open provided rolling stock was forthcoming. The Italian Government, to come to the assistance of Bohemia, had diverted its own trucks and succeeded in sending 1100 tons on the 3rd March. Since then, the amount had been increased and he was informed that now nine trains were despatched per day carrying in all 2700 tons. If to this he added what would come via Fiume and the Adriatic Ports, he thought that Mr. Hoover’s figure of 3,000 tons would be more than reached. The incident of Lubiana remained, and the Italian Government had not received satisfaction. It was bound to remember what had taken place at Spalato where Italian subjects had been molested in the presence of four Allied Admirals. The Admirals had demanded and obtained satisfaction. The Italian Government therefore proposed that a Commission of four Allied Generals should be appointed to proceed to Lubiana and make an investigation. He then submitted the following formula:

**The Means for Italy to Have the Necessary Reparation**

First—a commission consisting of four Generals (one American, one English, one French, one Italian) will go at once to Laibach to enquire into the incidents of 12th and 20th February, at Saloch and Laibach; after ascertaining the facts in the case they will require of the Local Government the punishment of the guilty persons and all those reparations and satisfactions for the Italian Government which shall be deemed due.

Second—The commission of four Generals, after ascertaining the facts in the case, will notify in the name of the Allied and Associated Governments that the repetition of similar incidents will have as its immediate consequence the inter-allied military occupation of the localities in which such incidents may occur in accordance with the terms of Art. 4 of the Armistice of November 3rd, 1918, besides any more severe measures which the Commission may deem requisite.

When the commission has been appointed and has begun its labours on the spot, the Italian Government will allow the transit via Laibach of those trains which the Commission shall deem necessary for victualling purposes.

As to the proposal made by Mr. Hoover, he reserved his right to make further comments when this part of the question had been settled.
Mr. Lloyd George said that the incident described by M. Crespi was a very serious one. The Powers could not permit the flag of a great Allied country to be subjected to indignity. They were bound to do all they could do to uphold one another’s national honour. He thought the sending of the Commission suggested by M. Crespi would have a good effect. A telegram informing the Yugo-Slavs that a Commission was to be sent would make it clear to them what the attitude of the Powers was. Nevertheless he did not think that in the meantime populations in no way concerned in the incident should be starved, and he did not understand that it was so proposed. He thought therefore, that Mr. Hoover’s proposal could be accepted and executed pari passu with the appointment of the Commission. He proposed that a telegram appointing a Commission of inquiry be sent at once; that the blockade be removed and that Mr. Hoover’s plans be put in operation as soon as the telegram had been sent.

M. Crespi said that he had agreed to discuss Mr. Hoover’s proposal. He would have to propose a few modifications suggested by the Italian Railway Experts. One of these modifications was contained in his proposal regarding the Commission to investigate the incident at Lubiana. It suggested that the Commission should have discretion to pass such trains as it thought necessary. As he had already explained, there was no imminent risk to Bohemia or to Austria, seeing that 9 trains a day were being sent, carrying as much as 2,700 tons. Italy could not consent to raise the Blockade before the institution of the Commission, which would be a beginning of some satisfaction to the Italian Government. It was probable that it could be instituted within twenty four hours.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the only objection he had to raise was that the resumption of traffic was made to depend on the assembling of the Commission. He appealed to the generosity of the Italian Government to allow traffic to proceed as soon as a telegram had been sent to the Yugo-Slavs, concerning the appointment of a Commission of enquiry. This would remove any appearance of the Italian Government having been over-ruled by the Supreme War Council. The telegram would show clearly that the Powers intended that Italy should have satisfaction.

Baron Sonnino suggested, in deference to what Mr. Lloyd George had said, a slight alteration in M. Crespi’s formula. He suggested that the last paragraph should run “As soon as the Commission has been appointed and is on the spot the Italian Government will allow . . . etc.” The presence of the Commission on the spot would be a guarantee that no repetition of the incident would occur. The Commission could be gathered in Lubiana in 24 hours, as each Power could select one of its officers at Trieste or Fiume. If no food were going to Bohemia and Austria a few hours might make a dif-
ference but as 2,700 tons were going daily since the previous day, a
delay of 24 hours would not matter. It might be difficult to continue
the transport of 2,700 tons a day by the other lines, but it could
certainly be continued for a few days. This alteration he thought
would give satisfaction both to Italy and to the Council.

M. Clemenceau asked how the decisions of the Commission would
be carried out. He had the worst recollection of a Commission of
four Admirals sent to Fiume some three months ago. The Italian
Admiral on this Commission had refused to submit to the views of
the majority: in consequence nothing had been achieved. He had
just heard that after three months’ delay the Commission were be-
ginning to do something. He did not wish to repeat this proceeding
with four Generals. The matter in hand in that case also was a
question of revictualling. The Allies desired to find means of sending
food to General Franchet d’Esperey’s Army.

Baron Sonnino said that in the present instance the Commission
was to examine facts. As the appointment of the Commission itself
would open the frontier, no such evil consequences as M. Clemenceau
had described could result, even were the Members of the Commission
to disagree in their judgment. It was only proposed that the facts
should be examined by an Allied Commission. Meanwhile traffic
would be resumed. Unless this proposal were accepted by the Coun-
cil, Italy would be driven to the only possible alternative which was
a Military occupation. This might be done at any time.

M. Clemenceau said he was not sure whether he could find a
French officer in proximity to Lubiana.

Baron Sonnino said that there was a French Base at Fiume.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he was not sure that an English Gen-
eral could be readily found. It might take some days to discover one.
Were people to starve because some mis-guided people at Lubiana
had been guilty of insulting an Allied flag? Their guilt even should
not be presumed. All we could say was that we would investigate
and punish anyone found guilty. This, as well as the assembling
of a Commission would take time. Seeing the appeals that came from
all countries for food, he felt that we should be more indulgent in
the matter of offenses against ourselves and run no risk of starving
the population of Europe.

Baron Sonnino said he would understand this objection if nothing
were being done, but 9 trains were being sent per diem.

Mr. Hoover begged to differ about the 9 trains. He got a daily
report and on no day had 9 trains been reported as having gone;
but there had been 9 trains in the last 2 days. On the 24th February
he and his colleagues informed the Supreme Economic Council that
they declined to take further responsibility for order in Austria
Hungary. They had done this after reflection and struggle with a
similar situation for some weeks. It was not only a question of this blockade, but of getting some unity again among a lot of disintegrated and antagonistic countries. There had been an Inter-Allied Commission in Trieste for one month and nothing had been accomplished. 80,000 tons of food was ready for distribution.

M. Crespi said that he had received a telegram that very morning stating that nine trains had been running since the previous day, including two via Innsbruck. The Italian Delegation had supposed that the Lubiana incident had been solved. Mr. Hoover, in his Note read on Wednesday, had said that the blockade had been reported as raised on the previous day. It was now found that this was not so and there was no solution. If Mr. Lloyd George wished the blockade to be raised, the Council could order the Italian officers to be sent back at once to Lubiana and a Commission of Investigation to be appointed. This would be a solution. Without this, Italy would be in a disastrous position. She would appear to have been forced to abandon a line of conduct at the dictation of the Supreme War Council.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that the sending of a telegram would prevent this consequence. He would propose an amendment to M. Crespi’s draft. He suggested that the last paragraph should read: “When the Commission has been appointed and the local authority of Lubiana has been so informed, the Italian Government will allow the transit via Lubiana of such trains as may be necessary for revictualling purposes.”

Mr. Lansing suggested that the appointment of the Commission should not be awaited, but that action should follow on the announcement that it would be appointed.

Baron Sonnino said that he could make no further concession. He would accept Mr. Lloyd George’s amendment but could go no further.

Mr. Lansing proposed that the Members of the Commission should be nominated that very day. He would further ask who was to determine the quantity of food that was necessary.

Baron Sonnino said the Trieste Relief Commission.

Mr. Lansing thought it would have to be the Director-General of Relief.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the proposal before the Council merely provided for the raising of the blockade and the resumption of traffic on the same lines as before. If the controlling authority were subsequently changed, authority would pass from the old to the new.

Mr. Lansing said that his acceptance of the formula was dependent on the adoption of Mr. Hoover’s proposals.

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2 See BC-44, p. 199.
Certain other amendments were made in the original formula proposed by M. Crespi and, subject to the reservation made by Mr. Lansing on behalf of the United States of America, the following resolution was adopted:

"First—A Commission consisting of four Generals (one American, one Englishman, one Frenchman, one Italian) will go at once to Lubiana to enquire into the incidents of 12th and 20th February, at Saloch and Lubiana; after ascertaining the facts of the case they will give such directions as may be required including the punishment of the guilty persons, and all reparations and satisfactions which may be deemed due to the Italian Government.

Second—The Commission of four Generals, after ascertaining the facts of the case, will notify in the name of the Allied and Associated Governments that a repetition of similar incidents will have as its immediate consequence the inter-Allied military occupation of the localities in which such incidents may occur, in accordance with the terms of Article 4 of the Armistice of November 3rd, 1918, besides any more severe measures which the Commission may deem requisite.

When the Commission had been appointed and the local authority of Lubiana has been so informed, the Italian Government will allow the transit via Lubiana of such trains as may be necessary for re-victualling purposes."

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the discussion on Mr. Hoover's text would now take place.

M. CRESPI said that he had certain comments to make on the draft. For instance as there was already a relief committee at Trieste he would suggest that the Director-General of Relief should work through this Commission rather than through the communication section of the Supreme Economic Council. He had another remark of a general nature to make which was that a discussion with the Austrians must take place before the plan could be put into operation. The Armistice did not confer on the Allied Powers any authority to proceed without Austrian consent.

Mr. HOOVER said that he would undertake to obtain the separate acquiescence of each of the local governments concerned. It would be made clear to them severally that they could not obtain food by any other means. No concerted Allied action would be required.

M. CRESPI said that what he wished to indicate was that some negotiation would be necessary.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he must point out that the state of war was not over. Consequently, all the railways in Austria-Hungary must remain under military control. It appeared to him extremely dangerous to allot a section of the railways to a Relief Department, independent of the military administration. The state of war, more-
over, had another consequence: all conversations with the enemy were forbidden while it lasted.

Mr. Hoover pointed out that all the states interested were not enemy states, but that food had to pass through enemy states to reach some friendly states. The military authorities had not taken over all the railroads in Austria-Hungary. They had only taken over a few of the railways for a definite object. The relief authorities dealing with the problem of revictualling the country would have to deal with 40 or 50 separate lines. The Military Authorities had made no attempt to solve the problem. As to conversations, all the Allies had delegations in every important town carrying on constant conversation with the local authorities. As to setting up a new agency, they already had representatives in four capitals, and an Over-Ruling Committee in Trieste. Less than 20% of the rolling stock would be required, and if hostilities were renewed, the Relief Department would give way to the Military Authorities. Unless this revictualling proceeded immediately, the Allies would have to resume military action at perhaps 5,000 times the cost in money and in lives.

M. Clementel said that the suggestion he had made on Wednesday tending to the execution by four Allied Generals of the Director-General’s instructions should give satisfaction to Marshal Foch.

Marshal Foch quoted, with disapproval, paragraphs (f), (g) and (h) of the proposals. They meant that the Military Authorities could get no rolling stock until the Relief Department was satisfied.

M. Clementel said that this applied except in case of war.

Marshal Foch replied that this case existed.

M. Crespi said that all agreed in principle, but there were technical objections which might be referred to a small Committee, and a final draft could be produced on the following day.

Mr. House suggested that a Committee be appointed to report immediately while the Council proceeded with the other questions.

(It was then decided that Mr. Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil, M. Clementel, M. Crespi, and General Weygand, should withdraw to another room and return later with a draft proposal.

After an interval the following draft, unanimously agreed to by the above Committee, was produced and accepted:

(a) All the states of the old Austrian Empire, including the areas held by the Italians on the Adriatic, should be called upon to furnish a definite contribution of railway rolling-stock;

(b) This rolling-stock should be marked as belonging to the Relief Administration and will be given priority for its purposes;

(c) The Director-General of Relief working through the communications section of the Supreme Economic Council should be made the mandatory for the disposition of this rolling-stock;
(d) A regular train service should be established under his direction that will carry out the necessary programmes of food to the different localities;

(e) This service should have entire freedom of movement over all railways regardless of political boundaries and in complete priority to other services except military; and within the Italian frontier this will be carried out in co-operation with the Italian authorities;

(f) The railway servants of any nationality may be employed in operations over any territory within the old Austrian Empire regardless of nationality or political boundaries;

(g) The Italian authorities will assign definite portions of port facilities to the Relief Administration at Trieste and Fiume for the consumption of these ends;

(h) In general the rolling-stock should not be demanded by any of the Allied Governments until this service is completely equipped, without prejudice to the ultimate ownership thereof;

(i) The railway officials of each state and port officials in each port will co-operate in maintenance of this service.

At this stage all the technical advisers save Marshal Foch, one General, one Admiral and one Air Officer of each nation, withdrew.)

Mr. Lloyd George said that he had the following draft resolution to propose:—

"The Military, Naval and Aerial terms of peace with Germany shall be based on the following principles:—

1. The German naval, military and air forces shall be raised entirely by voluntary service.

2. The minimum period of service for all ranks shall be 12 years with the colours.

3. The strength of the German army and air force shall not exceed 200,000 men of all ranks, organised in not more than 15 divisions and 3 cavalry divisions.

4. The strength of the German Navy shall not exceed 15,000 men of all ranks and ratings."

The object of this proposal was that Germany should not have an annual contingent of recruits, and should not be able to play the same trick on Europe as she had after Iéna. It might be objected that Germany would not have guns and cadres. This assumed that she would not be in collusion with any other power, for instance—Russia. It was absolutely necessary to make this impossible, and the method he proposed was, he believed, the only way to do so. A voluntary army was more expensive than a conscript army. If Germany had to maintain a voluntary army in addition to paying compensation to the Allies, there would be no money left for military adventures. The permanent limitation of armaments was an illusion. He had been told that very morning that the jigs and gauges necessary to permit the manufacture of armaments and munitions for a very large army could be concealed in one small room. Such con-
cealment could not be prevented, and a nation endowed with these standards could gain three months in the race for the production of armaments.

(There being no dissentient, the resolution was adopted.)

M. CLEMENCEAUX said that as there was no objection, the draft read by Mr. Lloyd George would be sent to the military, naval and air committees for adaptation to the body of their recommendations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Delegation had a complete set of proposals.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that in the Commission there were no advocates of Mr. Lloyd George’s principles. He would therefore ask that the British Delegation should be instructed to report on the matter. He had received the British project just referred to by Mr. Lloyd George at mid-day and at first sight he noticed that it dealt with other than military questions. Was the Commission to enter into these matters, or would the Governments give them instructions for their guidance? There were, for instance, chapters relating to prisoners of war and to Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAUX said that these matters did not concern the military experts. The Commission would be able to judge what part of the proposals concerned them and what part did not.

GENERAL DEGOUTTE said that he personally would never agree with the views expressed by the British Delegation in favour of a voluntary long-term army in Germany. He thought this would make Germany far stronger than a short-term conscript service.

M. CLEMENCEAUX said that the Governments could not force the Military Authorities to change their opinions. He suggested that a report should be made on Monday.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question of principle must be decided in the Council itself. He, on behalf of Great Britain, would never sign any peace giving Germany an army of more than 200,000 men. He would never agree to an army raised in Germany by short conscript service. No General’s opinion would shake his decision. This was a matter for Governments to decide. He did not wish to say that he rejected the advice of the Generals. It was to avoid this that he had put forward his resolution. He declared for a long service army as the only guarantee of a small army. He proposed this principle be accepted by the Council and that directions be given to the Military advisers to prepare regulations in accordance with this principle.

M. CLEMENCEAUX said that the case had been clearly put by Mr. Lloyd George. He himself was also bound by his acceptance of these principles. The resolution would now be reported on by the Military Committee, who would, of course, remain free to express their own views. The decision would remain with the Governments.
Mr. Lloyd George understood that the Military Advisers would
draft a scheme on the basis of the resolution.
(This was agreed to.
It was also agreed that the Naval and Aerial Committees should
be guided by the same principles.)

General Duval remarked that the Aerial Committee had pro-
posed to suppress the whole of the German air force.
Was he to understand that a different report was now
required?

Mr. Lloyd George said that he had no objection to the entire sup-
pression of the German air force.

Admiral Wemyss said that the Admirals had reconsidered cer-
tain points referred back to them by the Supreme
War Council on the previous day. He made no men-
tion of the clauses which had been reserved.

(Admiral Wemyss then read the proposed re-draft, and, after a
short discussion, the following revised clauses were accepted:—

"Part I


No vessels-of-war shall be constructed in Germany nor acquired by
Germany, except as follows:—
(a) New vessels shall only be built to replace units of the seagoing
fleet authorised by Clause 1.
(b) New vessels shall not exceed the following displacement:—
   Armoured ships . . . . . . . . 10,000 tons
   Light-Cruisers . . . . . . . . 6,000 "
   Destroyers . . . . . . . . . . 800 "
   Torpedo-Boats . . . . . . . . 200 "

(c) Except in the case of the loss of a ship, units of the different
classes shall only be replaced at the end of
   20 years in the case of armoured ships and light cruisers,
   15 years in the case of destroyers and torpedo-boats.

This number of years expresses the duration of the life of a ship
and shall count from the date of launching of the ship which is to be
replaced to the year in which the new ship is launched.


No submarines for any purpose whatever, commercial or otherwise,
shall be built in Germany or acquired by Germany.

Part II

Clause 3. Coast Fortifications.

All fortified works and fortifications now established within 50
kilometres of the German coast or on German islands off that coast,
other than those mentioned in Clauses 1 and 3 of Part II., shall be
considered as of a defensive nature and may be retained as at present. No new fortifications shall be constructed within the same limits.

The armament of these defences shall not exceed, as regards the number and calibre of guns, those in position at the date of the signature of the present Convention. Their numbers and calibres shall be at once communicated by the German Government to the Allied and Associated Powers.

The stocks of ammunition for these guns shall not exceed the following rates:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calibre</th>
<th>Rounds apiece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-inch and under</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 3-inch</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was agreed that Admiral Benson's reservations should be examined in connection with the general question of future control.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Paris, 8th March, 1919.

Annexure "A"

INTERUPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT SPA

Copy of Telegram

From:—Spa.
To:—Astoria.¹

(Despatched 4.25 a.m. Received 10 a.m. March 6th, 1919.)


Following for Lord Robert Cecil for the Economic Council and Hankey for the Supreme War Council, Hotel Majestic, Paris. Also for Marshal Foch, No. 4 Bis, Boulevard des Invalides, Paris, and for His Excellency Signor Crespi, Hotel Edouard VII, Paris:—

After communicating with Weimar, the German delegates refused to deliver their mercantile marine in its entirety until a definite programme of food supplies has been arranged up to next harvest. They indicate their willingness to compromise on the basis of delivering a portion of the ships in return for a limited supply of (? group omitted) stuffs and further ships proportionately with further supplies. We have pointed out to them that this is not consistent with the agreement for the immediate delivery of all the ships to which they have already bound themselves, and we have reassured them of the intention of the Associated Governments to accord further food supplies to the fullest extent that our instructions permit. The German delegates after further communication with Weimar having announced their inability to modify their attitude

¹Hotel Astoria, headquarters of the British delegation.
we are informing them that in view of our instructions no useful purpose can be served by further discussions, and that we are returning to Paris immediately.

The situation is evidently most serious one and I trust the (? Supreme War Council) will be in a position to consider it on Friday.

(Repeated Ministry of Shipping, London.)
Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the 17th Session, Supreme War Council, Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 8th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing.
Hon. E. M. House.

Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.
Mr. G. Auchincloss.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

Secretaries
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretaries
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelet.
M. Arnavon.
M. de Bearn.

ITALY

H. E. Baron Sonnino.
M. Salvatore Barzilai.

Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi.
M. Beretele.

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

General Tasker H. Bliss.
Mr. Hoover.
Mr. Baruch.
Mr. Davis.
Mr. Strauss.
Mr. Lamont.
Mr. Haskins.
Mr. McCormick.
Mr. Robinson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. Lord Robert Cecil, K. C., M. P.
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
Sir W. Beveridge.
Mr. J. M. Keynes, C. B.

FRANCE

Marshal Foch.
General Alby.
General Weygand.
Admiral de Bon.
M. Klotz.
M. Clementel.
M. Leygues.
M. Loucheur.
M. J. Cambon.
M. Tardieu.
M. de Lasteyrie.
Lieut. de V. Odend’hal.

ITALY

H. E. M. Crespi.
Admiral Grassi.
Col. Laghezza.

JAPAN

Admiral Takeshita.
Captain Nomura.
Captain Yamamoto.
1. M. Clementel said that on the 24th February, 1919, the Inter-Allied Blockade Council had passed a resolution to the following effect:—

"The Blockade of the Adriatic shall forthwith be raised and the trade of all countries shall be allowed free access to all ports."

He wished to ask the Conference to approve this Resolution.

M. Sonnino enquired whether the Resolution referred only to the commercial blockade of the Adriatic.

Mr. Lansing replied in the affirmative.

(It was agreed that the commercial blockade of the Adriatic should forthwith be raised.)

2. M. Clemenceau enquired whether the representatives of the Great Powers were prepared to hand in the names of the Generals, who were to proceed to Laibach.

(The following names were handed in:—

United States of America General Treat.
Great Britain General Gordon.
France General Savy.
Italy General Segre.)

Mr. Clemenceau, continuing, said that subject to the approval of the Conference he, as President of the Peace Conference, would forward the following telegram to the President of the Inter-Allied Relief Commission in Trieste:—

"The Supreme War Council at meeting held on 8th March, 1919, approved the following Resolution:—Firstly, a Commission composed of four Generals (1 American, 1 British, 1 French, 1 Italian) shall forthwith proceed to Laibach to enquire into the incidents which took place at Salisch and at Laibach on the 12th and 20th February. After ascertaining the facts of the case, they will issue all necessary instructions, which will include the punishment of the guilty, and such amends and indemnification as may be considered to be due to the Italian Government. Secondly, the Commission of four Generals, after having ascertained the facts, will issue a notification in the names of the Allied and Associated Governments, to the effect that a recurrence of similar incidents would immediately be followed by an Inter-Allied Military occupation of the localities where such incidents might occur, in accordance with the terms of Article 4 of the Armistice of 3rd November, 1918, combined with such other more stringent measures as the Commission may consider proper."
As soon as the Commission will have been appointed, and as soon as the local authorities of Laibach have been informed thereof, the Italian Government will authorise the passage of the necessary supply trains via Laibach."

(It was agreed that the above telegram should be forwarded in the name of the Great Powers to the President of the Inter-Allied Relief Commission in Trieste by M. Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference.)

3. M. TARDIÉP said that the Commission on Belgian Affairs entrusted by the Supreme Council at its meeting on 26th February, 1919, with the study of the question of the Revision of the Treaty of 1839, had arrived at the following conclusions:

(1) In law, the three treaties and all their clauses together constitute a single entity.

The treaty between Belgium and Holland is not separable from the other two.

Without examining the argument that the three agreements may be said to have been terminated by the fact of their violation, the Commission holds that since three of the Signatories consider revision necessary, such revision is called for.

(2) In fact, the three treaties which were directed against Belgium and imposed upon her and upon Holland by the Great Powers have not afforded Belgium any of the guarantees which these treaties promised to her, and by their clauses relative to her territory and her rivers have seriously impaired her capacity for defence, and are thus in great measure responsible for the injuries she has sustained. As far as concerns Germany, Austria and Russia, it is now in fact impossible to give to Belgium the guarantee of the five Great Powers to which she is entitled by the treaties. On this ground also, the revision of the treaties in their entirety is called for.

(3) In principle, the basis accepted for the Peace Conference contemplates the abandonment of the neutralisation of Belgium which constitutes a limitation upon her full sovereignty. Revision of the treaties is thus a matter of general interest. This neutralisation is at present guaranteed to Holland by Great Britain and by France under the treaty between the five Powers and Holland. The participation of Holland in the revision of the Treaties is thus called for.

The conclusion suggested accordingly is as follows:

(a) The treaties of 1839 should be revised in the entirety of their clauses at the joint request of the Powers which deem their revision necessary.
(b) Holland should take part in this revision.
(c) Those of the Guarantor Great Powers which have fulfilled their obligations should also take part therein.
(d) Similarly the Great Powers at the Peace Conference whose interests are general should take part therein.
(e) The general object of this revision is, in accordance with the aim of the League of Nations, to free Belgium from that limi-

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1 See BC-40, p. 141.
tation upon her sovereignty which was imposed on her by the treaties of 1839, and, in the interest both of Belgium and of general peace, to remove the dangers and disadvantages arising from the said treaties.

With respect to the procedure to be followed the Commission submits to the Supreme Council that:—

The Supreme Council entrusts the Guarantor Powers which have been faithful to their obligations with the duty of informing Holland that the Council deems the revision of the treaties of 1839 to be necessary, and of inviting her to send her representatives to set forth before the Supreme Council the views of the Dutch Government in regard to such revision.

The whole question of the revision of the treaties would then be before the Supreme Council. This revision could be examined with regard to the interests of Belgium and of Holland by the Commission on Belgian Affairs, as well as by the Commission of ports, waterways and international communications, on the basis of investigations carried on by each of these two Commissions.

The provisions of the final treaty would come under the guarantees contemplated by the League of Nations.

(The report of the Commission on Belgian Affairs on the Treaty of 1839 was duly accepted.)

4. M. Jules Cambon said that he had presided at a Meeting of the Small Powers, which had met together yesterday to elect their representatives on the Economic and Financial Commissions. It had been agreed that the Small Powers should elect five regular delegates in addition to four supplementary members to act as a panel. Unfortunately, an understanding had previously been reached by the South American States to form a combination, with the result that out of the five delegates elected to sit on the Financial Commission, four belonged to South American States, namely, Brazil, Panama, Bolivia and Peru, and the fifth representation was given to Portugal. The small European Powers, thus finding themselves out-voted, had refused to take any further part in the proceedings, and had refused to vote for the remaining four supplementary Delegates.

The same manœuvre had been followed in the case of the election of representatives for the Economic Committee with the result that the five seats fell to Brazil, Chili, [China?], Cuba, Siam and Equador.

The Smaller European Powers having refrained to vote for the Supplementary members, the representatives of the following states were elected by the votes of the other Small Powers, namely:—

For the Finance Committee—Roumania, Belgium, Chili [China?], Greece.
For the Economic Committee—Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Greece.

The Small European States since then had continued to protest and Mr. Politis, the Greek Foreign Minister, had declared that it was "shocking" that the Small Powers who had fought in the war should remain unrepresented on the Economic and Financial Commissions, whilst States that had merely broken off relations with Germany had obtained full representation.

M. Clemenceau said it was obviously very unjust that the South American States, who had made no sacrifice during the war, should obtain all the representation, whereas Belgium, Serbia and Roumania were excluded after the great sacrifices they had made during the war. He wished to enquire whether the Conference would accept this decision, or whether it would decide to upset the result of the election.

Mr. House suggested that each of the European Small Powers should have a representative on the Financial or Economic Commission, but without full voting powers. In his opinion the Small Powers did not care very much about voting, but each one was anxious to be represented. In his opinion, the difficulty would be solved if arrangements were made to include all the Small Powers mentioned by M. Pichon, giving them say half a vote apiece.

Mr. Balfour remarked that fractional voting was quite a new idea to him.

M. Pichon thought that the States that had merely broken off relations with the enemy Powers could not be allowed to have representation to the exclusion of those States that had taken a lively part in the war. He thought the latter States had a right to be represented. Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Greece, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and perhaps even Portugal had an undoubted right to be represented on a Committee dealing with reparation and finance, whereas the other States had no excuse for having an effective representation on these Commissions at the expense of the States he had mentioned. As a solution, he wished to propose that the Conference should select the States to be represented on these Commissions.

Mr. Lloyd George understood that the incident was holding up the work of an important Commission, whose report was required before the Peace Treaty could be drawn up. Consequently, in his opinion, the first thing for the Conference to decide was that the Committee should proceed with its work. In regard to the second question, namely, the representation of the Small Powers, he found himself in complete agreement with M. Pichon. The non-belligerent
Small Powers, other than those mentioned by M. Pichon, could be heard by the Commission, whenever any question concerning them came up for discussion.

Mr. House expressed his concurrence with M. Pichon's proposal.

Mr. Lansing said that a few days ago he himself had drawn attention to the names of the Small Powers who had been elected to sit on various Commissions and Committees. He had then pointed out that many of these names belonged to Countries that had merely broken off relations with the Central Powers, but had not declared war. For instance, on the previous occasion he had pointed out that Panama and Cuba had not been elected to sit on any Commission. Now, both Panama and Cuba had received representation, but the same objectional features still continued of putting on nations that had merely broken off relations without going to war. He, therefore, entirely agreed with M. Pichon's views on this question, and suggested that Brazil, Cuba and Peru should be added to this list of interested Countries given by M. Pichon.

Baron Sonnino enquired whether a distinction could not be made between countries entitled to vote and those entitled to attend meetings. If such a distinction could be made, five countries could be admitted to vote, the remaining five or six countries being admitted merely for consultation.

M. Pichon remarked that in accordance with the decrees of the Conference every State forming part of the Peace Conference had a right to be heard when questions concerning its interests were discussed. The important question, however, was that Countries with special interests should have a seat on the Economic and Financial Commissions; otherwise it would be impossible for them to have a voice in deciding the amount to be paid by Germany. How could the Financial Commission decide the amount to be paid by Germany without Belgium and Poland, for instance, having a voice in the matter?

M. Jules Cambon remarked that M. Pichon had suggested that six Delegates should be appointed to represent the Small European States. He thought the Small States would be quite satisfied if three out of the six representatives were appointed to the Economic Commission, and three to the Financial Commission.

M. Pichon insisted that certain of the small Powers such as Belgium, had a right to sit on both the Financial and Economic Commissions.

Baron Sonnino asked permission to explain his previous statement which was not in contradiction with M. Pichon's views. He thought the Conference should select the five representatives of the Smaller Powers from among the belligerent States; the remaining small Powers having a right to sit on the Conference with a consultative vote, that is to say, without having the full rights of Delegates.
M. Pichon drew attention to two important points. In the first place it was essential that there should not be too many Delegates on any Commission, since that interfered with the expeditious despatch of work. In the second place, the representatives of the Great Powers should not be swamped by an excessively large number of representatives of the Smaller States.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that when the Financial Commission had been set up, amongst other objects allotted to it, had been the division of the Ottoman debt. How could such a question, for instance, interest Ecuador or Panama? Again, there was the question of the Austrian debt, a most important matter. If Austria vanished, Czecho-Slovakia was very nearly concerned. But what had the other South American countries to do with it, whether belligerent nor [or] not? He wished to suggest, therefore, that the representatives of the Great Powers on the Commission should forthwith get to work, and at the end of a week the question could be considered as to whether the Small Powers should be admitted or not.

M. Crespi pointed out that unless the representatives of the small Powers were appointed, the Commission would not be legally constituted, and unless properly constituted, work could not be commenced.

M. Clemenceau, summing up, proposed that on Monday next M. Pichon should submit a draft resolution, giving effect to his proposal, which had apparently met with general approval.

(It was agreed that M. Pichon should, at the meeting to be held on Monday next, March 10th., submit a draft resolution giving effect to his proposals that the Conference should select the small Powers to be represented on the Financial and Economic Councils.)

5. Lord Robert Cecil said that the Supreme Economic Council had that day been considering the situation created by the breakdown of the negotiations at Spa, and certain definite conclusions had been reached.

In the first place, he wished to bring to the notice of the Conference that the question of the surrender of the merchant ships by Germany was one thing, and the understanding that the Allies should supply food to Germany was quite another thing. Article 26 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918, read as follows: "The Allies and the United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice, as shall be found necessary". Again, in the agreement for the prolongation of the Armistice, dated the 16th January, 1919, it had been said: "In order to assure the provisioning of Germany and the rest of Europe, the German Government
shall take all necessary steps to place the German Merchant Fleet for the duration of the Armistice, under the control and power of the Allied flags and the United States, who shall be assisted by a German Delegate. This arrangement shall in no wise affect the final disposal of such vessels. That was the position so far as the Armistice was concerned. There was, however, another aspect of the case to which he need not refer at any great length, he meant the obligations of humanity and the grave danger of Germany drifting into Bolshevism unless food were sent into Germany.

When the negotiations at Spa had been broken off, the Supreme Economic Council had met together to consider the situation, and had arrived at certain decisions, which had been embodied in the report which he would proceed to read to the Conference. Unanimous decision had been reached on all but two points, regarding which very strong differences of opinion appeared to exist.

Lord Robert Cecil then read the following draft report of the Supreme Economic Council:

"The Supreme Economic Council report that, in their opinion a communication on the lines hereinafter stated, should be made to Germany.

The Supreme Economic Council should be authorised and directed to appoint a Committee with full powers to prepare the actual terms of the proposed communication including the financial and other arrangements necessary to carry it out.

Germany should be informed that—

(1) She is bound by the terms of the Armistice to hand over her mercantile fleet forthwith, under the terms settled at Trèves on [in] January last.

(2) On grounds of humanity, the Associated Governments reiterate their decision to deliver to Germany the food now available in Europe for which payment has been arranged as soon as Germany shows her genuine intention to carry out her obligations referred to in the first paragraph, by sending to sea for that purpose the ships to be selected by the Associated Governments, and the Associated Governments will themselves provide (as quickly as transportation can be arranged) or will give permits for import from neighbouring neutrals for the balance of the month’s supply, that is, of 270,000 tons agreed on, as soon as at least ... ships have been similarly sent to sea, and as soon as payment for such food has been arranged.

(3) She may import up to (300,000) tons of breadstuffs and (70,000) tons of fats monthly until September 1st.

(4) She must pay for this food and may pay in any of the following ways:

(a) By the hire of the ships.

(b) By the export of commodities and the sale of cargoes of German ships now in neutral countries.

(c) By credits in neutral countries."
(d) By the outright sale of foreign securities or properties.
(e) By the arrangement of advances against the use of foreign securities of properties as collateral.
(f) Further, gold also may be used as collateral for loans to be released as other means of payment to provide means of liquidating such loans. The outright sale of gold can only be permitted in the event of its being agreed by the Associated Powers that the above named means of payment are inadequate.
(5) She may export commodities (except those on a black list) to any neutral or other agreed destination. The proceeds from these exports must be converted into payment for foodstuffs.
(6) A definite amount of the Shipping handed over will be continuously available to transport food to Germany until next harvest.
(7) She may purchase and import foodstuffs within the limits above stated, from neutrals who will, when necessary, be allowed to re-import equivalent quantities.
(8) It is understood that the declaration of the Associated Governments under this communication will be null and void should a state of hostilities be renewed.

Lord Robert Cecil, continuing, said that in regard to Clause 1 and 2 above, complete agreement had been reached. But two objections had been raised in regard to Clause 3, namely, in connection with the relaxation of the blockade, and in connection with the engagement to feed the Germans until September 1st.

In regard to the first objection, it was obvious that if any food at all were to be imported into Germany, that would necessarily imply a certain relaxation of the blockade. But, in his opinion, the importation of food, far from weakening the power of the blockade, would strengthen it. The only way in which the blockade could be weakened would be by sending into the country so much surplus food as to allow large stocks to be constituted. On the other hand, if only just as much food as was required for immediate consumption were allowed to be sent in, the power of the blockade would thereby be strengthened. Once the Allies started feeding the German people, it would be easy for the latter to realise the full force of a threat to cut off further supplies.

In regard to the second objection, the French representatives held that the clause, as worded, implied an absolute engagement to feed the Germans until September 1st. He did not think that was the correct English interpretation of the text. Obviously, as soon as the Armistice came to an end, further supplies of food could also cease. Moreover, Clause 8 made the supply of food dependent on a non-renewal of a state of hostilities.
In regard to Paragraph 4, the Council agreed that Germany must pay for the food supplied to her, but the gravest differences of opinion had been expressed in regard to the manner of payment, particularly in connection with Clauses (d) (e) and (f). As a matter of fact, he did not think his French colleagues had yet had an opportunity of considering Clause (f), which had been re-drafted in order to meet, if possible, some of the objections raised by them.

Finally he would add that Clauses 5, 6 and 7 had been unanimously accepted.

M. Clementel thought it would be necessary, in the first place, to bring to the recollection of the Conference the exact terms of the decisions taken by the Supreme War Council, with particular reference to any promises said to have been made to Germany. In Clause 2 (b) of the first armistice, dated November 11th, the Allies had merely contemplated the provisioning of Germany during the armistice: But at the time of the second armistice, in accordance with a decision reached by the Supreme Economic Council, it had been agreed to supply to Germany from time to time such quantities of food as might be considered sufficient to meet her immediate requirements. Accordingly, on the advice of Mr. Hoover, 270,000 tons had been fixed as the amount of the first instalment of food-stuffs: But difficulties had arisen as regards the payment, so that nothing had as yet been sent. That, however, was all that had ever been promised by the Allies to Germany. During the last negotiations, the Germans had asked for a guarantee that food would be supplied up to the next harvest. That request had been discussed by the Supreme Economic Council and the French Delegates had maintained that no undertaking could be entered into for so long a period: No agreement should be entered into for more than one month at a time, and the agreement should only apply to the duration of the armistice. That is to say, the Germans would continue to obtain their food requirements during the period of the armistice, but should the armistice be broken for any reason, the supply of food would ipso facto cease. The British and American delegates had agreed to add Clause 8, which laid down that in the event of a renewal of hostilities, the engagements entered into by the Associated Governments would become null and void. The French Representatives had accepted this Clause only on the understanding that the Military experts were satisfied that it did not contravene any of the terms of the armistice.

Clause 8 had been accepted by the French delegates in principle on the understanding that the figures given merely represented maxima and that the final quantities to be entered should be referred
to the Economic experts. The Experts had not yet been consulted, but no delay need thereby be incurred, as the four competent Ministers could settle that question within a few hours.

In regard to Clause 4, the French Representatives held the view that people who wanted to eat should work. It was a well-known fact that in Berlin, for instance, the unemployed received an unemployment indemnity of 8 marks per day and as a result, at the present moment, there were no less than 300,000 unemployed in receipt of gratuities. Furthermore, peasants were pouring into the town to have a rest and to draw their gratuities. This fact had had an enormous influence on the output of coal, potash, and other raw materials. In his opinion, therefore, the Germans should be given an ultimatum; they should be told that they would only receive food in return for raw materials. The Supreme Economic Council had thought this to be too harsh a condition to introduce into an agreement, but it had been decided to communicate it verbally to the Germans during the course of the recent negotiations at Spa. Unfortunately these negotiations had been broken off before that stage had been reached.

In regard to the method of payment for the food to be supplied to Germany the French representatives held that methods (a), (b) and (c) would be sufficient to meet all payments likely to fall due within the next few months. They had further suggested that the following Clause should be substituted for Clauses (d), (e) and (f), namely: “Should the above 3 ways be found insufficient to yield the sums required, it would be the duty of the Finance Committee to find supplementary ways”.

Clause 7 laid down that Germany could purchase and import food stuffs from neutrals, who would, when necessary, be allowed to re-import equivalent quantities. This meant that unlimited quantities of food could be purchased by neutral countries to replace equivalent quantities sold to Germany, thus practically abolishing the system of rationing which was still enforced in the case of neutral countries.

Lord Robert Cecil pointed out that in the British text the Clause in question read: “She may purchase and import food stuffs within the limits above stated from neutrals, who will, when necessary, be allowed to re-import equivalent quantities”.

M. Clementel said that the word[s] “Within the limits above stated,” gave complete satisfaction.

He wished finally to lay stress on the fact that in renewing the negotiations with the Germans the conclusion reached by the Conference should be communicated to the Germans by the President of the Armistice Commission at Spa, so as to avoid discussions being carried on by a large body of representatives.
M. KLOTZ suggested that Marshal Foch's views should be heard.

MARSHAL FOCH held that Clause 3 created a somewhat dangerous situation, since the Allies thereby bound themselves to supply food to the Germans until September 1st, unless, as stated in Clause 8, hostilities were renewed. Consequently, that Clause had the effect of disarming the Allies, who would be obliged to start hostilities should any difference arise with Germany, since, as long as the Clause remained, pressure could not be exerted by the fear of withholding food.

MR. LANSING enquired what was the connection between the subject under consideration and the military situation.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that at the present moment the Allies possessed a method of applying pressure to Germany, without appeal to arms, but if the Clause suggested were accepted, the only method of exerting pressure would be the renewal of hostilities.

MR. HOOVER held that a very important difficulty had apparently been overlooked. It was essential that the Allies should obtain the German merchant ships in order to deliver the food supplies required by all countries of Europe, both friendly and enemy. It was evident, in his opinion, that Germany would refuse to give up her ships unless she were assured a supply of food until next harvest. If a monthly agreement alone were desired, Germany did not consider that a sufficient guarantee to justify the surrender of her ships. It may become desirable to shut off the supply of food in order to exert pressure on Germany. But, the delegates who went to Spa were positive that the German ships would never be surrendered unless the guarantee asked for were given. It would be possible for the Allies to go into German harbours and take the ships by force, but a great many of the ships were in neutral ports, and could not, therefore, be taken by force. Consequently, the Allies were faced by a dilemma: either to abandon the point raised by Marshal Foch and so obtain the ships required, or deliberately to refuse to supply food to Germany and break the promises made. He must, however, insist on the situation in Germany to-day. During the last four years Germany had divided its own food supplies into eleven packets, and a twelfth packet had been made up of the food stolen from the occupied territories. Since the armistice the twelfth packet had been lost to Germany and the remaining eleven packets had, through unemployment and disintegration, been greatly reduced in size. Consequently, Germany now only possessed food sufficient to feed the country for eight months, and some time about the 1st May next, food would become so scarce in all the towns of 50,000 inhabitants and more, that starvation would stare the people in the face, and that would constitute a very grave danger for the whole Government of the country. That was the substance of the report received.
from the most trustworthy sources in Germany. Therefore, unless the Allies were willing to run the risk of supplying certain quantities of food to Germany, in return for the possible surrender of her merchant ships, thus enabling her to maintain a stable Government, the efforts of the representatives now sitting in the Council Chamber would be washed out to nothing within the next sixty days.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he had been rather staggered by Marshal Foch’s proposition that we were parting with a very great effective power of exerting pressure on Germany. The difficulty was, however, more apparent than real, for the Allies were not in reality parting with the considerable power which food gave them. As a matter of fact, there were only two contingencies which might call for the exercise of that power. The Germans might refuse to carry out the terms of the armistice, but in that case the armistice would at once come to an end, and therefore the provisions of Clause 8 would apply. Again, the Preliminary Terms of Peace would shortly be presented to Germany, and if Germany refused to accept those terms, that would put an end to the armistice. But, when that happened, the Allies would be quite entitled to decide not to advance into Germany and to exert the necessary pressure by the stoppage of food supplies. Consequently, the only two contingencies when food pressure might be required, had been duly provided for. The Conference was therefore not parting with any potent weapon. On the other hand, he wished to urge with all his might that steps should at once be taken to revictual Germany. The honour of the Allies was involved. Under the terms of the armistice the Allies did imply that they meant to let food into Germany. The Germans had accepted our armistice conditions, which were sufficiently severe, and they had complied with the majority of those conditions. But so far, not a single ton of food had been sent into Germany. The fishing fleet had even been prevented from going out to catch a few herrings. The Allies were now on top, but the memories of starvation might one day turn against them. The Germans were being allowed to starve whilst at the same time hundreds of thousands of tons of food were lying at Rotterdam, waiting to be taken up the Waterways into Germany: These incidents constituted far more formidable weapons for use against the Allies than any of the armaments it was sought to limit. The Allies were sowing hatred for the future: they were piling up agony, not for the Germans, but for themselves. The British troops were indignant about our refusal to revictual Germany. General Plumer had said that he could not be responsible for his troops if children were allowed to wander about the streets, half starving. The British soldiers would not stand that, they were beginning to make complaints, and the most urgent demands were being received.

*Gen. H. C. O. Plumer, Commander of the British Army of the Rhine.*
from them. Furthermore, British Officers who had been in Germany said that Bolshevism was being created, and the determining factor was going to be food. As long as the people were starving they would listen to the argument of the Spartacists, and the Allies by their action were simply encouraging elements of disruption and anarchism. It was like stirring up an influenza puddle, just next door to one’s self. The condition of Russia was well-known, and it might be possible to look on at a muddle which had there been created. But, now, if Germany went, and Spain: who would feel safe? As long as order was maintained in Germany, a breakwater would exist between the countries of the Allies and the waters of Revolution beyond. But once the breakwater was swept away, he could not speak for France, but trembled for his own country. The situation was particularly serious in Munich. Bavaria, which once had been thought to represent the most solid and conservative part of Germany, had already gone. He was there that afternoon to reinforce the appeal which had come to him from the men who had helped the Allies to conquer the Germans, the soldiers, who said that they refused to continue to occupy a territory in order to maintain the population in a state of starvation. Meanwhile the Conference continued to haggle. Six weeks ago the same arguments about gold and foreign securities had been raised, and it had then been decided that Germany should be given food. He begged the Conference to re-affirm that decision in the most unequivocal terms, unless this people were fed, if as a result of a process of starvation enforced by the Allies, the people of Germany were allowed to run riot, a state of revolution among the working classes of all countries would ensue with which it would be impossible to cope.

M. CLEMENCEAUX expressed his desire to make a few observations in reply to Mr. Lloyd George’s statement; and he would preface his remarks with the affirmation that his conclusions agreed with that of Mr. Lloyd George, namely, that Germany must be fed as soon as possible. That however, was not the question now under discussion. Mr. Lloyd George had said that the honour of the Allies was involved, since they had given the Germans to understand that food would be sent into Germany. That was not altogether a correct statement of facts. In the Armistice no promise had ever been made to feed Germany.

Mr. BALFOUR, intervening, remarked that almost a promise had been made.

M. CLEMENCEAUX, continuing, said he would not argue the point, because, as he had already said, he was ready to give the food, whether promised or not. On the other hand, his information tended to show that the Germans were using Bolshevism as a bogey with which to
frighten the Allies. If the Germans were starving, as General Plumer and others said they were, why did they continue to refuse to surrender their fleet? The Germans certainly did not act as if they were in a hurry, and it was curious that a people who was said to be so hard up for food should appear to be in no hurry to assist in obtaining it by giving up their ships. No doubt very pitiable reports were being received from certain parts of Germany in regard to food conditions; but those reports did not apparently apply to all parts of Germany. For instance, General Mangin had told him that there was more food in Mayence than in Paris. In his opinion, the food hardship was probably due to bad distribution. Mr. Lloyd George had said that the Germans must be made to observe the conditions of the Armistice. But the Germans had promised to surrender their mercantile fleet, and so far they had not done so. In his opinion, the Germans were simply trying to see how far they could go; they were simply attempting to blackmail the Allies. To yield to-day would simply mean constant yielding in the future. He had that day received the following telegram dated the 7th. March, 1919, from the French Naval Attaché, in London:—

"Having been informed of the refusal of the German Merchant Shipping Commission to surrender the German mercantile fleet to the Allies, a refusal which had led to negotiations being broken off and to the return of the Allied Mercantile Marine Commission to Paris, the Armistice Commission has forwarded the following telegram to the Allied Admiralties:—

Begins. Urgent:—

With reference to your 394 ANAC, it is proposed that the following action be taken, a limit of 3 days being imposed:—The Allied and Associated Powers shall insist that the Germans shall on or before the . . . March next execute without further discussion or reservations the conditions set forth in Article 8 of the agreement for the prolongation of Armistice, dated 16th January, 1919, in regard to the surrender of the German merchant ships in Allied ports. The draft agreement dated . . . . shall be accepted in its entirety. Should these conditions not be executed in their entirety within the prescribed period, the authorisation accorded to German merchant ships, including fishing boats and mine-sweepers, to proceed to sea, shall forthwith be cancelled. Further, no neutral ship shall be authorised to proceed to German ports and the blockade shall be completely re-established. Message ends.

ANAC requests that the above message be submitted to the Supreme War Council."

He himself did not wish to champion that text, but he accepted the spirit which it breathed. In his opinion Marshal Foch should be instructed to meet the German Peace Delegates at Spa, and to tell them that the Allied and Associated Powers refused to argue or to discuss matters concerning the accepted clauses of the armistice. The Germans had promised to surrender their mercantile fleet, and immediate compliance must be demanded. The Germans could at the same time be told that food would be sent, but the conditions of

\*Abbreviation for Allied Naval Armistice Commission.
Article 8 of the Armistice of 16th January, 1919, must in the first place be fulfilled. It was essential that no signs of weakness should be displayed on the eve of the settlement of other large territorial, military and economic questions. The Germans must not be given any advantage to-day that might give them the impression that the Allied Powers could be intimidated and made to yield. Therefore, in his opinion Germany should be asked point blank: “Are you or are you not going to execute the conditions set forth in Clause 8 of the [agreement for the prolongation of the] Armistice?” If his proposal were accepted, the position of the Great Powers would be extremely strong and promises to supply food could then safely be made.

Marshal Foch had made an objection which he (M. Clemenceau) considered to be very strong, but a slight amendment of the text would easily put that matter right. In regard to the manner of payment, he would be prepared to waive his objection to the earmarking of gold for the purpose, provided he knew that the Germans would work for their food. This was not an unreasonable request, and it would be found to be in agreement with the teachings of Christianity. In conclusion, he could not too strongly urge his view that the Germans should be made thoroughly to understand that the Allies would allow no nonsense in regard to the minute observance of the terms of the clauses of the Armistice. As soon as the Germans recognised this fact, he felt sure his colleagues, M. Loucheur, M. Klotz and M. Clementel, who were ever ready to be guided by feelings of humanity, would easily arrive at an agreement in regard to the supply of food to Germany, and the payment therefor.

M. Sonnino said that by way of conciliation, he desired to suggest a slight amendment to Clause 8 which, he thought, would give satisfaction to all parties. Mr. Hoover had argued that the Germans refused to surrender their ships to the Allies because such a surrender would merely act as an incentive to the Allies to ask for new conditions. He (Mr. Hoover) therefore maintained that a complete agreement in regard to the two questions, (the surrender of the ships, and the supply of food), must be reached simultaneously. On the other side, Marshal Foch had said that the acceptance of Clause 8 as at present drafted, would imply the renunciation by the Allies of all means of exercising pressure on the Germans, short of the renewal of hostilities. The Germans would thereby be given an incentive to break all the minor conditions of the Armistice, because they would know that the Allies would never go to war for small things, especially after demobilisation had proceeded further. In order to meet these divergent views, he proposed that the words “should Germany break the terms of
the armistice", should be inserted at the end of Clause 8 instead of "should a state of hostilities be renewed."

Mr. Balfour pointed out that M. Clemenceau's point was that the Germans had already broken the terms of the Armistice by their refusal to surrender the ships. On the other hand M. Sonnino's amendment meant that no food would be supplied until the ships had actually been delivered. Mr. Hoover had, however, laid the greatest stress on the importance for the immediate supply of food. Consequently he did not think M. Sonnino's amendment really met the difficulties of the case.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he was most anxious to get on with the supply of food to Germany. No conditions requiring the surrender of the German mercantile fleet had been included in the original Armistice, but in the agreement for the prolongation of the Armistice, it had been stated that: "In order to assure the provisioning of Germany and the rest of Europe, the German Government shall take all necessary steps to place the German fleet for the duration of the Armistice under the control and the flag of the Allied Powers and the United States." That agreement had been entered into on the 16th January last, and for two months nothing had been done.

Personally, he accepted M. Sonnino's amendment, and if it should meet with the approval of the Conference, he would propose to add to Clause 1 of the proposed communication to be made to Germany, the following sentence: "On condition that Germany formally acknowledges her obligations under Clause 8 of the Armistice of January 16th."

M. Clemenceau said that he would accept Mr. Lloyd George's proposal in regard to Clause 1. Furthermore he would suggest that Clause 1 be communicated forthwith to the Germans by Marshal Foch. In addition the Conference should that day also come to an agreement in regard to the remaining clauses of the draft under consideration, on the clear understanding, however, that those clauses would not be communicated to the Germans until Clause 1 had been accepted by them.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired how long it would take for a telegram embodying Clause 1 to reach the German Delegates and for a reply to be received thereto.

Marshal Foch replied that a telegram would have to be sent to Spa and then repeated either to Berlin or Weimar. He thought a reply might be received, at the earliest, on Monday evening, always supposing that the Germans were prepared to send an immediate affirmative or negative reply.

M. Clemenceau said that he had overheard a remark to the effect
that an ultimatum of this nature would inevitably lead to war. In his opinion if the Germans were prepared to go to war over a question of food supplies, they would not hesitate to do so when the military economic and financial peace conditions came to be presented to them.

Mr. Lloyd George said that on second thought, it would probably be better to summon the German Delegates to a meeting rather than to send a telegram. He was afraid the latter procedure might result in the despatch of a long argumentative reply by the Germans. In his opinion, the Allied Delegates sent to Spa should receive definite instructions to tell the Germans that a formal acknowledgement to undertake their obligations under Clause 8 of the Armistice of January 16th. 1919, was required as a preliminary to any discussions whatsoever in regard to the conditions for the supply of food.

Mr. Lansing remarked that Admiral Hope had already put forward that very same proposition twice during the recent negotiations.

M. Clemenceau in reply pointed out that Admiral Hope had merely spoken as a great Admiral: he had [not?] delivered a message to the Germans in the name of the Great Powers.

In regard to the statement made by Mr. Lloyd George, he wished to urge very strongly that the case of the Allies would be lost irretrievably should any discussions take place prior to the acceptance of the conditions contained in Clause 1. But as soon as the Germans had accepted their obligations under that clause, the remaining clauses could then be discussed. In conclusion, he wished to propose that Clause 1 should be presented to the German Peace Delegates by Marshal Foch himself since the terms of the Armistice were in question. Marshal Foch would naturally be accompanied by the Economic experts, and he would retire as soon as the revictualling clauses came under discussion. He would merely present Clause 1, dealing with the German Mercantile Fleet.

M. Clementel said he agreed with the proposal contained in the document, but he wished to raise a very strong protest against the suggestion that an Allied Commission consisting of a large body of men should proceed for the third time to Spa, there to enter into lengthy disputations with a corresponding number of German experts. He would like to remind the Conference that the question of the surrender of the German Mercantile Fleet had been settled by Marshal Foch alone at an interview with Mr. Erzberger within the space of 20 minutes. Marshal Foch had given Mr. Erzberger a time limit which left the German Delegate no option but to accept the conditions imposed. On the other hand, at the last meeting, the Germans had been represented by three separate sections within their Delegation, namely, representatives of the Treasury, Food Department, and the Shipping Department. Each section had held different opinions and had expressed antagonistic views. He did not think it
was at all dignified that twenty representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments should enter into violent disputations with the Germans. He felt very strongly on that subject. In his opinion, only one delegate should be appointed to represent the Allies in any further negotiations, and that single delegate so selected, should be a Military representative. In addition, technical advisers could accompany the official delegate merely as his advisers.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that the two questions, namely, the drafting of the text of the communication to be presented to the Germans and the procedure to be followed in communicating the same, should not be mixed up. Before proceeding further, however, he asked permission to read the following telegram which he had just received from General Plumer at Cologne dated 8th March, 1919, 2.45 p.m.:

"Please inform the Prime Minister that in my opinion food must be sent into this area by the Allies without delay. Even now the present rations are insufficient to maintain life and owing to the failure of supplies from Germany they must very soon be still further reduced. The mortality amongst women, children and sick is most grave and sickness due to hunger is spreading. The attitude of the population is becoming one of despair and the people feel that an end by bullets is preferable to death by starvation. All this naturally results in great activity by subversive and disorderly elements. Apart from the imminence of danger from the situation the continuance of these conditions is unjustifiable. I request therefore that a definite date be fixed for the arrival of the first supplies. This date should not be later than March 16th even if from that date regular supplies cannot be maintained."

He thought General Plumer’s telegram disclosed a very serious state of affairs and he felt certain that the Conference did not wish to create sympathy with Germany by a continuance of a system of starvation. To bring the discussion to a head he desired to make the following definite suggestion, namely, that the terms of the ultimatum to be presented to the Germans prior to the discussion of the conditions for the supply of food should be made to read as follows:

"On condition that Germany formally acknowledges her obligations under Clause 8 of the Armistice of January 16th, that is to say, (Here enter Article 8 of the agreement for prolongation of the Armistice dated 16th January, 1919), the delegates of the Associated Governments are authorised and directed to proceed upon their instructions as to revictualling."

