

CHAPTER II

THE NORTHERN REGION

Opposition in Archangel to the Soviet Régime—German Threat through Finland to the Murman Railway—Shipment of Arms and Stores to the Interior of Russia—British Requests for the Dispatch of American Forces to Murmansk—Arrival of a French Warship—Landing of Armed Forces—Allied Cooperation with the Murmansk Soviet—Arrival of an American Cruiser—German and Soviet Demands for Withdrawal of Allied and American Forces—Agreement of July 6, 1918, with the Murmansk Soviet—Argument of the Consul at Archangel against Intervention

File No. 861.00/953

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, January 13, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received January 15, 10.20 a. m.]

2228. Cole, Consul at Archangel, in reports dated January 2, 9th, latter being reply to your 1931, December 24,¹ states that commander in chief of Archangel and White Sea region same person appointed by Kerensky, and still directs all military, naval, and civilian affairs. When Bolshevik revolution occurred, socialist anti-Bolshevik leaders, with consent and cooperation of commander in chief, formed revolutionary committee in anticipation of possibility local Bolsheviks' assuming authority. This committee proclaimed itself the supreme power in the province and has been continuously sustained by commander in chief and civil authorities; no independence proclaimed, but committee function [proclamation?] announced orders of People's Commissaries obeyed. Munition shipments practically ceased.

Cole report January 4 stated movement started for federation of eight northeastern provinces by representatives of Zemstvos, Councils of Workmen-Soldiers-Peasants' Deputies, professional unions, City Dumas of Archangel, Vologda, Olonets, Novgorod, Yaroslav, Vyatka, and Perm Provinces, but his report of 9th states separation movement less strong and sentiment favoring semi-autonomous policy, as fear was growing that starvation would ensue if declared complete independence, starvation being only influence checking anti-Bolshevik sentiment.

Cole reports Constituent Assembly elections show following percentages for Archangel Province: Social Revolutionists 62, Cadets 10,

¹ Vol. I, p. 324.

Mensheviks 6, Bolsheviks 21, and that Bolshevik vote in Archangel city confined to soldiers, sailors, and naval shop workmen, that anti-Bolshevik sentiment attributable to money scarcity, interference with Constituent Assembly, and seizure of banks.

Reports railroad transportation steadily declining because of lack of locomotives, that food committee declares breadstuff supply will last until middle of February and that local supply meat and fish, small but steady. Postscript says "both" Constituent Assembly delegates are conservative Social Revolutionists.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1233

The British Embassy to the Department of State

No. 232

MEMORANDUM

The British Rear Admiral at Murmansk has reported to His Majesty's Government that a serious situation exists there owing to the anti-Ally attitude adopted by the Bolshevik garrison, and to the reported intention of the Finns who, acting at the instigation of the Germans, propose to advance on the Petrograd-Murmansk Railway. The arrival at Murmansk from Petrograd of refugees who are seeking passages for England and of repatriated Russian sailors and soldiers, the attitude of whom will probably be hostile, is complicating the situation.

In the opinion of the British Rear Admiral, the occupation of Murmansk will probably be necessary and he has made an urgent appeal for reinforcements. A British cruiser has been sent and the British Embassy are instructed to ask the United States Government to dispatch a man-of-war to join the squadron now on the spot as soon as possible, as the situation may develop rapidly and the matter is therefore extremely urgent.

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1918.

[Received March 5.]

File No. 861.00/1401a

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1918, 3 p. m.

2107. Request Norwegian Consul, Petrograd, deliver following message for Robins, head of American Red Cross Commission:

Please telegraph full statement of conditions at Murmansk as reported by Wardwell when he arrives, covering political situation, accumulation of supplies if any and condition of railroad transportation.

POLK

File No. 861.00/1268

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 11, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received March 12, 11.37 a. m.]

5. Martin¹ wires several hundred marines landed at Murman, more troops expected and that he participated by invitation in meeting with Russian, British, French officers who are organizing to defend Murman Railway from threatened or probable attack by Germans. He says that he saw a telegram from Trotsky approving of concerted action, and all regretted that no American officers on the ground to participate.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1293

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 12, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received March 14, 12 p. m.]

Cole wires answering inquiry concerning rifles *en route* Petrograd from Archangel that 50,000 ordered by Red Guard but that local committee sailors shipped 210,000 [rifles?] and 16,000,000 cartridges: still 110,000 rifles at Archangel.

Haynes² reports all attempts to pass Americans through Red and White Guard lines unsuccessful, that impossible to dispatch vessel from Stockholm, account mines, and that Germans have landed in Hangö and their aeroplanes been over Helsingfors for several days; that peace will be signed and Germans will take Petrograd.

Summers³ thinks peace will be ratified as no army in opposition in any way; says greatest danger now is drifting of sentiment of educated classes to Germany on account of the continued persecution by Bolsheviks.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1461

The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Robertson) to the Counselor for the Department of State (Polk)

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1918.

DEAR MR. POLK: The Ambassador has asked me to send to you the enclosed paraphrase of the telegram which he read to you this afternoon.

Yours [etc.]

ARNOLD ROBERTSON

¹ Lieut. (later Capt.) Hugh S. Martin, assistant military attaché.

² Thornwell Haynes, Consul at Helsingfors.

³ Maddin Summers, Consul General at Moscow.

[Enclosure—Telegram—Paraphrase]

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington (Reading)

March 12, 1918.

It appears most probable that the Germans will, as a result of the peace concluded with Russia, demand the evacuation of Murmansk by the Allies and that they may make an attempt themselves to occupy the port (1) as a submarine base; (2) with a view to furthering their designs on Spitzbergen; (3) for the purpose of cutting off Allied trade with Russia after the war. They will probably also be anxious to seize or destroy the large number of Russian vessels now at Archangel and Murmansk.

It appears essential for the above reasons that the position of the Allies at Murmansk should be a strong one, and it is considered desirable that their fleet there should be as representative as possible. Arrangements have been made by the French Government to send a man-of-war immediately and you should again urge upon the United States Government that it is desirable that they should follow the French example.

File No. 861.00/1388

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 28, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received March 29, 6.51 p. m.]

45. Leading [Martin?], Murman wires that British, French co-operating with Soviet there and that presence of American war vessel [would] have good effect. Military attaché and I so recommend. Can you send one? French, Italian Embassy, Serbian Legation arriving Vologda to-morrow numbering seventy. This tribute gratifying but regrettable from food standpoint.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1400

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 31, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 9.56 p. m.]

49. Martin, Murman, wires, 24th, French cruiser there and 200 troops in barracks, also armed marines and field pieces being landed from British cruiser. It is reported that Finnish White Guards being drilled by German officers and that points of Murman line are threatened and that railroad mined south of Murman and five war vessels in port to resist possible attack.

Cole wires, 27th, that public meeting will be held at Archangel to-morrow concerning food supplies which proposed attending unofficially; that evacuation commission rapidly shipping to interior from accumulation of supplies purchased from Allies on loans subsequently repudiated; that the local Soviet through British influence vainly objecting. Endeavoring through Robins and Summers to ascertain destination and explanation of such Soviet policy.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1693

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Vologda, April 24, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received April 30, 3.14 p. m.]

121. Cole wires two food ships arrived river mouth from England and met by armed ice-breaker. Lockhart,¹ answering inquiry whether Soviet government complied with landing conditions, said [he was?] endeavoring to have such conditions stated in my 92, April 12, 3 p. m.,² observed. I understood that vessels would remain with me [White Sea?] until Soviet accepted conditions but arrival at Archangel presents interesting situation, as local Soviet clamoring for provisions and opposing the removal of military supplies from Archangel which Central Soviet been transferring to Sukhona, twenty miles north Vologda, and to Siberian localities.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1765

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 8, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received May 9, 8.46 p. m.]

492. From source considered reliable it is learned that Count Mirbach³ has presented an ultimatum to the Soviet authorities stating that if British and French troops do not at once evacuate Murman Peninsula the consequence will be most grave and it will be necessary for Germany to undertake military operations occupying further territory either in the direction of Murmansk or elsewhere.

POOLE

¹Robert H. B. Lockhart, British special representative in Russia.

²No record of receipt of such telegram.

³Wilhelm, Count von Mirbach, German Ambassador to the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.

File No. 861.00/1764

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 8, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received May 9, 8.19 p. m.]

Remaining here for two days longer to study situation, including subjects mentioned in your 87, April 26, 6 p. m.² If Germany delivered ultimatum to Soviet government as reported in Consul General's No. 492, May 8, 1 p. m., Allied intervention should not be delayed, regardless of Soviet reply to ultimatum. If a demand for evacuation Murman is denied, Soviet government will require and probably request Allied assistance. If Soviet government accedes to German demand, of course Murman will not be evacuated and in such event Allied intervention should be announced regardless of Soviet wishes. Soviet government alarmed by German action in Ukraine, see Consul General's No. 493 of to-day,³ and by German possession of Rostov-on-Don and is evidently nervous concerning situation generally. No known organized opposition to Soviet government with force at its command but dissatisfaction therewith evidently [indicated], and maintain my opinion majority of Russian people would welcome Allied intervention.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1774

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 9, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received May 11, 1.55 p. m.]

504. Information received to-day practically confirms rumor of German ultimatum to the Soviet government reported my No. 492.

It is stated now that ultimatum contains three conditions: (1) immediate departure of British and French troops from Murman Peninsula; (2) occupation of Fort Ino near Petrograd; (3) disarmament of Lettish regiment which is now serving as personal guard to the Bolshevik leaders. We learned that the demand based on ground that Letts are [not] Russians but foreigners and should be sent to their native land. Demand respecting withdrawal French, British troops considered critical and evidence accumulating of consternation in Bolshevik circles accompanied by tendency on their part to seek assistance of the Allies.

¹ Sent via the Consulate General at Moscow (No. 496).

² Vol. III, p. 122.

³ Post, p. 682.

There is press gossip of further German demands involving economic reforms and the restoration of order through the placing of German troops of occupation at important centers. Possibility of German occupation of Moscow within near future again being discussed by serious people.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/1887

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract ¹]

VOLOGDA, May 20, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received May 26, 10.42 p. m.]

185. . . . Latest information from Embassy's men, Murman, dated 14th, states Finns attacking railway but repulsed by assistance of the British landed in greater number. Halsey,² substitute for Martin who is now in Moscow but is returning Murman soon, reports local Soviet cooperating with French contingents there but Central Soviet endeavoring with the assistance of German agitators at Murman to prevent such cooperation. Arrival of *Olympia* Murman anxiously awaited. The capture of Murman by Germans would jeopardize Archangel connection with England and America if not wholly sever it, consequently urgently important to send assistance to Murman immediately.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1894

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 22, 1918.

[Received May 29, 5.20 a. m.]

192. Station agent Vologda received service message that Murman Railroad cut on northern third by Finns. German submarines destroyed Russian wireless station at Murman and sunk Russian freighters, and several Norwegian fish boats in Murman waters.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1914

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 26, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received May 30, 6 p. m.]

205. Information from various sources confirms reported plan of Swedes [Finns], Germans to capture Murman line and Murman

¹Printed in full in vol. I, p. 536.

²The Rev. Jesse Halsey, Y.M.C.A. secretary.

itself. Halsey wires *Olympia* arrived at Murman 24th which is exceedingly gratifying. Martin leaving here to-day for there with instruction to communicate with you direct if my communication severed. Have instructed him to advise *Olympia* commander to land marines if so requested by the local Soviet as the British and the French have already landed. Highly important Allies should retain Murman as its capture by the Germans would sever Archangel and result in Russian-American communication's being confined to Pacific.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1897

The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, May 26, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received May 29, 9.39 a. m.]

Munition stores and two food ships question still unsettled. Believe presence American cruiser would have excellent effect on this and other problems. British cruiser expected here at end of month or first of next.

Four-cornered struggle here for power, parties thereto being:

- (1) Extraordinary evacuation commission whose members personally dishonest, pro-German and overbearing.
- (2) Chief [of] newly created old [Red] army White Sea military district, reported self-seeking, wily, and by some lukewarm pro-Ally only; both the above have mandates from Moscow, the first from Lenin, the second from Trotsky.
- (3) Central [committee,] Arctic Ocean flotilla, now influenced by newly arrived Black Sea sailors; this committee overbearing has just sanctioned murder on main street in broad daylight which forced assistant to commander in chief escape at once by leaving Archangel; this committee desires to dictate for entire province but lacks determined leadership.
- (4) Soviet provincial executive committee now nominally controlling province and pro-Ally because hoping receive food supplies; president this committee resents control from center but has no armed force to support him.

Old office of commander in chief being liquidated, the above four institutions [are] taking all his functions.

COLE

File No. 861.00/1907½

The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State

[The following paraphrase of a telegram was handed to the Secretary by the Ambassador on May 29, 1918:]

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington

May 28, 1918.

We understand from your reports that intervention at Archangel and Murmansk is regarded by the United States as a different question from that of intervention in the Far East.

I should be much obliged if you would urgently impress upon the United States Government and upon the President the following considered opinion of our military and naval authorities on this question.

On the Murmansk coast assistance from America is badly required and is, in fact, essential. Every day the position of Murmansk is more seriously endangered and, as the United States Government will of course be aware, it is of vital importance to us to retain Murmansk, if we desire to retain any possibility at all of entering Russia.

This danger has become so extreme that we are sending to Murmansk such small marine and military forces as we are able to spare during the present crisis in France. These forces will, however, clearly not be enough to resist the further efforts which the enemy are certain to put forward on this coast. The despatch of additional French or British reinforcements is impossible and it is therefore essential that America should help by sending a brigade, to which a few guns should be added. It is not necessary that the troops sent should be completely trained, as we anticipate that military operations in this region will only be of an irregular character.

It is possible that we may be asked why British troops are not sent. The reason is that Great Britain is now completely denuded of troops, and it is not feasible to take trained troops, even in small numbers, from France where they are being used more or less as *cadres* for the training of the American forces now reaching the west front. There is a further consideration which is worthy of careful consideration by the President. Great use has been made already of the divergence of view among the Allied countries with regard to the Russian situation, and for this reason it is of great importance that the United States should show their agreement with us on this matter by taking part in the steps adopted for preventing the closing of the only remaining door through which assistance can be given to Russia in her hour of need.

File No. 861.00/1987

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State[Telegram—Extract ¹]

Moscow, May 29, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received June 9, 10.21 p. m.]

576. . . . Halsey telegraphs from Murman May 25:

Notwithstanding orders received direct from Moscow Commissariat Foreign Affairs, district Soviet desires Allies to remain. They

¹ Printed in full in vol. I, p. 545.

inform me in writing that their feelings toward United States are most sincere and cordial and that this friendship will only be cemented by presence American warship. *Olympia* arrived 24th and is under orders British admiral.

Bolsheviks probably hope that by Murman cession to Finland they can avoid issue through direct clash between Allies on one side and Finland and Germany on other. . . .

POOLE

File No. 861.00/2299

*The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)*

ARCHANGEL, June 1, 1918.

[Copy received from the Consul July 19.]

SIR: I have the honor to request your attention to the following considerations regarding intervention in Russia by the Allies, considerations which lead me to fear and be apprehensive of such an intervention:

1. Intervention will begin on a small scale but with each step forward will grow in scope and in its demands for ships, men, money and materials.

To hold Archangel a part of the Archangel-Vologda Railroad must be held. As the River Dvina diverges to the east from the railroad line a part of the river must be held. The right flank toward Petrozavodsk must also be held. If the munitions evacuated toward the interior from Archangel are to be salvaged by force the railroad to and beyond Vologda must be held and the river to and beyond Kotlas. This means not the mere occupation of Archangel but an expedition into the interior of Russia. It means establishing and maintaining telegraph, telephone, wireless, railroad, river, White Sea water, sledge, automobile and horse communication with repair shops, hospitals, food warehouses, munitions trains, etc., etc. All of these things must be brought here in ships from Europe or America and maintained entirely by Allied means as the Russians can not be depended on to work willingly or, if at all, effectively. They work for themselves neither willingly nor effectively. Still less so will they work for others.

If intervention develops normally and according to its own inner necessities it will eventually result in establishing a new "Russian front" in place of the one ruined by the revolution. This front will lie somewhere north of Moscow, somewhere east of Petrograd

and somewhere west of the southern Ural Mountains. This time, however, the front will not be maintained by Russia with the Allies' help, but by the Allies without Russia's help and perhaps even against a large part of Russia's active or passive resistance.

In any case there are neither coal nor iron nor factories to work either coal or iron, nor is there wheat, in that part of Russia that will lie behind the new Allied front in Russia. If there had been any of these things Germany would have treated the north of Russia as she has treated the fruitful Ukraine, and the iron-bearing and coal-producing Donets Basin long ago.

Count the number of fighting men necessary to hold a front from Finland to the southern Urals. To this add the number of artisans, transport workers, etc., including the men to load and unload and run ships between New York or London and Russia and you will have the personnel needed for intervention. Then count the number of ships needed to support every hundred men at the front or in the rear of an army, and you will have the man power and ship power that intervention will cost—the approximate drain on our present none-too-great power needed in France.

Add to this that once launched there is no stopping such an expedition at any moment. The Dardanelles expedition was withdrawn almost in a night, but it never went more than a few miles inland and never operated over a front of more than a few miles. An expedition into Russia could not be withdrawn in a night or a week or a month—especially after Archangel freezes and the neck of the White Sea clogs up with ice.

The Murman Railroad communicates with Vologda only via Zvanka (which is practically Petrograd) and which will by the time of an intervention be in German or Finnish hands. Further, in winter, which will arrive before an expeditionary force could more than get started, the Murman line from Kandalaksha to Murmansk is the only way in and out of Archangel except the always possible but always difficult and dangerous passage of the neck of the White Sea by ice breaker. And navigation in the White Sea itself in winter must be maintained by ice breakers. Furthermore, from Kandalaksha to Murmansk, in fact for its whole length, the Murman Railroad has an open and exposed flank for it runs its entire length parallel to the Finnish frontier.

2. The ground for landing an interventionary force has not been properly prepared. The north of Russia is nowhere near as pro-Ally as it might be. Before talking business with a Russian you have to sit down to a glass of tea with him, preferably, if you are proposing the business, at your expense. The Russian native population in the north should be given "baksheesh" before it is asked to assist

an interventionary force. A few food ships should have been sent with no conditions or demands attached to them except that a fair exchange of the food for local produce or money be arranged.

3. Intervention in the north of Russia will mean that we must feed the entire north of Russia containing from 500,000 to 1,500,000 population, depending on the area of territory embraced in the intervention—perhaps even more if the intervention grows like a snowball, as I am convinced it will, at first anyway. The moment that any move is made at Archangel that the Soviet government can interpret as intervention or hostility, that thin stream of food that is now trickling into Archangel will cease abruptly. Then the Allies will be forced either to feed that entire population of Archangel Province and the region embraced in the intervention, or else to see thousands starve to death. If the intervention is withdrawn the moral obligation to feed will remain as the thin thread now uniting Archangel in this sense with the rest of Russia, once broken, can not soon be reestablished.

4. Intervention can not reckon on active support from Russians. All the fight is out of Russia. The Russians have definitely "quit". In fact they "quit" last spring before June. The only men who will fight are a few Red Guards and Red Army men, and their best stomach for fighting is against the *bourgeois* in their own land. Some Russian officers and *bourgeois* volunteers would undoubtedly rally to an Allied anti-Soviet movement but more for their pocket-books than for Russia or for hate of Germany. If nearer, they would, and have, rallied to Germany.

I believe every hope based on raising volunteers among the Russians to support an Allied army in Russia against Germany is doomed to complete and utter disappointment. Few men will be so raised and they will fight worse than indifferently.

The bulk of the population is indifferent to everything except their stomachs (bank accounts, wages or food). It cares more for food than for Russia, more for sugar than for independence, more for bread than for national pride.

5. The Socialist Revolutionists, Mensheviks, and Cadets who now advocate intervention are discredited officeholders seeking to regain power. They were only able to "lead" the people when they advocated peace (no more fighting), anti-imperialism (an excuse to desert from the front), and socialism (an excuse to raise wages indefinitely or to steal land or property belonging to others—such is the ignorant peasant's understanding of it). The very men who now pray for our bayonets to restore them to power are the ones who did more than even the Bolsheviks to ruin the Russian front and the Allies' common cause in Russia. They are more

responsible than the Bolsheviks for the present terrible struggle in France. The B[olsheviks] did not ruin the army, they merely swam into power on the ruination of the army.

The Socialist Revolutionist, Menshevik, and Cadet "intellectuals" will never rule Russia. Their place is around the steaming samovar, not in the halls of government. Their invitation to enter Russia is not an invitation from the Russian people. They misjudge the temper of the Russian people to-day as badly as they did a year ago.

6. On the other hand, the men who do rule Russia, however badly it is done, are the small Bolshevik leaders, who will always and everywhere oppose intervention. These men, not the "intellectuals," will direct Russian public opinion. They are coming more and more to see that Germany is the real enemy of Russia, not the so-called imperialist Allies. The attacks on the "imperialists of all nations" are becoming more and more phrases of habit, mere sops to the necessity for impartiality, and are losing their characters of being believed in either by those who repeat them or by those who hear them. In this sense the landing of Japanese at Vladivostok set back the progress of pro-Ally sentiment in Russia many months without adding anything tangible to the strength of our moral or political position. The same will be just as true, although on a more grandiose scale, of any intervention through Archangel, or deeper intervention through Vladivostok or Harbin.

The small Bolshevik leaders are becoming more and more anti-German. "Give the devil enough rope and he will hang himself." That is what Germany began at the robber's peace signed at Brest, what she has been doing in the Donets region, in the Crimea, and now, again, in the Ukraine (Skoropadski). The same is true of her action in Finland, Lithuania, Esthonia and Poland. Intervention will give many the chance to say that the Allies are no better than Germany, whereas, like Caesar's wife, we should be above suspicion even.

7. No child can ever be convinced that it is spanked for its own benefit. The mass of the Russian lower classes still believe in the Bolsheviks. Intervention will alienate thousands of anti-German Bolsheviks and we shall merely gain the support of discredited "intellectuals" and *bourgeois*. The *bourgeois* will soon tire of us if we do not restore their bank accounts.

8. Every foreign invasion that has gone deep into Russia has been swallowed up. The Germans know this and have only taken the nearest and most fruitful regions, avoiding the unproductive north. If they advance farther it will only be to their own ruin unless they come as allies to help the Soviet government against

the Allies. If we intervene, going farther into Russia as we succeed, we shall be swallowed up.

9. I can not see that the fundamental situation in Russia is changed even if it were proven that Lenin, Trotsky, Sverdlov, etc., drew monthly pay checks from the Berlin treasury. Whether intentionally or unintentionally everything that they or any other socialists in Russia have done has redounded to the advantage of Germany and our disadvantage, beginning with order No. 1 on the second day of the revolution. But the future of Russia is still in the Russian people, and it is of them we must think, of obtaining their lasting good will. Unless we are to march to Moscow and depose Lenin it is of little importance whether he be a German agent or not. If he is a German agent nothing would please him better than an intervention as he could at once throw himself into an open alliance with Germany. It is vitally important to the Allies, for the sake of the future (I hold that the present holds no military profit for us in Russia, see paragraph 4), that any cooperation between Russians and Germany be clandestine and contraband and attained either by the use of brute force by Germany, against Russia's will, or by German bribery and Russian treachery. It should have no possibility of a color of justification due to action by the Allies.

Intervention will not strengthen Russia against Germany, for, as said, it will only force the Bolshevik government into Germany's arms, commercially, financially, and militarily, and worst of all will establish, *de facto*, a friendly cooperation between the official Russian government and Berlin. If the war ends in less than victory in the west, such an alliance will be fatal to all our hopes for the great future in Russia. If the war ends in victory, such an alliance could never be entirely undone and for years would be a brake on our work in Russia.

