AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE
ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF "THE INQUIRY"

Breckinridge Long Papers

The Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 4, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Mr. Woolsey and I have thought about and talked about a bureau to be established for the study and preparation of those questions which appear likely to be proposed at the Peace Conference. We have thought that such work should be in charge of a board to be composed of,

First, a high official of the Navy;
Second, the Naval Instructor;
Third, the head of the War College;
Fourth, some official of the Department of State to be designated by you;
Fifth, some expert on International Law—such as Mr. Scott.

Under this board, and to serve as advisers to it, should be selected persons who are experts in the different geographical [geographical] divisions of the work: such as Professor Harper on Russia; someone on the Balkan States; someone on Turkey and Persia; someone on Japan; someone on Germany and Austria; someone on England, France and Belgium, and such others as may, from time to time, develop as either necessary or expedient.

It is felt that the bureau—if the suggestion meets with your approval—should be organized immediately but most quietly and that its existence be not made known; that it should meet, not at the Department of State, but at the War College, or some other place where it could be concealed, and that it be furnished with all books and literature which could be of any possible service to it.

Personally I feel that the Secretary of State should keep control of it and of its operations; that it should report to the Secretary of State and be under his directions. Whether this would be sufficiently insured under the membership above proposed, cannot be definitely said, but it could be made certain by adding one or more other persons to be designated by the Secretary of State or it might be assured by having it composed of five persons to be designated by the Secretary of State and to have the military and naval representatives attached
to it in an advisory capacity in the same manner as the expert advisers above indicated.

I am sorry that I will not have an opportunity to speak to you about this in person. I leave this memorandum for you and Mr. Woolsey will speak to you.

Respectfully submitted,

[B. Long]

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Paris Peace Conf. 182/1

Confidential Memorandum on Preparatory Work for Peace Conference

SEPTEMBER 15, 1917.

It is impossible in selecting negotiators to represent this Government at the Peace Conference to find men who possess the full knowledge to deal with the numerous and complex questions which will arise. It is important, therefore, that they should be furnished beforehand with information and data in a condensed form upon which they can rely in the discussion of questions even though they may not be participants in all the discussions.

To accomplish this purpose experts on the various probable subjects of negotiation should be invited, with or without compensation, to prepare brief, though comprehensive articles on these subjects, explaining to the writers that the purpose is for the use of the representatives of the United States at the Peace Conference and that, therefore, their work must be kept secret.

The subjects in general would fall under the heads of History, Commerce, and International Law. History would naturally be divided under the various countries and could be developed along political, commercial, industrial and military lines. Possibly it would be found advantageous to group certain countries together in treating of their history, while colonial possessions would require special treatment. Commerce would be in a measure statistical but would involve the careful study of exports and imports, markets and trade routes. International Law would cover a wide range of subjects, relating to peace and war, such as maritime law, rules of war, neutralization of land communication, internationalization of waterways, extent of territorial waters, &c.

Outside of these subjects which fall under the three heads named, there are others which should be considered, such as disarmament, in-
ternational guaranties and their enforcement, arbitration, &c. Possibly, too, it would be advisable to have the constitutions and political institutions of the countries carefully analyzed and commented upon.

Following out this general plan, which, if adopted, ought to be elaborated with great care in order that the experts engaged would understand the exact limits of their respective studies, a selection should be made from the historians, political economists and jurists in this country, who are especially qualified to deal with particular subjects. Each should prepare a pamphlet of not to exceed 10,000 or 15,000 words on the topic assigned to him and these pamphlets after being submitted to the person or persons having general charge of the work of gathering information for the negotiators should be secretly printed and carefully indexed for use when occasion arises.

In addition to these condensed articles it would probably be advisable to have a collection of documents, statistics, quotations, &c., which would form appendices to the articles, but which should be indexed so that they could be readily referred to. These appendices should also be secretly printed.

Full instructions should also be prepared for each writer engaged on this work explaining the method of treatment of the subject assigned to him.

The division of subjects, the selection of writers, the issuance of instructions, the examination of articles and collected data, and the direction of printing and indexing should be in the hands of one man, who should have such assistants as he may require.

Parls Peace Conf. 182/1

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

Queries

How far should the United States take part in the determination of European boundaries?

How far should the United States take part in the redistribution of colonial possession?

Should the United States go further than to approve or disapprove an agreed boundary on any other ground than that it contains an element of future discord?

Should the basis of territorial distribution be race, language, religion or previous political affiliation?

*The original of this undated memorandum is in Secretary Lansing's hand and is accompanied by other manuscript memoranda on subjects for consideration. The latter are not printed.
Where two or more countries have political claims to a particular territory, as in Macedonia, what should be the basis of settlement? If it is determined that the preponderance of a particular nationality in the population is controlling *prima facie*, how far should conquest or enforced colonization affect such basis? (This might apply to Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein and the region about Dantzig.) Should colonial possessions be guaranteed to the power holding them without a limitation as to the character of the government, commercial freedom, and economic opportunity to other nations?

Paris Peace Conf. 182/2

**Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State**

Dear Mr. Lansing: The President tells me of your conference with him yesterday as far as it related to me, and the work which you both have in mind for me to do.

I expect to be in Washington next week and I hope we may have an opportunity to talk it out, so I may have the benefit of your views and wide experience.

The memorandum which you gave the President, and which he in turn sent me, is in every way admirable and will be helpful in planning an organization.  

Sincerely yours,  

E. M. House  

New York, September 20, 1917.

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**Mr. Walter Lippmann to the Secretary of War (Baker)**

[New York,] October 27, 1917.

Dear N. D. B.: I want to write you personally for your advice and assistance.

It seems clear that the question of reducing armaments will be thoroughly agitated at the peace conference. By that time it will have become something more than a humane agitation. Economically the nations cannot support the present scale of expenditure and recover from the losses of the war. For we have to remember that a case of armaments today is immeasurably more burdensome than it was during the armed peace up to 1914. To return even to that scale would mean a radical proportionate reduction. Recognition of

* See footnote 1a, p. 10.
this fact seems to be dawning upon statesmen in Central Europe, especially in Austria, and undoubtedly gives a certain sincerity to their repeated pleas.

I have been examining what literature is immediately available, and I can find nothing which contains a practical and technical analysis of the problem. Obviously the crux of the problem is how to prevent cheating by subtle forms of mobilization. The line between normal industry and semi-military preparation no longer exists, and as armament is relative, one naturally suspects such obvious devices as limitation of budgets, of capital ships, or the size of standing armies.

What is needed now is a creative study of the question by a group of men who thoroughly understand modern military science. These men would be required at the peace conference as technical advisers, not only on the general question of reducing armaments but on the specific strategic problems which will arise.

Won't you, if you can manage the time think this over and see whether

1. It is advisable to have the matter studied in the Department.
2. Who could be assigned to study it.

I have shown this letter to Colonel House.

Devotedly yours,

WALTER LIPPMANN

Inquiry files

The Secretary of War (Baker) to Mr. Walter Lippmann.

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1917.

DEAR WALTER: I have your letter of the 27th with regard to the reduction of armaments question. I agree with you that it ought to be studied from the points of view which you suggest, and that those who study it ought to be headed by someone who would be available as a conferee at the Paris Conference. Under all the circumstances I think I would rather turn General Bliss's mind loose on this subject than anybody's else. He is not at hand just now, but when he comes back I will be glad to speak to him about it and let him brood upon it, as he will do thoroughly. I think it would not be a bad plan also to have General Crowder thinking about it, as he has a ruminating mind and will take a good deal of pleasure in learning all the literature there is on the subject; but perhaps it would be better to have General Bliss invite Crowder in to help him study it than to start

*General Enoch H. Crowder, Provost Marshal General, United States Army.
them independently in the matter, so that unless you want the study started sooner I will let the matter go until Bliss's return.

Affectionately yours,  

NEWTON D. BAKER  

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Inquiry filed

Mr. Walter Lippmann to the Secretary of War (Baker)

[NEW YORK,] November 5, 1917.

Dear N. D. B.: Your suggestion is ideal. I had not dared to hope that General Bliss would be able to give any time to the matter, and had had it in mind that General Crowder would be the best of all the men that I had known in the Department for this particular subject. I rather expect to go to Washington next week, with the chief inducement the hope of seeing you.

Ever yours,  

WALTER LIPPmann

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Paris Peace Conf. 182/4

The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1917.

MY DEAR DOCTOR MEZES:

I hope you will be in Washington this week as you plan as I think we should have a pretty thorough understanding as to how this Department can be made serviceable to you in your work. I am sorry I have not had time to study the details more than I have but I really have not been able to accomplish very much along those lines.

Very sincerely yours,  

ROBERT LANSING

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Paris Peace Conf. 182/5

Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, November 9, 1917.  
[Received November 10.]

Dear Mr. Secretary: I expect to spend next Monday and Tuesday, and if necessary, Wednesday and Thursday, in Washington, staying with Mr. Baruch at 1520–18th Street, telephone, North 8959. I shall get into touch with you regarding the matters mentioned in your favor of November 5th.
I am enclosing a second draft giving an outline of the subjects to be dealt with in The Inquiry that seem to be most urgent.

Very sincerely yours,

S. E. Mezes

[Enclosure]

A Preliminary Brief Outline of the Subjects To Be Dealt With in the Inquiry

I. Suppressed, Oppressed and Backward Peoples, etc. (e. g., Poles, Bohemians, Jugo-Slavs, African regions); in each case—
   1. Past and Present: History, Geography, (Races, Maps); Government and Politics, Social Status, Economics (business, agriculture), Strategy (chiefly to judge unfounded boundary claims).

2. Serious Proposals for Future: By whom made (nations, parties, leaders) and why; light thrown on each by data in 1, especially as to whether it would tend to establish a suitable geographic and business unit (with needed access to sea and markets) and tend, by constitution or laws (granting independence, autonomy, or civil and cultural rights) to insure sufficient freedom, security, and where feasible, unity.

II. International Business; Commercial Freedom and Equity.
   1. Physical bases; past and present operation and regulation; serious proposals analyzed. Straits, Canals, Rivers, Ports, Railways, Cables, Wireless, Aircraft (? ?).

2. Tariff Studies; e. g., Universal Free Trade; Most Favored Nation treatment for (practically) all; Revenue Tariffs; Open Door; Fair Access to Raw Materials; “Key” Industries and Materials.

3. Export of capital; concessions, spheres; facts and serious proposals.

III. Studies in International Law
   1. Surveys of positions taken by Important Nations on timely questions; also positions of text writers on them.

2. Serious proposals for vital changes analytically presented with forward outlook; by whom made and why; e. g., for
   1. Humanizing warfare on land, on sea, in air, (weapons, gasses, mines, submarines, etc.)
   2. The Freedom of the Seas.

3. Limitation of Armaments on land and sea.

4. Aid to workers on II above and IV below, and to other workers.
IV. Analytical Presentation of Serious Proposals for organizing (giving structure to) a concert of the authority and force of mankind to insure a just and lasting peace.

V. Restoration: Data and Estimates, insofar as, and if accessible.

Summaries of Important Divisions that Belong Together and General Summary.

Inquiry files

Dr. S. E. Mezes to Mr. Walter Lippmann

NEW YORK, November 10, 1917.

DEAR MR. LIPPmann: I have prepared a memorandum, which I enclose, giving a rough and approximate outline of the subjects to be dealt with in The Inquiry. I have included only those which seem to be most urgent and am sending the outline to you for your consideration and suggestion when we next meet. Naturally, it only can embody a general scheme which, if finally accepted, should be kept in mind in prosecuting individual inquiries, but should not be allowed to interfere with the variations in treatment which the nature of each inquiry, and even to some extent the personality of each inquirer, would naturally render desirable. The outline is an attempt to summarize the more important points of agreement that resulted from our various conferences.

I think we made good progress at our meeting on Thursday, and have no doubt that The Inquiry will continue satisfactorily. I am sending copies of the memorandum to the other gentlemen who were present at the meeting.

Sincerely yours,

S. E. MEZES

[Enclosure 1]

A Preliminary Brief Outline of the Subjects To Be Dealt With in the Inquiry

[Here follows text of the memorandum, which is identical with that printed on page 15 except for the addition of the following:]

VI. The Technique of Peace Conferences (so far as accessible)

Provisions in general terms (that might keep the promise to our ear and break it to our hope) and detailed provisions: Concurrent and later action of sub-committees, and of commissions established by conferences.

* Attached to the file copy of this letter are two memoranda, which are here printed as enclosures 1 and 2.
AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum of Needs

I. Data and sane proposals regarding war-breeding areas:
   1. Alsace-Lorraine
   2. Poland (including question of access to sea)
   3. Lithuanian region
   4. Czecho-Slovak (Bohemia, etc.)
   5. Roumanian Irredentist areas.
   6. Yugo-Slavia; 4, 5 and 6 possibly one study, i.e., Austro-
      Hungarian danger areas.
   7. The Balkans (not Roumania, but Dobruja).
   8. Italian Irredentist areas.
   9. Turkey in Europe and Asia (including Constantinople).
   10. Aegean Islands and nearby Asiatic shores.
   11. The Far East.
   12. German colonies in Africa and the Pacific; nearby colonies
       for comparison.

II. Data (historical, including geographical, governmental, eco-
    nomic, foreign relations) regarding important nations.

   1. National aspirations (political, territorial, economic) that
      must or might well be reckoned with, their bases and relative
      strength.

III. Examples, and sane suggestions, of types of governmental ar-
     rangements for international areas, such as, possibly, Dantzig,
     Trieste, Saloniki, Constantinople, all Turkey. World organi-
     zation, proposals that may be urged by responsible men.

IV. Laws of war on sea and land: History, sane proposals made.

V. Data regarding damage done on land and sea that calls for
    reparation, its amount, and possible ways of making reparation.

VI. Internationalized Trade Routes

VII. Business & Diplomacy

Inquiry Document No. 893

A Preliminary Survey

[Undated.]

I.—Practical Tasks of the Conference in Which the Inquiry
    Can Help

1) Establish or provide for the establishment of boundaries.
2) Set up or provide for the setting up of governments.
3) Estimate strength and weakness of doubtful states.
4) Draw up or provide for the drawing up of economic arrangements.
5) Provide for the safeguarding of minorities or of weak peoples.
6) Provide for equality of economic opportunity (most favored nation clause?)
7) Rewrite or provide for the rewriting of international law in general and as applied to specific problems—Miller, Woolsey, Scott, and State Department.
8) Bear in mind diplomatic history—ditto.

II.—Regions in which each task of Conference in which Inquiry can help will or may have to be undertaken

1) *Fragments of Russia*—a) west, b) south, c) west.
   Will have to be undertaken: estimate of strength and weakness of doubtful states.
   May have to be undertaken: boundaries, governments, economic arrangements, safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.

2) *Nucleus of Russia.*
   Will have to be undertaken: estimate of strength and weakness of doubtful states.
   May have to be undertaken: boundaries, governments, economic arrangements, safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.

3) *Poland.*
   Will have to be undertaken: boundaries, governments.
   May have to be undertaken: economic arrangements, safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.

4) *Slesvig.*
   May have to be undertaken: boundaries.

5) *Belgium.*
   May have to be undertaken: boundaries, economic arrangements.

6) *Luxemburg.*
   May have to be undertaken: boundaries, economic arrangements.

7) *Alsace-Lorraine.*
   Will have to be undertaken: boundaries.

8) *Trentino region.*
   Will have to be undertaken: boundaries.

9) *Triest region.*
   Will have to be undertaken: boundaries.

10) *Austria-Hungary.*
    Will have to be undertaken: boundaries, governments, economic arrangements.
    May have to be undertaken: safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.
11) **Balkans.**
Will have to be undertaken: boundaries, estimate of strength and weakness of doubtful states (Albania).
May have to be undertaken: governments, economic arrangements, safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.

12) **Turkey.**
Will have to be undertaken: boundaries, estimate of strength and weakness of doubtful states, safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.
May have to be undertaken: governments, economic arrangements.

13) **North Africa.**
May have to be undertaken: boundaries, economic arrangements, safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.

14) **Tropical and South Africa.**
Will have to be undertaken: safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.
May have to be undertaken: boundaries, economic arrangements.

15) **Far East.**
May have to be undertaken: economic arrangements.

16) **Pacific Islands.**
May have to be undertaken: safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.

17) **Latin America.**
May have to be undertaken: boundaries, economic arrangements.

18) **Persia and Afghanistan.**

19) **Spitzbergen.**

**CLASSIFIED BY TASKS.**

1) The establishment or provision for the establishment of boundaries will have to be undertaken for Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, Trentino region, Triest region, Austria-Hungary, Balkans, and Turkey.

The establishment or provision for the establishment of boundaries may have to be undertaken for the fragments of Russia, the nucleus of Russia, Slesvig, Belgium, Luxemburg, North Africa, Tropical and South Africa, Latin America.

2) The setting up or provision for the setting up of governments will have to be undertaken for Poland and Austria-Hungary.

The setting up or provision for the setting up of governments may have to be undertaken for the fragments of Russia, the nucleus of Russia, the Balkans, and Turkey.

3) Estimates of the strength and weakness of doubtful states will have to be undertaken for the fragments of Russia, the nucleus of Russia, the Balkans, and Turkey.
4) The drawing up or provision for the drawing up of economic arrangements may have to be undertaken for the fragments of Russia, the nucleus of Russia, Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey, North Africa, Tropical and South Africa, the Far East, and Latin America.

b) Provision for the safeguarding of minorities or of weak peoples will have to be undertaken for Turkey and Tropical and South Africa.

Provision for the safeguarding of minorities or of weak peoples may have to be undertaken for the fragments of Russia, the nucleus of Russia, Poland, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, North Africa, and the Pacific Islands.

III.—HOW INQUIRY CAN HELP WITH REGARD TO EACH MAJOR TASK OF CONFERENCE

1) Boundaries:

a) Racial boundaries:

i) Make a racial map of Europe, Asiatic Turkey, etc., showing boundaries and mixed and doubtful zones.

ii) On basis of i) draw racial boundary lines where possible, i.e. when authorities agree; when they disagree select those we had best follow; when these disagree map the zone of their disagreement; study density and distribution of peoples in these zones.

iii) Study, in each case, the stability or instability of racial distribution (e.g. Macedonia, N. E. Albania) as affected by change of political boundaries and consequent governmental action, by economic forces, by religious forces, by other cultural forces, etc., but all with stability or instability in mind.

b) Historic facts and national or racial aspirations as indicating boundaries (e.g. Serbo-Bulgarian ’12 agreement).

c) Economic facts and needs as indicating boundaries (e.g. Jugoslavia or Albania or Poland or Czechoslovakia as a well-balanced economic unit, access to ports, and markets, i.e. minor units that should not be disrupted, etc.).

d) Defensive needs as indicating boundaries.

e) International commitments and obligations as affecting proposed boundaries.

2) Government:

a) Inquiry can give some account of political and economic and military strength and weakness of “states,” and of what participation in government peoples have had, and an estimate of their capacity for self-government.
b) Inquiry can give some account of "provisional governments" that have claimed to represent them.

c) Beyond that it is a question of recognizing some provisional government, and, possibly, offering it facilities for getting started (and protection while doing so?).

3) Economic arrangements.
   a) Inquiry can gather some data as to economic resources and needs, strength and weakness.
   b) Inquiry can gather some data as to possible attempts to subject to economic vassalage.

4) Safeguarding minorities and weak peoples.
   a) Inquiry can gather data showing weakness and possible aggression, and needs and methods in the matter of protection.

IV.—THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INQUIRY DESCRIBED IN GENERAL TERMS

1) A collection of data in: a) reports; b) made maps and graphs; c) books and articles; d) collected maps, graphs, etc. All these must be made available by highly intelligent selection and indexing.

2) A presentation of the larger problems with regard to each problem area in the form of a discussion and evaluation of the data that bear on them, through the instrumentality of maps, graphs, and reports.

3) A force of trained men whose members have collected the data and made and can use the index in 1), have had part in 2), and can, on request, carry 2) further by means of 1).

V.—TASKS OF CONFERENCE THE INQUIRY CANNOT FURTHER AND WHERE THEY MAY BE FURTHERED

1) The exchange and repatriation of prisoners of war (War Department).

2) The restoration of devastated areas and provision for the needs of their populations.

3) Limitation of armaments (State, War, and Navy Departments).

4) International law regulating aircraft (War and Navy Departments, aided by State Department).

5) Allocation of raw materials, shipping, etc., during reconstruction (War Trade, War Industry, Shipping Boards).

6) Commercial treaties (Department of Commerce, Tariff Commission, except as stated above).

7) Current relations and commitments (State Department).

8) Drafting reports and making record (State Department with aid of Miller, Woolsey, Scott).
Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State

New York, November 19, 1917,
[Received November 20.]

Dear Mr. Secretary: It would be very helpful for me to have a verbatim statement of the agreement that was at one time contemplated between ourselves and other American republics looking towards the mutual guarantee of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and dealing, no doubt, with some other matters involved in these two guarantees. Would it be possible for you to have one of your assistants get and send me a statement of the contemplated agreement? I should, if you think best, use it as a possible form of general international agreement, without indicating that it was in contemplation an agreement for this hemisphere.

The point, of course, is that this is one of the types of international cooperation that needs study, especially as it was worked out by our own government.

Very sincerely yours,

S. E. Mezes

The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes

Washington, November 21, 1917.

My dear doctor Mezes: In compliance with your request of November 19th I am sending you the proposed agreement between this Government and other American Republics which was under consideration about a year-and-a-half ago. You will observe it is in the form of what might be called a “Pan American Treaty”.*

I assume you understand that this is of a most confidential nature and for the present I prefer you not to show it to anyone else and certainly not without having discussed the matter with me.

Very sincerely yours,

Robert Lansing

[Enclosure]

Draft of Proposed Pan American Treaty

The Governments of the United States of America, the Argentine Republic, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, etc.

*For papers previously printed on this subject, see Foreign Relations: The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, vol. iii, pp. 471 ff.; also Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 3-4.
Fully determined to maintain their territorial integrity and their political independence under republican forms of Government;
Desirous to define exactly the boundaries of their respective territories and to remove any doubts, uncertainties, or disputes that may exist as to their territorial limits, in order that their territorial integrity and their political independence under republican forms of government may be effectively, mutually and jointly guaranteed;
Anxious to settle by peaceable means all controversies that may arise between them or any of them, and by so doing to advance the cause of international justice; and
Resolved not merely to preserve peace between themselves, but also to maintain peace within their respective boundaries,
Have decided to conclude a treaty for these purposes, and to that end have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:
The Government of the United States of America:
The Government of the Argentine Republic:
Etc., etc.,
Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in due and proper form, have agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties to this solemn covenant and agreement hereby join one another in a common and mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and of political independence under republican forms of government.

ARTICLE II

To give definitive application to the guarantee set forth in Article I, the High Contracting Parties severally covenant to endeavor forthwith to reach a settlement of all disputes as to boundaries or territory now pending between them by amicable agreement or by means of international arbitration.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties further agree: First, that all questions, of whatever character, arising between any two or more of them, which cannot be settled by the ordinary means of diplomatic correspondence, shall, before any declaration of war or beginning of hostilities, be first submitted to a permanent international commission for investigation, one year being allowed for such investigation; and, Second, that if the dispute is not settled by investigation, to submit the same to arbitration, provided the question in dispute does not affect the honor, independence, or vital interests of the nations concerned or the interests of third parties.
To the end that domestic tranquility may prevail within their territories the High Contracting Parties further severally covenant and agree that they will not permit the departure from their respective jurisdictions of any military or naval expedition hostile to the established government of any of the High Contracting Parties, and that they will prevent the exportation from their respective jurisdictions of arms, ammunition or other munitions of war destined to or for the use of any person or persons notified to be in insurrection or revolt against the established government of any of the High Contracting Parties, provided, however, that a state of belligerency has not been recognized by any one of the High Contracting Parties.

The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible, in accordance with the constitutional laws and provisions of each of the contracting countries; the ratifications thereof shall be deposited at a date to be agreed upon in the office of the Pan American Union in the City of Washington, United States of America; and the treaty shall take effect as between the high contracting parties sixty days from the date of deposit of ratifications thereof.

The treaty shall continue in effect indefinitely.

In the event of one of the contracting powers wishing to denounce the present treaty, the denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Government of the United States of America, which shall immediately communicate a duly certified copy of the notification to all the other contracting parties, informing them of the date on which it was received.

The denunciation shall only have effect in regard to the notifying country, and then only one year after the notification has reached the Government of the United States.

This treaty is concluded for a period of years and shall be continued for similar periods of years unless it is terminated by agreement of all the contracting parties.

The treaty may be denounced by any of the contracting parties, but the denunciation to be effective must be made in writing, one year before the expiration of the period for which the treaty has been concluded, or one year before the expiration of the period for which it has been renewed, to the Government of the United States, which shall immediately communicate a duly certified copy of the notification to all the other contracting parties, informing them of the date on which it was received.

The denunciation shall only have effect in regard to the notifying country, and then only one year after the notification has reached the Government of the United States.
In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention and have hereunto affixed their respective seals.

Done in the City of Washington, in the United States of America, this day of ____, in the Spanish, English, French and Portuguese languages, the originals of which shall remain in the archives of the Pan American Union and copies thereof duly certified, shall be sent through the diplomatic channels to the High Contracting Parties.

Paris Peace Conf. 182/7

Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, November 23, 1917.
[Received November 24.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for your note of November 21st and its enclosure, which I shall treat as most confidential matter.

I shall myself shortly make a draft of the principles involved in your enclosure in general terms, eliminating all references to individual nations or groups of nations, and submit it for your consideration as a general plan that might deserve study by our group, if on consideration of the draft you think it advisable so to treat it.

Very sincerely yours,

S. E. MEZES

Inquiry files

The Secretary of War (Baker) to Mr. Walter Lippmann

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1917.

DEAR WALTER: Thank you for letting me see the copy of your letter to the President of the twenty-first.7 I thoroughly sympathize with the view you express, although I had not thought of it before. I am reaching the place, or have already reached it, where I feel that every energy must be combined to make Germany livable after the war. By that I mean livable to her own people as well as to the rest of the world. If a “victorious peace” were achieved by the Allies and the German people were condemned to intolerable domestic conditions of an economic kind they would be worse, maybe, than they were before, and yet access to the resources of civilization can be tolerated only upon assurances that can be relied upon that

*Not found in Inquiry files.
such resources will be used in the interest of civilization when they are supplied.

Cordially yours,

Newton D. Baker

Inquiry files

Mr. Walter Lippmann to the Division Chiefs of the Inquiry

New York, December 11, 1917.

Organization of the Secretary's Office

The organization of the Inquiry is as follows:

Chairman

Executive Committee

Director S. E. Mezes
Treasurer D. H. Miller
Research J. T. Shotwell
Secretary W. Lippmann

Division Chiefs

1. Politics and Government (including international cooperation)
   W. Lippmann
2. Economics and Business (national and international)
   D. H. Miller, 61 Broadway
   A. A. Young, War Trade Board, Washington, D. C.
3. Social Science (including history)
   J. T. Shotwell, 3755 Broadway, N. Y.
4. International Law
   J. F. Chamberlain, Columbia University
5. Geography
   Isaiah Bowman, 3755 Broadway, N. Y.
6. Strategy
   Unassigned.

Collaborators

Assistants
Memorandum on the Context of the Inquiry

[Undated—circa December 15, 1917.]

Now that a skeleton organization has been created it may be well to examine the context of the inquiry.

I

In all human probability the war will not at any one moment suddenly terminate in a peace. Demobilization will not precede the peace conference. It is not even likely that hostilities will cease during the early stages of the discussion.

The probable course of events is already indicated. We may expect a peace propaganda from Central Europe of increasing intensity calculated as accurately as possible to allure the groups of the Allied Left at a minimum of concessions. The minimum of actual concession will be covered by formulas which approach more and more the verbal form of the war aims outlined by the Left among the Allies. As the German proposals grow in “moderation” there is a political movement in each of the Allied nations towards its own left. The object of course is the division of the coalition as between the nations and within the nations. Naturally the German peace offensive is aimed at the weak points of the Alliance. Those points are those where the aims of the Allies do not coincide and within the nations the points where the imperialist-nationalist-liberal-pacifist-cleavages are least successfully covered.

Thus, the Reichstag resolution \(^*\) immensely reduced the war spirit of Russia and opened a schism between Russia and the Western Allies. That same resolution and the propaganda which accompanied it very seriously affected what might be called the reluctant liberal support of the war in the Western Nations. The Stockholm conference plan had a similar effect, and from its failure dates the withdrawal of official labor and socialist support of the French and British governments.

It must be noted that a parallel movement exists in Central Europe. There, too, the strain within the Allies and between the Allies is serious, and each move to seduce the Left among the Allies involves a heavy pull upon the Right in Germany. How much of the concessive policy of the German government is forced by the German Left, and how much is deliberately preventive in order to forestall division at home, and how much is carefully calculated to create division abroad, it is not possible to estimate exactly. But this we do know—the German government has succeeded thus far in maintaining a unity in

\(^*\) Foreign Relations, 1917, supp. 2, vol. i, p. 139.
Central Europe which is effective for military purposes and has played with considerable result for the weakening of the coalition.

The counter to this German effort has taken two forms. The first is coercive and consists in the suppression and ostracism of any opinion which is responsive to the concessive proposals from Central Europe. This policy has had some success in the Western Nations, at least temporarily, and may be even more successful in America as we become heavily engaged in France. But it is a very costly policy and in the long run, chiefly because it tends to accentuate class division into a militaristic-pacific division as well; because it corrupts the war spirit by inciting mob violence to drive out disinterested idealism; because it establishes a mood which is recklessly hostile to a constructive international policy. The other of the two methods by which the German offensive is countered reached its expression in the President’s reply to the Pope. That emphasized those purposes which have the widest possible acceptance; it repudiated those which not only divide the coalition within itself, but unify Central Europe in a tenacious defence psychology. This method unifies the Allies by attraction, immensely enlarges the constituency of the war, and because it acts to disintegrate Central Europe compels increasing concession by the Right to the Left. These concessions are, of course, minimal and deceptive, but the assumption of power by a Catholic Bavarian, even though an aristocrat, is an important shift in the balance of political power.

In enemy and friendly nations there is at this time a fierce political struggle, not even concealed. The fact that the European Allies did not themselves reply to the Pope is not to be taken as complete acceptance by the governments of the President’s reply. It is to be taken as an indication that the domestic political situations are too tense for them to risk a discriminating reply. They were compelled to avoid a debate which would have inevitably revealed grave differences of opinion.

Resistance to declarations now of “peace terms” arises from a recognition that once public opinion centers upon questions of territory, no bit of territory will seem worth the cost of war. The actual struggle is waged against the menace of the German army which has terrorized Europe and the world, and the object of the battle is either to demonstrate that the army can be beaten, or to inflict such pressure upon the German nation as would result in a radical rejection of the groups now in control of the Empire. Terms of peace are inevitably

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[^footnote2]: Count Georg von Hertling, Chancellor of the German Empire from Nov. 3, 1917.
secondary to this purpose. To permit them to occupy the center of
discussion would cause morale to decline by a substitution of mere ter-
ritorial ambitions for this greater purpose. A debate about territory
now would reduce the war to the merely nationalistic objects, and in-
evitably split the coalition.

Ultimately the difficulty seems to be this: The war is waged by many
nations against an international menace. Those who are directing
that war have not centered upon this international fact but retain it in
their consciousness and as part of their motive.

These divergencies of purpose in the coalition are no doubt the ultime
tate cause of an unco-ordinated strategy. The logic of nationalist
absolutism is to stake more and more on victory, and to increase the
prize as the effort requires sacrifice. The Western Allies are in the
control of absolute nationalists, the stability of whose own power de-
dpends upon the realization of certain large promises. Therefore in
official circles there has been a recession of interest in what may be
called the program of an enduring peace, the program for which the
workers, the farmers, the small capitalists and the liberal intellectuals
of Western Europe and America accepted the war. This heavy em-
phasis on nationalist success in each country has brought its govern-
ment into conflict with the governments of the Allies. As between
Russia and the West it appears to have opened up an era of tragic mis-
derstanding. For Italy it has meant a curious isolation which ap-
ppears to have led her to military disaster in a spectacular effort to
secure sympathy and assistance. Thus, because the Allies distrusted
Italy's political ambitions, and her unco-operative method of pursuing
them, her military zone was in a measure disregarded and the supplies
needed for an offensive to complete Italy's purposes were not furnished.
To secure those supplies Italy appears to have overextended her front
and exposed her flank. A similar political blunder upon the part of
Rumania appears to have led her to disaster.

Unity of strategy, especially if the war is prolonged, will depend
upon a simplification and pooling of purposes in both coalitions, the
enemies' and our own. This involves a shifting of political power
from those who now control all the nations of Western Europe and
Central Europe so that the governments represent both in personnel,
in social outlook and in patriotic purpose the middle parties. Unity
will involve placating the moderate left even at the cost of opposition
from the irreconcilable right. In both coalitions unity will depend
increasingly upon this movement toward the left. The movement, of
course, need not be parallel or at the same rate. In each country it
is relative to the position now occupied by the controlling groups.

But the two movements react upon each other almost like the bidding
at an auction. The price of unity is increased in each nation as the
liberalism of the enemy increases. But as the governing groups have
staked themselves on particular nationalist successes, this competition in liberalism cuts under the whole social regime which they represent. They resist liberalization of purpose, and so, while they disintegrate their own people, they make it easier for the enemy to hold together.

This political situation bears most heavily on our own success in the war. Excluding for the purposes of argument the invention of some brilliant tactical or strategic novelty, the military decision must be reached on the Western Front by an attempt to exhaust Germany’s reserves. No immediate spectacular success is expected. This involves an unprecedented strain on morale and resources which can be met only by the most successful kind of moral and administrative economy in Western Europe and the United States. This is to be had only by keeping political power upon the broadest basis of popular consent and by a powerful counter-offensive in diplomacy to reveal deceptive liberalism in Germany.

Without this we may expect Germany’s skilful seduction to succeed sufficiently to bring about moral disunion followed by administrative waste and military weakness. Larger and larger areas of the front would then grow torpid as the Russian, Rumanian, Macedonian, Caucasus, Mesopotamian and Gaza fronts now are, and as the Italian may very possibly be.

We may assume that following the conclusion of the Italian campaign Germany will attempt this winter to force a peace discussion aimed to disintegrate the Allied morale before the opening of the spring and summer fighting. The Allies, on the other hand, will resist this peace offensive during the winter, and will this summer try to force a German retirement behind the Meuse and the Scheldt, and will begin at least a tentative invasion of Germany through Lorraine. Until this occurs a very tight hand will be kept on peace discussion in Western Europe and America. If it occurs, the military decision will have been reached and the German army’s prestige will be sufficiently reduced to permit negotiation and discussion. This will be the decision. It will consist of the destruction of the submarine bases, the recapture of northern France, and a potential invasion at least of German territory. The deeper decision, however, will consist in the relative reserves of men. For when the new lines are established at the end of the 1918 campaign Germany will face the military reconquest of Lorraine at the time when the American reserve is becoming an actuality.

If such a decision is reached it will probably not be pressed to any ultimate conclusion. Negotiations will begin on the new line, and with the Allies in control of the outer world and, therefore, of all the materials essential to German reconstruction.
American plans and preparations

II

When the conference assembles

The motive which will probably control all others in the minds of European statesmen will be how to obtain the means of recuperation. Unless they are found revolutionary discontent will accompany demobilization. This will be intensified by the fact that the disbanding of armies is a slow process, and must be accompanied by violent discontent once the pressure of the enemy is removed. Slow demobilization will produce an insurrectionary spirit in those detained too long after hostilities cease. Quick demobilization will produce an economic crisis unless raw materials, transportation, markets, credit are in proper working order. The competition for these facilities will be immediate and intense, and the power to allocate them will be the strongest of all instruments of negotiation. No territory in that belt which stretches from the Baltic through the Balkans to the Persian Gulf (the chief area of debatable territory) is as immediately important as access to and use of sea-borne materials. If the Powers which control the outer communications have a policy of national autonomy and international organization to enforce, this is the only means by which it can be done. For though a military decision is obtained in the West, this great disputed belt of peoples will almost surely remain at the end of the war within the German lines.

The President has many times emphasized the fact that the supremacy of Germany throughout the Near East represents her victory thus far. This supremacy can scarcely be disputed from the East with Russia weak. The acceptance of the Reichstag Resolution by all but the extreme Pan-Germans is based unquestionably upon this fact, and it is highly significant that the German Foreign Secretary, von Kuhlmann, should be himself one of the chief promoters of the Bagdad railway. The men he represents undoubtedly see that German prestige east of the French boundary assures them a mastery of the points which control the approaches to three continents.

There is, however, one overpowering difficulty in the way, and that is the blockade. The Near East, even with Russia added as an economic colony, is still an inchoate empire which would require perhaps a generation of peace and economic resource to organize. Although the enthusiasts for Mittel-Europa write as if it could be a closed economic system, soberer criticism has shown them that this is an impossibility. Middle Europe must, in the immediate future at least, draw essential supplies of reconstruction from the outer world. To pay for those supplies the lost foreign markets must be regained.
There appear to be two schools of German imperialism at the present time, represented perhaps by the Fatherland Party and by the Kühlmann-Helfferich groups. They differ considerably in tone, in domestic policies, perhaps even in spiritual values. But there is a tacit agreement on two points: (1) that Germany’s immediate future is the domination of the eastern part of the continent; (2), that this domination depends upon access to the supplies of the outer world. It is upon the method of attaining the second point that they really disagree. Kühlmann and his group wish to attain it by “accommodation”, by a reconciliation with the western nations which at the present time is equivalent to a surrender of the Near East to the Germans. They count shrewdly that the anti-German coalition would have even less unity of action in peace than it has had in war and that German methods of competition would be irresistible in a world that was exhausted and in a sense demoralized by inability to win when the odds were in its favor. They believe they would secure their supplies from over-seas and dominate the Near East without serious resistance. The Fatherland Party, on the other hand, believes that this access to the outer world must be established by military and naval power, and maintained by constant threat of force.

That is why this party insists on retaining Belgium. That is why the struggle in Germany centers on Belgium. It is a contest between two schools of imperialism. The moderate Kühlmann school is assisted by the German Socialists because its plan of accommodation seems quicker to attain and does not imply a continuation of heavy armaments. This school consists of the really practical men of Germany who understand that recuperation is impossible without a reduction of military expenses and freedom from the threat of war.

For these reasons Belgium has become the pivot of German policy. Obviously the control of Belgium, besides its commercial advantages, would make it possible for Germany to prevent England ever again landing an army in France and would thus leave France absolutely at her mercy. This is probably even a stronger motive than the control of submarine bases. It is interesting to note that Bethmann,¹ who tried to preserve party unity, frequently toyed with the idea of an “administrative division of Belgium”. Such a division would mean Flemish administration of the Flanders coast with the possibility at least that the Flemings could be drawn into the orbit of German influence.

Immediate recuperation through access to supplies, followed by the organization of the Near East, is the probable policy from which Ger-

¹ Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor, 1909–17.
man peace plans arise. The President's speech at Buffalo\textsuperscript{12} makes clear his determination to check it, whether it takes Tirpitz\textsuperscript{13} form or Kühlmann.

III

How can this be done?
1. By a strong and independent Belgium and France.
2. By a reorganized Austria-Hungary in which the Czechs and Croats have the political power to which their numbers entitle them.
3. By a satisfactory settlement of the Balkans which makes Servia strong and Bulgaria satisfied.
4. By an independent Poland able to resist German encroachment.
5. By strong allied control over the essential parts of Turkey—Armenia, Palestine, Mesopotamia.
6. By the creation of a trustworthy Germany.

These may be reduced to three main lines of policy:
A. Evacuation and restoration of the West.
B. Diffusion of power in the East.
C. Domestic reform of Germany.

What are our assets?
I. Military power in the West
II. Economic control of the outer world.
III. Public opinion.
IV. Anti-Prussian feeling in Middle Europe.
V. War weariness.

What are our liabilities?
I. Imperilled communications and strength of Germany's defensive.
II. Incomplete political unity—particularism.
III. Complexity and apparent remoteness of the issue.
IV. War weariness
V. Inability to apply military pressure upon Middle Europe itself.

Assuming that evacuation in the West can be had at almost any time, how are we to attain the other two objects of policy—Diffusion of power in the East and Domestic Reform in Germany?
I. By forcing, rather than accepting, a retirement in the East, thus reducing the prestige of the German Army.
II. By increasing the unity of control in the outer world.


\textsuperscript{13} Alfred von Tirpitz, Lord High Admiral of the German Navy, 1911–16; Secretary of State for Naval Affairs, 1897–1913.
III. By making it clear to Germans that this control is a war measure which will not be relaxed when peace comes, unless there has been reform in Germany and conclusive evidence that the submerged nationalities of eastern Europe are freed.

IV. By friendly advances to these nationalities which encourage movements toward autonomy but do not promise independence.

V. By keeping alive the picture of a reunited peaceful world, constantly accompanied by proof that such a world is not possible with Germany controlled as she is today.