Marshal Foch thought that the mere recognition of Germany’s obligations under Clause 8 of the Armistice would hardly be sufficient, as the Germans had already recognised their obligations by accepting the clause. He suggested that the clause should be made to read:
“On condition that Germany formally acknowledges and undertakes to execute her obligations.”

Mr. Lloyd George accepted this amendment.

M. Clemenceau said that the next thing to settle was how the message should be delivered. He suggested that Marshal Foch should be authorised to meet the German delegates and communicate the message to them.

Mr. Lloyd George said he was the last man to have any distrust of Marshal Foch, whom he admired for his great qualities. On the other hand, the surrender of the ships really constituted a naval question and up to the present the shipping part of the Armistice had always been left to Great Britain. Thus, Admiral Wemyss had been sent to negotiate all matters relating to ships. And although he realised that Marshal Foch was a master on land, he thought Admiral Wemyss should be allowed to retain his mastership of the ocean: otherwise he feared the British Admiralty might think they had been deposed. He wished to propose, therefore, that the procedure followed hitherto should be adhered to and that a British Admiral should be sent to deliver the message relating to the surrender of ships.

M. Clementel said that the French delegates were firmly agreed that only one representative of the Allies should be appointed to meet a representative of the Germans. Should that principle be accepted, the one delegate could be accompanied by experts, if so desired, for consultation outside the Council Chamber. The French representatives quite agreed that the one Allied delegate should be a British Admiral. He would arrange to meet the German delegate and say to him:—“I come from the Supreme War Council to demand that you accept these conditions without further discussion”.

M. Clemenceau said that that proposal having been agreed, the conditions to govern the supply of food should next be settled. Clause I of the original draft now disappeared and would constitute a separate document to be presented to the German Peace delegate by a British Admiral, as a preliminary to the discussion of the remaining clauses of the original draft.

Clauses 2 and 3 of the original draft had been unanimously accepted. In regard to Clause 4, sub-heads (a), (b), and (c) had been accepted, but he would call on M. Klotz to make a statement in regard to sub-heads (d), (e) and (f).

M. Klotz expressed the view that sub-heads (a), (b) and (c) by themselves would be sufficient to meet all requirements, and M. Clemenceau’s statement that the Germans should be made to work in order to earn their food had merely confirmed that view. If
the Allies put on the table all the German gold and foreign securities which the Allies held in trust, there would be no incentive for the Germans to work. In order to reach an agreement he would, however, suggest the addition of the following paragraph at the end of Clause 3, namely:—“The methods of payment provided in (d), (e) and (f) shall not be resorted to until, in the judgment of the Supreme Economic Council, the possibility of payment under (a), (b) and (c), shall have proved inadequate.”

M. Loucheur thought that some misunderstanding existed in regard to the text. The American delegates had stated to him that two or three months would have to elapse before it could be known whether methods (a), (b) and (c) would provide sufficient funds. That was not the intention of the Committee. The wherewithal for the necessary payments would at once be made available by releasing the necessary quantities of gold and other securities. On the other hand, the Germans should be required to work in order to produce the raw material which would pay for the food supplies. Consequently, if at the end of a month or two it were found that the Germans were not producing any greater quantities of coal and other raw materials, the question as to whether the Allies should continue to feed people who refused to work would have to be reconsidered. It was essential that the Germans should not live at ease on the gold which was required for the payment of reparation for the damages deliberately committed by them.

Mr. Lloyd George said that on January 13th exactly the same speeches had been made by M. Klotz and he had then been overruled by the Supreme War Council. M. Klotz should, therefore, submit to the decisions then given by the Supreme War Council. In support of his statement, he would read to the Conference excerpts from the procès-verbal of the meeting of the Supreme War Council held on Monday, January 13th, 1919:—(I. C. 104) [IC-105] *

"President Wilson expressed the view that any further delay in this matter might be fatal, as it meant the dissolution of order and government. They were discussing an absolute and immediate necessity. So long as hunger continued to gnaw, the foundations of government would continue to crumble. Therefore, food should be supplied immediately, not only to our friends but also to those parts of the world where it was to our interest to maintain a stable government. He thought they were bound to accept the concerted counsel of a number of men who had been devoting the whole of their time and thought to this question. He trusted the French Finance Department would withdraw their objection as they were faced with the great problems of Bolshevism and the forces of dissolution which now threatened society.

M. Klotz said he would gladly meet President Wilson’s wishes. But it was not altogether a question of food supplies. They were all fully agreed as to the necessity of feeding the Germans but he would appeal to President Wilson to consider also the question of justice. He was quite willing to admit that

German foreign securities should be earmarked for this purpose. But they were creating a new German debt. There were other German debts which were just as honourable and noble. Therefore, he would ask, as a matter of justice, why Germany should pay for food in preference to paying off debts incurred for the restoration and for the reparation of damage committed elsewhere. Why should exclusive priority be given to such a debt? As a solution of the difficulty he would agree that payment for this food should be made in foreign securities and values. But he would add that 'these assets shall be pooled and distribution shall be made by the Allies, taking into account such privileged claims as the Peace Conference would admit.'

He would merely point out that it was not a question of food supply, it was purely a financial question and no delay need therefore occur in the supply of food.

President Wilson urged that, unless a solution for the immediate situation could be found, none of these debts would be paid. The want of food would lead to a crash in Germany. The great point, however, was this, that the Associated Governments have no money to pay for these supplies. Therefore Germany must pay for them, but if they were not paid for and supplied immediately there would be no Germany to pay anything.

Mr. Bonar Law pointed out that, in calculating the sums, they had been going on the assumption that the supply of food would last for one year. He did not think that it would need to last more than a few months, or, say, up to the harvesting of the next crop. The suggestion had also been made that the German merchant ships to be requisitioned would yield funds for the payment of a portion of the sum in question.

Mr. Klotz proposed that they should accept, for a period of two months, the text as it stood. At the end of that period the Peace Conference would be able to come to a decision on the whole question of policy.

Mr. Bonar Law considered that if sanction for two months' payment only were obtained, the food supplies could only last for two months.

Mr. Klotz thought that this showed some confusion of ideas. It was not a question of supplying food for two months. Food supplies could continue. The question to be settled during the course of the two months was merely as to the priority to be given to the payments to be made by Germany. It would be admitted that foreign securities must be considered as gilt-edged securities.

Mr. Bonar Law thought they were arguing in a circle. The first question to be settled was whether a new debt which they had no necessity to incur should be added to previous debts.

Mr. Klotz agreed, but suggested that at the end of the two months a priority list could be prepared.

Mr. Pichon said he thought that an agreement had now been reached. Everyone was agreed that payment had to be made. The proposal could therefore be accepted. But the Conference could reconsider the question later on, should they wish to do so.

(This was agreed to.)

It was true that Mr. Klotz had then suggested that the question should be reconsidered at the end of two months, but in the interval nothing had been done and as long as people were starving they could not be expected to work, as M. Klotz proposed.

Mr. Klotz asked permission to point out that his contention in reality was in complete agreement with what had originally been settled on January 18th. It had then been agreed that two months
later the whole clause would be reconsidered. In other words, he had then agreed to the sum of 450 million francs being expended during a period of two months, an expenditure which could, in his opinion, be incurred without endangering the finances of his country. Now, however, the proposal involved an expenditure of 2 milliards of francs up to the 1st September next, and for that purpose it was proposed to use up all the funds which might eventually become available for the payment of reparations. That was what he objected to. He had been willing and he was still willing to agree to an expenditure of 450 million francs; but he hesitated to go beyond that sum without a full and careful reconsideration of the whole question. Consequently, he had already shown a very conciliatory spirit and had made great sacrifices in agreeing to accept clauses (d), (e) and (f), with certain reservations; but it would be impossible for him to go further without compromising his country’s interests, which had been placed in his charge.

Mr. Lloyd George appealed to M. Clemenceau to intervene in the matter. It was true that on January 13th it had been suggested that the question might be reconsidered at the end of two months. Nothing had however, been done during those two months and now the question had been brought up for discussion with all the old arguments. He would not have raised the matter, but for the fact that during the past two months, in spite of the decision reached by the Supreme War Council in January last, obstacles had continually been put in the way, with the result that nothing had been done. He appealed to M. Clemenceau to put a stop to these obstructive tactics, otherwise M. Klotz would rank with Lenin and Trotsky among those who had spread Bolshevism in Europe.

Mr. House said that it always made him unhappy to take sides against France. But the American delegates had told him that they had gone to the utmost limits to meet the wishes of the French, and unless Clause 4 were accepted practically as it stood, it would have no value.

M. Clemenceau exclaimed that his country had been ruined and ravaged; towns had been destroyed; over two million men had lost their lives; mines had been rendered unworkable; and yet what guarantees had France that anything would be received in payment for all this destruction? She merely possessed a few pieces of gold, a few securities, which it was now proposed to take away in order to pay those who would supply food to Germany; and that food would certainly not come from France. In a word he was being asked to betray his country and that he refused to do.

Lord Robert Cecil thought that there had been some misapprehension as to Clauses (d) and (e) which in his opinion, could easily be
accepted by all the delegates. The strong opposition of the French representatives concerned Clause (f) which dealt with the question of gold. He would point out to M. Klotz that the Clause as redrafted now read as follows: “gold also may be used as collateral or loans to be realised as other means of payment, provide means of liquidating such loans. The outright sale of gold can only be permitted in the event of its being agreed by the Associated Powers that the other means of payment are inadequate”. M. Klotz himself had admitted that something of the kind would have to be done, that is to say, that some liquid assets would be required in order to get over the period until money could come in from other sources, such as mines. Consequently, he had confidently hoped that an agreement could have been reached as the British, American and Italian Delegates had gone a long way to meet the views of the French Delegates.

M. Cœsœr said that the draft of Clause (f) which had been presented at that morning’s meeting, had been different. He himself had suggested a new form as a compromise to reconcile the views of the French, American and British. In his opinion, he thought, the clause as now amended, should satisfy all parties. Italy, who was sadly in need of coal, was prepared to accept it. He hoped, therefore, that M. Klotz would do the same.

M. Loucheur thought that there had been a good deal of misunderstanding. He himself quite agreed that the Germans could not be expected to work until they had been fed. Two months ago a credit of 450 million francs had been voted; but so far that sum had not been utilised. He fully agreed that Mr. Hoover should at once take all the necessary measures for the immediate supply of the necessary food stuffs to Germany. Obviously, the credit of 450 million francs would not suffice. It had been thought that this sum could be supplemented by money to be obtained by the exportation of raw material from Germany; but there did not appear to be much likelihood of any great sums becoming available in that way in the near future. Consequently, as the matter was urgent, it would be necessary forthwith to open a credit for a much larger sum than 450 million. On that day, the Allies were, in fact, taking engagements to supply food up to a value which might amount to two milliards. He proposed, therefore, that the Conference should forthwith agree to open a credit for one milliard, to be made available immediately, and later on, if necessary, further credits could be opened.

(M. Loucheur’s proposal, having been accepted, the Conference adjourned for a short time for the re-drafting of the text of the communications to be made to Germany in such a manner as to embody the various amendments accepted that afternoon.)
After the adjournment the following draft was approved:—

1. As a preliminary to any discussion whatsoever with the German representatives, the principal representative of the Allied and Associated Powers is to make the following statement:—

On condition that Germany formally acknowledges and undertakes to execute her obligations under Clause VIII of the Armistice of January 16th, that is to say—

VIII. "In order to assure the provisioning of Germany and the rest of Europe, the German Government shall take all necessary steps to place the whole of the German merchant fleet, for the duration of the Armistice, under the control and the flags of the Allied Powers and the United States, who shall be assisted by a German delegate.

This arrangement shall in no wise affect the final disposal of such vessels. The Allies and the United States shall, if they consider this necessary, replace the crews either entirely or in part, and the officers and crews replaced shall be repatriated to Germany.

Suitable compensation, to be fixed by the Allied Governments, shall be made for the use of such vessels.

All questions of detail, as also any exceptions to be made in the case of certain types of vessel, shall be settled by a special agreement to be concluded immediately."

The Delegates of the Associated Governments are authorised and directed to proceed upon these instructions as to revictualling.

2. Subject to the above undertaking by Germany the principal representative of the Allied and Associated Powers is authorised to make a communication to the German representatives. (On the basis set forth in Annexure I.)

3. An Admiral, to be nominated by the British Government, will be the principal representative of the Allied and Associated Powers in these negotiations.

4. In order to avoid delay, the negotiations shall take place at Brussels.

The French Government undertake to make the necessary arrangements with the Belgian Government.

Marshal Foch undertakes to make the necessary communication to the German Delegates.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 10th March, 1919.

Annexure I

Supreme Economic Council

1. On grounds of humanity, the Associated Governments reiterate their decision to deliver to Germany the food now available in Europe for which payment has been arranged as soon as Germany shows her genuine intention to carry out her obligations, by sending to sea for that purpose the ships to be selected by the Associated Governments, and the Associated Governments will themselves provide (as quickly as transportation can be arranged) or will give permits for import from neighbouring neutrals for the balance of the month's supply, that is, of 270,000 tons agreed on, as soon as
at least —— ships have been similarly sent to sea, and as soon as payment for such food has been arranged.

2. She may import up to (800,000) tons of breadstuffs and (70,000) tons of fats monthly until September 1st.

3. She must pay for this food and may pay in any of the following ways:

(a) By the hire of ships.

(b) By the export of commodities and the same of cargoes of German ships now in neutral countries.

(c) By credits in neutral countries.

(d) By the outright sale of foreign securities or properties.

(e) By the arrangement of advances against the use of foreign securities or properties as collateral.

(f) Further, gold also may be used as collateral or loans to be released as other means of payment provide means of liquidating such loans. The outright sale of gold can only be permitted in the event of its being agreed by the Associated Powers that the above named means of payment are inadequate.*

4. She may export commodities (except those on a black list) to any neutral or other agreed destination. The proceeds from these exports must, however, be converted into payments for foodstuffs.

5. A definite amount of the shipping handed over will be continuously available to transport food to Germany until next harvest.

6. She may purchase and import food stuffs within the limits above stated, from neutrals who will, when necessary, be allowed to re-import equivalent quantities.

7. It is understood that the declaration of the Associated Governments under this communication will be null and void should Germany break the terms of the armistice.

*The methods of payment provided in (d), (e), (f), shall not be resorted to beyond the sum of $200,000,000 (in addition to the financial arrangements already agreed upon in payment of the first 270,000 tons of food), until in the judgment of the Supreme Economic Council the possibilities of payment under (a), (b) and (c) have proved inadequate. [Footnote in the original.]
Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 10th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

**Present**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. R. Lansing.
Hon. E. M. House.

**Secretaries**

Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.
Mr. G. Auchincloss.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.

**Secretaries**

Mr. H. Norman.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

**Secretaries**

M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. Arnavon.
M. de Bearn.

**ITALY**

H. E. Baron Sonnino.
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi.

**Secretaries**

Count Aldrovandi.
M. Bertelet.

**JAPAN**

H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.

**Also Present**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

General Tasker H. Bliss.
Admiral W. S. Benson.
Major General M. N. Patrick.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

Rear-Admiral G. P. Hope, C. B.
General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.
Major General Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G.
Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O.
Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N.
Paymaster Captain C. F. Pollard, C. B., R. N.

**FRANCE**

M. Leygues.
M. J. Cambon.
Marshal Foch.
General Belin.
General Degoutte.
General Weygand.
General Duval.
Admiral de Bon.
Commd. de V. Levavasseur.
Commd. Lacome.
Lieut. de V. Odend’hal.

**ITALY**

General Cavallero.

**JAPAN**

Admiral Takeshita.
General Nara.
Colonel Nagai.
Captain Fujioka.
Captain Yamamoto.

**Joint Secretariat**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

Colonel U. S. Grant.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

Captain E. Abraham.

**FRANCE**

Captain A. Portier.

**ITALY**

Lieut. Zanchi.

**JAPAN**

M. Saburi.

Interpreter.—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.
(1) M. Clemenceau said that M. Pichon had a text of a resolution on this subject to propose. The following text was then read and accepted:—

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers considering that the Powers which have actually taken part in the war and in consequence thereof suffered damage calling for reparation should not be excluded from the financial and economic committees, hereby declare that they cannot accept the list of delegates as put forward by the meeting of the Powers with particular interests, and with regard thereto move the following resolutions:

1) Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania, Czechoslovak Republic and Serbia shall be represented by one delegate each in the financial commission.

2) Belgium, Brazil, China, Poland, Portugal, Roumania and Serbia shall be represented by one delegate each in the economic commission.

The other Powers with particular interests shall have a hearing at these Committees whenever questions bearing on their interests are being dealt with.

M. J. Cambon was charged with the mission of communicating this decision to the Powers concerned.

(2) M. Clemenceau said that before proceeding with this subject he would read a Declaration made by Marshal Foch. He then read the following Declaration:—

On February 12th, the Governments entrusted a Military Committee with the task of laying down, in all liberty, the conditions of Germany's disarmament. After a particularly thorough study of the question, the Military Representatives established the draft of March 5th, which was based upon the short term of service and excluded the long term service.

On March 7th, the Governments, upon the demand of the British Government, entrusted the same representatives with the laying down of a draft based upon the long term service. The draft of March 10th is submitted as a consequence of these directions.

From the military point of view, I hold that the draft of March 5th is preferable for the considerations already explained and owing to the thorough study to which it was submitted.

If, in spite of all, the Governments were to adopt the principle of the long term service and rally to the draft of March 10th, it is indispensable, in order to diminish the danger, which, in my opinion, exists with an army based upon a long term of service, to reduce the strength from 140,000 men provided for in the draft, to 100,000 men, this for various reasons will be explained.
The draft regulations were then read article by article. (For text see Annexure A.)

Chapter 1. Article 1

Chapter 1, Article 1 was passed.

Article 2

M. Clemenceau pointed out that there was a discrepancy between the figure 140,000 men given in this article, and the figure recommended by Marshal Foch in his Declaration, namely 100,000.

Mr. Balfour enquired how the original number 200,000 had been reduced to 140,000 which it now appeared Marshal Foch wished further to reduce to 100,000?

M. Clemenceau explained that in the case of a short term service half of the contingents were undergoing training and were therefore regarded as ineffective, whereas, in a long term service, all the men serving were effective. Hence to obtain an equivalent of 200,000 short term men, 140,000 long service men were considered sufficient.

Mr. Lloyd George said he had no objection to raise to this.

Mr. Balfour asked whether the American Delegates agreed to the reduction.

General Bliss said that the American view was that a 25% reduction should be made on a short term Army of 200,000 to give an equivalent in long service men. The figure of 140,000 had therefore been chosen. The American Representatives were of opinion that this number should not be further diminished. It was a matter of guess work to judge what number of troops would be necessary to maintain order in Germany, but he felt that safety could not be ensured with less than 140,000.

Marshal Foch said that if the force left to Germany was to be a police force, 140,000 men represented far more than was required. In support of this, he instanced the United States of America with a population of 100,000,000 and a standing army, before the war, of 100,000 men and no constabulary. Proportionately 100,000 men were therefore more than enough to police Germany. If Germany were given a permanent army of 140,000 men, together with 15,000 sailors, a constabulary the number of which was unknown and not limited, but which probably exceeded that of the French constabulary which was 22,000 men, plus 6,300 Forest Guards, plus 23,000 douaniers, Germany would have a trained force of not less than 206,000. This would not constitute an aggressive force able to mobilise at once. If all Germany required was a police force, this was far too much, and 100,000 men would be ample. If the recommendations before the Council were adopted, the Allies would have to maintain 206,000 trained men against Germany. Even if this burden were distributed amongst four Powers, each would have to keep in readiness over 50,000 fully trained men.
Mr. Lansing said that in reference to Marshal Foch’s figures of forces in the United States before the war, he wished to make a few remarks. Before this war, the United States of America were perhaps the least military nation on earth. They had a population of about 100,000,000, that is to say some 20,000,000 more than Germany. The regular army had numbered 100,000 men, the National Guards contained 125,000 more or less trained men who had shown their value on the Mexican frontier. In addition to this there were thousands of men in the State Constabulary and tens of thousands in the police, all trained in the use of firearms, and suitable for incorporation. There were therefore available in times of Peace, 300,000 to 350,000 trained men. With this term of comparison, he did not think the allotment made to Germany over, great, especially if the very difficult task of the German Government be taken into account. The various States composing the German Federation had not the same spirit of cohesion as existed amongst the States of America.

Marshal Foch said that according to Mr. Lansing’s figures there were in the United States some 225,000 trained men before the war. He had added to this, however, the police in the various states. These had not been taken into account in considering the force of Germany. If Town and Municipal police were added to his estimate of Germany’s armed forces, the proportion would be about the same.

M. Clemenceau said that if the figure of 140,000 were maintained for the regular army, in effect Germany would have 200,000 trained men. If the army were reduced to 100,000 she would still have 160,000 trained men, and this figure exceeded that considered by General Bliss as necessary to maintain order in Germany. Marshal Foch had suggested that there [were?] four Powers ready to share the burden of opposing an equivalent force to this German army. He was not sure that he could prejudge the future so confidently. The British and American troops were reasonably anxious to go home. Should they do so the whole burden would be on France. He felt it was therefore his duty to say with the greatest emphasis that to lighten France’s burden Marshal Foch’s figure ought to be adopted.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he had been much impressed by the last argument. He was bound to admit that in all probability the occupation of any points it might be decided was necessary for the safety of France would ultimately be a burden on France alone. France was therefore entitled to a decisive voice in the matter. It was inevitable that this interest should affect France more closely than Great Britain, and Great Britain more closely than America. Twice in living memory invasion of French soil had come from the same quarter. France was therefore entitled to consider her fears.
Germany would have no good cause for complaint. Twice she had misused her military machine, and on this occasion its misuse had led to the death of 20,000,000 young men. Consequent famine and disorder would doubtless do to death as many more. The Associated Powers were therefore entitled to say that they would not allow Germany the use of a machine that could again be the cause of similar disaster. As between the figures of 100,000 and 140,000 he had no very clear predilection, but he did not feel that he could resist the Military Advisers of France, unprotected by the sea as England and America were, and with only the Rhine as a defence. He agreed there was force in what Mr. Lansing and General Bliss had said. Great Britain had a very small army, although it exceeded 100,000; but it had to ensure the security of a large and scattered Empire including India and Africa. There was also Ireland. Germany had no Empire, and as far as he knew, no Ireland. Should Bavaria represent the Irish problem of Germany it was not the business of the Allied Powers to arm Germany against her.

In conclusion, if France felt strongly about this question, he did not think that the British or American Delegates had a right to withstand her views.

Mr. Lansing said that he was very much impressed by the words of M. Clemenceau and also by those of Mr. Lloyd George, with whom he was glad to agree.

Mr. Balfour said that he had nothing to add to the arguments used, but the conclusion to which they led was one which the Conference must take into account. The army of Germany was to be reduced to a police force, and that a small one. In that case Germany must be secured against invasion. There was no plan at present before the Conference for general disarmament. If the Germans were told that they were to have only 100,000 armed men, while France, Poland or Bohemia could have as many as they wished, they would say that the Allied Powers were leaving them at the mercy even of their small neighbours. What form the guarantee of non-invasion should take he was not prepared to suggest, but some such guarantee would have to be found if the Conference made Germany powerless for attack and weak for defence.

M. Clemenceau said that the question raised by Mr. Balfour was a very important one, but its solution lay with the League of Nations, one of whose functions was to prevent sudden aggression by any of its members.

Mr. Balfour said that if this was the solution, it should be communicated to Germany.

Mr. House said that General Bliss suggested that the powers should guarantee the neutrality of Germany as she had guaranteed that of Belgium.
(Article 2 was accepted with the reduction, of the figure 140,000 to 100,000).

**Article 3**  
Article 3 was carried with the proviso that a proportional reduction of numbers be made.

**Article 4**  
Article 4 was carried with the same proviso.

**Article 5**  
The same proviso was made.

**M. Clemenceau** said that with reference to this article, he wished to enquire why an Army Staff was maintained at all. A police force would not require one. France had not had one before the war. The only purpose of an Army Staff could be the study and preparation of war. He, therefore proposed that Army Corps Staffs should be maintained, and that the Army Staff should be suppressed.

**Mr. Lloyd George** pointed out that Great Britain had had a small Army but nevertheless it had a general staff.

**Baron Sonnino** said that the Army Staff in Germany in the future might be engaged on the study of the defence of Germany.

**M. Clemenceau** said that France had to prepare her defence and yet had none.

**Marshall Foch** said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau that the Army Staff should be suppressed, but also pointed out that Article 7 endowed Germany with a War Office staff of 300 officers which was amply sufficient for the organization of their army.

(It was agreed that the words “and one army staff” be suppressed.)

**Article 6**  
Article 6 was accepted with the excision of the words “Army or . . .”

**Marshall Foch** suggested an addition forbidding manoeuvres carried out by Staffs or by troops representing larger formations than regiments.

**Article 7**  
(It was decided, after some discussion, that the difficulty of ensuring the execution of such a prohibition, and the undesirability of continual interference in the internal affairs of Germany on matters of detail, were considerations outweighing the advantages of the amendment.)

Article 7 was then accepted.

**Article 8**  
Article 8 was accepted.

**Article 9**  
Article 9 was accepted, with the addition of the words: “of the signing of this Convention”.

**Chapter II**  
The first seven Articles of Chapter II were accepted without amendment.

**Mr. Balfour** said he wished to ask two questions in relation to this Article. He was not aware that it had been explained why a different policy was advocated in relation to fortifications on the Southern and Eastern as opposed to the Western frontiers of Germany. Further, he was informed by Admiral Hope
that the number of rounds allotted to each gun had in the naval proposals been reduced to half the figures proposed in this Article. Was it not desirable to obtain uniformity?

General Degoutte, regarding the fortification of frontiers, said that the Germans had two fortresses on their Southern frontier at Ulm and Ingolstadt. Both of these were more than 50 kilometres from the frontier. There was therefore no case for disarming them. It had been thought undesirable to mention the dismantling of any fortresses on the Eastern frontier, as it was possible that they might be in Polish hands. There were also two small fortresses in the Mazurian region. It was thought undesirable to demand their destruction, though they would doubtless remain German, because they might serve as a protection against Bolshevism.

Marshal Foch, in relation to the ammunition allotted to the guns, agreed to the halving of the allotment proposed.

With this amendment, Article 8 was accepted.

M. Clemenceau said that he would ask for the suppression of this Article, as the Governments had not yet decided on the fate of the area in question. He thought it would be of no use to ask the Germans to agree to any terms regarding it before its final allotment. They would have to sign another document concerning territorial adjustments. After this, the provisions contained in this Article might, if necessary, be revised.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed that the question might be reserved.

Mr. Lansing proposed that the Article be struck out, and put in later if necessary.

(Article 9 was accordingly struck out, subject to reconsideration at a later date, if necessary.)

Article 10

Article 10 was accepted.

Article 11

Article 11 was accepted.

Article 12

Article 12, with the addition at the end of each clause of the words: “of the signing of the present convention”, was accepted.

After some discussion, it was agreed to substitute the formula “all compulsory military service shall be abolished in Germany”.

Article 2 was accepted, with the addition at the end of the last clause of the words “of the signing of this Convention”.

Mr. Balfour pointed out that though the first two Articles of this chapter fitted the heading of the Chapter itself, this and the subsequent Articles bore hardly any relation to it. He himself would have thought it unnecessary to put this kind of regulation into the Treaty at all. If, in military opinion, it were necessary to do so, it would be better to put them under
another heading. This led him to think that the whole document should be referred to the Drafting Committee of the Conference for re-adjustment and reduction to reasonable proportions.

MARSHAL FOCH said that provided the substance were not altered, he agreed to the re-casting of the document by the Drafting Committee.

M. SONNINO drew attention to the last words of the Article: "or in any other form". Earlier in the Meeting, Marshal Foch had said that constabulary was a military force. Was it or was it not included in the scope of this Article?

MARSHAL FOCH admitted that it was not, and again expressed his willingness to refer the document to a Drafting Committee, provided soldiers were attached to it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to Article 8 of this chapter, which apparently differentiated gendarmes, customs house officials, forest and coast guards from troops. It was therefore undesirable in Article 3 to mention them as an exception, as this would assimilate them to military forces.

MR. LANSING said that in view of the strong claim made by Marshal Foch on the basis that these people were soldiers, and should be counted as trained men, Article 8 should be entirely omitted, and that their instruction should be permitted.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch whether gendarmes were soldiers.

MARSHAL FOCH replied in the affirmative, adding that they were soldiers subjected to a special régime. They could not be governed by the same rules as were laid down for the standing army. The Conference was concerned with the latter only. Germany must be left freedom to enlist the number of constabulary she required.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed the addition at the end of this Article of the clause: "This does not affect the police forces mentioned in Article 8".

(With this addition, the Article was accepted.)

Article 4

Article 4 was accepted.

MARSHAL FOCH proposed the addition that there should be no military census or classification of horses for army purposes. Such a census was a necessary preliminary of mobilisation.

Article 5

MR. BALFOUR questioned whether it was wise to enter into details of this kind. If the Germans wished to know their resources, they could call their horse census agricultural and not military. They would obtain the same results. It would be quite sufficient if the Allied and Associated Powers could compel Germany to keep an army of no more than 100,000 men. If this result
could be achieved, it would be amply sufficient, and it was a pity to
cumber a treaty with details, many of which might be obsolete in
ten years.

Mr. House added that aggravating minutiae of this kind would
be a temptation to the Germans to evade them, and this would
ultimately bring the treaty as a whole into contempt.

M. CLEMENCEAUSaid that as both Great Britain and America were
opposed to any alteration, the Article would be accepted as it stood.

Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9 were accepted without amend-
ment.

MR. BALFOUR said that according to a telegram just shown to him
by Admiral Hope, the British Admiralty thought it necessary to
qualify the establishment of the Commission at the

Chapter IV.

Article 1

seat of the Central German Government by the pro-

viso “if found convenient”. He himself thought that
perhaps the whole paragraph might with advantage be omitted.

GENERAL BLISS said that the reasons which had led to the insertion
of this paragraph were that the German Government, unless this was
stated, might put obstacles in the way of the establishment of the
Commission in Berlin, and thereby make it very difficult for the
Commission to gain access to the records of the personnel of the
administration.

M. SONNINO proposed that the paragraph should read: “This Com-
mission shall be entitled to establish itself in, and to send sub-Com-
missions or delegates to, any part of German territory”.

(This was agreed to, and Article 1, with this amendment, was
accepted.)

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that it was undesirable to introduce the
clause, “especially from the point of view of military and financial
measures”. This suggested to the Germans that they

need not concern themselves with other considerations.

(These words were struck out, and, with this amendment, Article
2 was accepted.)

Article 3

Article 3 was accepted.

M. CLEMENCEAUSuggested the substitution of the words “this Con-
vention” for the words “the Treaty of Peace.”

(Thus was agreed to.)

MR. LANSING observed that the last words of para-

graph (a) raised the question of the possible subdivision of Germany
into several States. Should this take place, what part of the present
German territory would be, for the purposes of the Treaty, Germany?

(It was decided, after some discussion, to omit the words “or as
she may be constituted at any time thereafter.”)

With the amendments mentioned, paragraph (a) was accepted.
Mr. Balfour questioned whether there was any advantage in retaining this paragraph.

(It was agreed to suppress paragraph (b).)

Mr. Lloyd George said that though a partisan of the League of Nations, he was not sure that it would be in a position to do what was required of it in this paragraph. The Commission established under Chapter 4 would fulfill its duties in a relatively short time. The League of Nations might not agree to execute the Articles of the Convention. We, therefore, had provision for the supervision of Germany during a few months and no certain means of continuing it for 10, 20 or 30 years. The League of Nations was not a body of police to enforce the execution of a treaty. He thought the supervision should be organised and maintained by the Allied and Associated Powers.

(It was decided that Clause (c) should read as follows:

“The execution of these clauses shall be supervised by such means and by such organs as the Associated Powers may decide to employ or to create.”)

Mr. Lansing said that, on behalf of the United States, he wished to reserve his assent to Chapter 5 until the final draft came before the meeting.

(It was agreed that the whole Convention, as amended, should be referred to the Drafting Committee of the Conference, assisted by General Weygand, General Sir Henry Wilson, General Bliss and General Cavallero.)

Marshal Foch suggested that the Aviation clauses should be combined with the Military clauses in the same document, and, if possible, the Naval clauses also. If this were to be done, the Committee could not furnish its final draft in one day. He also pointed out that the Air clauses had not been examined, though they contained important questions of principle.

General Duval remarked that all the experts had agreed.

Mr. Lloyd George said that, for his part, he would assent to them.

Marshal Foch enquired whether the Naval terms were ready.

M. Leygues said that they were ready, excepting those relating to the Kiel Canal and submarine cables. Both these questions had been referred to Commissions.

M. Clemenceau asked M. Leygues to prevail on these Commissions to hasten their reports.

(It was decided that the Drafting Committee of the Conference should furnish the Council on Wednesday with a complete re-draft of the Convention, containing all the Military, Aerial and Naval Terms of a Preliminary Peace with Germany.)
Marschal Foch said that General Degoutte and General Cavallero wished to be heard.

General Degoutte said that he was not in favour of a long term army for Germany. He thought that dangers of this army system had not been considered.

M. Clemenceau observed that General Degoutte should have expressed his opinion while the Council was discussing Article 1 of the first chapter of the Convention. The matter was then decided and the discussion could not be re-opened.

General Weygand said that he had understood that the Council was examining a plan made by the military experts by order on certain assumptions which had been furnished to them. They had not, therefore, thought it right to make any comment on the principles the Council had chosen to impose.

General Cavallero said that he wished to express the same view as General Degoutte and Weygand. He had thought the Council meant to choose between two systems. His instructions were, as Italian military adviser, to state that the system of long term voluntary service was unacceptable.

M. Clemenceau said that, as Chairman of the Council, he could not take cognisance of the views of the military advisers of the Italian Government, but only of the vote of the Italian Delegation. The only satisfaction he could give to the Generals was that their protest would be recorded in the Minutes.

(The meeting then adjourned.)


(When the Military and Naval Advisers had withdrawn, a Conversation was held in M. Pichon’s Room.)

M. Pichon said that he had received a very important document from M. Benes, relating to a German conspiracy against Czecho-Slovakia. He suggested that the Council should consider this on the following day.

(This was agreed to.)

It was decided that the Military and Naval Convention should be discussed on Wednesday, and that the eastern and northern frontiers of Germany should be discussed on Thursday. At Mr. Lloyd George’s suggestion, it was decided that the discussion of Germany’s eastern and northern frontiers should be begun on Tuesday, after disposing of M. Benes’ note. It was further decided that Germany’s western frontier should be discussed on Friday.
Draft Regulations Concerning a Definite Military Status of Germany

Chapter 1.—Limitation of Effectives

Article 1.

The German Military Forces will be demobilised within the period mentioned in Article 9, and to the extent required in Articles 2 and 3.

Article 2.

The total effectives of the Land Army of all the States both present and future, constituting Germany, fixed so that Germany can ensure order and police control within her territory, shall not exceed 140,000 men, including officers.

Article 3.

The total effectives of Officers shall not exceed 6,000 including all staffs however constituted.

Article 4.

Germany is permitted to commence forthwith, recruiting on a voluntary basis of 12 years colour service for Non-Commissioned Officers and men, of an army which shall not exceed the establishment of

11 Infantry Divisions
3 Cavalry Divisions.

Article 5.

These divisions may be formed with not more than 4 Army Corps Staffs and 1 Army Staff.

The formation of forces differently grouped and of other organisations of command is forbidden.

Article 6.

The composition of the divisions and that of Army or Army Corps Staffs is given in Table No. 1.

The number of small units of infantry, artillery and engineers, and of technical services and troops, provided for the divisions, as well as the effectives allowed for these small units, technical services of troops, must not be exceeded:

Article 7.

As the German Army can have no other duty than the maintenance of internal order, and, in case of necessity, the police control of the frontiers, the High Command of the Army is confined to functions of an administrative character. The Staff of Officers of the Ministries of War of all the German States and of the Administrations directly
attached to them, shall be included in the total effectives given in Article 2, and shall not exceed 300 officers.

No organisation shall exist intended to prepare troops for employment in any warlike operations, and in particular, the German Great General Staff or similar formation shall be dissolved and cannot be reconstituted in any other form.

Article 8.

Only the number of military schools strictly indispensable to the recruitment of the officers of the units to be maintained shall continue to exist.

In consequence, the War academies or similar institutions of the German States and the different schools of officers, officer-students, cadets, non-commissioned officers, and non-commissioned officer students, shall be suppressed; the only schools authorised shall be those intended for the recruitment of the officers of each arm in the proportion of one school for each arm.

The number of students admitted to attend the lectures in these schools shall be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled up in the cadres of officers, students and cadres being included in the effectives mentioned in Article 1.

Article 9.

All the measures prescribed in the present chapter must be carried out within two months at the most.

CHAPTER 2.—LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

Article 1.

The units forming the German Army shall have an armament the total amount of which shall not exceed that stated in Table No. 2.

Article 2.

The German Army may have besides, at its disposal, to provide for eventual replacements, an amount of material equal to 1/25th part for small arms and to 1/50th part for guns of the quantity provided for in the preceding Article.

Article 3.

The German Army may have at its disposal stocks of munitions the amount of which shall not exceed that fixed by Table No. 3.

Article 4.

These stocks of munitions shall be stored at points fixed by the German Government of which it shall inform the Allied and Associated Powers.

Apart from these depots it shall be forbidden to form stocks, depots or reserves of munitions.
Article 5.

Production or use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, any liquid, any material and any similar device capable of use in war are forbidden.

Article 6.

The manufacture of armoured cars, tanks, or of any similar machines which can be used for military objects is forbidden.

Article 7.

The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material shall be permitted only in a very limited number of factories, the exact names of which shall be communicated to the Allied and Associated Powers with a statement of the amount of material ordered.

No other establishment having for its object the design, preparation, manufacture or storage of munitions or any war material whatever shall exist.

In particular, the arsenals shall be suppressed, unless they are used as depots for the authorised stocks of munitions. The personnel of the suppressed arsenals shall be dismissed.

Article 8.

(a) All fortified works, fortresses and land forts, which are situated in German territory West of a line traced 50 kilometres East of the Rhine, shall be disarmed and dismantled.

The construction of any new fortifications, of whatever importance or nature, within this zone is forbidden.

(b) The status quo is and shall be preserved as regards fortified works on the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany.

(c) The armament of the fortified works, fortresses and land or coast forts which Germany is allowed to retain shall never exceed, as regards the number and calibre of guns, those existing at the date of the signature of the present convention, which number and calibres shall at once be communicated by the German Government to the Allied and Associated Powers.

The stocks of ammunition for these guns shall be maintained at the following uniform rates: 3,000 rounds apiece for those the calibre of which is 10.5 cm. and under: 1,000 rounds apiece for those of higher calibre.

Article 9.

All territory on the left bank of the Rhine which may remain as part of Germany after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace will be “demilitarized”. That is to say, the inhabitants of this territory will not be permitted to bear arms or receive any military training or to be incorporated in any military organization either on a voluntary or compulsory basis, and no fortifications, depots, establish-
ments, railway construction or works of any kind adapted to military purposes will be permitted to exist within the area. Nor will this territory be allowed to contribute directly or indirectly in money or in material of any description towards the armies of Germany.

Article 10.

All German arms, munitions and war material, including all anti-aircraft guns, ammunition and projectors, etc., existing in Germany, including those mentioned in Articles 5, 6 and 7, in excess of the quantities allowed by the present regulations shall be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers at points to be fixed in German territory, with a view to their being destroyed or rendered useless.

The same shall be done in the case of special machinery intended for the manufacture of war material in excess of that recognised as necessary for the manufacture authorised.

War material of all sorts, even if not in working order, of origin other than German, shall be sequestrated; the Allied and Associated Powers shall decide as to its disposal.

Article 11.

Germany is forbidden to manufacture war material, including aircraft and engines, equipment and armament for aircraft for other countries.

The German State or States or German private individuals shall not receive by purchase, exchange or cession of any sort war material coming from abroad.

Article 12.

The measures prescribed by Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10 of the present chapter shall be carried out within one month.

The measures prescribed by Articles 7 and 8 of the present chapter shall be carried out within 3 months.

Chapter 3.—Limiting Clauses Concerning German Military Laws

Article 1.

The Universal Service Law shall be removed from the Statute Book of the German Constitution.

Article 2.

Clauses of the following Articles shall form an integral part of the German Military Laws.

These laws moreover shall not include any provision in contradiction of the clauses contained in the different chapters of the regulations. They shall on the contrary prescribe the abrogation of all previous legislative, financial or administrative measures which may be in contradiction with these clauses.
These laws shall be enforced in all German territory and promulgated within three months.

Article 3.

All non-commissioned officers and privates shall be voluntarily enlisted for 12 years continuous service only. Within this time they may not leave the Army except under the conditions laid down for officers in Article 4.

Beyond this number of voluntarily enlisted men, no military force shall be raised in Germany either in the form of a militia or in any other form.

Article 4.

Officers who have previously belonged to any military formations and who are not included in the units, the maintenance of which is authorised, shall not participate in any military exercise, whether theoretical or practical, and shall not be liable to any military obligation.

Officers kept in the Army shall serve at least till the age of 45 years.

Officers newly commissioned shall sign an engagement to serve on the active list for at least 25 years.

No officer shall leave the army without being pronounced unfit on grounds of health. If by an exception, he is authorised to do so, his place shall not be filled before he has reached the age of 45 years or the period of service of 25 years provided for is ended.

The proportion of officers thus pronounced unfit on grounds of health shall not exceed in any one year 5% of the total effectives of officers provided for in Article 2 of Chapter 1.

Article 5.

No measure of mobilisation shall be provided for.

In no case shall troops, services, or staffs include supplementary cadres.

Article 6.

The following units may have a depot of their own:

A regiment of Infantry,
A regiment of Cavalry,
A regiment of Field Artillery,
A brigade of Horse Artillery,
A battalion of Pioneers.

The effectives of the depots of the German Army are included in the total figure given in Article 1 of Chapter 1.
Article 7.
The administrative services the staff of which are neither officers, non-commissioned officers or men, shall have their effectives reduced for each category, to the fifth part of those provided for in the Budget of 1913. They are not included in the effectives indicated in Articles 1 and 2 of Chapter 1.

Article 8
Public servants such as Gendarmes, Customs House Officials, Forest and Coast Guards, and local and Municipal Police Officials, shall never be assembled to take part in any military training.

Article 9
Societies of retired soldiers, rifle, sporting or touring clubs and, in general, associations whether incorporated or not, whatever may be the age of their members, shall not concern themselves in any military question. They shall, in particular, be forbidden to instruct or exercise, or to allow to be instructed or exercised, their members in the vocation of war or use of weapons of war. The same rule applies to Schools or Universities not provided for in Article 7 of Chapter 1.

These Societies, Associations or Schools shall have no connection with the Minister of War or any other Military Authority. They shall have no military instructors.

Chapter 4.—Supervision

Article 1.
The provisions of all Articles of Chapter 1 and of Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10 of Chapter 2, will be carried out under the supervision of a special Commission, delegated for that purpose by the Allied and Associated Powers. That Commission will work until the provisions of the Articles mentioned above are carried out by Germany within the prescribed period; if, for any reason, anyone of these provisions be not carried out within the allotted period, the delegates of that Commission will immediately bring those facts to the knowledge of their respective Governments, who will give them new instructions.

This Commission shall be established at the seat of the Central German Government, but will be able to send Sub-Commissions or delegates to any other parts of German territory.

Article 2.
The German Government undertakes to facilitate so far as possible the exercise of this supervision, especially from the point of view of military and financial measures, and to communicate to the Commission in its entirety the War Budget.
It undertakes also to communicate to the said Commission all orders given by it for the carrying out of the provisions of the present regulations and to furnish, moreover on questions which may be put to it, all information which may be asked.

Article 3.

The destruction and putting out of action provided for in Chapter 2 will be carried out by orders of the German authorities under the supervision of the delegates of the said Commission.

Chapter 5

Article 1.

(a) All the provisions of this Convention shall be applicable throughout all the territories constituting Germany as she shall be on the signing of the Treaty of Peace or as she may be constituted at any time thereafter.

(b) Germany undertakes to respect all the Clauses of the present Convention and is responsible for their execution towards all the Powers who have signed this Convention with her.

(c) The execution of these Clauses may continue in the future to be supervised by such means and by such organs as a League of Nations may see fit to employ or to create.

Table No. 1

State and Establishment of the Army Corps Staffs of Infantry and Cavalry Divisions

(These tabular statements do not form a fixed establishment to be imposed on Germany, but the figures contained in them (number of units and strengths) represent maximum figures which should not in any case be exceeded.)

1. Army Corps Staffs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Maximum number authorised</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Headquarters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Corps Headquarters</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for Staffs</td>
<td></td>
<td>325</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table No. 1—Continued

**State and Establishment of the Army Corps Staffs of Infantry and Cavalry Divisions—Continued**

#### II. Establishment of an Infantry Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent Unit</th>
<th>Max. No. of such units in a single division</th>
<th>Maximum strengths of each unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Q. of an Infantry Div.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Q. of Divisional Infantry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Q. of Divisional Artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment of Infantry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each Regiment comprises:— 3 battalions of Infantry.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each battalion comprises: 3 companies of infantry and 1 machine gun company.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench Mortar Company</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisional Squadron</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each regiment comprises:— 3 groups of artillery.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each Group comprises:— 3 Batteries.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pioneer Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This Battn. comprises:— 2 companies of pioneers. 1 Pontoon detachment. 1 searchlight section.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Detachment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This detach. comprises:— 1 telephone detachment. 1 listening section. 1 carrier pigeon section.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisional Medical Service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks and Convoys</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for Infantry Division</td>
<td></td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### III. Establishment of a Cavalry Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Max. No. of such units in a single division</th>
<th>Maximum strengths of each unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters of a Cavalry Division</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each Regiment comprises 4 Squadrons.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse Artillery Group (3 Batteries)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for Cavalry Division</td>
<td></td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table No. 2

**Tabular Statement of Armament Establishment for a Maximum of 11 Infantry Divisions, 3 Cavalry Divisions and 4 Army Corps Staffs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Infantry Division</th>
<th>For 11 Infantry Divisions</th>
<th>Cavalry Division</th>
<th>For 3 Cavalry Divisions</th>
<th>4 Army Corps Staffs</th>
<th>Total of columns 2, 4 and 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>12,000 (1)</td>
<td>132,000 (2)</td>
<td>6,000 (3)</td>
<td>18,000 (4)</td>
<td>132,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbinés</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy machine guns</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1,188</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light machine guns</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1,782</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium trench mortars</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light trench mortars</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>297</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77 mm. guns</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 mm. Howitzers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This establishment must be drawn from the increased armaments of the divisional infantry.

### Table No. 3

**Maximum Stocks Authorised**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maximum number of arms authorised</th>
<th>Establishment per unit</th>
<th>Maximum totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>132,000</td>
<td>52,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbinés</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Machine-guns</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>1,782</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Trench Mortars</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Trench Mortars</td>
<td>297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77 mm. Guns</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery (77 mm. Guns)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 mm. Howitzers</td>
<td>800 rounds</td>
<td>105,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 11th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Present

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing.
General Tasker H. Bliss.

Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier,
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.

Secretaries
Sir P. Loraine, Bt.

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretaries
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. Arnavon.
M. de Beurn.

ITALY
H. E. M. Orlando.
H. E. Baron Sonnino.

Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi.
M. Bertele.

JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. M. Matsui.

Also Present

FRANCE
Marshal Foch.
General Weygand.

ITALY
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Lieut. Burden.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.

FRANCE
Captain A. Portier.

ITALY
Lieut. Zanchi.

JAPAN
M. Saburi.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.
(1) M. Clemenceau said that he had received a telegram, dated the 10th March, 1919, from General Nudant, the President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission at Spa, transmitting two verbal communications, which he had received from the German Minister Von Haniel. The first message read as follows:

"If, as stated by the press, the approaching discussions are intended to take the character of preliminaries of Peace and to prescribe, for instance, the Military and Naval terms of Peace, Wako¹ will not be qualified to deal with them. That would have to be done by a Commission presided by Brockdorff-Rantzau. You are requested, therefore, to give sufficient notice in order that the competent Commission may arrange to come to the meeting place."

Mr. Balfour said that apparently all Minister Von Haniel asked for was that due notice should be given in order that the German Government might be able to send a duly accredited Commission. He thought that was a reasonable request.

(It was agreed that when the time came for presenting the preliminaries of Peace to Germany, due notice thereof would be given, as requested.)

(2) M. Clemenceau, continuing, said that the second part of the message received from General Nudant read as follows:

"General Hammerstein² has handed in a written statement giving reasons in support of Germany's demand that no troops should be landed at Dantzig. The statement may be summed up as follows: The passage by rail of Polish troops across a region thickly populated by Poles in order to reach Warsaw would positively lead to risings and troubles in Eastern Prussia, at the rear of the German troops, who are now facing the Bolsheviks between the Sea and the Polish front."

Marshal Foch explained that a resolution had been passed by the Conference on the 25th February last, calling on M. Noulens as President of the Allied Commission in Poland to enquire whether the proposed disembarkation of troops at Dantzig, and their transport by rail to Poland, would be guaranteed by the German Government, without the necessity of securing this guarantee by a previous occupation by Allied Contingents of Dantzig and of the railways.

General Barthelemy and General Carton de Wiart, the French and British representatives on the Allied Polish Commission, had arrived in Paris yesterday. General Wiart had informed him that he had

¹ Abbreviation for Waffenstillstandskommission (German Armistice Commission).
² Military representative on the German Armistice Commission.
³ See BC-89, p. 120.
assisted at a meeting held at Kreutz on the 6th March last, when Mr. Noulens had handed to the Germans the resolution of the Conference above quoted. The German representatives had said that they would refer the matter to their Government; but so far no formal reply had been received. Meanwhile, General Hammerstein at Spa had been putting every possible obstacle in the way to prevent the Allies' request being granted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had spoken to General Wiart the previous evening, and the account he had given of Poland made him believe that the Allies ought to attend to the affairs of Poland as soon as possible. The Poles had no idea of organisation; they had no capacity to direct or govern. The Premier was a pianist; the President, an idealist without any practical ideas. The generals of the army were all acting independently; they had no notion of training the 500,000 troops they were raising or of co-ordinating the various units constituting the army. Taking these facts into consideration, General Wiart held the view that a French General of position should immediately be sent to take command of the whole of the Polish forces. He felt confident the Polish Government would willingly accept some such arrangement, on the understanding that the President of the Republic would continue to be the nominal head of the army with the French General as his Chief of Staff; the latter, however, being granted full powers of action. General Wiart was very insistent that someone should be sent at once, but he thought that the officer selected should be a general, whose name was widely known and respected. He suggested, for instance, someone like General Gouraud.

MARSHAL FOCH said that in his opinion all that General Wiart had said was very exact. He quite agreed with him that the Poles really had no army organisation of any kind, except perhaps at Posen, where German methods were still being followed.

In Galicia the Austrians were in command of the Polish forces, but (and that was typical of the Austrians) they were on bad terms with the civilian population and had only introduced disorder into the army. At Warsaw, there was no organisation of any kind. Consequently, he thoroughly agreed that a French General should forthwith be sent to Poland to put into execution without further delay the scheme for the reorganisation of the Army, which had already been accepted in principle by the Polish Government.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed that the Polish Government should forthwith be asked to accept General Henrys, as Military Adviser and Chief of the Staff to the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Republic, to organise the Polish forces in Poland.)
(3) M. CLEMENCEAUL next called attention to a letter sent by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czecho-Slovakian Republic, dated
Paris, 8th March, 1919, addressed to himself, which
had been circulated.

(For full text of letter, see Annexure “A”.)

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that the letter in question
contained various references to intercepted documents. In his opin-
ion, everything seemed to depend on those documents, and it would
be impossible for the Conference to arrive at any decision without
seeing those papers.

M. PICHEON explained that his reason for bringing the matter at
once to the notice of the Conference had been that Dr. Benes’ letter
contained the following sentence, namely: “The Prague Government
bids me to lay these facts before the Inter-Allied War Council, with
the request that the situation may receive consideration and the
necessary measures be taken immediately.” Furthermore, Dr. Benes
also wrote: “The Czecho-Slovakian Government accordingly begs the
Allied and Associated Governments to address an energetic pro-
test to the Governments of Vienna and Budapest requiring them at
once to cease all hostile action towards the Czecho-Slovak Republic
either of a military nature or from the point of view of propaganda.”
He (M. Pichon) had therefore thought that the Conference would
desire to address some communication to the Governments of Vienna
and Budapest pending the receipt of the relevant documents.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE hoped that no decision would be reached on
that date: that would look like pre-judging the case. In his opinion,
there was another side of the question. The situation was not the
same as that which existed in Germany. In Austria-Hungary there
were various nationalities; all had fought against us, and some had
suddenly become our Allies. These various nationalities were all now
scrambling for territory. He had heard, for instance, that both the
Rumanians and the Czecho-Slovaks were claiming territories which
contained 40 per cent of Magyars. In his opinion, the Allies were
here to do justice to all those peoples. He would circulate a letter
which the Archduke Joseph had addressed from Budapest to H. M.
the King of Great Britain, in which he exposed the tactics of the
Czecho-Slovaks, and pleaded for justice. He thought great care
should be taken to show complete fairness to all parties. The new
map of Europe must not be so drawn as to leave cause for disputa-
tions which would eventually drag Europe into a new war.

M. Pichon said that if Mr. Lloyd George thought that no action
should be taken on that day, he would not insist. He would, how-
ever, have been more ready to accept Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal,
had the complaint made by the Czecho-Slovaks related merely to
the action of the Austrians or Hungarians. But the plots men-
tioned by Dr. Benes had actually been started by Germans, whose names were given, including the well-known Baron Lancken, the notorious German Consul, Baron Gobsatell, as well as Dr. Schwarz, an agent of the Berlin Foreign Office. Dr. Benes affirmed that papers had been seized proving that an agreement had been entered into between the authorities of Berlin, Vienna and Budapest, to cause risings and strikes and civil war in Bohemia. Mr. Lloyd George had proposed that no action should be taken until the promised documents had been received, and he (M. Pichon) agreed. Obviously, it would be necessary to await the receipt of those documents before any decision could be reached.

Mr. Lloyd George drew attention to the claims put forward by Dr. Benes in his document, where he stated: "That the Hungarian Republic be ordered to give every satisfaction to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, the nature and method of such satisfaction being determined by the latter."

Mr. Lansing agreed that Dr. Benes made exactly the same request that Austria had made to Serbia in 1914.

Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said that he thought that the demand made by the Czecho-Slovaks was monstrous; the Italians had not dreamt of putting forward such a request when the Laibach incident had recently been considered.

M. Pichon thought that a reply should immediately be sent to Dr. Benes, informing him that the Conference had taken his letter into consideration, and had decided to take no action pending the receipt of the promised documents.

Mr. Lansing agreed to the general plan of postponing the further consideration of the question. He thought, however, that in addition the Allied Commission in Teschen should be called upon to investigate the matter in situ, in order that an independent view might be obtained, which would be of the greatest value.

He also wished to draw attention to the fact that though apparently the Berlin Government was wholly to blame for the intrigues in question, the Czecho-Slovaks merely asked for action to be taken against the Vienna and Budapest Governments. Furthermore, he thought the Czecho-Slovak Government had displayed considerable laxity; firstly, in permitting a courier to pass between Berlin and Prague and, secondly, in allowing a German official to reside at Prague.

M. Pichon pointed out that the official in Prague was there in accordance with the agreement entered into by the Czecho-Slovaks to supply German-Austria and the Magyars of Hungary with coal and other raw materials.

M. Sonnino enquired whether the intercepted documents referred to in Dr. Benes' letter had already been posted to M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon, in reply, read the last paragraph of Dr. Benes' letter, namely:

"I am at present preparing a detailed report on these events, which will be addressed to all the Allied and Associated Governments. This report will contain all the documents to which I have alluded in the present memorandum. I shall also venture to submit a copy of the said report with the documents in question, to the Supreme War Council, but before this can be done, I am taking immediate steps to inform the Council of the matter, in order that it may be aware of the facts, in the event of the Czecho-Slovak Government being obliged to take energetic measures in consequence of the Austro-Hungarian conspiracy."

Mr. Balfour said that before leaving this subject, he would like to ask Marshal Foch a question. The documents under consideration dealt with two kinds of attack on the Czecho-Slovaks: attack through propaganda and strikes, and a military attack by German-Austrian and Hungarian troops. The Czecho-Slovaks appeared to be exceedingly apprehensive in regard to the threatened military attack. He, himself, would be surprised to learn that either the German-Austrians or the Hungarians were in a condition to make a military attack on the Czecho-Slovaks, and he would be glad to have some explanation on that point from Marshal Foch, either immediately or later on, when the whole question would again come up for discussion.