10. Intervention will not engage three Germans in Russia to every one Ally. As at Saloniki, Rumania and Italy, and even in Russia, Germany will have the inside communication line while we must move in ships on the outside line. The front that will grow up will be infinitely nearer Berlin than London or Paris or New York. If the ships and men and auxiliary services for the new front be counted, it will be found that intervention will use three Allied war-power units to Germany's one.

11. Intervention will belie all our promises to the Russian people made since October 26, 1917.

12. We will lose that moral superiority over Germany which is a tower of strength to us everywhere, because we shall have de-

scended to using Germany's own weapons; namely, intervention and force.

13. We shall have sold our birthright in Russia for a mess of pottage. The birthright is the future friendship and economic cooperation with a great and free democracy controlling untold riches. The pottage will be the recovery of a few thousand tons of materials that we once gave to Russia after deciding we could ourselves do without them, the temporary control (for we do not intend annexation) of some hundreds of square miles of forest and barren northern tundra, trackless and as yet unproductive, a new front to drain our none-too-great resources for the war, and the thanks of a few discredited politicians without constituents.

And after all, unless we are to invade the whole of Russia, we shall not have affected that part of Russia where the population is massed, namely the center and the south where the industrial, mining and agricultural strength of Russia lies.

I leave out of consideration the point of view which to my mind might justify intervention eventually; namely, that our policy in Russia must be to keep her ruined and keep her in a turmoil. This would prevent Germany's making use of Russia just as after the revolution Germany prevented Russia's being of use to the Allies by fomenting turmoil and ruin.

Now for what I believe to be the best way to meet Germany in Russia and give her battle.

Russia is for a long time definitely and finally out of the war. The Allies, therefore, in Russia, are in the economic struggle with Germany that has been called the "war after the war." Thanks in part to Russia's economic backwardness, thanks in part to the war itself, and thanks in part to the economic insanity of the Bolsheviks, Russia is down and out economically and financially—at Germany's mercy now and for a long time to come. This is highly disadvantageous to the Allies, because now and in the future it strengthens Germany. Therefore it is our task to make Russia independent of Germany by sending her, so far as our own needs permit, what she needs for her factories (machines and materials), by sending her agricultural implements for her fields. If this latter leads to a surplus of grain, we should buy it for our own use to prevent Germany's profiting thereby.

We can make more friends in Russia by the proper use of sugar, boots, fishnets, and machinery than by 200,000 or 500,000 troops (see paragraph 4, end).

Trade with Russia is possible through the various foreign trade councils and committees and other government organs. In fact these organs are advantageous to us, as they will guarantee distribu-

tion to the actual consumer as trade with private parties could not. Russia and the Bolsheviks want to trade with us. We need certain products Russia yet has in abundance. Above and beyond this, trade is necessary to help put Russia industrially on her own feet again and to prevent her sinking deeper into dependency on Germany.

This trade will take ships. But the sending of ships for trade can be stopped at any moment by a simple order from Washington. The stream of ships necessary to supply and support an interventionary force, however, can not be stopped at will. The sending of ships must be continued until circumstances permit the force to be withdrawn. Ships must be sent in unusually large numbers to withdraw the force. And the development of the force will not depend on the number of ships available but on entirely other factors having no connection with the number of available ships. Trade, however, can be limited to the number of ships available at a given moment.

Further, in trade, the ships will be in use productively, bringing return cargoes, not unproductively.

In a word, intervention is sure to:

- (1) Go farther than at first planned involving unforeseen and difficult expenditures of ships, men, and materials;
- (2) Fail to reestablish Russia as a military factor in the war against Germany, because there is no fight in Russia except small, sporadic, class or party skirmishes;
- (3) Fail to divert large forces of men from the western front, as any force we can at present afford to send her can be met by a force drawn from within Germany, from other parts of Russia, or by reserves of the Landsturm class;
- (4) Fail to counteract German influence, if anything strengthening that influence except under and behind the guns of the interventionary force itself;
- (5) Necessitate the feeding of from 500,000 to 1,500,000 people;
- (6) Be likely to make Russia—or the best part of Russia left now, the center—an ally of Germany for years to come;
- (7) Break our solemn promises to Russia not to interfere.

Continuing the present policy will:

- (1) Make us no new enemies in Russia except the *bourgeois*, who think it is our duty to save their bank accounts;
- (2) Continue the contrast between the Allies and Germany, the Allies putting up with injury (annulment of loans) and insult (publishing the secret treaties), without, like Germany, using brute force in retaliation;
- (3) Preserving our hard-pressed man and economic war-power from a drain, whose extent it is impossible to foresee.

Continuing our present policy of nonrecognition, but still engaging in as broad trade relations as our resources in materials and ships permit will:

- (1) Insure a return for the tonnage used.
- (2) Insure our ability to stop or divert the tonnage involved at any moment at our own will.
- (3) Fight Germany's future economic supremacy in Russia at the most important moment of all; namely, when that economic supremacy is just in its first beginnings and before it can renew its strong hold on Russian economic life.
- (4) Help Russia to get somewhat on her own industrial and economic and financial feet, which is to my mind the supreme task of the moment, as otherwise we will always be at a disadvantage in Russia compared with Germany, and after the war German militarism, if not utterly broken, will have a limitless field for drawing resources from.

There is no greater danger in the world to-day than that Russia should become Germanized, except of course the danger that Germany should win on the western front. This policy of building up a strong and independent commercial, financial, and industrial Russia will be the task of the Allies' whole policy in Russia in the future, and now is the time to begin.

The time for soldiers in Russia has gone beyond recall.

The Allies must fight Germany in Russia with merchandise.

Every consideration presented above as regards Archangel or intervention basing on Archangel, applies equally, to my mind, to intervention basing on Vladivostok.

None of the above considerations prejudice, to my mind, in the slightest, the necessity for having at once strong naval forces in the Archangel harbor, at Murmansk and in the White Sea to steady Russia and strengthen our hands here in general. This will help without injuring anything as intervention will. The naval force at all the points mentioned should be considerable.

I have [etc.]

FELIX COLE

Memorandum of the Secretary of State

After conference with the President on Saturday, June 1, it was agreed that I should say to Lord Reading that this Government was entirely willing to send troops to Murmansk provided General

Foch approved the diversion of troops and the necessary shipping for that purpose from those now going to France. Before doing this I saw Secretary Baker who entirely agreed with this action and to-day I saw Lord Reading and told him of our attitude. He made notes and said he would inform his Government.

ROBERT LANSING

June 3, 1918.

File No. 861.00/1818

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1918, 4 p. m.

180. Your 134, April 30, 8 p. m.,¹ received May 18, 7 p. m., and 205, May 26.²

After consulting Secretary of Navy suggest you get in touch with Captain Bierer, commander of *Olympia*, who is under direct orders of the British Admiral at Murmansk. No additional American cruiser at present available to Murman coast or White Sea. Department studying question and will advise if anything further is possible but no further measures contemplated for the present.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2202

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract *]

Moscow, June 14, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received July 4, 6.07 p. m.]

269. . . . French Minister for Foreign Affairs cables French Embassy here that military conference Paris, June 3, decided to hold Murman first, then Archangel, if impossible simultaneously, and to land battalions American, British, French, Italian troops with necessary munitions and provisions to hold those ports, all troops being under British command until otherwise ordered. . . .

FRANCIS

¹ Vol. I, p. 511.

² Ante, p. 474.

³ Printed in full, ante p. 211.

File No. 861.00/2103

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, June 16, 1918, 3 a. m.

[Received June 24, 8.38 a. m.]

Poole wires following received to-day:

People's Commissariat Foreign Affairs allows itself to request American Consul General at Moscow to direct attention United States of America to the fact that the presence of military vessels belonging to the belligerent powers in the ports of the Russian Republic, with the possibility of their leaving for the open sea at any time for military purposes, must be regarded as inadmissible by the Russian Government. People's Commissariat expresses certainty that the United States Government, which has given so many proofs of its friendly attitude towards the Russian Republic, will lend attention to this stipulation which is obligatory upon Russia, and will give it full consideration. People's Commissar Foreign Affairs, George Chicherin.

Note of like import sent Lockhart but states in addition that writer "has several times pointed out to you necessity for English vessels to leave our northern ports," and ends:

Hopes that you will draw the attention of British Government to the impossibility of the further stay of English military vessels, even in small number, in the ports of the Russian Soviet Republic. Chicherin.

Note to French Consul General states that further presence of vessels of warring powers in ports of Russian Republic is inadmissible—even when long stay of such vessel is not connected with any military operations. Commissariat therefore expresses hope that French Government will not delay in recalling the military vessel which is in the Arctic Ocean near the Russian Coast. Chicherin.

These messages received midnight *en clair* being translations of originals in Russian.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2108

The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, June 21, 1918, 5 a. m.

[Received June 24, 4.59 p. m.]

Just received at 9 in the evening the following announcement from the People's Commissary, Kedrov, mentioned my telegram 99,

Embassy,¹ and 117, Consul General,¹ with accompanying letter from the local civil authorities:

In view of the well-known international and political situation, I announced that the arrival of a foreign warship, especially with an armed crew, at Archangel, where there is now concentrated an enormous quantity military stores and explosives, will be regarded as commencement military operations which may lead to serious consequences.

The Archangel Provincial Executive Committee encloses an announcement made by the People's Commissary Kedrov and requests that all war vessels of the country now within the port of Archangel be immediately removed from the district as above mentioned.

The same has been sent to British Consul, French Consul. Former conferring with commander of ice breaker. Have advised British Consul my opinion is that everything under the English flag should be withdrawn to Murmansk pending decision about military intervention, or until entry can be made with a sufficient strength to guarantee quick certain occupation.

I shall answer authorities by the obvious statement no naval forces here.

COLE

File No. 861.00/2089

The Secretary of the Navy (Daniels) to the Secretary of State

C-20-220 Op 36

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Department's letter of June 14, 1918, enclosing a copy of a cablegram from the American Ambassador to Russia in regard to conditions in Finland.¹

For the information of the Department of State, I enclose herewith a copy of a despatch from Admiral Sims, dated April 13, 1918, setting forth the instructions under which the British and French forces were to operate. These instructions were approved by this department and a copy given to the commanding officer of the *Olympia* for his guidance. The *Olympia* is now operating under the orders of the British Rear Admiral at Murmansk.

Attention is respectfully invited to the enclosed copy of a despatch of Admiral Sims concerning the proposed operations in this region of a British military force and to the proposed defensive measures by the Russian local authorities against German submarines.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS

¹ Not printed.

[Enclosure—Telegrams]

Admiral Sims to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)

April 13, 1918.

Instructions have been issued to the British Rear Admiral at Murmansk to take any steps which he may consider necessary and desirable with the forces at his disposal to protect and further the Allied interests generally, and to assist in recovering the Allied stores at Archangel. Instructions have also been given him that he is not to commit himself to land military operations away from the port, but subject to the above-mentioned restriction he may utilize the crew of the ships for the purpose of stiffening the local resistance against Germans if it be found practicable. The same instructions have been issued to the French senior officer. It is considered essential by the Admiralty that the Allied ships at Murmansk should be placed under the orders of the senior Allied commander, and that the ships be instructed to cooperate with him in carrying out the above instructions. I concur in the above and recommend that it be carried out. SIMS

Admiral Sims to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)

June 3, 1918.

A force of 600 infantry with field and machine guns has been sent to Murmansk in command of General Poole of the British Army. General Poole is to have under his command all the military forces ashore both at Archangel and Murmansk, his special duty being the organization of the Czechs, Serbian and other units which are reported to be at those places. Ships can now approach the harbor at Archangel safely as the River Dvina at that place is now clear of ice.

The president of Murmansk has requested permission of the central authorities to organize defensive force against German submarines, as a result of the recent activity of the enemy submarines in the Arctic Ocean and the White Sea. SIMS

File No. 861.00/2175

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, June 24, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received July 2, 12.35 p. m.]

297. Civil authorities Duma Archangel arrested, taken through Vologda en route Moscow; Vologda Duma also threatened for failure to execute orders of central Soviet government.

Shooting of Admiral Peplumasny yesterday arouses deep indignation and likely will cause sailors mutiny; bitterness augmented by ordering return Black Sea Fleet to Sevastopol on German dictation and consequent destruction many Russian war vessels. Numerous manifestations of Bolshevik desperation.

[Omission] says has been promised locomotives and equipment to move men and munitions from Archangel south if given two weeks' notice.

Cole reports that American, British, French Consuls [received] local official communication ordering withdrawal war vessels and prohibiting further arrivals. I instructed him make no reply whatever.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2168½

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, June 27, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Copied from confirmation, original not received.]

304. Soviet government requests cables be short and few because only available cable impaired, overloaded.

Cole wires June 26, 3 p. m., martial law declared Archangel and "orders issued for immediate military battle readiness."

British report Germans advancing from Pskov toward Petrograd. French military attaché, Moscow, reports Lenin and Trotsky told him, 25th, 2,000 British soldiers landed Murman, which Martin confirms, and said Council of Commissaires were considering the question of declaration of war against Entente "of which principle already adopted"; that Mirbach proffered aid, been refused, and Soviet government decided to operate its own forces immediately against efforts of French at Murman and against Japanese if intervened; that Trotsky stated no one could prevent Germans from intervening.

Since above Vosnesenski called and says reports of German advance untrue.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/11422

The Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. "Olympia" (Bierer) to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters (Sims)

MURMANSK, July 6, 1918.

[Copy transmitted by the Secretary of the Navy
to the Secretary of State, August 20.¹]

1. There is forwarded herewith enclosure A. Referring to I of enclosure A, Nasaremus therein mentioned is the same individual as Natsaremus previously mentioned in my weekly reports. Enclosure A was adopted by the District Council on 30 June and Moscow notified the same day. At a public meeting in Murmansk, which was attended by General Poole, Admiral Kemp, R.N., French Captain

¹ The letter of transmittal, which was returned to the Navy Department, has not been found in its files. See the reply of the Secretary of State, Oct. 14, 1918, *post*, p. 556.

Petit, and myself, the assent to the declaration, enclosure A, was called for by the president of the Murmansk District Council and the populace, probably 2,000 or more, practically to a man, raised their hands in token of approval.

2. The District Soviet, Murmansk District Council, Murmansk Regional Council, and Murman Region Council are the same thing, and are the council of administration or government of the Murman region. The Murman or Murmansk region includes the former Alexandrovsk and Kem districts of the Archangel Government, that is, the Murman coast, including the towns of Pechenga, Alexandrovsk, Murmansk, Kandalaksha, Kem, and Soroka. The administration of this region is directly under the District Council. The Council is composed of representatives from various committees, such as Railroad Workmen's Committee, Sailors' Committee, Military Committee, District Committee, etc. The number of committees is apparently unlimited, any special group of people who are numerous enough or powerful enough being allowed representation. The various committees choose representatives and these representatives combine and form the Council and elect their own officers to exercise powers of administration, tenure of office being entirely dependent upon the wishes of the majority.

3. The present head of the District Council is a man by the name of Yuriev. He is a native Russian, but he has been in this vicinity for only a few months, having appeared some time subsequent to the revolution. For some time, according to his own accounts and from other reports believed to be reliable, he lived in the United States working at various trades in various parts of the country. He does not speak very much English but seems to understand pretty near everything that is said in English. He seems very desirous of assisting in the relief of the country from its present chaotic condition and is a sincere worker to that end. He seems pro-Ally inclined and is pronouncedly pro-American. Another influential member of the District Council is a man by the name of Vesselago, formerly a captain in the Russian Navy. He is a member of the executive council of the District Council, acts in the capacity of a sort of business manager, and occupies in general a position of power. He is very able. While rather noncommittal he seems to favor the Allies. The military command of the district is under the charge of Zvigentsov, formerly an officer of the Russian Army and said to have been of the Imperial Guards. He was second in command of the whole Archangel district of northern Russia, acting under an appointment from the national Soviet at Moscow. He appears pro-Ally inclined. These three men, Yuriev, Vesselago, and Zvigentsov, form a sort of triumvirate as regards district and local affairs and seem to work together

to a marked degree. The head of the railway committee is Promortsev. He is a good listener, evidently does not understand English, and apparently seems purely concerned with workmen's interests, wages, etc.

4. The Sailors' Committee is known as the Centramur, organized by and composed chiefly of men of the old Russian Navy. They have representation in the District Council but tend more or less to independent exercise of power. They control in general the Russian vessels here, both naval and merchant. Officers are elected by popular vote amongst themselves. A few of the present officers were officers under the Imperial Government, but the majority are selected more on account of popularity than ability. The Centramur exerts a certain power by virtue of being in possession of the Russian men-of-war and certain arms and ammunition; also on account of the fact that at the time of the revolution the sailors succeeded in obtaining possession of considerable funds. With these funds on hand they have been able to get along with little work and by virtue of their numbers, estimated about 800 in all, and possession of arms and ammunition have wielded a sort of power through fear alone. With the presence of Allied men-of-war they are merely a factor of tolerance. At the same time, among the sailors are a number of officers of the ex-Russian navy who are excellent men and who seem to be earnest endeavorers to work for the good and upbuilding of Russia. The head of the Sailors' Committee, that is, president of the Centramur, is Laudanski and he seems to be an excellent man and especially well liked by the officers and sailors.

5. The situation is, of course, unsettled, whether or not more than it has been remains to be seen. Nasarenus or Natsaremus has not appeared.

6. On 4 July at Kem three Russians were killed by the British forces at Kem. It had been decided to disarm the Russians there, as at least some of those who had arms there did not seem to be friendly and some coming into Kem were supposed to be advance guards of Mr. Natsaremus. The three men who were killed resisted being disarmed. . . .

12. There is forwarded herewith enclosure B. This temporary agreement was gotten up and signed yesterday¹ due to the desire on the part of the Murmansk Region Council to be able to inform the Murmansk region in regard to the presence, objectives, and help of the Allies here, together with their cooperation with the Murmansk Regional Council. It is in writing a statement of the policy, opera-

¹The Russian translation printed and widely circulated in Murmansk at the time is dated July 6, which date is confirmed by the U. S. Military Attaché then in Murmansk.

tions, and intent of the Allied command represented at present by the senior Allied officers, British General Poole and Admiral Kemp, R.N. As finally drawn up in its present form, I saw no objections to signing it but on the contrary thought it desirable to sign it as all parties felt, in view of the present situation, that it was desirable. The Murmansk District Council especially persisted, in view of the present situation, in having something in writing in order to inform in particular the people of the district.

13. This agreement was drawn up in English. The Russian translation is a translation made from the English by the Murman District Council.

B. B. BIERER

[Enclosure A]

Resolution Adopted by the Murmansk District Council, June 30, 1918

GENTLEMEN, Representatives of the Nations and the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France:

The Murmansk District Council considers that the respite given to Russia by the Brest treaty is finished. The arrogant German imperialists have already occupied a good half of European Russia and have divided her into small, feeble groups incapable of resistance. In each of these groups there has been restored, in different forms, the old autocratic system which had been overthrown by the Russian revolution.

The German advance into Russia continues and we can not see where it will stop. In particular, the Germans and their servants, the White Guard of Finland, are attempting to occupy the Murmansk district, the last outlet from Russia to the open sea and the last route of communication with the Allies free from German control.

Russia, in the present state of her disorganized industries, means of transport, and food supply, can not recover herself and organize a serious defense against the Germans. In particular, she is unable to defend the Murmansk district against the attacks of the Germans and Finns. We are not able to provide for our district the necessary food and consolidate our economic affairs.

The help which Russia and, in particular, the Murmansk district so greatly desire can come only from your Governments, representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France. That is why the protest against the presence of your military forces here, which the central government has ordered us to transmit, is, to our firm conviction, an act of suicide and disaster for Russia, and especially for the Murmansk district.

The Murmansk District Council, in the firm conviction of its duty to Russia and to the population of the territory, whose confidence it enjoys, considering all these things, has decided:

I. The orders of Lenin, Trotsky, and Nasarenus to protest against the presence of the Allies here and drive them out are not to be obeyed.

II. The Allies must remain here and assist the highest local Russian power, the Murmansk District Council, to defend the country against the Germans and Finns, to organize a Russian Army, and improve our economic condition.

III. The highest power of this territory is the Murmansk District Council, in the hands of which must remain all the initiative, the Allies assisting it, but not interfering in internal affairs.

IV. To give to the relations between the District Council and the Allies a more definite and precise character, the Presidium of the District Council, together with two members of the Central Committee of the Fleet and two members of the Central Railway Committee, are authorized to begin immediate negotiations for working out a concrete written agreement, determining on the basis of the second and third paragraphs mentioned above the mutual rights and obligations of the Murmansk District Council and the Allies.

V. The District Council must take all measures for an early liquidation of the conflict between it and the central government and must endeavor to find some way of working again together.

VI. In agreeing to the above points of the resolution, we are guided by a sense of duty to retain this territory inviolate for Russia, in the name of which, as one nation, we are acting.

[Enclosure B]

*Temporary Agreement owing to Exceptional Circumstances between the Representatives in Murmansk of Great Britain, United States of America, and France, and the Presidium of the Murmansk Region Council*¹

ARTICLE 1

Subject on the part of the Allies to approval by their respective governments, this agreement has been made between the Representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France on one side, and the Murmansk Region Council on the other, with the object of united action on the part of the Signatories for the defence of the Murmansk Region against the powers of the German coalition. Both signatories agree to the fullest mutual co-operation for this end.

Nota: The Murmansk Region includes the former Alexandrovsk and Kem districts of the Archangel Government.

ARTICLE 2

The superior command of the Allied and Russian military forces in the Murmansk Region shall be organised on the same plan as actually exists on all other Allied fronts.

ARTICLE 3

All separate units of the Murmansk Region armed forces, already existing, or which are going to be formed, are to be under the direct command of the Russian military authorities, appointed by the Murmansk District Council.

Nota: It is most desirable that the Russians should form a purely Russian army; however, to further the ends in view, voluntary enlistment by the Allies of such Russians as may desire to join their forces is to be permitted. In principle however such forces should not be formed into separate Russian units but should as far as circumstances permit be formed into units composed of an equal number of companies of Allies and Russians.

ARTICLE 4

The representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France are to give to the Russian military command the necessary assistance in equipment, supplies, transporting and instructing the Russian military forces which are to be formed.

ARTICLE 5

All the authority in the internal government of the region belongs to the Murmansk Region Council.

¹Approved by the Council, July 7.

ARTICLE 6

The representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France, and agents do not interfere in the internal affairs of the Region, and for this reason:

(a) In all cases necessitating application to the local population the representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France, and their agents address themselves to the respective Russian authorities, but not directly to the population, except in the frontal region, where all orders of the Allied military command, arising out of the conditions of war, must be immediately executed by all.

(b) The regulations for entering and leaving the Murmansk region are defined by the Murmansk Region Council, who at the same time take into consideration the practically existing state of war in the region and the necessity of energetic measures being taken against spies.

(c) Scale of wages and productiveness of labour are to be fixed by the Murmansk Region Council.

ARTICLE 7

Owing to the impossibility at the present time to obtain the necessary food stuffs from Russia, the representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France bind themselves as far as possible to supply the Murmansk Region Council with foodstuffs for the whole population of the region, including workmen who have already come from other parts with their families on the basis equivalent in nourishment to the scale used in the Allied military forces at Murmansk.

ARTICLE 8

The distribution of the foodstuffs among the population is to be carried out by the competent Russian authorities.

ARTICLE 9

The representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France bind themselves to supply as far as possible textile goods and other necessities of life.

ARTICLE 10

The representatives of Great Britain, United States of America and France bind themselves as far as possible to supply the Murmansk Region Council with the necessary materials, goods and technical appliances for carrying out the building programme, in accordance with mutual agreement to be arrived at, taking into consideration in the first place the needs of war time, in the second place the needs for development by way of the Murmansk Railway of international trade, and in the third place the local fishing industry.