Inquiry Document No. 886

The Inquiry.—Report of Progress to December 15, 1917

At present the Inquiry is organized as follows: There is an Executive Committee of four, consisting of:

S. E. Mezes, Director.
J. T. Shotwell, Research Consultant.
W. Lippmann, Secretary.

The Committee has laid out the general field of research and selected the men to conduct it, who are known as Division Chiefs, with the following general assignments:

1) Politics and government, including international cooperation, W. Lippmann
2) Economics and business (national and international), D. H. Miller and A. A. Young
3) Social science, including history, J. T. Shotwell
4) International law, J. F. Chamberlain
5) Geography, Isaiah Bowman
6) Strategy, (unassigned)

Each of these division chiefs has a certain number of assistants and collaborators assigned to him, some voluntary, some paid.

This organization assembles the material, which is then deposited with Dr. Mezes, who has under his direction a staff for the filing and digesting of the material. The plan adopted here provides for an editing of the material by Dr. Mezes and Mr. Lippmann, who then pass it on to the librarian and the cataloguer. The librarian is Mr. Andrew Keogh of Yale University, and the cataloguer is Miss Wilson of the Columbia Library. The material will be very carefully sifted and filed in such a manner as to be readily available, after the scientific scheme adopted by the Belgian Institute of Bibliography. Under this system it will be possible to collect the material
on any topic in a very few minutes. The index will be as complete as it is possible to make it.

Mr. Keogh will also act as librarian of the Inquiry, assembling documents and materials on any points which are called for. He will be in a position to state where any material published is to be found, either in this country or abroad.

The administrative machinery of the Inquiry is now in running condition, and is planned so that the Central Committee is immediately in touch with the collaborators working in different parts of the country.

The personnel of these collaborators and assistants is representative of various sections of the country. We have drawn so far upon Harvard, Clark University, Smith College, Yale University, Columbia, City College, Princeton, University of Pennsylvania, University of Chicago, University of Minnesota, University of Missouri, Leland Stanford, upon the Library of Congress, the New York Public Library, the American Geographical Society, and the National Board for Historical Service. The filing of the material and the bulk of the correspondence is conducted from the rooms loaned to us by the American Geographical Society. Correspondence with men who are definitely working for the Inquiry is conducted from 3755 Broadway, which is the address of the American Geographical Society. Other correspondence is conducted from the personal addresses of the members of the Executive Committee.

1. The theory upon which the work is planned. The actual assignment of research is laid out so that by the fifteenth of February there shall be available a certain amount of reliable but not absolutely first-hand material on what the Executive Committee has considered as the more urgent problems, based, of course, upon the President's messages. The work is now under way, so that material will be assembled quickly on urgent problems, provision at the same time being made for more intensive work over a longer period.

The Committee has picked as the region of urgency the general area from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf, the colonial area of Central Africa, the problem of the economic needs of the Central Powers, now and immediately after the conclusion of hostilities, and the general problem of the "freedom of the seas." The regional studies are divided into five sections:

1) The Baltic provinces and Poland.
2) Austria-Hungary.
3) The Balkans, and especially the frontiers of Bulgaria.
4) Turkey in Asia.
5) Central Africa.

On these areas there will be, as stated above, available by February 15th at the latest a significant mass of material drawn from trust-
worthy secondary sources, which can then be examined more critically at a later date.

2. Research now under way. In accordance with the plan laid out above and supplementary to it, the following investigation is now under way:

a. A complete list so far as European newspaper sources are available of the significant official declarations and proposals made by governments bearing on the settlement of the war or on international policy. This material is arranged so that it is possible to see either all the declarations made by any one government, or all the declarations made about any particular problem by all the governments. This section is completed and is now in our files, being used as guide material for our other researches.

b. There is now under way, and will be completed by approximately the 5th of January, a careful examination of the press and periodical literature of the western powers, in order to assemble significant declarations of policy by opposition statesmen, minority parties, and important social groups.

c. There is now under way, and will be completed and brought up to date by approximately the middle of January, an examination of all the existing newspapers of the Central Powers for indications of economic and political policy now being discussed. These files will all be coordinated and kept up to date, so that any new utterance coming from a nation in which we are interested may be judged in the light of its other utterances since the beginning of the war.

d. There is now being prepared, and should be fairly well completed by February 1st at the latest, a Who's Who for the Central Powers, Russia, Poland, the Balkan States, and Scandinavia.

e. Arrangements have already been undertaken and may be completed this week for a digest of outstanding treaty obligations, so far as those can be ascertained. This material will also be collated with the declarations and proposals outlined above.

f. There is now being prepared for us, and should be completed by the first of February, a brief for each of the subject nationalities lying in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Persian Gulf. These briefs will state the grievances, the demands, the aspirations, the nature of the organizations through which the demands are made, and a Who's Who of the leaders among the subject nationalities.

g. There is now in our files a schematic chart prepared expressly for the Inquiry of the fourteen best known plans of international organization, drawn from American, British, Belgian, German, and other sources. This chart shows what provision if any is made in the different schemes for international legislative bodies, international administrative bodies, international judicial bodies, international conciliatory bodies, international commercial courts, methods of reference and award, and sanctions proposed.

h. There has been prepared for the Inquiry a chart showing all important international events since 1870, by years and by countries.

i. There is now being prepared, and should be completed by the middle of January, a collection of the declarations and proposals, and the actual practice, in regard to the creation of a new Poland.

j. For each of the five areas of greatest urgency, that is, Poland and the Baltic provinces, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey in
Asia, and Central Africa, the following material is ordered, with a view to having it collected by January 15th:

1) A historical sketch of not more than 2500 words, giving the high lights of greatest pertinence to the Inquiry.
2) One or two readable and authoritative volumes, carefully indexed.
3) Brief accounts of:
The actual participation, and prevention from participation, of each race in the central and provincial government, as to office holding and education for the same.
The actual participation of each race in local government, office holding, and education for the latter.
The restrictions and restraints imposed on subject races in such matters as: the use of language; the exercise and control of religion, meetings, societies, and newspapers; change of residence; entering of occupations; maintenance of their own schools.
The political clubs of racial membership, and other race-conscious social organs.
A brief preliminary description of the structure of governments and of the inter-working of their parts, for the major belligerents, and a volume or two on government structure, carefully indexed.

k. The following material will be ready by February first, prepared by the Division of Geography. It will be based largely on secondary material, and will be capable of more critical and intensive elaboration later if desired. For Poland and Lithuania, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey in Asia, and Central Africa, the following material:

Maps and explanatory articles showing the general relief character of the country; the barriers, gateways and corridors, strategic and economic; the proportion of flat and cultivable as against steep and uncultivable land; the drainage lines; the heads of navigation for vessels of different drafts; seasonal navigation; railway crossings and terminals on rivers; reconstruction of drainage lines; regional drift of internal commerce in relation to navigable streams;
The types of soil and their distribution; special features of the soil, such as erosion and conservation; climate, showing lands favorable to white settlement, the length of the growing season, fogs, destructive storms and droughts; distribution maps and explanatory articles showing the relative importance and value of mineral deposits, degree of mineral independence, amount and source of soil fertilizers; the ultimate development and limits of present exploitation of mineral resources; the relation of the undeveloped mineral and agricultural fields to centers of labor supply; the inherent and acquired productivity of the land for agriculture; the relative regional productivity; the relation of farm lands to industrial regions and centers of food consumption;
The forest types and commercial woods; the extent and degree of the development of existing forests; ultimate forest land;
forests in relation to transportation lines and ports, to centers of lumber consumption and to labor supply; forest policy;

Fisheries; fishing stations and shore rights; consuming centers; seasonal migration of commercial species of fish;

Miscellaneous natural resources, such as the therapeutic value of the climate; mineral springs and baths; hunting and breeding grounds for wild game; historic centers of religious pilgrimages;

As to the people, maps and explanatory articles showing the present general distribution by occupation, races, languages, and religions, together with comparisons of earlier and later distributions; materials showing the general level of civilization, significant customs, and general mode of life; the existing development of material resources; the domestic commerce and routes of trade; trade outlets on land and water; foreign commerce; analytic maps of economic frontiers and barriers, of physical frontiers and barriers, of political frontiers and barriers;

Military geography, showing strategic barriers and centers of distribution; maps of colonial relations and spheres of influence of the European states.

This material will all be presented in as simple and graphic form as possible. Specialized draughtsmen have been secured capable of depicting this material.

l. There is now being assembled, and should be completed by the 15th of February, authoritative material on the principles which have governed the drawing of strategic frontiers in Europe.

m. In the field of international law, there is now being prepared a general outline of the field to be covered, and more special assignments in the order of urgency will be made this week.

n. In the field of economics there is now being prepared, and should be completed at the end of January, a preliminary survey of the chief sources of economic strength and weakness of the nations participating in the settlement. A study of the existing machinery, administrative and legislative, preventing free economic intercourse between the nations which might be used either to maintain pressure upon the Central Powers or to relax restrictions as between the Allies. Figures and charts are being collected showing the financial position, the shipping situation, the industrial needs, and the industrial possibilities of the major powers. A study is being prepared of the chief processes by which goods travel from the producer to the consumer in the areas of greatest interest. A preliminary survey of this should be on hand by February 15th.

o. A special study is planned of Russo-German commercial relations, with a view to indicating methods by which the economic penetration of Russia, due to political weakness, may possibly be prevented.

p. The following subjects are being investigated by specialists, and preliminary reports should be had at varying dates from the beginning of January to the middle of February:

1) The history of the Slavic peoples and the diplomatic history of the Near East.

2) Contemporary American diplomatic history in its relation to European problems.

3) Italia Irridenta.
4) German colonial policy.
5) German militarism.
6) The relation of South Germany to the Empire.
7) The Ukraine and Russian history.
8) Alsace-Lorraine.
9) Bohemia and the South Slavs.
10) Poland.
11) The Pacific islands.
12) The theory of Middle Europe.
13) Special research in regard to Macedonia.
14) Austria’s claims in the Balkans.
15) Belgium.
16) Western Asia.
18) British colonial policy.
19) German industrial democratization.
20) The various meanings attached to “the freedom of the seas.”
21) A varied collection of data in regard to China, especially in its relations to the European settlement.

3. Editing. As this material comes in from the various sources, it will be edited by the Executive Committee and digested into the briefest possible form, so as to be both readable and graphic. In addition to the digesting, there will be briefs in regard to issues likely to be discussed at the peace conference, so that the work of different specialists may be brought to bear as compactly as possible upon the discussion. Particular care has been given to the problem of avoiding the collection of material which when collected would be unavailable because of its bulk or because of bad arrangement.

4. Costs. It will be possible on January first to present a budget of current expenses. It may be noted here, however, that the costs include only the bare expenses of workers whose services could not be secured voluntarily, besides the expense of clerical help and stationery supplies.

Inquiry files

Mr. Walter Lippmann to Colonel E. M. House

December 19, 1917.

My dear Colonel House: I beg to submit the following memorandum upon reconstruction:

1. The longer the war lasts and the more deeply the United States becomes involved the more complex will our internal political, economic and social problems be at the conclusion of peace.

2. Here is a partial list of issues that will have to be met:

The return of our army from France.
The demobilization of the expeditionary and home forces.
The reabsorption of these men into industry.
The transformation of many industries from the making of war materials to normal trade uses.
The financing of the war debt.
The revision of tariffs.
The administration of a vast government owned merchant marine.
The working out of a military and naval policy adapted to the international liberation at the close of the war.
The study of what war-created agencies like the Food Administration, the War Trade Board, etc., should be maintained, or how they should be modified.
The study of methods for meeting and regulating the foreign trade competition which will follow the end of the war.
The planning of a comprehensive immigration policy.
The development of the country’s education, especially along the lines of industrial technique and scientific agriculture.

3. In France, England, and Germany organs exist for working out after-the-war problems based on a realization that the return to peace will be accompanied by grave disorder unless it is skillfully and courageously planned. Once the war-motives are relaxed, governments will not be able to count so heavily on the patriotism and self-sacrifice of interested groups.

4. What appears to be needed is a disinterested analysis and forecast of these issues, together with the preparation of a number of alternative programs which can be put at the disposal of the President.

5. There are a number of ways in which this might be done. We might follow the English model and establish a Reconstruction Bureau in Washington. The objections to this are obvious. It would create an immense amount of gossip and speculation and would be besieged by dogmatists and special interests. A better way, it seems to me, would be to do it quietly, along the lines we are pursuing in collecting reference data for the peace conference. The method would have this advantage, that it would enable us to consider internal problems in their relation to international conditions.

6. In working out the organization of the Inquiry, we are canvassing the expert resources of the country as they relate to social problems. It would be entirely feasible, I believe, for the Inquiry to expand into this other field without straining it. The method of assembling data would be much the same, the machinery for editing and digesting would require no essential change. We should need a somewhat larger central office force, six or eight more men to direct the research, and from twenty-five to fifty thousand dollars to cover payments to specialists, their clerical assistants, and expenses.

7. If this method were adopted, the procedure would be about as follows:

To plot out the main issues tentatively.
To select scholars of an administrative type and divide the field among them.
To have each of them secure a small staff, say of four or five men, who would give full time, and associated with them a larger number of collaborators working voluntarily or for bare expenses.

To pick out key men in important trade, engineering, scientific, agricultural, and labor organizations, and stimulate them quietly to form committees in their organizations which would report needs, problems, and solutions.

To have the reports and researches collated and edited by the directors of the research.

The results could then be laid before the heads of departments at Washington for criticism and for preparation in the form of legislation.

[The remaining portion of this letter, if any, is missing from the Department files.]

[Filed copy not signed]

Inquiry Document No. 887

The Inquiry.—Memorandum Submitted December 22, 1917

The Present Situation: The War Aims and Peace Terms It Suggests

Our Objectives

The Allied military situation and Berlin-Bagdad.

The Allies have had various opportunities to destroy Middle Europe by arms, to wit: the Russian invasion of Galicia, the protection of Serbia, the intervention of Rumania, the offensive of Italy, the expedition at Gallipoli, the expedition to Saloniki, the Mesopotamian campaign, and the Palestinian campaign. The use made of these opportunities has produced roughly the following results: The Russian army has ceased to be an offensive force, and Germany occupies a large part of that territory of the Russian Empire which is inhabited by more or less non-Russian peoples; Rumania is occupied to the mouth of the Danube; Serbia and Montenegro are occupied; the Austrian and German are deep into Italian territory. As the Russian, Rumanian, Serbian, and Italian armies cannot be expected to resume a dangerous offensive, the invasion of Austria-Hungary has ceased to be a possibility. The Allies hold Saloniki, which they are unable to use as a base for offensive operations. There is danger that they may be driven from it. If they are able to hold it, and to keep it from Austrian hands, they have made a blind alley of one subordinate part of the Berlin-Bagdad project, which has always included a branch line to Saloniki, and then to the sea. By the cap-
ture of Bagdad they not only control the rich resources of Mesopotamia but have made a blind alley of the main Berlin-Bagdad line, so far as that line was aimed to be a line of communication to the Persian Gulf as a threat against India. By the capture of Palestine the British have nullified a subordinate part of the Berlin-Bagdad scheme, that is, the threat to the Suez Canal. By the almost complete separation of Arabia from Turkey, the Turks have not only lost the Holy Cities, but another threat to the Red Sea has been removed. Germany has therefore lost the terminals of her project, and if Saloniki, Jerusalem, Bagdad, and Arabia remain in non-German hands the possibilities of defense against the politico-military portions of the Bagdad scheme exist.

The problem of Berlin-Bagdad.

The problem is therefore reduced to this: How effectively is it possible for Germany to organize the territory now under her political and military influence so as to be, in a position at a later date to complete the scheme and to use the resources and the manpower of Middle Europe in the interests of her own foreign policy? She faces here four critical political problems: 1) The Poles; 2) the Czechs; 3) the South Slavs; and 4) Bulgaria. The problem may be stated as follows: If these peoples become either the willing accomplices or the helpless servants of Germany and her political purposes, Berlin will have established a power in Central Europe which will be the master of the continent. The interest of the United States in preventing this must be carefully distinguished before our objectives can become clear. It can be no part of our policy to prevent a free interplay of economic and cultural forces in Central Europe. We should have no interest in thwarting a tendency toward unification. Our interest is in the disestablishment of a system by which adventurous and imperialistic groups in Berlin and Vienna and Budapest could use the resources of this area in the interest of a fiercely selfish foreign policy directed against their neighbors and the rest of the world. In our opposition to Middle Europe, therefore, we should distinguish between the drawing together of an area which has a certain economic unity, and the uses of that unity and the methods by which it is controlled. We are interested primarily in the nature of the control.

The chief binding interests in Middle Europe.

The present control rests upon an alliance of interest between the ruling powers at Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, Constantinople, and Berlin. There are certain common interests which bind these ruling groups together. The chief ones are: 1) the common interests of Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest in the subjection of the Poles, the Czechs, and the Croats; 2) from the point of view of Berlin the
present arrangement assures a control of the external affairs and of the military and economic resources of Austria-Hungary; 3) from the point of view of Vienna and Budapest it assures the German-Magyar ascendency; 4) the interest that binds Sofia to the alliance lay chiefly in the ability of Germany to exploit the wrong done Bulgaria in the treaty of Bucharest; 5) the interest of Constantinople is no doubt in part bought, in part coerced, but it is also in a measure due to the fact that in the German alliance alone lies the possibility of even a nominal integrity for the Turkish Empire; 6) at the conclusion of the war, the greatest tie which will bind Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey to Germany will be the debts of these countries to Germany.

The disestablishment of a Prussian Middle Europe.

It follows that the objectives to be aimed at in order to render Middle Europe safe are the following:

1. Increased democratization of Germany, which means, no doubt, legal changes like the reform of the Prussian franchise, increased ministerial responsibility, control of the army and navy, of the war power and foreign policy, by representatives responsible to the German people. But it means something more. It means the appointment to office of men who represent the interests of south and west Germany and the large cities of Prussia—men who today vote Progressive, Centrist, or Social Democrat tickets—in brief, the men who stood behind the Bloc which forced through the Reichstag resolution of July.

2. In addition to increased democratization of Germany, we have to aim at an independent foreign policy in Austria-Hungary.

3. We must aim at preventing the military union of Austria-Hungary and Germany.

4. We must aim at the contentment and friendship of Bulgaria through a satisfactory solution of the Balkan frontiers.

5. We must aim at the neutralization and the internationalization of Constantinople and the Straits.

6. We must see that the control of the two military terminals of Berlin-Bagdad remain in the hands of an administration friendly to the western nations.

7. As a result of the accomplishment of the foregoing, we must secure a guaranteed autonomy for the Armenians, not only as a matter of justice and humanity but in order to re-establish the one people of Asia Minor capable of preventing economic monopolization of Turkey by the Germans.

These being our objectives, what are our present assets and liabilities?

**ASSETS**

[1.] *Our economic weapon.*

The commercial control of the outer world, and the possibility of German exclusion both from the sources of raw materials and the
richer markets, and from the routes of communication, lie in our hands. The possibility of a continued commercial exclusion weighs heavily, in fact, most heavily of all, upon the German mind at present, because upon the conclusion of peace a successful demobilization is possible only as there are raw materials and markets for the resumption of German industry. Without these the army would become a discontented and dangerous body. If the possibility of exclusion from economic opportunity is associated with a vision of a world co-operation realized, the double motives of fear and hope can be used upon the German people. This is our strongest weapon, and the Germans realize its menace. Held over them, it can win priceless concessions. It should be noted that this weapon will be of special advantage after the peace conference has assembled. Our ability to protract the discussion at the industrial expense of Germany and to our own benefit, and [sic] will give us a bargaining power of great advantage. Skillfully handled, this asset can be used both to threaten and to lure them; and its appeal is wellnigh universal, as the utterances and comment from Germany clearly show. To the dynasty and the ruling classes, it presents the most tangible threat of revolution, because it is obvious that the danger of revolution will be enormously increased upon the conclusion of peace, when the patriotic motive subsides. To the commercial classes it presents the obvious picture of financial ruin and of disorder. To the army it presents the picture of a long period following the conclusion of the war in which government will not dare to demobilize rapidly. To the poorer classes generally it presents the picture of a long period after the war in which the present hardships will continue.

II. Our assets in Austria-Hungary.

In Austria-Hungary we have a number of assets which may seem contradictory at first, but which can all be employed at the same time. There is the nationalistic discontent of the Czechs and probably of the South Slavs. The increase of nationalistic discontent among the Czechs and the possibility of some kind of Poland will tend to break the political coalition which has existed between the Austrian Poles and the German Austrians. On the part of the Emperor and of the present ruling powers in Austria-Hungary there is a great desire to emerge from the war with the patrimony of Francis Joseph unimpaired. This desire has taken two interesting forms: 1) it has resulted in the adoption of a policy of no annexations, which is obvious enough; and 2) in the adoption, evidently with much sincerity, of a desire for disarmament and a league of nations. The motive here is evidently a realization that financially Austria cannot maintain armaments at the present scale after the war, and a realization that in a league of
nations she would find a guarantee of the status quo. It follows that the more turbulent the subject nationalities become and the less the present Magyar-Austrian ascendency sees itself threatened with absolute extinction, the more fervent will become the desire in Austria-Hungary to make itself a fit partner in a league of nations. Our policy must therefore consist first in a stirring up of nationalist discontent, and then in refusing to accept the extreme logic of this discontent, which would be the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. By threatening the present German-Magyar combination with nationalist uprisings on the one side, and by showing it a mode of safety on the other, its resistance would be reduced to a minimum, and the motive to an independence from Berlin in foreign affairs would be enormously accelerated. Austria-Hungary is in the position where she must be good in order to survive.

It should be noted that the danger of economic exclusion after the war affects Austria-Hungary as well as Germany very seriously, and no amount of ultimate trade in transit to Turkey will be able to solve for her the immediate problem of finding work for her demobilized army, of replenishing her exhausted supplies, and of finding enough wealth to meet her financial burdens.

III. Our assets in Bulgaria.

In regard to Bulgaria our greatest asset is the possibility of satisfying her just claims, now that the threat of an imperialistic Russian occupation of Constantinople is removed. A satisfied Bulgaria would no doubt share in the economic advantages of Middle Europe, but without a strong national grievance of her own, her exploitation for political and military purposes is improbable. To this should be added the consideration that the reverberations of the Russian revolution are sure to be felt in Bulgaria.

IV. Our assets in Turkey.

In regard to Turkey our primary assets are our military successes, already commented upon above. These military successes should have a religio-political effect upon the Ottoman Turk. The great financial and economic weakness of Turkey immediately after the war and her need of assistance are also assets to be considered.

V. Our assets outside of Europe.

The German colonies are obvious material to bargain with, as is Germany’s exclusion from the Pacific and from Central and South America.

VI. The radicalism of Russia.

It is often overlooked that the Russian revolution, inspired as it is by deep hatred of autocracy, contains within it at least three other
great motives of serious danger to German domination: 1) anti-capitalist feeling, which would be fully as intense, or more intense, against German capitalism; 2) a religious love of Russia which is spiritually antagonistic to Protestant Germany; and 3) a powerful nationalist feeling among the Moderates, who will either return to power or at least exercise a strong influence in Russia. The revolution, therefore, must be regarded not only as inherently difficult for the Germans to manage and to master, but as being in itself a great dissolving force through its sheer example. Note in this regard the reported interpellation of a deputy in the Austrian parliament, who wanted to know when the Austrian and Hungarian landed estates were to be broken up upon Bolshevik principles, seeing that the government had recognized the Bolsheviks.

VII. The Vatican.

The Vatican has been rightly regarded as pro-German in its neutrality. But we should not be misled in regard to it as we have been misled in regard to the Russian revolution. The Germans have been skilful enough to use it. The Vatican is one of those forces in the world which require exceedingly skilful handling, and contains within it the possibility of great assistance to our cause, as is shown, for example, by the opportunity it offered the President to carry on the first successful diplomatic offensive made by the Allies since the beginning of the war.

VIII. American resources.

The fact that with time the man-power and resources of this country, added to the present forces of the Entente, render a complete and crushing military victory over the Central Powers a certainty.

IX. The intangibles.

To be counted on our side if skilfully used are certain intangibles which the President undoubtedly had in mind when he warned the statesmen of the world in his last message that they were living "in this midday hour of the world’s life." These are: 1) the universal longing for peace, which under the circumstances should not be handed over to Germany as something for them to capitalize; 2) the almost universal feeling on the part of common people of the world that the old diplomacy is bankrupt, and that the system of the armed peace must not be restored. This is a sentiment fundamentally anti-Prussian in its nature, and should be capitalized for our side; 3) there is then, too, a great hope of a league of nations which has the approbation of disinterested people everywhere; 4) there is the menace of social revolution all over the world, and as a factor in it a realization by the governing political and financial groups that the meeting of the war debts is virtually insoluble without revolutionary
measures about property. In a war fought for democratic aims, these fears should be made to fight on our side.

X. The changed direction of German policy.

In estimating the objects of German policy, as well as the concessions which Germany offers, it should be borne in mind that her first economic and political penetration pointed due south through Italy, that later it swerved southeast towards Constantinople, Bagdad, and the Persian Gulf, and that at present, in view of the Russian debacle, its direction of easiest advance is due east. The present is the best time for Germany to seize the opportunities offering themselves there, and this may very well cause her to decide that she will accept sacrifices towards the southeast, the west, on other continents, and in distant seas, in order to assure her control of the Russian opportunities.

LIABILITIES

Balanced off against these assets are our liabilities. They are, briefly:

I. The military impotence of Russia.

II. The strategic impossibility of any military operation which will cut to the heart of Middle Europe.

III. The costs and dangers of a war of attrition on the western front, and the improbability of anything more than a slow withdrawal by the Germans, leaving behind them an absolute devastation of western Belgium and of northern France.

IV. The possession by the Germans at this time of the occupied areas.

V. The concentration of France upon Alsace-Lorraine, which opens at least as a possibility an attempt by the Germans to cause an almost complete rupture of the western alliance by offering France an attractive compromise solution. In case the Germans should decide within the next few months that they could compensate themselves in the east, they may offer France enough in the west to force either a peace or so keep a schism of French opinion as to render France impotent.

VI. In regard to Italy, our liabilities are also heavy. There is the obvious danger of social revolution and disorganization.

VII. Another liability lies in the present unwillingness of the dominant opinion of Great Britain to discuss modifications of sea power.

A PROGRAM FOR A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE

Bulgaria, Serbia, and Italy.

Attention may first be directed to Bulgaria as a weak section of the German line. The Allies should publicly recognize Bulgaria’s
just national claims and Serbia’s right to independence and to access to the sea. This should be accompanied by a strong public move in the direction of Italy, emphasizing Italy’s just claims to a rectification of her frontier, both for defensive and for nationalistic reasons. The abandonment by Italy of her imperialist claims can be covered by strong assurances that her territory shall be evacuated and her pressing economic needs now and after the war assured.

**Austria-Hungary.**

Towards Austria-Hungary the approach should consist of references to the subjection of the various nationalities, in order to keep that agitation alive, but coupled with it should go repeated assurances that no dismemberment of the Empire is intended, together with allusions to the humiliating vassalage of the proudest court in Europe. It will probably be well to inject into the discussion a mention of the fact that Austria-Hungary is bound to Germany by huge debts expended in the interest of German ambition. In regard to Austria-Hungary it will probably not be wise to suggest frankly the cancellation of these debts, as in the case of Turkey. Reference to their existence and to the bondage which they imply will, however, produce a useful ferment. The desire of Austria-Hungary to discuss the question of disarmament should not be ignored. The discussion should specifically be accepted and the danger of disarmament in the face of an autocratic Germany explained again.

**Germany.**

As against Germany the lines of the offensive have already been laid down by the President. There should be more explicit assertion that the penalty of a failure to democratize Germany more adequately must mean exclusion from freedom of intercourse after the war, that the reward for democratization is a partnership of all nations in meeting the problems that will follow the peace. This offensive should of course contain the explicit assurance that we do not intend to dictate the form of responsible government in Germany, and that we are quite within the justified limits of intercourse with nations if we take the position that our attitude towards a responsible Germany would be different from our attitude towards the present Germany.

**Russia.**

Towards Russia our best success will lie: 1) in showing that we are not unwilling to state war aims; 2) in a hearty propaganda of the idea of a league of nations; and 3) in a demonstration to them that the diplomatic offensive is in progress, and that the Allies are not relying totally upon force.
France.

For the sake of the morale of France it will perhaps be wise to indicate an interest in the solution of the problem of Alsace-Lorraine.

The western Allies in general.

All of the western Allies should be braced: 1) by an energetic movement for economic unity of control; 2) by utterances from the United States which will show the way to the Liberals in Great Britain and in France, and therefore restore their national unity of purpose. These Liberals will readily accept the leadership of the President if he undertakes a liberal diplomatic offensive, because they will find in that offensive an invaluable support for their internal domestic troubles; finally 3) such a powerful liberal offensive on the part of the United States will immensely stimulate American pride and interest in the war, and will assure the administration the support of that great mass of the American people who desire an idealistic solution. Such a liberal offensive will do more than any other thing to create in this country the sort of public opinion that the President needs in order to carry through the program he has outlined.

A SUGGESTED STATEMENT OF PEACE TERMS

What follows is suggested as a statement of peace terms in case a general statement of terms at this time is desired. The different items are phrased, both with a view to what they include and exclude, in their relationship to the present military and diplomatic situation. The purpose is to make them serve both as the bases of an ultimate just peace and as a program of war aims which would cause the maximum disunity in the enemy and the maximum unity among our associates.

Belgium.

Belgium must be evacuated and restored by Germany, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations.

Northern France.

Northern France must be evacuated and restored.

Luxemburg.

This question should be ignored at this time and left to negotiation.

Alsace-Lorraine.

Every act of Germany towards Alsace-Lorraine for half a century has proclaimed that these provinces are foreign territory, and no genuine part of the German Empire. Germany cannot be permitted to escape the stern logic of her own conduct. The wrong done in 1871 must be undone.
This paragraph is phrased so as to avoid making the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France an essential aim of the United States in the war, while giving all possible moral support to France in her effort to regain the provinces. It is now our belief that the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine is highly desirable and practically essential to the successful recovery of France. It is also our belief that the relinquishment of Alsace-Lorraine would be the final seal upon the destruction of German militarism. At the same time, we recognize that America cannot insist upon fighting for Alsace-Lorraine longer than France herself is willing to fight, and therefore if Germany should offer France a compromise which France herself was willing to accept, it would be unwise for us to have a commitment on record which we could not fulfill.  

*Italy.*

We recognize that Italy is entitled to rectifications of her boundaries on the basis of a just balance of defensive and nationalist considerations. This right was recognized in principle by Austria-Hungary before Italy entered the war and justice towards Italy is in nowise altered by any subsequent military events. We recognize also that the port of Trieste should be commercially free and that the inhabitants of the city deserve their cultural autonomy.

It is our belief that the application of this plank will meet the just demands of Italy, without yielding to those larger ambitions along the eastern shore of the Adriatic for which we can find no substantial justification.

*The Balkans.*

No just or lasting settlement of the tangled problems confronting the deeply wronged peoples of the Balkans can be based upon the arbitrary treaty of Bucharest. That treaty was a product of the evil diplomacy which the peoples of the world are now determined to end. That treaty wronged every nation in the Balkans, even those which it appeared to favor, by imposing upon them all the permanent menace of war. It unquestionably tore men and women of Bulgarian loyalty from their natural allegiance. It denied to Serbia that access to the sea which she must have in order to complete her independence. Any just settlement must of course begin with the evacuation of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro by the armies of the Central Powers, and the restoration of Serbia and

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*Mr. Miller dissents in part and submits a separate memorandum. See appendix. [Footnote in the original. The memorandum is not attached to the file copy of this document.]

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*French text in R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia e gli altri stati, vol. 23, p. 412.*
Montenegro. The ultimate relationship of the different Balkan nations must be based upon a fair balance of nationalistic and economic considerations, applied in a generous and in[v]estive spirit after impartial and scientific inquiry. The meddling and intriguing of great powers must be stopped, and the efforts to attain national unity by massacre must be abandoned.

It would obviously be unwise to attempt at this time to draw frontiers for the Balkan states.* Certain broad considerations, however, may tentatively be kept in mind. They are in brief these: 1) that the area annexed by Rumania in the Dobrudja† is almost surely Bulgarian in character and should be returned; 2) that the boundary between Bulgaria and Turkey should be restored to the Enos-Midia line, as agreed upon at the conference of London; ‡ 3) that the south boundary of Bulgaria should be the Aegean Sea coast from Enos to the gulf of Orfano, and should leave the mouth of the Struma river in Bulgarian territory; 4) that the best access to the sea for Serbia is through Saloniki; 5) that the final disposition of Macedonia cannot be determined without further inquiry; 6) that an independent Albania is almost certainly an undesirable political entity.

We are strongly of the opinion that in the last analysis economic considerations will outweigh nationalistic affiliations in the Balkans, and that a settlement which insures economic prosperity is most likely to be a lasting one.

Poland.

An independent and democratic Poland shall be established. Its boundaries shall be based on a fair balance of national and economic considerations, giving full weight to the necessity for adequate access to the sea. The form of Poland's government and its economic and political relations should be left to the determination of the people of Poland acting through their chosen representatives.

The subject of Poland is by far the most complex of all the problems to be considered. The present distribution of Poles is such as to make their complete unification impossible without separating East Prussia from Germany. This is probably not within the bounds of practical politics. A Poland which consists essentially of Russian and perhaps Austrian Poland would probably secure its access to the sea through the Vistula River and the canals of Germany which run to Hamburg and Bremen. This relationship would very probably involve both

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*A tentative map is appended. [Footnote in the original. The map is not appended to the file copy of this document.]
†In the treaty of Bucharest. [Footnote in the original.]
‡And in the treaty of San Stefano. [Footnote in the original.]
the economic subjection of Poland and the establishment of an area of great friction. If Russia is to remain weak the new Poland will lie in an exceedingly exposed position. The experiment must no doubt be made, however, but in order to assure it a fair start, it is necessary to insist at the outset upon a democratic basis for the Polish state. Unless this is loyally observed, the internal friction of Poles, Ruthenians, and Jews is likely to render Poland impotent in the presence of Germany.

**Austria-Hungary.**

We see promise in the discussions now going on between the Austro-Hungarian Governments and the peoples of the monarchy, but the vassalage of Austria-Hungary to the masters of Germany, riveted upon them by debts for money expended in the interests of German ambition, must be done away with in order that Austria-Hungary may be free to take her rightful place among the nations.

The object of this is to encourage the present movement towards federalism in Austria, a movement which, if it is successful, will break the German-Magyar ascendency. By injecting the idea of a possible cancellation of the war debts, it is hoped to encourage all the separatist tendencies as between Austria-Hungary and Germany, as well as the social revolutionary sentiment which poverty has stimulated.

**Turkey.**

It is necessary to free the subject races of the Turkish Empire from oppression and misrule. This implies at the very least autonomy for Armenia and the protection of Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia by the civilized nations. It is necessary also to establish free intercourse through and across the straits. Turkey proper must be justly treated and freed from economic and political bondage. Her war debts to Germany must be cancelled. None of the money involved was spent in the interest of Turkey, and none of it should be regarded as a Turkish obligation. An adjustment of her pre-war debt in accordance with her territorial limitations is also required by the considerations of justice. Moreover, it will undoubtedly be feasible to arrange advances of money to Turkey in order to enable her under suitable supervision to institute and maintain satisfactory educational and sanitary conditions, and to undertake her economic rehabilitation. Thus Turkey can be freed from intermeddling and enabled to develop institutions adapted to the genius of her own people.

This will appear on the surface to be a drastic solution of the Turkish problem, but it is one which the military situation enables us to accomplish, and it can hardly be doubted that no principle of
justice requires the return of occupied portions of Turkey to the German-Turkish alliance. The cancellation of Turkey’s debt to Germany is the one final way to abolish German political and commercial penetration. It is also the one method by which Turkey can be given a new start, considerably reduced in size, without power to misgovern alien races, and therefore free to concentrate upon the needs of her own population. It should be noted in this regard that only a few days ago it was announced that Germany had agreed to forego interest on the Turkish debt for a period of twelve years after the war. This implies a realization on Germany’s part that if she insists upon the interest payments a repudiation is possible, carrying with it a destruction of German influence in Turkey.

The League of Nations.

From the nations at present engaged in resistance to Germany’s effort to dominate the world there is growing a League of Nations for common protection, for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, for the attainment of a joint economic prosperity, including equal opportunity upon the highways of the world and equitable access to the raw materials which all nations need. Whether this League is to remain armed and exclusive, or whether there is to be a reduction of armaments and a cordial inclusion of Germany, will depend upon whether the German Government is in fact representative of the German democracy.

This is of course simply another statement of the alternative before Germany.

We regard all of the terms mentioned as essential to any final agreement. It may well be, however, that some of the provisions other than those relating to Belgium and northern France, the evacuation of Italy and Rumania, and the evacuation and restoration of Serbia and Montenegro, do not require assent as a preliminary to discussion at the conference. And this is due to the fact that we have the power to compel Germany’s assent at the peace conference by our ability to bar her indefinitely from access to supplies and to protract the negotiations at her cost and at our own benefit.

We emphasize our belief that no surrender of this power, even by inference, should be considered until all the terms stated above are definitely agreed to, in detail as well as in principle, by Germany at the peace conference. This involves adopting as our policy the reserving of the discussion of economic peace until our political, social, and international objects are attained.

We might well adopt as our slogan “No economic peace until the peoples are freed.”
Mr. Walter Lippmann to Colonel E. M. House

December 28, 1917.

International Law

In plotting out the field of international law so far as it is likely to affect the peace conference it has become perfectly clear that there are a great number of questions for which the State Department alone could be responsible, and in order to avoid the duplication which might result from our doing ineffectively what the State Department is already in a position to do effectively, I am sending you a list of the subjects which seem to us outside our sphere:

1) The existing laws of war on land. The procedure for determining violation of the laws which may give rise to claims for the punishment of guilty persons, or to claims for damages and reparation on behalf of belligerent governments as well as innocent noncombatants.

2) The status of enemy merchant ships.

3) Questions of neutrality and the duties of neutral states, such as:
   a) The use of neutral ports by belligerent ships.
   b) The supplying of munitions to belligerents.
   c) Censorship questions, etc.

4) All questions relating to the existing blockade.

5) All questions relating to enemy trade during this war.

6) All questions relating to the custodianship of enemy property.

In general, these comprise the legal questions involved in the waging of the war.

If these questions are taken over by the State Department we should confine ourselves to special studies in international law, with one object in mind—the working out of proposals for the future. Naturally this will involve a good deal of study of the present experience, but it would not involve our making ourselves expert on the legal negotiations now in progress. We should then want to consider merely legal aspects of such problems as a possible league of nations, the internationalization of the Dardanelles, the protection of racial minorities in the Balkans, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary, access to the sea for land-locked states, the internationalization of certain railroads, rivers, and ports, the “freedom of the seas,” the reduction of armaments. In general one might say that our interest would be in those questions of international law which are involved in future political relations rather than in the immediate negotiations now in progress.
Inquiry files

Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Director of the American Geographical Society (Bowman)


My dear Dr. Bowman: For nearly two months the Inquiry have enjoyed the hospitality of the American Geographical Society and has been generously aided by you and the members of your staff. We have been permitted to use convenient rooms, and the whole of your spacious top floor, rearranged to meet our need; have been served by your attendants; and given invaluable and expert assistance by your competent collaborators. A number of other centers have contributed highly appreciated aid in the carrying on of our work for the Government, but none has done more than you have.

May I assure you and the Councillors of the American Geographical Society of our hearty appreciation.

Very truly yours,

[File copy not signed]

Inquiry Document No. 889


I. March 20, 1918

The purpose of the Inquiry is to secure command of the data which may be needed in the course of the negotiations at the peace conference. Obviously this cannot be acquired by the compilation of a new encyclopaedia or of a series of monographs. It is clear that the American negotiators will not have time to read extensive treatises. It is also clear that no treatise planned now would necessarily be in a form pertinent to the actual negotiations when they are in progress. No one can foresee at this time the order in which data will be requisitioned, nor the ideas about which the data will have to be grouped in the course of the negotiations. Whatever facts are assembled must clearly be under such control that they can be arranged and grouped and presented in almost any form at the shortest possible notice.

The first condition is the reliability of the material. Under the complex and shifting conditions, reliability means not only a critical use of the best sources but a very candid indication in each case of the degree of validity. On many points certain to be discussed there are no reliable data, though claims are often put forward by interested parties as if complete accuracy of information existed. In
these cases it will be as important to be in a position to examine such claims critically as to make final statements of fact. Where partisanship infects statistics as seriously as it does in many parts of Europe and Asia, the essence of reliability is to know as clearly as possible the character of the sources upon which assertions of fact are based.

The second condition is complete mobility of the material. The data must not only have been assembled before the conference. It must be immediately available in the course of the conference.

The third condition is simplicity and lucidity of presentation. This involves the preparation of maps, charts, graphs, statistical tables, schematic outlines, upon which a high degree of ingenuity has been exercised.

II.

The range of topics upon which the Inquiry may be required to furnish information has expanded with the course of events. The most striking case is supplied by the disintegration of the former Russian Empire. Four months ago the plans of the Inquiry called for the study of Russia as a unitary Great Power; today Russia is a complex of nationalistic, economic, and religious questions stretching from the Baltic Sea through Central Asia to China. Should Austria-Hungary disintegrate a multitude of new issues and relationships would immediately be raised. Under these conditions it has seemed prudent to maintain a flexible program, and to lay plans for further research in anticipation of new developments.