Marshall Foch replied that as far as his information went, he had been led to believe that the means of attack of Hungary and German-Austria were not very great, as against the Czecho-Slovaks. He would, however, look into the matter further before giving a final verdict, as he knew an attempt was being made to reconstitute two or three Hungarian divisions on the Bohemian front.

Mr. Lansing expressed the view that the continuance of the bureaucracy in Berlin was at the bottom of all the trouble; he referred to the continued employment of the same people and the same personnel that had been made use of by the old régime, together with the same methods of intrigue and espionage. He thought that the Allied and Associated Governments should suggest in some way or another to the German Government that their house must be cleaned, and that the men who had hitherto been responsible for all the trouble must be got rid of.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed, and suggested that a hint to that effect might be dropped by one of the members of the Food Supply Commission, for instance, by Mr. Hoover.

M. Clemenceau expressed the view that Germany only possessed one type of personnel—Scheidemann, Rantzau, and the rest, all
belonged to the old gang, and it would be impossible to get rid of them.

(1) The Governments of the United States of American, Great Britain, France and Italy, shall instruct the Commission at Teschen to proceed forthwith to Prague, in order to investigate the facts of the conspiracy of enemy States reported to the Allied and Associated Powers by the Czecho-Slovak Government, to furnish a report, and to make arrangements [recommendations?] as to the action to be taken.

(2) The communication addressed to [by] the Minister of Foreign Affairs to [of] the Czecho-Slovak Republic to the Prime Minister and Minister of War, Paris, on 8th March, shall be communicated by M. Pichon on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Commission at Teschen.

(3) M. Pichon shall inform M. Benes that further consideration of the question is postponed, pending the receipt of the documents referred to in his report of March 8th.)

(4) M. Clemenceau asked permission to read the following letter, dated the 6th March, 1919, which he had received from M. Pachitch:

> "Mr. President,
>
> At the meeting of the Supreme Allied Council held on February 18th, we had the honour to state that in our opinion we ought to be placed in the same situation and have the same opportunities as the Royal Italian Government for examining and discussing the problem of our frontiers. This statement was inspired by the desire to fix our future common frontiers on a basis of equilibrium and in such manner as to ensure neighbourly relations between the two countries of a loyal and friendly character. There was a further and more general reason for making that statement, namely, that our Government could only assume responsibility for solutions to which it had given its consent after an exchange of suitable explanations.
>
> The degree to which we have been animated by a desire to reach an amicable settlement, such as will leave in the future no trace of misunderstanding between the two Governments, has we think been proved by our offer to submit the settlement of this problem to an arbitration by President Wilson which would be sanctioned by the Peace Conference itself.
>
> In view of the assertion coming from different quarters and diffused by authorised organs of the Press, to the effect that the Council of Ten has accepted the point of view of the Italian Delegation, namely, that the delimitation of these frontiers should be examined and determined simultaneously with that of the frontiers between France and Germany and in accordance with the same procedure, that is to say in the Supreme Allied Council,—we consider it to be our duty to bring to the notice of that exalted Council the essential difference between those two problems, a difference which is derived from the fact that the Rhine frontier is to be fixed as between enemy States,

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*Annexure A, p. 327.
*BC-35, p. 44.
whereas that on the Adriatic must be fixed between two Governments whose peoples have been friends in the past, who desire to remain friends in the future and, what is even more important, between two countries which have fought for the selfsame cause of right and justice and have substantially contributed, in proportion to their strength and their resources, to the common victory.

We are indeed unable to imagine how a problem which touches so nearly the most vital interests of our country could be examined in a practical manner and settled equitably unless we have an opportunity of discussing it with our partners before the Council, nor how the Conference itself can sanction an arrangement which would be lacking in an essential element of validity, namely the participation of one of the interested parties.

For the foregoing reasons we take the liberty of writing to you, Mr. President, and of requesting your Excellency to be so good as to communicate this request to the Supreme Allied Council with a view to our admission to its deliberations whenever the discussion of frontier delimitation between Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes shall be placed on its Agenda.

I beg, etc. (Sgd) P. Pachitch

M. CLEMENCEAUX, continuing, asked the Conference to say what reply should be sent to M. Pachitch.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it had been agreed that the Small Powers would be entitled to be present whenever any question affecting their rights came under discussion; and, in his opinion, it made no difference whether the question to be discussed was one between two Small Powers or between a Great Power and a Small Power. He felt sure that the Italian representative would accept that view of the matter.

M. SONNINO said that at the Meeting of the Conference held on 18th February, 1919, after the Serbian Delegation had put forward their territorial claims, he himself had proposed, and the Conference had agreed to accept the following resolution:

"That the question raised in the statement of MM. Vesnitch, Zolger and Trumbitch, on behalf of the Serbian Delegation on the Serbian territorial interests in the Peace settlement, (excepting only the question in which Italy was directly concerned) shall be referred for examination in the first instance to an expert Committee, and that it shall be the duty of that Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limit, and to make recommendations for a just settlement."

That is to say, it had been decided that all frontier questions in which Italy was directly concerned should be considered by the Conference itself. That did not, however, mean that the representatives of the Serbs obviously had the same right to appear before the conference that other interested States had to appear before Commissions. He agreed, therefore,
that the interested parties would have the right to appear before the Conference to express their views, and to take part in the discussions; but the Small Powers could obviously have no voice in drawing up the final decisions.

Mr. Lloyd George hesitated to accept Baron Sonnino's interpretation of the question. He would draw the attention of the Conference to the decision taken at the meeting held on March 5th last, in regard to the admission of Belgians to the deliberations concerning the preliminaries of peace. It was then agreed:

"That the right of the Belgian Government to be represented on the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers during the discussion of the preliminary Peace Terms should be limited to the occasions coming within the regulations for the Peace Conference when terms for which Belgium was specially interested were under discussion."

In his opinion that decision could not be interpreted to mean that the Small Powers should retire when a decision had to be taken.

M. Sonnino held that in the case of a Commission on Frontiers the Small Powers were heard, but they took no part in the final decision. In his opinion, the Conference when dealing with territorial questions, should adopt the procedure followed by territorial Commissions.

Mr. Lansing thought that in justice when the decision came to be taken, either both parties should be present, or both parties should retire.

M. Clemenceau pointed out that the final decision would rest with the Conference itself.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed, but enquired whether both parties should be present during the discussion which led up to the final decision. That was the question under consideration. In other words, should one of the two interested parties be turned out, whilst the other party remained to take part in the final discussion.

M. Orlando said that according to his understanding the question should be regarded in the following light. In the first place, he could not agree that the Resolution quoted by Mr. Lloyd George was applicable except on the assumption that the question under consideration referred to a single State, called Serbia, and to a problem affecting that State. Had that really been the case, he would not have ventured to dispute the fact that questions concerning Italy and Serbia should be discussed as between equals and strictly in accordance with the procedure laid down for all other States with particular interests, taking part in the Conference.

But the question now under discussion did not concern the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Serbia proper. The Conference was asked to consider a question relating to the frontiers which
separated Italy from an enemy State, formerly known as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. If, in consequence of the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, new States had been formed, some of which desired to join Serbia, that meant that the Conference had no longer to deal with the Kingdom of Serbia, but with a new State consisting partly of the old Kingdom of Serbia and partly of other territories which belonged to an enemy State. The correctness of this point of view was evidence[d] by the fact that the Delegation had sent the communication under consideration not in the name of the Kingdom of Serbia but in the name of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and one of those members of that Delegation had actually been a Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The whole question, therefore, turned on whether this new State should or should not be recognised. Obviously, he (M. Orlando) could not prevent the friendly and allied Powers from recognising it, even though agreements to the contrary had been entered into. Certainly, the recognition of the new State would not constitute an amiable act towards Italy. But, however that might be, his Allied and Associated colleagues would not hesitate to admit that Italy was entitled to a free choice in the matter; and so far Italy had not recognised the new State. He, personally, did not recognise the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Furthermore, he regarded the Croats and the Slovenes, that is to say the people whose frontiers were in question, as his enemies. As far as Italy was concerned, these people had merely taken the place of the Austrians; and he would ask his colleagues to consider whether the representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Empire could have done anything worse to Italy, had they been present instead of the Croats and the Slovenes. Consequently, as far as he was concerned, the question presented itself as follows. No appeal could be made to a resolution which did not apply to the case under consideration. The question for the Conference to decide was whether matters relating to frontiers between Enemy and Allied countries should be discussed in the presence of the Enemy. He (M. Orlando) could never accept such a proposition. Italy’s allies and associates could naturally do as they pleased, but in regard to matters in which he was concerned, he would never agree to discuss them under those conditions, any more than France would ever agree to admit Germany to take part in a discussion on the settlement of her frontiers.

M. Sonnino, with whom he found himself in complete agreement, had stated that instead of imposing our conditions on the Croats and on the Slovenes, as would be done in regard to other enemy countries, he would agree to their being given a hearing. In agreeing to that, he had made a great concession and it showed how great was their desire to be conciliatory. But beyond that point he could
never agree to go and he must absolutely refuse to discuss and to dispute with his enemies.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he could well understand Mr. Orlando taking the line he had in regard to the Croats and Slovenes, as obviously they were not in the same position as the Belgians and the Serbs. But he could hardly take that line in regard to Mr. Pachitch. It would hardly be consistent for Mr. Orlando to say that he did not object to Mr. Pachitch or to the other Serbian delegates, but that he declined to discuss any territorial question if representatives of the Croats or of the Slovenes were admitted on equal terms. Therefore he would make the following suggestion. He thought it would be a very strong order for the Conference to rule the Serbs out when questions relating to their frontiers came under discussion, especially when it was remembered that the King of Serbia was now the King of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Serbs by the great gallantry displayed by their Armies had helped to conquer the countries in question. In his opinion, the Serbs should be granted exactly the same rights as had been accorded to the Belgians to attend when questions affecting their territorial interests were being discussed by the Conference. The Croat and Slovene countries did not constitute separate and independent bodies; they were going to be attached to and to form a part of Serbia. He begged Mr. Orlando, therefore, to consider whether the representatives of the Kingdom of Serbia proper, whose armies had fought on the side of the Allies, should not be present when questions concerning them came under discussion. He thought the Conference could hardly refuse the request of a country who had done its duty to the Allies and manfully supported the common cause during the whole period of the war.

M. Clemenceau thought that Mr. Orlando's proposal, together with Mr. Lloyd George's amendment, would meet with general approval; that is to say, the representatives of Serbia, an Allied country, should be admitted to the Conference to take part in the discussions whenever questions affecting their frontiers came under considerations.

Baron Sonnino pointed out that M. Pachitch would come to the Conference, not as a representative of Serbia, but as a representative of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; and he would presumably be assisted by M. Trumbitch and by Dr. Zolger, the latter a former Austro-Hungarian Minister.

M. Prochon agreed that M. Pachitch had written his letter on behalf of the Delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, that is, as the representative of a State which had not yet been recognised by all the Allies. Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, however, was that the representatives of Serbia alone should be invited to attend in connection with all questions relating to their own frontiers.
Consequently, he thought a reply should be sent to M. Pachitch, informing him that the Conference would be willing to admit the representatives of Serbia, but it could not receive the representatives of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes whose constitution had not yet been recognised by all the Allies.

M. Orlando said that the question under consideration might lead to very grave results for Italy. On the other hand, the question was not a very urgent one, since M. Pachitch’s letter had only been written on the 6th March last. He begged the Conference, therefore, with the greatest insistence to adjourn the further consideration of the question for a few days, in order to allow him to consult all his colleagues. He was particularly anxious that nothing should be done to prejudge the final solution of the question.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed that the Conference would be bound to meet a request of that kind.

Mr. Lansing said that before the discussion was closed he wished to state the views of his Government, whose views coincided with those expressed by Mr. Lloyd George. The question under consideration concerned Serbia, the same country which the Allies had always known: and the mere fact that the old Serbia had acquired or annexed other territories did not affect the case.

Baron Sonnino, interposing, said that the case under consideration did not merely refer to the acquisition or annexation of territories by Serbia.

Mr. Lansing thought that it did, just in the same way as England had acquired or annexed Scotland and called herself Great Britain. It was all a mere technicality, and in his opinion, it was important to uphold the decisions already reached. Serbian interests were at stake. When questions affecting Roumania and Serbia had been considered by the Conference, both parties affected had been heard. Consequently, he favoured the conclusion that either both parties should be included or both parties should be excluded. In any case one of the contending parties should not be allowed to sit as a judge of its own case.

(It was agreed to adjourn the further consideration of the question to a later meeting).

(5) M. Clemenceau said that the Territorial Co-ordination Committee had enquired whether the question relating to the constitution of a Turkish State fell within its jurisdiction, since no Commission had yet been appointed to deal with that question.

Mr. Lloyd George said that this enquiry raised very important questions of principle, for the solution of which instructions would have to be given by the Conference. So far, not even the crudest indications had been given. Furthermore, the mandatory question
was involved and would have to be discussed by the Conference. He proposed, therefore, that further discussion should be adjourned until President Wilson’s return.

(It was agreed that the question of the constitution of a Turkish State should be adjourned to a later date.)

(6) **M. Clemenceau** said that the Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Greece had enquired whether the delimitation of Albania and Jugo-Slavia, with the exclusion of the Adriatic frontiers, fell within its competence.

Mr. Balfour remarked that this raised a difficult question, since it had been agreed to exclude all frontier questions in which Italian interests were concerned. Furthermore, in view of the situation in Albania, he thought that the frontier between Albania and Jugo-Slavia would vitally concern Italy, and on that account should be excluded.

(It was agreed that the Committee for the study of Territorial Questions relating to Greece should not deal with the frontiers of Albania and Jugo-Slavia.)

(7) **M. Clemenceau** reported that a group of ladies, representing the Suffrage Association of the Allied countries, who had previously been received by President Wilson, had called on him with a request to take part in the work of the Conference. He had suggested, in reply, that a chosen number of their representatives should ask to be heard by the various Commissions of the Conference dealing with questions in which they were interested, such as, the International Labour Legislation Commission, and the League of Nations Commission.

M. Pichon pointed out that these ladies did not only ask to be heard, but they also wished to form part of the Commissions in question.

M. Sonnino said that he had also seen some of the women representatives, who had submitted the same proposals to him. They were anxious to be represented on the League of Nations, as it was possible that questions concerning white slave traffic might be considered.

(It was agreed that the Women’s Suffrage Association of the Allied Countries should be invited to send a deputation to state their case to the Commission on Labour Legislation and to the League of Nations Commission.)

(The meeting then adjourned until Wednesday, March 12th, 1919.)

Annexure "A"

PARIS, 8th March, 1919.

From:—The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

To:—The Prime Minister and Minister for War, Paris.

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT: Certain events which have taken place during the last few days at Prague and regarding which I have to-day received official information, compel me to address this memorandum to you with the request that you will kindly communicate the contents either to Marshal Foch or to the Supreme War Council. Our position is serious. The decision of the Conference with regard to Teschen has been a severe blow to us. The Germans are taking advantage of it, believing that they can treat us just as they like and that we are no longer protected. I therefore address myself to you and respectfully request your swift and energetic intervention.

On the 1st March, 1919, the Czecho-Slovak Authorities discovered a conspiracy of espionage and revolutionary propaganda at Prague against the Czecho-Slovak Republic organized by agents from Berlin and Vienna with the connivance of the authorities at Budapest. This plot, as may be seen from the intercepted documents, was prepared with the object of keeping the Governments of Berlin and Vienna informed as to the military situation of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and of fomenting disturbances either in the German regions, or in the mixed Czech and German districts, or in the purely Czech territory where they hoped to stir up a Bolshevik movement. The plot was organised by agents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, by Baron Gobsattel (late Consul of the German Empire) and Dr. Schwartz. The Czech Authorities had allowed them to remain in Prague at their own request because they were occupied in charitable work for German nationals. Under cloak of this pretext they carried on their hateful campaign, and, as proved by documents seized by the Czecho-Slovak Government, they were sent from Berlin by the present Ministry of Foreign Affairs and worked under the directions of the notorious Baron Lancken, who even paid a clandestine visit to Prague on one occasion in this connection.

The plot was discovered by the Czecho-Slovak authorities, who arrested a courier sent by the Berlin Government on Messrs. Gobsattel and Schwartz’s premises with revolutionary propaganda, leaflets, ethnographical maps, and other documents addressed either to the two gentlemen in question, to the authorities in Vienna, or to the authorities in Budapest.

In agreement with the authorities in Vienna these gentlemen organised a press campaign, especially in the German papers, describing the situation of the Czecho-Slovaks as disastrous; they exploited the decision of the Peace Conference on the Teschen ques-
tion against the Prague Government, and tried to stir up either Nationalist or Bolshevist disturbances. At the same time, the Czecho-Slovak authorities were able to seize a certain number of documents emanating from the War Ministry in Vienna.

From these documents they were able to ascertain that, in connection with this campaign of espionage and propaganda, the Vienna Government was preparing military measures against the Czecho-Slovak Republic. It was organising certain regiments and issuing written orders, announcing that these regiments were intended to undertake operations in certain districts of Bohemia and Moravia, especially those of Znaim in Moravia and Trautenau and Leitmeritz in Bohemia.

It tried simultaneously to bring about a general strike in the Czecho-Slovak Republic (to begin on 4th. March), hoping to stir up serious Bolshevist disturbances. The regiments referred to above even received maps and detailed plans of operations, mentioning the names of villages and localities on which they were to march. At the same time arms, ammunition and, above all, machine guns were issued to them. The Czecho-Slovak authorities ascertained with absolute certainty that all these orders and operations were prepared by agents of the War Ministry in Vienna and that the exceedingly widespread system of espionage was organised on behalf of the Vienna authorities and with this special object, on the territory of the Czecho-Slovak Republic; the whole scheme was prepared in concert with similar attempts made by Magyars in Slovakia.

The Prague Government begs me to lay these facts before the Interallied War Council, with the request that the situation may receive consideration and the necessary measures be taken immediately.

As a matter of fact, the Czecho-Slovak Republic—as one of the Allied countries which, notwithstanding the danger that menaced it, always worked loyally with the Allies—cannot be left defenceless in the difficult situation in which it is placed. It is organising itself, but it has a considerable army in Russia which it requires for its own defence, but which cannot return. The whole world knows that this army defended the interests of the Allies with the greatest devotion; it is now far from its own country and cannot defend it directly.

Furthermore, we are threatened by another great difficulty; notwithstanding the efforts of the Allies, the Czecho-Slovak Republic cannot obtain sufficient food supplies. From this point of view, it is placed in a much more difficult position than that of our enemies to-day; German-Austria and the Magyars exploit this situation and make use of it in their subversive dealings and for their pan-German ends.
We believe, therefore, that the Allied and Associated Governments cannot allow this action on the part of the Governments of Vienna, Budapest and Berlin to pass without rejoinder, since it is not only dangerous for us, but also directed against the Allies.

The Czecho-Slovak Government accordingly begs the Allied and Associated Governments immediately to address an energetic protest to the Governments of Vienna and Budapest, requiring them at once to cease all hostile action towards the Czecho-Slovak Republic either of a military nature or from the point of view of propaganda.

This is the first measure of imperative necessity which should be taken with the least possible delay. In addition to this, the Czecho-Slovak Government requests the Allied and Associated Governments to impose the following measures upon the Vienna and Budapest Governments viz:—

1. That the Austro-German Republic be compelled to give entire satisfaction to the Czecho-Slovak Government.

2. That, after most careful enquiry, exemplary punishment be meted out to all the guilty parties, the nature and extent of such punishment being communicated to the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

3. That the Government of the Austro-German Republic be ordered to repay to the Czecho-Slovak Republic the total amount of all extraordinary expenditure, whether of a military nature or undertaken in the interests of public safety incurred to prevent the threatened invasion and revolution.

4. That all military detachments intended to invade the territory of the Czecho-Slovak Republic be immediately disarmed and disbanded under Inter-allied control.

5. Whereas no reliance can be placed in any contingent declaration by the Government of the Austro-German Republic that it will attempt no further plots against the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and whereas this would in no wise secure the Czecho-Slovak Republic against any other hostile action, the permanent armed forces of the Austro-German Republic must be so diminished as to be merely sufficient to assure the service of public safety.

6. That all weapons rendered superfluous by the reduction of armed Austro-German forces be restored to the Interallied Commission (including Czecho-Slovak delegates) which shall be entrusted with the control of all munition factories and arsenals on Austro-German territory.

7. That all Austro-German railways be placed under the control of the Interallied Commission, including Czecho-Slovak delegates.

8. In view of the imminent danger that the Government of the Austro-German Republic will continue to plot against Czecho-Slovak independence, the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic reserves the right to take provisionally all measures necessary to prevent any Austro-German action hostile to the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

9. That the Government of the Hungarian Republic be ordered to open a most strict enquiry, under Interallied control, as to the share taken by the Magyar Army in the projected invasion and as to the delivery of arms and ammunition for this purpose.
10. That, after careful enquiry, exemplary punishment be meted out to the guilty parties within the territory of the Hungarian Republic, and that the result of this enquiry, together with the nature and extent of such punishment, be communicated to the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

11. That the Hungarian Republic be ordered to give every satisfaction to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, the nature and method of such satisfaction being determined by the latter.

The Governments of Vienna and Budapest could easily be compelled to acquiesce in the measures required, because the question of food places them entirely at the mercy of the Allies. In any case, I venture to repeat my request and to beg the Allies to deal with this question and to protect us from our common enemies.

In closing I would just venture to draw the attention of the Allied and Associated Governments to the conclusions which may be drawn from all these events.

1. The so-called Socialist Government at Berlin is pursuing the same policy towards us as the old Imperial Government, making use of the same agents and the same methods as the former militarist Government of William II.

2. The Republic Governments at Vienna and Budapest are employing the same methods against us as the old Austro-Hungarian Government and whilst ostensibly desiring to submit themselves to the decision of the Peace Conference, are attempting to stab us in the back.

3. Up to the present we have refrained from taking any military action or reprisals against our Austrian and Magyar enemies.

I must add that the Allied and Associated Governments have requested us to supply German Austria and the Magyars of Hungary with coal and other raw materials, which we have loyally done, and in the meantime our enemies were planning a treacherous attack on us. Conditions with us are such that the population is losing all patience, and if measures of some kind are not taken to give us at any rate moral support, we shall not be able to guarantee order in our country.

Monsieur le Président, I am at present preparing a detailed report on these events, which will be addressed to all the Allied and Associated Governments. This report will contain all the documents to which I have alluded in the present Memorandum. I shall also venture to submit a copy of the said report, with the documents in question, to the Supreme War Council, but before this can be done I am taking immediate steps to inform the Council of the matter, in order that it may be aware of the facts, in the event of the Czecho-Slovak Government being obliged to take energetic measures in consequence of the Austro-Hungarian conspiracy.

I have [etc.]

Edward Beneš
Minutes of a Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, March 12th, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. R. Lansing
* Hon. E. M. House
Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison
Mr. G. Auchincloss

BRITISH EMPIRE
* The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour,
O. M., M. P.

Secretaries
Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Bearn

ITALY
* H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Somnino

Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

JAPAN
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

* Present for items 1 and 2 only.

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
General Tasker H. Bliss
Admiral W. S. Benson
Major General M. N. Patrick
Colonel Garrett

BRITISH EMPIRE
General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B.,
D. S. O.
Major General Hon. C. J. Sackville West, C. M. G.
Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves,
D. S. O.

FRANCE
M. Leygues
Marshal Foch
Admiral de Bon.
General Belin
General Weygand
General Duval
Comdt. Lacome
Comdt. de V. Levavasseur
Lieut. de V. Odend’hal.

ITALY
General Cavallero

JAPAN
Captain Nomura
Captain Yamamoto

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . Lieut. Burden
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . . . . . Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Captain A. Portier
ITALY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lieut. Zanchi
JAPAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. Saburi

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.
1. Mr. Lloyd George said that a telegram had been received from the British Military Representative at Vienna to the effect that a bill would be introduced by the Austrian Government, probably during the course of the present week, providing for the abdication and banishment of the Emperor Charles. The Austrian Government, wishing to prevent any personal annoyance or danger to the Imperial Family, had apparently requested the British Mission in Vienna to grant facilities for the Emperor’s journey out of Austria. The Swiss Government had expressed its readiness to allow without condition the passage of the Austrian Imperial Family through Switzerland: but it refused to grant permission to the Emperor to reside in Switzerland, unless a guarantee were given by the Allied Governments that no difficulties would hereafter be raised in regard to his extradition.

He did not know what views the Conference held on the question; but he, (Mr. Lloyd George) was inclined to think that the Swiss Government might be given a guarantee that the Allies would not desire to ask for the Emperor’s extradition. In his opinion, the Emperor was not [to] be held responsible for the war. The whole responsibility rested with his uncle, Francis Joseph. Furthermore, when the Emperor Charles had ascended the throne, he had done his best, though rather clumsily, to bring about peace. In view of the present situation in Austria, he would suggest that the Swiss Government be given the desired guarantee so as to avoid the occurrence of an awful tragedy.

M. Sonnino said that he saw no objection to the thing itself. But, in his opinion, somewhat complicated issues might be raised if an attempt were made at this stage to make a distinction between this particular Monarch and the other Sovereigns who might, or might not, eventually be held responsible for the war.

M. Clemenceau suggested that the question might be referred to the existing Committee dealing with the responsibilities for the war.

Mr. Lansing explained that the Committee on Breaches of the Laws of War, of which he was President, had not attempted to draw up a list of criminals, because the Sub-Committee, dealing with the responsibility for the war, had decided that no one could be tried under that particular head. That is to say, the Sub-Committee had come to the conclusion that the accused could not be brought before any legal tribunal, since they were only guilty of a moral responsibility.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that the Committee on Breaches of the Laws of War could be asked to report whether the Emperor Charles could, in any way, be held responsible for the war. His information
went to show that the Emperor was now being treated very badly in Austria, where the situation was daily more nearly approaching that of Russia. The Empress also had been treated somewhat brutally; and since the Emperor could in no way be held responsible for the war, it would be a pity if he were murdered. For that same reason, the Austrian Government was rather anxious to get him away.

Mr. BALFOUR suggested, as carrying out Mr. Lloyd George's idea, that a telegram should at once be despatched to Vienna, in the name of the Conference, stating that, as far as the Allied and Associated Governments were concerned, the Emperor should forthwith be permitted to go to Switzerland. At the same time, the Great Powers would ask the Swiss Government to receive the Emperor pending a final decision being reached on the question to be referred to the Committee on Responsibility. In that way, the Emperor would be permitted to remain in Switzerland for a few days, pending the final decision. He did not know whether the Swiss Government would accept a provisional guarantee of that nature, but he thought the proposal would meet M. Sonnino's views.

To sum up: a telegram would at once be sent to the British Military Representative at Vienna, in the name of the Great Powers, asking him to facilitate the Emperor's journey to Switzerland. At the same time, the Swiss Government would be asked to give the Emperor a temporary hospitality in Switzerland.

Mr. HOUSE questioned whether that proposal would reassure the Swiss Government. He thought that the Swiss Government would require a definite guarantee that no difficulty would be raised about extradition.

Mr. LANSING thought that the great difficulty lay in the fact that the Committee on Responsibilities had reached the conclusion that the late rulers of the various enemy States could not be held responsible for making the war; but they could be held liable for the violations of the customs and laws of war, which had taken place through their failure to prevent or to put a stop to such occurrences. The Committee held that the Emperor of Austria could also be made responsible for the latter acts.

M. SONNINO agreed that, owing to the danger of the situation in Austria, the Emperor should, provisionally, be put in a place of safety.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether the British Government really had any positive evidence that the Swiss Government would refuse to receive the Emperor Charles without a guarantee that no difficulties of any kind would be raised about extradition. He, himself, had been informed by M. Dutasta, who had only recently visited
Berne, that the Swiss Government would be ready to receive the Emperor without any guarantee.

Mr. House enquired whether the Conference could not there and then frankly state that the Emperor’s extradition would not be demanded.

M. Sonnino agreed. He thought that perhaps a guarantee could be given that for two or three months the Great Powers would not ask for anything in regard to the extradition of the Emperor Charles.

M. Clemenceau thought that the Conference could well take that on itself.

Mr. Balfour agreed and said he felt quite confident that the Great Powers were not going to prosecute the Emperor Charles. He certainly could not be tried before a legal tribunal under any existing code: though an attempt might be made to set up some international court for the purpose.

(It was agreed to authorise Mr. Balfour on behalf of the five Great Powers:—

(1) To telegraph to the British Mission in Vienna to grant facilities for the Austrian Imperial Family’s journey out of Austria into Switzerland, and

(2) To ask the Swiss Government to give hospitality to the Imperial Family; a guarantee being given, if so required by the Swiss Government, that no difficulties would be raised.)

2. M. Clemenceau called on General Duval to read the conditions to be imposed on the German Government in regard to Military and Maritime Aeronautics. He understood that reservations had been made by some of the Allied Officer Air Delegates in regard to certain of the conditions of the draft Convention, and he asked General Duval to call the attention of the Conference to the controversial clauses in question, when read.

General Duval replied that the document had been unanimously accepted without reservations by any of the members of the Commission.

(General Duval then read the aerial peace terms, Article by Article, for text of which, see Annexure “A”.)

Mr. Balfour pointed out that apparently at the present time the most effective method of maintaining order was by Aeroplanes. He had read in the newspapers that the Spartacists’ nests in Berlin had been attacked and put out of action by Aeroplanes.

General Duval agreed that order could obviously be maintained by using Aeroplanes; but he had no information in regard to their use in Berlin.

Mr. Balfour said that he did not wish to press the matter further.
Mr. Lansing expressed the view that the entire suppression of dirigible balloons was, in his opinion, a little too stringent. Were not certain classes of dirigibles used for commercial purposes?

General Duval replied that the clause applied only to military material, and he drew attention both to Article 9 and to the title of the Convention wherein it was clearly laid down that the conditions to be imposed on Germany related to Military and Maritime Aeronautics only.

Mr. Lansing said he was prepared to accept the clause.

M. Clemenceau suggested that the words:—"from date of signature of present Convention" should be added. The clause would therefore read:—"The whole personnel ... within one month from date of signature of the present Convention (but the effectives provided for in the Military and Aerial statute must not be exceeded)."

(This was agreed to.)

(Article 1 was approved, Clause (2) (c) being amended, as above stated, by the addition of the words: "from date of signature of present Convention.")

Mr. Lansing enquired whether this Article related only to Military Aviation Grounds, and if so how could a distinction be made between Military Aviation grounds and commercial Aviation grounds?

General Duval replied that the whole question of the organisation of a commercial Air Service had been reserved for future study, and he invited attention to Article IX, which read as follows:—

"The rules relative to the organisation of a commercial Air Service in Germany after the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace, and to its being granted international circulation shall be determined by the said Treaty of Peace."

Mr. Lansing enquired why the Article in question had been inserted before a decision had been reached on the question of the distinction to be drawn between Military and Commercial aeronautics.

Mr. Balfour said that Mr. Lansing's point was well worth considering, namely, the distinction to be drawn between Military and Commercial Aeronautics. Reference had been made to Article IX which merely deferred a decision on the really difficult question connected with flying, that is, the distinction to be drawn between Military and Commercial machines, until after the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace. In his opinion, it would be most difficult to draw a distinction between Military and Commercial Aeroplanes.
Article I forbade all Military aviation, though provisions were made in the Convention for the organisation of a future Commercial Air Service. Under those conditions, the Revolutionists of the future might have commercial Aeroplanes which they could convert into fighting machines, whilst the police would, by the terms of the Convention, find themselves without Aeroplanes of any kind with which to face the danger. Article IX merely evaded the question by referring the decision to a body not yet appointed.

Mr. House explained that it was not the fault of the Official Air Delegates that the question had been so dealt with, because in accordance with the terms of reference, the delegates had merely been asked to suggest the conditions to be imposed on the German Government in regard to Military and Maritime Aeronautics. The commercial question really did not form part of their terms of reference.

Mr. Balfour agreed and suggested, as a practical way out of the difficulty, that an Inter-Allied Aerial Commission should at once be appointed to consider and to submit recommendations in regard to the distinction to be drawn between Commercial and Military Aeronautics: all conditions contained in the draft Aerial Convention, which required a distinction to be drawn up between Military and Commercial Aeronautics, being thus reserved for further consideration. He would therefore ask the Conference to accept the following Resolution:—

"It is agreed:—
That a Commission consisting of two representatives each (with technical delegates as required) of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, with five representatives elected by the other States at the Conference be appointed to consider:—
(a) Aerial matters arising out of the work of the Preliminary Peace Conference or referred by the Commissions set up by the Conference.
(b) A Convention in regard to International Aerial Navigation in time of peace."

Mr. House pointed out that a Commission had already been appointed to consider Commercial Aerial Questions.

Marshal Foch said the Allies were now engaged in carrying out the complete disarmament of Germany and the armaments with which she had fought the Allies, both in the Air and on the Earth, were being taken away from her. Why should any exception be made in the case of the aerial armaments of Germany? Why should the Allies not proceed forthwith to take away all the military aircraft? He thought the Allies were fully entitled to do that. On the other hand, he quite agreed with Mr. Balfour that a special Inter-Allied Commission should be appointed to study the question of Commercial Aeronautics; but that should be kept as a separate
problem. He was firmly of the opinion that, in the interests of the Allies, it was urgent forthwith to commence the disarmament of the German Military Air Service. Eventually it would be possible to decide where the line could be drawn between Military and Commercial Aeronautics; but no delay should occur in depriving the Germans of their military aircraft which had wrought such evil work throughout the war in connection with the unjustifiable bombing of open towns. The Conference should, therefore, adopt the principle of the Aerial disarmament of Germany.

Mr. Lansing expressed his complete agreement with Marshal Foch's point of view. But, as long as aeroplanes existed which could be used for commercial purposes, they could always be converted into military machines. The problem presented the same difficulties as that connected with horses, which could be used to draw guns or to draw ploughs. Everything depended on the use made of the article in question. Consequently, he, personally, was far more impressed with the necessity for the removal of the guns and armaments in the aeroplanes, in preference to depriving the Germans of the use of flying machines which would be of value to them for purely commercial purposes.

General Groves held that it was impossible to get away from the point of view that all aircraft was inherently an implement of war. Leaving that question out of consideration, however, the Inter-Allied Aerial Commission had been obliged to decide on the purely military aspect of the case. In regard to the future, however, it was evident that all machines, commercial or otherwise, would be capable of being converted very quickly into machines suitable for military purposes. It would, therefore, be very difficult to prevent Germany setting up a large potential military air service under the guise of commercial enterprise. He thought that question, which was one of great difficulty and complexity, should, as proposed, be referred to a special Inter-Allied Commission.

Marshal Foch agreed that, as suggested by Mr. Lansing, the armament of aeroplanes could be removed; but the Convention drawn up the Officer Air Delegates aimed at the complete disarmament of Germany. Consequently it forbade the organisation of a military Flying Corps, maintained as a military body, capable of acting militarily in the manner which had during the war rendered possible the perpetration of those ghastly bombing raids, so universally condemned.

General Duval asked permission to explain the circumstances which had guided the Officer Air Delegates in drawing up the Convention under consideration. The terms of reference included the complete disarmament of the German Military Air Service; and commercial aviation had in no way been referred to. As a matter
of fact at the present moment no commercial air service existed in
Germany, and it could only be created by the conversion of military
machines. Consequently, by imposing the surrender of all military
machines and by prescribing the prohibition of the construction of
new machines, the draft Convention solved for the present and until
the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace, the question of the
maintenance both of a commercial and of a military air service in
Germany.

Should the Conference now wish to reach a decision on the ques-
tion of commercial aeronautics, that could still be done; but he felt
compelled to point out that the question was a very big one, and
could not be settled within a reasonable time. Mr. Balfour's reso-
lution proposed that a convention in regard to International Aerial
Navigation in time of peace should be drawn up. That raised a
very complex question, so great that no one country had ever yet
been able to draw up even its own national convention. Should the
Conference, therefore, decide to draw up a convention in connection
with International Aerial Navigation, he despaired of ever reaching
a conclusion before the signing of the Peace. For that very reason
Articles IV and IX had been introduced in the convention as the
only practical means of arriving at an immediate settlement.

M. Pichon said in support of General Duval's statement that in
the past many attempts had been made to draw up a Convention
in regard to international Aerial Navigation, but without result.
He thought eventually a decision might be reached, but it would
be a very lengthy work requiring careful consideration and if it
were to form part of the Air Terms of Peace, it would indefinitely
postpone the signing of the necessary Convention.

Mr. Balfour thought that some misunderstanding appeared to
exist. The previous speakers appeared to labour under the im-
pression that nothing was to be done in regard to the German Mil-
tary Air Service until the question of commercial Aerial navigation
had been settled. In his opinion, the Allied Aerial Commission
had been quite right in framing the conditions of the Convention
under discussion. But in raising this question, Mr. Lansing and
he had meant to point out that the disarmament of Germany would
not be permanently effected as long as the question of Commercial
Aeronautics was left unsettled.

Mr. Lansing suggested that as a Commission to study Aerial
navigation already existed, this question should be referred to it
for consideration, with special reference to the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing between Military and Commercial Aviation; the Com-
misson being required to submit their report with as little delay
as possible.
M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to set forth the situation as it existed at the present moment. As Marshal Foch and General Duval had correctly explained, the Inter-Allied Aerial Commission had been instructed to study the disarmament of Germany and the Convention under consideration gave the formal means of accomplishing that desideratum. The discussion of the Articles from that point of view should therefore be proceeded with.

On the other hand, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing had stated that it would be very difficult to carry out a proper disarmament of Germany unless a definite agreement were reached in regard to the distinction to be drawn between Military and Commercial aviation. In his opinion, that question could most satisfactorily be referred to the existing Commissions. No doubt, it would be impossible to attain perfection since the Germans could obviously always be able to evade whatever conditions might be laid down. Consequently it would be sufficient for the present to consider only the military aspect of the case and to demand the immediate surrender of all military machines.

Finally, in his opinion, Article 9 could be amended so as to discriminate between Commercial and Military machines, the question being referred to a Commission whose function would be to suggest what amendments were necessary in order to give effect to the views expressed.

(It was agreed that the question of making a distinction between Commercial and Military Aviation would be considered in connection with Clause IX.

Article II was approved, subject to the last sentence of the Article being amended to read:—"this is to be carried out within one month after the signature of the present convention."

GENERAL DUVAl explained that Article III had been included at the request of the British representatives in order to allow for the establishment of an aerial line of postal communication with Bohemia, and also to maintain communications with Poland by the air route across Germany.

Mr. Balfour said that the only comment he had to make in regard to Article III was that nothing had yet been settled as to how long the Allied and Associated troops would occupy German territory. He thought that the Article might provisionally be accepted, pending the drafting of the terms of peace, when the question of the period of time applicable to the conditions imposed in Article III might be reconsidered.

(It was agreed, until the final terms of peace had been settled, to reserve the decision of the period of time during which Germany should allow to all Allied aircraft free passage through the air, free transit and right to land on her territory.)
Mr. Balfour expressed the view that in accordance with the conditions of Article IV, the German motor industry would be absolutely stopped until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace. The Germans would not be able to build even the most innocent motors for lorries.

General Duval suggested that the words “aeroplane motors” could be inserted instead of the word “motors”.

Mr. Balfour continuing, enquired whether experts could be sure of distinguishing between a combustion motor engine suitable for an aeroplane or a dirigible, and one suitable for a motor lorry.

General Duval explained that aeroplane motors were made of very great power, 120 to 180 H.P. No lorries would use motors of so great a power.

(Mr. Balfour withdrew his objection.)

Mr. Lansing asked permission to raise a question in connection with the statement that the Article would be made operative “until the signature of the definite treaty of peace”. He assumed that the Article in question would be inserted in the definite treaty of peace. Consequently, he failed to see what was the use of the Article.

General Duval explained that, in drafting this Article the Officer Air Delegates had in mind that the Convention would be presented to the Germans for acceptance without delay. Subsequently, there would be a final act embodying all the terms of peace. He thought that the Article could, if necessary, be re-drafted to make this clear.

M. Sonnino understood that the Article was intended to mean that as long as it was impossible to define a military as distinguished from a commercial flying machine, the manufacture of all parts of aeroplanes, hydroplanes, water gliders, dirigibles and motors should be forbidden. In the Peace Treaty all those questions would be settled, and accordingly the conditions contained in the Convention would cease to operate. But, as a safeguard, until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace, all manufacture should be suspended.

Mr. Lansing quite agreed with M. Sonnino that the Article in question should be included in the Treaty of Peace. That being the case, he could not understand why provision should be made for a duration of time which did not exist. The whole of the Aerial Convention would in fact be included in a Treaty, which would go to the Senate of the United States of America for approval. That Preliminary treaty would, however, cover questions of boundaries, indemnity, and practically everything that would go into the definite Treaty of Peace, though not necessarily in such minute detail.

Marshal Foch thought that Mr. Lansing’s objection might be met by substituting for the words “until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace”, the words “until the signature of the Convention
which will fix the statutes of commercial and aerial navigation in Germany”.

Mr. Lansing agreed that that would be a rational way of settling the affair. Personally, he could not see what constituted the difference between a Preliminary and a Final Peace in regard to aviation. Consequently, he failed to understand why commercial aviation should not be re-established in Germany as soon as the Preliminary Terms of Peace were signed.

Mr. Balfour thought there would be some danger in first signing a Preliminary Peace, then a final definite Treaty of Peace, and lastly, in addition, to have subsequently a Convention about aerial matters. Germany might disapprove the Convention [or] refuse to sign it: it would then be very difficult to go to war about a Convention after the Preliminary Peace and the Final definite Treaty of Peace had been signed.

M. Clemenceau suggested that the Article might be accepted as it stood.

(Article IV was approved without modification.)

Mr. Lansing pointed out that Article V contemplated the handing over of all photographic and cinematographic apparatus. In his opinion, their cession was not a necessity, but they might be described as spoils of war, and he wished to enquire whether in the opinion of the experts such apparatus constituted a real danger.

General Duval explained that since it had been agreed to demand the surrender of all war material, it was only logical that photographic and cinematographic apparatus should also be included. He also wished to point out that the apparatus in question could only be used on board air-ships.

(Article V was accepted without amendment.)

Article VI

(Article VI was accepted without amendment.)

General Duval pointed out that paragraph 2 of Article VII, which laid down that the special Control Commission should work at the seat of the Central German Government, might require to be slightly modified, in order to agree with the similar condition laid down in the Military Convention. In this connection, he wished to draw attention to the note inserted at the end of the Convention, which read as follows:—“The Officer Air Delegates request that the Commission instituted by Article VII as regards aviation shall form part of the Commission instituted with the same objects by the Military Convention, and should operate according to the same principles and within the same time limits.”

Mr. Lansing enquired why a provision had been entered requiring the German Government to give to all Delegates of the Special Control Commission every facility “to take any photographs and sketches”.
GENERAL DUVAL said that this condition had been inserted at the request of the American Air Delegate, and he personally would be glad to see it struck out.

GENERAL PATRICK agreed to the omission of this condition.

(It was agreed to accept Article VII, the words: "to take any photographs and sketches" being deleted.)

GENERAL DUVAL pointed out that just as in the case of the Military Convention it was proposed that the whole Convention should be referred to the Drafting Commission for such minor additions and alterations as might be found necessary.

(Article VIII was accepted without amendment.)

GENERAL DUVAL expressed the view that Article IX should be retained in the Convention. In drawing up this Article, the Officer Air Delegates had not thought it right to prevent Germany from constituting a commercial air service; but the conditions which should govern such an aerial service could not be settled within the time available. Consequently, it had been agreed to forbid to Germany all forms of aviation, not particularly with the intention of forbidding commercial aviation, but to prevent any developments from taking place until the rules relative to the organisation of a commercial air service could be laid down in the Peace Treaty.

MR. LANSING said he agreed with the general purpose of the Article; but, in his opinion, it should not properly be included in the Convention which dealt with Military Aviation. He thought the whole question of commercial aeronautics might perhaps be dealt with in a second document, which need not even necessarily form part of the Peace Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAUX said that Mr. Balfour had handed in the following text of a resolution, the second paragraph of which he thought would probably give satisfaction to Mr. Lansing.

Mr. Balfour’s resolution read as follows:—

"It is agreed—

1. That the existing aviation Commission, consisting of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, with five representatives of other States at the Conference shall be recognised and invited to consider:—

(a) Aerial matters arising out of the work of the Preliminary Peace Conference or referred by the Commissions set up by the Conference.

(b) A Convention in regard to International Aerial Navigation in time of peace.

2. That the question of the commercial aviation to be allowed to Germany be referred to this Commission."

(This Resolution was adopted.)
M. Clemenceau, continuing, said that Article IX of the Convention should be referred to the existing Aviation Commission for report as to whether it should be included in the Convention, either in its present form or with amendments.

Marshal Foch suggested that a date should be fixed for a reply to be received from the Aviation Commission in regard to Article IX.

M. Clemenceau said that two questions had been referred to the Aviation Commission: a practical question relating to Article IX, a reply to which should be given within the next two days; and a more ideal part relating to the preparation of a Convention in regard to International Aerial Navigation in time of peace, which would require time for careful study.

General Duval remarked that the terms of reference to the Aviation Commission were exceedingly large.

Mr. Balfour said he could not quite understand what objection there could be to the proposals contained in his resolution. Article IX merely contained a statement of good intention, but supplied no machinery for the organisation of a commercial air service in Germany, whereas his resolution would, he hoped, lead to the creation of the required machinery.

M. Clemenceau agreed, and proposed that Article IX be referred to the existing Aviation Commission with a request that a report be submitted within 48 hours.

(It was agreed that Article IX be referred to the existing Aviation Commission for report within 48 hours as to whether it should be included in the Aerial Convention, and, if so, to make such amendments thereto as might be considered necessary.)

(It was decided that the Drafting Committee of the Conference should furnish the Council with a complete draft of the Convention dealing with the conditions to be imposed on the German Government in regard to Military and Maritime Aeronautics (see Annexure "A") taking into account the following reservations and amendments:—

(i)—Article I (2) (c). After the words “within one month”, add “from date of signing of present Convention.”

(ii)—Article II. After the words “This is to be carried out within one month”, add the words “from date of signing of present Convention.”

(iii)—Article III, is reserved for further consideration.

(iv)—Article VII. Delete the words “to take any photographs and sketches.”

(v)—Article IX. See resolution above.

In addition, the Drafting Committee should reconcile the conditions and statements made in the Aerial Convention with those contained in the Military Convention, especially in regard to the control
to be exercised by the Special Commission to be sent to Germany (Article VII), and in regard to the time limits prescribed for the execution of the terms of the Convention.)

3. Mr. BALFOUR said that he wished to raise a further question. By the Convention, Germany would quite properly be deprived of aircraft and material, which would have to be disposed of somehow. That material possessed great military and commercial value, and he wished to know how it was proposed to distribute it. Naturally, he quite understood that no reference to this question would be made in the Convention which had just been approved.

Mr. LANSING thought that the taking over of all the property referred to in the Convention looked to him far more like the taking over of spoils of war rather than disarmament. In his opinion, if the whole of this material could not be used for commercial purposes, it should be destroyed; but, if it could be used for commercial purposes, it should be left to Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that his reply to that would be that the question could not be settled at once, and, in any case, it should not be dealt with in the Convention. He thought the question should be adjourned for consideration at a later date.

M. SONNINO remarked that the matter could be discussed when the disposal of the ships and submarines came under discussion.

(For discussion regarding the disposal of the aircraft to be surrendered by Germany.)

4. M. SONNINO asked permission to draw attention to a question of urgency. A declaration had been received from the Czechoslovak Govt. to the effect that it declined to accept responsibility for any share of the Austro-Hungarian debt, whether incurred before the war or during the war. The Conference would recollect that the question had been discussed at their meeting held on 25th February last, when a decision had been reached to address a telegram to the Financial Conferences of the former Austrian Empire, then sitting at the Ballplatz in Vienna.

In his opinion, the Czechoslovak communication called for immediate action; otherwise the Austro-Hungarian Governments would refuse payment, and serious consequences might therefore ensue.

M. PICHON said the communication referred to by Baron Sonnino had been circulated to all the Delegations.

(For full text of communication, see Annexure “B”.)

The Czechoslovak Government whilst refusing to pay any part of the interest on the debt, held by enemy countries, were apparently

\[1\text{See BC-39, p. 118.}\]
willing to contribute towards the payment of the interest due to bond-holders in Allied and Associated countries. On the 25th February last the Conference had passed the following resolution:—

'It was agreed that a copy of the following telegram should be addressed by the French Foreign Office in the name of the five Great Powers to the Gesamter Konferenz, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ballplatz, Vienna:—

"The Allied and Associated Governments are informed there is some danger that when the coupons of the Austro-Hungarian loans fall due on March 1st, they will not be paid owing to the inability of the Austrian Government, the Hungarian Government and the other Governments concerned to come to an understanding as to the respective quotas due on such payments.

The Allied and Associated Governments declare that as far as they are concerned any arrangement now made with regard to the payment of the coupons in March out of common funds will not prejudice in any way the settlement by the Peace Conference of the quotas to be imputed to each for the Austro-Hungarian debt.""

The British Delegation would also send a copy of the same telegram to the British Military Mission in Vienna.)

He agreed with Baron Sonnino as to the gravity of the situation, and he would suggest that the question be referred for consideration and report to the Allied Financial Commission.

'It was agreed to refer the question of the payment of the coupons of the Austrian debt due on 1st March, 1919, to the Allied Financial Committee for consideration and report.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the Territorial Coordination Committee would not be prepared to submit their report on the Western frontiers of Poland for a day or two. He suggested, therefore, that the consideration of the question should be postponed until Saturday, and suggested that the Conference should adjourn until that date, when President Wilson would also be present. The Agenda for Saturday might therefore contain:—

1.—The final revised draft of Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace.
2.—The Western frontiers of Poland.

MR. LANSING asked that a Meeting should, if possible, be held on Friday afternoon to discuss the eastern boundaries of Germany.

'It was agreed to adjourn until Saturday afternoon, March 15, the President being empowered to call a Meeting for Friday afternoon in the event of the report on the Western frontiers of Poland being available.)

PARIS, 13th March, 1919.
Annexure "A"

Air Terms of Peace.—Conditions To Be Imposed on the German Government in Regard to Military and Maritime Aeronautics

Article I.

The effective of the German Air Service in material and personnel shall be reduced to the following figures:—

(1) Material.

(a) Aeroplanes.

The military forces of Germany having to be limited to the necessary minimum to allow her to maintain order in the interior, must not comprise any military aviation.

(b) Hydroplanes.

Germany can for a period not longer than 1st October, 1919, maintain a total of 100 hydroplanes or water gliders for the purpose of seeking out submarine mines, with the necessary equipment, but without armaments, munitions or bombs.

(c) Motors.

In addition to the motors mounted on hydroplanes, and water gliders mentioned above, one motor may be allowed for each hydroplane or water glider.

(d) Dirigibles.

No dirigibles shall be kept.

(2) Personnel.

(a) Land Aviation.

Land aviation being suppressed, no personnel is allowed under this heading.

(b) Naval aviation.

Until the 1st October, Germany may maintain a total number of 1000 all ranks which will comprise all the personnel flying and non-flying of all formations and establishments.

(c) The whole personnel, excepting a total of 1,000 men mentioned in Paragraph I (2) (b) figuring at present on the control lists of the German land and sea forces will be demobilised or sent to other arms or services within one month (but the effective provided for in the Military and Naval Statute must not be exceeded).

Article II.

No aviation ground and no shed for dirigibles must be maintained or established:

(1) to the East of the Rhine, at a distance of less than 150 Kilometres from that river.

(2) to the West of the Eastern German frontier at a distance of less than 150 Kilometres from that frontier.
(3) to the North of the Southern German frontier at a distance of less than 150 Kilometres from the frontier of Italy or of Czecho-Slovakia.

All grounds now existing which do not satisfy these conditions are to be immediately placed out of use. The sheds are to be dismantled and the earth is to be ploughed up. This is to be carried out within one month.

Article III.

Germany will allow to all Allied aircraft free passage through the air, free transit and right to land on her territory until complete evacuation of German territory by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article IV.

The manufacture of parts of aeroplanes, hydroplanes, water gliders, dirigibles and motors shall be forbidden in the whole of German territory until the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace.

Article V.

The material now existing in the German land and sea forces or in process of manufacture, in excess of the figures given under Article I shall be handed over to the Allies. In that material must be comprised in particular:—

complete aeroplanes and hydroplanes, as well as those in process of manufacture, repair, or of being put together;
dirigible balloons able to take the air in process of manufacture, repair or being put together;
machinery for the manufacture of hydrogen;
dirigible sheds and every kind of shelter for balloons or dirigibles.

Pending their delivery dirigible balloons are to be maintained blown out with hydrogen at Germany's expense and the apparatus for the manufacture of the hydrogen, as well as shelters for dirigibles may, at the discretion of the Allied and Associated Powers, be left to Germany until the moment when the dirigibles are handed over.

Motors.
Cells.
Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb throwers, torpedo throwers, synchronisation apparatus, aiming apparatus).
Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs, loaded and unloaded, stocks of explosives or material for their manufacture).
Instruments for use on aeroplanes.
Wireless apparatus; photographic or cinematograph apparatus. Detached parts connected with any of the preceding categories.
Article VI.

Any movement of material mentioned in Article V shall be forbidden without special authorisation by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article VII.

The terms of the various Articles of the present Convention shall be carried out under the control of a Special Commission delegated for that purpose by the Allied and Associated Powers.

This Commission shall work at the seat of the Central German Government, but shall be able to send a sub-Commission or delegates to any other part of German territory.

This Commission will have every power to settle directly and without appeal any disputes which may arise in regard to the execution of the present Convention.

The German Government will immediately hand over to it:—

1. A numerical list of the personnel belonging to all the German Air Services and of the existing material as well as of that in process of manufacture or on order.
2. A complete list, with their position, of all establishments working for aviation, and of all landing grounds and sheds.

The German Government will immediately place at the disposal of this Commission all documents relating to the German Air Service.

The German Government will give to all the delegates of this Commission every facility to carry out their mission, and in particular:—

1. To effect over the whole extent of German territory a census of the material mentioned under Article V;
2. To inspect, whenever called upon, aeroplane, balloon and motor manufactories, and arms, munitions and explosive factories, aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks and depots.
3. To take any photographs and sketches.

The German Government will immediately hand over to this Commission all the information and documents set forth in Articles V and VII, and all the material mentioned in these Articles shall be handed over as rapidly as possible, and within a time limit of three months.

Article VIII.

The Commission instituted under Article VII will work until the conditions of this convention have been carried out by Germany within the prescribed period; if for any reason anyone of these provisions be not carried out within the allotted period the delegates of that Commission will immediately bring these facts to the knowledge of their respective Governments who will give them new instructions.
Article IX.

The rules relative to the organisation of a commercial air service in Germany after the signature of the definite Treaty of Peace, and to its being granted international circulation shall be determined by the said Treaty of Peace.

Note:—The Officer Air Delegates request that the Commission instituted by Article VII as regards Aviation shall form part of the Commission instituted with the same objects by the Military Convention, and should operate according to the same principles and within the same time limits.

Annexure “B”

M. Benes, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czecho-Slovak Republic,
to M. S. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs [of France]

PARIS, March 6, 1919.

I have the honor to submit to you herewith a communication sent to me from Prague by the Minister of Finances following a decision of the Council of Ministers.

It is a decision of the Czecho-Slovak Government on the subject of the payment of the coupons of the Austro-Hungarian National loan at the time of their maturity on 1 March 1919. This decision was reached as the result of a telegram from the French representative at Berne, sent to the representatives of the nations of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire at Vienna. This despatch was as follows:

“The governments of the Allied and Associated States have learned that there is danger that the coupons of the Austro-Hungarian National Debt, at the time of their maturity on 1 March 1919, shall not be paid, for the reason that the Austrian and Hungarian governments, as well as the other interested governments, are not in a position to agree on the share incumbent on each.

“The Allied Governments state that no arrangement which may be made to insure the payment of the coupons in the month of March from the common funds can influence in any way the decision of the Peace Conference concerning the reapportionment of the Austro-Hungarian debt.

“Signed: Pichon, Balfour, Lansing, Sonnino, Martino.”

I take the liberty of sending you herewith the decision of the Czecho-Slovak government bearing on this despatch, and of adding that this question obviously is intimately connected with the problem which is now being discussed in certain commissions of the Peace

1 Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
Conference, and that it particularly affects the question of the economic and financial liquidation of Austria-Hungary.