ARTICLE 11

All sums expended by the Governments of Great Britain, United States of America and France in accordance with this agreement are to be placed to the debit of the general account of the government debt of Russia to the respective Powers, but a separate account for the Murmansk Region is to be kept of such sums.

ARTICLE 12

The representatives realise that it will be necessary for the governments of Great Britain, United States of America and France to accord the Murman Region Council the necessary financial assistance, the amount, form and conditions of which will be decided by further agreement.

ARTICLE 13

This agreement comes into force from the moment of confirmation by the Murman Region Council and remains in force subject to Art. No. 1 until such time as normal conditions between the central Russian Government and the Murman Region Council, as also with the governments of Great Britain, United States of America and France, are established.

ARTICLE 14

On the signature of this agreement the representatives of Great Britain, United States of America, and France in the name of their respective governments, do again confirm the absence on their part of any intention of taking possession of the Murmansk Region in its entirety or part thereof. The Presidium of the Murmansk Region Council on behalf of the Council declares before the people of Russia and the governments of Great Britain, United States of America and France that the sole reason of concluding this Agreement is to save the Murmansk Region in its integrity for the great Undivided Russia.¹

[Presidium of the Murmansk Region Council:

President YURIEV

Vice President KORELSKI

Secretary TALY

Director of Affairs VESSELAGO

British Representative: F. C. POOLE, *Major General,*
Commanding Allied Forces in North Russia

French Representative: PETIT, *Capitaine de Vaisseau,*
Commanding "Amiral Aube"

Representative of United States of America: B. B. BIERER, *Captain,*
U.S. Navy, Commanding U.S.S. "Olympia."

MURMANSK, July 6, 1918.]

File No. 861.00/2104

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1918, 7 p. m.

212. Your 289, June 20, 10 p. m.² Department understands you will make no reply and take no other action regarding request for American ships to leave Russian ports. LANSING

¹ The signatures and date are reconstructed from this copy (British, French, and American signatures only) and from the Russian translation described in footnote 1, p. 491.

² Vol. I, p. 564. See also the Ambassador's telegram of June 16, 3 a. m., ante, p. 486.

File No. 861.00/2239

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, July 7, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received July 10, 4 p. m.]

324. Crisis precipitated by killing Mirbach renders necessary immediate troops Archangel. Poole at Murman with forces wholly inadequate and plans to land Archangel first week in August with 5,000 men. This is [intended for?] moral effect and will dishearten [enhearten?] Russians and probably Czechs also. The Germans will doubtless advance promptly with all force can command. If Allied troops [advance?], will encourage thousands of Russians who otherwise would remain inactive and permit Germany to restore order and gain secure foothold.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2089

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (C-20-220 Op 36), enclosing telegram embodying the instructions to Allied naval officers at Murmansk.

I am thoroughly in accord with the general principles by which the actions of the commander of the *Olympia* are to be governed. Referring to the proposed measures of the Russian local authorities at Murmansk against German submarines, I shall be glad to know what tangible preparations have been effected and how, in your judgment, this Government may cooperate to assist.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.00/2266½

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, July 11, 1918, 2 a. m.

[Copied from confirmation, original not received.]

329. Referring to my telegram No. 328¹ similar telegrams also received by French and Italian colleagues, tone of French telegram however stronger than others. After conferring with Allied chiefs here to-night we have unanimously agreed not to comply with demand. British Embassy has so advised General Poole, Murman,

¹ Vol. I, p. 618.

and Admiral Kemp, Archangel, at the same time urging immediate sending Allied troops Archangel. I am so informing Consuls, Moscow and Archangel.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2310

The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, July 15, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received July 20, 12.23 p. m.]

76. Local authorities, dissatisfied British violation Russian sovereignty west shores White Sea, issued a proclamation summoning guards to resist English, French robbers seeking destruction Soviet government because it refuses rejoining the war between greedy capitalists, without having mentioned the United States of America. Violated sovereignty Russia in the hoisting of the British flag on some Russian boats as well as introducing vessels in the service by armed force proving the inhabitants of occupied regions are [dis]satisfied on account food-distribution. In reference to information about above-mentioned encroachments, Archangel Soviet finally declined responsibility for the safety British armed ice breaker named *Alexander* wherewith she departed.

COLE

File No. 861.00/2304

The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, July 15, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received July 20, 12.08 p. m.]

77. The attitude of the inhabitants of Archangel in anticipation of the arrival of the Allied forces as follows: (1) Welcome on the part of civilians; (2) publicly expressed disfavor toward military intervention by the local Bolshevik leaders goaded thereto by Moscow; (3) part of the Archangel executive department would nevertheless eventually cooperate as well as welcome the Allies, if they proceed with tact, luring rather than bullying.

My cipher telegrams in Russia will not be accepted except diplomatics to the Department.

COLE

File No. 861.00/2586

The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State

No. 27

ARCHANGEL, July 19, 1918.

[Received August 27.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that during the recent visit to this city of Admiral Kemp, the British senior naval officer in the Arctic Ocean, word was received by the local authorities here, through the master of a Russian vessel just returned to Archangel from Kem, that what the local authorities deemed violations of Russian sovereignty had been committed by the British military and naval authorities along the Murman Railroad and on the west coast of the White Sea. Among these alleged acts was the shooting of three members of the Kem County Council of Workmen's Deputies. Admiral Kemp immediately departed for the west coast of the White Sea (Kandalaksha) to investigate, as he stated nothing of the kind could have been done under the orders given by him to the captain of H. M. S. *Attentive*, then in the region mentioned (Kandalaksha, Kem, Soroka). With the Admiral, on a Russian vessel, went two members of the Archangel Soviet Executive Committee.

After the return of the members of the local committee it has been represented in the local papers that the three men were arrested during a meeting of the Soviet and then taken out and summarily shot. In the meantime there is no other version of the affair authoritatively current nor are the Allies in this city able to contradict the above version due to the oversight in not sending representatives from the Allied consulates or military mission of Archangel to Kem with the members of the local executive committee.

I have suggested to the British and French Consuls that it is not now too late to send such representatives, if a permit to leave the city for Kem should be granted, to go to the scene of the alleged shooting and obtain an authoritative account of the affair from the British authorities in command there. Should a permit be granted it will enable the Allied representatives here to obtain the means of denying a false report which has been, and throughout the future will be, of great disadvantage. The People's Commissar Mr. Kedrov, who is here in direction of all the Soviet affairs under mandate from Lenin and Trotsky, has already stated that this affair is definitive proof that the English and French are no better than the Germans in their attitude toward the Soviet government.

The only means at the disposal of the French Consul to combat such a statement is a secret report as to what was learned by the executive committee representatives at Kem, which is not in itself authoritative or capable of publication. According to this report it

was ascertained that the three men had not been killed at the same time or place: that two were killed while resisting Allied troops, either while resisting arrest or while firing from buildings at the soldiers entering the city, while the third was killed by four Serbian soldiers who were convoying him, after arrest, to prison or to an officer.

Other acts complained of by the Soviet authorities are the hoisting of the old Russian commercial flag on requisitioned Russian vessels (called by the Bolsheviks the "Tsar's flag"), the hoisting of the British merchant ensign on other requisitioned ships, the impressment of Russian boats into service, the refusal to allow the crews of Russian ships to land, and the requisition of considerable quantities of timber for barracks.

In the meantime both the Allied Consuls directly concerned, namely, the British and French, have no official word regarding these affairs, nor has such word been sent to the Allied Ambassadors at Vologda, although communication can be had occasionally and more or less illegally.

I have [etc.]

FELIX COLE

File No. 861.00/2587

The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State

No. 28

ARCHANGEL, July 20, 1918.

[Received August 27.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the Central Commissariat of Food Supply has telegraphed the Archangel Food Supply Committee (now called the Provincial Food Supply Commissariat) that it may make purchases abroad in its own name and for its own account because the continued interruption of transportation between European Russia and Siberia, due to the Czecho-Slovak movement and the military operations connected therewith, have made it impossible for Archangel to expect to be supplied with grain from the central distributing organ.

This is, at last, the clear permission to trade with abroad that Archangel moderates have been striving for since early spring. It is, however, at the present moment useless. No negotiations are possible on account of the political tension and the ban laid on telegrams to and from Europe.

The fact, however, that the central government has, so to speak, washed its hands of Archangel's food supply for the coming winter, is significant and of utmost importance to the Allies since now, if Archangel starves, the fault therefore will be laid entirely at our

door, most especially at the door of the British who have held a dominating position throughout all the negotiations with the local authorities—negotiations that have only resulted in exasperating the local Bolsheviks, putting the harbor into a state of defense under orders of the central government, losing to the Allies the entire quantity of war stores, metals, and merchandise that lay here throughout the winter and that could have been exchanged for food products, and which have undoubtedly had a most deplorable effect on the course of the politics maintained by the central Soviet government at Moscow, as every check or mistaken move in the policy maintained by England in the north has had as its result a strengthening of the hold established by the Moscow Soviet government on Archangel, and an increased anti-Ally attitude on the part of the Archangel authorities delegated here from Moscow.

If, however, the anticipated British occupation of this city does not occur, I believe that the United States, by taking up the opportunity offered by the present free hand given the local food commissariat, could reach a working agreement with it that would eventually enable the Allies to maintain armed force here to form a rallying point for the scattered and weak Russian spirits that may still rally for a struggle against Germany. Such a peaceful creation of a "nucleus" or "rallying point" would have a much more far-reaching effect throughout the mass of the Russian populace than the forcible establishment of such a "nucleus" by an occupational or expeditionary force can possibly have.

I have [etc.]

FELIX COLE

File No. 861.00/2589

The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State

No. 29

ARCHANGEL, July 22, 1918.

[Received August 27.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of July 20, the British Consul learned that two parties of Allied subjects, soldiers and sailors, including one officer, had been captured by the Bolsheviks near Archangel and were then in the city. It was added that they were to be shot the following morning. In order to verify this report and save the men should it prove well-founded, the British Consul, the French Consul, and myself immediately proceeded to the railroad station across the river to the special train in which was living People's Commissar Kedrov, who is at Archangel under special authority granted him as one of the Council of People's Commissars and is in full charge of all Soviet

activities here. It would appear that the facts of the matter are these, based on the statement made by Kedrov and afterwards partially verified through other sources in the city. About July 15 a Serbian soldier and a Canadian soldier from Kem were arrested near the Nikolski monastery a few miles west of the Dvina River delta. These two men, it is stated, bore false Russian passports and both spoke Russian perfectly, both being the sons of Russian mothers, and brought up in Russia. It is said the two admitted, probably under considerable pressure, that they had been sent by the British military at Kem to discover likely spots along the coast for "agitators" to land. They further are said to have declared that in a few days a small boat would come from Kem to take them back. The Russians lay in wait for this boat and stopped it when it came by a blank shot from a large armed yacht, the *Gorislava*. From the small boat from Kem, a former Russian tug, the *Mitrofan*, were taken a sub-lieutenant of the British Navy and five sailors from H.M.S. *Attentive*, all in uniform.

Commissar Kedrov admitted that the men had been arrested but stated that they were not to be shot as he had decided to send them to Moscow. The way in which he said this left us to understand that he considered he was justified in having the men summarily executed had he so deemed best, and that he had, in fact, thought of so doing but had changed his mind. As agreed upon among us, the British Consul immediately declared that, as there was a state of peace between Great Britain and Serbia on one side and Russia on the other, it would have been unjustifiable, since in peace time espionage (the charge against the men) was not judiciable by court-martial but was for trial by civil criminal law unless the accused was a member of the army or a subject of the nation against which the act was committed. Kedrov claimed there were precedents for the contrary and went on to reproach the British with having acted in even a more flagrant way than the shooting of two spies caught red-handed; namely, in having arrested three members of a local government organ during one of its sessions and summarily executing them. He referred, of course, to the alleged shooting of the three members of the Kem County Council of Workmen's Deputies. He went on to declare that experience had shown that every time a local body, against the wish of the central authority, had invited outside aid, the outsider had soon made himself master and had overthrown the body which invited him in. He cited the Ukraine, the Caucasus, made some vague reference to Japan, and ended by saying that the recent events in Kem and on the west coast of the White Sea had justified that theory, as the British and French "had proven themselves no better than the Germans" (his exact

words). He then cited the events, in proof of his statement, that were mentioned in my despatch of July 19¹ He said an almost *de facto* state of war existed there.

On the British Consul's requesting an interview with the men, Kedrov declined, stating that it was necessary to keep the men's statements secret "in order to forestall other events." He did, however, give the names of as many of them as he had at hand in his car, and stated that had he decided to shoot them he would have allowed them an interview with their Consul the night before their execution.

It is learned to-day that the men were sent to Moscow yesterday. Before their departure they were allowed to receive food from the British Consulate.

It is significant that not only does the name of America rarely appear in the newspaper diatribes and in the poster proclamations against the "foreign invaders," the "imperialistic vultures," etc., etc., but that Kedrov also failed to mention America in his remarks about the Allies and the Germans above quoted. In fact he did not use the word "Allies" at all, confining himself always to either "England," "France" or "Anglo-French" and "Franco-English."

I have [etc.]

FELIX COLE

File No. 861.00/3018

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

No. 1120

VOLOGDA, July 22, 1918.

[Received October 17.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of telegrams exchanged between the Embassy and the Consul at Archangel regarding an order issued by the representative of the Council of People's Commissars, Kedrov, while at Archangel, concerning the prohibition of the entrance of foreign warships into the port of Archangel.

Kedrov, who is one of the most violent and unscrupulous members of the Bolshevik Party, was sent to Archangel for the purpose of strengthening the power of the local Soviet there, which, prior to his arrival, had been showing signs of pro-Ally sentiment, and in connection with which mission he issued the order contained in Mr. Cole's telegram to the Embassy No. 103 of June 23, 1918 (enclosure No. 1.)²

¹ *Ante*, p. 498.

² Not printed; see the Consul's telegram of June 21, 5 a. m., *ante*, p. 486.

Upon receipt of this telegram I called a conference of my colleagues, at which a reply was agreed upon, the text of which is embodied in my telegram No. 78 of June 26, 1918, to Mr. Cole (enclosure No. 2).¹ The Department will note that it is specifically stated in my telegram that this statement should not be given out as coming from the Ambassadors, but as an expression from the Consuls at Archangel. This instruction was carried out as given and the announcement was made as coming from the Consuls themselves. I deemed it expedient to handle the matter in this way rather than have Mr. Cole take up the question direct with the local Archangel civil authorities, as suggested in his telegram No. 105 of June 24 (enclosure No. 3).²

Shortly after the publication of this Allied statement, Kedrov left Archangel returning to Moscow by way of Vologda. During his short stay in Vologda he spent his time in exhorting the local Soviet against the Allies and removed from office the mayor and assistant mayor, both of whom having been elected prior to the Bolshevik revolution of November last were not in sympathy with the Soviet government or methods.

Kedrov passed through Vologda two days ago, *en route* to Archangel, apparently to endeavor once more to hearten the local Soviet, which is again showing signs of weakening under pressure of pro-Ally sentiment in the surrounding districts.

I am informed by my Italian colleague that disturbances have recently broken out in the vicinity of Archangel, during which members of local Bolshevik organizations have been killed, and apparently Kedrov's mission is an attempt to stem what would appear to be a general tide of pro-Ally sentiment following the distribution of food from the two British ships mentioned in my No. 121 of April 24, 1918.³

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

[Enclosure—Telegram]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Consul at Archangel (Cole)

VOLOGDA, June 26, 1918, 11 p. m.

78. French Ambassador and I agree that letters of Commissaires and Executive Committee should be given newspapers and have concurred in following statement which British Consulate here also wiring to British Consul, Archangel, with discretionary instructions:

The communications received by the American, British and French Consuls at Archangel concerning war vessels are somewhat surprising when viewed

¹ Printed *post* as enclosure.

² Not printed.

³ *Ante*, p. 472.

vis-à-vis with the efforts of those countries to send supplies to remedy the scarcity of food in the northern provinces as well as to give sustenance to Russian war prisoners who are being returned from the Central Empires in emaciated condition and to minister to the necessities of Russian children. The American Red Cross has distributed thousands of cans of condensed milk and has more supplies *en route*. The Young Men's Christian Association which recently lost 150 tons of supplies by the wreck of the steamship *Wreaham* has additional food and medicines *en route* and is constantly shipping supplies to Russia. We know that the American Ambassador has cabled to America to send to Archangel immediately 10,000 tons of flour within thirty days and 10,000 additional within thirty days thereafter and is attempting to have agricultural implements shipped and other commodities needed by Russia. We are also aware that England and France would ship food or certainly medical supplies and manufactured goods if the safe arrival thereof could be assured. The war vessels of the Allied powers are the only protection such shipments can have from German submarines; consequently our surprise at the issuance of this order by the Soviet authorities.

Furthermore the British and French Governments shipped to Archangel when they were Allies of Russia's Government and before the Brest treaty great quantities of munitions and other supplies which those governments have been endeavoring to have returned to the armies which need them especially since the Soviet government has attempted to repudiate the obligations therefor. The position of those governments is that they do not relinquish their claims on these supplies notwithstanding the strenuous efforts being made for their evacuation from Archangel. They claim the right to reserve liberty of action to take such measures as appear to them conformable to their interests.

The others of the Allies who have not received the preceding document, notably, Italy and Japan, we are confident consider themselves as jointly bound and will act in accord with America, France and Great Britain.

This should not be given as statement of ambassadors but as expression from consuls although not signed; probably interview from dean of these consuls.

Show British Consul who may concur possibly without consulting Lockhart to whom copy sent by British Consulate here.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2428a

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Archangel (Cole)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1918, 3 p. m.

Convey following message to American Ambassador by hand if no other sure and confidential means of communication exists:

Nothing from you since July 11. Latest message from Moscow reporting your movements is dated July 25, sent via wireless to Paris. Department has noted your reply July 15 to request that Allied missions remove to Moscow. For your information the Red Cross is sending some 4,000 tons of medicines and foodstuffs to Archangel next month. This Government has also consented to send a small force of American troops to Murmansk but will not take part in any expedition into Russia from that port. Spare no effort to keep Department advised of your movements. Have cabled you fully and frequently but assume messages have been largely interrupted.

POLK

File No. 861.00/2416

*The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, July 31, 1918.

[Received August 6, 11.55 a. m.]

Commissariat Foreign Affairs informs Allied representatives Moscow under date July 30 that—

In view of situation on White Sea, reinforced defense has been established on its shores and no vessel, boat, or ship of any kind will under any circumstances whatsoever be permitted to land or to set passengers ashore. Should any such attempt be made they will be fired upon by the coast defense.

POOLE

Occupation of Archangel by Allied Forces, August 2, 1918²—Overthrow of the Soviet and Formation of the Supreme Government of the Northern Region—Relations with the Allied and American Diplomatic Representatives and Military Authorities—Arrival of American Troops, September 4, 1918

File No. 119.2/469

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

MURMANSK, August 1, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received August 2, 7 a. m.]

343. Your 218, 220, 221, 228, and circular July 11, 8 a. m.,³ from London delivered last midnight. Stopped here because wire communication with Vologda severed. Your 221 undecipherable. Please repeat groups. No advice from General Poole⁴ who arrives Archangel to-morrow with force of about 1,700 and whose landing will be resisted if Bolsheviks still in control. When will American troops arrive here and how many? Think important their coming be expedited with all haste possible.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2405

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

MURMANSK, August 2, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received August 3, 7.47 p. m.]

344. Arrived Murman 10 p. m., July 31, and came aboard *Olympia* where have been since. When left Kandalaksha thought would re-

¹ Sent via the Embassy in France (No. 4674) ; by wireless from Moscow to Paris.

² See also vol. I, chap. xiii.

³ None printed.

⁴ Maj. Gen. Frederick C. Poole commanding the British forces in north Russia.

turn to-day and possibly go thence on the same boats to Archangel where anti-Bolshevik *coup d'état* arranged for 31st; not that I had any connection therewith, quite the contrary, as thought no Allied chiefs should be there when occurred. Allied forces due Archangel under Poole this evening but landing resisted if Bolsheviks still control, otherwise not. Do not know character or object of opposition nor what government it will establish if successful, consequently shall [make] no recommendation until better informed; cannot be worse than Soviet, with whom Allies cannot possibly afford to even cooperate. Bolshevik success in Russia would be menace to all orderly governments, ours not excepted, and would in my judgment impair the foundations of society itself; the guiding impulse is class hatred and it looks contemptuously on the sacredness of the family as well as the inviolability of person and property. I believe in division of land and that tillers of the soil should own it and that state should apportion same at extremely moderate compensation to present holders on easy terms but not in confiscation absolute.

Germany, disappointed in France, thanks to our timely action, will now turn to Russia and organize fighting front which the Allies should oppose with forces numbering minimum of 25,000 provisioned and equipped for winter; such force would attract 100,000 Russians, possibly more, but 5,000 or 10,000 Allied troops would be ineffectual in moral influence, while it might hold Murman and Archangel winter. No time for delay and am contemplating sending Riggs or Ruggles to Paris probably with French and British officers to acquaint War Council with Russian situation; they will not leave however before seeing Poole and ascertaining his views and plans nor before I see your cables accumulated here where cable manager says frightful congestion prevails; estimates over 200 for embassies and consulates and promises us some at 4 p. m. to-day as expecting twelve additional men from Alexandrovsk to assist in relieving congestion.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2409

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

MURMANSK, August 3, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received August 4, 5:05 p. m.]

345. Local Soviet Archangel deposed yesterday with no casualties, so reported by Chaplin, Russian officer commanding anti-Bolshevik forces Archangel, to local agents commissaire Murmansk; Murman Soviet renounced allegiance to central Soviet about six weeks ago. Reported unofficially to-day that Allied forces landed Archangel not only without opposition but were welcomed by people with

flowers and cheers. Trying to establish communication with Poole preparatory for a conference to learn his instructions and plans. Probably return to Kandalaksha to-morrow with Italian and British chiefs of mission.

Understood that Chaplin represents Social Revolutionary government, right and left, also Cadets and Octobrists and Monarchists who have formed organization and designated it "Center," whose bond of union is opposition to Bolshevism.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2419

The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Department of State

[Telegram—Extract]

ARCHANGEL, August 4, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received August 6, 11.15 a. m.]

83. Government of northern territory formed during night of August 1, containing nine members as follows: seven members of the Constituent Assembly from provinces of Archangel, Vyatka, Vologda, Novgorod, Kazan, Samara, from old northern front, also assistant mayor Vologda city and [vice] president Archangel city Duma, N. V. Chaikovski being president thereof.

City quiet. Pierce and other Americans safe. . . .

COLE

File No. 861.00/2433

The British Embassy to the Department of State

No. 864

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Government have received a communication from Mr. Lindley, His Majesty's representative at Archangel, reporting that the city was occupied by British troops on August 2 without casualties. Mr. Lindley, in reporting this operation, strongly urges the vital necessity for sending out American battalions at the earliest possible moment in order to take full advantage of this success. He adds that it is of no great importance whether the American troops sent are fully trained or not.

The British Ambassador has been instructed to communicate this report to the Secretary of State, and to add that His Majesty's Government trust that the United States Government will concur in the view expressed as to the urgency of sending American troops.

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1918.

[Received August 7.]

File No. 861.00/2448

The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, August 6, 1918.

[Received August 10, 9.50 a. m.]

88. New government issued following proclamation August 3:

SUPREME GOVERNMENT NORTHERN TERRITORY

To Citizens Province and City Archangel:

Bolshevik power has fallen. Bolsheviks fled because in hour of their need unsupported by populace which detested them for their betrayal of Russia at Brest Litovsk, for civil war, augmentation of universal famine, destruction of liberties and rights, legalized system of robbery and shooting squads and for their ruination of country's economic, industrial life.

People's representatives elected by universal suffrage now forced to take into their hands governmental authority in northern region because as yet no legal all-Russian government.