The method of settlement laid down by the President in his addresses introduces another factor which increases the detailed variety of the topics likely to be discussed. Since the peace conference is to be conducted by open discussion, a command of fact totally unnecessary in secret negotiations is required. Where the whole world is to be the critic of the debates, the American influence will be in proportion to the depth and incisiveness with which just principles are applied to particular cases.

So far as the territorial settlement goes, the following areas are indicated as probable subjects of discussion:

1) On the west from Switzerland to the North Sea and from the military line to the Rhine.
2) The Baltic basin.
3) The Adriatic and its hinterland.
4) The Mediterranean basin.
5) The Balkan peninsula.
6) The Turkish Empire.
7) The Austro-Hungarian Empire.
8) The Polish area.
9) The former Russian Empire.
10) The whole of Asia, with the possible exception of India.
11) The territories of the Pacific Ocean.
12) The whole of Africa.
13) The islands of the Atlantic.
14) Possibly Latin America.

The decisive negotiating power will lie with the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. The influence of these powers will be increased or diminished insofar as they carry with them the support of the Russian nations, the Scandinavian countries, Holland, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Spain, Brazil, Argentine, and Chile, and in a lesser degree of the smaller belligerents and neutrals.

In order to understand the needs and purposes which inspire the claims put forth by the Powers, it is necessary to have an analysis of the relationship of their political, social, and economic needs to their resources and their present situation. It is important to know on whom they are dependent for supplies and who is dependent upon them, what investments, what cultural and religious affiliations, what political ideas, make them friendly or antagonistic to policies of other Powers and to proposals which may be brought forward in the interests of international order.

The nature of the claims put forward by the conferees will be determined by the views of the dominant parties at the time of the settlement as to the general character of the settlement, as to immediate national interest and need. These views will either be enlarged or diminished by the process of negotiation, as viewed in its effect upon the support of other powers, the adhesion of the second-class powers, and the interests and demands of domestic factions.

As a general rule, it is necessary, therefore, to know, in regard to each disputed area, what resources human and material it contains, what is the concrete interest of each power in the area, what political group or groups within each power are concerned in that interest. It is necessary also to know the place of that area in the general plan of each power’s foreign policy. Finally, the data as to each disputed area and as to the nations with whom it has relationships must be in such form that the displacement of forces effected by any particular proposal can be estimated.

The American negotiators must be in a position to judge whether a claim put forth by a power is supported by the democracy at home, or whether it is merely a traditional diplomatic objective or the design of an imperialistic group. In the fiercely disputed areas they must be prepared freely to offer friendly suggestions either of compromise or of constructive experiment, but if these suggestions are to have much weight they must be supported by a body of reliable fact and must be presented tersely and graphically so as to carry conviction.

In addition to territorial settlements the American program involves complex covenants in respect to trade, future international disputes,
the guarantees of minority rights, of equality upon the seas, and of reduction of armaments. For a successful negotiation in respect to each proposal, it will be necessary not only to have the data that bears upon the probable effects of the proposal, but also a large number of alternative suggestions, so as to give an accommodating and experimental character to American purpose.

Finally, the American negotiators should command various well-tested programs of reform and reconstruction for the historically embittered areas. They should be in a position to propose to the torn peoples of the Balkans and Turkey or to the natives of Africa expedients of education, sanitation, financial reform, adequate police, and simply administered justice. With this end in view, comparative studies are being made of the different types of government applied to dependent and backward peoples. A careful examination is planned of the various attempts in the past to secure the rights of subject peoples. From sympathetic analyses of failure and success it is hoped that a working program may be derived.

III. THE TECHNIQUE OF THE INQUIRY

1) The assembly of source materials. The inquiry is not purchasing a library. It is locating source materials in the various libraries of the country, keeping in its central office a card catalogue of the materials, a critique of them, and the nearest places where the actual material can be found. The librarian and his staff are instructed to draw up a scheme by which a complete reference library could be physically assembled in New York on two weeks notice. No actual arrangements have been made with the various libraries of the country, but it is assumed that whenever the time came all necessary books could be borrowed or requisitioned.

There is now working in the service of the Inquiry a group of experts each of whom commands the source material in some portion of the field. These men can be assembled at any time, are organized in groups under leaders, and are entirely competent to handle the source materials.

The Inquiry has prepared and keeps current, the declarations of statesmen, of opposition parties and of important political groups in all parts of the world, as they bear upon the settlement. These are arranged so that the total official or semi-official expression of any one nation in regard to the settlement can be studied, or the total expressions of all nations in regard to a particular topic. There is also being prepared a diplomatic history since 1870 arranged in special form so that all the documents bearing upon a topic which has been a continuing object of diplomatic interest are available.
2) The preparations outlined above have as their object the creation of an agency by which research can be carried on from time to time in the course of the negotiations. In addition data are now being collected by specialists for those problems which the present situation justifies us in believing will surely be the subject of discussion. For territorial questions these data will be arranged as follows:

In each area the smallest administrative units for which figures exist are listed on a chart and in parallel columns the latest and most reliable data are assembled. If the data are of a kind about which there is no dispute of authorities they will be designed in one fashion; if there is dispute, as for example in Macedonia, the best figures (in this case the best Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek, Austrian, German, French and Russian statistics) will be given, together with the judgment of the specialists in the employ of the Inquiry. It is planned to put upon these charts not only statistics but brief historical and political facts or comment of a significant character. Naturally, some districts will require more intensive research than others. The amount of research put upon each district depends upon its critical character, upon the number of scholars whose services can be secured, upon the time available, and upon judgment of the value of research.

Presenting all the available material in respect to an area in this schematic form and in the smallest feasible units, the immediate bearing of any frontier which can be assigned may be determined with some definiteness. Moreover, a great many possible combinations of fact can easily be made if the data are arranged in this way. Thus, for example, if the Cholm question should arise at the conference, the procedure would be to list the administrative districts in the area under dispute, say ten or twelve, extract from the chart of Polish data the facts in regard to these districts and sum them up in a table showing the ethnic composition of the area, the religious affiliations, the condition of agriculture, the industrial plants, the mineral production and mineral possibilities, the educational facilities, the railroad systems and canals which cross it, and any important historical facts connected with the area. If the program is completed and if the proper clerical and mechanical assistance is at hand, the Inquiry should be able to furnish the American negotiators with the relevant facts for a problem of this kind in two hours or less.

In each area it is necessary to have available, besides the facts as to that area, the best possible analysis of the interests of the neighboring states and of the Great Powers in any particular settlement. With this object in view, there is now in course of preparation a schematic and analytic study of the special interests, commercial, political, religious, military, of each power. These interests are sometimes expressed by treaties, sometimes by informal understanding, sometimes
they exist merely as ambitions among certain influential classes. Wherever possible, it is important that the interests of each nation should be visualized as concretely as possible and traced home to its course [sic].

3) Presentation of material. There are being prepared for the Inquiry a set of base maps for all the areas under discussion. Upon these base maps will be laid a large amount of the data which seems relevant, and copies of a complete loose-leaf atlas will be at the disposal of the negotiators. In addition, the Inquiry is planning, by means of a properly organized force actually at the conference, to be in a position to lay any proposal made upon a map, showing the relations of that proposal to any set of facts for which information is at hand. Thus, if a certain boundary for Poland is proposed, the Inquiry would be prepared to furnish the negotiators with maps showing the relation of the proposal to the distribution of Poles or to the location of mineral deposits, railways, etc. Besides maps, the Inquiry is planning charts and graphs showing various relationships, as, for example, the dependence of Austria upon the port of Trieste, or the relation of the trade of an independent Poland to Germany and to Austria. Provided there is a sufficient expert staff to control the underlying source material adequately, and provided sufficient draftsmen and cartographers are available, the Inquiry ought to be in a position to furnish the American negotiators with graphic representations of sets of facts in their relationships upon very short notice.

[IV.] Topics of Research

I) The Western Theater.
   A) Belgium.
   B) Luxemburg.
   C) Alsace-Lorraine.

II) The Italian Theater.
   A) Trentino.
   B) Trieste and Istria.
   C) The Adriatic Coast.

III) The Former Russian Empire.
   A) The Baltic Provinces.
   B) Lithuania.
   C) Finland.
   D) Poland.
   E) Great Russia.
   F) White Russia.
   G) The Ukraine.
   H) Cis-Caucasia and Trans-Caucasia.
   I) Bessarabia.
   J) Siberia.
IV) Austria-Hungary.

V) The Balkan States.
   A) Serbia.
   B) Montenegro.
   C) Bosnia and Herzegovina.
   D) Albania.
   E) Bulgaria.
   F) Greece.
   G) Rumania.
   H) The Aegean Islands.
   I) The peninsula as a whole.
   J) The disputed areas.
   K) Various solutions of the Balkan question.

VI) The Ottoman Empire.
   A) Constantinople and Adrianople.
   B) Anatolia.
   C) Armenia.
   D) Syria.
   F) Arabia.
   G) Mesopotamia.
   H) The Nestorians.
   I) The Kurds.

VII) Persia and the Persian Gulf.

VIII) Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism.
   A) Russian Central Asia.
   B) Chinese Turkestan.
   C) Afghanistan and Beluchistan.

IX) Africa.
   A) General.
   B) Northern Africa.
   C) Central Africa.
   D) South Africa.

X) The Pacific.
   A) The British possessions.
   B) The German Pacific Islands.
   C) Indo China and Siam.
   D) Japan.
   E) China.

In addition to these areas, topical research is either being conducted or material assembled on the world situation as to commerce, agricultural products, routes of trade, immigration and emigration, shipping, tariffs, commercial privileges, credit, debt, budgets, armaments, international law.
As a part of the field of international law, it is planned to have readily available all the leading precedents and authorities, together with the views expressed in diplomatic correspondence or otherwise, and also the treaties and agreements heretofore and now existing which have either a bearing upon, or may be affected by, the proceedings of the conference.

V. TENTATIVE LIST OF ISSUES

The section of the report which follows is tentative and is submitted merely for purposes of illustration. The questions listed have at one time or another figured in the plans of the belligerents.

I. THE WESTERN THEATER

A) Belgium.

1) The Flemish-Walloon question.
   a) Its relation to the German administrative division of Belgium during the occupation as a possible center of intrigue and interference in Belgian politics after the war.
   b) The incitement of Flemish nationalism coincident with the strict control of the submarine bases.

2) Antwerp.
   a) The relation of Antwerp to German export and import commerce; to the Rhine trade and the German waterway system.
   b) Possible methods and probable effects of discrimination against German trade with Antwerp in Belgian control, or of discrimination in favor of Germany with Antwerp in German power.
   c) The effects of different proposals made by Germany for commercial treaties involving a special position in Antwerp.

3) Railroads.
   a) Economic and political factors involved in the control of Belgian railroads.
   b) The strategic railway system of Germany aimed at Belgium: possible safeguards.

4) Studies of frontier questions between Belgium and Germany in regard to Belgian territory lying across the German border.

5) Methods of estimating reparation; methods of payment; conditions of evacuation.
6) Sources of supply and markets for Belgium on the conclusion of peace, looking to the reestablishment of her industry.

7) The Scheldt question.

8) Fortifications, armaments, and guarantees of neutrality.

B) Luxemburg.

1) The importance of the mineral resources and strategic position of Luxemburg in relation to the German Empire, Belgium, and France.

2) Probable economic and military effects of:
   a) The continued neutrality of Luxemburg within the German customs area.
   b) Incorporation into the German Empire.
   c) Partition among Belgium, Germany, and France, or between Belgium and France.

C) Alsace-Lorraine.

1) Brief history to 1871.

2) The constitutional position of Alsace-Lorraine and her experience within the German Empire.

3) Detailed study of the popular vote of Alsace-Lorraine by districts in Reichstag and local elections since 1871: electoral procedure; the character of the electoral districts; political map of Alsace-Lorraine by election-districts. Such data form the basis for inferences regarding:
   a) The different forms of plebiscite proposed, whether by referendum, by constituent assembly, or otherwise.
   b) The necessity of international control in the case of a plebiscite.
   c) The probable results of a plebiscite, either for the Reichsland as a whole or for its districts.

4) The exact delimitation of the coal, iron, and potash areas.
   a) The relation of these areas to the geographical distribution of French and German sympathizers within Alsace-Lorraine.
   b) The effect on German iron industry of the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine.
   c) The effect on French industry of the return of Alsace-Lorraine.
   d) The effect of retrocession, partition, or autonomy on the economic welfare of Alsace-Lorraine itself.
   e) The tariff problem.

5) The position of Alsace-Lorraine in relation to vital railway and canal systems.
6) The immigration and emigration statistics of Alsace-Lorraine.

7) Various proposals with regard to the provinces:
   a) The case for and against the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine: 1) with guarantees of certain economic rights to Germany; 2) without such guarantees. Political, economic, and strategic effects of retrocession; the problem of the German population.
   b) The proposal to grant Alsace-Lorraine a larger measure of autonomy within the German Empire.
   c) The proposal to partition Alsace-Lorraine between Bavaria and Prussia, with a view to the probable democratizing effect of such a partition.
   d) Alsace-Lorraine as a neutralized state.
   e) The nationalistic and strategic aspects of a possible division of Alsace-Lorraine, and its relation to the mineral areas.

8) The French claim to the boundary of 1814 rather than that of 1815.

9) The resources of the Saar valley.

10) The French desire for the Rhine frontier; the ethnic, economic, and strategic results of such a boundary.

11) The Brécy-Longwy district: its resources, present ownership, and the direction of its export and import trade; the problem of strategic defense.

II. THE ITALIAN THEATER

A) The Trentino.
   1) A general ethnic, strategic, and economic study of the area from the Italian frontier of 1914 to the highest peaks of the north.
   2) A detailed study of the disputed triangle at the conclusion of the Italo-Austrian negotiations of 1915, with special attention to the ethnic composition of the Bozen valley, the position of the ridge crests, and the economic drainage of the area.

B) Trieste and Istria.
   1) The ethnic composition of Trieste: of the environs.
   2) The relation of Trieste to the Austrian hinterland.
      a) Estimate of the effect of Italian annexation and of internationalization.
   3) The economic affiliations of the Italian inhabitants of Trieste.
   4) Ethnic composition of the peninsula of Istria.
C) The Adriatic Littoral.
   1) The Isonzo front: Ethnic and strategic aspects.
      a) The possibility of a slight modification of the Italian
         frontier towards the east.
      b) Görz and Gradiska as gateways.
   2) The Dalmatian coast.
      a) The ethnic, economic, and strategic bases of the Italian
         claim to the Dalmatian coast and the adjacent islands.
      b) The Italian Jugo-Slav question on the Dalmatian coast.
   3) Fiume: its commercial hinterland and relation to the Jugo-
      Slav question.
   4) The Italian claim to a protectorate over Albania.
      a) The relation of this claim to Serbia and to Greece.
      b) The effect on Serbia, Albania, Greece, and Austria of the
         Italian occupation of Avlona.

D) The Franco-Italian frontier.
   1) The Italian claim to French Savoy, with an analysis of the
      strategic, ethnic, and economic factors involved.

III. THE FORMER RUSSIAN EMPIRE

A) The Baltic Provinces.
   1) The German landed aristocracy’s aspirations and the native
      aspirations.
   2) The question of German colonization.
   3) The problem of western Russia’s access to the sea.

B) Lithuania.
   1) Historical and economic relationship with Poland; with
      Russia.
   2) Ethnic affinity with Letts of Courland and Livonia.
   3) Delimitation of the Lithuanian area.
   4) The bearing of various proposals on German economic pene-
      tration of Lithuania:
      a) Autonomy.
      b) Annexation.
      c) Union with Baltic Provinces.
      d) Union with Poland.
   5) The tariff question.

O) Finland.
   1) Finland’s historical experience with self-government.
   2) German influence and interests.
   3) The dispute over the Åland Islands; relations with Sweden.
D) Poland.
1) Frontiers: ethnological, historical, strategic, economic; a critical study of conflicting statistics and partisan claims.
2) Special studies of contested districts, such as Cholm and Suwalki.
3) The “Austrian solution” of the Polish problem.
4) Estimate of Poland’s economic and political relations with the Central Powers under the following conditions:
   a) The creation of an independent and united Poland with complete right of self-determination.
   b) The exclusion of Prussian Poland, or Galicia, or both.
   c) The inclusion of Lithuania and Courland.
5) The protection of Jewish and other racial and religious minorities.

E) Great Russia.
1) Political and social forces significant for the future of Russian democracy.
2) Access to the sea.
3) Economic resources; problems of reconstruction; economic treaty relations with Central Europe.
4) Historical, ethnological, and economic data for an estimate of the probable relations with border states in case the latter achieve independence.
5) The proposed federalist solution.

F) White Russia.
1) Degree and extent of national self-consciousness.
2) The conflict of religions, as affecting educational and political problems.
3) Relations with Great Russia; with other Russian border-nations; with Germany.

G) The Ukraine.
1) Historical and ethnographical frontiers.
2) The Little-Russian portion of Galicia.
3) Economic resources and relations with the Central Powers.
4) Odessa, the Black Sea routes, the mineral basin.
5) The land system, social classes, and counterrevolutionary forces.
6) Economic treaty relations with Central Europe.
7) Political and social forces making for or against constitutional stability.

H) Cis-Caucasia and Trans-Caucasia.
1) Armenian claims in Trans-Caucasia—historical, racial, and religious.
2) The international importance of railways passing through Caucasia.
3) Oil, manganese, and other mineral resources.
4) The racial and religious map of Caucasia, with an estimate of the results of self-determination.
5) Difficulties in the way of Pan-Turanianism.
6) The protection of minorities.

I) Bessarabia.
   1) Rumania’s claims, historical and ethnological.
   2) Ukrainian and Jewish minorities.
   3) Relation to Odessa; to control of the Danube.

J) Siberia and Central Asia.
   1) Resources and potentialities.
   2) Japanese interests in the Maritime Provinces and the Amur basin; strategic importance of Trans-Baikalia.
   3) Central Asia: prospects of autonomy; of continued development under Russia; of Pan-Turanian agitation; agricultural possibilities, especially in cotton.

IV. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

A) General data.
   1) Decentralization and federal autonomy.
   2) The balance of political and ethnic forces.

B) The place of Austria-Hungary in the project of Central Europe.

C) The relation of Austria-Hungary to the Russian border nations.

D) Special studies of the several nationalities:
   1) Austrians, Magyars, Czechs, and Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Rumanians, Italians and Ladines, Serbo-Croats and Slovenes.
      a) Exact delimitation of each linguistic area.
      b) Study of political experience, nationalistic aspirations, literacy, economic resources, and fecundity of each nationality.

E) Dalmatia.
   1) The ethnic and religious composition, the economic affiliations, and the political relationships of the tongue of land from Ragusa to Volavitzha.

V. THE BALKAN STATES

A) Serbia.
   1) The Serbo-Albanian frontier.
   2) Ragusa, Durazzo, and Saloniki as ports for Serbia.
   3) The Serbo-Bulgarian frontier.
   4) The question of South Slav unity.
B) Montenegro.
   1) The Montenegrin-Albanian frontier.
   2) Mount Lovcen and Cattaro.
C) Bosnia-Herzegovina.
   1) Economic resources and affiliations.
   2) Attitude of the various ethnic and religious groups towards
       Austro-Hungarian domination and towards Serbia.
D) Albania.
E) Bulgaria.
   1) Political and economic sympathies.
   2) Demand for national unity.
   3) Social structure.
F) Greece.
G) Rumania.
   1) Frontier rectifications.
   2) Economic relations with the Central Powers.
   3) Land system.
   4) Treatment of minorities.
   5) Claims.
H) The Aegean islands.
I) The ethnic and religious composition of the peninsula as a whole.
J) The disputed areas of the Balkans:
   1) Epirus.
   2) Macedonia.
   3) Thrace.
   4) Dobrudja.
   5) Pirot and the strip of Serbian territory between the Morava
      and the Danube, claimed by Bulgaria.
   6) Thasos.
   7) Bukewina.
   8) Transylvania.
   9) The Maritza valley.
K) Various solutions of the Balkan question:
   1) Union of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
      Jugo-Slav state, or as a federation of autonomous states.
   2) Incorporation of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia into a re-
      constructed Austro-Hungarian monarchy as an autonomous
      kingdom.
   3) A great Bulgaria.
   4) An autonomous Macedonia.
   5) The proposal to partition Albania.
   6) A Rumania including Bessarabia but minus the Dobrudja.
   7) Provisional autonomy for contested districts, pending a refer-
      endum under supervision of the League of Nations.
   8) Proposals for a Balkan federation.
VI. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

1) Studies of ethnic distribution, mineral resources, agricultural possibilities, irrigation projects, railway concessions, railway projects, sanitation, schools, missions.

2) The Capitulations.

3) Forms of guarantee for subject nationalities.

A) Constantinople and the Straits.
   1) Topographical outlines of a possible internationalized area.
   2) Administrative, military, and economic questions involved in the internationalization, including terminal and port facilities, police, sanitation, municipal administration, ownership of the Bagdad Railway approaches, tunnels, etc.

3) Relation of the area to the Ottoman public debt.

B) Anatolia.
   1) The Greek claim to Smyrna and its hinterland.
   2) The Italian claim to Adalia.
   3) Conflicting Italian and Greek claims to the Dodecanesus.

C) Armenia.
   1) Delimitation of the Armenian area; study of districts contested with Kurds and others.

2) Political problems in case Armenia remains under Turkish suzerainty.

3) Economic problems of an independent Armenia.

D) Syria.
   1) The projected Jewish state in Palestine.

2) French railway interests and political claims.

3) British claims.

   1) British claims.

F) Arabia.
   1) The Arab question and the Kingdom of the Hedjaz.

G) Mesopotamia.
   1) The Arab question.

2) Irrigation projects; economic resources.

3) The Bagdad railway.

H) The Nestorians.

I) The Kurds.

VII. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

A) The British zone.

B) The Neutral zone; oil fields; British claims.

C) The former Russian zone.
A) Russian Central Asia.
B) Chinese Turkestan.
C) Afghanistan and Beluchistan.
D) The relation of Pan-Turanianism to Berlin-Bagdad and Berlin-Bokhara.
E) The Pan-Islamic question.
   1) Pan-Islamism and the British and French colonies.
   2) The Arabian countermovement.
   3) The question of depriving Turkey of the caliphate as a defensive measure against Pan-Islamism.

IX. AFRICA

A) General.
   1) Areas in Africa available for colonization.
   2) Sources of supply for chief tropical products.
B) Northern Africa.
   1) The British interest:
      a) In Egypt and the Suez Canal.
      b) In strategic control over the Moroccan coast.
      c) In the trade of Morocco, Tunis, and Algeria.
   2) Libya.
      a) The proposed extension of the hinterland.
      b) Nullification of treaty rights of the Turkish sultan.
      a) The French railway system binding French Africa together.
      b) Franco-Italian relations in respect to Tunis and Libya.
      c) French and Spanish relations in Morocco.
   4) The Italian interest in Northern Africa.
      a) In Tripoli and Cyrenaica.
      b) Claim to Tunis.
      c) Commercial interest in Egypt.
   5) The German interest in Northern Africa.
      a) In the mines and the trade of Morocco.
      b) In the shipping of North African ports.
      c) The German policy as protector of the Mohammedans of North Africa.
   6) The Portuguese islands off the Atlantic coast.
   7) The Spanish islands.
C) Central Africa.
   1) The British blocks of territory: (i) the Nile valley group, with East Africa and Somaliland; (ii) the Rhodesian group; (iii) Nigeria and the West African group.
2) The relationship of the British possessions to those of Portugal.
3) The British Cape-to-Cairo project, in its relation to German East Africa and to Belgian Congo.
4) The Belgian Congo.
5) French possessions and claims.
   a) West Africa and the island of Madagascar.
   b) The French claims in Cameroons.
6) The former German colonies: Cameroons, Togo, East Africa.
   a) German colonial policy.
   b) Proposals for partition.
   c) Proposals for restoration, with guarantees of fair treatment for natives.
7) The Italian possessions: Eritrea, Italian Somaliland.
   a) Italy’s entry to the Sahara through Libya.
   b) Her aspirations respecting Abyssinia.

D) South Africa.
   1) British possessions, including the Union of South Africa, Swaziland, Basutoland, the protectorate of Bechuanaland, Walvis Bay.
      a) Treaty rights for the recruitment of native labor in Portuguese East Africa.
      b) The control of ports, including Walvis Bay and Delagoa Bay.
   2) The problem of Afrikander and the native.
      a) The relation of Afrikander to German Southwest Africa.
   3) Caprivi’s finger and the commerce of the upper Zambesi valley.
   4) Germany’s interest in Southwest Africa, and her relation to the colonial possessions of Portugal.

X. THE PACIFIC

A) The British interest.
   1) In Australia, New Zealand, Papua, and the Fiji Islands.
   2) In the smaller islands of Oceania.
   3) In North Borneo, Straits Settlements, Malay States.
   4) In Hong Kong, Wei-hai-wei, Yangtze valley, and the trade of China.
   5) In defense of Canadian coast.
   6) In the General naval situation in the Pacific; in the coolie question.

B) The former German possessions.
   1) South of the equator, in British occupation: Kaiser Wilhelm’s Land, Bismarck Archipelago, Solomon Islands, Samoan Islands.

C) Indo China and Siam.
1) French possessions in Indo China.
2) French and British interests in Siam.

D) Japan.
1) Policies and parties.
2) Interests in Eastern Asia and in the Pacific.
3) The emigration question.

E) China.
1) Prospects of stable government.
   a) Political parties.
   b) Constitutional reforms.
   c) Nature and form of economic assistance required.
2) Relations with Japan.
   a) Japanese demands and Chinese concessions.
   b) Japanese spheres of influence.
   c) Kiao-chow and Shantung.
3) The Russian sphere of influence: Northern Manchuria, Outer Mongolia.
4) British interests: Hong Kong, Wei-hai-wei, the Yangtze valley, Outer Tibet, General commerce.
5) French interests in southern China.
   a) The leased port of Kwang-chow.
   b) Special position in Kwang-tung, Kwang-si, and Yunnan.
   c) Railway projects.
6) German interests.
7) American interests and the Open Door policy.
8) Other economic questions.
   a) The Boxer indemnity.
   b) The tariff.

Inquiry Document No. 800

*Mr. Walter Lippmann to Dr. S. E. Mezes and Mr. D. H. Miller*

APRIL 17, 1918.

**Memorandum on the Peace Conference**

I) Territorial questions of the following classes may be expected to arise at the peace conference:

   a) Territories whose status was fixed by agreement prior to the conference.
This covers Belgium, northern France, or any other territory in which the specific assignment of sovereignty is determined as a condition of the assembly of the conference itself.

b) Territories under military control, to which the formula of self-determination is to be applied.

The biggest group of these territories will be those on Germany's eastern frontier. Here the essential questions to be decided are:

1) The auspices under which self-determination is to occur.
2) The area within which self-determination is to occur.
3) The portion of the population within the area which is to participate in the self-determination.
4) The right of emigrants and immigrants to participate.
5) The alternative proposals to be submitted to the qualified electors.

c) New states seeking admission to the family of nations.

At the present time these would include the Ukraine, Finland, the Kingdom of the Hedjaz, other Arab states, and possibly the Caucasian republics.

d) States within which oppressed nationalities are to be protected.

The chief example is Turkey, though the need will apply also in the Balkans, and possibly in Poland and the Russian border nations.

e) States hitherto less than sovereign, seeking a more independent status.

This will include Persia, Afghanistan, possibly Turkey, China, and Siam.

f) States under belligerent occupation in which no national consciousness exists.

This covers the African colonies, the Pacific islands.

g) Spheres of influence and interest established before and during the war.

This will cover the various claims in the Far East, in Turkey, and in Africa, and may even include such matters as the Monroe Doctrine.

h) Territories formally annexed during the war.

This will cover, among other things, Courland, parts of Rumania, and, from the German point of view, Cyprus, Egypt, and possibly Morocco.

i) Territory claimed by belligerents to complete their national unity.

j) Territory claimed by belligerents for its strategic value.
(a) Territory claimed by belligerents for its economic value.
(b) Territory claimed by belligerents on historical grounds.
(c) Rights of way and other privileges claimed by one state in
the territory of another.

This will cover such questions as Poland’s and Serbia’s
access to the sea.

(d) Exchanges of territory.

There probably would be a certain amount of shifting
of colonial territories by common agreement.
(e) The control of international rivers.
(f) The control of the narrow seas.
(g) The extension of territorial waters.

II) Economic questions.

(a) The release of raw materials.
(b) The disposition of shipping.
(c) Financial exchanges.
(d) The relation of specific economic agreements to a general
economic peace.
(e) Most-favored nation clause.
(f) The exploitation of resources, trade, and communications in
backward regions.
(g) The status of enemy business within national territories.
(h) Agreements in respect to emigration and immigration.
(i) Loans to insolvent states.
(j) Indemnities and reparations.

III) International law.

(a) The status of merchant ships in time of war.
(b) The use of the submarine as a commerce destroyer.
(c) The embargo and national commercial monopoly.
(d) Air-craft.
(e) The conscription of non-selfgoverning peoples.
(f) The reduction of armaments.
(g) The right of intervention.
(h) Conciliation, mediation, and arbitration.
(i) The right of appeal from a national to an international tri-
unal.

(j) Sanctions.
(k) The definition of national honor and unfriendly acts.

IV) Miscellaneous.

(a) Uniformity of law and practice in commerce and labor legis-
lation.
(b) Naturalization laws.
(c) Patent laws.
(d) The validity of secret agreements.
V) Transitional questions.
   a) Special provisions will have to be made for the period of the
demobilization in respect to:
   1) Shipping.
   2) Raw materials.
   3) Repatriation of prisoners.
   4) Enemy property.
   b) Arrangements will also have to be made for the provisional
administration of certain areas.
   c) Intervention to restore order may be necessary.
   d) The terms of the treaty may be repudiated as a consequence of:
an overturn in the government of some one of the contracting
parties.

VI) Representation at the peace conference.
   a) The belligerent Great Powers.
      1) Negotiations in which only directly interested parties take
part.
      2) Negotiations subject to the general participation of the
Powers.
   b) The belligerent small powers.
   c) The passive belligerents.
      This covers states like China, Siam, Brazil.
   d) The nations which have severed diplomatic relations with one
or some of the Central Powers.
   e) The neutral powers.
   f) The protected states.
   g) National delegations and religious organizations.
      There will be present at the conference delegations from
Armenians, several parties of Poles, Jugo-Slavs, Czechs,
Lettis, Jews, etc., etc.
   h) New nations.
   i) The Holy See.
      The most difficult question here is raised by the article in
the treaty between France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy
in regard to the Vatican’s part in the peace negotiations.
   j) Special labor delegations, as distinct from labor representa-
tives among the peace commissioners of national states.

VII) Procedure at the peace conference.
   a) Place of meeting.
   b) Credentials.

The previous section on representation indicates the dif-
culty of determining who shall be admitted to the con-
ference.
The order of business.
This is of primary importance, and should be examined from every angle, because the full exercise of America's influence can only be brought to bear if a skillful use is made of the order of business.

Committees.
The character and personnel of these committees is of primary importance, in view of the multitude of questions before the conference.

The taking of evidence.
Some rules of evidence will have to be agreed upon, in order to sift out conflicting claims.

Voting on reports.
This is an integral part of the question of representation, and is also fundamental to what sanctions the conference shall set up. There is a critical point in regard to the element of consent.

Special organs of the conference.
The conference will require a large number of continuing bodies, as well as technical bodies, for the detailed settlement of many questions.

Provision for amendment of the treaty.
This again is a critical question in regard to the League of Nations, because on it turns the flexibility and adaptability of the settlement.

The question of adjournment.
It will have to be determined whether the adjournment of the conference is final or temporary. Provisions for temporary adjournment and periodic meeting may well be the practical approach to a League of Nations.

The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1918.

My Dear Doctor Mezes: I had hoped before this to be in New York and to get into more direct and detailed touch with your work. That which I know of it and have seen is so excellent that I probably could contribute little in the way of suggestion. However there is one branch of study which intended to mention as of importance in view of the uncertainty as to the scope of the conference which will take up world affairs. I refer to South and Central America. It is
of course possible that these regions may not be considered at all, but I think as a matter of precaution we should give as careful study to them as to the countries of Europe and Asia, following the same general treatment along historical, ethnological, geographical and economic lines. It would be most unfortunate to be without preparation if these countries became subjects of discussion.

I am writing you this because I do not see how I can get to New York within the next few days, and I do not think work on these subjects should be postponed. Possibly you have had this same thought and have already acted upon it. If so, this letter is superfluous. But it seemed to me sufficiently important and urgent to call to your attention on the possibility that the desirability of this particular study and collection of data had not occurred to you.

With warm regards I am

Very cordially yours,

[File copy not signed]

Paris Peace Conf. 132/10

Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State

New York, April 22, 1918.
[Received April 24.]

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have your note of April 17th with its valuable suggestion to the effect that there is urgent need for as careful a study along historical, ethnological, geographical, and economic lines of the problems involved in South and Central America as for those involved in the countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

We have had in mind the need of such additional studies, but in view of the financial budget on which we are operating, we had planned to postpone the South and Central American work until the European, Asian, and African work, and general studies in international economics and organization had progressed further; for on our present scale of expenditure it is only possible to take up our work serially, as a simultaneous investigation in all the fields would entail a larger monthly expenditure than we are now incurring. A consideration of the general scope of the work in brief outline will make the situation clearer.

In order to be prepared for possible eventualities when the conference assembles, facts bearing on the following problems should be gathered, digested, and held under such control that they can be promptly and compendiously presented:

1) Critical economic, political, and territorial problems in: a) Europe; b) The Near East; c) The Far East, including the Pacific Islands; and d) Africa.
2) Problems of international law, international business and economics, and international organization, which of course are world-wide.

3) Problems of the western hemisphere, which, though closely linked up with international law, economics and organization, and with the foreign relations, politics, and economics of the countries of the eastern hemisphere, also involve special studies.

1) and 2) above we have well in hand, though much remains to be done if our representatives at the conference are to be supplied with data which will enable them to maintain their positions as against those taken by representatives of the Central Powers, or even of our Allies, who have been in active and even bitter negotiation with one another on such subjects for so many years, and whose officials, travelers, and scholars have busied themselves with them and know the ins and outs of the problems involved with an intimate knowledge. All that remains to be done in 1) and 2), in addition to filling out in detail the data we have blocked out in substantially satisfactory general outlines, is to prepare maps and charts of the Atlantic Ocean basin, the Pacific Ocean basin, and the Indian Ocean basin, as it is over these oceans that the lines of communication run which tie together in relation to one another the eastern and the western hemispheres, and Eur-Asia with the continent of Africa. The omission just named we can supply before very long, and without adding to the present monthly rate of expenditure.

While on this subject, I may point out a factor in the situation that it is easy to overlook. If our government is to be prepared at the conference it will be necessary not only to accumulate an appreciable body of reports, maps, and graphic presentations of problems and possible solutions, but, even more important, to train a body of workers who can handle this mass of data and the research on which it is based, and draw out from them, as the conference progresses, just the facts that are needed to make clear the reach and significance of proposals that will be constantly made, and the exact nature of which it is quite impossible to anticipate. This means, of course, that even when the facts with regard to any problem or area have been gathered with approximate adequacy, the force must continue to deal with such data, and, by constant practice, to perfect itself in analyzing proposals of various kinds and presenting their significance in a compact and readily intelligible form, for in no other form can busy officials and conference use them. This is the critical part of our task.

Coming specifically to the matter of expenditure, our last month's budget shows that we spent some $7,000 for the salaries of men engaged in gathering historical, ethnographic, geographic, and economic data, and in administration; $3,000 for the salaries of the clerical force
and for draftsmen to put the results of research in compact form on maps and diagrams; and $3,000 in addition for supplies and incidental expenses. The continuation of such a monthly expenditure of $18,000 (which may run to $15,000 if rush reports are called for) would enable us to complete the gathering of data in the first and second fields above mentioned and, incidentally, to give our force practice for the quick work we shall be called upon to do at the conference itself. The cost of printing, a sizable item, is not included in this estimate, nor is the cost of getting to and attending the conference. Moreover, I am, of course, omitting any estimate of the cost of gratuitous services and equipment, contributed by universities, societies and libraries, that total much more than $18,000 monthly.

And now as to South and Central America. We have made a careful study of the additional expenditure which would be necessary if we are to take on South and Central America at once, on top of what we are at present swinging, with the following result: We can get South and Central America up to the standard of adequacy we have attained in the European regions by August first if an additional expenditure of $20,000, to be scattered over the three months up to August first, is authorized, and can keep this additional data alive and train a staff to deal with it competently at the conference at a cost of about $5,000 a month from August first until the time of starting for the conference. This calculation is based on an estimate which shows that we will need for each of the additional areas—that is, for South and for Central America—about four draftsmen, one supervisor of draftsmen, a gatherer and digester of economic data, with two assistants, a gatherer and digester of political and social data, with two assistants, a man competent to make diagrams and graphs, and some additional clerical force, and expenditures for supplies and drafting expenses.

Of course I see the wisdom of your suggestion, and appreciate that in the case of certain eventualities we might proceed to the conference unprepared to deal at all adequately with problems in which Latin America would be vitally involved, and in which her support and co-operation would be of decided significance.

With cordial regards,

Very sincerely yours,

S. E. Mezes

[Enclosure]

SOME OF THE DATA NEEDED FOR SOUTH AMERICA
(Similar Data needed for Central America)

I Natural Resources
   Mineral
   Vegetable

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Animal
Water Power
Labor

II Concessions and Investments
Existing
History
Legality
Scope
Nationality
Terms
By what political faction granted
Desired
By whom
History and present status of negotiations
Unappropriated

III Loans
Where floated
Where held
By whom
Nationality
Government participation
Debt Service
To what applied

IV Export Trade
Destination, volume and velocity, value
Character and nationality of commercial control
Bounties, laws, etc.
How financed
Firms engaged

V Import Trade
Origin, route, volume, velocity, value, indispensability
How financed
Tariffs
Firms engaged, selling organization

VI European colonies and European settlements
VII Areas colonizable by Europeans, by Asiatics
VIII Territorial disputes
IX Domestic Political Groups
Personalities
Social, financial, international affiliations
Control of Press
Attitude of Intellectuals, especially in University centers
The controlling classes, and their basis
X Budget analyses and tax systems
XI Commercial probabilities, especially in their relation to European Needs
XII American assets and liabilities in each state
XIII Exact account of participation by each state in the war
    Neutrality awards
    Damages suffered
    Acts for which damages might be asked of them
XIV The way government works
XV Elections
XVI Islands
XVII Ethnography and Population Distribution and Demography
XVIII History
XIX International Law and Lawyers

Paris Peace Conf. 182/10

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In view of the fact that Friday is Liberty Day I assume that there will be no Cabinet meeting.

On that account I take the liberty of sending you the enclosed letter which I received from Doctor Mezes 16 relative to the work of his organization and the proposal to extend that work to South America. I do this because Doctor Mezes in his letter states that it will require about $20,000 to carry it out. My own view is that this should certainly be done, as I explained to you on Tuesday.

If you approve of the work will you be good enough to make an allotment of the amount required in order that I can inform Doctor Mezes to begin at once the collection of the data? As I said to you I intend to go to New York on Friday, May 3d, to go over the work already done and to see if it ought to be extended along certain lines.

Will you be good enough to return to me Doctor Mezes letter which I have not answered?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

16 Supra.
The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House

[Extract]

May 7, 1918.

My dear Colonel: I saw the President today in regard to the expansion and continuation of the Commission of Inquiry, of which Doctor Mezes is the head. He approved thoroughly going on with the work and will furnish the necessary funds. Will you be good enough to advise Doctor Mezes of this and to have him let me know what additional funds are required and when?