The Czecho-Slovak Government is obviously particularly interested in this problem; it is a question of its fundamental existence.

I have had the honor personally to state on several occasions that the Czecho-Slovak State will do all that it can to insure that the Allied and Associated States will not lose a single sou in the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.

This principle, which we have always recognized and which also will guide us, when we submit before the Peace Conference our plan concerning the financial liquidation of Austria-Hungary, is in no way influenced by this decision. We wish, simply, to negotiate directly with the Allied and Associated States in dealing with questions which affect us so directly, and we do not wish to dispute these troublesome and difficult questions again with our enemies, the Austrians and the Magyars.

Moreover, the attached document itself indicates sufficiently what our point of view is.

Requesting you, Sir, to be so good as to let me know whether the French Government accepts this point of view, or otherwise what are its objections to this procedure, I beg you to accept the assurances of my highest esteem.

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Enclosure to Annexure “B”

The Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic cannot enter into negotiations, which are to assure the payment of the March coupons and cannot contribute any amount, even in case where by this act, no prejudice would be brought into the decision of the Peace Conference, relative to the reparation of the guarantee, for the debts of Austria-Hungary. The situation of the Czecho-Slovak Republic differs essentially from that of the other Governments as well in that which concerns the Austrian war debt as the pre-war debt. The Czecho-Slovak Government can neither pay the Austrian and Hungarian war debts nor even the interest that would result therefrom, because in this way it would render itself liable towards the Allies and the engagements it made with them. The Austrian and Hungarian war loans were issued with the object in view of conducting the war against the Allies and against the Czecho-Slovak people which has been recognized by the Allies as a friendly nation, of which the Paris Government and the armies in the Entente countries were recognized as being an Allied government and army. According to principles in the Allied countries, all the transactions of the war loans and the payment of interest on such loans as were directed
against the Allies have been cancelled and the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic would act disloyally against the Allies if it contributed in part to the payment of the coupons of the war loans.

This disloyalty would be so much the more serious because these war loans are found in the hands of the subjects of the states who up to the present are still considered by the Allies as enemies; it would thus be to enemy countries that the Czecho-Slovak Republic would pay them.

Outside of this the government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic remarks, that, on the contrary, it has the right and the duty to claim for its citizens reparation for the damages that were caused them by the anti-constitutional and illegal war loans. The subscription to these was imposed by the infraction of all laws of liberty: the citizens were menaced by the threat of having all their goods confiscated, by threat of imprisonment, and of being sent to the first line of the front, by condemnation to death even of those who faithful to the Czecho-Slovak government of Paris refused to give money for the carrying on of the war against the Allies. Should the government of the Czecho-Slovak republic contribute to the payment of the coupons of the war loans, it would approve of the terrible injustices which were permitted against the Czecho-Slovak people on the part of those the incontestable inheritors of whom are the Austro-German and Magyar republics and which still today are in most intimate relations with the enemies of the Allies.

In that which relates to pre-war debts, the government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic cannot participate either, in the slightest measure to the payment of the March coupons, because these pre-war debts are placed for the most part in countries hostile to the Entente. The government of the Czecho-Slovak republic will charge itself to pay for its subjects in seasonable time, the coupons of the pre-war debt and will come to an understanding directly with the Allied governments as to the method of paying loan coupons, found in the Allied countries where it is diplomatically represented, and can independently and indirectly settle the questions of interest on these pre-war debts.

For these reasons, the government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic does not think it necessary to have any discussions relative to this matter brought up at the meeting of the plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the states created from the territory of old Austria-Hungary.
Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Saturday, March 15th, 1919, at 3 p.m.

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. R. Lansing  
Hon. E. M. House  

**Secretaries**

Mr. A. H. Frazier  
Mr. L. Harrison  
Mr. G. Auchincloss

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.  
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.

**Secretaries**

Mr. E. Phipps

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau  
M. Pichon

**Secretaries**

M. Dutasta  
M. Berthelot  
M. Arnavon  
M. de Bearn

**ITALY**

H. E. M. Orlando  
H. E. Baron Sonnino

**Secretaries**

Count Aldrovandi  
M. Bertele  
Capt. Fracchia  
M. Brambilla

**JAPAN**

H. E. Marquis Saionji  
H. E. Baron Makino  
H. E. M. Matsui

**ALSO PRESENT**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

General Tasker H. Bliss  
Major General M. N. Patrick  
Dr. S. E. Mezes  
Mr. I. Bowman  
Mr. J. B. Scott  
Colonel W. S. Browning  
Colonel E. G. Gorrell  
Captain S. Montgomery

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.  
Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss, G. C. B., C. M. G., M. V. O.  
Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.  
Major General W. Thwaites, C. B.  
Major General Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G.  
Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O.  
Lt. Col. F. H. Kisch, D. S. O.  
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst, C. B., K. C.  
Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N.  
Paymaster-Captain C. F. Pollard, C. B., R. N.

**FRANCE**

M. Leygues  
Marshal Foch  
General Weygand  
General Bellin  
General Degoutte  
General Duval  
Admiral de Bon  
General Le Bond  
M. Tardieu  
M. Cambon  
M. Fromageot  
M. Degrand  
Comdt. de V. Levavasseur  
Comdt. Lacombe  
Lient. de V. Odend'hal

**ITALY**

Admiral Grassi  
General Cavallero  
M. Tosti  
Marquis della Torretta
M. Clemenceau said that Mr. Lansing had a resolution to propose.

Mr. Lansing then read the following resolution:—

It is agreed that:—

Marshal Foch is hereby requested to seek an early opportunity to arrange with the Germans that any member or delegate of the Inter-allied Mission to Poland shall be enabled at any time to visit any portion of the territories east of the Vistula still under German civil or military command.

Mr. Lansing explained that the purpose of the proposal was to obtain means of checking the alleged sale of arms to the Bolsheviks by the Germans whenever they evacuated territory. He presumed that similar information had reached all Governments on this score.

(No comment being made, the above resolution was adopted.)

2. M. Clemenceau said that to complete the nominations to the Aviation Commission, representatives of the smaller Powers were required.

M. Pichon proposed that the following Powers be invited to nominate members on this Commission:—

| Belgium    | Roumania |
| Brazil     | Serbia   |
| Greece     |          |

He thought that it was necessary to designate the Powers that should be represented lest the incident relating to election of delegates for the Financial and Economic Commissions be repeated.

M. Clemenceau said he understood that each of the Powers mentioned would have the right to select their own delegate.

Mr. Balfour suggested that Portugal should be added to the list as the Azores were important as an air station.

M. Pichon said he had no objection to the addition of Portugal.

Mr. Lansing pointed out that Cuba had equally strong claims. Without Cuba the Allies would have had no sugar.
(It was therefore agreed that the following Powers with special interests should appoint members to the Aviation Commission:

Belgium  Portugal
Brazil  Roumania
Cuba  Serbia
Greece

3. M. Clemenceau stated that he had received a message from President Wilson asking for the postponement of the discussion on the Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace. In view of this request the discussion would be postponed until Monday, 17th March.

4. M. Clemenceau said that the remaining item on the Agenda was the report of the Polish Commission. As some of the Powers present were not ready to discuss this subject, it would be necessary to adjourn its discussion.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Monday, March 17, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson
Hon. R. Lansing

Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.

Secretaries
Mr. E. Phipps

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Bearn

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino

Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Berteile

JAPAN

H. E. Marquis Salony
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Admiral W. S. Benson
General Tasker H. Bliss
Major General M. N. Patrick
Dr. Bowman
Prof. Lord
Colonel W. S. Browning
Colonel E. G. Gorrell
Captain Schofield
Commander Carter

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., D. S. O.
Major General W. Thwaites, C. B.
Major General Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G.
Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
Brigadier General H. W. Studd, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O.
Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O.
Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O., R. N.
Paymaster Captain Pollard, C. B., R. N.
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst, C. B., K. C.
Lieut. Col. F. H. Kisch, D. S. O.

FRANCE

M. Leygues
M. J. Cambon
Marshal Foch
General Weygand
General Degoutte
General Bellin
General Le Boulennec
General Duval
Admiral de Bon
M. Degrud
M. Fromageot
Comdt. de V. Levavasseur
Comdt. Lacombe
Lieut. de V. Odendhal

ITALY

General Cavallero
Admiral Thaon di Revel
Admiral Grassi
Capt. di Corvette
Capt. F. Ruspoli
Capt. Fracchia
M. Tosti
M. Brambilla
JAPAN
Admiral Takeshita
General Nara
Colonel Nagai
Captain Fujioka
Captain Yamamoto

BELGIUM
General Gillain
Colonel Menschaert
Lt.-Col. Gallot

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . Colonel U. S. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . . . . . . . Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O;
FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Captain A. Portier
ITALY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lieut. Zanchi
JAPAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. Saburi

Interpreter.—Professor Mantoux

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the first question on the Agenda related to the Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace, and he would call upon M. Mantoux to read the document which had been circulated, Article by Article. He understood there were certain parts which had been reserved; and he enquired whether the Commission had prepared any special reports in regard to those paragraphs, or whether Marshal Foch or General Weygand would be in a position to give the necessary explanations.

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the sub-Committees which had dealt with subjects such as the Kiel Canal, and Cables, had submitted special reports, which had been duly considered by the Allied Military, Naval and Aerial Commission. When the time came, he would, if so desired, give the summary of those reports.

(M. Mantoux then read the draft Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace, Article by Article. For full text, see Annexure “A”.)

(Read and approved.)

PRESIDENT WILSON asked to be assured that the exterior dangers from the Bolsheviks and so forth, which the Germans might have to meet on their eastern frontiers had been considered by the military experts in fixing the total number of effectives to be allowed to Germany.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the Commission considered that the 100,000 men allowed, in addition to the gendarmerie, would be quite sufficient for the maintenance of order within the territory of Germany and for the defence of her frontiers.
MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired, following up President Wilson’s point, how many German troops had been engaged in suppressing the various Spartacist insurrections through Germany, including Bavaria.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that he had no exact idea; only vague estimates were available.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the number of German troops so engaged had exceeded 100,000.

MARSHAL FOCH replied in the negative.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in putting his question he had in mind such isolated places as East Prussia, which adjoined Russia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the province of East Prussia would have no direct contact with Russia, as Lithuania intervened.

MARSHAL FOCH said that in the whole of Eastern Germany, the number of German troops did not exceed 28,000 to 30,000 men.

(Article 2 was approved.)

PRESIDENT WILSON called attention to the use of the word “never” in the second paragraph of Article 3. In his opinion, that word would cover all future time, and if that were intended, some permanent machinery would have to be set up to ensure the execution of the conditions therein set forth.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that President Wilson’s point would be met by substituting the word “not” for “never”.

(It was agreed that paragraph 2 of Article 3 should read:—“The number and strengths of the units of infantry . . . constitute maxima which must not be exceeded”.

Articles 4 & 5 were read and accepted.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch had proposed the following text in substitution of the one which had been previously reserved by the Supreme War Council:—“The number of Employés or Officials of the German States, such as Customs House Officers, Forest Guards, Coastguards, must not exceed that of the employés or officials functioning in 1913. The number of gendarmes and employés or officials of the local or municipal police, may only be increased to an extent corresponding to the increase of population since 1913 in the districts or municipalities in which they are employed. These employés and officials shall never be assembled for military training”.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the word “not” should, as in the previous Article, be substituted for “never” in the last paragraph.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. BALFOUR, continuing, said that if the Peace Conference were to decide that the territory on the Western bank of the Rhine should be administratively severed from the rest of Germany, the eastern section would, under this article, still be authorised to have the number of employés formerly needed by the entire German Empire.
President Wilson said that this question had better be postponed for the present, as it could not be settled until a decision had been reached on the territorial question itself. (Clause 6 was accepted, subject to such modifications as might be required when the territorial question relating to the future constitution of German territories on the Western bank of the Rhine came to be settled).

Articles 7 & 8

(Were read and accepted.)

President Wilson suggested that the word “not” should be substituted for the word “never” in the last line of the first paragraph.

(This was agreed to.)

(Article 9 was accepted, as amended.)

President Wilson called attention to the very great scope and difficulty of the second sentence of this Article, namely:

Article 9

“All orders shall be notified to the Allied and Associated Governments, and may not be carried out until after such notification”.

No limiting time was given, and no provisions were made to set up a permanent machinery for receiving the notification therein referred to, and for granting permits. In his opinion, the execution of that sentence was not feasible, and he proposed that it should be deleted from the text. It would be impossible to introduce a guarantee of that nature without setting up an instrumentality permanently limiting the sovereignty of Germany. The only other alternative would be to reserve the right of going to war with Germany in the event of her failing to make the notification therein referred to.

M. Clemenceau pointed out that the same difficulty would arise if Germany were to set up an army of 200,000 men in place of the 100,000 allowed her.

President Wilson agreed. He pointed out that in the Convention provisions had been made for the setting up of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, but no time limit of any kind had been given. He quite agreed to the setting up of these Commissions during the definite time required for carrying out the necessary disarmament. But all these Commissions of Control had been made instrumentalities of the Inter-Allied High Command, which, in his opinion, meant an indefinite continuation of that Command, and of the Allied and Associated armies. In his opinion, if the Allied armies were to be maintained for ever in order to control the carrying out of the Peace Terms; not peace, but Allied armed domination would have been established. His Government would never agree to enter into such an arrangement and, were he to enter into such an agreement,
he would be far exceeding his authority under the United States Constitution.

Mr. Lloyd George expressed the view that there was very great force in what President Wilson had said. In his opinion, Article 10 was the sort of clause which would be a perpetual source of irritation and humiliation to any country; whilst, on the other hand, it would not ensure the purpose intended. For instance, if in 1870 the Germans had imposed on France a condition to limit her army, that would have been a reasonable proposition. But if Germany had, in addition, imposed a condition that France was not to order a single rifle without asking her permission, that would have been intolerable. In 40 years’ time, when Germany might have recovered her self-respect, should she require to order anything to replace the armaments permitted to her, she would have to give notice separately to France, Great Britain, America, Italy and Japan. He did not know what the Germans were made of, but he certainly knew what France and Great Britain would have felt about it. In his opinion, such a condition would constitute a constant source of insult, whilst, on the other hand, it did not really serve any useful purpose. Should the Germans mean to evade it, they would merely refrain from making the required notification. The first part of Article 10, which President Wilson was ready to accept, was merely a treaty obligation, whereas the second part of the first paragraph was merely intended to check that obligation. In his opinion, however, it did not succeed in doing that, and the Allied and Associated Governments would obviously be thrown back on the ordinary means which Governments possess of checking the doings of other countries. Although diplomatically the Allies had been taken by surprise when Germany declared war, and especially in regard to the use that might be made of the guns, the number of men and the number of guns possessed by Germany had been fully and accurately known. The construction of guns and the training of men could not be carried out clandestinely. Should there be a clause in the League of Nations requiring each member to notify to the others its programme of armaments and stocks of war material, that would be in no way humiliating, as every country would be bound to do the same thing.

President Wilson pointed out that a condition to that effect already practically existed in the League of Nations Covenant.

Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said that the clause as it now stood would merely be making for trouble. Should some German Minister say that he would defy the Allies and refuse to give the information required: would the Allies be prepared to go to war? That might be done should Germany proceed to order rifles or war material greatly in excess of the quantities prescribed; but not otherwise. His military advisers took substantially the same view as President
Wilson, namely, that the conditions objected to could never in reality be enforced, and, in his opinion, it was inexpedient to put into a treaty a number of conditions that the enemy would be bound to evade. In his opinion, that was not a good plan, as the continual evasion of a multitude of small points would eventually lead to the document itself becoming a mere scrap of paper. He wished, therefore, strongly to support President Wilson's objection.

Marshal Foch held that there were two objects to be attained in regard to the control to be exercised over the execution of the clause. One control would have to be set up in order to follow the immediate application of the conditions dealing with the surrender and destruction of armaments and other war materials in excess of the quantity prescribed. The work of that control would naturally come to an end as soon as the material in question had been surrendered. But, in regard to the application of the other conditions, no provisions had been made for setting up a special control and the only control possible would be that which would, under ordinary circumstances, be exercised by Military Attaches and other similar agencies. Should the Supreme War Council, however, hold the opinion that the condition in question would cause unnecessary humiliation to the enemy, he agreed to its suppression.

(It was agreed to accept Article 10, with the omission of the following sentence:—

"All orders shall be notified to the Allied and Associated Governments and may not be carried out until after such notification.")

President Wilson proposed that the last sentence of the first paragraph of Article 11 should read as follows:—

**Article 11**

"This will also apply to any special plant intended for the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognised as necessary for the manufacture which is authorised."

(This was agreed to.)

President Wilson pointed out that Article 12, in effect, established a limitation on the activities of other countries than Germany. One of the outstanding difficulties of the present war had been the question of ensuring that goods shipped to neutral countries did not find their way to Germany. This clause would have the effect of limiting sales by other countries to Germany. As far as he was concerned, he would be content to oblige Germany to manufacture her own armaments, if possible. But that involved a supervision of exports and imports from and into Germany, and he did not see how that could be done without setting up very complicated machinery. The United States of America had tried to do that on the Mexican frontier but with little success, because the
power of smuggling was very great and required a minuteness of supervision which was not practicable. It had been agreed to set up a League of Nations which made it obligatory for each member to notify its stock of war material.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether that would not be the answer to President Wilson’s criticisms.

President Wilson, continuing, said that the League of Nations by itself would not be sufficient, because the application of Article 12 involved a perpetual and permanent supervision. In accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations, the members would only be required to disclose the war material possessed by them and not whence it came, whereas the Article under consideration required an investigation into the origin of supplies, not only in Germany, but in other countries also. If suitable inoffensive machinery could be set up, he would be prepared to accept the Article in question, but in the place of an illusive process of that nature he would prefer merely to judge by results. In order to give effect to his proposal, he would suggest that Article 12 should be made to read:

“Germany shall strictly prohibit the import of arms, munitions and war materials of every kind, and shall also prohibit the export of the same to foreign countries.”

The treaty obligation to enforce the provisions of the Article would thus be placed upon Germany.

Mr. Lloyd George said that, in his opinion, Article 12 should be accepted as it stood, as, under the Covenant of the League of Nations, it had been laid down that the manufacture of arms, munitions and war material should become a State undertaking.

President Wilson said that the procedure mentioned by Mr. Lloyd George had only been accepted in principle.

Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said that his argument was thereby somewhat weakened. Nevertheless, if the Article as originally drafted were included as a part of the Treaty, any member of the League of Nations selling arms to Germany would be guilty of a breach of the League’s Covenant.

President Wilson said that, under the circumstances, he was prepared to withdraw his objection.

Mr. Balfour pointed out that the French and English drafts did not correspond, in that the English version read:

“Importation into Germany of arms, munitions and war material of every kind is strictly prohibited,”

whereas the French text read:

“Importation into Germany of arms, munitions and war materials of every kind shall be strictly prohibited.”
(Article 12, with the following amendment, was accepted:—

"Importation into Germany of arms, munitions and war material of every kind shall be strictly prohibited. The same applies to the manufacture for and export of arms, munitions and war material of every kind to foreign countries.")

Mr. Balfour enquired how it would be possible to forbid the importation of materials required for the manufacture of asphyxiating gases, as many of these were innocent chemicals which were eventually perverted to these nefarious uses.

Marshal Foch suggested, in order to meet Mr. Balfour's criticism, that the second paragraph of Article 13 might be altered to read:—

"The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices."

(This was agreed to.)
(Article 13, as amended, was accepted.)

Article 14 was read and accepted.

Mr. Balfour called attention to the second paragraph which laid down that "Until the expiration of his period of enlistment, no non-commissioned officer or private may leave the army except for reasons of health and after having been first finally discharged as unfit for service." That condition would require the retention in the Army of men, for instance, who had committed every crime in the calendar. In his opinion, the imposition of such a condition would be inherently impossible.

President Wilson agreed. He thought that for pure reasons of humanity, it might be desirable to omit such a condition.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the second paragraph in question should be omitted, and that the third paragraph should be made to read:—

"The proportion of men discharged for any reason must not exceed in any year 5 per cent, etc."

President Wilson said that the words "before expiration of period of their enlistment" should be added after the words "for any reason".

(Article 15, as amended, was approved, namely:—

"The period of enlistment for non-commissioned officers and privates must be 12 consecutive years.

The proportion of men discharged for any reason before expiration of the period of their enlistment must not exceed in any year 5 per cent of the total effective fixed by the second paragraph of Article 2 of the present stipulations.")
MR. BALFOUR pointed out that a corresponding correction to that made in Article 15 would also have to be made in Article 16, by the omission of paragraph 4 and by making paragraph 5 read—

"The proportion of officers discharged for any reason must not exceed in any year 5 per cent, etc."

(This was agreed to.)

Article 17 (Article 17 was read and approved.)

Article 18 (Article 18 was read and approved.)

PRESIDENT WILSON asked to be told for his own information what was technically included under "Mobilisation". Would it, for instance, prevent the whole of the 100,000 men being assembled in one place?

MAREHAL FOCH explained that by "Measures of Mobilisation" was understood any steps taken to increase the number of men, or the number of animals, forming part of an army, by the calling up of reserves.

(Article 19 was accepted.)

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that he quite agreed with the provisions contained in Article 20 in regard to the Western frontiers of Germany. In regard to the Eastern frontiers, however, Germany, would now be faced with much weaker Powers, owing to the creation of a number of new States, such as, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, a new Roumania, a modified Serbia, and a Turkey broken up into a score of parts, from which the stronger units would have disappeared. It must not be forgotten that Germany's ambitions had always leant towards the South and the East, and he would like to enquire whether sufficient thought had been given towards ensuring the safety of those regions against future German aggression. He was particularly concerned that nothing should be done to revive those ambitions, either by permitting Germany to attach to herself the newly created States, or by permitting her to retain as formidable a front on that side as heretofore.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the answer given by General Degoutte at a previous meeting, which would appear to cover President Wilson's objections. General Degoutte had then stated that Germany only had two fortresses which were situated less than 50 miles from the Eastern and Southern frontiers.

PRESIDENT WILSON accepted this explanation and withdrew his objections as being more theoretical than practical.

M. CLEMENCEAUX said that he understood a large number of railway sidings existed along the Franco-German frontier. He en-
quired from Marshal Foch whether he placed any importance on their existence.

**Marshal Foch** replied in the negative.

(Article 20 was accepted without amendment.)

(b) Section II.

**Naval Clauses.**

**Article 21**

(Article 21 was read and accepted.)

**Article 22**

(Article 22 was read and accepted.)

**Article 23**

(Article 23 was read and accepted.)

**M. Levasseur** suggested that the last sentence of Article 24, which stated that “all these vessels will be destroyed or broken up” should be omitted, as the question was purely one which affected the Allied and Associated Governments, and a decision would be reached among themselves.

(This was agreed to.)

**Mr. Lansing** pointed out that in the Military Clauses the expression “Allied and Associated Governments” had been employed, whereas in the Naval Clauses the expression “Governments of the Allies and the United States of America” had been used. He assumed that would be put right when the text came to be edited.

**Mr. Balfour** thought it was important to decide which of these expressions should be employed. The expression “Governments of the Allies and the United States of America” had been deliberately used in the Article in question in order that no other Associated Government should participate in the possible distribution of the ships to be surrendered.

**Baron Sonnino** pointed out that the word “Government” appeared in the singular in connection with the word “Associated” in the French text.

**President Wilson** said that he preferred that the present text be retained.

(Article 24 was approved, the last sentence being deleted, namely: “All these vessels will be destroyed or broken up.”)

**Article 25**

(Article 25 was reserved for further consideration.)

**Article 26**

(Article 26 was read and accepted.)

**Article 27**

(Article 27 was read and accepted.)

**Article 28**

(Article 28 was read and accepted.)

**Article 29**

(Article 29 was read and accepted.)

**Article 30**

(Article 30 was read and accepted.)

**President Wilson** enquired what the term “in Germany” was intended to mean. Did it mean that the construction and acquisition of any submarines would be forbidden both to the German Government and to private individuals?

**Marshal Foch** replied in the affirmative.

(Article 31 was accepted.)
PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the last words of the last paragraph, namely: “in German territory” should be omitted.

(Article 32 was accepted, with the omission of the last three words: “in German territory.”)

BARON SONNINO pointed out that in the last paragraph of Article 33 the French word “Ulteriorément” had been translated as “ultimately”. He suggested that a better translation would be “subsequently.”

(Article 33 was accepted, the word “ultimately” in the last paragraph being altered to “subsequently”.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the words “on account of ill-health” should be omitted in paras. (1) and para. (3) of Article 34. The concluding sentence of para. (3) being made to read:—“... must engage to serve to the age of 45, unless discharged for sufficient reasons.”

(Article 34 as amended was accepted.)

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was entirely in sympathy with the destruction of the fortifications on the Islands of Heligoland and Dune, but he thought the destruction of breakwaters was rather a serious matter from a humane point of view, as those formed havens for fishermen in case of storms in the North Sea. If the destruction of the fortifications could be assured, he could see no real justification for destroying harbours. No doubt the works had been undertaken for military reasons, but they were there now, and were extremely useful as fishing harbours.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the fishing harbours were quite different and separate from the Naval harbours. No fishing boats had ever been allowed into the Naval harbours.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the Clause was not well expressed. What was meant was that only certain harbours, that is to say, that only purely Naval harbours, should be destroyed. But that was not clearly stated in the Article in question, as the use of the word “included” gave the sentence too wide an interpretation.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that in Heligoland two kinds of harbours existed, harbours for fishermen and harbours constructed as Naval Bases. After Germany had obtained possession of these islands she had built ports purely as Naval bases, and the latter were alone intended for destruction in the Article in question. That destruction was absolutely necessary in order to prevent Heligoland again becoming useful as a base for military operations.
President Wilson pointed out that Germany’s Naval Establishment had under the Naval Convention been reduced to a minimum. The Naval Service had also been reduced to a minimum; and in addition the fortifications were all to be destroyed. Consequently, his contention was that the artificial harbours were useful places of refuge. It would be noticed that the destruction of these harbours was to be carried out “under the supervision of the Allied Governments,” since the United States of America did not wish to take part in a destruction which was not considered to be necessary from a purely military point of view.

Mr. Lloyd George said that after President Wilson’s statement he would rather like to look further into the question, and he suggested that this Article be reserved for future consideration.

(It was agreed that Article 35 should be reserved for future consideration.)

Article 36

(Article 36 was read and accepted.)

President Wilson pointed out that the second paragraph of Article 37 made it incumbent on Germany to notify to the Governments of the Allies and the United States of America the strength of the armaments of the coast defenses. In his opinion, that was a question in which all European countries were particularly interested. He proposed, therefore, that the second sentence of Paragraph 2 should read:—“The German Government shall communicate forthwith particulars thereof to all European Governments.”

Mr. Balfour enquired whether it would not be preferable to say straight away that the League of Nations should be informed.

President Wilson replied that the League of Nations should be regarded as something more than an alliance to enforce this Peace Treaty. In his opinion the United States of America could be omitted from this clause, since it was not more entitled to have the information therein set forth than Japan or any other Asiatic Government.

Mr. Balfour thought that Article 37 should be compared with Article 9 in which it was clearly stated that the number and calibre of the guns constituting the armament of fortified works, etc., would have to be notified by the German Government to the Allied and Associated Governments. He thought the two articles should be placed in the same framework and, consequently, America should not be left out of Article 37.

President Wilson admitted the force of Mr. Balfour’s contention. On the other hand, Article 37 dealt with local fortifications which could not be transported to the United States of America or elsewhere.

Baron Sonnino enquired whether the Allied and Associated Gov-
Governments could not be made responsible for giving the necessary information to other Governments.

President Wilson replied that that would place Germany under the perpetual obligation of notifying a particular group of States as to her doings; a condition, which he considered exceedingly humiliating to her.

(Article 37 was approved; the last sentence of Paragraph 2 being made to read:—“The German Government shall communicate forthwith particulars thereof to all the European Governments.”)

M. LEYGUES said that the Sub-Commission appointed by the Supreme War Council at the meeting held on March 6th, 1919, to report on the future regime of the Kiel Canal had unanimously agreed that the following clause should be inserted in the preliminary Treaty of Peace, on the assumption that the canal should remain entirely within German territory and without prejudice to any guarantees of a military nature which might be stipulated:—

“The Kiel Canal shall remain under the sovereignty of Germany with the reservation that the rules, which shall ultimately be formulated in regard to the international regime of navigable waterways shall be applied to this Canal and its approaches, in particular those rules which concern freedom of navigation for the subjects, goods, and flags of all nations at peace with Germany in such manner that no distinction shall be made between the subjects, goods, and flags of Germany, and of all other States at peace with her. This provision shall apply not only to merchant ships, but also to ships of war.”

M. LEYGUES continuing, said that two questions arose in connection with the text submitted by the Sub-Commission. In the first place, the proposal had been made that the Canal should be placed under the sovereignty of Germany. In the past that arrangement had permitted the hegemony of Germany, and enabled it to make the Baltic a German lake, both economically and militarily. He did not think the Allies were going to allow Germany to reconstitute that power; but the use of the word “sovereignty” meant the grant of full power to Germany to do what she liked. Should the Allied and Associated Governments wish to assure a normal existence to the new Baltic nationalities, such as Finland, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, free access to the sea must be assured. Now, the Baltic was not a free sea since all channels had been mined by Germany with the exception of the Kiel Canal, which was reserved for her own use. The Belt was not practicable, on account of the dangers to navigation, and there remained only the Sound which was too shallow, being less than 7 metres deep, for the passage of large ships. Therefore, the Kiel Canal could not in justice be placed under the sovereignty of Ger-

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1 See BC-45 (SWC-12), p. 225.
many; it must be subjected to a regime, which would allow its free use to all countries for the passage both of commercial and military ships. The Canal was accessible to the larger ships: it had a surface width of 100 metres, a bottom width of 31 metres, and a depth of 11 metres. Therefore, unless the Kiel Canal were opened, the Baltic countries would only be able to keep ships below a certain size owing to the shallowness of the only other available channel, the sound. In his opinion, therefore, two things were necessary, namely: firstly, German sovereignty over the Kiel Canal must not be proclaimed and, secondly, the regime to be enforced should allow free access to the Baltic through the Kiel Canal to the ships of all countries, and especially to the ships of those Baltic countries whose independence and autonomy it has been decided to recognise so that their means of existence might be ensured to them.

President Wilson said that he was quite prepared to discuss any proposal that would make the Kiel Canal a free International waterway. But the draft text under consideration merely stated that the rules, which might ultimately be formulated in regard to the International régime of waterways should be applied to this Canal. In his opinion, that statement was extremely vague as the unknown rules formed the essence of the system to be applied. Had it been proposed to give to the Kiel Canal the same status as the Suez or Panama Canal, that would constitute a definite proposal. But the clause as now drafted merely prescribed the application of an unnamed and undefined system. He inquired, therefore, whether it would not be sufficient to say that the régime to be applied to the Kiel Canal should be the same as that applied to the Suez Canal.

M. Leygues said that the Admirals who had first considered the question, had proposed the following text:—“The Kiel Canal shall be opened at all times to all commercial and war ships of all nations. No nation will be given favoured treatment and no class ships shall be excluded.” He suggested that the Conference should accept that text.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired when the Report of the Commission on International Ports, Waterways and Railways could be expected. He did not think that Germany should be treated in any different way to other countries in connection with the public waterways passing through her territory. He invited attention to the International régime applied, for instance, to the Danube.

President Wilson thought that a distinction should be drawn between the Kiel Canal and other International waterways, in that the Kiel Canal was an artificial waterway running altogether through Germany, and created by her; whereas great rivers, like the Danube, constituted the boundaries of nations, or passed through one national territory and continued in another.
Mr. Balfour pointed out that the Conference was now discussing how to limit Germany's military and naval power. The use of the Kiel Canal in time of war gave Germany an enormous advantage, and it was in the public interest that the Kiel Canal should not be used for purely military purposes. From a commercial point of view, he was told, the Kiel Canal was not of much importance; consequently, unless the fortifications in connection with the Canal could be destroyed, it was of little use to take any other action. He proposed that the whole question should be referred to the Inter-Allied Commission on International Ports, Waterways and Railways.

President Wilson agreed that the question should be left to the Commission on International Ports, Waterways and Railways because it constituted, in reality, a purely commercial question and, he thought, the same general policy ought to apply to the Kiel Canal as to other International waterways.

Mr. Lloyd George expressed the view that the Sub-Commission which had considered the question of the Kiel Canal had accepted that principle. On the other hand, it would be difficult to avoid the Kiel Canal remaining under the sovereignty of Germany.

Mr. Balfour thought that measures should nevertheless be taken to prevent its being fortified.

Admiral de Bon said, in reference to Mr. Balfour's statement in regard to the employment of the Kiel Canal for military purposes, that the destruction of all fortifications had been prescribed. The French representatives had, in fact, drawn up the following text for inclusion in Article 38:—

"In view of ensuring free passage through the Kiel Canal, from the North Sea into the Baltic, Germany will neither erect any fortification nor instal any gun, in the islands or on its territory, within 30 miles from the Elbe Mouth and the Kiel Canal.

The fortifications now in existence will be demolished and the guns removed, within three months.

The same will apply to the torpedo-tube batteries, the mine-stores, and obstruction material sheds."

This text had, however, not yet been accepted by the Allied Naval experts.

Mr. Lloyd George proposed that the further consideration of Article 38 should be postponed until the Report of the Inter-Allied Commission on International Ports, Waterways and Railways had been received. He understood their Report might shortly be expected.

Baron Sonnino said that if he were correctly informed, the work of the Commission on International Ports, Waterways and Railways was being held up pending a decision being reached on certain territorial questions. Consequently, this particular question should be
referred to that Commission as a special thing, requiring immediate decision. Otherwise the Conference by referring questions from one Commission to another would be entering into a vicious circle.

President Wilson drew attention to the fact that in a previous Article provisions had been made for the disarmament of the coasts of Germany, which would obviously include the armaments in the neighbourhood of the Kiel Canal. Therefore, there would be no great objection in omitting Article 38 altogether. The Convention was, in his opinion, quite complete without that Article, which could, eventually, find a place in some other document.

M. Clemenceau agreed on the clear understanding that the Article should form part of the Preliminaries of Peace.

(It was agreed to reserve Article 38 for further consideration.)

Article 39

(Article 39 was read and agreed.)

M. Clemenceau said that a Report relating to submarine cables had been submitted by the Judicial Commission to which the question had been referred, but it had not yet been circulated.

President Wilson submitted that the question was not a military or a naval one at all, except in a very restricted measure.

M. Leygues suggested that the consideration of this question should be adjourned to a later date as the Report of the Commission relating thereto had not yet been distributed.

(Article 40 was reserved for further consideration.)

Article 41

(Article 41 was read and approved.)

(Article 42 was approved. The English text being altered to read:—“within two months from the signature of the present stipulation . . . “)

Article 43

(Article 43 was read and approved.)

(The following text of Article 44 was approved:—)

“Until the complete evacuation of German territory by the Allied and Associated troops, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Germany freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and of landing”.

General Duval pointed out that in drafting Article 45 the British, Italian, Japanese, and French Representatives had asked for the addition of the following words at the end of Article 45, viz:—

“And after the signature of the Treaty of Peace during a period to be fixed by the Treaty of Peace”
This proposal had been opposed by the American representative.

President Wilson said that he could not accept any such additional condition. He thought the Article should stand as at present drafted.

General Duval explained that the Commission had asked for the addition of the words in question for the reason fully set forth in the following report of the Aeronautical Commission on the questions referred by the Supreme War Council of the Peace Conference:

"It was thereupon ruled that the questions to be answered were four in number, viz:—

1st Question. Can civil aeroplanes and airships be easily transformed into weapons of war?

2nd Question. Should all aviation and all aeronautical fabrication continue to be forbidden, in Germany and all other enemy States, until the signature of the Treaty of Peace?

3rd Question. After the Treaty of Peace and in view of the easy transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of war, will it be necessary to prohibit civilian aviation in Germany and all other enemy States?

4th Question. Arising out of the preceding questions is it necessary to suggest alterations in the Regulations concerning the Air Terms imposed on Germany until signature of the Treaty of Peace?

I. In answer to Question 1 the Commission unanimously replied:—

Yes Commercial aeroplanes and airships can be very easily and quickly transformed into weapons of war.

II. In answer to Question 2, the Commission unanimously re-plied:—

Yes (question quoted).

III. In reply to Question 3 (quoted), Great Britain replied as follows:

Yes, for a period long enough to dissipate the very extensive air industry now existing in Germany and all States which became our enemies by reason of the war. This period should not, in its opinion, be less than from two to five years.

France replied as follows:—

Yes, for 20 or 30 years, a period required for the destruction of all existing flying material and dispersion of personnel, for it is impossible to foresee the progress of flying in the immediate future. Even now:—

1 aeroplane can carry 1 ton of explosives a distance of 300 kilometres.

1000 aeroplanes can carry 1000 tons of explosives a distance of 300 kilometres (or more than has been dropped during a whole
year of war). In order to have 1000 aeroplanes ready for use at any time, it is sufficient for the factories to turn them out at the rate of 100 a month.

Italy replied as follows:—

Yes, for a long period, since Germany and all enemy States deserve to be penalised and the Allies are entitled to take precautions.

Japan replied:—

Yes, (agreeing with the majority).

The United States replied:—

No, considering all such restrictions of the entire flying activity of Germany and her Allies after the signature of the Treaty of Peace to be neither wise nor practicable.

IV. In accordance with the answers given to the above questions, and after extensive study of the Regulations relating to the Air Terms imposed on Germany until the signature of the Treaty of Peace, the Commission recommended that the following amendments be made to such Regulations, viz:—

1. That Article 45 be completed as follows:— “And after signature of the Treaty of Peace during a period to be fixed by the Treaty of Peace.”

This was carried by a majority of votes.
The United States reserve their opinion as regards this addition.

2. That the whole of Article 50 be omitted.

This was carried unanimously.”

**President Wilson** said that the Military Units of aircraft had already been regulated by other Articles. The addition proposed was an excursion into other realms. Railroad trains could be used to carry guns, should the manufacture of trains therefore be limited? Some types of ships could be readily converted for military use, should the construction of ships be limited on this account? The amount of military equipment authorized has already been limited, and personally he was not willing to go any further in that direction. (Article 45 was accepted without amendment).

**President Wilson** asked the Commission that formulated Article 46 to say whether all the materials specified constituted military material or not.

**General Duval** replied in the affirmative.

**President Wilson** enquired whether plant[s] for the manufacture of hydrogen necessarily constituted military material?
GENERAL DUVAL replied that the proviso in question related only to hydrogen plant[s] in military Aviation Parks.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that had not been specifically stated.

GENERAL DUVAL pointed out that the commencement of Article 46 clearly stated that “on the signature of the present stipulations, all military and naval aeronautical material, . . . must be delivered to the Allied and Associated Governments”.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if the first paragraph were strictly interpreted and applied it would be sufficient. He was perfectly satisfied with all military material, but he did not think that it was clear that only this was intended. He had another observation to make, namely, that it was not definitely stated whether this material should be destroyed or turned over. If turned over, it must either be stored or divided. In case the latter method were adopted, would it be put to the credit of Germany on the balance sheet or not? He thought many complicated questions might arise from this paragraph.

GENERAL DUVAL stated that there had not been full unanimity as to what disposition should be made of the materials surrendered; but in any case it was not considered that this disposition should be specified in the terms agreed to with the Germans. There was entire unanimity about this and about the fact that the material should be surrendered.

MR. BALFEUR said that the question under consideration formed a parallel case with that relating to the surrender of ships, and the disposition of the aircraft should be decided on the same principles. He was informed by his experts that all aircraft and aircraft appliances and sheds, now in Germany, were military, as Germany had no commercial aircraft as yet.

M. SONNINO proposed that the third paragraph should be made to read as follows:—

“In particular, there will be included the following military and naval material”.

PRESIDENT WILSON, subsequently, proposed that the following phraseology should be accepted for the third paragraph of Article 46:—

“In particular, the material to be handed over will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or designed for military or naval aeronautical purposes”.

(This was agreed to.)

(Article 46 was adopted, paragraph 3 being altered to read:—

“In particular, the material to be handed over will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or designed for military or naval aeronautical purposes”).
President Wilson expressed his willingness to accept Article 47, but the German Government was in an unstable equilibrium, and supposing it were upset within three months, then the Allied and Associated Governments would presumably have to set up a new Government in Germany.

M. Clemenceau thought that the same remark would apply to all the Articles of the Convention.

M. Fromageot asked for a ruling as to the character of the document that the Conference wished to present to the Germans. If the Convention under discussion were to be considered merely as a set of military clauses for immediate execution by the Germans, and not as a Treaty of Peace, it was to be feared that when the Treaty of Peace was presented to Germany, she would argue that the clauses previously accepted had not been Peace conditions, and consequently were open to fresh discussions. On the other hand, if the Articles under consideration were to be considered as final Peace conditions, then it would be necessary for them to be ratified by the legislators of the various countries, parties to the agreement, and in that case he would suggest that Article 47 be made to read:

"After the expiration of a period of three months from the date of exchange of ratifications of present stipulations for German laws, etc."

President Wilson remarked that the same question arose in regard to Article 48, and asked that that Article be read before the whole question came under discussion.

(Article 48 was then read.)

President Wilson, continuing, said that the paragraph as it now read indicated that these terms would be part of the Armistice. But if they were to constitute the Preliminary Treaty of Peace, the wording was not correct. In this matter he found himself in considerable difficulty, and he would be compelled to seek legal advice. He had assumed that this preliminary Convention would only be temporary until the complete Treaty was prepared, and that it would have the character of a sort of exalted armistice, the terms being re-included in the formal Treaty. If this Preliminary Convention should have to be submitted to the Senate for a general discussion there, he knew from the usual slow processes of legislatures that it would be several months before it could be ratified.

Mr. Balfour expressed the view that the statements made by President Wilson were most important and serious. As he understood the situation, the policy accepted was that a Preliminary Peace should be made, each clause of which should be a part of the
final Act, so that by the settlement of the Preliminary Peace a great part of the final permanent Peace would actually have been conquered. It now appeared, however, that the American Constitution made that full programme impracticable.

President Wilson said he did not feel quite sure of his ground, and he proposed that the question be postponed until he could consult with the Constitutional lawyers, in whose opinion he had more confidence than in his own. For the present, it appeared to him that they would have to use the alternative phraseology proposed by M. Fromageot, namely:—“After the expiration of a period of three months from the date of exchange of ratifications of present stipulations for German laws, etc.”

(Articles 47 and 48 were reserved for further consideration.)

Mr. Balfour drew attention to the footnote of Article 49, and expressed the view that the note was not really relevant, as no express time limit had been fixed.

President Wilson said that while it was not specifically stated that any of the Commissions provided should have an indefinite duration, he thought it would be advisable to add a statement including the explanation made by Marshal Foch that these Commissions would not continue more than three months.

Marshal Foch stated that it appeared to him unnecessary to undertake such a contract with the Germans. They could agree to this among themselves.

Mr. Balfour called attention to the fact that some of the operations might take more than three months, such as the destruction of the naval works at Heligoland harbour. It appeared to him that provision would have to be made for supervision during an indefinite, not an eternal, period.

M. Clemenceau thought that some definite conclusion should be reached.

Mr. Balfour enquired whether it would not be necessary to continue to exercise supervision over the German Army and its armaments in order to ensure their maintenance in the status stipulated.

President Wilson held that supervision of that nature would become endless. He thought that the Allies should agree among themselves that these Commissions would cease to function when the terms had once been carried out; for example, as soon as the army had been actually reduced to 100,000 men.

Marshal Foch maintained that Articles 49 and 50 mutually explained one another.

Mr. Balfour thought that Article 49 included in general all the terms, and was not specifically limited by Article 50.
M. Orlando thought that a very important point had been raised and it was necessary that a distinction should be made. First of all, there were clauses the execution of which could be completed within a definite period, and it had been unanimously agreed that the Commissions of Control over the execution of these clauses would last during the time necessary for their execution. But there were also clauses the execution of which would extend over an indefinite period, and the most important of these seemed to be that Germany should not have an army exceeding 100,000 men. It was necessary, then, to know what control the Allies would establish to supervise the carrying out of these clauses operating during an indefinite period. Marshal Foch had said that the control of the Commissions would not be applied to the clauses having an indefinite period of execution. Article 49 should, therefore, be modified to conform with this interpretation and to make the distinction between the two kinds of stipulations clear. It remained, then, to determine what guarantee the Allies would have for the execution of the other stipulations. Commissions could not be charged with this duty, as Germany would, as a result, always remain under the control of such Commissions. He personally would not object to such a proposal, but he did not think it would be accepted. What guarantee would there then be? The League of Nations might be considered. One of the Allied Powers alone could not be charged with this duty since Germany had taken engagements towards all the Allies conjointly. Some Inter-Allied agency would, therefore, have to be constituted. He feared he might be accused of raising difficulties, but it seemed to him that these were questions which must be considered.

M. Clemenceau agreed that the question raised by M. Orlando was a very important one, but he thought that they were digressing from the question under consideration.

President Wilson suggested that "All Military, Naval and Air Clauses" should be substituted for "The Military, Naval and Air Clauses".

(This was agreed to.)

(Article 49 as amended was approved, to read as follows:—

"All Military, Naval and Air Clauses contained in the present stipulations for which a time limit is fixed, shall be executed by Germany under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the Allied and Associated Governments."

Article 50
(Article 50 was read and approved.)

Article 51
(Article 51 was read and approved.)

Article 52
(Article 52 was read and approved.)

Article 53
(Article 53 was read and approved.)
President Wilson said that these Articles, as at present drafted, contemplated the continuation of the Inter-Allied High Command during a period of three or four months after the signing of the Peace Preliminaries. He wished to enquire why the High Command should be continued when Commissions had been created whose function it would be to supervise the complete execution of the stipulations of the Treaty. He proposed, therefore, that the Military Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should represent the Allied and Associated Governments. The same remark applied to Article 55, where the words: “Allied and Associated Governments”, should be substituted for “Admiralties of the Allied Governments and the United States”.

(It was agreed:—

(1) That Article 54 should read: “The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Allied and Associated Governments in dealing with . . .”

(2) That Article 55 should read: “The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Allied Governments and the United States in dealing with . . .”

(3) That Article 56 should read: “The Aerial Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Allied and Associated Governments in dealing with . . .”)

(The Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace were accepted, subject to the following amendments and reservations:—

Section 1.

Article 3. Paragraph 2 to read:—“The number and strengths of the units of infantry . . . constitute maxima which must not be exceeded”.

Article 6. The following amended text was accepted, subject to such modifications as might be required when the territorial question relating to the future constitution of German territories on the Western bank of the Rhine came to be settled:—“The number of employés or officials of the German States, such as Customs House Officers, Forest Guards, Coastguards, must not exceed that of the employés or officials functioning in 1913.

The number of gendarmes and employés or officials of the local or municipal police, may only be increased to an extent corresponding to the increase of population since 1913 in the districts or municipalities in which they are employed. These employés and officials shall not be assembled for military training.”

Article 9. The word “not” to be substituted for “never” in the last line of the first paragraph.

Article 10. The second sentence to be omitted:—“All orders shall be notified to the Allied and Associated Governments and may not be carried out until after such notification”.

Article 11. The last sentence of the first paragraph to read as follows:—“This will also apply to any special plant intended for the
manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognised as necessary for the manufacture which is authorised.”

Article 12. The words “shall be” to be substituted for “is” in the first paragraph.

Article 13. Paragraph 2 to read:—“The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices”.

Article 15. The following amended text was accepted:—“The period of enlistment for non-commissioned officers and privates must be 12 consecutive years. The proportion of men discharged for any reason before expiration of the period of their enlistment must not exceed in any year 5 per cent of the total effectives fixed by the second paragraph of Article 2 of the present stipulations”.

Article 16. The fourth paragraph to be omitted. The fifth paragraph to be amended to read:—“The proportion of officers discharged for any reason must not exceed in any year 5 per cent of the total effectives of officers provided by Article 2, third paragraph, of the present stipulations”.

Section II.

Article 24. The last sentence of Article, viz: “All these vessels will be destroyed or broken up” to be deleted.

Article 25. Reserved for further consideration.

Article 32. The last three words, viz: “in German territory” to be deleted.

Article 33. The word “subsequently” to be substituted for “ultimately” in the last paragraph.

Article 34. The words “on account of ill-health” in paragraphs 1 and 3 to be deleted, paragraph 3 being amended to read:—“Officers belonging at the date of the signature of the present stipulations to the German Navy and not demobilised must engage to serve to the age of 45, unless discharged for sufficient reasons.”

Article 35. Reserved for further consideration.

Article 37. The last sentence of paragraph 2 to read:—“The German Government shall communicate forthwith particulars thereof to all the European Governments”.

Article 38. Reserved for further consideration.

Article 40. Reserved for further consideration.

Section III.

Article 42. This Article to commence:—“Within two months . . .”

Article 44. The following text was accepted:—“Until the complete evacuation of German territory by the Allied and Associated troops, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Germany the freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and of landing”.

Article 46. The third paragraph was amended to read as follows:—“In particular, the material to be handed over will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or designed for military or naval aeronautical purposes”.

Section IV.

Article 47. Reserved for further consideration.

Article 48. Reserved for further consideration.
Section V.

Article 49. Article 49 to be amended to read as follows:—"All Military, Naval and Air Clauses contained in the present stipulations for which a time limit is fixed, shall be executed by Germany under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the Allied and Associated Governments."

Article 54. This article to read:—"The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Allied and Associated Governments in dealing with . . ."

Article 55. This Article to read:—"The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Allied Governments and the United States in dealing with . . ."

Article 56. This Article to read:—"The Aerial Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Allied and Associated Governments in dealing with . . ."

2. Marshal Foch asked permission to draw the attention of the Conference to the situation in Poland. On the 2nd of January last the Allied and Associated Governments had decided to send to Poland a Mission to report on the situation and on the needs of that country. Mr. Noulens, in despatches dated the 5th, 8th, 11th and 12th March had, in the name of the Mission, drawn attention to the actual situation existing in Poland. The gravity of the situation was such that the very existence of this nation, which the Allied and Associated Governments had decided to recognise, to reconstitute and to assist, was in question. The most imminent danger related to the town of Lemberg which was infested by the Ukrainians, and whose fall would entail that of the Polish Government. Such an eventuality threatened to draw into anarchy a country menaced on three sides by the Germans, Bolsheviks and by the Ukrainians. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary to take immediate action, and the Allied and Associated Governments could no longer delay in arriving at a decision in order to ward off the grave peril which threatened Poland. Assistance must at once be sent to Lemberg. The possible measures included the transport to Lemberg of a part of the Polish troops at Odessa if the situation in that region made this possible; and the transport to Lemberg of one Polish regiment from France. The transport of these troops would be carried out over the Roumanian, Italian and Austrian railways and for this purpose an understanding would have to be reached by the Allied General Staffs. The force thus made available would, however, be largely strengthened by the support of the Roumanian Army, for which purpose a force of ten to twelve divisions at least could be obtained of good physique and good moral[e]. The Roumanian Government had, in principle, agreed to participate in the prepared operations on the condition that the Allied and Associated Governments would furnish the material which was lacking, namely: clothing, equipment and food. The assistance of the Roumanian Army should be accepted without
delay and without hesitation on account of its great value and on account of the proximity of Roumania to the theatre of operations. It was of the utmost importance that Roumania should be given, without delay, the assistance required, but in order to bring together the necessary resources concerted action between the Allied General Staffs was again necessary.

To sum up, the two countries, Poland and Roumania, with whom the Allies were tied, offered sufficient forces for the purpose required, provided that these troops received guidance and material assistance. Their combined action would constitute a most solid barrier against Bolshevism, which would otherwise triumph. The object in view would be realised as soon as the Allied Governments decided on a resolute policy, affirming their resolve to stop the progress of Bolshevism, and constituting for the purpose an Allied High Command, charged with the duty of supplying to Poland and to Roumania (and eventually to the other Governments in a position to act, such as Finland etc.) the necessary material aid, and with the duty of co-ordinating the action of these various Governments.

Mr. Lloyd George hoped the Conference would not accede to the proposals contained in the statement read by Marshal Foch as, he thought, it would merely mean giving support to the perpetration of a great mischief. The proposal at bottom merely meant the setting up of a great army for the eventual invasion of Russia. It would be agreed that Roumania had nothing whatever to do with Lemberg, but it was hoped that, once the Roumanian troops had been brought to that place, they would be available for operations against Russia. He was entirely opposed to any such operations which could only be carried out at the expense of the Allies. Even supposing the policy was correct, who was going to pay? Roumania could not finance their own justifiable military operations. The Poles were starving and unable to defend Lemberg against an untrained mob of Ukrainian rebels, unless they were organised, furnished with supplies, and paid by the Allies. He, therefore, personally would have nothing to do with the proposal which merely, being interpreted, meant that in the first place the Roumanians and the Poles would be assembled in Galicia and under the guise of relieving Lemberg, Russia would be invaded. Furthermore, the proposal suggested the transfer of troops from Odessa. Did the Conference fully realise what was happening in that region? It had been said that the Ukrainians possessed a powerful army, that they did not want the Bolsheviks, that they would be able in effect to roll the Bolsheviks back to Moscow. As a matter of fact, it appeared that the Allied troops, as well as the anti-Bolshevik Ukrainian troops, had actually been driven back to a narrow fringe in the south of the country. Kerison had been lost and the Bolsheviks were pressing on towards Odessa;
the whole of that grain district had, in fact, fallen into the hands of the Bolsheviks. In the face of that situation, it was now proposed to take all the forces from Odessa in order to take part in some quarrel at Lemberg. In his opinion, these proposals merely meant giving help to the Bolsheviks, since Petlura was fighting against the Bolsheviks and now it was proposed to destroy him.

In regard to the question of Lemberg, he would enquire whether any decision had been reached that the town should belong to Poland. In his opinion no decision had been reached by the Committee appointed to enquire into the frontiers of Poland. Why, therefore, should the Conference decide the question in favour of the Poles and against the Ukrainians before the question had been properly examined? Had the Poles felt very strongly on this question he thought they would have been able to defend themselves.

To sum up, he was entirely in favour of using all sources of persuasion in order to bring about the temporary settlement of the dispute between the Poles and the Ukrainians in the same way as had been done in the case of Teschen. But he was absolutely opposed to the idea of organizing armies, to the idea of sending Roumanians at the Allies’ expense to Lemberg, and to the idea of sending Haller’s Army, which was required to defend Poland, to Lemberg to fight questions of this kind. Consequently, he suggested that the proposal made by Marshal Foch should be negatived in so far as it related to military operations, and that persuasion should, in the meantime, be used pending a decision on the question of the frontiers of Poland. Apparently the Poles had a quarrel with the Ukrainians and an attempt was being made by them to grasp territory from the Ruthenians. No doubt the Polish troops would march against Lemberg, provided they were fed and paid by the Allies, but he personally would never agree to such a proposal.

**Marshal Foch** asked that the discussion should be brought back to the particular question under consideration. Today was the 17th March, a month in which the enemy generally prepared his offensive, a fact which was evidenced by the experience of previous years. Therefore, if the Conference would that day merely consider the Allied situation, and not that of the enemy which was unknown, the following conclusions would be reached.

In accordance with M. Noulens’ report, it would be admitted that the situation in Poland was very grave. Lemberg was about to fall, and if Lemberg fell the Polish Government would fall with it. That is to say, the Government would be wrecked at its birth, and the country, which it had been intended to re-constitute, would be threatened, by Germans, Bolsheviks and Ukrainians with the result that the creation of the Allies might only live a few days. To prevent the occurrence of this catastrophe, the Commission sent to
Poland by the Allied and Associated Governments had proposed that the Polish troops at Odessa and in France should be sent to Lemberg without delay. And, as Allied Commander-in-Chief, he had put forward proposals to give effect to the demands made by the Commission. He had accordingly proposed that arrangements should forthwith be made by the Allied General Staffs for the transportation of the above Polish troops across various territories, in order to assist in the defence of Lemberg, which would otherwise fall. The Commission had also reported that assistance could be given by Roumanian troops, who were only too anxious to give the help required, provided an understanding were reached between the Roumanian and Polish Governments. He (Marshal Foch) still took, as the basis of his proposals, the suggestions made by the Inter-Allied Commission which had been sent to Poland; and, in order to give effect to the recommendations of the Commission, he had merely formulated a scheme having as its object the continuation of the policy hitherto followed, namely: the creation of an independent Poland, and its support when threatened. The Roumanian Government, which was fighting on the Allied side, had agreed to send troops to Lemberg on condition of its receiving some assistance. The scheme he had proposed was a very moderate and restricted one; it was based on the recommendations made by the Polish Commission and it would work out successfully with the employment of only small military means, without great expense, and without undertaking any imprudent engagements. By the application of his scheme, a nucleus of resistance against the Bolsheviks would be created, and time would be gained for a further study of the situation. At the present moment, it was undeniable that the Bolsheviks were gaining ground everywhere in South Russia, and they were preparing a big attack on the Lower Dniester. Consequently, measures should forthwith be taken to put up a resistance to prevent the wings of the anti-Bolshevik armies being rolled up and the centre being pierced. It was with that object in view that he had proposed to constitute here an Inter-Allied staff to deal with this question with a view to the utilisation of all available means.