These presents bring to common notice that highest governmental authority in northern territory is "Supreme Government of Northern Territory" consisting of delegates to Constituent Assembly, also representatives Zemstvos and cities.

Supreme government undertakes following task: (1) reestablishment of single all-Russian national government by cooperation to that end with other territories, also reestablishment of local self-government in north; (2) defense of north and entire nation against insolent onslaughts on Russian territory and independence of inhabitants made by Germany, Finland, other enemy countries; (3) reunion to Russia of lost districts in accordance with desires of inhabitants thereof; (4) reestablishment of crushed liberties and reestablishment of true organs of popular government, namely Constituent Assembly, Zemstvos, city Dumas; (5) reestablishment of firm administration of justice assuring citizens satisfaction of economic, social, spiritual needs; (6) guarantee that laboring classes may obtain land they are by right entitled to; (7) defense of rights of labor in accordance with economic, political interests of north and Russia as whole; (8) overcome existing famine.

Supreme government will immediately publish orders naturally resulting from above program.

It relies for support on all classes which treasure above objects.

In particular expects to defend north with friendly assistance of governments and peoples allied to Russia: England, America, and France and others. Also counts on Allied assistance against starvation and financial difficulties.

Is convinced Russia's and Allies' interests in struggle against foreign enemy are one and same.

Knows Allied troops come not to interfere in internal affairs and their arrival not against desires of local population. Therefore greets Allied forces entering north to wage contest against common enemy and summons entire population to greet them gladly and assist by every possible means.

Supreme government proclaims above and calls upon people to maintain calm, order and pursue its labors.

Members Supreme Government, Northern Territory: Chaikovski, Member Constituent Assembly from Vyatka Province; Ivanov, same, Archangel; [Maslov], same, Vologda; Gukovski, same,

Novgorod; Martyushin, same, Kazan; Diedusenko, same, Samara; Likhach, same, former northern front; Zubov, Assistant Mayor, City Vologda; Startsev, Vice President, Archangel City Duma.

ARCHANGEL, August 2.

COLE

File No. 861.00/2429½

The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State .

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, August 6, 1918.

[Received August 8, 12.26 p. m.]

89. New government issues following orders: (1) appointing commander in chief Russian forces military and naval; (2) abolishing all organs so-called Soviet government and ordering arrest all Soviet commissars, committees, officials, etc.; (3) appointing government commissars for provinces and counties; (4) appointing governmental committees in provinces and counties, consisting commissar as above and representative from Zemstvo and city, making three in committee; (5) reestablishing municipal governments and Zemstvos, latter both provincial, county and township; (6) empowering local self-government organs control food supply, maintaining so far as possible existing apparatus but cleansing from Bolshevik elements; (7) reestablishing judicial apparatus; (8) reestablishing freedom press, conscience, meeting and speech; (9) reestablishing free existence, activity cooperative associations, labor unions, organizations to further the prosecution of war, etc.; (10) denationalizing transportation, financial and industrial institutions.

COLE

File No. 861.00/2727

The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State

No. 31

ARCHANGEL, August 6, 1918.

[Received September 12.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the Allied Embassies which had arrived from Vologda set sail from this port on Monday, the 29th of July, and that the days immediately following their departure were extremely quiet except for a noticeable feverish activity in the various Bolshevik headquarters.

The White Sea military district staff had already completely evacuated to Vologda and the control of the city and region had passed from the hands of the Civil Provincial Executive Committee

to the Council of Defense of the region consisting of the commander, Colonel Potapov, a prominent member of the Provincial Executive Committee, his military political commissar, and one other. This body was busy perfecting plans for the defense of the city and for its destruction in case evacuation should become necessary.

At 4 o'clock on the morning of August 1 all Allied consuls in Archangel received a note from the Council of Defense which read as follows:

The Council of Defense of the Archangel region informs you herewith that after bombarding the city of Onega, British troops have occupied it. The Council of Defense requests a prompt reply giving your interpretation of this act and stating whether or not you consider it to be the opening of hostilities against the Russian Federated Republic of Soviets or as a misunderstanding. Measures have been taken to resist the landing.

The French Consul and myself replied evasively and I expressed my surprise at the receipt of the letter inasmuch as the American consular service is a civil and not a military institution and that my government was not called into question by the alleged act. I concluded by saying that the United States had never and did not now have any intention of warring with Russia and furthermore I could not consider the possibility of war between America and Russia.

Incidentally, the Acting Belgian Consul, who is a Russian subject, was unable to reply since he had fled from the city.

During the entire forenoon of this day the city was calm, the only sign of anything unusual being the small number of persons on the streets. All the ferries crossing the river were crowded, although the evacuation proper did not begin until late in the afternoon, at which time an Allied aeroplane flew over the city and the news came out that the Allied naval forces by the valuable aid of aircraft had captured the batteries which are situated on an island in the mouth of the river entrance to the harbor of Archangel.

From then on, the Bolsheviks hurried their evacuation which reached its height at 10 in the evening and was completed by midnight.

I remained in the Consulate during the greater part of the day and in the afternoon and evening did not leave the office until arrested. About two hours previous to the arrest, which took place at 11 in the evening, a secret message was received warning us that all Allied Consuls were to be arrested in a few minutes. Consul Pierce and myself thereupon placed the codes beside an open stove with a bottle of kerosene and a constantly burning candle in preparation

for immediate destruction in case of necessity and gave directions that any one demanding entrance should be detained in conversation at the door.

After waiting about an hour and a half in expectation of immediate arrest, members of the Young Men's Christian Association called and announced that there were but few soldiers on the street all hastening to the river front there to embark on any available craft. This led us to believe that the news of our intended arrest was a false rumor and Consul Pierce left the Consulate to reconnoiter with the intention of returning in a half hour to report on the progress of the evacuation.

He had scarcely left the office when some officers from the commander's staff wearing Caucasian uniforms arrived in an automobile to make the arrest. The codes were hastily burned and after packing some necessary clothes together I was escorted to a modern mansion in the center of the city where I found the British Consul and Vice Consul, the French Consul, and a number of French and British officers. We were given to understand that we were imprisoned by the commander's staff, which while pretending to be Bolshevik, was proceeding in the interests of the Allies. During the night the Caucasians brought in the commander himself and a safe containing 4,500,000 rubles belonging to the Bolshevik staff. We were released at 11 o'clock of the following morning by N. V. Chaikovski, who is at the present time at the head of the local government.

It is now apparent that the Caucasians were adventurers pure and simple, acting, after the evacuation commenced, solely to obtain the above-mentioned sum of money and that the consuls were arrested in order to guarantee the persons of the adventurers, to be held as hostages or likely to assure and prove loyalty to whichever party might obtain permanent control.

Consul Pierce returned to the Consulate shortly after my arrest and not knowing the exact nature of the arrest remained on the streets until 6 in the morning, when, after learning the details, he reentered the Consulate and awaited my return.

Later in the day of August the 2d, at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the American Consular Corps went down the river in a tug-boat to meet the incoming Allied military and naval officials which were greeted by the Russians along the shore with cheers, blowing of whistles, and the waving of handkerchiefs.

The landing of the Allied officials was received by an armed guard of counter-revolutionists and a procession was made through the streets filled with cheering people to the new government headquarters where expressions of good will on both sides and short speeches were made to the people.

Consul Pierce and myself desire to mention Y. M. C. A. secretaries Hofstra and Craig and a courier from the Consulate General in Moscow . . . for the excellent manner in which they stood by and the courage they showed during the above-mentioned critical period.

I have [etc.]

FELIX COLE

File No. 861.00/2479

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, August 10, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received August 13, 6.10 a. m.]

356. Diplomatic Corps still on boats attempting to find domiciles. Poole says promised 5,000 American troops this month and when asked by whom replied War Council, Paris. Bierer with 50 blue-jackets only American forces here. Would appreciate information about coming American forces and their disposition. Nothing from you since your August 3, 7 p. m., received as leaving Murman. Sent card Chaikovski, president of the supreme government of the northern region, who called to-day bringing Minister of Finance; financing new government difficult problem. Think it will request Allied assistance. Was also visited by Minister of War who says new government represents all Russian parties except Bolsheviks and pro-Germans, and formed for resurrecting Russia and resisting Germany; that of ten members composing new administration, nine were elected to the Constituent Assembly; that similar movement started in Samara, also in Siberia and that thorough understanding between such new governments which are energetically extending their respective jurisdiction.

Nothing about conditions in Moscow nor the attitude of Soviet government toward the Allies or Allied representatives as no communication with interior. Have you any?

Indications of friction between Allied military authority and new civil government which diplomats endeavoring to prevent.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2738

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

ARCHANGEL, August 19, 1918.

[Received September 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith translation of a number of orders¹ issued by the "supreme government of the northern re-

¹ Not printed; see telegram No. 88 of Aug. 6 from the Consul at Archangel, ante, p. 508.

gion" decreeing the construction and operation of the new government.

It will be seen from these orders that in principle there is a reversion to the general form of government during the Kerensky régime, using the Zemstvo and municipal Duma organizations as a base, with the addition of an appointed commissar who will exercise rather arbitrary powers in connection with the other representatives in each [the] government; however, at the present time, this is probably necessary in order to exert some positive control of the functioning of such representatives, the government being in its primitive stage. Because of the impossibility at the present time of holding elections to determine the representatives from the Zemstvo and municipal organizations, they too are, of necessity, selected by the leaders of the present new government. This form of government, on the whole, should and undoubtedly will appeal to the majority of the people, who have not forgotten the practical efficiency of the Zemstvo organizations nor their actual popular representation.

I will keep the Department informed both by despatch and by cable as to the future changes in the form of this government together with pertinent comment thereon.

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2615

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

MURMANSK, August 23, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received September 2, 5.50 a. m.]

366. Nothing from you since unnumbered July 30,¹ except unnumbered cable August 3² received 4th, Murman, approving decision remaining Russia and Reuter [statement] 4th received August 17 and Department confirmation thereof August 22.³ Sending this by courier to Murman as Archangel-Murman cable overloaded and efficiency impaired by conflicting currents from magnetic pole.

Quiet here, where not exceeding 200 [2,000?] Allied soldiers under Poole, who has expeditions 100 miles south on Vologda Railroad and 200 miles up Dvina River toward Kotlas, but is awaiting reinforcements before attempting further advance. Poole expects 4,800 Americans here September 15 and 1,000 British September 1, says is confident that whatever troops opposing his are under German instruction as none but experienced men could [handle] machine and aerial guns with which enemy seems to be equipped.

¹ *Ante*, p. 504.

² Vol. I, p. 625.

³ Statement of Aug. 3, regarding military action in Russia, *ante*, p. 328.

Of 50 American bluejackets 25 were sent up Dvina in a party of 300 August 13, three Americans detailed with Garstin expedition on branch of Dvina, one Pescke, slightly wounded, returned to Archangel. Garstin [to be?] buried 24th with military honors, forces [British] officer well known to Embassy staff.

Department's official announcement of Siberian policy, although mystifying on first reading, appears admirably adapted to Russian situation and pleases [omission]; resulting Japanese statement which was received before receipt of declaration and consequently was obscure when [not?] read in connection with ours, was quite [omission] Russian Government. I shall endeavor to follow policy outlined when American troops arrive.

Meantime American, French and Italian chancelleries assigned quarters in governor's mansion. I have secured comfortable apartment and have attendant on [omission] invitations tea afternoon 24th to the officials of the new government to meet Allied chiefs and General Poole and staff and other Allied military missions. [Embassy] staff consists of Johnston, McClelland, Groves and the Misses Woodworth, Knox, Struve with Military Attaché Ruggles, Lieutenant Kliefoth and two assistants. Riggs left 20th instant for Paris on his urgent request approved by Ruggles and myself to acquaint War Council, Paris, with Russian situation and the necessity for prompt reinforcements. His return expected in one month.

Captain Bierer returned to Murman 17th instant with Admiral Kemp.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2621

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

MURMANSK, August 25, 1918.

[Received September 2, 2.47 a. m.]

369. I gave informal copy of Department's declaration on Russian relations to President new government. Just received following reply:

After the receipt from you [of] copy [of] communication [of] your government to press, 4th August, transmitted by Reuter, its contents were put before sovereign government, northern region, for its consideration. As result this sovereign government asked me [to] inform you [of] its conclusions.

Sovereign government shares fully your government's opinion regarding rôle of Allied armed forces in Russia under present conditions. It welcomes with a particular pleasure the readiness of your government to help us in reconstructing our own army for suc-

cessful struggle against our common enemy as well as in reorganization of our national government for one whole Russia and so far as it would be acceptable for the Russian people. This help of Allied powers seems to us essential for interests of Allied cause and is guarantee of sincerely friendly future relations between us and Allies in general, and between American and Russian democracies in particular. We fully appreciate your government's decisive declaration regarding its intention not to break the sovereignty of Russia and abstain from any interference into internal affairs our country. Such disinterested decision on part [of] your government appears to us proof of its deep and truly statesmanlike understanding of interests of Allied cause in Russia, success of which depends to great extent on unanimous enthusiasm of population and on its full confidence towards Allies. We are quite certain any attempt to exercise any political pressure or interfere in governing of country would provoke among population, not the strengthening of its true patriotism, but either protest and resistance, or in the best case indifference to regeneration of our motherland.

With a feeling of sadness we must state that the true interests of Allied cause and the ways of effectively helping Russia in her present conditions are not equally understood by all the Allies. Still we hope that the organized efforts of the interested parties will result, in the near future, in a full unity of the opinions in this question and in a complete accord of the united actions.

The sovereign government evidently is pointing out that the humane and leading part in this uniting of the views [for] arrival at true interpretation of the interests of the Allied cause in Russia will belong to the Government of the United States.

Chaikovski, replying to my request that [when] his reply published last two foregoing paragraphs be omitted as would injure government and embarrass me, said reply not be published here. Just attended meeting Russo-American committee for closer commercial relations and made speech noncommittal except anti-German.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2944

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 1207

ARCHANGEL, August 27, 1918.

[Received October 15.]

SIR: . . . In default of instructions to the contrary I shall, to the extent of my authority, encourage American troops if and when landed, to proceed to such points in the interior as Kotlas, Sukhona, and Vologda, as at those places, as well as in Petrograd and Moscow, are stored war supplies which the Soviet government, in violation of its promises and agreements, transferred from Archangel. Furthermore, I shall encourage American troops to obey the

commands of General Poole in his effort to effect a junction with the Czecho-Slovaks and to relieve them from the menace which surrounds them; that menace is nominally Bolshevik but is virtually inspired and directed by Germany. . . .

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2620

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, August 31, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received September 3, 9.45 a. m.]

374. Situation exceedingly difficult, but not impossible in my judgment. New government claims jurisdiction over six provinces but freedom of action limited exclusively to territory occupied by Allied forces, of which have reminded government in my effort to reconcile it to orders issued by military authorities without previous consultation. Friction invariably accompanies exercise of military and civil authority over same territory. British military complain because some Russians suspicious of British and French intentions and resent foreign domination. Have started report that America disapproves presence of Allied forces and has demanded their departure within two days; it appears that different construction placed on Department's declaration of August 3 from what was intended and some charge discord between America and other Allies. Furthermore new government is opposed by monarchists and extreme revolutionists who mistake [miss?] no opportunity to undermine it. I think new government should be encouraged and strengthened in every way possible as its overthrow would prolong civil dissension and greatly strengthen Bolsheviks and perpetuate Soviet government. I have taken this position with my colleagues who unanimously expressed agreement therewith and said they were cooperating. The new government claims understanding with sober [Social Revolutionist?] movement in Samara and with new Siberian government.

It is reported that American troops will arrive within three days and I hope report true as their presence would be effective answer to false rumors and would probably reconcile new government to exercise military authority. General Poole's orders are meant to strengthen new government by repressing opposition thereto but new officials claim they have no authority and are being effaced by military rule. If Allied forces were not here Bolsheviks would drive into Arctic Ocean all new government officials and supporters not caught and shot.

Courier from American Consul, Samara, arrived 30th. Left Samara August 3 for Vologda where he arrived 15th and remained few hours, long enough to learn that Bolshevik troops shooting ten men daily without trial because suspected of counter-revolutionary sentiments. Some days ago reports courier from Allied Consuls, Ekaterinburg, who arrived Archangel 24th, fifty men, four women, interned as hostages, were shot in cold blood including women on approach Czechs. More later, as holding daily conferences with colleagues and new government officials.

Tell Mott¹ Russia great field. Food supplies work of his association but men of experience and judgment required including educators and send same immediately with supplies as food situation is critical.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2638

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 3, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received September 6, 5.07 p. m.]

379. Situation complicated, requires adroit handling, comparatively few *bourgeois* here or in northern provinces where Provisional Government officials continued to function months after Bolshevik revolution, and would have remained in undisturbed possession if Bolshevik rule had not become inconsiderate and cruel throughout Russia. Central Soviet sent Commissaire Kedrov here who arrested non-Bolshevik members City Duma, taking them Moscow and committed many outrages, thus embittering the people, majority of whom had accepted anti-bourgeois instincts. Meantime many secret organizations had been formed throughout Russia, but most or all suppressed by Soviet killing leaders without trial or by German bribing or by personal jealousies. The French were prompt to encourage and financially assist every anti-Bolshevik movement. French Ambassador went from Vologda to Moscow in June telling me object of his visit was to confer with French officials and nationals there; have since learned that he proposed to a nonpolitical organization called the Center that triumvirate should be named to administer affairs after Bolshevik deposed, and demanded as two members thereof Savinkov and Chernov, the promoters to select the third, which proposition killed that movement about middle June as leaders

¹ John R. Mott, general secretary of the National War Work Council of the Y. M. C. A.

said were distrustful of Savinkov whom considered murderer, and that Chernov reformed Bolshevik, unworthy of trust. They did not tell French Ambassador this, but so expressed themselves to my informant.

About July 10 when Chicherin and Radek trying to move Allied missions to Moscow, British captain visited me Vologda and stated Archangel ripe for revolution. My No. 355 [350] narrated movements from Vologda and causes thereof until landed Archangel, see instruction [telegram 355?] of August 9.¹ Found new government here but realize same would not have succeeded if Allied forces had not landed, neither would it survive if Allied troops taken away. Have had frequent conferences with new government which is profuse in complaints against military, claiming that orders issued by latter belittle the new government and impair its influence.

New Ministry talks irrationally about Russian laws demanding that French Colonel appointed military governor of Archangel city by Poole be removed, and that order issued by him with Poole's approval be rescinded. An order which was meant for protection of new government requires militia to arrest anyone accused by a citizen of Bolshevik propaganda and take accused and accuser to authorities. I told President when he came to my apartment about midnight complaining of order that there was nothing objectionable therein; in fact such is law in America. The President is theorist, if not dreamer.

British who are colonizers by instinct and practice, and in control Archangel port since war began are disposed to treat the government contemptuously, but I remonstrate, arguing that must avoid repetition of German experience in Ukraine.

Furthermore, overthrow of this government would prolong civil dissension, strengthen Soviet government and Bolsheviks generally, and would injure Allied cause. This government repudiates Brest treaty and is mobilizing army to fight Germany, consequently is our ally and should be protected and encouraged. Do not understand that I recommend recognition now, but if, as government claims is contemplated, union with similar movement in Siberia is effected, then we could recognize. If, however, people believe that we come as conquerors they will recklessly resist.

Three American battalions expected here to-morrow and their landing will not only strengthen my position, but go a long way toward reconciling Russians. I do not know what instructions these troops have, but if General Poole asks my approval I shall not object to his sending them to the interior in accordance with objects set forth in the Department's declaration of August 3.

¹ Vol. I, p. 631.

Have been reading American papers on Allied intervention in Russia and see that sentiment is divided; I realize enormous responsibility of the President and the Department and I am aware of conflicting appeals and influences to which you are subjected; and I highly appreciate confidence manifested in my efforts cable communication in reply as you have been advised [*sic*]. Observe President considering sending commission to Siberia but hope if sent will be instructed to confer with me before adopting policy. Imperative send [provisions?] here or Murman. I would appreciate it if experienced men should accompany same for distribution under my direction or with my approval.

No reply to my telegram No. 364, August 13, 8 p. m.,¹ recommending authority to join British and French in guaranteeing 15,000,000 ruble loan of new government, guaranty secured by merchandise.

[Information] anxiously awaited concerning vessel with 4,000 tons supplies mentioned in your unnumbered telegram July 30.²

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2648

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State
[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 4, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received September 7, 7.36 p. m.]

381. Lindley says 3,000 tons flour will arrive from England 10th September and 6,000 tons additional about the 15th. I hoped we would be first to report food shipments.

About 4,800 American troops on three transports arrived here to-day, Colonel Stewart commanding.

Naval Lieutenant Riis also arrived on transport not touching Murman where he had orders to report from Admiral Strauss but no official designated in order. He brought two boiler makers with orders to report to *Olympia*. Riis speaks Russian and Esthonian. I have designated him acting naval attaché until otherwise instructed.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2645

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State
[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 6, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received September 8, 2.52 p. m.]

385. July 6, agreement signed, Murman, between [by?] England, America and France represented respectively by Poole, Bierer and

¹Vol. III, p. 58.

²*Ante*, p. 504.

Petit, French naval captain, with Murman Soviet.¹ I suppose Department duly advised. Department never informed me of agreement, but when I was on *Olympia* cable was received from Navy Department or probably Admiral Sims approving Bierer's action. Agreement binds Allies to supply Murman region with foodstuffs including workmen and their families to [omission] extent possible and "to accord Murman region council necessary financial assistance, amount, form, and conditions of which to be decided by further agreement." Object of agreement was to effect unresisted landing Allied forces and induce local Soviet to renounce allegiance to Central Soviet, Moscow.

Poole left Murman for Archangel July 31, leaving Maynard in command. No money ever paid by Allies and only 1,200 tons flour furnished by England. It appears no workmen paid since June, some since January. Representative Murman council has been here a week demanding 32,000,000 rubles concerning which he has had several conferences with American, French, British and Italian chiefs. To-day agreed to accept 5,000,000 rubles to appease striking workmen. Maynard arrived to-day, reports situation Murman serious if workmen's claims ignored longer. Chiefs agree subject to the approval of governments to pay Maynard for distribution among workmen 5,000,000 [rubles] on condition Allied representatives supervise distribution money, and further condition that management of Murman Railway be controlled by Allies.

Murman region includes Alexandrovsk and Kem districts, and the Murman council negotiating for a union with sovereign government here. Another condition of 5,000,000 ruble advance and future advances is that sovereign government guarantee repayment or adding same to Russian war debt. Maynard returns to Murman 7th taking 5,000,000 [rubles] furnished by French Ambassador. The Italian and the Serbian Governments informed representatives here that [they?] approve aforesaid agreement. Shall I concur and obligate Government to pay our share? Railroad never constructed properly, requires much reconstruction, but essential for transporting men and supplies for which road now almost exclusively used. The Allies control to Soroka about 360 miles from Arctic coast. Do not see how we can decline participation. Answer. No reply to my 364,² asking authority of guarantee with the British and French 15,000,000 ruble loan secured by 20,000,000 [rubles] worth merchandise.

New government experiencing financial difficulties. It appears England has cabled [garbled group] proposing plan for holding [building] up reserve in London to secure note issue by new govern-

¹ For text of agreement, see *ante*, p. 493.

² Vol. III, p. 58.

ment.¹ I see no objection thereto except fear reserve inadequate and can see no reason why such reserve should be confined to London and not include New York for whatever rubles we purchase for our requirements here.

FRANCIS

Coup d'état of September 5, 1918; Restoration of the Deposed Government through Efforts of the American Ambassador—Protest of the American Government against the Conduct of the British Commander in Chief—Plan of the Reinstated Ministers to Resign in Favor of the Samara Government: Efforts of the American Ambassador to Dissuade Them

File No. 861.00/2646

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 6, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received September 8, 9.30 p. m.]