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

Inquiry Document No. 882

Report on the Inquiry, May 10, 1918

Part I

The work of the Inquiry consists of the following sections:

1) The western front—Belgium, Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine, from the left bank of the Rhine to the occupied part of France.
2) The head of the Adriatic—the Trentino, the Isonzo, Istria and Trieste, the Dalmatian coast.
3) Austria-Hungary—including the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav movements.
4) The Balkans—Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, the Greek islands, and the Greek fringe on the coast of Asia Minor.
5) The Ottoman Empire—Thrace, Constantinople, the Straits, Anatolia, the Armenian vilayets, Syria and Palestine, Mesopotamia, the Arab states.
6) Persia, Afghanistan, and Beluchistan.
7) The former Russian Empire—the Polish area, including Galicia, Teschen, East and West Prussia, Posen, Silesia; Lithuania, Courland, Estonia; White Russia; Ukraine; Finland; Great Russia; Siberia; the Caucasus; Mohammedan Russia; Russian Central Asia.
8) Rumania and Bessarabia.
10) The Far East—Japan, China, French Indo China, Siam.
11) The Pacific Ocean—the Dutch colonies, the German colonies, Australasian claims, the American naval position.
12) South and Central America.
In addition to these analytical territorial studies, the following
synthetic research is in progress:

13) The commercial relations of Central Europe in the east, west,
and over seas.
14) Political and commercial developments and plans of the British
Empire.
15) The world situation as to minerals, agricultural products,
manufactures, shipping, commercially strategic lines of transpor-
tation, British, German, French, Italian firms doing for-
ery business, timber resources of the world, raw material pos-
sibilities, tariffs, credit.
16) The needs and political affiliations of the European neutrals.
17) Projects for educational, sanitary, and fiscal reform in back-
ward areas, especially Turkey, the Balkans, and Africa.
18) A special diplomatic history of the world in its bearing upon
problems of the settlement.
19) The diplomatic policy of each of the Great Powers.
20) A current collation, summary, and analysis of public commit-
ments in all countries, affecting the settlement, together with
an examination of sources upon which claims are based.
21) The collection and analysis of plans proposed for settling
questions likely to arise at the peace conference.
22) International Law—the collection of treaties and precedents,
statements of legal questions involved in the President’s
program, with particular reference to the League of Nations,
the equality of trade, and equality upon the high seas.
23) The production of a series of maps and graphs embodying
the results of research.
24) The collection of detailed primary reference maps on all parts
of the world which may come under discussion.
25) The selection and planning of a library to be assembled at
short notice, for use at the conference itself.
26) The revision and current use of all material in the archives,
and the training of a corps of expert advisors and assistants
competent to use this material.
27) The framing of plans for transforming the present staff
of the Inquiry into a secretariat for the use of the peace
commissioners.
28) Detailed critiques of reports and other material.
29) The central direction of the research and administration of
the staff and equipment.

Part II

In this part an attempt will be made to state the force engaged
in each one of the sections named above, discriminating between
volunteers and salaried employees, together with an estimate of the

In the following portion of this memorandum workers on the Inquiry were
designated as volunteers or as salaried workers, with the amount of the salary
specified in each case. These designations and salaries have been omitted
without inserting indication of omission.
present condition of the work, the probable changes, and a forecast of
the future.

1) The western front:

The work is under the direction of Dean Charles H. Haskins of
Harvard University.

Belgium.—The political problems of Belgium are being done by
Dean Haskins himself. For the summer months an assistant at a
nominal salary has been authorized. Preliminary reports are at
hand; a definitive report is not expected until late summer. As Dean
Haskins continues his duties at Harvard, including those in the sum-
mer school, he is not able to give his full time to the subject.

Alsace-Lorraine.—A preliminary report by Professor E. B. Kreh-
briel of Stanford University (no longer a member of the Inquiry's
staff), dealing with the possibilities of a plebiscite is completed, but
criticism showed that more detailed study was necessary before any
satisfactory conclusions could be reached.

The following studies are nearing completion under the direction
of Professor Wallace Notestein of the University of Minnesota: a)
the present government of Alsace-Lorraine; b) public opinion in
Alsace-Lorraine, based especially upon the debates of the Reichstag
and the Landesausschuss; c) conditions in Alsace-Lorraine since
1914, as seen in German, French, and Swiss newspapers; d) the recent
attitude of the clergy in Alsace-Lorraine towards France and
Germany.

Professor Notestein's work will terminate on July 1st.

Professor E. C. Armstrong of Princeton University is preparing
a special study of the question of language and the linguistic frontier
of Alsace-Lorraine, which should be ready by July 1st.

Professor W. H. Hobbs of the University of Michigan has com-
pleted a study of the boundaries of Alsace-Lorraine in their relation
to mineral resources. Professor Hobbs is now doing work on
irrigation in Turkey, but it is planned to terminate his engagement
on July 1st.

Economic studies of Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, and France.—Two
investigations in regard to the western front are in their initial
stages: a) the economic relation of Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine to
Germany and France is just about to be investigated. The direction
of this research will be in the hands of Professor Clive Day of Yale
University, the actual research to be done by Dean Haskins and his
assistant; b) Studies of the needs of France in relation to reconstruc-
tion are to be initiated under the direction of Dean Haskins.

A report on Luxemburg prepared by Dr. L. D. Steefel is at hand,
and is regarded as satisfactory.

The French ports.—A preliminary report on the harbors of France,
especially the Channel ports, has been submitted by Professor Day.
2) The head of the Adriatic:

_Italy._—This work is under the joint direction of Dean Haskins and Professor Dana C. Munro of Princeton University. Good provisional material is at hand for determining ethnic and strategic frontiers for Italy.

Detailed and definitive research is being done by Professor Lunt of Haverford, and will be completed in the course of the summer.

The position of Italy in the Adriatic and her relation to the Jugo-Slavs, Albania, and Greece requires study, but has not yet been undertaken, because the force necessary has not yet been freed from other research.

It will be necessary also to undertake in the future a study of Italy’s commercial position in the Mediterranean and the probable attitude of different parties in Italy towards the groups of problems which will arise at the peace conference. This is a matter of critical importance upon which the Inquiry has not yet been able to make a study.

3) Austria-Hungary.

The political problems of Austria-Hungary are under the direction of Professor Charles Seymour of Yale University. The economic problems are under the direction of Professor Day.

_Nationality questions._—Material on the distribution of nationalities and the economic and social bases of classes and nations in Austria-Hungary may be regarded as in semi-final form.

_Internal politics._—The internal politics of the Dual Monarchy are being studied by Professor Robert Kerner of the University of Missouri. Brilliant reports on the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav questions are at hand. Owing to the fact that Professor Kerner is himself of Czech descent and an enthusiastic Czech nationalist, it is felt that his work requires careful checking up by men of cooler judgment.

_Economic studies._—Professor Clive Day’s economic studies of the industrial organization of Austria-Hungary are illuminating and satisfactory, though by no means final. They require integration in the general economic situation of Central Europe and western Russia. Owing to the disintegration of Russia all material based on pre-war statistics with regard to Austria-Hungary stands in need of constant revision.

It is the opinion of the Inquiry that Professors Day, Seymour, and Kerner constitute an unusually strong combination which should be kept intact for the final peace conference.

_Galicia._—The nationalist questions involved in Galicia are being studied as part of the Polish question, though the group of men working on Austria-Hungary study Galicia in its political and economic relations to the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
4) The Balkans:

_Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania._—_Greece._—_Serbia._—The work on Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania is being done by Professor W. S. Monroe of the State Normal School of New Jersey; the work on Greece and the Greeks by Professor W. S. Ferguson of Harvard University; the work on Serbia is being done by Professor Monroe insofar as it involved Bulgarian and Albanian claims.

It will be necessary, however, to study Serbia also as part of the Jugo-Slav movement, and it is planned to have Professor Kerner take this up at a later date.

It is believed that by June 1st, when Professor Monroe's engagement must be terminated, the nationalistic problems of the disputed parts of the Balkans will be carried as far as it is useful to carry them.

The biggest thing which remains to be done on the Balkans is the study of constructive proposals, such as a customs union, the Balkan Federation, an autonomous Macedonia, etc., etc. This will require detailed studies of the internal and external economic and religious life of the people, in its relation to their national claims. It is a work requiring great knowledge and insight, and the present plan of the Inquiry is to put the facts before the best men in different fields of the Inquiry, as well as before outsiders like Dean Pound of the Harvard Law School and various men who have made a lifelong study of the Balkan question.

5) The Ottoman Empire:

The work is under the general direction of Professor Dana C. Munro of Princeton University, who has the following men assisting the investigation in this field:


_Irrigation questions._—A study of the irrigation possibilities of Mesopotamia is being conducted by Professor F. H. Newell, formerly head of the U. S. Reclamation Service.

The study of Turkey is of course enormously difficult, owing to the extreme complexity of the problem, the unreliability of official statistics, and the great changes caused by the war. The sources have been examined and collected, good information has been collected on concessions to various powers, and preliminary reports have been made on most of the areas.

It is necessary to say frankly, however, that in spite of the learning and hard work of the group of men under Professor Munro,
the result up to date is unsatisfactory. The Inquiry is not prepared to speak with any authority on Turkish questions. At the present time the whole work on Turkey is under close examination with a view to determining whether a drastic reorganization of personnel may not be necessary.

At least four months will be required to gain control of the needed information about Turkey, and as many more to develop a group of men who can speak with expertness. From this it must not be inferred that the elementary material on Turkey is not available. It is. What is lacking is a real appreciation of the inwardness of internal race and religious questions and their bearing upon international politics.

The Mohammedan world.—A study is now being made by Mr. Leon Dominian, and will be completed on June 1st, giving a con-
spectus of the Mohammedan world from Morocco to Central Asia. Mr. Dominian’s engagement will terminate on June 1st.

6) Persia, Afghanistan, and Beluchistan.

The work on Persia has been under the direction of Professor A. V. W. Jackson, assisted by Dr. A. Yohannan, and Dr. Louis Gray. Dr. Yohannan’s services have been terminated, and Dr. Gray, being an invaluable man for general research, is now employed in other fields of the Inquiry.

The reports on Persia are provisional but satisfactory. They lack a certain amount of unity which Dr. Gray can supply, but nevertheless they carry the subject about as far as it is useful to carry it on the basis of the material available in this country.

7) The former Russian Empire.

The work has been under the direction of Professor Archibald C. Coolidge of Harvard University. On May 1st, owing to his appoint-
ment by the War Trade Board as a special agent in Stockholm, the direction of the Russian work was taken over by Professor Robert H. Lord of Harvard University.

The Polish area.—In addition to the general direction of the Rus-
sian work, Professor Lord is himself doing active research on the Polish problem. For the statistical and scientific side of this work he has as his assistants Dr. Henryk Arectowski and Professor S. J. Zowski. This work has been done with a very high degree of skill, and in the opinion of the Inquiry with great success.

The territory “indisputably Polish.”—The material for defining the area which the President described as “indisputably Polish” is provisionally completed, and definitively completed for approximately 80% of the area.

Economic life.—Examination of various claims.—The material on Polish economic life is provisionally completed, and definitively com-
pleted for about 40% of the area. Four months more will put the Inquiry in possession of all the material needed for discussing the delimitation of the Polish state. This will include a comparative examination of the scientific claims put forward by different groups among the Poles themselves and by German, Austrian, Russian, French, and Italian authorities.

**Polish politics.**—Professor Lord’s specialty is the politics of Poland. This is a subject which requires constant reference to current events. It also requires collaboration with the men working on the politics of all the surrounding territories. The work is in healthy condition, but of course from the nature of the subject it cannot be allowed to lapse, and in the opinion of the Inquiry it should be continued without interruption to the peace conference itself.

Professor Lord, with Dr. Arctowski as his assistant, will be fully competent to act as expert advisor on the Polish question.

**Lithuania, The Baltic Provinces, the Ukraine, the Don Cossacks, Siberia.**—Owing to the scarcity of men who can deal with Russian affairs, it has been necessary to cover the whole field of Russia by transferring Professor F. A. Golder from one area to another as soon as a provisional report has been completed. He has up to date done Lithuania, the Baltic Provinces, the Ukraine, the Don Cossacks, and he is at present engaged upon Siberia.

**The Caucasus.**—Professor A. I. Andrews has prepared a report on the Caucasus.

**Esthonia.**—A report on Esthonia is being prepared by Mr. Speck of the Congressional Library, and will be done in two or three months.

**Finland.**—Dr. S. E. Morison will complete a report on Finland by June 1st.

**Central Asia.**—Provisional report on the economics and ethnography of Central Asia has been submitted.

All of these reports are satisfactory compilations from official sources and other available material. No one of them, however, is definitive, and owing to the constant change of events each of them requires constant examination and revision. Nevertheless, it may be said that the Inquiry has the main outline of facts and problems in the border nations of the former Russian Empire.

**Great Russia.**—On approximately May 1st arrangements were made with Professor Lord to undertake a study of Great Russia itself, especially in its relation to the border nations and to reconstruction. For this purpose it is planned to secure the services of Dr. I. M. Rubinow of the Federal Trade Commission, who is regarded as the best authority in America on internal Russian economics.

**Agrarian problem.**—It is planned to secure from Professor V. Simkhovitch of Columbia University a study of the agrarian problem in Russia.
In order to tie together all the research in the eastern theater, Professor Day will direct further economic research and Professor Lord further political research, the two men acting in close collaboration. They will aim to analyze the relations of the different parts of Russia to each other and to Central Europe. This is a work which clearly cannot be terminated at any particular moment. After the permanent facts have been gathered, they require constant examination and illumination in the light of events.

8) Rumania and Bessarabia:

Preliminary reports by Professor W. A. Reed on Bessarabia and the Dobrudja are at hand.

9) Africa:

Work on Africa is under the direction of Mr. George Louis Beer.

French North Africa.—French North Africa is being studied by Professor G. F. Andrews.

The native races.—Mr. O. Bates, editor of the Harvard African Studies, is just beginning a special report on the native races of Africa.

Economic problems.—Mr. Beer himself has just completed an excellent study of the general economic problems of Central Africa. This will be a basis of a study of the legal questions involved, and for more detailed studies on maps of the resources and possibilities of each area in Africa which is subject to an exchange of sovereignty.

As Africa is likely to be a field of detailed negotiation, in which America may very well be called upon as conciliator or arbitrator, and in view of the President’s statement about African colonies, it seems plain that the equipment of the Inquiry cannot be too detailed or the knowledge too intimate. No really expert student of Africa was available, and the Inquiry has therefore been compelled to pick men who could make themselves expert.

It is planned to expand Mr. Beer’s work by securing for him the assistance of Professor Harris, author of “Intervention and Colonization in Africa.” The practical possibilities for useful study are not likely to be exhausted within any period which can now be foreseen, and it will be of essential importance to keep those men whose study has made them expert intact as an organization for the final conference.

The work is in such condition that it would be available at any date in the next few months. Whatever other time is available for research will be profitably used in deepening and extending information and conclusions.

10) The Far East:

Work on the Far East has been under the direction of Mr. W. H. Pitkin. Mr. Pitkin’s services terminate on June 1st.
China.—Reports on Chinese economic problems have been submitted by Dr. A. P. Winston, and others are in progress of preparation.

A detailed map showing the railroads of China has been prepared through the courtesy of the American International Corporation, and will be turned over June 1st.

Mr. Pitkin himself has submitted reports on Far Eastern policy, and upon the legal bases of the Japanese, Russian, and French spheres of influence in China.

Japan.—Arrangements have been made with the Honorable R. S. Miller, Consul General at Seoul, whereby he is to report information upon Japanese politics.

A preliminary economic study of Japan was handed in by Dr. James F. Abbott of Washington University, and a report on Japanese foreign policy is at hand.

India.—Statistical and other material for India has been compiled, and will be turned in on June 1st.

Siam.—Mr. Pitkin has assembled material on Siam, which is to be supplemented by surveys of the events leading up to the declaration of war and its reaction upon Siamese policy.

Part of Mr. Pitkin's staff will need to be retained. Just what part cannot be accurately stated now, since the subject is still under examination.

11) The Pacific Ocean:

The German colonies.—A good provisional report on the German colonies in the Pacific islands by Professor Blakeslee of Clark University is at hand.

Australasia.—Joint administration of the New Hebrides.—Additional reports have been submitted by Dr. Preston Slosson on the position of Australasia with regard to the peace settlement, and on the joint administration of the New Hebrides. Dr. Slosson is the general assistant of Professor J. T. Shotwell, an exceedingly useful man for the general purposes of the Inquiry, and should be retained for that reason.

12) South and Central America:

The research will be directed by Dr. Isaiah Bowman. As the authorization for this work was not secured until approximately May 1st, it is entirely in its preliminary stages. General plans have been drawn, and Professor Bailey Willis of Stanford University has been selected to do the economic and scientific part of the research. The active cooperation of Mr. J. H. Stabler of the Division of Latin American Affairs of the Department of State has been
secured on the political side. Various candidates for the actual research in the politics and history of Latin America are now under consideration.

For this work $20,000 has been set aside, which is administered as a separate fund, though the overhead charges for expense and general administration are carried by the general funds of the Inquiry.

It is planned to assemble the essential material within a period of three months, and to keep it current thereafter with a reduced staff.

13) The commercial relations of Central Europe.

This is under the direction of Professor Day, whose work has already been referred to in the sections on Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the western front (§s 1, 3, 7).

In addition the National Board for Historical Service is preparing a digest of official information in regard to German and Austrian commercial policy after the war, on the basis of German newspapers and periodicals now in Washington.

14) Political and commercial developments and plans of the British Empire:

This work is being done by Professor J. T. Shotwell, with the assistance of Dr. Slossen. A preliminary draft should be completed by July 1st. The subject is so vast and subject to such constant change that no final date can be set for the completion of this work.

15) The world’s economic situation:

This work is under the direction of Professor Allyn A. Young of Cornell University, who is cooperating closely with a number of government bureaus in Washington.

Minerals.—The world mineral situation is being studied by the U. S. Geological Survey, which has set aside a staff of six men for this purpose alone. The material on Europe is approximately completed. For most of the important minerals the whole world has been covered. The subject is splendidly in hand, and for particular problems may be regarded as complete. The final and conclusive material should be in hand in the next two or three months.

Agricultural products.—Information on agricultural products has been received from the Department of Agriculture for all areas likely to come under consideration. A special study of agricultural possibilities is being conducted by an expert in the Department of Agriculture, and should be completed in the course of the summer.

Manufactures.—The statistics of manufacturers are being prepared by the Bureau of the Census, under the direction of Professor Young, and will be completed in the course of the summer.
Shipping.—Arrangements for securing information as to shipping have been made, and the situation at any particular date can be obtained at short notice.

Transportation.—The highly important study of commercially strategic lines of transportation has been done only superficially for certain obvious cases, that is, the Bagdad railway, the Berlin-Bokhara scheme, the Danube, the Rhine, the Vistula. As soon as men are released from more immediately pressing problems, it will be highly desirable that all important transportation possibilities in Russia, the Balkans, Russian Asia, China, and South America should be examined in the light of their commercial implications.

Firms doing foreign business.—A list is being prepared of all British, German, French, Italian firms doing foreign business, together with the amounts of business, the character of the business, and the location of their plants. This list is being compiled as a private enterprise by a friend of Dr. Young's in the General Electric Company. A staff of about sixty people is engaged on it. It is entirely gratuitous.

Timber.—The necessary information in regard to timber, especially in Russia, is being prepared by Mr. Raphael Zon, an expert in the U. S. Forestry Service. This work is being done under the direction of Professor Young by the committee of men working with the War Industries Board. The information is probably available for all the more important factors at the present time, though it has not yet become organized. The material needs of course to be kept current.

Commercial treaty arrangements.—It is planned to produce a chart showing the commercial treaty arrangements of the world as they exist at the present time, with corrections for new developments. It is hoped that for this work the cooperation of the Tariff Commission may be secured.

Tariffs, credit.—Preliminary material prepared by Mr. David H. Miller is at hand. It is hoped, however, to secure more detailed information through the Federal Reserve Board.

16) The needs and political affiliations of the European neutrals:

This important work has just been started. Miss Ruth Putnam, under the direction of Professor Day, is preparing a statement of Holland's political position and of her relations to her colonies. Arrangements for work in regard to Scandinavia, Switzerland, and Spain are in their preliminary stages. It was felt that it would be unwise to use the limited force available for work of this character until the more important problems had reached a certain stage of progress. Moreover, it is believed that most valuable assistance can be obtained from the men in government service who have conducted actual negotiations with the neutrals.
It should be noted that Professor Young’s service as head of the research division of the War Trade Board qualifies him to oversee the research in regard to the neutrals, and as soon as a force is available he will take up that problem.

17) Education, sanitary, and fiscal reforms in backward areas:

   *Education.*—The educational problem in Turkey, Africa, and the Balkans is being studied by Professor Paul Monroe of Teachers’ College, Columbia University, with special reference to the application of our own experience in the Philippines. This work is satisfactorily advanced, though of course it is inexhaustible.

   *Colonizable areas in Africa—sanitary problems.*—A good study of the areas in Africa colonizable by white men has been completed by Miss Wrigley of the staff of the American Geographical Society.

   Certain studies made by the Rockefeller Institute in regard to Turkey are at hand. Much remains to be done, for which at present no force is available.

   *Fiscal reform.*—The subject of fiscal reform has not yet been studied.

18) Diplomatic history of the world.

   The provisional draft of this has been completed. The work was carried out by the National Board for Historical Service, under the direction of Professor Greene. For clerical and incidental expenses the sum of $300 was allotted. The printing of the report has been authorized by the Secretary of State. As the work was done under great pressure and by a widely scattered group of men, it is proposed to take time now for careful revision and editing.

19) A survey of the diplomatic policy of each of the Great Powers has been undertaken.

20) Collection of public commitments affecting the settlement.

   A current file of declarations is maintained at the central offices of the Inquiry by a Columbia University student, Mr. Edward Gluck, with clerical assistance.

21) The collection and analysis of solutions for problems likely to arise at the conference.

   These are gathered from all possible sources and are collated and arranged at the central offices of the Inquiry.

22) International law:

   This work is under the immediate direction of Mr. David H. Miller, in collaboration with Mr. Woolsey of the State Department and Major James Brown Scott, attached to the Secretary of State. The facilities of the law division of the Carnegie Institution are employed, the bulk of the work being done in Washington.
The problems involved in the League of Nations, freedom of the seas, the reduction of armaments, and the equality of trade are of course only partly covered as yet. It is hoped that in the course of time the political and economic research in various fields can all be brought to bear on these questions. They cannot be handled with authority until research on diplomatic problems is more advanced.

23) The production of a series of maps and graphs embodying the results of research.

The map program is under the immediate direction of Dr. Bowman, who has a staff of 11 men. The following base maps will be completed by the end of May:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Basin</td>
<td>1:3,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>1:9,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1:1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria-Hungary (preliminary)</td>
<td>1:2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasus (prelim.)</td>
<td>1:2,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td>1:9,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America (with pop. density)</td>
<td>1:9,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (western)</td>
<td>1:1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans (revised)</td>
<td>1:2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1:9,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alsace-Lorraine</td>
<td>1:250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1:1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria-Hungary (revised)</td>
<td>1:2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland and Lithuania</td>
<td>1:4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1:26,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans (preliminary)</td>
<td>1:2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1:3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>1:1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Adriatic</td>
<td>1:3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danube to India</td>
<td>1:6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Empire</td>
<td>1:13,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>1:1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anatolia, Armenia</td>
<td>1:2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrol</td>
<td>1:500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Provinces</td>
<td>1:1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria and Palestine</td>
<td>1:500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1:2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1:4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>1:5,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Block diagrams:

Albania
Alsace-Lorraine

Trentino
Isonzo

These maps are needed in quantities for the convenient summary of the research and for the exposition of problems susceptible to such expression. In addition, it is proposed to put upon graphs all material not susceptible to cartographic representation.
In addition, it is proposed to provide, at a cost of $20 a set, 25 sets of the millionth map of Europe and western Asia produced by the British General Staff and the French Service Geographique de l'Armee. We have the best of reasons for believing that the authoritative data for the British and French governments will be embodied on these maps, and it is therefore the intention of the Inquiry to put all data which might be used as evidence at the conference upon millionth maps. This will make them readily comparable with the British and French material.

24) The collection of detailed primary reference maps:

There will be required at the peace conference a very complete reference library of detailed European maps, including all the General Staff maps and other detailed maps engraved to a large scale. Most of these will be loaned by the American Geographical Society. There are certain ones, however, which will have to be purchased abroad, and for which provision should be made soon. The approach of the peace conference itself will create a great scarcity of maps.

The disposition to be made in the future of draftsmen now available is a difficult question. A few of them will be transferred to work on Latin America and their salaries debited to the Latin American fund. In one or two cases, perhaps, different types of draftsmen will be needed as the work advances, and some of the men should therefore be dispensed with. As trained draftsmen are exceedingly scarce, and as a force of draftsmen will be needed at the conference itself, the drafting force should in principle be kept intact. The type of work needed by the Inquiry can only be developed after months of training, even of the most skilled draftsmen, and any man who has been with the Inquiry for some time represents an invested capital of experience which should be preserved.

However, should it appear by the autumn that the meeting of the conference is likely to be postponed for a long time, a recommendation for the decrease of the drafting force can be made.

25) The selection and planning of a library to be assembled on short notice.

The library is under the direction of Mr. Andrew Keogh, librarian of Yale University, who has a staff of seven. Mr. Keogh’s department has two functions: 1) the preservation and indexing of all the documents and maps of the Inquiry; 2) the preparation now of lists of books which will be needed on all subjects likely to be discussed at the peace conference, together with information as to where they can most quickly be borrowed or purchased.

The Inquiry is not now purchasing a library. Only a very few indispensable books which cannot be obtained in accessible libraries are being bought. The library which will actually be used at the
peace conference exists as a paper scheme, planned on the theory that when actual negotiations begin the necessary books can be obtained.

26) The revision and current use of all material in the archives:

This is under the immediate control of the Executive Committee, who have a staff of four assistants, P. T. Moon, H. L. Gray, F. R. Flournoy, John Storck. These men are trained every day in the use of the material itself. They have grown up with the Inquiry and know all its details. They are the men who are needed to control the intricate mass of material now in the archives. As the material increases in scope, the importance of this part of the work grows. On it depends, in the last analysis, the availability of all the research being done. This staff should under any circumstance be kept intact, and in the course of the next few months should be slightly enlarged.

27) The framing of plans for transforming the present staff of the Inquiry into a corps of expert advisors and assistants competent to use this material.

An attempt is being made to work out in detail the probable organization needed at the peace conference, together with recommendation as to personnel.

28) Detailed critiques of reports and other material.

This work is done by Professor James T. Shotwell, who has as his assistant Dr. Slosson.

29) The central direction of the research and administration of the staff and equipment.

This work is performed by Dr. Mezes, Mr. Miller and Mr. Lippmann. Clerical and business force, including the photostat operators, consists of about 22 persons.

PART III.—Conclusions

In Appendix 1

Not printed.
ciple that certain of the men should be regarded as on a reserve list, to be called into active service whenever needed.

By working under full pressure it would be possible to produce an intelligent result from six to twelve months hence. For the production of a result which will adequately support the case of the President in all its detailed application, the research should be regarded as continuous up to and including the time of the conference itself.

Special emphasis is put upon the necessity of training each individual man for this work. The type of intellectual effort required differs radically from any with which university life accustoms one. The mass and intricacy of the detail covered is greater than any ever attempted in the field of political science.

The discovery and applications of methods by which this mass of detail can be made readily and reliably useful to statesmen engaged in momentous negotiations requires men who have lived with the research and who know it in all its parts, and have explored all the means by which it can be arranged and presented. The Inquiry should be regarded primarily as an active organization, and not simply as a group of scholars producing voluminous reports which can be printed and used in their absence. For satisfactory results at the peace conference, a selected group of men who have done the work should be on hand to mediate between the documentary material and the peace commissioners themselves.

Inquiry files

Mr. Walter Lippmann to the Secretary of War (Baker)

[New York,] May 16, 1918.

Dear N. D. B.: I am very proud indeed of the copy of your book that you sent me. I shall keep it in the very small box which contains things I shall want always to preserve.

The work here goes along steadily and what might be called the structural part of it is developing fairly satisfactorily. On many of the problems of first-rate importance there is a real famine in men and we have been compelled practically to train and create our own experts. This is especially true of problems connected with Russia, the Balkans, Turkey and Africa. Those are lands intellectually practically unexplored. What we are on the lookout for is genius—sheer, startling genius and nothing else will do because the real application of the President's idea to those countries requires inventiveness and resourcefulness which is scarcer than anything. I have been reading lately with much perturbation about the way in
which ignorance on the part of peace commissioners in the past has
lost causes which have been won on the battlefield. It isn’t difficult
to win a war and lose the peace. England did it over and over again
in the nineteenth century in regard to Turkey.

Won’t you give my best to Mrs. Baker and the children.
Yours always,

W[ALTER] L[IPPMAAN]

The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes

New York, June 7, 1918.

My Dear Doctor Mezes: Here is the French outline of preparatory
work which is being carried out by the experts whom they have
selected, and of which I spoke to you yesterday. I think that except
as to division IV you cover practically everything that is in the list.
However, you may find this of considerable interest.

I was very glad to have the opportunity of a conference with you
yesterday and am deeply impressed with the thoroughness of the work
that is being done. The one thing we must guard against is pre-con-
ceived ideas or theories which will affect the unbiased treatment of
the various subjects. I am sure you realize the necessity of this, but it
ought to be impressed upon those who are working for you.

Very sincerely yours,

Robert Lansing

Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State

New York, June 10, 1918.
[Received June 13.]

My Dear Mr. Secretary: Thank you for the French outline of pre-
paratory work. I am having it compared with our own and with simi-
lar British outlines which we have, in order to extract from it such
suggestions as it may offer.

We were very glad of the opportunity for a conference with you last
Thursday. It clarified our ideas in a number of important respects.

I am also glad to see that our insistence, on the prime necessity of
being open-minded and unbiased, accords with your ideas. We look
upon ourselves as engaged in forging instruments in aid of judgment;
that is, in gathering for each region and problem a thorough, well pro-

^ Not enclosed with file copy of this letter.
portioned and well organized body of facts which will aid you and other officers of the Government in determining policies. Naturally, we have had difficulty from time to time in keeping the theories of our collaborators out of the work, and in some cases it has not been wholly possible to do so. Indeed, there are regions, Austria-Hungary, for instance, and the Balkans, where it sometimes seems best to get the facts from two or more antagonistic points of view, as such points of view will be urged at the Conference, and it is well to know what they are. But that, of course, is different from admitting our own prepossessions into the study of regions and problems.

Very sincerely yours,

S. E. Mezes

Inquiry files

Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Division Chiefs of the Inquiry

NEW YORK, July 9, 1918.

In view of the number of requests it has become necessary to send to the various departments in Washington for assistance and co-operation and the confusion that has in some instances resulted, there has been criticism of The Inquiry, and I shall ask you in the future to submit to me all such requests before sending them.

S. E. Mezes

Paris Peace Conf. 182/12

Mr. David Hunter Miller, Major James Brown Scott, and Mr. L. H. Woolsey to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1918.

Sir: On February 11th last the undersigned were orally directed by you to undertake certain work in the field of international law relating to such questions as might be considered by the Peace Conference at the close of the present war, including, pursuant to your subsequent direction, consideration of questions of international policy in connection therewith, with special reference to the historic attitude of the United States.

Pursuant to such instructions the undersigned have the honor to report as to the scope and progress of such work as follows:

I.—A LIBRARY, INCLUDING AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN, EVERY AUTHORITY WHICH MAY BE CALLED FOR AT THE CONFERENCE

There are two phases of this portion of the work. The first phase is the preparation of an inclusive list of such works, which com-
prise, chiefly speaking, collections of treaties, international agreements of a less formal character, diplomatic documents, state papers, statutes, judicial decisions, the works of prominent publicists, and of certain historians.

This collection necessarily includes Continental, Latin-American and Japanese writings as well as those of Great Britain and the United States, and also the leading periodicals during say the last twenty years, as these contain many studies of importance which are more detailed in their nature than those of the general works of authors of authority or repute.

The second phase of this portion of the work comprises the actual assembling of the library, partly, but to a limited extent, by purchase. This limitation is necessary not only for financial reasons, but also because of the fact that a large portion of the necessary collection is not available except in existing libraries. Arrangements are to be made with the chief libraries of the country for the loan of such books and documents as are not purchased, in order that they can be assembled in advance upon very short notice.

II.—DOCUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES UNDER A TOPICAL ARRANGEMENT

For this purpose the field of international law has been divided into somewhat more than forty headings and under these headings are being assembled the important treaties, agreements, diplomatic documents, state papers, statutes, decisions, opinions, etc., having a bearing upon the particular topic in question. Each collection is to be arranged and edited with such brief comment as may be deemed necessary and will contain a bibliography. Such of the matter as may be in foreign languages is to be translated and the collection under each topic separately printed in convenient form by the Government Printing Office.

An essential part of this work in each case includes extracts from the periodicals mentioned above.

Generally speaking, research in this division is limited to the century commencing with the Congress of Vienna and ending with the outbreak of the war.

The headings above mentioned comprise the following:

Aborigines
Aliens
Arbitration
Blockade
Capture
Claims
Contraband
Debts and Obligations
Diplomatic Agents
Fisheries
High Seas
Industrial Property
International Co-operation
International Law
(Municipal Effect, Asent of States, etc.)
International Organization
Intervention
III.—Collection of Treaties, Conventions and Agreements Made by Belligerents After August 1, 1914

The importance of these documents cannot be overrated, inasmuch as they state officially and in solemn form the views of the contracting parties at the time they were negotiated and rendered effective.

The official texts of the Allied Governments can be procured; the official texts of Germany and its allies will be more difficult to obtain, and doubtless in some cases they can not be had, because of their confidential nature. They will need to be supplied with historical notes and commentary.

IV.—Diplomatic Correspondence and Authoritative Utterances During the War Period

This collection chronologically arranged by countries is to be in addition to the collection in the library to be assembled of authorities containing such papers.

An essential feature of the compilations will be exhaustive indices.

While it is hoped to have these compilations printed, a somewhat obvious limitation in this regard is that they cannot be complete until the close of the war itself; consequently an arbitrary date will be fixed, and papers of the subsequent period will be found only in the subsequent authorities collected.

V.—A Memorandum of Principles and Rules of the Law and Practice of Nations in Relation to the Program Laid Down in the Official Utterances of the President

This work is in course of preparation by the undersigned and the endeavor will be to point out

a. The principles and rules of international law upon which the various provisions of the Program in detail rest.

b. The necessary changes and advances in international law which are indicated by the various provisions of the Program.
This memorandum is to contain quotations of and references to every statement of the President having a bearing upon the questions which may arise at the Peace Conference, and also in connection therewith notes and citations of the relevant precedents and authorities legal and historical.

VI.—Special Monographs

While in general, monographic treatment is not deemed by the undersigned appropriate for all topics, there are certain topics, particularly those of a highly technical nature, in respect of which monographs supplementing the collection of authorities are deemed necessary. In some cases it is possible for this work to proceed in connection with the assemblage of other material, described under II. In others it needs to be postponed until the more essential work is completed.

This method of treatment is also deemed appropriate in regard to certain legal questions arising from the war but requiring detailed settlement thereafter, whatever may be the provisions of the Peace Treaty. Such, for instance, are questions involved in the repatriation of prisoners-of-war and the adjustment of property rights sequestered during the war.

Progress

Within the scope of the undertaking as thus outlined, very considerable progress has been made, and the undersigned will from time to time present further special reports upon the progress of the work accompanied by such compilations, collections of material and monographs as are in completed form and available for such use as the Secretary of State may be pleased to direct.

We are [etc.]

DAVID HUNTER MILLER
Special Assistant in the Department of State

JAMES BROWN SCOTT
Major, United States Reserves,
Attached to the Department of State

L. H. WOOLSEY
Solicitor for the Department of State

Inquiry files

Dr. Isaiah Bowman to Dr. S. E. Mezes

NEW YORK, July 13, 1918.

DEAR DR. MEZES: May I observe, in all respect, that the state of affairs you point out in the attached memorandum ¹⁹ is due to the

¹⁹Dr. Mezes' memorandum of July 9, 1918, p. 99.
present loose organization of the Inquiry—possibly an excellent thing in a small democratic organization but wholly inappropriate to a large one now establishing broad relationships with almost every scientific bureau of the government.

The time has come when there should be a stricter division of functions among the officers of the Inquiry and an exact definition of status and appointments. It is a source of growing embarrassment to remain as we are.

Forgive my very direct and even blunt presentation of this matter. It saves time and it is the way I like to speak.

Very truly yours, Isaiah Bowman

Inquiry files

The Executive Officer of the Inquiry (Bowman) to Professor C. H. Haskins


Dear Mr. Haskins: The Executive Committee of the Inquiry announces the composition of the Research Committee, as follows:

C. H. Haskins, Chairman
(History)

A. A. Young
(Economics)

J. T. Shotwell
(Editor)

I. Bowman
(Geography)

Plans have been approved for a liaison between the general Inquiry and the division of international law in order that each may derive benefit from research in related fields. Dr. Shotwell, who has charge of the Diplomatic History in the division of international law, will act as liaison officer between the Research and Law Committees. In addition he will carry out a program of editorial work for the Inquiry as a whole.

The Research Committee will meet on August 9th, and at that time frame definite plans of work for the November first program, basing decisions, so far as practicable, on the judgment of the general conference of division chiefs held on August 2d.

With individual conferences on plans of mutual interest and with the free exchange of views between collaborators and members of the Research Committee, it is certain that the work of the Inquiry will

Identical letters were sent to Messrs. Day, Seymour, Mezes, Miller, Young, Willis, Fenneman, Simkhovitch, Tyler, Munro, Beer, and Lord, of the Inquiry.
go forward with all possible dispatch and in a manner satisfactory to each investigator.

Any further suggestions as to plans will be gladly received before the meeting of the Research Committee on August 9th.

Very truly yours, 

Isaiah Bowman

Inquiry files

Memorandum on the Organization of The Inquiry

[Undated.]

Organization of The Inquiry

Chief:
E. M. House.

Executive Committee:
Director: S. E. Mezes
Treasurer: D. H. Miller
Executive Officer: I. Bowman

International Law
D. H. Miller &
staff

International Economics
A. A. Young &
staff

Problem Areas
I. Bowman

Editorial Committee

J. T. Shotwell, Chm.
Diplomatic History and Library Staff

Research Committee

C. H. Haskins, Chm.
(History)

A. A. Young, Sec.
(Economics)

J. T. Shotwell
(Editor)

I. Bowman
(Geography)

V. G. Simkhovitch
Librarian

Regional staffs
for
West front
Austria-Hungary
Balkans
Russia
Turkey
Far East
Pacific Islands
Africa
Latin America
Inquiry files

Dr. Isaiah Bowman to Colonel E. M. House

[New York,] August 17, 1918.

Dear Colonel House: The shortest way in which I can report on the work of the Inquiry is to enclose the minutes of the first two meetings of the Research Committee and the Map Committee. While some of the items are not self-explanatory the general nature of the work will be sufficiently clear. We are going full speed ahead and everyone is working in the highest spirit. The composition and work of the Research Committee have reestablished the morale of the whole staff.

I was unwilling to accept the responsibility for "men, money and plans" except on condition that this responsibility be fully shared by members of a research committee. In selecting the committee I was guided by the thought that it must command the respect of everyone both within and without the Inquiry. When the peace conference organization stands in the limelight, as it inevitably will, I felt sure you would wish to have the guiding committee composed of men of whom there can be not the slightest question.

Permit me to say that Dr. Mezes and I have worked together with cordial good-feeling and without the slightest personal difficulty. But I could not escape the conviction that his good nature had been taken advantage of for purposes that were not in harmony with the spirit of joint responsibility and team work that must pervade the Inquiry if its work is to be successful. Under these circumstances there were only two ways out: to resign or to fight, but not to quarrel. I could not, in view of the great importance of the Inquiry, just drop out. Mr. Miller is an exceptionally wise and big man for whom we all have the highest respect and it is to his judgment and tact that we owe the success of the reorganization plans.

We now have matured plans and cooperative decisions and these are forged without fuss or talk. We have in Dean Haskins an extraordinary man—clear-headed, direct, strong. Dr. Young is one of the ablest men I have ever known and as Secretary of the Research Committee brings a driving energy to the management of the research. Dr. Shotwell is a brilliant scholar whose wide experience and knowledge make him an indispensable critic of research plans and results. You may depend upon us all for complete devotion to the work and everyone on the team has that sense of personal responsibility which is a guarantee of success.

The Committee has scrutinized the budget with extreme care. Certain topics and areas are not yet represented. The best men we can

*Not printed.*
find ought to be engaged to fill the gaps. For example, Dr. Young's work on International Economics needs several men at once. The savings we can effect will do something in supplying the need for money. The Committee will challenge every expenditure. But I am frank to say that the work actually suffers for need of funds. The colleges and universities are carrying so heavy a burden that the Inquiry is obliged to pay more and more for its men. We feel the most urgent need for $5000 more per month. Given that, we could develop the work with stronger men and at greater speed.

There comes to us all, who are working close to the problems, a sense of the profound need for the work of the best men and for haste in order that this country may take a fit place at the settlement.22

Sincerely yours,

[File copy not signed]

Inquiry files

Professor C. H. Haskins to Mr. H. Nelson Gay

18 September, 1918.

My Dear Gay: You may have seen in the newspapers some mention of the fact that the Government of the United States has undertaken, under the general direction of Colonel House, a systematic collection of information for the use of the American delegates at the Peace Conference. Having recently been made chairman of the Research Committee which has charge of the collection of a large section of this material, I am desirous of having our equipment strengthened on the side of Italy. Elaborate special studies are in preparation on the linguistic and other questions connected with the Italian-Austrian frontier, and Italian interests will also come in for consideration in connection with the special studies on Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. It would, however, be of advantage if we could have at our disposal a rather full statement of the general questions which will concern Italy at the Peace Conference, the statement to be prepared by one who is fully informed of existing conditions and at the same time able to regard them objectively. You are obviously indicated as the only person qualified to prepare a statement of this kind, and we should be very grateful if you would undertake it. It could be made as full as you choose, taking up the matter under various headings in the form of an analysis of the situation and the pros and cons of the different problems, whether political, economic, or military, which will concern Italy

22 On Aug. 22, 1918, Colonel House replied to this and another letter of the same date (not printed), "... I have not answered your letters because I would rather discuss the matters you raise, when I see you."
at the Peace Conference. The material will be welcomed as soon as possible, say before the end of November. If you would prefer to send a series of statements as each is ready, this would be equally welcome.25

I hope very much that you can arrange to undertake this. All such matters are naturally highly confidential, and your report should be directed through the embassy pouch to the Inquiry, 3755 Broadway, New York City.