M. Pic hon drew attention to the fact that the Polish Commission, which had dealt with this particular question, had put forward certain definite proposals, which would appear to agree with what Mr. Lloyd George had said. Paragraph 3 of the Commission’s proposal, dated 14th March, 1919, read as follows:—

“3. Lastly, with the object of making a simultaneous diplomatic attempt to save Lemberg, it submits to the Supreme Council the proposal to enjoin the Ukrainian Government, through the intermediary of the Warsaw Commission to accept an armistice.

If this attempt is to have any chance of success, the armistice con-
ditions should, generally speaking, take the present situation into account, and more particularly in regard to the present possession of the oilfields."

In his opinion, in the manner above suggested, a solution might best be obtained. He thought if the Ukrainians were given the oilfields, they would be likely to accept an armistice. That was the proposal which had been put forward by General Barthélémy, and General Carton de Wiart, and had been accepted by all the experts, except Marshal Foch.

M. Cambon said that he was President of the Committee for Polish Affairs. Having heard General Barthélémy and General Carton de Wiart and Lieutenant Foster, his Committee had decided to adopt the recommendation just read by M. Pichon, which included the idea of an armistice. The Commission in Poland had recently visited General Petliura and had been somewhat badly received. In consequence the conclusion had been reached that the proposal for an armistice by itself would not in all probability satisfy the Ukrainians, unless some advantages were at the same time granted to them, such as the temporary cession of the oilfields. In addition, in order to make the acceptance of an armistice more certain, it would be necessary for Poland to be able to put forward some show of force. For that reason, in his opinion, the necessary help should be given to Poland by the immediate return of the Polish troops now in France.

M. Clemenceau enquired by what route the troops would be sent from France to Poland. He thought there would be some difficulty in sending them via Dantzig.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the difficulty was one of shipping. No ships were available unless each of the Allies agreed to make a contribution, as it was a question of withdrawing ships which would otherwise be employed for the transportation of Australian or American troops from France.

President Wilson enquired as to the advisability of communicating with the Allied Maritime Transport Council with a view to hastening the matter.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the shipping question was one which would have to be settled by the Governments concerned as matters of policy were involved, which the Allied Maritime Council could not settle. There was no spare shipping and consequently the ships required for Polish troops could only be obtained by the temporary withdrawal of ships at present employed for the transport of Allied and American homeward bound troops.

President Wilson enquired whether the Allied Maritime Council could not be asked to submit a memorandum showing what each
country was required to do, that is to say, to submit a scheme giving a definite quota of contribution.

(This was agreed to.)

M. CLEMENCEAU summing up, said that the proposal made by the Committee for Polish Affairs which read as follows should at present be accepted:—

"With the object of making a simultaneous diplomatic attempt to save Lemberg, it submits to the Supreme Council the proposal to enjoin the Ukrainian Government, through the intermediary of the Warsaw Commission to accept an armistice. If this attempt is to have any chance of success, the armistice conditions should, generally speaking, take the present situation into account, and more particularly in regard to the present possession of the oilfields".

(This was agreed to.)

MARSHAL FOCH proposed that the question of the transport of Polish troops from France and Odessa to Poland should be studied by an Allied General Staff. He also proposed, with the consent of the Conference, to study the possible utilisation of the Roumanian troops in Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the question to be settled was chiefly a financial one, as the employment of the Roumanian army would entail considerable expense.

MARSHAL FOCH pressed for a definite answer to his proposal. He asked, in the event of its acceptance, that a representative of each Government should be appointed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he agreed to accept the first part of Marshal Foch’s proposal, relating to the study of the question of the transport of Polish troops from France and Odessa to Poland; but he declined to agree to the study of the second proposition to which he was entirely opposed in principle. He could not agree to instruct the Allied Commander-in-Chief to study the question of attacking the Ukrainians at Lemberg, whilst at the same time, General Franchet d’Esperey was being instructed to do all he could to help the Ukrainians to fight against the Bolsheviks at Odessa.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed his agreement with Mr. Lloyd George’s views.

M. ORLANDO said that he would also accept Marshal Foch’s first proposal.

(It was agreed:—

(1) To call upon the Allied Maritime Transport Council to submit a scheme showing what should be the contribution in shipping of each of the Allied and Associated Governments for the transport of General Haller’s troops from France to Dantzig.

(2) To enjoin the Ukrainian Government through the intermediary
of the Warsaw Commission to accept an armistice. The armistice conditions should, generally speaking, take the present situation into account and more particularly in regard to the present possession of the oilfields.

(3) To authorise Marshal Foch to study the possibility of the transport of Polish troops to Poland from France and Odessa.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 18th March, 1919.

Annexure “A”

Naval, Military and Air Conditions of Peace

SECTION I.—Military Clauses

CHAPTER I.—EFFECTIVES AND CADRES OF THE GERMAN ARMY

ARTICLE 1

Within two months of the signature of the present stipulations the German military forces shall be demobilised to the extent prescribed hereinafter.

ARTICLE 2

The German Army must not comprise more than seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry.

In no case must the total number of effectives in the army of the States constituting Germany ever exceed 100,000 men, including officers and establishment of depots. The army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers.

The total effective strength of officers, including the personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed 4,000.

ARTICLE 3

Divisions and Army Corp Headquarters staffs shall be organised in accordance with Table No. 1. annexed hereto.

The number and strengths of the units of infantry, artillery, engineers, technical services and troops laid down in the Table constitute maxima which must never be exceeded.

The following units may each have their own depot:

- An infantry regiment;
- A cavalry regiment;
- A regiment of Field Artillery;
- A battalion of Pioneers.
The divisions must not be grouped under more than two army corps headquarter staffs.

The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped or of other organisations for the command of troops or for preparation for war is forbidden.

The Great German General Staff and all similar organisations shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form.

The officers, or persons in the position of officers, in the Ministries of War in the different States in Germany and in the Administrations attached to them, must not exceed three hundred in number and are included in the maximum strength laid down in Article 2, 2nd paragraph, of the present stipulations.

**Article 5**

Army administrative services consisting of civilian personnel not included in the number of effectives prescribed by the present stipulations will have such personnel reduced in each class to one-tenth of that laid down in the Budget of 1913.

**Article 6**

(Reserved by the Supreme War Council.)

**CHAPTER II.—ARMAMENT, MunITIONS AND MATERIAL**

**Article 7**

At the expiration of two months from the signature of the present stipulations the German army must not possess an armament greater than the amounts fixed in Table No. 2, with the exception of an optional increase not exceeding one-twenty-fifth part for small arms and one-fiftieth part for guns, which shall be exclusively used to provide for such eventual replacements as may be necessary.

**Article 8**

At the expiration of two months from the signature of the present stipulations, the stock of munitions which the German army may have at its disposal shall not exceed the amounts fixed in Table No. 3.

Within the same period the German Government will store these stocks at points to be notified to the Allied and Associated Governments. The German Government is forbidden to establish any other stocks, depots or reserves of munitions.
THE COUNCIL OF TEN

ARTICLE 9

The number and calibre of the guns constituting, at the date of
the signature of the present stipulations, the armament of the for-
tified works, fortresses, and land or coast forts which Germany is
allowed to retain, will be immediately notified by the German Gov-
ernment to the Allied and Associated Governments, and will consti-
tute maximum amounts which may never be exceeded.

Within two months from the signature of the present stipulations,
the maximum stock of ammunition for these guns will be reduced to,
and maintained at, the following uniform rates:—1,500 rounds per
piece for those the calibre of which is 10.5 cm, and under: 500 rounds
per piece for those of higher calibre.

ARTICLE 10

The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material, shall
only be carried out in factories or works, the location of which shall
be communicated to the Allied and Associated Governments, and the
number of which they retain the right to restrict. All orders shall
be notified to the Allied and Associated Governments, and may not
be carried out until after such notification.

Within three months from the signature of the present stipulations,
all other establishments for the manufacture, preparation, storage or
design of arms, munitions, or any war material whatever shall be
closed. The same applies to all arsenals except those used as depots
for the authorised stocks of munitions. Within the same period the
personnel of these arsenals will be dismissed.

ARTICLE 11

Within two months from the signature of the present stipulations,
German arms, munitions and war material, including anti-aircraft
material, existing in Germany in excess of the quantities allowed,
will be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Governments to be
destroyed or rendered useless. This will also apply to special plant
intended for the manufacture of military material, except such as
may be recognised as necessary for manufacture which is authorised.

The surrender in question will be effected at such points in German
territory as may be selected by the Allied and Associated Govern-
ments.

Within the same period arms, munitions and war material, includ-
ing anti-aircraft material, of origin other than German in what-
ever state they may be, will be delivered to the Allied and Associated
Governments, who will decide as to their disposal.
ARTICLE 12

Importation into Germany of arms, munitions and war material of every kind is strictly prohibited.

The same applies to the manufacture for and export of arms, munitions and war material of every kind to foreign countries.

ARTICLE 13

The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany.

The same applies to materials for the manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices.

The manufacture and the importation into Germany of armoured cars, tanks and all similar constructions suitable for use in war are also prohibited.

CHAPTER III.—RECRUITING AND MILITARY TRAINING

ARTICLE 14

Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in Germany.

The German Army may only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment.

ARTICLE 15

The period of enlistment for non-commissioned officers and privates must be twelve consecutive years.

Until the expiration of his period of enlistment no non-commissioned officer or private may leave the Army except for reasons of health and after having been first finally discharged as unfit for service.

The proportion of men so discharged must not exceed in any year five per cent of the total effectives fixed by Article 2, second paragraph, of the present stipulations.

ARTICLE 16

The officers who are retained in the Army must undertake the obligation to serve in it up to the age of forty-five years at least.

Officers newly appointed must undertake to serve on the active list for twenty-five consecutive years at least.

Officers who have previously belonged to any formations whatever of the Army, and who are not retained in the units allowed to be maintained, must not take part in any military exercise whether
theoretical or practical, and will not be under any military obligations whatever.

No officer may leave the Army except for reasons of health and after having been first finally discharged as unfit for service.

The proportion of officers so discharged must not exceed in any year five percent of the total effectives of officers provided by Article 2, third paragraph, of the present stipulations.

**Article 17**

On the expiration of two months from the signature of the present stipulations there must only exist in Germany the number of military schools which is absolutely indispensable for the recruitment of the officers of the units allowed. These schools will be exclusively intended for the recruitment of officers of each arm, in the proportion of one school per arm.

The number of pupils admitted to attend the courses of the said schools will be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled in the cadres of officers. The pupils and the cadres will be reckoned in the effectives fixed by Article 2, second and third paragraphs, of the present stipulations.

Consequently, and during the period fixed above, all military academies or similar institutions of the German States as well as the different military schools for officers, student officers ("Aspiranten"), cadets, non-commissioned officers or student non-commissioned officers ("Aspiranten"), other than the schools above provided for, will be abolished.

**Article 18**

Educational establishments, the universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs, and generally speaking associations of every description, whatever be the age of their members, must not occupy themselves with any military matters. In particular they will be forbidden to instruct or exercise their members, or to allow them to be instructed or exercised, in the profession or use of arms.

These societies, associations, educational establishments and universities must have no connection with the Ministries of War or any other military authority.

**Article 19**

All measures of mobilisation or appertaining to mobilisation are forbidden.

In no case must formations, administrative services or General Staffs include supplementary cadres.
CHAPTER IV.—FORTIFICATIONS

ARTICLE 20

Within three months of the date of the signature of the present stipulations all fortified works, fortresses and field works situated on Germany’s territory to the west of a line drawn fifty miles to the east of the Rhine will be disarmed and dismantled.

The construction of any new fortification, whatever its nature and importance, is forbidden in this zone. The fortified works of the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany will be maintained in their existing state.

TABLE No. 1

STATE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTER STAFFS AND OF INFANTRY AND CAVALRY DIVISIONS

(These tabular statements do not form a fixed establishment to be imposed on Germany, but the figures contained in them (number of units and strengths) represent maximum figures which should not in any case be exceeded.)

I. ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Maximum No. Authorised</th>
<th>Maximum strengths of each unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Corps Headquarters Staffs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of Headquarters Staffs</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Max. No. of such units in a single division</th>
<th>Maximum Strengths of each unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Q. of an Infantry Div.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Q. of Divisional Infantry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Q. of Divisional Artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment of Infantry. Each Regiment comprises 3 Battalions of Infantry. Each Battalion comprises 3 companies of Infantry &amp; 1 machine gun Company.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench Mortar Company</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisional Squadron</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery Regiment. Each Regiment comprises 3 groups of artillery. Each group comprises:—3 batteries.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pioneer Battalion. This Battn. comprises:—2 companies of pioneers, 1 Pontoon detachment, 1 searchlight section.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Detachment: This detachment comprises:—1 telephone detachment, 1 listening section, 1 carrier pigeon section.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisional Medical Service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks and Convoys</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for Infantry Division</td>
<td></td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table No. 1—Continued

**III. Establishment of a Cavalry Division**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Max. No. of such units in a single division</th>
<th>Maximum Strengths of each unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters of a Cavalry Division</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each Regiment comprises 4 Squadrons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse Artillery Group (3 Batteries)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for Cavalry Division</td>
<td></td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table No. 2

**Tabular Statement of Armament Establishment for a Maximum of 7 Infantry Divisions, 3 Cavalry Divisions and 2 Army Corps Headquarter Staffs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Infantry Division</th>
<th>For 7 Infantry Divisions</th>
<th>Cavalry Division</th>
<th>For 3 Cavalry Divisions</th>
<th>2 Army Corps Headquarters</th>
<th>Total of Columns 2, 4, and 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy machine guns</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>This establishment must be drawn from the increased armaments of the divisional infantry.</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light machine guns</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Trench Mortars</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light trench Mortars</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>189</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7 cm. guns</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5 cm. Howitzers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table No. 3

**Maximum Stocks Authorised**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maximum - number of arms authorised</th>
<th>Establishment per unit</th>
<th>Maximum Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>400 rounds</td>
<td>40,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbines</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Machine guns</td>
<td>792</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>8,000 rounds</td>
<td>15,408,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Trench Mortars</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>600 rounds</td>
<td>25,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Trench Mortars</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>800 rounds</td>
<td>151,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery (7.7 cm. guns)</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>1,000 rounds</td>
<td>204,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5 cm. Howitzers</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>800 rounds</td>
<td>67,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section II.—Naval Clauses

Article 21

After the expiration of a period of two months from the signature of the present stipulations the German naval forces in commission must not exceed:

6 battleships of the “Deutschland” or “Lothringen” type,
6 light-cruisers,
12 destroyers,
12 torpedo boats,

or an equal number of ships constructed to replace them as provided in Article 30.

No submarines are to be included.

All other warships, except where there is provision to the contrary in the present stipulations, must be placed in reserve or devoted to commercial purposes.

Article 22

Until the completion of the minesweeping prescribed by the present stipulations (Article 33) Germany will keep in commission such number of minesweeping vessels as may be fixed by the Allies and the United States of America.

Article 23

After the expiration of a period of two months the total personnel of the German navy, including the manning of the fleet, coast defences, signal stations, administration and other land services, must not exceed 15,000, including officers and men of all grades and corps.

The total strength of officers and warrant officers must not exceed 1,500.

Within two months from the signature of the present stipulations, the personnel in excess of the above strength shall be demobilised.

No naval or military corps or reserve force in connection with the navy may be organised without being included in the above strength.

Article 24

From the date of the present stipulations all the German surface warships which are not in German ports cease to belong to Germany, who renounces all rights over them.

Vessels which, in compliance with the armistice, are now interned in the ports of the Allies, are declared to be finally surrendered.

Vessels which are now interned in neutral ports will be there
surrendered to the Governments of the Allies and the United States of America. The German Government must address a notification to that effect to the neutral Powers on the signature of the present stipulations. (All these vessels will be destroyed or broken up.)

**ARTICLE 25 (reserved)**

Within a period of two months from the date of the present stipulations, the German surface warships enumerated below will be sunk. These warships will have been disarmed as provided in Article 23 of the Armistice dated 11 November, 1918. Nevertheless they must have all their guns on board.

These vessels will be sunk in the presence and under the control of representatives of the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America and in such place as shall be fixed by the said Governments.

**Battleships**

Oldenburg  Posen
Thüringen  Westfalen
Ostfriesland  Rheinland
Helgoland  Nassau

**Light-Cruisers**

Stettin  Strassburg
Danzig  Augsburg
München  Kolberg
Lübeck  Stuttgart

and in addition forty-two modern destroyers and fifty modern torpedo boats, as chosen by the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America.

**ARTICLE 26**

On the signature of the present stipulations the German Government must undertake, under the supervision of the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America, the breaking-up of all the German surface warships now under construction.

**ARTICLE 27**

The German auxiliary cruisers and Fleet auxiliaries, of which the list is annexed to the present section, will be disarmed and treated as merchant ships.
ARTICLE 28

On the expiration of one month from the date of the present stipulations all German submarines, submarine salvage vessels and docks for submarines, including the tubular dock, must have been handed over to the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America.

Such of these submarines, vessels and docks as are considered by the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America to be fit to proceed under their own power or to be towed shall be taken by the German Government into such Allied ports as have been indicated (there to be destroyed or broken up).

The remainder, and also those in course of construction, shall be broken up entirely by the German Government under the supervision of the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America. The breaking-up must be completed within three months at the most after the signature of the present stipulations.

ARTICLE 29

Articles, machinery and material arising from the breaking-up of German warships of all kinds, whether surface vessels or submarines, may not be used except for purely industrial and commercial purposes. They may not be sold or disposed of to foreign countries.

ARTICLE 30

Germany is forbidden to construct or acquire any warships other than those intended to replace the units in commission provided for in Article 21 of the present stipulations.

The vessels-of-war intended for replacement purposes as above shall not exceed the following displacement:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armoured ships</td>
<td>10,000 tons,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light-cruisers</td>
<td>6,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>800 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo boats</td>
<td>200 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Except where a ship has been lost, units of the different classes shall only be replaced at the end of a period of 20 years in the case of battleships and cruisers, 15 years for destroyers and torpedo boats, counting from the launching of the ship.

ARTICLE 31

The construction and acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Germany.
ARTICLE 32

The vessels-of-war in commission of the German fleet must only have on board or in reserve the allowance of arms, munitions and war materials fixed by the Governments of the Allies and the United States of America.

Within a month from the fixing of the quantities as above, arms, munitions and war material of all kinds, including mines and torpedoes, now in the hands of the German Government and in excess of the said quantities, shall be surrendered to the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America at places to be indicated by them. (Such arms, munitions and war material will be destroyed or rendered useless.)

All other stocks, depots or reserves of arms, munitions or naval war material of all kinds are forbidden.

The manufacture and the export of these articles to foreign countries shall be forbidden in German territory.

ARTICLE 33

On the signature of the present stipulations, Germany will forthwith sweep up the mines in the following areas in the North Sea to the eastward of longitude 4°00'E. of Greenwich:

(a) between parallels of latitude 53°00'N. and 59°00'N.
(b) to the northward of latitude 60°30'N.

Germany must keep these areas free from mines.

Germany must also sweep and keep free from mines such areas in the Baltic as may ultimately be notified by the Governments of the Allies and of the United States of America.

ARTICLE 34

(1) The personnel of the German navy shall be recruited entirely by voluntary engagement entered into for a minimum period of

25 consecutive years for officers and warrant officers,
12 consecutive years for petty officers and men.

The number engaged to replace those discharged on account of ill-health must not exceed five per cent, per annum of the totals laid down in this section (Article 23).

(2) The personnel discharged from the Navy must not receive any kind of naval or military training or undertake any further service in the Navy or Army.

(3) Officers belonging at the date of the signature of the present stipulations to the German Navy and not demobilised must engage to serve till the age of 45, unless discharged on account of ill-health.
(4) No officer or man of the German Mercantile Marine shall receive any training in the Navy.

Additional Articles

**ARTICLE 35**

*Heligoland*

The fortifications, military establishments, and harbours of the Islands of Heligoland and Dune shall be destroyed under the supervision of the Allied Governments, by German labor and at the expense of Germany, within a period to be determined by the Allied Governments.

The term "harbours" shall include the north-east mole; the west wall; the outer and inner breakwaters and reclamation works within them; and all naval and military works, fortifications and buildings, constructed or under construction, between lines connecting the following positions taken from British Admiralty chart No. 120 of 19 April, 1918:

(a) lat. 54°10'49'' N., long. 7°53'39'' E.
(b) 54°10'35'' N., 7°54'18'' E.
(c) 54°10'14'' N., 7°54'00'' E.
(d) 54°10'17'' N., 7°53'37'' E.
(e) 54°10'44'' N., 7°53'26'' E.

**ARTICLE 36**

*Routes Into the Baltic*

In order to ensure free passage into the Baltic to all nations, Germany shall not erect any fortifications in the area comprised between latitudes 55°27'N. and 54°00'N. and longitudes 9°99'E. and 16°00'E. of the meridian of Greenwich, not instal any guns commanding the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic. The fortifications now existing in this area shall be demolished and the guns removed under the supervision of the Allied Governments and in periods to be fixed by them.

The German Government shall place at the disposal of the Allies and of the United States of America all hydrographical information now in its possession concerning the channels and adjoining waters between the Baltic and the North Sea.
ARTICLE 37

Coast Defences

All fortified works and fortifications, other than those mentioned in Articles 35 and 36, now established within fifty kilometres of the German coast or on German islands off that coast shall be considered as of a defensive nature and may remain in their existing condition. No new fortifications shall be constructed within these limits.

The armament of these defences shall not exceed, as regards the number and calibre of guns, those in position at the date of the signature of the present stipulations. The German Government shall communicate forthwith particulars thereof to the Governments of the Allies and the United States of America.

On the expiration of a period of two months from the signature of the present stipulations the stocks of ammunition for these guns shall be reduced to and maintained at a maximum figure of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rounds per piece</th>
<th>Calibre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>for 3-inch and under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>for over 3-inch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARTICLE 38

Kiel Canal

(Reserved.)

ARTICLE 39

Wireless Telegraphy

Until the Treaty of Peace the German high-power W/T stations at Nauen, Hanover and Berlin shall not be used for the transmission of messages relative to naval, military or political affairs in Germany, or any State which has been allied to Germany in the war, without the assent of the Governments of the Allies and the United States of America. These stations may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America, who will decide the wavelength to be used.

Until the Treaty of Peace Germany shall not build any more high-power W/T stations in her own territory or that of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey.
### Article 40

**Submarine Cables**

(Reserved.)

**Annex**

(See Article 27.)

**German Auxiliary Cruisers and Fleet Auxiliaries**

*Interned in neutral countries.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Berlin</th>
<th>Seydlitz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Santa Fe</td>
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### Section III.—Air Clauses

**Article 41**

The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces.

Germany may, during a period not extending beyond October 1st, 1919, maintain a maximum number of one hundred seaplanes or flying boats, which shall be exclusively employed in searching for submarine mines, shall be furnished with the necessary equipment for this purpose, and shall in no case carry arms, munitions or bombs of any nature whatever. In addition to the engines installed in the seaplanes or flying boats above mentioned, one spare engine may be provided for each engine of each of these craft.

No dirigible shall be kept.

**Article 42**

Within one month from the signature of the present stipulations the personnel of the air forces on the rolls of the German land and sea forces shall be demobilised. Up to the 1st October, 1919, however,
Germany may keep and maintain a total number of one thousand men including officers, for the whole of the cadres and personnel, flying and non-flying, of all formations and establishments.

**Article 43**

No aviation ground or shed for dirigibles will be maintained or established:—

1. to the east of the Rhine, within a distance of 150 kilometres from that river;
2. to the west of the eastern frontier of Germany, within a distance of 150 kilometres from that frontier;
3. to the north of the southern frontier of Germany within a distance of 150 kilometres from the frontiers of Italy and Czecho-Slovakia.

All aviation grounds now existing in the zones defined above will be immediately put out of use. The sheds will be dismantled and the earth ploughed up. The work of putting these out of use must be completed within one month from the signature of the present stipulations.

**Article 44 (Reserved)**

Germany will allow to all Allied aircraft free passage through the air, free transit, and the right to land on her territory, until the complete evacuation of German territory by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers.

**Article 45**

The manufacture and importation of aeroplanes, parts of aircraft, seaplanes, flying boats or dirigibles, and of engines for aeroplanes, shall be forbidden in all German territory until the signature of the final Treaty of Peace.

**Article 46**

On the signature of the present stipulations, all military and naval aeronautical material, except the machines mentioned in Article 1, second and third paragraphs, must be delivered to the Allied and Associated Governments. Delivery must be effected at such places as the Allied and Associated Governments may select and must be completed within three months.

In particular there will be included in this material:—

Complete aeroplanes and seaplanes, as well as those being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Dirigibles able to take the air, being manufactured, repaired or assembled. Plant for the manufacture of hydrogen. Dirigible sheds and shelters of every sort for aeroplanes.
Pending their delivery, dirigibles will, at the expense of Germany, be maintained inflated with hydrogen; the plant for the manufacture of hydrogen, as well as the sheds for dirigibles, may, at the discretion of the Allied and Associated Powers, be left to Germany until the time when the dirigibles are handed over.

- Engines for aeroplanes.
- Nacelles and fuselages.
- Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb dropping apparatus, torpedo dropping apparatus, synchronization apparatus, aiming apparatus).
- Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs, loaded or unloaded, stocks or explosives or material for their manufacture).
- Instruments for use on aircraft.
- Wireless apparatus, and photographic or cinematograph apparatus for use on aircraft.
- Detached parts connected with any of the preceding categories.

The material referred to above shall not be removed without special permission from the Allied and Associated Governments.

**SECTION IV.—General Articles**

**ARTICLE 47**

After the expiration of a period of three months from the signature of the present stipulations the German laws must have been modified and shall be maintained in conformity with the preceding articles. Within the same period all the administrative or other measures relating to the execution of the present stipulations must have been taken.

**ARTICLE 48**

The Armistice of November 11, 1918, and the Conventions subsequent thereto remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the present stipulations.

**SECTION V.—Inter-Allied Commissions of Control**

**ARTICLE 49**

The military, naval, and air clauses contained in the present stipulations shall be executed by Germany under the Control of Inter-Allied Commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the Allied and Associated Governments.

**ARTICLE 50**

The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control will be specially charged with the duty of seeing to the complete execution of the works of de-
struction demolition and rendering things useless to be carried out at the expense of the German Government in accordance with the present stipulation.

They will communicate to the German authorities the decisions which the allied and Associated Governments have reserved the right to take, or which the execution of the military, naval and air clauses may necessitate.

**Article 51**

The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control may establish their organisations at the seat of the central German Government.

They shall be entitled as often as they think desirable to proceed to any point whatever in German territory, or to send Sub-Commissions, or to authorise one or more of their members to go to any such point.

**Article 52**

The German Government must give all necessary facilities for the accomplishment of their missions to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control and to their members.

It shall attach a qualified representative to each Inter-Allied Commission of Control, for the purpose of receiving the communications which the Commission may have to address to the German Government and to supply or procure for the Commission all information or documents which may be required.

The German Government must in all cases furnish at its own cost all labour and material required to effect the deliveries and the works of destruction, demolition, dismantling and of rendering things useless provided for in the present stipulations.

**Article 53**

The cost of maintenance of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control, and the expenditure incurred by them in the execution of their duties, shall be borne by Germany.

**Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control**

**Article 54**

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Inter-Allied High Command in dealing with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the military clauses. In particular it will be charged with the duty of receiving from the German Government the notifications relating to the location of the stocks and depots of munitions, the armament of the
fortified works, fortresses, and forts which Germany is allowed to retain, and the location of the works or factories for the production of arms, munitions and war material and their operations.

It will take delivery of the arms, munitions, and war material, will select the points where such delivery is to be effected, and will supervise the works of destruction, demolition and rendering things useless to be carried out in accordance with the present stipulations.

The German Government must furnish to the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and documents as the latter may deem necessary to ensure the complete execution of the military clauses, and in particular all legislative and administrative documents and regulations.

**NAVAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL**

**Article 55**

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Admiralties of the Allied Governments and the United States in dealing with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Naval Clauses.

In particular it will be its special duty to proceed to the building yards and to supervise the breaking up of the ships which are under construction there, to take delivery of all surface ships or submarines, salvage ships, docks and the tubular dock, and to supervise the destruction and breaking up provided for.

The German Government must furnish to the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and documents as the Commission may deem necessary to ensure the complete execution of the Naval Articles, in particular the designs of the war ships, the composition of their armaments, the details and models of the guns, munitions, torpedoes, mines, explosives, wireless telegraphic apparatus and in general, everything relating to Naval War Material, as well as all legislative or administrative documents or regulations.

**AERONAUTICAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL**

**Article 56**

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Inter-Allied High Command in dealing with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Air Clauses.

In particular it will be charged with making an inventory of the aeronautical material existing in German territory, of inspecting aero-
plane, balloon and motor manufactories, and factories producing arms, munitions and explosives capable of being used by aircraft and visiting all aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks and depots, of authorising, where necessary, a removal of material and of taking delivery of such materials.

The German Government must furnish to the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control, all such information and legislative administrative or other documents which the Commission may consider necessary to ensure the complete execution of the Air Clauses, and in particular a list of the personnel belonging to all the German Air Services, and of the existing material, as well as of that in process of manufacture or on order, and a list of all establishments working for aviation, of their positions, and of all sheds and landing grounds.
Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 19th March, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
President Wilson
Hon. R. Lansing
Secretary
Mr. A. H. Frazier

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.
Secretaries
Sir P. Loraine

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Bearn
Lieut. de Percin

ITALY
H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele
M. Brambilla

JAPAN
H. E. Marquis Salonji
H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. M. Matsui

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
General Tasker H. Bliss
Dr. I. Bowman
Professor Lord
Captain W. C. Farabee

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe, K.C.B.
Mr. H. W. Malkin
Mr. J. J. Paton
Lieut. Col. F. H. Kisch, D.S.O.

FRANCE
Marshal Foch
General Weygand
General Le Rond
M. Jules Cambon
M. Tardieu
M. Hermitte
M. Degrand

ITALY
Marquis della Torretta

JAPAN
M. Nagaoka
M. Ashida

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . . Col. U. S. Grant
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . . . . . Capt. E. Abraham
FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt. A. Portier
ITALY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lieut. Zanchi

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux

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1. After some discussion it was agreed that this question could not be dealt with at once, but should be discussed on Friday.

2. M. Cambon said that the Committee over which he presided had prepared two documents. One was a telegram to be sent by the Supreme Council to the President of the Allied Commission at Warsaw, and the second a declaration by the Allied and Associated Powers addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian troops in Eastern Galicia (for text see Annexure "A"). The Committee, however, had on the 18th March heard Dr. Lord, the American delegate on the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw. He was of opinion that the Warsaw Commission would not be able to bring about an armistice between the Poles and Ukrainians. He suggested that the Warsaw Commission should be asked merely to bring about a cessation of hostilities and that the conclusion of an armistice should be undertaken at Paris under the direct authority of the Supreme Council of the Conference, acting through the Polish and Ukrainian representatives at present there. The Committee therefore recommended that the Supreme Council should hear the views of Dr. Lord. If these views were adopted the two documents above mentioned would have to be modified.

(After a short discussion it was agreed that Dr. Lord should be heard and that Marshal Foch should be summoned to attend the discussion.)

Dr. Lord said that, before explaining the proposals he had to make, he thought it was his duty to state that the views he was about to express were personal to himself. As a Member of the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw he was aware of the views held by his colleagues. Since his return to Paris, however, he had come to the conclusion that vigorous action, in other words military action, as recommended by the Commission, could not be undertaken. He had therefore come to think that diplomatic means of putting an end to the conflict must be sought. Dr. Lord then set forth the following proposals:

1. That the Conference send an urgent invitation to the Poles and Ukrainians to agree to an immediate suspension of hostilities.
2. That this suspension of hostilities be effected through a truce based substantially on the existing military status quo, but under conditions which would insure the security in Polish hands of the city of Lemberg and of the railway connecting Lemberg with Przemyśl.
3. That in case both belligerent parties agree to an immediate truce, they should be invited to send representatives to Paris to discuss with an interallied commission appointed for this purpose the terms of an armistice which should last until the final settlement of the Conference of the territorial questions pending in Eastern Galicia.
4. That the armistice as finally fixed by the interallied commission after due consultation with Polish and Ukrainian representatives should be submitted to the Conference, and, if approved by it, should then be communicated to the belligerent parties as a mediatary arrangement proposed by the Conference.

The foregoing recommendations were based principally on the following:

(a) That it is indispensable to secure an immediate cessation of hostilities, especially in view of the grave situation at Lemberg, the imminent fall of which may involve the most disastrous consequences upon the whole political situation in Poland.

(b) That this termination of hostilities ought if possible to be obtained without the need of resorting to force.

(c) That such a peaceful solution of the question can probably be attained only by the direct intervention and by the moral authority of the Conference.

Recommendation 1.

It is recommended that the Conference send an urgent invitation to the Poles and Ukrainians to agree to an immediate suspension of hostilities.

The interallied Commission at Warsaw has already attempted to establish such a truce, and has met with a severe check. It would seem useless to direct this Commission to make a second attempt of the same kind. After all that has happened, it would probably be unable to obtain the agreement of the Ukrainians. Moreover, the delay incidental to the trip from Warsaw to Lemberg and the necessary discussions with the Ukrainians would probably consume so much time that Lemberg would have fallen before anything was arranged. The only way to secure an immediate result, and one which may perhaps avert the fall of Lemberg, is for the Conference to intervene with all the moral authority it possesses, by means of telegrams to be dispatched immediately and simultaneously to the two belligerents.

Recommendation 2.

It is recommended that this suspension of hostilities be effected through a truce based substantially on the existing military status quo but under conditions which would insure the security in Polish hands of the city of Lemberg and of the railway connecting Lemberg with Przemysl.

It is suggested that the truce signed between the Poles and the Ukrainians on the 24th February under the mediation of the Interallied Commission of Warsaw (a copy of which is here appended (Annexure B)), might serve substantially as the basis for a new truce. It is necessary, however, to stipulate expressly that the city
of Lemberg and the railway which feeds it should be left in Polish possession. After the citizens of Lemberg have defended themselves with such determination for four months against the Ukrainians, it seems impossible to hand over the city to its besiegers, or to deprive it of its food supply, during the period of the armistice.

If both belligerents expressed their agreement to an immediate suspension of hostilities, representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments could promptly be sent to Lemberg to conclude the truce, but the Conference ought first to obtain the agreement to an immediate truce before any Interallied Commission on the spot were called into action.

Recommendation 3.

It is recommended that in case both belligerent parties agree to an immediate truce, they should be invited to send representatives to Paris to discuss with an interallied commission appointed for this purpose the terms of an armistice which should last until the final settlement by the Conference of the territorial questions pending in Eastern Galicia.

It appears indispensable that the negotiations for an armistice should be carried on in Paris under the supervision and with the direct authority of the Conference, rather than by an interallied commission on the spot. For the Ukrainians, who have hitherto been the refractory party in this dispute, have already dealt with a number of interallied commissions, have refused to accept their proposals, and in all probability will continue to refuse so long as they dare to do so, a commission which has no means at its disposal except persuasion will almost certainly be unable to effect anything.

There would seem to be only two means of escaping from this dilemma; either the mediating powers must use force to impose their terms, and this everyone is anxious to avoid; or else the powers must call into play all the moral authority they possess, and this can be attained only by placing the mediating action under the most direct supervision and sanction of the Conference.

The transfer of the proceedings to Paris would also have this great advantage, that the Ukrainians are especially anxious to have a representation here, a representation which, once the armistice was disposed of, might then have the opportunity to lay before the Powers the desires of the Ukrainian people with regard to the definite solution of the territorial questions affecting them. Perhaps the surest means of securing their acceptance of a truce and later of an armistice is to be found precisely in the opportunity here offered them to secure a hearing before the Conference.

At the same time knowledge could be conveyed to them that if they refused to defer to the wishes of the Powers with regard to an
armistice, they would then be excluded from a hearing on the far more fundamental questions so long as they remained obdurate.

Moreover the variety and difficulty of the problems connected with this negotiation, involving as it does, questions of high policy on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments, render it particularly desirable that the negotiations should be conducted here rather than by a commission remote from Paris and imperfectly informed as to the desires and intentions of the Powers.

It is suggested that the negotiation of an armistice at Paris might be entrusted to the Commission on Polish Affairs, who are in possession of sufficient data to enable them, in consultation with Polish and Ukrainian representatives, to arrange an armistice here as easily as it could be done at Lemberg.

**Recommendation 4.**

It is recommended that the armistice as finally fixed by the inter-allied commission after due consultation with the Polish and Ukrainian Representatives should be submitted to the Conference, and, if approved by it, should then be communicated to the belligerent parties as a mediatory arrangement proposed by the Conference.

A difficulty which has lamed every previous effort at mediation in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict has been the uncertainty whether the terms proposed by the mediators had the sanction of the Great Powers. It is indispensable that the armistice conditions to be arranged in the new negotiations should be issued only after receiving the most careful attention and approval of the Conference. Nothing but the expressed sanction of the Conference itself could have weight enough to extort the necessary sacrifices from both the belligerents.

It would seem that the Conference could put forth these armistice conditions by way of friendly mediation without committing itself to imposing them by force in case of refusal. The conditions should be supported by the assurance that a belligerent who refused to accept them need expect no recognition and no hearing from the Conference.

Dr. Lord added that it was perhaps hardly necessary to emphasise the importance to the present Polish Government of holding Lemberg. The situation was so critical that some immediate action must be taken. Heretofore Lemberg had held out because the Poles had been able to operate the railroad from Przemysl; but this had been cut, and he had been told when there that Lemberg had provisions enough for only 8 days after suspension of the railroad traffic. These 8 days were now nearly passed. It was universally acknowledged that M. Paderewski’s Government could not survive the loss of Lemberg. On the other hand, if it were made possible for them to hold on to the city for a short time longer, the advent of General
Haller’s army or other factors might change the situation in favour of the Poles.

President Wilson asked what means existed of communicating with the Commanders-in-Chief of the opposing forces.

Dr. Lord said that communication with the Ukrainians might be had through Vienna and with the Poles through Warsaw. He suggested that several alternative routes should be used.

President Wilson asked by whom Dr. Lord suggested the communications should be signed.

Dr. Lord replied that they should be sent by order of the Council through a military channel. He believed that there was in Lemberg itself a British Colonel who might be able to communicate with the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian troops by wireless.

Baron Sonnino asked whether there was direct communication with Lemberg.

Dr. Lord said he thought communication by wireless via Warsaw could be obtained.

Mr. Lloyd George said that Colonel Kisch informed him that this was doubtful.

Colonel Kisch explained that since the Railway to Lemberg had been cut, it was probable telegraphic communication was also interrupted and very doubtful whether the Ukrainians would take wireless messages from Lemberg.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired what was the national character of the population in and around Lemberg.

Dr. Lord replied that in the city itself, 10 to 12% were Ruthenians, 50% Poles and the remainder, Jews. The Polish character of the city population had been strikingly demonstrated by the events of the last four months. The town has been defended against the Ukrainians street by street and house by house.

Mr. Lansing observed that the city of Lemberg was a Polish island surrounded by a Ruthenian district.

Dr. Lord agreed.

President Wilson observed that there were in Paris both Polish and Ukrainian representatives. It might perhaps be the most expeditious method if they were severally asked to inform their Governments that it was the desire of the Council that hostilities should cease and that if either party refused the truce its claims would not be heard by the Conference.

Dr. Lord said that this method might be employed but should be supplemented by the sending of telegrams direct as the Ukrainians had the greatest interest in not receiving the message.

Mr. Balfour asked Dr. Lord whether it was not desirable that the terms of the truce should approximate as closely as possible to the
final delimitation between Poland and the Ukraine. Would there not be a great disadvantage in delivering to either a region which might subsequently be taken from them?

Dr. Lord replied that without pre-judging any ultimate decision, he thought it was of urgent importance to cause fighting to cease.

Mr. Lansing asked whether Dr. Lord would favour a truce on the present line held by either side.

Dr. Lord replied that this was not quite his view. He was prepared to remove the Ukrainian troops from the immediate vicinity of Lemberg. These troops could not be trusted to refrain from looting the city at any moment. It was also important to re-establish traffic on the Railway line which the Ukrainian troops had cut.

M. Clemenceau asked Marshal Foch whether he had any comments to make on Dr. Lord’s proposals.

Marshal Foch said that he had little criticism to make except to say that if the Ukrainians neglected the decisions of the Conference as they had those of the Inter-Allied Commission, the Conference might be discredited. He was not sure on what terms the Allies were with the Ukrainians. Were the latter friends or enemies?

Mr. Balfour said that he shared Marshal Foch’s doubts but he would like to ask Marshal Foch to explain how the Ukrainians, whose country was represented as over-run by Bolsheviks, could find troops to invade Poland which was being over-run by no-one.

Marshal Foch said that he had no explanation to offer of this phenomenon unless it be assumed that the Ukrainians were in agreement with the Bolsheviks.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the Conference hitherto had only heard the Poles. According to the maps he had the majority of the population in Eastern Galicia was Ukrainian. According to the principle of the Allied and Associated Powers the country should, therefore, be attributed to them, unless very cogent reasons to the contrary existed. It might be that the Ukrainian troops attacking Lemberg were troops raised among the local population to establish their independence. If we supported the Ukrainians in the South, as we had done, why should we fight them in the North? The Report of the Polish Committee showed that the Poles were not incapable of claiming more for themselves than was theirs by right. They had done so in respect to their frontiers with Germany and Russia. They might be doing so in this region too. It was desirable that the Conference should be strictly impartial. It was not improbable that what the Poles chiefly wanted in Eastern Galicia was the oilfields.

Mr. Balfour remarked that there was a decision which the Council should take before leaving this subject. The Polish Committee had
asked whether they were to proceed to draw the boundaries of Poland in other regions than those bordering on Germany. The Committee had not proceeded with any investigation concerning the Eastern and Southern frontiers of Poland, pending a decision by the Council regarding the status of Lithuania, Ukraine etc. He was of opinion that the Committee should proceed without delay to fit the proper ethnographical limits of Poland in order that when the Conference came to deal with the question of Lemberg, and of the oil wells of Eastern Galicia, it should have before it an impartial judgment. If the Ukrainian Delegation were to come before the Council, the Council should be prepared with the advice of an impartial body before attempting to adjudicate. The Committee in his opinion therefore, should be told to proceed with their labours.

Mr. Lansing remarked that the same procedure should apply to Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Cambon said that some time ago he had asked if the Committee was authorised to hear the Ukrainians and Lithuanians. The Committee had felt that before hearing Delegates of these nationalities, permission should be obtained from the Council, as the Committee did not know with whom they were dealing. If the Council now decided that they should be heard, the Committee would proceed at once to hear them.

President Wilson pointed out that, if in accordance with Dr. Lord's proposals, the Council was to make the acceptance of a truce a condition of being heard with the Ukrainians, this proposal would not offer them any special inducement if they had already been heard by M. Cambon's Committee. He proposed that M. Cambon should be asked to draw up a message to both Commanders embodying the suggestions of Dr. Lord. The message should then be signed by the Chairman of the Conference and despatched by the best method available. It should also be communicated to the Polish and Ukrainian groups at present in Paris with a warning that the hearing of their respective claims depended on their accepting the truce.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he supported this proposal.

Baron Sonnino said that the only reason that might induce the Ukrainians to accept the truce would be the hope of some kind of recognition by the Peace Conference. If the Committee set about defining the frontier in Galicia, and its decision were adverse to the Ukrainians, they would get to know it and would feel they had nothing to gain from obeying any behest sent to them by the Council. They would feel that it was to their interests to effect the capture of Lemberg as speedily as possible. He therefore, supported President Wilson's proposal but thought that no definition of the Polish Frontier in this region should be made for the present. The Council
might promise to hear the Ukrainians if they stopped fighting. This
was probably the only means of saving Lemberg.

M. Clemenceau said he also accepted President Wilson's proposal,
but he would ask that the message be submitted to all the Heads of
Governments and signed by each.

This was agreed to.

The following resolution was then adopted:

(1) That the attached telegram, signed by the heads of the dele-
gations of the United States of America, British Empire, France,
Italy and Japan, shall be transmitted in the name of the Conference
by the French Government to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Polish
and Ukrainian forces by the best available routes.

(It was arranged to send the message direct by radio. In addition
that General Bliss should instruct the American General Kernan at
Warsaw to proceed to the front to deliver the message to both
Generals.)

(2) That the telegram shall also be communicated by the French
Government in the name of the Conference to the heads of the Polish
and Ukrainian groups in Paris.

(3) That the Paris Commission for Polish affairs shall resume
its study of the remaining Polish frontiers.

**Telegram**

A. General Pawlenko Commanding the Ukrainian forces before
Lemberg.

In the course of its sitting of March 19th, the Supreme Council of
the Peace Conference has decided to request both parties now oppos-
ing each other at Lemberg to conclude a truce immediately on receipt
of the present telegram.

In consequence, the Chiefs of the Allied and Associated Govern-
ments apply to General Pawlenko to acquaint him with the request
from the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference immediately to
stop hostilities as far as he is concerned, in front of and in the region
of Lemberg; this request is simultaneously being sent to the Polish
General Rozwadowski, Commanding the Garrison of Lemberg.

Throughout the duration of the truce, the troops of both parties
shall remain on their positions the communications by rail between
Lemberg and Przemyśl must however remain open strictly in so far
as necessary for the daily revictualling of the town.

The Supreme Council add that they are ready to hear the terri-
torial claims of both parties concerned and to approach the Ukrain-
ian and Polish delegations in Paris or whatever authorised
representation the parties may select, with a view to changing the
suspension of arms into an armistice.

The hearing of the Ukrainian and Polish representatives with
regard to their competitive claims is moreover made subject to the
formal condition of an immediate suspension of hostilities.

B. An identical telegram mutatis mutandis to General Rozwadowski
commanding at Lemberg.
3. **M. Cambon** said that he had received a telegram from **M. Noulens** to the effect that the Germans wished to discuss the question of the landing of Polish troops at Danzig at Spa, instead of with the Inter-Allied Commission in Poland. A draft telegram had been prepared for the approval of the Council in answer to this message.

**General Weygand** explained that Marshal Foch had given orders to the Armistice Commission at Spa that any discussion on this subject should be refused, and that the Germans should be referred to the Inter-Allied Commission in Poland. A copy of this order had been sent to **M. Noulens** for his information.

(There was a short adjournment.)

4. **M. Cambon** referring to the map accompanying the report explained that the red line represented the claims of the Poles, and the blue line the frontier proposed by the Committee. There were in these regions no natural frontiers. The population was very mixed as was usual in central and eastern Europe. The Committee had followed as far as possible the ethnological principle, but it had been impossible to draw any lines that did not include alien populations. Economic and strategic requirements had also been taken into account, in order that the new State should be so delimited as to be capable of life. At all points save one, the frontier adopted by the Committee gave the Poles less than they asked for. The exception was in the region of the river Bartsch. The reason in this case was of a military nature. Without this line of frontier Posen would be exposed, at the very outbreak of war with Germany, to be surrounded and captured at once. It was to render its defence possible that the Committee had placed the frontier further west than the Poles themselves had suggested. Further north the Committee had adopted a line considerably more to the east than the Poles. This region was sparsely populated and was the scene of the intense German colonization that had been pursued of late years. In 1908, Prince Bül low, who was then Chancellor, had obtained legislation for the forcible expropriation of the Poles in this region. Not only could no land or houses be sold to Poles but they were prevented from building or even repairing their houses. He had himself seen Poles living in abandoned trucks and omnibuses and then evicted from them because they had placed stoves inside them which the Germans represented as repairs. It was commonly supposed that the Russians had persecuted the Poles more than the Germans. This was not the case. German persecution penetrated into private life in a manner unknown to the Russians. This had led to the emigration of Poles on a large scale.
Still further north the Committee had adopted a line following the Lakes up to the sea. This line had been drawn in accordance with statistics of school attendance.

In order to give Poland access to the sea, the Committee had attributed to Poland a strip of territory enclosing Danzig. There was another Port east of this, namely, Elbing, which had once been Polish, but which the Committee had decided to leave in Eastern Prussia. Danzig had been Polish until the first partition, and its possession was a matter of life and death to Poland. The discussions at present proceeding regarding the transport of Polish troops to Poland through Danzig indicated the importance of that Port. Without access to the sea, Poland would be stifled. There were commercial and economic reasons as well as military reasons to justify the attribute of Danzig to the Poles. Since its annexation by Germany, Danzig had diminished in importance. It was true that the townpeople themselves were mostly of German race, but the surrounding population was Polish. Danzig had communication with the interior by two railways, one leading to Thorn and the other to Mlawa. The Committee proposed to give both these lines to Poland.

East Prussia was doubtless the most Prussian part of Germany, and its capital, Königsberg, was a holy place of Prussianism. The southern part of the Province, notably in the district of Allenstein, the people were Polish, but the Poles here, unlike the majority of their countrymen, were Protestants, and had been very largely Germanized. They spoke German as much as Polish. The Committee therefore, proposed that these people be consulted concerning their future allegiance, and that a plebiscite be held there.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the bulk of the recommendations of the Committee represented views that had secured general agreement. He would suggest that only controversial questions should be discussed, and that M. Cambon be asked to give replies to any points that might be raised on questions that might appear still open to discussion. He himself, had one general question to put. He noted that the number of Germans to be included in the future Polish State as drawn up by the Committee was not less than 2,132,000. This was a considerable figure, and might spell serious trouble for Poland in the future. The Germans moreover might hesitate to sign any Treaty containing such a provision. Any terms that no delegate and no Government were likely to sign should make the Council hesitate. The present German Government had gained a temporary victory, but was not very strong. It was said that another rising was likely to take place in 6 weeks. The Government might
not be able to withstand it. If the Allies should present a document requiring from Germany huge indemnities and the cession of a large German population to Poland, the German Government might collapse. The Poles, as it was, had not a high reputation as administrators. He wished to ask if the Committee could not restrict the Polish claims in such a way as to diminish the German population assigned to Poland. In the Dantzig district alone 412,000 Germans were assigned to Poland. Was it necessary to assign so much German territory, together with the port of Dantzig? There was another district in which a German majority was being attributed to Poland, namely that of Marienwerder. He would ask whether this could not be avoided.

M. CAMBON said that in his general explanation he had pointed out that it was very difficult to make a frontier on purely ethnological lines. The same difficulty would be encountered in dealing with the frontiers of Greece and other countries in the east of Europe, where the population was very mixed. Economic and strategic reasons therefore must be given weight. In the case of Marienwerder, for instance, if this place were left to Prussia, all the lines from Warsaw to the sea would pass through Prussian territory, and Poland would practically be cut off from the sea.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that it was hardly possible to draw any line that would not have Germans on both sides of it, but he thought it was very dangerous to assign two million Germans to Poland. This was a considerable population, not less than that of Alsace-Lorraine in 1870. He would point out that the Germans had been accorded communication between East and West Prussia across Polish territory. Why was a similar arrangement not possible in favour of the Poles? To hand over millions of people to a distasteful allegiance merely because of a railway was, he thought, a mistake.

President Wilson drew attention to the very special effort made in late years by the German Government to colonise the very region to which Mr. Lloyd George had drawn attention. The Germans had sought to make a German cordon from Schneidemühl to Marienwerder in order to isolate Dantzig from Poland. Hence, this was actually a region of political colonization.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that he referred less to Marienwerder itself than to the country East of it, which was historically German.

M. CAMBON said that he regarded it as essential for Poland to have free access to the sea. This region afforded the best corridor from the mainland to Dantzig. He thought that a large number of the German population which was of recent importation would emigrate to other parts of Germany when the Polish State was constituted.
Mr. Lloyd George said that he raised no objection in respect to the regions lately colonized by Germany, but he did not feel that he could assent to the delivery of areas whose whole history was German.

President Wilson said that this would only be justified by reciprocity. Many Poles in areas historically Polish were to be left within Germany.

Mr. Lloyd George asked whether the Council proposed to define the frontiers of Germany finally on ex parte evidence alone. The other side had not been heard. It was not only a question of fairness to Germany of establishment of a lasting peace in Europe. It was neither fair nor prudent, because of a railway, to hand over large populations to a Government they disliked.

M. Cambon said that it was quite true the Committee had only heard the Poles. It had not been commissioned to listen to the Germans. It had been asked to examine the means of setting up a Polish State with some prospect of continued life. The Committee had tried to approximate to the Polish State as it existed before the first partition. After examination they had made recommendations of a far more modest character. What had caused the death of Poland was not merely its faulty political system, but principally its lack of communication with the sea. The end of Poland might be considered to have occurred in the year 1743, when Dantzig fell. Without it, Poland could not live. By it alone could Poland have contact with the liberal Powers in the West. It was no use to set up a Poland deprived of access to the sea as it would inevitably be the prey of Germany or Russia. Not only must Poland have a sea-board, but full and free communication with Dantzig. If he had to choose between protecting German populations largely imported since the 18th Century, and protecting the Poles, he preferred the latter alternative. There was no comparison between the need of the Germans for communication between East and West Prussia and that of the Poles for communication between Warsaw and Dantzig. East Prussia had very little railway traffic with Western Prussia. Nine tenths of its exports—chiefly wood—went by sea. The products of East Prussia, by reason of the cost of land transport, at the present time went by sea. The council need therefore feel no anxiety about the land communication between East and West Prussia. On the other hand, the two railways linking Warsaw to Dantzig were absolutely essential to Poland.

M. Tardeu said that he wished to draw attention to two points. One was that the Committee set up to co-ordinate recommendations as to boundaries had unanimously approved the report of the Polish Committee. Secondly, the situation which Mr. Lloyd George wished to avoid was bound to recur everywhere. The Conference had set out to revive ancient States subjected for a number of years or cen-
turies to alien domination. In every instance inevitably some of the dominating race would be found settled in these areas. With the best will in the world it would not be possible to settle frontiers on ethnological grounds alone. If the submerged nations were to be revived a mixed population must be included in them.

M. Cambon added that the Polish Committee had also reached unanimous conclusions.

Mr. Lloyd George said that though the British delegates had adopted the conclusions, they had done so reluctantly. They regarded them as a departure from the principles of the Fourteen Points which had been adopted by the Allies. In some parts of the territory assigned to Poland the argument of political colonisation did not apply. We were told, moreover, that a region colonised with Germans as far back as the 18th Century should be restored to Poland. But because fifty years ago some capitalists had built a railway that was convenient to the Poles, the area surrounding it must be ascribed to Poland, in spite of the undoubted German nationality of the population. M. Cambon had said that a corridor to the sea was necessary to Poland. He had nothing to say against this. The Vistula was a navigable river, and must remain the principal artery for commerce. There were, moreover, other railways. A railway could be removed, but a long-settled population was not removed with the same ease. He thought that in accepting these proposals the Council would be abandoning its principles and making trouble, not only for Poland, but for the world. Wherever it could be shown that the policy aimed at reversing the German policy of Polish expropriation the decision might be accepted by the Germans, but the areas he had in mind would be represented as “Germania Irredenta” and would be the seed of future war. Should the populations of these areas rise against the Poles, and should their fellow-countrymen wish to go to their assistance, would France, Great Britain and the United States go to war to maintain Polish rule over them? He felt bound to make this protest against what he considered to be a most dangerous proposal.

President Wilson said that the discussion had brought out a difficulty which, it had been said, would be met in many cases, and he had not reached a definite conclusion in his own mind on the particular point under discussion. He hoped that the discussion would be carried far enough to bring out all its elements. Everywhere in Europe blocks of foreign people would be found whose possession of the country could be justified by historic, commercial and similar arguments. He acknowledged that the inclusion of two million Germans in Poland was a violation of one principle; but Germany had been notified that free and safe access to the sea for Poland would be insisted upon. The Allied and Associated Powers
were therefore not open to the reproach that they were doing this merely because they had the power to do it. This was one of the things they had fought for. The difficulty was to arrive at a balance between conflicting considerations. He thought Mr. Lloyd George was misinformed in saying that the river carried the largest proportion of the commerce. He would find that the railroad along the river carried the greater, or at least an equal amount, of the traffic.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that he was referring not to the railroad along the river, but to the one further to the East.