386. After reviewing with General Poole Italian, American soldiers at 10, told me that revolution had taken place during the night and that President and six Ministers of new government been put upon steamer at 2 o'clock and now *en route* to Solovetski Monastery 30 hours distant where ministers be confined. When asked if movement resisted Poole replied no, as government had no forces for resistance. It appears that Captain Chaplin, commander Russian soldiers and as such reporting to Poole, also controls municipal militia or police, had ordered ministry arrested and deported. I asked Poole if he knew such action contemplated. Reply was that he heard rumors thereof and wrote note to Chaplin advising against it. This conversation on steps of government building where Poole and I received salute of American troops. Seeing Chaplin I beckoned to him and demanded explanation. Chaplin said he had driven out the Bolsheviki and had permitted new government installation but administration composed of eight ministers including one Archangel citizen had shown itself inefficient by permitting Bolshevik propaganda and given permission for public meetings in opposition to expressed will of Poole. The latter had said Chaplin intended issuing proclamation immediately announcing government deposed and appointing Startsev manager of civil affairs of northern region.

Leaving Chaplin I joined Poole who was talking with Stewart and other American officers and told Poole to permit no proclamation from Chaplin until submitting same to Allied chiefs whom I requested to assemble my apartment at 12 o'clock. They came with Poole who had secured copies of two proclamations signed by Chaplin. Diplomatic conference consisted French, Italian,

¹ Vol. III, pp. 66 and 67.

British, American chiefs. I opened conference by stating Chaplin's action was outrageous usurpation of power and insult to diplomatic chiefs; no disagreement. When this statement being expressed, I proposed that Poole be requested to prevent Chaplin and Startsev from functioning and prohibit circulation of the proclamation. Both propositions met approval and Poole agreed to execute same.

Meantime representatives of the cooperatives were awaiting audience with me in an outer room having stated to Cole whose attendance [*sic*] I saw that news of *coup d'état* was rapidly gaining circulation and was promoting great excitement as suspected of being monarchist movement and cooperatives desired to know whether sanction from London or Paris or Washington. I proposed that cooperatives be shown in but my colleagues preferred that I go and talk with them taking Cole to interpret. I left conference and think convinced cooperatives that Allies were not a party to *coup d'état*. This consumed half an hour. Returning to conference I asked Poole opinion of arresting Chaplin and found him very much opposed thereto as thought Chaplin sole reliance to organize Russian army as Chaplin only Russian believing Russians fighting. Cooperatives had said that *coup d'état* was monarchical and if something was not done to convince the people especially those [of sawmill] villages that Allies not fostering movement bloody civil war might ensue. Poole objecting to Chaplin arrest, it was agreed that ministers should be brought back to Archangel and Poole, consenting thereto, as [said] would catch steamer by wireless if possible, if not would send a destroyer. Thereupon conference adjourned till 5 p. m. when Chaplin and Startsev requested to be present.

Later nine representatives of Zemstvos called and presented protest against overthrow of the new government saying as cooperatives had affirmed that if anything done to perpetuate or support Chaplin act, life of the district would immediately cease and sanguinary strife would follow. I convinced cooperatives and Zemstvos that Allied diplomats disapproved *coup d'état* but cooperatives, while accepting my statement that my colleagues knew nothing of Chaplin plans, expressed themselves as suspicious of British and French military officers and evidently doubted Poole's sincerity.

Colonel Stewart commanding American troops called immediately upon arrival September 4 but mention had no message the particulars [*sic*] and said his only orders were to report to Poole. I have been vainly trying to see him since to explain situation lest he become inoculated by British and French officers who have lost faith in Russians. If Department approves I would appreciate War Department's instructing ranking American officer in Russia to keep close touch with me. More later.

Your telegrams as reported in my No. 373, August 30, 7 p. m.,¹ still missing also 243, 4, and 5. Please repeat those pertaining to policy. Your 246, September 4, 4 p. m.,¹ received to-day via London. Am utilizing Coolidge.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2647

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 7, 1918.

[Received September 9, 6.06 p. m.]

387. Following was promulgated yesterday evening:

The representatives of those of the Allied powers whose troops have arrived in northern Russia, having heard of the kidnaping of the members of the government of the northern region, desire to disclaim all responsibility for this act. They disapprove of violent measures from whichever side they may originate and all the more in that they have come to Russia with hope of seeing established a free régime of order and legality.

The act was carried out by Russians against Russians and is not therefore strictly speaking the concern of the Allies. The representatives of the latter feel, nevertheless, constrained in the special circumstances which exist to see that the arrested members of the government are at once given their liberty and brought back to Archangel. As soon as this has been done it is hoped that an arrangement will be made which will prevent the recurrence of such regrettable incidents and which will unite every Russian of good will in the work of the regeneration of his country.

Meantime the affairs of the district will go on as before. The Allied representatives invite all good Russians to pursue their normal occupations in full confidence that no attack on their liberties will be encouraged by the Allies. Francis, American Ambassador; J. Noulens, *Ambassadeur de France*; Torretta, *Ministre d'Italie*; F. O. Lindley, His Britannic Majesty's Commissioner.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2684

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 8, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received September 12, 6.07 p. m.]

388. After my 386, September 6, 9 [7] p. m. Chaplin distributed circular order reinstating military governor Archangel who was removed by deposed government. Two ministers, Diedusenko and Ivanov, had escaped arrest and issued incendiary circular inciting people to resist Chaplin government which Startsev, civil governor

¹ Not printed.

of Archangel, was supporting. Poole on my request had prohibited Chaplin from issuing proclamations but when people congregated around two contradictory proclamations and read in connection with Ambassadors' proclamation all posted on telegraph poles and walls they were greatly confused. Poole called and concurred in my suggestion that Allied Ambassadors assume control local situation to prevent civil war in rear of Allied front, which extends 60 miles on railroad toward Vologda and about 160 on Dvina toward Kotlas, neither expedition having definite knowledge of strength of Bolsheviks opposing them. Consequently Allied forces numbering not exceeding 9,000 altogether, Americans included, would be in precarious situation with civil war in the rear. Failure of Archangel anti-Bolshevik movement would be deplorable from every viewpoint. It would strengthen Bolshevik government, weaken anti-Bolshevik movement in Samara and Siberia, endanger position of Allied forces throughout Russia. These reasons moved me to aggressively espouse assuming control until return of kidnapped ministers and the restoration of sovereign government, if I can persuade Poole to support it.

I consider *coup d'état* a crime, and if Poole and Kemp would agree I should have its originators arrested. Poole objects because says Chaplin assisted in Bolshevik overthrow and is energetic and decidedly pro-Ally. Allied Ambassadors told Chaplin and Startsev yesterday to cease functioning in any capacity from that moment and they understood thoroughly as I was spokesman and Chaplin fully comprehends English. Proclamation was immediately prepared to the effect that Ambassadors of Allied countries having troops in northern region and the commander had decided to assume control of affairs pending establishment of a constituted government representative of majority of people for the prevention of civil strife in rear of Allied front and to avoid calamity of widespread famine which threatens and for relief of which provisions are being sent from our countries. This proclamation translated into Russian was sent to printers last evening but I was informed after last midnight that the printers refused to work, consequently proclamation not promulgated. Meantime Admiral Kemp reports deposed ministers will return 9 p. m. Allied Ambassadors will meet at my apartment at 6 p. m. to determine future course. Think I shall advocate restoration sovereign government but on conditions enabling military to cooperate without friction. Colonel Stewart yesterday told me one American battalion had gone on railroad and another left by river. Stewart again said only orders he had were to report to General Poole.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2719b

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1918, 6 p. m.

253. The American Ambassador at Tokyo has been ordered to proceed informally to Vladivostok and report to the Department his views as to how the purpose of the United States to assist Russia may be furthered under the conditions which he will find to exist there. His reports will be for the special information of the Department and his stay at Vladivostok will be unofficial and temporary.

The following supplementary instructions have been sent him to-day: [Here follows telegram to the Ambassador in Japan, dated September 9, 1918, 5 p. m., *ante*, page 372.]

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2680

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 9, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received September 12, 8.42 p. m.]

389. Kidnaped Ministers returned last night and promised representative of Allied Ambassadors would perform no act of government before conferring 11 a. m. to-day, but before that hour issued a proclamation officially signed, stating had been brought back by the Allies and assuring people their rights be protected. President telephoned me of this whereupon I requested him come my apartment to meet Allied Ambassadors, and withhold circulation of the proclamation until workable agreement effected to prevent friction, which continually arose before kidnaping. Ambassadors prepared statement for signature of Chaikovski personally, officially stating kidnaped Ministers been brought back by Allies and promising preservation of people's rights and liberties. Such declaration submitted to Ministers who not disposed to accept but agreed to consider and return 4 p. m. Italian Ambassador and I of one mind. Commissioner Lindley reasonably concurs, but apparently hampered by Poole, who issues orders without submitting to any authority while professing desire to comply with wishes of Ambassadors, especially American Ambassador. French Ambassador and Poole himself are surrounded by military officers who have no patience with Russians and no faith in reorganization of army without mailed fist. Meantime returned Ministers propose unreasonable conditions. Situa-

tion extremely difficult, but I am assiduously endeavoring to reconcile conflicting opinions and avoid bloodshed.

Returned Ministers assert that British Colonel Thornhill, chief British Intelligence Bureau, was cognizant of kidnaping and assisted in planning same, which Lindley discredits.

I think I have given Colonel Stewart thorough understanding of the situation. He dined with me last night as did Lindley, Poole and Admiral Kemp. I have refrained from giving Stewart orders.

Am hourly receiving delegations, decided majority of which protest against *coup d'état* and threaten armed uprising if sovereign government not restored. These delegations represent peasants, Zemstvos and laborers, who constitute bulk of population; while other side composed of Russian officers claiming to number 500 and wholesale and retail timber organizations and commercial interests generally complain that supreme government is weak, incapable, but opponents represent very small percentage of the people. While sovereign government inexperienced and deficient in comprehending fully the situation, they are supported by overwhelming majority of the people and claim to be working in cooperation with regeneration movements in Samara and Irkutsk. For this reason I am supporting sovereign government and endeavoring to reconcile thereto my colleagues and military authorities.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2683

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 9, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received September 13, 7 a. m.]

390. After second conference of four hours, supreme government Ministers reinstated and they are issuing proclamations so announcing and calling off strikes which were general. They demanded court-martial to try Chaplin and his associates but Ambassadors advised against. This point unsettled. I opposed court-martial because fear would result in revealing that some British and French officers were behind Chaplin, who I think guilty of a crime. Government consent to three additional portfolios and transfers of present ministers to other departments but are firm in opposition to dismissal of any minister. Present Minister of War inexperienced and unable to cooperate with Allied military. Several times to-day bloodshed seemed imminent but was fortunately avoided.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2855

The Consul at Archangel (Cole) to the Secretary of State

No. 41

ARCHANGEL [September 10, 1918].

[Received October 1.]

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report as to the political situation in Archangel before the kidnaping of the members of the sovereign government of the northern territory took place. I think it necessary to make the report even now, after the crisis due to the *coup d'état* has passed, in order to show into what inflammable material the bomb fell.

On the afternoon of August 2, when General Poole and the Allied troops and war vessels entered the city and harbor, there was considerable enthusiasm shown but it was plain to be seen that this enthusiasm was confined to certain classes. The General was greeted on the quay by a guard of honor hastily gotten together and consisting of peasants armed and clothed, as to uniform, in a makeshift way. There was also a large crowd of enthusiastic middle-class persons. Thus the General's landing immediately revealed what classes favored his coming, namely those two classes, the peasantry, and the city "intelligents" and *bourgeois*, who had suffered most under the Bolsheviks. The working class was patently absent. As the General's yacht approached the quay a few tugs whistled but the great majority of tugs and river craft kept silence. During the march of the Allied officers through the streets to the government building the absence of the city working class was even more conspicuous.

The feeling that there was something new in the city, something new about which people were enthusiastic, lasted only a few days. The populace soon sank back into the apathy that had become habitual with it. This apathy continued until the *coup d'état* when the populace became aroused again, but in a very different sense.

After the troops had received the check administered to them at Obozersk by the Bolsheviks the apathy deepened into what almost approached dissatisfaction in some quarters and blame was laid to the Allies for not having brought more troops. The arrival of a food ship in these first days would have done much to relieve the situation but no such ship came.

One of the first orders issued by the Allied military aroused much disapprobation, without at the same time accomplishing much. This was the order forbidding the display of any flags anywhere except the white, blue, and red national ensign, the navy Andreievski cross flag and the Allied flags. What struck the Russian popu-

lace (and it also looked strange to persons who had been in Russia continuously before the Allies' entrance) was the total absence of red flags. It was expected that the Bolshevik emblem, a red flag with white or yellow letters, R.S.F.S.R., would be forbidden but the plain red flag was not a Bolshevik but a universal socialist emblem. As a prominent Menshevik leader, who had been in the Food Supply Ministry under Kerensky, and a prominent local Socialist Revolutionist of the right, who had been in prison under the Bolsheviks for pro-Ally sympathy, said to me: "The order is understandable to intelligent persons who realize that the Allied military intend it as a measure against the Bolsheviks and not against the socialists who invited the Allies into Russia." But they said it actually operated against those socialists and that the masses unfortunately understood it in this sense, and that the Bolsheviks were active in so interpreting it to the masses. They regretted that the Allied military did not understand that after eight months of uninterrupted Bolshevik control in Russia the masses actually saw more meaning in the red flag than in the white, blue, and red one. The Allies, they said, had come to change this and the moderate socialists wished to change it, but it could be done only with time, and the order in question merely hindered instead of helping the convalescence from Bolshevism.

The same men pointed out that they themselves, prominent pro-Ally leaders, and all their pro-Ally colleagues, were seriously handicapped in their struggle against Bolshevism by the fact that the military governor general would issue no permits for any political meetings whatsoever. They declared that there was no open propaganda by the Bolsheviks in the sawmill villages below the city where the immense majority of the workmen of the region around Archangel are located. The men stated that in the two meetings that had been held in the day or two before the order was issued forbidding meetings not a single Bolshevik had appeared to heckle or argue against the moderates. According to them, however, before the mill opening in the morning, during the lunch hour and after the close of work, wherever a few workmen would gather together or group themselves on their way home, a Bolshevik workman or agitator would appear and agitate against the moderates and against the Allies. The two strongest Bolshevik arguments were continuously the forbidding of the socialist flag and the non-appearance of food ships. The two men referred to declared that were absolute freedom of meeting allowed it would be the most effective means of combating Bolshevism as unless in absolute control the Bolsheviks had always thriven best in a state of conspiracy and that repression

had been proven to be the food on which they best thrive. It was also stated that were the free publication and sale of any and all newspapers permitted no Bolshevik organ would appear.

An incident that occurred on the 15th of August created a great deal of anger against certain circles among the Allies. This anger was felt not among the Bolsheviks, who, I am told, used the occurrence to point their "I-told-you-so" statements, but among the pro-Ally socialists. General Poole issued a proclamation to the people and it was criticized in No. 3 of the *Vozrozhdenie Severa* (Rebirth of the North). This paper is the semiofficial organ of the government, reflecting more or less the political views of the members of the government. The article appears on the second page of the number mentioned, beginning at the top of the third column. It is distinctly a criticism but not a malicious one. On the afternoon of the 15th, a French officer, M. le Comte de Luberzac, of the Allied Counter-Espionage Bureau, appeared at the newspaper office and apparently demanded the arrest of the author of the article. It is reported that high words resulted on both sides. So far as I know nothing ever came of the matter and the incident only attains its full significance in the light of later events. It left, however, in the minds of the moderate socialists connected with the paper, all of whom stand close to the government, an impression of an acute hostility already existing between them and certain Allied officers in the group to which Luberzac belonged.

On the other [hand], after General Poole's entrance the Russian political leaders, the majority of whom had been in hiding until August 2, did not display a proper understanding of the fact that such an attitude actually existed among trusted and powerful Ally counselors regardless of the rightness or wrongness thereof. These men who had been shut tight for months in a conspiracy and unable to express their views openly were rather too eager to enjoy the full freedom to express their opinions that they took for granted after the Bolshevik overthrow. They were, however, very circumspect after all, but not as circumspect as they should have been, knowing as they did of the existence of the bitterness against them and their kind on the part of influential Allied officers as mentioned above.

It was during these days, but probably without any connection with the incident above referred to, that desertions began among the Russians who had enlisted in the British-Slavic Legion. An undoubted part in these desertions was played by the failure of the expedition on the railroad and river to make rapid progress which would have had an extremely beneficial effect on the situation in its entirety and prevented the loss to Allied military prestige which occurred at this time.

Among the mass of the populace, however, none of the above factors, all of them unfavorable to the Allied cause in Archangel and northern Russia, played so strong a rôle as the apparent indifference of the Allied authorities to the food situation. No food ships had come in with the troops. No word as to the near approach of any such ships had been, or could be spread, among the people. At this time the Allied command and the Allied diplomatic corps did not itself know what would be sent. This uncertainty was a trump card in the hands of the Bolsheviks who argued that the Allies could not furnish food being themselves on the verge of starvation and needing every ounce of food to use at home to prevent the outbreak of those hunger riots which would soon develop into the world revolution so long predicted by the Bolsheviks and which latterly was their only reliance. America, said the B[olshevik]s, would furnish nothing, she being only interested in strengthening her own financial, military and commercial position *vis-à-vis* the weakened nations of Europe, and in furthering her own imperialistic aims in Siberia. Great anxiety was constantly expressed by the moderate socialists and cooperative leaders in the food-supply committees, who did not doubt that food would be sent but feared it would come too late to avoid a severe pinch of a week or so. They justly argued that the food question was a vital one and one on which they had based a great deal of their pro-Ally propaganda against the Bolsheviks and that delay in bringing food would block their agitation in favor of the intervention. They feared that it was not sufficiently realized that the mere arrival of food ships in the harbor did not mean food in the peasants' huts as time must elapse between the ship's arrival and the receipt by the consumer, due to the necessary work of distribution, etc. In a word the delay and uncertainty concerning food worked a good deal of injury to the Allied cause here.

These, then, were the factors causing the cessation of enthusiasm for the Allies that once existed among moderate socialist and *bourgeois* liberal circles, and which prevented the birth of enthusiasm among those classes where it had never existed. Into this unhappy situation burst the attempted *coup d'état* which definitely ruined the Allied cause for the time being and left a situation which only the presence of an overwhelming number of American troops and the vague consciousness among the people that great, democratic, friendly America was at Russia's side made bearable even to the pro-Ally Russians.

I have [etc.]

FELIX COLE

File No. 861.00/3079

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 1214

ARCHANGEL, *September 17, 1918.*

[Received October 29.]

SIR: . . . Permit me here to give some of the details and circumstances of the kidnaping which I have not given you before. . . . Several days after my arrival here when I was endeavoring to lessen the friction between the sovereign government and General Poole, the latter told me a man had said to him that he would take all of the government Ministers away some night and General Poole need know nothing about it. In reply to my inquiry as to what his answer was the General told me that he said the government should not be taken away; I thereupon impressed General Poole with the importance of protecting the Ministers, saying the overthrow of this government would strengthen the Bolsheviks greatly, weaken the regeneration of Russia and would be very injurious to the Allied cause, with all of which General Poole expressed assent. About six hours before the kidnaping occurred, or at 7.15 p. m., a conference adjourned after two hours' session in my office at the chancery; the persons in this conference besides myself were Noulens, Lindley and Torretta, together with Chaikovski, Martyushin, Minister of Finance, and two or three others. We had adjourned to meet the following day at my apartment.

It has developed since that after leaving my office Noulens told Lindley that he had heard from a secret source that the Ministers were to be deported that night, but that he did not credit the report. Lindley went to General Poole and told him what he had heard, whereupon General Poole directed one of his aides to write to Chaplin that he had heard such a rumor, but did not think Chaplin could be contemplating such a move. This was at 8 p. m. The British Intelligence Bureau, of which Colonel Thornhill is chief, is just across the street from and immediately opposite the apartment occupied by the Ministers, both houses being on corners. The American troops had arrived on three transports about 1 p. m., September 3; one battalion had been sent up the Dvina River, another battalion down the railroad toward Vologda, and the third battalion was being quartered at Smolny Barracks, but had not yet begun its duty of patrolling the street, which was still the duty of British and Russian soldiers. There must not have been a patrol on the streets the night of the kidnaping, September 5-6, or even if

there was it was instructed not to interfere with thirty soldiers who were taking from the house immediately opposite the British Intelligence Bureau the Ministers of the sovereign government and conveying them to a steamer at the wharf. . . .

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2661

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 10, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received September 11, 5.15 a. m.]

391. Lindley says confidentially has asked to be relieved if not given control over military forces which General Poole appears empowered to command; apparently friction setting out [in]. Poole when informed by me that supreme Government reinstated and relations between it and military be defined, to-day writes informally requesting nothing be decided before knowing his views as "Military dispositions in this town remain in my hands." Americans constitute decided majority of Allied forces under Poole, totaling about 4,000; one battalion sent on railroad toward Vologda, one on Dvina toward Kotlas and one performing guard duty in Archangel. Americans arrived 3d, debarked 4th. Kidnaping occurred night of 5th. Americans first assigned guard duty 6th from which community concluded Americans planned or supported *coup d'état*. Stewart says only orders were report to Poole. While I suspect British and probably French officers planned *coup d'état* American officers absolutely knew nothing about it. Your unnumbered July 30, 3 p. m.,¹ through American Consul, Archangel, and also your circular of August 3, 4 p. m.,² stated American troops sent Archangel but gave me no instructions or authority over them. If Poole has unlimited control I fear he has learned military and colonizing instincts together with his contempt for sovereign government and his general mistrust of Russians will handicap American policy in Russia and may possibly bring about condition like that in Ukraine. I am not asking control of American troops but informing Department of conditions so that it can give instructions if so elects.

Since above written have seen Stewart who says Poole desires him to take command of railroad expedition toward Vologda; Stewart, while not shirking responsibility, dislikes leaving Archangel and I prefer he remain here as he commands three battalions and Arch-

¹Ante, p. 504.

²See footnote 1, ante, p. 328.

angel is base of operations. Tramway employees on strike because Ministry kidnaped; Major Nichols commanding American battalion here says was asked by military control office if had men who could run street cars and replying affirmatively was told to send such men to car barn and take out cars consequently since yesterday afternoon American soldiers have been acting as motormen and conductors but collecting no fares, public riding free and every car crowded to full capacity. I advised Nichols to request that written order be given him for such use of American soldiers.

Please send Jenkins or Willoughby Smith or both here immediately, also Flack.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2720a

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 12, 1918, 3 p. m.*

1313. The Department has received most disturbing reports concerning the high-handed methods taken by General Poole with the local government at Archangel, whose authority he apparently ignores. The natural effect upon the Russian people will be to arouse resentment and possibly open hostility toward the Governments whose troops have been landed in northern Russia for the purpose of aiding and not of coercing the inhabitants. The course which General Poole is reported to have taken is entirely at variance with the policy of this Government as set forth in the *aide-mémoire* handed to Lord Reading on July 18¹ and with the understanding when American troops were sent to Russian territory.

In view of this unfortunate state of affairs and the possibly serious consequences which may result in the attitude of the Russian people, not only at Archangel but elsewhere, toward the governments whose troops are under General Poole's command, you are requested to lay this matter before the British Government without delay, expressing the deep concern which the President feels as to a continuance of military interference with the local authorities at Archangel in matters of a civil nature.

You may also, in urging the British Government to instruct General Poole to be more considerate of the civil authorities, say that the President, in the event that this reported interference is not checked, will be compelled to consider the withdrawal of the Amer-

¹ Dated July 17, *ante*, p. 287.

ican troops from the superior command of General Poole and the directing of Colonel Stewart to act independently in accordance with the announced policy of this Government. The President would deplore the necessity of taking this step but he cannot permit the United States to share responsibility for the reported action of General Poole as commander of the united forces.