I am slow in acknowledging various pamphlets which you have sent me concerning war matters. I have also read with interest your letter to the Harvard Library concerning the building up of an American collection in Rome. I trust you have had a good summer.

Ever sincerely yours,

CHAS. H. HASKINS

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Inquiry files

The Research Committee of the Inquiry to the Division Chiefs

[SEPTEMBER 21, 1918.]

COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

Kindly inform the men working under your direction that we are now in touch with the following government organizations, and that the Inquiry would be glad to receive requests for information or suggestions as to work that might be done. It is understood that all such requests or suggestions should pass through the hands of the Executive Officer.

Military Intelligence Division, General Staff
Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce
U. S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior
U. S. Forest Service, Department of Agriculture
Bureau of Soils, Department of Agriculture
Office of Farm Management, Department of Agriculture
Bureau of Plant Industries, Department of Agriculture
Division of Foreign Tariffs, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce
Division of Latin American Affairs, State Department
Foreign Trade Advisor, State Department
Bureau of Research, War Trade Board

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25 For material concerning Italian claims forwarded by Mr. Gay in response to this request and transmitted to the Department of State through the Embassy in Italy, see pp. 417-441 and 442-447.
Division of Planning and Statistics, War Industries Board and
U. S. Shipping Board
U. S. Tariff Commission
National Research Council
Anthropology Committee
Medical Research Committee

In the case of the Military Intelligence Division, Colonel Dunn has
even offered to cable any or all of the military attachés for espe-
cially urgent information. The existing liaison between the M. I. D.
and the Inquiry enables us to tap practically any source of informa-
tion in the country.

Inquiry files

Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Treasurer of the Inquiry (Miller)

[New York,] October 15, 1918.

My Dear Mr. Miller: After an official conference Colonel House
has given instructions that the work of the Inquiry should be
speeded up and has authorized a monthly expenditure for this and
subsequent months for the Inquiry proper of $25,000 if necessary,
with the understanding that additional employees shall be taken on
only until the time when the official force proceeds to the Confer-
ence, except in such cases as it may prove quite impossible to obtain
satisfactory appointees without offering them a longer term.

Very truly yours,

S. E. Mezes

Paris Peace Conf. 152/13

Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State

New York, October 19, 1918.

[Received October 21.]

Dear Mr. Secretary: Before Colonel House left I had a con-
ference with him regarding future work in the Latin American
field. After going into the matter with some care we reached the con-
clusion that all the work that need be done in preparation for the
peace conference in that field could be well taken care of on the bal-
ance of the fund originally allotted to it—about $6000—and he asked
me to arrange for the tying up of this work on that basis.
We also have before us a program of work in Latin America prepared by Professor Bailey Willis, who has been in charge of that field for us. Colonel House thought that the work proposed by Professor Willis would bring in valuable results, and the rest of us here at the Inquiry are of the same opinion, but it seemed to him that the results would hardly bear on the peace conference and should be judged on the basis of their possible utility to the Department of State rather than on the basis of the needs of the Inquiry or the peace conference. He therefore asked me to so advise Professor Willis, in order that the Professor might take up with your Department the question as to whether such work should be undertaken under its auspices.

I have so advised Professor Willis, from whom you will no doubt hear shortly, and I am sending a copy of this letter to your Mr. Stabler, inasmuch as the work heretofore done was carried on in direct liaison with him.

Sincerely yours,

S. E. Mezes

Inquiry files

Dr. S. E. Mezes to Professor C. H. Haskins

[New York,] October 19, 1918.

Dear Dean Haskins: Colonel House asked me to let you know that he has gone to Europe for a visit of uncertain duration. Please treat this information as confidential until his arrival on the other side is noted in the press.

Before leaving he decided on a chart of organization of the Inquiry, a copy of which I am enclosing; division heads remain unchanged. His idea was to organize the force of the Inquiry in the way in which it could most effectively work when the conference is in session and he thought it would be well for the organization to go into effect at once in order that we might practice our parts ahead of time.

He believed that the administrative plan with heads rather than with committees would prove more effective, though no doubt special committees for consultation and editorial revision or visé will be

24 Jordan H. Stabler, Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, Department of State.
25 Identical letters were sent to the other members of the Research Committee of the Inquiry.
26 Not enclosed with file copy of this letter; it was apparently similar to the chart enclosed with Dr. Mezes' letter of Oct. 25, 1918, to Secretary Lansing, p. 112.
constituted from time to time as the exigencies of situations may require.

He especially charged me with the pleasant duty of thanking the members of the Research Committee for their invaluable aid in rendering the work of the last few months effective.

This is just an outline of his message which I shall be glad to expand into fuller detail should any points remain unclear.

Cordially yours,

S. E. Mezes

Inquiry files

Professor C. H. Haskins to Dr. S. E. Mezes

NEW YORK, 22 October, 1918.

DEAR DR. MEZES: I have your letter of 19 October and note the changes in the organization of the Inquiry which you enclose therewith. It is quite clear that there is no place for committees in the kind of plan you outline. I am glad to learn that Colonel House thought the work of the Research Committee during the summer had some value.

In the copy of the chart sent me, the various fields of investigation are left swinging in the air without any connection with the officers above. It would look, however, as if the problem areas are supposed to be under the immediate direction of Messrs. Bowman and Young, and, unless otherwise instructed, I shall assume that as division chief I report to them.

I also note the omission of Luxemburg from the problem areas, where it belongs along with Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES H. HASKINS

763.72119/2804

Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, October 28, 1918.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Before Colonel House left for Europe we discussed together the work already accomplished and the year's program for Latin America with which you are familiar.

Colonel House asked me to say to you that the work already done for Latin America, and such further work as could be done on the balance of the $20,000 fund (which amounts to about $6000), would
bring in the minimum of essential material for the peace conference, and that the proposed year's program went into many matters which in his judgment were valuable, and might well be called to your attention as possibly useful to your Department, but as going beyond the needs of the Inquiry or the peace conference.

He thought, however, that a part of the program involving an expenditure of $5000 or less monthly from November 1st, and for a period of two or three months, would bring in all the material contemplated in the original program submitted to you on May 4th; 27 and supplement the minimum results mentioned above, and would undoubtedly be useful at the peace conference if certain questions regarding Latin America should come up, as they may.

If you think well of such an additional two or three months' program, we should of course be glad to administer the work at the Inquiry, details being arranged in conference between your Mr. Stabler and Mr. Bowman, our Executive Officer.

Believe me [etc.]

S. E. Mezes

Paris Peace Conf. 184/11

Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, 25 October, 1918.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am sending you a copy of the chart prepared by Colonel House and submitted to you yesterday, with the modifications discussed at our conference. 28

I am not sure that I mentioned yesterday Colonel House's statement to me that he thought that some seventy-five or eighty individuals should compose the force of the Inquiry, an estimate he said he had reached after discussing the matter with you.

His further thought was that while some of this force might not be needed at once, probably most of it would be in view of two facts: first, that it would have to be kept in operation or else be lost and could probably be kept in operation best as a unified body; and second, that there was no way at present of determining the order in which the different members of the force would be needed and that they could be used, if kept as one body, to get the material into more satisfactory shape than it is at present.

Believe me [etc.]

S. E. Mezes

27 Not printed.
28 See diagram on page 112.
President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 29 October, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As I said to you orally yesterday, I think that the enclosed is much too ambitious a programme, and I would be obliged if you would have a simpler one worked out, in the meantime telling Dr. Mezes that it is so unlikely that anything but the main territorial, political and racial questions at issue will be settled at the peace conference and practically so certain that all detailed discussions of financial and commercial and other similar arrangements will be delegated by the conference to special conferences or commissions, that I think he ought to plan only to carry the men and materials with him which will be serviceable in settling the main questions, together of course with the necessary clerical aid.

The Department itself in the meantime can work out the necessary minimum personnel and organization.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

Woodrow Wilson

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Memorandum by the Secretary of State

Secretery of Commission (Confidential Clerk)
Assistant Secretary in charge of
Records
Drafting Experts
Translators
Clerical Force
Force to consist of
Confidential Clerk
Recording and filing clerk
2 Drafting experts
[4 Translators]
[10 Stenographers]
[6 Messengers (From Marine Corps)]

[Undated.]

Grew.
Harrison

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No enclosure with file copy of this letter. See footnote 28, p. 111.

For the program worked out by Secretary Lansing, see the following document.

The original of this memorandum is typewritten except for the names of individuals, which have been added at the right. These are in Secretary Lansing's hand except for the words "House & Baker," which were written by President Wilson. Brackets have been substituted in all cases where parentheses appear in pencil on the original.
Assistant Secretary in charge of
Codes
Communications
Intelligence
Printing

Force to consist of
Confidential Clerk
9 Code Clerks

[† Subordinates on intelligence and information to be ar-
ranged.]

[4 Telegraphers]
[3 Expert proof-readers—(1 of French)]
3 Photostat operators
2 Mimeograph operators.

[Disbursing Officer in charge of Accounts.]
[Assistant Disbursing Officer]
[2 Clerks.]

Transportation Officer in charge of
Transportation
Accommodations
Supplies
Guards

Force to consist of
2 Assistants
10 Chauffeurs (From Army)
† Secret Service Men.
† Guards (From Marine Corps)

Technical Advisers
3 International Law
[1 Military]
[1 Naval]
[1 Trade]
[1 Claims.]

Director of Specialists in charge of
Expert information
Cartography
Library

Force to consist of
Confidential Clerk
7 Specialists on territorial divisions
Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, etc.
Italy
Western Russia and Poland
Turkey
Austria-Hungary

Patchin
House & Baker
Miller, Scott
Mezes
Haskins
Lunt
Lord
Young
Seymour
Balkans
Colonies
4 Assistants to Specialists 7?
2 Cartographers Jefferson, Obeck [Lobeck]
4 draughtsmen
Librarian Shotwell
2 Assistants

083.1140/246: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, October 30, 1918—9 p. m.
[Received October 31—6:15 p. m.]

22. For Polk from Auchincloss. Colonel House wishes Mezes to be asked to send him a cable advising him of the progress and difficulties of "Inquiry" since his departure. He wishes further to be fully advised regarding this work by cable.

EDWARD HOUSE

Paris Peace Conf. 184/12

The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1918.

MY DEAR DOCTOR MEZES: I submitted your diagram of the proposed personnel for the peace conference to the President after Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 29th. After a very brief discussion of it I left it with him for his consideration. This morning he returned the diagram to me with a letter a copy of which I enclose.22

I think it would be very well, therefore, after you have thought the matter over, to arrange to come here and see me. Possibly you could do so early next week. Meanwhile I will endeavor to work out the organization in accordance with the President’s suggestion from the Department’s standpoint.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

763.72119 P 43/924a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1918—3 p. m.

10. From Mezes. The Inquiry is running down data to aid in disentangling aspiring peoples in Western Russia, Austria-Hungary,

22 See the President’s letter of Oct. 29, 1918, to Secretary Lansing, p. 113.
Trentino, Balkans, Turkey and Africa and in finding stable boundaries for them. Miller is taking over short reports and a few maps for these regions. If you need them some key men with a few draughtsmen and translators could be sent over in Bowman's charge. Have [Had?] a conference with Secretary Lansing on your personnel and organization chart which he is working out in touch with the President for a second conference the two of us are to have next week.

LANSING

763.72119/2604

The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1918.

DEAR DOCTOR MEZES: I desire to acknowledge receipt of your letter of October 23, in regard to the continuance by the Latin American Division of the Inquiry and to inform you in reply that I have discussed the matter with the President who approves of the expenditure of $5,000 per month, beginning November 1, for a period of three months, in order to continue the work of the above-mentioned Division of the Inquiry.

I have instructed Mr. Stabler, Chief of the Latin American Division, to communicate with Mr. Bowman, the executive officer of the Inquiry, in order to arrange for a conference in connection with the continuance of the work of the Latin American Division, of the Inquiry.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

Paris Peace Conf. 184/13

Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, November 8, 1918.

[Received November 11.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am writing to confirm a telegram sent you to-day, in accordance with your request, reading as follows: *3*

"Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Belgium, Haskins; Italy, Lunt; Russia, Lord; Turkey, Young; Austria-Hungary, Seymour; Balkans, Day; Colonies, Beer; Cartographers, Jefferson and Lobeck; Library, Shotwell. An assistant for each specialist, making seven assistants, would help very much."

Believe me [etc.]

S. E. MEZES

*3 For changes in this list of specialists, see Dr. Mezes' letter of Nov. 14, 1918, to Secretary Lansing, p. 118.
Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, November 9, 1918.
[Received November 12.]

Dear Mr. Secretary: I had an opportunity coming up on the train yesterday to study the program we discussed in your office.* It seems to me that it meets emergency needs quite thoroughly, but I find that in the section to be under my charge there is one omission that I hope can be supplied.

There is no place for Dr. Bowman, who as you know has acted and is still acting as our Executive Officer, and who therefore does not come in under divisional specialists, cartographers, or the library force. Dr. Bowman in addition to his valuable services to us is Director of the American Geographical Society, which has furnished us with our headquarters free of charge for the last year and has extended to us many courtesies. I should not feel that I could ask him to go or ask his trustees to approve of his going under the title of Confidential Clerk, and I am writing to ask if in lieu of that position there might not be substituted the position of Chief Territorial Specialist or that of Executive Officer, which Dr. Bowman now occupies. If his services should not be available our work would be very seriously embarrassed.

Believe me [etc.]

S. E. Mezes

The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1918.

My Dear Doctor Mezes: I have your letter of the 9th, which was delayed in reaching me as it was marked "Confidential", while "Personal and Urgent" results in immediate delivery to me.

I quite agree with you that Doctor Bowman should be included in your group and leave it to you to give him such title as seems appropriate. I would not, however, approve that you forego your confidential clerk. By all means take both.

I am investigating as to whether there will be available in the army in Paris photostat machines, as it would save considerable trouble if they have them there rather than take one from this side. As soon as I know I will inform you.

As to stenographers and translators, Secretary Baker assures me that we can obtain all we need on the other side so we are not

* See the undated memorandum by the Secretary of State, p. 113.
planning to take them from here—only those that can be designated confidential clerks.

I will keep you advised as to progress of arrangements so that you can make your plans accordingly.

Sincerely yours,

[File copy not signed]

Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, November 14, 1918.

[Received November 15.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am glad that the inclusion of Dr. Bowman can be effected and that the position of confidential clerk may also continue.

I should like to suggest two other alterations in the list wired you last Saturday, which was, of course, prepared hastily.

1. That the name of W. L. Westermann be substituted for the name of A. A. Young as specialist for Turkey, and as a consequence,

2. That A. A. Young be designated as specialist in economic resources and be substituted for one of the assistants to specialists.35

I need hardly say that some of the most important data affecting boundary decisions are economic, involving a knowledge of the precise location, of the value and of the amount of mineral and agricultural resources, of the drainage lines by rail and water effecting the distribution of such resources, etc. Such economic problems are thick along the northern, eastern and western limits of Bohemia and Silesia, in Galicia and, of course, in Asiatic Turkey at various places. It was with this in mind that I suggested Professor Young, who is primarily an economist, and I suggested him for Turkey in view of the large part that economic problems play there. But on reflection, I am sure it would be clearer and better to let Young go under his own colors rather than as a regional specialist for Turkey, and he is a man of too much competence and position to be asked to go merely as an assistant. The change suggested will not, of course, add to the number originally contemplated.

I note what you say about stenographers and translators and about the photostat machine.

Believe me [etc.]

S. E. MEZES

35 In a telegram dated Nov. 15, 1918, Secretary Lansing replied, “Your letter fourteenth. I quite agree as to your arrangement relative to Westermann and Young.”
CHOICE OF PLACE FOR THE CONFERENCE AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson

PARIS, October 28, 1918.

3. Things are moving so rapidly that the question of a place for the Peace Conference is upon us. The French are urging Paris. The Belgians, Brussels. The only objection to Paris is that if a sharp difference should arise between one of the Allies and the French it might be embarrassing. Otherwise it is desirable. Will you not advise me as to your preference.

The Supreme War Council will not meet until Wednesday.

EDWARD HOUSE

Woodrow Wilson Papers

President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)

[WASHINGTON, October 28, 1918.]

2. Much as I should enjoy Paris I think neutral place of meeting much wiser care being taken not to choose a place where either German or English influence would be strong. My preference is for Lausanne.

[WOODROW WILSON]

763.72119 P 43/906: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 1, 1918—12 a. m.

[Received 1 p. m.]

28. I suggest that you discuss with the President the advisability of authorizing me to use my discretion in securing options for accommodations for the American representatives at the ultimate Peace Conference. Of course, at the present time it has not been
definitely decided when or where this Conference will take place. It may be necessary however for quick action to be taken, and accordingly I would appreciate an expression of your opinion concerning this matter.

House

763.72119 P 43/906: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1918—1 p. m.

9. Your Number 28, November 1. President agrees with me that you should be authorized to use your discretion in securing options for accommodations for American Representatives at peace conference. I conclude from your telegrams that the place will be either Geneva or Lausanne. My only suggestion is that you act at the earliest possible moment and secure ample accommodations, since there is no doubt any portion can be released, if desirable, before the conference.

Lansing

763.72119/9087: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 5, 1918—4 a. m.
[Received 6:55 a. m.]

49. Strictly confidential for Polk from Aichincloss. For your information and for such use as you may see fit to make of it. There is little doubt that through the influence of the United States, exercised through Colonel House, the present decision to hold the Peace Conference in Switzerland was brought about. Colonel House proposed Switzerland to Lloyd George and secured his assent. Clemenceau of course was in favor of Versailles but did not argue the matter with George and Colonel House. Orlando stated Italy would vote for any place that the United States was in favor of. I suggest that these facts be pointed out to McCormick and that he be told that it would be advisable to secure informal assurances from the Swiss Government through Sulzer during the commercial negotiations now being carried on by the War Trade Board with Switzerland on the following points.
1. The Swiss Government will offer every possible facility to assist the United States Government in securing suitable accommodations in Switzerland for its representatives at the Conference.

2. The Swiss Government will permit United States Government officials to install in Switzerland a central telegraph and telephone service at such points as may be necessary for the use of the United States representatives at Peace Conference. This would involve the leasing by the United States of such telegraph and telephone lines as may be necessary and available and within the discretion of the United States authorities. The construction, maintenance and operation of such telegraph and telephone lines as may be required. It would be understood that these lines would be utilized only during the session of the Peace Conference and to be employed only for governmental business and for press agencies approved by the Government of the United States.

3. Complete freedom from any censorship by the Swiss Government of any communications sent over these lines either by United States Government officials or by press agencies approved by the United States.

If the above assurances cannot in substance be secured it would seem wise to reconsider the tentative decision already arrived at to hold the Conference in Switzerland. Please cable very promptly your views with reference to this matter as I am planning to send representatives in the very near future to Switzerland to secure options on suitable accommodations.

EDWARD HOUSE

Woodrow Wilson Papers

President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)

[WASHINGTON, November 7, 1918.]

11. On second thought it occurs to me that Versailles may be the best place for the peace conference where friendly influences and authorities are in control rather than Switzerland which is saturated with every poisonous element and open to every hostile influence in Europe.¹

Referring to your number 57² your reply to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs about Austrian forces in the Ukraine I altogether approve.

[WOODROW WILSON]

¹ Regarding proposed locations for the Peace Conference, see also Colonel House's telegram No. 72, Nov. 9, 1918, 4 p. m., Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 485.
² Not printed.
The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 11, 1918—8 p.m.

[Received November 11—6:57 p.m.]

93. Though the decision to hold the Peace Conference in Paris has not as yet been formally taken by the Allies and the United States I feel sure that this will be done within next few days. The British Government has sent representatives to Paris who have conferred with me and who have advised me that they are planning to request the French Government to requisition for the use of the British representatives at the Peace Conference the Hotel Majestic or the Hotel Astoria and perhaps both. I would very much prefer that all of the negotiations for the acquisition of headquarters for the American representatives should be conducted by Ambassador Sharp with the assistance of the American military authorities now in Paris who have already had experience in dealing with the French authorities in the matter of requisitioning accommodations for the use of the War Department in Paris. Various plans for the accommodation of the American representatives have been proposed to me and at the present time I am inclined to think that the best suggestion that has been made is for you through Ambassador Sharp to request the French authorities to requisition for the use of the American representatives at the Peace Conference the Hotel de Crillon, together with a very much smaller hotel on the Boissy d'Anglas in the near vicinity of the Crillon.

The Crillon has accommodations for approximately 100 guests. I should estimate that the American representation including high military officials would amount to at least this number. The operation of the hotel should be placed entirely in the hands of citizens of the United States. This can easily be arranged. The smaller hotel near the Crillon could be fitted up as offices. It [if] would also suggest that you instruct Ambassador Sharp to discuss with the French Government the acquisition of suitable accommodations for the President. I have [in] mind certain residences which may be suitable in the near vicinity of the Crillon.

I suggest that the staff of the “Inquiry” be instructed to report at once when it would be practical for them to sail for France. At the present time it seems clear to me that we should try to establish our organization in working order in Paris as near to December 1st as possible though in all probability the actual Peace Conference will not be called before December 16th because it is unnecessary and I believe inadvisable to send to Europe for the Conference either stenographers, code clerks, or any other kind of clerical assistance. Very efficient men can be obtained to do this work from the army and naval forces now in Europe. I should appreciate an
expression of your views and a statement of what action you propose to take. I have handed a copy of this cable to Ambassador Sharp.

Edward House

763.72119 P 43/905: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

Washington, November 13, 1918—1 p. m.

34. Your 93.\(^*\) I quite agree with you that the best arrangement is for Ambassador Sharp to request the French authorities to requisition for the use of the American Commissioners at the peace conference the Hotel de Crillon. Possibly it could be arranged so that the offices would be in that Hotel and any overflow of people connected with the Commission could live at the smaller hotel of which you speak. Will you be good enough to take up this matter with Ambassador Sharp as soon as possible in accordance with your suggestions, notifying him that I will instruct him to take the matter up with the French Government as soon as it is officially decided to have the meeting of the conference in Paris? He might informally approach the French Government on the subject without awaiting instructions. Please explain to him also that I am taking this indirect means of communication as I do not feel I can make it official in nature until the place of meeting is formally agreed upon.

It does not seem to me advisable that the Bureau of Inquiry should leave before the rest of the force as they will not be fully equipped with stenographers and others. The President feels that we must economize in the matter of clerical force and expects to draw largely from the army supply in Paris.

Your Number 84: \(^*\) I have reasons for objecting to the attendance of ... at the peace conference, which I can explain to you better on seeing you.

Lansing

763.72119/2699: Telegram

The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Secretary of State

Havre, November 14, 1918—6 p. m. [Received November 15—2:22 a. m.]

154. Hymans asks me to express the earnest desire of the Belgian Government to have the Peace Conference held in Brussels. The

\(^*\) Supra.
\(^*\) Not printed.
movement was begun on receipt of a telegram from Francqui at Brussels saying that Cardinal Mercier, the National Committee, all magistrates and members of Parliament and prominent men in Belgium unanimously requested it. The King was at first not favorably impressed with the idea saying after so long a strain the social obligations it would entail would be onerous but he yielded to the wishes of the Government. While sharing the forebodings of His Majesty, I transmit the request for your consideration.

Whitlock

763.72119/9136: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 20, 1918—11 p. m.
[Received November 20—8:07 p. m.]

130. For the President and Secretary of State. Lord Derby has just sent word to me that he has heard from Mr. Balfour that the British Government does not feel that it is bound to consider Versailles as the place finally decided upon for the Peace Conference. They feel that this is a question which must be finally decided by the Inter-Allied Conference. Mr. Balfour points out, however, that after the various delegations have arrived in Paris, and the organizations set up there, it will be most difficult to change the meeting place of the final conference. Lord Derby believes that the British Government has, however, definitely accepted the proposal that the Inter-Allied Conference should be held in Paris. Lord Derby states that he is doing his best to hurry the French Government into the taking over of the necessary accommodations for the staff of the British Government. Lord Derby has asked the French Government to take over both the Astoria which has 130 bedrooms and the Majestic Hotel which has 450 bedrooms. He says that the rent has not yet been agreed upon.

Edward House

763.72119 P 43/956: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 22, 1918—1 p. m.
[Received November 22—10 a. m.]

141. From Grew. I have been informed that the French Government is taking the necessary step to place the Hotel Crillon at

*Émile Francqui, head of the Belgian Comité National d’Alimentation et Secours.
our disposal. Ambassador Sharp is attending to all of these negotiations and will no doubt report direct on terms thereof. We are making satisfactory progress with physical organization of offices in quarters previously occupied by Red Cross at 4 Place de la Concorde.

Edward House

763.72119 P 43/1017: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 22, 1918—9 p. m.
[Received 11:59 p. m.]

5968. Referring to the Department's 34, November 13, 1 p. m. for Colonel House. I would say that I have been successful in getting prompt action by the French Government in the matter of requisitioning the Hotel Crillon for [special?] use of the American commissioners at the Peace Conference. Representations were made by Mr. Auchincloss to me that there was the greatest need for expedition in securing this property as certain arrangements affecting the hotel accommodations would necessarily have to be made prior to the actual coming over of the members of the commission. A representative of the American military governor of Paris called on me to inform me that the property would be turned over to those representing the commission on the 25th instant; just now, however, I am informed that the hotel will be formally requisitioned on the 23rd instant and representative of the Embassy is asked to be present. As to the terms of rental, duration of lease, etc., I asked Major Warburton, military attaché, to take up with the proper authorities the question of procedure in taking over the property and the estimate of the amount of rent, etc.; after seeing these authorities he has left a report with me, the substance of which is as follows: After the military governor of Paris has been notified that the property is desired for military purposes, it is thereupon requisitioned on the basis of the taxes paid upon the income derived from the property. A Military Board of Reviews examines the property and if there are any damages assesses value for same. The property is requisitioned by this board for only the time that it is actually needed and may be returned to the owners without any notice whatever. The rental assessed by the board is arbitrary and in the case of the United States Government it would be the same as that which the French or any other Government would have to pay. I shall appreciate any further instructions that the Department may desire to give in reference to the matter.

Sharp
The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 29, 1918—10 p.m.
[Received November 29—8:46 p.m.]

200. Grew advises me as follows with reference to tentative arrangements for leasing office space for the peace commission in addition to the Hotel Crillon already taken over by the Embassy. The transfer of the lease for the property at 4 Place de la Concorde from the American Red Cross to the commission has been arranged and is now awaiting signature. The rent of the property is now 75,000 francs a year, the lease to run for a period of 6 months after the date announced by the French Government as the official [date?] of the suspension of hostilities. Mr. Warren of the legal department of the commission has examined the terms and approves. There would, furthermore, be a charge of 40,000 francs representing less than 50 percent of the cost of the fixtures installed by the Red Cross which would thus be taken over by the commission and sold at the expiration of its occupancy. Tentative arrangements have also been made to take over four upper stories of adjoining building at 3 Rue Royale for 3 months beginning December 7th, when the lease of Red Cross expires at the rate of 2,000 francs a month. This lease may afterwards be extended. Mr. Warren has examined and approves.

I suggest that matter be handled in the same way as in the case of Hotel Crillon by direct authorization from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador to sign these leases.

EDWARD HOUSE

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The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1918—noon.
[Received 3:30 p.m.]

2. From Colonel House, December [4]. December 16th would be perfectly convenient so far as the British Government are concerned for the holding of the first meeting of the inter-Allied Conference. Balfour adds that Clemenceau expressed the view that December 16th might prove too early. Balfour suggests that it may be wise to allow a few days for informal discussions before the actual meeting of the Conference.

POLK
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

U. S. S. "George Washington," December 7, 1918—5 p. m.
[Received December 8—12:58 a. m.]

4. Your 2, December 5, 12 noon. For Colonel House. President suggests that arrangements for meeting of Inter-Allied Conference be postponed until preliminary informal discussions have shown just what would be best in all the circumstances.

Lansing
PRESIDENT WILSON'S TRIP TO EUROPE

Woodrow Wilson Papers

President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON [November 10, 1918 (?).]

12. With reference to the peace conference will it not be wise and necessary to postpone it until there are governments in Germany and Austria-Hungary which can enter into binding agreements? I feel obliged not to leave before delivering my annual message to the Congress on the second of December. I could leave immediately after that and hope that it will be possible to fix the date of meeting accordingly. Would a preliminary visit to England be wise if I could not visit Italy also beforehand? Nelson Page will tell you how busy the English propagandists are destroying our prestige and building up their own in Italy.

Referring to your number 66,1 our judgment corresponds with yours. Hoover is coming over immediately to discuss the matter and propose our method of handling it.

Referring to your number 51 two, the plan of secret codes is being worked out between the Departments of State and Navy.

Referring to your number eight,4 please express to the French Prime Minister my deep pleasure and great encouragement. He may rest assured that we will not take advantage of his generous promise unreasonably and I am sure that between us we can serve the world in the noblest way.

Do not think it would be wise to increase delegation to seven. That would involve similar increase in other delegations. Better to make another Republican selection.

[Woodrow Wilson]

033.1140/247 : Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 11, 1918—9 p. m.
[Received November 11—2:55 p. m.]

90. Secret for the President. I believe it is essential that you land in England. You could arrange to visit Italy later and during some

2 Not printed.
* Post, p. 344.
128
interim. I shall count on your sailing December 3d. This would enable you to land December 11th and remain in England the 12th and 13th reaching Paris night of 14th. The Peace Conference will probably be called for December 16th but there need be no active sessions for a week or 10 days. This time could be used for Inter-Allied conferences. Please let me know whether I can plan according to this schedule.

Edward House

033.1140/248: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 13, 1918—1 a.m.
[Received November 12—9:15 p.m.]

100. For the President. Lord Derby, British Ambassador, called today and presented me the following telegram from Mr. Balfour:

“If you think invitation would be acceptable will you please express to the President the sincere hope of His Majesty’s Government that should he decide to come to Europe in connection with negotiations for peace he will honor this country by landing here. I need hardly assure you of the warm welcome he will receive. Oxford University would, I know, be proud to offer him a degree. Cambridge has already done so, gladly violating in his honor its immemorial practice. I hope he [will] find time to visit both.”

Edward House

Woodrow Wilson Papers

President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)

[Washington, November 13, 1918.]

14. I hope that it is understood that my coming to the peace conference depends upon the prime ministers, the actual directing heads of the other governments, being also delegates. I assume also that I shall be selected to preside. I have decided that the selection of McCall 4 would be unwise and expect to appoint Justice Day 5 if he is well enough.

Referring to your number 100, 6 no letter received from Curzon about an Oxford degree has reached me. Of course I cannot decline the degree but it will be impossible for me to prepare an address which I would be willing to deliver on the Romanes foundation.

4 Samuel W. McCall, Governor of Massachusetts, 1916–18.
5 William R. Day, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
6 Supra.
Referring to your number 89, my position must of course be that the boundaries of Italy and the whole Adriatic settlement is to be decided by the peace conference in the general interest.

[Woodrow Wilson]

033.1140/249: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 13, 1918—11 a.m.
[Received November 13—7 a.m.]

101. For the President. The Allied Governments are waiting to know the approximate date of your arrival so that plans for the preliminary and final conferences can be made. I hope it will be possible to have your answer today.

Edward House

Woodrow Wilson Papers: Telegram

President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)

[WASHINGTON, November 13, 1918.]

I expect to sail December 3rd.

[Woodrow Wilson]

763.72119/9134: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 14, 1918—9 p.m.
[Received November 15—8:20 a.m.]

107. Secret for the President. If the Peace Congress assembles in France Clemenceau will be presiding officer. If a neutral country had been chosen you would have been asked to preside.

Americans here whose opinions are of value are practically unanimous in the belief that it would be unwise for you to sit in the Peace Conference. They fear that it would involve a loss of dignity and your commanding position.

Clemenceau has just told me that he hopes you will not sit in the Congress because no head of a state should sit there. The same feeling prevails in England. Cobb cables that Reading and Wiseman voice the same view. Everyone wants you to come over to take part

in the preliminary conferences. It is at these meetings that peace terms will be worked out and determined just as the informal conferences determined the German and Austrian armistices. It is of vital importance I think for you to come as soon as possible. For everything is being held in abeyance.

John Davis who is here gives as his offhand opinion that you need not be present the opening of Congress. However I am for your sailing December 3d but hoping you will consider it possible to come at an early date. Clemenceau believes that the preliminary discussion need not take more than 3 weeks. The peace conferences he believes may take as long as 4 months.

We will not know until we have a meeting to discuss the method of procedure just how many delegates each country may have but I am inclined to think that they will adopt my suggestion and appoint seven with only five sitting at one time. I believe it would be well to have seven delegates with two Republicans and one of those Root and the other McCall. This may avoid criticism and opposition. I doubt whether Justice Day would satisfy the Republicans any better than McCall and he would not be as useful. I believe it would be a mistake not to have labor represented.

If you do not deliver the valedictory lecture at Oxford I would suggest coming directly to France and going to Italy and England later. Pending your arrival we will take up the question of the method of procedure but Clemenceau promises me that no questions concerning peace terms will be brought up. He insists that you become the guest of the nation and in my opinion you cannot avoid this.

In announcing your departure I think it important that you should not state that you will sit in at the Peace Conference. That can be determined after you get here. There is reason enough for your coming because of the impossibility of keeping in touch and exercising a guiding hand at such a distance.

The French, English and Italian Prime Ministers will head their delegations.

House

763.72119/9133 : Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 15, 1918—7 p.m.
[Received November 15—4:33 p.m.]

108. For the President. I send for your information following telegram from Clemenceau to Lloyd George.

7 Elihu Root, Secretary of State, 1905–9.
"The coming of President Wilson naturally changes some of our plans in preparing for the Conference. It seems to me that we cannot begin the work before the President arrives. We ought to be unanimous in this respect. Besides, I think it is not a bad idea to let the German revolution settle down for a while in order that we may know before proceeding what we have before us. I would suggest to you that we draw up some preparatory memoranda, either in London or in Paris. I am ready to accept all your suggestions in this respect. If we should proceed thus, the President on arriving could make his observations without any delay and the task would find itself advanced. I expect to see Mr. Sonnino this afternoon. I do not doubt that he will assent. A particularly serious question is to know whether the President intends to take part in the Conference. I ought not to hide from you that in my opinion this seems to be neither desirable nor possible. Since he is chief of state he is consequently not on the same level as ourselves. To admit one chief of state without admitting all seems to me an impossibility."

Edward House

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033.1140/250: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 15, 1918—11 p.m.
[Received November 15—7:32 p.m.]

110. For the President. I have just received the following communication from Lord Derby:

"Copy of telegram from Mr. Balfour to Lord Derby of November 15th. Very urgent. Personal. Please convey following message from the King to Colonel House for transmission to the President of the United States. 'I am delighted to hear that you contemplate shortly coming to England on your way to France. It would give the Queen and myself the greatest pleasure if you and Mrs. Wilson will be our guests at Buckingham Palace during your stay in London.'"

Edward House

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Woodrow Wilson Papers

Senator Key Pittman* to President Wilson

[Washington,] November 15, 1918.

My Dear Mr. President: On yesterday you honored Senator Gerry* and myself by seeking our opinion with regard to the general impression of the necessity of your attending the Peace Conference.

* United States Senator from Nevada.
* Peter G. Gerry, United States Senator from Rhode Island.
I then unhesitatingly replied that I believed that the necessity was recognized by a large majority of the members of the Senate. I now discover that there is a grave diversity of opinion with regard to the effect that such action on your part might have and it has occurred to me that you would possibly be interested in a frank recital of these various expressions.

Last night I had the pleasure of assembling at a dinner with about thirty of your closest and strongest political supporters. The assembly involuntarily and spontaneously resolved itself into an unofficial and temporary committee upon the welfare of yourself and the Democratic party. It might seem presumptuous that any Democrat should take the liberty of even suggesting the effect of the future conduct of one who has always been intuitively right and whose success has not only been beyond that of his party but supreme throughout the world. The debate and the suggestions, Mr. President, came from no presumption, but from the love that each man there has for you and the hopes that are wrapped up in your career. The following are some of the points urged most strongly by those who believe that it would be a mistake for you to attend the Peace Conference, namely:

1. That you are now held in a sacred reverence by all the people of Europe and are looked upon as a superman residing afar off in a citadel of power beyond that of all nations, and that your association at the peace table with well-understood statesmen, who are but frail men long subject to criticism and even suspicion by certain classes of peoples, would lower your dignity, mar your prestige, and encourage resistance to any ultimatum that you might find it necessary to submit to the Peace Conference.

2. That you would be involved by the numerous petty questions and details and that your position with regard to the great principles that you maintain would be obscured.

3. That in these debates and decisions upon lesser questions you would lose the moral support of peoples that you may now confidently look to in your effort to establish the great principles of international justice.

4. That our own country itself is now in the immediate and gravest period of reconstruction, and that without your guiding hand upon the rudder at all times our government may be shipwrecked.

5. That congress is in session; that your advice and your executive action may be required at any minute.

Those who believe that it will be necessary for you to attend the Peace Conference expressed these views:

1. That the adoption and establishment of your program is essential to the liberty, the peace, and the happiness of the world, and that such accomplishment is of more importance than the temporary glory of any man or group of men.

2. That there are certain facts bearing upon the diplomacy of the greater nations that may be only told verbally, and that you alone have
the power to speak them with sufficient verity to give them the fullest force.

3. That it would be unnecessary for you to wear away the strength of your armor and of your sword upon lesser questions and in minor debates; that these simpler but more tedious questions and other preliminaries could be disposed of by the Peace Conference before the great questions which will start the contest of great nations come before the Peace Conference. And that even then you need not attend the conference until it has reached such a stage of open and hopeless rupture that your dominating presence, personality and power are required to force the cessation of debate and the adoption of the only program that this country will ever stand for.

4. That it is unnecessary at this time to either declare that you will or will not attend the conference, as nothing but events can determine the necessity of the case.

5. That if the adoption of your program should ultimately require your presence at the peace table then all other considerations, both personal and political, should be cast aside.

You know, of course, that the latter expressions were mine as well as the expressions of a number of other supporters of yours who attended the dinner. I must say, however, that I have the very highest regard for the opinions of those who expressed contrary views. I have again this morning, when visiting several of the Departments, listened to similar arguments both pro and contra. Should you desire at any time to speak to any of these gentlemen with regard to the matter, I will, of course, feel at perfect liberty to submit to you their names.

Personally, I hope that if you do go to the Peace Conference you will not come back until your program is adopted. Then I know that you will come back with the recognition that you have won and are entitled to, a recognition that will not only reflect glory upon you but upon your party which hangs and depends upon you.

Very sincerely yours,

KEY PITTMAN

Woodrow Wilson Papers

President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)

[WASHINGTON, November 16, 1918.]

15. Your 107* upsets every plan we had made. I infer that French and English leaders desire to exclude me from the Conference for fear I might there lead the weaker nations against them. If I were to come to the seat of the Conference and remain outside I would be merely the centre of a sort of sublimated lobby. All weak parties

*ante, p. 180.
would resort to me and there would be exactly the same jealousy that
was excited by the Germans addressing themselves exclusively to me.
I play the same part in our government that the prime ministers play
in theirs. The fact that I am head of the state is of no practical con-
sequence. No point of dignity must prevent our obtaining the results
we have set our hearts upon and must have. It is universally expected
and generally desired here that I should attend the conference, but I
believe that no one would wish me to sit by and try to steer from the
outside. I am thrown into complete confusion by the change of pro-
gramme. The programme proposed for me by Clemenceau, George,
Reading, and the rest seems to me a way of pocketing me. I hope
you will be very shy of their advice and give me your own independent
judgment after reconsideration.

[WOODROW WILSON]

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson

PARIS, November 16, 1918.

15. In reply to your number 15\footnote{Supra.} my judgment is that you should
sail for France December 3d and determine upon your arrival what
share it is wise for you to take in the proceedings. As Commander in
Chief of the armed forces you have ample grounds for coming in
order to solve the important questions connected with their return
home. This can only be done here intelligently.

When here you will be in a position to assess the situation properly.
It is impossible to do so from Washington through cables from me.

As far as I can see all the Powers are trying to work with us rather
than with one another. Their disagreements are sharp and constant.

There is a tendency to delay not only the preliminary conferences
but the final one. This I think is unfortunate. The sooner you an-
nounce your purpose of sailing December 3d the better. Until then
no plans can be made.

EDWARD HOUSE

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson

PARIS, November 16, 1918.

16. To be more explicit as to my own opinion as to the advisability
of your sitting in the Peace Conference let me say that I have con-
stantly contended that you should do so, but Sharp is practically the only one who has agreed with me. I see no need of reaching a decision until you arrive.