President Wilson said that the proposal would, however, leave in German hands territories abutting on the westerly railroad at several points.

M. Cambon said that the direct line to Warsaw through Mlawa was quite near the frontier proposed by the Committee. Mr. Lloyd George had mentioned the Vistula as the main artery of traffic. Marienwerder dominated the Vistula as well as the railway lines, and anyone holding that place commanded the valley.

M. Picton pointed out that there were only two lines of railroads from Dantzig to supply twenty millions of people. One of these was through Thorn and the other through Mlawa. The latter passed East of Marienwerder, this was the one referred to by Mr. Lloyd George. Both were indispensable to the economic life of Poland.

Mr. Lloyd George admitted that the line from Mlawa was important, but did not regard it as essential for access of Poland to the sea.

President Wilson said that it must be realised the Allies were creating a new and weak state, weak not only because historically it had failed to govern itself, but because it was sure in future to be divided into factions, more especially as religious differences were an element in the situation. It was therefore necessary to consider not only the economic but the strategic needs of this state, which would have to cope with Germany on both sides of it, the Eastern fragment of Germany being one of a most aggressive character. There was bound to be a mixture of hostile populations included in either state. The Council would have to decide which mixture promised the best prospect of security. He was afraid himself of drawing the line as near the Dantzig-Thorn railway line as Mr. Lloyd George suggested. He, however, felt the same anxieties as Mr. Lloyd George. The desire might arise among the Germans to rescue German populations from Polish rule, and this desire would be hard to resist. It was a question of balancing antagonistic considerations. He had wished to bring out the other elements in the problem.

Mr. Balfour said that he agreed with President Wilson that a balance must be attained, and that it is necessary to admit that ethnological considerations must in many cases be qualified. The
line under discussion was that joining the port and the capital of Poland. It might be presumed that no circuitous line was likely to be built which could compete with the direct line. If the ethnological frontier were adhered to this line would cut German territory twice—at Soldau and Riesenbug. This was doubtless inconvenient; but he would like to ask the experts if Poland could be given such rights over this line as would preserve its character as a Polish line, in spite of crossing German territory at these two points.

President Wilson suggested that the Committee should consider the ancient boundary of the province of East Prussia as it existed in 1772. This line was in some cases intermediate between the line recommended by the Committee and the ethnological line advocated by Mr. Lloyd George. It would not cut the railway between Dantzig and Mlawa and its adoption might offer a sentimental justification to Germany for the loss of some German population.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed that this might be considered with advantage. He proposed that the report on the boundaries of Poland should be referred back to the Committee for reconsideration with a view to readjustment of the boundaries of East Prussia in such a manner as to exclude from the new Polish State territory historically as well as ethnologically Prussian, while ensuring to Poland secure access to the sea.

President Wilson suggested that the Committee be merely asked to reconsider its recommendations in the light of the discussion.

(It was agreed to refer to the report on the boundaries of Poland back to the Committee for reconsideration in the light of the foregoing discussion.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)


Annexure "A"

Draft Telegram to the President of the Allied Commission at Warsaw

The Supreme Council have decided that in view of the extreme importance of avoiding the fall of Lemberg a fresh effort to effect a cessation of hostilities between the Poles and Ukrainians should be made forthwith. For this purpose you will at once despatch to the front an Armistice Commission, with full powers to negotiate in the first instance a cessation of hostilities on the basis of the present positions of the opposing forces, and subsequently an Armistice. In order that these negotiations may have the most favourable chances of success, the Armistice Commission is to be instructed to negotiate in accordance with the present military situation, which is undoubtedly favourable to the Ukrainians. The Poles must be made to understand that they must for the present purpose at any rate
give up their claims to such portion of the oilfields as are in Ukrainian hands, without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of the question. The Ukrainians on the other hand must agree to the free use of the Przemysl-Lemberg railway by the Poles for the revictualling of Lemberg from the moment of the cessation of the hostilities.

In order that the efforts of this Armistice-Commission may be disassociated, in the eyes of the interested parties, from the previous unsuccessful negotiations, it is suggested that the Commission should be under American presidency.

Both Poles and Ukrainians should be made to understand that these fresh negotiations are undertaken with the direct authority and on the lines laid down by the Peace Conference.

Proposal for a Declaration by the Allied and Associated Governments to General Pavlenko, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian forces in Eastern Galicia

The Allied and Associated Governments, having received the report of the Inter-Allied Mission to Lemberg, and the telegram addressed to the President of the United States by Dr. Faneyko, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Western Ukrainia, desires to call the most earnest attention of the Ukrainian authorities to the declaration issued by the Allied and Associated Governments on January 23rd [24th], summoning all the people of Eastern Europe to cease hostilities and to refrain from any attempt to use force in order to assert their territorial claims.¹

The Allied and Associated Governments reserve to the future the definitive settlement of the territorial questions pending in Eastern Galicia, as elsewhere, and must demand that the peoples who desire to press their claims before the Peace Conference should place their faith in the validity of their claims and in the spirit of justice animating the Great Powers, rather than in armed force.

Therefore the Allied and Associated Governments demand of the Ukrainian military authorities that they consent to an immediate cessation of hostilities on the basis of the truce signed between the Poles and the Ukrainians under the mediation of the Inter-Allied Mission on February 24th.²

If the Ukrainian military authorities give proof of their good faith by assenting to this demand, the Allied and Associated Governments will then take immediate measures to effect an armistice, to

² See Annexure "E," infra.
last until the definitive settlement of the territorial question. If the
Ukrainian authorities do not immediately accept the suspension of
hostilities, they have only to expect that the Allied and Associated
Governments will regard them as disturbers of the peace of Europe.

Annexure "B"

Convention

Concluded between the delegates of the Supreme Command and
the Government of Western Ukraine:—Colonel Miron Tarnawski,
the former deputy Lew Baczynski, and Father Francois Xavier
Bonne, on the one part;
And the delegates of the Command of the Polish army in Eastern
Galicia:—Senior Colonel of Brigade Miezeczylaw Kulinski, Staff
Major Jean Hempel Quartermaster General, and Major Valerien
Marienski Assistant Chief of Staff, on the other part;
Relating to the suspension of hostilities on the Polish-Ukrainian
front in Eastern Galicia.

Full powers have been conferred on the delegates of both sides,
by the Supreme Command of the Ukrainian Army and by the Com-
mand of the Polish Army in Eastern Galicia respectively.

Article I.
All military action shall cease on the 25th February, new style,
at six o'clock in the morning.

Article II.
The two armies shall remain in their positions. Reconnoitering
as well as patrols by aeroplane shall cease.

Article III.
All movement of troops and transport of munitions is forbidden
in the regions comprised between: Sambor, Mikolajow, Bobrka,
Kurowiec, Krasne, Kamionka Strumilowa, Krystynopol, Sokal,
Grubieszow, Belzec, Narol, Rozanec, Czerwona, Wola, the line
through San, Przemysl, Ustrzyzki, Dolne, and Sambor.

Article IV.
Communications between the two lines are forbidden along the
whole extent of the front. Bearers of flags of truce may pass only
by the way Lwow-Sichow.

Article V.
The suspension of hostilities shall last until the 26th of February
at six o'clock in the morning. On the following days, if it has not

*Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
been denounced before that hour, it shall be automatically extended for 24 hours.

Hostilities may be resumed twelve hours after delivery of the denunciation to the Interallied Commission at Leopol, which shall acknowledge receipt and note the hour.

**Article VI.**

Officers of the Allied and Associated armies shall be in control on both sides and shall settle all disputes.

**Article VII.**

Commissions from both sides shall remain in the following places: Sambor, Mikolajow, Bobrka, Krasne, Kamionka Strumilowa, Krystynopol, Belzec, Przemysl, Chyrow.

Officers of the Allied and Associated armies shall remain at Mikolajow, Bobrka, Krasne, and Przemysl.

The commissions shall proceed to their posts on the 25th day of February, armed with passes which shall be furnished to them by officers of a rank not lower than Major. The members of these Commissions shall enjoy the absolute right to return to their point of departure after the denunciation of the suspension of arms.

Lwow, February 24.—midnight 25.

**MIRON TARNAWSKI**

**D. L. BATSCHEWSKY**

**FR. XAV. BONBE**

**MIECZEWSLAW KULINISKI**

**JEAN HEMPEL**

**VALERY MARIENSKY**
Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, March 21st, 1919, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
President Wilson
Hon. R. Lansing

Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. Dolbeare

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour,
O. M., M. P.

Secretaries
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey,
K. C. B.
The Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn
M. Arnayon

ITALY
H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino

Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele
M. Brambilla

JAPAN
Marquis Salonji
M. Matsui

Secretaries
M. Kawai
M. Ashida

ALLEY PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
General Tasker H. Bliss
Admiral Benson
Dr. I. Bowman
Dr. Lord
Mr. Scott

BRITISH EMPIRE
General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B.,
D. S. O.
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
Maj. General W. Thwaites, C. B.
Colonel F. H. Kisch, D. S. O.
Mr. H. J. Paton
Capt. C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., D. S. O.,
R. N.
Mr. J. A. Salter

FRANCE
M. Cambon
M. Tardieu
M. Leyguès
Marshal Foch
Admiral de Bon
General Weygand
General Belin
General Le Rond
M. Degrand
M. Hermite
Lt. de Percin

ITALY
Marquis della Torretta

JAPAN
M. Kuriyama

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
British Empire
FRANCE
ITALY

Colonel U. S. Grant,
Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
Captain A. Portier,
Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter:—Professor Mantoux.
M. Clemenceau having declared the meeting open, called on Marshal Foch to make a statement in connection with the transport of General Haller's army to Poland.

Marshal Foch said that the question of the transportation of General Haller's army to Poland by rail had been studied, and the conclusion had been reached that it could be carried out as soon as the Conference gave the necessary authority, five or six days only being required in order to get the rolling stock together. By the land route one or two trains could be despatched daily; but conversations in regard to details were still taking place between the general staffs of the Allied Powers concerned.

The transport of the troops by sea, via Dantzig, had also received consideration, and a conclusion had been reached in regard to the tonnage which would be required.

The carriage by rail would only give very feeble results; consequently, it should be supplemented by the sea route, provided an agreement could be reached in regard to the disembarkation of the troops at the Port of Dantzig, and their transportation thence over the railway lines, under proper guarantees.

M. Clemenceau asked Marshal Foch to make some statement about the views taken by the Germans in regard to the passage of the Polish troops through Dantzig.

Marshal Foch replied that all he knew on this subject was contained in the telegrams received from M. Noulens and General Dupont, copies of which had been circulated.

M. Clemenceau drew Marshal Foch's attention to the recommendation contained in M. Noulens' telegram of the 18th March, 1919, to the effect that the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw considered it necessary that the Naval forces of the Entente should immediately make a considerable demonstration opposite Dantzig, and enquired whether that proposal had Marshal Foch's approval.

Marshal Foch said that with the information at his disposal, he could express no opinion. The Supreme War Council alone could determine the object to be attained; it would then be possible to determine the means of securing the end desired.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired from Marshal Foch what it was that he wished the Conference to decide. It had been definitely settled that General Haller's army should be sent to Poland, provided the necessary tonnage could be made available. He failed therefore to understand what else was in Marshal Foch's mind.
MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that in accordance with the decision taken by the Supreme War Council on 17th March, 1919, he had been merely authorised “to study the possibility of the transport of Polish troops to Poland from France”. He wished to know, therefore, whether the Conference agreed to the transport of the troops by rail to Poland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as far as the Conference was concerned, the decision had been reached that General Haller’s army should be sent to Poland; and the only question left to be considered was the means of transport. In other words, the principle of the transport of the Polish troops was decided, the only question in doubt was the method of transportation. The latter obviously was a question which should be decided by the specialists; it could not be decided by the Conference.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that the transport of the Polish troops by rail could be started at once, but as this method would be very slow, he proposed that transport by sea should continue to be studied by the Allied Maritime Transport Council, to whom the question had been referred by the Supreme War Council on the 17th March last.

In connection with the sea route, another question however, required to be settled, namely, whether the troops could be landed at Dantzig. This operation at the moment, seemed somewhat doubtful.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired to what place the troops sent by rail were to be taken.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the troops could be railed either to Lemberg, or to Cracow, or to any other part of Poland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE again asserted that the question was not one which the Conference could be called upon to decide; the Allied Maritime Transport Council alone was competent to furnish the necessary information. A decision had already been reached by the Conference that the troops should be sent provided tonnage could be made available, as would appear from the Resolution taken at the meeting held on 17th March last, namely:

“To call upon the Allied Maritime Transport Council to submit a scheme showing what should be the contribution in shipping of each of the Allied and Associated Governments for the transport of General Haller’s troops from France to Dantzig.”

1 See BC-52 (SWC-18), p. 384.
Marshal Foch pointed out that he sought the sanction of the Conference to both routes being used, namely, the rail route and the sea route; and enquired whether that proposal was approved by the Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that the reply should be in the negative. The land route was extremely long, and complicated by the situation at Lemberg. The Conference had merely agreed to the transport by sea, because it was anxious not to appear to take sides in the quarrel which was taking place at Lemberg.

Marshal Foch enquired whether under those conditions the land route was ruled out.

President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau replied in the affirmative.

Marshal Foch continuing, said that the sea route then alone remained. A transport scheme had been worked out and could forthwith be brought into operation. Only two questions remained to be considered, namely, the possibility of landing at Dantzig, and the transportation by rail from Dantzig to Thorn.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he was not altogether satisfied with the manner in which the negotiations had been conducted in Poland. He could not bring himself to believe that the Germans would in reality point blank refuse to carry out one of the conditions of the armistice, and, as a matter of fact, it was not clear from the information available that the Germans had actually done so. It was not quite clear what had occurred at Posen, and whether the Germans had really refused to carry out the accepted conditions of the armistice. Under those circumstances, he thought the best solution of the difficulty would be for Marshal Foch to put the question to the German representatives at Spa, particularly as a military operation was involved. Marshal Foch should, in his opinion, be authorised to tell the German delegates that the Allied and Associated Governments had decided to send troops to Poland through Dantzig in accordance with the provisions of Clause XVI of the armistice. He did not think the Germans would ever refuse compliance.

President Wilson drew attention to the fact that Clause XVI of the armistice stated that the troops of the Allies should have free access to Poland through Dantzig. A technical question might be raised as to whether the Polish troops could be defined as "troops of the Allies". In his opinion, the answer would be in the affirmative since those troops had been raised in France and America to fight on the side of the Allies. Nevertheless that was a matter which would have to be explained to the Germans.
MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that Clause XVI of the armistice of 11th November 1918, read as follows:

"The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their Eastern frontier, either through Dantzig or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories or for the purpose of maintaining order."

That was all it contained. Had troops been dispatched shortly after the signature of the armistice, the Germans would undoubtedly have allowed them free passage; but today the Germans would undoubtedly maintain that, since perfect order prevailed in Poland, it was unnecessary to send troops for the purpose of maintaining order and that the line could only be employed to convey supplies to the population. Furthermore, he would invite attention to the instructions sent to M. Noulens on the 25th February 1919, that the Germans should guarantee the proposed disembarkation of troops at Dantzig, and their transit thence by rail to Poland. It was necessary that the guarantee in question should be obtained, otherwise great risks would be run. In his opinion, that constituted a new condition, which could not be considered to form part of Clause XVI of the armistice of November 1918.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he could not agree with the view taken by Marshal Foch. His information went to show that Haller's army was essential for the maintenance of order in Poland, and to prevent the spread of Bolshevism. If those troops were not required to maintain order, he did not understand why they should be sent at all. They certainly were not required to fight against the Germans or anyone else: a definite ruling on that point had been given by the Conference at a previous meeting.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that Clause XVI stated that: "The Allies shall have free access, etc." He did not know whether the Poles were "Allies": but, even so, it was certain that without proper guarantees, it would not be safe to convey troops over a railway line whose two extremities (Thorn–Dantzig) were fortified and held by the enemy, without taking other measures to secure the safety of the line.

M. CLEMENCEAUV asked Marshal Foch to put forward his own proposals.

MARSHAL FOCH said that on the 11th January 1919, the Military High Command had suggested to the Supreme War Council the occupation by Allied contingents of the railway line in question, but the proposal had been rejected. Again, on the 24th February 1919, he had suggested that the only possible solution of the question appeared to be that the Eastern boundaries of Germany should forth-
with be determined, and that the Germans should be required to accept that frontier line, and to withdraw their troops behind it. In that way, free transit over the Dantzig line would be obtained. In his opinion, as long as the railway line remained in the hands of the Germans, there could be no guarantee even if a verbal promise were given by them—a thing which, as a matter of fact, they had so far refused to do. He would again ask the Conference to consider the railway route to Poland, as by that route troops could be taken to any place desired. The traffic capacity of the line, as he had already stated, was very poor, but the troops would reach Poland eventually, whereas by the northern sea route, in his opinion, they would never get there. It would not be necessary for the troops to go to Lemberg, if taken by the land route. They could be sent wherever required, either to Cracow or to Warsaw.

President Wilson said it was not clear to him from the telegrams, which had been circulated, that the Germans had denied their obligations under Article XVI of the Armistice of November 1918. It appeared to him that they merely wanted to discuss the question at Spa at a meeting with the military authorities, just as had been done in the case of other similar matters. In his opinion, the Conference was taking a great deal for granted when it assumed that the Germans would attack the troops when passing over the Dantzig Thorn railway line, since that would mean a renewal of the war. He had been told that General Haller considered that an escort of Allied troops would not be necessary; merely a few officers were required to superintend the process of transportation. Consequently, if his information were correct, the Germans had not denied their obligations under the Armistice. On the contrary, it would appear from messages received from Poland that they actually admitted their obligations. In this connection he would point out that Marshal Foch had stated that all his information in regard to the unwillingness of the Germans to comply with the demands of the Allies had been obtained from M. Noulens’ messages. Now, M. Noulens was the head of a Commission that had been sent by the Allied and Associated Governments to Poland, and it was highly probable that the Germans might imagine that the Commission would naturally act in the interests of the Poles. Therefore, he could not help thinking that when the matter came to be dealt with by the Allied High Command at Spa, as suggested, the question would assume a different aspect in the minds of the Germans.

Marshal Foch drew attention to a very precise message dated Spa, 20th. March, 1919, in which the following statement occurred, namely:—

“In confirmation of these incidents, the German Commission com-
municated to me this morning a note which amounts to a clear and categorical refusal (1) to let Poles land at Danzig, (2) to authorise Officers of Warsaw Mission to proceed to territory occupied by the Germans to the east of the Vistula.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he entirely shared President Wilson’s views. He did not know what had really occurred at Posen, but if Marshal Foch was satisfied that General Haller’s troops should be sent to Poland, provided tonnage could be set free for the purpose, then he would suggest that the Marshal should himself without delay interview the German representatives at Spa so that all necessary arrangements might be made. He could not believe that the Germans would refuse to allow the troops free passage along the Danzig Thorn railway line; and the idea that the Germans would cut them off was most unlikely. What object would the Germans have in doing so? Even if a whole brigade were cut up, it would not reduce the strength of the Allied Forces in any way, whereas such an outrage would lead at once to the Allied troops marching into Germany, or to the renewal of a strict blockade. He was not surprised to hear that General Haller himself had no apprehensions from that side.

In conclusion, he proposed definitely that Marshal Foch should be authorised to proceed to Spa to take the matter up with the German representatives there with a view to making a formal demand and the necessary arrangements.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that Germany had already given, according to General Dupont, a point blank refusal. Under those conditions, it was a question whether negotiations should now be re-opened. Certainly he could go to Spa and say to the Germans that they must either allow the passage of the troops or he would wring their necks. It might be a moot point whether the question to be put to the Germans did or did not constitute a new demand; but if he went to Spa, he must go there fully authorised to tell the Germans that they must comply with the demands of the Allies, failing which hostilities would be renewed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Marshal Foch should first put forward his demand in exactly the same way as other similar conditions had previously been put forward, that is to say, tactfully but firmly. He could see no difference between the demand, now to be delivered, and those previously made.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that the chief advantage of discussing the matter at Spa was that Marshal Foch would be able to explain, firstly, that the demand was made in execution of Clause XVI of the Armistice; secondly, that the troops to be transported were actually Allied troops; thirdly, that they were required for the main-
tenance of order in Poland; and fourthly, that there was no idea of using them against Germany. This explanation would relieve the Germans of any suspicions that might exist in their minds. He hoped Marshal Foch would give a frank and open explanation to the Germans and tell them that they were expected to yield in good faith to the conditions of the Armistice; there was no necessity to say what the consequences of a refusal would be.

**Marshal Foch** called attention to the character of the conversation which [he] had previously held with the Germans. In each case, he had had to deal with the renewal of an Armistice, which expired on a fixed date. That is to say, a refusal by the Germans to accept the terms to be imposed as a condition of the renewal of the Armistice by the date given naturally entailed the breaking of the Armistice, and the renewal of hostilities. Consequently, the Germans had no choice in the matter. Similarly, if on this occasion he did proceed to Spa to communicate the decision of the Supreme War Council to the Germans, he could not be expected to remain there indefinitely to await an answer.

**M. Pichon** expressed the view that Marshal Foch's proposals should be accepted, otherwise the Allied and Associated Governments would find themselves in a difficult and delicate position in view of the fact that the Germans had already given a categorical refusal to allow the Poles to land at Dantzig. Should Marshal Foch, therefore, simply ask for the enforcement of Clause XVI of the Armistice without being empowered to give an ultimatum, the effect would be merely to encourage the growing tendency of the Germans to resist the demands of the Allies. Therefore, he asked the Conference to authorise Marshal Foch to insist on an immediate compliance with the conditions of the Armistice. Public opinion was already much exercised by the fact that the Germans had apparently been able with impunity to confront the Allies with a refusal. He, therefore, very strongly seconded Marshal Foch's proposal. If he correctly understood the telegram received from General Nudant at Spa, it was the German Peace Commission that had notified to the representative of the Allied and Associated Governments at Spa, the clear and categorical refusal of the German Government to allow the Poles to land at Dantzig, since the message in question had been given officially to General Nudant, Marshal Foch's representative at Spa. Under those conditions he did not think Marshal Foch could be asked to proceed to Spa without giving him at the same time full authority to compel the Germans to submit.

**President Wilson** thought that if it were considered that a question of dignity was involved, he would like to ask whether it was more undignified to make sure that the Germans understood what was
wanted, than it would be to send troops by another route, as proposed by Marshal Foch. In his opinion, to send troops by another route than Dantzig would constitute an entire yielding to German demands. He thought, therefore, it would be far more dignified to renew conversations with the Germans.

Mr. Lloyd George said that to bring the discussion to a point he proposed, definitely, that Marshal Foch should be authorised to place the demands of the Allied and Associated Governments before the German Delegates, calling upon them to comply with the conditions of Clause XVI of the Armistice, the correct interpretation of which would be set forth. He quite agreed that Marshal Foch should not be asked to make a demand, which the Allied and Associated Governments were not prepared to impose; but if the Germans refused to comply with the just interpretation of the terms of the Armistice, that would naturally constitute a serious matter. He thought most of the difficulties which had been raised by the Germans had reference to the occupation of the port of Dantzig. Marshal Foch treated the question of the passage of the troops between Dantzig and Thorn as a march through an enemy country, where bases and lines of communication would have to be held. Clause XVI of the Armistice, however, merely stipulated “free passage” and, therefore, Marshal Foch’s demands should be restricted to the free passage of troops from Dantzig to Poland, and the port of Dantzig should not be held any longer than was required for the troops to pass through. In his opinion it was possible that the Germans thought that the demands of the Allied and the Associated Governments merely constituted a method of prejudging the question of the ownership of Dantzig in favour of Poland. The Allied and Associated Governments, however, were entitled to the use of this route, and Marshal Foch should make it quite clear to the Germans that if free passage were not allowed, that would constitute a breach of the armistice, and he would return to Paris to consult with the Supreme War Council in regard to the further measures to be taken.

Marshal Foch argued that a clear and categorical refusal had already been given to the question he had been asked to put to the Germans. Suppose he agreed to repeat the question and met with the same reply, he could then hardly tell the Germans that he would proceed to Paris to consider what should be done. He felt that if he agreed to go to Spa he should have full discretion to take the necessary measures, should he meet with a refusal.

Mr. Lloyd George thought his proposal had not been fully understood by Marshal Foch. In his opinion, in the event of the Germans declining to accede to his demands, Marshal Foch should be author-
ised forthwith to tell the Germans that their refusal constituted a breach of the Armistice, and that he would proceed to Paris merely to decide what means should be taken to enforce his demands, namely, whether troops would be marched into Germany, or whether economic restrictions would be imposed.

He drew attention, however, to the fact that he did not know exactly what demands had been put forward by the Polish Commission to the Germans. The Conference had seen General Nudant’s telegram giving the reply of the German Commission, but no information was given in regard to the question put to the Germans.

President Wilson agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that General Nudant’s telegram gave the reply to demands which had been made by the Allies, but it was not known what those demands were.

Marshal Foch expressed the view that if the Conference considered that the terms of the armistice established the right of free passage through Danzig, it would be sufficient for the Supreme War Council to inform the German Government of its intention to apply Article XVI of the Armistice and the necessary steps could then be taken to enforce compliance. It would not be necessary, therefore, for him to proceed to Spa.

Mr. Lloyd George said that someone would have to present the demand to the Germans.

M. Clemenceau suggested a written document could be delivered by Marshal Foch.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed to M. Clemenceau’s proposal, provided it were made perfectly clear in the document that an occupation of Danzig was not intended, but merely a free passage through Danzig.

M. Clemenceau said he understood that Marshal Foch’s proposal was accepted, namely, that the Supreme War Council would draft its demands and Marshal Foch would proceed to Spa to present the document to the German Delegates.

Marshal Foch agreed that he would transmit the document to Spa, stating that the Supreme War Council demanded the execution of Clause XVI of the Armistice. At the same time, in reference to Mr. Lloyd George’s argument, it would be necessary to establish a base at Danzig in order to supervise the embarkation and entrainment of the Polish troops. He thought, therefore, that the document should contain a statement to the effect that provisions should be made by the Germans for the landing of the troops, housing and transport.

M. Clemenceau understood that Marshal Foch would himself take the document to Spa.

Marshal Foch said that he would telegraph the document to his representative, General Nudant, at Spa, since it was not intended that

\[^a\text{Ante, p. 428.}\]
he should discuss the question with the German Delegates, and General Nudant was there to see to the execution of the clauses of the armistice. He would, therefore, merely tell General Nudant to insist on the execution of the conditions contained in Clause XVI of the Armistice which conditions had been held in abeyance.

Mr. Lloyd George said he would ask the Conference to accept the following resolution:—

"It is agreed:

That Marshal Foch shall receive full authority to demand from the Germans that Clause XVI of the Armistice of November 11th shall be so interpreted as to permit the free passage of General Haller’s army, as part of the Allied army, to Poland through Dantzig, to maintain order in Poland. That he will inform them that this passage does not involve a permanent occupation of the port of Dantzig and that a refusal to accede to this demand will be interpreted as a breach of the armistice by Germany. In the event of a refusal on the part of the Germans to accede to this demand Marshal Foch will inform them that the armistice has been broken and that he is returning to Paris to take the instructions of the Allied and Associated Governments as to the action to be taken."

Marshall Foch maintained that if the intention were merely to apply Clause XVI of the armistice, it would only be necessary to call on the Germans to execute its provisions.

Mr. Lloyd George said that it would be necessary to insist on the Germans interpreting Clause XVI to mean that General Haller’s Army must be given free passage through Dantzig in order to proceed to Poland for the purpose of maintaining order, and that the passage asked for did not mean the occupation of Dantzig.

Marshall Foch called attention to the fact that Mr. Lloyd George’s resolution contained a statement to the effect that the free passage of General Haller’s Army to Poland did not involve the occupation of the port of Dantzig. In his opinion, no such undertaking could be given since it would be necessary to constitute a temporary base at Dantzig in order to supervise the disembarkation and entrainment of the troops, operations which might continue for two or three months, if five or six divisions were to be transferred.

Mr. Lloyd George expressed the view that such temporary establishments could not be defined as an occupation. Nevertheless, if the Conference preferred he would suggest adding the words:—“that every facility must be given for the temporary accommodation of the troops passing through the port.”

President Wilson said he did not like to force on Marshal Foch an unacceptable mission. If Marshal Foch’s judgment were against this, the Conference should not urge him to undertake it, and should he so desire, some other channel of communication should be sought.
He could see that the mission was extremely distasteful to Marshal Foch, and he did not wish to insist on his carrying out a work against his wishes. As an alternative, he would therefore suggest that the Supreme War Council should draw up its demands in writing to be conveyed in a formal manner to the German Delegates through General Nudant at Spa. That would be a less impressive way than the delivery of the message by Marshal Foch in person; but this method might have to be taken if the Marshal did not like to undertake the duty himself.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed that it might be necessary to find some other channel of communication; but he did not think the proposal to transmit the message through General Nudant was a good one.

President Wilson said he would read, for the information of the Conference, a portion of M. Noulen’s despatch dated Posen, 18th March, 1919:

“The following conclusions have been reported by the Commission which returned to Warsaw on March 15th, after having been instructed to go to Dantzig to examine the possibilities of disembarking Polish troops: this operation will be very easy, for the wharfs, in particular those of Kaiserhafen, are large and well-suited for unloading several large steamers. The apparatus for unloading is sufficient. There are also two large empty warehouses for the housing of troops, and accommodation and sheds for material and provisions. The railways connect the quays with the principal lines; in a word, all facilities exist for a fairly extensive disembarkation of troops. Colonel Marshal and Intendant Gruet started for Paris on Sunday, and will give all detailed information with a view to effecting as soon as possible the despatch of General Haller’s troops, the urgency of which is felt more and more.”

M. Clemenceau said that, putting aside altogether his own personal opinions, which by the way coincided with those of M. Pichon, he would allow himself to ask Marshal Foch whether he would not subordinate his own personal feelings and inclinations, in order to remain the mouthpiece of the Allies—and they were Allies. It was essential that no dissensions should appear among the Allies on the eve of taking a decision which might lead to very serious consequences, even to a renewal of hostilities. Marshal Foch had been the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies and had led them magnificently to victory. He had thus acquired great influence, and unless he were the Allied spokesman on this occasion, the Germans would be led to believe that serious differences existed among the Allies, and these imaginary differences would be taken to explain the delays which had occurred, even though he and his colleagues knew that a delay was unavoidable, owing to the inherent difficulties of the questions to be settled. Nevertheless, the Germans would take this as further evidence that disagreements existed between the Allies
and would draw therefrom additional encouragement. We trusted that such an unfortunate incident would be avoided and that a formula would be found, which would meet Marshal Foch's objections. With this object in view, Mr. Lloyd George had proposed the following amended resolution:

It is agreed:

That Marshal Foch shall receive full authority to demand from the Germans that under Clause 16 of the Armistice of November 11th, they shall permit the free passage of General Haller's army, as part of the Allied Army, to Poland through Dantzig to maintain order in Poland. That he shall inform them that this passage does not involve the occupation of the port of Dantzig, although every facility must be given for the temporary accommodation of the troops passing through the port. That he shall notify the Germans that a refusal to accede to this demand will be interpreted as a breach of the armistice by Germany. In the event of a refusal on the part of the Germans to accede to this demand, Marshal Foch is instructed to take counsel with the Supreme War Council as to the action to be taken."

MARSHAL FOCH thought there existed a contradiction in the resolution just read. On the one hand, he was given full authority to make demands, whilst on the other hand, he was told to come back for further instructions. In other words, he was authorised to speak, but not to act.

M. CLEMENCEAUX explained that it would only be necessary for Marshal Foch to consult with the Supreme War Council as to the particular action to be taken in the event of a refusal. In his opinion, Marshal Foch should merely deliver the message to the German delegates at Spa, and then return immediately to Paris. On receipt of the Germans' reply, the Marshal would then consult the Council as to the further measures to be taken.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he did not think it necessary that he should go to Spa merely to deliver a letter.

M. CLEMENCEAUX replied that the Council placed considerable importance on the delivery of the message by Marshal Foch in person.

MARSHAL FOCH called attention to the fact that he would find no-one at Spa, except General Hammerstein, who would say he had no authority; he was merely a letter-box and he himself also had a letter-box a representative at Spa in the person of General Nudant.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether no means existed for informing the Germans that Marshal Foch would come to Spa to lay an ultimatum before them on the subject of the transport of troops to Poland, and that a delegate should be sent to receive that message. In that case the question would not be left to General Hammerstein.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed that if a German Plenipotentiary were
sent to receive the message he would go; but otherwise he did not see what useful purpose would be gained by his proceeding to Spa.

President Wilson thought that Marshal Foch clearly regarded this Mission, for some reason which he could not understand, as humiliating to himself. He (President Wilson) was the last man to propose anything that was humiliating to a man he so much admired as Marshal Foch. Therefore, he would ask Marshal Foch to suggest a solution of the difficulty.

Marshal Foch saw nothing humiliating to himself in the proposal under consideration. He only saw in the proposal a violation of the principle which had so far governed his relations with the Germans. In other words, he was now asked to talk and argue with the Germans, whereas his strength had so far lain in silence. In reply to President Wilson’s question, he proposed that a telegram to the following effect should be sent:

“The Supreme War Council calls the attention of the German Government to Article XVI of the Armistice and demands its immediate execution in regard to the disembarkation and free passage of troops from Dantzig to Thorn, and the grant of all facilities for the transport of the Polish forces. Guarantees shall be given for the complete execution of the conditions contained in that clause. Refusal to comply with the demands herein contained shall constitute a breach of the Armistice, leading to immediate renewal of hostilities.”

President Wilson enquired whether any means existed for communicating with the Authorities in Berlin, who might be informed that the Supreme War Council had received a message from General Nudant, which was not understood. The German Authorities would at the same time be informed that the Allied and Associated Governments had decided to send the Polish troops through Dantzig to Poland, and they desired the Berlin Authorities to give the necessary instructions to their military authorities on this point. He should be glad to know whether there was any direct or indirect channel of communication with Berlin.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that no other means of communication existed, except through Spa.

President Wilson suggested that no decision should be taken until General Nudant’s promised reports had been received, so that the Conference might know exactly what demands had been put forward by M. Noulens, and whether these demands were consistent with the terms of the Armistice.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that the proposals put forward by M. Noulens might have been inconsistent with the letter of Article XVI. In this connection he called atten-
tion to the following extract from the Minutes of the Conference held on the 19th March:

"M. Cambon said that he had received a telegram from M. Noulens to the effect that the Germans wished to discuss the question of the landing of Polish troops at Dantzig at Spa instead of which [with] the Inter-Allied Commission in Poland. A draft telegram had been prepared for the approval of the Council in answer to this message.

General Weygand explained that Marshal Foch had given orders to the Armistice Commission at Spa that any discussion on this subject should be refused, and that the Germans should be referred to the Inter-Allied Commission in Poland. A copy of this information [order] had been sent to M. Noulens for his information."

President Wilson called attention to the fact that the Warsaw Commission had been instructed to arrange for the receipt and transportation of the Polish troops at Dantzig. The Germans, on the other hand, had asked to have the discussion transferred to Spa, and the Council had been told that this request had been refused. The Germans then refused to discuss the matter further. This might be a perfectly proper refusal, and he suggested that M. Cambon be called on to furnish all the correspondence on the subject, so that the Council should know exactly what M. Noulens' Commission had asked and what had been refused.

M. Cambon explained that the Secretariat-General of the Peace Conference had from time to time forwarded to him as Chairman of the Committee on Polish Affairs, all the documents received from M. Noulens in order to keep him fully advised. The day before yesterday the following telegram, dated Posen March 18th, 1919, received from M. Noulens, had been communicated to him:

"The Inter-Allied Commission has taken note of the declaration according to which the Berlin Government guarantees the safety of transport to German territory, but the Commission protests against the inadequacy of the reply on the other points of detail set forth by the Commission at the Conference held at Kreutz on March 5th.

As a matter of fact, the German Government is seeking all possible ways of escape in order to delay and avoid the landing of Polish troops at Dantzig.

We have proof of this in intercepted telegrams. If the Allied Governments do not rush things through and demand the complete execution of Article XVI of the Armistice, the Germans will manoeuvre between the Commission of Spa and that of Warsaw in order to delay all decisions.

As the Allied Governments have instructed the Warsaw Commission to find a solution to this question we demand that the Berlin Government should be once more informed of the matter officially, and that the Commission at Spa should force the Germans to address themselves to us and insist on their submitting, without delay, in all the measures of detail which the Inter-Allied Military Commission may have to require. Further, the Inter-Allied Commission at War-

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BC-58, p. 413.
saw holds it necessary that the Naval Forces of the Entente should immediately make a considerable demonstration opposite Dantzig. This will be the way to prevent the Germans stirring up troubles on the day before that when the port will be opened to the troops of General Haller, and assigned according to the wireless messages to Poland.”

A draft telegram had been prepared by him for the approval of the Council in answer to this message; but General Weygand had explained to the Meeting that Marshal Foch had already, in reply to a similar telegram, received by him, given orders to the Armistice Commission at Spa that any discussion on this subject should be refused, and that the Germans should be referred to the Inter-Allied Commission in Poland. A copy of this order had also been sent to M. Noulens for his information. Consequently, there was nothing more to be said.

Mr. Lloyd George drew attention to a previous telegram of the same date, signed by M. Noulens, which read as follows:—

“The pourparlers with the German Delegation are almost ended. As a result of our demand with regard to the disembarkation of Polish troops at Dantzig, von Rechenberg has just written to say that the German Delegation had no authority to consider this point, and that his Government had the right; and also the duty, of approaching the Armistice Commission at Spa, as the exact interpretation of Article XVI was not fixed. He added, ‘My Government authorises me to say that, in the event of an eventual disembarkation at Dantzig, it would doubtless reserve the right to discuss the application of the principle set up by the Agreement of the 11th November, but that it was able to guarantee the safety of transport on German territory’.

“Finally, as the Commission complained some time ago that orders had not been given to the local authorities at Dantzig when our Mission arrived there, von Rechenberg says that it will be necessary to be informed in advance of the time fixed for disembarkation, the numbers and composition of the expeditionary corps, and the length of time it will stay in Dantzig.”

In his opinion, the requests made by the German Delegation were very reasonable and there was nothing contained therein which would justify the renewal of hostilities.

In regard to the reply sent by General Weygand to the telegram read by M. Cambon, he regretted that the question had not first been referred to the Supreme War Council.

General Weygand explained that he had sent the telegram on his own responsibility, because the Supreme War Council had authorised the Commission in Poland to take all necessary action.

President Wilson said that the Conference was still ignorant as to the demands made by M. Noulens to the German Government.
That is to say, the Conference did not know what their Commission had demanded and what had been refused.

M. Cambon said that the following telegram sent by M. Noulens on the 16th March, 1919, gave some indication as to the demands made by him to the German Government:

"On account of the frequent bombardment of the Polish front by the Germans, the Inter-Allied Commission at Posen has thought it necessary to impose on both the parties the obligation to withdraw their artillery to a distance of 20 kilometres on either side of the line of demarcation. This condition, which had at first been accepted by the Germans at Kreutz, has subsequently been put in question by them. They state to-day that the German High Command refuses to withdraw the artillery to a greater distance than 6 kilometres from the line.

As regards Danzig, after having declared that they awaited instructions, and thereby delayed a solution of the question, the German Delegates state to-day that their Government wished to discuss the question at Spa. This request is put forward in the hope that different views may be taken by the various Missions representing the Allied Governments. It is necessary that the German answer should be given to the Commission charged with the study of the question of the debarkation of Polish troops at Danzig. The local authorities at Danzig have given permission to the Mission of Lt.-Col. Marshall to study the available resources for this operation, but they have refrained from giving any assistance and from taking any engagements on the pretext that they had received no instructions from their Government. We have therefore actually no guarantees that the disembarkation can be carried out with safety. The Inter-Allied Commission considers it indispensable in order to put an end to the dilatory proceedings of the German Delegation that the wishes of the Allied Governments should be communicated to Berlin by the Allied High Command."

It was on the strength of that telegram that he had drafted a reply for the approval of the Supreme War Council, informing M. Noulens that negotiations would not be transferred to Spa and should be continued by him at Posen.

President Wilson said that the telegrams which had been read showed that everything was approaching a satisfactory conclusion on the 17th and 18th, while on the 20th everything was exploded. In that connection he would again invite attention to the fact that General Dupont had telegraphed to General Nudant from Berlin that negotiations at Posen had been broken off for reasons given by M. Noulens. General Nudant, in forwarding that message had said:

"In confirmation of these incidents, the German Commission after sending several vague notes has communicated to me this morning a note which amounts to a clear and categorical refusal (1) to let Poles land at Danzig, (2) to authorise officers of Warsaw Mission
to proceed to territory occupied by the Germans to the east of the Vistula."

He again wished to draw attention to the fact that the Conference did not know what the "vague notes" referred to by General Nudant were, nor what it was that had been categorically refused by the Germans.

General Weygand explained that the telegram from General Nudant, just read by President Wilson, had been despatched at 14 hours 15 the previous afternoon. At the same time, the papers relating thereto had been sent by special messenger, but they could not reach Paris before tomorrow, the 22nd March.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that what was interpreted as "a clear and categorical refusal" would probably be found to be due to the refusal given to the Germans to discuss the question at Spa. It was probable that the German delegates at Posen were not authorised by the German Government to carry out the necessary negotiations relating to Armistice Conditions, which had invariably been carried out at Spa. He sincerely regretted the fact that General Weygand had sent his reply without first consulting the Supreme War Council, especially as the telegram was one which might have led to very serious results, including the resumption of hostilities.

General Weygand explained that the telegram from M. Noulens to which he had replied was one dated the 12th March 1919, which read as follows:

"The Inter-Allied Commission of Warsaw learns from intercepted telegrams that the German Government were inclined to refuse to grant passes to Allied officers to study the preparatory measures to be taken in connection with the transport of troops through Dantzig, stating that a request had already been forwarded to Marshal Foch requesting that the troops should be disembarked at Königsberg and at Libau. That proposal would put aside the decision taken by the Inter-Allied Commission to insist on the enforcement of Article XVI of the Armistice of November last. Should another port be approved by the Allied Governments, the Germans would take that condition to imply a disavowal of the Commission; inevitable complications would delay the transportation of the troops; and lastly, the fear of insurrections which the Germans invoked as a reason for keeping the troops away from Dantzig would certainly take place, whereas it was hoped that the early arrival of Haller’s Division and the authority which that event would give us to reason with the Poles, were likely to prevent the occurrence of any disturbances."

General Weygand, continuing, said that he had forthwith replied to that telegram, because he knew that the Germans; if unable to get what they wanted in one way always tried to get it by other means. In this case again their intention had been to complicate the issue and to create dissensions. Had he given any other reply to the
Germans, they would have taken it as a disavowal of the Commission, to whom the Council had given full powers to settle this question. Thus, M. Noulens having been given full authority, the Germans appealed to Spa, and Dantzig having been selected as the port of disembarkation, the Germans offered Königsberg or Libau. Consequently, he had felt justified in replying at once to M. Noulens to allow him to continue his negotiations.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that under the circumstances the meeting should be adjourned to await the receipt of General Nudant's reports from Spa. A telegram should also be despatched forthwith to M. Noulens asking him to report in clear and precise terms what demands had been made to the Germans. He regretted that an adjournment until Monday should be necessary; but that was unavoidable even though the Germans might thereby gain confidence from a knowledge of the fact that no decision had been reached.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that a copy of the exact answer given by the German Delegation should also be obtained.

M. PICHON proposed sending the following telegram to M. Noulens at Warsaw:—

"You are requested to telegraph immediately the exact terms of your demands to the German Commission to permit Allied Polish troops to disembark to Dantzig and their free passage on the railway line to Thorn: also the precise replies made by the Germans."

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE requested that the reports received from General Nudant should forthwith be circulated.

MARSHAL FOCH enquired whether, pending further decision the transportation of troops by rail to Poland was duly authorized. The transportation of troops by that route would be extremely slow, but still some results would be obtained.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE thought that President Wilson's comment on that subject was irrefutable. Should the Allied and Associated Governments agree to send the Polish troops to Cracow by that route after the Germans had refused passage through Dantzig, it would mean yielding to the German pretentions.

President Wilson suggested that in the interval preparations for the expedition of the troops to Dantzig should be completed.

M. PICHON enquired, in view of the fact that an adjournment had been agreed to, whether the fact should not be published that the Supreme War Council had decided upon the transportation of the Polish troops via Dantzig.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE thought it would be advisable to wait before publishing anything on the subject.
Mr. Balfour pointed out that considerable difficulty existed in connection with the supply of the required tonnage for the transport of troops via Dantzig. He was informed by the experts that passenger ships would alone be suitable for this work, and that none were available, unless ships at present employed for the transport of British and American troops were temporarily withdrawn for the purpose.

President Wilson pointed out that the Allied Maritime Transport Council had already been called upon, in accordance with a decision taken on the 17th March last, to submit a scheme showing what should be the contribution in shipping of each of the Allied and Associated Governments for the transport of General Haller’s troops from France to Dantzig.

Mr. Lloyd George thought it would be extremely unwise under these circumstances to publish the fact that the Supreme War Council had decided to send General Haller’s Army to Poland by sea, because considerable difficulties existed in regard to tonnage, the withdrawal of which would seriously affect the shipping programme relating to Australian troops.

(It was agreed:—

(1) To send the following telegram to M. Noulens at Warsaw:—

“You are requested to telegraph immediately the exact terms of your demands to the German Commission to permit Allied Polish troops to disembark at Dantzig and their free passage on the railway line to Thorn also the precise replies made by the Germans.”

(2) To adjourn further consideration of the question pending receipt and circulation of reports to be received from General Nudant for M. Noulens.

(3) To obtain report from the Allied Maritime Council, in accordance with the decision taken on 17th March, 1919.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)


* See BC-52 (SWC-18) p. 383.
Minutes of a Conversation Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Friday, March 21st, 1919, at 6 p.m.

Present

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
President Wilson
Hon. R. Lansing

Secretary
Mr. A. H. Frazier

BRITISH EMPIRE
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour,
O. M., M. P.

Secretaries
The Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn
M. Arnayon

ITALY
H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino

Secretaries
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

JAPAN
Marquis Salonji
M. Matsui

Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Colonel U. S. Grant

BRITISH EMPIRE
Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.

FRANCE
Captain A. Portier

ITALY
Lieut. Zanchi

JAPAN
M. Ashida

Interpreter:—Professor Mantoux.
Mr. Lloyd George said that he raised the following question with considerable disinclination. It would be in the recollection of the Conference that on Tuesday last a discussion took place on the subject of Poland. It was necessary that at these meetings the members should express themselves quite freely and quite clearly. He was therefore surprised on the following morning to find in the French papers not only a full report of the Committee’s finding illustrated by secret maps; but, in addition, a garbled account of what he himself had said in the Council. The account contained actual quotations of the words used by him between quotation marks. Had a verbatim report been given, he would not have objected so strongly. But the report gave a very wrong impression of what he had said, and the distortion permitted an opportunity for violent attacks against him. He did not mind the personal attacks, except in so far as they did undoubtedly tend to create ill-feeling, more especially as England itself was abused for its action in Syria.

The Conference would recollect that President Wilson had on a previous occasion drawn the attention of the Council to a similar occurrence. The report then complained of had also been a very garbled version of what had actually taken place at the meeting. There had been sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the information must have come from British sources and had probably been supplied by someone who had been present at the meeting. Feeling that the honour of the British Delegation was thereby involved, he had directed that measures be taken in order to discover the offender. The case was tracked down, with the result that not only was the person concerned dealt with as far as possible, but also the newspaper correspondent responsible was sent away from Paris. He was afraid from internal evidence that the incident now complained of had come from French sources, for reasons which he could give. It was most unfortunate that such disclosures should be made, and he felt sure that the French delegates would not resent his taking notice of the matter. That very afternoon General Bliss had told him that an American gentleman just returned from Berlin stated that the disclosures which were daily appearing in the papers in connection with the peace negotiations were causing the greatest harm in Germany. From what this witness had seen and heard in Germany, he felt convinced that if the whole peace terms, however stiff, were at once presented, they would be accepted. But the disclosure of one condition at a time had the effect of driving the Germans to desperation, especially as each new thing was published to the world with the suggestion that the Allies were not agreed among themselves. He wished to speak quite plainly, and to say that if
similar disclosures were to be repeated, he would much prefer not to take any further part in the discussions, and to put off expressing his views until the final Conference took place. A perusal of the articles complained of would make it clear that someone who had been present in the room was responsible for the disclosure, and his colleagues would agree that it would be impossible to continue these discussions if such incidents were likely to recur.

It would be in the recollection of some of his colleagues that he had hesitated to agree to the Peace Conference meeting in a capital, because he was afraid that the local press would take an undue part in the proceedings, and attempt to influence decisions by an injudicious criticism of the delegates of other countries. The mere fact that the Peace Conference was meeting in Paris should transform the city for the moment from a French into an international capital.

It would be unnecessary for him to lay stress on the fact that the occurrence of such incidents only tended to encourage the Germans to give the public the wrong impression that the Allies were only fighting each other for individual advantages. Consequently, such incidents must be put a stop to; strong action must be taken to prevent the possibility of their recurrence; otherwise, that Conference would become absolutely futile.

M. Clemenceau said that he could only thank Mr. Lloyd George for his statement, which he accepted in the spirit in which it was made. Mr. Lloyd George would recognise how difficult it was to supervise the press. The pressmen had entry into all Government offices, and it was impossible to prevent leakage occurring. He could only express his deep regret that the articles referred to had found their way in the press, and he promised to take every possible measure to prevent a recurrence of the incidents complained of. Here, in France, the press censorship still functioned; but the Government did not dare to enforce it too rigorously. Nevertheless, he would do his best to stop the publication of such harmful articles. He agreed word for word with everything that Mr. Lloyd George had said. Nothing had done more to put the Allies in the wrong light with the Germans than the indiscretions of the press. He promised to do his best to prevent a repetition of such indiscretions. But he could hardly guarantee that nothing of the kind would ever occur again.

Mr. Lloyd George drew attention to the fact that the articles complained of had been published in the “Temps”, the “Journal”, and the “Echo de Paris”. As was well known, the “Temps” was, at any rate, supposed to be in close touch with the Government, so that the article in question became doubly mischievous. His complaint, however, was not directed against the press. His chief
point was that someone sitting in that room had deliberately given the information complained of to the press with a definite purpose. He fully agreed with M. Clemenceau that it was impossible to control the press, but it should be possible to prevent responsible officials from giving away such information, especially when the information so given was deliberately altered in order to make it the ground for a violent attack on one of the Allied countries.

M. Clemenceau said he would make very serious protests to the directors of the “Temps”. At the same time he would point out that in France a press censorship still existed which did not exist in Great Britain and America, consequently measures could be taken for its proper application.

President Wilson enquired whether in M. Clemenceau’s opinion a severe enquiry could not be instituted to discover who had given out the information about Poland.

Mr. Lloyd George explained that the British authorities had in the previous case instituted a stern inquiry, with the result that the offender had been discovered. He thought that if the French Government were to make a stern and persistent enquiry, the culprit in this case would also be found. In his opinion, the culprit ought to be tracked down, otherwise discussion here would become impossible.

M. Clemenceau agreed.

Mr. Balfour invited attention to another aspect of the same case. The same leakage was taking place in regard to Commissions and Committees, with the result that the members who had expressed an opinion on any question were subsequently lectured by outside parties. For instance, he himself had mentioned at one of the meetings that the port of Dantzig constituted a difficult problem. In consequence, M. Dmowski had called on him and talked to him for a considerable time on his supposed anti-Polish feelings; though, as a matter of fact, he was a great supporter of the Poles. The point, however, was this, namely, that as a result of his having made a remark at a secret meeting, an outside diplomat had forthwith been sent to him to discuss the whole question.

President Wilson said he could confirm Mr. Balfour’s statement, because he himself had first learnt of the decisions about to be reached by Commissions from outside parties against whom the decision was going to be given. In his opinion, every member of the Delegation should take steps to ensure that no one connected with his Delegation was to blame.

M. Clemenceau enquired whether, to begin with a notice should not be circulated to all members of the Peace Conference, enjoining strict secrecy.
MR. LANSING pointed out that the whole of the military and naval terms had been published in the press.

M. SONNINO said that whilst all were agreed in regard to the question of the Press, the proceedings of Committees and Commissions presented a greater difficulty. In his opinion, a circular should be issued to all members of the Commissions impressing on them the necessity for reticence. He thought a great many people talked almost unconsciously; therefore, a circular might be useful.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that whoever was responsible for giving the information should not be allowed in the Council Chamber. The incident to which he had called attention presented the same characteristics as the previous case, that is, it contained a communication in inverted commas, which could only have been given by someone who had been present in the room.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with all that had been said by M. Clemenceau. He merely wished to add that severe instructions had been given to the Press, and daily a great number of articles and paragraphs were suppressed by the press censor. An enquiry would, however, be carried out as suggested by Mr. Lloyd George.

(It was agreed:—

(1) That a strict and severe enquiry should be instituted by the French Authorities in order to discover, if possible, the name of the person who had given information to the Press in regard to the Conversation held at the Quai d'Orsay about Poland.

(2) That a circular should be issued by the Secretariat General to members of the Peace Conference impressing on them the necessity for strict reticence in regard to the proceedings of the Conference.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS. 22nd March, 1919.
Minutes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 22nd March, 1919, at 11 a.m.

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Hon. R. Lansing

**Secretary**

Mr. A. H. Frazier

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.

**Secretaries**


Mr. Norman

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

**Secretaries**

M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Bearn

**ITALY**

H. E., M. Orlando
H. E., Baron Sonnino

**Secretaries**

Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele

**JAPAN**

Baron Makino
Marquis Saionji
M. Matsui

**Secretary**

M. Kawai

**ALSO PRESENT**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

Dr. I. Bowman
Dr. Lord

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
Colonel F. H. Kisch, D. S. O.
Mr. H. J. Paton

**FRANCE**

M. Cambon
M. Tardieu
General Le Rond
M. Hermitte
Lt. de Périn
M. Degrand

**ITALY**

Marquis della Torretta

**JAPAN**

M. Kuriyama

**Joint Secretariat**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

Lieut. Burden.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

Captain B. Abraham.

**FRANCE**

Captain A. Porter.

**ITALY**

Lieut. Zanchi.

**JAPAN**

M. Sabori.

*Interpreter:*—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

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1. M. Clemenceau opened the Meeting by asking M. Jules Cambon to address the Council.

M. Cambon said that he proposed to read the note prepared for the Council by the Committee on Polish Affairs in accordance with the instruction received to re-examine the proposals concerning the western frontier of East Prussia in the light of the exchange of views in the Council on the 19th March.¹

Mr. Lloyd George expressed the opinion that as this note had been communicated to all the representatives, it would be unnecessary to read it.

M. Clemenceau said that the conclusion of the note was that the Committee on Polish Affairs, after reconsidering the problem, maintained its previous proposals.

(For text see Annexure “A”.)

Mr. Lloyd George said that as he had taken an active part in the discussion of the first Report of the Polish Committee and as he had raised objections to the inclusion within Poland of two million Germans, he felt he must add a few comments on this second Report. He was still somewhat alarmed by the effect the Report would produce. He was not as convinced as at the previous meeting that this effect could be avoided. He did not wish to criticise the Polish Committee which had worked in a perfect spirit of impartiality and which had had to solve serious difficulties. Poland had to be given a corridor to the sea with every guarantee of security. The Committee had come to the conclusion that this could not be done without subjecting to Poland a large German population. He feared that this demand, added to many others which would have to be made from Germany, would produce deplorable results on German public opinion. The Allies should not run the risk of driving the country to such desperation that no Government would dare to sign the terms. At the present time the Government at Weimar was not very stable and all the currents of German life went on their way without taking much notice of its existence. It was tolerated, however, as there was nothing put in its place. The Conference must avoid presenting such a Treaty that no Government would dare sign it, or such as would cause the immediate collapse of any government that undertook the responsibility of accepting it. These observations were not levelled at the Committee on Polish Affairs, but the recommendations of that Committee were a considerable element in the difficulty just mentioned. He was inclined to accept, provisionally, the solution proposed by the Committee and to do likewise with all similar proposals by other Committees, with the clear understanding that the Supreme

¹ See BC-53, p. 414.
Council reserved the right of revision when it came to consider the total effect of all these proposals.