The direct interference of General Poole with the civil authorities at Archangel has been most unfortunate and is reported to have caused great offense and humiliation to the Russians. This Government has been able thus far to retain the good will and confidence of the Russian people in general. It cannot afford to risk this friendly attitude by being a participant in an expedition whose commander apparently is indifferent to the rights and feelings of the Russian communities with which he comes in contact. I have very frankly and emphatically explained the situation to the British Chargé here who assured me he would immediately telegraph his Government.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2697

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, *September 12, 1918, 10 p. m.*

[Received September 14, 10.03 a.m.]

396. When Ministers came to conference yesterday afternoon they greatly surprised Ambassadors by stating they had decided to abandon supreme government of northern region. Government had been reinstated, but complained of military interference and cited several cases. They submitted written statement to the effect that zone occupied by Allied forces is narrow with little prospect of being enlarged soon and that—

Under present circumstances existence in northern region of subordinate organs of Russian state government and organs of self-government or local administration quite sufficient.

They planned to appoint military governor who would report to triumvirate directly at Samara, composed of Alexeev, Avksentiev, and Stepanov. Said they were going to Zemstvo meeting at 6 p. m. and knew we were also, and they would announce abdication there. Ambassadors dissuaded them from making such announcement and I requested reconsideration of determination. Thereupon they said had fully considered and were immovably resolved to abdicate because two powers could not function in limited territory without

friction and furthermore their decree of mobilization had met with disappointing response. Ambassadors met to-day but Ministry appears arranging for departure and did not come to conference. I called President by telephone and requested him to dine with me but he said had engagement and when I suggested 11 o'clock visit he replied would be engaged most of night with colleagues arranging abdication but promised to call at 11 to-morrow. My colleagues do not attach great importance to government's departure saying civil and military can not function in such a narrow zone without friction. Lindley had called on President and suggested President be a governor general himself but he declined. Ambassadors concluded to insist on his remaining as representative of general government at Samara and adviser to military governor general of Archangel which I shall advise. If Ministry abdicate proposed abdication unknown to public.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2681

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 12, 1918.

[Received September 13, 9.14 a. m.]

397. The Zemstvos of Archangel Province met yesterday and invited Allied diplomats to attend. As dean I spoke. I had prepared speech, which, after thanking Zemstvos for invitation, drifted into speech of American Ambassador. Colleagues on reading same requested that I eliminate American Ambassador and deliver speech for Allied representatives which I did.

I stated we realized the condition of Russia and did not recognize Brest or Ukraine treaties, and trusted patriotic Russians did not, as they were disgraceful and insulting and dismembered Russia and had for their object making Russia a German province, which elicited hearty applause. Attention was then called to civil strife in Russia, to idleness of industries, and paralysis of commerce, proceeding:

And that is not all. There is suffering from hunger in this land of plenty. You have produced ample for the necessities of your own people and can do so again. Armed German and Austrian prisoners and armed Bolsheviks under command of German and Austrian officers have prevented this section of Russia from getting food from those sections which produced an abundance. Allied forces have come within your borders with the sole intention of remedying this

deplorable situation. The Allied countries have already *en route* to Archangel ships laden with provisions and are able and planning to send more to relieve the threatened famine and to clothe those who would otherwise suffer from the rigors of a northern winter. Your surplus products such as flax and lumber and sugar-beet seed and ores and other articles which you can give in exchange [*sic*].

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2680

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1918, 5 p. m.

Your 389, September 9, 6 p. m., and two previous telegrams regarding recent events.¹

Department approves your action fully. Determine your future course by careful compliance with policy communicated to you in Department's No. 253, September 9, 6 p. m.²

Colonel Stewart will receive by cable complete text of statement of policy towards Russia, of which essential portions are embodied in above telegram. It is important that you and Colonel Stewart should keep in closest personal touch. Please inform me if instructions to that effect fail also to reach him. You appreciate of course that in military matters Colonel Stewart is under the command of General Poole. Please continue to keep Department fully advised of developments.

Department appreciates notable service performed in the past by Chaikovski in the cooperative movement, but is not surprised at the difficulties you report in practical matters.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2701

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 13, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received September 15, 7.33 p. m.]

399. Had a thorough talk with the governor [*sic*] Chaikovski who says government decision to abdicate very near immovable. I endeavored to persuade him to continue until communication established with triumvirate directory at Samara so could inform them

¹Ante, pp. 525 and 523.

²Ante, p. 525.

of contemplated movement and satisfy people that abandonment government part general plan. He expressed a desire to go to England and explain to the Allies the nature of movement for regeneration of Russia. He said movement non-partisan but combination occasionally [essentially?] patriotic. Russians humiliated by condition to which Bolsheviks had brought country and while considerable fraction of the organization favored constitutional monarchy such fraction willing first to aid movement for establishment of republic with the understanding that if majority favored monarchy they would be permitted to assume leadership.

Said association composed of 200 representative Russians who held secret meetings in Moscow over which he presided and which (representing three elements; namely, military, socialistic or conservative democrats, and limited monarchist) self-controlled, that each element selected three men, total nine, who did meet at Samara and chose of their number for triumvirate directory: Alexeev representing military and constitutional monarchy element, Avksentieiev representing socialists, and Stepanov for the conservatives. Stepanov substituted for Kishkin who was arrested before escaping from Moscow and imprisoned there. Scheme contemplated new constituent assembly chosen by universal suffrage to meet and determine character of the government and select administrators. Communication severed with Samara which Soviet radios claim captured by Red Army but unconfirmed. Can you ascertain whether true? He said other governments like this organized in sections but success unknown.

Ministry will confer with Ambassadors to-morrow and will submit public statement explaining abdication, also orders for military governor who will represent and report to the triumvirate.

My objection to abdication is that it will strengthen central Soviet and give Allied occupancy the appearance of military invasion; peasants and laborers probably can be quieted by food distribution but otherwise would be irresponsible. Hear confidentially that ship left New York September 7, with 1,500 tons flour for Archangel; to whom consigned and what purpose?

President said Poole sending democratic Russian soldiers to the front which [while] keeping here those [opposed to?] sovereign government and expresses fear that another *coup d'état* being planned; that British and French had opened [recruiting] stations for Russians to which mobilization failure greatly due. My No. 363, August 13, 7 p. m.,¹ recommended opening American recruiting station here and I renew recommendation if Russians abandon effort to raise army as many Russians would enlist with us who would not

¹ Not printed.

with the British or French. If however you could place fund at my disposal, say \$100,000, for feeding and equipping Russian army could use same to great advantage; military attaché and other American officers visited by Russian officers who desire to enlist Russian army but sovereign government has no funds with which to feed and equip them except that furnished by British, who President charges are withholding funds and persuading Russians to join British army. Can you do this? Amount advanced would not be gift but loan and the moral effect would be telling.

Poole grants my demand for American representation in censorship and requests Russian-speaking American officer. Please hasten Prince's coming.

Your No. 253, September 9, 6 p. m.,¹ received 11th garbled but substance comprehended. Please keep me advised concerning Siberian movement.

FRANCIS

File No. 763.72/13456

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, September 15, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 6.30 p. m.]

1899. The Secretary of War² requests that the following urgent and extremely confidential message be given to the President immediately:

The message from Clemenceau which has been sent you through the Department of State requests sending of five additional [American] battalions to Murmansk.³ The French profess themselves unable to send any further forces but further secured Foch's indorsement to Clemenceau's request. You will observe, however, that Foch stipulates that they be sent direct from America and not detached from forces now in France. The military advisers at Versailles considered the subject yesterday and unanimously but informally agreed that in future no further forces of any kind should be sent to Murmansk this year, English and French representatives concurring. Bliss says Foch consents only out of deference for Clemenceau and will not misunderstand your declining. Bliss and I agree that yielding to this request would only open the door to further diversion of American forces as French and British will not send theirs and will join in requests upon us. Could you not decline on ground that all our energy is to be devoted to early and decided success on western front? Our men are thus in battle and in both France and

¹ *Ante*, p. 525.

² Newton D. Baker, at this time on special mission in Europe.

³ *Post*, p. 544.

England their success is on every tongue. Pershing really won a great fight and his army is impatient to go on. Our losses are about 5,000 wounded and sick sent to hospitals but very few dead or mortally hurt. Of those I saw most were slight injuries. Prisoners numbered 15,000 when I left. Full details of casualties and captures not available for some days.

PAGE

File No. 861.00/2731

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 16, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received September 18, 10.10 a. m.]

403. Ambassadors just had satisfactory conference my house with Chaikovski, Poole and Durov, new governor general. Departing government submitted address to people of northern region stating original object of its formation was temporary and terminates with formation of all-Russian state government. Aim having been accomplished by formation [of] said government at Samara composed of members Constituent Assembly, government of northern region resigns its powers and appoints governor general who reports to all-Russian authority Samara. No direct communication with Samara now but same expected to be established by wireless in a few days. While advance "clearing country of German-Bolshevik detachments" proceeds in accordance with well-devised plan it is necessarily slow; as that portion of northern region freed from Bolsheviks is under military authority and Allied representatives have agreed to appointment of governor general responsible to all-Russian government and will see that his legitimate functioning is not interfered with—are main reasons why relinquishment of and transfer of power occur now.

Address calls upon all citizens of region to support governor general with their confidence and their cooperation in discharge of his onerous duties and in his efforts to organize Russian army and that governor general will work hand in hand with town and Zemstvo organs of self-government with friendly collaboration of Allies. The address furthermore states that supreme administration takes this grave decision only after careful consideration of affairs in northern region from all points of view and of course with the consent of Allied representatives and assures people against possibility of restoration or reactionary conspiracies such as *coup d'état* of September 6.

Address ends with felicitation on beginning of regeneration and unification of fatherland which troops operating in north and east

will secure by joining, and ends, "Long life to united independent and free Russia! Long life to all-Russian Constituent Assembly and to new all-Russian government!" I think no disturbance will follow this announcement. In fact it would have been excellent arrangement if criminal kidnaping not occurred as territory is too small contribute toward civil and military functioning without friction. Durov and assistant Samarin dining with me this evening. Ministers of supreme government giving tea 5 p. m. which chiefs will attend.

I broached Russian mobilization to the President and Poole when latter said was not enlisting Russians in British army but forming Slav-British legion and when any Russian military authority organized would turn legion over to it as nucleus Russian army (such information enlightening to me furthermore). Poole stated had ample supplies, equipment for all Russians enlisting and said that President Wilson should understand that fighting Bolsheviks was not fighting Russians but Germans as Bolsheviks indissolubly linked with Germans as demonstrated in every engagement.

British supply ship arrived to-day but unadvised whether for military or civil relief. Poole furthermore stated eight vessels would clear by September 25 from Canada, United States and England with sufficient supplies to relieve food necessities of the civil population. Please inform me on the subject.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2730

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, September 18, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

1982. Your 1313, September 12, 3 p. m.¹ The Counselor of the Embassy presented this matter yesterday in conversation with Mr. Balfour who said in substance that he entirely shared the views you set forth, which the British Chargé d'Affaires in Washington had also already conveyed to him by telegraph. He also said that even before he had received Barclay's communication of your views he had taken vigorous steps to mend matters at Archangel both as to the future action of General Poole and to correct the bad impression the occurrence had made on the Russians as far as possible. He specially wished you to know of his immediate action, and said that in addition to this he had repeated Barclay's telegram textually to Lindley at Archangel.

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¹ *Ante*, p. 533.

File No. 861.00/2778

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 18, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received September 24, 7.50 a. m.]

410. Quiet. Government will publish resignation to-morrow, possibly 20th, but uncertain. *Fatherland*, journal recently established, Chaikovski says by British, contains article criticizing, ridiculing Durov, sovereign government and Constituent Assembly, consequently government attempting to suppress. Another journal, *Resurrection of the North*, has two blank columns, from which article criticizing Poole eliminated by censors. I have demanded censorship representation [garbled groups] but have no satisfaction therefor. Please expedite arrival of Prince, Lehrs, Bukowski.

Allies gained decided victory on Dvina killing, capturing 150 opponents who numbered 600 and fled in disorder. Our casualties unknown, [fatalities] thought light. Three Americans killed on railroad 17th. Total Americans died of [influenza] epidemic, 50, including one lieutenant.

Military attaché received garbled cable from March¹ directing close touch with me but omitting Stewart's name. Stewart understands meant for him.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2845

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 20, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received 12.24 p. m.]

432[?]. Y.M.C.A. occupy theater here where they maintain reading, billiards and writing rooms much frequented by Allied soldiers. Last evening I addressed them inviting Governor General and President to accompany me. Latter requested, made a speech after I had spoken and stated that he had prepared cable to President Wilson asking for more American troops and to [after] consultation requested me to send the following telegram:

To the President: Torn to pieces and bleeding, tumbling to death, Russia appeals to you, great citizen, for a quick and decisive help. It was thanks to the American forces that the glorious change has been effected on the [western?] front. Now the eastern front, which we are endeavoring to restore under trying conditions of struggle

¹ Gen. Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff, U. S. A.

against the Bolsheviks, is craving for a similar change at your convenience. Strategic situation in northern Russia needs sending more American troops here for enabling us to form a second Russian army for delivering a decisive blow to the enemy and for putting an immediate end to the horrible spilling of innocent blood in the central part of Russia. Quite appreciating the hardships of the task, Russian democracy offers in advance her heartiest gratitude and admiration to her precatory sister for the exploit. Nicholas Chaikovski.

I send in cipher by request because sender wished same unknown to British and French.

Two steamers just arrived here conveying 500 American, 500 British, 700 French soldiers, also two American couriers with six pouches, also Consul Davis, wife and child.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2730

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1918, 4 p. m.

267. Referring to the action of General Poole and resultant friction with Russians, I understand Lindley has been advised of this Government's views and of action by British Government both as to the future course of General Poole and to correct the unfortunate impression made at Archangel.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2776

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 21, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received September 24, 6.20 a. m.]

416. Quiet. Another officer died. Total deaths, 65, including two lieutenants.

Government installing Durov governor general, will publish abdication Monday. Three ministers left yesterday for Samara; delegation of Russian officers opposed to sovereign government planning to go Samara to explain conditions here to Alexeev and represent that American Ambassador protected two ministers. French Ambassador thinks undue favoring sovereign government, which socialistic, may drive anti-socialistic Russian officers and Russian bourgeoisie to German side. I told him our policy was not to interfere

even with local governments and to discreetly protect same if decided choice of people as this government undoubtedly is.

The transport *Rhodesian* arrived from Montreal with 5,800 tons flour which being transferred to Russian craft for shipment to interior points, where flour exhausted. Please advise what vessels *en route* Archangel with supplies.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2777

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 23, 1918, midnight.

[Received September 24, 2.45 a. m.]

420. Your telegrams Nos. 265¹ and 267 received to-day. Two officers of Omsk government arrived here to-day; left Ekaterinburg August 13; report all-Russian government Samara not yet established, consequently sovereign government here not now abdicating. I insisted always government continue functioning until abdication and appointment approved by Samara government, thereby differing with colleagues who, while not so admitting, were pleased by abdication. Governor General appointed issued first order to-day which unobjectionable except in branding *coup d'état* as a crime of adventurers. While I think kidnaping was crime and perpetrator deserved punishment, I believe Governor General indiscreet when calling promoters adventurers as they may be sincere patriots, but nevertheless perpetrated crime.

Likewise Lindley advocates Allied Ambassadors' promulgating statement that proclamation issued by two Ministers stating Grand Duke Michael in Archangel did so from interested motives solely. While I object to impugning their sincerity, but willing to sign, stated they were mistaken. A number of Russian officers organized by Chaplin have agreed to disobey and ignore Samarin, assistant governor general. Chaikovski tells Allied chiefs that a Russian officer Filinenko so persuaded officers, and is planning another conspiracy and should be banished from Archangel. I agree, but French Ambassador argued that Filinenko entitled to right of free speech while properly denied same to strikers and socialistic journals criticizing Poole. I proposed that neither sovereign government nor Poole nor Governor General issue proclamation or order with-

¹ Not printed.

out approval of Allied Ambassadors. This was not adopted but seems only solution of situation.

Your 259, September 14, 1 p. m.¹ As telegraphic communication Samara [not?] established, please ask American Consul there what status of all-Russian regeneration movement.

Can Department advise me whether a state of war exists between the United States and Bolshevik government?

FRANCIS

Proposal for Increasing the American Forces at Archangel and Extending the Operations: Refusal of the American Government, September 26, 1918—Reorganization of the Local Government: Subordination to the All-Russian Government at Omsk—Disapproval of the Ambassador's Plan to Recruit an American-Slavic Legion—Replacement of the Commander in Chief—Disaffection among the American Soldiers and among the Local Russian Recruits

File No. 861.00/2858

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*²

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1918.

[Received September 27.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: As your excellency knows, I have had by order of my Government the honor to expound to the President of the United States and to yourself the grave reasons which led us to believe that the progress of events in Russia was such as to justify an additional effort, very limited to be sure, in Murmania, so as to turn to account the gains already made and prevent dangerous setbacks.

With the President we hold that the whole American effort properly should be brought to bear at the French front where the war will be won, since our archenemy's forces are massed there. No one can have an interest superior to our own in a final victory on that battle field since it will mark, for us in particular, the hour of a long-awaited deliverance.

It seems to us however that that hour would not be delayed, but in all likelihood brought nearer, on the contrary, if we did not allow the elements of success we command elsewhere, and which could be turned to profitable advantage through a very slight increase of the present effort, to run to waste. The less secure the Germans feel themselves in the east the more difficult will it be for them to swell their armies and reserves on our front. We have agreed with the President in entirely giving up every idea of reorganizing an

¹ Not printed.

² See also telegram No. 1899, Sept. 15, from the Ambassador in Great Britain, *ante*, p. 538.

eastern front, but it strikes us there would be a very great advantage to all concerned in taking measures to prevent the food products of Siberia and metals of the Ural from reaching the Bolsheviki and through them the Germans. The hardest part of that task has already been accomplished, thanks to the admirable action of the Czechs who, isolated in a vast country, have succeeded without outside help in rescuing the whole of the Trans-Siberian for the benefit of the parties of order and justice. Very little would need be done firmly to establish that conquest and do for the still more important stores of Siberia what we have done for the stores of Archangel and Vladivostok.

That little, according to the information gathered by the military command there, would consist in adding nine battalions to the forces now in northern Russia; England is furnishing four. We would wish the United States kindly to furnish the other five. This increase of forces would make it possible to achieve two objects the importance of which is to us obvious: first, the defense of Murmania, the essential basis of ice-free communications against a German attack from Finland, which it would be very dangerous passively to await; next an advance from Archangel to give a hand to the Czechs and make a reality of the above-mentioned barrage through the occupation of Vologda and Perm.

Marshal Foch, whose advice was sought on the subject, answered (as I have already had occasion to remark orally) in his note of September 12, that by reason of the great results which apparently may be achieved at this time with a limited force in northern Russia, the Marshal Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies deems it advantageous to send five battalions of American troops direct to Archangel from America.

The members of the Versailles council, on the other hand, appear to have considered the same question without having more recent data and on the mere strength of the previous decision of the War Supreme Council which contemplated, in case difficulty arose, a stay of operations during the winter, when bases of action would be merely maintained at Vladivostok and Archangel. Their opinion however has not been approved by their governments as it should have been under the existing agreements and therefore can not prevail.

Upon the immediate carrying out of the measures which I have again the honor most earnestly to urge upon your excellency, on account of the time of the year, depend not only the mastery of the ways of communication, toward which the Czechs have already done the main work (and, in the opinion of my Government, our failure to do the rest would hardly be excusable), but also a stiffening of

the orderly elements which appear to grow more consistent in Russia and portend a reawakening which might be fraught with consequences for the present and future.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

File No. 861.00/2799a

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1918, 6 p. m.

274. As it is, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, plain that no gathering of any effective force by the Russians is to be hoped for, we shall insist with the other governments, so far as our cooperation is concerned, that all military effort in northern Russia be given up except the guarding of the ports themselves and as much of the country round about them as may develop threatening conditions. We will, of course, do our utmost to send supplies, but cannot undertake general relief, and must presently, of course, be cut off from Archangel by the ice and able to go only to Murmansk.

You are advised that no more American troops will be sent to the northern ports.

The course which you have followed is most earnestly commended. It has the entire admiration of the President who has characterized it as being thoroughly American. I highly approve of your actions. They have been very consistent and have been guided by a very sound judgment exercised under the most trying and complicated circumstances. The course which the Government of the United States is following is not the course of our free choice but that of stern necessity. Circumstances in European Russia, which have thrown the country into one of the saddest periods recorded in all history, and our separation from the scenes of bloodshed and anarchy by the intervening hostile territory render any efforts which this Government could make to bring succor to the distressed people of Russia inadequate and impracticable. We are constrained, consequently, to come to a decision which this message will convey to you.

For your information the following is sent to you. It is being sent to Mr. Morris who is now at Vladivostok and is being conveyed directly to the Governments at London, Paris, Rome, Tokyo and Peking. [Here follow the first seven paragraphs of telegram of September 26, 1918, 6 p. m., to Ambassador Morris, temporarily at Vladivostok, *ante*, page 392.]

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2814

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 26, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received September 27, 9.37 p. m.]

426. Chaikovski and Durov dined with me last evening. Appeared harmonious but French Ambassador and Lindley say Durov complaining that government remaining and threatening to resign, having accepted appointment under the impression government abdicating. He is unacceptable to Russian officers because they consider him inexperienced and not sufficiently high rank. Both thought last evening another conspiracy planned but mainly against Durov. Prince¹ here installed as censor and member of Intelligence Bureau will keep me advised. I am opposed to *coup d'état* and shall prevent if possible.

Chaikovski telephoned to me 4 p. m. desired to meet Ambassadors which he did 6 p. m., when announced Ministry decided resign and form executive government four members: Chaikovski, President and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Gukovski, Minister of Justice, both socialists; Durov, Governor General and Director of Military Affairs; Grudistov, representing commercial interests, Minister of Finance and Trade and Commerce and Minister of the Interior. Durov without politics. Think Grudistov also but represents commercial financial interests and will reconcile antisocialistic elements; has not accepted on account of large business interests but Chaikovski and Ambassadors think should accept and endeavoring to persuade him to do so.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2819

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 27, 1918.

[Received September 28, 11.30 a. m.]

428. Have had conference with two representatives Siberian government arrived Archangel 23d. They report object of Siberian government is struggle against Brest Litovsk peace; creation of national Russian army; organization of common anti-German front with Allies; restoration order and social life which will result in regeneration of Russia. Jurisdiction or influence of government extends east to Chita; west including Ekaterinburg where exists inde-

¹ Capt. Eugene Prince, U. S. N. A., Assistant Military Attaché.

pendent local government but closely allied with Siberian government Omsk; south to union with Dutov,¹ with whom relations friendly; north to Arctic Ocean, immense area population approximating 30,000,000. They report Siberian government financially independent and has loaned Samara local government 20,000,000 rubles, 15,000,000 of which secured by silver taken from Bolsheviks. . . .

[One representing] Siberian cooperatives on special mission to arrange for purchase agricultural and other machinery and sale of Siberian products England and America; says 15,000,000 pounds butter are stored also large quantity of flax; have concluded visa his passport for America.

These officials state railroad and telegraph open east to Vladivostok by both lines. Please cable if true. This leaves only Perm, Vyatka and Vologda held by Bolsheviks.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2777

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1918, 4 p. m.

276. Your September 23, 12 p. m., No. 420, received. The Government of the United States has never recognized the Bolshevik authorities and does not consider that its efforts to safeguard supplies at Archangel or to help the Czechs in Siberia have created a state of war with the Bolsheviks.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2829

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 27, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received September 28, 2.06 p. m.]

427. Ambassadors and General Poole just had a conference with Chaikovski, Gukovski, Durov, Grudistov. After prolonged heated discussion Chaikovski agreed to issue amnesty proclamation pardoning all implicated in *coup d'état* and Poole guaranteed against another *coup d'état*.