I notice in the memorandum which the French Foreign Office gave me yesterday concerning procedure and which I cabled to the Secretary of State 12 that they recommend only three delegates for each country. This is misleading for nothing has yet been determined and I think George and Clemenceau have different views.

Edward House

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1918—6 p. m.

48. Your Number 110, November 15, 11 p. m. The President directs the following reply:

"The kind invitation from Your Majesty and the Queen, which Mr. House has transmitted, has given Mrs. Wilson and me the greatest gratification. If we were coming at once to England, we would accept it with pleasure. It now seems to be my duty, however, to go directly to France and there await the developments of the great business in hand, before making any personal plans. We hope that we shall later be able to cross the channel and have an opportunity to thank you and the Queen in person for your generous courtesy."

Lansing

President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON [undated.]

16. I am issuing the following announcement:

["The President expects to sail for France immediately after the opening of the regular session of the Congress, for the purpose of taking part in the discussion and settlement of the main features of the treaty of peace. It is not likely that it will be possible for him to remain throughout the sessions of the formal peace conference, but his presence at the outset is necessary in order to obviate the manifest disadvantages of discussion by cable in determining the greater outlines of the final treaty, about which he must necessarily be consulted. He will, of course, be accompanied by delegates who will sit as the representatives of the United States throughout the conference. The names of the delegates will be presently announced."

22 Telegram No. 109, Nov. 15, 1918, midnight, p. 344.
It would not be wise for me to come as if on another errand. There is only one errand our people would approve. If the French prime minister is uneasy about the presidency of the conference I will be glad to propose that he preside. I urge that the larger delegations be limited to five. Two other messages go to you through the State Department. I approve of your plan to employ experts on the assessment of damage done.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{[Wilson]}

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

\textit{The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson}

\textbf{PARIS, November 19, 1918.}

18. I am delighted to receive your number 16.\textsuperscript{14} I am confident that everything will now work out satisfactorily. You will probably be made Honorary President of the Congress and the French Prime Minister Acting President.

I am arranging with Pershing to have our army engineers make an approximate estimate of the damage done in Belgium and France.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Edward House}

\textbf{923.1140/6: Telegram}

\textit{The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State}

\textbf{ROME, November 19, 1918—2 p. m.}

[Received November 20—5 a. m.]

2380. The press states that the President and the Secretary of State are on their way to Paris. Learn also from members of Ministry here that they are informed from Paris that Mr. Wilson is coming to Europe. If he comes, he will be expected to visit Italy.

Both the King and Orlando have expressed great pleasure that he is coming and their belief that it be of great importance in enabling him to understand many problems.

His failure to visit Italy would have unfortunate and possibly serious effect upon our relations and would greatly increase existing tension between France and Italy.

Everyone here desirous of doing him all honor and all questions affecting official visits easily adjustable.

\textbf{Nelson Page}

\textsuperscript{19} See Colonel House's telegram No. 17, Nov. 17, 1918, to President Wilson, vol. ii, p. 575.
\textsuperscript{14} Supra.
\textsuperscript{15} For additional correspondence on this subject, see vol. ii, pp. 575 ff.
The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 21, 1918—7 p. m.
[Received November 21—4:42 p. m.]

185. Secret for the President. The French Government have advised me that His Highness, Prince Murat has placed his residence at the disposal of the French Government in order that they may offer it to President Wilson for his use during his stay in Paris. I shall visit this house as soon as possible and cable you fully respecting it. Please make no announcement respecting this matter until I advise you further.

EDWARD HOUSE

President Wilson to the Counselor of the Department of State (Polk)

WASHINGTON, 22 November, 1918.

My Dear Mr. Counselor: I find that our party for Europe will consist, besides myself, of: 18

Mrs. Wilson
Miss Edith Benham, her Secretary
Rear Admiral Cary T. Grayson
Mr. George Creel
Mr. Gilbert F. Close
Irving [Irwin] H. Hoover,

seven secret service men, namely:

Joseph E. Murphy
Edmund W. Starling
John Q. Slye
William A. Lanvoigt
John J. Fitzgerald
Walter G. Ferguson, and
John L. Sullivan;

Arthur Brooks, my personal attendant
Susie Booth, Mrs. Wilson’s maid

Will you not be kind enough to see that the proper arrangements are made for passports? I may have one or two names to add later, but I think not.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

Woodrow Wilson

18 The following list was transmitted to Colonel House in the Department’s telegram No. 63, Nov. 25, 1918, 4 p. m., to the Ambassador in France (file No. 033.1140/251a).
The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 23, 1918—4 p.m.  
[Received November 23—2:49 p.m.]

150. Secret for the President and Secretary of State. Referring further to our number 135. Auchincloss visited today the house placed at the President’s disposal by the French Government. This house is number 28 Rue de Monceau, a couple of blocks above the Boulevard Haussmann and in one of the highest parts of the city. The house, however, is not far from the street, in the center of spacious grounds, which are surrounded by a high wall. The interior of the house is beautifully furnished and is in first-class repair. On the ground floor there are the following rooms: A. Large dining room capable of seating 35 persons; B. large ballroom or salon; C, three medium-sized drawing rooms. On the second floor there are the following rooms: A, small suite of two rooms; B, small study or library; C, large study or writing-room, which could be used as the President’s workroom; D, bedroom and drawing room and bath which could be used by the President; E, connecting suite of three rooms, bedroom, boudoir and sitting room which could be used by Mrs. Wilson; F, medium-size breakfast or dining room. On the third floor there are seven bedrooms and four sitting rooms, all of which are attractively furnished. There is a private garage on the grounds. I am taking steps to have proper telephonic and wire connections installed in a manner, as near as possible, similar to that at present existing in the White House. All in all I believe the house placed at the President’s disposal by the French Government is as attractive a residence as there is in Paris, and I have informally advised the Foreign Office that I felt sure the President would be altogether pleased with the arrangements made in his behalf. If there are any particular points that you wish me to attend to with respect to these accommodations, I trust that you will communicate them to me in the near future. The Foreign Office have asked me not to make public the arrangements they are making for the present.

Edward House

"ANTE, p. 138."
The Acting Chief of the Bureau of Citizenship, Department of State (Flournoy), to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State (Crane)

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1918.

DEAR MR. CRANE: Yesterday Mr. Hoover,¹ at the White House, called me up on the telephone in regard to passports for persons connected with the President's party, who are going to France with him. He enquired about obtaining a passport for the President. I told him that I did not think that it would be necessary for the President and Mrs. Wilson to carry passports. However, he seemed to think that they would wish to have them. I told him then to put it up to the President. The President said that he and Mrs. Wilson wanted to take passports, and upon Mr. Hoover's request I went to the White House this morning and took their applications. I told Mr. Hoover that I did not think it necessary for the President to make the usual application, but he said that the President wished to go through the usual routine. As soon as the photographs are obtained, I shall have the passport made out and send it to the Secretary for signature.

Please let me know whether the Secretary wishes me to come over and take the passport applications of himself and Mrs. Lansing.

R. W. F[LOURNOY]

033.1140/258: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 24, 1918—2 p. m.
[Received November 24—10: 06 a. m.]

161. Secret for the President. In your announcement quoted in your telegram number 16 ¹ you state, "The President will sail for France." I understand this to mean that you will go direct from the United States to France and not pass through England. Please confirm this.

EDWARD HOUSE

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1918.

17. Referring to my despatch 16 I shall sail directly for France as you advised.

WILSON

¹ Irwin H. Hoover, head usher at the White House.
² Ante, p. 136.
AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

033.1140/254: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 26, 1918—4 p.m.
[Received November 26—1:34 p.m.]

181. Your number 63, November 24 [25], 4 p.m.20 Please advise me of the names of the persons, other than the President and Mrs. Wilson, whom the President wishes to have stay in Prince Murat’s house. It will be perfectly practical to have the President’s valet and Mrs. Wilson’s maid stay at the house if the President so wishes. Accommodations for those of the President’s personal party whom he does not wish to have stay in the same house with him will be reserved at the Hotel Crillon.

Edward House

Paris Peace Conf. 184.44/1

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

Washington, 26 November, 1918.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: In his Number 181,21 House asks what members of my party Mrs. Wilson and I will wish to have stay with us in Prince Murat’s house. I would be very much obliged if you would have a cable sent to him, answering his question as follows:

“The President and Mrs. Wilson would be glad to have, besides the President’s valet and Mrs. Wilson’s maid, the following persons stay in Prince Murat’s house with them: Miss Benham, Dr. Grayson, Mr. Close, and Mr. I. H. Hoover.”22

Cordially and faithfully yours,

Woodrow Wilson

033.1140/6: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)

Washington, November 26, 1918—1 p.m.

1864. Your 2380, November 19th. Strictly confidential, for your own information. President and Secretary of State are planning to

20 Not printed; see footnote 16, p. 138.

21 Supra.

22 Sent as telegram No. 88, Nov. 29, 1918, 1 p.m., to the Ambassador in France, for Colonel House (file No. 033.1140/255a). In a telegram of Dec. 11, 1918, the name of Charles Swem, the President’s stenographer, was added to this list (file No. Paris Peace Conf. 184.21/22b).
sail for France about December 4th. The President has made no arrangements for visiting Italy but may do so before his return to the United States.

LANSING

033.1140/255: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 27, 1918—11 a. m.
[Received November 27—9:53 a. m.]

184. Secret for the President. I have talked the matter over with Admiral Benson and I suggest that you take the southern route and land at Marseille. At this time of year the chances are very much in favor of your having far milder and more pleasant weather on the southern route than on the northern one. That was our experience last year. Benson tells me that it will only take 2 days longer and that if you sail on the 4th you would arrive at Marseille on the 14th. This would bring you to Paris in plenty of time for the Conference. Will not you please let me know what you decide [to] do.

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119/2802: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME, November 27, 1918—1 p. m.
[Received 8:33 p.m.]

2415. Department 1864.23 Please say to the President for me: “For heavens sake don’t come to Europe without visiting Italy before returning home.”

NELSON PAGE

033.1140/15: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

ROME, November 28, 1918—12 p. m.
[Received November 29—9:29 a.m.]

2423. Congressman Carlin of Virginia having been accorded private audience today by the Pope, states that the latter expressed

* Ante, p. 141.
most earnestly his hope that the President will visit Rome during his visit to Europe, declaring that should he come here he would receive most cordial welcome from himself and would be received by him formally or informally in accordance with whatever President's wishes might be. And further, that President would find no embarrassment there touching anything President might wish in visiting others or carrying out any program he might have.

This statement accords with what the head of the American Catholic College had already mentioned to me privately, to the effect that nothing like any conditions such as were proposed when Mr. Roosevelt came to Rome would be suggested now.

The foregoing, taken in connection with the declaration to me by Premier Orlando that the Italian Government will make no difficulties [apparent omission] the President's visiting the Pope, I understand to mean that the President will of course be absolutely free to do here as he would at home. Paris informed.

NELSON PAGE

033.1140/255b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1918—2 p. m.

89. From the President. Your 184, November 27, 11 a. m. After conference with Daniels 24 and the people of the Navy Department who know the areas of floating mines, etc., I am convinced that it would be wiser to keep to the original plan and land at Brest.

LANSING

033.1140/32a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1918—7 p. m.

6519. French Ambassador stated that French Government suggested President arrive at Brest 3:30 p. m. December 12th and arrive in Paris morning of the 13th. Owing to the fact the George Washington is a slow boat President suggested time of arrival at Brest should be 13th and arrival Paris 14th. In response to an invitation to lunch or dine with President of French Republic, the President accepted for lunch for 14th. Please inform House and General Harts.

POLK

24 Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy.
Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

FORWARDED FROM WASHINGTON, December 9, 1918—5 p. m.

19. For the President. According to present plans I understand that you will arrive in Paris at 10 a. m. on Saturday December 14. Upon your arrival you will be taken at once to your residence. At 12:30 a large formal lunch will be given in your honor at the Elysees Palace by the President. A committee of laboring men and socialists headed by Albert Thomas, Renaud, Geer, and Cabraine, wishes to present you with an address at 3:30 p. m. on Saturday the 14th and to hold a monster parade in your favor at that time. This is not definite but will probably take place. On Monday December 16, a formal reception will be tendered you and Mrs. Wilson by the city of Paris at the Hotel de Ville at 2:30 p. m. and I have accepted for you.

I have told Wiseman to tell Balfour and George that you will [reserve?] Tuesday December 17, Wednesday December 18, and possibly the 19th free for conferences with them and I expect that both Balfour and George will be in Paris on the 17th. December 19 and 20th the King of Italy, the Italian Prime Minister and Baron Sonnino will be in Paris. The French and Belgian Governments are most insistent that you should make a trip to the devastated regions of France and Belgium. Accordingly the French Government are making arrangements for you to take a trip beginning December 26 which will occupy approximately 3 days through northern France and Belgium. At the same time it is planned that you should visit our army. Your trip to Italy, which I believe is necessary, might be begun on December 29 or 30th in order that you may return to Paris by January 3 or 4th for the first formal conference of the Allies. Clemenceau has told me that the English elections, the French celebrations, and the official visits to Paris have made it absolutely impossible to begin these formal conferences before January 3 or 4th.

Will you please let me know if you wish me to take any particular action with reference to the foregoing.

EDWARD HOUSE

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

LYONS, December 9, 1918—10 p. m.

For the President. The following is a translation of an advance copy of the address of welcome which President Poincaré expects to
deliver at the luncheon which he will give in your honor on the 14th instant:

“Mr. President. Paris and France were impatiently expecting you. They were longing to welcome and hail you as the eminent democrat whose words and deeds are inspired by exalted thought, as the philosopher who delights in involving universal laws from private [?], as the prominent statesman, touching the highest political and moral truths have suggested formulas that bear the stamp of immortality.

They were also passionately yearning to convey, through your person, their thanks to the great republic whose chief you are, for the invaluable assistance it has spontaneously bestowed, during this war, on the defenders of right and liberty. Even before America had resolved to intervene in the contest she had shown to the wounded, to the widows, to the orphans of France, a beneficence and generosity, the memory of which shall never vanish from our hearts. The donations of your Red Cross, the innumerable contributions of your fellow citizens, the touching activities of American women have anticipated your military and naval action and evinced little by little which way your sympathies were leaning. And from the day when you threw yourselves into the midst of the battle [garbled groups].

A few months ago you cabled to me that the United States would send to invaded France ever increasing forces able to submerge the enemy under an overwhelming flow of new divisions. And, in fact, flowing more than a year a continuous tide of youth and energy has poured on to the shores of France. No sooner had they landed, than your gallant battalions fired by their chief, General Pershing, rushed into the fight with such manly contempt of danger, such smiling disregard of death, that our old experience of this terrific war often felt incited to counsel prudence.

They have come here with the enthusiasm of crusaders leaving for the Holy Land. They are now entitled to behold with elation of heart the common achievement and to deem their courage and faith a mighty help thereto.

Eager as they were to meet the enemy, they were yet unaware when they arrived of his monstrous crimes. To obtain a proper view of the German conduct of war, they had to witness the systematically burnt down cities, the flooded mines and the crumbling factories, the devastated orchards, of many shelled and fired cathedrals, the whole device of that savage war waged against national wealth, nature, beauty, which the imagination is unable to conceive at a distance from the men and things that have endured it and that still give evidence thereof. You will have the opportunity, Mr. President, to inspect with your own eyes the extent of that disaster. The French Government will also furnish you with authentic documents in which the German general staff develops with astounding cynicism its plan of plunder and industrial annihilation. Your noble conscience will return a verdict on its guilt.

Should it remain unpunished, could it be renewed, the most splendid victories would be useless. Mr. President, France has striven, has patiently toiled, during four long years she has bled at every pore, she has lost the best of her children, she mourns for her young sons. She aspires now even as you do to a peace of justice and safety.
She did not intend that such an aggression might be renewed, when she submitted to such sacrifices. Nor did you intend to allow uncondemned criminals to lift up their heads again and to prepare new murders when America, under your strong impulse, armed herself and crossed the ocean. Keeping a true remembrance of Lafayette and Rochambeau, she came to relieve France because France herself was true to her traditions. Our common ideal has conquered. Together we have stood for the vital principles of free societies, together we must now build such a peace as will not permit the deliberate and underhand reconstruction of organisms aiming at conquest and oppression. The peace must make amends for the general hardship and sorrows of yesterday; it must be a guarantee against the perils of tomorrow. The association which has been formed, in view of the war, between the United States and the Allies and which contains the germ of the permanent institution you have outlined with such eloquence, will, from this day find its decisions of profitable use in the concerted study of just decisions, in the mutual support we all need in order to make our rights prevail. Whatever precautions we may take for the future, no one, unfortunately, can assert that we shall forever spare to mankind the horrors of new wars. Five years ago, the progress of a science and the state of civilization ought to have led to hope that no government, however autocratic, would succeed in hurling nations in arms against Belgium and Servia. Without cherishing the illusion that posterity may forever be completely safe from such collective madness, we must introduce into the peace we are going to build all the conditions of justice and probabilities of duration that we can insert in it. To such a vast and magnificent task you have chosen, Mr. President, to come and to apply yourself hand in hand with France. France expresses its gratefulness to you. She knows America's friendship. She is aware of your rectitude and nobility of thought. With full confidence she is ready to work with you.

I raise my glass, Mr. President, in yours and Mrs. Wilson's honor. I drink to the prosperity of the republic of the United States, the great friend of yesterday and of the past, of tomorrow and of all times.

SHARP

Paris Peace Conf. 182/19a

The Secretary to President Wilson (Close) to the Secretary of State


Memorandum for the Secretary of State:

The President asks if you will be kind enough to have for [sic] following message sent in code to Mr. House in France:

"Referring to your No. 19, December 9th, the President asks me to say that while he greatly regrets the necessity for postponing the beginning of the formal business of conference until the third or fourth of January, he is of course willing to acquiesce in the programme as outlined, subject of course to such changes as may be mutually agreeable upon conference after his arrival. But he wishes
me to ask if it would not be possible, in some tactful way that would not give offence or be misunderstood, to avoid the demonstration of laboring men and socialists which you say is being planned for the afternoon of Saturday. The President fears embarrassment from any seeming identification with any single element, and recalls the criticisms already made by those interested in opposing his principles with regard to the source of the popular support which he is receiving.”

[For] The President
G. F. Close

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/14 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, December 10, 1918—7 p.m.

My December 9, 10 p.m. The Foreign Office desires to receive if possible an advance copy of President Wilson’s reply to President Poincaré’s address, also to know whether it will be delivered in French.

SHARP

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/155

The Secretary to President Wilson (Close) to the Secretary of State

11 December, 1918.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State:

Will you not be kind enough to have the following reply sent to this message from Ambassador Sharp:

“The President’s reply to President Poincaré will be in English and will be as follows:

“Mr. President: I am deeply indebted to you for your gracious greeting. It is very delightful to find myself in France and to feel the quick contact of sympathy and unaffected friendship between the representatives of the United States and the representatives of France. You have been very generous in what you were pleased to say about myself, but I feel that what I have said and what I have tried to do has been said and done only in an attempt to speak the thought of the people of the United States truly and to carry that thought out in action. From the first, the thought of the people of the United States turned toward something more than the mere winning of this war. It turned to the establishment of eternal principles of right and justice. It realized that merely to win the war was not enough; that it must be won in such a way and the questions raised by it settled in such a way as to insure the future peace of the world and lay the foundation for the freedom and happiness of its many peoples and nations.
“Never before has war worn so terrible a visage or exhibited more grossly the debasing influences of illicit ambitions. I am sure that I shall look upon the ruin wrought by the armies of the Central Empires with the same repulsion and deep indignation that they stir in the hearts of the men of France and of Belgium, and I appreciate as you do, Sir, the necessity of such action in the final settlement of the issues of the war as will not only rebuke such acts of terror and spoliation, but make men everywhere aware that they cannot be ventured upon without the certainty of just punishment.

“I know with what ardor and enthusiasm the soldiers and sailors of the United States have given the best that was in them to this war of redemption. They have expressed the true spirit of America. They believe their ideals to be acceptable to free peoples everywhere, and are rejoiced to have played the part they have played in giving reality to those ideals in cooperation with the armies of the Allies. We are proud of the part they have played, and we are happy that they should have been associated with such comrades in a common cause.

“It is with peculiar feelings, Mr. President, that I find myself in France joining with you in rejoicing over the victory that has been won. The ties that bind France and the United States are peculiarly close. I do not know in what other comradeship we could have fought with more zest or enthusiasm. It will daily be a matter of pleasure with me to be brought into consultation with the statesmen of France and her Allies in concerting the measures by which we may secure permanence for these happy relations of friendship and cooperation, and secure for the world at large such safety and freedom in its life as can be secured only by the constant association and cooperation of friends.

“I greet you, Sir, not only with deep personal respect, but as the representative of the great people of France, and beg to bring you the greetings of another great people to whom the fortunes of France are of profound and lasting interest.”

[For] The President
G. F. Close

Paris Peace Conf. 851.008/2: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, December 12, 1918—10 p. m. [?] [Received December 13—10 a.m.]

For the President. Mr. Renuder [Renaudel], at the head of a delegation representing the various groups of socialists and men of [five words missing], just left with me copy of an address which they wish to present to you at 3:30 Saturday afternoon. It is also planned to have at the same time a large parade of working men in your honor. Following is a verbatim copy of the salient points of the address which covers nearly five pages:
"The general labor confederation, strong with a million union members, the socialist party, which, at the beginning of the war, had in parliament one hundred members representing one million two hundred thousand citizens, have wished to prove to you that your hope of speaking to the masses, which had until then been silent, has not been vain. But how could they omit affirming to you that thousands and thousands of men, women and children in France, a silent mass, whose ancestors struggled so for the rights of citizens, are with you in your desire to fix the rights of nations and to realize the peace of the peoples. An immense task which will not be the work of a moment for which the statesman will only be able to sow the fruitful seeds at the peace conference, and then afterwards count on the good will of the peoples for the beneficent harvest. It is not mere chance that today brings the workers, the socialists and the democrats of France towards you. Thus, it follows, French labor believes the world must be ripe for democracy. It is with that object in view that you have laid down your fourteen articles of peace. The peoples now expect the rapid peace will record and define exactly the fourteen peace stipulations in order that the world’s reconstruction may at last seriously begin.”

Quotations are made in the speech from the resolutions of the London conferences of February, 1915, and February, 1918.

Complete copy of the speech will be handed you upon arrival at Brest.

Edward M. House Papers

Copy of Telegram From the British Ambassador in France (Derby) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour)

No. 1785

Paris, December 16, 1918.

President of the Council wishes me to communicate to you immediately following part of long and satisfactory conversation which he yesterday had with President Wilson.

Latter informed him that he was anxious to attend the Peace Conference. He added that if the Conference declared that they preferred that he should not attend, he would quite understand, but he nevertheless desired that his wishes in the matter should be known.

On the President of the Council pointing out that other Heads of States might wish to attend the Conference and that difficulties might arise in consequence, President stated that he would attend as Head of the U. S. Government and not in his capacity of President. He pointed out that the case of the U. S. of America was different from those of France and England, as in the latter countries nothing could be done by the Heads of States without the approval of the President of the Council and the Prime Minister respectively, whereas in the United States nothing could be done without reference to him.
would not dream of urging that he should preside at the Conference, as that was clearly the prerogative of Monsieur Clemenceau, but he strongly pressed that he should be permitted to be present.

The President of the Council asks me to let you know that although he was at first very strongly opposed to the idea he is now of the opinion that the President ought to be allowed to attend the Conference as a member and he himself intends to support his request. He feels sure that if it became known that the President had expressed a wish to be present and had been refused the effect would be very bad, at any rate in France. He would be grateful for your views and those of the Prime Minister with regard to the President’s proposal.

[File copy not signed]

Woodrow Wilson Papers

The Secretary to the President (Tumulty) to President Wilson

WASHINGTON [undated—circa December 18, 1918.]

Before finally declining invitation to visit Vatican, hope you will consider influence Pope can wield in favor of your ideals among free peoples of all countries in case an appeal to world necessary to sustain your principles. His influence of incalculable advantage. Misstep in this matter may be most hurtful. While there is political danger in visit, the larger aspects must be considered. The great issue which you are pushing forward in Europe and throughout the world will depend upon the popular sentiment behind you throughout Europe. The Vatican can help in this. We should use every instrument that can help you in this great hour. If you succeed—which is certain—visits to Vatican will be forgotten in realization of larger result.

TUMULTY

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/46b : Telegram

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)

PARIS, 21 December, 1918.

20. The President has just arranged the following respecting his trip to England. He will leave French Channel port between 9 and 10 a. m. on December 26th and will arrange to arrive in London at approximately 2 p. m. on the same day. The following will accom-
pany him: Mrs. Wilson, Admiral Grayson, Miss Benham (Mrs. Wilson's Secretary), Mr. Close and Mr. Swem, President's man servant and Mrs. Wilson's maid, nine secret service men and three newspaper men, viz., Associated Press, United Press and International News Representatives. While he is in England he will have as his Military Aide the Commanding General of the American Troops in London, just as General Harts, Commanding General of the American Troops in Paris, acts as his Aide during his stay in Paris. Mr. Young will be in the party as Disbursing Officer. It is possible that Colonel House may go to London with the President but this has not yet been definitely decided. The President expects to stay in England on 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th of December as the guest of the British Government. We understand that the arrangements for the entire party will be looked after by the British authorities. You would have been notified before this of the arrangements but they have been changed from hour to hour and it was only this morning that it was possible to ascertain definitely the President's wishes.

AMERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/69 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

ROME, December 29, 1918—4 p. m.
[Received December 30—8 a. m.]

42. Italians request me submit for President's approval following plan for visit: Leave Paris in the morning arrive Rome the next day spending 2½ days in Rome, 1 day in Naples, 1 day Florence and Bologna, 1 day Venice, 1 day Milan and Turin, thus making 8 days from departure Paris to return Paris. Government desires plan only what meets with approval of the President and any suggestions modifications of above plans will be very much appreciated by Government which is awaiting a reply, before making definite arrangements.

Date of leaving Paris left for President to set. Foreign Office informs me Italian Government will send train to Paris to fetch President and take him everywhere returning him Paris duty [duly?].

Very confidential. Government states that for political reasons if President goes to Naples he will also visit other places named.

Sudden smallpox epidemic reported very bad in Naples but Foreign Office says President will be guest at Royal Palace there and so will not be brought contact any danger.

NELSON PAGE
PARIS, December 29, 1918.

5. [From House.] The President will leave Paris on Wednesday evening, January 1st., arriving Rome Friday morning, stopping 2 hours at Turin en route. He will call at Vatican. He will also call upon the American Protestant denominations in Rome, and I suggest that they meet together at one place in order that the President may make a single visit instead of several. It would be advisable for him to leave Rome on Saturday night at such an hour as to bring him to Genoa at about nine where he would lay wreath at foot of Statue of Columbus. He would then proceed to Milan and after stopping there a couple of hours will leave, via Turin without stopping there again, for Paris, arriving on Monday morning. It is understood that the Italian government has already dispatched special train to Paris for the President’s party. Edward House.

AMERICAN MISSION

PARIS, December 30, 1918—7:40 p.m.

8. [From House.] Your 41. Following is list of persons who will accompany President to Rome:—President Wilson, Mrs. Wilson, Miss Benham, Admiral Grayson, General Harts, Messrs. George Creel, Arthur E. Frazier, Hoover, Close, Swem, Captains Garfield, Kimball, Knightingale, Lieutenants Jennings, Corcoran, five journalists, Foster, Rodgers, Nevin, Probert, Bender; four Secret Service men, eight War College photographers, two servants of President. This list is subject to correction. Edward House.

AMERICAN MISSION

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1919—7 p.m.

71. For the Secretary of State from Polk: Secretary of War informs me steamer George Washington sailed from New York January

*Not printed.*
1st and will arrive in Brest about 10th. The ship would have time to make a return trip to America with troops and be back in France about February 12th. Before the War Department makes any plans it of course desires to know the President’s pleasure. Will you please find out as soon as possible whether he will need the ship before February 12th, in which case the boat will be held in France to await his orders.

Polk

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/35 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Rome, January 7, 1919—8 p. m.
[Received January 9—10 : 30 a. m.]

58. I hear that propaganda is going on against the President in Paris and that a number of French propagandists are going prospectively to America to take part in a propaganda against him there. I have mentioned this report to my French Colleague and suggested that it be looked into. Some of the American Colony might be looked after.

Nelson Page

Paris Peace Conf. 865.00/15 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

[Extract]

Rome, January 11, 1919—6 p. m.
[Received January 12—9 : 30 p. m.]

65. Political: President Wilson’s brief but very successful visit to Italy has been the noted event of last two weeks. He arrived Rome Friday, Jan. 4th, and left next night for Milan, thence to Genoa and Turin, returning to France Sunday night. Everywhere he received enthusiastic reception from all classes, including the more or less troublesome labor classes of the North. At Milan Executive Committee of Regular Socialists had passed resolution calling on members to pay no homage to Wilson which had no effect, President being cordially received by Socialist Mayor Caldara and by organized Socialist Labor. Turin, he was met by large and notable labor representation. This would seem to discredit and make of little value attacks on President by Avanti, the radical Socialist organ, especially since all other papers of every political leaning united in editorial comment
very favorable to him. Naples was disappointed, and Florence disgruntled at not receiving visit, indeed in Florentine papers there appeared no editorial comment at all. But the visit was a great success and the President's speeches have been reprinted everywhere and have made a profound impression throughout Italy. Whatever others may say, the people of Italy have unbounded confidence in him. Visit to Pope caused no hostile criticisms, the country understanding that he visited the Pope only as religious head of American Catholics, and that it had no political significance. This visit was followed by one to the representatives of the Protestant bodies in Italy.

The state luncheon given at the American Embassy in his name to Their Majesties, the King and Queen, was attended by Their Majesties, and by the principal Ministers, members of the Court, the Ambassadors of the Allies, the Mayor of Rome, and other high officials. It was the first time that Their Majesties have ever accepted an invitation to an Embassy. The luncheon was considered a great success from the diplomatic, as well as the social point of view.

Nelson Page

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/84 : Telegram

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, January 11, 1919—7:20 p.m.

253. [From Lansing.] Your 71 January 2/7 p.m. President informs me that present schedule for George Washington is entirely satisfactory to him and that he hopes that if he returns on this vessel in February the War Department will ship as many troops on her as possible. Lansing.

American Mission
PERSONNEL OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

Edward M. House Papers

The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson

Dear Governor: From the German acceptance of your terms which we received yesterday, it looks as if the Peace Conference might be close upon us.

Germany seems so nearly in collapse that I cannot believe that it will be necessary for a peace conference to continue more than two and a half to three months. It looks as if the Allies might be able to lay down their own terms, and if Clemenceau will cooperate with us as closely as he did last year at the Inter-Allied Conference, it will greatly shorten the life of the congress. It merely needs a little organization and some understanding amongst the principals to have matters expedited in a way that is quite unusual at such gatherings.

I am enclosing you a list of people which I hope you will think well to have come over to advise when these several subjects come before the congress. It will strengthen the American position and facilitate the work of the commissioners to have such a staff, and it will leave the commissioners free to discuss fundamentals.

I do not give the personnel of the Peace Inquiry as that is almost wholly composed of experts on technical subjects.

I am writing this on shipboard so it may return with this boat.

Affectionately yours, [File copy not signed]


[Enclosure]

Proposed Staff of Advisers to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Army

General Bliss. General Pershing.

Navy

Admiral Benson and another.

Finance (Treasury Department)
Benjamin Strong, Leffingwell, Albert Strauss.
Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson

Paris, November 6, 1918.

7. When Lloyd George was here I spoke to him and Clemenceau about the number of delegates each country should have at the Peace Conference. Clemenceau remarked that half of France wanted to be

*It seems to me that it will be absolutely necessary to have a man of the dimensions of Cobb to interpret to the newspaper people the policies you stand for. It is a difficult and delicate task. The men I have suggested for Wire Communications should be under Cobb’s direction. Their work should be to interpret to the world, outside of America, what Cobb interprets to the newspaper fraternity at the Conference itself. Creel, I take it, you will want to continue at home in the same capacity as now for he will never be more needed than then. [Footnote in the original.]
present and Lloyd George replied that he was lucky for all England wished to attend. Lloyd George said he would be compelled to appoint among others a man from the Colonies and a labor representative. We agreed to postpone final discussion until they had time to think about it further.

I suggested that England, France, Italy and the United States should each have five places at the table, the other belligerent powers to have representation varying from one to three places according to their relative importance. This seemed to meet with their approval. I had in mind that Germany should also have five places.

It is essential that the sittings should contain only a limited number for we have found it difficult to transact business satisfactorily at Versailles, and it was necessary for the Prime Ministers to meet in advance in order that business might be facilitated.

The smaller countries like Belgium, Serbia and Greece have been quite contented to have one place each at the Versailles sittings.

I would appreciate an expression of your opinion.

Edward House

Woodrow Wilson Papers

President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)

[Washington, circa November 7, 1918.]

10. Referring to your number 7. I concur in your views with regard to representation at the Peace Conference.

[Woodrow Wilson]

763.72119 P 43/284b: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington, November 9, 1918.

For House from Polk. Department seriously concerned over revolutionary committees in Switzerland. Fear it would be difficult to adequately protect lives of peace delegates as we could not take in our own armed force.

McCall came out for President election day and he is being held responsible for the defeat of Weeks in Massachusetts. Republicans bitter, particularly those from Massachusetts. Under circumstances permit me to call your attention to this fact as it might change your views. Feel strongly this situation to be serious, particularly as next

1 Supra.
2 Samuel W. McCall, Governor of Massachusetts, 1916-18.
Senate will be Republican. Don’t you think a western representative such as Borah might be desirable.

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson

PARIS, November 10, 1918.

10. In view of the Republican resentment of Governor McCall’s attitude in the recent elections and in anticipation of a hostile Senate, would it not be well to increase the membership of the delegates to seven and include another Republican of the standing and influence of Root?  

In the event that for any reason you think it best not to name any member of the Cabinet other than Lansing, may I suggest Sharp as a desirable delegate.

Edward House

123 G 861/75a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1918—noon.

33. For Grew. After consultation with the President you are selected to act as Secretary of the United States Commission to the Peace Conference. Your assistant secretaries will be Harrison and Patchin. Cable at once any suggestions which you may have as to needs.

Lansing

763.72119 P 43/916: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 15, 1918—1 p.m.
[Received November 15—10:31 a.m.]

106. Your 34 [33], November 14 [13]. From Grew. Wish to express my extreme gratification at selection as secretary of United States Commission to Peace Conference and am particularly happy to have Harrison and Patchin associated. Arrangements for the representatives are progressing and will take shape as plans of our Commission develop. For the present I foresee no needs which cannot

*Elihu Root, Secretary of State, 1905–9.
be met here except insofar as Colonel House has made recommendations from time to time, particularly the request Department his 102 regarding stationery. It seems essential that the problems presented in telegrams 52 and 100 [99f] concerning communication with Washington, political intelligence, etc., should be dealt with in perfect accord and I earnestly hope that the recommendations made therein may be approved as delay in setting the machinery in motion may seriously affect the eventual smooth running of the American organization.

Would be glad to have Bullitt come as soon as possible and Dresel when available.

Edward House

Woodrow Wilson Papers

Associate Justice Day, of the Supreme Court, to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1918.

My Dear Mr. President: I am deeply appreciative of the honor which you have conferred upon me in the offer of a place upon the Peace Commission.

I wish it were practicable for me to accept this opportunity for service. I am, however reluctantly, constrained to forego this privilege.

Wishing you continued success in the great work before you, I am, with high regard,

Sincerely yours,

William R. Day

Woodrow Wilson Papers

President Wilson to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)

[WASHINGTON,] 16 November, 1918.

My Dear Daniels: I am sure you know my own cordial personal feeling towards Mr. Bryan, but I would not dare, as public opinion stands at the present moment, excited and superheated and suspicious, appoint Mr. Bryan one of the Peace Commissioners, because it would be unjustly but certainly taken for granted that he would be too easy and that he would pursue some Eutopian scheme.

As I have said, this would be unjust, but I am sure you agree with me that it would be thought, and the establishment of confidence from
the outset in the processes of the Peace Conference on the part of our people, now too much in love with force and retribution, is of the utmost importance.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

[Woodrow Wilson]

763.72119 P 43/910: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 18, 1918—8 p. m.
[Received November 18—7:40 p.m.]

119. Secret for the President. I believe it is very important that we should do everything possible to establish closer relations with liberal elements here in Paris. Ray Stannard Baker has been doing work of this character but has now gone to Italy to keep in touch with liberal elements there. I suggest that Miss Ida Tarbell, who has a profound knowledge of French character and institutions and who has written a life [of] Madam Roland which is exceedingly well thought of by French scholars, be sent at once to Paris to keep in close relations with the liberal elements here and to report on their activities. Miss Tarbell is persona grata with the liberal elements here. 7

Edward House

763.72119/9123: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 20, 1918—2 p.m.
[Received November 20—1:38 p.m.]

126. Secret for the President and Secretary of State. Various circumstances are delaying an agreement respecting important points connected with the constitution of the Peace Conference and the procedure to be followed therein. George and the other members of the English Government are engrossed in the pending elections and will in all probability be unwilling until the elections are over to decide definitely how many delegates they will wish to nominate, and who these delegates will be. If George is defeated of course considerable confusion respecting this matter will result. If George wins he will make probably some radical changes in his Cabinet which may affect the make-up of the English delegation at the Peace Conference.

7 For President Wilson's reply to this telegram, see the Department's telegram No. 50 for Colonel House, Nov. 19, 1918, 4 p.m., vol. II, p. 301.
France, Clemenceau may try to limit the representative[s] to three. He would then head the French delegation and would have with him Pichon and possibly Foch, over both of whom he exercises almost complete control. If it is decided that there shall be more than three delegates Clemenceau would probably have to appoint some man like Briand \(^8\) who would act independently and would have a strong following. In Italy the situation, so far as I am informed concerning it, has not taken any very definite shape. Orlando will of course head the delegation.

In view of the uncertainty in connection with this matter, I suggest that no announcement be made concerning our delegation until England, France and Italy are committed to a definite number of delegates. The French are urging that the French language be used as the official language of the Conference. Since the French are to be given the place of meeting and the presidency of the Conference, it would seem as if they should meet the convenience of England and ourselves with respect to the language to be used. At the conferences before the Armistice was signed Orlando and Pichon were the only ones that could not understand English. In addition to ourselves and the English, Clemenceau, Sonnino, the Belgian representative, the Servian representative, the Greek representative and the Japanese representative are all able to understand English. I shall take up this question with the English in order to see how they feel.

**Edward House**

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703,72119 P 43/022: Telegram

_The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State_

_Paris, November 20, 1918—6 p. m._

[Received November 20—3 p. m.]

127. Secret for Polk only, from Auchincloss. Thank you for your number 47, November 8 [18], 9 p. m.\(^9\) and your number 48, November 8 [18], 10 p. m.\(^10\) You may rest assured that in any matters that I have anything to do with Army and Navy will be subordinate to State Department. We are working under serious handicaps inasmuch as Grew is still sick, Ambassador is in bed with what looks like influenza; Straight,\(^11\) whom we had assigned to us, has very bad case of influenza; Cobb is in London, and Lippmann is sick, and several others who have been assigned to us here are also sick. Miller ar-

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\(^8\) Aristide Briand, French President of the Council, Oct. 29, 1915–Mar. 20, 1917.
\(^9\) *Post*, p. 138.
\(^10\) Not printed.
\(^11\) Maj. Willard Straight, assigned to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.
rived yesterday after a trip of 15 days. I will try to get an answer to your telegram number 44, November 18, 7 p. m. 12 and would have, but on account of the fact that Vatican are occupied with their elections, and there is no Italian representative here, it is difficult get final decision on points of this character. Please thank Shaw, Barton and Duncan 28 very much for all they are doing. Please do not let my wife come to Europe unless she is confident that she is physically strong enough to stand the trip.

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119 P 43/923 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1918—7 p. m.

54. For Auchincloss from Polk. Your 118, November 18. 14 Department would like you to go ahead on the plan outlined in your 99 with the modifications made by our Number 36. 15 Suggested that Strauss 16 or Kent 17 be taken over as financial adviser . . . President said he would telegraph for some one when he was needed. This seems to be the plan they are following in regard to representatives of the various boards. President and commissioners plan to sail about December 3d. Commission has not yet been determined. Strictly confidentially, President taking with him Cary Grayson 18 and Creel, not Tumulty. 29

LANSING

Woodrow Wilson Papers

Mr. Henry White to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Pray accept the expression of my thanks for the honor you have been pleased to confer upon me.