M. Cambon said that he had only a word to add. He agreed that the Germans in general and the Prussians in particular would be extremely sensitive in regard to the destruction of the cherished enterprise of Prussia pursued for so many years. They had hoped to link Eastern and Western Prussia along the coast of the Baltic. The Committee, however, had been charged with the constitution of a Polish State with some chance of survival. The Committee had considered that to do this, wide access to the sea was necessary.

President Wilson said that he thought the procedure proposed by Mr. Lloyd George was wise, and he was prepared to accept it. He did not, however, quite see how the Public would be made to understand that the Council had provisionally accepted frontiers for Poland.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that when the matter of communications to the Press had been discussed, it had been decided that no information should be given regarding territorial questions. It would, therefore, be enough to inform the Press that an agreement had been reached, without any details.

President Wilson said that the Public might be informed that the Committee’s Report had been received and reserved for further examination together with the whole group of territorial questions. He would suggest the following formula:—

“The new Report of the Commission on Polish Affairs was received and discussed and reserved for final examination in connection with subsequent boundary determinations affecting Germany.”

(This text was adopted.)

2. M. Clemenceau caused to be read to the Council four telegrams lately received relating to the rupture of negotiations.

(See Annexure “B” (a), (b), (c) and (d).)

Mr. Balfour said that two questions arose. The first, which was the more important, was to determine whether the demands addressed by the Allies to the Germans were in conformity with the clauses of the Armistice. For his part he thought they were and that the Germans were attempting to evade their execution. If the Council shared his opinion he thought that the application of the terms of the Armistice should be vigorously pursued through the instrumentality of Marshal Foch at Spa. The second question raised by the Germans was whether it was more convenient to land troops at Königsberg or at Libau. This was a question of convenience which might be examined.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that disembarkation might be carried out at all three ports.
MR. LANSING enquired whether the whole correspondence relating to disembarkation was now available.

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that M. Noulens’ note to the Germans was not yet before the Council. According to the terms of General von Hammerstein’s telegrams it would seem that M. Noulens had asked for free passage for Polish troops and not for Allied troops. If so, the request would not be in agreement with the terms of the Armistice. Polish soldiers could, if need be, be represented as Allied troops if they had been enlisted in the French or American armies, but, if the Germans were required to give passage to Polish troops as such, the Allies might be putting themselves ostensibly in the wrong. This point, therefore, should be made clear, and once our rights had been established, the Council might enquire whether it was more expedient to disembark at Königsberg or at Libau than at Dantzig, in order to avoid crossing German territory.

BARON SONNINO observed that this would entail crossing Bolshevik territory.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if the Polish troops were disembarked at Königsberg it was not quite clear how they would avoid crossing German territory. It must be remembered that this question was closely related in the minds of the Germans to the ultimate fate of Dantzig. An impression would be produced on the population of Dantzig that the Poles had come to take possession of the town. This impression might perhaps only last for a few days during the passage of the troops, but it might be strong enough to provoke disorder. It had been declared that the decisions of the Conference must not be prejudged by military operations. A bad example should therefore not be set. It was therefore very desirable to know exactly in what terms M. Noulens had addressed the Germans.

MR. Lloyd George thought that it would be advantageous to use all three routes. This would doubtless hasten the realisation of our plans and facilitate the importation of food into the country. The idea of disembarking at Dantzig should, however, not be abandoned, as this would look like a surrender of our position.

He also wished to draw attention to the wording of Clause 34 of the Armistice:

“To secure the execution of the present Convention under the most favourable conditions the principle of a Permanent International Commission of Armistice is accepted. This Commission shall operate under the supreme authority of the Chief Command of the Naval and Military Forces of the Allies.”

Consequently, it appeared to him that the Germans were within their rights in demanding that the negotiations should be conducted at Spa and not at Posen.
M. Clemenceau agreed.
Mr. Balfour observed that the Germans suggested the disembarkation of Polish troops at Königsberg or Libau. As regards Königsberg, Marshal Foch might be asked to furnish a report, but as to Libau, he wished to point out that this port was in Courland, in a zone claimed by the Lithuanians. Lithuanians and Poles were not on the best of terms.

President Wilson remarked that the same difficulty arose in respect to Memel.

M. Clemenceau proposed as a result of the discussion that Marshal Foch be requested to furnish the Council with all documents not at present before it; to prepare a report on the subject of a possible disembarkation at Königsberg, and to meet the heads of Governments at a private meeting, on Monday, 24th March, at 3 p.m.

(This proposal was accepted.)

3. Following on proposals by President Wilson and Mr. Balfour, it was decided that the Secretary General should draw up a list of all questions ready for immediate discussion, giving priority to such as concerned Preliminaries of Peace with Germany.

It was further decided that the two following questions should be considered at the next Meeting of the Council on Monday, 24th March, 1919, at 4 p.m.:

(1) Submarine Cables.
(2) Teschen.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Paris, 22nd March, 1919.

Annexure “A”

To the Council of Ten
From the Commission on Polish Affairs.

The Polish Commission has been instructed to reconsider its recommendation in regard to the western frontier of East Prussia in the light of the Conversation at the Council of Ten on March 19th.

That conversation started primarily from the objection that the number of Germans whom it was proposed to include within the new Polish State was excessive, and it was suggested that this objection was particularly applicable to the region between the Vistula and the proposed western frontier of East Prussia.

2 Contained in Report No. 1 of the Commission on Polish Affairs.
The recommendations of the Polish Commission were based primarily on the ethnographical distribution of the two peoples concerned, but it was recognised that in any particular region other considerations might be so strong as to override purely ethnographic facts. This applied to the region to which attention was drawn at the Conversation of the 19th March, in as much as the Commission were of the opinion that it was their duty to assign to Poland, throughout its length, the Danzig-Mlawa-Warsaw railway:

(a) In order that Poland might have secure access to the sea.
(b) Since the economic value of the railway would lie only in the fact of its serving as a means of communication between different parts of Poland.
(c) Since this is by far the shortest line of rail between the port of Poland and the capital of Poland.

These considerations were held to outweigh the fact that this involved the annexation of two areas (Kreis Rosenberg and that part of Kreis Marienwerder which lies east of the Vistula) which were not only predominantly German, but had been part of Ducal or East Prussia for many centuries. The total population for these two areas according to the undoubtedly biased census figures of 1910 are 73,000 Germans and 7,000 Poles. It should be observed that all other areas assigned to Poland east of the Vistula are historically Polish territory, with the exception of a small district in the extreme south where there is a Polish Protestant population.

As regards the 73,000 Germans of Kreis Rosenberg and Marienwerder, it should be observed that although their claim for special consideration is undoubtedly strengthened by their historic connection with East Prussia, the intricate and abnormal character of the historic frontier of East Prussia makes it almost impossible to follow that frontier. The Prussian Government itself has recognised this by excluding these districts from East Prussia, and incorporating them with West Prussia to which geographically they belong. Further, to assign the whole of this area to East Prussia is impossible, as it would give the Germans complete command of the Vistula, and the historical principle in this area must therefore in any case be overridden by considerations other than that of the Danzig-Mlawa railway.

Taking the above facts and arguments into consideration, the Commission remain of the opinion that the importance to Poland of retaining complete control over the Danzig-Mlawa-Warsaw railway overrides the historical and ethnographical arguments in favour of Germany in this area.

With regard to the general question of the number of Germans included in Poland, it should be noted that the statistics in the third and fourth columns of Appendix I (B) of the Report of the Com-
mission have reference only to the strip of former German territory which it is proposed to include within the new Polish State.

Until the eastern frontier of Poland has been defined, it is impossible to forecast precisely the total population of the new State, but the figure will probably approximate 25,000,000. The total German population in this area, including that assigned to Poland under the recommendations of the Report of the Commission, will amount to not more than 3,000,000; thus the Germans will at most constitute about 1/8 of the total population, not allowing for the considerable emigration of Germans which is certain to ensue; and for which easy facilities are being arranged under the treaty clauses.

The Commission have made a careful scrutiny of the ethnographic distribution in the territories bordering on the proposed new frontiers.

In five localities only (leaving the Danzig corridor out of consideration) has any appreciable departure been made from the ethnographic line, and the total number of Germans involved is not more than 200,000. The economic and other reasons which led the Commission to take the decisions in question have already been explained in Part III (a) to (e) of their report, and the sufficiency of these reasons has not been questioned.

One general fact therefore becomes clear—that the large number of Germans assigned to Poland is primarily the result of the nature of the intimate racial distribution in this part of Europe, and not of any neglect on the part of the Commission to consider ethnographical facts. Before Poland was partitioned there were large German minorities permanently settled on Polish territory. Since the partition, and more especially since the creation of the German Empire, the immense energy of one of the most efficient of modern states has been directed towards the Germanization of this area by all possible means, and the most extreme measures have been taken to maintain and to increase the proportion of Germans to Poles. The German minority in the area assigned to Poland is not gathered together in the western boundaries of Polish territory, but is widely distributed over the whole area and intimately mixed with the Polish population. However unfortunate may be the inclusion of the German minority in the Polish State, no adjustment or modification of the boundary can avoid this result.

The general conclusion is that the cession of the Mlawa railway is a comparatively small factor in causing the large number of Germans to be assigned to the Polish State, and the Commission respectively submit that their original proposals offer the best possible solution to the problem which they were called upon to solve.

March 20, 1919.
Annexure “B”

A.

General Von Hammerstein to General Nudant

ARMISTICE COMMISSION,
Spa, March 7th, 1919.

WAKO 12,784

The Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw, in the course of a meeting which took place on the 6th March at the station of Kreuz (German Posnania) under the Presidency of Ambassador Noulens, insisted on the disembarkation of Polish troops at Dantzig. With reference to my note 11,805 of February 27th, 1919, I recall the fact that the disembarkation of large numbers of Polish troops at Dantzig would undoubtedly cause fresh bloodshed. It would be considered by the excited Polish minorities in West Prussia as a signal for a rising preconcerted by the Entente. Allied officers who are probably to accompany the transports would be unable to oppose it. Moreover, the transport of food from Dantzig in the direction of Poland would be seriously hampered by the simultaneous transport of troops.

I lay special stress on the serious danger which would threaten the German front against the Russian Bolsheviks, the communications of which with its rear would thus be hindered.

If the Allies think it necessary now to bring Polish troops to Poland by the Baltic Sea, it is proposed to send them in the first place by way of Libau where they would not touch German territory at all, and whence they can be sent against the Russian Bolsheviks with the greatest possible speed. In the second place would come the East Prussian ports of Memel and Pillau (Koenigsberg).

According to declarations of undoubted authenticity, the object seriously sought by the Allied Governments is to avoid the outbreak of fresh hostilities between the Germans and the Poles in the East. If it is desired to attain this object, Dantzig should not be chosen as a port of disembarkation for Polish troops.

For this reason I am instructed by the German Government once more urgently to draw attention to the consequences which would ensue.

(Signed) VON HAMMERSTEIN

B.

General Von Hammerstein, President of the German Armistice Commission, to General Nudant, President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission

Spa, March 8th, 1919.

I forward as an enclosure an extract from the report received by telegraph on the sitting of the International Commission at Kreuz
on March 7th. This paper clearly shows that Ambassador Noulens really intends to prepare for a disembarkation of Poles at Danzig. I am instructed to make the following observations on this subject:

(1) I ask to be informed whether the Inter-Allied Commission, set up solely to fix the line of demarcation of German Posmania, is competent in principle to settle a question of such serious importance. On the German side nothing is known on this subject.

(2) I observe that Article 16 of the Armistice Treaty does not give the Allies the right to land Polish troops at Danzig. The Allies are only “to have the right of free passage by Danzig, in order to be able to revictual the population of the regions evacuated by the Germans on the east of Germany and in order to maintain order”.

The disembarkation of Polish troops is not therefore provided for by the Conventions. As it is certain that it would have the effect of disturbing public order it must even be considered that it is contrary to Article 16.

The Allies would thus be acting against their own intentions, which they have constantly proclaimed, of maintaining order and preventing hostilities.

(3) The declaration of Ambassador Noulens, according to which no protest has ever yet been made against the choice of Danzig as a port of disembarkation, is incorrect (see 11.805 of February 27th and 12.784 of March 7th). The principal reason why this question has not been cleared up is that no such demand has ever been made officially on the part of the Allies.

(4) The admission of Polish officers and officials and other Polish employés to Danzig and moreover to German territory can only be allowed if the Entente undertakes to guarantee that the people in question will abstain from all agitation and from all political activity and will strictly observe German instructions and conditions as long as they remain in German territory. The text of the Armistice Treaty confers no right to lay down conditions, still less such far-reaching conditions as those set forth in the enclosure, by which Germany alone will be bound.

(5) It has already been stated in the note of March 7th, No. 12.784, that Germany is ready to undertake Polish transport. The conditions can be treated in detail by word of mouth, as soon as the Allied and Associated Governments have officially expressed their desire to examine the question more closely. But I point out now, after an exhaustive study of the state of communications, that, even from the technical point of view it would be far better to use the ports lying further east. I am in a position to give more precise information on the possibility of working transport from these points in the direction of Poland.

*For the latter, see part A of this annexure, supra.*
Copy of a Telegram From Marshal Foch to General Nudant

No. 1576/0 of March 18th.

(Communicated to General von Hammerstein by General Nudant under No. 716 G)

By letters 11.805 of February 27th.
12.784 of March 7th.
12.944 of March 8th.

General Hammerstein has asked in the name of the German Government that the disembarkation of Polish troops may take place, not at Dantzig, but at Koenigsberg, Memel or Libau.

Now, the President of the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw telegraphs that the German Government, taking this application as a pretext, claims the right to refuse to allow the passage of officers instructed to make preparatory arrangements for transport by way of Dantzig.

Please remind the German Commission:

(a) That the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw has received from the Allied Governments full powers to settle the conditions of the application of Article 16 of the Armistice of the 11th November, and that consequently it is for the Commission alone to lay down these conditions.

(b) Consequently that the above-mentioned application calls for no reply and the German Government could in no case make use of this application to postpone the solution of the question.

I am informing M. Noulens of the above measures.

(Signed) Weygand

D

General Von Hammerstein to General Nudant, Respecting the Disembarkation of Polish Troops in Germany

(Continuation of 698 G. and 716 G.)

20th March, 1919.

I have the honour in the name of the German Government to make the following declaration confirming my verbal declaration at the Plenary Session of the 19th March:

1. On handing over Note 716 G. of the 18th March 1919 * General Nudant declared that the Inter-Allied Commission at Posen was empowered to settle the question of the disembarkation of Polish Troops at Danzig. The German Government, however, maintains its right, according to Article 34, of the Convention of the 11th

*Notification of Tel: 1576/0 of 18th March. [Footnote in the original.]
November 1918, to treat this question, which is governed by the aforesaid Convention, at Spa.

2. Note 716 G. of the 19th March cannot be said to be a final declaration as regards the question of the disembarkation of Polish Troops. It only concerns my letter of the 7th March No. 12.784.† The point of view of the German Government is, however, contained in the note of the 8th March No. 12.944.‡ The German Government is waiting to see the effect of the opinions contained in this Note before further steps are taken.

3. The German Government attaches special importance to the fact that, by the offer made in the Note No. 12.944 of the 8th March, para: 5., it declared itself ready to take measures which go beyond its obligations. It must therefore maintain its view that these measures should be taken under the conditions which itself imposes. It is ready to discuss this point.

The German Government can in no way lend itself to the passage of enemy troops through a country where nationalities are mixed, in a case where the right is so plainly on its side. Neither is it possible to suppose that the Allied Governments wish to act contrary to the assurances which they have repeatedly given and in accordance to which they have no other intention in the East than to maintain order, and avoid further bloodshed. The German Government can declare that quiet prevails in the region in question. Unhappily it cannot but fear that the appearance of Polish Troops would mean an attempt at the violent and flagrant oppression of the Germans who are undoubtedly in a majority in West Prussia.

4. In these conditions, the German Government cannot be expected to yield to the demand that it should allow Allied Officers, and among them Polish Officers, to move about in the region to the East of the Vistula, without restriction as regards their journeys, and without supervision. No paragraph of the Convention obliges the German Government to consent to this. In view of its experience with Mr. Paderewski and Colonel Wade in a similar case,§ it has now to be doubly prudent. The Government however is disposed, in this instance also, to do all it possibly can. It will willingly examine, in each particular case, whether it can allow these journeys for special objects, without threatening public order, and in what conditions.

(Signed) VON HAMMERSTEIN

Forwarded by General Nudant under No. 6.039 (as continuation of 758. of 20th March.)

† Forwarded under No. 5.492 of 7th March. [Footnote in the original.]
‡ Note forwarded under No. 5.596 of 9th March. [Footnote in the original.]
§ See vol. ii, pp. 422-424.
Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 24th March, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Present

America, United States of

President Wilson
Hon. R. Lansing
Secretary-General

Secretary

Mr. A. H. Frazier
Mr. L. Harrison

British Empire

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour
Secretary-General
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey
Secretary
Mr. E. Phipps

France

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
Secretary-General
Peace Conference
M. Dutasta
Secretaries
M. Berthelot
M. Arnavon
M. de Bearn

Italy

H. E. M. Orlando
H. E. Baron Sonnino
Secretary-General
Count Aldrovandi
Secretary
M. Bertelet

Japan

H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. Marquis Saionji

Also Present

America, United States of

Admiral Benson
Capt. Schofield
Mr. James B. Scott
Dr. I. Bowman
Dr. Haskins
Dr. Lord
Mr. Dickson

British Empire

Sir Eyre Crowe
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst
Colonel F. H. Kisch
Dr. Pierce Higgins

France

M. Tardieu
M. Cambon
M. Fromageot
M. de Lasteyrie
M. Hermitte
Marshal Foch
General Weygand
General le Rond

Italy

Admiral Thaon di Revel
Admiral Grassi
Captain R. N. Ruspoll
Marquis della Torretta
M. Brambilla

Japan

M. Yamakawa
Capt. S. Yamamoto
(2) M. Clemenceau called on M. Fromageot to give a summary of the report of the Committee on Submarine Cables.

M. Fromageot said that at a meeting of the Supreme War Council held at the Quai d'Orsay, on Friday, March 7th, 1919,¹ the following resolution was accepted:

"(1) Is it right under the rules or principles of International law to treat as capture or prize submarine telegraph cables of an enemy cut or taken possession of by naval operations?

(2) Is it right under the rules or principles of International law for a Government whose naval forces have cut or taken possession of a submarine telegraph cable of an enemy to retain such cable by way of reparation?

(3) In the event that the cut or captured cable of an enemy is landed on the territory of another nation, what right and authority does such nation possess under contracts or permits granted to the enemy to cancel the same or to control the use of the cable?"

To these questions the Committee had submitted the following replies:

*On the first and second questions.*

(1) The Committee is unanimous in thinking that military necessity is a justification for the cutting of enemy cables.

(2) On the question as to whether the enemy cables can or cannot be the subject of capture or prize the Delegates of the British Empire, France and Japan think that the capture and confiscation of enemy cables are legally justified by the general principle of the right of capture of enemy property at sea. The delegates of the United States and of Italy consider, on the other hand, that in the present state of international law this opinion is not well founded, the property in enemy cables cannot be assimilated to property subject to capture at sea.

(3) In these circumstances the Committee is unanimous in considering that in the absence of a special rule, recognising the right of confiscation of enemy submarine cables, the treaty of peace must decide the disposal of these cables.

*On the third question.*

The Committee is unanimous in considering that the answer depends upon the terms of the contracts entered into between the owner

of the cable and the third Power on whose territory such cable is
landed, and that, in all cases, these contracts are, as regards the bel-
ligerents who have cut or seized the cable, a res inter alios acta.

Mr. Balfour said that as far as he had been able to make himself
acquainted with the report of the Committee, he did not think it gave
as much assistance as had been hoped for. The ques-
tion would, therefore, have to be discussed in full con-
ference. In the first place, he thought that two points
should be sharply distinguished, namely: a first question, which was
relevant to peace with Germany, and a second question, which would
have to be left to be settled after peace had been concluded. The latter
question was this: “Ought world-arrangements to be made for the
regulation of submarine cables?” It might well be that the movement
to internationalise waterways, great rivers, straits, certain railways,
etc., would have to be extended to cables, which were of the utmost
value for commercial purposes. That question, however, could well
be postponed.

The other question to be decided was this: “Had Germany any right
over cables which had been cut and diverted? Had Germany any
right to complain and, if so, what principle should be asserted?” In
his opinion Germany had no right to complain of the action which
had been taken; and the Allied and Associated Governments had a
right to appropriate cables in exactly the same manner as ships cap-
tured at sea. That view, he admitted, had not received unanimous
acceptance: it had been accepted by the French, Japanese and British
members, and rejected by the American and Italian representatives.
Consequently, a difference of opinion existed, and it was difficult for
a man who was not a lawyer to argue where lawyers disagreed. He
maintained, however, that the question had been settled during the
Spanish-American War, when the United States Courts had decreed
that belligerents had no claims in regard to cables cut during the War.
He did not think that the Germans could, with reason, complain if the
Allies seized the cables which, though constructed by private enterprise,
had been heavily subventioned by the enemy Governments and used by
them for strategic and warlike purposes, until destroyed. Therefore,
in his opinion, if the right to appropriate any property at all were
admitted, the right to appropriate cables undoubtedly existed. He
did not wish to make any pronouncement in regard to the regulation
of cables throughout the world. That world-problem could not be
discussed during the present conferences, and the consideration of
that question would have to be postponed to a more favourable occa-
sion. That was all he wished to say on the subject for the moment
and he would like to hear the case argued on the other side before
saying anything more.
Admiral de Bon said that at the Meeting of the Supreme War Council held on March 6th, 1919, when the question of the disposal of German cables first came under discussion, he had expressed the view that submarine cables undoubtedly formed instruments of war, since they were used for the transmission of enemy messages and, since ships had been lost in cutting enemy submarine cables, the latter must be considered to be war material and fair prize, resulting from war operations. At that meeting, the view appeared to have been accepted by all parties that Germany could have no pretensions in regard to the future disposal of her submarine cables. Furthermore, when the matter came to be referred to the Judicial Commission, the conclusion reached was that International Law contained nothing which would upset the views expressed by the Military Authorities. In regard to the principle involved, two points of view had been expressed by the legal experts, which clearly proved that the problem could not be solved on purely legal grounds. The British, French and Japanese experts held that the Allied and Associated Governments had full right to appropriate the cables in question, while the American and Italian experts held the opposite view without having any established principles on which to base their conclusions. In other words, the views expressed were not based on International Law. In this connection he wished, however, to point out that the views expressed by the American Members of the Committee were not shared by other American experts, such as Mr. Grafton Wilson and Admiral Stockton.

He agreed with Mr. Balfour that the question to be answered was this: "Could the Allied and Associated Governments appropriate cables without giving Germany just cause of complaint?" He thought the Conference was entitled to accept the recommendations made by their Military experts since the legal experts had been unable to produce any ruling against such procedure. In other words, the Allied and Associated Governments should decide to keep the cables in question. In regard to the regulation of cables throughout the world, he agreed that the question should form the subject of future study, since it did not appertain to the immediate problem under consideration.

Mr. Lansing said that he had listened with interest to the arguments advanced in favour of retaining possession of the cables seized by France and Great Britain during the war, and he quite agreed with Mr. Balfour that the matter of internationalising cables should be taken up as soon as possible so that there should be no monopoly of cables. In the case under consideration, he thought the report submitted by the Committee was excellent in that it did not attempt to solve what had not been solved. The Committee had arrived at the unanimous

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*See BC-45 (SWC-12), p. 226.*
conclusion that no law existed, which could be applied to the cases referred to it. The Committee had, it was true, unanimously admitted the right to cut cables as a war measure; but he (Mr. Lansing) denied the fact that the cutting of cables as a war measure gave the right of possession. In his opinion there was a very great difference between the capture of ships at sea and the seizure of cables. Cables were attached to a submarine region, which was not in the sovereignty of any nation. The cutting of a cable was merely an expedient of war; and, in his opinion, it was wrong that such a cable should continue in the possession of the nation, who cut it, after hostilities were over. Furthermore, cables could not be considered as belonging wholly to one country since they crossed other territorial waters and terminated in other countries. Consequently, to divert such cables to other uses and to deprive their use to former owners would constitute a dangerous precedent. The basis of capture on the high seas was that the ship could be brought within the jurisdiction of the captor, where it could be reduced to possession. This could not be done with submarine cables. Cables were the result of private enterprise and represented investments of money by individuals or companies. If it were argued that the keeping of cables deprived individuals of all ownership, no individuals would hereafter invest money in cables, to the great detriment of mankind. Admiral de Bon had given expression to the opinion held by certain naval authorities; but he would invite attention to the fact that there was not unanimity on the subject among naval experts. To sum up, in his opinion, since no basis in law existed for the guidance of the Conference, he thought it would be most impolitic to take over as spoils of war cables useful to all the world and to convert them into the State property of the captors. Such action would be contrary to American opinion as it involved acceptance of the principle that the conqueror could deal with the conquered as he wished.

Mr. Balfour enquired whether Mr. Lansing wished to suggest that cables were less useful to mankind because removed from the property of Germans.

Mr. Lansing replied that his contention was that it would make more of a monopoly.

Mr. Balfour said that he himself was no lover of monopolies, but he thought the word was somewhat out of place in connection with the question under investigation. As far as the connection between the United States of America and Europe was concerned, he would admit that the majority, but not all the cables passed through Great Britain. He believed 13 cables passed through Great Britain; but all of them were owned or controlled by American capital. He quite agreed that a cable landing in a country would be subject to the laws
of that country, and in war-time it was only natural that restrictions would be put on the use of such cables, as national interests might require. As a result, cases had occurred when Great Britain had been obliged to take over the control of all the 13 cables just mentioned. But in addition to the 13 American cables to Europe, which passed through Great Britain, there were 3 other cables which went through France and did not touch British soil. Consequently, he thought the word monopoly was somewhat excessive.

In regard to the question of sparing private property amid the horrors of war, he would invite attention to the fact that the United States of America had itself, during the war, put in a claim for acquiring 600 miles of German cables and the British Government had given its consent. He was ignorant, however, whether the United States had used those 600 miles of cable or not. But, at any rate, the American Government had not driven to its extreme logical conclusion the principle which Mr. Lansing had laid down, the justice of which he himself fully recognised. He thought that the case had been very fairly presented on both sides. He quite felt that the question of international communications would have to be dealt with sooner or later; but all were agreed that it could not form part of the problem under consideration.

Mr. Lansing enquired whether the Conference thought it would be advisable to submit to a Prize Court the question of the right to the appropriation of the cables in question.

Mr. Balfour said he would wish, in the first place, to consult with his experts. He feared, however, that a Prize Court would refuse to give any judgment as no actual precedent existed.

President Wilson said he had experienced great difficulty in coming to a conclusion. In the first place he would have hesitated to discuss the question from a legal point of view, but as no legal point of view existed he felt warranted in expressing an opinion. It was true that the problem to be solved contained two parts, namely: (1) Was Germany to be deprived of the ownership of the cables, and (2) what was to be done with them in regard to their use as indispensable means of communication? Up to now the Conference had only considered the question from the point of view of depriving the Germans of the ownership of the cables as a result of the war; but it should not be overlooked that the question also affected the whole commercial world. For that reason he was unable to agree with Admiral de Bon that the cables could be appropriated solely on the ground that they formed instrumentalities of war; for it was evident, that cables were also indispensable instruments of commerce, and indispensable to the pacific intercourse of nations. He thought, therefore, the cables must
be regarded as property from the point of view of habitual use, that is to say, from a peace point of view. As a consequence, it would be impossible to contemplate embarrassing their use as means for re-establishing the ordinary courses and processes of trade, to which the commercial world had become accustomed in times of peace. Furthermore, the Allied and Associated Governments expected Germany to pay heavy sums as reparations, and she could only do that by establishing favourable international balances to herself; otherwise she would be compelled to pay in her own currencies, which would be of little value to the Allies. It followed, therefore, that the question of the ownership of the cables must also be looked at from the German trade point of view. Four cables existed with one end in Germany itself, namely: the Emden-Vigo, Emden-Brest, Emden-Teneriffe, and Emden-Azores lines. These formed means of communication between Germany and the rest of the commercial world, and, in his opinion, it would be agreed that it made a great difference whether they were administered by one instrument or various.

Reference had been made to the decision reached by the United States Courts in the Spanish-American war, when it had been decided that damages could not be claimed for what had been done to cables during the period of hostilities. That decision related merely to the responsibility of the Government towards the owners of enemy property. Similarly, in his opinion, the cables now under consideration were really enemy private property, unless it could be established that the Government was the only owner. Consequently, the question of the disposal of the cables was one which could only be dealt with in connection with the disposal of other enemy property, since all countries had during the war taken temporary possession of enemy alien property within its borders. He thought the question would have to be considered from that point of view. Those familiar with International Conferences on the Rights of Nations maintained that the United States of America had never willingly assented to the principle of the capture of private property at sea. He would, therefore, hesitate to agree to the appropriation of the cables in question, even if cables could be considered to be private property, captured at sea. Hence he shared the views of the American representatives on the Committee. In his opinion, no analogy could be drawn between cables, which consisted of fixed lines uniting two shores, and ships, which were built to move from place to place and which could be converted into possession when carried into the harbours of the captors. He begged the Conference to proceed very slowly in deciding to do something, the basis of which had never been discussed in time of peace when a careful and unbiased decision could have been reached. In his opinion, it would be extremely unwise to establish a principle of law as a war measure.
Mr. Balfour said he wished to make one observation of a practical character without adding anything more to the theory of the principles involved. The Conference had discussed the question of restoring these cables to Germany in order that she might resume her economic existence. That was an error because the belligerents besides cutting the cables had also diverted them. The point, therefore, was that though it would be possible to relay the cables at the expense of the Allies, it would not be possible to hand over the cables as they were before the war. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the necessities of war and the pressure of events had compelled France and Great Britain to divert these cables. Therefore, nothing could be done except to relay them in order to revert to the statu[s] quo ante bellum.

President Wilson enquired whether a list of the cables which had so been diverted could be given.

(Mr. Balfour then read a list of the cables which had been diverted.)

President Wilson enquired whether by diversion was merely meant that the cable had been cut, and the cut end being attached to a new cable which went in the new direction required.

Mr. Balfour explained that for the purpose of diverting the cables whole sections had been taken up and placed in an altogether different position.

M. Clemenceau said he found some difficulty in arriving at a definite conclusion. He had at first thought that the suggestion made by Mr. Lansing to refer the question to a Prize Court would have found acceptance. But he was now given to understand that the Prize Courts both of Great Britain and France would be compelled to rule that the question fell outside their jurisdiction because no precedent existed.

In his opinion a distinction would have to be made between the question of right, which could only be settled by law, and the question of fact. He had been much struck by the statement made by Mr. Balfour that the cables having been rightly diverted as an act of war, could not be restored to their former position, and the act of war constituted an accomplished fact. The question of right could however be referred to a legal committee.

Baron Marino said that the cables mentioned in today’s programme comprised two links in which Japan was interested. The Japanese view, as expressed by her experts, coincided with the opinions expressed by Great Britain and France. In regard to the two cables seized by Japan, the one belonged entirely to the German Government; the other was private, but had been heavily subsidized by the German Government out of all proportion to its importance. Both cables had been employed to promote Germany’s “Welt Politik” as well
as her economic domination. He did not wish to discuss the legal aspect of the case; but from the point of view of preventing military domination and economic abuses Japan was opposed to the return of the cables to Germany, since they might again be used for the same purposes. In conclusion he would add that the two cables in question had also been taken up and diverted for war purposes, and in that respect the situation in Japan was the same as that of Great Britain and France.

President Wilson asked Baron Makino to name the two lines he had referred to.

Baron Makino replied that the two lines in question were:

(1) Chifu-Tsingtau-Shanghai.

(2) Yap-Shanghai.

Yap-Menado.

M. Orlando said that there were evidently two questions involved; the question of law and the question of fact. In regard to the legal aspect of the case he had always maintained that law was not a mystical science and, consequently, any one possessed with an atom of common sense had a right to express an opinion. From a common sense point of view he thought the Conference could not talk of applying to cables the Clauses of International law applicable to ships, since the two cases were quite different: the law applicable to ships was inapplicable to cables.

Next in regard to the possibility of appropriating a particular thing. If the thing were private property, even enemy property, it could not, in accordance with the rules of international law, be appropriated. In his opinion the two principles which he had just expressed must be accepted, namely: the impossibility of applying the rules relating to the capture of ships to the seizure of cables and, secondly, the illegality of appropriating private enemy property. He would add, however, with equal frankness, that the question of fact put forward by M. Balfour had made a great impression on him because, whilst international law could not be applied, the dictum that “what is done is done” could be accepted. In regard to the diversion of the cables it would be necessary to decide whether such action was permissible under the rules of war. That question had been unanimously decided in the affirmative, that is to say, a permissible act of war had been accomplished. Secondly, it was evident that the cables in question could not be restored to Germany, and either an indemnity would have to be paid to Germany or something would have to be done to put the cables back in the position in which they were before the war. In his opinion, to do this would be to admit that what had been done had not been right. He regretted that the fact relating to the
diversion of the cables had not been raised before the question had been referred to the special commission, because, in his opinion, that fact altered the whole situation. On the legal aspect of the case he was in complete agreement, with the views expressed by the American and Italian representatives, but if the facts were as stated by Mr. Balfour, that is to say, if the Allied and Associated Governments were faced with an accomplished act which had been carried out in strict accordance with the admitted rules of war, then the thing had been done, and there was really no question for discussion.

M. Tardieu thought that the Conference was faced with a question of fact which could not be undone, and a question of law relating to the disposal of private enemy property. Under these conditions he suggested that all the German Government's cables should be appropriated, and the private cables should be kept, their value being entered on the list of reparations, the German Government being charged with the duty of indemnifying private owners.

President Wilson said that the principle he was seeking to go on was this. He was interested in seeing that there should be an entirely just Peace, rather than that advantages should be gained by any country from a material point of view. The decisions embodied in the Peace Treaty should be such that they could hereafter be accepted as precedents. Thus, while he understood that the right to cut cables had been established by law, he was doubtful whether the same right existed to divert cables to other termini, that is to say, to appropriate private property to public uses. On that question he would be glad to have an expert ruling.

Mr. Balfour said that he did not pretend to have sufficient authority to deal with the question of law. Nevertheless, Mr. Wilson said that the right to cut cables in time of war had been established. In his opinion, that right had only been established because the United States of America had done it, that was apparently the only justification.

President Wilson explained that the question had been referred for decision to a Commission.

Mr. Balfour, continuing, said that so far as his opinion went the United States of America had cut a cable, the British Government had complained, the question had then been taken to a Court and tried by the regular machinery, which had justified the action taken by the American Government by ruling that private owners had no right to compensation in the case. President Wilson now made a distinction between destroying private property and appropriating private property. In his opinion, if the destruction of private property were admissible its appropriation, after diversion, could not be denied.
President Wilson explained that, in his opinion, it was permissible to destroy certain property for purposes of war but it was not permissible to use the same continuously for purposes of Peace.

Mr. Balfour suggested that the German Government should be informed that so much of their property in cables still remained under the sea and so much had been diverted. The Government could be permitted to resume possession of the part lying in its old bed which could be put in order. He thought that would be a solution of the problem.

Mr. Lansing pointed out that Great Britain had so far never recognised the fact that the cutting of a cable gave the right to its appropriation.

Mr. Balfour said that he had just been reminded that an important distinction existed between the case of the Spanish American cable, to which reference had previously been made, and the present case. The Spanish American cable had been a neutral cable, whereas the present cable was an enemy cable.

Mr. Lansing agreed. He pointed out, however, that the cable in question had been used by the Spanish, and Great Britain had then declared that she would not allow its use unless both belligerents were granted equal rights to usage.

M. Orlando thought the observations just made still further confirmed the view he had previously taken. To be quite frank, he thought the whole question turned on whether by diverting the cables anything had been done contrary to the laws of war. If an Army were to occupy enemy territory, it was entitled to damage communications, railway lines, tunnels, and bridges. No indemnity would be due for such damage, because the destruction of the enemy railway lines constituted a regular act of war. But it was not permitted to remove the rails as an act of war. In his opinion, exactly the same argument applied to cables. In the present case, however, the property in question had not been destroyed; it had been diverted. Consequently, though he, himself, was not a great believer in Commissions, he thought the whole question was so very complicated that it could only be settled on grounds of equity. On that account, it should be referred to a special Commission.

Mr. Balfour said that he had a suggestion to make which he thought would meet the general views. He wished to propose the following resolution:

"The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense the submarine cables cut by Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her expense any parts which have been cut out from such cables, or which without having been cut are now in use by any of those Powers."
Mr. Balfour, continuing, said that since drafting his resolution, his attention had been drawn to the fact that certain of the cables taken by the Japanese and Italian Governments were purely Government cables. That question had been overlooked in his draft resolution. He thought that point should be considered by the Drafting Committee in preparing the necessary clause.

Admiral Thaon di Revel explained that no enemy Government cables had been appropriated by the Italian Government. In the North Adriatic there was one cable which had been cut. In the Lower Adriatic there were two cables, one between San Giovanni di Medua and Taranto and the other between Otranto and Corfu. Both had been cut, and the latter had been diverted by the British Government.

Baron Makino enquired whether the resolution as drafted might not be interpreted to mean that all cables might be returned to Germany.

M. Clemenceau explained that the whole question had merely been referred to the Drafting Committee and would be reconsidered when the Report of that Committee was received.

(It was agreed to refer the following resolution to the Drafting Committee for early submission of a draft clause for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace:—

The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense the submarine cables cut by Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her expense any parts which have been cut out from such cables, or which without having been cut are now in use by any of those Powers.)

(3) Dr. Lord said that the proposal laid before the Supreme War Council (see Annexure “B”), was designed to render more effective the work of the Commission at Teschen. That Commission had been established with the object of putting an end to the fighting between the Poles and the Czechs, and to regulate other contentious questions. The Commission, accordingly, had taken up its duties in February last and had endeavoured to work along the lines of their mandate; but without success, because the powers accorded were not sufficient to enable effective action to be taken. The great difficulty was due to the fact that the role allotted to the Commission was only that of adviser and counsellor, to make suggestions to the Czech and Polish Governments. In every case, the questions to be settled had to be referred to the Governments at Warsaw or Prague with the result that great delays invariably ensued. The most important question related to the supply of coal to Poland and the Commission had not so far succeeded in getting a single ton of coal to Poland, because it was unable to put through its wishes. It was now proposed that the four Great Powers, represented on the Inter-
Allied Teschen Commission, should request the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments to accept the principle that, within the limits of the original mandate, the decisions of the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission should become effective the moment they were promulgated, without requiring the assent of the Governments of Prague and Warsaw. It was understood, however, that the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments would reserve the liberty of presenting their objections to the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission or of appealing to the Conference, but in any case the decisions of the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission would be binding until revoked by that Commission or countermanded by the Conference.

President Wilson enquired whether the Teschen Commission thought that these proposals would be effective.

Dr. Lord explained that he did not speak on behalf of the Teschen Commission as a whole. The proposals he had put forward had the support of the American Representatives of that Commission who were now in Paris; but he believed that the proposals represented roughly the views of the whole of the Teschen Commission.

Mr. Balfour said that he could answer President Wilson’s question as far as the British Government was concerned. Colonel Coulson, the British Representative on the Teschen Commission had made a proposal substantially identical to that put forward by Dr. Lord.

M. Cambon explained that a copy of Dr. Lord’s proposals had been forwarded to him and in consequence he had, that morning, called together the Commission on Czecho-Slovak questions. The American Representative on that Commission had, however, expressed his inability to throw any light on the question and in consequence the meeting had been adjourned to a later date.

Dr. Lord explained that the proposal put forward by the United States Delegation did not come officially from the Teschen Commission. It had been put forward by himself and Dr. Bowman, but he believed it agreed with the views of the Commission.

M. Cambon, continuing, said he personally had no objections to offer to the proposal made, but the question had not been examined by his Commission. He was, however, quite prepared to accept the proposal on behalf both of the Commission on Czecho-Slovak questions and of the Polish Commission.

Baron Sonnino enquired whether the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments would accept the proposal.

Dr. Lord explained that the resolution had merely been submitted in order that the principle might be accepted by the Supreme War Council, whose duty it would then be to obtain the acceptance of the proposals therein contained by the Governments of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland.
(It was agreed:—

1. That the four Great Powers represented on the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission request the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments to accept the principle that within the limits of the original mandate of this Conference (February 3, 1919) the decisions of the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission are to become effective the moment they are promulgated, without requiring the assent of the Governments of Prague and Warsaw.

It is understood that the said Governments may reserve the liberty of presenting their objections to the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission or of appealing to the Conference, but in any case, the decisions of the Inter-Allied Teschen Commission will be binding until revoked by that Commission or countermanded by the Conference. The Inter-Allied Teschen Commission is requested to report its proceedings to the General Secretariat of the Peace Conference for review by the Paris Commission on Polish Affairs.

2. To telegraph to the Governments of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia an identical note to give effect to the preceding.)

(For text of telegram to be sent see Annexure "B"; paragraph IV.)
(The meeting then adjourned.)


Annexure "A"

Annex to Procès-Verbal

Transport of General Haller’s Troops to Poland

In the course of a meeting which took place at 3 p.m. on Monday, March 24th, 1919, in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay between M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Orlando, and Marshal Foch with M. Mantoux as Interpreter, the following Conclusions were reached on the subject of the transport of General Haller’s Army to Dantzig:

1. The negotiations shall be taken up at Spa, under Clause 34 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918.

2. Marshal Foch shall demand that under Clause 16 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918, the Germans shall permit the free passage of General Haller’s Army as part of the Allied Army, through Dantzig to Poland, for the purpose of maintaining order in that country. They must also undertake to give every facility for the temporary accommodation of the troops passing through the port. Any refusal to accede to this demand will be interpreted as a breach of the Armistice by Germany.

*See annexure B, infra.*
3. In the event of a refusal by the Germans to accede to this demand, Marshal Foch shall confer with the Supreme War Council as to the action to be taken.

4. This decision shall be notified by the Secretary-General to the Warsaw Commission.

Annexure "B"

Proposal for Rendering Effective the Work of the Teschen Commission

I. The Interallied Teschen Commission was created on February 3, 1919, in a communication signed by the following: Woodrow Wilson; D. Lloyd George; V. E. Orlando; G. Clemenceau; Roman Dmowski; E. Benes.

The mandate of the Conference included the following instructions:

(1) To proceed to an inquiry upon the basis of which the Peace Conference could form a decision definitively fixing the respective frontiers of the Czechs and the Poles in the contested zone.

(2) To supervise the exploitation of the mines of the Karwin-Ostrawa district so as to avoid any infraction of the rights of private property, and to supervise the police measures which the situation might require.

(3) To secure to the Poles that part of the output of those mines which might be equitably claimed by them to meet their wants.

(4) To prevent conflict between the Czechs and the Poles by ensuring the application of the following rules:

(a) No measure implying annexation of all or of a part of the Principality of Teschen either to the territory of Poland or of Czechoslovakia taken by interested parties shall have binding force.

(b) Political elections and military conscription are to be suspended in the district of Teschen pending the decision of the Peace Conference.

(c) The local administration is to continue the function in accordance with the conditions of the pact of November 5, 1918, and the rights of minorities are to be strictly respected.

(d) The Czechs are to put at the disposal of the Poles all their available resources in war materials and to grant them every facility in the transportation of arms and ammunition.

(e) The Czech Government is to release immediately, with their arms and baggage, the Polish prisoners taken during the recent conflict.

(f) A line of military occupation is to be established giving to the Czechs the mines and railway line north of Teschen and to the Poles the town of Teschen and the railroad line south of the town of Jablunkow.

*For text, see Commission polonaise des travaux préparatoires au Congrès de la Paix, Mémoire concernant la délimitation des frontières entre les états polonais et tohéco-slovaque en Silésie de Cieszyn, Orawa et Spisz, annexe B4, pp. 27–31. (Paris Peace Conf. 186.8114/5).*
II. The Interallied Teschen Commission reached Teschen on February 13th. In the administration of its mandate it has been confronted with the following difficulties:

(1) It has had to report both to the Interallied Commission at Warsaw and to the Peace Conference at Paris.
(2) In dealing with the local authorities it has been obliged to secure the assent of the Governments at Prague and Warsaw to each of its proposals.
(3) The Czech local authorities long showed themselves unwilling to carry out the terms of the agreement as to the withdrawal of their troops to the line of demarcation.
(4) The Czech local authorities have failed to deliver the stipulated quantity of coal to the Poles.

III. To overcome the difficulties noted above, it is recommended that the Conference adopt the following resolutions:

(1) Resolved:
That the four Great Powers represented on the Interallied Teschen Commission request the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments to accept the principle that within the limits of the original mandate of this Conference (February 3, 1919) the decisions of the Interallied Teschen Commission are to become effective the moment they are promulgated, without requiring the assent of the Governments of Prague and Warsaw.

It is understood that the said Governments may reserve the liberty of presenting their objections to the Interallied Teschen Commission or of appealing to the Conference, but in any case the decision of the Interallied Teschen Commission will be binding until revoked by that Commission or countermanded by the Conference. The Interallied Teschen Commission is requested to report its proceedings to the general secretariat of the Peace Conference for review by the Paris Commission on Polish Affairs.

(2) Resolved:
To telegraph to the Governments of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia an identic note, to give effect to the preceding.

IV. To make the foregoing resolutions effective, the following telegrams are proposed.

(1) To the Interallied Teschen Commission:
Recognizing the importance of quick and effective decisions in the administration of the powers entrusted to the Interallied Teschen Commission, the Conference has sent an identic note to the Governments of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia requesting them to instruct the local authorities of the Duchy of Teschen that they are to accept the decision of the Interallied Teschen Commission without waiting for the assent of their respective Governments.

The local authorities will keep their respective Governments fully informed of the decisions of the Interallied Teschen Commission and should either of the Governments concerned protest the decisions of the Commission, due attention should be given to such protestation.
The two Governments may reserve the right to appeal to the Peace Conference should they be unwilling to accept any decision of the Interallied Teschen Commission, but, in each instance, pending a final decision, the local authorities shall follow the mandate of the Interallied Teschen Commission. A resolution of the Conference requires your Commission to report its proceedings to the general secretariat of the Peace Conference for review by the Commission on Polish Affairs.

(2) Identic note to the Governments of Poland and of Czecho-Slovakia.

In order to ensure the administration of the Teschen agreement of February 3rd in a more effective manner, the Peace Conference requests your Government to consent to the following arrangement. It proposes that the principle should be established that the decisions of the Interallied Teschen Commission are in each case to become effective as soon as they are announced, without requiring the local authorities to await the agreement of the Governments of Poland or of Czecho-Slovakia.

Should your Government desire to do so, it may reserve the liberty of presenting any objections to these decisions either to the Conference at Paris or to the Interallied Teschen Commission, but it is proposed that, pending a reply, the decisions of the Interallied Teschen Commission should be binding. An identic note to this effect is being sent to the Government of Poland (Czecho-Slovakia). Should your Government accept this principle it is requested that immediate notification be sent to all the local authorities and to the Conference at Paris.

March 21, 1919.
Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Wednesday, 16th April, 1919, at 4 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.
Mr. B. Lansing.
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Lord Hardinge.
Secretaries
Mr. H. Norman.
Mr. E. Phipps.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
Secy-General
Peace Conference
M. Dutasta.
Secretaries
M. Berthelot.
M. Arnavon.

ITALY

Baron Sonnino.
Marquis Salvago-Raggi.
Secy-General
Count Aldrovandi.
Secretary
M. Bertele.

JAPAN

Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
Secretaries
M. Kawai.
M. Ashida.

ALSO PRESENT

ITALY

M. Ricci-Busatti.
M. Placentini.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Lieut. E. C. Burden.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Captain E. Abraham.

ITALY

Lieut. Zanchi.

JAPAN

M. Saburi.

Interpreter.—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.
1. M. Clemenceau said that the Meeting had been called in order to bring together the Council of Four and the Council of Five. It was proposed that the work done separately should be examined in common. His first request, therefore, was that the Council of Five should report what they had accomplished and what still remained to be done. He asked Baron Sonnino if he would make a statement on this subject.

Baron Sonnino said that on the previous day the Council of Foreign Ministers had before them an agenda of some eleven items. The bulk of these had been remitted to the Drafting Committee, which, he understood, was to meet that day at 5 p.m. The Council of Foreign Ministers was to meet again on Thursday, the 17th instant, to deliberate on the drafts submitted by the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee were charged with the task of coordinating proposals made by Great Britain and by the United States. In other words, to reconcile the two drafts suggested.

M. Clemenceau enquired on what subjects the discussion had taken place.

Baron Sonnino said that the subjects dealt with were:—

Opium,
Belgium,
The Suez Canal and Egypt, and
An Article requiring from Germany a general renunciation of rights outside Europe, which were to be surrendered to the trusteeship of the Five Powers.

Reference had been made to the Drafting Committee with the object of ensuring that the whole ground was being covered.

President Wilson asked whether the impression that a fuller Conference had been desired to decide these points was erroneous.

Baron Sonnino remarked that another question discussed had been the upkeep of the Army of Occupation in Germany. On this subject, General Weygand had made certain explanations revealing a difference of opinion in calculating the expenses involved in maintaining these forces. Two theses had been put forward and these had been referred to the Council of Four.

Mr. Lansing said that his impression was that they had been referred to the Economic Council.

M. Dutasta said that the reference had been to the Council of Four.

Mr. Balfour observed that, if this was so, the matter should be dealt with.

¹ The minutes of the Council of Four are to be printed in later volumes. For minutes of the Council of Foreign Ministers (Council of Five), see pp. 515 ff.
2. Baron Sonnino said that two methods of calculating the cost had been mentioned. One considered only the actual expenses of the moment, food, billeting, etc. The other considered more general expenses. He was not able to specify exactly what the definition was, as he had not taken an active part in the discussion.

President Wilson said that presumably the latter category included expenses of army administration as separate from the cost of the actual maintenance in the occupied districts.

Mr. Lansing remarked that on the 8th March, General Pershing had addressed a written enquiry to Marshal Foch. No answer had been returned. The United States of America were, therefore, somewhat embarrassed in giving an opinion on this subject.

M. Clemenceau said that when the documents relating to the subject were before the Meeting, it would be possible to form an opinion or to remit them to some Committee.

Baron Sonnino said that General Weygand was in a position to state the case fully.

President Wilson observed that if General Weygand were called, he could only re-state the question and not offer a solution. He would suggest that the Military Advisers at Versailles be asked to define what was understood by “cost of military occupation.”

Baron Sonnino remarked that there were differences of opinion among military authorities.

President Wilson said that it was desirable to have these differences of opinion laid before the Council.

Mr. Balfour drew attention to the divergent views held by the various delegates at Spa.

President Wilson asked that a digest of these various views should be prepared and laid before the Council.

Mr. Balfour agreed that what was required was a brief narrative fitted for civilian understanding. The Council of Four would then be able to reach a decision.

Baron Sonnino observed that the whole discussion had been raised by a question put by the German General von Hammerstein asking for a definition of what was the cost of maintaining a man and a horse in occupied territory.

President Wilson suggested that the correspondence that had taken place at Spa should be referred to the Military Advisers at Versailles in order that a digest should be prepared of the various opinions.

Baron Sonnino said that he did not disagree, but he thought it right to warn the Council that military opinion was divided as to what should be reckoned in the account.
(It was then decided to remit to the Military Advisers of the Supreme War Council at Versailles the drafting of the various points of view regarding the estimation of the cost of upkeep of the Forces of Occupation in Germany).

Baron Sonnino observed that the cost of upkeep of the Armies of Occupation previous to the signature of Peace was distinct from that of a continuance of occupation after Peace.

President Wilson said that should any occupation subsequent to the signature of Peace be provided for, the same definition and the same interpretation could be adhered to as in the case of occupation previous to Peace.

3. Mr. Balfour drew attention to Item 6 on the Agenda for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers on the previous day. There were two amendments before the Meeting. One had been adopted, and the other had been referred to the Council of Four. He suggested that the matter be explained by someone who had been present at the Meeting on the previous day.

Mr. Lansing said that the difficulty had arisen with regard to exacting from the Germans the disclosure of their secret processes for the manufacture of ingredients for the inhuman conduct of war. As the Allies in another provision had prohibited the manufacture of such things, he regarded the suggested amendment as unnecessary. Further he believed that the disclosure of these secrets would add nothing to the military power of the Allies, who already possessed the secret of making even more deleterious gases than Germany. On the other hand, the revelation of these secrets would be of great economic advantage to Allied industries in that the dye making processes would be revealed at the same time. He believed that this motive very likely was not unconnected with the proposal.

Mr. Balfour said that the Military Authorities attached great importance to this question. Their opinions were based on military considerations, and they were in no manner concerned with any ambition to obtain industrial secrets. In their memorandum on the subject they took care to state that the dye process was quite divorced from the purpose they had in view. What they required was a purely military piece of knowledge. He did not profess himself to understand or to estimate the value of this knowledge but he was convinced that the Military Experts attached great importance to it.

Mr. Lansing said that the American Military Experts did not attach any value to it.

Baron Sonnino pointed out that the British proposal demanded the surrender of all chemical processes out of which gases had been or could be made, and for the production of all substances from which
gases or other destructive agencies could be produced. This definition was so wide that it was bound to cover the revelation of the secrets of dye making.

President Wilson said that he believed the framers of the proposal had not this object in view.

Mr. Balfour pointed out that an effective gas mask could not be made without knowledge of the gas which it was to contend with.

President Wilson said that whatever weight might be given to the military opinion on this matter it was certain that many people other than military experts were interested in the revelation of these secrets. There was a further difficulty. However much the Allies might demand the revelation of secrets, they would never be certain that they possessed them all. Twenty-five years of University experience had made him well aware that the most difficult secrets to obtain were those of inventors. Many researchers were so suspicious of their fellow men that they contrived to keep their formulae in their own head for years. In no sphere of life was there so intense a competition as among inventors, each of whom wished to be the first in the field with his invention. This was certainly no less true of Germany than of other countries. He had made objections of a similar character to other proposals, as he thought it was a mistake to exact more than could with certainty be obtained. It could serve no useful purpose to expose oneself to be deceived. The Allies must trust their own inventors to cope with their German rivals. There was a whispering gallery connecting not only the Foreign Offices, but also the laboratories of the world.

Baron Sonnino agreed that the Germans might reveal their second best secrets, but would probably succeed in keeping their best ones.

President Wilson said that they would certainly not reveal their new ones.

Mr. Balfour said that though President Wilson’s remarks appealed to him, he felt that he was not in possession of military knowledge and did not feel disposed to take a decision before he had heard what the Military Authorities had to say. He understood that both the French and British military authorities were agreed.

President Wilson remarked that the Military experts were doubtless authorities as to what they wanted to obtain, but that he regarded himself as an authority as to what they would get.

Mr. Balfour said that he would nevertheless like to know what their case was.

M. Clemenceau was also of the opinion that the experts should be consulted.

Baron Sonnino said that in any case the formula suggested was too wide.
President Wilson said that he was always prepared to hear military opinion, but that he wished to register his dissent from the proposal put forward.

M. Clemenceau said that if the military experts were unable to answer the objections that had been raised, he would adopt President Wilson's view.

President Wilson then suggested that this question also should be sent to the Military Advisers at Versailles, in order that they should formulate a military opinion on the subject.

Mr. Balfour agreed, but added that the two categories of objection raised should be communicated to them, namely:

(a) That in all probability the secrets would not be obtained;
(b) That if obtained they would confer an unfair advantage to competing industries in Allied countries.

(The following Resolution was then adopted:—

"The Military Advisers of the Supreme War Council at Versailles are requested to state the military advantages of exacting from the Germans the revelation of their secret processes for the manufacture of lethal gases.

It is to be observed:—

(a) That no means of supervision exist capable of guaranteeing the veracity of the statements the Germans might make on this subject.
(b) That such a demand for the revelation of German secrets of manufacture might give an unfair advantage to rival industries in Allied countries.")

(4) M. Clemenceau said he wished to raise the question of the Kiel Canal. A document had been submitted to the Council of Four as being a unanimous report of a Commission on this subject. On examination, the report had proved to be an old report, previously dismissed. It had come up again unamended. He had telephoned to the Secretary of the Naval Committee, who had replied that he knew nothing of it.

President Wilson explained that there had been unanimity on this subject in the Waterways Commission, which had referred the report back to the Council.

M. Clemenceau observed that the question had a military side, on which naval authorities should be called upon to state their views.

President Wilson suggested that the naval authorities might sit in combined session with the Waterways Commission.