Grudistov persisted in declination to become minister on the ground that executive council, fifteen members, of which he expected to be chairman, should be separated from Ministry and I thought same correct, but colleagues insisted that *bourgeoisie* be represented

¹ Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks.

in ministry. Consequently Mefodiev was suggested and will probably be offered membership in the ministry. Executive council is representative of following interests: Zemstvo, two members; following one each—Archangel city government, trades-union, cooperative producers, cooperative consumers, peoples' bank, bourse, chamber of commerce, retailers, shipbuilders, owners fishing boats, [omission] private banks, society for studying north, and timber interests which are represented by Grudistov who proposed plan. Council represents local interests which the sovereign government did not. Plan approved unanimously and promises satisfactory operation but Russians very uncertain and mutually suspicious.

Riggs cables from Paris that Bliss¹ may be opposed to sending additional American troops Archangel and the French Ambassador Washington had cabled Paris President Wilson likewise opposed. Riis, acting naval attaché by orders from the Navy Department (operations), reports two ships, *McElvare*, *Dundee*, with British and French troops and two American couriers; Poole's chief of staff told me last evening these expected arrivals were to fill military organizations already here. Epidemic apparently under control, total deaths, including four killed in action, 68.

Allied forces expect to take Kotlas within ten days and [as] Bolsheviks only waging guerrilla warfare but have mined Dvina, also planning advance down railroad toward Vologda which starts within next few days. [American] troops with both expeditions. Poole says will confer medal on an American for gallant service.

In action on the Dvina, 21st, one officer, 30 Americans wounded; all brought here, doing well but anxious to return to duty.

British, French and myself guaranteed 250,000 rubles jointly for the construction of additional hospital space.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2840

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, *September 29, 1918, 7 p. m.*

[*Received September 30, 1 p. m.*]

431. The President's message received. Your telegram 274, September 26, deciphered and clear. Thanks for personal commendation but I am not resting on past efforts. I may be flattering myself but I think I have been greatly instrumental in bringing about present cooperation between sovereign government, Poole, and the Allied Ambassadors which I believe is more in accord with

¹ Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, U.S. member of the Supreme War Council.

our policy, thanks to assistance by you, see your telegram No. 267; have not mentioned to Lindley nor he to me but observe changed attitude of Poole. Difficulties not absolutely removed but making a persistent effort to that end.

Y.M.C.A. doing excellent work, also the American Red Cross; vessel just arrived with 2,000 tons supplies. American soldiers here besides helping physically have a widespread moral effect, their joyousness, buoyancy contagious, inspiring, cannot fail to impress Russians consequently regret no more coming.

Desiring encourage formation Russian army is my reason for organizing Slav-American Legion. Friction between Russian officers and soldiers will disappear when Russian and American officers associated in instructing battalion; furthermore, our own well-disciplined troops beneficial example.

I am not planning to enlist battalion in our army. I think Russian army essential to establishment of government and the regeneration of Russia and association of our soldiers will convince Russians that an army is not inimical to liberty as our government has been model since the revolution for all democratic Russians except Bolsheviks.

See my 428, 27th, concerning Siberian government. If the Siberian Railway opened, northern Russia will be supplied from Siberia and consequently not depending on foreign aid. If I am rightly informed concerning Omsk government the capture of Vologda, Vyatka, and Perm will make such supplies accessible and will render many Russian surplus products available for export.

British Secret Service states famous German baron, bomb expert, *en route* from Finland to Archangel to explode supplies; and Prince, from information gained Moscow, believes report true. Munitions evacuated from Petrograd, Archangel stored Vologda, Kotlas toward which Allied forces advancing.

The government will have mobilization Archangel next week of five classes, '93 to '98, but probably be only 15,000 available in this province; Vologda and Vyatka Provinces under this government jurisdiction have respectively 60,000 and 120,000 available men.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2831

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, September 29, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received September 30, 9.15 a. m.]

430. After some further discussion to remove misunderstanding scheme for government outlined in my 427, September 27, 6 p. m.,

was adopted. Mefodiev declined but another representative *bourgeois* will be selected.

British and French are enlisting British-Slavic legion and French-Slavic legion, claiming have several thousand Russians enlisted. Many Russians express desire to enlist under American auspices, consequently am planning to organize American-Slavic legion also. All legions thus formed will be transferred to the Russian Government when organized.

I assume that remainder of \$6,000,000 allotted in your 2064¹ and 179,² or about \$1,500,000, can be used for this purpose. Do not be discouraged about Russians enlisting yet; understand many thousands Russians have joined Czechs. Expect Vologda will be taken before navigation closes and possibly Kotlas and Vyatka.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2840

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1918, 6 p. m.

284. Your 430 and 431, September 29. There are definite limiting facts which govern your proposal to organize American-Slavic legion. It is certain that no money additional to the balance of \$6,000,000 fund, which balance, I understand, now approximates \$1,300,000, is or will be available for this purpose. You must therefore consider the consequences of what may follow when fund is exhausted. The President wants you to know how much we admire the spirit and success with which you have guided matters at Archangel, but has serious doubts about the undertaking. Please consider the foregoing carefully before you go further and report.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2876

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 3, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received October 4, 9.30 p. m.]

444. Quiet here; epidemic practically ended. Five British battalions landed at Murman, 30th; Poole dissatisfied because he desired them here; five more battalions reported coming soon. If

¹ Vol. III, p. 108.

² *Ibid.*, p. 126.

American forces had landed with Poole, he thinks could have routed Bolsheviks and captured Vologda and Kotlas but delay has enabled Bolsheviks to increase their strength and present more formidable resistance under German instruction. If American troops had not come, doubtful whether central committee or diplomatic corps or sovereign government could have remained in Archangel.

I have had the President's speech and appeal of Department to Allied and neutral governments translated and shall publish, 5th, with a note from myself directing attention thereto.

Minister of Justice resigned because he disagreed with President who is now forming ministry but is obsessed with the idea that Russian law requires his colleagues to be Constituent Assembly members in order to have legislative or supreme power. President more pliable has agreed to abstain from participation in municipal elections to be held soon. Poole and the Governor General cooperating. Archangel crowded; experiencing difficulty in securing hospital.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.002/55

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 4, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received October 6, 9 p. m.]

449. After 5 p. m. President requested a conference with Ambassadors which was held 7 p. m. when the following Ministry submitted: Chaikovski, President and Minister of Agriculture; Gukovski,¹ Minister of Justice; Kurakin, Minister of Finance; with Kalinin and Graner assistants over Bureaus of Commerce and Supplies respectively. Zubov, secretary with portfolio Posts and Telegraphs, Durov, Minister of War and Governor General. Conference held with commercial interests which were asked to submit names for portfolios without votes, but after discussion disagreeing resume negotiations disaffections resulted, the President claiming that association for regeneration of Russia held at Moscow months ago limiting legislative or sovereign power to members Constituent Assembly which includes above-mentioned President and the Minister of Justice who are socialists. [Durov?] is a Cadet, others not politically active. Graner leader of cooperatives in Europe. Kurakin is the manager of the State Bank. The executive council, Grudistov chairman, continues. I am personally acquainted with all and think se-

¹ In a notice published in the official collection of orders of the Supreme government of the northern region (No. 1, Art. 136, p. 156), Gorodetski was named as Minister of Justice and Mefodiev as Minister of Commerce, Industry, and supplies.

lection good as many active in commerce and politics here were arrested by Bolsheviks, taken to Moscow, or fled to escape arrest. Ambassadors expressed no opposition. Ministry will be announced 6th.

French Ambassador received cable Paris stating Omsk and Ufa governments formed all-Russian government with five representatives: Avksentiev; Chaikovski, president Archangel government; Vologodski, president of Omsk government; Astrov, former mayor of Moscow; and General Boldyrev.

Bolsheviks claiming victories against Czechs and say that when Archangel port closes will turn attention thereto and easily capture Allied forces there. Please cable Siberian situation.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2897

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 6, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 7, 11.07 a. m.]

451. Deciphering of your 284, October 3, 6 p. m., completed while I was holding a conference with Ruggles, Stewart, and [Samarin?], assistant governor general, to determine how we could render the most effective assistance to formation Russian army. The conclusion was to defer organizing petition for Slav legion and assist sovereign government in every consistent way in promoting mobilization which it has decided upon. The government and ourselves also dependent on British for clothing and food for our armies. The British and French efforts towards respective legions disappointing in results, former secured about 1,600, latter maximum 200. Government's mobilization will be hampered by competing efforts of British and the French to organize in the city. I shall have a conference with Poole before his departure and with Ironside on the subject.

Please express to the President my sincere appreciation of his approval, also my congratulation [on] speech of 27th ultimo.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2915

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 7, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 8, 10.13 a. m.]

456. Delegation of commercial interests conferred with Ambassadors my apartment, evening 5th, stating had visited President

by request and were prepared to submit representatives of such interests for portfolios but did not do so because the President refused compliance with the conditions they sought to impose. I listened respectfully, although previously advised and familiar with occurrence, then emphatically, perhaps impatiently, gave them my views prefacing remarks with the statement that I had not conferred with my colleagues who were present and could speak for themselves.

After remarking that I belonged to commercial class in America, noting that the delegation represented [it] here, and admitting that at home I was called *bourgeois*, stated that I had for one year waited and endured inconveniences, indignities, and risks in expectation of Russian *bourgeoisie* or *intelligentsia* doing something to save Russia from the Bolsheviki and Germans, and this sovereign government was the first organized opposition to such enemies of Russia that I had been able to get in touch with; that this government had redeemed Archangel and northern Russia from Bolsheviks, had invited the Allied forces to enter Russia, had renounced the Brest Litovsk peace and were attempting to organize resistance to the Central Empires; that under such circumstances my opinion was that every patriotic Russian should not only be prompt to render aid when requested, but should proffer his services and means; that all party differences should be buried temporarily and all should unite for the regeneration of Russia. I called attention to the conciliatory spirit of this government as evidenced by general amnesty extended to all engaged in the criminal kidnaping of the Ministers.

My colleagues in turn concurred in my appeal, thereupon a member of the delegation, previously quiet, said that if our friends, the Allies, feel this way, I think we should comply with their wishes and his associates reluctantly assented. A meeting of the Commercial Industrial Union held yesterday unanimously approved advice and sent to the government three names, one or two of which will be given portfolios. The union advised me immediately and I promptly transmitted their action to the Département.

Later, since the above was dictated, the President phoned saying that two of the three men submitted by the commercial interests, Mefodiev and Gorodetski, will be given portfolios.¹

FRANCIS

¹ See footnote 1, p. 552.

File No. 861.00/2929

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 9, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received October 10, 12.17 p. m.]

464. For the Navy Department also, if you approve. *Amiral Aube*, French cruiser, been here two months. Has powerful wireless equipment by which news is received; acting naval attaché says will be replaced by a cruiser same class, *en route* from France, which will remain Archangel through the winter. French naval attaché requests American cruiser be sent also; the British will probably have a cruiser. Acting naval attaché and I think it advisable American cruiser be stationed here; also cruiser, class of *Baltimore*, or large destroyer would answer. Is McCully coming? Understand *Olympia* remaining at Murmansk through the winter. President Chaikovski says British requisitioning many Russian craft, including volunteer Russian fleet, and can get no satisfaction from them on the subject. Have we commandeered any Russian craft? Three British ships just arrived from England with food and ordnance supplies for the military.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2932

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 10, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 11, 12.31 p. m.]

465. Major arrived here left Petrograd 16th instant gives a horrible account of Bolshevik cruelties saying that 43,000 innocent men and women are imprisoned, hundreds being killed daily. My conclusion is that the only way to end this disgrace to civilization is for the Allies immediately to take Petrograd and Moscow by sending sufficient troops therefor to Murman and Archangel without delay; 50,000 would serve but 100,000 would be ample. Poole says could take Petrograd with 10,000, could not hold it.

Bolsheviks gaining strength by terrorizing. Russians correctly reason that if no additional Allied troops come the Allies will be driven from northern Russia and all Russians will be exterminated by the Bolsheviks, consequently efforts to mobilize army against the Bolsheviks and Germans doomed to failure unless Allied forces materially increased at once.

Furthermore Bolsheviks have captured Kazan, Samara, and Simbirsk and the Czechs reported routed Allies [along?] Volga. Bolsheviks hold Perm and Vyatka and are reenforcing Kotlas. Unconfirmed reports state that they are doing successful propaganda work among the Czechs in upper [Urals?] where Czechs becoming inoculated with Russian politics. If our policy of having the Czechs remain east of Urals is followed, the Bolsheviks with German assistance can drive small Allied forces from Archangel and Murman. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to capture Moscow and Petrograd from Vladivostok before the Germans can send troops to assist Bolsheviks, but if, however, forces promptly sent Murman and here, Germans are too much occupied in France to render material aid.

Kemp, candid talker, says the United States most culpable ally, that Allied forces so [too?] small and that horrible slaughter by the Bolsheviks is a disgrace to the Allies.

How do we construe supplemental treaty of August 20 [27] between Germany [and?] Soviet? Of course we will not desert Russia but if Bolsheviks not promptly suppressed there is danger of a revolution in Austria and if proletariat dominates Russia and Austria-Hungary all countries are in jeopardy from radical social revolution.

Does our reply to German peace proposal just received include Russia when it states armistice can not be proposed to Governments associated with us against the Central powers "so long as the armies of those powers are upon their soil"?

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3680

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of August 20, 1918, enclosing the weekly report of the commanding officer of the U.S.S. *Olympia* dated July 6, 1918, in which while reporting conditions in the Murmansk region of Russia he transmits:

- (a) A declaration and resolution of the Murmansk District Council, and
- (b) A temporary agreement between the representatives of the Allies and the Murmansk Region Council, to the latter of which the commanding officer of the *Olympia* was a signatory, and whose action in signing this agreement has been provisionally approved by Vice Admiral Sims.

After careful consideration of the agreement in question you express the opinion that it is sound in principle and should meet with

the approval of this Government, and request that if this Department concurs therein you may be so informed in order that the agreement may receive final approval.

In view of the fact that the agreement in question sets forth that all authority in the internal government of the region belongs to the Murmansk Region Council and that the representatives of Great Britain, France and the United States do not interfere in the internal affairs of the region, this Department perceives no reason why the commander of the U.S.S. *Olympia* should not be informed that the agreement meets with the approval of this Government.¹

In accordance with your request, the correspondence in your communication under acknowledgment is herewith returned.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 861.00/2943

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 14, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received October 15, 2 p. m.]

478. *Attentive* cleared with Poole and Colonels Thornhill, Banters, and Grimes; consented to wait until 16th if I would [go] but I informed Kemp and Poole early 12th that I would not. Poole asked Chaikovski for a letter which I thought indicated need for support in order to return. General Ironside is in command. Can not we arrange that an American general command Allied forces here? The British are feared, disliked, Americans welcomed fraternizing with Russians.

Municipal elections yesterday resulted 32 socialists, 26 *bourgeoisie*, two Jews. Political conditions very sensitive. If British policy dominates will drive many socialists to Bolshevism which will be, I repeat, a menace to well-regulated government everywhere if not eradicated. Russian vessel arriving from Pechora reports intercepted radios from Ukraine stating German soldiery mutinied, embraced Bolshevism, captured Kharkov and allied with Russian Bolsheviks. This was told me by Chaikovski who nearly embraced me when I told him I am not leaving.

FRANCIS

¹The substance of this approval was communicated to the Ambassador in Russia in telegram No. 308, Oct. 16, 1918, in reply to his No. 385, Sept. 6, *ante*, p. 519.

File No. 861.00/2640

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1918, 6 p. m.

308. Your 385, September 6, 6 p. m.¹ Agreement regarding Murmansk District Council signed tentatively by commanding officer of the *Olympia* and referred to this Department by the Secretary of the Navy, has now been approved and Secretary of the Navy so advised October 14.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/3311

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 1230

ARCHANGEL, October 16 and 18, 1918.

[Received November 30.]

. . . Since the above was dictated, I have received the detailed results of the municipal election of last Sunday. The total registered vote was 21,613, but only 8,733 votes were cashed [*sic*], little more than 40 per cent. The following was the result:

Ticket No. 1 (union of house renters)	-----	102 votes
" " 2 (socialists)	-----	4,610 "
" " 3 (<i>bourgeoisie</i>)	-----	3,769 "
" " 4 (Jews)	-----	195 "
" " 5 (fire brigade)	-----	57 "

The number to be elected was 60, of which—

Ticket No. 1 elected	-----	1 candidate
" " 2 "	-----	32 candidates
" " 3 "	-----	26 candidates
" " 4 "	-----	1 candidate
" " 5	-----	did not elect any candidate

This election is looked upon as a *bourgeois* victory, because the socialists have only 53, or $\frac{4}{10}$ per cent [*sic*], of the new Duma while they had 70 per cent of the former Duma. There are very few *bourgeois* in Archangel City and the proportion of that vote in Archangel Province is still less than it is in the city. The socialists claim that the workmen did not vote, which accounts for the diminished socialist vote, while some of the *bourgeoisie* claim that the workmen are dissatisfied with the present provisional government

¹ *Ante*, p. 519.

and other *bourgeois* say that the workmen are really Bolsheviks. The same vote is another indication that if the Allies should abandon Archangel many socialists and many non-voters would turn to the Bolsheviks.

The condition at Murmansk is critical. The provisional government has dissolved the Murmansk Soviet and appointed a governor general, Ermolov. Yuriev, an ignorant but honest sailor with judgment, was the president of the Murman Soviet when the Allies landed there and he was the leader in the movement of the Murmansk Soviet renouncing allegiance to the Central Soviet at Moscow. Yuriev and Vesselago paid me a visit of about two hours this forenoon. Vesselago is an educated Russian and by some is thought to be "too smart"; his integrity is questioned and Yuriev has demanded a thorough investigation of the acts of the Murmansk Soviet. President Chaikovski calls on me daily and when asked yesterday whether he feared a *coup d'état* at Murmansk when the Soviet was dissolved, replied negatively, provided the new governor general can take 5,000,000 rubles when he goes to Murmansk to assume office. Yuriev will bring Ermolov, the new governor general, to see me to-morrow. . . .

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3001

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 18, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received October 20, 7.25 a. m.]

491. American naval attaché returned from railroad front reporting great dissatisfaction among two companies American troops and three companies French under British command. No British troops that front, all troops exhausted from continuous service. French inclined to insubordination because they had heard that hostilities ceased western front and claimed further service here solely in British interest, such feeling permeating officers also and American soldiers and officers becoming inoculated. Bolsheviks outnumbering Allied forces but are undisciplined in their fighting and are abstaining therefrom at will; warfare has been guerrilla character from the beginning. If American troops withdrawn, the French would not remain and the Bolsheviks advancing would besiege Archangel. I am sending a member of military mission to front and shall keep one there continuously when officers arrive, who Riggs advises are *en route*.

I think the British are doing all possible with the few men available. Ironside dining with me this evening alone, shall have thorough talk and telegraph further. The mistake was in not sending more troops when landing as the Bolsheviks were then demoralized and 10,000 soldiers could have taken Vologda and [Vyatka?] and possibly overturned Soviet government. The Bolsheviks have learned of the small force here and are reenforcing their resistance and radiating false reports from Moscow concerning victories. I learn confidentially from Lindley that the British War Office is being urged to permit 5,000 British soldiers to come to Archangel from Murman if cannot send additional force from other places.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3003

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 19, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received October 20, 5 a. m.]

495. General Ironside regretfully says appeal for permission to transfer troops Murman to Archangel refused by the British War Office but the General is not discouraged and is making best disposition of few troops here. Has arranged for each American company at the front to spend eight days monthly in Archangel. He says that he is aiding Russian mobilization. The President is pleased that 800 responded to mobilization call out of a possible 1,500 in territory mobilized. Ironside concurs, saying has recommended additional call in the territory occupied by Allies.

Your 312, October 17, 4 p. m.,¹ gives gratifying information which was unknown hitherto and renders me less modest in suggesting and demanding.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3002

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 20, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 11.20 p. m.]

497. Tereshchenko² arrived 18th incognito, dined with me last evening alone; has been exclusively in Norway since released from

¹ Not printed.

² Michael I. Tereshchenko, from March to May 1917, Russian Minister of Finance; from May to November, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

prison about the middle of March; comes as a courier from Russian Minister at Stockholm to the provisional government here, also Omsk government. Chaikovski requested him to come to Archangel but he left Stockholm before receiving message. I consider Tere-shchenko patriotic Russian, supporting our policy. He plans, if impossible to go to Omsk direct, to go via the United States and I have assured him visa.

He gives me first information about the formation in London of a Russo-British organization with a capital of £300,000,000 for exploit[ation] northern Russia, especially Pechora district, and colonizing same with Irish. Buchanan, former British Ambassador, Russia, vice chairman. Tereshchenko objects to scheme as I do.

Please inform me when replies received [on proposals] to Allies mentioned in your 193 [1953], October 11.¹

Martyushin, former Minister of Finance, sovereign government, tendered same position provisional government but declined and will sail for United States on direct steamer within ten days; is a representative of cooperatives authorized to arrange exchange of Russian products for our manufactures. Intended going via England but the President and myself induced him to go direct to America. I am giving him a letter to War Trade Board, copy to the Department. He speaks Russian only.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3037

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 23, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 24, 11.14 a. m.]

510. Chaikovski reports mobilization proceeding quite satisfactorily and Ironside encouraging. Less friction since the departure of Poole, Thornhill, Grimes. Chaikovski respected by all and situation improving but would be greatly benefited by eminent Russian general as Minister of War and ranking all Allied generals. President says General Lechitski who commanded Russian army in the last success on south front is available but would not be subordinate to any Allied general. He says that Lechitski is desired by Omsk government. If you could possibly arrange with Allies having forces here to agree to such arrangement I strongly recommend doing so. He is recognized by all as having ability, fidelity, char-

¹ To the Ambassador in Great Britain; see vol. III, p. 147, footnote 1.

acter with brilliant record; is liberal conservative, been hiding since last revolution but whereabouts known.

I think this very desirable not only because it strengthens government, aids mobilization, but would be in line with our policy by divesting Allied occupation of its conquest or military phase. Have we received replies from Allies to plan outlined in your telegram 193 [1953], October 11, 1 p. m. [8 p. m.],¹ to London, or from neutrals concerning protest against Bolshevik crimes? Please answer.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3002

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1918, 7 p. m.

322. Your 497, October 20, 6 p. m. Department will now be pleased to have Tereshchenko visit the United States in capacity of private individual and to facilitate his departure for Siberia. Visa authorized for Tereshchenko and also Martyushin.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/3043

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 25, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 26, 10.17 a. m.]

520. Answering your 315, October 22, 4 p. m.² Neither McCully, Poole arrived. I see Chaikovski and Ironside often, former favorably impressed by latter. I think they will cooperate harmoniously if General Poole remains away, which I think advisable, also Thornhill and Grimes. Ironside supplanted British commander on railroad front with French commander upon which I congratulated him as I think change will remedy French disaffection. I have received reports of American officers and soldiers on the railroad front being dissatisfied and am sending Stewart there.

After Consul Poole arrives if present harmony continues and Poole and McCully view the situation properly, I think I can safely leave for London but be compelled to go to Murman to take *Olympia* as her captain says she cannot come here, if ice heavy, first due 29th. Poole's arrival unknown. Shall inform Department if and when depart. Can I safely go to Vladivostok via Mediterranean from Lon-

¹ See vol. III, p. 147, footnote 1.

² Not printed.

don? Planning to take Johnston. Doolittle arrived; Flack, Calder, Zahler not arrived; no instructions. What advices from Ambassador Morris, Vladivostok; what responses to the *aide-mémoire* mentioned in Department's 193 [1953], October 11, 1 p. m. [8 p. m.]¹ to London?