I sincerely appreciate the confidence in me evinced by your appointing me a member of the Delegation which is to accompany you from this country to the approaching Peace Conference in Europe. I trust that my experience of such international gatherings,

28 Not printed.
29 G. Howland Shaw, Carlyle Barton, and J. Donald Duncan, of the office of the Counselor for the Department of State.
30 Post. p. 197.
31 No. 99 is printed on p. 194; No. 36, on p. 196.
32 Albert Strauss, Vice Governor of the Federal Reserve Board.
33 William Kent, member of the United States Tariff Commission.
34 Rear Admiral Cary T. Grayson, physician to the President.
35 Joseph P. Tumulty, secretary to the President.
which is considerable, and my personal friendship with many of
those who are to represent other countries, may be of service to you
and the members of our delegation, with a view to the attainment of
a just and permanent Peace, based in so far as may be possible, upon
the fourteen points set forth as the basis of such a Peace, in your
address to the nation and to the world of the 8th of January last.\textsuperscript{20}

I am [etc.] \hfill \textit{Henry White}

\textit{Woodrow Wilson Papers}

\textit{President Wilson to Senator Henry L. Myers} \textsuperscript{21}

\textit{[Washington,] 20 November, 1918.}

\textbf{My Dear Senator:} I think I need not tell you my own cordial
feeling towards Mr. Bryan. I should have entire confidence in his
principles and in his influence at the conference, but I feel that it
is our duty to keep in mind, particularly at this time when all the
world is a bit abnormal in its acute sensibilities, the reactions of
the public mind of the several countries concerned. Mr. Bryan is
soft-hearted, and the world just now is very hard-hearted. It would
render a very large and influential body of our public opinion very
uneasy if they thought that peace was to be approached in the
spirit which they would attribute to Mr. Bryan. I think it highly
important to hold opinion steady and calm, and for that reason I
do not think that it would be wise to include Mr. Bryan among the
commissioners, much as it would personally gratify me to do so.

Cordially and sincerely yours, \hfill \textit{[Woodrow Wilson]}

\textit{Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/9}

\textit{The Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces
(Pershing) to the Special Representative (House)}

\textbf{General Headquarters [A. E. F.], 21 November, 1918.}

\textbf{Inter-Allied Committees}

1. Major Willard Straight, of your Staff, recently made a request
on the First Section of the General Staff for the following infor-
mation:

\begin{itemize}
  \item [(a)] List of all Inter-Allied Committees upon which we have
      representatives.
  \item [(b)] Names of our representatives.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{21} Replying to a letter of Nov. 18, 1918 (not printed), from Senator Myers
of Montana suggesting that William J. Bryan be named to the Commission
to Negotiate Peace.
(c) Reference to General Orders creating or relating to these committees.

2. Inclosed herewith is a statement in duplicate giving the data requested by Major Straight. This was compiled from information received from the five Staff Sections at these Headquarters and from the heads of the Administrative and Technical Services and is believed to be complete.

For the Commander-in-Chief:
[File copy not signed]
Chief of Staff

[Enclosure]

Statement of Inter-Allied Committees and A. E. F. Members

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The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1918—5 p. m.

59. Secret. For Colonel House from the President. It seems to me that we are justified in insisting on five delegates. It would be extremely embarrassing to us to have fewer than five. I do not understand that any government can be arbitrarily limited, except by agreement. I think also with you that we are entirely justified in insisting upon the English language being officially sanctioned and used at the conference as well as French. The limitation to French would greatly embarrass us, if only in the matter of constant translation, for which we haven’t a suitable confidential force. You will remember that English is the diplomatic language of the Pacific. I would be very much obliged if you would cable whether it would be necessary or wise for us to bring any domestic servants with us. We are exceedingly distressed by the news of your illness and beg that you will take extra good care of yourself. We all unite in affectionate messages.

Polk

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 22, 1918—6 p. m.
[Received November 22—4:46 p. m.]

142. Harrison from Grew. Your 6337 of [to] Paris Embassy, November 19, 5 p. m.22 reached me November 21, 7 p. m. Warmly reciprocate your congratulations. I assume our Secretariat should be in full running order when Commission reaches Paris, so shall proceed with provisional organization subject to any changes which you may wish to introduce on your arrival. Shall draw on Pershing for personnel as office accommodations become ready and men needed. Several offices will be fully equipped on Monday and others will follow steadily. Please let me know whether you and Patchin are sailing in advance of Commission and when.

Regarding political intelligence, see telegram of [No.] 132, November 21, 6 p. m.23

22 Not printed.
23 Post, p. 199.
Regarding counter espionage, Van Deman has not yet received instructions, but I assume they have already been sent from Washington.

Edward House

Woodrow Wilson Papers.

President Wilson to the Secretary of the American Federation of Labor (Morrison)

[WASHINGTON], 22 November, 1918.

My dear Mr. Morrison: I have received a great many messages besides your own very interesting and persuasive message with regard to appointing a representative of labor on the Peace Commission, and have of course given the matter the most serious consideration.

I have at the same time received equally strong appeals to appoint a representative of the agricultural interests of the country, a representative of the socialistic bodies of the country, a representative of the women of the country, and many other similar suggestions. I am not putting all of these upon a par. I am merely illustrating the fact that many special bodies and interests of our complex nation have felt, and felt very naturally, a desire to have special spokesmen among the peace delegates.

I must say, however, that my own feeling is that the peace delegates should represent no portion of our people in particular, but the country as a whole, and that it was unwise to make any selection on the ground that the man selected represented a particular group or interest, for after all each interest is, or should be, related to the whole, and no proper representative of the country could fail to have in mind the great and all-pervasive interest of labor or of any other great body of humanity.

The number of delegates will be small, and I have thought that therefore special representation was out of the question.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

Woodrow Wilson

*Col. Ralph Henry Van Deman, assistant to the Chief of Military Intelligence.*
The Secretary of the Treasury (McAdoo) to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Here is a letter from your very devoted admirer, Hon. William McAdoo, of New York. I pass it along to you for what it may be worth. Unless your mind is already made up, it seems to me that on the whole Mr. Root is well worth considering. I know the disadvantages, but, on the other hand, the personnel of the commission as a whole might outweigh these disadvantages.

Affectionately yours,

W. G. McAdoo

The Secretary of War (Baker) to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am inexpressibly grieved at the resignation of Mr. McAdoo, though I can readily understand that the terrible burdens of his work have made it necessary for him to have more rest than it would be impossible [sic] for him to get here in Washington continuing at the pace he has gone for the past two or three years.

It seems to me that Mac’s resignation changes essentially the possibility of my going abroad as a member of the peace commission. Of course, with you in Europe neither I nor anybody else is necessary to the presentation of America’s case, but here at home, particularly during your absence, I can perhaps be helpful in conference with the remaining members of the Cabinet. The next two or three months are likely to present situations of uncertainty of opinion and hesitancy on the part of business and labor in process of readjustment, and while no fresh legislative policy perhaps needs to be worked out, I am persuaded that the country would feel more concerned about your own absence if two members of the Cabinet were with you now that the Secretary of the Treasury’s post will have to be filled by a man new to those responsibilities.

I trust you will understand the spirit of this suggestion, but I am really deeply concerned not only to have your own stay in Europe made as free from anxiety as possible but to have the situation here kept on the even balance and public feeling and opinion kept in sympathy with both the things you are doing abroad and the policies of the economic and political readjustment here which you desire to have our peace-time establishment take.

*Letter of Nov. 21, 1918 (not printed), suggesting the appointment of Elihu Root to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.*
May I suggest for your consideration the possibility of making General Bliss a peace commissioner? And then after the conferences have gone so far that you feel you are able to return here, and leave the details to be reduced to writing for signature, if you then thought it wise I could be sent over to join the commissioners at the windup.

Respectfully yours,  

NEWTON D. BAKER

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The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 23, 1918—5 p.m.
[Received November 23—1:11 p.m.]

152. Secret for the President. Among the important questions which will arise not only at the Peace Conference but probably also at the preliminary Inter-Allied conferences will be those pertaining particularly to finance, commerce and the use of our raw material and food. The whole world is vitally interested in what manner we propose to use our great strength in finance and in raw material. England, France and Italy participants [display?] perhaps more interest in these questions than in almost any others. I suggest the advisability of your taking steps to secure a small body of advisers on these subjects either to come with you or to be ready to come over on short notice.

EDWARD HOUSE

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The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 24, 1918—noon.
[Received November 24—9:20 a.m.]

159. Secret for the President. Your number 59, November 22, 5 p.m. It will be unnecessary for you to bring any domestic servants with you except your valet and Mrs. Wilson’s maid.

I shall take up the matter of the use of English at the conference with the British and hope to secure their support. I am working to secure a definite agreement from the British and French that England, France, Italy and the United States should each have five places at the table, [in line with my] suggestion contained in my number 7 and accepted by you in your number 10.27

Thank you so much for your message of sympathy. I am still in bed and very weak but making satisfactory progress.

EDWARD HOUSE

27 No. 7 is printed on p. 156; No. 10, on p. 157.
The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 24, 1918—7 p. m.
[Received 11:51 p. m.]

164. I have just received a communication from Lord Derby stating that he has received telegram from Mr. Balfour saying that he does not think we shall be able to persuade the French to consent to English being recognized as the official language at the Conference. Mr. Balfour however sees no objection to the matter being discussed unofficially with Mr. Clemenceau. I am taking this matter up further through Wiseman who is now in Paris and hope to be able to persuade the British Government to take a more positive position.

Edward House

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 25, 1918—8 p. m.
[Received November 25—6:23 p. m.]

172. Secret for the President. My number 126, your number 59 and my number 159.26 I have received no definite assurances respecting number of delegates, but I now feel satisfied from informal expression which I have received from both French and British authorities that there will be no objection to the number being fixed. Accordingly, I modify my suggestion contained in my number 126 that no announcement be made concerning our delegation until arbitrators are committed to a definite number. I now see no reason why you should not make whatever announcement you have in mind respecting our delegates.

Edward House

Woodrow Wilson Papers

President Wilson to the Secretary of the Treasury (McAdoo)

[WASHINGTON,] 25 November, 1918.

My Dear Mac: Of course I realize the force of the recommendation which Mr. William McAdoo urges,29 but I could not think of appointing Mr. Root, because I have had more opportunities than he has had

29 See Secretary McAdoo's letter of Nov. 23, 1918, p. 160.
of knowing just how hopeless a reactionary he is. I think his appointment would discourage every liberal element in the world.

In haste,

Affectionately yours,

[Woodrow Wilson]

763.72119 P 43/917 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918—7 p.m.

75. Your 116 November 18, noon.* For Grew. Following list of members of Commission excluding President's party:

Robert Lansing, Henry White, Commissioners Plenipotentiary.

Leland Harrison, Assistant Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; J. K. Huddle, confidential clerk to Assistant Secretary; Sydney Y. Smith, drafting expert; H. E. Fenstermacher, S. Y. Skinner, recording and filing clerks;

Philip H. Patchin, Assistant Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; R. B. Macatee, confidential clerk to Assistant Secretary; C. B. Welsh, H. C. Coney, L. W. Ronimus, L. E. Mundy, H. Goldstein, clerks;

William McNeir, Disbursing Officer of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; George H. Harris, Assistant Disbursing Officer.

Major James Brown Scott, Technical Adviser; George A. Finch, Professor Amos S. Hershey, Henry G. Crocker, Assistants to Technical Adviser; George D. Gregory, Confidential Secretary to Major Scott.


Librarian, J. T. Shotwell; D. P. Frary, P. W. Slosson, Assistant Librarians.

Commissioner White's manservant.

Following ladies accompanying party: Mrs. Lansing, Mrs. Grew, Mrs. Miller, Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Mezes.

LANSING

* Not printed.
Woodrow Wilson Papers

The Secretary of Labor (Wilson) to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918.

My dear Mr. President: I am inclosing herewith letter 31 just received from Mr. Frank P. Walsh, 32 urging the naming of Mr. Gompers as a member of the Peace Commission.

Because of the high esteem in which Mr. Walsh is held by the wage-workers of the country and his close contact with their general sentiment, I feel that you ought to have the benefit of his judgment before arriving at your conclusions.

Faithfully yours,

W. B. Wilson

Woodrow Wilson Papers

President Wilson to the Secretary of Labor (Wilson)

[WASHINGTON,] 27 November, 1918.

My dear Mr. Secretary: Thank you for sending me Walsh's letter about Mr. Gompers. Mr. Gompers needs no commendation, so far as I am concerned, but I am entirely of your opinion about the representation, or the apparent representation, of special classes or interests.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

[WOODROW WILSON]

763.72119/9190: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 27, 1918—8 p. m.
[Received November 27—6:40 p. m.]

191. Secret. For the President. Wiseman, who is here, has received a cable stating that Mr. Balfour agrees: "That delegates on panel system would suit us best." I am not entirely certain what this means. It may mean that England might appoint any number of delegates, only five of which could sit at any one time. I shall ask for further explanation of this and will advise you promptly. Wiseman also says that Mr. Balfour believes we will have considerable [difficulty?] in inducing the French to meet our views on the language question. Balfour suggested that Derby and I take up

31 Not printed.
32 Joint Chairman of the National War Labor Board.
with Clemenceau the question of arranging the use of both English and French as the official languages of the convention. Shall I act along these lines?

Edward House

763.72119 P 48/917: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

Washington, November 29, 1918—5 p. m.

92. Following additions and corrections to list telegraphed in my 75 of November 26, 7 p. m.:

Substitute H. A. [A. H.] Lybyer for W. S. Ferguson as assistant to specialists; William C. Bullitt, L. T. Alverson, clerk, Mrs. Auchincloss and Mrs. Benson.

Lansing

763.72119 P 48/959: Telegram

Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 30, 1918—2 p. m.

[Received 6:37 p. m.]

201. Secret for Polk from Auchincloss. With the approval of the Colonel, I am informally trying to get the financial, shipping and general economic representatives of the United States in Europe prepared in some measure for the Inter-Allied conferences and the Peace Conference. At the present time I am requested to get them to ascertain as nearly as possible what line their British and French colleagues expect to proceed in these conferences. Of course this work is entirely informal inasmuch as none of these men have been specifically selected by the President to do this work. Most likely they are the necessary United States representatives on the spot or in prospect, who have any knowledge of these matters which are sure to be of vital importance at the Conference. At the present time the Treasury Department is well represented by Davis with whom I have had a number of long talks. Hurley of course represents our Shipping Board and I am in close touch with him. Stevens, Rublee and Morrow who are in London are available for this work, but I am not sure that Hurley will be willing to call upon them as long as he is over here. Summers, provided some of his organization is left here to help him, is entirely able to look after the raw material questions. The Food Administration work is being handled by Hoover together with the general
relief work. Inasmuch as the Colonel could not see Hoover when he was here I have been working matters out with him. McFadden and Sheldon and, if necessary, Stewart, with all of whom I have been in conference, are available for War Trade Board and general commercial work. McFadden seems to me to be the ablest of these, but Sheldon has a very intimate knowledge of the situation and is most helpful. The Alien Property Custodian has no representative here and according to the list received from the Department of those coming with the President you apparently do not intend to send such a representative to Europe at this time. I strongly suggest that you get the Department to send some one over to represent the Alien Property Custodian. Would it be possible to send Bradley Palmer? It would seem to me he would be very useful.

At lunch yesterday when a number of the above representatives were present, they urged that an attempt be made to bring them together every day to compare notes so as to afford greater coordination of their efforts. Occasionally amazingly contradictory telegrams go through to Washington and this ought to be avoided. I am taking steps informally to bring about greater cooperation pursuant to the wishes of these gentlemen. I send you the above for your information. The British are bringing over a very large body of financial and economic representatives and we have simply got to be prepared to meet them and to advise our delegates. My personal opinion has always been (and this has been reinforced by information received since I have been here) that economic questions will be at the basis of almost every dispute which will arise at the conferences and accordingly I think we ought to make some effort to prepare the facts upon which the President can adopt the policy of the United States respecting these matters. I would be glad [to] have your comment on the above.

Edward House:

Form of Credentials Issued to Commissioners Plenipotentiary

Woodrow Wilson

President of the United States of America,

To All to Whom These Presents Shall Come, Greeting:

Know Ye, That reposing special trust and confidence in the integrity and ability of the Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of

* Assistant Counsel to the Alien Property Custodian.

272674—42—vol. i—12
State of the United States, the Honorable Henry White, lately Ambassador of the United States to France and Italy, the Honorable Edward M. House and General Tasker H. Bliss, United States Army, I do appoint them jointly and severally to be Commissioners Plenipotentiary on the part of the United States at the International Peace Conference to meet at Versailles, hereby empowering them jointly and severally to meet and confer with any persons invested by their respective Governments with like power and authority and with them to negotiate, conclude and sign for and in the name of the United States, any and all International Acts necessary to the conclusion of a definitive peace, the same to be transmitted to the President of the United States for his ratification, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof.

In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

Given under my hand at the City of Washington, this thirtieth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and eighteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and forty-third.

WOODROW WILSON

By the President:
ROBERT LANSING
Secretary of State.

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Form of Commission of Individual Commissioners Plenipotentiary

WOODROW WILSON,
President of the United States of America,

To all who shall see these presents, Greeting:

Know Ye, that reposing special trust and confidence in the Integrity and Ability of ROBERT LANSING, of New York, I do appoint him as a COMMISSIONER PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, and do authorize and empower him to execute and fulfill the duties of that Office according to law, and to have and to hold the said Office, with all the powers, privileges and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him the said ROBERT LANSING, during the pleasure of the President of the United States.

In testimony whereof, I have caused these Letters to be made Patent and the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.
Given under my hand at the City of Washington, the thirtieth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and eighteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and forty-third. 

Woodrow Wilson

By the President:

Robert Lansing,
Secretary of State.

763.72119 P 43/969 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House

Washington, December 2, 1918—7 p. m.

112. Secret for Auchincloss from Polk: Your 201 November 30th: Quite agree with your point of view. So far I have been unable to make any progress as to financial representative. Hope Secretary will be able to take matter up with President on trip and send wireless for Harding 44 or Strauss to go over; also representative of the Alien Property Custodian. Earnestly hope you will not use . . .

Lansing

763.72119 P 43/973 : Telegram

Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, December 4, 1918—10 p. m. [Received December 4—8:24 p. m.]

229. Secret for Polk only, from Auchincloss. Your 112, December 5 [2], 7 p. m. Believe Davis probably most satisfactory man to act as Treasury’s adviser of Peace Mission. Understand that Crosby has cabled Treasury Department that Colonel House told him he would like to have him available for consultation on reissuing [?] matters and has asked for instructions from Treasury. Perhaps you can advise Treasury Department correctly in the light of my 201, November 30. Your advice respecting other Treasury representatives will be followed. Understand now that McFadden and Sheldon are returning to United States in the near future.

Did my wife sail with Presidential party?

Please cable what you were able to do with reference to our 222. 45

Edward House

44 William P. G. Harding, Governor of the Federal Reserve Board.
45 Not printed.
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1918—11 a. m. [Received 2 p. m.]

1. French Government requested that Gompers be asked to go over soon as his influence would be useful in Germany. Has President reached a decision as to this matter?

POLK

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

U. S. S. "GEORGE WASHINGTON," December 5, 1918—9 p. m.

2. Your Dec. 5, 11 a. m. Matter attended to.

President replied to an inquiry by Gompers as to the holding of an International Labor Conference that he saw no objection to its being held. He added that he thought it advisable for Gompers to be present at Paris in any event.

LANSING

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

[PARIS,] December 7, 1918.

1. From Grew. In building up an organization for the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in order that the Commission upon arrival may be in a position to enter unhandicapped upon its proper functions, I have with Colonel House's approval availed myself of the offer of the Army and the Navy to place at our disposal the personnel necessary to supplement those coming from the United States. This organization is now nearly perfected and includes the following divisions or bureaus each under a chief responsible either directly to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary, or to the Secretary, or to one of the Assistant Secretaries, who in turn will be responsible to the Commissioners:

(1) The "Inquiry."
(2) The Technical Advisors.
(3) The Secretariat, including the keeping of the minutes of the Conferences, expert drafting, files, registry, indexing, routing, receiving and dispatching mail, coding, transmission, answering general correspondence, et cetera.
(4) Publicity and distribution of information, printing, et cetera.
(5) Political and Economic Intelligence, including editing of daily bulletin.
(6) Negative Intelligence, including counter-espionage and protection.
(7) Executive Offices including personnel, assignment of rooms and offices, hotel management, supplies, courier service, upkeep of buildings, et cetera.
(8) Disbursing Office.
(9) Ceremonial office, including the receipt, distribution and return of visiting cards, formal calls, entertainments, invi- tations, precedence, et cetera.
(10) Liaison and Diplomatic Intelligence, including liaison with General Headquarters American Expeditionary Force, Commanding General in Paris, French Government, Diplomatic Corps, Foreign Peace Commissions, American civilian activities, Representatives of newly formed governments, et cetera.
(11) Medical Staff.

Up to the present we have for this purpose drawn upon the Army and Navy for a considerable number of officers, especially fitted for the particular duties allotted to them, who have been temporarily assigned to the Commission and who have necessarily been quartered provisionally in the Hotel Crillon as other quarters in Paris are practically unobtainable. Rooms in the Crillon have already been assigned to all of the persons listed in the Department's 75, November 26, 7 p. m., and 92, November 29, 5 p. m., as well as to Colonel and Mrs. House, General Bliss and staff, including several officers and assistants, Admiral and Mrs. Benson and the Admiral's staff, Major General Kernan and staff (at the request of General Bliss) and General McKinstry, and to the Secret Service men accompanying the President. All of the foregoing officials have also been assigned offices either in the Hotel Crillon or in the buildings at 4 Place de la Concorde or 3 Rue Royale mentioned in my 200, November 29th, to which no reply has yet been received from the Department, and to which I request an early answer. Today 8 officers from the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department under Captain Pier have reported to me under instructions from General Bliss and they inform me that 6 more are soon to arrive and that General Churchill is coming with 5 more, making in all 20 officers. I have received no instructions whatever regarding the assignment of these officers to the Commission and am considerably embarrassed by their unannounced arrival, having already proceeded with the organization of our political intelligence

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* * * Apparently the reference is to Colonel House's telegram No. 200, Nov. 29, 1918, 10 p. m., p. 126.
section by drawing upon the personnel already in Europe according to the plans elaborated in Colonel House's 99 approved by the Department's 36. In view of General Bliss' request that they should be quartered with the Commission I have provisionally assigned rooms to them at the Crillon and office space at 4 Place de la Concorde. Please instruct me further in the premises.

As matters now stand we are in a position to offer the Commissioners Plenipotentiary on the day of their arrival every possible facility which could have been foreseen. However the offices in the two buildings at 4 Place de la Concorde and 3 Rue Royale have now all been allotted and the available bedrooms, salons and offices in the Hotel Crillon will not permit us to expand much further unless we oblige some of the officers assigned to us to find accommodations elsewhere which is now practically impossible in Paris. I cannot foresee until the Commission arrives and enters upon its work whether further expansion will be necessary but should this prove to be the case we shall be obliged to endeavor to requisition another small hotel in the vicinity.

All of these steps have been taken after consultation with and approval by Colonel House.

American Mission

933.1140/33: Telegram

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, December 8, 1918---1 p. m.
[Received 2: 50 p. m.]

3. From Grew. In view of the Department's decision that the telegraphic communications of the Commission will not be handled by the Navy at the Washington end, Admiral Benson has informed me through Commander Ingersoll that the Navy does not wish to handle the Paris end, which would entail divided responsibility. Accordingly, upon the arrival of personnel from the State Department, the Navy will withdraw its personnel now assisting us and has already released the reserve communication personnel of the Navy now being held in London.

It is impossible to foresee how large a corps of coding clerks will be required by the Commission, but it is probable that the six men being sent out by the Department will eventually be far from ade-
quate. I wish to bring the foregoing situation to the Department’s attention.

AMERICAN MISSION

033.1140/33: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1918—3 p.m.

153. For Grew. Your No. 3, December 8th. I had nothing to do with the arrangements for handling telegraphic communications. Fear Navy’s attitude in Paris result of resentment. Urge you to hold situation as it is until arrival President’s party. Patchin can explain situation as he and Phillips were responsible for present arrangement. Think it would be most unfortunate if any radical change is made by Navy before you have an opportunity to discuss the matter with Secretary of State. Suggest you take the matter up with the Colonel immediately and have necessary officers held as it would be most unfortunate to have the mission crippled through any inter-Departmental rivalries. Show this telegram to Patchin on his arrival; he knows my views. Will take matter up with Phillips when he returns later in the week.

POLK

766.72119/3315e: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1918—4 p.m.

53. For Grew from Phillips. Merely for your information and strictly confidential. Various persons returning recently from Paris seem to be impressed by the fact that the organization of the Mission includes a good many Americans still in army who are prominent socially, although otherwise not of pronounced ability. Senators and Representatives are daily approaching the Department with requests to have their constituents, many of whom are men of ability, attached to our Mission and it might be somewhat embarrassing if the impression became general that a large number of men were being appointed because of their social prominence. I thoroughly appreciate your difficulty and the necessity of building up quickly an organization but am sure you will forgive me for this word of caution.

POLK
Lieutenant Ralph Hayes to the Executive Officer of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace (Bowman)

[Paris,] December 19, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BOWMAN: Following are some excerpts from a confidential report which I made to General Pershing on the day before your party landed at Brest.

"When the party to accompany the Peace Commissioners was made up in America, the Secretary of War was to be with the President, and General Churchill, Chief, M. I. D., selected a group of experts from his department to act as a staff for Mr. Baker. Later General Churchill was informed that for the present at least, Mr. Baker was not to accompany the President; however, General Churchill was told to bring the men he had selected and, in answer to an inquiry of his, was told that the President knew of the plan to keep these military intelligence men in the party.

"There seems to be a considerable amount of feeling in the State Department that this making of peace should be a State Department affair and that whatever participation the War Department has should be distinctly under the direction of the State Department. Hence the group of men brought over with General Churchill failed to receive much of a cordial reception and are looked upon as unnecessary adjuncts. . . ." Naturally he is very partial to and enthusiastic about his own group. He says they have been carefully chosen, have available a wealth of information, and can do excellent team work.

"Would not the whole difficulty be solved by the designation of General Churchill by the Commander-in-Chief as Director of Army Peace Personnel. This would permit him:

(1) To disengage the dead timber that has already attached itself to the Commission.
(2) To act as a judge on further additions from the army.
(3) To return to America whatever men from his own group he finds unnecessary here. . . ."

"My suggestion specifically would be that at a definite hour each morning General Churchill should consider applications received in the preceding twenty four hours for additional army personnel; if necessary should have me or someone else telephone G. H. Q., Tours, or the Central Records Office for information about the men concerned; and in cases where men are sufficiently qualified and where there is sufficient need here, should have me telephone forthwith to

Omission indicated in the original.
G. H. Q. (direct, or through the office of General Harts, or through Tours) for necessary orders."

Ralph Hayes, 1st Lt.,
Liaison Officer for General Pershing.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.68/1

Memorandum Regarding the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence of the Commission to Negotiate Peace

The Intelligence Section of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, dealing with the territorial, economic, and political matters which come before the peace conference, represents a new idea in international relations—the idea of utilizing the expert services of scholars in determining the facts that should be the bases of the peace settlements. The Intelligence Section is an outgrowth of the Inquiry, a group of men engaged during more than a year past in gathering material for the peace conference under the direction of Colonel House. Similar organizations have been at work in France and England.

In all three countries, so far as is known, the choice of men was made irrespective of political standing, and solely with the view of securing the best scholars in their respective fields. The idea was also entertained that the meeting of these expert bodies at the peace conference would greatly diminish the cares and responsibilities of the plenipotentiaries, whose time would necessarily be filled with the active and current business of negotiation.

Actual experience at the peace conference has shown the soundness of these anticipations, since in almost every case the discussion of a question has involved the appointment of special committees who are to hear the facts and report to the Bureau. It is surprising to what an extent the impartial discussion of disputed points has led to unanimity of opinion, even on the part of nations directly interested in a given solution. The whole process marks a new stage in the development of better international relations, since it carries over into the field of international relations the good will which has always existed in the world between scholars expert in the same subject. It may be doubted whether at any time in the future complicated problems of world politics will be discussed without reference to expert bodies like those now working out the intricacies of European politics, ethnography, resources, waterways, ports, railroads, canals, topography, etc.

* The memorandum bears no indication of date or origin.
The experiment has been attended by some very interesting results. In the case of the American experts an appeal was made to the colleges and universities and private and public institutions of various kinds in the United States for the loan of men and material, and to all such requests the most hearty response was obtained. It became a kind of joint educational enterprise which elicited the enthusiasm and devotion of a large group of strong men at a time of need when everyone was seeking to be of the largest service to the national government.

The work of the American experts was carried on at the building of the American Geographical Society, Broadway and 156th Street, New York City, where there was made available the largest collection of carefully selected maps in the United States and the best geographical library as well, including the services of a trained staff. The building was well guarded so that during the entire time of its existence the Inquiry lost none of its material, and was able to work quietly and effectively against the day when it would be called upon for service at the peace conference.

The interest of the Administration in the work is shown by the fact that Colonel House held a number of important consultations there, and likewise the Secretary of State. President Wilson himself visited the Inquiry on October 12, 1918, meeting some of the principal men engaged upon its work and examining in some detail the material that they had gathered.

The Director of the Inquiry is Dr. S. E. Mezes, who has traveled widely in Europe and Northern Africa, and has from the first directed the activities of the staff and is now Director of the Intelligence Section of the American Commission.

The Chief Territorial Specialist and Executive Officer of the Section is Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Director of the American Geographical Society, who has conducted three scientific expeditions to South America and has written extensively on South American problems. For his work in this field he was awarded the Bonaparte-Wyse gold medal of the Société Géographique de Paris about two years ago.

Paris Peace Conf. 184,1/5

The Chief of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Mezes) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

[Paris,] December 21, 1918.

Would the following memorandum express your idea of the sense of our conference of this afternoon:

1) There is to be complete control over the employment of the military personnel assigned to the Commission by the Commission itself
through its Secretary. The following proposal simply arranges for
the orderly and effective integration of that part of the staff borrowed
from the army in so far as this integration is needed for the smooth
running of purely military arrangements which the Commission may
wish to have made.

(2) To this end it is proposed to designate General Churchill as
officer in charge of military personnel and to instruct him to report
to you in that capacity. Having been thus designated and instructed
as to your wishes, General Churchill can then be held responsible for
the following:

a) That military personnel and materiel now at the disposition of
the Commission be so utilized as to best serve the interests of
the Commission.

b) That additional personnel and materiel be obtained and in-
stalled promptly as required.

c) That all contact with the military establishment in France and
in the United States be concentrated in a single office, so that
there may be no conflict of authority or of purpose.

3) In outlining the above it has been kept in mind that your thought
seemed to be that such a plan would avoid possible question between
the arrangements for securing help from the military authorities by
the Inquiry and the arrangements already made by yourself with
officers detailed by General Harts or by General Bliss.

4) If the suggestions contained herein are not acceptable, in no
matter how small a degree, please modify in whatever manner seems
advisable, since we are merely trying to put on record our common
viewpoint regarding the matter.

S. E. MEZES

Paris Peace Conf. 184/10

Memorandum Presented to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary by
General Tasker H. Bliss 41

The American Peace Commission should do whatever is necessary
to make it clearly understood by everyone that, now that the war is
finished and until it should be resumed (which God forbid), this Com-
mission is the highest and most important governmental agency of the
United States now in Europe.

It is, therefore, recommended:

(1) That approval of the Commission be given to the proposition
already made that the Secretary of the Commission be given a title
which will place him on the same plane of dignity as in the case of the
British Commission.

41 The copy of this document in the Department's files is undated and unsigned.
It is stated in General Bliss' diary that he presented the memorandum to the
Commissioners Plenipotentiary on Dec. 23, 1918.
(2) That the first few minutes of each meeting of the Commission be devoted to the transaction of routine business connected with its interior administration; that during this time (if not longer) the Secretary (by whatever title he may be designated) of the Commission be present to report what may be of interest to the Commission in regard to the organization of its assistant-personnel, &c; and that in all communications written by him which are in the nature of instructions to anyone or requests that any American official do anything, for the Commission, he precede his official signature by the formula, "By Direction of the American Peace Commission."

(3) Incidentally, it is suggested that it might be well to keep a very brief, formal record of every meeting of the Commission, stating the matters discussed and the conclusions, tentative or final, reached. Experience with the Supreme War Council indicates that this is the practice of the Allied Governments in the work of commissions of importance.

(4) It is believed that there is a tendency to overload the Commission with unnecessary assistant-personnel resulting not only in having two or more men to do one man's work but in considerable unnecessary expense charged for the maintenance of the Commission. It is possible, for example, that there may be military or other officials whose opinion may not be asked three times, if at all, by the Commission or by any member of it during its lifetime. At the Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Force there is a very fine and highly trained organization devoted to the collection of data and the preparation of memoranda on military subjects of all kinds. The Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France has stated that he will place at the disposition of the Commission all assistance under his control. There is a daily courier service between Paris and his headquarters. A question requiring a military opinion can be formulated today and by the first hour in the morning will be in the hands of that highly trained, specialized organization. In many cases the reply will be on its return to Paris the same night. This, undoubtedly, is the way in which such matters will be handled by the French Peace Commission. They will be referred to the French General Staff in Paris for its opinion. We have a similar and equally competent General Staff at Chaumont to pass on military questions. All that is required here is a very small and carefully selected personnel that will keep in touch with the duties of the Commission or of its individual members, will formulate the necessary questions and will have them transmitted to Chaumont. Manifestly it would be entirely unnecessary to bring that specialized staff from Chaumont to Paris and maintain it here at the expense of the Commission.
It is, therefore, recommended that the most careful scrutiny be directed by the Commission to be made by the Head of each Section as to the necessity of maintaining the personnel now under his charge.

It is further recommended that from this moment no addition be made to the assistant-personnel of the American Peace Commission except upon formal recommendation made by the Head of the Section or bureau concerned showing the necessity for the person desired and his qualifications for the position, which recommendation shall be presented to the Commission and acted upon by it.

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Paris Peace Conf. 184/65

Memorandum for the President

The Commissioners Plenipotentiary today adopted the following resolution:

The American Peace Commission should do whatever is necessary to make it clearly understood by everyone that, now that the war is finished and until it should be resumed (which God forbid), this Commission is the highest and most important governmental agency of the United States now in Europe:

It is therefore recommended that the Secretary of the Commission be given a title which will place him on the same plane of dignity as in the case of the British Commission.

The officer of the British Commission holding the position corresponding to that of the Secretary of the American Commission has been given the title of “Superintending Ambassador”. It would not seem appropriate to give the Secretary of the American Commission this title, as there would be some question as to whether he would not then rank equally with the Commissioners. It is therefore proposed that he be given the title of “Supervising Director with Ministerial Rank.”

It is also recommended that the two Assistant Secretaries of the Commission be made Secretaries with the rank of Counselors of Embassy, in order that they may be in a position to deal on equal terms with their colleagues on the other peace commissions.

A telegram\(^4\) has been sent to Washington to have three new commissions, bearing the seal of the United States, sent out by mail to be filled in in accordance with the foregoing recommendations, if approved by the President; but in order that there may be no delay in establishing the rank of these three officials, and in order that

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\(^4\) Not printed.
they may be correctly announced to the Office of Protocol in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is suggested that the President provisionally authorize the adoption of the titles suggested above.

Paris, December 23, 1918.

763.72119 P 43/15: Telegram

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris [December 23, 1918.]

[Received December 23—9:01 p.m.]

56. For Phillips from Grew. Your 53, December 19, 4 p.m. I fully appreciate your friendly word of caution and assure you that it will at all times be of great help to have you bring criticisms of our organization to my attention. As a matter of fact the criticism in this instance is quite unjustified, and I have traced similar comments, circulating in Paris, to certain persons which [who] without justification have been hostile to our organization from the start and which I can explain to you only in person. The situation is fully known to and understood by the Commission[ers Plenipotentiary?] who have approved of the organization as they found it. I think the criticisms which have come to you in Washington can be satisfactorily answered by the following facts:

1. We now have 66 Army officers assigned to the Commission from the A. E. F. of whom a considerable number, including interpreters, reported under direct instructions from the War Department. Of these 66 only 11 were known to me personally at the time of their selection and only 6 others were known to me even by name. Of the total number small percentage may be said to be prominent socially, although the term is of course relative and misleading.

2. These men were selected upon high recommendation after a careful examination into their records, ability and special qualifications for certain duties and not one has failed to make good in the work assigned to him. I consider that all have pronounced ability.

3. Having been guided by efficiency, not favoritism, we have refused the application of a very great number of men, who may be said to be socially prominent, on the ground that they were not of pronounced ability.

4. Those officers assigned to the Commission who may be said to be socially prominent, were selected on account of their thorough knowledge of French and their affiliations with various branches of the French Government and the diplomatic corps and various civilian activities in France. The efficiency of the organization depended upon the selection of certain men with these particular qualifications.

5. The short time given us to build up the organization before the arrival of the Commission necessitated our selecting men without consulting Members of Congress.
6. Twenty-five states of the Union are represented among the officers mentioned under heading 1.

I hope that these facts and circumstances, which can be corroborated by anyone within the Commission, will be sufficient to silence any further similar criticisms which may be brought to your attention, and I only regret that you have been caused anxiety by the reports that have reached you.

American Mission

Paris Peace Conf. 184.1—Helms, Birch

Mr. William O. Bullitt to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

Paris, 27 December, 1918.

Dear Joe: Colonel House has asked me to request you to bring up before the Commission to-morrow morning the question of the proposed appointment of Major Birch Helms to the following position:

Major Helms to be detailed to the Peace Commission as a Special Military Attaché or Intelligence Officer to assist in obtaining information for the Commission relative to Republican sentiment in the United States.

To transmit correct and accurate data, independent of press dispatches, to Republican leaders, who may be in Paris, such as Senator Wadsworth and Mr. George W. Perkins recently, and if convenient, to arrange through proper channels for them to see members of the Commission.

To have authority to attend conferences of the Peace Commission, with newspaper correspondents and also confer occasionally with members of the Commission so that correct data can be transmitted to Republican leaders in the United States independent of press dispatches.

Very respectfully yours,

William C. Bullitt

Paris Peace Conf. 184.1—Helms, Birch

The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Mr. William C. Bullitt

1. Replying to your letter of December 27th, I beg to inform you that the Commissioners Plenipotentiary today disapproved the proposal to appoint Major Birch Helms as a special military attaché or intelligence officer to assist in obtaining information for the Commission relative to the Republican sentiment in the United States, to transmit correct and accurate data to Republican leaders who may be
in Paris, and to have authority to attend conferences of the Peace Commission with newspaper correspondents, and also to confer occasionally with members of the Commission so that correct data can be transmitted to Republican leaders in the United States independent of press despatches.

December 28, 1918.

Paris Peace Conf. 184.00101/—

Minutes of the Daily Meetings of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary, Monday, December 30, 1918 44

1.

The Commissioners instructed the Secretary of the Commission to prepare a telegram to the Acting Secretary of State requesting him to send out an official notification to the British, French and Italian Governments of the names of the American Commissioners to the Peace Conference.

2.

Mr. Lansing brought up the question of the status, in their relation to the Commission, of Mr. Hurley, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Baruch, and other advisors. The question arose in connection with Mr. Hurley’s request for an assignment of rooms for himself and his wife at the Hotel Crillon; and also his request that the Department of State be authorized by the Commission to issue a passport to France to Mrs. Robinson, the wife of his assistant, who proposes to sail on the Leviathan tomorrow. The Commissioners decided that the question of the status of these officials should be submitted to the President, and directed the Secretary of the Commission to prepare a memorandum to the President on this subject. They also decided that until the status of these officials was settled, the Department of State, and not the Commission, should assume the responsibility for issuing passports for their families. A telegram to the Acting Secretary of State to this effect was prepared. 45

in Vienna and to make it clear that there was no camouflage connected with the sending of these agents to Austria, as they were in

44 Minutes of other meetings before Jan. 31, 1919, have not been found in Department files.
45 Following this paragraph, a portion of the minutes is missing from the Department’s copy.
no sense propagandists, but merely observers. The Commissioners spoke to Mr. Baker after the meeting, and requested him to prepare a statement on the subject for their consideration.

6.

Mr. Lansing spoke at some length on the organization of an international council in connection with the League of Nations, which led to a general discussion of the League of Nations, the question of strategic boundaries, &c. The discussion then led to the recent election victory of Lloyd George, and the victory of Clemenceau in obtaining in the Chamber of Deputies the greatest majority vote he had ever received. It was pointed out that President Wilson alone had met with a political reserve in the recent elections at home, and that he was also handicapped by the approach of the end of his term of office.

7.

Mr. Grew submitted to the various Commissioners separately, after the meeting of this morning, the names of the following personnel to compose the second party of Political Intelligence Agents for Austria. Mr. Lansing, Mr. House, and General Bliss offered no objections. Mr. White was absent and could not be consulted.

- Captain F. Dellschaft;
- Captain Arthur Gammel;
- Captain John Karmazin;
- Army Field Clerk E. Vogel;
- Captain Nicholas Roosevelt;
- Army Field Clerk S. Snyder;
- Sergeant E. H. Davison.

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Paris Peace Conf. 184.091/5 : Telegram

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

DECEMBER 30, 1918.

111. [From Lansing.] Please send out official notification to British, French and Italian Governments of the names of the American Commissioners to Negotiate Peace. I suggest that this be worded in order to indicate that the President of the United States has come to Paris as a representative of the United States in connection with the Peace Conference and that the four Commissioners Plenipotentiary are associated with him. Lansing.

AMERICAN MISSION
The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the French Minister for
Foreign Affairs (Pichon)

Paris, January 6, 1919.