(It was then decided to refer the question of the Kiel Canal to a Joint Session of Naval Experts, and of the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways & Railways.)
(5) Baron Sonnino said that two drafts had been proposed on the subject of the validity of Prize Court Decisions. The British draft proposed a clause to be inserted in the treaty stipulating that the validity of Allied Prize Court decisions should not be challenged by the enemy. The American draft proposed, in addition, that the Allies should have the power to invalidate similar decisions taken by German Prize Courts. Both these drafts had been remitted to the Drafting Committee to be fused into one clause. The American draft also contained an additional paragraph, on which he understood the American Delegates did not insist.

Mr. Lansing remarked that the United States did not insist on the form, but wished the substance to be preserved. The reason for this was that Prize Courts in America had ceased to function at the armistice. Nevertheless, the United States wished to maintain certain seizures made subsequently, and therefore without Prize Court decisions.

(7) M. Clemenceau said that he had another point to submit to the meeting. A resolution had been adopted regarding responsibilities, and it had been considered right that Belgium should undertake the prosecution. This had been agreed, he thought, with the consent of M. Hymans. He had heard since that the President of the Belgian Council had come to Paris, and was prepared to refuse his consent to this proposal. As representative of a monarchical State, he held the view that Belgium could not take the lead in prosecuting a monarch.

President Wilson said that he did not think this obstacle unsurmountable. The essential point was that the Kaiser was to be tried for a high misdemeanor, which might not legally amount to a crime, namely:—for violating the neutrality of Belgium. If Belgium refused to be prosecutrix she would not refuse to be witness. He further pointed out that in the draft adopted, Belgium had not been specifically set down as prosecutrix.

M. Clemenceau said that if that was so, he did not wish to press the point any further.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Paris, 16th April, 1919.
Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Thursday, May 1, 1919, at 4 p. m.

Present

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson.
Hon. R. Lansing.

Secretaries
Mr. A. H. Frazier.
Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.

Secretary-General
Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.

Secretary
Sir P. Lorraine, Bt.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretary-General
M. P. Dutasta.

Secretaries
M. P. Gauthier.
M. Arnavon.
M. de Bearn.

**JAPAN**

H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. Viscount Chinda.

Secretary
M. Saburi.

Also Present

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

Admiral W. S. Benson.
Mr. Rogers.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden,
G. C. M. G., K. C.
Rear-Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
Captain C. T. M. Fuller.

**FRANCE**

Admiral De Bon.
Capitaine de Vaisseau Levavasseur.
Lieutenant de Vaisseau Odend'hal.
M. de Peretti.

**JAPAN**

Vice Admiral Takeshita.
M. Yamakawa.
Captain Yamamoto.

Joint Secretariat

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

Colonel U. S. Grant

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

Major A. M. Caccia

**FRANCE**

Captain A. Portier

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Moutoux.

M. Clemenceau called on M. Pichon to explain how the suggestion of submarine cables now stood.

M. Pichon said that on the 24th March, 1919, the following Resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour had been passed by the Council of Ten, namely:
"The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense submarine cables cut by the Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her expense any parts which had been cut out from such cables or which, without having been cut, are now in use by any of those Powers".

It had been agreed that this text should be referred to the Drafting Committee for the submission of a draft clause for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace. The Drafting Committee had prepared a text (See I. C. 178)\(^1\) which, however, was only accepted by the American representative subject to the approval of his Government. At a meeting of the Foreign Ministers held at the Quai d'Orsay on the 30th April, 1919, the text in question had again come under discussion. Mr. Lansing had been unable to accept the draft text proposed by the Drafting Committee and had proposed certain amendments (See I. C. 178), which both Mr. Balfour and Admiral de Bon had been unable to accept. Consequently, it had been decided to refer the whole question to the Heads of Government for final decision.

**President Wilson** enquired whether Mr. Balfour held the view that the Article, as drafted by the Drafting Committee, carried out the intentions of the Resolution passed on the 24th March, 1919.

Mr. **Balfour**, in reply, said he would like to give his version of what had occurred. On the 24th March, 1919, at the Conference of the Ten, which Mr. Lloyd George had not attended, a prolonged discussion of the cable question had taken place. A Resolution had been unanimously accepted, which was to be referred to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Articles of the Peace Treaty. Both Mr. Lansing and he (Mr. Balfour) had adhered to that Resolution, which was to govern the action of the Drafting Committee. The question had now arisen as to the correct interpretation to be given to the original Resolution. Mr. Lansing would no doubt explain his point of view. He, himself, interpreted the clause to mean that all acts taken by the Allies in connection with enemy submarine cables during the war should stand, and that Germany should have no claim to compensation. Thus, for instance, should a cable line have been cut and diverted, the new system so established should stand. On the other hand, Germany would have a perfect right to reconstruct her former cable system as it stood before the war. To illustrate his argument, he would ask the Council to imagine a German cable line going from A to C through B. During the war the

\(^1\) FM–10, p. 645.
cable was cut at B and connected up with a new line from B, to D, so that the line went from A to B to D, as follows:

\[ \text{A} \quad \text{B} \quad \text{C} \quad \text{D} \]

Under these conditions, Mr. Lansing held that the piece A–B should now be restored to Germany, whereas the British, French and Japanese representatives contended that as A–B was an essential part of the new line A–B–D, it could not be restored to Germany, though she should have a right to join up the piece B–C with a new line to be laid by her from B to A.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether the Germans would have the right to the use in common of the line A–B.

Mr. Balfour explained that it would not be practical for two separate systems to use the same cable line. Consequently, the part A–B would have to be owned by the country that had laid down the line B–D. In his opinion, unless the British interpretation were accepted, the Allies and not the Germans would have to spend an enormous sum of money in making their new cable lines effective. He fully agreed that the number of cables should not be diminished and that the more cables there were, the better it would be; but he thought that it was Germany who should be required to make the expenditure to reconstruct her lost cables. Great Britain had already spent over £400,000 on the changes necessary for adapting the lines taken over from Germany to the new cable systems.

President Wilson said that when he took part in the discussion, it had been with an unfortunate ignorance of technical details. He had not known that the main trunk line could not be used by two parties. He had supposed that the Germans could, at their own expense, connect up their end and operate through the common trunk line. As the trunk line lay at the bottom of the sea, in what might be called no-man’s-land, it was not subject to capture, but was subject to use. He realised that there was no International law on this question. He had assented to the resolution, therefore, under an erroneous impression, which was entirely his own fault. He would take an example. There had been a cable line from Emden by the Azores to New York. The European end had been diverted to Brest, and the American End to Halifax. This had caused great inconvenience to the United States, and he had supposed that a new branch line to
New York could be attached to the main trunk line without disturbing the communication with Halifax and similarly that a new German end could be installed without disturbing the line to Brest. But, under the interpretation now given to the resolution, Germany would not have the use of the main trunk line and only the abandoned short ends of the original cable lines would be restored to her, and she would have to replace the main lengths of the line extending to a length of some 3,000 miles. In addition, Germany would have to obtain the right to land in the Azores. This was not what he had assented to, but the error was due to his ignorance. He thought that in a war in which many nations had participated and expended their share of blood and treasure, these indispensable instruments of international communication should not pass into the hands of only three of the parties in the war. He had no desire to re-establish the German cable system, but he had a very decided interest in ensuring the means of obtaining quick cable communication. Wireless, as now developed, had not the same value as cables, since anyone could pick up wireless messages. On the other hand, cables possessed a certain degree of privacy, depending on the good faith of the employees. Again the cable lines across the Pacific passed through the Island of Yap, which thus became a general distributing centre for the lines of communication of the North Pacific. Yap should not, therefore, fall into the hands of one Power.

In his opinion, the case had assumed a new aspect, since he had heard the interpretation now given to the resolution. It was proposed that the German cables were to be turned over entirely to those who had cut them during the war, even though one particular line, Pernambuco to Monrovia, actually terminated at both ends in neutral countries. If any method could be devised to put the cable systems under International control he would be quite satisfied; but it seemed to him a very serious matter that all Powers should not have a common interest in them. He thought a satisfactory solution would be reached, if the enemy cables could be turned over to the Allied and Associated Governments as trustees, and managed under the terms of an International Convention. He asked to correct a slight mistake made in his statement. He found there had actually been two cables from London to New York. One of these lines had been diverted so as to operate between Brest and New York, thus constituting a Franco-American line. The second line had been connected to run from Land’s End to Halifax.

Mr. Balfour said that he wished to repeat the statement made by him at a previous meeting, when discussing the same question, to the effect that he was entirely against monopolies. But the existing cable systems could not be described as monopolies in the bad sense of the word. The Cable Companies in question though registered in Great
Britain were actually owned by a majority of American shareholders, which rather disposed of the idea that any undue monopoly existed.

President Wilson pointed out that in accordance with the laws of the United States of America a majority of directors would have to belong to the country in which the Company was registered.

Mr. Lloyd George did not think that the same law applied to Great Britain in the case of international companies. He understood that, although these cable companies were owned by British companies, they were actually operated by American companies.

Mr. Lansing thought that the whole question was merely one of investments. The control of the cable lines was wholly in the hands of the British.

Admiral de Bon said that two definite questions called for decision by the Council, namely: Firstly, the use to which the captured German cables should be put, and secondly, the regulations which the Allies, and especially the United States of America, wished to apply to the use of cables crossing the high seas. In regard to the first question, the cables which had previously constituted the German system could be considered under three different heads. Firstly, the lines which had been taken over by the Allied Governments and organised into new systems which were now in use. He thought no one would suggest the return of these cable lines to Germany, with the resulting disturbance of the existing lines of communication. He felt certain that complete agreement existed on this point. Secondly, bits of cables existed which had been disconnected from the main trunk line and still lay, unused, at the bottom of the sea. President Wilson maintained that these bits of cable belonged to no one and, therefore, Germany should have the right to utilise them in re-constructing her new cable lines. He saw no difficulty in accepting President Wilson’s views even though these bits of cables constituted materials of war, captured during operations of war. Thirdly, there remained the question of the cable from Pernambuco-Monrovia which had been cut by the French, diverted, and made ready for use. The Government of the United States had for political reasons requested that this cable line should not be used, and to this the French Government had assented.

To sum up, complete agreement existed in regard to the first point. The second point was debatable but President Wilson’s point of view could be adopted. The third point constituted a special case, since the cable in question had been diverted to Monrovia and was ready to function. Had America objected before the completion of the work, the line could have been diverted to Konakry and in that case no discussion would have arisen. In any case, he was strongly opposed to the return of that cable to Germany.

In regard to the question of cable communications in general, which the American Government wished to have assured by constituting an
international system of control, the question did not appertain to the Treaty of Peace. It could, therefore, well be put aside for further study on the lines laid down by President Wilson. The present task of the Conference would, therefore, be confined to informing Germany that the cables, which, during the period of the war had been cut and utilised by the Allied and Associated Governments would not be restored to her and that they would remain the property of the Allied and Associated Governments. On the other hand, Germany would have the right to regain possession of the cables or parts of cables which had been cut and remained unutilised.

The resolution passed on March 24th stated that Germany would not be debarred from repairing at her own expense the submarine cables cut by Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her own expense any parts of submarine cables which had been cut out from such cables or which, without having been cut, were now in use by any of those Powers. In his opinion, the Allied and Associated Governments should not permit Germany to lay down new cables without first obtaining the necessary licences. In his opinion, no clause should be introduced in the Peace Treaty which might appear to give Germany the right to avoid such formalities. The Governments concerned must retain the right to decide whether a new licence should be granted or not.

To sum up, as far as the Treaty of Peace was concerned, he thought it would only be necessary to lay down that the Allied and Associated Governments would retain the cables now being used by them, including the Monrovia Pernambuco cable, which had been made ready for use; and that Germany would be allowed to pick up and re-connect the bits of unused cables. It would be unnecessary to make any statement in the Peace Treaty in regard to the future policy of the Allied and Associated Governments on the subject of the control of cables.

Sir Robert Borden said that he had not been able to study the cable situation under discussion very carefully; but Canada was deeply interested in the cables crossing the Atlantic. Though many of the cable lines landed at Halifax, the Canadian Government had no control over that line; the control being American.

Mr. Lansing, intervening, pointed out that only the control was American, the property itself being vested in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that the Americans, at all events, controlled the rates to be charged for cables.

Mr. Lansing doubted the correctness of that statement. The Western Union Cable Company of America merely controlled the working of the cables; but the cables themselves were owned by British Companies.

Sir Robert Borden, continuing, said that he was certain of one thing, namely, that the Canadians did not control these cable lines.
The Canadian Government had been requested by the British Government to allow the cable line in question to land at Halifax. The permission asked for had been granted and he would now strongly object to its removal. In his opinion, the whole question of cable control required careful consideration by the Governments concerned.

President Wilson pointed out that he did not wish Sir Robert Borden to imagine that anyone held the idea of diverting the cable from Halifax.

Mr. Lloyd George held that if the line in question were handed back to Germany, it would as a natural consequence be diverted to New York.

President Wilson expressed the view that the meeting had to decide only the two following definite questions, namely:

"(i) Are submarine cables proper objects of appropriation and can they be retained without reckoning them in the total bill of reparations?"

"(ii) Can any means be devised to place the cable lines under international control?"

He thought if these principles could be accepted, a satisfactory agreement would easily be reached.

Sir Robert Borden invited attention to the fact that six or seven years ago the Canadian Government had endeavoured to exercise some control over the rates charged for cables. The Government eventually only succeeded in obtaining a reduction by threatening to lay cables of their own.

Mr. Lloyd George maintained that whatever President Wilson’s intention might be in connection with the cable line in question, the effect would obviously be to divert the cable from Halifax. The right to take cables was just as strong as the right to capture ships. He agreed that cables had not heretofore formed the subject of capture; but there had never been a war of the same kind before, and serious risks and heavy expenditure had had to be incurred in order to obtain possession of these cables. He, himself, would be quite prepared to consider the question of the payment of some sort of compensation to Germany for the surrender of the cables, but this was a new proposition and would require careful examination. A direct line of communication to Canada having now been established, the people of Canada who had suffered much in money and life during the war would feel deeply deserted if the suggestion were accepted to return these lines to Germany. In conclusion, he wished to support very cordially what Admiral de Bon had said, namely, that after peace had been established the Governments should meet together and endeavour to arrive at some agreement on the question of the international control of cable lines. The only point, however, now to be decided was whether these particular cables should be restored to Germany or not. He held the view that if such a step were now taken very bitter feeling would be raised.
President Wilson pointed out that there was a side of the question to which Mr. Lloyd George had not referred. If it were merely a question of returning the cables to Germany or not, the solution would be comparatively easy, as this could only be answered in the negative. But the Council was asked to decide whether these cables should remain exclusively in the hands of those who had taken them over, though all parties had taken part in the war. Should a decision to that effect be taken, that might prejudge any ulterior arrangements, whereas, in his opinion, the Treaty of Peace ought to leave the question open.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether President Wilson could make some definite proposal.

President Wilson suggested that the Peace Terms should require the cables in question to be transferred to the Allied and Associated Powers as Trustees; who would be authorised to determine the future working of the cables in the interests of the Powers concerned.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired whether the Trustees would have the power of diverting the cables to other places.

President Wilson expressed the view that the Trustees would only be empowered to do this as a result of a unanimous decision, on the grounds that such a diversion would be in the interest of the whole of the Powers concerned.

Sir Robert Borden explained that the Canadian Government had intended to make the cable in question State property to be linked up with the land telegraphic system, which already belonged to the Government. In this way, it was thought measures could be taken to reduce rates.

President Wilson thought that the question raised by Sir Robert Borden was not in contradiction with his own proposals, and should be considered when the question of drafting the international convention relating to cables was undertaken.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that President Wilson’s proposal would apply to all cables, and consequently would also affect the French and Japanese Governments.

Baron Makino said he wished to state Japan’s position in the matter. At the last meeting on this subject, Mr. Balfour had proposed a resolution which had been accepted after long discussion. He had not then had time to catch the real purport of the resolution. Accordingly, he had wished to obtain some explanation, but he was told that after the text came back from the Drafting Committee, he would have an opportunity of discussing the question further. At the present moment, he was prepared to accept the policy contained in the resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour on 24th March last.

In regard to the appropriation of the cables in question, he would invite attention to the policy that had been pursued, vis-à-vis, Germany, as expressed in the Peace Treaty. It would be found that a
certain number of questions had been settled not strictly in accordance with the recognised usages of international law. For instance, in regard to the taking over of private property. Again, Article 13 of the Financial Clauses authorised the taking over of undertakings of public utility. That is to say, the Allied and Associated Governments had, in his opinion, gone very far in taking over German rights and much further than had ever been done heretofore. In his opinion, the same procedure could therefore well be followed in regard to cables. The Cable Company taken over by the Japanese Government had a capital of 15 million marks at its disposal and in addition received from the German Government an annual subsidy of 1½ million marks. These facts clearly proved that the undertaking had not been a commercial one; but part and parcel of the German political system. For this reason, taking into consideration also the general policy introduced elsewhere in the Treaty to which he had just alluded, it was not unreasonable that this cable should be taken over by Japan. That clearly was the Japanese point of view, and after very careful consideration he had been led to the conclusion that the best policy would be to adopt Mr. Balfour’s original resolution.

Next, in regard to the International Convention relating to the future management of cables, his personal opinion was that such an arrangement would be desirable. Such a Convention could be drawn up on the same lines as the International Postal Convention, subject to International agreement. But for the moment he was only willing to accept the proposals contained in Mr. Balfour’s resolution adopted on March 24th last.

Mr. Lloyd George said that President Wilson had put forward a new proposal. So far, he had only been able to have a short consultation with Mr. Balfour, who agreed with him that their experts should be consulted before reaching a definite conclusion. He would therefore ask the Council to adjourn the further discussion of the question, in order to give time for proper consideration of the new proposal. He felt very hopeful that an agreement would be reached; but he would like to consult his experts. In his opinion, it would be a mistake to discuss the proposal until it had received further consideration.

President Wilson explained that he had put forward his proposal for two reasons. Firstly, because he thought it was right and, secondly, because he thought it afforded a solution in the general interest, which would have the effect of creating a solidarity amongst the Allied Powers.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed provided financial solidarity alone was not intended.

Sir Robert Borden was particularly anxious to avoid private companies acquiring too large a monopoly. For instance, he was anxious
to approach the American Government with a view to reducing cable
rates and ship rates.

President Wilson expressed his complete agreement with Sir
Robert Borden's purpose. The common trusteeship he had pro-
posed was intended to bring about these very objects. He thought
that one reason why the German cable referred to by Baron Makino
had not paid was because it constituted merely an independent piece,
which did not enter into the general system. With the permission
of the Council, he would formulate a definite draft resolution for
discussion at the next meeting of the Council.

Mr. Lansing thought that the draft resolution might very well
be drawn up on the lines of the Article dealing with the surrender
of German Colonies.

(It was agreed that President Wilson should formulate a draft
resolution for discussion at the next meeting of the Council of Ten
to the effect that all German Cables seized during the war should
be transferred to the Allied and Associated Powers as trustees,
who would determine the future working of the cables in the interests
of the Powers concerned).

The meeting then adjourned.

Paris, 1 May, 1919.
Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, May 2nd, 1919, at 5 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.

Secretary-General

Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

JAPAN

(During latter half of Meeting)

H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. Viscount Chinda.

Secretary-General

M. Saburi.

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Admiral W. S. Benson.
Mr. Rogers.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G.
Mr. F. J. Brown.
The Hon. C. H. Tufton, C. M. G.

FRANCE

Admiral de Bon.
M. Hayes.
Capt. de V. Levavasser, Lieut. de Vaisseau Odend'hal.

JAPAN

Vice-Admiral Takeshita.
M. Yamakawa.

[Joint Secretariat]

BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
FRANCE . . . . . . . . Capt. A. Fortier.

Interpreter:—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. Clemenceau said that the Japanese Representatives had not yet been able to reach the Meeting. He thought, however, that a preliminary discussion might be held in regard to the draft resolution, which had been prepared by President Wilson, and which read as follows:—

"It is agreed:

(1) That an article shall be inserted in the Treaty of Peace whereby Germany shall on her own behalf and on the behalf of German nationals renounce in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers jointly all rights, titles and privileges of whatsoever nature possessed by her or her nationals in the submarine cables or portion thereof mentioned below:—

Emden—Vigo: from the Straits of Dover to off Vigo.
Emden—Brest: from off Cherbourg to Brest.
Emden—Teneriffe: from off Dunkerque to off Teneriffe.
Emden—Azores (1) from the Straits of Dover to Fayal.
Emden—Azores (2) from the Straits of Dover to Fayal."
Azores—New York (1) from Fayal to New York.
Azores—New York (2) from Fayal to the longitude of Halifax.
Teneriffe—Monrovia: from off Teneriffe to off Monrovia.
Monrovia—Lome:

| from about | lat. 2 deg. 30' N. |
|           | long. 7 deg. 40' W. of Greenwich |
| to about  | lat. 2 deg. 20' N. |
|           | long. 5.30' deg. W. of Greenwich |
| and from about | lat. 3 deg. 48' N. |
|           | long. 0.00. |

Lome—Duala: from Lome to Duala.
Monrovia—Pernambuco: from off Monrovia to off Pernambuco.
Constantinople—Constanza: from Constantinople to Constanza.
Chefoo—Tsingtao—Shanghai: from Tsingtao to Chefoo, and from Tsingtao to Shanghai.
Yap—Shanghai, Yap—Guam, and Yap—Menado (Celebes): from Yap Island to Shanghai, from Yap Island to Guam Island, and from Yap Island to Menado.

(2) That the Five Allied and Associated Powers shall jointly hold these cables together with any rights or privileges pertaining thereto for common agreement as to the best system of administration and control; and

(3) That the Five Allied and Associated Powers shall call as soon as possible an International Congress to consider and report on all international aspects of telegraph, cable and radio communication, with a view to providing the entire world with adequate communication facilities on a fair, equitable basis."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it would be unwise to take any decision on this question in the absence of the Japanese Representatives.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that a preliminary discussion could be held in regard to the Atlantic cables.

(At this stage MM. Yamakawa and Saburi, and Vice-Admiral Takeshita entered the Council Chamber.)

MR. BALFOUR said that since the last meeting he had been able to make careful enquiries in regard to the actual position of the Atlantic cables. This aspect of the case, he thought, was very important as being relevant to the final decision, and it would throw light on what had actually happened. He felt bound to confess that he had only on that day been able to discover the actual position of affairs and, he thought, Mr. Lansing’s previous information must have been equally imperfect, since he (Mr. Lansing) had told the Council at a previous meeting that Great Britain had control of too many cable lines. Now, the fact of the case was that Great Britain had control of no cable lines, with the exception of the one recently captured from Germany. This statement had greatly surprised him and it had led him to make further enquiries in order to obtain an explanation. It appeared that there existed 13 cable lines between the United Kingdom and America. Seven of these
lines were actually owned by American companies, and the remaining 6 though owned by British companies were leased to American companies for a period which still had some 90 years to run. The explanation for this surprising state of affairs was, however, a very simple one. It showed how monopolies, to which the Heads of Government objected worked. The fact was that a cable running, say between Land’s End and New York, would be of no use unless the company owning the cable was able at New York to make satisfactory arrangements for the further transmission of messages along the internal telegraph lines. In Great Britain, the State owned all land telegraph lines; but in America these were apparently owned by two private companies, who so arranged their rates as to “freeze out” British owned cables. In consequence British companies had been driven to say to the American companies: “As we cannot work our cable lines under these conditions, we will lease them to you”. The result was that all cables running between Great Britain and America were either owned or leased by American companies. The British did not grumble at the service, which was efficient and good, though the rates were somewhat high; but the fact remained that the whole control was American.

President Wilson thought the inference contained in the last part of Mr. Balfour’s statement should be completed. In his opinion it was just as necessary to obtain land connections at the British end of the cable lines as it was at the American end.

Mr. Balfour explained that the difference lay in the fact that in Great Britain the land telegraph lines were State owned and the policy of the British Government had been to encourage the laying down of cables, and with this object in view, very favourable terms had been given to the cable companies; so much so that the American Companies actually contemplated increasing the number of their cable lines. However that might be, the last thing he wished to do was to make a complaint about American companies. But he did wish to point out that one of the morals of the existing state of affairs was that it was no use to obtain the control of cable lines crossing the Ocean unless international agreements could, at the same time, be made in regard to the rates charged over land lines. Thus, if the Great Powers decided to take over, as suggested in President Wilson’s resolution, the Trans-Atlantic cables, and if they quarrelled with the great American Companies owning the land lines, they would be just as helpless as the British cable companies had been and would be “frozen out”. Consequently, the American Government would have to consider whether it would not have to modify its system, so as to obtain some control over its land lines. So much in regard to the question of the control of cables in time of peace. On the other hand, in time of war it would never be possible to take away the control
which every nation naturally possessed over the landing places situated in her own country. No nation would agree to give up her sovereignty over such landing places. Thus, for instance, Great Britain would never agree to hand over Land's End. Consequently, in time of war, every nation would use its powers to prevent messages hurtful to its own national interests being transmitted from the landing stages. He fully admitted that his statement was based on the system which had existed in the past, and he agreed that other conditions might prevail in the future, owing to altered international relations. It would, however, be an illusion to suppose, firstly, that any international arrangement in regard to cables would necessarily yield satisfactory results unless the land telegraph lines were also controlled and secondly, that effective control could only be exercised over cables which landed in a country which was at war.

Furthermore, he thought it would not be wise to try to limit the power of nations to lay cables between the different parts of their own Dominions, if they so wished. Thus, for instance, he thought the United States of America should have perfect liberty to lay cables, for instance, between America and the Philippines and America and Panama, and he held that a cable which began and ended on American soil should be wholly controlled by America. He doubted the propriety of preventing any such arrangement. On the other hand, it should be realised that as a result Great Britain would thereby be placed in a position to apply Empire preferential cable rates. He thought that this introduced a question which could not, however, be decided before the International Congress referred to in paragraph 3 of President Wilson's draft resolution, had been appointed.

Mr. Lloyd George thought that the strongest argument against the kind of international control proposed by President Wilson in the event of war, was that it might become impossible any longer to cut enemy cables. Thus, for instance, had the Atlantic cable lines been controlled in 1914 by America, France, Great Britain and Germany, it would not have been possible to cut the cables, as had been done.

Mr. Balfour agreed, but maintained that each nation could have stopped messages from passing through their territory. In his opinion this question chiefly affected the Great Sea Powers, for it was particularly advantageous to them to be able to cut cables in the event of war.

President Wilson enquired whether the Council was not arguing a question which was not yet in debate. In his draft resolution he had merely attempted to make arrangements so that the cables in question could be placed under the best system of administration and control. As Baron Makino had stated at yesterday's meeting, the Allied and Associated Governments had taken certain liberties with international law in the Peace Treaty, and in his opinion a new deci-
sion in international law was being made in regard to taking possession of cable lengths which lay in No Man's Land, at the bottom of the sea, in order to connect the ends to form new cable systems. He agreed that no clear ruling on this point existed in international law; and such action could only be justified by analogies such as the seizure of private property. The point he wished to make, however, was this, namely, that it was not proposed to assign to one or two of a number of partners in the war, the indispensable means of international communication, though the other belligerents were also vitally interested. He thought, therefore, that all partners of the war should have a voice in the system of administration and control to be adopted in future. The five Allied and Associated Powers who would hold these cables as trustees in accordance with his draft resolution, were the very Powers upon whom the whole system of peace and international understanding would henceforth rest. Consequently power should be conferred upon this group of Great Powers to decide the whole question, and he felt confident they would be in a position to do so equitably. He fully agreed that it would be impossible to interfere with sovereign rights.

In regard to the question of rates and monopolies, he agreed that at the present moment the proposals contained in his draft resolutions would merely be applied to a small number of cables; but he thought means might eventually be devised to break down the existing high rates. It would be admitted that no international understanding could be effective unless international means of exercising pressure were at the same time accorded and, in this connection, it might be found useful for the Great Powers to lay additional cables in order to make new and better communications, and so obtain the means of controlling rates and of preventing the creation of monopolies. But these results could not be reached by conversations which would be held after the property in question had been definitely assigned to particular Powers.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he could not altogether accept President Wilson's conclusion. At the present moment the Atlantic cables were almost wholly in the hands of American monopolies, which had been very skilfully engineered. These American companies preferred London for their operations, as it suited them better for practical reasons. The greater part of their business was in London, which was a great cable distributing centre; and, in addition, the British Post Office had been extremely liberal in its arrangements for the transmission of messages over British land lines. The fact remained, however, that the existing 13 cable lines were all controlled by Americans. During the war the British had captured a German cable and connected it with Canada, and the line now constituted the only Canadian State owned line. The Canadian Government had recently contem-
plated laying a second cable in order to bring pressure to bear with a view of reducing the rates charged by the monopolist companies. President Wilson, however, now proposed that the cable line in question should be placed under international control. If America desired to break down American monopolies, he thought the only way would be for additional cable lines to be laid. To lay a cable across the Atlantic cost between £700,000 and £800,000. Consequently, whoever wanted to break monopolies would have to pay that sum. On the other hand, he failed to see why Canada should be deprived of something which had been captured during the war just as legitimately as the capture of a ship; the latter representing communications over the seas, the former, communications under the seas.

To sum up, he failed to see the point of dispossessing Canada in order to set up a kind of international control over something which she regarded as essential to her business success, and which had cost her over £200,000 to organise.

President Wilson thought that Mr. Lloyd George had, in his statement, made various assumptions which were not necessarily justified. In the first place, it was not correct to say that America wanted to deprive Canada of the cable in question. Secondly, he did not propose to establish a permanent international control over the particular cable in question. His proposal had merely contemplated the setting up of some authority, which would possess the right to enquire as to how all existing systems could best be administered and controlled. In other words, should the cable in question be assigned to Canada by the Treaty of Peace; the United States of America would thereafter have no right to ask what it was intended to do with the cable, for the obvious reply would be that the cable belonged to Canada, and America could not interfere in its management. But since, at the present moment, the Allied and Associated Governments, were partners of war, he considered it to be part of his privilege to enquire what was to be done with the cable in question. He merely asked, therefore, that an initial enquiry should be made as to what was to be done with the cables mentioned in his draft resolution.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he did not for a moment challenge President Wilson’s right to examine what was to be done with any piece of property that had been seized from the enemy during the war. On the other hand, he thought it would be wiser to accept the proposal made by Admiral de Bon at yesterday’s meeting, namely, that Germany should be informed that the cables which during the period of the war had been cut and utilised by the Allied and Associated Governments, would not be restored to her, and that they would remain the property of the Allied and Associated Governments. At the same time, an International body could be appointed to consider and report on the whole question of ocean cables.
President Wilson thought that the only difference between the two plans was that in accordance with his own proposals the cables would during the intermediate period be vested in trustees. With this exception, his proposal did not differ in principle from Admiral de Bon’s.

Mr. Balfour proposed the following amendments to President Wilson’s draft resolution:—

“(a) Para. 1.
The word ‘jointly’ to be omitted.
(b) Para. 2.
To be amended to read as follows:—“These cables shall continue to be worked as at present without prejudice to any decision as to their future status which may be reached by the five Allied and Associated Powers mentioned in the next paragraph.”

President Wilson said he would accept the amendments proposed by Mr. Balfour.

Mr. Balfour, continuing, said that Sir Robert Borden had suggested the following addition to the end of the new paragraph 2, namely:—

“And without prejudice to any vested right that may be claimed by reason of cutting, possession, expenditure and utilisation.”

President Wilson thought that the latter addition would be quite unnecessary. He suggested that the whole of the resolution should be re-drafted to embody Mr. Balfour’s amendments and taken the first thing at the meeting to be held on the following day.

Viscount Chinda wished to call attention to one important point in the draft resolution. He thought the submarine cable lines Chefoo-Tsingtao-Shanghai; Tsingtao-Chefoo; and Tsingtao-Shanghai should be omitted from the first paragraph of the resolution, since it had already been agreed by the Council of Four that these cables were to be renounced by Germany in favour of Japan.

(This was agreed to.)

Mr. Rogers invited attention to the fact that Mr. Balfour’s amended paragraph 2 merely related to cables at present being worked. He thought the wording should be amended so as to include cables and parts of cables not at present in use.

(This was agreed to.)

(It was agreed that the following draft resolution, as amended, should be considered at a Meeting to be held on Saturday, May 3rd, at 11 a.m.):

“Germany renounces, on her own behalf and on behalf of her nationals, in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,
all rights, titles or privileges of whatever nature in the submarine
cables set out below, or in any portions thereof:

Emden—Vigo: from the Straits of Dover to off Vigo.
Emden—Brest: from off Cherbourg to Brest.
Emden—Teneriffe: from off Dunkerque to off Teneriffe.
Emden—Azores (1): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal.
Emden—Azores (2): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal.
Azores—New York (2): from Fayal to the longitude of Halifax.
Teneriffe—Monrovia: from off Teneriffe to off Monrovia.

Monrovia—Lome:

from about  lat. 2 deg. 30' N.
     long. 7 deg. 40' W. of Greenwich

     lat. 2 deg. 20' N.

     long. 5.30 deg. W. of Greenwich

to about   lat. 3 deg. 48' N.

     long. 0.00.

to Lome.

Lome—Duala: from Lome to Duala.
Monrovia—Pernambuco: from off Monrovia to off Pernambuco.
Constantinople—Constanza: from Constantinople to Constanza.
Yap—Shanghai, Yap—Guam, and Yap—Menado (Celebes): from
Yap Island to Shanghai, from Yap Island to Guam Island,
and from Yap Island to Menado.

Such of the above-mentioned cables as are now in use, shall con-
tinue to be worked in the conditions at present existing; but such
working shall not prejudice the right of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers to decide the future status of these cables in such
way as they may think fit.

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers may make such
arrangements as they may think fit for bringing into operation any
of the said cables which are not at present in use.

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall as soon as
possible arrange for the convoking of an International Congress to
consider all international aspects of communication by land tele-
graphs, cables or wireless telegraphy, and to make recommendations
to the Powers concerned with a view to providing the entire world
with adequate facilities of this nature on a fair and equitable basis."

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Paris, 2nd May, 1919.
Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 12th May, 1919, at 4 p.m.

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**  
President Wilson  
Hon. H. White  
Secretary  
Mr. L. Harrison  

**BRITISH EMPIRE**  
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.  
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.  
Secretary-General  
Secretary  
Mr. H. Norman  

**FRANCE**  
M. Clemenceau  
M. Pichon  
Secretary  
M. Arnavon  
Capt. de St. Quentin  
M. de Bearn  

**ITALY**  
H. E. M. Orlando  
H. E. Baron Sonnino  
Secretary-General  
Count Aldrovandi  
Secretary  
M. Bertele  

**JAPAN**  
H. E. Baron Makino  
H. E. Viscount Chinda  
Secretaries  
M. Saburi  
M. Kawai

**ALSO PRESENT**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**  
Dr. Seymour  
Dr. Day  
Mr. A. W. Dulles  
Dr. W. E. Lunt  
Major D. W. Johnson  

**BRITISH EMPIRE**  
Sir Eyre Crowe  
Hon. H. Nicolson  
Mr. A. Leeper  
Major H. W. V. Temperley  
Major Barnes  

**FRANCE**  
M. J. Cambon  
M. Tardiou  
M. Aubert  
M. Hermitte  

**ITALY**  
M. de Martino

**Joint Secretariat**

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**  
Lieut. Burden.  
**BRITISH EMPIRE**  
Captain E. Abraham.  
**FRANCE**  
Captain A. Portier.  
**ITALY**  
Lieut. Zanchi.

*Interpreter:*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.
M. Clemenceau asked M. Tardieu to explain the finding of the Committee on Jugo Slav affairs.

M. Tardieu gave an explanation of the finding of the Committee substantially identical to that given in I. C. 182 and in I. C. 184.

Mr. Balfour asked whether any method of obtaining a plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin had been thought out.

M. Tardieu replied that no methods had been suggested, as the Committee had not thought it necessary to propose any, until the plebiscite had been accepted in principle.

M. Clemenceau enquired whether the principle of the plebiscite was accepted.

President Wilson replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Lloyd George also agreed.

Baron Sonnino expressed the view that if a plebiscite were resorted to in this area, there should be one in Marburg and in other doubtful corners along the proposed frontier.

Mr. Balfour said that it was true there were other regions with mixed populations, but if the Conference were satisfied that it possessed sufficient knowledge to solve these problems without a referendum, he could see no reason why a plebiscite should not be resorted to in the isolated case of the Klagenfurt Basin if the Conference did not think itself sufficiently well-informed to decide its fate without one.

M. Tardieu pointed out that the Commission had been unanimous not only regarding the rest of the frontier, but in recommending a plebiscite in this area.

President Wilson pointed out that the most urgent business before the meeting was to frame a clause for the Treaty. Some definite stipulation should be put down. He read the draft prepared by the Committee on Roumania and Jugo-Slavia, given as Article 5 on page 31 of Report No. 2 (W. C. P. 646.)

"In the whole of the basin of Klagenfurt, as defined below, an Inter-Allied Commission will be charged by the five Allied and Associated Powers with the duty of ascertaining on the spot the wishes expressed by the inhabitants as to the attachment of their territory to that of the Jugo-Slav State.

If the conclusions of this Commission establish the formal desire of the population to be attached to the Jugo-Slav State, the five Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to give satisfaction to such desire."

Mr. Balfour agreed that all Austria need know was that the people in the area in question would be consulted.

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1 FM-12, p. 671.
2 FM-14, p. 697.
M. Orlando said that if he understood the clause aright, it meant that the fate of this territory was reserved until the conclusion of the labours of the Commission set up by it. On these terms he would accept the draft Article.

(The draft Article regarding the consultation of the population in the Klagenfurt Basin by an Inter-Allied Commission was accepted.)

M. Tardieu then proceeded to explain the difficulty regarding the triangle south-east of Tarvis. (See I. C. 184 and Annexure.)

Baron Sonnino asked at what date the final attribution would be made. He expressed the opinion that the occasion of making a Treaty with Austria was the best moment for settling this.

Mr. Balfour explained that the result obtained at the last meeting of the Foreign Ministers (see I. C. 184) a compromise had been reached solely in order to obtain means of settling speedily with Austria. He agreed with Baron Sonnino that the final attribution of this territory must be made at some date. He suggested that if it were not settled immediately, it might be considered when the Conference came to decide on the boundaries of Jugo-Slawia.

M. Clemenceau suggested that this course should be adopted.

Baron Sonnino adhered to the view that the matter should be settled immediately; not only was it an Italian interest, but it was also a first-rate Austrian interest. It concerned the Austrians to know by what means they would communicate with the sea. The territory in question was a small mountainous wedge with a very small population. It was quite separate from the question of Fiume, and it could readily be decided in connection with the forthcoming Treaty with Austria.

President Wilson pointed out that two questions were involved. One was that of the ultimate sovereignty to be acknowledged by the population of the district. As this population was predominantly Jugo-Slav, the natural answer would be that the sovereignty should be Jugo-Slav. The second question was that of direct railway communication between Austria and Italy. In a similar instance the Conference had found no great difficulty in settling an almost identical problem. Arrangements had been made to ensure unimpeached transit between Eastern and Western Prussia.

Baron Sonnino pointed out that in order to give Czecho-Slovakia some 60 kilometres of railway, about 60,000 Magyars were to be subjected to Czecho-Slovak sovereignty. This had been done in order to ensure unimpeached railway communication between Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania. Similarly, no less than 280,000 Magyars had been handed over to Roumania, and in Poland, together with 100 kilometres of railway, some 100,000 Germans had been made Polish subjects.

(Considerable dissent was expressed from this statement. Such

solutions might have been proposed by Committees, but had not yet been accepted by the Council.)

M. CLEMENCEAUS said that the proposal which he asked the Council to accept or reject was, that the limits of Austria should be fixed provisionally, and that the final attribution of the triangle in question be reserved until the frontiers of Jugo-Slavia were determined. This would be in accordance with the decision of the Foreign Secretaries of the previous Saturday. (I. C. 184.)

(This was finally agreed to and the frontier of Austria as proposed by the Committee on Jugo-Slavia in the report, and in the annexure to I. C. 184 was accepted.)

(The southern frontier of Hungary as set forth in the document annexed to these Minutes (Annexure A) was also accepted.)

M. CAMBIC made a statement explaining the findings of the Committee on Czecho-Slovak affairs. He pointed out that the administrative boundary between Austria and Bohemia had been followed almost throughout. There were two small deviations. Firstly, at Gmund, the railway junction of which was to be left within Czecho-Slovakia. This junction was situated at some 4 kilometres from the town and was the junction of the two main lines serving Bohemia. The second deviation was near Feldsberg, at the join of the rivers Thaya and Morava. These two streams were the main arteries of Moravia and gave access to the Danube. The line had therefore been drawn in such a way as to give the stream to Czecho-Slovakia, while the railway parallel with the stream which was necessary to Vienna, was left within Austria.

M. CLEMENCEAUS asked whether any objections were raised to the solution proposed by the Committee.

(No objections were raised, and the frontier proposed by the Committee was adopted.)

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that it would be necessary to specify the frontier between Austria and Hungary in the Treaty with the former. He reminded the Meeting that it had been decided to set up a Commission to investigate this matter in order to prepare the Conference for the raising of the question by either of the parties interested. He was informed that the Austrians would raise the question, and that the Allied and Associated Powers would be called upon to decide it. He read the decision recorded in I. C. 182 Para. 1, D, and asked whether any nominations had been made.

(No nominations had been made.)

BARON SONNINO asked whether it would not be enough to require

\[FM-12, p. 674.\]
Austria to recognise the independence of Hungary, and Hungary that of Austria, without raising the frontier question at all.

President Wilson said that he was informed the Austrians would raise the question.

(After some discussion it was decided that Austria would be required to recognise the frontier of 1867 between Austria and Hungary, and that if any difficulty arose regarding this frontier, the Allied and Associated Powers might if necessary arbitrate.)

After a short statement by M. Tardieu the frontiers of Hungary, as laid down in Annexure A, were accepted. (The Meeting then adjourned.)


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Annexure "A" to IC 185 [BC-61]

Articles Regarding Hungarian Frontiers Proposed by the Council of Foreign Ministers for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace With Hungary

Paris, 8th May, 1919.

In accordance with the instructions given to it by the Supreme Council of the Allies, the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs studied the question of Hungarian frontiers at its meeting of 8th May. 5

It begs to suggest to the Supreme Council the adoption of the draft Articles proposed:—

1. By the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions in Annex III of its Report, relating to the frontier between the Czecho-Slovak Republic and Hungary.

This frontier is fixed as follows:—

(1) From the point where the frontier between Austria and Hungary meets the Danube as far as its confluence with the Eipel.

The Tâhoeg of the main stream of the Danube, as far as the confluence of the Danube and the Eipel (Ipoly).

(2) Between the confluence of the Eipel and the Sajo.

The course of the Eipel as far as a point about 10 kilometers south-south-west of the Losonez station;

A line following the watershed running from north-west to south-east; cutting the Salgo-Tarjan; Losonez railway; continuing along the watershed towards the south-east, and then south as far as point 628, 7 kilom. east-north-east of Salgo-Tarjan.

Following the watershed, at first in a general north-easterly direction, and then, after reaching point 278 (south of the confluence of the Sajo and the Rima) in an east-north-easterly direction to meet the Sajo.

5 See FM-12, p. 670.
(3) Between the Sajo and the Ung.

A line cutting the Putnek-Lozónez railway at Banrevé station (about 6 kilometres west of Putnek) so as to pass between the bifurcations of the two railways, leading respectively, northwards to Pelsócz, and southwards to Borsodnádasd.

Following the watershed in a general north-easterly direction as far as a point 7 kilometres east of Pelsócz.

Following a general east-north-easterly direction and cutting the Torna-Edeleny railway 4 kilometres southwest of Torna.

Following in an easterly direction the ridge of the left bank of the Bodva, passing north of Keny and South of Buzita, to meet the Hernad 6 kilometres north-east of Hidásnémeti, then following this river upstream as far as a point just west of Nádasd.

Turning east and passing south of Nádasd, meeting and following the watershed between the Bozsák and the Ronyva.

Meeting this latter river 8 kilometres north-north-west of Sátorálja-Ujhely and following its Talvég southwards.

Cutting the railway triangle south-east of Sátorálja-Ujhely, in such a way as to leave to the Czechoslovaks the complete possession on their territory of the Kassa-Csap railway.

Crossing the Bodrog about 5 kilometres south of Bodrog-Szerdahely.

(4) Between the Bodrog and the frontier of Ruthenian territory.

A line parallel to and to the south of the Sátorálja-Ujhely-Csap railway, passing north of Lacza and south of Perbenyik and Tarkany to meet the Tisza (Theiss) west of the latter village.

Following the Talvég of the Tisza upstream to the point (2 kilometres east-south-east of Csap) where the frontier between Ruthenian territory and Hungary touches that river.

2. By the Committee on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs in Annex VI of its Report No. 1 relative to the frontier between Rumania and Hungary.

This frontier is fixed as follows:

Leaving the point of junction of the frontiers of Rumania, the Czecho-Slovak State (Ruthenian territory) and Hungary; the boundary between Rumania and Hungary runs in a general south-southwesterly direction, roughly parallel to and to the west of the railway Halmi; Szatmár-Németi; Nagy Károly; Nagy-Varad; Nagy-Szalonta.

Cuts the railway Nagy-Szalonta; Gyula about 12 kilometres from Nagy-Szalonta, passes between the two bifurcations formed by the junction of this railway and the railway Szeghalom-Erdőgyarak.

Passes east of Kőtegyván, east of Gyula, west of Ottlakan, east of Kevermes, and east of Dombegyház, between Battonya and Torny, where it meets the administrative boundary between the Comitats of Csanád and Arad.

Following this administrative boundary to its salient north-northwest of Nemet-Perego, whence it runs towards the river Maros which it reaches about 1 kilometre south of Nagylak station, passing between the town and the railway station.

Follows the Talvég of the Maros downstream to a point about 3.5 kilometres upstream from the railway bridge on the line Mako-Szeged. Thence it runs west-south-west, following the Talvég of a backwater as far as the bend which it makes at a point about 1 kilometre south-
east of point 84 and about 9 kilometres south-west of Makó, of approximate position 46°10' North and 20°22' East of Greenwich. This point is the meeting place of the three frontiers of Roumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia.

3. By the Committee for Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs, in Annexe VI of its 2nd Report, relative to the frontier between Yugoslavia and Hungary.

This frontier shall be fixed as follows:—

Leaving the meeting-place of the frontiers of Yugoslavia, Roumania and Hungary, 9 kilometres south-west of Makó.

A line running in a general north-westerly direction, passing between Szt-Ivan and Gyalo and meeting the main stream of the river Tisza.

Following downstream the Talweg of the main stream of the Tisza, and then following upstream that of its backwater, thus making a détour round the south of the island of Nagyret.

A line in a general E. W. direction, passing south of Roszke; cutting the railway line from Szabadka to Kishunhalas at about 3 kilometres to the south-east of the station of Kelebia.

A line in a general north-easterly-south-westerly direction, cutting the railway line from Szabadka to Baja at about 1.5 kilometres to the east of the station of Csikeria.

Meeting the river Kigyos at the bend which it makes 4 kilometres east-north-east of Baosmadaras;

Following the Talweg of this river westwards;

Crossing the marshy region lying north and west of Rigyicza leaving this village to Yugoslavia, the exact trace to be determined on the ground by the Boundary Commission.

Rejoining the Talweg of the river Kigyos west of Rigyicza and following it to a point about 8 kilometres south-west of the railway junction at Rigyicza.

Turning west-south-west, passing between the villages of Szantova and Bereg, reaching the main stream of the Danube at about 8 kilometres to the north of point 169 (Kisküszeg).

The Talweg of the main stream of the Danube southwards to its confluence with the river Drave.

The Talweg of the main stream of the Drave towards the north-west of its confluence with the river Mur.

The Talweg of the Mur to the point where the frontier between Hungary and Austria meets that river from the north.

In the region between Czecho-Slovak and Yugoslavia territory, Hungary is coterminus with Austria.
Secretary's Notes of a Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers Held in the Salle de l’Horloge, Quai d’Orsay, on Tuesday, June 17, 1919, at 11 a. m.

Present

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

President Wilson
Hon. R. Lansing

Secretary-General
Mr. J. C. Grew

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour

Secretary-General
Sir M. P. A. Hankey.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretary-General
Peace Conference
M. Dutasta

**ITALY**

Baron Sonnino
Marquis Imperiali

**JAPAN**

Baron Makino
Viscount Chinda

**TURKEY**

S. A. Damad Ferid Pacha
S. E. Riza Tewfik Bey
S. E. Tewfik Bey

Joint Secretariat

**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**
Colonel U. S. Grant.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**
Major A. M. Caccia.

**FRANCE**
Captain E. Abraham.

**ITALY**
Captain A. Portier.

Interpreter.—M. Mantoux.
M. Clemenceau, addressing the Delegates of the Government of the
Ottoman Empire, said that they had been good enough to request leave
to submit their views in regard to the questions before
the Peace Conference in regard to the Turkish Empire.
The Allied Representatives hastened to reply to their
request in the sense that they were at the disposal of
the Ottoman Delegates. The latter had been good enough to under-
take the journey, and it was hoped that it might be a useful one for
all the parties concerned. The Ottoman Delegates were requested to
be so good as to state their views.

His Highness Damad Ferid Pacha then read out the following
statement:—

"Gentlemen, I should not be bold enough to come before this high
Assembly if I thought that the Ottoman people had incurred any
share of responsibility in the war which has ravaged Europe and Asia
with fire and sword.

"I apologise in advance for the development which I must give to
my statement, for I am in point of fact defending to-day before the
public opinion of the whole world and before history a most com-
licated and ill-understood case.

"In the course of the war, nearly the whole civilised world was
shocked by the recital of the crimes alleged to have been committed
by the Turks. It is far from my thought to cast a veil over these
misdeeds which are such as to make the conscience of mankind
shudder with horror for ever; still less will I endeavour to minimise
the degree of guilt of the actors in the great drama. The aim
which I have set myself is that of showing to the world, with proofs
in my hand, who are the truly responsible authors of these terrible
cri mes.

"We are under no illusions in regard to the extent of the dissatis-
faction which surrounds us; we are absolutely convinced that a mass
of unfortunate events has made Turkey appear in an unfavourable
light; however, when the truth has once been brought to light, it will
warn civilised nations and posterity against passing an unjust judg-
ment on us. The responsibility for the war in the East—assumed,
without the knowledge of the Sovereign or of the people, in the Black
Sea, by a German ship commanded by a German Admiral—rests
entirely with the signatories of the secret Treaties, which were un-
known alike to the Ottoman people and to the European Chanceries.
These agreements were concluded between the Government of the
Kaiser and the heads of the revolutionary Committee, who at the
beginning of 1913, had placed themselves in power by means of a
coup d’État. I call to witness the official despatches exchanged be-
tween the representatives of France and Great Britain and their
respective Governments during the three months which preceded the
outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and the Empire of the Czars. When war had once been declared, the eternal covetousness of Russia as regards Constantinople was skillfully represented to the people as an imminent danger, and anxiety for the preservation of national existence thereupon rendered the struggle a desperate one. Our archives are moreover, thrown entirely open to an enquiry which would enable the statements which I have the honour to make to this high Assembly to be amply confirmed.

"In regard to the other tragic events I beg leave to repeat here the declarations which I have repeatedly made to the Ottoman Senate. Turkey deplores the murder of a great number of her Christian co-nationals, as much as she does that of Moslems, properly speaking. In point of fact, the Committee of Union and Progress, not content with the crimes perpetrated against Christians, condemned to death by every means three million Moslems. Several hundreds of thousands of these unfortunate beings, hunted from their homes, are still wandering about today in the middle of Asia Minor without shelter and without any relief for their very existence; and even if they returned to their provinces they would find themselves just as destitute, for a large number of towns and villages, both Moslem and Christian, have been completely destroyed. Asia Minor is today nothing but a vast heap of ruins. The new Government notwithstanding its vigilant care, has been as yet unable to mitigate the disastrous effects of the cataclysm. It will always be easily possible to confirm my assertions by an enquiry undertaken on the spot. It is necessary, however, to dismiss any theory of racial conflict or of any explosion of religious fanaticism. Moreover, the Turkish people, at a time when violence could strive successfully against right, showed itself able to respect the lives, the honour and the sacred feelings of the Christian nation[al]'s subject to its laws. It would be fairer to judge the Ottoman nation by its long history as a whole rather than by a single period which shows it in the most disadvantageous light.

"Whatever be the names by which they are called, the principles and the methods of both the Russian and Turkish revolutionaries are the same, namely to destroy society in order to seize its ruins by putting its members out of the way and taking possession of their property. Europe and America are endeavouring at the cost of immense sacrifice to deliver the Slav people, whose ostensible attitude towards the Entente is scarcely different at the present time from that of the Turks, for both have been reduced to silence and both paralysed by an unheard of tyranny. The Turks, who thus find themselves, under the domination of the Committee, in the same situation as that of the Russians under the Terrorists, deserve the same sympathy and the same humanitarian and kindly assistance at the hands of the rulers of the Great nations which hold the destinies of the world in their hands."
"Latterly the truth has begun to filter through into European public opinion. The great trial of the Unionists at Constantinople has proved the responsibility of the leaders of the Committee—who all of them occupy high positions in the State—for the war and the other tragic events; that is the rehabilitation of the Ottoman nation.

"Thus rehabilitated in the eyes of the civilised world, our mission will henceforward be that of devoting ourselves to an intensive economic and intellectual culture in order thus to become an useful factor in the League of Nations. The Ottoman People hope that the chaos in the East, fostered as it is by this abnormal state of affairs which is neither war nor peace, may at last be replaced by order, and it likewise desires to see the end of the continued occupation of its territories in spite of the Armistice. This occupation has in fact resulted at Smyrna in the most deplorable excesses which have been committed to the hurt of the defenceless Moslem population.

"It desires with equal earnestness the maintenance, on the basis of the status quo ante bellum, of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which, during the last 40 years, has been reduced to the least possible limits. It lastly wishes to be granted in Thrace, to the North and West of Adrianople where the Mohammedan population is in an overwhelming majority, a frontier line which will render possible the defence of Adrianople and Constantinople.

"What we ask for thus is, moreover, completely in conformity with President Wilson’s principles, which we invoked when requesting an Armistice, being convinced that they would be evenly applied in the interests of the peace of the world. On the other hand a fresh parcelling out of the Ottoman Empire would entirely upset the balance in the East.

"The ranges of the Taurus are moreover nothing more than a geological line of demarcation. The regions situated beyond those mountains, from the Mediterranean up to the Arabian Sea, are, although a language different from the Turkish language is spoken there, indissolubly linked with Constantinople by feelings which are deeper than the principle of nationality; on either side of the Taurus the same ideals, the same thoughts, the same moral and material interests bind the inhabitants. These form a compact block and its disintegration would be detrimental to the peace and tranquillity of the East. Even a plebiscite would not solve the question, for the supreme interests of more than three hundred million Moslems are involved, and they form an important fraction of the whole of the human race.

The conscience of the world could only approve conditions of peace which are compatible with right, with the aspirations of peoples and with immanent justice.[7]

M. Clemenceau, after thanking the Turkish Grand Vizier for his
communication, proposed with his leave to adjourn the meeting for a few moments in order to deliberate, and undertook to make to him a quarter of an hour later whatever communication was decided on.

(The meeting was adjourned at 11.30 a.m. and resumed at 11.55 a.m.)

M. CLEMENCEAU, addressing the Ottoman Delegates, said that he had been requested by the Heads of Governments and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Allied and Associated Powers to inform them that the statement made by the Grand Vizier had been listened to with the utmost attention, that it was intended to subject that statement to detailed examination and to make a reply as soon as one was ready. He added that the Heads of Governments and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, in view of the occupations which then absorbed their time, would be unable to make their reply before Saturday; and that one of the Heads of Government was leaving Paris that evening and would only return on Friday. He therefore proposed that a meeting should be held on the following Saturday at 11 a.m. for the presentation of the Allied reply. He further stated that if the Ottoman Delegates had any comments to offer or requests to make or anything to say in regard to the programme which he had just outlined the Allied representatives would be glad to hear them.

HIS HIGHNESS DAMAD FERID PASHA said that the Ottoman Delegation was preparing a memorandum which would be forwarded as soon as it was ready.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired on what day it would be sent.

HIS HIGHNESS DAMAD FERID PASHA said that it would be sent on Friday evening.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Allied representatives would defer their reply until after the receipt of the Turkish memorandum, and would then fix a date for the next meeting.

HIS HIGHNESS DAMAD FERID PASHA expressed his agreement.

(The meeting was adjourned at noon.)

PARIS, June 17th, 1919.