I am willing after the operation to return here or go to Siberia, but in either event think should be out of Russia shortest time possible. I consider union of Archangel and Omsk governments exceedingly important and the junction from this end depends on armistice; if armistice arranged, believe would be able to reach Omsk via northern route sooner than via Vladivostok as Allies would immediately send sufficient troops to rescue the Czech Army.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3070

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 28, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 29, 2.30 p. m.]

525. President received October 26 cable from Omsk October 19, signed by Avksentiev, President of the all-Russian government, and saying that Allies requested a statement from Archangel provisional government of recognition and subordination to the all-Russian government, Omsk. The President has addressed a communication to me as Dean, saying provisional government placed before the representatives of the Allied powers the following declaration:

Provisional government of northern Russia hereby declares that considering unselfish northern region of Russia an inalienable part in the all-Russian state and recognizing as the sovereign authority of this state the government elected by a conference of members of the Constituent Assembly at Ufa, having its seat now at Omsk, and presided over by N. D. Avksentiev, it expresses its willingness to obey directly communicated orders of this sovereign Russian authority until the next all-Russian Constituent Assembly be called together.

Chiefs of American, British, French, Italian missions received this and made no objection thereto. Marshall [missions?] took no formal action thereon, personally expressing approval of declaration.

This cable came through the United States (proper?) [in?] Russian without relay; can you communicate with all-Russian government Omsk? Have we representatives there?²

FRANCIS

¹ See vol. III, p. 147, footnote 1.

² Answered, Nov. 2, that message was being transmitted through the Vice Consul at Omsk.

File No. 861.00/3037

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1918, 3 p. m.

331. Your 510, October 23, 6 p. m., under consideration. For your confidential information: command of forces in northern Russia was assigned to the British by decision of War Council at Versailles. Any change would require consideration by the Council. War Department would probably agree to control of American troops by Russian only if officer selected were of definitely approved capacity.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/3130

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, October 31, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received November 1, 5.34 p. m.]

532. Mobilization success beyond expectations; 1,500 Russians mobilized but Ironside says Durov weak man. If mutiny occurs Ironside thinks can manage but says will kill mobilization and I concur. Mobilized Russians disobeyed parade orders 29th. Durov addressed recalcitrants in two-hour speech to which corporal replied, then Durov asked if another soldier desired to talk, whereupon another corporal spoke and then about one thousand men attempted to speak at once. One grievance is Allied forces are given more meat than Russians, also given jam and cigarettes, which are withheld from the Russians. In meeting Allied Ambassadors with President to-day I advocated making rations same when Lindley replied ration fixed by British War Office and can not be changed, which is characteristic but unwise. Durov asked Ironside if he would send two companies Allied troops to disarm men, if so requested, and told me Ironside refused; but the latter said had not refused, but required opportunity to judge whether armed Allied forces necessary, otherwise would be blamed for fatal blow to mobilization.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3196

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 2, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 9, 1.08 p. m.]

540. My 532, October 31, 7 p. m. Chaikovski states situation quieted and dissatisfaction among the 1,300 Russian soldiers liqui-

dated, with changes in command to ensue and segregation of troops. While speaking of matter as unimportant his manner belied his words. Your 331, October 31, 3 p. m., just received and being deciphered.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3226

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 4, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 16, 10.50 p. m.]

548. Durov and Samarin replaced yesterday on order of President Chaikovski by temporary appointees, namely Rear Admiral Vikorst, formerly commander of division of northern Russian fleet, and Lieutenant Colonel Zilinski, formerly General Staff. President to-day stated had cabled General Miller, well-known Russian general in Rome, inviting him to come and accept place in government but as yet no time for reply; also that General Marushevski supposedly *en route* here from Stockholm and that with the assistance of General Ironside all difficulties with newly formed mobilized Russian troops would be peacefully liquidated to-day.

Mobilization in Onega and Shenkursk districts postponed a few days.

The President stated that he had requested Tereshchenko to remain here and work with him in the government but that the latter stated the time had not yet arrived for a member of Kerensky government to come forward.

He stated in private conversation that he had informed Chaikovski that he did not find his policy sufficiently vigorous and that he expected to telegraph in this sense to the Omsk government upon his arrival in Stockholm.

President stated that he had cabled Omsk acknowledging subordination of provisional government of the northern region to the authority of Omsk all-Russian government. Tereshchenko expects to leave to-morrow night for Stockholm.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/3119

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1918, 4 p. m.

343. For your information. Navy Department has informed this Department that upon the assumption of the duties of commander

the United States naval forces in northern Russia, Rear Admiral N. A. McCully was given the following instructions as to policy:

1. Call promptly on our Ambassador and consult with him freely.
2. Read carefully the President's proclamation on Siberian intervention, and the attached despatch of the State Department to our Ambassador to Russia. Shape your policy in accordance with these pronouncements.
3. Cooperate with the military and naval forces of the Allies, in so far as the policies above indicated and the forces at your disposal permit. Maintain cordial relations with the senior United States Army officer.
4. Exert your influence towards the conservation and support of local Russian authority, except where that authority is exercised in a manner contrary to the interests of the Russian people.
5. Your actions should make it clear that you are the sincere friend of the Russian people, and that American forces have no ulterior military or political motive inimical to Russian sovereignty.
6. Subject to the restrictions imposed by our Government's policy and by these instructions, you will regard yourself as under the orders of the senior naval officer of the cobelligerent powers present in northern Russian waters.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/3225

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 7, 1918.

[Received November 16, 4.45 p. m.]

560. After leaving I have authorized address to American soldiers northern Russia framed by myself. Their spirit of sacrifice and service is commended notwithstanding handicaps under which they have labored. I alluded to provisions made for their comfort by Red Cross and Y.M.C.A. and stated that no service of Allied troops anywhere is of greater importance than in northern Russia. Reference is made to many expressions of President and statement ventured that war will continue in Russia after negotiations for peace between our Government and Allies with Central Empires are effected but that we should be recreant to our obligations if we should withdraw our forces from Russia and permit the Russian people, who have already suffered by loss of six million young manhood, enormous damage to their industries, their commerce and their commercial interests, to continue to exhaust themselves in civil strife or become the victims of any foreign power, etc.

FRANCIS

Retention of American and Allied Troops in North Russia after the Armistice with Germany—Local Attitude toward the Kolchak Government at Omsk

File No. 861.00/3220

The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 13, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received November 15, 10.45 p. m.]

572. Signing of the armistice has created some uncertainty among the American and French troops. The reasons heretofore assigned for their presence in north Russia no longer seem valid to them. If they are held here there must be an early and authoritative statement of motives as already suggested in my telegram 553 of November 6, 7 p. m.¹ Officers and men inquire why military operations are necessary against the Bolsheviki. The situation is aggravated by the British. The military attaché will telegraph the War Department concerning the situation of our troops *vis-à-vis* the British military authority. There is in addition a suspicion that the British may be "imperialistic" and that American forces are possibly being used toward ends which do not accord with our own ideas. News of the impending return of General Poole tends to confirm this view.

Concerning possible withdrawal of American troops it is to be observed, *contra*, that we have an obligation to the inhabitants of this region who would be exposed, if we withdrew, to severe Bolshevik reprisals and that we have an even more important obligation to all Russia to protect her from economic exploitation by creditor nations which may find themselves with a freer hand now that peace has come. Whether or not the information of the French Ambassador communicated in No. 571, November 12, 8 p. m.,² is correct, it must be foreseen that any Russian government of the near future will be weak and therefore liable to incur unwise obligations heavily mortgaging the capital wealth of the country and it is by no means certain that nations whose losses in Russia have been more considerable than ours will find it easy to forego the opportunity of obtaining concessions or establishing spheres of influence. The interests of Russia and the ultimate interests of her creditors demand an unhampered reconstruction of the national economy. To this end both have need, but above all Russia, of the friendly offices of a disinterested third party. It is difficult to see how the United

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed; it contained the report of a Soviet offer of payment of interest on loans in return for recognition (File No. 861.00/3223).

States can avoid the obligation of this rôle in view of our professed friendship for the Russians and their special confidence in us and our ideals. [We?] will not even fulfil it if we withdraw our troops and leave the field free to our less disinterested associates. One feature of the north Russian situation is the influence which Ambassador Francis has exercised in favor of square deal and I feel sure the presence of an American force here has been an essential factor in his success.

POOLE

File No. 763.72119/2694

The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 18, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 19, 3.03 p. m.]

582. Yesterday at a public meeting organized by the Northern Region Union for the Regeneration of Russia, on the occasion of the Allied victory, Chaikovski and representatives of the union, City Duma, Zemstvo, and Cooperatives emphasized Russia's right to representation at the coming peace conference, on the ground of her sacrifices earlier in the war and the repudiation of the Brest Litovsk treaty by the greater part of Russian opinion.

The French Ambassador replying for the Diplomatic Corps said that the Allies cannot fail to recognize Russia's claim, that future considerations of fact and law must determine what Russian government will be admitted to representation but it can be said now that it will not be the Bolshevik government. He also gave assurances of disinterested aid by the Allies in the regeneration of Russia.

General Miller has telegraphed [from] Rome accepting Chaikovski's invitation to come to Archangel saying he will start at once. It is proposed to make him governor general of the northern region and commander in chief of the Russian forces. Until he arrives General Marushevski, who arrived yesterday from Stockholm, will fill these offices and subsequently become Miller's assistant. Miller is repudiated [reputed] to be an able soldier of liberal ideas. He went to Rome as chief Russian military mission to Italy. Marushevski seems to enjoy general respect. Is reputed to be liberal and a good organizer.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/3237

The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 18, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received November 19, 10.17 a. m.]

585. General Ironside has received official notification of his appointment as commander in chief in northern Russia. Lindley informs me that General Poole has been ordered to the south of Russia to join Denikin who has succeeded Alexeev at the head of the Volunteer Army and that General Milne, heretofore commanding British forces at Saloniki, has been ordered to take command at Odessa. Lindley adds that his civil propaganda and intelligence personnel has been ordered to leave Archangel for Odessa.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/3381

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State

No. 1302

MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by direction of his Government, that a telegram has been received at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's representative at Archangel who states that the situation there would undoubtedly be immensely improved by a clear declaration of policy from the Allies. The friendly or indifferent portion of the population are at present afraid to declare themselves on our side or to cooperate with us as they fear a withdrawal of our troops and subsequent Bolshevik reprisals. Their hesitation will become more pronounced as soon as the armistice is settled and will continue to increase until the Allies make an authoritative pronouncement as to their future intentions.

Mr. Lindley stated in an interview which he gave recently to the editor of the pro-government paper that the Allied Governments were no doubt considering their action in case of peace, but that the armistice would in his personal opinion not alter the situation in the Archangel region and that it would certainly not entail an immediate withdrawal of Allied troops. Mr. Lindley adds that such an expression of personal opinion carried little weight with it. He states that he fully realises the difficulty of arriving at a decision when it is a question of continuously taking into considera-

tion the fact that so many governments and questions of home politics must be thought of, but the longer it is postponed the stronger the Bolsheviks will become. It is generally agreed that they were in a very tottering condition in August last. His Majesty's representative enquires whether it would not be possible to take the line that the presence of representative Russian delegates is necessary at the peace conference and that so long as all free expression of opinion in Russia is prevented by the reign of terror such representatives cannot be found. The fact that no punishment has been inflicted on the murderers of Captain Cromie or of the innocent Russians whom we still consider as our Allies might be added to this broad reason for intervention.

In communicating the above to the United States Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is directed to inform them that His Majesty's Government consider it desirable that some form of statement should be made with a view to easing the situation. While in the opinion of His Majesty's Government it is undesirable to enter into any explanation, as Mr. Lindley has proposed, with regard to retaining the Allied troops in the Archangel region, it is suggested that the Allied representatives should make a plain official statement to the effect that the Allied occupation is not likely to be terminating in the immediate future, although it is not intended that it should be permanent.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is directed to add that His Majesty's Government would be grateful for an expression of the views of the United States Government in the matter.

WASHINGTON, *November 20, 1918.*

File No. 861.00/3257

The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *November 21, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[Received November 22, 9.35 a. m.]

3906. The Foreign Office have given me the following telegram they have received from Lindley, the British representative at Archangel, which our Consul there asked to have communicated to you:

Following is text of proclamation issued by Chaikovski to-day:

To the population of northern region and Russian Allies: The world war is at an end, all civilized humanity breathes a sigh of relief, the crisis of our sickness is past and we are now freed from immediate threat to civilization and liberty but danger of incidental complications due to the war remains. One such complication, Bol-

shevism, must be liquidated before humanity can devote itself to constructive work of peace. It is a mistake to suppose conclusion of peace between Allies and Central powers puts an end to danger of Bolshevism.

Unfortunately, Bolshevism is a danger not merely to Russia but equally from an international point of view. This danger consists in seizure of power by a negligible minority relying on the armed support of rebel army and navy in order to force the majority to submit to the will of leaders of a single party unrecognized by population and not elected by them for government of the country.

Such usurpation of authority is only possible in the atmosphere of war; with cessation of wars it should immediately be liquidated no matter what high-sounding watchwords it may adopt to justify such violation of the rights of the free people.

In Russia it has taken the form of return to the previous government by intensive and extraordinary police methods similar to those employed by Imperial Government during period of martial law lasting from 1889 to 1917 with short intervals in 1905 and 1906 at the time of first Russian revolution. Soviet authorities returned to this policy after the October rebellion¹ of 1917. Since that time they have committed more crimes and acts of violence than the Imperial Government during the whole twenty-seven years of its unnatural dictatorship. Now this siren tempting to influence either the credulous, weak-minded, or unprincipled is trying to persuade the world it represents longed-for socialist heaven, "proletariat dictatorship." It is time to put an end to this mystification. All peoples must strain every nerve for the sake of liberty, justice and happiness of the proletariat of the world; otherwise it will be the grave, not only for their own liberty, prosperity, but those of all humanity.

In any case there can be no place for Bolshevik usurpers at international peace congress for peaceful relations between nations incompatible with policy of violence on which Bolshevik power is based. Such policy can only lead to civil war and inevitably leads to war with neighboring nations and destroys the state of peace.

That is why there can be no true end to the war without final liquidation of Bolshevism, that is why no one having at heart the cause of peace can lay down arms before Soviet power has been broken.

LAUGHLIN

File No. 861.00/3381

The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)

MEMORANDUM

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires of Great Britain and begs to acknowledge the receipt of a memorandum No. 1302, dated November 20, 1918, on the subject of making some statement with a view to easing the situation at Archangel.

¹ November revolution, if the new-style calendar is used.

In view of the fact that the President and the Secretary of State will shortly proceed to Paris, where they will be able to confer directly with representatives of the Allied Governments, it is believed that consideration of any general statement in regard to the Bolsheviks in Russia might best be deferred until that time. In the meanwhile, the Government of the United States proposes to inform the American Chargé d'Affaires at Archangel that the signing of the armistice will make no change in the general situation relative to American troops in north Russia until such time as the President and the Secretary of State are able to discuss this question upon their arrival in Paris.

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1918.

File No. 861.00/3307

The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 29, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 30, 7.50 a. m.]

610. I am telegraphing *en clair* No. 611 for the Department's possible criticism Thanksgiving address which I delivered before soldiers at Y.M.C.A. after reading to them the most significant portions of the President's address to Congress communicating terms of armistice. Reference is made to my 572, dated November 13, 3 p. m.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/3316½

The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, November 29, 1918.

[Received November 30, 4.03 a. m.]

611. To hold the light steady until they find themselves—that is now task of nations which like ourselves are so fortunate as to have acquired capacity for peaceful orderly adjustment their political institution to progress of age.

To hold light steady until they find themselves—it's no easy matter even most general point view. For individual it's even more difficult to perceive always just how effort being applied to accomplishment general purpose. This feeling uncertainty comes especially to us in northern Russia who are working on outskirts of the big job on edge of befogged situation not always clear even to those having all facts before them.

Let me tell you who have just come from central Russia that down there as sly and dangerous set of demagogues as ever known are pil-laging a poor and benighted people. 'Twas not Bolsheviki who made Russian revolution, 'twas not they who overthrew Tsar, giving to Russia first hope she might enjoy that liberty, peace, comfort which we Americans have almost come to take for granted. Men that did that now languishing in Bolshevik prisons, fled abroad or died at hands mercenary alien firing squad. These men struggling with monumental task establishing free government for people just emerged from centuries black ignorance oppression were forcibly dispersed by gang of political adventurers admittedly sustained by German money, German intrigue, seeking German military ends in Russia's confusion, Russia's dismemberment, abasement. These political adventurers aim not at what we conceive democracy where every man entitled to life, liberty, etc., but at what they call "dictatorship of proletariat" which is in fact but inversion of old autocracy which we in common with other democratic peoples of world gloried to see overthrown.

You men want know what you are doing here. You are protecting one spot in Russia from sanguinary bedlam of Bolshevism, you are keeping safe one spot where real progressives of Russian revolution may begin to lay foundation of great free Russian state which is to come. Don't think you are forgotten. Washington knows what you are doing, what you are up against. You may be sure that President has thought of you and in good time will tell you and rest of us what he expects each to do in order hold steady light of our forward-working democracy.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/3324

The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, December 2, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received December 3, 5.11 a. m.]

625. To Paris also. News of *coup d'état* in Siberia which was received by Allied Embassies several days ago has now been officially communicated to Chaikovski by Maklakov at Paris and will probably be published to-morrow.

Chaikovski is disturbed by Siberian developments and apparent Allied support for Denikin in the south. He desired to send a protest to Omsk but failed to obtain support of the other members of the provisional government of the northern region, who are

almost all *bourgeois*. Two of them are more or less frankly pleased with the turn of events in Siberia, only one supported his proposal for a protest, the remaining either vacillated or counseled delay.

Failing support of the government, he desired to send independent protest in his capacity as a member of the Directory, but the British and the French Ambassadors have dissuaded him for the present, creating the hope that the Allied Governments may effect some adjustment at Omsk acceptable to him. They have informed him that they have recommended to their governments the discountenancing of illegal and forceful measures.

Increased activity has been perceptible for some days in local commercial and banking circles in favor of the reaction. A leading Cadet has published in a local newspaper an attack upon the Constitutional Assembly as having been elected under circumstances which gave it no real sanction, and denying the authority of highest members of the Assembly or groups thereof to set up governments such as the Omsk Directory. There seems to be also some monarchist agitation among the Russian army officers. As a precautionary measure, Chaplin, who figured in the arrest of the Governor, September 5, has been sent out of Archangel. Concurrently with the foregoing there are evidences of increased unrest and radical agitation among the laboring classes.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/3220

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Russia (Poole)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1918, 8 p. m.

386. Your 572, November 13, 3 p. m. Signing of the armistice has created no change in the situation until the question of how to further assist Russia, particularly after the withdrawal of German troops from occupied Russian territory, is determined by discussion with the Allied Governments at Paris. The President and Secretary of State have to-day sailed for France. As already made quite clear by this Government American forces were sent to Archangel only to safeguard Russian stores and supplies and to protect the port of Archangel from attacks which were being organized or directed in whole or in part by German and Austrian prisoners of war.

POLK

File No. 861.00/3399

The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, December 10, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received December 11, 8.23 a. m.]

648. Lindley has received from Balfour statement British policy in Hamilton [Russia], of which the following is the gist:

Dispatch of British troops to Russia warrant [was] for the purpose of withholding German forces from the western front, and not to overthrow any existing régime or to reestablish order. His Majesty's Government do not intend to interfere in Russian domestic affairs, but owe certain obligations to the Czechs who are our allies and certain governments which have grown from [up] under our protection on the White Sea, in Siberia, the Caucasus and Transcaspian. The extent of the protection to be given and what may develop thereafter can not now be foreseen. As, after four years of war, His Majesty's Government have not forces available to be dispersed over the large area of Russia, this will depend largely upon the decisions of Associated Governments having more considerable resources at their disposal. British activities will be limited for the present to the use of the troops now in Russia and to furnishing munitions to certain elements known to be friendly to the Allied cause.

Military attaché learns that 3,400 additional British troops recently arrived at Murmansk.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/3404

The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, December 11, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received December 12, 11.50 a. m.]

654. One company of the local Russian regiment having been ordered to the front this morning, meetings were begun which resulted in the entire regiment's declining to leave its barracks. On the second order being sent to them by General Ironside himself, five hundred, mostly old soldiers, prisoners of war, returned from Germany, presented themselves in proper formation, the remainder were then driven from the buildings by a few shots from a trench mortar and placed under guard. On being ordered to indicate the ringleaders, they pointed out some thirty men who were forthwith

shot. The company designated for service at the front was then sent forward without arms. No reaction on the general public is perceptible so far.

The incident emphasizes anew the incapacity of Russian officers of the old régime to adjust themselves to new conditions and the unwisdom of persisting in conscription. I understand that conscription was insisted upon by the local Russian government, including Chaikovski, despite the opinion of Mr. Francis and the other Ambassadors that the volunteer system is alone practicable at present.

General Marushevski, who has commanded the Russian forces since November 18, as reported my No. 582, is an excellent man, but inevitably embarrassed by the constant necessity of accommodating the revolutionary [sentiments?] of the men on the one side to the stupid reactionary ideas of many of the officers on the other. Miller, who will supersede Marushevski, the latter remaining as second in command, is reported leaving London to-day *en route* from Rome.

Foregoing also sent to Paris.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/3434

The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, December 12, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received December 13, 3.04 p. m.]

658. To Paris also. Tendencies noted in the last paragraph of my 625, December 2, 8 p. m., especially unrest among left elements, becoming somewhat more marked as news Siberian events spreading. Allied embassies have had following published to-day:

In view of current rumors, the Allied military command, after consulting with the Allied embassies, considers it desirable to inform the people of the Archangel government that while adhering carefully to the principle of noninterference in Russian internal politics it cannot permit public order to be disturbed in the areas protected by Allied troops. Political activity in this region must be carried on within the legal limits. Any attempts at a *coup d'état* or other violent or illegal political change, whether coming from the parties of the right or the left, is forbidden and will be rigorously put down.

This action was taken on my proposal. It seemed important first to put a definite stop by this means to the silly counter-revolutionary plotting of certain Russian officers, who thought they had the secret sympathy of the Allies, in which they may not have been without

encouragement from certain French officers, although Noulens has energetically opposed all such movements; second and most important, to reassure the mass of the people whose uneasiness seems to have been largely due to a fear that the Allies might countenance or support a reactionary *coup*.

There is still no perceptible popular reflex from the events reported in my telegram 654 of yesterday. This disturbance was somewhat apart from the developments mentioned above, having its origin in the conditions described in the second and third paragraphs of my 654, and its most immediate cause in the unwise insistence of the Russian officers upon resuming epaulets which are to the soldiers the outward symbol of reaction.

Bolshevik propaganda has been especially active recently; it has also aimed to influence the American troops and to create ill feeling among them against the British in which it has unfortunately not been without success. The situation is reported to have been acute in M Company, since one of its popular men was killed at the front by a Canadian aviator under circumstances which are now being investigated. By the arrest of four Bolshevik agitators yesterday, Colonel Ruggles's office broke up a Bolshevik plot directed to produce an uprising among the American troops early next month. The plot had apparently made no progress.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/3460

The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, December 17, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received December 18, 1.52 p. m.]

664. Local situation generally quiet and satisfactory. Announcement by the Allied command and embassies reported my No. 658, December 12, 7 p. m., seems to have had good effect, reassuring elements of the left.

Vigor with which mutiny, reported in Embassy's telegram 654, December 11, 8 p. m., was handled, and the fact that executions were carried out entirely by Russians, has produced favorable effect; only thirteen were executed instead of thirty as originally reported. Bulk of soldiers have expressed themselves satisfied to be free of agitators; company designated for service at the front has again received its arms and went forward with apparently good morale; I have had no reports as yet concerning its further behavior.

Foregoing to Paris also.

POOLE