EXCELLENCY: On instructions of my Government, I have the honor
to inform Your Excellency that President Woodrow Wilson is in
France as the representative of the United States of America at the
Peace Conference and that he is accompanied by the following Com-
missioners Plenipotentiary:

Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State;
Honorable Henry White, former Ambassador to France and Italy;
Honorable Edward M. House;
General Tasker H. Bliss, United States Army.

Mr. Joseph Clark Grew, Minister plenipotentiary, is the Secretary
and Supervising Director of the Commission; Mr. Leland Harrison
and Mr. Philip H. Patchin are Assistant Secretaries.

With assurances [etc.]

Robert Woods Bliss

The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the
Secretary of State

Paris, January 10, 1919.

Dear Mr. Lansing: The appended telegram was wrongly routed
to me, and I send it down to you without delay.46

In connection with Mr. Baker’s statement that he hears much
comment to the effect that there are already too many military men
attached to the Commission, I think it advisable to make the follow-
ing comment, in case you wish at any time to be in a position to
reply to criticisms of this nature:

(1) In accordance with the wishes of the Commissioners, General
Churchill recently made a survey of the entire organization with
a view to reporting on the necessity of every individual now assigned
to the Commission, and his preliminary report states that

46 Telegram No. 146, Jan. 8, 1919, 6 p. m., from the Acting Secretary of State
to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, for Lansing from Secretary of War
Baker (not printed). An extract from this telegram reads: “I, of course,
want to do what is necessary to facilitate the work of the Commission but
am extremely reluctant to add needless military men to the Commission’s
personnel as I hear much comment to the effect that there are already too
many.”
“No appreciable reduction in personnel can be made without interfering with the work of the Commission as it is organized at present or as it is proposed to reorganize it.”

(2) The officers attached to the Commission are assigned chiefly to the Executive Offices, the Secretariat, the Intelligence Section, and the Liaison Office.

(a) No one who has not seen the necessary plant of the Commission, including two hotels and an office building, can understand the great amount of administrative work handled by the Executive Offices, including the management of the hotels, transportation, courier service, mail service, requisitions and supplies, construction and repair, assignment of rooms and offices, printing, telephone service, supervising of guards, orderlies, &c., &c. I do not hesitate to say that we are understaffed rather than overstaffed in this division.

(b) The military personnel assigned to the Secretariat as translators, clerks, stenographers, etc., were almost exclusively assigned to us by direct instructions of the War Department in Washington.

(c) If there is any doubt as to the essential character of the Liaison Office—which is composed of eight officers on duty with the Commission and five giving only part of their time to the Commission’s work—the answer is to be found in the appended list of requests 47 which have been made of that office within the last few days, and which indicate the importance of the work it is doing.

(d) The Intelligence Section is the only division of the organization which may perhaps be regarded as overstaffed, and this is due solely to the fact that twenty officers were assigned to us by the Secretary of War, himself, without our being consulted. We are now dispensing with the services of some of them, and requesting that they be relieved from duty with the Commission.

Respectfully yours,

J. C. Grew

47 Not attached to file copy of this letter.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURING INFORMATION

123 G 601/178 : Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 8, 1918—2 p. m.  
[Received November 8—11:06 a.m.]

61. Secret for the President and Secretary of State. We are getting a mass of misinformation respecting present conditions in Austria, Bohemia and the Ukraine, practically all of which is being provided us by the English, French and Italians. We have no American sources of information. The reports received are, as they are often, colored by the self interest of the persons furnishing them. I regard it as exceedingly important that we send at once to these countries agents who will be in a position to furnish us with accurate and unbiased information respecting conditions. This work should be under the general direction of a man who is entirely familiar with German and Austrian affairs. I suggest that you constitute Grew a special representative of the Department of State to do this work. Of course he should have a number of assistants whom I can secure for him over here. If you approve of this suggestion I will take the necessary steps to set up the organization. This matter I believe is most urgent.

Edward House

763.72119 P 43/979 : Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 12, 1918—midnight.  
[Received November 13—1:45 a.m.]

99. Secret for the President. Referring further to our number 61. I beg to suggest the following:

The whole problem of securing political intelligence, establishing an adequate counterespionage organization and providing protection for you and for the personnel, papers, and property of the American representatives at the Peace Conference should be dealt with, I believe, along the following lines:

1. Political intelligence.

At the present time the United States officials in Europe charged with considering political and economic questions presented by the

1 Supra.
termination of the war are receiving practically no dependable information concerning political and economic conditions in the following countries: Poland, Bohemia, Ukraine, Austria, Servia, (including Yugo-Slavia), Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania and Turkey. From Roumania and Greece some information is obtained but it is very incomplete. I consider it essential that we at once set up instrumentalities in these localities which will furnish us with information concerning political conditions in these countries and that this information should come to us through American eyes. I do not think it will be difficult promptly to set up an organization for this purpose and I suggest that I be authorized to proceed along the following lines:

Subparagraph A. After conferring with Hoover and learning his plans for relief, to select men from among the United States military and naval forces now in Europe and from any other available sources, who shall be appointed for the time being, agents of the Department of State. These men to constitute the basis of a “political intelligence section” of the American delegation to the Peace Conference.

Subparagraph B. To despatch the men so selected as soon as practicable to do so, to points such as Warsaw, Lemberg, Posen, Prague, Berne [Brünn?] (Moravia) Budapest, Vienna, Innsbruck or Salzburg, Belgrade, Agram, Sarajevo, Sofia, Bucharest (and some point in Transylvania), Kief, Scutari, Constantinople and Odessa. One agent should be sent to each place and he should take with him one code clerk with codes, one stenographer and if necessary one interpreter. A courier service also will shortly have to be established to operate between the United States and individual agents and their base from which messages could be forwarded by telegraph to Paris.

Subparagraph C. These agents so selected not to be in any sense accredited to the countries in which they are located. The military and naval men will of course not wear their uniforms. So far as possible the governments in the localities to which they are sent will be requested to give them assistance in the conduct of their work. These men would work in close cooperation with any relief agencies set up by Hoover.

Subparagraph D. To set up at some point in the Balkans, such as possibly Bucharest, a central office to which these agents can forward (probably for the President by courier only) their reports for transmission to the United States via Paris.

Subparagraph E. To establish at Paris for the assistance of the American delegation at the Peace Conference a “political intelligence section” under the direction of Grew and such other persons as the State Department may send to help him to which would be forwarded all reports from these agents and from other agents of the Department of State already constituted in European countries.

2. Counterespionage organization.
I have conferred with General Nolan, the head of the United States Military Intelligence in Europe, and I believe that this work should be handed over to him and I suggest that a civil official of
the Department of State who has an appreciation of the duty of work desired done should be associated with him.

3. The protection of the President and of the American delegation at the Peace Conference and their [papers] and property.

I suggest that the most practical method of handling this problem is through the use of the military authorities working under the direction of General Nolan who is entirely familiar with the peculiar conditions presented by this kind of work in France.

Almost all of the personnel to do the work outlined in paragraph 1 can be obtained here in Europe. I should very much appreciate an expression of your views respecting this important matter. If the plan as outlined is promptly approved it can be put into operation before the Peace Conference is called.

Edward House

763.72119 P 43/979 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

Washington, November 15, 1918—6 p. m.

36. Your numbers 61 and 99. Plan approved in principle. Please proceed with organization of office under Grew as stated in paragraph 1 sub-paragraph E also report names and qualifications of individuals to be recommended for appointment by the Department as agents as proposed in sub-paragraphs A and C.

Believe it would be desirable for Grew to consult with Colonel Van Deman, Assistant to Chief of Military Intelligence, as to quickest and safest method of communication (sub-paragraphs B and D). Van Deman should be able to furnish codes and possibly interpreters and clerks also. Kindly report result.

Harrison suggests that meanwhile Van Deman be requested to instruct Captain Voska, Berne, to send advance secret agents immediately into Poland, Bohemia, Ukraine, Austria, Hungary and Russia, if not already arranged, and through Italy into Servia, including Jugo-Slavia. Inform Van Deman if not already advised that instructions can now be sent in code for Military Attaché, Jassy, through Department and Legation. Appropriate instructions will be sent in that way to Military Attaché, Jassy, for despatch of secret agents into Bulgaria and Turkey.

Department will advise you further regarding paragraph 2. It is hoped that arrangements can be made for Van Deman to handle this.

* Both printed supra.
As regards suggestion paragraph 3, Secretary of War has undertaken to provide necessary protection for Commissioners, archives, et cetera.

LANSING

763.72119/9122 : Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 16, 1918—3 p. m.
[Received November 16—1:45 p. m.]

112. Queries to be sent to Berne, Copenhagen and Stockholm. Please furnish what information you can as to:

Query 1. The character of native authority prevailing in Courland, Estonia and Finland; the national elements represented; relation of directing heads to Russian and German revolutionary parties; the prevailing opinion in these territories on the subject of their status during the Peace Conference and in the Treaty of Peace.

Query 2. What authority prevails at present in the following places: Riga, Vilna, Kovno, Grodno, Memel, Konigsberg, Danzig, Tarnopol, Czernowitz, Teschen, Pressburg? The object of this query is to secure information as to the present relation between the Poles and the nationalities with whom they are in conflict.

Query 3. Have you any information showing extent of authority of the Czecho-Slovak Government at Prague over Slovak districts of Hungary?

Query 4. Send summary of ultimatum reported to have been delivered by the Government at Jassy to the Hungarian Government.

Query 5. Are you able to say whether the National Council in Bosnia recognizes the authority of the Government at Zagreb?

Query 6. Are any Polish or Bolshevist uprisings reported in Posen, Prussian Silesia or in the neighborhood of Danzig?

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119 P 48/923 : Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 18, 1918—4 p. m.
[Received November 18—2:55 p. m.]

118. Secret for Polk only. From Auchincloss. It is most difficult to advise Grew with reference to organization of our work unless you keep us confidentially and promptly advised respecting what plans are being made in Washington for handling particular branches of work of Peace Conference. You [We?] were instructed indirectly yesterday that the Committee on Public Information planned to do
work on a large scale in Paris. Please explain to me as fully as possible what their plans are. I drew up our 99 before you had advised us that Grew was to act as Secretary of the Commission. Grew is at present in bed with a mild attack of influenza. Unless you wish us to wait until he personally recovers I will go ahead with the plan outlined in our 99. Can you tell me now whether the heads of such organizations as the "War Industries Board," "War Trade Board," "Fuel Administration," "Alien Property Custodian," et cetera, are to be present at the Peace Conference and if not who is going to represent these bodies for purposes of consultation. Please advise me the date when it is planned that American staff for the Peace Conference will arrive. Please give names of principals when possible. You cabled that Miller was sailing on the third but he has not arrived. When is he coming? I should greatly appreciate your private advice on the above points at the earliest possible moment.

Edward House

763.72119 P 43/923: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1918—9 p.m.

47. For Auchincloss from Polk. Your No. 118 November 18th.* Will take up matter at once and see what I can do to help. Have been keeping out of it. Will find out about Committee on Public Information. Know that Creel and Sisson⁵ are going over. Sorry to hear Grew is ill. Think it will be very helpful for you to go ahead, but suggest you await a definite answer on your 99, which I will try to obtain tomorrow. Think Summers would be the best representative of the War Industries Board. No appointment has been made for War Trade Board or Alien Property Custodian. Will suggest someone be selected. Can see no object in representative of the Fuel Administration. Will cable you as soon as we have the information in regard to date of sailing of American staff and names of principals. Miller sailed the 3d or 4th. Warrin and Professor Hudson⁶ sailed the 9th. In making plans do all you can to keep in mind that both Army and Navy are endeavoring to take some of the functions of the Department. This is natural on their part, but I hope you will keep our

*Ante, p. 194.
⁴For a further reply to Colonel House's telegram No. 118 of Nov. 18, see the Department's telegram No. 54, Nov. 20, 1918, 7 p. m., p. 162.
⁵Edgar Sisson, general director of the Foreign Section of the Committee on Public Information.
⁶Frank L. Warrin, Jr., and Manley O. Hudson, assistants to the technical advisers on international law, Commission to Negotiate Peace.
interests at heart. If any of your telegrams have not been satisfactorily answered send me a confidential message calling my attention to messages and I will have them attended to.

LANSING

763.72119 P 43/924 : Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 19, 1918—7 p. m.
[Received November 19—4: 16 p. m.]

123. Your telegram number 36, November 15, 6 p. m. I shall detain Hoover upon his arrival early next week and shall ask him to lay the basis for a political intelligence system during his visit to the Central Powers with Gibson's assistance. Agents will be despatched as soon as they can be chosen and approved by the Department. Grew will have general supervision of the political intelligence section here; arrangements being made for handling material effectively. I suggest that Gibson remain in Austria after Hoover's return with headquarters at Vienna to have general supervision over agents. In view of the uncertainties of communication and travel, it is important to have someone there who can move about as required under instructions from Paris. Do you not think it would be advisable for him to open the Embassy Chancery so as to have place for section of documents and codes and for installation of wireless outfit for rapid communication to Paris?

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119 P 43/960 : Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 21, 1918—6 p. m.
[Received 8: 01 p. m.]

132. From Grew. Your 35 [36?], November 15, 6 p. m. Our 99 and 123. Have discussed matters fully with General Nolan, Colonel Van Deman, Gibson and Auchinleck. We are in entire accord as to plans. It is important to send in, as soon as possible, a number of trained men of known ability to be reinforced as rapidly as possible by others as soon as their suitability is established. Should very particularly like to have the following men from the diplomatic service, and am convinced that their usefulness in this

*No. 99 printed on p. 194; No. 123, supra.*
new field will justify and greatly outweigh any temporary incon-
venience to the missions to which they are now assigned: Para-
graph 1, Dulles, or Herter, whichever one can be spared; 2, Eugene
Schectraf; 3, Lithgow Osborne; 4, Norman Armour.

I hope Department will assign these men by telegraph and direct
them to report to us in Paris at the earliest possible moment.

The following Army officers are now here available. Commander
in chief will detail them for service under our direction as soon as
Department gives its approval:

1. Major Stephen Bousal, who is already known to the Department;
2. Captain Royall Tyler, now in Paris, excellent French, German
and Spanish; good background of international affairs; sound judg-
ment. Has since our entry into the war been chief, American sec-
tion, Inter-Allied Bureau Paris;
3. [Apparent omission] assistant military attaché at Berne. Per-
fected German; good judgment, active, good background on political
conditions, has lived in Germany and Austria;
4. Lieutenant Frederick R. King, French and German, good gen-
eral training, very friendly relations with Benes and others members
of new Czecho-Slovak Government. Benes has asked that King be
allowed to go with him.

The commander in chief has expressed himself as ready to assign
to this work, and [any?] other officers who may be fitted and who
are desired by us. A further list will be submitted as soon as we
can look into the qualifications of men [?] are now in our possession.

Question of communication is being arranged with military and
naval authorities. Military authorities have requested me furnish
codes, and instead of ordinary interpreters will assign officers speak-
ing the languages desired. A list of 250 such officers has been sub-
mitted and the commander in chief will assign as many of these men
as we may require.

There is already a great shortage of clerks and none can be pro-
vided by military authorities.

Nolan of the opinion, in which we concur, that Voska’s services
can best be utilized in continuing his present duties directly under
military intelligence section, which will cooperate in every way.

Paragraph 3 of your telegram concerning protection. Has Sec-
retary of War telegraphed commander in chief or shall we take
it up directly with military authorities as regards question of cre-

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*Allen W. Dulles.
*Christian A. Herter, special assistant to the American Minister at Berne.
*Second secretary of embassy in Great Britain.
*Second secretary of legation in Belgium.
dentials for our agents? I assume they should not be accredited to anyone as representatives of the Department of State. I suggest therefore that each man be provided with a document from Hoover designating him as a member of the United States Food Administration, or whatever relief organizations may be established. This would be, I think, quite justifiable as any representative sent by Hoover into these countries must depend upon, in a great measure, our agents for knowledge of political conditions which will have so important an influence on relief policies.

Hoover has not arrived, but we shall consult with him upon his arrival and hope that he will have no objection.

To meet necessary initial expenses, request that I be authorized by telegraph to draw on the Secretary of State, for $50,000 or such part of that sum as may be necessary.

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119 P 43/924 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918—5 p. m.

71. Your 123 November 19, 7 p. m. Suggestion that Gibson remain in Austria with headquarters in Vienna approved. Not thought advisable to open Embassy Chancery. It is presumed Hoover will open headquarters’ office in Vienna and Gibson should be able to use that office in the capacity of assistant to Hoover.

LANSING

763.72119 P 43/960 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918—6 p. m.

72. Your 132, November 21, 6 p. m. For Grew. Diplomatic secretaries not available for this purpose with sole exception of Gibson. Choice of Major Bonsal, Captain Tyler, Captain Schelling and Lieutenant King approved. They should secure codes, officers to act as interpreters, clerks and stenographers from Nolan. All should be furnished with credentials by Hoover, as you suggest.

You may draw upon me up to $50,000.

LANSING
The Secretary of State to All Missions in Europe Except Paris

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918—6 p. m.

It is of high importance that the American Embassy in Paris should be advised of the political developments as they occur in the country to which you are accredited. Accordingly you are instructed to telegraph to the American Embassy in Paris for Col. House copies of your cable despatches to the Department when in your judgment Paris should be so advised. At the end of each cable despatch you should advise the Department whether Paris has been informed.

LANSING

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As you are already aware, the necessity has become apparent for the establishment of a political intelligence service in connection with the American delegation to the Peace Conference and it would appear that an expenditure of at least $50,000 would be imperative. Will you not, therefore, allot to this Department the sum of $50,000 from the appropriation for "National Security and Defense" in order that steps may be taken in Paris immediately to organize such an intelligence service as the conditions seem to require?

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 27 November, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am not clear whether by the enclosed you mean the development which we have been planning through House, in response to his cables, or not. Am I right in assuming that it is?

Faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

Supra.
The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 27, 1918—9 p. m.
[Received 10 p. m.]

194. [From] Grew: Have just discussed with Hoover whole question of political intelligence from the new central states. He is in entire accord with our plan as elaborated in my 182, November 21st and is willing to designate as members of United States Food Administration any men whom I may assign for work in the field. He himself has four or five food experts available who will cooperate with our agents. Have today received Departments 72, and hope to get our men started immediately.

EDWARD HOUSE

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1918.

My Dear Mr. President: You are entirely correct in assuming that my letter of the twenty-sixth of November relates to the expenses of the arrangements for gathering political intelligence, which we have been planning through Colonel House in response to his telegrams.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

Memorandum by the Executive Officer of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Patterson)

PARIS, 5 December, 1918.

Memorandum No. 10
Subject—Courier Service—Plan of Operation

The Commission has attached to it a representative of the Overseas Courier Service which was established by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and which is now operated by the General Staff in the United States, and by the Postal Express Service in cooperation with the State Department and the Navy Department in Europe.

18 Ante, p. 201.
This places at the disposal of the Commission the following service:

I.—**Between Europe and America**

Officer Couriers depart for and arrive from New York and Washington at intervals of about three or four days, connecting with every fast vessel. Special facilities are provided throughout for expediting in every way possible the handling of the dispatches and to provide for their safety. The service has maintained the following record since its installation:

Number of couriers dispatched between Europe and America 80
Best time between Paris and Washington 7 days and 20 hours.
Average time between Paris and Washington 11½ days.

II.—**Throughout Europe**

Courier service is available in Europe as follows:

(1) **Within Paris and to Versailles.**
Regular couriers operate by motorcycle between 4 Place de la Concorde, the American Embassy, 5 Rue Chaillot, Office of Colonel E. M. House, 78 Rue de l’Université, Office of the Commanding General, U. S. Troops, District of Paris, 7 Rue Tilsit, and the Office of the Supreme War Council, Versailles, leaving each point at intervals of one hour from 10:00 A.M., until 10:00 P.M.
A plentiful supply of special motorcycle and other messengers are available to handle dispatches for other points in Paris.

(2) **Between Paris and London.**

(3) **Between Paris and General Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces, General Headquarters British Expeditionary Forces, and Quartier Générale of the French Army.**
Regular couriers operate daily between Paris and the General Headquarters of the French, British, and American Armies. The time of transmission of dispatches are approximately as follows:

(a) Between Paris and G. H. Q., Amer. Expeditionary Forces 5 hours.
(b) Between Paris and British General Headquarters 5 hours.
(c) Between Paris and Grand Quartier Générale 2 hours.

(4) **Between Paris and Army Post Offices in Europe.**
Army Post Offices of the Postal Express Service have been established at all the principal places where American troops are located
in Europe, including the Army, Corps, and Division Headquarters, and the principal cities of France. Dispatches are forwarded between Paris and these post offices through motor dispatch riders, railway postal cars, and other agencies of the Postal Express Service.  

(5) Between Paris and Berne, Switzerland.  

Couriers will operate daily between Paris and Berne, leaving Paris at 8:25 P. M. and leaving Berne, Office of the American Embassy at 10:00 A. M. The time of transmission of dispatches is about 22 hours.  

(6) Between Paris and Rome, Italy.  

Couriers will be dispatched daily between Paris and Rome, leaving Paris at 8:25 P. M. and Rome at 11:00 P. M. The time of transmission of dispatches is approximately 36 hours.  


Couriers will operate daily between Paris and the Offices of the American Embassy at Brussels and the Hague. The time of transmission of dispatches between Paris and Brussels is approximately 12 hours and between Paris and the Hague approximately 20 hours.  


Upon the establishment by the State Department of representatives at these places, communication by courier with them will be instituted.  

R. C. Patterson, Jr.,  
Captain, U. S. A.  

Approved:  
J. C. Grew  
Secretary.  

763.72/12438: Telegram  
The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State  

PARIS, December 5, 1918—7 p. m.  
[Received 8:09 p. m.]  

6144. Your 6499, December 3d, 3 p. m. 14 Embassy has been making a practice of showing all outgoing telegrams of importance to Colonel House.  

Sharp  

14 See vol. ii, p. 391, footnote 11.
Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume I

763.72119 P 43/4: Telegram

Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, December 5, 1918—8 p. m.
[Received December 5—7 p. m.]

232. From Grew. In view of the delay in formulating an agreement among the Allies as to relief policies, it has not yet been possible to send political intelligence agents into the field accredited as representatives of Food Administration and there is at present no certainty as to when this can be arranged, although Hoover will again consider the question on his arrival London where he is now conferring with the British authorities. Since diplomatic secretaries are not available for this purpose, the only method I can suggest without further delay in establishing our organization in the field, is to obtain a release from the Army for such officers as we may select [apparent omission] the approval of the Department and to send them abroad in civilian clothes as representatives of the Department of State and I request a decision on this point. In the meantime, we have made further provisional arrangements with General Nolan as regards organization, codes, etc. and with Colonel Carty of the Signal Corps as regards communication by wireless and we have a long list of Army officers recommended by General Nolan and Colonel Van Deman for this work in the field to be sent abroad a few at a time. Our home office is now well organized and is prepared on the arrival of the Commission to issue daily printed bulletins containing digests of all political and economic intelligence and press reports received from such sources as are available but we shall of course be much handicapped by not having our own agents in the field.

In view of Gibson's assignment to Hoover, whose plans are at present indefinite, his services are not available and other arrangements will have to be made for organizing our field work.

Hugh Wilson he [has?] stated that Dolbeare's health would not prevent his doing light work in Paris and if he is not needed elsewhere he would be of material value to us in our home office here.

Edward House

Paris Peace Conf. 184/41a

The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Paris, December 10, 1918.

My Dear Mr. Ambassador: In connection with the organization of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, there has been

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15 F. R. Dolbeare, second secretary of legation in Switzerland.
established a Liaison Department, whose duties it will be to keep
the Commission in personal touch with all activities with which it
should be familiar. For this purpose, it will be necessary for the
head of this Department, Lieut. Col. R. H. Williams, Jr., to be placed
in touch with various Departments of the French Government and
with various Embassies and Legations. I should be infinitely
obliged if you would prepare and forward to such Departments as
you deem wise a letter accrediting me officially as Secretary of the
American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and as competent to cor-
respond directly in case of need with these various Departments.
My desire is to have your official sanction and introduction before
proceeding to take up matters of an official character on behalf of
the Commission.

Yours very sincerely,

[File copy not signed]

763.72119/2968: Telegram

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, December 12, 1918—1 p. m.

[Received 2:30 p. m.]

7. From Grew. Will you please request the consuls throughout
the Allied and neutral countries and those countries bordering the
Mediterranean to transmit to the American Mission copies of re-
cent and all future reports dealing with the political situation or
with any economic situation of sufficient magnitude to have political
significance. This request is made in order that we may have at
hand here the information on which to predicate comments, criti-
cisms and the like in regard to existing conditions.

American Mission

763.72119/3310f: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington, December 19, 1918—5 p. m.

Representing the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, which
in turn is allied with the economic organizations of the war boards
and which in accordance with memorandum approved by President
is to be official agency for supplying economic information to Peace

26 John Foster Dulles.

272674—42—VOL. I—14
Commissioners. Convinced it will be useful and hope you will support it.

POLK

The Executive Officer of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Bowman) to Messrs. Beer, Day, Dixon, Haskins, Hornbeck, Jefferson, Lord, Lunt, Mezes, Seymour, Shotwell, Westermann, and Young

December 20, 1918.

It has been arranged that each one of the division chiefs is authorized to see nationalist leaders and others to learn more intimately the views of the various nationalist groups. It is suggested that these relations should always be maintained in a very cordial spirit, and that our attitude should be one of receptivity. It is advised that each person maintain an impartial attitude and disclaim any information regarding policies.

The Chief of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Mezes) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

[Paris.] December 21, 1918.

Subject: Organization of a division entitled the Division of Current Intelligence Summaries.

By mutual agreement and in accordance with a conference between Mr. Grew, Dr. Mezes, Mr. Bullitt, and Mr. Bowman, it is proposed to have in the Section of Territorial, Economic, and Political Intelligence a division entitled the Division of Current Intelligence Summaries, and to place Mr. William C. Bullitt in charge.

The plan requires for its operation a central office in charge of Mr. Bullitt where there would be received all current intelligence material, whether reports and memoranda from field agents, cablegrams from embassies, or clippings from the press. The material will be in charge of assistants selected for their ability to discard material as well as select it, so that there may be gathered each day as small an amount as possible of information of critical value to the Commission. The central office would route this material to the different specialists, and would secure the reactions of the specialists to the information obtained each day. There would thus be concentrated
each twenty-four hours the entire information that had been received, and the reactions of all specialists and intelligence officers to it. It would be from such material that Mr. Bullitt would prepare the epitomes and comments for the Commissioners which are now a part of his daily program.

The epitomes would be gathered in a special room, which would be open only to the Commissioners and to the specialists, and to designated officers and assistants of the Division of Current Intelligence Summaries. Those items of greatest importance would be starred on the list of summaries, and the material on which the starred items was based would be found in the special room. All other material would be kept in classified form in the central office of the Division, where it would be available should it be desired by any Commissioner or specialist.

According to the proposed plan the field agents in touch with the Commission would be under the direction of the administrative officers of the Section of Territorial, Economic, and Political Intelligence. Their work in the field would be directed by this Section and their reports received by its central office.

The details of the operation of the central office and the relations between it and the specialists is to be the subject of a conference between Mr. Bullitt and Mr. Bowman, and to later conferences with the specialists, in case this plan is approved by the Commissioners.

S. E. Mezes

Paris Peace Conf. 184/66

The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Mr. William C. Bullitt

[PARIS,] December 23, 1918.

In pursuance of a memorandum submitted by Dr. Mezes to Mr. Grew and approved by the Commission, you have been appointed Chief of the division entitled Current Intelligence Summaries, one of the divisions of that section of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace entitled Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence.

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS, December 31, 1918—8 p. m.
[Received January 1, 1919—6:30 a. m.]

122. [From Lansing.] After having studied the question of sending agents into the field to obtain political information, it seems to me
advisable that these men should go not as representatives of the Department of State, which would give them a diplomatic status and which might be misunderstood, but as agents of the Commission itself. We have accordingly sent Ellis Dresel into Germany to make a general survey of the situation and to return to Paris to report to the Commission within a few days. The following men have also started for Vienna under the leadership of Professor A. C. Coolidge: Captain Walter Davis, Captain W. A. Pashkovski, Professor Robert Kerner, F. E. Parker, Lieutenant R. C. Foster, Lieutenant F. R. King, Lieutenant H. G. Campagnoli; and also officers to act as couriers who will be selected before the party leaves Berne. Their purpose is to establish a nucleus in Vienna, and they will be joined from time to time by other men to be selected by the Commission who will be sent by Coolidge to various points in Central Europe. The Commission will report the names of these men to you for your information as soon as they are definitely selected. We already have a large list of well qualified Army officers to draw from. Their reports will be forwarded to the Department as well as to the Commission. It is intended that Army officers shall go in civilian clothes, permission first having been obtained through military channels from the governments of enemy countries to which it is intended to send them. Lansing.

AMERICAN MISSION

763.72119/3512

The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, January 9, 1919.

[Received January 24.]

Sir: With reference to your telegram No. 127, of January 7th, 4 p. m. , I beg to confirm my reply of even date, stating that the Confidential Bulletin of the Commission was discontinued after No. 7 had been issued, as it was found preferable to convey to the Commissioners by word of mouth, rather than by a printed bulletin, the intelligence received by the Commission. This is done by Mr. Bullitt, who receives all incoming intelligence and communicates a digest thereof orally to each of the Commissioners in a daily personal conference.

7 For correspondence concerning the Dresel Mission to Germany, see vol. II, pp. 180 ff.
8 For correspondence concerning the dispatch of the Coolidge Mission, see vol. II, pp. 218 ff.
9 Not printed.
As a matter of record, I enclose the seven issues of the Confidential Bulletin, as well as a copy of the Official Bulletin,\textsuperscript{20} which preceded the Confidential Bulletin and of which only one number was published.

I have [etc.]

\textsuperscript{20} None reprinted.

J. C. Grew
CENSORSHIP AND RELATIONS WITH THE PRESS

851.731/118 : Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 16, 1918—10 p. m.
[Received 10:40 p. m.]

114. Secret for the President. I suggest that you send me a cable which I can show to the heads of British and French Governments for the purpose of obtaining from them the entire suspension of the present political censorship upon American press despatches; military necessity can no longer be invoked as a defense of the drastic censorship now being exercised. There seems to be in my opinion no adequate reason why the character of the political information supplied to the American people should be dictated by the French and British Governments.

EDWARD HOUSE

851.731/118 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1918—5 p. m.

42. Your Number 114, November 16, 10 p. m. Following reply from the President:

"Please express to the French and British authorities our hope and expectation that they will entirely remove the present political censorship upon American press dispatches. Now that the argument of military necessity no longer obtains, there can be no good reason why the character of the political information supplied to our people should be determined by the British and French Governments and there is danger of a very serious revulsion of feeling on this side of the water, if such a censorship is continued. I hope that you will press the matter very earnestly and very promptly."

LANSING

212
851.731/117: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 21, 1918—9 p. m.
[Received November 21—5:05 p. m.]

137. Secret for the President and Secretary of State. I have just received the following communication from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

"You were good enough to communicate to me under date of yesterday telegram of President Wilson expressing desire that the political censorship applied up to the present to press telegrams sent from France to America be completely suppressed. I have the honor to inform you that the French Government is happy to respond to the desire of President Wilson. Dispositions will therefore be taken immediately to suppress all censorship of press telegrams sent from France to the United States. Please accept, et cetera. Signed S. Pichon."

This is of course very satisfactory. I have taken the measures up with the British authorities through Lord Derby, and I expect to have an answer from them before long. I shall advise the press correspondents informally of the action of the French Government, and request them to advise me of any further interference with their press despatches.

Edward House

851.731/116: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 22, 1918—12 p. m.
[Received November 22—9:08 p. m.]

146. Referring further to our number 137.1 I am now advised by the press correspondents that their messages to the United States are being permitted to pass through without interference by the French censor.

Edward House

841.731/2103: Telegram

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 28, 1918—12 p. m.
[Received November 28—9:10 a. m.]

195. Secret for the President. Referring to our 137 and 146.2 I am advised through Wiseman that the British Government have

1 Supra.
2 Both printed supra.
abolished the political censorship of press despatches for the United States from Great Britain.

EDWARD HOUSE

Robert Lansing Papers

President Wilson to the Secretary of State

PARIS, 17 December, 1918.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have been thinking a great deal lately about the contact of the Commission with the public through the press and particularly about the way in which the Commission should deal with the newspaper men who have come over from the United States. I have come to the conclusion that much the best way to handle this matter is for you and the other Commissioners to hold a brief meeting each day and invite the representatives of the press to come in at each meeting for such interchange of information or suggestions as may be thought necessary. This I am sure is preferable to any formal plan or to any less definite arrangement.

I am also convinced that the preparation of all the press matter that is to be issued from the Commission is a task calling for a particular sort of experienced ability. I beg, therefore, that you and your fellow Commissioners will agree to the appointment of Mr. Ray Stannard Baker as your representative in the performance of this duty. Mr. Baker enjoys my confidence in a very high degree and I have no hesitation in commending him to you as a man of ability, vision and ideals. He has been over here for the better part of a year, has established relationships which will be of the highest value, and is particularly esteemed by the very class of persons to whom it will be most advantageous to us to be properly interpreted in the news that we have to issue. If you see no conclusive objection to this, I would suggest that you request Mr. Baker to do us the very great service of acting in this capacity.

I am writing in the same terms to the other members of the Commission.

Sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

033.1140/50: Telegram

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS [undated.]

[Received December 19, 1918—10:21 p. m.]

29. For Polk from Auchincloss. 4. Please deliver the following message to Tumulty from the President.
The President has made the following arrangements with respect to the handling of our newspaper publicity while he is in Europe: Maximilian Foster is to act as liaison officer between the President and the newspaper men. He is to give out all announcements respecting the plans of the President and the Commission and all routine or special news items. Each morning at 10:30 the four members of the Commission, other than the President, are to meet all the newspaper men in one room and at that time be questioned by them. The President has designated Ray Stannard Baker to act with the newspaper men as the interpreter of the American position at the Conference, to handle the publicity of the Commission and to reflect the general spirit and purposes of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Creel is to have charge of the dissemination and spreading broadcast throughout the world [outside?] the United States of all publicity given out by the Commission. It will be the policy of the Commissioners to be very frank with the newspaper men and to give them as much information as is practicable trusting to their discretion in not publishing any information that would cause trouble or that would be indiscreet in any way. It is impossible for us over here to know whether newspaper men are respecting our confidence or not. We have no way of telling whether they publish information which was given them simply as “a steer” and not for publication. The President wishes you to keep a close lookout on the American press and to cable him freely exactly what the tone of the press is and whether any particular papers are acting in an indiscreet way. He also wishes you from time to time to make any suggestions that may occur to you to assist us in our work with the newspaper men.

AMERICAN MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 184 82/2 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1918—2 p. m.
[Received December 21—10 a. m.]

67. For the Secretary of State. The press telegrams from Paris are now read with a great deal of interest and are the basis of discussion in Congress and editorial comment. The stories are frequently contradictory and sometimes obviously ridiculous. I take the liberty of suggesting that the press representatives be warned of [the danger] of speculation and if possible it might be desirable for someone in the mission to see the reports that are sent particularly by the press associations, not for the purpose of censorship, but to be in a position when desirable to inform the Department that reports are untrue so they could be contradicted.
The Associated Press under date of December 18th Paris, stated that the American delegation had resolved to advocate sinking of the surrendered warships. As a result of this story resolution was introduced in the Senate protesting against this policy. Suggest Department be authorized to contradict story if untrue.

I have warned press here against danger of accepting these press stories as facts and the danger of creating irritation against the Allies as a result of reported serious disagreements.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 184.82/2: Telegram

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

[PARIS,] December 23, 1918.

76. [From Lansing.] Your 67 December 20th 2:00 p.m. The matter dealt with by the Associated Press under date of December 18th mentioned in your telegram has not been discussed here. Lansing.

AMERICAN MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 184.82/3

The Chief of the Press Bureau (Baker) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

PARIS, December 31, 1918.

Subject: An interview of British newspaper correspondents with the members of the Commission.

1. Mr. George Adam, the Paris correspondent of the London Times, was in to see me today to talk over the relationship of the British correspondents to the American Commission. The same subject has been broached by other British correspondents. They are very desirous of some opportunity for meeting the Commissioners. They do not ask to come in with the American correspondents at the morning sessions, but suggest an opportunity once or twice in the week of meeting the Commissioners. There will be from half a dozen to ten.

2. I would suggest that the Commission receive, at least once, sometime this week, the British correspondents, immediately following a morning meeting with the American correspondents. Mr. Adam says that the British Press Association will nominate the men and that they will all be noteworthy correspondents.

3. I have made inquiries in regard to what the British practice will be. Mr. Adam says it is the intention of the news department of the British Commission to treat all correspondents alike, extending no
special facilities to the British correspondents. But it is not intended that any correspondent shall directly meet members of the Commission. Sir George Riddell, assisted by Mr. Mair, will be here on behalf of the British Commission and will see correspondents. Access even for British correspondents to the British Commissioners can only be had by special appointment.

4. Whether the American Commission should receive the British correspondents regularly unless the British Commissioners will extend similar privileges to the American correspondents, is a subject open to question. I believe, however, that it would be not only an act of courtesy, but an expression of the democratic American approach to this whole situation if the Commission would receive the British correspondents at least once, and let them present their own case.

RAY STANNARD BAKER

Paris Peace Conf. 184,82/5

The Chief of the Press Bureau (Baker) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)


Subject: Appointments of British correspondents with the commissioners.

1. In reference to the decision of the Commission in regard to making appointments for British correspondents, I have sent the enclosed letter to Mr. Adam. I think it will cover the ground.

RAY STANNARD BAKER

[Enclosure]

The Chief of the Press Bureau (Baker) to Mr. George Adam

PARIS, January 2, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. ADAM: I have, in accordance with our conversation of the other day, taken up the matter of meetings of British correspondents with the American Commissioners. The present morning conferences with American newspaper men are not for the purpose of giving out news but are merely give and take conversations to bring about a clearer understanding between the Commission and the correspondents. It is felt that if the Commissioners appoint meetings with the British correspondents, they would also have to set a time for the French and Italian correspondents, and there seems, moreover, to be no arrangement by which the American correspondents will be given an opportunity of meeting the British Commissioners.
It is our desire to cooperate fully with the British correspondents, and to grant them every facility in our Press Department, and we shall undertake to give any of the correspondents who come to us, here, the fullest possible information at our disposal. I wish, personally, to make the acquaintance of as many of the British correspondents as possible.

Very sincerely yours, 

RAY STANNARD BAKER


Subject: List of visitors.

1. I spoke to the Commission the other morning in regard to giving a daily list of the visitors who have called upon the Commissioners, and the names of those with whom the Commissioners have held conferences, so that the newspaper correspondents can have some idea of what is going on. This suggestion was approved.

2. Will it be convenient for you if we have an orderly call at 6.30 every evening for these reports? This is a system with which the correspondents have become familiar in connection with visitors to the White House at Washington.

RAY STANNARD BAKER


1. I hear a great many newspaper men inquiring anxiously as to whether the initial meeting of the Peace Conference is to be an open one, so that they can be present. They hope that the American Commissioners will use their influence in this direction. Whatever may be the policy afterwards in regard to Committee Conferences, a formal opening meeting would help enormously in making our people feel that they were being made a part of the proceedings: and would give the correspondents an opportunity of seeing and hearing all the delegates from all of the countries.

RAY STANNARD BAKER
The Assistant Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Harrison) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)

[Paris,] January 8, 1919.

I presented Mr. Baker's request to the Commissioners at the meeting this morning, and Mr. Baker also spoke to them before their meeting with the newspaper correspondents. It did not seem practical to have the newspaper correspondents attend the initial meeting of the Allied Delegates, if that is what was meant by Mr. Baker's request. It is thought probable that provision would be made for the newspaper correspondents to be present at the first formal meeting of the Conference.

Mr. Baker has already been advised of the Commissioners' views in this matter.

Leland Harrison

No. 114
Subject: Press Office.

1. In order to facilitate the work of Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, in charge of the Press Office of the Commission, I shall be very glad if you will place at his disposal such information in the possession of the Political, Territorial and Economic Intelligence Section as he may desire, it being understood that you will indicate to him how much of this information may, in your opinion, properly be published; that he will regard as confidential any other data which you may furnish him; and that he will submit to me for approval any communications to the Press which may be prepared in his office based upon information furnished by your section. I have informed Mr. Baker to the foregoing effect.

J. C. G[rew]

January 9, 1919.
The Chief of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Mezes) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)


Re: Publicity.

After consultation with the Plenipotentiaries, Mr. Baker desires that members of the Intelligence Section from time to time prepare memoranda for, and make oral explanations to the press representatives, outlining facts and problems in interesting regions, but without setting forth attitudes or policies.

While this is not a job for which we have preference, we are willing to undertake it, as desired, provided the Plenipotentiaries approve of our doing so, notwithstanding the embarrassments to themselves that are likely to be involved. I mean that in cabling this news, the pressmen will inevitably interlard it with discussions and statements of policy, which some of them will at times attribute to the plenipotentiaries, entailing embarrassment and calling for denials or more serious action.

It evidently is not for this section to decide whether that risk is to be assumed.

S. E. Mezes